{"id":"court_ctb_2177_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":2177,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"UNKNOWN","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION In re :","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"## **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\nIn re :\n\nHo Wan Kwok, :\n\nDebtor.<sup>1</sup>\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_:\n\n: Chapter 11 : Case No. 22-50073\n\n:\n\n:\n\n# **JOINT STATEMENT AND JOINDER OF OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED CREDITORS AND PACIFIC ALLIANCE ASIA OPPORTUNITY FUND L.P. IN SUPPORT OF TRUSTEE'S EMERGENCY STAY MOTION [ECF NO. 2160] AND AMENDED EMERGENCY STAY MOTION [ECF NO. 2165]**\n\nThe Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the \"Committee\" or \"UCC\"), and Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. (\"PAX\"), by and through their respective undersigned counsel, hereby submit this Joint Statement and Joinder in Support of the Emergency Motion and Amended Emergency Motion [ECF Nos. 2160 and 2165] (the \"Emergency Motions\")<sup>2</sup> of the Chapter 11 Trustee, Luc Despins (\"Trustee\"), and respectfully represent in support thereof the following:\n\n1. The Committee and PAX join in and incorporate by reference the arguments made and relief requested in the Trustee's Emergency Motions and submit this joint statement and joinder to set forth additional reasons that further support the granting of the Emergency Motions. Kwok has victimized creditors through delay, obfuscation and serial proliferation of litigation for\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and the Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\n<sup>2</sup> Capitalized terms that have been defined in the Emergency Motions, if used herein, shall have the same meanings ascribed to them in the Emergency Motions.\n\nyears. And, the closer creditors get to recovering assets to be made whole, the more brazen his gambits. His most recent efforts — which would shut down these chapter 11 cases in their entirety — is a blunderbuss effort to get another court with no familiarity with these proceedings to stymie the Trustee and creditors from making any progress in these cases. His effort violates the automatic stay and the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court, and should be prohibited.\n\n### **A. The Stay Motion Usurps This Court's Exclusive Jurisdiction**\n\n2. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), \"the district courts shall have original *and exclusive* jurisdiction of all cases under title 11\" (emphasis added). In the immediately succeeding subsection, district courts are granted \"original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11.\" 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b).\n\n3. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) \"[e]ach district court may provide that any or all cases under title 11 and any or all proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11 shall be referred to the bankruptcy judges for the district.\" Such a referral was made in this district by the standing Order of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Daly, J.), entered September 21, 1984, whereby the District Court \"referred to the Bankruptcy Judges of this District\" \"all cases under Title 11, U.S.C., and all proceedings arising under Title 11, U.S.C., or arising in or related to a case under Title 11, U.S.C., pending on June 27, 1984, or filed on or after June 28, 1984….