{"id":"court_ctb_2234_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":2234,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2023-08-30","title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION | -------------------------------------------","summary_zh":"关于刑事案中止动议进展的通知 —— Ho Wan Kwok 破产案（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo），CTB 22-50073 ECF #2234（2023-08-30立案）。第11章破产受托人及 Genever 债务人向破产法院及利害关系方通报债务人在纽约南区刑事案中所提中止破产案动议的反对意见进展，并附上了美国司法部、受托人、无担保债权人委员会及雪莉-荷兰酒店（The Sherry-Netherland, Inc.）提交的回应文件。","summary_en":"Notice regarding criminal case stay motion update — In re Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo / Guo Wengui), CTB 22-50073 ECF #2234 (filed 2023-08-30). The Chapter 11 Trustee and Genever Debtors notify the Bankruptcy Court and parties in interest regarding opposition responses filed in the SDNY criminal case against the debtor's motion to stay bankruptcy cases, attaching responses from the DOJ, the Trustee, the Creditors' Committee joinder, and The Sherry-Netherland, Inc.","body_en":"# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| ------------------------------------------------------ | x      |                         |\n|--------------------------------------------------------|--------|-------------------------|\n| In re:                                                 | :<br>: | Chapter 11              |\n| HO WAN KWOK et al.,                                    | :<br>: | Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |\n| Debtors.1                                              | :<br>: | Jointly Administered    |\n| ------------------------------------------------------ | :<br>x |                         |\n\n# **NOTICE OF CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE AND GENEVER DEBTORS REGARDING UPDATE WITH RESPECT TO DEBTOR'S MOTION IN CRIMINAL CASE FOR AN ORDER STAYING THESE CHAPTER 11 CASES AND ASSOCIATED ADVERSARY PROCEEDINGS**\n\nBy notice dated August 30, 2023 [Docket No. 2158], Luc A. Despins, as chapter 11\n\ntrustee (the \"Trustee\") for Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"), informed this Court and parties in\n\ninterest that the Debtor had filed a motion in the criminal case pending against him in the United\n\nStates District Court for the Southern District of New York [Case No. 1:23-cr-00118-AT] (the\n\n\"Criminal Case\") seeking to stay the above-captioned chapter 11 cases and all related adversary\n\nproceedings.2\n\nThe Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and Genever Holdings Corporation wish to provide\n\nan update to the Court and parties in interest with respect to the Debtor's Motion. In particular,\n\nthe following responses have been filed to the Debtor's Motion in the Criminal Case:\n\n 1 The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\n<sup>2</sup> Attached to the August 30, 2023 notice were copies of (a) the *Debtor's Notice of Motion for an Order and Writ Staying Bankruptcy Cases or in the Alternative for Other Relief* [Criminal Case ECF No. 129] (the \"Motion\") and (b) the related memorandum of law [Criminal Case ECF No. 131].\n\n- 1. Letter response of the United States Department of Justice, dated September 21, 2023 [Criminal Case ECF No. 148], a copy of which is attached hereto as **Exhibit 1**; and\n- 2. *Response of Chapter 11 Trustee and Genever Debtors in Opposition to Defendant Ho Wan Kwok's Motion for an Order and Writ Staying Bankruptcy Cases or in the Alternative For Other Relief*, dated September 21, 2023 [Criminal Case ECF No. 145], and the related declaration of Nicholas A. Bassett [Criminal Case ECF No. 146], copies of which are attached hereto as **Exhibit 2** and **Exhibit 3**, respectively;\n- 3. *Joinder of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors in Support of the Response of Chapter 11 Trustee and Genever Debtors in Opposition to Defendant Ho Wan Kwok's Motion for an Order and Writ Staying Bankruptcy Cases or in the Alternative For Other Relief*, dated September 21, 2023 [Criminal Case ECF No. 147], a copy of which is attached hereto as **Exhibit 4**;\n- 4. Letter response of The Sherry-Netherland, Inc., dated September 21, 2023 [Criminal Case ECF No. 149], a copy of which is attached hereto as **Exhibit 5**.\n\nDated: September 27, 2023 New York, New York\n\n> By: */s/ G. Alexander Bongartz*  Avram E. Luft (admitted *pro hac vice*) G. Alexander Bongartz (admitted *pro hac vice*) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6079 aviluft@paulhastings.com alexbongartz@paulhastings.com\n\n*and*\n\nNicholas A. Bassett (admitted *pro hac vice*) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C., 20036 (202) 551-1902 nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n*and*\n\nDouglas S. Skalka (ct00616) Patrick R. Linsey (ct29437) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 781-2847 dskalka@npmlaw.com plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n*Counsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and Genever Holdings Corporation*\n\n# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| ------------------------------------------------------  | x                                     |  |\n|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|\n| In re:                                                  | :<br>:<br>Chapter 11                  |  |\n| HO WAN KWOK, et al.,1                                   | :<br>:<br>Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)     |  |\n| Debtors.                                                | :<br>:<br>(Jointly Administered)<br>: |  |\n| ------------------------------------------------------x |                                       |  |\n\n# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nThe undersigned hereby certifies that on September 27, 2023, the foregoing Notice was electronically filed. Notice of this filing was sent by e-mail to all parties to the above-captioned chapter 11 case by operation of the Court's electronic filing (\"CM/ECF\") system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as indicated on the Notice of Electronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF system.\n\nDated: September 27, 2023 New York, New York\n\n> By: */s/ G. Alexander Bongartz*  G. Alexander Bongartz (admitted pro hac vice) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6079 alexbongartz@paulhastings.com\n\n*Counsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and Genever Holdings Corporation*\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and the Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\n# **Exhibit 1**\n\n![](_page_5_Picture_1.jpeg)\n\n**U.S. Department of Justice**\n\n*United States Attorney Southern District of New York*\n\n*The Silvio J. Mollo Building One Saint Andrew's Plaza New York, New York 10007*\n\nSeptember 21, 2023\n\n**VIA ECF**  Hon. Analisa Torres Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl St. New York, NY 10007-1312\n\n# **Re:** *United States v. Ho Wan Kwok***,** *et al.***, S1 23 Cr. 118 (AT)**\n\nDear Judge Torres:\n\nThe Government respectfully submits this letter brief in response to defendant Ho Wan Kwok's August 30, 2023 motion. (*See* Dkt. 131 (\"Kwok Br.\").\n\nKwok's motion principally seeks a stay of the bankruptcy proceedings that Kwok himself voluntarily initiated in February 2022. (*Id.*). Kwok's co-defendant Yanping Wang has joined in that motion. (*See* Dkt. 135 (\"Wang Ltr.\")).\n\nIn the event a stay is denied, Kwok also makes several requests in the alternative. (Kwok Br. 1, 28-30). First, Kwok requests a modification of the Protective Order in this case to allow production of criminal discovery to the bankruptcy Trustee. (*Id.* at 28-29). Second, Kwok seeks an order that Kwok's \"defense team\" have continued, unchaperoned access to the property located at 675 Ramapo Valley Road, Mahwah, New Jersey 07430 (the \"Mahwah Mansion\"). (*Id.* at 29- 30). Relatedly, Kwok moves to \"preclude\" the Government \"from facilitating the sale\" of the Mahwah Mansion until the conclusion of this case. (*Id.*). Lastly, Kwok requests an order that the Government not solicit or receive Kwok's privileged information or records from the Trustee. (*Id.*).\n\n# **A. The Government's Position on a Stay of the Bankruptcy Proceedings**\n\n The Government presently takes no position on Kwok's motion to stay the bankruptcy proceedings.\n\n# **B. Kwok's Alternative Requests Should Be Denied**\n\n If the Court declines to stay the bankruptcy proceedings, Kwok's alternative requests should also be denied for the reasons explained below.\n\n# **1. Two of Kwok's Requests Are Moot**\n\nKwok's first and last alternative requests should be denied as moot.\n\nFirst, Kwok's request to modify the Protective Order should be denied as moot. Kwok's counsel submits there is not good cause for such a modification and is only seeking such a modification because the Trustee obtained an order requiring Kwok to do so. (Kwok Br. 29). The Trustee is no longer seeking to enforce the order at this time. (Dkt. 145 (\"Trustee Br.\") at 6, 23). Kwok's request is therefore moot.\n\nSecond, Kwok's request regarding potentially privileged materials should be denied as moot. The Government has neither solicited nor received Kwok's potentially privileged information or records from the Trustee does not presently intend to do so, and will not do so absent agreement from Kwok's counsel (or the appropriate holder) or an order of this Court finding that such materials are not privileged and/or subject to the crime-fraud exception. Thus, Kwok's request regarding potentially privileged materials is moot.\n\nAccordingly, even if the Court reaches the alternative requests, both of these requests should be denied as moot.\n\n# **2. Kwok's Request For Unfettered Access to the Mahwah Mansion Should Be Denied**\n\nKwok's request for an order permitting his \"defense team\" unchaperoned access to the Mahwah Mansion through the conclusion of this case and any appeals should be denied for the reasons that follow.\n\nAs background, the Mahwah Mansion was purchased, renovated, and furnished with fraud proceeds, specifically G|CLUBS membership funds, after the funds were funneled through bank accounts in other entities' names. (Dkt. 19 (\"Indictment\") ¶ 16(b)-(c)). As alleged in the Indictment, G|CLUBS was used by Kwok and his conspirators to defraud victims by falsely promising them purportedly highly valuable stock in GTV (*i.e.*, using G|CLUBS as a vehicle to continue the unlawful private placement offering after the SEC intervened to stop the GTV offering) and falsely promising them \"a full spectrum of services\" once they became \"members.\" (*Id*. ¶ 15). The Mahwah Mansion and furnishings that were purchased with misappropriated G|CLUBS membership funds were identified as specific property subject to forfeiture in the Indictment. (*Id.* ¶ 55(v)).\n\nOn March 15, 2023, agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (\"FBI\") executed a search warrant at the Mahwah Mansion. Multiple FBI photographers meticulously documented the premises and its contents, taking over 2,000 photographs in the course of the search, which have been produced to the defendants in discovery. The FBI also conducted aerial surveillance of the Mahwah Mansion prior to the search, which photographs and videos have been produced to the defendants. The Government also seized voluminous physical evidence from the Mahwah Mansion, including, for example, electronic devices, Kwok's personal items (*e.g.*, customdesigned Brioni suits), and certain of the extravagant furnishings purchased with misappropriated G|CLUBS membership funds.\n\nFollowing Kwok's arrest, individuals claiming to be associated with the \"New Federal State of China\" (\"NFSC\"), a purported alternative government for the people of China founded by Kwok that is affiliated with the Himalaya Farm Alliance described in the Indictment, began using the Mahwah Mansion as their new base of operations. (*See* Indictment ¶ 14). Based on the Government's investigation, NFSC members are fiercely loyal to Kwok, and individuals in the NFSC are also associated with entities that are part of Kwok's fraud enterprise. The NFSC's occupation of the Mahwah Mansion was documented in videos and broadcasts posted publicly on social media services, GNews, and other instrumentalities of the fraud controlled by the defendants. (*See, e.g.*, attached Exhibit A (Trustee's complaint against Mahwah Mansion) ¶¶ 41- 42, 55-66 (documenting this evidence with citations)). [1](#page-9-0) In other words, after Kwok's arrest, Kwok's followers and agents have sought to perpetuate Kwok's criminal enterprise—using as a base of operations the very same mansion Kwok and his co-conspirators purchased with fraud proceeds.\n\nSubsequent to the Government's public filings regarding the Mahwah Mansion and the public broadcasts of the defendants' associates occupying the Mahwah Mansion, which threatened to diminish its value, the Trustee conferred with the Government regarding the disposition of the Mahwah Mansion. Unlike chattel or funds in a bank account, the Government generally cannot seize real property with a forfeiture-based seizure warrant prior to a final order of forfeiture which order would come only after a criminal conviction, at the conclusion of the subsequent ancillary forfeiture proceeding. Given that the defendants' associates were using the Mahwah Mansion (itself purchased with fraud proceeds) and that their occupation of the Mahwah Mansion could dissipate the property's value, on July 6, 2023, the Government provided the Trustee with 12 photographs taken during the Government's March 15, 2023 search illustrating that Kwok used the Mahwah Mansion as a personal residence.[2](#page-9-0)\n\nOn July 11, 2023, the Trustee filed an *ex parte* motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction regarding Kwok's associates' access to the Mahwah Mansion. *In re Ho Wan Kwok, et al.*, Case No. 23-05017, Dkt. 4 (D. Conn. Bankr.) (JAM). On August 1, 2023, Judge Manning granted the order in part. *See id.*, Dkt. 17. On July 13, 2023, the Government executed a proposed settlement with the Trustee that would permit the Trustee to secure the value of the Mahwah Mansion during the pendency of the criminal case. *In re Ho Wan Kwok, et al.*, Case No. 23-05017 (D. Conn. Bankr.) (JAM), Dkt. 24, Ex. 1; *see also id.* at Dkt. 53, 56. On August 31, 2023, following additional briefing and hearings, Judge Manning granted the Trustee's motion and issued a modified preliminary injunction to restrict access to the Mahwah Mansion to (a) the Security Services (as defined in the Preliminary Injunction); (b) the Trustee and his representatives and/or professionals; (c) the United States Department of Justice and its employees and representatives; (d) the FBI and its employees and representatives; (e) other federal, New Jersey state, or Mahwah municipal law enforcement agencies and their employees and\n\n<sup>1</sup> The FBI conducted aerial surveillance of the Mahwah Mansion after the March 15, 2023 search on two occasions —once members of the NFSC and the defendants' enterprise began inhabiting and broadcasting from the Mahwah Mansion. Photographs and videos of this aerial surveillance have also been produced to the defendants.\n\n<sup>2</sup> Kwok suggests that this was a violation of the Protective Order. (Kwok Br. 3, 21). Kwok is wrong. The Protective Order applies to the Government's \"disclosure[s] to the defendants\" of evidence pursuant to its discovery obligations and restricts *the defendants'* use of those materials acquired from the Government. (Dkt. 63 ¶ 1). It does not restrict the Government's use of its evidence. (*See id.*).\n\nrepresentatives; (f) any other persons expressly authorized by the Trustee in writing (which can include email); and (g) any other person expressly authorized by the United States District Court for the Southern District for New York or the bankruptcy court. *In re Ho Wan Kwok, et al.*, Case. No. 23-05017, Dkt. 58 (D. Conn. Bankr.) (JAM).\n\nOn September 1, 2023, the Trustee conducted a walkthrough of the Mahwah Mansion, which was video-recorded and photographed. After the instant motion from Kwok seeking to \"preserv[e] the status quo\" of the Mahwah Mansion (Kwok Br. 3), on September 12, 2023, the Trustee provided the Government with six photographs from the Trustee's September 1, 2023 walkthrough. Significantly, those photographs illustrate that the defendants' co-conspirators have been tampering with the interior of the property in an apparent effort to obstruct this criminal case by modifying the Mahwah Mansion to suit a defense narrative. Specifically, the defendants' coconspirators posted placards at room entrances that appear to suggest that the rooms of Kwok's Mahwah Mansion are, in fact, NFSC and/or G|CLUBS [3](#page-9-0) offices or rooms, as shown in the photographs below:\n\n![](_page_8_Picture_4.jpeg)\n\nThese after-the-fact placards were not present as of March 15, 2023, when the Government searched the Mahwah Mansion pursuant to a search warrant issued in this case.\n\nIn light of the foregoing, this Court should not credit Kwok's claim that a ruling against him would \"permit the Trustee in the Bankruptcy Cases to control *and potentially alter an alleged crime scene of critical importance to this proceeding*.\" (Kwok Br. 4 (emphasis added)). In fact, it is *Kwok* and his associates who appear to have been doing what Kwok claims to seek to prevent, by materially altering the Mahwah Mansion to serve a defense narrative.\n\n<sup>3</sup> Kwok's motion states the Mahwah Mansion was purchased \"in furtherance of the business of *GTV*.\" (Kwok Br. 20 (emphasis added)). Kwok has not explained why then the placards denote \"NFSC\" and \"G|CLUBS.\"\n\n318\n\nSimply put, the record provides no basis for permitting the \"defense team[4](#page-9-0) \" unfettered and unchaperoned access to the property that the defendants and their associates have been using as an instrument to attempt to obstruct justice. Such access is unnecessary, particularly given the voluminous documentation—comprising *thousands* of photographs, as well as videos—of the Mahwah Mansion that already exists in the defendants' possession (with even further evidence forthcoming). [5](#page-9-0) Contrary to Kwok's assertions, evidence regarding the condition and use of the Mahwah Mansion is not \"beyond Mr. Kwok's reach.\" (Kwok Br. 20). Rather, that evidence is in the possession of Kwok's and Wang's counsel, and Kwok's attempt to analogize the circumstances here to thwarting access to a material witness is baseless. (*Id.* at 22). There is simply no need for Kwok's \"team\" to have ongoing and continual access, potentially for years, to the Mahwah Mansion. If granted, Kwok's requests could needlessly incur costs, diminishing the Mahwah Mansion's value at the expense of victims and creditors alike, and risk providing opportunity to NFSC members who seek to exploit a mansion purchased with fraud proceeds in furtherance of a scheme to obstruct this criminal prosecution on behalf of NFSC's leaders, the defendants.\n\nNevertheless, to the extent Kwok's or Wang's criminal defense attorneys of record seek to conduct a site visit to the Mahwah Mansion—as they were permitted to do with the Sherry Netherland apartment, with the Government's consent (*see* Dkt. 72, 78, 79)—the Government would not object to such a visit on similar terms to the visit of the Sherry Netherland. (*See also*  Trustee Br. 6-7, 27, 29-30 (Trustee would not object to such a site visit \"subject to potential safeguards surrounding [Kwok's] counsel's access to the Mahwah Mansion\")). [6](#page-9-0)\n\nFinally, there is no need for this Court to \"preclude\" the Government \"from facilitating the sale\" of the Mahwah Mansion until the conclusion of this case. (Kwok Br. 29-30). It is unclear, as an initial matter, what that means. In any event, Kwok's request is at least premature, as there is no imminent sale, and any such sale would be subject to the ordinary course of the bankruptcy\n\n<sup>4</sup> Kwok's brief does not define who the members of the \"defense team\" are, nor did either defendant submit a proposed order to the Court regarding this request.\n\n<sup>5</sup> The Government has served a subpoena on the Trustee for the videos and photographs arising from his September 1, 2023 walkthrough, and will produce those materials to the defendants promptly after receipt. The Government produced to the defendants earlier today the six photographs from that walkthrough that the Trustee has already provided.\n\n<span id=\"page-9-0\"></span><sup>6</sup> Kwok did not confer with the Government regarding such a request prior to the filing of his motion.\n\nprocess in which Kwok is participating. (*See* Trustee Br. 7, 26, 30).\n\nAccordingly, Kwok's requests should be denied.\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\n DAMIAN WILLIAMS United States Attorney\n\nBy: */s/*\n\nMicah F. Fergenson Ryan B. Finkel Juliana N. Murray Assistant United States Attorneys (212) 637-2190 / -6612 / -2314\n\nCc: All Counsel of Record (by ECF)\n\n# **EXHIBIT A**\n\n# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| --------------------------------------------------------                | x                                 |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|\n| In re:                                                                  | :<br>:<br>Chapter 11              |\n| HO WAN KWOK, et al.,<br>1                                               | :<br>:<br>Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |\n| Debtor.                                                                 | :<br>:<br>(Jointly Administered)  |\n| -------------------------------------------------------                 | x<br>:                            |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, Chapter 11 Trustee,                                     | :<br>Adv. Proceeding [•]          |\n| Plaintiff,                                                              | :<br>:<br>July 11, 2023           |\n| v.                                                                      | :<br>:<br>:                       |\n| TAURUS FUND LLC,                                                        | :                                 |\n| SCOTT BARNETT, as trustee of TAURUS                                     | :                                 |\n| FUND LLC, and                                                           | :                                 |\n| TAURUS MANAGEMENT LLC, as trustee                                       | :                                 |\n| of TAURUS FUND LLC,                                                     | :                                 |\n| Defendants.2<br>------------------------------------------------------- | :<br>:<br>x                       |\n\n# **COMPLAINT OF CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK SEEKING, PURSUANT TO BANKRUPTCY CODE SECTIONS 541, 542, AND 544, (I) DECLARATORY JUDGMENT THAT DEBTOR IS EQUITABLE OWNER OF MAHWAH MANSION AND THAT SUCH PROPERTY IS PROPERTY OF ESTATE AND (II) RELATED RELIEF**\n\nLuc A. Despins, in his capacity as the chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") appointed in the\n\nchapter 11 case (the \"Chapter 11 Case\") of Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\" or \"Kwok\"), files this\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202), and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee and the Genever Debtor is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\n<sup>2</sup> The trustees of Taurus Fund named as defendants will be served with the Complaint.\n\nadversary complaint (the \"Complaint\") against defendants Taurus Fund LLC (\"Taurus Fund\"), Scott Barnett, as trustee of Taurus Fund, and Taurus Management LLC, as trustee of Taurus Fund (\"Taurus Management\" and, collectively with Taurus Fund and Scott Barnett, the \"Defendants\") and states as follows:\n\n#### **NATURE OF ACTION**\n\n1. The Trustee brings this Complaint to recover yet another multi-million-dollar asset the Debtor has hidden from his creditors with the aid of his seemingly endless web of shell companies. The asset in question is one of the largest mansions in the United States, a 21 bedroom, 50,000 square foot, castle-styled private residence with 12.5-acre grounds located at 675 Ramapo Valley Road, Mahwah, New Jersey 07430 (the \"Mahwah Mansion\"). This extremely valuable property is owned by the Debtor but held by or in the name of a shell company, Taurus Fund. For the reasons set forth herein, the Mahwah Mansion and the fixtures and personal property located in the Mahwah Mansion should be turned over to the Trustee and incorporated into the chapter 11 estate for the benefit of the Debtor's creditors.\n\n2. The Mahwah Mansion was purchased in December 2021 for \\$26.5 million and has since been used by the Debtor personally. Taurus Fund, the property's nominal owner, is, according to its Articles of Organization, a manager-managed LLC managed by (i) the Debtor's chauffeur and/or bodyguard, Scott Barnett, and (ii) another shell company, Taurus Management.\n\n3. As further discussed below, Taurus Fund is in administrative default under Nevada law. Its charter was revoked and right to transact business forfeited. As a result, as of January 1, 2023, Taurus Fund's managers, Scott Barnett and Taurus Management, have held all property and assets of Taurus Fund—including the Mahwah Mansion—in trust.\n\n4. Despite holding nominal title to the Mahwah Mansion, Taurus Fund is, in reality, the owner in name only. The Debtor's control of the Mahwah Mansion is transparent, with the property's actual control and ownership disguised by only the smallest of fig leaves. Until his arrest and detention, the Debtor used the Mahwah Mansion as his residence, filling it with his own personal belongings and funding millions of dollars of renovations to the property through Taurus Fund. Meanwhile, the \"management\" of this historic mansion worth tens of millions of dollars is allegedly entrusted to the Debtor's driver and/or bodyguard, Mr. Barnett.\n\n5. These and the other facts described herein show that the Debtor was (and remains) the equitable owner of the property at all relevant times. Because the Mahwah Mansion is equitably owned by the Debtor, it is property of the Debtor's chapter 11 estate.\n\n6. Based on these facts, the Trustee seeks a ruling pursuant to sections 541, 542, and 544 of the Bankruptcy Code (i) declaring that the Debtor is the equitable owner of the Mahwah Mansion and that the Mahwah Mansion is property of the Debtor's chapter 11 estate to be administered by the Trustee, and (ii) ordering the turnover of the Mahwah Mansion and the fixtures and personal property located in the Mahwah Mansion to the Trustee.\n\n7. The Trustee separately asserts that (i) the Debtor equitably owns Taurus Fund itself or, alternatively, (ii) Taurus Fund is the Debtor's alter ego. In either case, Taurus Fund or its assets (or their value) should be brought into the Debtor's chapter 11 estate.\n\n#### **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**\n\n8. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this adversary proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). This adversary proceeding has been referred to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §157(a). Venue is appropriate in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.\n\n#### **PARTIES**\n\n9. The Trustee is the chapter 11 trustee in the Chapter 11 Case pursuant to the Court's order entered on July 8, 2022 [Main Case Docket No. 523].\n\n10. Taurus Fund is a limited liability company formed in the State of Nevada and is the purported nominal owner of the Mahwah Mansion.\n\n11. Scott Barnett is one of the two managers of Taurus Fund, and upon information and belief, a trustee of Taurus Fund. Barnett is also the Debtor's chauffeur and/or bodyguard.\n\n12. Taurus Management is a limited liability company formed in the State of New Mexico. Taurus Management is the other manager of Taurus Fund, and upon information and belief, a trustee of Taurus Fund.\n\n#### **FACTS**\n\n#### **I. Debtor's Prolific Use of Shell Companies**\n\n13. As the Court is well aware, the Debtor uses a seemingly inexhaustible stream of shell companies, purportedly owned by family members or business subordinates, to shield his assets and activities from creditors. The Debtor's \"shell game\" has allowed him to continue to deny ownership of his assets and refuse to pay his debts.