{"id":"court_ctb_2133_2","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":2133,"sub_number":2,"doc_type":"EXHIBIT","filed_date":"2023-08-25","title":"EXHIBIT B | Case 22-50073<br>Case 1:23-cv-00343-LJL<br>Doc 2133-2<br>Filed 08/25/23<br>Document 72<br>Entered 08/25/23 1","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"## **EXHIBIT B**\n\n|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------|\n| 40<br>UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                                                                                                                                            |                            |                   |\n| SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK                                                                                                                                                 |                            | 08/22/2023        |\n| ---------------------------------------------------------------------                                                                                                         | X                          |                   |\n| JUNWU GONG,                                                                                                                                                                   | :<br>:<br>:                |                   |\n| Plaintiff,                                                                                                                                                                    | :                          |                   |\n| -v                                                                                                                                                                            | :<br>:                     |                   |\n|                                                                                                                                                                               | :                          | 23-cv-343 (LJL)   |\n| STUART M. SARNOFF, O'MELVENY & MYERS<br>LLP, CARL M. STANTON, CITY OF NEW YORK,<br>OFFICER JOHN DOE 1, OFFICER JOHN DOE 2,<br>OFFICER JOHN DOE 3, OFFICER LAUREN A.<br>DUFFY, | :<br>:<br>:<br>:<br>:<br>: | OPINION AND ORDER |\n| Defendants.                                                                                                                                                                   | :                          |                   |\n| ---------------------------------------------------------------------                                                                                                         | :<br>X                     |                   |\n\nLEWIS J. LIMAN, United States District Judge:\n\nDefendants Stuart M. Sarnoff (\"Sarnoff\") and O'Melveny & Myers LLP (\"O'Melveny\" and, together with Sarnoff, the \"Moving Defendants\") move, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, for an order granting them sanctions against Plaintiff's counsel, Yongbing Zhang and Richard Freeth, and enjoining Plaintiff Junwu Gong (\"Gong\" or \"Plaintiff\") and his counsel and those in active concert with them from filing other similar suits without leave of court. Dkt. No. 36. The motion is granted in part and denied in part.\n\n## **BACKGROUND**\n\nThe Court assumes familiarity with the prior proceedings in this matter. The following facts are taken from the parties' submissions in connection with the motion for sanctions and the Court resolves factual disputes as necessary for the disposition of the motion. *See Chemiakin v. Yefimov*, 932 F.2d 124, 130 (2d Cir. 1991) (suggesting that on Rule 11 motions courts should act as fact finders and an evidentiary hearing is required when there are disputed facts).\n\n#### **I. The Allegations of the Complaint**\n\nPlaintiff initiated this action by complaint filed on January 18, 2023 (the \"Complaint\").1 Dkt. No. 2. Plaintiff is a foreign-born, ethnic Chinese U.S. Permanent Resident who has, on numerous occasions, joined with other ethnic Chinese individuals to protest against the Chinese Communist Party (\"CCP\"). *Id*. ¶¶ 15, 36–37. He alleges that he has been subjected to an ongoing campaign of harassment by agents of the CCP. *Id.* ¶ 70. O'Melveny is a Delawareregistered limited liability partnership, which conducts business as a law firm and regularly transacts business in the State of New York. *Id*. ¶ 50. Defendant Sarnoff is a lawyer at O'Melveny, *id*. ¶ 45, and is a resident of the State of New York, *id*. ¶ 49.\n\nThe Complaint alleged that Moving Defendants violated the Foreign Agents Registration Act, 22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(1) (\"FARA\"), by acting as unregistered agents or representatives of the People's Republic of China (\"PRC\"). *Id.* ¶¶ 173–79. It also alleges that Moving Defendants violated and conspired to violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, enforceable through 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3). *Id.* ¶¶ 126–55.\n\nThe Complaint's allegations grow out of a series of events from November 22, 2022 to December 20, 2022. On November 22, 2022, Plaintiff participated in what he claims were peaceful protests at the offices of O'Melveny in New York, because of what he alleges to be O'Melveny's relationship with the CCP. O'Melveny is alleged to have at least three offices in the PRC and to conduct work in the PRC that is \"extremely lucrative.\" *Id.* ¶¶ 42–43. In 2013, it represented a China-based genomic research and sequencing company, BGI, in the first ever\n\n<sup>1</sup> The complaint was initially filed on January 13, 2023 but was rejected for a filing error. *See*  Dkt. No. 1.\n\nacquisition of a United States publicly traded company by a Chinese acquiror. *Id.* ¶¶ 25–26.2 Beginning on December 2, 2022, Plaintiff participated in regular protests at a location believed to be near Sarnoff's home in New York City. *Id.* ¶ 68. Sarnoff is an O'Melveny lawyer, who is allegedly \"conspicuous[ly]\" involved in the firm's China practice. *Id.* ¶ 45. On the morning of December 20, 2022, Plaintiff again joined protests at a location believed to be near Sarnoff's home. *Id.* ¶ 71.\n\nPlaintiff alleged that he and other protesters were harassed at these protests by another Defendant, Carl M. Stanton (\"Stanton\"); the only identifying information provided about him in the Complaint is that he is alleged to be a resident of New York City and New York State. *Id.* ¶ 51. The Complaint focused on events that occurred on December 20, 2022, during which Plaintiff was hit by an automobile driven by Stanton. *Id.* ¶ 96. Officers of the New York Police Department (\"NYPD\") (one of whom is personally named in the Complaint) failed to file a police report after Plaintiff summoned them to the scene. *See id.* ¶¶ 101–08. Later, after Plaintiff had begun feeling ill and \"went into shock\" at a nearby restaurant, the protesters called an ambulance to assist Plaintiff but NYPD officers obstructed Plaintiff's efforts to get medical attention. *Id.* ¶¶ 112–19.\n\n<sup>2</sup> In 2020, two BGI entities were allegedly added to the Entity List of the United States Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security for \"conducting genetic analyses used to further the repression of Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,\" *id.* ¶ 27; in January 2021, Reuters allegedly reported that BGI has worked with the PRC's military on efforts to enhance soldiers' strength and other projects, *id.* ¶ 28; in July 2021, Reuters allegedly reported that BGI developed a prenatal test with the assistance of the People's Liberation Army which is also used for genetic data collection, including to \"single out Tibetan and Uyghur minorities to find links between their genes and their characteristics,\" *id.* ¶ 29; and, in October 2022, the United States Department of Defense allegedly added a BGI subsidiary to its list of Chinese military companies operating in the United States, *id.* ¶ 30.\n\nThe Complaint contained few, if any, allegations regarding the conduct of Moving Defendants and no allegations that tied Moving Defendants to any state action. It alleged that the December 20 protest occurred at a location believed to be near Sarnoff's residence. *Id.* ¶¶ 71–72. However, it does not allege that Sarnoff did anything during the protest or that he was even present in his residence at the time.3 The Complaint also alleged that, during a prior protest outside O'Melveny's offices in New York City, Stanton was observed \"on several instances\" taking pictures from inside the property where the protesters and members of the public were not permitted and using a swipe card to enter through the security entrance. *Id.* ¶¶ 76–77. Plaintiff alleged, upon information and belief, that Stanton is not an officer of the NYPD, *id.* ¶ 82, although the Complaint alleged that Stanton represented that he was \"with\" the police or had some kind of connection with the NYPD, *id.* ¶¶ 80–81. Further, there are no allegations that O'Melveny, much less Sarnoff, have any relationship with Stanton, and there are no allegations that O'Melveny or Sarnoff had any involvement with the conduct of Stanton, the NYPD, or any state actor on December 20. It was Plaintiff, not O'Melveny, Sarnoff, or Stanton, according to the Complaint, who called the NYPD after he was hit by Stanton's car and the protesters who called the ambulance. *Id.* ¶¶ 85, 88, 114.\n\nThe Complaint did allege that Moving Defendants had a connection to the CCP. Plaintiff asserted that \"O'Melveny is beholden to the CCP, and as such performs whatever acts are requested by the CCP—including acts within the United States that would require registration as foreign agents with the US Government,\" *id.* ¶ 47, and that the CCP's unregistered agents in the United States \"are now believed to be Defendant Sarnoff, Defendant O'Melveny and Defendant\n\n<sup>3</sup> The Complaint does not even allege that, as a matter of fact, the protest occurred near Sarnoff's residence.\n\nStanton,\" *id.* ¶ 64. The only factual allegations made to support these claims were that O'Melveny and Sarnoff performed legal work on behalf of a Chinese company, *id.* ¶¶ 25–26, and that O'Melveny has offices in the PRC from which it conducts \"lucrative\" business with a \"potentially significant impact on the country,\" *id.* ¶¶ 42–43. There are no factual allegations to support that Stanton has any connection to the PRC or CCP.\n\n### **II. Procedural History Relevant to the Rule 11 Motion**\n\nOn March 23, 2023, Moving Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Dkt. No. 19. In their memorandum of law in support of the motion, Moving Defendants argued that Plaintiff failed to allege any conduct by either of them directed toward Plaintiff, Dkt. No. 20 at 1–2, and that the FARA claim was \"just as meritless\" because \"[c]ourt after court has held that there is no private right of action under FARA,\" Plaintiff had not alleged any injury traceable to Moving Defendant's conduct, and Plaintiff did not allege facts that would require FARA registration, *id.* at 2–3.\n\nOn March 28, 2023, Moving Defendants filed their motion for sanctions, along with a supporting memorandum of law and a declaration. Dkt. Nos. 26–28. Moving Defendants, however, withdrew the motion on March 29, 2023, because they had not complied \"with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c)(2)\" that the motion cannot be filed until after the party against whom the motion is made has been given an opportunity to withdraw the offending claim or papers. Dkt. No. 29.\n\nOn April 14, 2023, the Court held an initial pretrial conference. Dkt. No. 34. At the conference, the Court inquired whether Plaintiff's counsel had any additional factual \"allegations against either Mr. Sarnoff or O'Melveny that would suggest that they acted in collusion with the police department.\" *Id.* at 4. Counsel responded that his allegations were based on supposition:\n\n\"[T]he firm and the individual defendants were not pleased with being the target of these protests,\" and \"it would make sense that . . . the defendants in their position would send someone to . . . observe, get information.\" *Id.* at 7. Counsel admitted that he did not know or have factual allegations regarding Stanton's \"mandate.\" *Id.*. He also admitted that he did not know whether Stanton hit Plaintiff \"accidentally or on purpose.\" *Id.* at 8. As to the police, counsel claimed that the conduct of the officers was \"peculiar,\" because the officers refused to file a report. *Id.* Plaintiff's counsel nonetheless claimed that there was factual information that counsel had that was responsive to a number of issues raised in Moving Defendant's motion to dismiss. *Id.* at 13– 14. As a result, the Court stayed discovery pending a decision on the motion to dismiss and gave Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint by April 21, 2023. *Id.* at 15–16. The Court also warned Plaintiff's counsel: \"while I have not looked at the Rule 11 motion, I have looked at your complaint. And you should give it a second look because the motion does appear to be quite strong. And I will take the Rule 11 motion that is going to be filed very seriously.\" *Id.* at 16–17.\n\nOn April 26, 2023, Plaintiff filed the first amended complaint (\"Amended Complaint\").4 The Amended Complaint contains eleven new paragraphs quoting a report of the Heritage Foundation regarding the threat posed to the United States by the PRC and citing a news article regarding the arrest in New York of two alleged operatives for the PRC. Dkt. No. 43 ¶¶ 11–21. It also includes an allegation that O'Melveny has \"on several occasions yet discovered by Plaintiff,\" represented Chinese entities alleged to have tortured Chinese individuals or to have aided and abetted or ratified the same, *id.* ¶ 34, that \"O'Melveny and Sarnoff have, with other counsel, been part of the CCP team charged with destroying the life of Ho Wan Kwok (aka Miles\n\n<sup>4</sup> Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint on April 21, 2023, but it was rejected for a filing error. *See* Dkt. No. 41; Clerk's Entry (Apr. 24, 2023). The parties agreed to an extension of time to May 1, 2023 for Plaintiff to file an amended complaint, which the Court granted. Dkt. No. 44.\n\nGuo) and use whatever means necessary to have him returned to China for either additional jail and torture or execution,\" *id.* ¶ 55(f), and that the law firm represented a company named BYD America Corporation in *Jun Zhao v. BYD America Corp.*, in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, *id*. ¶ 35.<sup>5</sup> In all other respects the Amended Complaint is identical to the Complaint. It does not add any factual allegations with respect to the events of December 2020. It levels the same allegations that Moving Defendants participated in civil rights violations and a violation of FARA, *see id.* ¶¶ 140–80, 187–93, without any additional factual allegations supporting either set of claims.\n\nOn July 17, 2023, the Court issued an Opinion and Order granting Moving Defendants' motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint against them with prejudice. Dkt. No. 57. The Court concluded that Plaintiff failed to allege facts to support any of the theories under which Moving Defendants could be held liable under Section 1983 for any of the injuries he alleged he suffered. *Id.* at 13. The Court also concluded that Plaintiff had failed to plead any facts to support a conspiracy claim under Section 1985(3), including a failure to plead an agreement. *Id.* at 20–21. Finally, the Court concluded that Plaintiff did not plead facts to establish standing for his FARA claim. *Id.