{"id":"court_ctb_2145_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":2145,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION | -------------------------------------------","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| ----------------------------------------------------------- |          | x           |                         |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-------------|-------------------------|\n| In re:                                                      |          | :<br>:      | Chapter 11              |\n| 1<br>HO WAN KWOK,<br>et al.,                                |          | :<br>:      | Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |\n|                                                             | Debtors. | :<br>:<br>: | (Jointly Administered)  |\n| ----------------------------------------------------------  |          | x           |                         |\n\n# **REPLY OF CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE TO GREENWICH LAND LLC AND HING CHI NGOK'S OBJECTION TO CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE'S SIXTH SUPPLEMENTAL OMNIBUS RULE 2004 MOTION**\n\nLuc A. Despins, in his capacity as the chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") appointed in the above-captioned chapter 11 case (the \"Chapter 11 Case\") of Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"), hereby submits this reply (the \"Reply\") in support of the Trustee's *Sixth Supplemental Omnibus Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee for Entry of Order Under Bankruptcy Rule 2004 and Local Rule 2004-1 Authorizing Discovery with Respect to Additional Entities and Individuals Affiliated with Debtor and Relevant Banks* [ECF No. 2079] (the \"Sixth Rule 2004 Motion\") and in response to Greenwich Land, LLC's (\"Greenwich Land\") and Hing Chi Ngok's (\"Ms. Ngok\" and, together with Greenwich Land, collectively, the \"Objectors\") *Objection* thereto [ECF No. 2098] (the \"Objection\"). In Reply to the Objection, the Trustee respectfully states the following:\n\n1. This Court has twice held that a Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2004 (\"Rule\n\n2004\") investigation of an entity that is not a party to an adversary proceeding is not forbidden by\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and the Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\nthe pending proceeding rule. Yet, the Objectors (again) object for that very reason to the Sixth Rule 2004 Motion in a continuing effort to interfere with the Trustee's investigation of connections between Rule 2004 subpoena targets and the Debtor's estate (the \"Estate\").\n\n2. The Objection is a near carbon copy of the rationale offered by the Objectors in their objection to the Fifth Rule 2004 Motion (as hereinafter defined). Despite the Court's prior rulings now being law of the case twice over, the Objectors recycle the same arguments to again oppose a Rule 2004 investigation of entities they do not represent.\n\n#### **BRIEF BACKGROUND**\n\n3. On August 17, 2023, counsel for the Trustee met-and-conferred telephonically with counsel for the Objectors regarding this Objection. Objectors stated that they intended to object based on the already rejected argument that the Trustee may not conduct a Rule 2004 investigation of an entity that is not a party to adversary proceeding number 23-05005 (the \"Adversary Proceeding\") if any subject matter of the investigation implicates the Adversary Proceeding.