\n\n14. For example, this Court has found, in its order holding the Debtor in contempt for violating the Court's corporate governance order, that the Debtor was the beneficial owner of Ace Decade Limited (and, through it, Dawn State Limited), and that the Debtor controlled and employed Ace Decade Limited's nominee owner, Yvette Wang.3\n\n<sup>3</sup> *Order Granting Motion to Hold Debtor in Contempt of Corporate Governance Order*, ¶¶ 1, 4 (Jan. 24, 2023, Docket No. 1372) (\"Corp. Governance Contempt Order\").\n\n15. Similarly, immediately prior to the filing of the Debtor's chapter 11 case in February 2022, in the Debtor's pre-petition litigation against PAX in New York state court, Justice Ostrager found that it was the Debtor's practice to use shell companies to shield his assets from creditors.4 Justice Ostrager also found that the Lady May yacht was beneficially owned and controlled by the Debtor, despite title to the yacht being nominally held by HK USA, purportedly owned by Mei Guo.\n\n16. Previously, Judge Liman of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York found, in a 2021 decision, that Eastern Profit Corporation Limited, an entity originally owned by another of the Debtor's chauffeurs and then transferred to the Debtor's daughter, was \"in essence, a shell corporation\" for the Debtor.5 Eastern Profit Corporation Limited was one of numerous purportedly independent entities whose financial accounts were identified by a 2018 Hong Kong court order to be \"subject to the effective control\" of the Debtor.6\n\n17. Relatedly, a confidential witness declaration filed by the Trustee under seal at Docket No. 1327 (the \"Confidential Witness Declaration\") and incorporated by reference as an exhibit in support of this Complaint, establishes, among other things that:\n\n<sup>4</sup> Ex. 1, Decision & Order, at 1, *PAX v. Kwok*, Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 2022) [Docket No. 1181] (the \"Final Contempt Decision\").\n\n<sup>5</sup> *Eastern Profit Corp. Ltd. v. Strategic Vision US LLC*, No. 18-CV-2185 (LJL), 2021 WL 2554631, at \\*1 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2021).\n\n<sup>6</sup> Ex. 2, Hong Kong Restraint Order, at 7-18.\n\n18. Particularly relevant to this Complaint, this Court has found that the New Federal State of China (the \"NFSC\") and the GSeries Entities such as Gettr, GClubs, GNews, GFashion, GMusic, and GEdu (the \"GSeries Entities\")7 are \"led by the Debtor,\"8 \"serve the purposes of the Debtor, serve as business vehicles for the Debtor, and their members are personally loyal to the Debtor.\"9\n\n19. Finally, and also particularly relevant to this Complaint, the Debtor has—until his\n\nrecent arrest by the FBI—used this shell game to fund his extravagant lifestyle and luxury\n\nresidences. For example:\n\n- Lamp Capital LLC and Golden Spring (New York) Ltd. (shell companies purportedly owned by the Debtor's son) have paid the Debtor's living expenses and legal fees;\n- Bravo Luck Limited (another shell company purportedly owned by the Debtor's son and in which the Debtor had a direct ownership interest) has claimed beneficial ownership of the Debtor's \\$70 million luxury apartment at the Sherry Netherland Hotel;10\n- Hong Kong International Investments (USA) Limited (\"HK USA\") (a shell company purportedly owned by the Debtor's daughter, Mei Guo, and recently\n\n<sup>7</sup> The Court also found that: \"The G in GSeries stands for Guo.\" *Corrected Memorandum of Decision Granting in Part Motion for Preliminary Injunction* ¶¶ 2, 3 (Adv. Proc. No. 22-05032, Jan. 13, 2023) [Docket No. 133] (the \"PI Decision\") (\"The GSeries includes the following entities: Himalaya Exchange, Gettr, GFashion, GMusic, GClubs, GNews, and GEdu.\").\n\n<sup>8</sup> PI Decision, ¶ 7 (\"The Debtor is the leader of The Whistleblower Movement, NFSC, ROLF, and Himalaya.\").\n\n<sup>9</sup> *Id.* (\"The Whistleblower Movement, NFSC, ROLF, GSeries, and Himalaya serve the purposes of the Debtor, serve as business vehicles for the Debtor, and their members are personally loyal to the Debtor.\").\n\n<sup>10</sup> The Trustee has challenged Bravo Luck Limited's asserted interest in the Sherry Netherland apartment. See Amended Adversary Complaint Against Bravo Luck and Qiang Guo Seeking (I) Invalidation of Purported Trust Agreement in Favor of Bravo Luck and, (II) in Alternative, Ruling that Debtor Effectuated Fraudulent Transfer in Favor of Bravo Luck and Qiang Guo Pursuant to Section 276 of New York Debtor and Creditor Law, Made Applicable by Section 544 of Bankruptcy Code (Adv. Proc. No. 22-05027, Feb. 28, 2023) [Docket No. 40].\n\nruled by this Court to be the Debtor's alter ego11) has held title to the Debtor's yacht, the *Lady May*—which the Court ruled was property of the estate despite HK USA's nominal ownership;\n\n- Greenwich Land LLC (a shell company purportedly owned by the Debtor's wife) holds nominal title to the Debtor's Connecticut residence;12\n- Anton Development Limited (a shell company originally owned by one of the Debtor's chauffeurs and then transferred to the Debtor's daughter) held title to a Bombardier Global XRS private jet; and\n- HCHK Technologies, Inc. (another shell company purportedly owned by the Debtor's employees) has paid fees associated with the management of the Lady May and of the Debtor's Bombardier aircraft, and has paid nearly \\$2.8 million to purchase a new private plane for the Debtor.13\n- 20. In sum, while this Complaint focuses on the Mahwah Mansion and Taurus Fund,\n\nthe Trustee believes that context regarding the Debtor's wide-ranging strategy of using shell companies to shield assets from creditors will assist the Court in understanding the Trustee's position. The Trustee also expressly reserves all rights to pursue actions asserting claims against\n\nother entities at the appropriate time.\n\n<sup>11</sup> *See Memorandum of Decision and Order Granting Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Second Counterclaim*, at 36 (Adv. Proc. No. 22-05003, May 18, 2023) [Docket No. 221].\n\n<sup>12</sup> The Trustee has sought an alter ego judgment against this entity in adversary proceeding 23-05005, in connection with which the Court entered a prejudgment remedy and temporary restraining orders against Greenwich Land LLC and the Debtor's wife. *See Order Granting in Part Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction* (Adv. Proc. No. 23-05005, Mar. 28, 2023, Docket No. 14) (the \"Greenwich TR &PI Order\"); *Order Granting Chapter 11 Trustee's Amended Application for Ex Parte Prejudgment Remedy* (Adv. Proc. No. 23-05005, Mar. 28, 2023) [Docket No. 15] (the \"Greenwich PR Order\").\n\n<sup>13</sup> The Trustee has sought an alter ego judgment against HCHK Technologies, Inc., HCHK Property Management, Inc., and Lexington Property and Staffing, In. in adversary proceeding 23-05013, in connection with which the Court entered a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against this entity. *See Order Granting in Part Emergency Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction* (Adv. Proc. No. 23-05013, June 12, 2023, Docket No. 18) (the \"HCHK TR & PI Order\"). *See also Complaint of Chapter 11 Trustee for Estate of Ho Wan Kwok Pursuant to Sections 105, 362, 363, 541, 542, 544 and 549 of the Bankruptcy Code Seeking (i) Declaratory Judgment that HCHK Technologies, Inc., HCHK Property Management, Inc., and Lexington Property And Staffing, Inc., Are (A) Alter Egos of Debtor; or, (B) in the Alternative, An Order that Debtor Equitably Owns Such Entities and/or Their Property; and (II) Injunctive Relief* (Adv. Proc. No. 23-05013, June 8, 2023) [Docket No. 1].\n\n#### **II. Nominal Ownership by Taurus Fund, Shell Company of Debtor**\n\n21. On December 16, 2021 (the \"Purchase Date\"), Taurus Fund purchased the Mahwah Mansion from Crocker Mansion Estate LLC for approximately \\$26.5 million.14 The deed was recorded on the same date at Bergen County, New Jersey.15\n\n22. Taurus Fund was formed in Nevada on December 16, 2021, the same date as the Purchase Date.16\n\n23. Besides the Mahwah Mansion, Taurus Fund also holds title to a Bösendorfer grand piano designed by F.A. Porsche (the \"Porsche Piano\"), which is believed to be valued at over \\$250,000. The Porsche Piano was previously located at the Debtor's GSeries offices at 3 Columbus Circle. Upon information and belief, the Debtor's employees or agents have removed the piano and taken it to an unknown location.17 As of the time of this Complaint, while the Trustee's investigation is ongoing, other than the Mahwah Mansion and the Porsche Piano, the Trustee is not aware of any other assets held by Taurus Fund.18\n\n24. While its members remain unknown, Taurus Fund is managed by (i) the Debtor's chauffeur and/or bodyguard Scott Barnett and (ii) Taurus Management.19\n\n25. Scott Barnett is the Debtor's chauffeur and/or bodyguard, and as of the date of this Complaint, Barnett continues to be employed by and actively work for the Debtor. In fact,\n\n<sup>14</sup> *See* Ex. 3, Deed of Mahwah Mansion.\n\n<sup>15</sup> *Id*.\n\n<sup>16</sup> *See* Ex. 4, Article of Organization of Taurus Fund LLC.\n\n<sup>17</sup> The Trustee has been advised by counsel for GNews, one of the GSeries entities controlled by the Debtor, that the Porsche Piano should be placed back in the Debtor's GSeries offices at 3 Columbus Circle, but the Trustee is not aware that this has been done.\n\n<sup>18</sup> To the extent that Taurus Fund has any other assets, they should also be incorporated into the Debtor's chapter 11 estate.\n\n<sup>19</sup> *See* Ex. 4, Article of Organization of Taurus Fund LLC.\n\non June 20, 2023, in an email to the Trustee, Aaron A. Romney, the Debtor's counsel, notified the Trustee that \"*Scott Barnett, who worked security for Mr. Kwok at the Sherry [Netherland], will be picking up [certain] boxes*\" from the Sherry Netherland containing the Debtor's and his family members' clothes and personal effects.20 Barnett is also listed as a covered driver under an insurance policy issued by AIG to Golden Spring (New York) Ltd.,21 one of the Debtor's many shell companies.22 Barnett has also been paid by at least two other shell companies, Greenwich Land, LLC,23 (which is purportedly owned by the Debtor's wife and which holds title to the Debtor's residence in Greenwich, Connecticut),24 and Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc. (\"Lexington Property\")25 (Lexington Property is 99.999% owned by Holy City Hong Kong Ventures, Ltd., an entity itself 100% owned by the Debtor's assistant, Yvette Wang).26\n\n26. Taurus Fund's other listed manager, Taurus Management, was formed on December 15, 2021, one day before the Purchase Date, as a limited liability company in the State of New Mexico.27\n\n<sup>20</sup> *See* Ex. 5, Email from Aaron A. Romney to the Trustee, Stephen Kindseth and Eric Henzy (June 20, 2023 at 1:01 PM).\n\n<sup>21</sup> *See* Ex. 6, New York Automobile Declarations Page, by and between AIG Property Casualty Company and Golden Spring (New York) Ltd., for the policy period between Apr. 1, 2022 and Apr. 1, 2023).\n\n<sup>22</sup> As noted above, the Debtor has previously used his chauffeur and/or bodyguard to hold his shell companies.\n\n<sup>23</sup> *See* Ex. 7, Check to Scott Barnett from Greenwich Land, LLC, on February 2, 2021, for an amount of \\$619.99.\n\n<sup>24</sup> The Trustee has sought an alter ego judgment against this entity in adversary proceeding 23-05005, in connection with which the Court entered a prejudgment remedy and temporary restraining orders against Greenwich Land LLC and the Debtor's wife. *See* Greenwich TR &PI Order; Greenwich PR Order.\n\n<sup>25</sup> *See* Ex. 8, Lexington Property Expenses by Vendor Summary, January – December 2021, Scott Barnett was paid \\$115.08 by Lexington Property.\n\n<sup>26</sup> The Trustee has sought an alter ego judgment against Lexington Property, HCHK Technologies, Inc., and HCHK Property Management, Inc. in adversary proceeding 23-05013, in connection with which the Court entered a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. *See* HCHK TR & PI Order.\n\n<sup>27</sup> *See* Ex. 9, Articles of Organization of Taurus Management LLC.\n\n27. The publicly available formation documents for Taurus Management indicate that Taurus Management is a manager-managed LLC. However, the documents do not identify a manager or member.28\n\n28. Despite being a New Mexico entity, Taurus Management shares the same address as Taurus Fund in Nevada at 6628 Sky Pointe Drive, Suite 129-1071, Las Vegas, NV 89131.29\n\n29. Taurus Fund has ignored its obligations under Nevada law to file with the Secretary of State an annual list containing information such as names, titles and addresses of all of its managers, as well as a signature of the manager or authorized representative. It is, accordingly, marked as \"in default\" on the website maintained by the Nevada Secretary of State.30\n\n30. Taurus Fund has also failed to comply with New Jersey law. Under New Jersey law, Taurus Fund's ownership of property in New Jersey requires it to register as a foreign business entity with the New Jersey Secretary of State. However, a review of public records indicates that no such filing has been made.\n\n#### **III. Scott Barnett and Taurus Management Became Trustees of Taurus Fund**\n\n31. Under Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 86.263(2), Taurus Fund's annual list of information was due on December 31, 2022. Because it failed to timely file the list, Taurus Fund is deemed in default under Nevada law.\n\n<sup>28</sup> *Id*.\n\n<sup>29</sup> *Id*.\n\n<sup>30</sup> *See* Ex. 10, Taurus Fund LLC, Secretary of State of Nevada, Entity Search, http nv.gov/EntitySearch/BusinessInformation.\n\n32. On January 1, 2023, pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 86.274(2), Taurus Fund's company charter was revoked by the Nevada Secretary of State, and its right to transact business forfeited.\n\n33. Upon revocation of Taurus Fund's charter and forfeiture of its right to transact business, under Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 86.274(5), all of the property and assets of Taurus Fund, including the Mahwah Mansion, are required to be held in trust by its managers—namely Scott Barnett and Taurus Management—and the same proceedings may be had with respect to its property and assets as those apply to the dissolution of a limited liability company pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 86.505 and 86.521.\n\n34. Upon information and belief, as of the date of this Complaint, Taurus Fund has not applied to reinstate its charter, and remains in default.\n\n35. Upon information and belief, as of the date of this Complaint, Scott Barnett and Taurus Management remain as trustees of Taurus Fund and hold the Mahwah Mansion and all other assets of Taurus Fund in trust under Nevada law.\n\n#### **IV. Debtor Equitably Owns Mahwah Mansion**\n\n36. Although Taurus Fund held nominal title to the Mahwah Mansion, the Debtor had full beneficial ownership and control over the property until his arrest on March 15, 2023. As of the date of this Complaint, the Debtor has been denied bail and remains in federal custody.\n\n37. The Debtor's residence at, and his equitable ownership of, the Mahwah Mansion was revealed in the criminal indictment against him containing multiple charges of securities\n\nfraud, wire fraud, and money laundering (the \"Criminal Indictment\").31 The Criminal Indictment identified the Mahwah Mansion as one of the Debtor's luxury residences in the United States, along with his apartment at the Sherry-Netherland and his residence in Greenwich, Connecticut.\n\n38. *In fact, a \"public records\" search under the Debtor's name lists the Mahwah Mansion as the Debtor's personal address*. 32\n\n#### **A. Debtor Made Decision to Purchase Mahwah Mansion**\n\n39. Constructed in 1907, the castle-styled Mahwah Mansion, located within 25 miles of New York City, is described as one of the world's most magnificent and rare estates. The mansion has 21 bedrooms, more than 19 bathrooms, a great hall, library, tea room, formal dining room, restaurant-style kitchen, movie theater, billiard room, indoor lap pool with spa, massage room, wine room, game room, gym, outdoor pool with cabana, majestic gardens with two fountains, tennis court, 8-car garage, and rare wood, stone work and craftsmanship throughout the castle.33 Additionally, the Mahwah Mansion has its own Wikipedia page and was listed on the National Register of Historic Places in 1997.34\n\n40. The grandeur and lavishness of the Mahwah Mansion is consistent with the Debtor's preference for extravagant residences, just like the \\$70 million Sherry Netherland apartment and the Debtor's multi-million dollar residence in Connecticut.\n\n<sup>31</sup> *See* Criminal Indictment of Ho Wan Kwok and Kin Ming Je, *United States v. Kwok et al.*, 23 Cr. 118, filed Mar. 6, 2023 [ECF No. 2]. A copy of the Criminal Indictment is attached as **Exhibit 11** hereto.\n\n<sup>32</sup> *See* Ex. 25, Lexis Public Record Comprehensive Person Report (listing Mahwah Mansion as the Debtor's address).\n\n<sup>33</sup> *See* 675 Ramapo Valley Road, Mahwah, New Jersey 07430, United States, CHRISTIE'S INTERNATIONAL REAL ESTATE GROUP, http (last visited July 6, 2023) (describing grandeur and lavish amenities of the Mahwah Mansion).\n\n<sup>34</sup> *See* Crocker-McMillin Mansion, WIKIPEDIA, http (last visited July 6, 2023).\n\n41. On April 12, 2023, the NFSC, which, as this Court has found, is controlled by the Debtor and serves the purposes of the Debtor,35 released a video on Gettr featuring a tour of the Mahwah Mansion hosted by Pamela Tsai, a/k/a Nicole (\"Tsai\")36 and Qidong Xia, a/k/a Changdao Brother, or David Xia (\"Xia\") (the \"First Video Tour\").37 Xia is currently the Secretary General of the NFSC and Chairman of the Rule of Law Society and a person with whom the Debtor remains in contact.38 For example, on April 17, 2023, during a Gettr live stream by Tsai, Roy Guo,39 and Xia, the Debtor allegedly made a fifteen-minute phone call to\n\n<sup>35</sup> PI Decision ¶7 (\"The Whistleblower Movement, NFSC, ROLF, GSeries, and Himalaya serve the purposes of the Debtor, serve as business vehicles for the Debtor, and their members are personally loyal to the Debtor.\").\n\n<sup>36</sup> This Court has found that Tsai is an associate of the Debtor and is associated with The Whistleblower Movement, NFSC, GSeries, Himalaya and/or ROLF. *See* PI Decision ¶¶ 11-15. The Court also found that Tsai actively participated in the protest campaign against the Trustee both outside of the Trustee's residence and at the entrance of Paul Hastings' office at Grand Central Terminal in New York, which were enjoined by this Court pursuant to the Court's *Order Granting In Part Motion for Preliminary Injunction* (Adv. Pro. No. 22- 05032, Jan. 11, 2023) [Docket No. 129] (the \"PAX PI Order\"). Tsai also appeared in videos reposted by the Debtor on November 16 and 18, 2022, which were designed to threaten and harass the Trustee and his family members by identifying their names and employers and making baseless and outrageous attacks and comments. *See Motion for An Order (I) Preliminarily Enjoining the Debtor from Publishing Personal Information About Certain Parties and Their Relatives Online, (II) Directing the Debtor to Remove Any Such Existing Posts, (III) Granting A Temporary Restraining Order in the Event that the Court Orders a Hearing on This Motion; and (IV) Referring the Debtor's Conduct to the US Attorney's Office for the District of Connecticut* ¶¶ 27-28 (Adv. Pro. No. 22-05032, Nov. 22, 2022) [Docket No. 3] (the \"PAX TRO Motion\").\n\n<sup>37</sup> *See* NFSCTV (@chinatruth2022), *Nicole Looks at Brother Seven*, GETTR (Apr. 12, 2023), http (last visited July 6, 2023). Contemporaneously with the filing of this Complaint, counsel for the Trustee has provided the Court with a flash-drive containing copies of each of the videos quoted in this Complaint (the \"Video Flash-Drive\"), with a translation prepared by counsel of the relevant segment of such videos. The translated copy of the video referenced in this footnote is included in the Video Flash-Drive and is incorporated as **Exhibit 12** hereto.\n\n<sup>38</sup> *See, e.g.*, NFSCTV (@chinatruth2022), GETTR (June 5, 2023), http (last visited July 6, 2023), identifying David Xia as the Secretary General of NFSC and Chairman of the Rule of Law Society.\n\n<sup>39</sup> This Court has found that Roy Guo is an associate of the Debtor and is associated with The Whistleblower Movement, NFSC, GSeries, Himalaya and/or ROLF. *See* PI Decision ¶¶ 11-15. The Court also found that Roy Guo actively participated in the protest campaign against the Trustee both outside of the Trustee's residence and at the entrance of Paul Hastings' office at Grand Central Terminal in New York, which were enjoined by this Court pursuant to the Court's PAX PI Order.\n\nXia while in federal custody.40 Pursuant to the phone call, the Debtor urged his followers to follow the lead of Xia.41\n\n42. During the First Video Tour, Xia and Tsai stated that the Debtor had the idea of buying a property in around 2020 and 2021; that the Debtor visited various properties in 2021; that the Debtor picked the Mahwah Mansion himself; that the Debtor decided to buy the Mahwah Mansion at the end of 2021; and that the Debtor instructed that everything related to the Mahwah Mansion be done in secrecy.42\n\n43. In sum, the Debtor decided to purchase the Mahwah Mansion on December 16, 2021, two months prior to the Debtor's voluntary filing of chapter 11 petition on February 15, 2022. He also decided to hide his purchase and equitable ownership of the Mahwah Mansion (which, unsurprisingly, is not listed on the Debtor's schedules of assets and liabilities), which would have remained hidden if not for the Criminal Indictment by the U.S. government on March 15, 2023.43\n\n<sup>40</sup> *See* NFSCTV (@chinatruth2022), *Nicole Looks at Brother Seven*, GETTR (Apr. 17, 2023), http (last visited July 6, 2023) at 45:48-46:05 (video containing the Debtor's alleged phone call to his business associates where the Debtor asked his followers to \"follow the arrangement of Changdao Brother\") (Changdao Brother is Xia's nickname). The translated copy of the video referenced in this footnote is included in the Video Flash-Drive and is incorporated as **Exhibit 13** hereto.\n\n<sup>41</sup> *Id*.\n\n<sup>42</sup> *See* Ex. 12, First Video Tour, http (last visited July 6, 2023) [video showing Xia and Tsai touring the Mahwah Mansion ], *e.g.*, at 2:10-2:20, 3:40-3:50, 6:25-6:30, 10:00-10:25, 14:20-14:25, 26:30-26:45, 28:55-29:40, 31:30-31:50, 32:41-33:48.\n\n<sup>43</sup> The Trustee and the Department of Justice are working on a stipulation to resolve their potential competing claims to the proceeds of an eventual sale of the Mahwah Mansion (*i.e.*, whether the proceeds should be distributed to victims/creditors through the chapter 11 process or pursuant to the forfeiture process in connection with the criminal charges against the Debtor). The Trustee expects to present a stipulation to the Court in the near future.\n\n#### **B. Debtor Financed Purchase of and Renovation to Mahwah Mansion**\n\n44. Despite Taurus Fund's nominal title to the Mahwah Mansion, the Debtor directed and was personally involved in the purchase of and renovations to the mansion, using money that was under his control. Specifically, according to the Criminal Indictment, the Debtor \"used fraudulently-obtained victim money to purchase, fund, or finance a \\$26.5 million purchase of [the Mahwah Mansion] for [the Debtor] and his family.\"44\n\n45. The Criminal Indictment also explained that the funds used to purchase the Mahwah Mansion were funneled through other shell companies. Specifically, in or around November 2022, shortly before the Debtor's voluntary chapter 11 filing, the Debtor, acting through his co-defendant and alleged co-conspirator, William Je (\"Je\"),45 directed the funneling of funds from G Club Operations, LLC (\"G-Club\") through bank accounts in other entities' names toward the purchase of the Mahwah Mansion46 for the use and benefit of the Debtor, his wife (Hing Chi Ngok), his daughter (Mei Guo), and his son (Qiang Guo).<sup>47</sup>\n\n46. Based on the Trustee's investigation, Je, referred to by Mei Guo as \"uncle William,\" and who is currently on the run from law enforcement, is a trusted family friend and\n\n<sup>44</sup> *See* Ex. 11, Criminal Indictment ¶ 4; *see also* Ex. 14, Order Denying Kwok's Motion for Release Pending Trial, at 3, *United States v. Kwok*, 23 Cr. 118-1 (AT) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2023) [Docket No. No. 51] (noting that \"[t]he majority of funds raised through the membership organization were used to pay [the Debtor's] and his family's personal expenses, and purchase high-priced goods and real property, such as [the Debtor's] mansion in New Jersey.\"\n\n<sup>45</sup> The Government believes that William Je remains at large and is believed to be in the UAE. *See Memorandum of Law of the United States of America in Opposition to Defendant Yanping Wang's Motion for Pretrial Release* (the \"USAO Memorandum\"), at 4, attached as Exhibit B in the *Reply of Chapter 11 Trustee to G Club Operations LLC's Supplemental Objection to Trustee's Motion to Compel and Request for Related Relief* (the \"G-Club Reply\") (June 23, 2023) [Main Case Docket No. 1934].\n\n<sup>46</sup> Ex. 11, Criminal Indictment ¶ 15b.\n\n<sup>47</sup> *See* Ex. 15, Complaint ¶ 104(b), *S.E.C. v. Kwok*, 23 Civ. 2200 (PGG) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2023) [Docket No.1] (\"SEC Complaint\").\n\nfinancial advisor of the Debtor. Je has been closely involved with the Debtor's real estate purchases, previously having been involved in the consideration of multiple potential property purchases by the Debtor. Je also arranged, under the Debtor's instructions, a transfer of \\$37 million to be held in escrow as a purported \"loan\" to cover the cost of the Lady May. As this Court has already found, both the Lady May and the \\$37 million escrow funds constituted and constitute, as applicable, property of the Debtor's chapter 11 estate [Adv. P. No. 22-05003, ECF No. 221].\n\n47. The Debtor not only funded the purchase of the Mahwah Mansion, he also funded significant improvements to the property. Between December 2021 and March 2022, he arranged for an additional \\$13 million to be transferred to an escrow account to pay for extravagant furnishings for, and renovations to, the Mahwah Mansion. These extensive expenditures include a wing for his son and daughter each, as well as various furniture and decorative items, such as Chinese and Persian rugs worth approximately \\$978,000, a \\$62,000 television, a \\$53,000 fireplace log cradle holder, a \\$59,000 watch storage box, and a \\$35,000 mattress.48\n\n48. In the First Video Tour, while touring the dining room of the Mahwah Mansion, Tsai commented on the various delicate pieces of Chinese calligraphy and paintings, which were \"selected by Mr. Kwok himself.\"49 Xia particularly emphasized that there are many pieces of important antiques in the Mahwah Mansion, which were purportedly \"donated by [the Debtor's]\n\n<sup>48</sup> *See* Ex. 15, SEC Complaint ¶ 104(c). *See also* Ex. 11, Criminal Indictment ¶ 15(c).\n\n<sup>49</sup> *See* Ex. 12, First Video Tour, at 26:00-26:20.\n\nfamily fund,\"50 that these antiques are \"worth way more than the house itself,\"51 and that only the Debtor knows and is able to tell the story behind each antique.52 Upon information and belief, any funds from the Debtor's family fund are the Debtor's funds.\n\n49. These statements were repeated in another video tour of the Mahwah Mansion, given by Xia and Tsai on April 15, 2023 (the \"Second Video Tour,\" and together with the First Video Tour, the \"Video Tours\").53\n\n## **C. Debtor Resides at Mahwah Mansion**\n\n50. Together with his apartment at the Sherry-Netherland Hotel and his residence in Greenwich, Connecticut, the Mahwah Mansion is one of at least three luxury residences owned by the Debtor in the United States.54\n\n51. During the search of the Mahwah Mansion, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (the \"FBI\") found a number of the Debtor's personal effects, including (i) prescription medication in his name,55 (ii) an international driving permit and New York's learner's permit, both issued to the Debtor,56 (iii) family pictures,57 (iv) a certificate of authenticity for a Ferrari\n\n<sup>50</sup> *Id.