\"<sup>3</sup>\n\n4. Thus, by virtue of the foregoing, this Court has the exclusive jurisdiction over these Chapter 11 cases and is the only court that has the jurisdictional authority to stay them. Indeed, in\n\n<sup>3</sup> The Standing Order may be found at http (last visited September 5, 2023).\n\none of the few (if not only) cases to directly address the issue, the district court in *U.S. v. LaRouche*\n\n*Campaign*, 682 F.Supp. 627 (D. Mass. 1987), ruled that a district court in a criminal case against\n\nthe debtor lacks jurisdiction to enjoin the debtor's bankruptcy case pending in another district. *Id.*\n\nat 628. The court stated in relevant part:\n\nAt previous conferences in this case, I had informed counsel of my tentative view that an order enjoining civil proceedings before another district court in another jurisdiction, if not beyond the jurisdiction of this court, would be at least an inappropriate exercise of my authority. Because defendants have failed to direct me to any authority supporting their contentions that I have such authority and should exercise it in this instance, and for reasons stated below, I now adopt that tentative view as my final ruling on this issue.\n\n- \\*\n- \\*\n\n\\*\n\n…the cases on which defendants rely are not in point, and at best offer only weak support by analogy for the proposition that a federal court having jurisdiction over a criminal case in one district has jurisdiction to enjoin the United States, or a United States Bankruptcy Judge, or others participating in a bankruptcy matter before that judge, to stay all proceedings in that matter. I conclude that there is no direct support in precedent for the exercise of such jurisdiction, and that it is unlikely that higher courts will recognize such jurisdiction when the issue is squarely presented for decision.\n\n*Id.* The court went on to conclude that even if it had jurisdiction, it would be inappropriate to\n\nexercise it:\n\n…even if jurisdiction does exist, I conclude that it would be inappropriate to exercise it in this instance. The bankruptcy proceeding involves not only interests of the United States and some (or perhaps all) of the defendants before this court, but as well many other persons who may have claims as creditors in those proceedings. It is not feasible or sensible to attempt to give them notice and an opportunity to be heard here, and it would be offensive to fundamental principles of adjudication to enter an injunction effecting a stay such as defendants seek without appropriate consideration of their interests.\n\n*Id.* at 629.\n\n5. This Court's exclusive jurisdiction as it relates to staying proceedings in a\n\nbankruptcy case or other disputed litigation over which it is presiding is further confirmed by 11\n\nU.S.C. § 305(a), which provides in pertinent part that a bankruptcy court \"may dismiss a case …, or suspend all proceedings in a case under this title, at any time if — (1) the interests of creditors and the debtor would be better served by such dismissal or suspension.