\n\n4. Trustee's counsel reminded Objectors' counsel that the Court has already twice rejected that argument. Moreover, the Trustee noted that, contrary to the first time this issue arose before the Court—when the target of the Rule 2004 investigation was a company directly related to the yacht at issue in the Lady May case—here, any reference to Greenwich Land was part of a comprehensive effort to ensure that the scope of the Trustee's Rule 2004 investigation covered all likely assets of the Estate. The Trustee stated that any objection by the Objectors would merely serve to waste the Estate's and the Court's time and resources. The Objectors stated that they intended to object anyway.\n\n5. The law of the case on this matter is clear. Last November, a different combination of family member and shell company associated with the Debtor (*i.e.*, Mei Guo and HK\n\n2\n\nInternational Funds Investment (USA) Ltd., LLC (the \"Prior Objectors\")) objected to the Trustee's\n\n*Second Supplemental Omnibus Motion for 2004 Examination* for substantially the same reasons\n\nas those that premise the instant Objection.\n\n6. Following briefing and a lengthy hearing, the Court conclusively rejected the Prior\n\nObjectors' arguments:\n\nUpon consideration of the pleadings, the arguments advanced at the hearing, the facts and circumstances of this case, and the applicable law, the Court finds the pending proceeding doctrine is not a bar to the examinations of Apsley Yachts Ltd. and DWF LLP because they are not parties to the pending adversary *HK Int'l Funds Invs. (USA) Ltd., LLC v. Despins ex rel. Kwok*, Case No. 22-05003 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022). *Compare In re SunEdison*, 572 B.R. 482, 490 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017) (\"The Debtors are not parties to the State Court Action, and hence, the rule does not apply to them.\"); *In re Washington Mutual, Inc.*, 408 B.R. 45, 53 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009) (\"The possibility that JPM may intervene in the DC Action is not a sufficient reason to deny the Debtors' Motion at this time. The 'pending proceeding' rule is predicated on there actually being a pending action involving the two parties. JPM has not cited any authority for the proposition that a Rule 2004 examination of an entity is improper when a proceeding is pending in another venue against a third party and there is a 'substantial likelihood' that the examinee may intervene.\") (internal citations omitted); *In re Ecam Publications, Inc.*, 131 B.R. 556, 560–61 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1991) (allowing 2004 examination by trustee of parties, against whom the trustee had bought but not yet brought claims) *with In re Martelli*, Nos. 16-20983- PRW, 16-20316-PRW, 16-20968-PRW, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 2015, at \\*12-13 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. July 20, 2017) (applying pending proceeding rule to nonparties to that proceeding because the material was sought by a party to the proceeding and was related to the proceeding); *In re Enron Corp.*, 281 B.R. 836, 838 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) (applying pending proceeding rule to a non-party to that proceeding because \"no party disputes that the automatic discovery stay of the [Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(3)(B)] applies to McKinsey.