*, at 33:08-33:25.\n\n<sup>51</sup> *Id*., at 33:25-33:29, 33:48-33:56.\n\n<sup>52</sup> *Id.*, at 33:29-33:33.\n\n<sup>53</sup> *See* NFSCTV (@chinatruth2022), *Nicole Looks at Brother Seven*, GETTR (Apr. 15, 2023), http (last visited July 6, 2023), *e.g*., at 21:55-22:20, 33:05-33:30, 35:20- 35:35, 40:00-40:23. The translated copy of the video referenced in this footnote is included in the Video Flash-Drive and is incorporated as **Exhibit 16** hereto.\n\n<sup>54</sup> *See* Ex. 17, USA Response in Opposition as to Wang's Motion for Bond, at 3, *United States v. Yanping Wang,* 23 Mag. 2007 (UA) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2023 [Docket No. 10].\n\n<sup>55</sup> A picture taken by law enforcement of the medication (with personally identifiable information redacted) is attached as **Exhibit 18** hereto.\n\n<sup>56</sup> A picture taken by law enforcement of the driver's license (with personally identifiable information redacted) is attached as **Exhibit 19** hereto.\n\n<sup>57</sup> A picture taken by law enforcement of these family pictures is attached as **Exhibit 20** hereto.\n\nautomobile, addressed to the Debtor,58 and (iv) in what appears to be the Debtor's personal dressing room, \"approximately 30 Brioni custom-made suits, each of which bore the handstitched words 'Brioni for Miles Kwok' inside the jackets,\" 59\n\n52. Besides personal items and luxury furniture and goods, the FBI also found inside the mansion a safe, located in a closet that was attached to what appears to be the Debtor's personal dressing room, containing \"approximately \\$394,000, €5000, HK\\$188,050, and [RMB] 250 in cash, and approximately 156 gold coins (alongside a receipt, which indicated that the coins were valued at approximately \\$109,555).\"60\n\n53. The FBI also recovered from the Mahwah Mansion evidence of the Debtor's foreign travel documents, including a copy of the Debtor's expired United Arab Emirates passport, as well as 10 computers or laptops, 16 external media storage devices (USB and hard drives), nine cellphones and a cell scrambler,61 which the Debtor uses.62\n\n54. Prior to the Debtor's arrest on March 15, 2023, the Debtor had frequently conducted live streaming on social media platforms, including Gettr, from the Mahwah Mansion. Between January 11, 2023 and February 19, 2023, the Debtor held at least 11 live broadcast\n\n<sup>58</sup> A picture taken by law enforcement of the certificate is attached as **Exhibit 21** hereto.\n\n<sup>59</sup> *See* Ex. 22, USA Letter in Opposition to Brief in Support of Pretrial Release by Kwok, at 3, *United States v. Kwok*, S1 23 Cr. 118 (AT) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2023) [Docket No. 26]. A picture taken by law enforcement of these custom suits is attached as **Exhibit 23** hereto.\n\n<sup>60</sup> Ex. 17, *id.*\n\n<sup>61</sup> Ex. 17, *id*. (noting in footnote 2 that a cellphone scrambler is an external device that attaches to a cellphone and is designed to defeat government wiretaps and other eavesdropping technologies by converting voice into noninterpretable analog noises for transmission over the phone network).\n\n<sup>62</sup> Ex. 17, *id.*, at 14 (\"The defendant uses dozens of different cellphones and cellphone scramblers\").\n\nsessions using his personal account at Gettr, @milesguo, in the Mahwah Mansion on January 11,63 15, 64 22,65 23,66 and 29,67 and on February 1,68 8,69 12,70 15,71 16,72 and 19.73\n\n#### **D. Debtor Made Mahwah Mansion Available to His Associates**\n\n55. Upon information and belief, in April 2023, following the Debtor's arrest and the disclosure of the Mahwah Mansion in the Criminal Indictment, in an effort to continue to shield valuable assets from his creditors, the Debtor directed his associates to claim the Mahwah Mansion as the new base of the NFSC.\n\n56. On April 9, 2023, the NFSC held an event at the Mahwah Mansion, during which allegedly 500 followers went into the mansion and livestreamed their speeches on various internet platforms, including Gettr.74\n\n63 *See* GNews (@milesguo), GETTR (Jan. 11, 2023), http\n\n<sup>64</sup> *See* GNews (@milesguo), GETTR (Jan. 15, 2023), http\n\n<sup>65</sup> *See* GNews (@milesguo), GETTR (Jan. 22, 2023), http\n\n<sup>66</sup> *See* GNews (@milesguo), GETTR (Jan. 23, 2023), http\n\n<sup>67</sup> *See* GNews (@milesguo), GETTR (Jan. 29, 2023), http\n\n<sup>68</sup> *See* GNews (@milesguo), GETTR (Feb. 1, 2023), http\n\n<sup>69</sup> *See* GNews (@milesguo), GETTR (Feb. 8, 2023), http\n\n<sup>70</sup> *See* GNews (@milesguo), GETTR (Feb. 12, 2023), http\n\n<sup>71</sup> *See* GNews (@milesguo), GETTR (Feb. 15, 2023),http\n\n<sup>72</sup> *See* GNews (@milesguo), GETTR (Feb. 16, 2023), http\n\n<sup>73</sup> *See* GNews (@milesguo), GETTR (Feb. 19, 2023), http\n\n<sup>74</sup> *See* NFSCTV (@chinatruth2022), GETTR (Apr. 9, 2023), http (last visited July 6, 2023) (full livestreaming video of approximately 3.5 hours showing followers lining up to enter the Mahwah Mansion and making speeches in the mansion).\n\n57. As the Court previously found, NFSC and Gettr \"serve the purposes of the Debtor, serve as business vehicles for the Debtor, and their members are personally loyal to the Debtor.\"75\n\n58. Videos were also posted on the NFSC official homepage, showing followers\n\nentering and giving speeches in the Mahwah Mansion.76 In particular, the videos include\n\ncaptions transcribing statements of the NFSC followers after seeing the mansion, including that\n\n\"*[the Debtor] has prepared a base for the NFSC members*,\"77 that \"*everything [the Debtor] has*\n\n*prepared for the fellow fighters [at the Mahwah Mansion] is the best*,\"78 and that they wanted\n\nto \"*leave their marks in the room where [the Debtor] used to live broadcast.*\"79\n\n59. Since April 9, 2023, Xia and other NFSC members have begun to conduct their\n\naffairs from an office in the Mahwah Mansion.80\n\n77 *Id.*\n\n<sup>75</sup> PI Decision ¶ 7 (\"The Whistleblower Movement, NFSC, ROLF, GSeries, and Himalaya serve the purposes of the Debtor, serve as business vehicles for the Debtor, and their members are personally loyal to the Debtor.\").\n\n<sup>76</sup> *See NFSC Fellow Fighter Feels that the Air at the NFSC Base is Sweet,* NEW FEDERAL STATE OF CHINA (Apr. 12, 2023), http (last visited July 6, 2023) (including livestream videos of followers entering the Mahwah Mansion on April 9, 2023).\n\n<sup>78</sup> *See Everything Mr. Miles Guo has Prepared for the Fellow Fighters in the NFSC Base is the Best*, NEW FEDERAL STATE OF CHINA (Apr. 19, 2023), http (last visited July 6, 2023) (video showing followers making speech inside the Mahwah Mansion and title of the video is \"Everything Mr. Miles Guo Has Prepared For the Follow Fighters In the NFSC Base Is The Best\").\n\n<sup>79</sup> *See Fellow Fighters are Excited to Leave their Footprints on the Base of the NFSC*, NEW FEDERAL STATE OF CHINA (Apr. 16, 2023), http (last visited July 6, 2023) (video showing followers making speech in the Mahwah Mansion with the caption stating that followers \"think the mansion is very luxurious.\").\n\n<sup>80</sup> *See* Ex. 16, Second Video Tour, at 2:05-2:30 (showing Xia sitting in the Mahwah Mansion office).\n\n60. On April 12, 2023, in the First Video Tour,81 Xia noted that the Mahwah Mansion was also designated by the Debtor to be a premium lounge for G-Club members and place to hold conferences for various Himalaya organizations and the Farms.82\n\n61. As this Court knows, the G-Club and Himalaya are entities that (like the NFSC) \"serve the purposes of the Debtor, serve as business vehicles for the Debtor, and their members are personally loyal to the Debtor.\"83\n\n62. As noted above, on April 17, 2023, in a livestreaming on Gettr by the Debtor's associates, Tsai, Roy Guo, and Xia (currently the Secretary General of the NFSC and Chairman of the Rule of Law Society), the Debtor allegedly made a 15-minute phone call to Xia while in federal custody.84 Pursuant to the phone call, the Debtor urged his followers to follow the lead of Xia.85\n\n63. Upon information and belief, the Debtor directed Xia to take residence at the Mahwah Mansion in an attempt to maintain control of it, while continuing to shield valuable assets from his creditors.\n\n<sup>81</sup> *See* Ex. 12, First Video Tour, at 6:35-7:00.\n\n<sup>82</sup> The Trustee is aware of no evidence that this was anything more than empty promises, consistent with the other GClub promises the Debtor employed as part of the fraud alleged against him.\n\n<sup>83</sup> PI Decision ¶ 7 (\"The Whistleblower Movement, NFSC, ROLF, GSeries, and Himalaya serve the purposes of the Debtor, serve as business vehicles for the Debtor, and their members are personally loyal to the Debtor.\").\n\n<sup>84</sup> *See* Ex 13, NFSCTV (@chinatruth2022), *Nicole Looks at Brother Seven*, GETTR (Apr. 17, 2023), http (last visited July 6, 2023) at 45:48-46:05 (video containing the Debtor's alleged phone call to his business associates where the Debtor says \"follow the arrangement of Changdao Brother\") (Changdao Brother is Xia's nickname).\n\n<sup>85</sup> *Id*.\n\n64. On May 5, 2023, Xia led a small group of the Debtor's associates to meet with\n\nU.S. Rep. George Santos86 at the Mahwah Mansion, which was livestreamed on Gettr.87\n\n65. On May 19, 2023, in relation to a lawsuit *SEC v. Mountains of Spices et al*.,\n\ncounsel for Mountains of Spices (\"MOS\"), William J. Quinlan, filed a letter, confirming, among other things, that Xia has resided at the Mahwah Mansion because he and others have been removed by the Government from NFSC's former offices.88\n\n66. On June 4, 2023, the NFSC held a gathering of more 100 guests at the Mahwah Mansion to celebrate its third anniversary, with more than 10 leaders of various Himalaya Farms present.89 The event was livestreamed on Gettr. As this Court has found, Himalaya Farms are affiliated Himalaya entities, which are controlled by the Debtor.90 One farm leader commented\n\n<sup>86</sup> Eleven days later, on May 16, 2023, Rep. Santos spoke on the floor of the House characterizing the Debtor as a \"harmless political target\" and calling on (among others) the DOJ to \"free Miles Guo.\" *See* http (last visited July 6, 2023).\n\n<sup>87</sup> *See, e.g.*, NFSCTV (@chinatruth2022), GETTR (May 5, 2023), http (last visited July 6, 2023) (showing the livestreaming of George Santos' visit to the Mahwah Mansion); *see also* NFSCTV (@chinatruth2022), GETTR (May 5, 2023), http (last visited July 6, 2023) (cover photo of the video shows Xia and Santos in the hall of Mahwah Mansion); *Congressman George Santos, visited the homebase of the New Federal State of China*, GNEWS (May 5, 2023 15:02:28), http (article posted by Gnews discussing Santos visit to the Mahwah Mansion)..\n\n<sup>88</sup> *See* Ex. 24. MOS Letter in Response to DOJ's Objection to Lift Stay on MOS, at 2, *S.E.C. v. Mountains of Spices,* No. 1:23-cv-02200-PGG (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2023) [Docket No. 49] (\"Whether the 'leader of MOS' has streamed videos in a New Jersey residence is not relevant, and, regardless, he has only resided there because, on information and belief, the Government had a receiver appointed that removed the movement from its prior offices.\").\n\n<sup>89</sup> *See* NFSCTV (@chinatruth2022), GETTR (June 4, 2023), http (last visited July 6, 2023) (full streaming of the NFSC event at the Mahwah Mansion).\n\n<sup>90</sup> PI Decision ¶¶ 4, 7 (\"NFSC is associated, affiliated, and/or connected with the Himalaya Global Alliance (together with affiliated Himalaya entities, such as Himalaya Exchange and Himalaya Farms, 'Himalaya')) (\"The Debtor is the leader of The Whistleblower Movement, NFSC, ROLF, and Himalaya. The Whistleblower Movement, NFSC, ROLF, and Himalaya serve the purposes of the Debtor, serve as business vehicles for the Debtor, and their members are personally loyal to the Debtor\").\n\non the lavishness of the Mahwah Mansion, stating that \"what [the Debtor] has arranged for us is purely touching.\"91\n\n67. Abundant evidence demonstrates that, despite being nominally owned by Taurus Fund, even since his arrest the Debtor continues to utilize the Mahwah Mansion for his own benefit, including by making it available for the NFSC, G-Club and Himalaya, which the Court has already determined are used by the Debtor for his own purposes.\n\n## **First Claim**\n\n# **(Declaratory Judgment that Debtor Is Equitable Owner of Mahwah Mansion and Ordering Turnover of Mahwah Mansion and Fixtures and Personal Property in Mahwah Mansion to Trustee)**\n\n68. The Trustee repeats and realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-67.\n\n69. New Jersey law applies to the equitable ownership claim, because the Mahwah\n\nMansion is located in New Jersey.92\n\n70. Courts have found that a debtor had an equitable interest in property upon one or more of the following grounds: (1) the debtor's funds were used to acquire the property; (2) the debtor represented that he had an interest in the property or used the property to obtain credit; or (3) they involved property that was once owned by the debtor and then transferred to a third party (usually in the face of creditor pressure).93 A court applying New Jersey's equitable\n\nownership law has also found a debtor to be the equitable owner of property based on the\n\n<sup>91</sup> *See* NFSCTC (@chinatruth2022), GETTR (June 4, 2023), http at 5:19:10 – 5:19:50 (last visited July 6, 2023) (full streaming of the NFSC event at the Mahwah Mansion).\n\n<sup>92</sup> *See Kartzman v. Beiman (In re Beiman)*, No. 15-10488 (JKS), 2018 WL 6978705, \\*3 (Bankr. D. N. J. Mar.19, 2018) (providing that in bankruptcy cases, state law generally determines what interest, if any, a debtor has in property) (citing *O'Dowd v. Trueger (In re O'Dowd)*, 233 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 2000); *see also Butner v. United States*, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (noting that property interests are created and defined by state law).\n\n<sup>93</sup> *In re Beiman*, at \\*4 (Bankr. D. N. J. Mar.19, 2018).\n\npatterns and practices of the debtor's fraudulent behaviors, where the debtor, funding the purchase of properties, placed title to the properties in the name of third parties while maintaining *de facto* control and ownership.94\n\n71. As detailed above, the Mahwah Mansion is equitably owned by the Debtor. Among other things, the Debtor financed the purchase of and renovations to the Mahwah Mansion, resided there, and held it in a shell company managed by his chauffeur and/or bodyguard. Public record also shows that the Debtor's address is at the Mahwah Mansion. Even after his arrest and incarceration, the Debtor has continued to benefit from the property by using it as a base of operations for the NFSC, which, as the Court has already found, is under the Debtor's control. Moreover, it is consistent with the Debtor's pattern and practice to have a shell company purchase and hold title to the Debtor's luxury residences, including without limitation, his apartment at the Sherry-Netherland and his residence in Greenwich, Connecticut.\n\n72. To the extent Taurus Fund held title to the Mahwah Mansion, it did so in name only, with the Debtor acting at all times as the mansion's true beneficial owner.\n\n73. Because the Mahwah Mansion was equitably owned by the Debtor, it is property of the Debtor's chapter 11 estate.95 Based on these facts and circumstances, the Trustee seeks a ruling pursuant to sections 541, 542, and 544 of the Bankruptcy Code (i) declaring that the Mahwah Mansion constitutes property of the Debtor's chapter 11 estate to be administered by\n\n<sup>94</sup> *In re NJ Affordable Homes Corp.*, No. 05-60442 (DHS), 2006 WL 2128624, \\*8 (Bankr. D.N.J. June 29, 2006) (holding that the mere fact that title to a property is in the name of a third party does not mean that the debtor does not have an equitable interest in the property, however speculative that interest may be, to make it property of the bankruptcy estate).\n\n<sup>95</sup> To the extent that the Porsche Piano is not currently in the Mahwah Mansion, the Trustee requests its turnover wherever it may be.\n\nthe Trustee and (ii) ordering Taurus Fund (and/or Scott Barnett and Taurus Management, as trustees of Taurus Fund) to surrender the Mahwah Mansion and the fixtures and personal property in the Mahwah Mansion to the Trustee.\n\n## **Second Claim**\n\n# **(Declaratory Judgment that Debtor is Equitable Owner of Taurus Fund and Ordering Turnover of Taurus Fund and Its Assets to Trustee)**\n\n74. The Trustee repeats and realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-67.\n\n75. Nevada law applies to the equitable ownership claim because Taurus fund is a\n\nNevada entity.96\n\n76. A court applying Nevada's equitable ownership analysis to the Debtor's\n\nrelationship to Taurus Fund will focus on (1) whether the Debtor has active or substantial control\n\nof Taurus Fund, and (2) whether the Debtor is using and receiving benefits of Taurus Fund's\n\nassets.97\n\n77. The Debtor is the equitable owner of Taurus Fund. First, the Debtor has active\n\nand substantial control over Taurus Fund, because, among other reasons:\n\n- a. Taurus Fund was managed by the Debtor's chauffeur and/or bodyguard and another shell company under the Debtor's control;\n- b. Taurus Fund has not followed any corporate formalities, including compliance with the business organization disclosure and registration laws of Nevada and New Jersey;\n- c. Taurus Fund's purchase of the Mahwah Mansion, was funded by money controlled by the Debtor; and\n\n<sup>96</sup> *See United States v. 74.05 Acres*, 428 F. Supp. 2d 57, 61 (D. Conn. 2006) (\"Ownership interests are defined by the law of the State in which the interest arose.\").\n\n<sup>97</sup> *See In re Twin Lakes Vill., Inc.*, 2 B.R. 532 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1980).\n\nd. The Porsche Piano owned by Taurus Fund was located in the offices of the GSeries entities, which, as this Court has found, were controlled by the Debtor.\n\n78. Second, the Debtor uses Taurus Fund's asset—the Mahwah Mansion—as his residence, public record lists the Mahwah Mansion as the Debtor's address, and Taurus Fund uses money funded and controlled by the Debtor to pay the Debtor's expenses in connection with such residence, including for construction and maintenance.\n\n79. Because Taurus Fund was equitably owned by the Debtor (prior to the revocation of its charter under Nevada law), the ownership and corporate control rights over Taurus Fund and the assets of Taurus Fund were, following the Petition Date, property of the Debtor's chapter 11 estate.\n\n80. Accordingly, the Trustee seeks a ruling pursuant to section 541, 542, and 544 of the Bankruptcy Code, (1) declaring that: (a) at all times the Debtor has been the equitable owner of Taurus Fund; (b) any and all assets held by Taurus Fund at any time prior to the Debtor's petition date of February 15, 2022 constituted property of the Debtor; and (c) any and all assets held by Taurus Fund at any time from the date of the Debtor's February 15, 2022 chapter 11 petition to the present constituted and constitute, as applicable, property of the Debtor's chapter 11 estate; and (2) ordering the turnover of Taurus Fund and any and all of Taurus Fund's assets to the Trustee.\n\n#### **Third Claim**\n\n# **(Declaratory Judgment, in the Alternative, that Taurus Fund is Debtor's Alter Ego and Ordering Turnover of Taurus Fund and Its Assets to Trustee)**\n\n81. The Trustee repeats and realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-67.\n\n82. Nevada law applies to the alter ego/veil piercing claim because Taurus Fund is a Nevada entity.98\n\n83. Under Nevada law, a court applying Nevada's alter ego analysis to the Debtor's relationship to Taurus Fund will focus on: (1) whether Taurus Fund is influenced and governed by the Debtor; (2) whether there is a unity of interest and ownership that Taurus Fund is inseparable from the Debtor; and (3) whether adherence to the corporate fiction of a separate entity would, under the circumstances, sanction fraud or promote injustice.99 Factors that may indicate an alter-ego relationship include: (1) commingling of funds: (2) undercapitalization; (3) unauthorized diversion of funds; (4) treatment of corporate assets as the individual's own; and (5) failure to observe corporate formalities.100\n\n84. The Debtor had influence and exercised control over Taurus Fund such that Taurus Fund had no independent existence from the Debtor, and the Debtor used Taurus Fund's corporate form to perpetrate a fraud and injustice. Taurus Fund is an alter ego of the Debtor, because, among other reasons:\n\n- a. Taurus Fund was managed by the Debtor's chauffeur and/or bodyguard and another shell company under the Debtor's control;\n- b. Taurus Fund has not followed any corporate formalities, including compliance with the business organization disclosure and registration laws of Nevada and New Jersey;\n\n<sup>98</sup> *See Hyundai-Wia Mach. Am. Corp. v. Rouette (In re Rouette)*, 564 B.R. 157, 174 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2017) (\"In the absence of an overriding federal interest or policy, federal courts look to the law of the state of incorporation to determine whether to pierce a corporation's veil.\") (citing *In re Carterhouse, Inc*., 94 B.R. 271, 276 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1988).\n\n<sup>99</sup> *See Bermuda Rd. Properties, LLC v. EcoLogical Steel Sys., Inc.*, No. 2:12–cv–01579–JAD–GWF, 2017 WL 797092, \\*3 (D. Nev. Mar. 1, 2017) (citing *LFC Mktg. Grp., Inc. v. Loomis*, 8 P.3d 841, 845 (Nev. 2000) and *Polaris Indust. Corp v. Kaplan*, 747 P.2d 884, 886 (Nev. 1987)).\n\n<sup>100</sup> *Id*.\n\n- c. Taurus Fund's purchase of the Mahwah Mansion was funded by money controlled by the Debtor;\n- d. The Debtor uses the Mahwah Mansion as his residence, and Taurus Fund uses money funded and controlled by the Debtor to pay the Debtor's expenses in connection with such residence, including for construction and maintenance; and\n- e. The Porsche Piano owned by Taurus Fund was located in the offices of the GSeries entities, which this Court has found were controlled by the Debtor.\n\n85. The Debtor has wrongfully and unjustly used his alter ego control over Taurus Fund to, among other things, cause Taurus Fund to hold assets for the Debtor's use and benefit, while purporting to keep such assets outside the reach of the Debtor's creditors, enabling the Debtor to live a life of luxury without paying his debts.\n\n86. At all relevant times, the Debtor was indebted to one or more creditors. Such creditors could have pursued the relief sought herein by the Trustee in exercise of such creditors' rights.\n\n87. Accordingly, the Trustee seeks a ruling pursuant to sections 541, 542, and 544 of the Bankruptcy Code, (1) declaring that: (a) at all times Taurus Fund was an alter ego of the Debtor; (b) any and all assets held by Taurus Fund at any time prior to the Debtor's petition date of February 15, 2022 constituted property of the Debtor; and (c) any and all assets held by Taurus Fund at any time from the date of the Debtor's February 15, 2022 chapter 11 petition to the present constituted and constitute, as applicable, property of the Debtor's chapter 11 estate; and (2) ordering the turnover of any and all of Taurus Fund's assets to the Trustee.\n\n#### **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**\n\nWHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the Trustee respectfully requests that judgment be entered as follows:\n\n1. On the First Claim, an order, pursuant to sections 541, 542, and 544 of the\n\nBankruptcy Code (1) declaring that: (a) the Debtor is the equitable owner of the Mahwah Mansion, and (b) that the Mahwah Mansion is property of the Debtor's chapter 11 estate to be administered by the Trustee; and (2) ordering Taurus Fund (and/or Scott Barnett and Taurus Management, as trustees of Taurus Fund) to turn over the Mahwah Mansion or its value and the fixtures and personal property in the Mahwah Mansion to the Trustee;\n\n2. On the Second Claim, an order, pursuant to sections 541, 542, and 544 of the Bankruptcy Code (1) declaring that: (a) at all times the Debtor is the equitable owner of Taurus Fund; (b) any and all assets held by Taurus Fund at any time prior to the Debtor's petition date of February 15, 2022 constituted property of the Debtor; and (c) any and all assets held by Taurus Fund at any time from the date of the Debtor's February 15, 2022 chapter 11 petition to the present constituted and constitute, as applicable, property of the Debtor's chapter 11 estate; and (2) ordering the turnover of Taurus Fund and any and all of Taurus Fund's assets to the Trustee.\n\n3. On the Third Claim, an order, pursuant to sections 541, 542, and 544 of the Bankruptcy Code, (1) declaring that: (a) at all times Taurus Fund was an alter ego of the Debtor; (b) any and all assets held by Taurus Fund at any time prior to the Debtor's petition date of February 15, 2022 constituted property of the Debtor; and (c) any and all assets held by Taurus Fund at any time from the date of the Debtor's February 15, 2022 chapter 11 petition to the present constituted and constitute, as applicable, property of the Debtor's chapter 11 estate; and (2) ordering the turnover of any and all of Taurus Fund's assets to the Trustee.\n\n4. Reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses incurred in this action; and\n\n5. Such other and further relief as the Court may deem just, proper, or equitable under the circumstances.\n\n[*Remainder of page intentionally left blank.*]\n\nDated: July 11, 2023 New York, New York LUC A. DESPINS CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE\n\nBy: /*s*/ *Douglass Barron*\n\nAvram E. Luft (admitted *pro hac vice*) Douglass Barron (admitted *pro hac vice*) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6000 aviluft@paulhastings.com douglassbarron@paulhastings.com\n\n*and*\n\nNicholas A. Bassett (admitted *pro hac vice*) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 551-1902 nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n*and*\n\nDouglas S. Skalka (ct00616) Patrick R. Linsey (ct29437) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 781-2847 dskalka@npmlaw.com plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n*Counsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee*\n\n# **Exhibit 2**\n\n# **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK**\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\n\n-against-\n\nHO WAN KWOK,\n\nCase No. 1:23-CR-118-1 (AT)\n\nDefendant.\n\n**ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED**\n\n# **RESPONSE OF CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE AND GENEVER DEBTORS IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT HO WAN KWOK'S MOTION FOR AN ORDER AND WRIT STAYING BANKRUPTCY CASES OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR OTHER RELIEF**\n\nLuc A. Despins Adam J. Fee G. Alexander Bongartz PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6000 lucdespins@paulhastings.com adamfee@paulhastings.com alexbongartz@paulhastings.com\n\n *and*\n\nNicholas A. Bassett PAUL HASTINGS LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C., 20036 (202) 551-1902 nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n*Counsel for Luc A. Despins, as Chapter 11 Trustee, Genever Holdings Corporation, and Genever Holdings LLC*\n\n# **TABLE OF CONTENTS**\n\n# **Page**\n\n|      |                            |    |      | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  1                                                                                   |  |\n|------|----------------------------|----|------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|\n|      |                            |    |      | FACTUAL BACKGROUND  7                                                                                      |  |\n| I.   |                            |    |      | Bankruptcy Cases 7                                                                                         |  |\n| II.  | Trustee's Investigation  8 |    |      |                                                                                                            |  |\n| III. |                            |    |      | Mahwah Adversary Proceeding  9                                                                             |  |\n|      |                            |    |      | ARGUMENT  11                                                                                               |  |\n|      | I.                         |    |      | Bankruptcy Court Is Proper Forum to Decide Stay Motion  11                                                 |  |\n|      | II.                        |    |      | Stay Motion Fails on Its Merits  15                                                                        |  |\n|      |                            | A. |      | Applicable Legal Standard for Stay Request  16                                                             |  |\n|      |                            |    | i.   | Balancing Test  16                                                                                         |  |\n|      |                            |    | ii.  | Other Considerations  17                                                                                   |  |\n|      |                            | B. |      | Debtor Has Not Satisfied Burden for Obtaining Requested<br>Stay  18                                        |  |\n|      |                            |    | i.   | Factor 1: Limited Overlap Between Bankruptcy<br>Cases and Criminal Case  18                                |  |\n|      |                            |    | ii.  | Factor 3: Global Stay of Bankruptcy Cases Would<br>Unduly Prejudice Thousands of Creditors  19             |  |\n|      |                            |    | iii. | Factor 4: Allowing Bankruptcy Cases to Proceed<br>Does Not Prejudice Debtor  22                            |  |\n|      |                            |    | iv.  | Factor 5: Interests of the Bankruptcy Court Weigh<br>Against Stay of Bankruptcy Cases  28                  |  |\n|      |                            |    | v.   | Factor 6: Public Interests Weighs Against Stay of<br>Bankruptcy Cases 28                                   |  |\n|      | III.                       |    |      | Respondents Do Not Object to Categories (i), (ii), and (iv) of<br>Debtor's Proposed Alternative Relief  29 |  |\n|      | IV.                        |    |      | Court Should Deny Ms. Wang's Request for Global Stay of<br>Bankruptcy Cases 30                             |  |\n|      |                            |    |      | CONCLUSION  30                                                                                             |  |\n\n# **TABLE OF AUTHORITIES**\n\n# **Cases**\n\n| An v. Despins,<br>22-cv-10062 (VEC) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2023) [Docket No. 29] 2                                             |\n|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| In re Atlas,<br>183 B.R. 978 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995) 13                                                                   |\n| In re Baldwin-United Corp.,<br>770 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1985)14                                                              |\n| In re Bame,<br>251 B.R. 367 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2000) 23, 24                                                                 |\n| Bernard v. Lombardo,<br>No. 16 CV. 863, 2017 WL 2984022 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2017) 16, 19                                    |\n| Citibank, N.A. v. Super Sayin' Publ'n, LLC,<br>86 F. Supp. 3d 244 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) 14, 15, 16                              |\n| Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub,<br>471 U.S. 343 (1985) 23                                                  |\n| Eastern Profit Corp. Ltd. v. Strategic Vision US LLC,<br>No. 18-CV-2185 (LJL), 2021 WL 2554631 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2021) 2 |\n| Erti v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc. (In re Baldwin-United Corp. Litig.),<br>765 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1985)13, 14     |\n| Gong v. Sarnoff,<br>23-cv-343 (LJL) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2023) [Docket No. 72] 3                                            |\n| Gran Sabana Corp. N.V. v. Kossoff,<br>No. 21-CV-3154 (RA), 2021 WL 3666116 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2021) 16, 17                |\n| Karimona Invs., LLC v. Weinreb,<br>No. 02CV1792WHPTHK, 2003 WL 941404 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2003) 14                          |\n| Layng v. Garcia (In re Garcia),<br>569 B.R. 480 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2017) 28                                                |\n| Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc.,<br>676 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2012)15, 16, 17, 27                                 |\n\n| Mango Labs, LLC v. Eisenberg,<br>No. 23-CV-00665 (LJL), 2023 WL 3510908 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2023) 14                        |\n|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| Nat'l Coal. on Black Civic Participation v. Wohl,<br>No. 20 CIV. 8668 (VM), 2021 WL 694557 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2021) 14, 16 |\n| PAX v. Kwok,<br>Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 2022) [Docket No. 1181] 1, 2                                  |\n| In re Randolph Hosp., Inc.,<br>No. 20-10247, 2022 WL 19298765 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2022) 21                           |\n| S.E.C. v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd.,<br>93 F. Supp. 2d 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 11, 12                                               |\n| In re Sturman,<br>No. 10 CIV. 6725 RJS, 2011 WL 4472412 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2011) 12                                       |\n| In re U.S. Lines Inc.,<br>262 B.R. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 21                                                                  |\n| United States v. LaRouche Campaign,<br>682 F. Supp. 627 (D. Mass. 1987) 3, 11, 13                                          |\n| United States v. Simon,<br>373 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1967)11, 18                                                               |\n| In re Walnut Hill, Inc.,<br>No. 16-20960 (JJT), 2018 WL 2672242 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 1, 2018) 21                          |\n| Statutes                                                                                                                   |\n| 11 U.S.C. §§ 108(a)(2); 546(a) 21                                                                                          |\n\nLuc A. Despins, in his capacity as the chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") appointed in the chapter 11 case of Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\" or \"Mr. Kwok\"), and Genever Holdings Corporation (\"Genever BVI\") and Genever Holdings LLC (\"Genever US\" and, together with the Trustee and Genever BVI, the \"Respondents\")1 hereby file this Response (the \"Response\") in opposition to (i) the Debtor's *Motion for an Order and Writ Staying Bankruptcy Cases or in the Alternative for Other Relief* [ECF No. 129] (the \"Stay Motion\") and the related memorandum of law [ECF No. 131] (the \"Memorandum of Law\") and (ii) the joinder of Yanping Wang (\"Ms. Wang\") in the Stay Motion [ECF No. 135] (the \"Joinder\").2 In support of this Response, the Respondents also submit the *Declaration of Nicholas A. Bassett in Support of Response of Chapter 11 Trustee and Genever Debtors in Opposition to Defendant Ho Wan Kwok's Motion for an Order and Writ Staying Bankruptcy Cases or in the Alternative for Other Relief* (the \"Bassett Declaration\"), filed contemporaneously herewith, and respectfully states as follows:\n\n#### **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\n1. The Debtor claims to need an unprecedented global stay of his chapter 11 case to protect his rights as a criminal defendant in this Court. But the Stay Motion in reality has very little to do with this criminal case and everything to do with the Debtor's desire to obtain all the benefits of the bankruptcy process—including the worldwide automatic stay it imposes on civil litigation against him—while bearing none of its burdens. The Debtor filed his chapter 11 case *voluntarily* in the Bankruptcy Court in February 2022 for the self-serving purpose of avoiding the enforcement of a New York state court judgment against him in excess of \\$250 million.<sup>3</sup>\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Debtor, Genever BVI, and Genever US are referred to, collectively, as the \"Debtors\".\n\n<sup>2</sup> Capitalized terms used but not defined in this Response have the meanings set forth in the Stay Motion.\n\n<sup>3</sup> Similarly, the Debtor chose to commence the chapter 11 case of Genever US, which he controlled at the time of its chapter 11 filing in October 2020.\n\nNow that his chapter 11 case has gone exceedingly poorly for the Debtor and those close to him, he is trying desperately to make it stop.\n\n2. Before filing for bankruptcy, the Debtor had presented himself to the public as a billionaire who enjoyed all the trappings of a life of extreme luxury, including yachts, private jets, luxury cars, and multi-million dollar residences. Yet, in the schedules of assets he filed in his chapter 11 case, the Debtor remarkably claimed to have a mere \\$3,850 in assets to his name. As several courts have now observed, the Debtor was able to maintain his opulent lifestyle while professing to own virtually no assets by constructing a vast maze of shell companies in which he hid his wealth in the names of family members and close associates (such as Ms. Wang).<sup>4</sup> The Trustee has spent months deconstructing the Debtor's \"shell game\" through an investigation of the Debtor's financial affairs and has already recovered tens of millions of dollars for the benefit of the estate. Efforts to recover additional valuable assets are ongoing.\n\n3. The Debtor has responded by seeking to obstruct and interfere with the Trustee's investigation by any means possible, including by seeking (twice) to remove the Trustee, by refusing to comply with the Trustee's discovery requests, and even by rallying his followers across the globe to harass the Trustee, his counsel, members of his family, and one of the Debtor's largest unsecured creditors—which harassment was enjoined by the Bankruptcy Court.5\n\n<sup>4</sup> *See, e.g.*, Decision and Order on Motion, at 1, *PAX v. Kwok*, Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 2022) [Docket No. 1181] (\"Ostrager Contempt Decision\") (describing Debtor as \"a self-declared multibillionaire [who has] secreted his assets in a maze of corporate entities and with family members.\"), attached as **Exhibit 1** to the Bassett Declaration; *see also Eastern Profit Corp. Ltd. v. Strategic Vision US LLC*, No. 18-CV-2185 (LJL), 2021 WL 2554631, at \\*1 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2021) (finding that that Eastern Profit Corporation Limited, an entity originally owned by one of the Debtor's chauffeurs and then transferred to the Debtor's daughter, was \"in essence, a shell corporation\" for the Debtor.)\n\n<sup>5</sup> *See Corrected Memorandum of Decision Granting in Part Motion for Preliminary Injunction* ¶ 7 (Adv. Proc. No. 22-05032, Jan. 13, 2023) [Docket No. 133] (the \"Harassment PI Decision\"), attached as **Exhibit 2** to the Bassett Declaration. In addition, various individuals filed a lawsuit in this district alleging the Trustee and his counsel violated the Foreign Agents Registration Act by failing to register as agents of the People's Republic of China or the Chinese Communist Party. The district court found that the Debtor, although not a party, was \"at the center\" of this lawsuit. Op. & Order at 2, *An v. Despins*, 22-cv-10062 (VEC) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2023)\n\nThe Stay Motion is but the Debtor's latest tactic to stymie, at all costs, the Trustee's ongoing investigation.\n\n4. To conceal his true motivations in the Stay Motion, the Debtor fabricates nonexistent issues in his chapter 11 case that allegedly implicate his rights in this case. For example, the Debtor baldly asserts, among other things, that (i) the Trustee has disposed of personal property of the Debtor located at his former Sherry Netherland apartment, (ii) the Debtor's mansion in Mahwah, New Jersey, has been \"turned over\" to the Trustee for disposition, and (iii) the Trustee has failed to comply with orders of the Bankruptcy Court relating to the Debtor's privileges.6 As explained in detail below, even a cursory review of the record in the Bankruptcy Court—with which the Debtor and his bankruptcy counsel should be intimately familiar—reveals that each of these statements is categorically untrue.\n\n5. Despite his allegations having no basis, the Debtor doubled down on them in another filing with this Court on September 21, 2023. *See* ECF No. 143. Although this new filing is styled as a motion to compel the production of documents from the Government, it reads as a transparent effort by the Debtor to repeat and buttress the same false accusations he makes in the Stay Motion. For example, he repeats his erroneous allegation that the Trustee and the Government are collaborating to \"fast track\" the sale of the Mahwah Mansion, which is entirely\n\n <sup>[</sup>Docket No. 29], attached as **Exhibit 3** to the Bassett Declaration. The district court dismissed the lawsuit and imposed Rule 11 sanctions. *Id.* at 13 (\"[T]his lawsuit is just another part of a campaign of misbehavior designed to vex [the Trustee and Paul Hastings].\"). Other judges in this district have made similar findings, dismissing and sanctioning lawsuits brought under FARA against other participants in the bankruptcy case. *See*  Op. & Order at 32, *Gong v. Sarnoff*, 23-cv-343 (LJL) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2023) [Docket No. 72] (\"The inescapable conclusion is that Zhang and Freeth are targeting those with interests opposed to Kwok's with the aim of chilling what they perceive as advocacy against him.\"), attached as **Exhibit 4** to the Bassett Declaration.\n\n<sup>6</sup> The Court should also reject the Debtor's self-serving rhetoric that he \"attempted to resolve the Bankruptcy Cases through a potential global settlement.\" Mem. of Law at 5.The only source for this statement is the Debtor's own motion to remove the Trustee, *see* Bankr. ECF No. 1274, which no party in interest supported and which he withdrew. Moreover, as it relates to the Debtor's characterization of the Trustee's purported \"thinly veiled threats\" during a settlement conference with the Debtor, *see* Mem. of Law at 6, the Trustee refers this Court to the Bankruptcy Court's description of these events in its Harassment PI Decision.\n\nuntrue because no sale process can even be initiated unless and until the Trustee prevails on the merits of his pending adversary proceeding. Equally specious is the Debtor's assertion that the Trustee and Government were somehow improperly communicating about the indictment against the Debtor before it was filed. He makes this allegation by citing to time entries showing the Trustee had discussions with the Government about the indictment on March 16 and 18, 2023, which he says was two weeks before the filing of the indictment on March 29, 2023. The Debtor, however, carelessly refers to the superseding indictment dated March 29, 2023, which merely added Ms. Wang as a defendant, and fails to acknowledge that the initial indictment against the Debtor was unsealed on March 15, 2023. It was, of course, this original indictment that the Trustee discussed with the DOJ after the fact in mid-March.\n\n6. Stripped of its factual inaccuracies and exaggerated rhetoric, the Stay Motion has no merit and should be denied. However, as a threshold matter, the Respondents submit that the Stay Motion should be considered and decided by the Bankruptcy Court, which has exclusive jurisdiction over all property of the estate. The Stay Motion offers no authority in support of the extraordinary relief it requests of staying an entire bankruptcy case. To the contrary, in *United States v. LaRouche Campaign*, 682 F. Supp. 627, 628 (D. Mass. 1987), the district court was asked to stay a bankruptcy case involving two of the defendants in a criminal case before it, and the district court held that *it lacked jurisdiction to do so*. Other case law—including cases in which the Second Circuit reversed an order that would have temporarily enjoined a debtor (or trustee) from taking certain, limited, actions within the larger bankruptcy case—shows the reluctance with which other courts have invaded a bankruptcy court's jurisdiction or impaired its ability to administer an estate.7\n\n<sup>7</sup> As the Trustee advised this Court on September 6, 2023, the Trustee previously filed in the Bankruptcy Court an emergency motion (and a related motion to expedite) seeking to enjoin the Debtor's prosecution of the Stay\n\n7. To the extent this Court is inclined to consider the merits of the Stay Motion, it should deny the motion because the Debtor has not come close to satisfying his burden for obtaining a stay under Second Circuit law. The Debtor all but ignores the extreme prejudice to his creditors that would result from the global stay he requests. Contrary to the Debtor's unsupported assertion, the Bankruptcy Cases are not being run for the benefit of one large hedge fund. In fact, more than 1,400 proofs of claims have been filed in the Bankruptcy Cases, almost all by individuals, asserting billions of dollars in claims. While the Trustee expects that many of these claims are subject to reduction or disallowance (and the Trustee's analysis in this regard is ongoing), it is already clear that these claims cover a wide spectrum, including tort claims (including allegations by one of the Debtor's former employees of sexual assault by the Debtor), defamation claims, breach of contract claims, and, of course, claims of counterparties to the Debtor's alleged fraudulent schemes (which, to be clear, are not limited to the allegations in this criminal case). All these creditors have waited for years to obtain a recovery and now must look to the Trustee to collect estate assets, resolve their claims, and make distributions.\n\n8. The delay in distributions is not the only harm a stay would cause to creditors. Delaying the Trustee's investigation would substantially increase the risk that the Debtor, his family members, and his business associates will continue their efforts to move assets beyond the reach of the Trustee. This is not mere speculation, as there are several examples of the Debtor, members of his family, and/or his associates transferring or disposing of significant assets without Bankruptcy Court approval, including after the Debtor's and Ms. Wang's indictment and subsequent confinement. In addition, a global stay of the Bankruptcy Cases would, for all\n\nMotion. The Bankruptcy Court denied the motion to expedite, but noted that a hearing on the emergency motion would be scheduled, if needed, after this Court has acted on the Stay Motion. At the hearing on the Stay Motion, the Trustee can, as necessary, address the comments made by Bankruptcy Judge Manning at the hearing on the motion to expedite, including comments related to extending the statute of limitation to bring avoidance actions.\n\npractical purposes, eliminate the Trustee's ability to bring avoidance actions to recover valuable property of the estate, as the statute of limitation to commence such actions is set to expire on February 15, 2024, *i.e.*, well before the scheduled April 2024 trial in this case.\n\n9. While the Debtors' estates and their creditors will suffer immense harm from a stay, the Debtor has not credibly shown that the Bankruptcy Cases somehow prejudice his rights as a criminal defendant. The Debtor asserts that the Trustee is pursuing litigation over issues that overlap with his criminal case, but the Trustee's objectives and arguments are entirely different from those of the Government. The Trustee is seeking to recover assets (regardless of whether such assets are fruits of a crime), not prove criminal liability. And the Debtor's concerns regarding privilege issues and other evidentiary matters are illusory because, ultimately, this Court, not the Bankruptcy Court, will decide what evidence is admissible in this case and, in any event, do not justify the extraordinary remedy sought here by the Debtor.\n\n10. Perhaps realizing the dubious nature of his requested global stay, the Debtor requests four categories of relief in the alternative, namely an order from this Court (i) authorizing the Debtor to disclose to the Trustee the information produced to him by the Government, (ii) permitting the Debtor to access the Mahwah Mansion, (iii) precluding the Government from facilitating the sale of the Mahwah Mansion in the Bankruptcy Cases, and (iv) prohibiting the Trustee from sharing with the Government any documents or information subject to privileges held by the Debtor. These requests are mostly acceptable to the Trustee. As to the first request, the Trustee no longer presently intends to seek disclosure of the information provided to the Debtor by the Government, and the Trustee will be asking for the Bankruptcy Court to modify the Contempt Order accordingly. In principle, and subject to certain safeguards regarding category (ii), with respect to which the Trustee is willing to meet and confer with the\n\nDebtor, the Trustee has no objection to an order granting the relief set forth in categories (ii) and (iv). Finally, with respect to category (iii), it is not clear to the Trustee what the Debtor means in seeking to preclude the Government from \"facilitating the sale.\" That said, that requested relief is premature, as the Mahwah Mansion has not yet been determined to be property of the estate, let alone is it subject to any sale motion.\n\n#### **FACTUAL BACKGROUND**\n\n#### **I. Bankruptcy Cases**\n\n11. On February 15, 2022, the Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States Code (the \"Bankruptcy Code\") in the Bankruptcy Court. Notably, the Debtor filed his petition four business days after one of his largest unsecured creditors, Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. (\"PAX\"), obtained an order from a New York state court (a) holding the Debtor in contempt for removing his luxury superyacht (which PAX sought to use to satisfy a \\$116.4 million judgment) outside the jurisdiction of the court and (b) imposing on the Debtor a contempt fine of \\$134 million, which fine was due five business entry of such order.8\n\n12. On June 15, 2022, after the Debtor's failed effort to propose a chapter 11 plan, the Bankruptcy Court entered a memorandum of decision and order [Bankr. ECF No. 465]9 (the \"Trustee Order\") directing the United States Trustee to appoint a chapter 11 trustee. On July 8, 2022, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order [Bankr. ECF No. 523] appointing the Trustee.\n\n13. Genever BVI, an entity wholly owned by Mr. Kwok, and its wholly owned subsidiary, Genever US, are also chapter 11 debtors in cases that have been administratively\n\n<sup>8</sup> *See* Ostrager Contempt Decision, at 10, Ex. A to the Bassett Decl.\n\n<sup>9</sup> Attached as **Exhibit 5** to the Bassett Declaration. Filings on the docket of the administratively consolidated Bankruptcy Cases, Case No. 22-50073, are referred to as \"Bankr. ECF No. \\_\\_\\_\\_.\"\n\nconsolidated with the Debtor's chapter 11 case. Genever BVI's sole asset is the shares it holds in Genever US, whose principal asset is the 18th floor apartment at the Sherry Netherland in Manhattan (the \"Sherry Netherland Apartment\").10\n\n# **II. Trustee's Investigation**\n\n14. The Debtor's bankruptcy schedules, filed in March 2022, claimed only \\$3,850 in assets compared to hundreds of millions of dollars of liabilities.11 The Debtor asserted in the Bankruptcy Court that he was essentially penniless, and that his luxurious homes, the Lady May yacht, and his other publicly flaunted trappings of wealth did not belong to him, but to companies purportedly owned by his family members.12\n\n15. Since his appointment, the Trustee has been working diligently to identify and recover for the benefit of the estate the assets the Debtor has hidden. To that end, in accordance with the Bankruptcy Court's directive, the Trustee has launched a complex and thorough investigation and litigation process, focusing on the Debtor's \"shell game\"—*i.e.*, his use of *alter ego* companies to hide his assets from creditors. Broadly speaking, the process includes (a) discovery pursuant to Rule 2004 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the \"Bankruptcy Rules\") and (b) litigation to recover specific property and assets.\n\n16. Because the Debtor and others have refused to comply with the Trustee's subpoenas, the Trustee has been forced to litigate a number of discovery disputes. One such\n\n<sup>10</sup> The Stay Motion does not offer any basis for staying the chapter 11 cases of Genever BVI and Genever US. The motion should be denied as to these debtors for this reason alone. Nor does the Debtor have any economic interest in Genever BVI, Genever US, or the Sherry Netherland Apartment. Genever BVI was previously transferred to the Trustee (and, as noted, Genever BVI wholly owns Genever US), and any beneficial interest that had previously been asserted by Bravo Luck Limited (an entity purportedly owned by the Debtor's son) and/or the Debtor's son in Genever BVI, Genever US, or the Sherry Netherland Apartment has been relinquished as part of a settlement with Bravo Luck Limited and the Debtor's son. *See* Bankr. ECF. 2153.\n\n<sup>11</sup> *See* Schedules of Assets and Liabilities at 1 [Bankr. ECF No. 78].\n\n<sup>12</sup> *See Declaration of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok in Support of the Chapter 11 Case and Certain Motions* [Bankr. ECF No. 107].\n\ndispute involved the Debtor's contention that he could prevent the Trustee from obtaining information from his counsel and other professionals by seeking to invoke the attorney-client privilege and other privileges or protections. This dispute was ultimately resolved when the Debtor, after extensive negotiations, consented to the entry of an order governing the passage of the privilege to the Trustee [Bankr. ECF No. 856] (the \"Privileges Order\").\n\n17. In response to another discovery dispute, the Debtor asserted that his Fifth Amendment rights justified his refusal to produce any documents to the Trustee or to provide any description of how he searched for documents.13 The Trustee disagreed with the Debtor's blanket assertion of the Fifth Amendment. On July 26, 2023, the Bankruptcy Court issued a detailed and carefully reasoned 42-page decision agreeing with the Trustee and holding the Debtor in contempt of court [Bankr. ECF No. 2035] (the \"Contempt Order\").14\n\n18. Notwithstanding the non-compliance of the Debtor and others with the Trustee's discovery efforts, the Trustee has brought a number of adversary proceedings to recover specific assets for the benefit of the estate. To date, the Trustee has recovered over \\$60 million in assets, and stands to recover more as his investigation and recovery efforts continue.\n\n#### **III. Mahwah Adversary Proceeding**\n\n19. In the indictment in this case, the Government included forfeiture allegations with respect to, among other things, a 21-bedroom, 50,000 square foot, castle-styled private residence\n\n<sup>13</sup> *See* Bankr. ECF No. 1444 (stating that Debtor is \"invok[ing] [his] rights under the 5th Amendment to the United States Constitution, including under the act of production doctrine, with respect to the Subpoena dated August 17, 2022, in its entirety, including all requests for documents and information set forth therein\"), attached as **Exhibit 6** to the Bassett Declaration.