{"id":"court_ctb_2158_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":2158,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2023-08-30","title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION | -------------------------------------------","summary_zh":"受托人通报债务人刑事动议的通知 —— Ho Wan Kwok 破产案（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo），CTB 22-50073 ECF #2158（2023-08-30立案）。第11章破产受托人向破产法院提交通知，报告郭文贵已在其纽约南区联邦法院刑事案（案号 1:23-cr-00118-AT，ECF #129、#130、#131）中提请动议，请求刑事法院下令中止破产案及相关对抗性诉讼，或就资产保全、进入现场调查及特权信息保护给予替代救济。","summary_en":"Trustee's Notice of Debtor's Criminal Motion — In re Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo / Guo Wengui), CTB 22-50073 ECF #2158 (filed Aug 30, 2023). The Chapter 11 Trustee files a formal notice informing the Bankruptcy Court that Kwok filed a motion and memorandum in his SDNY criminal case (No. 1:23-cr-00118-AT, ECF Nos. 129, 130, 131) seeking to stay the bankruptcy cases and adversary proceedings or obtain alternative relief regarding property access and privilege protections.","body_en":"# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| --------------------------------------------------------------- | x |\n|----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|\n| :
In re:
: | Chapter 11 |\n| :
HO WAN KWOK, et al.,
: | Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |\n| :
Debtors.1
: | Jointly Administered |\n| :
--------------------------------------------------------------- | x |\n\n# **CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE'S NOTICE OF DEBTOR'S MOTION IN CRIMINAL CASE FOR AN ORDER STAYING THESE CHAPTER 11 CASES AND ASSOCIATED ADVERSARY PROCEEDINGS**\n\nLuc A. Despins, as chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") for Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"), hereby provides notice that earlier today the Debtor filed a motion in the criminal case pending against him in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York [case no. 1:23-cr-00118-AT] (the \"Criminal Case\") seeking to stay the above-captioned chapter 11 cases and all related adversary proceedings. The Debtor's *Notice of Motion for an Order and Writ Staying Bankruptcy Cases or in the Alternative for Other Relief* [Criminal Case ECF No. 129] (the \"Motion\") is appended hereto as **Exhibit A**. The Debtor's *Memorandum of Law* in support of his Motion is appended hereto as **Exhibit B** [Criminal Case ECF No. 131]. 2 The *Declaration of Sidharda Kamaraju Accompanying Defendant's Motion for an Order and Writ Staying*\n\n1 The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and the Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\n2 The Debtor filed this memorandum partially under seal. The Trustee has not been provided with an unsealed copy of the Motion.\n\n*Bankruptcy Cases* [Criminal Case ECF No. 130] is filed herewith as **Exhibit C**. The Trustee is reviewing the Motion and will respond as appropriate.\n\nNew Haven, Connecticut\n\nDated: August 30, 2023 LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE,\n\nBy: */s/ Patrick R. Linsey* Douglas S. Skalka (ct00616) Patrick R. Linsey (ct29437) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 821-2000 dskalka@npmlaw.com plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n*and*\n\nNicholas A. Bassett (admitted *pro hac vice*) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C., 20036 (202) 551-1902 nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n*and*\n\nAvram E. Luft (admitted *pro hac vice*) G. Alexander Bongartz (admitted *pro hac vice*) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6079 aviluft@paulhastings.com alexbongartz@paulhastings.com\n\n*Counsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee*\n\n# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| ----------------------------------------------------------- | x | |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------|---|-------------------------|\n| | : | |\n| In re: | : | Chapter 11 |\n| | : | |\n| 1
HO WAN KWOK,
et al., | : | Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |\n| | : | |\n| Debtors. | : | (Jointly Administered) |\n| | : | |\n| ----------------------------------------------------------- | x | |\n\n**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nThe undersigned hereby certifies that on August 30, 2023, the foregoing, and all exhibits and attachments thereto, was electronically filed. Notice of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties to the above-captioned chapter 11 case by operation of the Court's electronic filing (\"CM/ECF\") system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as indicated on the Notice of Electronic Filing. 2 Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF system.\n\nNew Haven, Connecticut\n\nDated: August 30, 2023 LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE,\n\nBy: */s/ Patrick R. Linsey*\n\nPatrick R. Linsey (ct29437) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 821-2000 plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n1 The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and the Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\n2 To the extent that the foregoing was filed outside regular business hours, service by mail on recipients unable or not qualified to accept electronic notice was made on the next business day.\n\n# **EXHIBIT A**\n\n**(Debtor's Notice of Motion for an Order and Writ Staying Bankruptcy Cases or in the Alternative for Other Relief)**\n\n## **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK**\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\n*Plaintiff,*\n\nv.\n\nHO WAN KWOK,\n\n*Defendant*.\n\nCase No. 1:23-CR-118-1 (AT)\n\n**NOTICE OF MOTION FOR AN ORDER AND WRIT STAYING BANKRUPTCY CASES OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR OTHER RELIEF**\n\n## **ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED**\n\nDefendant Ho Wan Kwok, through counsel, respectfully moves the Court to issue an order and writ staying the bankruptcy cases captioned *In re Ho Wan Kwok, et al.*, Case No. 22- 50073(JAM) (Bank. D. Conn.) (Jointly Administered), including the jointly administered proceedings captioned *In re Genever Holdings Corp.*, Case No. 22-50542(JAM) (Bank. D. Conn.), and *In re Genever Holdings LLC*, Case No. 22-50592(JAM) (Bank. D. Conn.), and all related adversary proceedings, pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, and the Court's inherent supervisory authority.\n\nDefendant moves upon the Declaration of Sidhardha Kamarju, the exhibits annexed thereto, and the accompanying Memorandum of Law.\n\nDefendant respectfully requests oral argument on this motion.\n\nDated: August 30, 2023 New York, New York Respectfully submitted,\n\nSidhardha Kamaraju Matthew S. Barkan Daniel J. Pohlman Clare P. Tilton PRYOR CASHMAN LLP 7 Times Square New York, NY 10036 (212) 421-4100 [skamaraju@pryorcashman.com](mailto:skamaraju@pryorcashman.com) [mbarkan@pryorcashman.com](mailto:mbarkan@pryorcashman.com) dpohlman@pryorcashman.com ctilton@pryorcashman.com\n\n*Attorneys for Defendant Ho Wan Kwok*\n\n# **EXHIBIT B (Debtor's Memorandum of Law)**\n\n# **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK**\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\n*Plaintiff,*\n\nv.\n\n**FILED PARTIALLY UNDER SEAL**\n\nHO WAN KWOK,\n\nCase No. 1:23-CR-118-1 (AT)\n\n*Defendant*.\n\n# **MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR AN ORDER AND WRIT STAYING BANKRUPTCY CASES**\n\nSidhardha Kamaraju Matthew S. Barkan Daniel J. Pohlman Clare P. Tilton PRYOR CASHMAN LLP 7 Times Square New York, NY 10036 (212) 421-4100 skamaraju@pryorcashman.com mbarkan@pryorcashman.com dpohlman@pryorcashman.com ctilton@pryorcashman.com\n\n*Attorneys for Defendant Ho Wan Kwok*\n\n# **TABLE OF CONTENTS**\n\n| | | | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii |\n|----|----|------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 2 |\n| | | | RELEVANT BACKGROUND 5 |\n| I. | | | The Bankruptcy Filing and the Indictment 5 |\n| | | | II. The Contempt Order Invades Mr. Kwok's Fifth Amendment Rights 7 |\n| | | | III. The Settlement Agreement Between the Trustee
and the Government Concerning the Mahwah Facility 9 |\n| | | | IV. The August 2023 Subpoenas Invade Mr. Kwok's Attorney-Client Privilege 12 |\n| | | | ARGUMENT 14 |\n| I. | | | Applicable Law 14 |\n| | | | II. Discussion 17 |\n| | A. | | The Court Should Stay the Bankruptcy Cases to Protect
Mr. Kwok's Rights and the Integrity of these Proceedings 17 |\n| | | i. | The Contempt Order Threatens
Mr. Kwok's Fifth Amendment Rights 18 |\n| | | ii. | The Mahwah Proceeding
Threatens Mr. Kwok's Brady Rights 20 |\n| | | iii. | Erosion of Mr. Kwok's Attorney-Client Privilege 23 |\n| | | iv. | The Government Has Previously Sought
a Similar Stay of a Parallel Proceeding 25 |\n| | B. | | In the Alternative, the Court Should Enter an
Order that Minimizes the Harm to Mr. Kwok's Rights. 28 |\n| | | | CONCLUSION 30 |\n\n# **TABLE OF AUTHORITIES**\n\n## **Page(s)**\n\n# **Cases**\n\n| In re Baldwin-United Corp.,
770 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1985)15 | |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|\n| Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963) 3, 18, 20, 29 | |\n| Caleb and Brown Pty. Ltd. v. Thompson,
No. 20-cv-8612(LAP), 2020 WL 6887680 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2020) 16 | |\n| Eisenberg v. Feiner (In re Ahead By A Length, Inc.),
78 B.R. 708 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987) 17 | |\n| Giglio v. U.S.,
405 U.S. 150 (1972) 20 | |\n| In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Feb. 2, 2012,
741 F.3d 339 (2d Cir. 2013)19 | |\n| Harris v. Nelson,
394 U.S. 286 (1969) 14 | |\n| Hoffman v. United States,
341 U.S. 479 (1951) 18 | |\n| Landis v. North Am. Co.,
299 U.S. 248 (1936) 15 | |\n| Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc.,
676 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2012)15, 16 | |\n| In re
Marceca,
131 B.R. 774 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) 17, 18 | |\n| Rex Med. L.P. v. Angiotech Pharms. (US), Inc.,
754 F. Supp. 2d 616 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)26 | |\n| S.E.C. v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd.,
93 F. Supp. 2d 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)14 | |\n| In re Schick,
215 B.R. 4 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) 18 | |\n\n| SEC v. Millan,
20 Civ. 06575 (CM), 2020 WL 5898769 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2020) 27 | |\n|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|\n| SEC v. Oakford Corp.,
181 F.R.D. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) 18 | |\n| State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Parisien,
352 F. Supp. 3d 215 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) 15 | |\n| Sterling Nat. Bank v A-1 Hotels Int'l Inc.,
175 F. Supp. 2d 573 (SDNY 2001)26 | |\n| In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated Jan. 29, 1999,
191 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 1999)18 | |\n| Tom Doherty Assocs., Inc. v. Saban Ent., Inc.,
60 F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 1995)26 | |\n| Trustees of Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat. Pension Fund v. Transworld Mech., Inc.,
886 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)16, 17 | |\n| In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated Aug. 21, 1985,
793 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1986)19 | |\n| In re Two Subpoenas to Testify Before Grand Jury Dated Dec. 1, 2016,
252 F. Supp. 3d 170 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) 19 | |\n| United States v. Amrep Corp.,
405 F. Supp. 1053 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)15, 16 | |\n| United States v. FINRA,
607 F.Supp.2d 391 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) 16 | |\n| United States v. Gerace,
No. 21-2419, 2023 WL 3243477 (2d Cir. May 4, 2023) 15, 16 | |\n| United States v. Hamilton,
730 F. Supp. 1272 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)21, 22 | |\n| United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A.,
No. 12 Cr. 763, 2013 WL 3306161 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013) 15 | |\n| United States v. Leal-Del Carmen,
697 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2012) 22 | |\n| United States v. Ming He,
94 F.3d 782 (2d Cir. 1996)15 | |\n\n| United States v. Nebraska Beef, Ltd.,
194 F. Supp. 2d 949 (D. Neb. 2002) 22 | |\n|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|\n| United States v. Simon,
373 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1967)15 | |\n| United States v. Soriano,
401 F.Supp.3d 396 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) 22 | |\n| United States v. Valenzuela–Bernal,
458 U.S. 858 (1982) 21 | |\n| United States v. Yalincak,