\"); *cf. In re Cambridge Analytica, LLC*, 600 B.R. 750 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019) (unclear who was the target of the 2004 examination); *In re Bennett Funding Grp., Inc.*, 203 B.R. 24, 30 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1996) (applying pending proceeding rule where discovery was sought by a party to the proceeding against a third-party defendant to that proceeding); *Sweetland v. Szadkowski (In re Szadkowski)*, 198 B.R. 140 (Bankr. D. Md. 1996) (applying pending proceeding doctrine a party to the proceeding was seeking discovery against another party to that proceeding.).\n\n*Order Granting Chapter 11 Trustee's Second Supplemental Omnibus Motion for 2004*\n\n*Examination* [ECF No. 1184] (the \"First Prior Decision\").\n\n7. Rather than respecting the First Prior Decision, on May 22, 2023, the Objectors recycled the Prior Objectors' arguments in objecting [ECF No. 1813] (the \"Second Prior Objection\") to the Trustee's *Fifth Supplemental Omnibus Motion for Entry of an Order Under Rule 2004 Authorizing Discovery with Respect to Additional Entities and Individuals Affiliated with the Debtor, and Entities Doing Business with the Debtor and Affiliated Entities* [ECF No.\n\n1789] (the \"Fifth Rule 2004 Motion\").<sup>2</sup>\n\n8. On June 7, 2023, the Court granted the Fifth Rule 2004 Motion and overruled the Objectors' Second Prior Objection (the \"Second Prior Decision\" and, together with the First Prior Decision, collectively, the \"Prior Decisions\"). The Court noted that the basis for its decision was set forth in the First Prior Order and further stated that the Court \"continues to be persuaded by the case-law\" holding that the pending proceeding doctrine precludes discovery through a Fed. R.\n\nBankr. P. 2004 examination\n\n*only where the proposed examiner and examinee are parties to a pending proceeding* and discovery in that proceeding must be conducted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the analogous part VII rules of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. *Compare In re SunEdison*, 572 B.R. 482, 490 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017) (\"The Debtors are not parties to the State Court Action, and hence, the rule does not apply to them.\"); *In re Washington Mutual, Inc.*, 408 B.R. 45, 53 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009) (\"The possibility that JPM may intervene in the DC Action is not a sufficient reason to deny the Debtors' Motion at this time. The 'pending proceeding' rule is predicated on there actually being a pending action involving the two parties. JPM has not cited any authority for the proposition that a Rule 2004 examination of an entity is improper when a proceeding is pending in another venue against a third party and there is a 'substantial likelihood' that the examinee may intervene.\") (internal citations omitted); *In re Ecam Publications, Inc.*, 131 B.R. 556, 560–61 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1991) (allowing 2004 examination by trustee of parties, against whom the trustee had bought but not yet brought claims) *with In re Martelli*, Nos. 16-20983-PRW, 16-20316-PRW, 16-20968-PRW, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 2015, at \\*12-13 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. July 20, 2017) (applying pending proceeding rule to non-parties to that proceeding because the material was sought\n\n<sup>2</sup> The Objectors' Second Prior Objection reflects that the Objectors were familiar with the Court's First Prior Decision inasmuch as the Objectors cited to the First Prior Decision by reference to its ECF Number. (*See* Second Prior Objection at ¶ 11.) As they do in their Objection now, the Objectors cited to the court's prior decision only to indicate their disagreement with it.