\n\n<sup>14</sup> Attached as **Exhibit 7** to the Bassett Declaration. In addition to the Contempt Order, the Bankruptcy Court has issued six (6) other contempt orders against the Debtor and entities related to the Debtor for failure to surrender estate property or comply with court-approved subpoenas issued by the Trustee. *See* Bankr. ECF Nos. 1372, 1537, 1709, 1892, 2009, and 2093.\n\nwith 12.5-acre grounds located at 675 Ramapo Valley Road, Mahwah, New Jersey 07430 (the \"Mahwah Mansion\"), which was originally purchased for approximately \\$26.5 million.\n\n20. The Trustee has conducted an investigation into whether the Mahwah Mansion is property of the estate and, on July 11, 2023, commenced an adversary proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court (the \"Mahwah Adversary Proceeding\") against the purported owners of the mansion.15 The complaint seeks an order declaring, among other things, that the Mahwah Mansion is property of the Debtor's estate to be administered by the Trustee. With the complaint, the Trustee filed a motion seeking to, among other things, preliminarily enjoin the Mahwah Defendants from encumbering, transferring, dissipating, or otherwise interfering with the Mahwah Mansion and restricting access to it. The Bankruptcy Court granted this motion in an order dated August 24, 2023 [ECF No. 47 in Adv. Proc. No. 23-05017]16 (the \"PI Order\").\n\n21. On August 30, 2023, after the Mahwah Defendants admitted that the Mahwah Mansion and its contents were uninsured,17 the Trustee filed an emergency motion [ECF No. 57 in Adv. Proc. No. 23-05017] (the \"Emergency Motion\") requesting that the Bankruptcy Court immediately modify the PI Order to limit access to the Mahwah Mansion to certain security services, officials, and others with the consent of the Trustee or as approved by this Court or the\n\n<sup>15</sup> The defendants are Taurus Fund LLC (\"Taurus Fund\"), Scott Barnett (the Debtor's bodyguard and chauffer), and Taurus Management LLC (together with Taurus Fund, collectively, the \"Mahwah Defendants\").\n\n<sup>16</sup> Filings on the docket of the Mahwah Adversary Proceeding are referred to as \"ECF No. \\_\\_\\_\\_ in Adv. Proc. No. 23-05017.\"\n\n<sup>17</sup> As part of the PI Order, the Bankruptcy Court ordered the Mahwah Defendants to file, by August 28, 2023, proof of insurance for all assets and property of Taurus Fund (including the Mahwah Mansion) and all personalty and/or fixtures in, on, or at the Mahwah Mansion. The Bankruptcy Court later extended the deadline to August 30, 2023, on which date the Mahwah Defendants filed a response revealing that Taurus Fund's property—including the Mahwah Mansion and its contents—were uninsured, *see* ECF No. 55 in Adv. Proc. No. 23-05017, and the Mahwah Mansion remains uninsured today.\n\nBankruptcy Court (collectively, the \"Authorized Parties\"). The Bankruptcy Court granted the Emergency Motion on August 31, 2023. *See* ECF No. 58 in Adv. Proc. No. 23-05017.18\n\n22. The Trustee knew when he filed the Mahwah Adversary Proceeding that issues could arise from the fact that the Mahwah Mansion is subject to both potential forfeiture in the criminal case and potential recovery in the bankruptcy case. The Trustee reached out to the Government to address these issues in a manner that could allow the Mahwah Adversary Proceeding to proceed without interruption. This resulted in a settlement agreement dated as of July 13, 2023 (the \"Settlement Agreement\"). Under the Settlement Agreement, (i) the Trustee would proceed with the Mahwah Adversary Proceeding without objection or interference by the Government and (ii) the Trustee and the Government reserved their rights regarding the distribution of the net proceeds (after payment of the estate's expenses in connection with taking control of and selling the Mahwah Mansion) from the disposition of the Mahwah Mansion. The Trustee has filed a motion seeking Bankruptcy Court approval of the Settlement Agreement, and a hearing was held on August 30, 2023. The Bankruptcy Court has not yet ruled on the motion.\n\n#### **ARGUMENT**\n\n#### **I. Bankruptcy Court Is Proper Forum to Decide Stay Motion**\n\n23. As a threshold matter, the Respondents respectfully submit that the Bankruptcy Court is the proper forum to determine whether the Bankruptcy Cases should be stayed. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), bankruptcy courts (through orders of reference from the applicable district court) have exclusive jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases and property of a bankruptcy estate.\n\n<sup>18</sup> Attached as **Exhibit 8** to the Bassett Declaration.\n\n24. Notably, the Stay Motion does not cite a single case where a district court granted the extraordinary relief the Debtor seeks here, *i.e.*, staying an *entire bankruptcy case*. 19 In the *LaRouche* case, the district court was asked to stay a bankruptcy case involving two defendants in a criminal case before the court—and the district court held that *it lacked jurisdiction to do so*. *LaRouche*, 682 F. Supp. at 628. The court expressed skepticism \"that a federal court having jurisdiction over a criminal case in one district has jurisdiction to enjoin the United States, or a United States Bankruptcy Judge, or others participating in a bankruptcy matter before that judge, to stay all proceedings in that matter.\" *Id.* The court, therefore, \"conclude[d] that there is no direct support in precedent for the exercise of such jurisdiction.\" *Id*.\n\n25. The Debtor notes that the All Writs Act \"provides federal district courts with substantial authority to preserve their jurisdiction,\"20 citing to *S.E.C. v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd.*, 93 F. Supp. 2d 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). The *Credit Bancorp* decision, however, supports the Trustee's position by demonstrating why it should be the *Bankruptcy Court*, not this Court, that decides the Stay Motion.\n\n26. In *Credit Bancorp*, the SEC brought an enforcement action in the Southern District of New York against Credit Bancorp, its subsidiaries, and several individuals. The district court appointed a receiver to, among other things, pursue insurance proceeds. One of the individuals charged in the action filed his own civil case in the Eastern District of Kentucky against two of the insurers, and the court-appointed receiver moved in the New York case to stay the Kentucky case. The court granted the stay, explaining that, \"where a court has appointed a\n\n<sup>19</sup> The Memorandum of Law cites to *United States v. Simon*, 373 F.2d 649, 651-52 (2d Cir. 1967), in which the district court enjoined the bankruptcy trustee (for ninety days) from deposing certain individuals that were also named in a separate criminal matter. But the district court did not stay the bankruptcy case itself. Moreover, the Second Circuit *reversed the district court*. This case, therefore, offers the Debtor no support. In fact, as discussed below, it strongly support the Trustee's position.\n\n<sup>20</sup> Mem. of Law at 14.\n\nreceiver and obtained jurisdiction over the receivership estate, as here, the power to stay competing actions falls within the court's inherent power to prevent interference with the administration of that estate.\" *Credit Bancorp*, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 477. Just like the Trustee here, the receiver in *Credit Bancorp* was appointed to \"protect the estate property and ultimately return that property to the proper parties in interest,\" and was charged with \"marshaling and preserving the assets of the estate in order to effectuate an orderly, efficient, and equitable administration of the estate.\" *Id.* at 476-77.\n\n27. In essence, *Credit Bancorp* stands for the proposition that where a courtappointed fiduciary is charged with the equitable administration of an estate, the power and duty to prevent interference with that estate—including enjoining parallel proceedings—lies with the court supervising the estate. Indeed, this principle applies even more forcefully in bankruptcy cases, where Congress has vested bankruptcy courts with exclusive jurisdiction over property of the debtor's estate, and the automatic stay prohibits interference with that jurisdiction. *See generally In re Sturman*, No. 10 CIV. 6725 RJS, 2011 WL 4472412, at \\*2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2011) (state court motion to \"enjoin any further activity in the bankruptcy estates\" was a clear violation of the automatic stay).21\n\n28. Based on these authorities, the Trustee respectfully submits that jurisdiction to decide the Stay Motion lies with the Bankruptcy Court, not this Court. But even if this Court *could* decide the Stay Motion, it should decline to do so and instead defer to the Bankruptcy\n\n<sup>21</sup> The Debtor's request that this Court decide the Stay Motion also violates the so-called *Barton* doctrine, which prohibits non-bankruptcy courts from ruling on issues that would interfere with the official duties of a bankruptcy trustee. As one bankruptcy court has explained, \"[u]nder Supreme Court precedent more than one hundred years old, parties may not interfere with a trustee's official duties by seeking injunctive relief in another court, unless they have obtained leave from the bankruptcy court that appointed the trustee.\" *In re Atlas*, 183 B.R. 978, 980 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995).\n\nCourt. This was the alternative conclusion of the district court in the *LaRouche* case, which reasoned as follows:\n\n> Even if jurisdiction does exist, I conclude that it would be inappropriate to exercise it in this instance. The bankruptcy proceeding involves not only interests of the United States and some (or perhaps all) of the defendants before this court, but as well many other persons who may have claims as creditors in those proceedings. It is not feasible or sensible to attempt to give them notice and an opportunity to be heard here, and it would be offensive to fundamental principles of adjudication to enter an injunction effecting a stay such as defendants seek without appropriate consideration of their interests.\n\n*LaRouche Campaign*, 682 F. Supp. at 628-29.\n\n29. The *LaRouche* court's reasoning is consistent with compelling precedent from the Second Circuit. *Erti v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc. (In re Baldwin-United Corp. Litig.)*, 765 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1985), involved a multi-district securities fraud litigation pending in the Southern District of New York. One of the broker-dealer defendants filed a proof of claim against Baldwin in its separate chapter 11 case pending in Ohio and also commenced a thirdparty complaint against Baldwin in the securities litigation. The broker-dealer then sought, and the Southern District of New York issued, a TRO enjoining the debtor from seeking any relief against any of the defendants (including the broker-dealer) in the securities litigation, including seeking an order from the Ohio bankruptcy court to enforce the automatic stay.22 On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the district court did have jurisdiction \"to determine the applicability of the automatic stay,\" *id.* at 347, but that \"its issuance of the injunction challenged on this appeal\n\n<sup>22</sup> The Memorandum of Law cites another Second Circuit ruling in the Baldwin matter, *In re Baldwin-United Corp.*, 770 F.2d 328, 339 (2d Cir. 1985). *See* Mem. of Law at 15. In that opinion, the Second Circuit left in place a different TRO issued by the district court, which enjoined the 31 appellant states (and their attorneys general) from commencing any action against any of the defendants in the securities litigation. It is telling that the Debtor cites this opinion, which has nothing to do with and does not discuss any proposed or ongoing actions in Baldwin's separate bankruptcy case, while ignoring the Second Circuit's ruling, issued only two months prior, that directly explored the exact issues relevant here, *i.e.*, the interplay between the authority of a bankruptcy court to administer its case and the authority of district court to manage a separate civil proceeding.\n\nwas a misuse of its equitable power.\" *Id*. The court explained that this injunction interfered with the Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction because it prevented the debtor \"from invoking the vital authority of the Bankruptcy Court\" to carry out the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code (including the applicability of the automatic stay). *Id*. at 357-48. And while it was also true that the district court had the \"power to issue all writs in aid of its jurisdiction,\" *id.* at 348, any conflict \"between the authority of the Bankruptcy Court to administer this complex reorganization and the authority of the District Court to administer consolidated pretrial proceedings\" should be resolved in favor of maintaining the \"*unfettered authority of the Bankruptcy Court*.\" *Id.* (emphasis added).23\n\n30. The Respondents submit that, consistent with that precedent, this Court should defer consideration of the Stay Motion to the Bankruptcy Court.24\n\n## **II. Stay Motion Fails on Its Merits**\n\n31. If this Court is nevertheless inclined to consider the Stay Motion on its merits, the Court should deny the motion because the Debtor has failed to satisfy his burden of justifying the extraordinary remedy of a stay of the Bankruptcy Cases under Second Circuit precedent.\n\n<sup>23</sup> The *Baldwin* court also pointed to the procedural history in the lower courts, and observed that the movant's procedural \"maneuver\" and its \"litigating stance with respect to the reach of the stay reveals few, if any, equities in its favor.\" 765 F.2d at 349. Similarly here, the Stay Motion is, at best, motivated by litigation tactics and strategy, not genuine concerns for the Debtor's constitutional rights.\n\n<sup>24</sup> This would also be consistent with the general (*i.e.*, not necessarily specific to bankruptcy) rule for such motions, pursuant to which motions to stay litigation are presented in the court in which such litigation is pending. *See, e.g.*, *Mango Labs, LLC v. Eisenberg*, No. 23-CV-00665 (LJL), 2023 WL 3510908, at \\*1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2023) (government moved \"to intervene in this case pursuant to Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and for a full stay in this matter, including a stay of all discovery, until the conclusion of the parallel criminal case\"); *Nat'l Coal. on Black Civic Participation v. Wohl*, No. 20 CIV. 8668 (VM), 2021 WL 694557, at \\*1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2021) (\"before the court is defendants' second motion for a stay pending resolution of the criminal proceedings against them\"); *Citibank, N.A. v. Super Sayin' Publ'n, LLC*, 86 F. Supp. 3d 244, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (\"defendants have moved to stay these two related civil actions pending the resolution of a related criminal investigation and prosecution\"); *Karimona Invs., LLC v. Weinreb*, No. 02CV1792WHPTHK, 2003 WL 941404, at \\*1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2003) (in breach of contract and fraud action, denying defendant's \"motion to stay his deposition pending the resolution of a related criminal matter\"). Moreover, here, the Government sought a stay of the SEC litigation against the Debtor in the district court presiding over that litigation.\n\n# A. Applicable Legal Standard for Stay Request\n\n32. The Memorandum of Law includes a lengthy discussion of what the Debtor characterizes as the \"applicable law\" for granting a stay request.25 Yet, the Debtor fails to acknowledge that, in the Second Circuit, \"a stay of a civil case to permit conclusion of a related criminal [proceeding]\" is \"an extraordinary remedy.\" *Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc.*, 676 F.3d 83, 98 (2d Cir. 2012) (as modified) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Debtor further fails to mention that \"[i]n order to invoke this extraordinary remedy of staying a civil case until the conclusion of a related criminal proceeding, the defendant bears the burden of showing undue prejudice . . . or interference with his constitutional rights.\" *Citibank, N.A. v. Super Sayin' Pub., LLC*, 86 F. Supp. 3d 244, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In fact, the U.S. Constitution \"rarely, if ever, *requires* such a stay.\" *Louis Vuitton*, 676 F.3d at 98 (emphasis in original).26 This is because a \"defendant has no absolute right not to be forced to choose between testifying in a civil matter and asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege.\" *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted).\n\n#### *i. Balancing Test*\n\n# 33. In determining whether to grant a stay of parallel proceedings, courts in the\n\nSecond Circuit usually consider six factors:\n\n- 1) the extent to which the issues in the criminal case overlap with those presented in the civil case;\n- 2) the status of the case, including whether the defendants have been indicted;\n- 3) the private interests of the plaintiffs in proceeding expeditiously weighed against the prejudice to plaintiffs caused by the delay;\n- 4) the private interests of and burden on the defendants;\n- 5) the interests of the courts; and\n- 6) the public interest.\n\n 25 *See* Mem. of Law at 14-17.\n\n<sup>26</sup> *See also id.* at 100 (\"a plausible constitutional argument [requiring a stay] would be presented only if, *at a minimum*, denying a stay would cause '*substantial prejudice*' to the defendant\") (emphasis added).\n\n*See Citibank, N.A.*, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 246-47. *See also Gran Sabana Corp. N.V. v. Kossoff*, No. 21-CV-3154 (RA), 2021 WL 3666116, at \\*2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2021); *Nat'l Coal. on Black Civic Participation v. Wohl*, No. 20 CIV. 8668 (VM), 2021 WL 694557, at \\*3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2021); *Bernard v. Lombardo*, No. 16 CV. 863 (RMB), 2017 WL 2984022, at \\*2 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2017) (all applying six-factor test and denying stay).\n\n34. The Debtor seemingly asks this Court to discard this balancing test, based on the Second Circuit's description of the test as a \"mechanical device.\"27 This mischaracterizes the Second Circuit's holding and guidance in *Louis Vuitton*. In fact, courts in this Circuit overwhelmingly continue to apply the balancing test. *Louis Vuitton* stands only for the unremarkable proposition that, when applying the balancing test, the trial court must not lose sight of the overall question, namely \"whether the civil action should be stayed based on the particular facts before it and the extent to which such a stay would work a hardship, inequity, or injustice to a party, the public or the court.\" *Louis Vuitton*, 676 F.3d at 99-100.\n\n#### *ii. Other Considerations*\n\n35. Another aspect of Louis *Vuitton* that the Stay Motion conveniently ignores is the Second Circuit's statement that the concerns relevant to a stay request can also be addressed through \"alternative forms of relief, such as tailored stays, protective orders, quashing or modifying subpoenas, [or] sealing confidential material.\" *Louis Vuitton*, 676 F.3d at 102. In other words, \"a blanket stay of the civil action is not the only means of safeguarding [the defendant]'s rights and assuaging the legitimate concerns he may harbor.\" *Gran Sabana Corp.*, 2021 WL 3666116, at \\*3.\n\n<sup>27</sup> *See* Mem. of Law at 16 (citing *Louis Vuitton*, 676 F.3d at 99).\n\n36. The availability of less extreme measures leads directly to another consideration highlighted in *Louis Vuitton*, namely the true motivation or purpose behind the requested stay. Noting that there was \"nothing in the record to indicate that the defendants ever pursued such alternative relief,\" the Second Circuit concluded that the defendants' \"insistence that the civil proceedings be stayed\" was really \"part of a larger pattern of overall delay and obfuscation.\" *Louis Vuitton*, 676 F.3d at 102. The Second Circuit further noted that the defendants' arguments for the requested stay \"ring hollow in light of the defendants' plainly dilatory tactics . . . *even prior to their indictments*.\" *Id.* (emphasis added).\n\n#### B. Debtor Has Not Satisfied Burden for Obtaining Requested Stay\n\n37. Applying the balancing test and the other considerations espoused by *Louis Vuitton* to the facts here, it is abundantly clear that there is *no basis whatsoever*—let alone extraordinary circumstances—to grant a global stay of the Bankruptcy Cases. Indeed, other than the second factor (*i.e.*, that the Debtor has been indicted), all factors and considerations in evaluating a stay motion weigh in favor of denying the Stay Motion.\n\n#### *i. Factor 1: Limited Overlap Between Bankruptcy Cases and Criminal Case*\n\n38. Contrary to the Debtor's hyperbole, there is only limited overlap between the Trustee's efforts to identify and recover property of the estate and these criminal proceedings.\n\n39. In *United States v. Simon*, 373 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1967), the district court enjoined the bankruptcy trustee (for ninety days) from deposing certain individuals that were also named in a separate criminal matter. Reversing the district court, the Second Circuit held that the district court's reliance on cases where the civil and criminal matters arise out of the same or related transactions was flawed because the trustee was \"pursuing an independent cause of action on behalf of [the debtor]'s creditors and security holders, which was commenced more than one year before the indictment was found.\" *Id.* at 653-54.\n\n40. Like the trustee in *Simon*, the Trustee is acting solely to fulfill his fiduciary obligations to the bankruptcy estates and their creditors. The Trustee is not seeking to establish the Debtor's criminal liability, but rather his focus is on demonstrating that certain companies nominally owned by the Debtor's family members or business associates are, in reality, *alter egos* of the Debtor and/or that their assets are equitably owned by the Debtor. This does not require the Trustee to show that the Debtor committed any crimes or that the funds used to purchase the property in question were the proceeds of alleged fraudulent schemes. In any event, to the extent the Debtor believes that the Trustee's investigation infringes on his rights as a criminal defendant in certain instances, there is no reason that the Bankruptcy Court or the Connecticut District Court would not be capable of addressing those issues. The Debtor also remains free to seek specific relief from this Court, on a case-by-case basis.\n\n# *ii. Factor 3: Global Stay of Bankruptcy Cases Would Unduly Prejudice Thousands of Creditors*\n\n41. A global stay of the Bankruptcy Cases for the duration of these criminal proceedings would inflict great harm on the Debtors' creditors. A stay of the Bankruptcy Cases would substantially delay—potentially for years—the resolution of thousands of claims and any distribution from the Debtors' assets. Given the automatic stay, the Debtors' creditors have no alternative forum to resolve their claims against the Debtors or obtain a recovery from the Debtors' assets. This stands in stark contrast to the Debtor who *chose* to commence his chapter 11 case (notwithstanding his displeasure with how the case has unfolded).\n\n42. A delay of distributions, however, is not the only harm to creditors. Staying the Trustee's investigation will substantially increase the risk that the Debtor, his family members, and his business associates will continue to attempt to move assets beyond the reach of the Trustee. *See Bernard*, 2017 WL 2984022, at \\*3 (\"The risk to Plaintiffs is particularly great here\n\nbecause the Court has already found, among other things, that Mr. Lombardo abused the corporate form . . .\"). This is no mere speculation, as the Debtor's family members and associates have, on numerous occasions, already undertaken efforts to move or take control of potential estate assets during the Bankruptcy Cases. For example:\n\n- As this Court already found in denying Ms. Wang's bail request, in January 2023, Ms. Yvette Wang transferred the shares of a Kwok-associated entity (Ace Decade Holdings Limited (\"Ace Decade\")) to another of the Debtor's associates in Switzerland. *See* ECF No. 110. This transfer occurred while the Bankruptcy Court was considering the Trustee's motion to hold the Debtor in contempt for failing to transfer Ace Decade to the Trustee (a motion that the Bankruptcy Court ultimately granted). Worse, at the time of the transfer, the Debtor had already agreed (pursuant to an order entered by the Bankruptcy Court) not to contest the Bankruptcy Court's finding that he was, in fact, the beneficial owner of Ace Decade.28 *See* Bankr. ECF No. 1110.\n- Similarly, this Court has found that, \"[a]fter her arrest in this case, Wang continued directing co-conspirators to transfer funds from accounts associated with entities involved in the alleged fraud scheme.\" *See* ECF No. 110.\n- In the summer of 2022, Whitecroft Shore Limited, another shell company purportedly owned by the Debtor's daughter, transferred a private jet to an unknown third party for a purchase prices of over \\$10 million. Incredibly, the Debtor's daughter has testified that she does not know the name of the buyer or the whereabouts of the proceeds from that sale. The Trustee believes that the private jet was beneficially owned by the Debtor and has commenced an adversary proceeding to recover the proceeds of this unauthorized postpetition sale.\n- In April 2022, Greenwich Land, an entity purportedly owned by the Debtor's wife, sold a property located in Greenwich, Connecticut, for \\$2.2 million. The Trustee has commenced an adversary proceeding against Greenwich Land seeking determinations that, among other things, Greenwich Land is the *alter ego* of the Debtor and the Debtor is the equitable owner of Greenwich Land. The April 2022 property sale is particularly egregious as it occurred in violation of a restraining notice issued in connection with New York state court litigation brought by one of the Debtor's creditors against the Debtor.29\n\n<sup>28</sup> The Trustee intends to bring an action against Ms. Wang for this blatant violation of the automatic stay.\n\n<sup>29</sup> The restraining notice notified Greenwich Land, among other things, that \"we understand [the Debtor] may have direct, indirect, or beneficial ownership in, or the right or ability to direct or control, you and your assets,\" and that \"you are hereby forbidden to make or suffer any sale, assignment or transfer of, or any interference with, any property in which [the Debtor] has an interest, except as provided in [New York Civil Practice Law\n\n43. Based on the Trustee's investigation, the foregoing examples are just the tip of the iceberg of ongoing efforts by the Debtor and his associates to deprive the Debtor's creditors of their recoveries. The Trustee is continuing to investigate millions of dollars of transfers made by various shell companies that, the Trustee believes, are beneficially owned by the Debtor. If the Bankruptcy Cases are stayed, these transfers will be allowed to continue unabated. Worse, the information regarding such transfers will become stale during the pendency of the global stay, and, once the stay is lifted, the Trustee would have to re-start his investigation at great cost and further delay to the estate.\n\n44. In addition, the requested stay would jeopardize the Trustee's ability to bring valuable avoidance actions within the applicable two-year statute of limitations, which expires in February 2024 (the second anniversary of the Debtor's chapter 11 filing). *See* 11 U.S.C. §§ 108(a)(2); 546(a). The Trustee acknowledges the Bankruptcy Court's statement that the Trustee could potentially seek to extend this deadline;30 however, absent the consent of each defendant (which is impossible, especially if the Trustee's investigation is stayed) and/or equitable tolling (which is uncertain and would require expensive collateral litigation), the weight of the authority makes clear that this deadline ordinarily cannot be extended. *See, e.g.*, *In re U.S. Lines Inc.