\" While a court also has the inherent power \"to control the disposition of the causes on its docket,\" which is the source of its authority to stay a civil proceeding over which it is presiding \"'when the interests of justice seem to require such action',\" *Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc.,* 676 F.3d 83, 96-97 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting *United States v. Kordel*, 397 U.S. 1, 12 n. 7 (1970)), the prerogative to do so is with the court presiding over the proceedings for which a stay is requested – which in this case is this Court. *See Matter of Nichols*, 615 B.R. 588, 593 (D. Ariz. 2020) (affirming bankruptcy court's denial of a stay of bankruptcy proceedings pending conclusion of parallel criminal proceedings against the debtors and observing that \"[t]he bankruptcy court, being privy to the unique situation of its own proceedings, is the ultimate fact-finder as to which considerations are most appropriate\" to support or deny such a stay request). Accordingly, the Debtor's Stay Motion is a blatant, impermissible collateral attack on multiple discovery and contempt rulings of this Court.<sup>4</sup> If the Debtor is unhappy with those rulings, he should request relief from this Court or\n\n<sup>4</sup> *See, e.g.,* Memorandum of Decision and Order Granting in Part Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Adv. Pro. No. 23-50017, ECF No. 47; Memorandum of Decision and Order Holding Individual Debtor in Contempt of Court and Denying Motion for Stay of Order Compelling Production, Case No. 22-50073, ECF No. 2035; Consent Order Regarding Control of Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Protection Related to Rule 2004 Subpoenaed Documents and Information, Case No. 22-50073, ECF No. 856; Order Granting Motion to Hold Debtor in Contempt of Corporate Governance Order, Case No. 22-50073, ECF No. 1372; Order Granting Chapter 11 Trustee's First Supplemental Omnibus Motion Under Rule 2004 Authorizing Discovery With Respect to Additional Legal and Financial Advisors to the Debtor, Entities and Individuals Affiliated With Debtor, and Relevant Banks, Case No. 22-50073, ECF No. 866; Order Granting Chapter 11 Trustee's Second Supplemental Omnibus Motion for Rule 2004 Examination, Case No. 22-50073, ECF No. 1184; Order Granting Trustee's Third Supplemental Omnibus Motion for Rule 2004 Examination, Case No. 22-50073, ECF No. 1339; Order Granting Trustee's Fourth Supplemental Omnibus Motion for Rule 2004 Examination, Case No.\n\npursue appeals of them in the United States District Court for Connecticut pursuant to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure — not forum shop to get another court to oversee these cases.\n\n6. By authority of 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), a \"'bankruptcy court may enjoin proceedings in other courts when it is satisfied that such a proceeding would defeat or impair its jurisdiction with respect to a case before it'.\" *Drennen v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London* (*In re Residential Capital,* LLC), 563 B.R. 756, 774 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting *Togut v. RBC Dain Correspondent Servs*. (*In re S.W. Bach & Co*.), 425 B.R. 78, 88 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010)). Here, allowing the Debtor to seek a stay of the entirety of these proceedings from another court would undoubtedly \"impair\" this Court's exclusive jurisdiction over these cases and should be enjoined, as the Trustee requests.