* at 21. The Court, however, retained jurisdiction to address Defendants' motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. *Id.* at 24.\n\nOn April 20, 2023, before the Amended Complaint was dismissed, Moving Defendants refiled the Rule 11 motion for sanctions, memorandum of law, and declaration, along with a declaration attesting to their compliance with Rule 11(c)(2). Dkt. No. 36–39. Plaintiff filed his\n\n<sup>5</sup> The Amended Complaint also refers to O'Melveny's work on two Hong Kong initial public offerings and a takeover of a biotech company, *id.* ¶ 56, and it attaches a blog post allegedly written by a former O'Melveny attorney accusing the firm of \"monetizing\" the relationships its partners have with the United States government, Dkt. No. 43-7.\n\nmemorandum in opposition to the motion on May 4, 2023, Dkt. No. 45. On May 17, 2023, Moving Defendants filed their reply memorandum of law.6 Dkt. No. 51. On July 27, 2023, the Court issued an order scheduling oral argument on the motion for sanctions and indicated that any party that desired to present evidence at the hearing should submit a letter to the Court on or before August 7, 2023, indicating what evidence, if any, it wished to present and that, in the absence of any additional evidence, the Court would decide the motion based on the evidence submitted in connection with the Rule 11 moving and opposition papers. Dkt. No. 63. Moving Defendants submitted a letter on August 7, 2023, indicating that they would not submit additional evidence.7 Dkt. No. 66. That same day, Plaintiff filed a letter indicating that he would submit evidence at oral argument and that he would testify. Dkt. No. 67. The Court held oral argument and the evidentiary hearing on August 16, 2023. *See* Minute Entry (Aug. 16, 2023). Plaintiff failed to appear at the Evidentiary Hearing. Plaintiff's counsel, Richard Freeth, offered a copy of his 2021 tax return, which was received without objection.\n\n<sup>6</sup> Moving Defendants filed their motion for sanctions on April 20, 2023, Dkt. No. 36, after the Court granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint, *see* Dkt. No. 34 at 16, but before Plaintiff actually filed his Amended Complaint, *see* Dkt. No. 43. On July 7, 2023, the Court directed the parties to file letter briefs addressed to the question whether Moving Defendants' Rule 11 motion is properly before this Court or whether the Rule 11 motion had to be re-served on Plaintiff's counsel upon the filing of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. Dkt. No. 54. Each party filed a letter brief addressed to that issue on July 13, 2023. *See* Dkt. Nos. 55–56. 7 Though the Court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing if there are no disputes of material fact, *see Chemiakin*, 932 F.2d at 130 (\"Although appellants attempt to engraft onto Rule 11 a requirement that an evidentiary hearing be held prior to the imposition of sanctions, there is no such requirement, absent disputed facts or issues of credibility.\"); *see also* Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory Committee's Note to 1993 Amendment (\"The court must to the extent possible limit the scope of sanction proceedings to the record.\"), the Court provided both parties with an opportunity to present additional evidence given the nature of the hearing and its reliance on facts outside the record.\n\n## **III. Rule 11 Evidence**\n\nMoving Defendants argue that this lawsuit \"is merely one in a series of abusive, harassing tactics undertaken at the behest of Miles Kwok (also known as Wengui Guo and Ho Wan Kwok)\" against O'Melveny and Sarnoff arising from the assistance Moving Defendants provided their client, investment fund Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. (\"PAX\"), in a lawsuit against Kwok in New York State court. PAX obtained a \\$116.4 million judgment against Kwok and the state court-imposed contempt sanctions of \\$134 million against Kwok. Dkt. Nos. 38-9, 38-10.\n\nOn April 18, 2017, PAX sued Kwok in New York State court for breaching a \\$30 million loan agreement. Dkt. No. 38-11 (\"State Court Complaint\").8 PAX was represented by O'Melveny and Sarnoff. The State Court Complaint alleged that Kwok owed approximately \\$88 million including contractual interest. *Id.* at ECF p. 4. After nearly four years of litigation, Justice Barry Ostrager of the New York Supreme Court issued a judgment in favor of PAX and against Kwok in the amount of \\$116,402,019.57, on February 3, 2021. Dkt. No. 38-9. One year later, on February 9, 2022, Justice Ostrager, in a decision and order, imposed contempt sanctions on Kwok, ordering Kwok to pay \\$134 million—\\$500,000 per day for 268 days in contempt fines—to be paid in five business days or the court would \"exercise its full authority under New York Judiciary Law § 753.\" Dkt. No. 38-10.<sup>9</sup> Justice Ostrager's opinion was scathing. He found that, in order to avoid PAX's judgment, Kwok had \"park[ed] his substantial personal assets with a series of corporations, trusted confidants, and family members\" and \"secreted his\n\n<sup>8</sup> The Court can take \"judicial notice of a document filed in another court 'not for the truth of the matters asserted in the other litigation, but rather to establish the fact of such litigation and related filings.'\" *Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rotches Pork Packers, Inc.*, 969 F.2d 1384, 1388 (2d Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).\n\n<sup>9</sup> New York Judiciary Law gives the state court the power \"to punish, by fine or imprisonment, or either\" a contempt of court. N.Y. Jud. Law § 753.\n\nassets in a maze of corporate entities and with family members.\" *Id.* at 1. After addressing Kwok's violation of court orders with respect to his yacht, the Lady May, Justice Ostrager concluded: \"The machinations associated with the shell game Kwok has orchestrated with respect to the Lady May are of a piece with every other evasive and contemptuous act Kwok has taken during the five years this litigation has been pending, which is why there are 1,180 docket entries in this case.\" *Id.* at 8.\n\nOn February 15, 2022, on the eve of the contempt order's five-day deadline, Kwok filed for personal bankruptcy in the District of Connecticut under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Dkt. No. 38-15; *see also* Dkt. No. 45 at 9. In that proceeding, Kwok listed O'Melveny's client, PAX, as his largest creditor, to whom he owed approximately \\$254 million. Dkt. No. 38-15 at ECF p. 10; Dkt. No. 38-16. On or about July 7, 2022, upon application of the United States Trustee, Dkt. No. 38-17, and over Kwok's objection, the United States Bankruptcy Court in Connecticut (the \"Bankruptcy Court\") appointed a trustee, Luc Despins from Paul Hastings LLC, to administer Kwok's estate, *see* Dkt. No. 38-18; *see also* Dkt. No. 45 ¶ 38.10 On August 10, 2022, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order, upon the application of Despins, confirming that Despins held all economic and governance rights, for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate, with respect to all entities owned or controlled by Kwok. Dkt. No. 38-19. On August 16, 2022, the Court granted the Trustee's Rule 2004 motion to serve subpoenas on various legal and financial advisors to Kwok. Dkt. No. 38-20. That same day, the Court granted the Trustee's Rule 2004\n\n<sup>10</sup> On June 30, 2022, the United States Trustee Program (\"USTP\") applied to appoint Joe Whitley as the Chapter 11 Trustee, Dkt. No. 45 at 9, and then withdrew the application for the appointment of Whitley, Dkt. No. 45-15. Plaintiff asserts that the bankruptcy court \"repeatedly stat[es] its concerns about the violation of the removal process outlined in the Bankruptcy Code\" citing the notice of appointment, Dkt. No. 45-14, and withdrawal of the appointment application, Dkt. No. 45-15, for support, but neither exhibit contains the \"concerns\" referenced by Plaintiff.\n\nmotion to serve subpoenas on various entities and individuals affiliated with Kwok. Dkt. No. 38- 21.\n\nOn November 22, 2022, PAX (represented by Moving Defendants) filed an application for a temporary restraining order (\"TRO\") and preliminary injunction in the Bankruptcy Court, seeking to restrain and enjoin Kwok and all persons in active concert or participation with him from (1) posting false and harassing online materials about Despins, PAX's or PAG's officers or employees, counsel to the Trustee or PAX, and of any respective relatives; (2) publishing online the home addresses and other personal information of those individuals; and (3) encouraging, inciting, suggesting, or directly or indirectly funding protests at the home or office of any of those individuals (including former spouses). Dkt. No. 38-30 at 1–2. The Bankruptcy Court held an expedited hearing the next day and, on that same day, entered the TRO granting PAX the full relief requested. *See id.* at 6.11 The TRO extended to all \"other persons who are in active concert or participation with [Kwok] . . . upon receipt of actual notice by personal service or otherwise.\" *Id.* at 7.\n\nBeginning on December 5, 2022, the Bankruptcy Court held a four-day evidentiary hearing on PAX's motion for a preliminary injunction. *See* Dkt. No. 38-37 (transcript of the hearing for the motion for preliminary injunction). On January 13, 2023, the Bankruptcy Court\n\n<sup>11</sup> Moving Defendants repeatedly point to the Bankruptcy Court's findings of fact of its preliminary injunction decision throughout their briefing for the factual propositions contained therein. *See, e.g.*, Dkt. No. 37 at 2, 6, 7, 8. However, the Court is not able to take judicial notice of these findings, other than for the fact that they exist. *See Int'l Star Class Yacht Racing Ass'n v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc.*, 146 F.3d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that the district court erred when it took judicial notice of orders of a bankruptcy court \"to establish facts asserted therein\" because \"[f]acts adjudicated in a prior case do not meet either test of indisputability contained in Rule 201(b): they are not usually common knowledge, nor are they derived from an unimpeachable source\"). The Court thus limits itself to the direct evidence that Moving Defendants submitted with their motion papers.\n\nissued a preliminary injunction, among other things, \"enjoining [Kwok] from protesting, picketing, parading, or displaying or distributing harassing material, at any time, within two hundred feet (200 ft.) of the homes [or residences, or the offices or workplaces, or entrance thereof] of relatives (including former spouses) of . . . counsel to . . . PAX\" during certain time periods. Dkt. No. 38-3 at 3–4. The Bankruptcy Court noted that \"harassing materials\" include those that describe O'Melveny lawyers as \"Communists, agents of the Chinese Communist Party, extortionists, anti-Semites, racists, supporters of genocide, or otherwise make[] similarly disparaging allegations regarding such parties' actions or beliefs.\" *Id*. at 5. The preliminary injunction also extends to those in active concert with Kwok upon actual notice of the order. *Id.* at 7.\n\nMoving Defendants present additional evidence of the harassment against them and the connection between this harassment and New Federal State of China (the \"NFSC\"), and by association, Kwok—and they present evidence that this activity did not dissipate upon the Bankruptcy Court's issuance of the TRO or the preliminary injunction. The NFSC is closely associated with Kwok, who founded the organization. *See* Dkt. No. 38-5; Dkt. No. 38-22 at ECF p. 5. NFSC, according to a report published on GNews and seemingly authored by the news arm of NFSC, NFSC News, engaged in protests against Paul Hastings, O'Melveny, and lawyers for both firms for 80 days as of February 7, 2023.12 Dkt. No. 38-38 at ECF p. 4. The article reported that the \"NFSC . . . protests will continue for another 100 days after completing 90\n\n<sup>12</sup> Plaintiff admits in his Complaint that he attended these protests and suggests that he did so in connection with involvement in NFSC. As Plaintiff pleads, on November 22, 2022, \"the Plaintiff joined in peaceful protests at the office of Defendant O'Melveny,\" Dkt. No. 2 ¶ 67, and \"commencing on December 2, 2022, the Plaintiff with a number of other people, joined in regular peaceful protests at a location believed to be in proximity to the home of Defendant Sarnoff,\" *id.* ¶ 68.\n\ndays.\" *Id.* at ECF p. 5. According to Moving Defendants, \"[t]he protests . . . continued in violation of the preliminary injunction, culminating in a February 12, 2023, incident in which Kwok's followers assaulted one of Mr. Sarnoff's neighbors.\" Dkt. No. 37 at 10. Moving Defendants attached a security incident report signed by a reporting officer that reported on the alleged assault. *See* Dkt. No. 38-39.\n\nMoving Defendants also submit videos of protests in front of Sarnoff's home. *See, e.g.*, Dkt. No. 38-32. Another video shows protesters with images of O'Melveny lawyers, including Sarnoff, juxtaposed next to slogans including \"Supporters of Genocide\" and \"CCP's favorite lawyers.\" *See* Dkt. No. 33 at 5:20–5:50. And a video posted by GNews shows protesters outside of Sarnoff's home showing placards with a picture of Sarnoff juxtaposed next to hammers and sickles and the phrase \"Chinese Communist Party's Running Dog.\" *See* Dkt. No. 38-34. This language is identical to language used on the NFSC account on Gettr, a social media website, which, on December 4, 2022, posted that Sarnoff was \"a running dog paid for and owned by CCP to persecute Chinese dissidents.\" Dkt. No. 38-29. Finally, on November 29, 2022, NFSC supporters sent emails to 100 O'Melveny employees, calling out Sarnoff by name and \"express[ing] deep disturbance at O'Melveny partners . . . [for] attempts to persecute some of the world's loudest whistleblowers attempting to take down the Chinese Communist Party.\" Dkt. No. 38-35.\n\nMoving Defendants also present evidence of a relationship between Gong's counsel and Kwok. Yongbing Zhang, who signed the Complaint but not the Amended Complaint, *compare*  Dkt. No. 2 at ECF p. 25, *with* Dkt. No. 43 at ECF p. 29, appears in numerous photos of NFSCled protests circulating on social media, including a post on NFSC's Gettr account from November 20, 2022 showing Zhang picketing at the house of Despins' ex-wife in Westchester\n\nCounty, New York, and holding a sign calling the trustee an \"A-List Scumbag.\" Dkt. No. 38-24 ¶ 32. Zhang also appeared in photos with Kwok from June 4, 2022 at the NFSC Second Anniversary party. Dkt. No. 38-25.\n\nFinally, within days of the TRO, the lawyers who filed this lawsuit on behalf of Plaintiff filed three other near-identical lawsuits, targeting those who either were affiliated with PAX or represented PAX or who assisted the Bankruptcy Court. *See* Dkt. Nos. 38-40–38-42. On November 28, 2022, Zhang and Richard Freeth filed a lawsuit in this District against Paul Hastings and Chapter 11 Trustee Despins on behalf of a purported Chinese-born U.S. resident. *See* Dkt. No. 38-40 ¶ 2 (Complaint in *An et al. v. Despins et al.*, No. 22-cv-10062 (VEC) (S.D.N.Y.)). That complaint alleges that Paul Hastings and Despins \"operated covertly as unregistered agents of\" either or both of the PRC or the CCP, *id.*, and makes nearly identical allegations of a FARA violation to those made here, *see, e.g.*, *id.* ¶ 39. On November 28, 2022, Zhang and Freeth filed a lawsuit on behalf of the same plaintiffs against Weijan Shan, the chairman of PAX's managing member, Pacific Alliance Group, and Shan's son, Bo Leilei Shan. *See* Dkt. No. 38-41 (Complaint in *An et al. v. Shan et al.