\n\nby a party to the proceeding and was related to the proceeding); *In re Enron Corp.*, 281 B.R. 836, 838 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) applying pending proceeding rule to a non-party to that proceeding because \"no party disputes that the automatic discovery stay of the [Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(3)(B)] applies to McKinsey.\"); *cf. In re Cambridge Analytica, LLC*, 600 B.R. 750 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019) (unclear who was the target of the 2004 examination); *In re Bennett Funding Grp., Inc.*, 203 B.R. 24, 30 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1996) (applying pending proceeding rule where discovery was sought by a party to the proceeding against a third-party defendant to that proceeding); *Sweetland v. Szadkowski (In re Szadkowski)*, 198 B.R. 140 (Bankr. D. Md. 1996) (applying pending proceeding doctrine [where] a party to the proceeding was seeking discovery against another party to that proceeding.) The [Objectors] have not identified or established any relevant pending proceedings, in which Bento and the Trustees are parties. Therefore, the [Second Prior] Objection is overruled.\n\n(Second Prior Decision at 2-3 (emphasis added).)\n\n9. Rather than accepting the Court's two Prior Decisions, the Objectors acknowledge the Second Prior Decision again only to state their disagreement with it. (*See* Objection at ¶ 17 (criticizing Second Prior Decision purportedly as a \"narrow reading of the caselaw overlook[ing] the key issue of scope and misapprehend[ing] the purpose of Rule 20004 discovery\").)\n\n## **ARGUMENT**\n\n10. The Prior Decisions are law of the case and as such should continue to govern, \"unless cogent and compelling reasons militate otherwise. Cogent and compelling reasons include an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.\" *Coan v. Licata (In re First Conn. Consulting Grp., Inc.)*, 2023 Bankr. LEXIS 852, \\*76 (Bankr. D. Conn. March 31, 2023) (citing *United States v. Quintieri*, 306 F.3d 1217, 1230 (2d Cir. 2002)). The Objectors' general dissatisfaction with the Prior Decisions is neither well founded, nor does it begin to approach their burden to demonstrate cogent and compelling reasons for the Court to revisit this issue.\n\n11. The Prior Decisions were resoundingly correct, and it is telling that much of the case law that the Objectors cite they either cited themselves in the Second Prior Objection or the\n\nCourt itself discussed in the Second Prior Decision.\n\n12. Moreover, the Objectors mischaracterize the nature of the Sixth Rule 2004 Motion and the investigation sought thereby. They employ selective quotations and ellipses to cherry pick topics relevant to the Objectors in an effort to inaccurately portray the Sixth Rule 2004 Motion as targeted primarily at obtaining discovery for use in the Adversary Proceeding. (*E.g.*, Objection at ¶ 13.) Reference to the complete forms of subpoenas and document requests attached to the Sixth Rule 2004 Motion reflects that the handful of items related to the Objectors (*e.g.