\n\n#### **B. The Automatic Stay Applies to the Stay Motion**\n\n7. A motion to stay all proceedings in these bankruptcy cases is unquestionably an \"act … to exercise control over property of the estate,\" 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3), and also runs afoul of one of the most fundamental protections § 362 is intended to provide, *viz.,* to \"restrain[ ] any formal or informal action or legal proceeding that might … interfere with the trustee's orderly administration of the estate'.\" *Bayview Loan Servicing v. Fogarty* (*In re Fogarty*), 39 F.4th 62, 71 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting *Picard v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd*., 762 F.3d 199, 207 (2d Cir. 2014)). *See also SEC v. Brennan*, 230 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 2000) (\"the automatic stay provision is intended to allow the bankruptcy court to centralize all disputes concerning property of the debtor's estate so that reorganization can proceed efficiently, unimpeded by uncoordinated proceedings in other arenas\").\n\n<sup>22-50073,</sup> ECF No. 1646; Order Granting Trustee's Fifth Supplemental Omnibus Motion for Rule 2004 Examination, Case No. 22-50073, ECF No.1891.\n\n8. For example, the alter ego and equitable ownership claims the Trustee is pursuing against Golden Spring (New York) Ltd. (Adv. Pro. No. 23-05018) and Taurus Fund LLC (Adv. Pro. No. 23-05017) are property of the estate. *The Anadarko Litigation Trust v. Kerr-McGee Corp*. (*In re Tronax Inc.*), 855 F.3d 84, 99-100 (2d Cir. 2017). Staying the bankruptcy cases as requested by the Debtor in the Stay Motion would necessarily stay the Trustee's pursuit of these causes of action and thereby effectuate \"control\" over claims that are property of the estate. Beyond that, the stay requested by the Debtor offends the broad and fundamental purposes of the automatic stay to protect a trustee's orderly administration of the estate from interference and to centralize disputes concerning property of a debtor's estate in the bankruptcy court free from \"uncoordinated proceedings in other arenas.\" *Brennan*, 230 F.3d at 75.\n\n9. Other cases confirm that the Debtor has violated the automatic stay. In *In re Atlas,*  a Chapter 7 debtor filed a motion in federal district court to enjoin the trustee from asserting any claim to the Debtors' interest in pension plans (\"the Plans\"). *In re Atlas,* 183 B.R. 978 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995). There, the bankruptcy court found that the \"[Debtor's] filing of the Complaint constitutes a willful violation of the automatic stay. The Debtors' interest in the Plans was listed as property of the estate in the Debtors' schedules, and an action to enjoin the Trustee from obtaining that property or from litigating over the claimed exemption as to that property falls within the scope of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3)'s prohibition against actions to obtain possession of or exercise control over property of the estate.\" *Id*. at 981. Of particular relevance to the instant proceeding, the court in *Atlas* admonished the party seeking the stay that \"[u]nder Supreme Court precedent more than one hundred years old, parties may not interfere with a trustee's official duties by seeking injunctive relief in another court, unless they have obtained leave from the bankruptcy court that appointed the trustee.\" *Id.* at 980. *See also In re Lickman,* 297 B.R. 162, 170-171 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003) (Florida debtor who sought legal relief in Pennsylvania state and federal courts in an \"effort to hinder and delay the trustee's administration of the probate asset,\" violated the stay because \"[t]he stay applies to attempts to obtain control over tangible and intangible property.