{"id":"court_ctb_2210_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":2210,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT HO WAN KWOK, *et al.*, ) (Jointly Administered)","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"## **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\nHO WAN KWOK, *et al.*, ) (Jointly Administered)\n\n)\n\n)\n\n)\n\nDebtors.<sup>1</sup>\n\nIn re: ) Chapter 11 ) Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n) Re: ECF No. 2079\n\n## **ORDER GRANTING CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE'S SIXTH SUPPLEMENTAL OMNIBUS MOTION FOR RULE 2004 EXAMINATION**\n\nBefore the Court is the Sixth Supplemental Omnibus Motion for Entry of Order Authorizing Discovery (the \"Rule 2004 Motion\") filed by Mr. Luc A. Despins, in his capacity as Chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") for the estate of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok. (ECF No. 2079.) For the reasons stated below, the Rule 2004 Motion is **GRANTED**.\n\nOn August 11, 2023, the Trustee filed the Rule 2004 Motion. (ECF No. 2079.) On\n\nAugust 18, 2023, Greenwich Land LLC (\"Greenwich Land\") and Ms. Hing Chi Ngok (together,\n\ncollectively, the \"Greenwich Parties\") filed an objection to the Rule 2004 Motion. (ECF No.\n\n2098.) On August 25, 2023, the Trustee filed a reply in further support of the Rule 2004 Motion.\n\n(ECF No. 2145.) On August 29, 2023, a hearing was held on the Rule 2004 Motion and the\n\nCourt took the matter under advisement. It is ripe for decision.\n\nThe Greenwich Parties argue that, notwithstanding this Court's previous conclusions that the \"prior pending proceeding\" doctrine did not apply on largely analogous facts and\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and the Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\ncircumstances, this Court's prior orders were mistaken and the prior pending proceeding doctrine should bar the Trustee from seeking any discovery materials related to the Greenwich Parties because of the adversary proceeding styled *Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC*, Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05005 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Sept. 6, 2023) (the \"Adversary Proceeding\"). Alternatively, the Greenwich Parties argue that the facts before presently before the Court are distinguishable because fact discovery in the Adversary Proceeding is closed as of September 15, 2023. Finally, insofar as the Greenwich Parties' objection is overruled, the Greenwich Parties move that the Trustee be precluded from using in the Adversary Proceeding any discovery materials obtained pursuant to an order granting the Rule 2004 Motion.\n\nThe Trustee argues that the Court has twice ruled that the pending proceeding doctrine requires the existence of a pending proceeding between the proposed examinee and the proposed examiner and that the Court should so rule again and grant the Rule 2004 Motion. The Trustee additionally argues that the Greenwich Parties mischaracterize the Rule 2004 Motion. The Trustee contends that the purpose of the Rule 2004 Motion is not to obtain discovery materials relevant to the Adversary Proceeding but rather to trace the flow of assets between various entities associated with Mr. Kwok. The Trustee asserts it would be a mistake to exclude any such entity – such as Greenwich Land – from the requests for documents and information because Mr. Kwok's financial affairs concern numerous interrelated entities and assets tend to flow through these entities, including, perhaps, an entity the Trustee mistakenly excluded. Finally, the Trustee argues that the Greenwich Parties' arguments about a discovery dispute in the Adversary Proceeding are not proper.\n\nThe Court agrees with the Trustee. The purpose of Rule 2004 examinations is to investigate the assets, liabilities, and financial affairs of the debtor – including causes of action.