853 F.3d 629 (2d Cir. 2017)21 | |\n| Statutes | |\n| 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(3) 8 | |\n| 11 USC § 521(a)(4) 19 | |\n| 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) 14, 16 | |\n| Other Authorities | |\n| Fed. R Bankr. P. 2004 passim | |\n| Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 17 | |\n\nDefendant Ho Wan Kwok, through his undersigned attorneys, hereby respectfully moves the Court, pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, and pursuant to the Court's inherent supervisory authority, for an order staying the bankruptcy cases captioned *In re Ho Wan Kwok*, *et al.*, Case No. 22-50073(JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn) (Jointly Administered), including each of its related adversary proceedings1 (the Kwok Chapter 11 Case (as defined below), the Genever US Chapter 11 Case (as defined below), the Genever BVI Chapter 11 Case (as defined below), and all related adversary proceedings (collectively the \"Bankruptcy Cases\") or, in the alternative, for an order (i) modifying the protective order entered in this case (the \"Protective Order\") to allow production of the discovery in this case to Luc Despins, Esq. (the \"Trustee\"), the Chapter 11 trustee in the Bankruptcy Cases, pursuant to a contempt order (the \"Contempt Order\") entered against Mr. Kwok by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut (the \"Bankruptcy Court\") on or about July 26, 2023; (ii) directing that Mr. Kwok's defense team continue to be permitted access to the property located at 675 Ramapo Valley Road, Mahwah, New Jersey 07430 (the \"Mahwah Facility\") through the pendency of this case and any resulting appeals; (iii) precluding the government from facilitating the sale of the Mahwah Facility in the Bankruptcy Cases through the pendency of this case and any resulting appeals; and (iv) ordering that the government not solicit or receive from the Trustee any information or records that are subject to any privileges belonging to Mr. Kwok, including, but not limited to, his attorney-client or Fifth Amendment privileges, and identifying any such materials already provided by the Trustee.\n\n1 A list of the docket numbers of the related adversary proceedings are contained in the Proposed Order and Writ attached as Exhibit 1 to the Declaration of Sidhardha Kamaraju dated August 30, 2023 (\"Kamaraju Decl.\").\n\n## **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\nIt is a bedrock principle of the Constitution that when the government charges a defendant with violations of criminal laws, the defendant is afforded significant rights, including the right against self-incrimination and the right to access exculpatory evidence. This Court is principally tasked with safeguarding those rights, which are fundamental to the fairness and integrity of a criminal proceeding, and to which Mr. Kwok is entitled. Mr. Kwok's rights are under increasing threat, however, because, at the same time Mr. Kwok is being prosecuted by the government, he is also the debtor in a parallel Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding where, in the name of marshalling Mr. Kwok's assets, the Trustee, with the government's cooperation, is litigating the very issues that go to the heart of this prosecution. In doing so, the Trustee is interfering with Mr. Kwok's rights as a criminal defendant and the sanctity of these proceedings.\n\n*First*, the Trustee is forcing Mr. Kwok to participate in the violation of his own constitutional right against self-incrimination. Casting aside Mr. Kwok's invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights, the Trustee has sought to compel Mr. Kwok and his counsel to produce to the Trustee (and thus effectively authenticate) the discovery produced by the government in this matter, and has even procured the Contempt Order from the Bankruptcy Court based on Mr. Kwok's failure to produce documents that he plainly should not have to produce in light of the pending criminal prosecution. The Trustee's discovery demands call upon Mr. Kwok, for example, to produce documents showing his purported relationship with GTV, which, as the Court knows, is a central issue in this proceeding. In response to these overreaching requests, Mr. Kwok properly asserted his Fifth Amendment rights under the act of production doctrine.\n\nDespite acknowledging that Mr. Kwok's right against self-incrimination was implicated, the Bankruptcy Court nevertheless sided with the Trustee and ordered Mr. Kwok to produce the documents based on a tortured reading of an exception to the act of production doctrine. Although Mr. Kwok has sought leave to appeal that ruling to the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, the Contempt Order places Mr. Kwok in an untenable position—he is constrained to move this Court to modify the Protective Order to permit production to the Trustee, even though doing so would violate his constitutional rights. Even the government opposes modification of the Protective Order for this purpose.\n\n*Second*, the Trustee commenced an adversary proceeding against the owner of the Mahwah Facility and procured a preliminary injunction requiring it to turn the facility over to the Trustee for disposition. Surprisingly, rather than seeking to prevent the disposal of a piece of real property that sits at the heart of the superseding indictment (the \"Indictment\") in this matter, the government has instead entered into a settlement agreement with the Trustee (the \"Settlement Agreement\") to facilitate that sale and has provided the Trustee with evidence from *this* case, in apparent violation of the protective order in this action, in support of the Trustee's efforts to seize the Mahwah Facility.\n\nThe government's selective cooperation with the Trustee is telling. The Mahwah Facility plays a central role in this case—indeed, in the Indictment, the government repeatedly (and erroneously) alleges that the Mahwah Facility was improperly purchased using investor funds for Mr. Kwok's benefit. Mr. Kwok vigorously disputes this contention and intends to show at trial that the purchase of the Mahwah Facility was entirely consistent with GTV's business and the representations made to investors. Mr. Kwok intends to do so by, among other ways, demonstrating the intended use of the facility. Accordingly, preserving the status quo at the Mahwah Facility is critical. If, however, the Trustee, as he did already with Mr. Kwok's actual residence at the Sherry Netherland Hotel (the \"Sherry Netherland Residence\"), takes control of the Mahwah Facility, then Mr. Kwok will lose access to the facility and the *Brady* evidence that it\n\ncontains. This Court should not permit the Trustee in the Bankruptcy Cases to control and potentially alter an alleged crime scene of critical importance to this proceeding.\n\n*Third*, the Trustee has demonstrated his willingness to use discovery in the Bankruptcy Cases to effect an end-run around Mr. Kwok's attorney-client privilege in a way that threatens his Fifth Amendment rights. In particular, prior to Mr. Kwok's arrest, he entered into a consensual order in the Kwok Chapter 11 Case to resolve a dispute with the Trustee over control of Mr. Kwok's privileged communications (the \"Privilege Order\"). The Privilege Order provides that the Trustee holds Mr. Kwok's attorney-client privilege and claims of work-product protection, but cannot waive those privileges absent Mr. Kwok's consent or further order of the Bankruptcy Court. Mr. Kwok has no intention of waiving any privileges. Given, however, the Trustee's intention to litigate the same issues in the Bankruptcy Cases that are at issue before this Court, it is clear that the Trustee will seek to use Mr. Kwok's privileged communications about issues that are also material to his defense to the criminal charges here. Mr. Kwok's concerns are compounded by the fact that the government and the Trustee have been readily sharing information behind the scenes, including (i) the Trustee providing his purported \"analysis\" about the ownership of the Mahwah Facility to the government and (ii) the government providing the Trustee with photographs taken during the execution of a search warrant at the Mahwah Facility for the Trustee's use in seizing that property. This type of coordination imperils Mr. Kwok's ability to defend himself fairly in both this case and the Bankruptcy Cases.\n\nTaken in isolation, any one of these issues may be redressable in the Bankruptcy Court. But taken together, these and related issues present grave consequences to Mr. Kwok's defense against the government's charges here, and, as the Trustee's counsel has stated, these issues will only repeat themselves for as long as the Bankruptcy Cases persist. Mr. Kwok acknowledges the importance of the Bankruptcy Cases and the Trustee's efforts to recover assets for the estate, but Mr. Kwok's rights as a criminal defendant present weightier concerns. The integrity of this proceeding must take primacy. Accordingly, Mr. Kwok respectfully requests that this Court enter an order staying the Bankruptcy Cases during the pendency of the criminal proceedings.\n\n## **RELEVANT BACKGROUND**\n\n## **I. The Bankruptcy Filing and the Indictment**\n\nMr. Kwok filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on February 15, 2022 (the \"Kwok Chapter 11 Case\") in the Bankruptcy Court in Connecticut. Approximately five months later, on or about July 8, 2022, the Bankruptcy Court approved the appointment of Despins as Trustee in the Kwok Chapter 11 Case. The Kwok filing was followed by Genever Holdings Corporation (\"Genever BVI\") initiating bankruptcy (the \"Genever BVI Chapter 11 Case\") on October 11, 2020, and Genever Holdings LLC (\"Genever US\") initiating bankruptcy (the \"Genever US Chapter 11 Case\") in this Court on October 12, 2020. The three cases have been consolidated, and the Trustee controls Genever US and Genever BVI. The interests of creditors in the Kwok Chapter 11 Case have been represented through an Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the \"Creditors' Committee\"), as well as an entity holding an unsatisfied civil judgment against Mr. Kwok, Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. (\"PAX\").\n\nBeginning in July 2022, Mr. Kwok, through his counsel, attempted to resolve the Bankruptcy Cases through a potential global settlement, offering a payment of many millions of dollars from his family to his creditors. (*See* Kwok Bankruptcy Case Dkt. No. 1274 ¶ 12.) Mr. Kwok negotiated first with PAX, which had a large claim against his estate. By September 2022, Mr. Kwok and PAX had entered into a term sheet. (*Id.* ¶ 12.) After reaching agreement in principle with PAX, Mr. Kwok, again through his counsel, negotiated with the Creditors Committee and reached an agreement in principle by the end of October 2022. (*Id.* ¶ 13.)\n\nOn October 26, 2022, Mr. Kwok's bankruptcy counsel informed the Trustee that Mr. Kwok had reached an agreement in principle on all material items with both PAX and the Creditors' Committee. (*Id.* ¶ 14.) However, it is apparent that the Trustee soon derailed these efforts. On November 17, 2022, the Trustee met with Mr. Kwok, along with his attorneys Stephen Kindseth and Aaron Mitchell. (*Id.* ¶ 19; Kamaraju Decl. Ex. 8 (Dec. 12, 2022 H'ring Tr.) at 848:25-849:1.).) The Trustee made various thinly veiled threats at the November 17 meeting, including asking Mr. Kwok if he knew who Al Capone was, telling Mr. Kwok that Al Capone went to jail for tax evasion, and stating that he hoped that the support that Mr. Kwok was receiving was being reported as income in the United States. (Kamaraju Decl. Ex. 8 at 862:18-19.) The Trustee then told Mr. Kwok that he spoke to the Internal Revenue Service and the Securities and Exchange Commission (the \"SEC\") on a weekly basis, and that he should settle before it was \"too late.\" (*Id.* 862:24- 863:12.) The Trustee then made a settlement demand of \\$250 million, which was considerably more than what Mr. Kwok had negotiated with PAX and the Creditors' Committee. (*Id.* 863:16- 18.) The Trustee also threatened to lock Mr. Kwok out of the Sherry Netherland Residence, and stated that Mr. Kwok would pay \\$250 million when he was about to go to jail. (*Id.* 866:24-867:24.)\n\nOn or about March 6, 2023, a grand jury sitting in this District returned a sealed indictment against Mr. Kwok and others, alleging, among other offenses, securities fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (the \"FBI\") arrested Mr. Kwok on March 15, 2023, and searched the Mahwah Facility and the Sherry Netherland Residence that same day. The FBI seized voluminous records, not only from the Mahwah Facility and the Sherry Netherland Residence,2 but also from the home of one of Mr. Kwok's co-defendants, Yanping Wang. The government has (presumably) produced materials collected from these searches to the defendants in this matter, subject to the Protective Order entered by the Court on or about May 4, 2023.\n\n## **II. The Contempt Order Invades Mr. Kwok's Fifth Amendment Rights**\n\nAs noted above, on July 26, 2023, the Bankruptcy Court issued a Memorandum of Decision and Order Holding Individual Debtor [Mr. Kwok] in Contempt of Court and Denying Motion for Stay of Order Compelling Production. (*See* Kamaraju Decl. Ex. 2 (the \"Contempt Order\").) The Contempt Order held Mr. Kwok in contempt for asserting his Fifth Amendment rights in the face of the Trustee's demands that Mr. Kwok produce voluminous documents (including those produced by the government in this case). (*Id.* at 35-36.) The Bankruptcy Court's erroneous contempt order stemmed from the Trustee's Motion for a Rule 2004 Subpoena. (Kamarju Decl. Ex. 3 (the \"2022 Rule 2004 Motion\").) Through the 2022 Rule 2004 Motion, the Trustee sought both to compel Mr. Kwok to testify in a deposition, and also for Mr. Kwok to produce broad categories of documents, including but not limited to communications between Mr. Kwok and his family, \"[a]ll documents related to 'any investments or trading' by Mr. Kwok and various entities (including all entities mentioned in the Indictment in this action), and all documents \"related to any obligation, claim, liability or debt associated with any legal dispute involving\" Mr. Kwok. (*Id.* at 14-15.)\n\nIn response, Mr. Kwok invoked his \"rights under the 5th Amendment to the United States Constitution, including under the act of production doctrine … including [to] all requests for\n\n2 During the search of the Sherry Netherlands Residence and while Mr. Kwok was detained, a fire broke out, badly damaging parts of the apartment. Other than an FBI report describing the start of the fire, the government has not produced any discovery to the defense explaining why the fire broke out during the FBI's search.\n\ndocuments and information.