\"); *In re Klarchek,*, 508 B.R. 386, 394 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014) (the debtor filed a state action seeking to dissolve a family trust less than 24 hours after the bankruptcy court granted the trustee's request for Rule 2004 examination to investigate said trust. The court found that this violated the automatic stay where the bankruptcy estate was the party in interest in the dissolution proceeding, and that the proceeding was plainly brought in attempt to interfere with the trustee's investigation of trust. The court stated that the debtor's attempt to thwart the Trustee's investigation \"seems to fall squarely within what might constitute an exercise of control [under section 362].\")\n\n10. In addition, the Trustee currently has pending before the Court motions to authorize Genever Holdings LLC to borrow funds from the Debtor's estate and for authorization to spend estate funds on remediating the Sherry Netherland apartment which is now indisputably property of the Debtor's estate [ECF Nos. 2110, 2113]. A stay of these motions would also have the effect of exercising control over property of the estate as remediation would be delayed until it suited the Debtor's interests in the criminal proceeding.\n\n11. Equally significant, this Court is the proper court in the first instance to address whether the automatic stay applies to the Stay Motion, as any order by the District Court in the Criminal Case could later be nullified as a violation of the automatic stay. *See DT Land Development, LLC v. West LB AG*, No. Civ. 09-00844 RB WDS, 2010 WL 11496951, at \\*4 (D.N.M. Oct. 5, 2010). *See also SEC v. Brennan*, 230 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding that order entered by district court was a violation of the automatic stay). As the district court in *DT*  *Land* further observed, \"'once a bankruptcy proceeding begins in one court, the concurrent jurisdiction of other courts is partially stripped. That is, if the automatic stay applies to an action directed at the debtor or its property, jurisdiction is exclusive in the bankruptcy court'.\" *DT Land,*  at \\*4 (quoting *Chao v. Hosp. Staffing Services*, 270 F.3d 374, 384 (6 th Cir. 2001)).\n\n**WHEREFORE**, the Committee and PAX respectfully request that the Court grant the Trustee's Emergency Motions and grant such other and further relief as it may deem just, equitable and proper.\n\n## Dated: Bridgeport, Connecticut **OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED** September 7, 2023 **CREDITORS OF HO WAN KWOK**\n\nBy: */s/ Irve J. Goldman* Irve J. Goldman Jonathan A. Kaplan Kristin B. Mayhew Pullman & Comley, LLC 850 Main Street, 8th Floor, PO Box 7006 Bridgeport, CT 06601-7006 (203) 330-2213 [igoldman@pullcom.com](mailto:igoldman@pullcom.com) *Its Attorneys*\n\n## **PACIFIC ALLIANCE ASIA OPPORTUNITY FUND L.P.