\n\nThe pending proceeding doctrine applies in circumstances where there is a pending proceeding between the proposed examinee and examiner, which proceeding is subject to stricter discovery rules – such as Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 as made applicable by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7026 or 9014 in, respectively, adversary proceedings or contested matters. The purpose of the pending proceeding doctrine is to prevent Rule 2004 from providing a mechanism for discovery abuse. *See In re Cambridge Analytica LLC*, 600 B.R. 750, 752 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019); *In re SunEdison*, 572 B.R. 482, 489 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017); *In re Enron Corp.*, 281 B.R. 836, 840– 41 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002).\n\nThe pending proceeding doctrine, however, is not an exception that swallows the rule: generally, it is applied where there is a pending proceeding between the proposed examiner and examinee. *Compare SunEdison*, 572 B.R. at 490 (\"The Debtors are not parties to the State Court Action, and hence, the rule does not apply to them.\"); *In re Alem*, Case No. 13-00119, 2013 WL 4840486, at \\*1–3 (Bankr. D.D.C. Sept. 11, 2003) (denying Rule 2004 motion for an examination of the debtor by his co-defendants in pending state court action); *In re Washington Mutual, Inc.*, 408 B.R. 45, 53 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009) (\"The possibility that JPM may intervene in the DC Action is not a sufficient reason to deny the Debtors' Motion at this time. The 'pending proceeding' rule is predicated on there actually being a pending action involving the two parties. JPM has not cited any authority for the proposition that a Rule 2004 examination of an entity is improper when a proceeding is pending in another venue against a third party and there is a 'substantial likelihood' that the examinee may intervene.\") (internal citations omitted); *In re Mirant Corp.*, 326 B.R. 354, 356–57 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005) (noting where adversary proceeding was prospective that Rule 2004 contains no aid of litigation exceptions, and indeed its purpose is, in part, to aid litigation); *2435 Plainfield Ave., Inc. v. Township of Scotch Plains*\n\n*(In re 2435 Plainfield Ave., Inc.)*, 223 B.R. 440, 456–57 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1998) (quashing Rule 2004 subpoenas served on employees and/or agents of defendant to adversary proceeding); *In re Bennett Funding Grp., Inc.*, 203 B.R. 24, 30 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1996) (applying pending proceeding rule where discovery was sought by a party to the proceeding against a third-party defendant to that proceeding); *Sweetland v. Szadkowski (In re Szadkowski)*, 198 B.R. 140 (Bankr. D. Md. 1996) (applying pending proceeding doctrine where a party to the proceeding was seeking discovery against another party to that proceeding); *In re Ecam Publications, Inc.*, 131 B.R. 556, 560–61 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1991) (allowing 2004 examination by trustee of parties, against whom the trustee had bought but not yet brought claims) *with In re Martelli*, Nos. 16- 20983-PRW, 16-20316-PRW, 16-20968-PRW, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 2015, at \\*12-13 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. July 20, 2017) (applying pending proceeding rule to non-parties to that proceeding because the material was sought by a party to the proceeding and was related to the proceeding); *cf. Cambridge Analytica*, 600 B.R. at 750 (unclear who was the target of the 2004 examination); *In re Se. Materials, Inc.*, No. 09-52606, 2010 WL 5128608, at \\*4–5 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Dec. 10, 2010) (allowing Rule 2004 examination of non-parties to the pending proceeding but subject to limitations regarding issues related to the pending proceeding); *Enron Corp.*, 281 B.R. at 838 (applying pending proceeding rule to a non-party to that proceeding because \"no party disputes that the automatic discovery stay of the [Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(3)(B)] applies to McKinsey.