*, No. 22-cv-10060 (ALC) (S.D.N.Y)). The plaintiffs there allege that Weijan Shan and Bo Leilei Shan also acted \"as unregistered agents of either or both\" of the PRC or the CCP. *Id.* ¶ 29. The principal allegation against Weijan Shan was that he was photographed with United States Senator Diane Feinstein, who it is alleged \"has supported communist causes and more recently was revealed to have a CCP spy serving as her Senate office manager\" and received \"significant revenue from companies in China.\" *Id.* ¶ 72.13 The allegation against the son related to FARA follows principally from the\n\n<sup>13</sup> The allegations about Senator Feinstein are sourced from a website called \"Discover the Networks.\" Dkt. No. 41 ¶ 72.\n\nfact that he is Shan's son. *Id.* ¶ 79. Finally, on March 17, 2023, Zhang and Freeth (along with a third lawyer, Brian R. Della Rocca), filed a lawsuit in the District of Maryland against Weijan Shan and several other defendants, including the University of Maryland. Dkt. No. 38-42 (Complaint in *Wyatt et al. v. Univ. of Md.*, No. 23-cv-742 (JKB) (D. Md.)). The complaint contains identical FARA allegations against Weijan Shan. *Id.* ¶¶ 118–25. It also contains civil rights claims similar to the ones here, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 pursuant to the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments, *id.* ¶¶ 83–90; *id.* ¶¶ 101–10, and violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), *id.* ¶¶ 91–100. Plaintiffs allege that they were protesting at the University of Maryland where Weijan Shan's daughter is a doctoral student to inform other students about the \"Shan family's CCP background and their influence at U.S. public schools,\" *id.* ¶ 26, when they \"started experiencing some unexpected restrictions from Defendants\" and \"were instructed to discontinue holding signs, distributing flyers and conducting livestreaming online,\" *id.* ¶ 39. They also allege that, after the Bankruptcy Court issued its order and their permit was revoked, they were threatened with arrest if they continued protests at the University Commons. *Id.* ¶¶ 47, 55.\n\nThe Honorable Judge Valerie E. Caproni dismissed the complaint in *An et al. v. Despins et al.*, No. 22-cv-10062, without prejudice and sanctioned counsel and plaintiffs in that action under Rule 11. *See id.* Dkt. No. 29; *see also An v. Despins*, 2023 WL 4931832 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2023). A motion to dismiss and motion for sanctions remains pending in *An et al. v. Shan et al.*, No. 22-cv-10060 (ALC) (S.D.N.Y). *See id.* Dkt. Nos. 22, 31. Finally, in *Wyatt et al. v. University of Maryland*, No. 23-cv-742 (JKB) (D. Md.), the Honorable Chief Judge James K. Bredar dismissed Counts I, II, III, and V against defendants the University of Maryland, Darryll Pines, Joel Dewyer, and Bruce Perry with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction, *id.* Dkt. No. 29, and\n\ndismissed the case against the remaining defendants without prejudice for failure to serve under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), *id.* Dkt. No. 34.\n\n#### **LEGAL STANDARD**\n\nRule 11 requires an attorney to certify that (1) a pleading or motion \"is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;\" (2) \"the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law;\" and (3) \"the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). \"The text of Rule 11 makes only 'attorney[s]' and 'unrepresented part[ies]' subject to Rule 11(b)'s strictures, which means that only those individuals can violate it.\" *Int'l Techs. Mktg., Inc. v. Cognyte Techs. Israel Ltd.*, 2022 WL 11280876, at \\*11 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2022). However, Rule 11(c)(5) presents the only limitation on a court's ability to impose sanctions on represented parties: A court is prohibited from imposing monetary sanctions on a represented party for making frivolous legal arguments in violation of Rule 11(b)(2). Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(5); *see also* Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1) (\"[T]he court may impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule or is responsible for the violation.\"). \"[T]here is no question that once a court finds that Rule 11(b) has been violated by an attorney or unrepresented party, sanctions may be awarded against any 'attorney, law firm, *or party* that violated the rule or is responsible for the violation.'\" *Int'l Techs. Mktg., Inc.*, 2022 WL 11280876, at \\*12 (emphasis in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(5)).\n\nRule 11(c), in turn, permits a court to impose \"appropriate sanctions\" for violations of Rule 11(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1). Sanctions imposed under Rule 11(c)\n\nmust be limited to what suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. The sanction may include nonmonetary directives; an order to pay a penalty into court; or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of part or all of the reasonable attorney's fees and other expenses directly resulting from the violation.\n\nFed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4). \"When a court determines that Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate, it 'has significant discretion in determining what sanctions, if any, should be imposed for a violation.'\" *E. Gluck Corp. v. Rothenhaus*, 2008 WL 2944624, at \\*3 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2008) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)–(c), Advisory Committee Notes to 1993 Amendment).\n\n\"[T]he standard for triggering [sanctions] under Rule 11 is objective unreasonableness,\" *Margo v. Weiss*, 213 F.3d 55, 65 (2d Cir. 2000), and is \"not based on the subjective beliefs of the person making the statement,\" *Star Mark Mgmt., Inc. v. Koon Chun Hing Kee Soy & Sauce Factory, Ltd*., 682 F.3d 170, 177 (2d Cir. 2012); *see also In re Austl. & N.Z. Banking Grp. Ltd. Sec. Litig.*, 712 F. Supp. 2d 255, 265–66 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). Thus, an attorney files a pleading or motion in violation of Rule 11 if it is \"frivolous, legally unreasonable, or factually without foundation, even though not signed in subjective bad faith.\" *Wechsler v. Hunt Health Sys., Ltd*., 216 F. Supp. 2d 347, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); *see also Simon DeBartolo Grp., L.P. v. Richard E. Jacobs Grp., Inc*., 186 F.3d 157, 167 (2d Cir. 1999).\n\n#### **DISCUSSION**\n\n# **I. Defendants Have Satisfied the Safe-Harbor Provision**\n\nThe threshold question presented by Moving Defendants' motion is whether they have satisfied the 21-day safe-harbor period of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. Rule 11 provides that a motion for sanctions \"must not be filed or be presented to the court if the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, or denial is withdrawn or appropriately corrected within 21 days after service.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). Therefore, if, during this twenty-one day \"safe-harbor\"\n\nperiod, the adversary \"withdraw[s] or appropriately correct[s]\" the alleged violation, the adversary is insulated from Rule 11 liability for the offending filing. *Id*. If a Rule 11 motion is directed to a new filing, the moving party must re-notice the violation and give the alleged transgressor an additional twenty-one days to withdraw or correct. *See Lawrence v. Richman Grp. of CT LLC*, 620 F.3d 153, 158 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (\"[W]e conclude that where, as here, a defective complaint is dismissed and a party is granted leave to replead, the filing of an amended pleading resets the clock for compliance with the safe harbor requirements of Rule 11(c)(2) before a party aggrieved by the new filing can present a sanctions motion based on that pleading to the district court.\").\n\nMoving Defendants have satisfied the 21-day safe-harbor provision and need not have renoticed their motion after Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint. Moving Defendants served their motion and supporting papers on Plaintiff on March 29, 2023. Dkt. No. 39 ¶ 2. That motion identified \"the source of authority for the sanctions being considered; and . . . the specific conduct or omission for which the sanctions are being considered so that the subject of the sanctions motion can prepare a defense,\" as required by the principles of due process. *See Star Mark Mgmt., Inc.*, 682 F.3d at 175. The papers challenged the Complaint as violating Rule 11 and specifically identified that the action was initiated to harass Moving Defendants and that neither the FARA claim nor the civil rights claims were supported by fact or by law or a wellfounded argument for the extension of existing law. *See generally* Dkt. No. 37. Specifically, Moving Defendants charged that the civil rights and FARA allegations against them \"consist[ed] entirely of unadorned conclusions without any supporting factual matter,\" *id.* at 12, that FARA \"provides no private right of action, and there is no avenue for inferring one\" or basis upon which Plaintiff would have standing, *id.* at 2, and that the FARA allegations were factually\n\n\"incoherent,\" *id.* at 21. On April 20, 2023, twenty-one days after Plaintiff was served with the Rule 11 papers, Moving Defendants filed the sanctions motion. *See* Dkt. No. 39.\n\nThe motion was not mooted by Plaintiff's filing of the Amended Complaint. Plaintiff received leave to file the Amended Complaint on April 14, 2023, *see* Dkt. No. 34 at 16, and filed the Amended Complaint on April 26, 2023, *see* Dkt. No. 43. Although the Amended Complaint added new and unrelated allegations to the original Complaint that is the subject of this motion, it did not \"withdraw\" the challenged pleading or otherwise \"appropriately correc[t]\" it. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). The purpose of the safe-harbor requirement is to provide \"an opportunity to correct or withdraw the defective filing\" and to \"reduce, if not eliminate, the unnecessary expenditure of judicial time and adversary resource.\" *Lawrence*, 620 F.3d at 158. A pleading, including a complaint, is \"withdrawn\" either when it is dismissed, *see Hockley by Hockley v. Shan Enters. Ltd. P'ship*, 19 F. Supp. 2d 235, 241 (D.N.J. 1998) (\"Since [third-party plaintiff] withdrew its position [in its third party complaint] when it voluntarily dismissed its claims, it is not subject to Rule 11 sanctions.\"); *Brown v. Pierce Mfg., Inc.*, 169 F.R.D. 118, 119 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (holding that Rule 11 sanctions cannot be imposed when plaintiff moved to dismiss deficient complaint within twenty-one days of being served with defendant's Rule 11 motion); 5A C. Wright & A. Miller, *Federal Practice and Procedure* § 1337.2 (4th ed., Apr. 2023 Update) (\"[A] motion for sanctions will be rejected if the party subject to sanctions files for voluntary dismissal within the twenty-one day safe harbor period, because voluntary dismissal effectively constitutes a withdrawal of the offending paper for purposes of the safe harbor provision.\"), or when an amended pleading is filed that no longer asserts that claim, *see Team Obsolete Ltd. V. A.H.R.M.A. Ltd.*, 216 F.R.D. 29, 43 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that plaintiff \"effectively withdr[ew]\" sanctionable claims by dropping certain claims and certain defendants); 2 *Moore's Federal Practice* § 11.22(1)(b) (\"Filing a motion for leave to amend a pleading *to eliminate challenged claims* constitutes effective withdrawal of those claims.\" (emphasis added)).\n\nPlaintiff did not \"withdraw\" the challenged Complaint. Plaintiff continued to assert the same allegedly frivolous and harassing allegations and claims in the Amended Complaint as in the challenged Complaint. He reiterated his claims. Plaintiff also did not \"appropriately correc[t]\" the challenged Complaint. A pleading is \"appropriately corrected\" when the issues underlying a challenged claim or pleading are addressed. *See, e.g*., *Rates Tech. Inc. v. Mediatrix Telecom, Inc*., 2007 WL 1987787, at \\*4 (E.D.N.Y. June 29, 2007) (concluding that the relevant issue before the court was not whether the plaintiff sought leave to amend within the twenty-oneday safe harbor period but rather \"whether the proposed First Amended Complaint corrects the alleged deficiencies in the original Complaint\"). Moving Defendants did not seek sanctions on the basis that the Complaint lacked sufficient allegations of O'Melveny's and Sarnoff's legal work on behalf of Chinese entities or sufficient allegations of the threats that the PRC poses to United States interests, which were the topics addressed by the allegations added to the Amended Complaint. *See* Dkt. No. 43 ¶¶ 11–21, 35, 55. Moving Defendants sought sanctions because the Complaint itself was initiated to harass Moving Defendants, the FARA claim was legally and factually frivolous, and the Section 1983 and 1985(3) claims against Moving Defendants lacked any allegations that Moving Defendants were associated with the conduct of the NYPD on December 20, 2022. The Amended Complaint did not address any of those issues. Its very filing—and its failure to address the deficiencies of the Complaint—compounded the claimed injury to Moving Defendants. A party cannot escape Rule 11 sanctions by adding new\n\nallegations or claims but at the same time still \"insisting upon a position after it is no longer tenable.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)–(c), Advisory Committee Notes to the 1993 Amendment.14\n\nIt follows further that Moving Defendants were not required to re-notice the defects in Plaintiff's pleading after Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint or to give Plaintiff an additional twenty-one days to withdraw or correct its allegedly sanctionable claims. The twenty-one-day safe harbor time period has meaning. The longer a frivolous and harassing complaint remains outstanding the greater the harm. The twenty-one days corresponds with the time period under Rule 12(a)(1) to prepare and file an answer to a complaint, *see* Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1), and the time period under Rule 15(a)(1) to amend a pleading as of right, *see* Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). If, within the time period the framers of the Federal Rules believed was sufficient to file a responsive or amended pleading, the offending party fails to correct a pleading whose defects have been identified to him, the offending party is not entitled to relief from a Rule 11 sanction. The damage has been done and remains.\n\nMoving Defendants *would* have been required to re-notice Plaintiff if Moving Defendants sought sanctions based upon the Amended Complaint. A single Rule 11 motion does not function as an evergreen deposit serving as notice that whatever filings or papers follow are sanctionable without need of notice or an opportunity to be heard. The motion for sanctions is conduct specific; it \"must describe the specific conduct that allegedly violates Rule 11(b).\" Fed.\n\n<sup>14</sup> The court in *Sacerdote v. Cammack Larhette Advisors, LLC*, 2022 WL 2078012, at \\*9 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2022), stated that \"because Rule 11 is aimed at addressing particular defective or frivolous *documents*, a Rule 11 motion aimed at an initial complaint must be re-noticed upon the filing of an amended complaint.