**\n\nBy: */s/ Patrick M. Birney* Patrick M. Birney (CT No. 19875) Annecca H. Smith (CT No. 31148) ROBINSON & COLE LLP 280 Trumbull Street Hartford, CT 06103 Telephone: (860) 275-8275 Facsimile: (860) 275-8299 E-mail: pbirney@rc.com asmith@rc.com\n\n-and-\n\nPeter Friedman (admitted pro hac vice) Stuart M. Sarnoff (admitted pro hac vice) O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP Seven Times Square New York, NY 10036 Telephone: (212) 326-2000 Facsimile: (212) 326-2061 Email: [pfriedman@omm.com](mailto:pfriedman@omm.com) [ssarnoff@omm.com](mailto:ssarnoff@omm.com)\n\nAttorneys for PAX\n\n#### **CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE**\n\nI, Irve J. Goldman, herby certify that on the 7 th day of September, 2023, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Joint Statement and Joinder was filed with the Court and served upon all parties that have filed a notice of appearance and request for notice electronically via the Court's CM/ECF electronic filing system.\n\n*/s/ Irve J. Goldman*","body_zh":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION（美国康涅狄格州破产法院布里奇波特分院）\n\n关于：\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）：\n\n债务人。1\n\n_____________________________________________\n\n_____________________________________________:\n\n: 第 11 章 : 案号 22-50073\n\n:\n\n:\n无担保债权人官方委员会与 PACIFIC ALLIANCE ASIA OPPORTUNITY FUND L.P. 支持受托人紧急中止动议 [ECF NO. 2160] 及经修正紧急中止动议 [ECF NO. 2165] 之联合声明及加入动议\n\n无担保债权人官方委员会（Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors，简称“委员会”或“UCC”）与 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（太盟亚洲机会基金有限公司，简称“PAX”），通过各自署名的代理律师，特此提交本联合声明及加入动议，支持第 11 章受托人 Luc Despins（“受托人”）的紧急动议及经修正紧急动议 [ECF Nos. 2160 及 2165]（“紧急动议”）2，并就支持该等动议恭敬陈述如下：\n\n1. 委员会及 PAX 加入并援引受托人紧急动议中所作出的论辩及所请求的救济，并提交本联合声明及加入动议，以列明进一步支持准许该等紧急动议的其他理由。多年来，Kwok 一直通过拖延、混淆视听以及连环发起诉讼来侵害债权人的利益。而且，债权人越接近追回资产以获得全额清偿，他的花招就越发猖獗。他最近的举动——企图彻底关停这些第 11 章案件——是一种胡乱出击的做法，旨在让另一个对本案审理程序毫无了解的法院来阻碍受托人和债权人在这些案件中取得任何进展。他的这一举动违反了自动中止规定以及本法院的专属管辖权，应当予以禁止。\n\n1 本等第 11 章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（亦称郭文贵、Miles Guo 及 Miles Kwok，以及其他众多化名）（纳税人识别号后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（纳税人识别号后四位：8202）及 Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 及 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为：Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 转交 Ho Wan Kwok 破产财产受托人 Luc A. Despins（仅用于接收通知和通信之目的）。\n\n2 紧急动议中已定义的首字母大写术语，如在本文中使用，应具有紧急动议中赋予它们的相同含义。\n\nA. 中止动议僭越了本法院的专属管辖权\n\n2. 根据 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a)，“地区法院对第 11 编项下的所有案件享有原始和专属管辖权”（后加强调）。在紧随其后的下一款中，地区法院被授予“对因第 11 编引起的所有民事诉讼程序，或在第 11 编项下案件中引起的或与其相关的民事诉讼程序享有原始但非专属的管辖权”。28 U.S.C. § 1334(b)。\n\n3. 根据 28 U.S.C. § 157(a)，“各地区法院可规定，将第 11 编项下的任何或所有案件，以及因第 11 编引起的或在第 11 编项下案件中引起的或与其相关的任何或所有程序，移送给该地区的破产法官”。本地区通过 United States District Court for the District of Connecticut（康涅狄格区联邦地区法院）（Daly 法官）于 1984 年 9 月 21 日作出的常设命令（standing Order）作出了该等移送，地区法院借此将“1984 年 6 月 27 日未决的，或于 1984 年 6 月 28 日或之后提交的，U.S.C. 第 11 编项下的所有案件，以及因 U.S.C. 第 11 编引起的、或在 U.S.C. 第 11 编项下案件中引起的或与其相关的所有程序……”“移送给本地区的破产法官”……3\n\n4. 因此，基于前述规定，本法院对这些第 11 章案件享有专属管辖权，且是唯一拥有管辖权权限中止这些案件的法院。实际上，在\n\n3 该常设命令可在 http 查阅（最后访问日期：2023 年 9 月 5 日）。\n\n直接涉及该问题的少数（若非唯一）案例之一中，U.S. v. LaRouche Campaign, 682 F.Supp. 627 (D. Mass. 1987) 一案中的地区法院裁定，在针对债务人的刑事案件中，地区法院缺乏管辖权去禁止债务人在另一地区未决的破产案件。同上，第 628 页。该法院在相关部分指出：\n\n在先前本案的庭前会议中，我曾告知律师我的初步观点，即命令禁止另一司法辖区内另一地区法院审理的民事诉讼程序，即使不超出本法院的管辖权，也至少是对我职权的不当行使。由于被告未能向我指出任何支持其主张（即我拥有该等管辖权并应在此情形下行使该管辖权）的权威判例，且基于下文所述的理由，我现在采纳该初步观点作为我就此问题的最终裁定。\n\n*\n*\n*\n\n……被告所依赖的判例并不切题，充其量只能通过类比为以下主张提供微弱的支持：即对某地区的刑事案件拥有管辖权的联邦法院，有管辖权命令禁止美国政府、或美国破产法官、或在该法官面前参与破产事项的其他人，以中止该事项中的所有程序。我的结论是，判例中没有支持行使该等管辖权的直接依据，而且当该问题被明确提交裁决时，上级法院也不太可能承认该等管辖权。\n\n同上。该法院进而得出结论认为，即使其拥有管辖权，行使该管辖权也是不恰当的：\n\n……即使管辖权确实存在，我的结论是，在当前情形下行使该管辖权也是不恰当的。破产程序不仅涉及美国政府以及本法院面前部分（或可能全部）被告的利益，而且同样涉及可能在该等程序中享有债权人权利请求的许多其他人。