\").\n\nThe Greenwich Parties argue that the pending proceeding doctrine also bars discovery regarding issues related to a pending proceeding. While the Greenwich Parties correctly quote their supporting cases, the Court notes that the vast majority of them involved parties to the pending proceeding or, in the case of a corporate defendant, the employees and/or agents of a\n\nparty. *See Alem*, 2013 WL 4840486, at \\*1–3; *2435 Plainfield Ave., Inc.*, 223 B.R. at 456–57;\n\n*Bennett Funding Grp.*, 203 B.R. at 30. Additionally, *Southeastern Materials* allowed the Rule 2004 examination, albeit subject to limitations regarding the pending adversary proceeding. 2010 WL 5128608, at \\*4–5. In *Baroni v. OneWest Bank, FSB (In re Baroni)* the court was not determining whether to grant a Rule 2004 motion, but rather determining whether costs and fees associated with a Rule 2004 examination that had previously occurred could be recovered in an adversary proceeding. Case No. 1:12-bk-10986-MB, Adv. P. No. 1:13-ap-01249-MB, 2017 WL 4404141, at \\*14 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2017) (disallowing compensation for fees billed in adversary proceeding that properly relate to Rule 2004 discovery in main case).\n\nIn adopting the position that the issues involved in a pending proceeding, as well as the parties, are relevant to the determination of a Rule 2004 motion, *Southeastern Materials* cites *In re Lufkin* which states, in pertinent part, that:\n\nA handful of decisions have considered the allowable scope of a Rule 2004 examination where related civil or criminal proceedings are taking place or are likely to occur in another court. The general rule in these cases is that the existence of, or potential for, collateral litigation is insufficient reason to deny examination. *See, e.g., In re Coffee Cupboard, Inc.,* 128 B.R. 509 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991). Where the primary purpose is to benefit the bankruptcy estate, \"the fact that [examination] may also produce information which in turn may collaterally be used by third parties in separate litigation outside of the bankruptcy case [ ] is no reason to restrict its use or to shield parties . . . from such possible litigation.\" *In re Mittco, Inc.,* 44 B.R. 35, 38 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1984). However, Rule 2004 examinations should not be designed to discover information for use in an unrelated case or proceeding. *See Coffee Cupboard,* 128 B.R. at 516.\n\n255 B.R. 204, 208–09 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2000). That is, the issues subpoenaed may be cause to *narrow* a holding under the pending proceeding doctrine. *See In re Buick*, 174 B.R. 299, 306 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1994). In that connection, the Court is persuaded by the argument of the Trustee that the purpose of including the Greenwich Parties as related parties in the Rule 2004 Motion is not to obtain discovery relevant to the Adversary Proceeding but rather to ensure that\n\nthere is not a gap created in the Trustee's understanding of the flow of assets between entities related to Mr. Kwok because the Trustee did not ask about the Greenwich Parties.\n\nThe Court does not address the Greenwich Parties arguments about discovery and the admissibility of evidence in the Adversary Proceeding because those issues are not presently properly before the Court.