\" (emphasis in original) (citation and alteration omitted)). That language, however, is dicta in a case where the court held that the defendants never provided adequate notice as against the initial complaint and that, even if it had, its Rule 11 motion would have been meritless. *Id.* at \\*9–10. There is no reason to believe that the court would have reached the same result had proper notice been provided and the plaintiff—in the face of a Rule 11 motion—doubled down on its sanctionable conduct.\n\nR. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). But, here, Defendants do not seek sanctions based on the Amended Complaint; they seek to sanction the Complaint.15 Dkt. No. 38; Dkt. No. 56 at 3. Therefore, the filing of an amended complaint did not \"reset the clock,\" *Lawrence*, 620 F.3d at 158, and Moving Defendants' notice served on Plaintiff's two attorneys on March 29 and March 30, 2023 satisfies the dictates of Rule 11, *see* Dkt. No. 39.\n\n### **II. Plaintiff's FARA Claim Was Frivolous**\n\nThe Court has no difficulty concluding that Plaintiff's FARA claim is frivolous. \"An argument constitutes a frivolous legal position for purposes of Rule 11 sanctions if, under an 'objective standard of reasonableness' . . . it is 'clear . . . that there is no chance of success and no reasonable argument to extend, modify or reverse the law as it stands.'\" *Galonsky v. Williams*, 1997 WL 759445, at \\*3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 1997) (quoting *Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole–CNCA v. Valcorp, Inc*., 28 F.3d 259, 264 (2d Cir.1995)). Although \"Rule 11 provides room for litigants to make 'nonfrivolous argument[s] for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law,'\" *Doe v. 239 Park Ave. S. Assocs., LLC*, 2022 WL 4592713, at \\*4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2022) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2)), the Rule is violated \"where it is patently clear that a claim has absolutely no chance of success under the existing precedents, and where no reasonable argument can be advanced to extend, modify or reverse the law as it stands,\" *Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York*, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985), *superseded on other grounds by rule*. The standard is objective. It is not a defense that the offending party acted with\n\n<sup>15</sup> For this reason, *Lawrence v. Richman Group of CT LLC*, 620 F.3d 153, is distinguishable. There, the district court imposed sanctions on the plaintiff for filing a second amended complaint based on a Rule 11 motion noticed and filed with respect to the first amended complaint. *See id.*  at 157 (noting that \"the sanctioned conduct was the filing of the second amended complaint\" and that the panel was only reviewing the \"safe harbor argument as it pertains to the filing of the second amended complaint,\" not the first amended complaint, which was properly noticed). Here, Moving Defendants seek sanctions with respect to the Complaint, not the Amended Complaint, and the Rule 11 motion is properly noticed with respect to that document.\n\na pure heart but an empty head. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)–(c), Advisory Committee Notes to the 1993 Amendment. \"[T]he extent to which a litigant has researched the issues and found support for its theories even in minority opinions, in law review articles, or through consultation with other attorneys\" is taken into account in determining whether Rule 11 has been violated. *Id.*\n\nPlaintiff's FARA claim here lacked any chance of success and was objectively frivolous. Plaintiff admitted that there is no \"explicit 'private right of action' provision in the FARA statute,\" Dkt. No. 2 ¶ 178, and he relied on the notion that the court should imply that Congress intended to create such a right of action. But every court to have considered the issue, in this Circuit and elsewhere, has held that no private right of action can be implied in FARA. *See, e.g.*, *Dvoinik v. Rolff*, 2023 WL 3276398, at \\*5 (M.D. Fla. May 5, 2023) (\"Nothing in the statutory scheme suggests an intent to create a private cause of action for FARA violations.\"); *Henry v. Washington*, 2022 WL 9491957, at \\*2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 16, 2022), *report and recommendation adopted*, 2022 WL 9372175 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 14, 2022) (\"[T]here is no private cause of action provided for in the act such that Plaintiff could sue for a violation of it.\"); *Bey v. Epstein*, 2021 WL 8155603, at \\*9 (D. Conn. Aug. 6, 2021) (\"[A] private right of action cannot be inferred from FARA.\"); *Weican Meng v. Xinhuanet Co*., 2017 WL 3175609, at \\*5 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2017) (holding that FARA does not contain a private right of action); *Comm. for a Free Namibia v. S. W. Afr. People's Org.*, 554 F. Supp. 722, 725 (D.D.C. 1982).\n\nPlaintiff's assertion that the Court was free to imply that Congress intended to fashion a private right of action because \"the statute is silent on the creation of a private right of action,\" Dkt. No. 45 at 14 ¶ 66, only highlights counsel's abject failure to do any research into the basis of his claim before he filed it. The Supreme Court has been clear since at least its decision fortyfour years ago in *Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington*, 442 U.S. 560, 571 (1979), where the Court\n\nheld that where Congress is silent as to its intent to create a private cause of action and there is no basis to find one in the structure of the statute or in the legislative history, the courts are not free simply to imply one. *See also Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.*, 430 U.S. 1, 25 (1977) (examining \"legislative history to discern the congressional purpose underlying the specific statutory prohibition\" to determine \"whether the creation by judicial interpretation of the implied cause of action . . . is necessary to effectuate Congress' goals\"). Indeed, twenty years ago, the Court held that a court cannot imply a private right of action unless the federal law, on its face, \"manifests an intent 'to create not just a private right but also a private remedy.'\" *Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe*, 536 U.S. 273, 284 (2002) (quoting *Alexander v. Sandoval*, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001)); *see also Olmsted v. Pruco Life Ins. Co*., 283 F.3d 429, 432 (2d Cir. 2002) (\"A court . . . cannot ordinarily conclude that Congress intended to create a right of action when none was explicitly provided.\"). \"[T]he Supreme Court has come to view the implication of private remedies in regulatory statutes with increasing disfavor.\" *Republic of Iraq v. ABB AG*, 768 F.3d 145, 170 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting *Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P. v. Gotham Partners, L.P.*, 286 F.3d 613, 618 (2d Cir. 2002)). The Supreme Court has \"clarified in a series of cases that, when deciding whether to recognize an implied cause of action, the 'determinative' question is one of statutory intent.\" *Ziglar v. Abbasi*, 582 U.S. 120, 131 (2017) (quoting *Sandoval*, 532 U.S. at 286). Congress must have \"'unambiguously conferred' 'individual rights upon a class of beneficiaries' to which the plaintiff belongs.\" *Health & Hosp. Corp. v. Talevski*, 143 S. Ct. 1444, 1457 (2023) (quoting *Gonzaga Univ.*, 536 U.S. at 285–86). Thus, \"implied rights of action are disfavored.\" *Moya v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec*., 975 F.3d 120, 128 (2d Cir. 2020) (declining to find a private right of action under the Rehabilitation Act against executive agencies). Since *Ziglar*, the Second Circuit has only found an implied right of action in one case,\n\nand then only after determining that \"[t]he text . . . unambiguously evinces Congressional intent to authorize a private action\" and the statute \"also identifies a 'class of persons'\" who benefit from the availability of the right of action. *Oxford Univ. Bank v. Lansuppe Feeder, LLC*, 933 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 2019).\n\nNeither in his Complaint, nor in his opposition to the motion to dismiss, nor in his opposition to the Rule 11 motion, has Plaintiff identified any reason to believe that FARA would be an exception to the numerous regulatory statutes as to which the courts have held no private right of action exists. FARA was originally enacted \"[t]o protect the national defense, internal security, and foreign relations of the United States by requiring public disclosure by persons engaging in propaganda activities for or on behalf of foreign governments, foreign political parties, and other foreign principals.\" *Meese v. Keene*, 481 U.S. 465, 469 (1987) (quoting Amendment to Foreign Agents Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 77-532, 56 Stat. 248, 248–49 (Apr. 29, 1942)). To that end, FARA requires a foreign agent as defined therein to file required documents with the Attorney General, 22 U.S.C. § 612(a), and it gives \"the Attorney General [the authority to] make an application to the appropriate United States district court for an order enjoining such [violating] acts,\" 22 U.S.C. § 618(f). Moreover, Section 618(e) \"criminalize[s] the failure to satisfy the requirements of . . . sections 612(a) and 612(b) [(*i.e.*, the failure to register)].\" *United States v. McGoff*, 831 F.2d 1071, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1987). All of these rights of enforcement attach to the Attorney General, not private parties. And \"[P]laintiff cannot point to any language in the statute or its legislative history which suggests that Congress intended to establish a cause of action in any entity other than the federal government.\" *Comm. for a Free Namibia*, 554 F. Supp. at 725.\n\nThe best that Plaintiff has been able to muster is to state that (1) \"only District Courts have, as of yet, opined on the issue, and there has been no appellate or Supreme Court ruling,\" Dkt. No. 2 ¶ 178, and (2) \"there has been a lack of enforcement action—resulting in the violation of constitutional rights, and a blatant disregard of the rule of law,\" *id*. ¶ 179. It is not necessary, however, for the Second Circuit or the Supreme Court to have explicitly rejected an argument for a district court to have the authority to conclude that the argument is frivolous. The number of issues that reach the appellate courts, much less the Supreme Court, is limited. Those courts do not have the resources to address every frivolous issue. Thus, that a claim has not previously been rejected by a circuit court does not alone give the plaintiff the license to make the claim, any more than the fact that an issue that previously has been addressed and rejected by a circuit court necessarily precludes a subsequent plaintiff from raising it. At all times, the critical question is not whether the circuit courts or Supreme Court has spoken directly on a particular issue—the question is whether the claim is \"warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2). If the claim is warranted by existing law or a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, a party can make that claim without violating Rule 11(b)(2). If it is not so warranted, the pleading is sanctionable.\n\nPlaintiff's suggestion that he is entitled to enforce FARA because the United States government has not adequately done so fares no better; Plaintiff does not gain the right to step into the shoes of the United States Attorney General merely because he disagrees with his or her enforcement decisions. Plaintiff \"did not come forward at any point with any authority or coherent explanation as to why he has\" a private right of action, and the claim was \"thus objectively frivolous.\" *Thompson v. Steinberg*, 2021 WL 3914079, at \\*7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1,\n\n2021), *aff'd*, 2023 WL 353359 (2d Cir. Jan. 23, 2023); *see also Biocad JSC v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd.*, 2022 WL 268102, at \\*5 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (imposing sanctions because \"several courts . . . have previously\" ruled against the legal argument, and yet plaintiff \"did not cite a single case\" explaining why the legal argument is still viable).\n\nMoreover, even if the Court somehow found that FARA conferred a right of action on any private party, Plaintiff never articulated a basis upon which he could have asserted a FARA claim. As the Court concluded in its opinion dismissing Plaintiff's FARA claim in the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff did \"not allege any harm associated with his allegation of Defendants' violation of\" FARA and did not allege that any potential harm was \"traceable to Defendants' failure to register under FARA or how a declaratory judgment compelling registration would redress his alleged injury.\" *Gong v. Sarnoff*, 2023 WL 4561800, at \\*11 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2023). The same conclusion applies with equal force to the Complaint.\n\nFinally, Plaintiff's allegations lacked evidentiary support and there was no basis to believe that they would have evidentiary support. Plaintiff alleged that \"O'Melveny is beholden to the CCP, and as such performs whatever acts are requested by the CCP—including acts within the United States that would require registration as foreign agents with the US Government.\" Dkt. No. 2 ¶ 47. Plaintiff further alleged that the CCP's unregistered agents in the United States \"are now believed to be Defendant Sarnoff, Defendant O'Melveny and Defendant Stanton.\" *Id.* ¶ 64. However, the only factual allegations made to support these claims with respect to Moving Defendants are that they have performed legal work on behalf of a Chinese company, *id.* ¶¶ 25– 26, and that O'Melveny has offices in the PRC from which it conducts \"lucrative\" business with a \"potentially significant impact on the country,\" *id.* ¶¶ 42–43. However, FARA exempts from registration (1) \"[a]ny person engaging or agreeing to engage only . . . in private and nonpolitical\n\nactivities in furtherance of the bona fide trade or commerce of such foreign principal,\" 22 U.S.C. § 613(d), and (2) \"[a]ny person qualified to practice law, insofar as he engages or agrees to engage in the legal representation of a disclosed foreign principal before any court of law or any agency of the Government of the United State,\" *id.*§ 613(g). Further, \"agent of a foreign principal\" is defined only to apply to activities performed by agents \"within the United States.\" *Id.* § 611(c). There is no allegation of fact that O'Melveny or Sarnoff took any actions that would fall within the ambit of FARA and not be reached by one of FARA's exemptions.\n\n#### **III. Plaintiff Initiated this Action with an Improper Purpose**\n\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 permits a court to impose sanctions when a pleading has been filed \"for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1); *see also Fox v. Boucher*, 794 F.2d 34, 37–38 (2d Cir. 1986) (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 \"permits the imposition of sanctions when an attorney signs a pleading that is interposed for an improper purpose without reasonable inquiry or without grounds justifying the argument advanced.\"). \"There is a clear line between zealous advocacy and abuse of the legal system that an attorney may not cross.\" *Galonsky v. Williams*, 1997 WL 759445, at \\*1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 1997) (citing *Baffa v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp.*, 222 F.3d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 2000)). But \"[a] party should not be penalized for or deterred from seeking and obtaining warranted judicial relief merely because one of his multiple purposes in seeking that relief may have been improper.\" *Sussman v. Bank of Isr.*, 56 F.3d 450, 459 (2d Cir. 1995); *see also In re Firestar Diamond, Inc.*, 634 B.R. 265, 308 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2021) (\"While the 'improper purpose' and 'frivolousness' inquiries are separate and distinct, they often overlap, and courts have found that a complaint is not filed for an improper purpose if it is nonfrivolous.\"). However, \"[a] court may infer an improper purpose if, in light of Plaintiffs' conduct during and outside of litigation, a complaint is so\n\nbaseless as to suggest that there is an ulterior motive behind the lawsuit.\" *An*, 2023 WL 4931832, at \\*6.\n\nThe Court also has no difficulty finding that Plaintiff here initiated this action for an improper purpose. The Complaint's allegations and claims against Moving Defendants are legally frivolous and factually flawed. Plaintiff's FARA claim is devoid of all factual and legal basis and is independently sanctionable. *See supra* Section II. Plaintiff's Sections 1983 and 1985 claims are similarly without merit.16 Plaintiff alleged he was injured when he was hit by Stanton's car, Dkt. No. 2 ¶ 96, that no police report was filed, *id.* ¶ 108, and that the NYPD obstructed his ability to get medical attention, *id.* ¶¶ 112–19. However, Plaintiff never asserted any facts to support that Moving Defendants had any involvement in the events of December 20, 2022, exercised state authority, or acted in concert with the police. Nor did he assert any basis to believe that such evidence exists. *See Gutierrez v. Fox*, 141 F.3d 425, 427 (2d Cir. 1998) (Rule 11 \"explicitly and unambiguously imposes an affirmative duty on each attorney to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the viability of a pleading before it is signed.\"). There was no reason to believe that either of Moving Defendants had any involvement in the offending conduct. The Complaint contains no non-conclusory allegations that either Moving Defendant was present at the scene when the offending conduct occurred or that Stanton or the NYPD was acting at the direction of the Moving Defendants.\n\nIn fact, when asked what his basis to believe that \"Sarnoff and O'Melveny actually did collude with the police\" during the initial pretrial conference, counsel for Plaintiff, Richard\n\n<sup>16</sup> In its Opinion and Order on Moving Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, the Court dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3) claims, which were supported by substantively identical allegations to those asserted in the Complaint, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.\n\nFreeth, responded with speculation and conjecture. *See Craig v. City of New York*, 2022 WL 2238451, at \\*6, \\*12 (E.D.N.Y. June 22, 2022) (complaint is sanctionable when it rests \"on conjecture and speculation\"); *see also Katzman v. Victoria's Secret Catalogue*, 167 F.R.D. 649, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (\"The total lack of substance [of a complaint] gives rise to the inference that the action was filed for improper purposes.\"). Counsel stated that he \"would imagine\" that Moving Defendants had a connection with Stanton and that \"it would make sense that, you know, the defendants [Sarnoff and O'Melveny] in their position would send someone to, at least, observe, get information.\" Dkt. No. 34 at 6–7. Imagination is guess work; it does not permit one to sue a party for violation of a law enforceable by criminal penalties. The Complaint is similarly devoid of allegations regarding Stanton's connection with the police; though it alleges that Stanton \"indicated that he worked with or had some kind of connection [with the] NYPD,\" it concludes \"[u]pon information and belief, [that] Defendant Stanton is not an officer with the NYPD.\" Dkt. No. 2 ¶¶ 80, 82. Moreover, pressed for clarification about what the state action in this case was, Freeth suggested that \"it seems strange[,] [s]eems very, you know, suspect to me\" that when Plaintiff fell \"down in the street after making contact with a vehicle,\" the police didn't \"do anything.\" Dkt. No. 34 at 8–9. In response to a question from the Court about whether \"discovery would help [Plaintiff] sustain this complaint,\" Plaintiff's counsel responded, \"Well, maybe it would, and maybe it would turn out to be that there isn't anything to support [the Complaint]. I don't know.\" Dkt. No. 34 at 9.\n\nThere is every reason to believe, and the Court finds, that the Complaint was filed not to redress any injury Plaintiff suffered on December 20, 2022, or to obtain judicial relief, but to harass Moving Defendants because of their representation of a client in litigation against Kwok and to deter others from doing the same. Plaintiff and his counsel Zhang are affiliated with\n\nKwok and sympathetic to him and his interests. *See supra* pp. 12–14. Plaintiff experienced his alleged injury at a protest outside Sarnoff's house. *See* Dkt. No. 2 ¶ 71. He previously attended protests outside O'Melveny's office. *Id.* ¶ 67. The Court rejects the notion that Plaintiff attended those protests solely or even primarily because of Moving Defendants' representation of Chinese clients or offices in China. Numerous other law firms represent Chinese clients in litigation in the United States and have (or until recently had) offices in China. The protests singled out Moving Defendants and they singled out Moving Defendants after they had assisted a client in litigation against Kwok. The inference is inescapable that Plaintiff attended the protests because of the assistance that Moving Defendants provided their client against Kwok and to deter and prevent Moving Defendants from continuing to do so.\n\nThe conclusion that the lawsuit was filed to harass Moving Defendants, to punish them for their representation of PAX, and to deter others from also representing clients with interests that are opposed to Kwok's is further reinforced by the language of Plaintiff's brief in opposition to the motion for sanctions. Plaintiff argues that Moving Defendants' accusations are \"dismissive\" because they \"suggest that Plaintiff is simply an empty-headed follower of Mr. Kwok.\" Dkt. No. 45 ¶ 13. Nowhere in his opposition brief does he dispute that he is a follower of Kwok or make anything other than the most superficial and conclusory argument that the lawsuit was filed for reasons other than to harass Moving Defendants for their involvement in the PAX litigation and Bankruptcy Court litigation.17 In fact, he spends 31 paragraphs of his opposition devoted to the argument Kwok has been unfairly targeted by the CCP and the United\n\n<sup>17</sup> Plaintiff argues that he \"has initiated this matter because his Constitutional rights have been violated [and] he feels threatened by the CCP, and its agents, facilitators and/or co-conspirators.\" *Id.* ¶ 52. However, that argument as against Moving Defendants is belied, as described in detail above, by the frivolousness of the claims brought against them.\n\nStates government, that the PAX litigation and bankruptcy proceedings were part of some broader conspiracy against Kwok, and that the CCP has \"weaponize[ed]\" the \"U.S. Courts to target Mr. Kwok.\" *Id.* ¶¶ 15–46.\n\nAnd if there is any doubt of the harassing purpose of this lawsuit, the history of lawsuits Zhang and Freeth have filed in this Court and elsewhere against PAX, persons associated with PAX, PAX's counsel, and those assisting the Bankruptcy Court settles that doubt. \"Although a party should not be sanctioned for 'greater litigiousness' alone, a court may infer improper purpose where multiplicative filings are coupled with 'objectively unreasonable statements.'\" *LCS Grp., LLC v. Shire LLC*, 2019 WL 1234848, at \\*14 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2019) , *judgment aff'd, appeal dismissed in part sub nom. LCS Grp., LLC v. Shire Dev. LLC*, 2022 WL 1217961 (2d Cir. Apr. 26, 2022) (quoting *Storey v. Cello Holdings, LLC*, 347 F.3d 370, 393 (2d Cir. 2003)); *see also* Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)–(c), Advisory Committee Notes to 1993 Amendment (noting that \"whether *the person*\"—and not specifically \"the litigant\"—\"has engaged in similar conduct in other litigation . . . may in a particular case be [a] proper consideration[]\" in determining whether and what kind of sanctions to impose). Plaintiff's counsel has engaged in repeated frivolous litigation in this Court and the District of Maryland. *See supra* pp. 14–16. These cases are unmistakably directed at parties and lawyers, who are either involved in Kwok's bankruptcy or in the PAX litigation. They contain similar allegations and similarly frivolous claims. The inescapable conclusion is that Zhang and Freeth are targeting those with interests opposed to Kwok's with the aim of chilling what they perceive as advocacy against him. The plaintiffs in the actions brought by Zhang and Freeth could have pursued relief from any number of individuals and entities engaged in similar activity in the PRC and for PRC companies for allegedly violating the registration requirements of FARA, but they did not. They only went\n\nafter individuals and entities who were involved in the Kwok bankruptcy or the PAX action. Although not dispositive here, this conclusion adds force to the Court's finding that sanctions are necessary and should be applied against Plaintiff's counsel. *See Billewicz v. Town of Fair Haven*, 2022 WL 4115966, at \\*13 (D. Vt. Aug. 11, 2022), *aff'd*, 2023 WL 3961437 (2d Cir. June 13, 2023) (\"This repeated litigation suggests a pattern of abusive litigation and gives rise to an inference of improper motives.\").\n\nLastly, the inference that the litigation was not filed to obtain judicial relief but to harass PAX's lawyers because they are PAX's lawyers is reinforced by the failure of Plaintiff and his counsel to pursue—before the Court prompted counsel to do so—the persons Plaintiff alleges to be those who inflicted harm against him by violating his constitutional rights: the NYPD and its officers. Plaintiff's Complaint was accepted for filing on January 18, 2023, *see* Dkt. No. 2, and Plaintiff requested that summonses be issued as to Moving Defendants and Stanton approximately a month later on February 23, 2023, *see* Dkt. Nos. 5–7. Plaintiff did not then, or within the requisite 90 days, serve or attempt to serve the City of New York or any of the officers allegedly involved in the December 20 incident—who he alleges were the principal wrongdoers. He served the summonses and Complaint on Moving Defendants and Stanton alone on March 20, 2023. Dkt. No. 18. Indeed, it was not until over four months later that Plaintiff served the state actors named as defendants in this case, *see* Dkt. Nos. 59, 64, and even then, only after the Court alerted Plaintiff to the defect and ordered Plaintiff to show cause why the case should not be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) for failure to serve the City of New York and the named police officer—Lauren A. Duffy—*see* Dkt. No. 58. There is every reason to believe that had the Court not issued the Order to Show Cause the City of New York would *never* have been served. And there is thus every reason to believe that Plaintiff did not\n\nfile this lawsuit as a result of some grievance he had with the City of New York as a result of the conduct of the NYPD or to obtain relief from an injury he alleges he suffered as a result of conduct by the NYPD. The inference is inescapable that he filed the lawsuit to harass and deter O'Melveny and Sarnoff for their conduct on behalf of a client who opposed Kwok's interests and not because of any injury Plaintiff suffered on December 20, 2020.\n\n### **IV. Sanctions Award**\n\nRule 11 permits a court to \"impose an appropriate sanction\" if it finds the Rule 11(b) has been violated \"after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond.\" \"A sanction imposed under [Rule 11] must be limited to what suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4). Still, \"[u]nder Rule 11, a District Court retains broad discretion to fashion an appropriate sanction based on the facts and circumstances of a particular case.\" *Colliton v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP*, 2008 WL 4386764, at \\*15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2008), *aff'd*, 356 F. App'x 535 (2d Cir. 2009); *see also Lawrence v. Wilder Richman Sec. Corp.*, 417 F. App'x 11, 15 (2d Cir. 2010) (\"[A] district court has 'broad discretion' to 'tailor[ ] appropriate and reasonable sanctions under [R]ule 11,' including an award of attorney's fees where warranted.\" (internal citations omitted) (quoting *O'Malley v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth.*, 896 F.2d 704, 709 (2d Cir. 1990))).\n\nA court considering sanctions must be sensitive to the concern that it is not chilling legitimate advocacy. There is nothing inherently wrong in pursuing those persons believed to be supporters of the PRC based on legitimate legal arguments or arguments based on a wellfounded belief in the reversal of existing law. But Plaintiff here, and his attorneys, are not seeking to use the legal system to vindicate rights; they are seeking to use the legal system to chill legal advocacy and to harass Moving Defendants because of their association with a\n\nparticular client. It is this behavior, coupled with the frivolousness of Plaintiff's FARA claim, that merits sanctions.\n\nMoving Defendants request that the Court require that Zhang and Freeth \"pay all attorneys' fees and costs that Defendants Mr. Sarnoff and O'Melveny have incurred in defending against this action.\"18 Dkt. No. 37. The Court finds that an award of attorneys' fees and costs for defending this action—but not for bringing the Moving Defendants' motion under Rule 11 is no greater than what is necessary to \"deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4). These costs and attorneys' fees are to be borne by Freeth, Zhang, and Plaintiff. *See An v. Despins*, 2023 WL 4931832, at \\*8 (concluding that sanctions should be imposed on plaintiff's counsel for \"issue[s] over which counsel exercise[d] principal responsibility,\" like ensuring that the complaints filed met a minimum merit threshold and pled adequate facts to establish subject matter jurisdiction\" (alterations in original) (quoting *United Republic Ins. Co., in Receivership v. Chase Manhattan Bank*, 315 F.3d 168, 171 (2d Cir. 2003))). Moving Defendants are directed to file an application for fees and costs within fourteen days of the date of this Order.\n\nFreeth has pleaded that he lacks the ability to pay Moving Defendants' attorneys' fees and costs. It is appropriate to consider ability to pay at this stage. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4) (\"A sanction imposed under this rule must be limited to what suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated.\"); *see also* Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)–(c),\n\n<sup>18</sup> Although Zhang has not made an appearance in this action, he, along with Freeth, signed the Complaint and thus \"certifie[d] [to the Court] to the best of [his] knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstance.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). Rule 11(c) permits a court to sanction \"any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule or is responsible for the violation.