*, certain real property located in Greenwich, Connecticut) are only a few of the many subjects of the Trustee's broad investigation of the Debtor's finances and the Estate's assets.\n\n13. It is essential that the Trustee's Rule 2004 investigation include all such relevant subject matter, even if it occasionally overlaps with topics relevant to adversary proceedings. As the Court is now well familiar, a hallmark of the Debtor's \"shell game\" is the Debtor's orchestration of many thousands of transfers between his associated entities and individuals. Carving out particular topics relevant to pending adversary proceedings from the Trustee's Rule 2004 investigation of the Debtor's larger scheme may result in a break in the chain of asset movement and interconnected relationships.\n\n14. As before in their Second Prior Objection, the Objectors also continue to make arguments that pertain to discovery in the Adversary Proceeding—as opposed the Sixth Rule 2004 Motion. The Objectors complain about the Trustee's assertion of work-product privilege in the Adversary Proceeding (Objection at ¶ 5) and complain about the discovery schedule that the Court ordered in the Adversary Proceeding (*id.* at ¶ 6). It is apparent that the Objectors' primary grievance arises from their insistence that—in defending the Adversary Proceeding—they may demand the Trustee's privileged and protected work product and that he provide them with their own records—turning the burdens of discovery on their head. The Objectors are simply wrong.\n\n15. This Objection, like the Objectors' last, is not the forum to air an Adversary Proceeding discovery dispute. To the extent that the Objectors wish to litigate that dispute, they are free to do so in the Adversary Proceeding.<sup>3</sup> The existence of discovery disputes in the Adversary Proceeding does not present grounds to object to the Sixth Rule 2004 Motion—much less on a rationale that the Court has rejected on two prior occasions.\n\n16. The Court should grant the Sixth Rule 2004 Motion and overrule the Objection. *[THE REMAINDER OF THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK.]*\n\n<sup>3</sup> The Trustee reserves the right to respond and substantively address the Objectors' arguments if and when the Objectors elect to make them in the proper forum.\n\nWHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the Court should overrule the Objection, grant\n\nthe Sixth Rule 2004 Motion, and grant such other and further relief as is just and proper.\n\nDated: August 25, 2023 New Haven, Connecticut\n\n## LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE\n\nBy: */s/ Patrick R. Linsey* Douglas S. Skalka (ct00616) Patrick R. Linsey (ct29437) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 781-2847 dskalka@npmlaw.com plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| ----------------------------------------------------------- | x           |                         |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|-------------------------|\n| In re:                                                      | :<br>:      | Chapter 11              |\n| HO WAN KWOK et al.,                                         | :<br>:<br>: | Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |\n| Debtors.1                                                   | :<br>:      | Jointly Administered    |\n| ----------------------------------------------------------- | x           |                         |\n\n## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nThe undersigned hereby certifies that on August 25, 2023, the foregoing was electronically filed. Notice of this filing was sent by e-mail to all parties to the above-captioned chapter 11 case able to receive electronic notice by operation of the Court's electronic filing (\"CM/ECF\") system. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF system.\n\nDated: August 25, 2023 Luc A. Despins, as Chapter 11 Trustee New Haven, Connecticut By: */s/ Patrick R. Linsey*  Douglas S. Skalka (ct00616) Patrick R. Linsey (ct29437) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 781-2847 dskalka@npmlaw.com plinsey@npmlaw.com *Counsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee*\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).","body_zh":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION（美国康涅狄格区破产法院布里奇波特分院）\n\n----------------------------------------------------------- x\n\nIn re（关于）: :\n: 第11章（Chapter 11）\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）,\net al., :\n: 案号：22-50073 (JAM)\nDebtors（债务人）. :\n:\n: （合并审理）\n---------------------------------------------------------- x\n第11章破产受托人对 GREENWICH LAND LLC 与 HING CHI NGOK（岳庆芝）就第11章破产受托人第六次依据第2004条规则提出的综合动议所作异议的答辩\n\nLuc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯）以在上述 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（“债务人”）的第11章破产案件（“第11章案件”）中获任命的第11章破产受托人（“受托人”）之身份，特此提交本答辩书（“答辩书”），以支持受托人的《第11章破产受托人关于根据<破产程序规则>第2004条及本地规则第2004-1条作出命令授权对与债务人及相关银行有关联的额外实体和个人进行证据开示的第六次补充综合动议》[ECF No. 2079]（“《第六次2004条动议》”），并回应 Greenwich Land, LLC（“Greenwich Land”）与 Hing Chi Ngok（岳庆芝）（“岳女士”，与 Greenwich Land 合称“异议人”）对此提出的异议 [ECF No. 2098]（“《异议》”）。针对该《异议》，受托人谨作如下答辩陈述：\n\n1. 本法院已两次裁定，《联邦破产程序规则》第2004条（“第2004条规则”）对非民事对审诉讼当事方的实体进行的调查，不受\n\n1 在这些第11章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵，亦称 Miles Guo、Miles Kwok 以及其他诸多化名）（税务识别号后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（税务识别号后四位：8202）以及 Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 及 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为 Paul Hastings LLP（普衡律师事务所）, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 转交 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）破产财产受托人 Luc A. Despins（仅用于通知与通讯目的）。\n\n待决诉讼规则的禁止。然而，异议人（再次）以此为由对《第六次2004条动议》提出异议，企图继续干扰受托人对第2004条规则传票调查对象与债务人破产财产（“破产财产”）之间关联的调查。\n\n2. 该《异议》与异议人在其针对《第五次2004条动议》（定义见下文）提出的异议中所陈述的理由如出一辙。尽管法院此前的各项裁定如今已两次成为本案准则，异议人仍重抄相同的论调，再次反对对他们并不代表的实体开展第2004条规则调查。\n简要背景\n\n3. 2023年8月17日，受托人的律师与异议人的律师就本《异议》进行了电话会商。异议人表示，他们打算基于此前已被驳回的论点提出异议，即：如果调查的任何标的事项牵涉到第 23-05005 号民事对审诉讼（“民事对审诉讼”），则受托人不得对并非该民事对审诉讼当事方的实体开展第2004条规则调查。\n\n4. 受托人律师提醒异议人律师，法院已两次驳回该论点。此外，受托人指出，与本问题首次呈至法院时的情况不同——当时第2004条规则调查的对象是一家与 Lady May（梅号游艇）案中争议游艇直接相关的公司——在本案中，对 Greenwich Land 的任何提及，都是为了确保受托人的第2004条规则调查范围涵盖破产财产所有可能资产所作出的全面努力的一部分。受托人表示，异议人的任何异议都只会徒耗破产财产和法院的时间与资源。异议人表示他们无论如何都打算提出异议。\n\n5. 本案在此问题上的法理准则是明确的。去年11月，与债务人相关的家庭成员和空壳公司的另一组合（即 Mei Guo（郭美）与 HK International Funds Investment (USA) Ltd., LLC（香港国际基金投资（美国）有限公司）（“前异议人”））对受托人的\n\n《关于进行2004条调查的第二次补充综合动议》提出了异议，其理由与作为本《异议》前提的理由基本相同。\n\n6. 在经过答辩书陈词和冗长的听证会之后，法院终局性地驳回了前\n\n异议人的论点：\n\n经审议各项诉状、听证会上提出的论点、本案的事实与具体情况以及适用法律，法院认定待决诉讼原则并不构成对 Apsley Yachts Ltd. 及 DWF LLP 进行调查的障碍，因为它们不是待决的 HK Int'l Funds Invs. (USA) Ltd., LLC v. Despins ex rel. Kwok, Case No. 22-05003 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022) 这一对审诉讼的当事方。对比 In re SunEdison, 572 B.R. 482, 490 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017)（“债务人并非州法院诉讼的当事方，因此该规则不适用于他们。”）