\" (Kamaraju Decl. Ex. 2 at 4; *see also* Kwok Bankruptcy Case Dkt. No. 1444, Ex. A.) The Bankruptcy Court held multiple hearings regarding the interplay between Mr. Kwok's Fifth Amendment rights and the Trustee's right to certain records pursuant to the bankruptcy code. (*Id*. at 5-7). During oral argument in these hearings, the Trustee stated explicitly that the discovery that he was seeking from Mr. Kwok was the discovery produced by the government in this action and that the Trustee knew that if he requested the discovery directly from the government, that request would be rejected. (Kamaraju Decl. Ex. 9 (May 2, 2023 H'ring Tr.) at 14:3-9, Despins: \"Your Honor should enter an order saying that [Mr. Kwok] is directed to seek a modification of any . . . protective order in the criminal case to allow the Chapter 11 Trustee access to the document produced by the Government to [Mr. Kwok];\" *id.* at 15:20-21, Despins: \"The DOJ is never going to produce anything to us. We don't exist in their court.\")\n\nOn July 26, 2023, the Bankruptcy Court issued the Contempt Order. In relevant part, the court held that production of materials pursuant to the 2022 Rule 2004 Motion \"would be testimonial and incriminating both with regards to the documents in the possession of the prosecution and the documents that have not been seized by the prosecution.\" (Kamaraju Decl. Ex. 2 at 20.) Despite recognizing that Mr. Kwok properly invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and that any production would be testimonial, the Bankruptcy Court held that an exception to the act of production doctrine applied, namely the \"required records\" doctrine. (*Id*. at 22, 33.) The Bankruptcy Court held that the required records exception applied because (i) Mr. Kwok had statutory duties to provide information to the Trustee under 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(3) and 521(a)(4), (ii) the records were allegedly of the kind that Mr. Kwok \"customarily kept,\" and (iii) the records had assumed \"public aspects\" by virtue of their connection to the proceeding. (*See id.* at 20-33.) As a result, the Bankruptcy Court held that \"(i) it is not impossible for [Mr. Kwok] to comply with the Order Compelling Production and (ii) under the required records exception, the Individual Debtor may not properly invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in response to the Order Compelling Production.\" (*Id*. at 33.)\n\nThe Bankruptcy Court erroneously rejected Mr. Kwok's arguments that the Contempt Order should be stayed given the risk that it could interfere with this Court's proceedings. The Bankruptcy Court found that \"this Order does not substantially interfere with the Criminal Court's interest in the orderly administration of the Criminal Action.\" (*Id*. at 39.) The Bankruptcy Court ordered Mr. Kwok \"to petition the Criminal Court to allow production to the Trustee.\" (*Id*. at 11.) On August 9, 2023, Mr. Kwok sought leave from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut to appeal the Bankruptcy Court's Contempt Order, which the Trustee opposed. As of the filing of this motion, the District Court had not ruled on Mr. Kwok's request.\n\n## **III. The Settlement Agreement Between the Trustee and the Government Concerning the Mahwah Facility**\n\nThe Trustee has also moved swiftly to dispose of key properties critical to this proceeding, and—contrary to the Trustee's prior representation to the Bankruptcy Court that he does not \"exist\" in the eyes of the government—is now enlisting the assistance of the prosecution team in those efforts. Prior to his detention in this proceeding, Mr. Kwok resided at the Sherry Netherland Residence. The Trustee, who now controls the Sherry Netherland Residence (Kwok Bankruptcy Case Dkt. No. 2110 ¶ 24), has disposed of property that was located in the Sherry Netherland Residence, (*see* Kwok Bankruptcy Case Dkt. No. 1809 (docket order regarding Trustee motion to abandon property located in Sherry Netherland Residence).) The Trustee is currently seeking financing to facilitate a sale of the Sherry Netherland Residence. (*See* Kwok Bankruptcy Case Dkt. No. 2110.) Mr. Kwok made an application to this Court for an order allowing access to the Sherry Netherland Residence before its sale, which was granted. (Dkt. Nos. 72, 79.)\n\nThe Trustee has now turned his sights to another property that is key to the charges in the Indictment: the Mahwah Facility. Soon after Mr. Kwok's arrest, on or about June 28, 2023, the Trustee apparently \"advised the Government that he had concluded, after extensive analysis, that, among other things, the [Mahwah Facility] is equitably owned by [Mr. Kwok] and, therefore, is property of [Mr. Kwok's] chapter 11 estate.\" (Kwok Bankruptcy Case Dkt. No. 2083 ¶ 12.)3 On or about July 11, 2023, the Trustee commenced the adversary proceeding *Despins v. Taurus Fund LLC et al.*, Adv. Proc. No. 23-05017 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn.) (the \"Mahwah Proceeding\"), in which, among other things, the Trustee alleged that the Mahwah Facility was owned by a corporate entity that is a purported alter ego of Mr. Kwok's.\n\nThe Trustee attached to the Mahwah Proceeding complaint several photographs taken by the FBI during its search of the Mahwah Facility. (*See* Kamaraju Decl. Ex. 4 (photographs of the Mahwah Facility).)4 The Trustee confirmed that these photographs were provided to the Trustee by a member of the prosecution team, despite the Protective Order in this case. (Kamaraju Decl. Ex. 10 (Aug. 14, 2023 H'ring Tr.) at 85:2-25.) It does not appear that the government has ever publicly disclosed these photographs.\n\nTogether with the Mahwah complaint, on July 11, 2023, the Trustee also filed a request for\n\n3 As noted above, this was not the first time that the Trustee had provided information to the government. Mr. Kwok has requested from the government production of all communications with the Trustee or his representatives, but the government has not produced any such communications. In the event the government refuses to produce those communications, Mr. Kwok will move to compel production of that information, which is relevant, particularly in light of the apparent coordination between the Trustee and the government.\n\n4 Given that these photographs contain personal information about not only Mr. Kwok and his family, but also presumably FBI agents involved in the search, and are presumably subject to the Protective Order, we are submitting these photographs under seal. The Trustee has informed Mr. Kwok's bankruptcy counsel that these records were inadvertently filed on the public docket and that he is \"contemplating\" filing a motion to seal the records.\n\na temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction (the \"Mahwah TRO\"), in which he requested that the owner of the property vacate the Mahwah Facility, turn over all means of accessing the Mahwah Facility to the Trustee, and limit access to the Mahwah Facility to (i) the Trustee and his team, (ii) the U.S. Department of Justice, (iii) the FBI, (iv) other law enforcement agencies and (v) any other persons authorized by the Trustee. (Mahwah Proceeding Dkt. No. 4) The Trustee additionally requested that the court order the U.S. Marshals Service to implement the order, including through \"the use of reasonable force if necessary to gain access to the Mahwah Mansion or as otherwise necessary to ensure compliance.\" (Mahwah Proceeding Dkt. No. 4-1 at 3-4.) On August 1, 2023, the Bankruptcy Court granted the Trustee's request for a temporary restraining order, but declined to direct the Marshals to assist the Trustee in implementing the order. (Mahwah Proceeding Dkt. No. 17.)\n\nThe true extent of the government's cooperation with the Trustee to dispose of the Mahwah Facility was revealed on August 14, 2023, when the Trustee filed with the Bankruptcy Court a motion for approval of a Settlement Agreement between the Trustee and the government (signed by the prosecution team) that purported to adjudicate certain rights between the Trustee and the government with respect to the Mahwah Facility. According to the motion and accompanying Settlement Agreement (which was not filed with this Court):\n\n- There have been discussions between the government and the trustee regarding \"potentially complex issues raised both in [the Mahwah] Proceeding and in the government's ongoing criminal case.\" (Kamaraju Decl. Ex. 5, Motion ¶ 1.).\n- \"The Trustee and the government are aligned both on the need to obtain control of and liquidate the Debtor's assets as quickly and efficiently as possible.\" (*Id*. ¶ 6.).\n- The Trustee and the government agreed to negotiate how to apportion the proceeds from any sale of the Mahwah Facility, except that certain administrative costs *including the Trustee's counsel's attorney's fees*—would be paid first out of those proceeds. (*Id.*, Settlement Agreement ¶¶ 6, 14(b).)\n\n The government agreed to \"execute promptly any documents which may be required to convey clear title\" for the Trustee's sale of the Facility. (*Id.* at 23.)\n\nAlthough the defense first learned of the Settlement Agreement when it was filed publicly, the Trustee and the government executed it more than a month earlier, on or about July 13, 2023.\n\nOn August 14, 2023, the Bankruptcy Court held a hearing on the Trustee's motion for a preliminary injunction. In advance of the hearing, Mr. Kwok's bankruptcy counsel filed a letter with the court indicating that Mr. Kwok considers the Mahwah Facility and its contents to be important evidence in this proceeding, and that he intended to file a motion in this Court to ensure continued access to the Mahwah Facility and to prevent any changes to it or its contents pending resolution of this proceeding. (Kamaraju Decl. Ex. 11). On August 24, 2023, the Bankruptcy Court entered a preliminary injunction with respect to the Mahwah Facility. (Mahwah Proceeding Dkt. No. 47.)\n\n## **IV. The August 2023 Subpoenas Invade Mr. Kwok's Attorney-Client Privilege**\n\nOn August 22, 2022, the Trustee filed a motion seeking an order \"confirming\" that he controlled certain legal privileges formerly held by Mr. Kwok, and directing that Mr. Kwok and others not withhold information on the basis of \"any such privileges \"or attempt to assert any such privileges.\" (Kwok Bankruptcy Case Dkt. No. 777 at 1.) That motion followed on the heels of the Trustee's prior receipt of authority from the Bankruptcy Court to serve subpoenas on \"the Debtor and numerous law firms and other professional advisors who represented him\" pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004 (\"Rule 2004\"). (*Id.* ¶ 1.) In response, Mr. Kwok invoked attorney-client privilege, work product protection, and other privileges and protections. (*Id.* ¶ 2.)\n\nOn September 14, 2022, the Bankruptcy Court issued the Privilege Order (attached hereto as Kamaraju Decl. Ex. 12), on consent, providing that the Trustee had \"exclusive control\" of \"any attorney-client privilege or work product protection\" concerning (among other things) any assets that are or were held by Mr. Kwok or any other individual or entity that the Trustee was investigating. (*Id.* at 1.) The Privilege Order appeared to acknowledge that Mr. Kwok retained any privilege relating to unrelated issues, \"such as unrelated criminal allegations\" or Mr. Kwok's asylum application. (*Id.* at 3.) To the extent that Mr. Kwok's counsel believed that \"particular documents or information … could result in personal harm to [Mr. Kwok] if disclosed to the Trustee,\" Mr. Kwok was required to log such documents on a privilege log and Mr. Kwok and the Trustee were both empowered to file motions clarifying who controls the privilege over any disputed communications. (*Id.* at 4.)\n\nThe Privilege Order's acknowledgement of Mr. Kwok's inviolable privilege with respect to criminal matters was not, however, followed in practice. Numerous individuals who were served with subpoenas by the Trustee—including former counsel for Mr. Kwok—did not provide Mr. Kwok's bankruptcy counsel any opportunity to review productions for privilege or selfincrimination issues. Other subpoena recipients have produced materials to the Trustee and Mr. Kwok's bankruptcy counsel simultaneously.\n\nMoreover, the Trustee himself has pushed back against Mr. Kwok's assertion of his privilege. For example, in an August 17, 2023 email, the Trustee's counsel conveyed to Mr. Kwok's bankruptcy counsel that the Trustee did \"not believe there is a reasonable basis for [Mr. Kwok] to withhold his consent to waiver of the privilege\" as to certain of the documents it considered as \"material to the adversary proceeding.\" (Kamaraju Decl. Ex. 6.) These documents included lawyers-only communications directly discussing\n\nThe Trustee\n\n13\n\nhas indicated that he may seek an order from the Bankruptcy Court permitting him to waive privilege as to these communications.\n\nFurther disputes as to the ability of the Trustee to waive Mr. Kwok's privilege are expected. On August 11, 2023, the Trustee filed a motion seeking authority under Rule 2004 to serve additional subpoenas (his sixth such motion), including on a long-standing counsel for Mr. Kwok, Victor Cerda, as well as his law firm. At a hearing on August 29, 2023, the Bankruptcy Court reserved decision on this motion and on August 30, 2023, issued a docket update indicating that the motion had been taken under advisement. (Kwok Bankruptcy Case, Aug. 30, 2023 Docket Text.) The Bankruptcy Court has permitted subpoenas to Mr. Kwok's lawyers, including lawyers involved in responding to regulatory inquiries, in the past. (*E.g.*, Kwok Bankruptcy Case Dkt. Nos. 839 (motion seeking discovery from, *inter alia*, law firms representing Mr. Kwok), 866 (granting Dkt. No. 839).)\n\n## **ARGUMENT**\n\n## **I. Applicable Law**\n\nThe All Writs Act provides that \"[t]he Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.\" 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). \"The purpose and function of the All Writs Act is to supply the courts with the instruments needed to perform their duty, as prescribed by the Congress and the Constitution . . . .