\" Fed. R. C. P. 11(c)(1). It does not limit a court's ability to sanction attorneys to those who have made an appearance in a case. The Court finds that Zhang, alongside Freeth, is responsible for the violations of Rule 11 detailed in this Opinion and Order.\n\nAdvisory Committee Notes to 1993 Amendment (noting that \"what amount, given the financial resources of the responsible person, is needed to deter that person from repetition in the same case; what amount is needed to deter similar activity by other litigants . . . may in a particular case be proper considerations\" in determining whether and what kind of sanctions to impose); *Star Mark Mgmt., Inc.*, 682 F.3d at 179 (noting that a \"district court[ has] broad discretion to lower a sanctions award based on inability to pay\"); *Oliveri v. Thompson*, 803 F.2d 1265, 1281 (2d Cir. 1986) (\"[G]iven the underlying purpose of sanctions—to punish deviations from proper standards of conduct with a view toward encouraging future compliance and deterring further violations—it lies well within the district court's discretion to temper the amount to be awarded against an offending attorney by a balancing consideration of his ability to pay.\"). Accordingly, within seven days of the date that the application for fees and costs is submitted, Plaintiff and his counsel may submit any information they desire the Court to consider in apportioning (or not apportioning) the fee award.19\n\nAdditionally, Zhang and Freeth are directed to pay the Court a fine of \\$2,500 each for the burden that litigating the Complaint placed on the Court and its personnel and to deter the two from filing such frivolous and harassing litigation in the future. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)–(c), Advisory Committee Notes to 1993 Amendment (noting that the \"court has available a variety of possible sanctions to impose for violations, such as . . . ordering a fine payable to the court\"). Such payments shall be made to the Clerk of Court of the Southern District of New York within fourteen days of the date of this Opinion and Order and proof of payment shall be filed on the docket.\n\n<sup>19</sup> Moving Defendants may request leave to submit a reply brief, if necessary, within two business days of any response by Plaintiff.\n\nMoving Defendants also seek an order \"enjoining Plaintiff, Plaintiff's counsel, and those in active concert with them from filing other similar suits without leave of court.\" Dkt. No. 37. \"If a litigant has a history of filing vexatious, harassing or duplicative lawsuits, courts may impose sanctions, including restrictions on future access to the judicial system.\" *Hong Mai Sa v. Doe*, 406 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Factors that a court should consider \"in restricting a litigant's future access to courts\" include:\n\n(1) the litigant's history of litigation and in particular whether it entailed vexatious, harassing or duplicative lawsuits; (2) the litigant's motive in pursuing the litigation, e.g., does the litigant have an objective good faith expectation of prevailing?; (3) whether the litigant is represented by counsel; (4) whether the litigant has caused needless expense to other parties or has posed an unnecessary burden on the courts and their personnel; and (5) whether other sanctions would be adequate to protect the courts and other parties.\n\n*Iwachiw v. N.Y. State Dep't of Motor Vehicles*, 396 F.3d 525, 528 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting *Safir v. U.S. Lines, Inc.*, 792 F.2d 19, 24 (2d Cir. 1986)). \"Ultimately, the question the court must answer is whether a litigant who has a history of vexatious litigation is likely to continue to abuse the judicial process and harass other parties.\" *Newman v. Jewish Agency for Isr.*, 2017 WL 6628616, at \\*6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2017), *aff'd sub nom. Eliahu v. Jewish Agency for Isr.*, 919 F.3d 709 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting *Safir*, 792 F.2d at 24).\n\nThe Court finds that an anti-suit injunction is not appropriate or necessary based on the current record. Although the Court has found that Plaintiff filed this suit to harass Moving Defendants and that he and his counsel did not have an objective good faith expectation of prevailing in this suit, Moving Defendants point to no other lawsuits that Plaintiff has filed for harassing purposes nor have they pointed to a real risk that Plaintiff himself will continue to file such harassing lawsuits if not enjoined. As to Plaintiff's counsel, while they appear to have engaged in repeated frivolous and harassing litigation over the course of several lawsuits, they have not, to the Court's knowledge, filed other actions since sanctions have been awarded\n\nagainst them in the case currently before the Honorable Valerie E. Caproni, *see An et al. v. Despins et al.*, No. 22-cv-10062 (VEC) (S.D.N.Y.). Moving Defendants themselves concede that they are not seeking referral to any disciplinary committee that would have the authority to restrict Moving Defendants' practice of law and the Court sees no such basis to do so on the present record. That counsel proceeded in the face of accusations that they violated Rule 11 (prior to any judicial finding that they did so) is an insufficient basis to impose any restrictions on the ability of counsel to file cases on behalf of their future clients.\n\nDuring Oral Argument, Moving Defendants requested that the Court order Plaintiff to strike the allegations against them from the Amended Complaint and, if he elects to pursue his claims against the other defendants, that he file an amended complaint before doing so. Plaintiff's counsel did not object to this request. Moving Defendants are directed to identify in their memorandum in support of attorneys' fees and costs the paragraphs that should be stricken from the Complaint and the Amended Complaint. Plaintiff may respond two weeks thereafter. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)–(c), Advisory Committee Notes to 1993 Amendment (\"The court has available a variety of possible sanctions to impose for violations, such as striking the offending paper.\").\n\nFinally, the Court will require Plaintiff, Zhang, and Freeth to file a copy of this Opinion and Order in all future actions opened by them for a period of one year from the date of this Opinion and Order.\n\n#### **CONCLUSION**\n\nThe motion for sanctions is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Moving Defendants are directed to submit an application for reasonable costs and attorneys' fees by no later than fourteen days from the date of this Opinion and Order. If Zhang, Freeth, and Plaintiff wish to offer evidence not already received by the Court, they are directed to do so alongside any objections to Moving Defendants' application for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs within seven days of the filing of such application.\n\nThe Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to close Dkt. No. 36.\n\nSO ORDERED.\n\nNew York, New York LEWIS J. LIMAN\n\nDated: August 22, 2023 \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\n\nUnited States District Judge","body_zh":"附件 B\n\n美国联邦地区法院\nSouthern District of New York（纽约南区）　08/22/2023\n---------------------------------------------------------------------　X\nJUNWU GONG（龚俊武），　:\n\n原告，　:\n-v　:\n\n:　23-cv-343 (LJL)\nSTUART M. SARNOFF（斯图尔特·M·萨诺夫）、O'MELVENY & MYERS\nLLP（奥麦文尼与迈尔斯律师事务所）、CARL M. STANTON（卡尔·M·斯坦顿）、CITY OF NEW YORK（纽约市）、\nOFFICER JOHN DOE 1（警员无名氏1）、OFFICER JOHN DOE 2（警员无名氏2）、\nOFFICER JOHN DOE 3（警员无名氏3）、OFFICER LAUREN A.\nDUFFY（警员劳伦·A·达菲），　:\n\n:　意见及命令\n被告。　:\n\nX\n\nLEWIS J. LIMAN（刘易斯·J·利曼），美国联邦地区法院法官：\n\n被告 Stuart M. Sarnoff（“Sarnoff”）和 O'Melveny & Myers LLP（“O'Melveny”，并与 Sarnoff 合称“提出动议的被告”）依据《联邦民事诉讼规则》第11条提出动议，请求作出命令，对原告代理律师 Yongbing Zhang（张永兵）和 Richard Freeth（理查德·弗里思）施加制裁，并禁止原告 Junwu Gong（“Gong”或“原告”）及其代理律师和与其积极协同行动者，未经法院许可提起其他类似诉讼。Dkt. No. 36。该动议部分准许，部分驳回。\n\n背景\n\n法院假定当事人熟悉本案此前的程序。下列事实取自当事人为制裁动议提交的材料，法院在处理该动议所必需的范围内解决事实争议。参见 Chemiakin v. Yefimov, 932 F.2d 124, 130 (2d Cir. 1991)（表明，对于第11条动议，法院应作为事实认定者，在存在事实争议时必须举行证据听证会）。\n\nI. 起诉状中的指控\n\n原告通过于 January 18, 2023 提交的起诉状（“起诉状”）提起本案。1 Dkt. No. 2。原告是一名出生于外国、具有华裔族裔背景的美国永久居民，其曾多次与其他华裔人士共同参与抗议中国共产党（“CCP”）的活动。Id. ¶¶ 15, 36–37。他声称，自己一直受到 CCP 代理人持续开展的骚扰活动。Id. ¶ 70。O'Melveny 是一家在 Delaware 注册的有限责任合伙企业，以律师事务所形式经营，并经常在 State of New York（纽约州）开展业务。Id. ¶ 50。被告 Sarnoff 是 O'Melveny 的一名律师，id. ¶ 45，并且是纽约州居民，id. ¶ 49。\n\n起诉状指称，提出动议的被告作为中华人民共和国（“PRC”）未注册的代理人或代表人行事，违反了《外国代理人登记法》22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(1)（“FARA”）。Id. ¶¶ 173–79。起诉状还指称，提出动议的被告侵犯并共谋侵犯原告根据《美国宪法》第一、第四和第十四修正案享有的宪法权利，该等权利可依据 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3) 强制执行。Id. ¶¶ 126–55。\n\n起诉状中的指控源于从 November 22, 2022 至 December 20, 2022 发生的一系列事件。于 November 22, 2022，原告参与了其声称在纽约 O'Melveny 办公室举行的和平抗议活动，原因是其所指称的 O'Melveny 与 CCP 的关系。据称，O'Melveny 在 PRC 至少设有三个办公室，并在 PRC 开展“极具利润”的业务。Id. ¶¶ 42–43。于 2013 年，其曾代表一家总部位于中国的基因组研究和测序公司 BGI，完成中国收购方首次收购一家美国上市公司的交易。Id. ¶¶ 25–26。2 自 December 2, 2022 起，原告定期参与在被认为靠近 Sarnoff 位于 New York City（纽约市）住所的地点举行的抗议活动。Id. ¶ 68。据称，Sarnoff 是 O'Melveny 的律师，“显著地”参与该所的中国业务。Id. ¶ 45。于 December 20, 2022 上午，原告再次参与了在被认为靠近 Sarnoff 住所的地点举行的抗议活动。Id. ¶ 71。\n\n原告指称，他和其他抗议者在这些抗议活动中受到另一被告 Carl M. Stanton（“Stanton”）的骚扰；起诉状中关于其身份所提供的唯一信息是，据称他是纽约市和纽约州居民。Id. ¶ 51。起诉状重点关注了 December 20, 2022 发生的事件，在该事件中，原告被 Stanton 驾驶的汽车撞击。Id. ¶ 96。在原告召唤 New York Police Department（“NYPD”）（其中一名警员在起诉状中被具名列出）到达现场后，NYPD 警员未提交警方报告。参见 id. ¶¶ 101–08。后来，原告在附近一家餐厅开始感到不适并“进入休克状态”后，抗议者召唤救护车协助原告，但 NYPD 警员妨碍了原告获得医疗救治的努力。Id. ¶¶ 112–19。\n\n2 于 2020 年，据称 BGI 的两个实体因“进行用于进一步压制新疆维吾尔自治区维吾尔族及其他穆斯林少数群体的基因分析”而被列入 United States Department of Commerce（美国商务部）Bureau of Industry and Security（工业与安全局）的实体清单，id. ¶ 27；于 January 2021，Reuters（路透社）据称报道称，BGI 曾与 PRC 军方合作，开展增强士兵体能及其他项目的工作，id. ¶ 28；于 July 2021，Reuters 据称报道称，BGI 在 People's Liberation Army（中国人民解放军）的协助下开发了一种产前检测方法，该方法也被用于收集遗传数据，包括用于“挑出藏族和维吾尔族少数群体，以发现其基因与其特征之间的联系”，id. ¶ 29；并且，于 October 2022，United States Department of Defense（美国国防部）据称将一家 BGI 子公司列入其在美国运营的中国军工企业名单，id. ¶ 30。\n\n起诉状几乎没有、即使有也很少涉及提出动议的被告行为的指控，且没有任何指控将提出动议的被告与任何州行为联系起来。起诉状指称，December 20 的抗议活动发生在被认为靠近 Sarnoff 住所的地点。Id. ¶¶ 71–72。然而，起诉状并未指称 Sarnoff 在抗议期间实施了任何行为，甚至未指称其当时在住所内。3 起诉状还指称，在此前于纽约市 O'Melveny 办公室外举行的一次抗议活动中，有人“数次”看到 Stanton 从抗议者和公众不得进入的物业内部拍照，并使用刷卡证从安保入口进入。Id. ¶¶ 76–77。原告基于信息和信念指称，Stanton 并非 NYPD 警员，id. ¶ 82，尽管起诉状指称 Stanton 表示其“与”警方有关，或与 NYPD 存在某种联系，id. ¶¶ 80–81。此外，没有任何指控表明 O'Melveny，更不用说 Sarnoff，与 Stanton 存在任何关系，也没有任何指控表明 O'Melveny 或 Sarnoff 参与了 Stanton、NYPD 或任何州行为人在 December 20 的行为。根据起诉状，是原告，而不是 O'Melveny、Sarnoff 或 Stanton，在被 Stanton 的汽车撞击后召唤了 NYPD；而是抗议者召唤了救护车。Id. ¶¶ 85, 88, 114。\n\n3 起诉状甚至没有在事实层面指称，抗议活动发生在 Sarnoff 住所附近。\n\n起诉状确实指称，提出动议的被告与 CCP 存在关联。原告主张，“O'Melveny 受制于 CCP，因此实施 CCP 所要求的任何行为——包括在美国境内需要向美国政府登记为外国代理人的行为”，id. ¶ 47，并且 CCP 在美国的未注册代理人“现被认为是被告 Sarnoff、被告 O'Melveny 和被告\n\nStanton”，id. ¶ 64。为支持这些主张而提出的唯一事实指控是，O'Melveny 和 Sarnoff 曾代表一家中国公司从事法律工作，id. ¶¶ 25–26，以及 O'Melveny 在 PRC 设有办公室，并由此开展“利润丰厚”的业务，对“该国可能具有重大影响”，id. ¶¶ 42–43。没有任何事实指控支持 Stanton 与 PRC 或 CCP 存在任何关联。\n\nII. 与第11条动议相关的程序经过\n\n于 March 23, 2023，提出动议的被告依据《联邦民事诉讼规则》12(b)(1) 和 12(b)(6) 提交了驳回起诉状的动议。Dkt. No. 19。在支持该动议的法律备忘录中，提出动议的被告主张，原告未指称二者中任何一人针对原告实施了任何行为，Dkt. No. 20 at 1–2，并主张 FARA 请求“同样毫无根据”，因为“一个又一个法院均认定 FARA 不存在私人诉权”，原告未主张其遭受的任何损害可追溯至提出动议的被告的行为，且原告未主张任何要求进行 FARA 登记的事实，id. at 2–3。\n\n于 March 28, 2023，提出动议的被告提交了其制裁动议，以及支持该动议的法律备忘录和声明。Dkt. Nos. 26–28。然而，提出动议的被告于 March 29, 2023 撤回了该动议，因为其未遵守《联邦民事诉讼规则》11(c)(2) 的要求，即在被提出动议的一方有机会撤回违规请求或文书之前，不得提交该动议。Dkt. No. 29。\n\n于 April 14, 2023，法院举行了首次审前会议。Dkt. No. 34。在会议上，法院询问原告代理律师是否有任何额外的事实“指控针对 Sarnoff 先生或 O'Melveny，足以表明他们与警察部门串通行事”。Id. at 4。代理律师答复称，其指控基于推测：\n\n“该律师事务所和个人被告对于成为这些抗议活动的目标并不高兴”，并且“可以理解的是……处于其地位的被告会派人去……观察、获取信息”。Id. at 7。代理律师承认，他不知道、也没有关于 Stanton 的“授权”的事实指控。Id..他还承认，他不知道 Stanton 撞击原告是“意外还是故意”。Id. at 8。就警方而言，代理律师称警员的行为“很奇怪”，因为警员拒绝提交报告。Id.。尽管如此，原告代理律师仍主张，其掌握的事实信息能够回应提出动议的被告在驳回动议中提出的若干问题。Id. at 13–14。因此，法院在就驳回动议作出决定之前中止证据开示，并允许原告于 April 21, 2023 前提交修正起诉状。Id. at 15–16。法院还警告原告代理律师：“虽然我尚未审阅第11条动议，但我已审阅了你们的起诉状。你们应当再仔细审阅一遍，因为该动议看起来确实相当有力。我将非常严肃地对待即将提交的第11条动议。” Id. at 16–17。\n\n于 April 26, 2023，原告提交了第一份修正起诉状（“修正起诉状”）。4 修正起诉状新增十一段内容，引用了 Heritage Foundation（传统基金会）关于 PRC 对美国构成威胁的报告，并援引了一篇关于两名涉嫌为 PRC 工作的人员在纽约被捕的新闻报道。Dkt. No. 43 ¶¶ 11–21。该起诉状还包括如下指控：O'Melveny 曾“在原告目前发现的若干次情形中”代理被指控曾折磨中国个人，或曾协助、教唆或追认该等行为的中国实体，id. ¶ 34；“O'Melveny 和 Sarnoff 与其他律师一起，一直是 CCP 团队的一部分，该团队负责摧毁 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（又名 Miles\n\n4 原告于 April 21, 2023 提交修正起诉状，但因提交错误被驳回。参见 Dkt. No. 41；书记员记录（Apr. 24, 2023）。双方同意将原告提交修正起诉状的期限延长至 May 1, 2023，法院准予该延期。Dkt. No. 44。\n\n郭文贵）并采取一切必要手段使其返回中国，以便对其施加额外监禁和酷刑或者处决”，同上，第55(f)段；并称该律师事务所在美国加利福尼亚中区联邦地区法院（United States District Court for the Central District of California）审理的 Jun Zhao v. BYD America Corp. 一案中代理了一家名为 BYD America Corporation 的公司，同上，第35段。5 在所有其他方面，修正起诉状与起诉状相同。其并未就2020年12月的事件增加任何事实主张。其提出了同样的指控，即提出动议的被告参与了侵犯民权及违反 FARA 的行为，见同上，第140–80、187–93段，但未增加任何支持任一组主张的事实主张。\n\n2023年7月17日，法院发布意见和命令，准许提出动议的被告提出的动议，驳回针对其的修正起诉状，且不得再行起诉。Dkt. No. 57。法院认定，原告未能主张事实，以支持提出动议的被告可依据第1983条就其所称遭受的任何损害承担责任的任何理论。同上，第13页。法院还认定，原告未能陈述任何事实以支持依据第1985(3)条提出的共谋主张，包括未能陈述存在协议。同上，第20–21页。最后，法院认定，原告未陈述事实以确立其就 FARA 主张所具有原告资格。同上，第21页。然而，法院保留管辖权，以处理被告依据《联邦民事诉讼规则》第11条提出的动议。同上，第24页。\n\n2023年4月20日，在修正起诉状被驳回之前，提出动议的被告重新提交了依据规则第11条提出的制裁动议、法律备忘录及声明，并提交了一份证明其遵守规则11(c)(2)的声明。Dkt. No. 36–39。原告于2023年5月4日提交了其反对该动议的备忘录，Dkt. No. 45。2023年5月17日，提出动议的被告提交了其答复法律备忘录。6 Dkt. No. 51。2023年7月27日，法院发布命令，安排就制裁动议进行口头辩论，并表示，任何希望在听证会上提交证据的当事方，应于2023年8月7日或之前向法院提交函件，说明其希望提交何种证据（如有），且如无额外证据，法院将根据与规则第11条动议及反对文件一并提交的证据裁定该动议。Dkt. No. 63。提出动议的被告于2023年8月7日提交函件，表示不会提交额外证据。7 Dkt. No. 66。同日，原告提交函件，表示将在口头辩论时提交证据并将作证。Dkt. No. 67。法院于2023年8月16日举行口头辩论和证据听证会。见 Minute Entry (Aug. 16, 2023)。原告未出席证据听证会。原告的律师 Richard Freeth（理查德·弗里思）提交了其2021年纳税申报表副本，该副本在无人反对的情况下被接收。\n\n5 修正起诉状还提及 O'Melveny（欧麦利文律师事务所）就两项香港首次公开募股及一家生物科技公司的收购所开展的工作，同上，第56段；并附上一则据称由一名前 O'Melveny 律师撰写的博客文章，该文章指控该律师事务所将其合伙人与美国政府之间的关系“货币化”，Dkt. No. 43-7。\n\n6 提出动议的被告于2023年4月20日提交制裁动议，Dkt. No. 36，当时法院已准许原告提交修正起诉状，见 Dkt. No. 34 at 16，但原告尚未实际提交其修正起诉状，见 Dkt. No. 43。2023年7月7日，法院指示双方提交函件摘要，论述提出动议的被告依据规则第11条提出的动议是否适当地提交于本法院，或者在原告提交修正起诉状后，规则第11条动议是否必须重新送达原告律师。Dkt. No. 54。双方均于2023年7月13日就该问题提交了函件摘要。见 Dkt. Nos. 55–56。\n\n7 尽管在不存在重大事实争议时，法院无须举行证据听证会，见 Chemiakin, 932 F.2d at 130（“尽管上诉人试图向规则第11条附加一项要求，即在施加制裁之前必须举行证据听证会，但除非存在争议事实或可信度问题，并无此项要求。”）；另见 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory Committee's Note to 1993 Amendment（“法院必须在可能范围内将制裁程序的范围限于案卷记录。”），鉴于该听证会的性质及其对案卷外事实的依赖，法院向双方提供了提交额外证据的机会。\n\nIII. 规则第11条证据\n\n提出动议的被告主张，本案“仅仅是 Miles Kwok（又名 Wengui Guo 和 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵））指使采取的一系列滥用性、骚扰性手段之一”，其针对 O'Melveny 和 Sarnoff（萨诺夫）的原因在于，提出动议的被告在纽约州法院针对 Kwok 的诉讼中，向其客户、投资基金 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（“PAX”）提供了协助。PAX 获得了一项针对 Kwok 的 \\$116.4 million 判决书，州法院还对 Kwok 处以 \\$134 million 的藐视法庭制裁。Dkt. Nos. 38-9, 38-10。\n\n2017年4月18日，PAX 在纽约州法院起诉 Kwok，指称其违反一项 \\$30 million 贷款协议。Dkt. No. 38-11（“州法院起诉状”）。8 PAX 由 O'Melveny 和 Sarnoff 代理。州法院起诉状称，Kwok 连同合同利息在内欠款约 \\$88 million。同上，ECF p. 4。经过近四年的诉讼后，纽约州最高法院（New York Supreme Court）的 Barry Ostrager（巴里·奥斯特拉格）法官于2021年2月3日作出有利于 PAX 且不利于 Kwok 的 \\$116,402,019.57 判决书。Dkt. No. 38-9。一年后，即2022年2月9日，Ostrager 法官在一项决定和命令中对 Kwok 处以藐视法庭制裁，命令 Kwok 支付 \\$134 million——268天藐视法庭罚款，每天 \\$500,000——并须在五个营业日内支付，否则法院将“行使其根据 New York Judiciary Law § 753 所拥有的一切权力”。Dkt. No. 38-10。9 Ostrager 法官的意见措辞严厉。他认定，为逃避 PAX 的判决，Kwok 已将“其数额巨大的个人资产存放于一系列公司、受信赖的亲信及家庭成员名下”，并将其\n\n8 法院可以对在另一法院提交的文件进行“司法认知，‘不是为了证明该其他诉讼中所主张事项的真实性，而是为了确立该诉讼及相关提交文件这一事实。’”Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rotches Pork Packers, Inc., 969 F.2d 1384, 1388 (2d Cir. 1992)（引文略）。\n\n9 New York Judiciary Law 赋予州法院“通过罚款或监禁，或两者并用”惩罚藐视法庭行为的权力。N.Y. Jud. Law § 753。\n\n资产“隐匿于错综复杂的公司实体及家庭成员之中”。同上，第1页。在论及 Kwok 就其游艇 Lady May 违反法院命令的行为后，Ostrager 法官总结道：“Kwok 就 Lady May 策划的这种空壳游戏所涉及的种种手段，与 Kwok 在本诉讼待决的五年期间所采取的其他一切规避性和藐视性行为如出一辙，这也是为何本案有1,180项案卷记录。”同上，第8页。\n\n2022年2月15日，即藐视法庭命令五日期限届满前夕，Kwok 依据《破产法典》第11章在康涅狄格地区（District of Connecticut）申请个人破产。