\n\nAccordingly, it is hereby\n\n**ORDERED:** The Objections are **OVERULED**. The Motion is **GRANTED**; it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** Neubert, Pepe & Monteith, P.C., as counsel for the Trustee, is hereby authorized to sign subpoenas in a form substantially similar to the subpoenas attached to the Rule 2004 Motion as Exhibits C-1 to C-20 and to serve the subpoenas, along with a copy of this Order, in accordance with Bankruptcy Rule 2004 requiring examination and the production of documents by the examinees listed on Exhibit B to the Rule 2004 Motion; it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** Subject to any rights under the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and applicable Local Rules, and unless otherwise ordered by the Court, the examinees are hereby directed to produce all documents within 30 days of the service of the subpoena, or such other time as agreed upon by the Trustee. To the extent an examinee does not produce any documents requested in the Subpoena on the basis of some privilege, the examinee is hereby directed to produce to the Trustee a privilege log that comports with Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(e)(2), made applicable by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9016, and D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 26(e), within 30 days of service of the Subpoena, or such other time as agreed upon by the Trustee; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** The examinees are hereby directed to ensure that all documents and other information, including without limitation in any electronic format, requested in the Subpoenas or","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格区破产法院（United States Bankruptcy Court District of Connecticut）\n\n关于：\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等人， （合并审理）\n债务人。1\n第11章\n案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF No. 2079\n\n批准第11章受托人关于依第2004条规则进行质证调查的第六次补充综合动议的裁定\n\n现由法院审理的是Luc A. Despins先生以Ho Wan Kwok先生破产财产的第11章受托人（下称“受托人”）身份提交的《关于作出授权证据开示裁定的第六次补充综合动议》（下称“《第2004条规则动议》”）。（ECF No. 2079。）基于下文所述理由，该《第2004条规则动议》获得批准（GRANTED）。\n\n2023年8月11日，受托人提交了《第2004条规则动议》。（ECF No. 2079。）2023年8月18日，Greenwich Land LLC（格林威治土地有限责任公司，下称“Greenwich Land”）与Hing Chi Ngok（岳庆芝）女士（合称“格林威治当事方”）对《第2004条规则动议》提出了异议。（ECF No. 2098。）2023年8月25日，受托人提交了进一步支持《第2004条规则动议》的答复。（ECF No. 2145。）2023年8月29日，法院就《第2004条规则动议》举行了听证会，并留案待决。现已具备作出裁定的条件。\n\n1 这些第11章案件中的债务人为Ho Wan Kwok（又名Guo Wengui、Miles Guo、Miles Kwok，以及其他多个化名）（纳税人识别号后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（日内瓦控股有限责任公司，纳税人识别号后四位：8202）以及Genever Holdings Corporation（日内瓦控股公司）。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC和Genever Holdings Corporation的邮寄地址为：Paul Hastings LLP（普衡律师事务所）, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok（仅用于接收通知和通信）。\n\n格林威治当事方主张，尽管本法院此前在基本类似的事实和情况下认定“先决未决程序”原则（prior pending proceeding doctrine）不适用，但本法院先前的裁定是有误的，并且鉴于案号为Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)、对抗性程序号为Adv. P. No. 23-05005 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. Sept. 6, 2023）的名为Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC的对抗性程序（下称“该对抗性程序”），先决未决程序原则应当禁止受托人寻求任何与格林威治当事方相关的证据开示材料。或者，格林威治当事方主张，目前呈现在法院面前的事实具有可区分性，因为该对抗性程序中的事实证据开示已于2023年9月15日截止。最后，如果格林威治当事方的异议被驳回，格林威治当事方提请动议，请求禁止受托人在该对抗性程序中使用根据批准《第2004条规则动议》的裁定所获得的任何证据开示材料。\n\n受托人主张，法院已两次裁定未决程序原则要求拟被质证人与拟质证人之间存在未决程序，法院应再次作出相同裁定并批准《第2004条规则动议》。受托人还主张，格林威治当事方曲解了《第2004条规则动议》。受托人认为，《第2004条规则动议》的目的并非获取与该对抗性程序相关的证据开示材料，而是为了追踪与Kwok先生关联的各实体之间的资产流向。受托人坚称，从文件和信息调取请求中排除任何此类实体（如Greenwich Land）将是一个错误，因为Kwok先生的财务事务涉及众多相互关联的实体，且资产往往流经这些实体，包括受托人可能错误排除的实体。最后，受托人主张，格林威治当事方关于该对抗性程序中证据开示争议的主张是不当的。\n\n法院同意受托人的意见。第2004条规则质证调查的目的在于调查债务人的资产、负债和财务事务——包括诉由。\n\n未决程序原则适用于拟被质证人与拟质证人之间存在未决程序的情形，该程序受制于更严格的证据开示规则——例如分别在对抗性程序或争议事项中通过《联邦破产诉讼规则》（Fed. R. Bankr. P.）第7026条或第9014条适用的《联邦民事诉讼规则》（Fed. R. Civ. P.）第26条。未决程序原则的目的在于防止第2004条规则成为滥用证据开示的机制。参见In re Cambridge Analytica LLC, 600 B.R. 750, 752 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019)；In re SunEdison, 572 B.R. 482, 489 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017)；In re Enron Corp., 281 B.R. 836, 840–41 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002)。\n\n然而，未决程序原则并非能够吞噬一般规则的例外：通常而言，它适用于拟质证人与拟被质证人之间存在未决程序的情形。对比SunEdison, 572 B.R. at 490（“债务人并非州法院诉讼的当事人，因此该规则不适用于他们”）；In re Alem, Case No. 13-00119, 2013 WL 4840486, at *1–3 (Bankr. D.D.C. Sept. 11, 2003)（驳回未决州法院诉讼中的共同被告对债务人进行第2004条规则质证调查的动议）；In re Washington Mutual, Inc., 408 B.R. 45, 53 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009)（“JPM可能参加华盛顿特区诉讼的可能性不足以构成此时驳回债务人动议的充分理由。‘未决程序’规则的前提是实际存在涉及该两方当事人的未决诉讼。