\" *Harris v. Nelson*, 394 U.S. 286, 300 (1969). Thus, the Act provides federal district courts with substantial authority to preserve their jurisdiction, including, but not limited to, enjoining related parallel proceedings. \"Pursuant to this inherent power, a federal court may enjoin actions in other jurisdictions that would undermine its ability to reach and resolve the merits of the dispute before it.\" *S.E.C. v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd.*, 93\n\nF. Supp. 2d 475, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (internal quotations and citations omitted); *see also, e.g., In re Baldwin-United Corp.*, 770 F.2d 328, 338 (2d Cir. 1985) (\"An important feature of the All-Writs Act is its grant of authority to enjoin and bind non-parties to an action when needed to preserve the court's ability to reach or enforce its decision in a case over which it has proper jurisdiction.\"); *State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Parisien*, 352 F. Supp. 3d 215, 224 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (enjoining state court proceedings).\n\nSimilarly, every court has the inherent power to \"control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.\" *Landis v. North Am. Co.*, 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). \"One of the primary purposes of the supervisory power is to protect the integrity of judicial proceedings.\" *United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A.*, No. 12 Cr. 763, 2013 WL 3306161, at \\*4 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013). A court's supervisory authority extends \"over members of the bar of this Court,\" *United States v. Ming He*, 94 F.3d 782, 792 (2d Cir. 1996), and includes federal courts' obligation to ensure that defendants in criminal cases receive \"fair standards of procedure,\" in which their rights are protected. *Id.*\n\n Both the All Writs Act and the Court's supervisory authority provide the Court with the power to stay a parallel proceeding that interferes with the Court's jurisdiction. *See United States v. Gerace*, No. 21-2419, 2023 WL 3243477, at \\*1 (2d Cir. May 4, 2023) (recognizing district court's authority to enjoin parallel state proceeding which imperiled pending criminal case); *Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc.*, 676 F.3d 83, 98 (2d Cir. 2012) (exercising its discretion, a district court \"may stay civil proceedings when related criminal proceedings are imminent or pending, and it will sometimes be prudential to do so\"); *United States v. Simon*, 373 F.2d 649, 651- 52 (2d Cir. 1967) (assuming without deciding that district court had authority under both All Writs Act and supervisory authority to enjoin parallel civil proceeding); *United States v. Amrep Corp.*, 405 F. Supp. 1053, 1055 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (stating that it is \"perfectly clear that the court does have jurisdiction to prevent interference with the trial of the pending indictment or with the preparation by defendants for such trial\" through staying related Federal Trade Commission (\"FTC\") proceedings); *United States v. FINRA*, 607 F.Supp.2d 391, 393 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (\"A district court unquestionably has the authority under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), to enjoin proceedings that threaten to interfere with its jurisdiction over a pending criminal case.\"); *Caleb and Brown Pty. Ltd. v. Thompson*, No. 20-cv-8612(LAP), 2020 WL 6887680 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2020) (staying civil proceeding pending final judgment in criminal case).\n\nAlthough some courts in this Circuit evaluate the propriety of a stay using a series of factors listed by the court in *Trustees of Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat. Pension Fund v. Transworld Mech., Inc.*, 886 F. Supp. 1134, 1139 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), the Second Circuit in *Louis Vuitton* declined to be bound by what it described as a \"mechanical device\" that does \"little more than serve as something of a check list of factors we ought to consider.\" 676 F.3d at 99. Rather, the \"decision ultimately requires and must rest upon 'a particularized inquiry into the circumstances of, and the competing interests in, the case.'\" *Id*. (quoting *Banks v. Yokemick*, 144 F. Supp. 2d 272, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)). In *Gerace*, the Second Circuit recently held that, in granting the government's request to enjoin a parallel state court defamation action brought by the defendant against potential witnesses in the criminal proceeding, the district court properly balanced the prejudice to the government from denying the injunction and to the defendant (the plaintiff in the parallel state court proceeding) from granting the injunction. 2023 WL 3243477 at \\*2; *see also FINRA*, 607 F. Supp. 2d at 393 (balancing the prejudice to the party requesting the stay and the party opposing the stay); *Amrep*, 405 F. Supp. at 1056 (finding the central question was degree to which parallel FTC proceeding would interfere with preparation for and conduct of defendant's criminal trial).\n\nPost-indictment, bankruptcy cases can provide an acute harm, because \"[t]he prejudice to the debtor's [F]ifth [A]mendment rights is more acute in the bankruptcy context because of the liberality of discovery procedures in civil litigation as contrasted with the limited discovery allowable under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.\" *In re Marceca*, 131 B.R. 774, 778 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) (granting stay of bankruptcy discharge litigation against debtor pending decision by government to indict or decline to prosecute the debtor; parties instructed to return for further consideration of the stay if indictment issued); *Eisenberg v. Feiner (In re Ahead By A Length, Inc.)*, 78 B.R. 708, 713 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987) (bankruptcy case stayed for six months pending further action in the criminal proceedings, without prejudice to further extension).\n\n## **II. Discussion**\n\n## **A. The Court Should Stay the Bankruptcy Cases to Protect Mr. Kwok's Rights and the Integrity of These Proceedings**\n\nIt is rare for a trustee to be appointed in the Chapter 11 case of an individual debtor. It is particularly complicated when such a debtor, as in this case, is then subsequently indicted on criminal charges that overlap in many ways with the issues in the Bankruptcy Cases. The circumstances here thus present a unique threat—already occurring—that Mr. Kwok's rights are being abrogated for a bankruptcy proceeding that appears to predominantly benefit a sizeable hedge fund (at the apparent expense of individual investors) and the Trustee's law firm (at which the Trustee is a partner). The risk to Mr. Kwok's guaranteed rights as a criminal defendant is untenable, and courts have recognized that parallel proceedings may \"impair a party's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, extend criminal discovery beyond the limits set forth in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(b), expose the defense's theory to the prosecution in advance of trial, or otherwise prejudice the criminal case.\" *Transworld*, 886 F. Supp. at 1138- 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citations omitted) (staying civil case pending resolution of parallel criminal proceeding); *see also SEC v. Oakford Corp.*, 181 F.R.D. 269, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (\"[T]he effect of . . . parallel proceedings is to place the defendant in the jaws of a pincers . . . .\").\n\nContinuation of the Bankruptcy Cases threatens more than Mr. Kwok's Fifth Amendment rights. Rather, as set forth below, the Bankruptcy Cases threaten a host of harms to Mr. Kwok's other rights as a criminal defendant, including his rights to *Brady* material and to his attorneyclient privilege. Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Cases should be stayed. *See*, *e.g.*, *In re Marceca*, 131 B.R. at 778 (staying bankruptcy proceeding during pre-indictment criminal investigation, with instruction to further consider duration of stay should debtor be indicted).\n\n## **(i) The Contempt Order Threatens Mr. Kwok's Fifth Amendment Rights**\n\n*First*, the risk posed by compliance with the Contempt Order is particularly significant because the act of production doctrine applies to any production made by Mr. Kwok. Through producing any documents to the Trustee, Mr. Kwok faces the risk that such production will implicitly authenticate the documents produced, and such production could be \"a link in the chain of evidence\" used to prosecute him, including in this criminal action. *Hoffman v. United States*, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951); *see also In re Schick*, 215 B.R. 4, 9 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997). This risk is amplified given that the Bankruptcy Court has already taken the position that any production by Mr. Kwok will constitute a \"tacit averment\" of the authenticity of materials. (Kamaraju Decl. 2 p. 16.) Of course, \"it is now settled that an individual may claim an act of production privilege [under the Fifth Amendment] to decline to produce documents, the contents of which are not privileged, where the act of production is, itself, (1) compelled, (2) testimonial, and (3) incriminating.\" *In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated Jan. 29, 1999*, 191 F.3d 173, 178 (2d Cir. 1999).\n\nThe Bankruptcy Court erroneously held that the required records exception overcame Mr. Kwok's Fifth Amendment rights. The provisions of the bankruptcy code purporting to provide the Trustee with authority to seek potentially incriminatory information from Mr. Kwok, 11 USC §§ 521(a)(3) and 521(a)(4), require individuals to cooperate with bankruptcy trustees, and to surrender to the trustee all property of the estate. The Second Circuit, however, has made clear that the required records exception is circumscribed, and only applies where there is a \"nexus between the . . . production request\" and the existing record-keeping, which must be \"required by statute or rule\" and where, as a result, the \"record-holder 'admits' little in the way of control or authentication\" by producing the records at issue. *In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated Aug. 21, 1985*, 793 F.2d 69, 73 (2d Cir. 1986).\n\nIn this case, as the Bankruptcy Court itself has found, production of the records called for by the Contempt Order would constitute a \"tacit averment\" by Mr. Kwok as to the authenticity of the records produced. (Kamaraju Decl. Ex. 2 at 16.) Moreover, the Second Circuit has made clear that the required records exception is a narrow exception that only applies to records that the producing party was under a statutory or regulatory duty to preserve, such as records required by FINCEN regulations, *In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Feb. 2, 2012*, 741 F.3d 339, 348 (2d Cir. 2013); New York state tax laws related to the purchase of alcohol for commercial purposes, *In re Two Subpoenas to Testify Before Grand Jury Dated Dec. 1, 2016*, 252 F. Supp. 3d 170, 176- 177 (E.D.N.Y. 2017); and rules governing an attorney's representation of a client, *In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum*, 793 F.2d at 73. Contrary to the Second Circuit's dictate, the Bankruptcy Court applied the exception to *all documents* concerning an individual debtor's financial affairs, at the same time the debtor is also facing criminal charges on related matters. The Bankruptcy Court's misapplication of this narrow exception risks swallowing Mr. Kwok's Fifth Amendment rights.\n\nMr. Kwok previously sought a more limited stay of the discovery at issue in the Contempt Order to ameliorate these issues. (Kwok Bankruptcy Case Dkt. No. 1649.) The Bankruptcy Court declined to grant that request. (*Id.* Dkt. No. 1740.) As a result, Mr. Kwok is forced to turn to this Court to guard his Fifth Amendment rights through the instant motion.\n\n## **(ii) The Mahwah Proceeding Threatens Mr. Kwok's** *Brady* **Rights**\n\n*Second*, the Mahwah Proceeding and the related Settlement Agreement threaten Mr. Kwok's rights under *Brady*. As the Court is aware, the Mahwah Facility features heavily in the government's Indictment, which alleges that Mr. Kwok purchased the property through the use of multiple entities (Ind. ¶16(b)) for use by himself and his family (¶ 4), and that he inappropriately used proceeds of crime to pay for \"extravagant renovations\" to this same property (¶16(c).) The Indictment makes direct reference to the \"various furniture and decorative items\" at the Mahwah Facility. (*Id*.). The defense intends to prove that the Mahwah Facility was not—as the government alleges—a private home for Mr. Kwok and his family, but rather a covert headquarters for use by Mr. Kwok's fellow dissidents and members of the anti-Chinese Communist Party (the \"CCP\") movement and in furtherance of the business of GTV, which was founded to be a platform for anti-CCP activity. Thus, aspects of the Mahwah Facility that demonstrate its purpose for the movement are exculpatory.\n\nGiven that the current status of the property will bear directly on these issues, and the nature and use of the property could provide evidence that is material and favorable to the defense, defense counsel's access to, and general preservation of, the Mahwah Facility must be maintained. *See Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); *Giglio v. U.S.*, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972); *see also* *United States v. Hamilton*, 730 F. Supp. 1272, 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (\"compulsory process and due process rights are both implicated where actions of the government prevent a defendant from obtaining material and favorable evidence.