Dkt. No. 38-15；另见 Dkt. No. 45 at 9。在该程序中，Kwok 将 O'Melveny 的客户 PAX 列为其最大债权人，其对 PAX 的债务约为 \\$254 million。Dkt. No. 38-15 at ECF p. 10；Dkt. No. 38-16。2022年7月7日前后，应 United States Trustee（美国受托人）的申请，Dkt. No. 38-17，并在 Kwok 反对的情况下，康涅狄格州美国破产法院（United States Bankruptcy Court in Connecticut）（“破产法院”）指定 Paul Hastings LLC 的 Luc Despins（吕克·德斯平）担任受托人，管理 Kwok 的破产财产，见 Dkt. No. 38-18；另见 Dkt. No. 45 ¶ 38。10 2022年8月10日，破产法院应 Despins 的申请作出命令，确认 Despins 为破产财产利益，就 Kwok 拥有或控制的所有实体持有一切经济和治理权利。Dkt. No. 38-19。2022年8月16日，法院准许受托人依据规则第2004条提出的动议，向 Kwok 的各类法律和财务顾问送达传票。Dkt. No. 38-20。同日，法院准许受托人依据规则第2004条提出的动议，向与 Kwok 有关联的各实体和个人送达传票。Dkt. No. 38-21。\n\n10 2022年6月30日，United States Trustee Program（“USTP”）申请指定 Joe Whitley（乔·惠特利）为第11章受托人，Dkt. No. 45 at 9，随后撤回了指定 Whitley 的申请，Dkt. No. 45-15。原告援引指定通知，Dkt. No. 45-14，及撤回指定申请，Dkt. No. 45-15，主张破产法院“反复表明其对违反《破产法典》所规定的罢免程序的关切”，但两份证据均不含原告所提及的“关切”。\n\n2022年11月22日，PAX（由提出动议的被告代理）向破产法院提交临时限制令（“TRO”）及初步禁令申请，请求限制和禁止 Kwok 及所有与其积极协同或参与行动之人：（1）在网上发布关于 Despins、PAX 或 PAG 的高级职员或雇员、受托人或 PAX 的律师及其各自任何亲属的虚假和骚扰性材料；（2）在网上公布该等人士的住址及其他个人信息；以及（3）鼓励、煽动、建议或直接或间接资助在该等人士任何人的住所或办公室（包括前配偶的住所或办公室）举行抗议活动。Dkt. No. 38-30 at 1–2。破产法院于次日举行加急听证会，并于同日作出 TRO，向 PAX 授予其请求的全部救济。见同上，第6页。11 TRO 适用于所有“其他与[Kwok]积极协同或参与行动之人……在通过个人送达或其他方式收到实际通知后”。同上，第7页。\n\n自2022年12月5日起，破产法院就 PAX 提出的初步禁令动议举行了为期四天的证据听证会。见 Dkt. No. 38-37（初步禁令动议听证会记录）。2023年1月13日，破产法院\n\n11 提出动议的被告在其书面陈述中反复援引破产法院关于初步禁令决定的事实认定，以支持其中所载的事实主张。见，例如，Dkt. No. 37 at 2, 6, 7, 8。然而，除证明这些认定存在这一事实外，法院不能对这些认定进行司法认知。见 Int'l Star Class Yacht Racing Ass'n v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc., 146 F.3d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 1998)（指出地区法院为“确立其中主张的事实”而对破产法院命令进行司法认知，属于错误，因为“先前案件中裁定的事实不符合规则201(b)所包含的任何一项无可争议性检验：它们通常既非公众常识，也非源自无可置疑的来源”）。因此，法院将自身限于提出动议的被告随其动议文件提交的直接证据。\n\n发布了一项初步禁令，除其他事项外，该禁令“禁止[Kwok（郭文贵）]在特定期间内，于……PAX 的律师的亲属（包括前配偶）的住所[或居所，或办公室或工作场所，或其入口]二百英尺（200 ft.）范围内的任何时间，进行抗议、纠察、游行，或展示或散发骚扰性材料”。Dkt. No. 38-3 at 3–4。破产法院（Bankruptcy Court）指出，“骚扰性材料”包括将 O'Melveny（欧麦律师事务所）的律师描述为“共产主义者、中国共产党的代理人、敲诈勒索者、反犹主义者、种族主义者、种族灭绝的支持者，或以其他方式对该等当事人的行为或信念提出类似诽谤性指控”的材料。Id. at 5。该初步禁令亦适用于在实际知悉该命令后与 Kwok 积极协同行动者。Id. at 7。\n\n提出动议的被告提交了关于针对其骚扰及该等骚扰与 New Federal State of China（新中国联邦，以下简称“NFSC”）之间联系的补充证据，并进而证明该活动在破产法院发布临时限制令（TRO）或初步禁令后并未消散。NFSC 与创立该组织的 Kwok 关系密切。See Dkt. No. 38-5; Dkt. No. 38-22 at ECF p. 5。据 GNews（GNews 新闻）发布且表面上由 NFSC 的新闻部门 NFSC News 撰写的一份报告，截至 February 7, 2023，NFSC 已针对 Paul Hastings（宝龙达律师事务所）、O'Melveny 以及两家律所的律师进行了 80 天的抗议。12 Dkt. No. 38-38 at ECF p. 4。该文章报道，“NFSC……抗议活动将在完成 90\n\n12 原告在其起诉状中承认其参加了这些抗议活动，并表示其似乎是因参与 NFSC 而如此行事。如原告所主张，November 22, 2022，“原告参加了在被告 O'Melveny 办公室举行的和平抗议活动”，Dkt. No. 2 ¶ 67，并且“自 December 2, 2022 起，原告与其他若干人参加了在据信邻近被告 Sarnoff（萨尔诺夫）住所的一处地点举行的定期和平抗议活动”，id. ¶ 68。\n\n天后，再持续 100 天。”Id. at ECF p. 5。据提出动议的被告称，“抗议活动……持续进行，违反了初步禁令，最终于 February 12, 2023 发生一起事件，其中 Kwok 的追随者袭击了 Sarnoff 先生的一名邻居。”Dkt. No. 37 at 10。提出动议的被告附上了一份由报告警官签署的安保事件报告，其中记载了该被指称的袭击事件。See Dkt. No. 38-39。\n\n提出动议的被告还提交了在 Sarnoff 住所前举行抗议的视频。See, e.g., Dkt. No. 38-32。另一段视频显示，抗议者展示了 O'Melveny 律师（包括 Sarnoff）的图片，并将其与“种族灭绝的支持者”和“中国共产党最喜欢的律师”等标语并置。See Dkt. No. 33 at 5:20–5:50。GNews 发布的一段视频显示，Sarnoff 住所外的抗议者展示了标语牌，牌上将 Sarnoff 的照片与锤子和镰刀以及“中国共产党的走狗”一语并置。See Dkt. No. 38-34。该语言与社交媒体网站 Gettr 上 NFSC 账户使用的语言完全相同；该账户于 December 4, 2022 发帖称，Sarnoff 是“一条由 CCP（中国共产党）付费并拥有、用以迫害中国异见人士的走狗”。Dkt. No. 38-29。最后，于 November 29, 2022，NFSC 的支持者向 100 名 O'Melveny 员工发送电子邮件，点名提及 Sarnoff，并“对 O'Melveny 合伙人……[为]企图迫害试图扳倒中国共产党的世界上一些最直言不讳的举报人”表示“深切不安”。Dkt. No. 38-35。\n\n提出动议的被告还提交了 Gong（龚）的律师与 Kwok 之间存在关系的证据。Yongbing Zhang（张永兵）签署了起诉状但未签署修正起诉状，compare Dkt. No. 2 at ECF p. 25, with Dkt. No. 43 at ECF p. 29；其出现在社交媒体流传的多张 NFSC 主导抗议活动照片中，其中包括 NFSC 的 Gettr 账户于 November 20, 2022 发布的一则帖子，显示 Zhang 在 New York（纽约州）Westchester County（威斯特彻斯特县）Despins（德斯平斯）前妻的住宅前进行纠察，并举着一块称该受托人为“A-List Scumbag”的标语牌。Dkt. No. 38-24 ¶ 32。Zhang 还出现在 June 4, 2022 于 NFSC 第二周年派对上与 Kwok 合影的照片中。Dkt. No. 38-25。\n\n最后，在 TRO 发布后数日内，代表原告提起本案的律师又提起了三宗几乎完全相同的诉讼，针对的是与 PAX 有关联、代表 PAX 或协助破产法院的人士。See Dkt. Nos. 38-40–38-42。于 November 28, 2022，Zhang 和 Richard Freeth（理查德·弗里思）代表一名自称出生于中国的美国居民，在本区对 Paul Hastings 和 Chapter 11 Trustee Despins（第 11 章受托人德斯平斯）提起诉讼。See Dkt. No. 38-40 ¶ 2 (Complaint in An et al. v. Despins et al., No. 22-cv-10062 (VEC) (S.D.N.Y.))。该起诉状称，Paul Hastings 和 Despins “秘密地作为” PRC（中华人民共和国）或 CCP 中之一或两者的“未登记代理人”行事，id.，且提出了与本案所作指控几乎完全相同的《外国代理人登记法》（FARA）违反指控，see, e.g., id. ¶ 39。于 November 28, 2022，Zhang 和 Freeth 代表同一批原告对 PAX 管理成员 Pacific Alliance Group（太盟投资集团）的主席 Weijan Shan（单伟建）及 Shan 之子 Bo Leilei Shan（单保雷）提起诉讼。See Dkt. No. 38-41 (Complaint in An et al. v. Shan et al., No. 22-cv-10060 (ALC) (S.D.N.Y))。该案原告称，Weijan Shan 和 Bo Leilei Shan 亦“作为 PRC 或 CCP 中之一或两者的未登记代理人”行事。Id. ¶ 29。针对 Weijan Shan 的主要指控是，他曾与 United States Senator Diane Feinstein（美国联邦参议员黛安·范斯坦）合影；据称，范斯坦“支持共产主义事业，且最近被揭露其参议院办公室主任是一名 CCP 间谍”，并从“中国公司”获得“巨额收入”。Id. ¶ 72。13 针对其子涉嫌违反 FARA 的指控，主要源于\n\n13 关于范斯坦参议员的指控源自一个名为“Discover the Networks”的网站。Dkt. No. 41 ¶ 72。\n\n其为 Shan 之子这一事实。Id. ¶ 79。最后，于 March 17, 2023，Zhang 和 Freeth（以及第三名律师 Brian R. Della Rocca（布赖恩·R·德拉罗卡））在 District of Maryland（马里兰联邦地区法院）对 Weijan Shan 和包括 University of Maryland（马里兰大学）在内的数名其他被告提起诉讼。Dkt. No. 38-42 (Complaint in Wyatt et al. v. Univ. of Md., No. 23-cv-742 (JKB) (D. Md.))。该起诉状包含针对 Weijan Shan 的相同 FARA 指控。Id. ¶¶ 118–25。其还包含与本案相似的民权请求，主张根据 First（第一修正案）、Fourth（第四修正案）和 Fourteenth Amendments（第十四修正案）违反 42 U.S.C. § 1983，id. ¶¶ 83–90; id. ¶¶ 101–10，以及违反 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)，id. ¶¶ 91–100。原告称，他们在 Weijan Shan 之女作为博士生就读的马里兰大学进行抗议，以便告知其他学生“Shan 家族的 CCP 背景及其在美国公立学校的影响力”，id. ¶ 26，期间他们“开始遭受被告施加的一些意外限制”，并“被指示停止举牌、散发传单和进行在线直播”，id. ¶ 39。他们还称，在破产法院发布命令且其许可被撤销后，如其继续在 University Commons（大学公地）抗议，将面临逮捕威胁。Id. ¶¶ 47, 55。\n\nValerie E. Caproni（瓦莱丽·E·卡普罗尼）法官阁下在 An et al. v. Despins et al., No. 22-cv-10062 一案中驳回了起诉状，但不妨碍再次起诉，并依据 Rule 11（规则第 11 条）对该案律师及原告实施制裁。See id. Dkt. No. 29; see also An v. Despins, 2023 WL 4931832 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2023)。在 An et al. v. Shan et al., No. 22-cv-10060 (ALC) (S.D.N.Y) 一案中，驳回动议和制裁动议仍在待决。See id. Dkt. Nos. 22, 31。最后，在 Wyatt et al. v. University of Maryland, No. 23-cv-742 (JKB) (D. Md.) 一案中，Chief Judge James K. Bredar（首席法官詹姆斯·K·布雷达）阁下以缺乏管辖权为由，有偏见地驳回了针对被告马里兰大学、Darryll Pines（达里尔·派恩斯）、Joel Dewyer（乔尔·杜耶）和 Bruce Perry（布鲁斯·佩里）的罪名项 I、II、III 和 V，id. Dkt. No. 29，并因未依 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m)（《联邦民事诉讼规则》第 4(m) 条）完成送达而不妨碍再次起诉地驳回了针对其余被告的案件，id. Dkt. No. 34。\n\n法律标准\n\nRule 11 要求律师证明：(1) 诉状或动议“并非为任何不当目的而提出，例如骚扰、造成不必要的拖延，或无谓地增加诉讼成本”；(2)“请求、抗辩及其他法律主张得到现行法律支持，或基于延伸、修改或推翻现行法律或确立新法律的非轻率论证”；以及 (3)“事实主张具有证据支持，或者，如特别指明，在获得进一步调查或证据开示的合理机会后，很可能获得证据支持”。Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)。“Rule 11 的文本仅使‘律师’和‘未由律师代理的当事人’受 Rule 11(b) 限制，这意味着只有该等个人可能违反该规则。”Int'l Techs. Mktg., Inc. v. Cognyte Techs. Israel Ltd., 2022 WL 11280876, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2022)。然而，Rule 11(c)(5) 对法院向由律师代理的当事人实施制裁的权力构成唯一限制：法院不得因由律师代理的当事人作出违反 Rule 11(b)(2) 的轻率法律论证而对其施加金钱制裁。Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(5); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)（“[法院]可以对违反该规则或对该违反行为负有责任的任何律师、律师事务所或当事人施加适当制裁。”）。“毫无疑问，一旦法院认定律师或未由律师代理的当事人违反了 Rule 11(b)，即可对任何‘违反该规则或对该违反行为负有责任的律师、律师事务所或当事人’裁定制裁。”Int'l Techs. Mktg., Inc., 2022 WL 11280876, at *12（原文强调）（引自 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(5)）。\n\n继而，Rule 11(c) 允许法院针对违反 Rule 11(b) 的行为施加“适当制裁”。Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)。依 Rule 11(c) 施加的制裁\n\n必须限于足以阻止该行为或处于类似情形的他人重复该行为的范围。制裁可以包括非金钱性指令；责令向法院缴纳罚金；或者，如系依动议施加且为有效威慑所必要，责令向动议方支付因该违反行为直接导致的部分或全部合理律师费及其他费用。\n\nFed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4)。“当法院认定适宜施加 Rule 11 制裁时，其‘对于应否因违反行为施加制裁以及施加何种制裁，享有重大裁量权。’”E. Gluck Corp. v. Rothenhaus, 2008 WL 2944624, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2008)（引自 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)–(c), Advisory Committee Notes to 1993 Amendment）。\n\n“触发 Rule 11 项下[制裁]的标准是客观不合理性”，Margo v. Weiss, 213 F.3d 55, 65 (2d Cir. 2000)，且“并不以作出该陈述之人的主观信念为基础”，Star Mark Mgmt., Inc. v. Koon Chun Hing Kee Soy & Sauce Factory, Ltd., 682 F.3d 170, 177 (2d Cir. 2012); see also In re Austl. & N.Z. Banking Grp. Ltd. Sec. Litig., 712 F. Supp. 2d 255, 265–66 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)。因此，如律师提交的诉状或动议“属轻率、在法律上不合理，或在事实方面没有基础，即使并非出于主观恶意签署”，即构成违反 Rule 11。Wechsler v. Hunt Health Sys., Ltd., 216 F. Supp. 2d 347, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also Simon DeBartolo Grp., L.P. v. Richard E. Jacobs Grp., Inc., 186 F.3d 157, 167 (2d Cir. 1999)。\n\n讨论\n\nI. 被告已满足安全港规定\n\n动议被告方所提动议提出的门槛问题是，其是否已满足《联邦民事诉讼规则》11条规定的21日安全港期限。11条规定，如被质疑的文书、请求、抗辩、主张或否认在送达后21日内被撤回或得到适当纠正，则制裁动议“不得提交或呈交法院”。Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2)。因此，如在该21日“安全港”期限内，对方当事人“撤回[]或适当纠正[]”所称违规行为，则对方当事人就该违规提交文件免于承担11条责任。Id. 如11条动议针对的是新提交的文件，动议方必须就该违规行为重新发出通知，并给予被指称的违规方额外21日以撤回或纠正。参见 Lawrence v. Richman Grp. of CT LLC（劳伦斯诉康涅狄格州里奇曼集团有限责任公司案）, 620 F.3d 153, 158 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam)（“[W]e conclude that where, as here, a defective complaint is dismissed and a party is granted leave to replead, the filing of an amended pleading resets the clock for compliance with the safe harbor requirements of Rule 11(c)(2) before a party aggrieved by the new filing can present a sanctions motion based on that pleading to the district court.”）。\n\n动议被告方已满足21日安全港规定，且原告提交修订起诉状后，其无需就其动议重新发出通知。动议被告方于 March 29, 2023 向原告送达其动议及支持性文件。Dkt. No. 39 ¶ 2。该动议确定了“所考虑制裁的授权依据；以及……正因其而考虑制裁的具体行为或不作为，以便制裁动议的对象能够准备抗辩”，此为正当程序原则所要求。参见 Star Mark Mgmt., Inc.（星标管理公司）, 682 F.3d at 175。该等文件质疑起诉状违反11条，并具体指出，本案系为骚扰动议被告方而提起，且FARA（《外国代理人登记法》）请求及民权请求均不受事实或法律，或支持扩展现有法律的有充分根据的论证所支持。一般参见 Dkt. No. 37。具体而言，动议被告方指称，针对其的民权及FARA指控“完全由未经修饰的结论构成，没有任何支持性事实材料”，id. at 12；FARA“不提供私人诉权，且不存在推定该项诉权的途径”，亦不存在原告据以具有诉讼资格的依据，id. at 2；且FARA指控在事实层面“前后矛盾”，id. at 21。于 April 20, 2023，即原告被送达11条文件后21日，动议被告方提交了制裁动议。参见 Dkt. No. 39。\n\n原告提交修订起诉状并未使该动议失去意义。原告于 April 14, 2023 获准提交修订起诉状，参见 Dkt. No. 34 at 16，并于 April 26, 2023 提交修订起诉状，参见 Dkt. No. 43。尽管修订起诉状在作为本动议标的的原起诉状中加入了新的、无关的指控，但其并未“撤回”被质疑的诉状，亦未以其他方式“适当纠正[]”该诉状。Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2)。安全港要求的目的在于提供“纠正或撤回有瑕疵的提交文件的机会”，并“减少——即使不能消除——对司法时间和对方资源的不必要支出”。Lawrence, 620 F.3d at 158。包括起诉状在内的诉状，在其被驳回时即被“撤回”，参见 Hockley by Hockley v. Shan Enters. Ltd. P'ship（霍克利诉山企业有限合伙案）, 19 F. Supp. 2d 235, 241 (D.N.J. 1998)（“Since [third-party plaintiff] withdrew its position [in its third party complaint] when it voluntarily dismissed its claims, it is not subject to Rule 11 sanctions.”）；Brown v. Pierce Mfg., Inc.（布朗诉皮尔斯制造公司案）, 169 F.R.D. 118, 119 (E.D. Wis. 1996)（裁定原告在被送达被告依据11条提出的动议后21日内申请驳回有瑕疵起诉状时，不得施加11条制裁）；5A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1337.2 (4th ed., Apr. 2023 Update)（“[A] motion for sanctions will be rejected if the party subject to sanctions files for voluntary dismissal within the twenty-one day safe harbor period, because voluntary dismissal effectively constitutes a withdrawal of the offending paper for purposes of the safe harbor provision.”）；或者，在提交的修订诉状不再主张该项请求时即被“撤回”，参见 Team Obsolete Ltd. V. A.H.R.M.A. Ltd.（过时团队有限公司诉A.H.R.M.A.有限公司案）, 216 F.R.D. 29, 43 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)（裁定原告通过放弃某些请求及某些被告，“有效地撤回[]”了可受制裁的请求）；2 Moore's Federal Practice § 11.22(1)(b)（“Filing a motion for leave to amend a pleading to eliminate challenged claims constitutes effective withdrawal of those claims.”（着重号为原文所加））。\n\n原告并未“撤回”被质疑的起诉状。原告在修订起诉状中继续主张与被质疑起诉状中相同的、据称毫无根据且具有骚扰性的指控及请求。他重申了其请求。原告亦未“适当纠正[]”被质疑的起诉状。当对被质疑请求或诉状所依据的问题予以处理时，该诉状即得到“适当纠正”。例如，参见 Rates Tech. Inc. v. Mediatrix Telecom, Inc.（费率技术公司诉Mediatrix电信公司案）, 2007 WL 1987787, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 29, 2007)（认定法院面临的相关问题并非原告是否在21日安全港期限内申请准许修订，而是“whether the proposed First Amended Complaint corrects the alleged deficiencies in the original Complaint”）。动议被告方并非基于起诉状缺乏关于O'Melveny's（欧麦律师事务所）和Sarnoff（萨诺夫）代表中国实体所作法律工作的充分指控，或缺乏关于PRC（中华人民共和国）对美国利益构成威胁的充分指控而寻求制裁；这些正是修订起诉状新增指控所涉及的主题。参见 Dkt. No. 43 ¶¶ 11–21, 35, 55。动议被告方寻求制裁，是因为起诉状本身系为骚扰动议被告方而提起，FARA请求在法律和事实层面均毫无根据，并且针对动议被告方的1983条及1985(3)条请求，毫无任何指控表明动议被告方与NYPD（纽约市警察局）于 December 20, 2022 的行为有关联。修订起诉状未处理上述任何问题。其提交本身——以及其未处理起诉状缺陷——加重了对动议被告方所称的损害。当事人不能通过增加新的指控或请求、但同时仍“坚持一项已不再站得住脚的立场”而逃避11条制裁。Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)–(c), Advisory Committee Notes to the 1993 Amendment.14\n\n进一步而言，动议被告方在原告提交修订起诉状后，无须就原告诉状的缺陷重新发出通知，亦无须给予原告额外21日以撤回或纠正其据称可受制裁的请求。21日安全港期限具有意义。毫无根据且具有骚扰性的起诉状存续时间越长，损害就越大。该21日与11(a)(1)条规定的准备并提交起诉状答辩状的期限相对应，参见 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)；亦与15(a)(1)条规定的依权利修订诉状的期限相对应，参见 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)。如在《联邦规则》制定者认为足以提交答辩状或修订诉状的期限内，违规方未能纠正已向其指出缺陷的诉状，则该违规方无权免受11条制裁。损害已经造成且仍然存在。\n\n如动议被告方寻求基于修订起诉状实施制裁，则动议被告方本应向原告重新发出通知。一项单独的11条动议并不构成一笔永久存款，能够通知其后无论提交何种文件或文书均可受制裁，而无需通知或听取意见的机会。制裁动议针对具体行为；其“必须说明据称违反Rule 11(b)的具体行为”。Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2)。但在此，被告并非基于修订起诉状寻求制裁；其寻求对原起诉状实施制裁。15 Dkt. No. 38; Dkt. No. 56 at 3。因此，提交修订起诉状并未“重新起算时钟”，Lawrence, 620 F.3d at 158，且动议被告方于 March 29 和 March 30, 2023 向原告的两名律师送达的通知符合11条的要求，参见 Dkt. No. 39。\n\n14 Sacerdote v. Cammack Larhette Advisors, LLC（萨塞尔多特诉卡马克·拉赫特顾问有限责任公司案）, 2022 WL 2078012, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2022) 中的法院称，“because Rule 11 is aimed at addressing particular defective or frivolous documents, a Rule 11 motion aimed at an initial complaint must be re-noticed upon the filing of an amended complaint.”（原文着重）（引文及改动略）。然而，该表述属于附带意见；该案中法院裁定，被告从未就原起诉状提供充分通知，且即便其提供了通知，其11条动议亦会毫无根据。Id. at *9–10。没有理由认为，若已提供适当通知，并且原告——面对11条动议——加倍坚持其可受制裁的行为，法院仍会得出相同结论。\n\nII. 原告的FARA请求毫无根据\n\n法院毫不困难地认定原告的FARA请求毫无根据。“就11条制裁而言，如依‘客观合理性标准’……‘显然……不存在成功的可能性，且不存在任何合理论点可扩展、修改或推翻现行法律’，则该论点构成毫无法律根据的立场。”Galonsky v. Williams（加隆斯基诉威廉斯案）, 1997 WL 759445, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 1997)（引自 Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole–CNCA v. Valcorp, Inc.（法国农业信贷国民银行—CNCA诉Valcorp公司案）, 28 F.3d 259, 264 (2d Cir.1995)）。尽管“Rule 11 provides room for litigants to make ‘nonfrivolous argument[s] for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law,’”Doe v. 239 Park Ave. S. Assocs., LLC（多伊诉南公园大道239号联合有限公司案）, 2022 WL 4592713, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2022)（引自 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2)），但在“依现有先例，一项请求绝无成功可能性显而易见，且无法提出任何合理论点以扩展、修改或推翻现行法律”时，即违反该规则，Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York（伊斯特韦建筑公司诉纽约市案）, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985), superseded on other grounds by rule。该标准是客观的。违规方以纯洁的心灵但空空如也的头脑行事，并非抗辩理由。参见 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)–(c), Advisory Committee Notes to the 1993 Amendment。在确定是否违反11条时，须考虑“当事人就争点所作研究的程度，以及其即使在少数意见、法律评论文章中，或通过咨询其他律师，是否已为其理论找到支持”。Id.\n\n原告在此提出的 FARA（《外国代理人登记法》）主张毫无胜诉可能，且在客观上属轻率主张。原告承认，FARA 法规中不存在明确的“私人诉权”条款，Dkt. No. 2 ¶ 178，并且其所依据的是法院应推定国会意图设立此类诉权的观点。然而，本巡回区及其他地区审理过该问题的每一法院均认定，不得从 FARA 中推定私人诉权。参见，例如，Dvoinik v. Rolff, 2023 WL 3276398, at *5 (M.D. Fla. May 5, 2023)（“法定制度中没有任何内容表明有意为违反 FARA 的行为设立私人诉因。”）；Henry v. Washington, 2022 WL 9491957, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 16, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 9372175 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 14, 2022)（“该法未规定私人诉因，因此原告不能就违反该法提起诉讼。”）；Bey v. Epstein, 2021 WL 8155603, at *9 (D. Conn. Aug. 6, 2021)（“不得从 FARA 中推断出私人诉权。”）；Weican Meng v. Xinhuanet Co., 2017 WL 3175609, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2017)（认定 FARA 不包含私人诉权）；Comm. for a Free Namibia v. S. W. Afr. People's Org., 554 F. Supp. 722, 725 (D.D.C. 1982).\n\n原告主张，由于“该法规对设立私人诉权保持沉默”，法院可以自由推定国会意图创设私人诉权，Dkt. No. 45 at 14 ¶ 66，这一主张只凸显了其律师在提出该项主张之前完全未对其依据进行研究。至少自美国最高法院（Supreme Court）四十四年前在 Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 571 (1979) 中作出裁决以来，最高法院已明确指出：当国会对于其设立私人诉因的意图保持沉默，且无法从法规结构或立法史中找到此种依据时，法院不能仅仅推定存在此种诉因。另参见 Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 25 (1977)（审查“立法史，以辨明具体法定禁止规定背后的国会目的”，从而确定“通过司法解释创设默示诉因……是否为实现国会目标所必需”）。事实上，二十年前，最高法院认定，除非联邦法律从其文义上“表明意图‘不仅创设私人权利，而且创设私人救济’”，法院不得推定私人诉权。Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284 (2002)（引自 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001)）；另参见 Olmsted v. Pruco Life Ins. Co., 283 F.3d 429, 432 (2d Cir. 2002)（“法院……通常不能在未明确规定诉权的情况下，认定国会意图创设诉权。”）。 “最高法院日益不赞成在监管法规中推定私人救济。”Republic of Iraq v. ABB AG, 768 F.3d 145, 170 (2d Cir. 2014)（引自 Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P. v. Gotham Partners, L.P., 286 F.3d 613, 618 (2d Cir. 2002)）。最高法院“已在一系列案件中澄清，在决定是否承认默示诉因时，‘决定性’问题是法定意图问题。”Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 131 (2017)（引自 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286）。国会必须已“‘明确无误地授予’原告所属受益人类别以‘个人权利’”。Health & Hosp. Corp. v. Talevski, 143 S. Ct. 1444, 1457 (2023)（引自 Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 285–86）。因此，“默示诉权不受青睐。”Moya v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 975 F.3d 120, 128 (2d Cir. 2020)（拒绝认定《康复法》项下针对行政机构的私人诉权）。自 Ziglar 以来，第二巡回上诉法院（Second Circuit）仅在一案中认定存在默示诉权，且仅在认定“该文本……明确无误地表明国会意图授权私人诉讼”并且该法规“还确认了因该诉权可得性而受益的‘一类人’”之后，才作出该认定。Oxford Univ. Bank v. Lansuppe Feeder, LLC, 933 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 2019).\n\n无论在其起诉状中、在其对驳回动议的反对意见中，还是在其对 Rule 11 动议的反对意见中，原告均未指出任何理由，使人相信 FARA 会成为众多法院已认定不存在私人诉权的监管法规中的例外。FARA 最初制定的目的，是“通过要求代表或为外国政府、外国政党及其他外国委托人从事宣传活动的人员公开披露信息，以保护美国的国防、国内安全及外交关系。”Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 469 (1987)（引自 Amendment to Foreign Agents Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 77-532, 56 Stat. 248, 248–49 (Apr. 29, 1942)）。为此，FARA 要求其中定义的外国代理人向总检察长提交所需文件，22 U.S.C. § 612(a)，并赋予“总检察长向适当的美国地区法院申请禁令命令，以禁止该等[违法]行为”的权力，22 U.S.C. § 618(f)。此外，第 618(e) 条“将未满足……第 612(a) 和 612(b) 条的要求[即未登记]定为犯罪。”United States v. McGoff, 831 F.2d 1071, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1987)。所有这些执法权均归属于总检察长，而非私人当事人。并且，“原告不能指出该法规或其立法史中的任何文字，表明国会意图在联邦政府以外的任何实体中设立诉因。”Comm. for a Free Namibia, 554 F. Supp. at 725.\n\n原告所能提出的最佳论点是：（1）“迄今为止，只有地区法院就该问题发表意见，且尚无上诉法院或最高法院的裁决”，Dkt. No. 2 ¶ 178；以及（2）“一直缺乏执法行动——从而导致宪法权利受到侵犯，并且公然无视法治”，id. ¶ 179。然而，第二巡回上诉法院或最高法院并非必须已明确驳回某一论点，地区法院才有权认定该论点属轻率主张。提交至上诉法院的争议数量有限，更不用说提交至最高法院的争议。这些法院没有资源处理每一个轻率问题。因此，一项主张此前未被巡回上诉法院驳回，并不当然赋予原告提出该项主张的许可；同样，某一问题此前已被巡回上诉法院审理并驳回这一事实，也不必然阻止之后的原告提出该问题。任何时候，关键问题均不在于巡回上诉法院或最高法院是否已直接就某一特定问题作出表态——问题在于，该主张是否“得到现行法律的支持，或者得到关于扩展、修改或推翻现行法律，或确立新法律的非轻率论点的支持。”Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2)。如果该主张得到现行法律或关于扩展、修改或推翻现行法律的非轻率论点的支持，当事人可在不违反 Rule 11(b)(2) 的情况下提出该主张。如未获此种支持，该诉状可受制裁。\n\n原告关于其有权执行 FARA、因为美国政府未充分执行该法的主张同样不能成立；原告仅因不同意美国总检察长的执法决定，并不会取得代替其行使职权的权利。原告“在任何时候均未提出任何权威依据或连贯解释，说明其为何拥有”私人诉权，因此该主张“在客观上属轻率主张。”Thompson v. Steinberg, 2021 WL 3914079, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2021), aff'd, 2023 WL 353359 (2d Cir. Jan. 23, 2023)；另参见 Biocad JSC v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., 2022 WL 268102, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2022)（因“若干法院……此前已”作出不利于该法律论点的裁决，而原告“未援引任何一个案件”说明该法律论点为何仍然可行，故施加制裁）。\n\n此外，即使法院以某种方式认定 FARA 向任何私人当事人赋予诉权，原告也从未阐明其能够提出 FARA 主张的依据。正如法院在驳回原告修正起诉状中 FARA 主张的意见书中所认定，原告“未主张与其关于被告违反”FARA 的指控相关的任何损害，也未主张任何潜在损害“可追溯至被告未依 FARA 登记，或强制登记的确认判决将如何补救其所主张的损害。”Gong v. Sarnoff, 2023 WL 4561800, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2023)。同一结论同样完全适用于起诉状。\n\n最后，原告的指控缺乏证据支持，且没有理由相信其会得到证据支持。原告主张，“O'Melveny（奥梅尔文尼律师事务所）受制于 CCP，因而实施 CCP 要求的任何行为——包括在美国境内实施的、将要求作为外国代理人向美国政府登记的行为。”Dkt. No. 2 ¶ 47。原告进一步主张，CCP 在美国未登记的代理人“现被认为是被告 Sarnoff、被告 O'Melveny 和被告 Stanton。”Id. ¶ 64。然而，为支持针对申请动议的被告的这些主张而提出的唯一事实指控是：他们曾代表一家中国公司提供法律服务，id. ¶¶ 25–26；以及 O'Melveny 在 PRC 设有办事处，并从该等办事处与一个“可能对该国具有重大影响”的实体开展“利润丰厚”的业务，id. ¶¶ 42–43。然而，FARA 免除以下人员的登记义务：（1）“任何仅……为促进该外国委托人的真实贸易或商业而从事或同意从事私人及非政治活动的人员”，22 U.S.C. § 613(d)；以及（2）“任何具备执业律师资格的人员，只要其在任何法院或美国政府任何机构前从事或同意从事对已披露外国委托人的法律代理”，id. § 613(g)。此外，“外国委托人的代理人”仅被定义为适用于代理人在“美国境内”实施的活动。Id. § 611(c)。不存在任何事实指控表明 O'Melveny 或 Sarnoff 采取了任何属于 FARA 适用范围且不受 FARA 豁免条款涵盖的行为。\n\nIII. 原告以不当目的提起本案\n\n《联邦民事诉讼规则》第11条允许法院在诉状系“出于任何不当目的，例如骚扰、造成不必要的拖延，或无端增加诉讼成本”而提交时施加制裁。Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1); 另见 Fox v. Boucher, 794 F.2d 34, 37–38 (2d Cir. 1986)（《联邦民事诉讼规则》第11条“允许在律师未经合理调查或在没有支持其所提出论点的依据的情况下，签署为不当目的而提出的诉状时施加制裁。”）。“积极辩护与滥用法律制度之间存在一条明确界线，律师不得逾越。”Galonsky v. Williams, 1997 WL 759445, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 1997)（援引 Baffa v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 222 F.3d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 2000)）。但是，“一方当事人不应仅因其寻求并获得有正当根据的司法救济的多重目的之一可能不当，而因此受到处罚或被阻却寻求和获得该等救济。”Sussman v. Bank of Isr., 56 F.3d 450, 459 (2d Cir. 1995); 另见 In re Firestar Diamond, Inc., 634 B.R. 265, 308 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2021)（“尽管对‘不当目的’和‘无理取闹性’的审查彼此独立且有区别，但二者往往重叠；法院已认定，如起诉状并非无理取闹，则其并非为不当目的而提出。”）。然而，“如结合原告在诉讼期间及诉讼外的行为来看，一项起诉状毫无依据至足以表明该诉讼背后存在隐秘动机，法院可以推断其具有不当目的。”An, 2023 WL 4931832, at *6。\n\n本院亦毫不困难地认定，本案原告出于不当目的提起本案。起诉状中针对动议被告的指控和请求在法律上属于无理取闹，在事实方面亦存在缺陷。原告基于 FARA 提出的主张完全没有事实和法律依据，并可独立地受到制裁。见上文第二节。原告依据 Sections 1983 and 1985 提出的主张同样毫无根据。16 原告称，其被 Stanton 的汽车撞击而受伤，Dkt. No. 2 ¶ 96；未提交警方报告，id. ¶ 108；且 NYPD 妨碍其获得医疗救助，id. ¶¶ 112–19。然而，原告从未主张任何事实以支持动议被告参与了 2022年12月20日的事件、行使了国家权力，或与警方共同行动。他也未主张有任何理由相信存在该等证据。见 Gutierrez v. Fox, 141 F.3d 425, 427 (2d Cir. 1998)（第11条“明确且毫不含糊地对每名律师施加积极义务，要求其在签署诉状之前，就该诉状是否成立进行合理调查。”）。没有理由相信任一动议被告参与了所称不当行为。起诉状没有任何非结论性的指控表明，在所称不当行为发生时任一动议被告在场，或 Stanton 或 NYPD 是依动议被告的指示行事。\n\n16 在本院就动议被告要求驳回原告修正起诉状的动议所作的意见和命令中，本院依据 Rule 12(b)(6)，以未能提出可获救济的请求为由，有偏见地驳回了原告依据 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3) 提出的主张；该等主张所依据的指控与起诉状中提出的指控在实质上相同。\n\n事实上，在首次审前会议期间，当被问及其认为“Sarnoff 和 O'Melveny 实际上确实与警方串通”的依据为何时，原告的律师 Richard Freeth 以推测和臆断作答。见 Craig v. City of New York, 2022 WL 2238451, at *6, *12 (E.D.N.Y. June 22, 2022)（起诉状若“基于臆测和推测”，即可受到制裁）；另见 Katzman v. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, 167 F.R.D. 649, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)（“[起诉状]完全缺乏实质内容，足以推断该诉讼是为不当目的而提起。”）。该律师称，他“会设想”动议被告与 Stanton 有联系，并称“可以理解，您知道，处于其地位的被告[Sarnoff 和 O'Melveny]会派人至少去观察、获取信息。”Dkt. No. 34 at 6–7。想象属于猜测；它并不允许一个人以违反可通过刑事处罚执行的法律为由起诉某一方。起诉状同样没有就 Stanton 与警方的联系作出任何指控；尽管其称 Stanton“表示其为 NYPD 工作或与 NYPD 有某种联系”，但其结论称，“根据所获信息和信念，被告 Stanton 并非 NYPD 的警员。”Dkt. No. 2 ¶¶ 80, 82。此外，在被要求澄清本案中的国家行为究竟是什么时，Freeth 表示，当原告“在与一辆车辆发生接触后倒在街上”时，警方没有“采取任何行动”，这“看起来很奇怪，[对我而言]似乎非常，您知道，可疑。”Dkt. No. 34 at 8–9。针对本院提出的证据开示是否会帮助“原告维持本起诉状”的问题，原告律师答道：“嗯，也许会，也许最终会发现没有任何东西支持[起诉状]。我不知道。”Dkt. No. 34 at 9。\n\n有充分理由相信，并且本院认定，提起起诉状并非为了救济原告于 2022年12月20日遭受的任何损害，或获得司法救济，而是为了因动议被告在针对 Kwok（郭文贵）的诉讼中代理客户而骚扰动议被告，并阻止他人采取同样行为。原告及其律师 Zhang 与 Kwok 有关联，并同情其本人及其利益。见上文第12–14页。原告在 Sarnoff 住所外的一场抗议活动中遭受其所称损害。见 Dkt. No. 2 ¶ 71。他此前曾参加在 O'Melveny 办公室外举行的抗议活动。Id. ¶ 67。本院不接受原告参加这些抗议活动完全或甚至主要是因为动议被告代理中国客户或在中国设有办公室的说法。许多其他律师事务所在美国的诉讼中代理中国客户，并且在中国设有办公室（或直至最近仍设有办公室）。这些抗议活动专门针对动议被告，并且是在动议被告协助一名客户提起针对 Kwok 的诉讼之后专门针对动议被告。不可避免的推断是，原告参加这些抗议活动，是因为动议被告向其客户提供了针对 Kwok 的协助，并旨在阻止和防止动议被告继续这样做。\n\n原告反对制裁动议的书状所用语言，进一步强化了本案是为骚扰动议被告、因其代理 PAX 而惩罚其，并阻止他人也代理利益与 Kwok 相对立的客户而提起的结论。原告主张，动议被告的指控具有“轻蔑性”，因为其“暗示原告只是 Kwok 先生的一名头脑空空的追随者。”Dkt. No. 45 ¶ 13。在其反对书状中，他没有任何地方否认自己是 Kwok 的追随者，也没有提出任何超出最表面和结论性论述的主张，以证明本案系出于除因动议被告参与 PAX 诉讼和破产法院诉讼而骚扰动议被告以外的理由提起。17 事实上，其反对书状中有31个段落专门论述 Kwok 如何受到 CCP 和美国政府的不公平针对、PAX 诉讼和破产程序如何构成针对 Kwok 的某一更广泛阴谋的一部分，以及 CCP 如何将“美国法院武器化”以“针对 Kwok 先生。”Id. ¶¶ 15–46。\n\n17 原告主张，其“提起本案是因为其宪法权利受到侵犯[且]其感到受到 CCP 及其代理人、协助者和/或共同阴谋者的威胁。”Id. ¶ 52。然而，如上文详述，就动议被告而言，该论点被针对其提出的主张之无理取闹性所否定。\n\n即便对本案的骚扰目的存有任何疑问，Zhang 和 Freeth 在本院及其他法院针对 PAX、与 PAX 有关联的人士、PAX 的律师以及协助破产法院者提起诉讼的历史，也足以消除该等疑问。“尽管一方当事人不应仅因‘更频繁地提起诉讼’而受到制裁，但如重复提交文件与‘客观上不合理的陈述’相结合，法院可以推断存在不当目的。”LCS Grp., LLC v. Shire LLC, 2019 WL 1234848, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2019), judgment aff'd, appeal dismissed in part sub nom. LCS Grp., LLC v. Shire Dev. LLC, 2022 WL 1217961 (2d Cir. Apr. 26, 2022)（引用 Storey v. Cello Holdings, LLC, 347 F.3d 370, 393 (2d Cir. 2003)）；另见 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)–(c), Advisory Committee Notes to 1993 Amendment（指出，在确定是否施加制裁以及施加何种制裁时，“该人”——而非特指“诉讼当事人”——“是否在其他诉讼中实施过类似行为……在特定案件中可以成为适当的考量因素”）。原告律师已在本院和 District of Maryland（马里兰联邦地区法院）反复从事无理取闹的诉讼。见上文第14–16页。这些案件明确针对参与 Kwok 破产程序或 PAX 诉讼的当事人和律师。它们包含类似指控以及同样无理取闹的主张。不可避免的结论是，Zhang 和 Freeth 正在针对利益与 Kwok 相对立者，目的在于压制他们所认为的针对 Kwok 的辩护活动。Zhang 和 Freeth 所提起诉讼中的原告本可就涉嫌违反 FARA 登记要求一事，向在 PRC 从事类似活动并为 PRC 公司从事活动的众多个人和实体寻求救济，但他们没有这样做。他们只追究参与 Kwok 破产程序或 PAX 诉讼的个人和实体。尽管该结论在本案中并非决定性的，但其进一步支持本院关于制裁必要且应适用于原告律师的认定。见 Billewicz v. Town of Fair Haven, 2022 WL 4115966, at *13 (D. Vt. Aug. 11, 2022), aff'd, 2023 WL 3961437 (2d Cir. June 13, 2023)（“这种反复诉讼表明存在滥用诉讼的模式，并引发对不当动机的推断。”）。\n\n最后，以下推论因原告及其代理律师未能在本院促请其这样做之前，追究原告所称因侵犯其宪法权利而对其造成损害之人——纽约市警察局（NYPD）及其警员——而得到进一步印证：本诉讼并非为获得司法救济而提起，而是因为PAX的律师是PAX的律师，故意骚扰PAX的律师。原告的起诉状于January 18, 2023获准立案，见Dkt. No. 2；约一个月后，即February 23, 2023，原告请求就提出动议的被告及Stanton（斯坦顿）签发传票，见Dkt. Nos. 5–7。原告当时或在规定的90日期限内，均未向纽约市（City of New York）或任何据称参与December 20事件的警员送达或试图送达文书——原告称其为主要侵权人。原告仅于March 20, 2023向提出动议的被告及Stanton送达传票和起诉状。Dkt. No. 18。事实上，直至四个多月后，原告才向本案中列名为被告的国家行为人送达文书，见Dkt. Nos. 59, 64；即便如此，也是在本院指出该瑕疵并命令原告说明为何不应根据Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m)因未向纽约市及被列名的警员——Lauren A. Duffy（劳伦·A·达菲）——送达文书而驳回本案之后，见Dkt. No. 58。有充分理由相信，若本院未签发说明理由令，纽约市将永远不会被送达文书。因此，也有充分理由相信，原告并非因其对纽约市警察局行为所致的纽约市不满，或为了就其所称因纽约市警察局行为而遭受的损害获得救济，而提起本诉讼。不可避免的推论是，他提起本诉讼是为了骚扰并威慑O'Melveny（欧迈律师事务所）和Sarnoff（萨诺夫），缘由是他们代表一名与Kwok（郭文贵）利益相对立的客户所实施的行为，而非原告于December 20, 2020遭受的任何损害。\n\nIV. 制裁裁定\n\nRule 11规定，如法院在给予通知及合理答辩机会后认定Rule 11(b)已被违反，法院可“施加适当制裁”。“根据[Rule 11]施加的制裁必须限于足以威慑该行为或处境相似者实施类似行为之重复的范围。”Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4)。不过，“根据Rule 11，地区法院仍享有广泛裁量权，可基于特定案件的事实和情况制定适当制裁。”Colliton v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, 2008 WL 4386764, at \\*15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2008), aff'd, 356 F. App'x 535 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Lawrence v. Wilder Richman Sec. Corp., 417 F. App'x 11, 15 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[A] district court has 'broad discretion' to 'tailor[ ] appropriate and reasonable sanctions under [R]ule 11,' including an award of attorney's fees where warranted.” (internal citations omitted) (quoting O'Malley v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 896 F.2d 704, 709 (2d Cir. 1990))).\n\n审议制裁的法院必须注意避免寒蝉效应，避免压制正当的诉讼代理。基于正当法律论据，或基于相信现行法律将被推翻的有充分根据的信念，追究被认为支持PRC的人员，本身并无不当之处。但本案原告及其律师并非试图利用法律制度维护权利；他们试图利用法律制度压制法律代理活动，并因提出动议的被告与某一特定客户的关联而骚扰该等被告。正是这种行为，加上原告FARA主张的轻率性，构成施加制裁的理由。\n\n提出动议的被告请求本院命令Zhang（张）及Freeth（弗里斯）“支付被告Sarnoff先生及O'Melveny为抗辩本案所发生的一切律师费和费用。”18 Dkt. No. 37。本院认定，裁定支付为抗辩本案所产生的律师费和费用——但不包括为提出提出动议的被告根据Rule 11提出的动议所产生的费用——并不超过“威慑该行为或处境相似者实施类似行为之重复”所必需的范围。Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4)。该等费用和律师费应由Freeth、Zhang及原告承担。See An v. Despins, 2023 WL 4931832, at \\*8（认定应就“律师承担主要责任的问题”对原告律师施加制裁，例如确保所提交的起诉状达到最低实体依据门槛，并提出充分事实以确立事项管辖权（原文修改）（引自United Republic Ins. Co., in Receivership v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 315 F.3d 168, 171 (2d Cir. 2003)））。提出动议的被告须于本命令之日起十四日内提交费用和成本申请。\n\nFreeth主张其无力支付提出动议的被告的律师费和费用。在此阶段考虑支付能力是适当的。See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4)（“根据本规则施加的制裁必须限于足以威慑该行为或处境相似者实施类似行为之重复的范围。”）；see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)–(c),\n\n18 尽管Zhang尚未在本诉讼中出庭，但其与Freeth共同签署了起诉状，因而“在经合理调查后，依其在当时情形下所能获得的最佳知识、信息和信念，[向本院]作出证明。”Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)。Rule 11(c)允许法院对“违反该规则或应对该违反行为负责的任何律师、律师事务所或当事人”施加制裁。Fed. R. C. P. 11(c)(1)。该规则并未将法院对律师施加制裁的权力限于已在案件中出庭的律师。本院认定，Zhang与Freeth共同应对本意见和命令中详述的Rule 11违反行为负责。\n\n1993 Amendment的Advisory Committee Notes（指出，在确定是否施加制裁以及施加何种制裁时，“鉴于负责人员的财务资源，需要何种数额以威慑该人员在同一案件中再次实施该行为；需要何种数额以威慑其他诉讼参与人从事类似活动……在特定案件中可能是适当的考量因素”）；Star Mark Mgmt., Inc., 682 F.3d at 179（指出“地区法院拥有基于无支付能力而降低制裁金额的广泛裁量权”）；Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1281 (2d Cir. 1986)（“[鉴于制裁的根本目的——惩罚偏离适当行为标准的行为，以促进未来遵守并威慑进一步违反——地区法院完全有裁量权，通过平衡考量违法律师的支付能力，酌减对其裁定的金额。”）。因此，自费用和成本申请提交之日起七日内，原告及其律师可以提交其希望本院在分摊（或不分摊）费用裁定时考虑的任何信息。19\n\n此外，Zhang和Freeth各须向本院缴纳\\$2,500罚款，以补偿就起诉状进行诉讼给本院及其工作人员造成的负担，并威慑二人在未来提起此类轻率且骚扰性的诉讼。See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)–(c), Advisory Committee Notes to 1993 Amendment（指出，“法院可就违反行为施加多种可能的制裁，例如……命令缴纳应付法院的罚款”）。该等款项应于本意见和命令之日起十四日内缴付纽约南区（Southern District of New York）法院书记员，并应在案卷中提交付款证明。\n\n19 如有必要，提出动议的被告可在原告作出任何答复后两个工作日内请求准许提交答辩状。\n\n提出动议的被告还请求一项命令，“禁止原告、原告律师及与其积极共同行动者，未经法院许可提起其他类似诉讼。”Dkt. No. 37。“如诉讼参与人有提起无理取闹、骚扰性或重复性诉讼的历史，法院可施加制裁，包括限制其日后进入司法体系。”Hong Mai Sa v. Doe, 406 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)。法院在“限制诉讼参与人日后进入法院”时应考虑的因素包括：\n\n(1) 该诉讼参与人的诉讼历史，尤其是其中是否包括无理取闹、骚扰性或重复性诉讼；(2) 该诉讼参与人推进诉讼的动机，例如，该诉讼参与人是否客观上善意地预期胜诉？；(3) 该诉讼参与人是否由律师代理；(4) 该诉讼参与人是否给其他当事人造成不必要的费用，或给法院及其工作人员造成不必要的负担；以及(5) 其他制裁是否足以保护法院及其他当事人。\n\nIwachiw v. N.Y. State Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 396 F.3d 525, 528 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Safir v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 19, 24 (2d Cir. 1986))。“最终，法院必须回答的问题是：具有无理取闹诉讼历史的诉讼参与人，是否可能继续滥用司法程序并骚扰其他当事人。”Newman v. Jewish Agency for Isr., 2017 WL 6628616, at \\*6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2017), aff'd sub nom. Eliahu v. Jewish Agency for Isr., 919 F.3d 709 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Safir, 792 F.2d at 24).\n\n本院认定，依据目前记录，发布禁诉令既不适当亦无必要。尽管本院已认定原告提起本诉是为骚扰提出动议的被告，并且原告及其律师对在本诉中胜诉并无客观上的善意预期，但提出动议的被告并未指出原告出于骚扰目的提起的任何其他诉讼，亦未指出如不予禁令，原告本人将继续提起此类骚扰性诉讼的现实风险。至于原告律师，尽管他们似乎在数起诉讼中反复从事轻率且骚扰性的诉讼活动，但据本院所知，自Honorable Valerie E. Caproni（瓦莱丽·E·卡普罗尼法官）目前审理的案件中对其裁定制裁以来，他们尚未提起其他诉讼，见An et al. v. Despins et al., No. 22-cv-10062 (VEC) (S.D.N.Y.)。提出动议的被告自身亦承认，他们并未寻求移交任何有权限制提出动议的被告执业的纪律委员会，本院根据当前记录亦未发现如此做的依据。律师在被指控违反Rule 11之后（且尚未有任何司法认定其确有此等违反行为之前）仍继续进行诉讼，不足以构成对其代表未来客户提起案件的能力施加任何限制的依据。\n\n在口头辩论期间，提出动议的被告请求本院命令原告从修正起诉状中删除针对他们的指控；如原告选择继续追究其针对其他被告的主张，则要求其在继续追究之前提交修正起诉状。原告律师未反对该请求。提出动议的被告须在其支持律师费和费用的备忘录中，指明应从起诉状及修正起诉状中删除的段落。原告可在其后两周内作出答复。See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)–(c), Advisory Committee Notes to 1993 Amendment（“法院可就违反行为施加多种可能的制裁，例如删除违法文书。”）。\n\n最后，本院将要求原告、Zhang及Freeth自本意见和命令之日起一年内，在其日后提起的所有诉讼中提交本意见和命令的副本。\n\n结论\n\n制裁动议部分准许，部分驳回。责令提出该动议的被告最迟于本《意见与命令》之日起十四日内提交关于合理费用及律师费的申请。如 Zhang（张）、Freeth（弗里思）及原告希望提交法院尚未收到的证据，则应在对提出该动议的被告关于合理律师费及费用的申请提出任何异议时一并提交，并应于该申请提交之日起七日内完成。\n\n谨此责成法院书记员关闭案卷编号 36。\n\n特此命令。\n\n纽约州纽约市 LEWIS J. LIMAN（刘易斯·J·利曼）\n\n日期：August 22, 2023 ___________________________________________\n\n美国联邦地区法院法官","key_entities":["Kwok","Je","CCP","CIPA","Despins","Guo","Chinese Communist Party","Paul Hastings","Ho Wan Kwok","GETTR","Luc Despins","RICO"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":1,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":18,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":19,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":20,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":29,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":33,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":34,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":36,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":37,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":38,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":39,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":41,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":43,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":44,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":45,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":51,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":54,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":56,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":57,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":58,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":63,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":66,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":67,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":72,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":13355,"status":"published","published_at":"2023-08-25 00:00:00","created_at":"2023-08-25","updated_at":"2026-08-23 21:36:31"}