试图在此向他们送达通知并给予其陈述意见的机会，既不可行也不明智；而在没有对他们的利益进行恰当考量的情况下作出禁令以实施被告所寻求的此类中止，将有违基本的审判原则。\n\n同上，第 629 页。\n\n5. 11 U.S.C. § 305(a) 进一步确认了本法院就中止其主持审理的破产案件或其他争议诉讼程序所享有的专属管辖权，该条款在相关部分规定，破产法院“可在任何时候驳回案件……或暂停本编项下案件中的所有程序，如果——(1) 债权人和债务人的利益将通过该等驳回或暂停得到更好的维护”。虽然法院也拥有“控制其备审案件目录上诉讼案件处置”的固有权力，这是其在“‘司法利益似乎需要采取此类行动时’”中止由其主持审理的民事诉讼程序的权力来源，Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 96-97 (2d Cir. 2012)（援引 United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 12 n. 7 (1970)），但行使该特权的权力属于主持审理被请求中止之程序的法院——在本案中即为本法院。参见 Matter of Nichols, 615 B.R. 588, 593 (D. Ariz. 2020)（维持破产法院在针对债务人的平行刑事诉讼程序结束前拒绝中止破产程序的裁定，并指出“破产法院知悉自身程序的独特情况，是确定哪些考量因素最适合支持或拒绝此类中止请求的最终事实裁决者”）。因此，债务人的中止动议是对本法院多项证据开示和藐视法庭裁决的公然且不可容许的附随攻击。4 如果债务人对这些裁决不满，他应当向本法院请求救济，或者\n\n4 参见，例如：裁决备忘录及部分准许初步禁令动议的裁定，Adv. Pro. No. 23-50017，ECF No. 47；裁决备忘录及裁定个人债务人藐视法庭并驳回中止强制提供文件裁定之动议的裁定，Case No. 22-50073，ECF No. 2035；关于 Rule 2004 传票所调取文件及信息相关的律师-当事人保密特权及工作成果保护控制权的同意裁定，Case No. 22-50073，ECF No. 856；准许裁定债务人违反公司治理裁定构成藐视法庭之动议的裁定，Case No. 22-50073，ECF No. 1372；准许第 11 章受托人根据 Rule 2004 授权就债务人的其他法律和财务顾问、与债务人关联的实体和个人以及相关银行进行证据开示的第一份补充综合动议的裁定，Case No. 22-50073，ECF No. 866；准许第 11 章受托人关于 Rule 2004 调查的第二份补充综合动议的裁定，Case No. 22-50073，ECF No. 1184；准许受托人关于 Rule 2004 调查的第三份补充综合动议的裁定，Case No. 22-50073，ECF No. 1339；准许受托人关于 Rule 2004 调查的第四份补充综合动议的裁定，Case No.\n\n根据《联邦破产诉讼程序规则》向 United States District Court for Connecticut（康涅狄格区联邦地区法院）提出上诉——而不是挑选法院，让另一个法院来监督这些案件。\n\n6. 依据 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) 的授权，“‘破产法院如果确信其他法院的诉讼程序会挫败或削弱其对其面前案件的管辖权，则可禁止其他法院的程序’”。Drennen v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London (In re Residential Capital, LLC), 563 B.R. 756, 774 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016)（援引 Togut v. RBC Dain Correspondent Servs. (In re S.W. Bach & Co.), 425 B.R. 78, 88 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010)）。在本案中，允许债务人向另一法院寻求中止本案全部审理程序，无疑将“削弱”本法院对这些案件的专属管辖权，应当正如受托人所请求的那样予以禁止。\n\nB. 自动中止适用于该中止动议\n\n7. 旨在中止这些破产案件中全部程序的动议，毫无疑问属于“行使对破产财产控制权的行为”，11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3)，并且也违背了第 362 条旨在提供的最根本保护之一，即“限制‘可能……干扰受托人对破产财产进行有序管理的任何正式或非正式行动或法律程序’”。Bayview Loan Servicing v. Fogarty (In re Fogarty), 39 F.4th 62, 71 (2d Cir. 2022)（援引 Picard v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., 762 F.3d 199, 207 (2d Cir. 2014)）。另见 SEC v. Brennan, 230 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 2000)（“自动中止条款旨在允许破产法院集中处理有关债务人破产财产的所有争议，以便重整能够高效进行，不受其他领域不协调程序的阻碍”）。\n\n22-50073，ECF No. 1646；准许受托人关于 Rule 2004 调查的第五份补充综合动议的裁定，Case No. 22-50073，ECF No. 1891。\n\n8. 例如，受托人（Trustee）针对 Golden Spring (New York) Ltd.（金泉（纽约）有限公司）（Adv. Pro. No. 23-05018）和 Taurus Fund LLC（Adv. Pro. No. 23-05017）提起的另我（alter ego）及衡平法所有权诉求，均属于破产财产。参见 The Anadarko Litigation Trust v. Kerr-McGee Corp. (In re Tronax Inc.), 855 F.3d 84, 99-100 (2d Cir. 2017)。如债务人（Debtor）在《中止动议》（Stay Motion）中所请求的那样中止破产案件，必然会中止受托人对这些诉由的追索，从而对属于破产财产的诉求构成“控制”。此外，债务人所请求的中止违反了自动中止（automatic stay）的广泛而根本之目的，即保护受托人对破产财产的有序管理免受干扰，并将有关债务人破产财产的争议集中在破产法院管辖，使其免受“其他领域不协调程序的干扰”。Brennan, 230 F.3d at 75。\n\n9. 其他判例亦证实债务人违反了自动中止。在 In re Atlas 案中，一名《破产法》第7章债务人向联邦地方法院提出动议，要求禁止受托人对债务人在养老金计划（“该等计划”）中的权益主张任何权利。In re Atlas, 183 B.R. 978 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995)（佛罗里达南区破产法院，1995年）。在该案中，破产法院认定“[债务人]提起诉状的行为构成了对自动中止的故意违反。债务人在该等计划中的权益已在债务人的财产明细表中被列为破产财产，而旨在禁止受托人取得该财产或就该财产所主张的豁免权进行诉讼的法律行动，均落入 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) 关于禁止采取行动以占有或控制破产财产的规定范围。”同前引，第981页。与本案程序特别相关的是，Atlas 案法院告诫寻求中止的一方：“根据一百多年前的最高法院判例，当事人不得通过向另一法院寻求禁令救济来干扰受托人的法定职责，除非他们已获得任命该受托人的破产法院的准许。”