\"). Absent this Court's intervention to preserve the Mahwah Facility and defense counsel's access to it, the \"fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice\" is put at risk. *United States v. Valenzuela–Bernal*, 458 U.S. 858, 872 (1982) (quoting *Lisenba v. California*, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941)).\n\nIn this case, while it is the Trustee who has filed the Mahwah Proceeding, the government is facilitating the Trustee's efforts to dispose of the Mahwah Facility. For one, the government already apparently aided the Trustee's obtaining of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction concerning the Mahwah Facility by providing the Trustee with law enforcement photographs (which presumably are subject to the Protective Order) that the Trustee then used as evidence. Moreover, the government, by entering into the Settlement Agreement, has further agreed to aid in the sale of the Mahwah Facility by, for example, executing any document necessary to consummate the sale, or splitting the proceeds in a manner that ensures payments of the Trustee's legal fees. (*See* Kamaraju Decl. Ex. 5, Settlement Agreement at 5, 7.) Indeed, the government's cooperation with the Trustee with respect to the Mahwah Facility is particularly curious, given that the government has included the Mahwah Facility in its forfeiture allegations, meaning that, in the event of a conviction and successful forfeiture proceeding, the government would itself be able to sell the Mahwah Facility and distribute those proceeds to the alleged victims. Thus, government cooperation is enabling the Trustee to do what the government could not do without a conviction, and to do so in a way that ensures that the Trustee's law firm will get paid before the purported victims in the criminal case and to their detriment. *Cf. United States v. Yalincak*, 853 F.3d 629, 635 (2d Cir. 2017) (\"[a]mounts recovered by a bankruptcy trustee for the\n\nbenefit of the bankruptcy estate, and consumed in the administration of the estate or distributed to non-victim creditors, plainly are not \"recovered … by the victim[s]\" of a crime; only amounts actually distributed to the victim creditors fit that description\").\n\nCourts have frequently encountered this issue in the context of witness availability, and have routinely found that government action causing a material witness's unavailability is violative of a defendant's constitutional rights. *See, e.g.*, *Hamilton*, 730 F. Supp. at 1276 (dismissing indictment following deportation of material witness); *see also United States v. Leal-Del Carmen,* 697 F.3d 964, 975 (9th Cir. 2012) (\"The government's wrongful deportation of a witness with exculpatory evidence, coupled with the district court's evidentiary errors, deprived Leal–Del Carmen of a fair trial and of his constitutional right to present a defense.\"); *United States v. Nebraska Beef, Ltd.*, 194 F. Supp. 2d 949, 960 (D. Neb. 2002) (dismissing indictment due to government's bad faith deportation of aliens with material testimony).\n\nThe government and the Trustee's joint conduct here with respect to the Mahwah Facility is analogous to these cases. The Court has already entered an order in this case directing the government to collect and produce exculpatory material to the defense \"promptly.\" (Dkt. No. 29.) Rather than ensuring Mr. Kwok's prompt access to exculpatory material, however, the Trustee and the government are working together to place exculpatory evidence—the Mahwah Facility beyond Mr. Kwok's reach. The Trustee and the government should not be permitted to do so. The Court should respectfully step in and protect Mr. Kwok's rights by staying the Bankruptcy Cases. *See*, *e.g.*, *United States v. Soriano*, 401 F.Supp.3d 396, 405 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (dismissing indictment where agents intentionally destroyed evidence that was favorable to the defendant).\n\n## **(iii) Erosion of Mr. Kwok's Attorney-Client Privilege**\n\n*Third*, pursuant to the Privilege Order, Mr. Kwok's attorney-client and other privileges can now effectively be used as a sword against him, rather than the shield they were intended to be. As a result, the government will have access to information that it would not otherwise be able to view. Through the Privilege Order, the Trustee now controls Mr. Kwok's privilege and can seek to waive it. While that may be appropriate purely under bankruptcy law, the Trustee's control threatens Mr. Kwok's constitutional rights as a criminal defendant in *this* case because the Trustee is seeking to litigate the very conduct that the government alleges in this proceeding. For example, in the Mahwah Proceeding, the Trustee's (misguided) theory is that Taurus (the Mahwah Facility's corporate owner), is Mr. Kwok's alter ego. The Trustee's theory dovetails directly with the government's claim in the Indictment that the Mahwah Facility was bought on Mr. Kwok's behalf. (*Compare* Mahwah Proceeding Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 4 (alleging that, despite Taurus holding legal title, Mr. Kwok owned the Mahwah Facility and used it as his residence) *with* Indictment ¶ 4 (alleging that Mr. Kwok purchased the Mahwah Facility for himself and his family).) Similarly, the Trustee has asserted claims with respect to a property in Greenwich, Connecticut (the \"Greenwich Property\") that the government claims was purchased by an entity that received proceeds of fraud. (*Compare Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC, et al.*, Adv. Proc. No. 23-05005 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn.) Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 3 (alleging that Greenwich Land, LLC, the owner of the Greenwich Property, is the alter ego of Mr. Kwok) *with* Government's Opposition to Mr. Kwok's Motion for Pretrial Release, Dkt. No. 26 at 5 (alleging that Greenwich Land, LLC purchased the Greenwich Property with proceeds of Mr. Kwok's alleged fraud).)\n\nAs a result, given the Privilege Order, the Trustee can now scour through Mr. Kwok's privileged communications for ammunition in his quest to prove Mr. Kwok's connection to these properties, and then use them publicly to litigate its adversary proceedings, thus giving the government access to those same communications. Moreover, as was made clear both by the Trustee's threats during the settlement negotiations in the Bankruptcy Cases and in the Settlement Agreement, the Trustee has no qualms about reporting such information directly to law enforcement, including the prosecutor's office handling this matter, and there would be nothing to stop him from sharing Mr. Kwok's privileged communications with the government here once he is authorized to waive Mr. Kwok's privilege. Indeed, the Settlement Agreement acutely demonstrates that the Trustee is already cooperating with the government behind the scenes with respect to the Mahwah Facility.\n\nThe threat to Mr. Kwok's attorney client privilege is not limited to disclosure of documents. The Trustee has previously subpoenaed Mr. Kwok's attorneys, (*see* Kwok Bankruptcy Case Dkt. No. 839), and is now seeking additional subpoenas to other attorneys who are representing Mr. Kwok for testimony about the very allegations that are at issue in this proceeding, including Mr. Kwok's longtime attorney, Mr. Cerda (and his firm) who is heavily involved in Mr. Kwok's defense. Under the Privilege Order, these attorneys may be unable to assert Mr. Kwok's privilege in response to deposition questions about the transactions that are at issue in this proceeding. Yet given the overlap between the issues in this case and the bankruptcy proceeding, their responses to such questioning could reveal confidences that could be used against Mr. Kwok at his criminal trial. Indeed, that appears to be the Trustee's aim in questioning these attorneys, given that he is pursuing a theory that the corporate owners of the Mahwah Facility are alter egos of Mr. Kwok.\n\nThe Trustee has no reason to exercise Mr. Kwok's privilege in a manner that protects his rights in this case. To the contrary, the Trustee is incentivized to use privileged information that he believes shows Mr. Kwok's control over the Mahwah Facility. And given his previous threats and representations, it is also clear that the Trustee has no compunction about approaching the government with information directly where he believes it serves his purpose. This Court can and should intervene to preserve Mr. Kwok's rights as a criminal defendant.\n\n# **(iv) The Government Has Previously Sought a Similar Stay of a Parallel Proceeding**\n\nThe government will be hard-pressed to contest a stay of the Bankruptcy Cases given that the government also sought to stay a parallel proceeding brought by the SEC involving the same conduct, which is captioned *SEC v. Kwok*, No. 23 Civ. 2200 (PGG) (S.D.N.Y.). (*See* Kamaraju Decl. Ex. 7 (government's motion to stay SEC proceeding).) The factors set out in the government's submission there fully support the stay Mr. Kwok seeks here:\n\n*First*, there can be no dispute about the overlap between the Bankruptcy Cases and this proceeding—both cases involve allegations that certain property and entities belong to, and are controlled by, Mr. Kwok. That overlap is a \"significant factor\" supporting a stay. (*Id.* at 4 (quoting *SEC v. Shkreli*, No. 15 Civ. 7175, 2006 WL 1122029, at \\*4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2016)).)\n\n*Second*, the status of the criminal case supports a stay, given that Mr. Kwok has been indicted. As the government notes, \"[t]he weight of authority in this Circuit indicates that courts will stay a civil proceeding when a criminal investigation has ripened into an indictment.\" (*See id*. (quoting *In re Par Pharm., Inc. Secs. Litig.*, 133 F.R.D. 12, 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)).) Indeed, as the government further remarks, \"[a] stay of a civil case is most appropriate when a party to the civil case has already been indicted for the same conduct for two reasons: first, the likelihood that a defendant may make incriminating statements is greatest after an indictment has issued, and second, the prejudice to the plaintiffs in the civil case is reduced since the criminal case will likely be quickly resolved.\" (*Id*. (quoting *Transworld*, 886 F. Supp. at 1139).)\n\n*Third,* while Mr. Kwok does not dispute the importance of the Bankruptcy Cases and compensating creditors to the extent possible, the ultimate resolution of those claims ultimately comes down to issues of who gets paid what and when. Even if the Bankruptcy Cases were delayed pending the criminal trial in April 2024 and related appeals, the estate would not ultimately suffer any prejudice because the bankruptcy estate is under the Trustee's or government's control at this time. *Cf*. *Tom Doherty Assocs., Inc. v. Saban Ent., Inc.*, 60 F.3d 27, 37 (2d Cir. 1995) (citation and quotation omitted) (\"Irreparable harm is an injury that is not remote or speculative but actual and imminent, and for which a monetary award cannot be adequate compensation.\"); *see also Rex Med. L.P. v. Angiotech Pharms. (US), Inc.*, 754 F. Supp. 2d 616, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (Monetary loss is insufficient\" to establish irreparable harm.) And, as addressed above, in the event of a criminal conviction, the government will, itself, be in a position to sell the Mahwah Facility and compensate any alleged victims, and to work with the Trustee to ensure that the estate will have access to whatever portion of the proceeds of a sale of the Mahwah Facility is appropriate.\n\n*Fourth*, as the government recognized in its stay application and as set forth above, a stay of the Bankruptcy Cases is unquestionably in Mr. Kwok's interests, as it will prevent the Trustee's unwarranted incursions on Mr. Kwok's constitutional rights in this matter. *See supra* at 17-22. \"When a defendant has been indicted, his situation is particularly dangerous, and takes a certain priority, for the risk of his liberty, the importance of safeguarding his constitutional rights, and even the strain on his resources and attention that makes defending satellite civil litigation particularly difficult, all weigh in favor of his interest.\" *Sterling Nat. Bank v A-1 Hotels Int'l Inc.*, 175 F. Supp. 2d 573, 577 (SDNY 2001).\n\n*Fifth*, it is in the Court's interest to grant a stay of the Bankruptcy Cases to protect its jurisdiction over this matter. As the background of this motion demonstrates, there are substantial\n\nand significant points of conflict between this proceeding and the Bankruptcy Cases, which require the Court's intervention to protect Mr. Kwok's rights. Those conflicts will not subside—the Trustee is litigating multiple adversary proceedings (and may file more) that will continue to invade Mr. Kwok's rights. Unless the Bankruptcy Cases are stayed, they will continually interfere with this Court's administration of a significant criminal case and Mr. Kwok's right to a proper defense.\n\n*Sixth*, staying the Bankruptcy Cases will \"serve the public interest by ensuring that [the criminal case] proceeds fairly against [Mr. Kwok] by not forcing him to either effectively waive his Fifth Amendment protection in the [criminal matter] or face an adverse inference herein that undermines [his] ability to defend this matter.\" *SEC v. Millan*, 20 Civ. 06575 (CM), 2020 WL 5898769, at \\*4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2020). Moreover, the government has already taken the position that the public is served by preventing criminal discovery from being disclosed in a parallel civil proceeding. (*See* Kamaraju Decl. Ex. 7 at 5.) The Trustee is explicitly seeking—with the blessing of the Bankruptcy Court—the discovery produced by the government in this case, presumably with the intention of using it in the Bankruptcy Cases. Indeed, given that the government has apparently already produced information to the Trustee (*e.g.