；In re Washington Mutual, Inc., 408 B.R. 45, 53 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009)（“JPM 可能会介入华盛顿特区诉讼的可能性，不足以成为此时拒绝债务人动议的充分理由。‘待决诉讼’规则以双方当事人之间实际存在待决诉讼为前提。JPM 并未引用任何判例依据来证明：当在另一管辖地针对第三方存在待决诉讼且被调查人‘极有可能’介入该诉讼时，对某一实体进行第2004条规则调查是不当的。”）（引文省略）；In re Ecam Publications, Inc., 131 B.R. 556, 560–61 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1991)（允许受托人对受托人已受让但尚未提起索赔的主体进行2004条调查）；与 In re Martelli, Nos. 16-20983- PRW, 16-20316-PRW, 16-20968-PRW, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 2015, at *12-13 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. July 20, 2017)（将待决诉讼规则适用于该诉讼的非当事方，因为该材料是由诉讼当事方所寻求且与该诉讼相关）；In re Enron Corp., 281 B.R. 836, 838 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002)（将待决诉讼规则适用于该诉讼的非当事方，因为“各方均不争议 [1995年《私人证券诉讼改革法》, 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(3)(B)] 的自动证据开示中止适用于麦肯锡”）；参见 In re Cambridge Analytica, LLC, 600 B.R. 750 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019)（不清楚谁是2004条调查的目标）；In re Bennett Funding Grp., Inc., 203 B.R. 24, 30 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1996)（在诉讼当事方针对该诉讼的第三方被告寻求证据开示时适用待决诉讼规则）；Sweetland v. Szadkowski (In re Szadkowski), 198 B.R. 140 (Bankr. D. Md. 1996)（在诉讼当事方针对该诉讼的另一当事方寻求证据开示时适用待决诉讼原则。）。\n\n《准予第11章破产受托人关于进行2004条调查的第二次补充综合动议的命令》[ECF No. 1184]（“《第一项在先裁定》”）。\n\n7. 异议人并未尊重《第一项在先裁定》，反而于2023年5月22日重拾前异议人的论点，对受托人的《关于根据第2004条规则作出命令授权对与债务人有关联的额外实体和个人以及与债务人和关联实体有业务往来的实体进行证据开示的第五次补充综合动议》[ECF No.\n\n1789]（“《第五次2004条动议》”）提出异议 [ECF No. 1813]（“《第二项在先异议》”）。2\n\n8. 2023年6月7日，法院准予了《第五次2004条动议》并驳回了异议人的《第二项在先异议》（“《第二项在先裁定》”，与《第一项在先裁定》合称“《在先裁定》”）。法院指出其裁决依据已在《第一项在先命令》中阐明，并进一步表示法院“继续确信相关判例法”，即判定待决诉讼原则排除通过《联邦破产程序规则》第2004条调查获取证据\n\n仅限于拟申请调查人和被调查人均为待决诉讼当事方，且该诉讼中的证据开示必须根据《联邦民事诉讼规则》或《联邦破产程序规则》类似的第七部分规则进行的情况。对比 In re SunEdison, 572 B.R. 482, 490 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017)（“债务人并非州法院诉讼的当事方，因此该规则不适用于他们。”）；In re Washington Mutual, Inc., 408 B.R. 45, 53 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009)（“JPM 可能会介入华盛顿特区诉讼的可能性，不足以成为此时拒绝债务人动议的充分理由。‘待决诉讼’规则以双方当事人之间实际存在待决诉讼为前提。JPM 并未引用任何判例依据来证明：当在另一管辖地针对第三方存在待决诉讼且被调查人‘极有可能’介入该诉讼时，对某一实体进行第2004条规则调查是不当的。”）（引文省略）；In re Ecam Publications, Inc., 131 B.R. 556, 560–61 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1991)（允许受托人对受托人已受让但尚未提起索赔的主体进行2004条调查）；与 In re Martelli, Nos. 16-20983-PRW, 16-20316-PRW, 16-20968-PRW, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 2015, at *12-13 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. July 20, 2017)（将待决诉讼规则适用于该诉讼的非当事方，因为该材料系\n\n2 异议人的《第二项在先异议》表明异议人熟悉法院的《第一项在先裁定》，因为异议人通过引用其 ECF 编号援引了《第一项在先裁定》。（见《第二项在先异议》第 11 段。）正如他们现在在《异议》中所做的那样，异议人援引法院的在先裁定仅是为了表达其不同意见。\n\n由诉讼当事方所寻求且与该诉讼相关）；In re Enron Corp., 281 B.R. 836, 838 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002)（将待决诉讼规则适用于该诉讼的非当事方，因为“各方均不争议 [1995年《私人证券诉讼改革法》, 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(3)(B)] 的自动证据开示中止适用于麦肯锡”）；参见 In re Cambridge Analytica, LLC, 600 B.R. 750 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019)（不清楚谁是2004条调查的目标）；In re Bennett Funding Grp., Inc., 203 B.R. 24, 30 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1996)（在诉讼当事方针对该诉讼的第三方被告寻求证据开示时适用待决诉讼规则）；Sweetland v. Szadkowski (In re Szadkowski), 198 B.R. 140 (Bankr. D. Md. 1996)（在诉讼当事方针对该诉讼的另一当事方寻求证据开示时适用待决诉讼原则。）[异议人] 尚未指明或确立 Bento 与受托人作为当事方的任何相关待决诉讼。因此，[第二项在先] 异议被驳回。\n\n（《第二项在先裁定》第 2-3 页（后加强调）。）\n\n9. 异议人不但不接受法院的两项《在先裁定》，反而再次承认《第二项在先裁定》仅仅是为了表达他们对此的不认同。（参见《异议》第 17 段（声称《第二项在先裁定》系“对判例法的狭隘解读，忽视了调查范围这一关键问题，并误解了第2004条规则证据开示的目的”而予以批评）。）\n论述\n\n10. 