同前引，第980页。另见 In re Lickman, 297 B.R. 162, 170-171 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003)（佛罗里达中区破产法院，2003年）（一名佛罗里达州债务人为了“阻碍和拖延受托人对遗产资产的管理”而向宾夕法尼亚州州法院和联邦法院寻求法律救济，其行为违反了自动中止，因为“中止适用于企图取得对有形和无形财产控制权的行为”）；In re Klarchek, 508 B.R. 386, 394 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014)（伊利诺伊北区破产法院，2014年）（在破产法院批准受托人依据《破产程序规则》第2004条进行调查该家族信托的审查请求后不到24小时内，债务人便提起了要求解散该信托的州诉讼。法院认定，鉴于破产财产是该解散程序中的利害关系方，且该程序的提起显然是为了试图干扰受托人对信托的调查，此举违反了自动中止。法院指出，债务人企图阻挠受托人调查的行为“似乎完全属于[第362条项下]可能构成行使控制权的情形。”）\n\n10. 此外，受托人目前尚有数项动议正由本法院审理，包括请求授权 Genever Holdings LLC 从债务人破产财产中借入资金，以及请求授权动用破产财产资金修缮 Sherry Netherland（雪莉-荷兰）公寓（该公寓目前无可争议地属于债务人破产财产）[ECF Nos. 2110, 2113]。中止审理这些动议同样会产生对破产财产行使控制权的效果，因为修缮工程将被迫拖延，直至符合债务人在刑事诉讼中的利益为止。\n\n11. 同样重要的是，本法院是一审认定自动中止是否适用于《中止动议》的适当法院，因为地方法院在刑事案件中作出的任何裁定/命令事后都可能因违反自动中止而被宣告无效。参见 DT Land Development, LLC v. West LB AG, No. Civ. 09-00844 RB WDS, 2010 WL 11496951, at *4 (D.N.M. Oct. 5, 2010)（新墨西哥区地方法院，2010年10月5日）。另见 SEC v. Brennan, 230 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 2000)（认定地方法院作出的裁定/命令违反了自动中止）。正如 DT Land 案的地方法院进一步指出的那样，“‘一旦某一破产程序在一家法院启动，其他法院的竞合管辖权即被部分剥离。也就是说，如果自动中止适用于针对债务人或其财产提起的行动，则破产法院拥有专属管辖权’”。DT Land, at *4（援引自 Chao v. Hosp. Staffing Services, 270 F.3d 374, 384 (6th Cir. 2001)）。\n\n综上所述，委员会与 PAX 谨此请求法院批准受托人的《紧急动议》，并给予法院认为公正、衡平且适当的该等其他及进一步救济。\n\n日期：康涅狄格州布里奇波特\n2023年9月7日\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）无担保债权人官方委员会（OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED CREDITORS OF HO WAN KWOK）\n\n签署人：/s/ Irve J. Goldman\nIrve J. Goldman\nJonathan A. Kaplan\nKristin B. Mayhew\nPullman & Comley, LLC\n850 Main Street, 8th Floor, PO Box 7006\nBridgeport, CT 06601-7006\n(203) 330-2213\n[igoldman@pullcom.com]\n其代理律师\n\nPACIFIC ALLIANCE ASIA OPPORTUNITY FUND L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙）\n\n签署人：/s/ Patrick M. Birney\nPatrick M. Birney (CT No. 19875)\nAnnecca H. Smith (CT No. 31148)\nROBINSON & COLE LLP\n280 Trumbull Street\nHartford, CT 06103\nTelephone: (860) 275-8275\nFacsimile: (860) 275-8299\nE-mail: pbirney@rc.com\nasmith@rc.com\n\n-及-\n\nPeter Friedman (admitted pro hac vice，经特许出庭代理)\nStuart M. Sarnoff (admitted pro hac vice，经特许出庭代理)\nO'MELVENY & MYERS LLP（美迈斯律师事务所）\nSeven Times Square\nNew York, NY 10036\nTelephone: (212) 326-2000\nFacsimile: (212) 326-2061\nEmail: [pfriedman@omm.com]\n[ssarnoff@omm.com]\n\nPAX 之代理律师\n\n送达证明\n\n我，Irve J. Goldman，特此证明：于2023年9月7日，上述《联合声明及加入申请》（Joint Statement and Joinder）的真实且正确的副本已向法院提交，并通过法院的 CM/ECF 电子归档系统向所有已提交出庭通知及申请接收通知的当事人进行了电子送达。\n\n/s/ Irve J. Goldman","key_entities":["Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Guo","Despins","Miles Guo","Luc Despins","Paul Hastings","CIPA"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":47,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":856,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":866,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1184,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1339,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1372,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1646,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1891,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2035,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2160,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2165,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":2771,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 13:22:30"}