*, the photographs from the FBI's search of the Mahwah Facility), and in light of the ongoing adversary proceedings, it is possible that additional discovery from this case will be revealed to have been produced by the government to the Trustee.\n\nIt is strange, frankly, that the government sought to stay the SEC action but has not only declined to seek to stay the Bankruptcy Cases that present the same concerns, but rather, is helping the Bankruptcy Cases along. Thus, it appears that the government will not act to protect Mr. Kwok's constitutional rights during the Bankruptcy Cases, even though the government explicitly predicated its request to stay the SEC proceedings on, among other things, the threatened harm to Mr. Kwok's Fifth Amendment rights. (*See id.* at 4.) Nor does the Bankruptcy Court appear inclined to protect Mr. Kwok's constitutional rights, given that that court has now declined to stay either the 2022 Rule 2004 Motion or its Contempt Order—in the face of Mr. Kwok's invocation of his constitutional rights—and has pressed on with discovery of Mr. Kwok's attorneys and the disposition of the Mahwah Facility.\n\nBankruptcy proceedings cannot come at the expense of Mr. Kwok's constitutional right to mount an effective defense to what the government alleges is a billion dollar fraud scheme. To date, the Trustee has demonstrated that, in pursuing the Bankruptcy Cases, he has no qualms about trampling Mr. Kwok's rights in this matter, and the Bankruptcy Court has declined to check the Trustee in his pursuit. Further, the government has demonstrated a willingness to support the Trustee's adversarial actions against Mr. Kwok. As a result, Mr. Kwok is left with no choice but to ask this Court to intervene and protect both Mr. Kwok's rights and the integrity of this proceeding.\n\n# **B. In the Alternative, the Court Should Enter an Order that Minimizes the Harm to Mr. Kwok's Rights**\n\nIf the Court is not inclined to stay the Bankruptcy Cases, then Mr. Kwok respectfully requests in the alternative that, in order to minimize the looming threats to key elements of Mr. Kwok's criminal defense, the Court enter the following relief:\n\n*First*, the Court should grant Mr. Kwok's motion for a modification of the Protective Order to produce discovery in this case to the Trustee (which relief Mr. Kwok understands the government opposes), so that Mr. Kwok avoids any sanction for asserting his Fifth Amendment rights in the Bankruptcy Cases. To be clear, Mr. Kwok seeks such relief only on pain of being sanctioned as a result of the Contempt Order, and continues to believe that he should not be required to turn over documents produced by the government in this case to the Trustee. Mr. Kwok recognizes that the legal standard for his request to modify the Protective Order is that there is good cause to request that modification. The undersigned cannot, consistent with their ethical obligations as officers of the Court, represent that they believe that there is good cause for the modification, because we believe that the Contempt Order was wrongly decided and Mr. Kwok has appealed it. The Trustee and Bankruptcy Court, however, appear to believe that such good cause exists. Accordingly, so that the Court can consider those arguments, Mr. Kwok has attached the Contempt Order to the accompanying Declaration of Sidhardha Kamaraju as Exhibit 2, as well as the Trustee's brief in support of his 2022 Rule 2004 Motion as Exhibit 3.\n\n*Second*, to ensure that Mr. Kwok has appropriate access to *Brady* material, Mr. Kwok requests that, in the alternative to a stay of the Bankruptcy Cases, the Court enter an order preserving the status quo of the Mahwah Facility and its contents, and guaranteeing access to the property by Mr. Kwok's legal team (without chaperoning by the Trustee) so as to preserve and review any evidence contained therein, which includes maintaining all personal property contained in the Mahwah Facility as-is, and expressly disallowing the Trustee from moving, altering, or modifying the Mahwah Facility or its contents in any way whatsoever. We understand that the Trustee has already removed chattels from another property alleged in the Indictment to be a crime scene, the Sherry Netherland Residence. Mr. Kwok's access to that property has been limited to an isolated visit chaperoned by agents of the same Trustee who is, according to his own words, feeding information to the government.\n\n*Third*, to prevent the continued flow of privileged information from the Trustee to the government, Mr. Kwok respectfully requests that, in the alternative to staying the Bankruptcy Cases, this Court issue an order preventing further communication, coordination, or other similar\n\naction between the government and the Trustee, and requiring the government to identify all such information already provided to it by the Trustee. As it stands, the Trustee possesses vast amounts of communications, including attorney-client communications, over which the Trustee asserts he has exclusive control. The Trustee's view seemingly is that he can also waive Mr. Kwok's privilege . That fact, coupled with the Trustee's repeated statements that he has provided information to the government and advised the government on the results of his investigations, vitiates Mr. Kwok's Fifth Amendment rights and upends criminal procedure.\n\n## **CONCLUSION**\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, Mr. Kwok respectfully requests that the Court stay the Bankruptcy Cases, or, in the alternative, (i) modify the Protective Order to allow production of the discovery in this case to the Trustee; (ii) direct that Mr. Kwok's defense team continue to be permitted access to the Mahwah Facility through the pendency of this case and any resulting appeals; (iii) preclude the government from facilitating the sale of the Mahwah Facility in the Bankruptcy Cases through the pendency of this case and any resulting appeals; (iv) order that the government not solicit or receive from the Trustee any information or records that are subject to any privileges belonging to Mr. Kwok and identify any such materials already provided by the Trustee; and (v) grant Mr. Kwok such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.\n\nDated: New York, New York August 30, 2023\n\n## PRYOR CASHMAN LLP\n\nBy: \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\n\nSidhardha Kamaraju Matthew S. Barkan Daniel J. Pohlman Clare P. Tilton\n\n7 Times Square New York, NY 10036 (212) 421-4100 skamaraju@pryorcashman.com mbarkan@pryorcashman.com dpohlman@pryorcashman.com ctilton@pryorcashman.com\n\n*Attorneys for Defendant Ho Wan Kwok*","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院布里奇波特分部\n\n--------------------------------------------------------------- x\n\n关于：\n： 第11章\n：\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，\n： 案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n：\n债务人。1\n： 合并管理\n：\n--------------------------------------------------------------- x\n第11章受托人关于债务人在刑事案件中提出请求裁定中止本第11章案件及相关对抗程序之动议的通知\n\nLuc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯）作为HO WAN KWOK（以下简称“债务人”）的第11章受托人（以下简称“受托人”），特此通知：债务人于今日早些时候在美国纽约南区联邦地区法院 [案号 1:23-cr-00118-AT] 对其未决的刑事案件（以下简称“刑事案件”）中提交了一项动议，请求中止上述标题所列的第11章案件及所有相关对抗程序。债务人《关于裁定及令状以中止破产案件，或备选请求其他救济的动议通知》[刑事案件 ECF No. 129]（以下简称“该动议”）随附于本通知，作为附件A。债务人支持其动议的法律备忘录随附于本通知，作为附件B [刑事案件 ECF No. 131]。2 随被告关于裁定及令状以中止破产案件之动议一并提交的Sidharda Kamaraju（西达尔达·卡马拉朱）声明 [刑事案件 ECF No. 130] 作为附件C随本通知提交。受托人正在审阅该动议，并将酌情作出回应。\n\n1 本第11章案件中的债务人为HO WAN KWOK（亦称Guo Wengui、Miles Guo及Miles Kwok，以及其他众多别名）（税务识别号码后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（吉尼弗控股有限责任公司）（税务识别号码后四位：8202）及Genever Holdings Corporation（吉尼弗控股公司）。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC及Genever Holdings Corporation的邮寄地址为：Paul Hastings LLP（普衡律师事务所），200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166，c/o Luc A. Despins，作为HO WAN KWOK遗产的受托人（仅用于通知及通信）。\n\n2 债务人将本备忘录的部分内容以密封方式提交。受托人未获提供该动议的未密封副本。\n\n康涅狄格州纽黑文\n\n日期：August 30, 2023 LUC A. DESPINS，第11章受托人，\n\n签署人：/s/ Patrick R. Linsey\nDouglas S. Skalka（道格拉斯·S·斯卡尔卡）(ct00616)\nPatrick R. Linsey（帕特里克·R·林赛）(ct29437)\nNEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C.（纽伯特、佩佩及蒙蒂思律师事务所）\n195 Church Street, 13th Floor\nNew Haven, Connecticut 06510\n(203) 821-2000\ndskalka@npmlaw.com\nplinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n以及\n\nNicholas A. Bassett（尼古拉斯·A·巴塞特）（获准pro hac vice出庭）\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP（普衡律师事务所）\n2050 M Street NW\nWashington, D.C., 20036\n(202) 551-1902\nnicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n以及\n\nAvram E. Luft（阿夫拉姆·E·卢夫特）（获准pro hac vice出庭）\nG. Alexander Bongartz（G·亚历山大·邦加茨）（获准pro hac vice出庭）\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP（普衡律师事务所）\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, New York 10166\n(212) 318-6079\naviluft@paulhastings.com\nalexbongartz@paulhastings.com\n\n第11章受托人代理律师\n\n美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院布里奇波特分部\n\n----------------------------------------------------------- x\n\n关于： ： 第11章\n\nHO WAN KWOK，\n等， ： 案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n债务人。 ： （合并管理）\n\n----------------------------------------------------------- x\n\n送达证明\n\n下列签署人特此证明，于August 30, 2023，前述文件及其所有证物和附件已以电子方式提交。本次提交的通知将通过法院电子提交（“CM/ECF”）系统的运行，以电子邮件发送给上述标题所列第11章案件的所有当事人；或按照电子提交通知中的指示，以邮寄方式发送给任何无法接受电子提交的人士。2 当事人可通过法院的CM/ECF系统查阅本次提交。\n\n康涅狄格州纽黑文\n\n日期：August 30, 2023 LUC A. DESPINS，第11章受托人，\n\n签署人：/s/ Patrick R. Linsey\n\nPatrick R. Linsey (ct29437)\nNEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C.\n195 Church Street, 13th Floor\nNew Haven, Connecticut 06510\n(203) 821-2000\nplinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n1 本第11章案件中的债务人为HO WAN KWOK（亦称Guo Wengui、Miles Guo及Miles Kwok，以及其他众多别名）（税务识别号码后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（税务识别号码后四位：8202）及Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC及Genever Holdings Corporation的邮寄地址为：Paul Hastings LLP，200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166，c/o Luc A. Despins，作为HO WAN KWOK遗产的受托人（仅用于通知及通信）。\n\n2 在前述文件于正常营业时间以外提交的范围内，对于无法或无资格接受电子通知的收件人，邮寄送达于下一个营业日完成。\n\n附件A\n\n（债务人关于裁定及令状以中止破产案件，或备选请求其他救济的动议通知）\n\n美国纽约南区联邦地区法院\n\n美利坚合众国，\n\n原告，\n\n诉\n\nHO WAN KWOK，\n\n被告。\n\n案号 1:23-CR-118-1 (AT)\n\n关于裁定及令状以中止破产案件，或备选请求其他救济的动议通知\n请求口头辩论\n\n被告HO WAN KWOK通过其代理律师，谨此请求法院依据《全令状法》28 U.S.C. § 1651及法院固有的监督权，发布裁定及令状，中止标题为In re Ho Wan Kwok, et al., Case No. 22-50073(JAM) (Bank. D. Conn.) (Jointly Administered)的破产案件，包括合并管理的、标题为In re Genever Holdings Corp., Case No. 22-50542(JAM) (Bank. D. Conn.)的程序，以及In re Genever Holdings LLC, Case No. 22-50592(JAM) (Bank. D. Conn.)的程序，及所有相关对抗程序。\n\n被告基于Sidhardha Kamarju的声明、其所附证物及随附的法律备忘录提出本动议。\n\n被告谨请求就本动议进行口头辩论。\n\n日期：August 30, 2023 纽约州纽约市 谨此提交，\n\nSidhardha Kamaraju\nMatthew S. Barkan（马修·S·巴坎）\nDaniel J. Pohlman（丹尼尔·J·波尔曼）\nClare P. Tilton（克莱尔·P·蒂尔顿）\nPRYOR CASHMAN LLP（普赖尔·卡什曼律师事务所）\n7 Times Square\nNew York, NY 10036\n(212) 421-4100\n[skamaraju@pryorcashman.com] [mbarkan@pryorcashman.com]\ndpohlman@pryorcashman.com\nctilton@pryorcashman.com\n\n被告HO WAN KWOK的代理律师\n\n附件B（债务人的法律备忘录）\n\n美国纽约南区联邦地区法院\n\n美利坚合众国，\n\n原告，\n\n诉\n\n部分内容以密封方式提交\n\nHO WAN KWOK，\n\n案号 1:23-CR-118-1 (AT)\n\n被告。\n\n支持被告关于裁定及令状以中止破产案件之动议的法律备忘录\n\nSidhardha Kamaraju\nMatthew S. Barkan\nDaniel J. Pohlman\nClare P. Tilton\nPRYOR CASHMAN LLP\n7 Times Square\nNew York, NY 10036\n(212) 421-4100\nskamaraju@pryorcashman.com\nmbarkan@pryorcashman.com\ndpohlman@pryorcashman.com\nctilton@pryorcashman.com\n\n被告HO WAN KWOK的代理律师\n\n目录\n\n判例及法规目录 ii\n\n初步陈述 2\n\n相关背景 5\n\nI. 破产申请及起诉书 5\n\nII. 藐视法庭命令侵犯Kwok先生的《第五修正案》权利 7\n\nIII. 受托人与政府就Mahwah设施达成的和解协议 9\n\nIV. August 2023传票侵犯Kwok先生的律师—当事人保密特权 12\n\n论证 14\n\nI. 适用法律 14\n\nII. 讨论 17\n\nA. 法院应中止破产案件，以保护\nKwok先生的权利及本程序的完整性 17\n\ni. 藐视法庭命令威胁\nKwok先生的《第五修正案》权利 18\n\nii. Mahwah程序\n威胁Kwok先生的Brady权利 20\n\niii. 对Kwok先生律师—当事人保密特权的侵蚀 23\n\niv. 政府此前曾请求\n中止类似的平行程序 25\n\nB. 备选而言，法院应作出一项\n将对Kwok先生权利的损害降至最低的裁定。 28\n\n结论 30\n\n判例及法规目录\n\n页码\n\n判例\n\nIn re Baldwin-United Corp.，\n770 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1985)15\n\nBrady v. Maryland，\n373 U.S. 83 (1963) 3, 18, 20, 29\n\nCaleb and Brown Pty. Ltd. v. Thompson，\nNo. 20-cv-8612(LAP), 2020 WL 6887680 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2020) 16\n\nEisenberg v. Feiner (In re Ahead By A Length, Inc.)，\n78 B.R. 708 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987) 17\n\nGiglio v. U.S.，\n405 U.S. 150 (1972) 20\n\nIn re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Feb. 2, 2012，\n741 F.3d 339 (2d Cir. 2013)19\n\nHarris v. Nelson，\n394 U.S. 286 (1969) 14\n\nHoffman v. United States，\n341 U.S. 479 (1951) 18\n\nLandis v. North Am. Co.，\n299 U.S. 248 (1936) 15\n\nLouis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc.，\n676 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2012)15, 16\n\nIn re\nMarceca，\n131 B.R. 774 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) 17, 18\n\nRex Med. L.P. v. Angiotech Pharms. (US), Inc.，\n754 F. Supp. 2d 616 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)26\n\nS.E.C. v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd.，\n93 F. Supp. 2d 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)14\n\nIn re Schick，\n215 B.R. 4 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) 18\n\nSEC v. Millan，\n20 Civ. 06575 (CM), 2020 WL 5898769 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2020) 27\n\nSEC v. Oakford Corp.，\n181 F.R.D. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) 18\n\nState Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Parisien，\n352 F. Supp. 3d 215 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) 15\n\nSterling Nat. Bank v A-1 Hotels Int'l Inc.，\n175 F. Supp. 2d 573 (SDNY 2001)26\n\nIn re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated Jan. 29, 1999，\n191 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 1999)18\n\nTom Doherty Assocs., Inc. v. Saban Ent., Inc.，\n60 F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 1995)26\n\nTrustees of Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat. Pension Fund v. Transworld Mech., Inc.