前述裁定属于本案法（law of the case），因此应当继续适用，“除非有令人信服且不可抗拒的理由要求作出相反决定。令人信服且不可抗拒的理由包括嗣后控制性法律发生变更、获得新证据、或纠正明显错误或防止显著不公正的需要。”Coan v. Licata (In re First Conn. Consulting Grp., Inc.), 2023 Bankr. LEXIS 852, *76 (Bankr. D. Conn. March 31, 2023)（援引 United States v. Quintieri, 306 F.3d 1217, 1230 (2d Cir. 2002)）。异议人对前述裁定的一般性不满既缺乏充分依据，也远远达不到其证明存在令人信服且不可抗拒的理由以促使法院重新审视该问题的举证责任。\n\n11. 前述裁定是极其正确的，而且发人深省的是，异议人所引用的判例法中，大部分要么是他们自己在前次第二份异议中自行引用过的，要么是法院本身在前次第二份裁定中已讨论过的。\n\n12. 此外，异议人曲解了《破产程序规则》第2004条第六次动议（Sixth Rule 2004 Motion）的性质以及据此所寻求的调查。他们采用选择性引述和省略号的方式，断章取义地挑选与异议人相关的话题，企图将《破产程序规则》第2004条第六次动议不准确地描绘成主要旨在获取用于对抗性诉讼程序（Adversary Proceeding）的证据开示。（例如，异议第13段。）参阅《破产程序规则》第2004条第六次动议所附的传票和调取文件请求的完整格式即可反映出，与异议人相关的寥寥数项内容（例如位于康涅狄格州格林威治的某些不动产），仅是受托人对债务人财务状况及破产财产资产所进行的广泛调查中的众多主题之一小部分。\n\n13. 受托人依据第2004条进行的调查必须涵盖所有此类相关主题，即使该调查偶尔会与对抗性诉讼程序相关的主题发生重叠。正如法院目前已熟知的那样，债务人“空壳骗局”的一个标志性特征就是债务人精心策划了其关联实体与个人之间数以千计的转账。若从受托人对债务人更大规模欺诈计划的第2004条调查中剥离出与未决对抗性诉讼程序相关的特定主题，可能会导致资产流动链条和相互关联关系的断裂。\n\n14. 正如他们之前在前次第二份异议中一样，异议人还继续提出涉及对抗性诉讼程序中的证据开示（而非针对《破产程序规则》第2004条第六次动议）的主张。异议人抱怨受托人在对抗性诉讼程序中主张律师工作成果特权（异议第5段），并抱怨法院在对抗性诉讼程序中命令的证据开示日程安排（同上，第6段）。显而易见的是，异议人的主要不满源于他们执意认为——在对抗性诉讼程序抗辩中——他们可以索要受托人享有特权和受保护的律师工作成果，并要求受托人向他们提供他们自己的记录——这彻底颠倒了证据开示的举证负担。异议人完全是错误的。\n\n15. 本异议与异议人的上一份异议一样，并不是提出对抗性诉讼程序证据开示争议的适当法庭。如果异议人希望对该争议进行诉讼，他们完全可以在对抗性诉讼程序中进行。3 对抗性诉讼程序中存在证据开示争议，并不构成对《破产程序规则》第2004条第六次动议提出异议的理由——更不用说是基于法院此前已在两次场合中予以驳回的法理依据。\n\n16. 法院应当准许《破产程序规则》第2004条第六次动议并驳回该异议。[本页其余部分有意留白。]\n\n3 如果且当异议人选择在适当的法庭提出其主张时，受托人保留予以回应并在实体上处理异议人主张的权利。\n\n据此，基于前述理由，法院应当驳回该异议，准许《破产程序规则》第2004条第六次动议，并给予公正和适当的其他及进一步救济。\n\n日期：2023年8月25日 康涅狄格州纽黑文\nLUC A. DESPINS，第11章受托人\n\n签署人：/s/ Patrick R. Linsey Douglas S. Skalka (ct00616) Patrick R. Linsey (ct29437) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 781-2847 dskalka@npmlaw.com plinsey@npmlaw.com\nUNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT（美国破产法院）DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT（康涅狄格区）BRIDGEPORT DIVISION（布里奇波特分院）\n\n----------------------------------------------------------- x\n\n关于： :\n: 第11章\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等， :\n:\n: 案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。1 :\n: 联合审理\n----------------------------------------------------------- x\n送达证明\n\n下述签署人特此证明，于2023年8月25日，前述文件已通过电子方式归档。本归档通知已通过电子邮件发送给上述标题所列第11章案件的所有能够通过本法院电子归档（“CM/ECF”）系统接收电子通知的当事人。各方当事人均可通过法院的 CM/ECF 系统查阅本归档文件。\n\n日期：2023年8月25日 Luc A. Despins，作为第11章受托人 康涅狄格州纽黑文 签署人：/s/ Patrick R. Linsey Douglas S. Skalka (ct00616) Patrick R. Linsey (ct29437) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 781-2847 dskalka@npmlaw.com plinsey@npmlaw.com 第11章受托人代理律师\n\n1 本第11章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（亦称为郭文贵、Miles Guo 和 Miles Kwok，以及其他众多化名）（纳税人识别号后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（纳税人识别号后四位：8202）和 Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 及 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为 Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins，作为 Ho Wan Kwok 破产财产的受托人（仅用于接收通知和联络之目的）。","key_entities":["Je","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Despins","Guo","Miles Guo","Paul Hastings"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":1184,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1789,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1813,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2079,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2098,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":2744,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 13:26:45"}