JPM未引用任何判例支持以下主张：即当在另一受案地针对第三方存在未决程序且被质证人存在参加诉讼的‘实质可能性’时，对某一实体进行第2004条规则质证调查是不当的。”）（引文省略）；In re Mirant Corp., 326 B.R. 354, 356–57 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005)（指出在对抗性程序尚处于预期阶段时，第2004条规则不包含协助诉讼的例外，且事实上其目的之一部分即为协助诉讼）；2435 Plainfield Ave., Inc. v. Township of Scotch Plains (In re 2435 Plainfield Ave., Inc.), 223 B.R. 440, 456–57 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1998)（撤销向对抗性程序被告的雇员和/或代理人送达的第2004条规则传票）；In re Bennett Funding Grp., Inc., 203 B.R. 24, 30 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1996)（在该程序的一方当事人向该程序的第三方被告寻求证据开示时适用未决程序规则）；Sweetland v. Szadkowski (In re Szadkowski), 198 B.R. 140 (Bankr. D. Md. 1996)（在该程序的一方当事人向该程序的另一方当事人寻求证据开示时适用未决程序原则）；In re Ecam Publications, Inc., 131 B.R. 556, 560–61 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1991)（准许受托人对已购买请求权但尚未提起索赔的当事人进行2004条规则质证调查）；并与以下案件相对照：In re Martelli, Nos. 16-20983-PRW, 16-20316-PRW, 16-20968-PRW, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 2015, at *12-13 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. July 20, 2017)（将未决程序规则适用于该程序的非当事人，因为该材料系由该程序的一方当事人寻求且与该程序相关）；另见Cambridge Analytica, 600 B.R. at 750（不明确谁是2004条规则质证调查的对象）；In re Se. Materials, Inc., No. 09-52606, 2010 WL 5128608, at *4–5 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Dec. 10, 2010)（准许对未决程序的非当事人进行第2004条规则质证调查，但受限于与未决程序相关事项的限制）；Enron Corp., 281 B.R. at 838（将未决程序规则适用于该程序的非当事人，因为“各方当事人均不争议《1995年私人证券诉讼改革法》（15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(3)(B)）的证据开示自动中止适用于麦肯锡”）。\n\n格林威治当事方主张，未决程序原则亦禁止就与未决程序相关的事项进行证据开示。虽然格林威治当事方准确引用了其支持性判例，但法院注意到，其中绝大多数案例涉及未决程序的当事人，或者在公司被告的情形下，涉及当事方的雇员和/或代理人。参见Alem, 2013 WL 4840486, at *1–3；2435 Plainfield Ave., Inc., 223 B.R. at 456–57；Bennett Funding Grp., 203 B.R. at 30。此外，Southeastern Materials案准许了第2004条规则质证调查，尽管该调查受制于关于未决对抗性程序的限制。2010 WL 5128608, at *4–5。在Baroni v. OneWest Bank, FSB (In re Baroni)案中，法院并非在决定是否批准一项第2004条规则动议，而是在决定与先前已进行的第2004条规则质证调查相关的成本和费用是否可以在对抗性程序中获得弥补。Case No. 1:12-bk-10986-MB, Adv. P. No. 1:13-ap-01249-MB, 2017 WL 4404141, at *14 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2017)（不准许对在对抗性程序中计费但实际属于主案中第2004条规则证据开示的律师费给予补偿）。\n\n在采纳“未决程序所涉及的事项以及当事方均与第2004条规则动议的裁决相关”这一立场时，Southeastern Materials案引用了In re Lufkin案，该案相关部分指出：\n\n“少数判决考虑了在另一法院正在进行或可能发生相关民事或刑事程序的情况下，第2004条规则质证调查的允许范围。这些案件中的一般规则是：附随诉讼的存在或可能性不足以成为拒绝质证调查的理由。参见，例如，In re Coffee Cupboard, Inc., 128 B.R. 509 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991)。在主要目的系为了破产财产利益的情况下，‘质证调查亦可能产生随后由第三方附随用于破产案件之外的单独诉讼中的信息这一事实，并非限制其使用或保护当事人……免受此类可能诉讼影响的理由’。In re Mittco, Inc., 44 B.R. 35, 38 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1984)。然而，第2004条规则质证调查的目的不应被设计为获取用于无关案件或程序的信息。参见Coffee Cupboard, 128 B.R. at 516。”\n\n255 B.R. 204, 208–09 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2000)。也就是说，被传唤的事项可能是根据未决程序原则限缩裁判范围的理由。参见In re Buick, 174 B.R. 299, 306 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1994)。就此而言，法院信服受托人的主张，即在《第2004条规则动议》中将格林威治当事方列为关联方的目的，并非为了获取与该对抗性程序相关的证据开示，而是为了确保受托人对与Kwok先生关联的各实体之间的资产流向的理解不会因为受托人未就格林威治当事方进行询问而产生断层。\n\n法院不对格林威治当事方关于该对抗性程序中的证据开示以及证据可采性的主张作出处理，因为这些问题目前尚未适当地呈现在法院面前。\n\n据此，特此\n\n裁定：异议被驳回（OVERRULED）。动议获批准（GRANTED）；并进一步\n\n裁定：特此授权作为受托人法律顾问的Neubert, Pepe & Monteith, P.C.签署形式与《第2004条规则动议》所附证据C-1至C-20传票实质相似的传票，并依据《破产诉讼规则》第2004条将传票连同本裁定副本一并送达，要求《第2004条规则动议》证据B中所列的被质证人接受质证调查并出示文件；并进一步\n\n裁定如下：在不违反《联邦破产程序规则》（Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure）、《联邦民事诉讼规则》（Federal Rules of Civil Procedure）及适用的《本地规则》（Local Rules）项下的任何权利的前提下，且除非法院另有命令，现责令受检人须在传票送达后 30 日内，或在受托人（Trustee）同意的其他时间内，提交所有文件。若受检人基于某项特权而未提交传票中要求的任何文件，现责令受检人须在传票送达后 30 日内，或在受托人同意的其他时间内，向受托人提交符合经《联邦破产程序规则》第 9016 条适用的《联邦民事诉讼规则》第 45(e)(2) 条以及《康涅狄格区联邦民事诉讼本地规则》（D. Conn. L. Civ. R.）第 26(e) 条规定的特权清单；并且进一步\n\n裁定如下：现责令受检人确保传票所要求的或","key_entities":["Kwok","Je","Ho Wan Kwok","Despins","Guo","Miles Guo","Paul Hastings"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":2079,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2098,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2145,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":2011,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 13:03:49"}