，\n886 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)16, 17\n\nIn re Two Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated Aug. 21, 1985，\n793 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1986)19\n\nIn re Two Subpoenas to Testify Before Grand Jury Dated Dec. 1, 2016，\n252 F. Supp. 3d 170 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) 19\n\nUnited States v. Amrep Corp.，\n405 F. Supp. 1053 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)15, 16\n\nUnited States v. FINRA，\n607 F.Supp.2d 391 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) 16\n\nUnited States v. Gerace，\nNo. 21-2419, 2023 WL 3243477 (2d Cir. May 4, 2023) 15, 16\n\nUnited States v. Hamilton，\n730 F. Supp. 1272 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)21, 22\n\nUnited States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A.，\nNo. 12 Cr. 763, 2013 WL 3306161 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013) 15\n\nUnited States v. Leal-Del Carmen，\n697 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2012) 22\n\nUnited States v. Ming He，\n94 F.3d 782 (2d Cir. 1996)15\n\nUnited States v. Nebraska Beef, Ltd.，\n194 F. Supp. 2d 949 (D. Neb. 2002) 22\n\nUnited States v. Simon，\n373 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1967)15\n\nUnited States v. Soriano，\n401 F.Supp.3d 396 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) 22\n\nUnited States v. Valenzuela–Bernal，\n458 U.S. 858 (1982) 21\n\nUnited States v. Yalincak，\n853 F.3d 629 (2d Cir. 2017)21\n\n法规\n\n11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(3) 8\n\n11 USC § 521(a)(4) 19\n\n28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) 14, 16\n\n其他资料\n\nFed. R Bankr. P. 2004 多处引用\n\nFed. R. Crim. P. 16 17\n\n被告人 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）通过其下列署名律师，谨此依据《All Writs Act》28 U.S.C. § 1651，并依据本院固有的监督权，恭请本院作出命令，中止案名为 In re Ho Wan Kwok, et al., Case No. 22-50073(JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn) (Jointly Administered) 的破产案件，包括其每一相关对抗程序1（下文所定义的 Kwok Chapter 11 Case、下文所定义的 Genever US Chapter 11 Case、下文所定义的 Genever BVI Chapter 11 Case，以及所有相关对抗程序，统称为“破产案件”）；或者，作为替代请求，作出命令：(i) 修改本案作出的保护令（“保护令”），以允许依据 United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut（美国康涅狄格联邦地区破产法院）（“破产法院”）于 2023年7月26日前后针对 Kwok 先生作出的藐视法庭命令（“藐视法庭命令”），向破产案件中的 Chapter 11 受托人 Luc Despins, Esq.（“受托人”）提供本案中的证据开示材料；(ii) 指示允许 Kwok 先生的辩护团队在本案及由此产生的任何上诉审理期间，继续进入位于 675 Ramapo Valley Road, Mahwah, New Jersey 07430 的不动产（“Mahwah 房产”）；(iii) 禁止政府在本案及由此产生的任何上诉审理期间，协助在破产案件中出售 Mahwah 房产；以及 (iv) 命令政府不得向受托人索取或接收任何受 Kwok 先生享有的任何特权保护的信息或记录，包括但不限于其律师—当事人特权或第五修正案特权，并识别受托人已提供的任何此类材料。\n\n1 相关对抗程序的案卷编号清单载于 Sidhardha Kamaraju 于 2023年8月30日作出的声明（“Kamaraju 声明”）附件 1 所附的拟议命令和令状中。\n\n初步陈述\n\n宪法的一项基本原则是，当政府指控被告人违反刑事法律时，被告人享有重大权利，包括不被强迫自证其罪的权利以及获取有利于被告的证据的权利。本院的主要职责是保障这些权利；这些权利对于刑事程序的公正性和完整性至关重要，Kwok 先生有权享有这些权利。然而，Kwok 先生的权利正日益受到威胁，因为在政府对 Kwok 先生提起刑事追诉的同时，他也是一项并行 Chapter 11 破产程序中的债务人；在该程序中，受托人以归集 Kwok 先生资产的名义，在政府的配合下，就正触及本次刑事追诉核心的问题进行诉讼。受托人如此行事，正在干扰 Kwok 先生作为刑事被告人的权利，并损害本程序的神圣性。\n\n首先，受托人正在强迫 Kwok 先生参与侵犯其自身不被强迫自证其罪的宪法权利。受托人无视 Kwok 先生援引其第五修正案权利，试图强制 Kwok 先生及其律师向受托人提供（从而实际上认证）政府在本案中提供的证据开示材料，甚至因 Kwok 先生未提供鉴于尚未终结的刑事追诉而显然不应被要求提供的文件，从破产法院取得了藐视法庭命令。例如，受托人的证据开示要求要求 Kwok 先生提供显示其与 GTV 所称关系的文件；如本院所知，该关系是本程序中的核心问题。针对这些越权请求，Kwok 先生适当地依据文书提交行为原则主张了其第五修正案权利。\n\n尽管承认 Kwok 先生不被强迫自证其罪的权利受到牵涉，破产法院仍站在受托人一方，并基于对文书提交行为原则某一例外的牵强解读，命令 Kwok 先生提供文件。虽然 Kwok 先生已寻求获准向 United States District Court for the District of Connecticut（美国康涅狄格联邦地区法院）就该裁决提起上诉，但藐视法庭命令使 Kwok 先生处于无法维持的境地——即使这会侵犯其宪法权利，他仍不得不请求本院修改保护令，以允许向受托人提供材料。即使政府也反对为此目的修改保护令。\n\n其次，受托人已对 Mahwah 房产的所有人提起对抗程序，并取得一项初步禁令，要求其将该房产移交受托人处置。令人意外的是，政府并未寻求阻止处置本案经修正起诉书（“起诉书”）核心所涉的一项不动产，反而与受托人签订和解协议（“和解协议”）以促成该出售，并向受托人提供本案证据，以支持受托人扣押 Mahwah 房产的努力；此举表面上违反了本案中的保护令。\n\n政府选择性地配合受托人，颇能说明问题。Mahwah 房产在本案中发挥核心作用——事实上，政府在起诉书中反复（且错误地）指称，Mahwah 房产系使用投资者资金为 Kwok 先生的利益而不当购买。Kwok 先生强烈争议该主张，并拟在审判中证明，购买 Mahwah 房产完全符合 GTV 的业务及向投资者作出的陈述。Kwok 先生拟通过包括证明该房产的预定用途在内的方式加以证明。因此，维持 Mahwah 房产的现状至关重要。然而，如受托人已对 Kwok 先生位于 Sherry Netherland Hotel（Sherry Netherland 酒店）（“Sherry Netherland 住所”）的实际住所所做的那样，若其控制 Mahwah 房产，则 Kwok 先生将失去进入该房产的机会，并失去其中所含的 Brady 证据。本院不应允许破产案件中的受托人控制并可能改变对本程序至关重要的被指称犯罪现场。\n\n第三，受托人已表明其愿意利用破产案件中的证据开示，以规避 Kwok 先生律师—当事人特权的方式行事，从而威胁其第五修正案权利。具体而言，在 Kwok 先生被逮捕前，他在 Kwok Chapter 11 Case 中签订了一项经双方同意的命令，以解决其与受托人就控制 Kwok 先生受特权保护通信所产生的争议（“特权命令”）。特权命令规定，受托人持有 Kwok 先生的律师—当事人特权及工作成果保护主张，但未经 Kwok 先生同意或破产法院进一步命令，不得放弃该等特权。Kwok 先生无意放弃任何特权。然而，鉴于受托人意图在破产案件中就与本院待决问题相同的问题进行诉讼，显然受托人将寻求使用 Kwok 先生关于同样对其应对本案刑事指控具有重要意义问题的受特权保护通信。政府和受托人一直在幕后随意共享信息，这一事实进一步加剧了 Kwok 先生的担忧，其中包括：(i) 受托人向政府提供其关于 Mahwah 房产所有权的所谓“分析”；以及 (ii) 政府向受托人提供在执行针对 Mahwah 房产的搜查令期间拍摄的照片，供受托人用于扣押该财产。此类协调危及 Kwok 先生在本案及破产案件中公平辩护的能力。\n\n孤立地看，这些问题中的任何一个或许都可在破产法院获得救济。但综合来看，这些及相关问题将对 Kwok 先生在本案中针对政府指控的辩护造成严重后果；而且，正如受托人的律师所称，只要破产案件持续存在，这些问题就会不断重演。Kwok 先生承认破产案件以及受托人为破产财产追回资产的努力具有重要性，但 Kwok 先生作为刑事被告人的权利涉及更为重大的关切。本程序的完整性必须居于首位。因此，Kwok 先生谨请本院作出命令，在刑事程序审理期间中止破产案件。\n\n相关背景\n\nI. 破产申请和起诉书\n\nKwok 先生于 2022年2月15日在 Connecticut（康涅狄格州）破产法院申请 Chapter 11 破产（“Kwok Chapter 11 Case”）。约五个月后，即于 2022年7月8日前后，破产法院批准任命 Despins 为 Kwok Chapter 11 Case 的受托人。Kwok 的申请之后，Genever Holdings Corporation（“Genever BVI”）于 2020年10月11日启动破产程序（“Genever BVI Chapter 11 Case”），Genever Holdings LLC（“Genever US”）则于 2020年10月12日在本院启动破产程序（“Genever US Chapter 11 Case”）。该三案已合并，受托人控制 Genever US 和 Genever BVI。Kwok Chapter 11 Case 中债权人的利益由 Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors（“无担保债权人正式委员会”）（“债权人委员会”）以及持有针对 Kwok 先生尚未履行民事判决的实体 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（“PAX”）代表。\n\n自 2022年7月起，Kwok 先生通过其律师试图通过可能达成的全面和解解决破产案件，提议由其家人向债权人支付数百万美元。（见 Kwok Bankruptcy Case Dkt. No. 1274 ¶ 12。）Kwok 先生首先与对其破产财产享有大额债权的 PAX 进行谈判。截至 2022年9月，Kwok 先生和 PAX 已签订条款清单。（同上 ¶ 12。）在与 PAX 原则上达成协议后，Kwok 先生再次通过其律师与债权人委员会谈判，并于 2022年10月底前原则上达成协议。（同上 ¶ 13。）\n\n2022年10月26日，Kwok 先生的破产律师告知受托人，Kwok 先生已就所有重大事项与 PAX 和债权人委员会均原则上达成协议。（同上 ¶ 14。）然而，显然受托人很快便破坏了这些努力。2022年11月17日，受托人与 Kwok 先生会面，Kwok 先生的律师 Stephen Kindseth 和 Aaron Mitchell 也在场。（同上 ¶ 19；Kamaraju Decl. Ex. 8 (Dec. 12, 2022 H'ring Tr.) at 848:25-849:1.）。）受托人在 11月17日的会议上作出各种几乎未加掩饰的威胁，包括询问 Kwok 先生是否知道 Al Capone（阿尔·卡彭）是谁，告诉 Kwok 先生 Al Capone 因逃税入狱，并称其希望 Kwok 先生正在获得的支持已在美国申报为收入。（Kamaraju Decl. Ex. 8 at 862:18-19。）随后，受托人告诉 Kwok 先生，他每周均与 Internal Revenue Service（美国国税局）和 Securities and Exchange Commission（证券交易委员会）（“SEC”）交谈，并称 Kwok 先生应在“too late”之前和解。（同上 862:24- 863:12。）随后，受托人提出 $250 million 的和解要求，远高于 Kwok 先生与 PAX 和债权人委员会协商的金额。（同上 863:16- 18。）受托人还威胁将 Kwok 先生排除在 Sherry Netherland 住所之外，并称 Kwok 先生在即将入狱时将支付 $250 million。（同上 866:24-867:24。）\n\n约于2023年3月6日，本辖区组成的大陪审团对Mr. Kwok（郭文贵先生）及其他人提出了一份密封起诉书，指控其犯有证券欺诈、电信欺诈和洗钱等罪。Federal Bureau of Investigation（联邦调查局，简称“FBI”）于2023年3月15日逮捕了郭先生，并于同日搜查了Mahwah Facility（马瓦设施）和Sherry Netherland Residence（雪莉荷兰公寓住所）。FBI不仅从马瓦设施和雪莉荷兰公寓住所2，还从郭先生的一名共同被告Yanping Wang（王燕平）的住所扣押了大量记录。政府已（推定）将从这些搜查中收集的材料提供给本案被告，但须遵守本院于约2023年5月4日作出的保密令。\n\nII. 藐视法庭命令侵犯了郭先生的《第五修正案》权利\n\n如上所述，2023年7月26日，破产法院作出《关于认定个人债务人[郭先生]藐视法庭并驳回暂缓执行强制提交命令之动议的决定备忘录及命令》。（见Kamaraju声明附件2（以下简称“《藐视法庭命令》”）。）《藐视法庭命令》认定郭先生藐视法庭，理由是其面对受托人要求郭先生提交大量文件（包括政府在本案中提供的文件）时主张其《第五修正案》权利。（同上，第35-36页。）破产法院错误的藐视法庭命令源于受托人提出的Rule 2004传票动议。（Kamaraju声明附件3（以下简称“2022年Rule 2004动议”）。）受托人通过2022年Rule 2004动议，既寻求强制郭先生在证言录取中作证，也寻求强制郭先生提交范围广泛的文件类别，包括但不限于郭先生与其家人之间的通信、“与郭先生及各实体（包括本案起诉书中提及的所有实体）的‘任何投资或交易’有关的[a]ll文件”，以及与“涉及”郭先生的任何法律争议相关的任何义务、权利主张、责任或债务“有关的所有文件”。（同上，第14-15页。）\n\n作为回应，郭先生援引其“根据《美国宪法》第5修正案享有的权利，包括根据提交行为原则……包括[就]所有下列事项提出的请求：\n\n2 在搜查雪莉荷兰公寓住所期间及郭先生被羁押期间，发生了一场火灾，严重损坏了该公寓的部分区域。除一份描述火灾起因的FBI报告外，政府未向辩方提供任何证据开示材料，以说明火灾为何在FBI搜查期间发生。\n\n文件和信息。”（Kamaraju声明附件2，第4页；另见Kwok Bankruptcy Case Dkt. No. 1444, Ex. A。）破产法院就郭先生的《第五修正案》权利与受托人根据破产法获得某些记录的权利之间的关系举行了多次听证会。（同上，第5-7页。）在这些听证会的口头辩论中，受托人明确表示，其向郭先生寻求的证据开示材料正是政府在本案中提供的证据开示材料，并且受托人知道，如其直接向政府请求该等证据开示材料，该请求将被驳回。（Kamaraju声明附件9（2023年5月2日听证会记录），第14:3-9页，Despins：“法官大人应作出命令，指示[郭先生]寻求修改刑事案件中的任何……保密令，以允许Chapter 11受托人查阅政府向[郭先生]提供的文件；”同上，第15:20-21页，Despins：“DOJ永远不会向我们提供任何材料。我们在他们的法院不存在。”）\n\n2023年7月26日，破产法院作出《藐视法庭命令》。与本案相关的部分中，法院认定，根据2022年Rule 2004动议提交材料“无论就检方持有的文件还是检方尚未扣押的文件而言，均将具有证言性质并导致自证其罪。”（Kamaraju声明附件2，第20页。）尽管承认郭先生适当地援引了其《第五修正案》反对自证其罪的权利，且任何提交均将具有证言性质，破产法院仍认定提交行为原则的一项例外适用，即“必须保存记录”原则。（同上，第22、33页。）破产法院认定，必须保存记录例外适用，因为：(i) 郭先生根据11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(3) and 521(a)(4)负有向受托人提供信息的法定义务；(ii) 该等记录据称属于郭先生“惯常保存”的种类；以及(iii) 该等记录因与该程序的关联而具有“公共属性”。（见同上，第20-33页。）因此，破产法院认定，“(i) [郭先生]遵守强制提交命令并非不可能，且(ii) 根据必须保存记录例外，个人债务人不得适当地针对强制提交命令援引其《第五修正案》反对自证其罪的权利。”（同上，第33页。）\n\n破产法院错误地驳回了郭先生提出的、鉴于《藐视法庭命令》可能干扰本院程序而应暂缓执行该命令的论点。破产法院认定，“本命令并未实质性干扰刑事法院对刑事诉讼有序管理的利益。”（同上，第39页。）破产法院命令郭先生“向刑事法院申请，允许向受托人提交。”（同上，第11页。）2023年8月9日，郭先生向United States District Court for the District of Connecticut（康涅狄格联邦地区法院）申请许可，就破产法院的《藐视法庭命令》提起上诉；受托人反对该申请。截至提交本动议之时，地区法院尚未就郭先生的请求作出裁定。\n\nIII. 受托人与政府就马瓦设施达成的和解协议\n\n受托人亦迅速采取行动处置对本程序至关重要的关键财产，并且——与受托人此前向破产法院所作的、其在政府眼中并“不存在”的陈述相反——现正争取检察团队在这些行动中的协助。在本程序中被羁押之前，郭先生居住在雪莉荷兰公寓住所。现控制雪莉荷兰公寓住所的受托人（Kwok Bankruptcy Case Dkt. No. 2110 ¶ 24）已处置位于雪莉荷兰公寓住所内的财产，（见Kwok Bankruptcy Case Dkt. No. 1809（关于受托人放弃位于雪莉荷兰公寓住所内财产之动议的案卷命令）。）受托人目前正在寻求融资，以促成出售雪莉荷兰公寓住所。（见Kwok Bankruptcy Case Dkt. No. 2110。）郭先生向本院申请命令，准许其在出售前进入雪莉荷兰公寓住所；该申请已获准。（Dkt. Nos. 72, 79。）\n\n受托人现已将目标转向另一处对起诉书所列指控至关重要的财产：马瓦设施。郭先生被捕后不久，约于2023年6月28日，受托人显然“告知政府，其经广泛分析后得出结论，除其他事项外，[马瓦设施]在衡平法上由[郭先生]所有，因此属于[郭先生]的chapter 11破产财产。”（Kwok Bankruptcy Case Dkt. No. 2083 ¶ 12。）3 约于2023年7月11日，受托人启动了对抗性程序Despins v. Taurus Fund LLC et al., Adv. Proc. No. 23-05017 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn.)（以下简称“马瓦程序”）；在该程序中，除其他事项外，受托人主张马瓦设施由一家公司实体所有，该实体据称是郭先生的另一个自我。\n\n受托人在马瓦程序的起诉状中附上了FBI在搜查马瓦设施期间拍摄的数张照片。（见Kamaraju声明附件4（马瓦设施照片）。）4 尽管本案存在保密令，受托人确认这些照片由检察团队的一名成员提供给受托人。（Kamaraju声明附件10（2023年8月14日听证会记录），第85:2-25页。）政府似乎从未公开披露过这些照片。\n\n受托人连同马瓦起诉状，于2023年7月11日还提交了一项请求，要求作出\n\n3 如上所述，这并非受托人首次向政府提供信息。郭先生已请求政府提供其与受托人或受托人代表之间的所有通信，但政府尚未提供任何该等通信。如政府拒绝提供该等通信，郭先生将提出动议，强制提交该等信息；该等信息具有相关性，尤其鉴于受托人与政府之间显然存在协调。\n\n4 鉴于这些照片不仅包含郭先生及其家人的个人信息，而且推定还包含参与搜查的FBI特工的个人信息，并且推定受保密令约束，我们正将这些照片密封提交。受托人已告知郭先生的破产律师，这些记录被无意间提交至公开案卷，且其正在“考虑”提出动议，要求密封这些记录。\n\n临时限制令和初步禁令（以下简称“马瓦TRO”），其中请求命令该财产所有人腾空马瓦设施，将进入马瓦设施的一切方式移交给受托人，并将进入马瓦设施的权限限于：(i) 受托人及其团队，(ii) U.S. Department of Justice（美国司法部），(iii) FBI，(iv) 其他执法机构，以及(v) 受托人授权的任何其他人员。（Mahwah Proceeding Dkt. No. 4）受托人还请求法院命令U.S. Marshals Service（美国法警局）执行该命令，包括“在必要时使用合理武力以进入马瓦庄园，或以其他必要方式确保遵守。”（Mahwah Proceeding Dkt. No. 4-1 at 3-4。）2023年8月1日，破产法院批准了受托人关于临时限制令的请求，但拒绝指示法警协助受托人执行该命令。（Mahwah Proceeding Dkt. No. 17。）\n\n2023年8月14日，受托人向破产法院提交动议，请求批准受托人与政府之间的一份和解协议（由检察团队签署），该协议据称就受托人与政府有关马瓦设施的某些权利作出裁决，由此披露了政府与受托人合作处置马瓦设施的真实程度。根据该动议及随附的和解协议（未向本院提交）：\n\n— 政府与受托人曾就“[马瓦]程序及政府正在进行的刑事案件中提出的潜在复杂问题”进行讨论。（Kamaraju声明附件5，动议¶ 1。）\n\n— “受托人与政府均一致认为，有必要尽快并尽可能高效地取得并变现债务人的资产。”（同上，¶ 6。）\n\n— 受托人与政府同意协商如何分配出售马瓦设施所得的任何收益，但某些管理费用，包括受托人律师的律师费，将首先从该等收益中支付。（同上，和解协议¶¶ 6, 14(b)。）\n\n政府同意“迅速签署可能为受托人出售该设施并转让清晰产权所需的任何文件。”（同上，第23页。）\n\n尽管辩方是在和解协议被公开提交时首次得知该协议，但受托人与政府早在一个多月前，即约于2023年7月13日，便已签署该协议。\n\n2023年8月14日，破产法院（Bankruptcy Court）就受托人（Trustee）提出的初步禁令动议举行了听证会。在听证会召开前，郭先生的破产案代理律师向法院提交了一封信，表明郭先生认为 Mahwah Facility（马瓦设施）及其内物品是本程序中的重要证据，并且他拟向本院提出动议，以确保其持续进入马瓦设施，并防止在本程序解决前对该设施或其内物品作出任何改动。（Kamaraju Decl. Ex. 11）。2023年8月24日，破产法院就马瓦设施作出了初步禁令。（Mahwah Proceeding Dkt. No. 47。）\n\nIV. 2023年8月传票侵犯郭文贵（Ho Wan Kwok）先生的律师—当事人特权\n\n2022年8月22日，受托人提出动议，请求作出命令，“确认”其控制郭先生此前持有的某些法律特权，并命令郭先生及其他人不得以“任何此类特权”为由隐瞒信息，或试图主张任何此类特权。（Kwok Bankruptcy Case Dkt. No. 777 at 1。）该动议紧随受托人此前获得破产法院授权之后；该授权允许其依照 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004（“Rule 2004”）向“债务人以及曾代理他的众多律师事务所和其他专业顾问”送达传票。（Id. ¶ 1。）作为回应，郭先生主张律师—当事人特权、工作成果保护及其他特权和保护。（Id. ¶ 2。）\n\n2022年9月14日，破产法院经同意作出《特权命令》（Privilege Order）（随附于此，作为 Kamaraju Decl. Ex. 12），规定受托人对涉及以下事项的“任何律师—当事人特权或工作成果保护”享有“专属控制权”：其中包括郭先生或受托人正在调查的任何其他个人或实体所持有或曾持有的任何资产。（Id. at 1。）《特权命令》似乎承认，郭先生保留与无关事项有关的任何特权，例如“无关的刑事指控”或郭先生的庇护申请。（Id. at 3。）如果郭先生的律师认为“特定文件或信息……如向受托人披露，可能会对[郭先生]造成个人损害”，郭先生须在特权清单中列明该等文件，且郭先生和受托人均获授权提出动议，以澄清谁控制任何有争议通信的特权。（Id. at 4。）\n\n然而，《特权命令》对郭先生就刑事事项享有不可侵犯特权的承认，在实践中并未得到遵循。受托人送达传票的众多个人——包括郭先生的前代理律师——均未给予郭先生的破产案代理律师任何机会，就特权或自证其罪问题审查所提交的材料。其他传票受领人则同时向受托人和郭先生的破产案代理律师提交材料。\n\n此外，受托人本人也反对郭先生主张其特权。例如，在2023年8月17日的一封电子邮件中，受托人的律师向郭先生的破产案代理律师表示，受托人“不认为[郭先生]有合理依据拒绝同意放弃特权”，就其认为“对该对抗程序具有重要性”的某些文件而言。（Kamaraju Decl. Ex. 6。）这些文件包括仅限律师之间、直接讨论相关事项的通信。受托人已表示，其可能会向破产法院请求命令，允许其放弃就这些通信享有的特权。\n\n预计还会就受托人放弃郭先生特权的能力产生进一步争议。2023年8月11日，受托人根据 Rule 2004 提出动议，请求授权送达额外传票（这是其第六次提出此类动议），其中包括向郭先生长期代理律师 Victor Cerda（维克托·塞尔达）及其律师事务所送达传票。在2023年8月29日的听证会上，破产法院保留对该动议的裁决，并于2023年8月30日发布案卷更新，表明该动议已提交审议。（Kwok Bankruptcy Case, Aug. 30, 2023 Docket Text。）破产法院过去曾允许向郭先生的律师送达传票，包括参与回应监管问询的律师。（例如，Kwok Bankruptcy Case Dkt. Nos. 839（寻求向包括代理郭先生的律师事务所在内的主体进行证据开示的动议），866（准许 Dkt. No. 839）。）\n\n论证\n\nI. 适用法律\n\n《全案令状法》（All Writs Act）规定：“最高法院及依国会法案设立的所有法院，可以发布为协助其各自管辖权所必需或适当、并符合惯例和法律原则的一切令状。”28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)。“《全案令状法》的目的和功能，是向法院提供履行其由国会和宪法所规定职责所需的工具……。”Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300 (1969)。因此，该法赋予联邦地区法院（federal district courts）维护其管辖权的实质性权力，包括但不限于禁止相关的平行程序。“根据该固有权力，联邦法院可以禁止其他管辖区内会削弱其审理和解决其面前争议实体问题能力的诉讼。”S.E.C. v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 93 F. Supp. 2d 475, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)（省略内部引文和引证）；另见，例如，In re Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328, 338 (2d Cir. 1985)（“《全案令状法》的一个重要特征，是在为维护法院作出裁决或执行其对具有适当管辖权案件所作决定的能力所需时，授予其禁止并约束诉讼非当事人的权力。”）；State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Parisien, 352 F. Supp. 3d 215, 224 (E.D.N.Y. 2018)（禁止州法院程序）。\n\n同样地，每个法院均享有固有权力，以“为自身、律师和诉讼当事人节省时间和精力的方式控制其案卷上案件的处置。”Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)。“监督权的主要目的之一，是保护司法程序的完整性。”United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12 Cr. 763, 2013 WL 3306161, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013)。法院的监督权延伸至“本院律师协会成员”，United States v. Ming He, 94 F.3d 782, 792 (2d Cir. 1996)，并包括联邦法院确保刑事案件被告获得其权利受到保护的“公正程序标准”的义务。Id.\n\n《全案令状法》和本院的监督权均赋予本院中止干扰本院管辖权的平行程序的权力。见 United States v. Gerace, No. 21-2419, 2023 WL 3243477, at *1 (2d Cir. May 4, 2023)（承认地区法院有权禁止危及未决刑事案件的平行州法院程序）；Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 98 (2d Cir. 2012)（地区法院行使其裁量权，“可以在相关刑事程序即将开始或尚在进行时中止民事程序，并且有时这样做是审慎的”）；United States v. Simon, 373 F.2d 649, 651- 52 (2d Cir. 1967)（假定但未裁定地区法院根据《全案令状法》和监督权均有权禁止平行民事程序）；United States v. Amrep Corp., 405 F. Supp. 1053, 1055 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)（指出，通过中止相关联邦贸易委员会（Federal Trade Commission，“FTC”）程序，“显然法院确有管辖权，以防止对未决起诉书审判或被告准备该等审判的干扰”）；United States v. FINRA, 607 F.Supp.2d 391, 393 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)（“地区法院无疑有权根据《全案令状法》28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)，禁止威胁干扰其对未决刑事案件管辖权的程序。”）