*, 262 B.R. 223, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that Bankruptcy Rule 9006, which ordinarily permits extensions of deadlines in bankruptcy, \"by its text, does not authorize a court to extend such [statutes of limitations and 11 U.S.C. § 108(c)] deadlines. The Rule only empowers a court to extend deadlines created 'by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court . . .' Bankr. R. 9006(b)(1).\"); *In re Walnut Hill, Inc.*, No. 16-20960 (JJT), 2018\n\nand Rules] § 5222(b).\" Restraining Notice, a copy of which was filed as part of ECF No. 1-47 in Adv. Proc. No. 23-5005, and which is attached as **Exhibit 9** to the Bassett Declaration.\n\n<sup>30</sup> *See* Sept. 12, 2023 Hr'g Tr. at 32:14-15. Relevant excerpts of the hearing transcript are attached to the Bassett Declaration as **Exhibit 10**.\n\nWL 2672242, at \\*2 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 1, 2018) (\"Rule 9006(b) cannot apply to Section 546(a) without violating the separation of powers preserved in the Constitution. Where the legislature has spoken authoritatively, it is not within the province of the judiciary to modify its determination.\"); *In re Randolph Hosp., Inc.*, No. 20-10247, 2022 WL 19298765, at \\*1 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2022) (\"Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9006(b) may not be used to extend statutory deadlines such as those established under 11 U.S.C. §§ 108 and 546.\").\n\n45. Given that the Trustee could challenge potentially millions of dollars of prepetition transfers going as far back as 10 years before the Debtor's chapter 11 petition date, the inability to assert estate causes of action would be highly detrimental to creditors.\n\n# *iii. Factor 4: Allowing Bankruptcy Cases to Proceed Does Not Prejudice Debtor*\n\n46. In the Stay Motion, the Debtor raises a handful of recent developments in the Bankruptcy Cases that, in his view, have infringed upon his constitutional rights as a criminal defendant. However, upon closer inspection, none of the developments (whether viewed in isolation or in combination) are prejudicial to the Debtor.\n\n# 1. Contempt Order Does Not Prejudice Debtor's Constitutional Rights and Is Now Moot In Any Event\n\n47. Throughout the Bankruptcy Cases, the Debtor has had a full and fair opportunity before the Bankruptcy Court to raise—and, in fact, did raise—his arguments in opposition to the Trustee's discovery requests, including that he could refuse to produce documents on the basis of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. That the Bankruptcy Court ultimately rejected the Debtor's arguments does not somehow mean he was prejudiced. Nor was the Bankruptcy Court doing the Trustee's bidding31—in fact, the Contempt Order rejected many of\n\n<sup>31</sup> The Debtor asserts that the Trustee somehow \"procured\" the Contempt Order from the Bankruptcy Court. Mem. of Law at 2.\n\nthe Trustee's arguments, including as to the application of the Act of Production Doctrine. It should be apparent from even a cursory review of the Contempt Order that Bankruptcy Judge Manning took very seriously her responsibility to consider the scope of the Debtor's constitutional rights.\n\n48. The Debtor contends his production to the Trustee of the disclosures he obtained from the Government in this case would somehow prejudice his rights as a criminal defendant. The Contempt Order, however, only required the Debtor to serve as a conduit for the production to the Trustee of information the Government provided to the Debtor, and thus the Debtor would not be authenticating the documents by producing them. *But this argument is now moot in any event because, as noted above, the Trustee is not presently pursuing these documents and will ask the Bankruptcy Court to modify the Contempt Order accordingly.*\n\n49. To the extent the Debtor is dissatisfied with any other aspect of the Contempt Order, he is, of course, free to seek appellate review in the Connecticut District Court and the Second Circuit, including on an expedited basis. In fact, the Debtor has already filed a motion with the Connecticut District Court requesting leave to appeal the Contempt Order (which motion the Trustee has opposed).32 Notably, however, the Debtor has not sought expedited consideration of his request for leave to appeal or moved for a stay pending appeal.\n\n#### 2. Privileges Order Provides No Support for Requested Stay\n\n50. The Debtor's assertion that the Trustee has somehow infringed upon the Debtor's attorney-client privilege is completely unsupported. It is hornbook law that, upon the appointment of a trustee, the debtor's attorney-client privilege and work product protection that could otherwise be asserted by a debtor or its counsel under any applicable law pass to the\n\n<sup>32</sup> As of the filing of this Opposition, the Connecticut District Court has not ruled on the Debtor's motion.\n\ntrustee. *See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub*, 471 U.S. 343, 353-54 (1985) (\"[I]t is clear that the trustee plays the role most closely analogous to that of a solvent corporation's management\" and \"vesting in the trustee control of the corporation's attorneyclient privilege most closely comports with the allocation of the waiver power to management outside of bankruptcy without in any way obstructing the careful design of the Bankruptcy Code.\"). The Trustee recognizes, of course, that where the debtor is an individual, courts have implemented the *Weintraub* ruling through a balancing test for prepetition33 communications to determine whether the privilege at issue relates most closely to a trustee's rights, obligations and, allocation of responsibility under the Bankruptcy Code, or whether the privilege primarily concerns the debtor's interests as an individual. *See, e.g.*, *In re Bame*, 251 B.R. 367, 375 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2000). Indeed, all of these issues were briefed and argued in the Bankruptcy Court shortly after the Trustee's appointment, with the Debtor vigorously opposing the Trustee's request for an order confirming that the Debtor's privilege had passed to the Trustee (subject to the aforementioned limitations).\n\n51. In the end, given the overwhelming authority in support of the Trustee's position, the Debtor agreed to the consensual resolution reflected in the Privileges Order, which contains several negotiated protections for the Debtor. Among other things:\n\n> the Trustee shall not be entitled to waive any Trustee Privilege (for example, by disclosing privileged documents or information in open court or on any public docket or by sharing such documents or information with a third party) absent the Debtor's written consent or further order of the Court, and all filings by the Trustee containing or\n\n<sup>33</sup> For privileged documents created postpetition, but prior to the appointment of a trustee, courts do not apply a balancing test. Rather, the privilege over such documents passes to the trustee automatically when the trustee takes over administration of the estate. *See, e.g.*, *Bame*, 251 B.R. at 375 (\"I find that the attorney-client privilege has passed to the Trustee with respect to communications between Kennedy & Graven and the Debtor during the period that the Debtor served as the DIP as to all matters having to do with administration of the estate, including, in particular, disclosure and recovery of assets.\").\n\ndescribing documents or information covered by a Trustee Privilege shall be filed under seal.\n\nPrivilege Order ¶ 8. Moreover, the Privileges Order provided that nothing in the order would prevent the Debtor \"from asserting any and all privileges concerning legal matters unrelated to the Investigation Topics, such as *unrelated* criminal allegations . . .\" *Id.* ¶ 4 (emphasis added).\n\n52. Given that the privilege has passed to the Trustee (as confirmed in the Privileges Order), there is nothing inappropriate about the Trustee seeking documents from the Debtor's counsel, even if all of those documents were privileged (which is, by no means, a forgone conclusion). For these and other reasons, the Bankruptcy Court properly authorized the Trustee to issue subpoenas upon the Debtor's counsel. Consistent with the Privileges Order, the subpoenas do not seek privileged materials unrelated to the Investigation Topics.34\n\n53. Moreover, the Trustee has *not* shared privileged communications with the Government or otherwise violated his obligations under the Privileges Order. The Debtor's suggestion that the Trustee would have no \"compunction\" of doing so is entirely unfounded.<sup>35</sup> Although the Trustee did share with the Government his *conclusion* that the Mahwah Mansion was equitably owned by the Debtor, he did not (as the Debtor asserts) share his legal analysis, which, in any event, was not based on privileged information the Trustee obtained during discovery.\n\n54. To the extent the Trustee may seek to waive any privilege in the future, he will, of course, comply with the terms of the Privileges Order—which, in the absence of the Debtor's\n\n<sup>34</sup> As defined in the Privileges Order, the \"Investigation Topics\" concern \"(i) assets (including actual or potential causes of action) that (A) are or were held by the Debtor, (B) are or were held by others that the Trustee is investigating pursuant to the Rule 2004 Subpoenas for purposes of determining whether they hold or may have information about assets in which the Debtor holds or may have held an interest, or (C) otherwise relate to, or could be brought into, the Debtor's estate, (ii) the Debtor's financial condition (including, without limitation, liabilities of the estate), or (iii) activities related to the administration of the estate . . .\" Privileges Order ¶ 2.\n\n<sup>35</sup> Mem. of Law at 25.\n\nconsent, would require relief from the Bankruptcy Court. That there may be \"disputes\" over the Trustee's ability to waive the privilege is meaningless.36 If such disputes occur, they will be initiated on notice to the Debtor, and he will have the opportunity to be heard.\n\n# 3. Mahwah Adversary Proceeding Does Not Adversely Affect Debtor's Rights as Criminal Defendant\n\n55. The Debtor's stated concern about losing access to evidence at the Mahwah Mansion due to the PI Order is another red herring. The Debtor has concocted this argument purely for strategic reasons. The Debtor rests his concern on the idea that the Mahwah Mansion has been turned over to the Trustee for disposition, but this is flatly untrue. The Bankruptcy Court will not determine whether the mansion is property of the estate until the Trustee's adversary proceeding has been litigated. Even then, assuming the Trustee prevails on the ownership question, he will need further Bankruptcy Court approval of any sale, on notice and hearing to all parties in interest. At that time, the Debtor will have the opportunity to raise any concerns he might have about the Trustee's proposed sale.37 And before that time, nothing precludes the Debtor's criminal counsel from accessing the Mahwah Mansion or taking photographs or recording necessary video of it.\n\n56. The PI Order provides interim relief to protect the Mahwah Mansion and in no way prejudices the Debtor. If anything, the PI Order helps the Debtor insofar as it aims to preserve the mansion and its contents in their current condition. Nothing in the PI Order\n\n<sup>36</sup> Mem. of Law at 14.\n\n<sup>37</sup> The Court should also not give any credence to the Debtor's assertion that the Trustee has abandoned or sought to abandon property at the Sherry Netherland Apartment. This is demonstrably false. In fact, on April 14, 2023, the Trustee filed a motion seeking to limit notice with respect to a generic motion to abandon certain property [Bankr. ECF No. 1666]. Following the objection of Bravo Luck Limited (which raised the concern that such forthcoming motion would seek to abandon property at the Sherry Netherland apartment), the Trustee stated on the record at the hearing on April 20, 2023 that the property he sought to abandon has no impact on the Sherry Netherland Apartment, which statement was adopted by the Bankruptcy Court in its subsequent order. *See* Bankr. ECF No. 1809, attached as **Exhibit 11** to the Bassett Declaration.\n\nprevents the Debtor or his counsel from visiting the property. In fact, the PI Order expressly states that anyone may enter the property with the approval of *this Court or the Bankruptcy Court*, 38 and it also allows parties to access the mansion with the Trustee's consent. The Trustee has no objection to the Debtor's counsel visiting the mansion, subject to appropriate safeguards, and does not contest the authority of this Court to grant such approval. To date, however, counsel for the Debtor has never made any such request to the Trustee, which further demonstrates that this argument has been concocted for strategic reasons.39\n\n57. The Debtor's arguments related to the Settlement Agreement are also unfounded. The sole purpose of the Settlement Agreement is to address the fact that the Mahwah Mansion is both (i) an alleged asset of the Debtor's chapter 11 estate and (ii) a property identified by the Government for forfeiture in the event the Debtor is convicted. This agreement is not only appropriate, but necessary, to protect the rights of both the Debtor's creditors in his chapter 11 case and the victims of his alleged fraud. Nothing in the Settlement Agreement prejudices the Debtor's rights, nor does it reflect improper coordination by the Trustee and the Government.\n\n58. Finally, the Debtor's purported outrage about the Trustee having attached certain photographs taken at the Mahwah mansion to his complaint in the Mahwah Adversary Proceeding is entirely misplaced. The Trustee redacted all private/personal information in these photographs before attaching them to his complaint. The Trustee did not, as the Debtor asserts, acknowledge that the photos were \"inadvertently\" filed on the public docket.40 In reality, the\n\n<sup>38</sup> The situation is no different than with respect to the Sherry Netherland Apartment, where the related order entered by the Bankruptcy Court permitted the Debtor to seek authorization from this Court to visit the apartment, which his counsel did. *See* ECF No. 79\n\n<sup>39</sup> In any event, the Debtor's professed concerns about the rights of his alleged victims in an eventual forfeiture proceeding are particularly precious, as forfeiture will only occur if the Debtor has been convicted.\n\n<sup>40</sup> Mem. of Law at 10 n. 4.\n\nTrustee reached out to Debtor's counsel to coordinate the filing of a joint motion to seal certain exhibits of the Mahwah complaint,41 and the Debtor's counsel never responded to the Trustee, which speaks volumes about the Debtor's \"concerns\" on this issue.\n\n# *iv. Factor 5: Interests of the Bankruptcy Court Weigh Against Stay of Bankruptcy Cases*\n\n59. A bankruptcy court, like any court, has a \"well-recognized interest in disposing 'of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself.'\" *Louis Vuitton*, 676 F.3d at 104 (*quoting Landis v. N. Am. Co.*, 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)). This interest is particularly acute here, given the numerous dilatory tactics of the Debtor, his family members, and his business associates to slow the Trustee's investigation. The Debtor's chapter 11 case has already been pending for nearly 19 months, leading the Bankruptcy Court to express frustration on multiple occasions with the various delays initiated by the Debtor and others. Staying the case in its entirety for months, if not years, would clearly run counter to the Bankruptcy Court's interests in finally resolving the Debtor's case and removing it from the court's docket.\n\n# *v. Factor 6: Public Interests Weighs Against Stay of Bankruptcy Cases*\n\n60. The public has an interest in a well-functioning bankruptcy system. The Stay Motion, however, seeks to put the Bankruptcy Cases on hold for an indeterminate amount of time; indeed, it may take years for all appeals to have been resolved in connection with these criminal proceedings. The Debtor should not be able to enjoy the benefits of bankruptcy (including a worldwide automatic stay against creditor actions) while not having to comply with any of its burdens (including cooperating with the Trustee and surrendering property of the estate and any recorded information). As one court aptly observed:\n\n<sup>41</sup> *See* E-mails to Eric Henzy regarding Motion to Seal Exhibit to Mahwah Complaint, attached as **Exhibit 12** to the Bassett Declaration.\n\nabsent something more, it simply cannot be the case that protections afforded to an allegedly fraudulent debtor outweigh the need to protect creditors and the bankruptcy system as a whole. . . . [If that were the case,] . . . [d]ebtors would be entitled to hold their creditors in abeyance indefinitely while allegations of misconduct run their course. To do so would frustrate the public interest in expeditious resolution of bankruptcy proceedings.\n\n*Layng v. Garcia* (*In re Garcia*), 569 B.R. 480 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2017). The stay the Debtor\n\nrequests would implicate these very concerns by allowing the Debtor to hold his creditors\n\nhostage for an indeterminate amount of time while he and his assets remains insulated from civil\n\nliability. For this reason, the public interest weighs strongly against granting the Stay Motion.\n\n# **III. Respondents Do Not Object to Categories (i), (ii), and (iv) of Debtor's Proposed Alternative Relief**\n\n61. Implicitly acknowledging that less drastic measures exist to address his stated\n\nconcerns than a global stay of the Bankruptcy Cases, the Debtor seeks four categories of relief in\n\nthe alternative. Specifically, he asks this Court to:\n\n(i) modify the Protective Order to allow production of the discovery in this case to the Trustee; (ii) direct that Mr. Kwok's defense team continue to be permitted access to the Mahwah Facility through the pendency of this case and any resulting appeals; (iii) preclude the government from facilitating the sale of the Mahwah Facility in the Bankruptcy Cases through the pendency of this case and any resulting appeals; (iv) order that the government not solicit or receive from the Trustee any information or records that are subject to any privileges belonging to Mr. Kwok and identify any such materials already provided by the Trustee.42\n\n62. The Trustee generally takes little issue with these requests. As to the first item,\n\nthe Trustee is withdrawing his request for this discovery, at this time, as noted above.\n\nAccordingly, the Debtor's concern in this regard is addressed and this matter is now moot. Items\n\n(ii) and (iv) are generally acceptable to the Trustee, subject to potential safeguards surrounding\n\n<sup>42</sup> Mem. of Law at 30.\n\nthe Debtor's counsel's access to the Mahwah Mansion. Finally, item (iii) is a non-issue at present because any relief related to an eventual sale of the Mahwah Mansion is premature. The Bankruptcy Court has not determined that the Mahwah Mansion is property of the estate, and therefore it cannot be sold by the Trustee. Any concerns the Debtor may have regarding a sale of the mansion can be addressed later, if and when a proposed sale is presented to the Bankruptcy Court, or the Debtor can renew his request to this Court if appropriate.\n\n#### **IV. Court Should Deny Ms. Wang's Request for Global Stay of Bankruptcy Cases**\n\n63. Finally, and for the same reasons set forth above, the Court should also reject Ms. Wang's request for a global stay. Indeed, her request stands on even weaker grounds than the Debtor's request, as she is *not* a debtor in the Bankruptcy Case, nor a defendant in any of the pending adversary proceedings in the Bankruptcy Cases. Because there is no proceeding pending against her in connection with the Bankruptcy Cases, there is no proceeding as to Ms. Wang that this Court could even stay.\n\n#### **CONCLUSION**\n\n64. For the reasons set forth above, the Stay Motion should be considered and decided by the Bankruptcy Court. To the extent this Court is inclined to consider the merits of the Stay Motion, the Respondents submit that the Stay Motion and the Joinder should be denied as to the request for a stay, but granted as to the requested form of alternative relief (subject to the modifications discussed herein).\n\n[*Remainder of page intentionally left blank.*]\n\nDated: September 21, 2023\n\nBy: */s/ Nicholas A. Bassett*\n\nNicholas A. Bassett PAUL HASTINGS LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C., 20036 (202) 551-1902 nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n *and*\n\nLuc A. Despins Adam J. Fee G. Alexander Bongartz PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6000 lucdespins@paulhastings.com adamfee@paulhastings.com alexbongartz@paulhastings.com\n\n*Counsel for Luc A. Despins, as Chapter 11 Trustee, Genever Holdings Corporation, and Genever Holdings LLC*\n\n# **Exhibit 3**\n\n# **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK**\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\n\n-against-\n\nCase No. 1:23-CR-118-1 (AT)\n\nHO WAN KWOK,\n\nDefendant.\n\n# **DECLARATION OF NICHOLAS BASSETT IN SUPPORT OF RESPONSE OF CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE AND GENEVER DEBTORS IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT HO WAN KWOK'S MOTION FOR AN ORDER AND WRIT STAYING BANKRUPTCY CASES OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR OTHER RELIEF**\n\n1. I am a partner at the law firm of Paul Hastings LLP, counsel to Luc A. Despins,\n\nchapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") in the above-captioned chapter 11 case (the \"Chapter 11 Case\")\n\nof Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Individual Debtor\"). I make this declaration (the \"Declaration\") in support\n\nof the *Response of Chapter 11 Trustee and Genever Debtors In Opposition to Defendant Ho Wan*\n\n*Kwok's Motion for an Order and Writ Staying Bankruptcy Cases or in the Alternative for Other*\n\n*Relief* (the \"Opposition\").\n\n2. Attached hereto are true and correct copies of the following documents:\n\n| Exhibit | Description of Exhibit                                                                                                                               |\n|---------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1.      | Decision & Order on Motion, PAX v. Kwok, Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 9,<br>2022) [Docket No. 1181]                                     |\n| 2.      | Corrected Memorandum of Decision Granting in Part Motion for Preliminary Injunction<br>(Adv. Proc. No. 22-05032, Jan. 13, 2023) [Bankr. ECF No. 133] |\n| 3.      | Opinion & Order, An v. Despins, 22-cv-10062 (VEC) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2023) [Docket No.<br>29]                                                         |\n| 4.      | Opinion & Order, Gong v. Sarnoff, 23-cv-343 (LJL) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2023) [Docket No.<br>72]                                                        |\n\n| 5.  | Memorandum of Decision and Order Denying Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice and<br>Granting Joinder to Motion for Appointment of Chapter 11 Trustee [Bankr. ECF No. 465] |\n|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 6.  | Notice of Filing of Declaration of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok Concerning Invocation of 5th<br>Amendment Privilege in Regard to Rule 2004 Discovery [Bankr. ECF No. 1444]             |\n| 7.  | Memorandum of Decision and Order Holding Individual Debtor in Contempt of Court and<br>Denying Motion for Stay of Order Compelling Production [Bankr. ECF No. 2035]       |\n| 8.  | Order Granting Emergency Motion to Modify Preliminary Injunction [ECF No. 58 in Adv.<br>Proc. No. 23-5017]                                                                |\n| 9.  | Restraining Notice [filed as part of ECF No. 1-47 in Adv. Proc. No. 23-5005]                                                                                              |\n| 10. | September 12, 2023 Hearing Transcript (excerpts)                                                                                                                          |\n| 11. | Order Denying Motion for Relief from Judgment/Order<br>[Bankr. ECF No. 1809]                                                                                              |\n| 12. | August 2023 Emails regarding Motion to Seal Exhibit to Mahwah Complaint                                                                                                   |\n\nI declare upon penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.\n\nBy: */s/ Nicholas A. Bassett*\n\nNicholas A. Bassett PAUL HASTINGS LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C., 20036 (202) 551-1902 nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n# **Exhibit 1**\n\n# **SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK NEW YORK COUNTY**\n\n318\n\n| PRESENT: | HON. BARRY R. OSTRAGER                                                             | PART                       | IAS MOTION 61EFM |\n|----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------|------------------|\n|          | Justice                                                                            |                            |                  |\n|          | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------X |                            |                  |\n|          | PACIFIC ALLIANCE ASIA OPPORTUNITY FUND                                             |                            |                  |\n| L.P.,    |                                                                                    | INDEX NO.                  | 652077/2017      |\n|          | Plaintiff,                                                                         |                            |                  |\n|          | -<br>v -                                                                           | MOTION DATE                |                  |\n|          | KWOK HO WAN, a/k/a KWOK HO, a/k/a GWO WEN                                          |                            |                  |\n|          | GUI, a/k/a GUO WENGUI, a/k/a GUO WEN-GUI, a/k/a                                    | MOTION SEQ. NO.            | 019              |\n|          | WAN GUE HAOYUN, a/k/a MILES KWOK, a/k/a                                            |                            |                  |\n|          | HAOYUN GUO, GENEVER: HOLDINGS LLC, and                                             | DECISION + ORDER ON MOTION |                  |\n|          | GENEVER HOLDINGS CORPORATION,                                                      |                            |                  |\n|          |                                                                                    |                            |                  |\n\n Defendants. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------X HON. BARRY R. OSTRAGER\n\nIn this 2017 case with 1,180 docket entries – almost all of which involve defendant Kwok Ho Wan's (\"Kwok\") efforts to avoid and deceive his creditors by parking his substantial personal assets with a series of corporations, trusted confidants, and family members -- this Court is called upon to determine whether the plaintiff, Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. (\"PAX\"), has met the burden of establishing that the Court should enter a final Order of Civil Contempt against Kwok. For the reasons that follow, this Court is simultaneously issuing a final Order of Civil Contempt.\n\nPAX secured a judgment against Kwok in the sum of \\$116,402,019.57 on February 3, 2021 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 716). Thereafter, PAX undertook a year's long effort to enforce its judgment by first identifying and then attempting to levy upon Kwok's assets in the United States. PAX encountered difficulty identifying assets over which Kwok exercised control because Kwok, who is a self-declared multi-billionaire, had secreted his assets in a maze of corporate entities and with family members. This scheme has enabled Kwok to assert that he has no assets despite his lavish lifestyle, which plaintiff has catalogued with material from social\n\nmedia clippings, photographs and videotapes showing Kwok living large and boasting of his wealth, expensive homes, private plane, and yacht. As noted in the transcript of proceedings of February 2, 2022, this evidence is of little probative value, as the witnesses sponsoring this evidence have no first-hand knowledge of the authenticity of this \"evidence\" other than that it is accessible on various websites.