；Caleb and Brown Pty. Ltd. v. Thompson, No. 20-cv-8612(LAP), 2020 WL 6887680 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2020)（在刑事案件作出终局判决前中止民事程序）。\n\n尽管本巡回区的一些法院使用 Trustees of Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat. Pension Fund v. Transworld Mech., Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1134, 1139 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) 中法院列举的一系列因素来评估中止是否适当，但第二巡回上诉法院（Second Circuit）在 Louis Vuitton 中拒绝受其所称的“机械装置”约束；该装置“只不过是用作我们应当考虑的因素的某种核对清单。”676 F.3d at 99。相反，“该决定最终需要并且必须建立在‘对案件情形及其中相互竞争利益的具体化审查’之上。”Id.（引自 Banks v. Yokemick, 144 F. Supp. 2d 272, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)）。在 Gerace 一案中，第二巡回上诉法院最近裁定，地区法院在批准政府提出的禁止被告针对刑事程序中潜在证人在平行州法院提起诽谤诉讼的请求时，适当权衡了不予禁令对政府造成的损害，以及准予禁令对被告（平行州法院程序中的原告）造成的损害。2023 WL 3243477 at *2；另见 FINRA, 607 F. Supp. 2d at 393（权衡请求中止一方和反对中止一方受到的损害）；Amrep, 405 F. Supp. at 1056（认定核心问题是平行 FTC 程序将会在何种程度上干扰被告刑事审判的准备和进行）。\n\n起诉后，破产案件可能造成严重损害，因为“在破产情境下，对债务人[F]ifth [A]mendment 权利的损害更为严重，这是因为民事诉讼中的证据开示程序较之《联邦刑事诉讼规则》所允许的有限证据开示更为宽松。”In re Marceca, 131 B.R. 774, 778 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991)（在政府决定起诉或不起诉债务人前，中止针对债务人的破产免责诉讼；指示当事人在作出起诉书后返回，以进一步审议中止事宜）；Eisenberg v. Feiner (In re Ahead By A Length, Inc.), 78 B.R. 708, 713 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987)（破产案件中止六个月，等待刑事程序中的进一步行动，且不妨碍进一步延长）。\n\nII. 讨论\n\nA. 本院应中止破产案件，以保护郭先生的权利及本程序的完整性\n\n在个人债务人的 Chapter 11 案件中指定受托人，实属罕见。当此类债务人如本案中一样，随后又因与破产案件中的争议在多方面重叠的刑事指控而被起诉时，情况尤其复杂。因此，本案情形带来了一种独特的威胁——且该威胁已在发生——即 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）先生的权利正因一项主要似乎使一家规模可观的对冲基金（且显然以个人投资者为代价）以及受托人的律师事务所（受托人为该所合伙人）受益的破产程序而遭到剥夺。对郭先生作为刑事被告所享有的受保障权利构成的风险不可接受，法院已认识到，并行程序可能“损害当事人免于自证其罪的第五修正案特权，使刑事证据开示超出 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(b) 规定的范围，在审判前向控方暴露辩方理论，或以其他方式损害刑事案件。”Transworld, 886 F. Supp. at 1138-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citations omitted)（在平行刑事程序解决前中止民事案件）；另见 SEC v. Oakford Corp., 181 F.R.D. 269, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)（“……并行程序的效果是将被告置于钳形攻势之中……。”）。\n\n破产案件的继续进行所威胁的不仅是郭先生的第五修正案权利。相反，如下所述，破产案件还威胁到对郭先生作为刑事被告的其他一系列权利造成损害，包括其获得 Brady 材料的权利及其律师—当事人特权。因此，应中止破产案件。参见，例如，In re Marceca, 131 B.R. at 778（在起诉书提出前的刑事调查期间中止破产程序，并指示如债务人被起诉，则进一步考量中止期限）。\n\n(i) 藐视法庭命令威胁郭先生的第五修正案权利\n\n首先，遵守藐视法庭命令所带来的风险尤为重大，因为任何由郭先生作出的提交均适用提交行为原则。郭先生向受托人提交任何文件时，面临该等提交会默示认证所提交文件的风险，而且该等提交可能成为用于起诉他的“证据链中的一环”，包括在本刑事诉讼中。Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951)；另见 In re Schick, 215 B.R. 4, 9 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997)。鉴于破产法院已经采取如下立场：郭先生作出的任何提交均将构成对材料真实性的“默示断言”，该风险被进一步放大。(Kamaraju Decl. 2 p. 16.) 当然，“现已确定，个人可以主张提交行为特权［依第五修正案］而拒绝提交内容本身不享有特权的文件，只要该提交行为本身是：(1) 被强制的，(2) 证言性的，且 (3) 具有自证其罪性质的。”In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated Jan. 29, 1999, 191 F.3d 173, 178 (2d Cir. 1999)。\n\n破产法院错误地认定，法定保存记录例外排除了郭先生的第五修正案权利。破产法中据称赋予受托人有权向郭先生寻求可能导致自证其罪的信息的规定，即 11 USC §§ 521(a)(3) and 521(a)(4)，要求个人与破产受托人合作，并向受托人交出破产财产中的全部财产。然而，Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）已明确指出，法定保存记录例外受到限制，仅在“……提交请求”与现有记录保存之间存在“关联”，且该记录保存必须是“由法律或规则要求”的，并且因此“记录持有人”通过提交相关记录时“几乎不承认对该等记录的控制或认证”的情况下才适用。In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated Aug. 21, 1985, 793 F.2d 69, 73 (2d Cir. 1986)。\n\n在本案中，正如破产法院自身所认定的，提交藐视法庭命令所要求的记录，将构成郭先生就所提交记录真实性作出的“默示断言”。(Kamaraju Decl. Ex. 2 at 16.) 此外，第二巡回上诉法院已明确指出，法定保存记录例外是一项狭窄的例外，仅适用于提交方负有法定或监管义务予以保存的记录，例如 FINCEN regulations（金融犯罪执法网络条例）所要求的记录，In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Feb. 2, 2012, 741 F.3d 339, 348 (2d Cir. 2013)；与为商业目的购买酒类相关的 New York state（纽约州）税法，In re Two Subpoenas to Testify Before Grand Jury Dated Dec. 1, 2016, 252 F. Supp. 3d 170, 176-177 (E.D.N.Y. 2017)；以及规范律师代理客户的规则，In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 793 F.2d at 73。与第二巡回上诉法院的指示相反，破产法院将该例外适用于有关个人债务人财务事务的所有文件，而该债务人同时还面临与相关事项有关的刑事指控。破产法院对这一狭窄例外的错误适用，可能吞噬郭先生的第五修正案权利。\n\n郭先生此前曾寻求对藐视法庭命令所涉证据开示作出更有限的中止，以减轻这些问题。(Kwok Bankruptcy Case Dkt. No. 1649.) 破产法院拒绝准许该请求。(Id. Dkt. No. 1740.) 因此，郭先生被迫通过本动议向本院寻求保护其第五修正案权利。\n\n(ii) Mahwah 诉讼程序威胁郭先生的 Brady 权利\n\n其次，Mahwah 诉讼程序及相关和解协议威胁郭先生依据 Brady 所享有的权利。如本院所知，Mahwah Facility（Mahwah 场所）在政府的起诉书中占据重要位置；起诉书指称，郭先生通过使用多个实体购买该房产 (Ind. ¶16(b))，供其本人及家人使用 (¶ 4)，并且其不当地使用犯罪所得支付对同一房产进行的“奢华翻修”费用 (¶16(c).) 起诉书直接提及 Mahwah 场所内的“各种家具和装饰物品”。(Id.) 辩方拟证明，Mahwah 场所并非如政府所指称的郭先生及其家人的私人住所，而是供郭先生的异议人士同伴及反中国共产党（“CCP”）运动成员使用的秘密总部，并用于促进 GTV 的业务；GTV 的创立宗旨是作为反 CCP 活动的平台。因此，表明 Mahwah 场所用于该运动目的的各方面情况，均具有开脱罪责的性质。\n\n鉴于该房产目前的状况将直接关系到这些问题，且房产的性质和用途可能提供对辩方具有实质性且有利的证据，必须维持辩护律师对 Mahwah 场所的进入权以及对该场所的整体保存。参见 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)；Giglio v. U.S., 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)；另见 United States v. Hamilton, 730 F. Supp. 1272, 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)（“政府的行为妨碍被告取得具有实质性且有利的证据时，强制程序权和正当程序权均受到牵涉。”）。若无本院介入以保存 Mahwah 场所并维持辩护律师对其的进入权，“正义这一概念本身所必不可少的基本公平”将面临风险。United States v. Valenzuela–Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 872 (1982)（引自 Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941)）。\n\n在本案中，尽管是受托人提起了 Mahwah 诉讼程序，政府正在协助受托人处置 Mahwah 场所的努力。其一，政府显然已经通过向受托人提供执法部门照片（推定受保护令约束），协助受托人取得有关 Mahwah 场所的临时限制令和初步禁令，受托人随后将该等照片用作证据。此外，政府通过订立和解协议，进一步同意协助出售 Mahwah 场所，例如，签署完成该出售所必需的任何文件，或以确保支付受托人律师费的方式分配所得款项。(See Kamaraju Decl. Ex. 5, Settlement Agreement at 5, 7.) 事实上，鉴于政府已在其没收主张中纳入 Mahwah 场所，政府就 Mahwah 场所与受托人进行的合作尤其令人不解；这意味着，如被定罪且没收程序成功，政府自身即可出售 Mahwah 场所，并向所称受害人分配该等所得款项。因此，政府的合作使受托人得以做成政府在未获定罪时无法做成的事，并以一种确保受托人的律师事务所在刑事案件中的所谓受害人之前获得报酬、且损害其利益的方式行事。Cf. United States v. Yalincak, 853 F.3d 629, 635 (2d Cir. 2017)（“由破产受托人为破产财产利益而收回、并在破产财产管理中耗用或分配给非受害人债权人的款项，显然并非犯罪‘受害人收回的……款项’；只有实际分配给受害人债权人的款项才符合该描述”）。\n\n法院经常在证人可出庭作证的情形中遇到这一问题，并一贯认定，导致重要证人无法出庭的政府行为侵犯被告的宪法权利。参见，例如，Hamilton, 730 F. Supp. at 1276（因将重要证人驱逐出境而驳回起诉书）；另见 United States v. Leal-Del Carmen, 697 F.3d 964, 975 (9th Cir. 2012)（“政府错误地驱逐拥有开脱罪责证据的证人，加之地区法院的证据裁定错误，剥夺了 Leal–Del Carmen 获得公正审判及行使其提出辩护的宪法权利。”）；United States v. Nebraska Beef, Ltd., 194 F. Supp. 2d 949, 960 (D. Neb. 2002)（因政府恶意驱逐拥有重要证言的外国人而驳回起诉书）。\n\n政府和受托人就 Mahwah 场所所作的共同行为与这些案件相类似。本院已经在本案中作出命令，指示政府“迅速”收集并向辩方提供开脱罪责材料。(Dkt. No. 29.) 然而，受托人和政府并未确保郭先生能够迅速取得开脱罪责材料，反而共同努力使开脱罪责证据——Mahwah 场所——脱离郭先生的可及范围。不应允许受托人和政府如此行事。本院应谨此介入，并通过中止破产案件来保护郭先生的权利。参见，例如，United States v. Soriano, 401 F.Supp.3d 396, 405 (E.D.N.Y. 2019)（在执法人员故意销毁对被告有利的证据时驳回起诉书）。\n\n(iii) 对郭先生律师—当事人特权的侵蚀\n\n第三，根据特权令，Kwok 先生（郭文贵）的律师—当事人特权及其他特权如今实际上可被用作对付他的利剑，而非其原本意图作为的盾牌。因此，政府将能够获取其原本无法查看的信息。通过特权令，受托人现已控制 Kwok 先生的特权，并可寻求放弃该特权。尽管这在纯粹的破产法下可能适当，但由于受托人正寻求就政府在本程序中指控的同一行为进行诉讼，受托人对该特权的控制威胁到 Kwok 先生作为本案刑事被告人的宪法权利。例如，在 Mahwah 程序中，受托人所持的（误导性的）理论是，Taurus（Mahwah 物业的公司所有人）是 Kwok 先生的另一个自我。受托人的理论与政府在起诉书中提出的主张直接契合，即 Mahwah 物业是代 Kwok 先生购置的。（比较 Mahwah Proceeding Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 4（指称，尽管 Taurus 持有法定所有权，Kwok 先生拥有 Mahwah 物业并将其用作住所）与 Indictment ¶ 4（指称 Kwok 先生为其本人及家人购置了 Mahwah 物业）。）同样，受托人就位于 Connecticut（康涅狄格州）Greenwich（格林尼治）的一处房产（以下简称“Greenwich 房产”）提出了主张，而政府称该房产系由收到欺诈所得的一实体购置。（比较 Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC, et al., Adv. Proc. No. 23-05005 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn.) Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 3（指称 Greenwich Land, LLC，即 Greenwich 房产的所有人，是 Kwok 先生的另一个自我）与 Government's Opposition to Mr. Kwok's Motion for Pretrial Release, Dkt. No. 26 at 5（指称 Greenwich Land, LLC 使用 Kwok 先生被指称的欺诈所得购置了 Greenwich 房产）。）\n\n因此，鉴于特权令，受托人现可全面查阅 Kwok 先生享有特权的通信，以在其寻求证明 Kwok 先生与这些房产之间关联的过程中寻找有利材料，继而公开使用这些材料对其对抗程序进行诉讼，从而使政府得以接触同样的通信。此外，正如受托人在破产案件和解谈判期间的威胁以及《和解协议》中所明确显示的，受托人毫不顾忌将此类信息直接报告给执法部门，包括处理本案的检察官办公室；一旦其获授权放弃 Kwok 先生的特权，将没有任何事物阻止其在此向政府分享 Kwok 先生享有特权的通信。事实上，《和解协议》鲜明地表明，受托人已在幕后就 Mahwah 物业事宜与政府合作。\n\n对 Kwok 先生律师—当事人特权的威胁并不限于文件披露。受托人此前已向 Kwok 先生的律师发出传票，（见 Kwok Bankruptcy Case Dkt. No. 839），现正寻求向其他代表 Kwok 先生的律师发出额外传票，要求其就本程序所涉的指控作证，其中包括 Kwok 先生长期代理律师 Cerda 先生（及其律所），其深度参与 Kwok 先生的辩护。根据特权令，这些律师可能无法针对有关本程序所涉交易的证言记录问题主张 Kwok 先生的特权。然而，鉴于本案争点与破产程序争点之间存在重叠，其对该等询问的回答可能揭示可在 Kwok 先生刑事审判中被用来对付他的保密信息。事实上，鉴于受托人正在推进一项理论，即 Mahwah 物业的公司所有人是 Kwok 先生的另一个自我，这似乎正是受托人询问这些律师的目的。\n\n受托人没有理由以保护 Kwok 先生在本案中权利的方式行使其特权。相反，受托人有动机使用其认为显示 Kwok 先生控制 Mahwah 物业的特权信息。鉴于其先前的威胁和陈述，同样明确的是，只要其认为直接向政府提供信息符合其目的，受托人便毫无顾忌地直接接触政府。本院能够且应当介入，以维护 Kwok 先生作为刑事被告人的权利。\n\n(iv) 政府此前曾寻求中止一项平行程序\n\n鉴于政府也曾寻求中止由 SEC（美国证券交易委员会）提起、涉及相同行为的一项平行程序，即 SEC v. Kwok, No. 23 Civ. 2200 (PGG) (S.D.N.Y.)，政府将难以反对中止破产案件。（见 Kamaraju Decl. Ex. 7（政府中止 SEC 程序的动议）。）政府在该案提交的材料中列出的因素完全支持 Kwok 先生在此寻求的中止：\n\n第一，破产案件与本程序之间的重叠无可争议——两案均涉及有关某些财产和实体属于 Kwok 先生并由其控制的指控。该重叠是支持中止的“重要因素”。（Id. at 4（引述 SEC v. Shkreli, No. 15 Civ. 7175, 2006 WL 1122029, at \\*4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2016)）。）\n\n第二，鉴于 Kwok 先生已被起诉，刑事案件的状态支持中止。正如政府指出的，“本巡回区占主导地位的判例表明，当刑事调查已发展为起诉书时，法院将中止民事程序。”（见 id.（引述 In re Par Pharm., Inc. Secs. Litig., 133 F.R.D. 12, 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)）。）事实上，正如政府进一步指出的，“当民事案件的一方当事人已因相同行为被起诉时，中止民事案件最为适当，理由有二：第一，在起诉书已经签发后，被告作出不利己陈述的可能性最大；第二，民事案件原告所受的不利影响会减轻，因为刑事案件很可能会迅速解决。”（Id.（引述 Transworld, 886 F. Supp. at 1139）。）\n\n第三，尽管 Kwok 先生并不否认破产案件及在可能范围内赔偿债权人的重要性，但这些主张的最终解决归根结底取决于谁在何时获得何种支付的问题。即使破产案件被延迟至 2024 年 4 月的刑事审判及相关上诉结束后，破产财团最终也不会遭受任何不利影响，因为目前破产财团由受托人或政府控制。参见 Tom Doherty Assocs., Inc. v. Saban Ent., Inc., 60 F.3d 27, 37 (2d Cir. 1995)（省略引文和引述）（“不可弥补的损害不是遥远或推测性的损害，而是实际且迫近的损害，且金钱给付无法构成充分赔偿。”）；另见 Rex Med. L.P. v. Angiotech Pharms. (US), Inc., 754 F. Supp. 2d 616, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)（“金钱损失不足以”确立不可弥补的损害。）而且，如上所述，如被作出刑事定罪，政府本身将能够出售 Mahwah 物业并赔偿任何被指称的受害人，并与受托人合作，确保破产财团能够取得出售 Mahwah 物业所得款项中适当的任何部分。\n\n第四，正如政府在其申请中止的文件中所承认并如上所述，中止破产案件无疑符合 Kwok 先生的利益，因为这将防止受托人对 Kwok 先生在本案中宪法权利的不当侵害。见 supra at 17-22。“当被告已被起诉时，其处境尤其危险，并具有某种优先性，因为其人身自由面临的风险、保障其宪法权利的重要性，乃至其资源和注意力所承受的压力——这使得为附带民事诉讼进行辩护尤为困难——均有利于其利益。”Sterling Nat. Bank v A-1 Hotels Int'l Inc., 175 F. Supp. 2d 573, 577 (SDNY 2001)。\n\n第五，为保护本院对本案的管辖权，本院有必要准予中止破产案件。正如本动议的背景所表明，本程序与破产案件之间存在实质且重大的冲突点，须由本院介入以保护 Kwok 先生的权利。这些冲突不会消退——受托人正在对多项对抗程序进行诉讼（并可能提起更多程序），这些程序将持续侵害 Kwok 先生的权利。除非破产案件被中止，否则其将不断干扰本院对一宗重大刑事案件的审理，以及 Kwok 先生获得适当辩护的权利。\n\n第六，中止破产案件将“通过确保[刑事案件]针对[Kwok 先生]得到公正进行而服务于公共利益，即不迫使其在[刑事事项]中实际上放弃第五修正案保护，或在本案中面临不利推定，从而削弱[其]为本案辩护的能力。”SEC v. Millan, 20 Civ. 06575 (CM), 2020 WL 5898769, at \\*4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2020)。此外，政府已采取立场，认为防止刑事证据开示在平行民事程序中被披露符合公共利益。（见 Kamaraju Decl. Ex. 7 at 5。）受托人明确寻求——并获破产法院许可——本案中由政府提供的证据开示材料，推定其意图是在破产案件中使用该等材料。事实上，鉴于政府显然已向受托人提供信息（例如，FBI（美国联邦调查局）对 Mahwah 物业进行搜查时拍摄的照片），并考虑到正在进行的对抗程序，可能会发现本案中额外的证据开示材料已由政府提供给受托人。\n\n坦率地说，政府寻求中止 SEC 诉讼，却不仅拒绝寻求中止提出相同关切的破产案件，反而帮助推进破产案件，令人奇怪。因此，显然政府不会在破产案件期间采取行动保护 Kwok 先生的宪法权利，尽管政府明确将其要求中止 SEC 程序的请求部分建立在对 Kwok 先生第五修正案权利受到威胁的损害之上。（见 id. at 4。）破产法院似乎也无意保护 Kwok 先生的宪法权利，因为该法院现已拒绝中止 2022 Rule 2004 Motion 或其 Contempt Order——尽管 Kwok 先生援引其宪法权利——并继续对 Kwok 先生的律师进行证据开示以及处置 Mahwah 物业。\n\n破产程序不能以牺牲 Kwok 先生对政府指称为一项十亿美元欺诈计划提出有效辩护的宪法权利为代价。迄今为止，受托人已表明，在推进破产案件时，其毫不顾忌践踏 Kwok 先生在本案中的权利，而破产法院拒绝制止受托人的推进。此外，政府已表明其愿意支持受托人针对 Kwok 先生采取的对抗性行动。因此，Kwok 先生别无选择，只能请求本院介入并保护 Kwok 先生的权利及本程序的完整性。\n\nB. 作为替代方案，本院应作出一项尽量减轻对 Kwok 先生权利损害的命令\n\n如果本院无意中止破产案件，则 Kwok 先生谨此备位请求，为尽量减轻对其刑事辩护关键要素迫在眉睫的威胁，本院作出如下救济：\n\n首先，法院应准许郭文贵（Ho Wan Kwok）提出的修改保护令动议，以便向受托人提供本案中的证据开示材料（郭先生理解政府反对此项救济），从而使郭先生避免因其在破产案件中主张第五修正案权利而受到任何制裁。为明确起见，郭先生仅因藐视法庭命令可能导致其受到制裁的压力而请求该项救济，并仍然认为不应要求其将政府在本案中提供的文件交给受托人。郭先生承认，其请求修改保护令所适用的法律标准是具有请求该项修改的正当理由。下列签署人作为法院官员，基于其伦理义务，不能表示其认为该项修改具有正当理由，因为我们认为藐视法庭命令的裁决有误，且郭先生已对其提出上诉。然而，受托人和破产法院似乎认为存在该等正当理由。因此，为使法院能够审议该等论点，郭先生已将藐视法庭命令作为附件 Sidhardha Kamaraju 声明的证据2附上，并将受托人支持其 2022 Rule 2004 动议的书面意见作为证据3附上。\n\n其次，为确保郭先生能够适当取得 Brady 材料，郭先生请求，作为中止破产案件的替代方案，法院作出命令，维持 Mahwah Facility（马瓦设施）及其内容物的现状，并保证郭先生的法律团队能够进入该财产（无需受托人陪同），以保存和审查其中包含的任何证据；这包括维持马瓦设施内的所有个人财产原状，并明确禁止受托人以任何方式移动、改变或修改马瓦设施或其内容物。我们了解，受托人已从起诉书指称为犯罪现场的另一处财产 Sherry Netherland Residence（谢里·内瑟兰住所）移走动产。郭先生进入该财产的机会仅限于一次孤立访问，并由同一受托人的代理人陪同；该受托人依其本人所言，正在向政府输送信息。\n\n第三，为防止特权信息继续从受托人流向政府，郭先生谨请求，作为中止破产案件的替代方案，本法院作出命令，防止政府与受托人之间进一步进行沟通、协调或其他类似行动，并要求政府识别受托人已向其提供的所有该等信息。目前，受托人持有大量通信资料，包括律师—当事人通信，而受托人主张其对此拥有排他性控制权。受托人的观点似乎是，其还可以放弃郭先生的特权。该事实，加之受托人一再表示其已向政府提供信息，并就其调查结果向政府提出建议，损害了郭先生的第五修正案权利，并颠覆了刑事诉讼程序。\n\n结论\n\n基于上述理由，郭先生谨请求法院中止破产案件，或者，作为替代方案，(i) 修改保护令，允许向受托人提供本案中的证据开示材料；(ii) 指示在本案及由此产生的任何上诉审理期间，继续允许郭先生的辩护团队进入马瓦设施；(iii) 禁止政府在本案及由此产生的任何上诉审理期间，协助在破产案件中出售马瓦设施；(iv) 命令政府不得向受托人索取或从受托人接收任何受郭先生享有的任何特权保护的信息或记录，并识别受托人已提供的任何该等材料；以及 (v) 准许法院认为公正和适当的其他及进一步救济。\n\n日期：New York, New York August 30, 2023\nPRYOR CASHMAN LLP（普赖尔·卡什曼律师事务所）\n\n签署人：________________________________________\n\nSidhardha Kamaraju Matthew S. Barkan Daniel J. Pohlman Clare P. Tilton\n\n7 Times Square New York, NY 10036 (212) 421-4100 skamaraju@pryorcashman.com mbarkan@pryorcashman.com dpohlman@pryorcashman.com ctilton@pryorcashman.com\n\n被告郭文贵的律师","key_entities":["Kwok","Kamaraju","Ho Wan Kwok","Despins","Je","Brady","Guo","Paul Hastings","GTV","Pryor Cashman","Miles Guo","CCP","Giglio","CIPA","forfeiture","Luc Despins","Yanping Wang","Chinese Communist Party"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":1,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":4,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":17,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":26,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":29,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":47,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":129,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":130,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":131,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":777,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":839,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1274,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1444,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1649,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1740,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1809,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2083,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2110,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":11753,"status":"published","published_at":"2023-08-30 00:00:00","created_at":"2023-08-30","updated_at":"2026-08-23 21:34:45"}