\n\nOn February 2, 2022, this Court held an evidentiary hearing at which seven witnesses submitted direct testimony by affidavit and were made available for cross-examination. The hearing followed protracted proceedings by PAX to locate and levy upon assets owned by defendant Kwok. Those proceedings established, among other things, that Kwok exercised dominion and control over a yacht called the Lady May and resulted in a series of orders restraining Kwok and/or the registered owners of the yacht called Lady May from removing the Lady May from the Court's jurisdiction. The first such Order was issued on September 30, 2020, as described in detail *infra,* and was followed by an October 15, 2020 Order that restrained \"Mr. Kwok and/or the registered owners of . . . the yacht, the 'Lady May'\" from leaving the jurisdiction. (NYSCEF Doc. No. 630). As detailed *infra*, Kwok spent much of July, August and September of 2020 on the Lady May. Contemporaneously with the proceedings resulting in the September 30 and October 15, 2020 restraining Orders, Kwok and his cohorts made arrangement for the Lady May to sail to Florida in early October 2020 and, thereafter, to the Bahamas. On March 16, 2021, the Court issued a conditional order of civil contempt which directed that if Kwok failed to return the Lady May to the jurisdiction of this Court by May 31, 2021, he would be subject to a \\$500,000.00 fine for each day that the Lady May remained outside the jurisdiction of this Court.\n\nThe Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed this Court's order holding Kwok in conditional civil contempt, finding that \"the daily fine of \\$500,000.00 was intended to strongly\n\nencourage defendant to purge himself of the contempt, which, despite being permitted to accomplish, he has shown no interest in doing. . .\" NYSCEF Doc. No. 953, 199 AD3d 423 (2021). The Appellate Division further held:\n\nThe motion court acted within its discretion in holding defendant in civil contempt, as plaintiff established by clear and convincing evidence that defendant violated a lawful, clear mandate of the court, of which he had knowledge, and that such violation resulted in prejudice to plaintiff's rights (*see El-Dehdan v El-Dehdan*, 26 NY3d 19, 29 [2015]; Judiciary Law § 753). … The motion court is instructed to proceed with an evidentiary hearing to resolve a dispute as to ownership and control of the yacht, and to assess appropriate penalties.\n\nPursuant to the Appellate Division's Order, this Court scheduled the February 2, 2022 evidentiary hearing to resolve the issue of whether Kwok beneficially owns and controls the yacht. Kwok failed to testify at the February 2, 2022 hearing, having previously invoked his Fifth Amendment right to decline to testify or respond to discovery requests relating to the Lady May in response to PAX's asset discovery efforts. PX 27, 28, 29, 30.<sup>1</sup> This invocation of the Fifth Amendment notwithstanding, Kwok is an active litigant in multiple fora and he has given prior testimony in this and other proceedings.\n\nKwok also filed a complaint in this court captioned *Guo Wengui a/k/a Miles Kwok v Hong Zeng*, 157025/2020, which references a blog post from Freebeacon.com dated September 8, 2017 in which Kwok complains about \"several incidents involving *his* 152-foot motor yacht, Lady May...\" (Complaint ¶ 8, NYSCEF Doc. No. 001) (\"the Zeng Complaint\"). The Zeng Complaint describes Kwok as an \"outspoken critic of the CCP\" who has gone to great \"lengths to expose the rampant corruption within the CCP and the Chinese government.\" The *Washington Post* reported that a former advisor to President Trump, Steve Bannon, was arrested in 2020 while on board the Lady May, and described Mr. Bannon as a friend and business\n\n<sup>1</sup> \"PX\" refers to Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits.\n\nassociate of Kwok, \"a vocal online critic of the Chinese government who was once close with that country's intelligence service but is now wanted by authorities in Beijing on charges of fraud, blackmail and bribery.\" Other news outlets have reported that Mr. Bannon utilized Kwok's private jet on more than one occasion to travel to political rallies.\n\nThe testimony adduced at the hearing out of the mouths of defendants' witnesses clearly and convincingly demonstrated that Kwok beneficially owns and controls the Lady May and has utter contempt for this Court and the judicial process.\n\nKwok once was the sole shareholder of Hong Kong Investments Limited (\"HK International\"). The testimony adduced at the hearing established that in 2014 Kwok transferred a 100% interest in HK International to one Qu Guo Jiao for no consideration. Ms. Qu was a trusted business associate of the Kwok family. Thereafter, Kwok fled China and on February 23, 2015, HK International purchased the Lady May for £ 28 million GBP. No testimony adduced at the hearing established the source of funds to purchase the Lady May, but the uncontradicted testimony of Kwok's daughter Mei Guo established that Ms. Qu did not provide the funds to purchase the yacht. Tr. 44. 2 Consequently, a reasonable inference is that Kwok provided the funds to HK International which were used to purchase the yacht. It is undisputed that Ms. Qu transferred the ownership of the Lady May to Kwok's daughter, Mei Guo, on or around June 17, 2017, for \\$1 or no consideration. Tr. 47. According to Ms. Guo's affidavit (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1162), Ms. Guo ultimately transferred ownership of the Lady May to the current title holder HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC (\"HK USA\"). Ms. Guo further avers that she is the sole owner of HK USA, although all of the multi-million dollar annual expenses for the\n\n<sup>2</sup> \"Tr.\" refers to the transcript of the evidentiary hearing, efiled at NYSCEF Doc. No. 1179.\n\nLady May, including fuel, maintenance, and the captain and crew are paid by Golden Spring (New York) Ltd. (\"Golden Spring.\"), which is allegedly the Kwok family office.\n\nAt the hearing Ms. Guo testified that her brother had bought the Lady May for her. Tr. 46. The Court cannot credit this testimony as there is no evidence that Ms. Guo's brother was involved with the corporate transactions leading to Ms. Guo's acquisition of the title to the yacht. And, indeed, in response to a question from the Court, Ms. Guo acknowledged that her brother was not involved in any of the transfers that occurred before she acquired the yacht. Tr. 47.\n\nOther testimony adduced at the hearing established that Kwok was repeatedly on the yacht every summer and that Ms. Guo was infrequently on the yacht. Trial Tr. 88:8-20. The Lady May's captain testified that Kwok was aboard the yacht for a significant portion of the months of July, August and September in 2020 and that this was consistent with his usual practice in the summer. Trial Tr. 87:24-88:7. Subsequent to this Court's September 30, 2020 restraining Order, in October 2020 the Lady May was sent to Florida and then the Bahamas for repairs and was subsequently dispatched to Italy in October 2021, purportedly at the direction of Golden Spring. Ms. Guo acknowledged that she was aware of both this Court's September 30, 2020 restraining Order and this Court's subsequent March 16, 2021 Order directing that the Lady May be returned to the Court's jurisdiction Tr. 55; 57-60; 62.\n\nMs. Guo testified that on the one hand, she directed the Lady May's itinerary but, on the other hand, testified that security for Kwok was such a concern that there would be no memorialization of any itinerary. Tr. 52. She further testified that when her father was on the yacht unaccompanied by her he had the freedom to choose wherever he wanted to go. Tr. 50. The fundamental issue, however, is who directed the yacht to be removed from this Court's jurisdiction in October 2020. Ms. Guo claims that in early October 2020 she no longer wished to\n\nuse the yacht and relayed that instruction to Golden Spring which, in turn, relayed her directive to the then captain of the ship, Captain Heaslop. Tr. 53.\n\nUpon further questioning, Ms. Guo admitted that it was Golden Spring that advised her that the yacht needed to be moved to a warmer place. Tr. 55. Ms. Guo then repeated her retracted testimony that her brother had given her the yacht, and she stated that her brother is the sole owner of Golden Spring. Tr. 56. This testimony is not credible given that on September 30, 2020 the Court entered a temporary restraining order restraining Kwok\n\n. . . from making or causing any sale, assignment, transfer, or interference with any property in which he has an interest, or from paying over or otherwise disposing of any debt now due or thereafter coming due to him, subject to the exceptions set forth in CPLR 5222 and in the ordinary course.\n\nNYSCEF Doc. No. 591. Significantly, Captain Heaslop, the then Captain of the Lady May, testified that Mr. Kwok told Captain Heaslop that Kwok would no longer be a guest on the Lady May \"a few days\" before the Lady May departed for Florida in early October 2020 (and apparently after the issuance of this Court's September 30, 2020 Order). Tr. 89. Captain Heaslop also contradicted Ms. Guo's testimony that Ms. Guo gave Captain Heaslop instructions about the yacht's movement. Tr. 94.\n\nMs. Guo also acknowledged having subsequently read the Court's March 16, 2021 Order requiring the Lady May to be returned to the Court's jurisdiction by May 31, 2021 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 728). She further acknowledged that she had discussed the Order with her lawyer (whose services were paid for by Golden Spring) and that she had *ignored* the Order.\n\nRussell Stockil, the Yacht Management Director for Yachtzoo SARL, testified that his company had a management contract with HK USA dated May 2021 and that he communicated with HK USA and Golden Spring, but never with Ms. Guo. Tr. 78. This was also the testimony of successor Captain Momchil Ivanov. Tr. 82. In short, Ms. Guo's testimony that she owns and\n\ncontrols the Lady May cannot be credited in any respect. Ms. Guo appears to be a woman in her twenties, has introduced no evidence that she exercised dominion and control of the Lady May, and provided no confirmation that she came into possession of the Lady May, other than as a ruse to shield the Lady May from being levied upon by her father's creditors.\n\nThe machinations associated with the shell game Kwok has orchestrated with respect to the Lady May are of a piece with every other evasive and contemptuous act Kwok has taken during the five years this litigation has been pending, which is why there are 1,180 docket entries in this case.\n\nThe Court has the authority to hold Kwok in civil contempt under Judiciary Law\n\n§ 753—and \"to punish [him], by fine and imprisonment\"—where, as here, the Court \"expressly find[s] that [Kwok's] actions were calculated to or actually did defeat, impair, impede, or prejudice the rights or remedies of a party to a civil proceeding.\" *Oppenheimer v. Oscar Shoes, Inc.*, 111 A.D.2d 28, 28 (1st Dep't 1985) (citing N.Y. Judiciary Law § 753). Section 753 sets forth four requirements:\n\n[T]o find that contempt has occurred in a given case, it must be determined that [1] a lawful order of the court, clearly expressing an unequivocal mandate, was in effect. [2] It must appear, with reasonable certainty, that the order has been disobeyed . . . [3] Moreover, the party to be held in contempt must have had knowledge of the court's order, although it is not necessary that the order actually have been served upon the party . . . [4] Finally, prejudice to the right of a party to the litigation must be demonstrated.\n\n*Fleetwood Fin. v Walter J. Dowd, Inc.*, 2016 WL 11546917, at \\*2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 14, 2016) (citing *McCormick v Axelrod*, 59 N.Y.2d 574, 583, *amended*, 60 N.Y.2d 652 (1983)). The testimony adduced in this case satisfies each element of this standard. Indeed, the Appellate Division intimated as such. *See Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P*., 199 A.D.3d 423 (1 st Dep't 2021) (\"[PAX has] established by clear and convincing evidence that [Kwok] violated\n\na lawful, clear mandate of the court, of which he had knowledge, and that such violation resulted in prejudice to plaintiff's rights. . .\").\n\nThe extent of PAX's ongoing \"prejudice\" turns on whether PAX has demonstrated that it could ultimately levy on the Lady May to satisfy its now centi-million dollar judgment against Kwok. Under CPLR § 5225, \"money or other personal property\" is leviable where the debtor holds the requisite \"interest.\" To satisfy this requirement, \"[i]t is not necessary that the judgment debtor have legal title to the property; a beneficial interest is sufficient.\" Weinstein, Korn & Miller, New York Civil Practice: CPLR ¶ 5225.09. \"A beneficial interest is '[a] right or expectancy in something . . . as opposed to legal title to that thing.'\" *Peterson v. Islamic Rep. of Iran*, 2013 WL 1155576, at \\*30 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2013) (citing Black's Law Dictionary, Interest (9th ed. 2009)). Kwok has much more than a beneficial interest in the Lady May. Not only does Kwok control the yacht, it appears he provided the funds to purchase it and he is the person who principally enjoys the use of the yacht.\n\nThe key factor is whether \"the property benefitted [the beneficial owner] as if he had received the property directly.\" *Id*. (quoting *Exp.-Imp. Bank of U.S. v. Asia Pulp & Paper Co., Ltd.*, 609 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2010); *see also Gliklad v. Chernoi*, 129 A.D.3d 604 (1st Dep't 2015) (upholding rejection of the judgment debtor's contention that he no longer held an interest in property because he transferred his interest to his daughters); *Colfin Bulls Funding B, LLC v. Ampton Invs., Inc*., 112 N.Y.S.3d 868 (Table), at \\*2, 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018) (granting judgment creditor's turnover motion notwithstanding judgment debtor's assertion that he transferred property to a corporation, because even if true, the evidence showed that he \"retained control and/or an interest\" in the property).\n\nThe evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that Kwok holds a beneficial interest in and controls the Lady May. In the latter connection, the Court takes notice of the filing of the Zeng case and draws an inference from all the record facts that Kwok has taken extraordinary steps to shield the yacht from his creditors. Moreover, Kwok's \"family office\" funds the yacht's day-to-day operations and maintenance.\n\nThe Court finds that Ms. Guo's testimony was not only internally inconsistent and dissembling, but also significantly undermined by the testimony of Captains Heaslop and Ivanov and Mr. Stockil, who stated that they have never taken yacht-related direction from Ms. Guo in the four and-a-half years that she directly or indirectly held title to the yacht.\n\nIn addition, it is established New York law that a party's invocation of the Fifth Amendment in a civil proceeding \"may form the basis of an adverse factual inference.\" *DeBonis v. Corbisiero*, 155 AD2d 299, 300 (1st Dep't 1989). An adverse inference may be applied whenever a factual determination is necessary or permitted, including in the context of contempt motions. *S.E.C. v. Durante*, No. 01 Civ. 9056 (DAB) (AJP), 2013 WL 6800226, at \\*10 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2013), *aff'd*, 641 F. App'x 73 (2d Cir. 2016); *LiButti v. United States*, 107 F.3d 110, 120–25 (2d Cir. 1997).\n\nSimilarly, under the missing witness rule, \"[a] trier of fact may draw the strongest inference that the opposing evidence permits against a witness who fails to testify.\" *Crowder v. Wells & Wells Equip., Inc.*, 11 A.D.3d 360, 361 (1st Dep't 2004) (applying adverse inference where defendant who failed to appear \"would be knowledgeable about a material issue raised by the evidence\").\n\nPAX is entitled to an adverse inference under both of these avenues. Kwok has invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in response to PAX's post-judgment discovery, including in response to requests specifically about the Lady May. While Kwok\n\nargues that an adverse inference is not appropriate here because \"[o]nly after a threshold showing that a piece of evidence is authentic is a party obligated to respond to it,\" this contention fails of its own weight. PAX has proffered substantial admissible evidence that Kwok has the requisite beneficial interest in and control of the Lady May. *See People v. Primo*, 96 N.Y.2d 351, 753 N.E.2d 164 (2001) (explaining that evidence is probative if it \"tends to prove the existence or non-existence of a material fact, *i.e.*, a fact directly at issue in the case\").\n\nAs of February 7, 2022, the Lady May has remained outside the jurisdiction of the Court for 268 days. Based on the daily fine of \\$500,000 imposed by this Court and affirmed by the Appellate Division, the resultant fine would amount to \\$134,000,000.00, which is more than PAX's outstanding judgment of nearly \\$120 million and a multiple of the GBP £ 28 million purchase price of the Lady May. Nevertheless, if billionaire litigants can simultaneously seek to use Court process in New York and elsewhere in the United States while knowingly and intentionally violating Court orders, there is no rule of law. Kwok must remit \\$134,000,000.00 to PAX within five business days of the service of this Court's Order with Notice of Entry. The Court is prepared to exercise its full authority under Judiciary Law § 753 in the event the fine is not timely paid.\n\nDated: February 9, 2022\n\n**CHECK ONE: CASE DISPOSED** X **NON-FINAL DISPOSITION** X **GRANTED DENIED GRANTED IN PART OTHER APPLICATION: SETTLE ORDER SUBMIT ORDER CHECK IF APPROPRIATE: INCLUDES TRANSFER/REASSIGN FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENT REFERENCE**\n\n# **Exhibit 2**\n\n# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\nHO WAN KWOK, *et al.*, ) (Jointly Administered)\n\n ) Debtors. ) )\n\n)\n\n)\n\nPacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. and ) Adv. P. No. 22-05032 (JAM) Luc A. Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee for the Estate ) of Ho Wan Kwok, ) Re: ECF No. 3\n\n ) Plaintiffs ) )\n\n)\n\nv. )\n\nHo Wan Kwok, )\n\n ) Defendant. ) )\n\nIn re: ) Chapter 11 ) Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n# **APPEARANCES**\n\nStuart M. Sarnoff Patrick M. Birney Daniel Cantor Annecca H. Smith Mia N. Gonzalez Robinson & Cole LLP O'Melveny & Myers LLP 280 Trumbull Street Seven Times Square Hartford, CT 06103 New York, NY 10036\n\n*and*\n\nPeter Friedman David V. Harbach II O'Melveny & Myers LLP 1625 Eye Street NW Washington, D.C. 20006\n\n*Attorneys for Plaintiff Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.*\n\nLuc A. Despins Douglas S. Skalka Paul Hastings LLP Nancy Bohan Kinsella 200 Park Avenue Patrick R. Linsey\n\nNew York, N.Y. 10166 Neubert Pepe & Montieth P.C. 195 Church Street *and* New Haven, CT 06510\n\nNicholas A. Bassett Paul Hastings LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C. 20036\n\n*Plaintiff Luc A. Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok, and his Attorneys*\n\n| David S. Wachen      | Jeffrey Hellman                     |\n|----------------------|-------------------------------------|\n| Wachen LLC           | Law Offices of Jeffrey Hellman, LLC |\n| 11065 Montague Court | 195 Church Street, 10th Floor       |\n| Potomac, MD 20854    | New Haven, CT 06510                 |\n\n*and*\n\nAaron A. Mitchell Lawall & Mitchell, LLC 55 Madison Avenue, Suite 400 Morristown, NJ 07960\n\n*Attorneys for Defendant Ho Wan Kwok, Debtor*\n\n# **CORRECTED MEMORANDUM OF DECISION GRANTING IN PART MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**\n\nJulie A. Manning, United States Bankruptcy Judge\n\nPursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024, the Memorandum of\n\nDecision issued on January 11, 2023 (the \"Memorandum,\" ECF No. 128), is corrected to address\n\nclerical mistakes and mistakes arising from oversight or omission in the Memorandum. The\n\ncorrected mistakes largely address typographical errors and citation formats. In one instance,\n\nthere is a correction to clarify which case in a string cite was quoted. *See* p. 36, *infra*. Also, to\n\naddress an issue raised to the Court during a Status Conference held on January 13, 2023, the Court corrects the Memorandum to confirm the existence of two separate injunctions with regard offices and workplaces—(i) a 36 ft. injunction around entrances; and (ii) a general 100 ft. injunction at particular times of the day. *See* p. 50, *infra*.; subparagraphs (d) and (f) of the Corrected Order to be filed.\n\n#### **I. INTRODUCTION**\n\nBefore the Court is Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.'s (\"PAX\") Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and the Motion for Preliminary Injunction (the \"Motion\"). (ECF Nos. 3 (redacted) and 5 (sealed).) PAX, *inter alia*, requests the Court enjoin Mr. Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\" or \"Defendant\") from various acts relating to an alleged social media and protest campaign allegedly organized by the Debtor. Because of the nature of the evidence presented in this adversary proceeding, the Court notes that the Debtor's Chinese name is pronounced Guo Wengui in Mandarin Chinese and Kwok Ho Wan in Cantonese Chinese.1 Guo/Kwok is the Debtor's family name and Wengui/Ho Wan is his given name.2 The Debtor is also known, among numerous aliases, as Miles Kwok or Miles Guo.3\n\nMr. Luc A. Despins, the Chapter 11 Trustee appointed in the Debtor's Chapter 11 case (the \"Chapter 11 Trustee,\" and together with PAX, the \"Plaintiffs\") has intervened in this adversary proceeding and joined in the Motion. (ECF No. 25.)\n\n The claims asserted in this adversary proceeding and in the Motion present very important, substantial, and serious issues. These issues include the intersection of the integrity of the bankruptcy court system with free speech protections contained in the Constitution. After an\n\n<sup>1</sup> ECF No. 97, at 97:4–8.\n\n<sup>2</sup> Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 133:23–25.\n\n<sup>3</sup> Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 107:20–21.\n\nextensive review of applicable law, and upon consideration of the evidence presented and arguments made during the Hearing, for the reasons set forth below, the Court grants in part the Motion for Preliminary Injunction.\n\n#### **II. BACKGROUND**\n\nThe Debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition in this Court on February 15, 2022. (Main Case ECF No. 1.)<sup>4</sup> The Debtor's case is jointly administered with two affiliated corporate Chapter 11 cases. (Main Case ECF Nos. 970 and 1141.)\n\nAmong early developments in the Debtor's Chapter 11 case, the Debtor's largest creditor, PAX, filed a Motion to Dismiss or Convert the Debtor's case (the \"Motion to Dismiss,\" Main Case ECF No. 183). Although the facts surrounding the Motion to Dismiss are complex and more fully set forth in the Debtor's Chapter 11 case, on June 15, 2022, the Court entered a Memorandum of Decision and Order Denying Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice and Granting Joinder to Motion for Appointment of Chapter 11 Trustee (the \"Order Granting Motion for Appointment of Chapter 11 Trustee,\" ECF No. 465). *In re Kwok*, 640 B.R. 514 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022). On July 8, 2022, Mr. Luc A. Despins was appointed as the Chapter 11 Trustee (the \"Order Granting Appointment of Chapter 11 Trustee,\" Main Case ECF No. 523).\n\nSince the appointment of the Chapter 11 Trustee, the Debtor, PAX, the Chapter 11 Trustee, and other parties have filed numerous and extensive pleadings in the Debtor's Chapter 11 case. A multitude of issues have been brought before the Court, including, in pertinent part, numerous discovery issues relating to the Chapter 11 Trustee's investigation into the assets of the Debtor, (*See* Main Case ECF Nos. 756–58, 856, 923, 995, 1046, 1184, 1303), issues relating to\n\n<sup>4</sup> References to the docket in the Debtor's individual Chapter 11 bankruptcy case *In re Kwok*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn.), will be styled \"Main Case ECF,\" while references to the docket in this adversary proceeding will be styled \"ECF.\"\n\nthe Debtor's Chapter 11 bankruptcy estate's (the \"Estate\") interest in certain properties (*See, e.g.*, *HK Int'l Fund Invs. (USA) Ltd. LLC v. Despins ex rel. Kwok*, Adv. P. No. 22-05003 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn.) and *Despins ex rel. Kwok v. Bravo Luck Ltd.*, Adv. P. No. 22-05027 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn.)), and issues relating to the Chapter 11 Trustee's control of the Debtor's economic and corporate governance rights (*See* Main Case ECF No. 717, the \"Corporate Governance Order\").\n\nOn November 16, 2022, a hearing was held on, *inter alia*, the Trustee's motion to hold the Debtor in contempt of court for alleged failure to comply with his duties under the bankruptcy code and under the Corporate Governance Order (Main Case ECF No. 913). During the contempt hearing, the Chapter 11 Trustee first alerted the Court and the Office of the United States Trustee as to the subject matter of this adversary proceeding, namely an alleged social media and protest campaign to harass and intimidate the Plaintiffs relating to their involvement in these cases, the Chapter 11 Trustee's ongoing investigation of the Estate's assets, and PAX's multi-year pursuit of its claim against the Debtor which totals more than \\$200 million. (*See*  Main Case ECF No. 1108.) On November 21, 2022, the Chapter 11 Trustee filed a statement, with attached exhibits, further detailing this alleged campaign. (Main Case ECF Nos. 1133 (redacted) and 1136 (sealed).)\n\nOn November 22, 2022, PAX commenced this adversary proceeding against the Debtor. (ECF No. 1, the \"Complaint.\") The Complaint makes additional allegations about the alleged social media and protest campaign. Along with the Complaint, PAX filed an Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for Preliminary Injunction. On November 22, 2022, the Chapter 11 Trustee moved to intervene as an additional Plaintiff in the adversary proceeding, which was granted. (ECF No. 25.)\n\nOn November 23, 2022, a hearing was held on the Application for a Temporary Restraining Order. Although the Debtor is represented by counsel in his Chapter 11 case, and that counsel appeared at the TRO hearing, the Debtor did not appear in this adversary proceeding through counsel until December 1, 2022. (ECF No. 47.)\n\nAt the conclusion of the TRO hearing, the Court granted a portion of the relief sought in the Motion and entered a temporary restraining order (the \"TRO\"). (ECF No. 26.) The TRO restrained the Debtor from (1) posting false and harassing materials about the Plaintiffs, their counsel, and their relatives; (2) publishing online the home addresses and other personal information of the Plaintiffs, their counsel, and their relatives; (3) encouraging, inciting, suggesting, or directly or indirectly financing protests at homes and offices of the Plaintiffs, their counsel, and their relatives; and (4) interfering with the integrity of these Chapter 11 cases. The TRO also directed the Debtor to take down social media posts that (a) published online home addresses and other personal information of the Plaintiffs, their counsel, and their relatives or (b) encouraged, incited, or suggested protests at homes and offices of the Plaintiffs, their counsel, and their relatives.\n\nThe TRO also scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the request for a preliminary injunction (the \"Hearing\") to begin on December 2, 2022. (ECF No. 39.) The Court continued the Hearing one business day to December 5, 2022, upon motion of the Debtor. (ECF No. 51.) On December 2, 2022, the Debtor filed his objection to the Motion. (ECF No. 58, the \"Objection.\") Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(2), the TRO was due to expire at 6:00 p.m. on December 7, 2022. During the third day of the Hearing, while evidence was continuing to be presented, but before the expiration of the TRO, the Court issued an order at 5:57 p.m. on December 7, 2022, extending the TRO for good cause in accordance with Rule\n\n65(b)(1)(2) (the \"Order Extending the TRO,\" ECF No. 80). The Hearing concluded on December 12, 2022. Counsel for PAX, the Chapter 11 Trustee and his counsel, and the Debtor and his counsel, presented witnesses, evidence, and their respective arguments professionally and respectfully.\n\n In order to fully and fairly analyze and determine these complex issues, the Court has had to consider and review voluminous evidence introduced during the four-day Hearing. Nine witnesses were called to testify during the Hearing, including the Debtor, one expert witness, and one of three interpreters who participated in the Hearing. The parties introduced 100 exhibits during the Hearing, the majority of which were videos and other postings made on various internet platforms. The ability to make specific findings of fact based on video evidence and other evidence that is not in document form is challenging and requires not only additional time, but additional technological resources. Although the parties were able to project the videos and internet platform screen shots during the Hearing, that evidence then need to be provided to the Court to become part of the official record of this adversary proceeding. After all of the evidence became part of the official record, the Court was able to prepare findings and fact and conclusions of law as set forth below.\n\n#### **III. JURISDICTION**\n\nThe United States District Court for the District of Connecticut has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). This Court has authority to hear and determine this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) and the Order of Reference of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut dated September 21, 1984. The instant proceeding is a statutorily core proceeding concerning the ability of this Court to address matters concerning the administration of the Estate, the liquidation of assets of the Estate, and the adjustment of the\n\ndebtor-creditor relationship in accordance with the provisions of Title 11. 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(A) and (O).\n\nThe Court finds that its exercise of jurisdiction is not unconstitutional under *Stern v. Marshall*, 564 U.S. 462, 487–99 (2011), because the Court is not determining the merits of a personal injury tort claim or a defamation claim as in *Stern*. Although the Debtor disagrees, the Complaint does not assert a defamation cause of action, but rather asserts causes of action under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) and 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). The Plaintiffs may assert such causes of action pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a) and 1109(b) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(7). The Court concludes the Complaint is not pretextual.\n\nThe Debtor argues that the relief sought in the Complaint is an improper use of § 105(a). The Court disagrees, noting it is common practice in adversary proceedings. *See, e.g.*, *Dunaway v. Purdue Pharms. L.P. (In re Purdue Pharms. L.P.)*, 619 B.R. 38 (S.D.N.Y. 2020); *Roman Catholic Diocese v. Doe (In re Roman Catholic Diocese)*, 628 B.R. 571 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2021); *Mgmt. Tech. Corp. v. Pardo (In re Mgmt. Tech. Corp.)*, 56 B.R. 357 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1985); Complaint, *Purdue Pharms. L.P. v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts (In re Purdue Pharms. L.P.)*, Case No. 19-08289 (SHL) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2018), ECF No. 1, *requested relief granted by* Order, *Purdue Pharms.*, Case No. 19-08289 (SHL) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2019), ECF No. 82, *most recently amended by* Order, *Purdue Pharms.*, Case No. 19-08289 (SHL) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2022), ECF No. 400.\n\nShould a reviewing court disagree with this Court's exercise of jurisdiction, the Court submits this Memorandum of Decision as proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052. The Plaintiffs consent to the Court's jurisdiction over the claims in this adversary proceeding, but the Debtor does not. *See Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif*, 575 U.S. 665 (2015).\n\nVenue in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.\n\n#### **IV. FINDINGS OF FACT**\n\nBased on the testimony and exhibits admitted during the Hearing, and upon taking\n\njudicial notice of pleadings filed in the jointly administered Chapter 11 cases and related\n\nadversary proceedings, the following are the Court's findings of fact:5\n\n#### *Entities Related to the Debtor*\n\n1. The Debtor began what is known as \"The Whistleblower Movement.\" He is the\n\nfounder of the New Federal State of China (the \"NFSC\") and the Rule of Law Foundation (the\n\n\"ROLF\"). ROLF's mailing address is the same as the address the Debtor listed on his\n\nbankruptcy petition as his personal address. PAX 35<sup>6</sup> , 40B, 55A, 64. Main Case ECF No. 1.\n\n<sup>5</sup> Because of the nature of the testimony during the hearing, the Court notes that, in a civil proceeding such as this adversary proceeding, a fact finder may draw adverse inferences against a party when said party refuses to testify in response to probative evidence offered against him or independent evidence exists of the fact to which the party refuses to answer. *Mirlis v. Greer*, 952 F.3d 36, 47 (2d Cir. 2020) (citing *Baxter v. Palmigiano*, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976) (\"[T]he Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them: the Amendment 'does not preclude the inference where the privilege is claimed by a party to a civil cause.\") (emphasis in original)); *Doe ex rel. Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer*, 232 F.3d 1258, 1264 (9th Cir. 2000) (\"[A]n adverse inference can be drawn when independent evidence exists of the fact to which the party refuses to answer.\")) Adverse inferences are appropriately admitted into evidence only if they are relevant, reliable, and not unduly prejudicial. *Brink's Inc. v. City of New York*, 717 F.2d 700, 710 (2d Cir. 1983). *But see Woods v. Start Treatment & Recovery centers, Inc.*, 864 F.3d 158, (2d Cir. 2017) (finding a court improperly admitted into evidence a defendant's invocation of Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in her deposition because such invocation was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial to the proceeding). The Debtor did appear and testify during the hearing and invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege almost 200 times in response to questioning by the Plaintiffs' counsel.\n\n<sup>6</sup> References to PAX's exhibits will be styled PAX [No.]. References to the Debtor's Exhibits will be styled Kwok [No.]. References to an exhibit where a witness wrote something down for the court will be styled [Witness's family name] [No.].\n\nKwok Direct, 7 ECF No. 97, at 106:10–25, 123:25–124:12, 124:15–21, 148:5–149:6, 149:17– 151:19, 189:2–23, 190:4–11; Cheng Direct, ECF No. 98, at 432:21–25.\n\n2. NFSC is associated, affiliated, and/or connected to the Debtor, ROLF, Farms, The Whistleblower Movement, Miles Guo Live Broadcast, and the GSeries. The GSeries includes the following entities: Himalaya Exchange, Gettr, GFashion, GMusic, GClubs, GNews, and GEdu. The Farms are also known as Himalaya Farms, which are social media groups used by members of the NFSC to communicate with each other. The NFSC home page directs visitors to The Farms via a hyperlink. PAX 34–36. Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 187:8–18; 188:9–19; Jiao Cross, ECF No. 98, at 374:17–376:25.\n\n3. The G in GSeries stands for Guo. The Debtor founded and controls GNews. GNews is connected to Saraca Media. The Debtor created GFashion. GFashion is connected to GNews, Gettr, and GCoin. PAX 34–36. Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 187:8–18, 188:4–19, 192:24– 193:2. The Debtor also controls Saraca Media Group and a related entity \"GTV,\" which is commonly referred to collectively as GTV. Jiao Cross, ECF No. 98, at 377:11–16, 413:23–24. GTranslators provides translation services for GNews broadcasts. PAX 26B, 40B.\n\n4. NFSC is associated, affiliated, and/or connected with the Himalaya Global Alliance (together with affiliated Himalaya entities, such as Himalaya Exchange and Himalaya Farms, \"Himalaya\"). PAX 6B.\n\n5. Himalaya entities, such as Himalaya New World, organize against the CCP.\n\nHimalaya New World writes articles and creates social media content to expose the truth about China and the CCP. Jiao Bing Shang is the President of Himalaya New World, Inc. Jiao Cross,\n\n<sup>7</sup> The Court will refer to testimony by [Witness's family name] [Type of testimony] followed by a cite to the redacted transcripts as they appear on the docket. The page number of the underlying transcripts, which are consecutively paginated for convenience, are used – not the page number on the Electronic Case Filling (\"ECF\") stamp.\n\nECF No. 98 at 373: 11–24, 397:25–398:6. Himalaya New World, Inc., also helps people to buy G-Club. Jiao Cross, ECF No. 98, at 413:25– 14:11.\n\n6. The Whistleblower Movement, NFSC, ROLF, and Himalaya are involved in the protests. PAX 3B, 3D, 6B, 9, 10B, 11B, 19B, 20B, 23, 24B, 26B, 28B, 38B, 39B, 40B, 42, 43B, 45, 47B, 51B. Kwok 8. Jiao Cross, ECF No. 98, at 353:19–354:1, 357:18–21, 367:11–19, 373:8–374:3; Cheng Direct, ECF No. 98, at 434:17–435:13; Cheng Cross, ECF No. 98, at 465:12–15; Li Direct, ECF No. 98, at 475:3–476:18; Li Cross, ECF No. 98, at 490:8–12, 22–23.\n\n7. The Debtor is the leader of The Whistleblower Movement, NFSC, ROLF, and Himalaya. The Whistleblower Movement, NFSC, ROLF, GSeries, and Himalaya serve the purposes of the Debtor, serve as business vehicles for the Debtor, and their members are personally loyal to the Debtor. PAX 6B, 34–36, 39B, 40B, 55A, 59, 64. Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 106:10–25, 123:25–124:12, 124:15–21, 148:3–149:6, 149:17–151:19, 187:8–18, 188:4–19, 189:2–23, 190:4–11; 192:24–193:2; Jiao Direct, ECF No. 98, at 340:22–24; Cheng Direct, ECF No. 98, at 435:4–6; Cheng Cross, ECF No. 98, at 450:6–11; Li Cross, ECF No. 98, at 491:4– 492:25. The Debtor's followers deny any association with the Debtor, but insist their motive behind protesting is: \". . . [The Debtor] is the spiritual leader, leader of the Chinese Whistleblowers, he is being followed by at least 500 million freedom-loving Chinese people . . . it is just like the Dalai Lama, of the spiritual leader of hundreds of millions of people from around the world. When he's under persecution or under attack by the CCP, people from around the world step forward . . ..\" Kwok 8.\n\n8. The Debtor communicates with members of NFSC, The Whistleblower Movement, and Himalaya via, *inter alia*, group chats, including group chats on WhatsApp. For example, the Debtor referred to one of the witnesses who testified during the Hearing, Ms. Yaqin Li, as \"great,\n\nwise, beautiful sister\" in a WhatsApp post commending her for her protest efforts. PAX 86. Li Cross**,** ECF No. 98, at 498:4–499:4, 503:9–505:19, 507:5–19.\n\n9. The Debtor uses, *inter alia*, single use \"burner\" phones to communicate with members of NFSC, The Whistleblower Movement, and Himalaya. Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 125:24– 126:10, 126:17–127:2. The Debtor is aware of his duty to cooperate with the Chapter 11 Trustee regarding his communications. Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 235:2–6. The Debtor has used burner phones for communications on matters related to his bankruptcy cases. Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 125:24–126:10, 126:17–127:2, 235:7–10.\n\n10. Associates of the Debtor have visited his office address at 3 Columbus Circle, New York, NY. PAX 85, 56, 57; Jiao Cross, ECF No. 98, at 418:15–419:20; Cheng Cross, ECF No. 98, at 463:8–19. GNews internet broadcasts, and the Debtor's October 2022 internet announcement made to his followers to stop protesting which was posted on NFSCTV's YouTube Channel, contain the same backdrop as a photograph taken at 3 Columbus Circle, New York, N.Y. PAX 39B, 40B, 67, 68. Associates of these entities that are closely affiliated with the Debtor also appear in photographs taken at the Sherry-Netherland apartment in which the Debtor has resided and/or resides. PAX 38A, 38B, 38D, 38E, 41B, 41C, 44, 58.\n\n#### *Persons Related to the Debtor*\n\n11. The Debtor is familiar with the individuals named Fay Fay (a/k/a Fei Fei), Beile Li (a/k/a Xiao Wangzi, Prince Li, Prince, or Little Prince), Huo Lai (a/k/a Fire Lai), Pamela Tsai (a/k/a Meiling Pam or Nicole), Jiao Bing Shang (a/k/a Ah Bing), Shan Mu, Roy Guo, Elliot Dordick, and Yaqin Li. PAX 3B, 3D, 8, 38A, 38B, 38D, 38E, 41B, 41C, 42, 43B, 44, 45, 56–58, 67–79, 81, 85, 86, 94, 95A, 95B, 95D. Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 163:23–166:9, 168:2– 170:6, 171:13–173:1, 173:6–11, 173:16–174:23, 175:2–10, 177:24–178:7, 178:18–22, 180:21–\n\n181:10, 187:19–24; 191:24–192:3, 192:13–15, 193:13–193:22, 194:22–195:9, 195:14–21,\n\n195:25–196:11, 206:12–14, 206:20–207:1. The Debtor invoked his Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination t in response to several questions about whether he recognized individuals in photographs and videos. However, the Debtor stated in a video posted on either December 5 or 6, 2022, after the completion of his testimony during the Hearing, \"The most important thing today is that comrades Prince, Huo Lai, Shan Mu, Nicole, and Luoyi were all there—they asked me to identify each—I spent the entire day looking at your faces.\" PAX 95B and 95D.\n\n12. Fay Fay, Beile Li, Huo Lai, Pamela Tsai, Jiao Bing Shang, Shan Mu, Yaqin Li, Roy Guo, and Ziheng Cheng are associated with The Whistleblower Movement, NFSC, the G-Series, Himalaya, and/or ROLF. PAX 3B, 3D, 8, 38B, 56–58, 67–79, 81, 85, 86, 93, 94, 95A, 95B, 95D. Jiao Cross, ECF No. 98, at 353:19–354:1, 357:18–21, 367:11–19, 373:8–374:3; Cheng Direct, ECF No. 98, at 434:17–435:13; Cheng Cross, ECF No. 98, at 465:12–15; Li Direct, ECF No. 98, at 475:3–476:18; Li Cross, ECF No. 98, at 490:8–12, 22–23.\n\n13. Elliot Dordick is an employee of Gettr. PAX 47B, 94.\n\n14. Fay Fay, Beile Li, Huo Lai, Pamela Tsai, Jiao Bing Shang, Shan Mu, Yaqin Li, Ziheng Cheng, and Elliot Dordick are friends, employees, servants, associates, followers, and/or colleagues of the Debtor. PAX 3B, 3D, 8, 38A, 38B, 38D, 38E, 41B, 41C, 42, 43B, 44, 45, 56– 58, 67–79, 81, 85, 86, 94, 95A, 95B, 95D. Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 163:23–166:9, 168:2– 170:6, 171:13–173:1, 173:6–11, 173:16–174:23, 175:2–10, 177:24–178:7, 178:18–22, 180:21– 181:10, 187:19–24; 191:24–192:3, 192:13–15, 193:13–193:22, 194:22–195:9, 195:14–21, 195:25–196:11, 206:12–14, 206:20–207:1.\n\n15. Fay Fay, Beile Li, Huo Lai, Pamela Tsai, Jiao Bing Shang, Shan Mu, Yaqin Li, Roy Guo, Ziheng Cheng, and Elliot Dordick are involved in the protests. PAX 19B, 24B, 38B, 40B,\n\n42, 43B, 45, 47B, 58, 86, 93, 94. Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 170:7–171:10. Jiao Direct, ECF No. 98, at 334:10–335:10; Cheng Direct, ECF No. 98, at 434:13–24; Li Direct, ECF No. 98, at 473:25–474:14.\n\n#### *Social Media Accounts Related to the Debtor*\n\n16. Mr. Brian Napierala, an intelligence analyst at Guidepost Solutions, LLC (\"Guidepost\"), was qualified as an expert witness during the Hearing to testify about open-source intelligence and cyber investigations regarding social media postings. Napierala Direct, ECF No. 97, at 36:15–19. Display names on Gettr can be changed at any time by anyone using the associated Gettr account. Napierala Direct, ECF No. 97, at 64:3–7. Handles, also known as usernames, are \"a little more sticky\" in that they require some form of dual authentication to change. Napierala Direct, ECF No. 97, at 64:19–65:2, 67:24–68:10. While multiple accounts may have the same display name, a handle is unique to an account. Napierala Direct, ECF No. 97, at 65:3–15, 68:11–17. Napierala Cross, ECF No. 97, at 80:11–13. Gettr marks verified accounts with a white \"v\" inside a red circle. Napierala Direct, ECF No. 97, at 66:2–19. Gettr verifies accounts through a process to identify that the account holder is who they claim to be. Napierala Direct, ECF No. 97, 66:2–19. Gettr accounts are password protected with potential dual authentication requirements in certain instances. Napierala Direct, ECF No. 97, at 68:18– 70:8. Users can, *inter alia*, post, re-post others' posts, and like others' posts on Gettr. Napierala Direct, ECF No. 97, 73:1–74:1.\n\n17. Gettr generates the date of a posting or a measure of when a post/repost was posted relative to when it was viewed. Napierala Direct, ECF No. 97, at 74:2–17, 75:24–76:4. When a timestamp appears at the bottom of a post/repost, that timestamp is Gettr generated and it is correct, except possibly with respect to the time zone. ECF No. 97, at 90:8–91:2. Internal\n\ntimestamps in videos are generated by the recording program. Napierala Direct, ECF No. 97, at 78:19–21. Guidepost recorded capture time where it could discern the time. Napierala Direct, ECF No. 97, at 75:7–19, 76:11–77:3.\n\n18. The @Miles Gettr account is verified by Gettr. *See* Fact 16, *supra*. The @Miles Gettr account formerly used \"MILES GUO Official\" as its display name. *See* Fact 19, *infra*. The @Miles Gettr account used a photograph of the Debtor, which photograph is also used by the NFSC Website under a heading labeled \"Who is Miles Guo,\" and is the profile picture of the @MilesGuo Gettr account. Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 107:17–19. At the top of the @Miles Gettr account is a banner with the NFSC emblem and Rule of Law Foundation emblem. The account's description stated: \"We are the Citizens of the New Federal State of China\" and \"Our Mission is to Take Down the EVIL Chinese Communist Party.\" The @Miles Gettr account reposts @NFSCSpeaks posts, @himalaya\\_mos posts, @gmusic posts, @QMAY007 (Display Name \"QMAY\") posts, which accounts are all verified by Gettr. The @Miles account posts its own original content, including \"Miles Guo's Broadcast Highlights,\" as well as G-News video content, and Fay Fay Show (a/k/a Fei Fei Show) videos. Several posts and re-posts contain content related to the protests. PAX 8, 35, 61.\n\n19. The @Miles account's display name was changed to \"NFSCTV\" on Gettr, and the profile picture was changed from a photograph of the Debtor to the NFSC emblem. It is unclear whether the description of the account remains unchanged. PAX 60.\n\n20. The @MilesGuo Gettr account is verified by Gettr. *See* Fact 16, *supra*. The @MilesGuo Gettr account at the time of capture used \"MILES GUO\" as its display name, and the @MilesGuo Gettr account uses a photograph of the Debtor, which photograph is also used by the NFSC Website under a heading labeled \"Who is Miles Guo,\" and was formerly the profile\n\npicture of the @Miles account. Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 111:12–14. At the top of the Gettr account is a banner with the NFSC emblem and Rule of Law Foundation emblem. The @MilesGuo account has \"liked\" posts from the @Miles account, and various accounts associated with NFSC and the term \"Himalaya\" in their handle that discuss the protests. PAX 8, 35, 53, 61. Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 127:21–128:6.\n\n21. The Debtor controls and at times personally uses the @Miles and @MilesGuo accounts. Others may also post on the accounts on his behalf. Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 126:14–16. Although the Debtor did not necessarily go through a verification process regarding his Gettr accounts, Gettr, an entity associated with him as part of the GSeries, verified his accounts. *See* fact 16, *supra*. PAX 8, 34–36, 61. Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 107:22–108:2, 111:17–19, 112:2–113:8, 117:22–118:12, 161:17–162:8; Jiao Cross, ECF No. 98, at 356:5– 357:17; Cheng Cross, ECF No. 98, at 464:23–465:9.\n\n22. The @MilesGuoLive Gettr account is verified by Gettr and includes a photograph of the Debtor as its profile picture. *See* Fact 16, *supra*. The @MilesGuoLive account reposts @NFSCSpeaks and @MilesGuo posts. PAX 50.\n\n23. The Debtor controls @MilesGuoLive. PAX 50. Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 132:6–8, 132:25–133:5, 135:25–137:4.\n\n24. The Debtor uses Gettr to reach a wide audience. Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 118:13–19.\n\n25. The @NFSCSpeaks Gettr account is controlled by NFSC – it is verified by a related entity, namely Gettr. *See* Fact 16, *supra*. PAX 34–36.\n\n26. NFSCTV's YouTube page prominently features an artist's rendition of the Debtor at the banner at the top of the page. Thumbnails of the videos available for viewing on the page\n\nindicate the Debtor is a frequent subject of the videos posted on the NFSCTV YouTube page. PAX 59.\n\n# *Timeline of Relevant Events*\n\n#### *i. Events following the appointment of the Chapter 11 Trustee on July 8, 2022*\n\n27. On July 8, 2022, the @Miles account posted a statement from the Debtor that \"the entire process of changing the trustee and my personal bankruptcy case is among the greatest treasures of our New Federal State of China and is of immense significance.\" The Debtor believes the Chapter 11 Trustee should be removed from his case for alleged conflict of interest. PAX 30A. Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 110:24–111:4, 243:2–11, 245:22–247:5.\n\n28. On July 13, 2022, the @Miles Gettr account posted a statement of the Debtor that the Debtor and undisclosed other parties would do their best to investigate the Chapter 11 Trustee's past work as a bankruptcy trustee and as a lawyer working on IPOs. There was a video embedded in the posting showing the Debtor, in a GNews broadcast with subtitles by G Translators, making this same claim. PAX 28A and 28B.\n\n29. On July 19, 2022, the @Miles Gettr account posted a statement about the Chapter 11 Trustee, stating \"Please spread the words about the revelations of the CCP military intelligence and the truths about the trustee of my bankruptcy case. All the U.S. DOJ officials and lawyers from various law firms who want to deport me and harm me will be sent to prison. I have the most unique voice in the world because almost every part of my body that can voice has been tortured by the CCP.\" PAX 26A.\n\n30. Mr. Stephen Kindseth, an attorney for the Debtor in his Chapter 11 case, testified that, after the Order Granting the Motion for Appointment of Chapter 11 Trustee entered on June 15, 2022, PAX and the Debtor engaged in settlement discussions. The settlement discussions\n\noccurred between July 2022 and September 2022. Kindseth Direct, ECF No. 111, at 844:1– 844:19. The Debtor would have paid money to PAX under the settlement. Kindseth Cross, ECF No. 111, at 869:4–7, 870:9–15. Settlement discussions started with the creditor's committee in September 2022 and continued through October 2022. Kindseth Direct, ECF No. 111, at 844:17–21. Mr. Kindseth requested throughout settlement discussions that the Trustee slow his investigation to give room for settlement talks. Kindseth Cross, ECF No. 111, at 894:11–895:11.\n\n31. On October 21, 2022, the Debtor made a statement in a GNews broadcast posted on the NFSCTV YouTube Channel asking the audience, which included \"fellow fighters,\" \"friends of the New Federal State of China,\" and his personal supporters, to stop spreading the personal information of PAG's<sup>8</sup> executives and their families and counsel. The Debtor stated he recognized this was a necessary condition for settlement and reconciliation. The Debtor stated that numerous parties he had accused of supporting the Chinese Communist party may one day become friends of NFSC. PAX had demanded the Debtor stop the doxing9 of PAG's executives and their families as part of settlement discussions. PAX 39B.\n\nQ [Attorney Friedman]: Okay. And do you-- do you recall Mr. Kwok making a statement on social media calling on people not to dox PAX, and not to dox people related to PAX made in connection with ongoing settlement discussions? A [Attorney Kindseth]: I recall that my client, at the request of PAX, complied with a term in the term sheet to post a video. And he posted a video, as requested by PAX and PAX's counsel.\n\nQ: And do you recall that part of that was him saying he would call on supporters not to dox PAX?\n\nA: Yes.\n\nQ: And not to harass PAX and family members who worked at PAX? A: As best as I can recall, because that came across my email, the terms that should have been contained in the video. I remember that request, and I believe\n\n<sup>8</sup> PAG is the managing partner of PAX.\n\n<sup>9</sup> Doxing is defined as \"to publicly identify or publish private information about (someone) especially as a form of punishment or revenge\" *See Dox*, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http (last visited January 10, 2023).\n\nhe satisfied the request. I've never seen the video, but based on conversations with counsel, I thought he complied with that request. Q: Okay. Do you recall him saying that it was necessary not to dox in order to have an effective bankruptcy process in the United States? A: Who would say that? Q: Your client. A: I don't recall that.\n\nKindseth Cross, ECF No. 111, at 870:16–871:14.\n\n32. On October 30, 2022, the Chapter 11 Trustee submitted a term sheet to the Debtor and his counsel regarding a global settlement and negotiations stretched into November 2022. Kindseth Direct, ECF No. 111, at 844:20–16. In November, PAX also demanded further financial security, but Mr. Kindseth believed things had been worked out with PAX by November 16, 2022. Kindseth Direct, ECF No. 111, at 845:17–23.\n\n33. On November 11, 2022, the Debtor was deposed by the Chapter 11 Trustee in connection with the Chapter 11 Trustee's motion seeking to hold the Debtor in contempt of the Corporate Governance Order. During questioning on the involvement of Yvette Wang with the entity known as Ace Decade Holdings, which is the subject of the contempt proceedings, the Debtor's responses devolved into accusations that Paul Hastings was like the CCP. Main Case ECF No. 1096 Ex. 27. In partial resolution of the Motion for Contempt, the Court later entered an order in which the Debtor agreed not to appeal the finding that he was, at least prior to the appointment of the Chapter 11 Trustee, the beneficial owner of Ace Decade Holdings. Main Case ECF No. 1110, the Partial Resolution Order.\n\n34. On November 15, 2022, the NFSC Gettr Page, @NFSCSpeaks, posted personal home addresses of the Chapter 11 Trustee, the Chapter 11 Trustee's family members, the chairman of PAG, family members of the chairman of PAG, and the law offices of the Chapter 11 Trustee's Counsel, and PAX's counsel. The @NFSCSpeaks post called for a 90-day protest\n\nat these locations. The post also contained photographs of some of the individuals living at the home addresses listed in the post. PAX 6B.\n\n# *ii. Events surrounding the Contempt Hearing held on November 16–18, 2022, including the Court being made aware of Call to Protest on November 16, 2022*\n\n35. On November 16, 2022, Mr. Kindseth transmitted to the Chapter 11 Trustee a letter summarizing terms for a global settlement that were acceptable to the Debtor. Kindseth Direct, ECF No. 111, at 841:24–843:24. The Chapter 11 Trustee called Mr. Kindseth's partner seeking to meet, which the Debtor agreed to do. Kindseth Direct, ECF No. 111, at 841:18–23, 846:19– 21. Mr. Kindseth wanted to settle the case before the settlement fell apart on account of things \"heating up\" inside and outside of this Court. Kindseth Direct, ECF No. 111, at 845:24–846:18. The contempt proceeding, the 2004 subpoenas, and the money paid by third parties to the Debtor's lawyers to defend contempt and the subpoenas, were reasons things were \"heated.\" Kindseth Cross, ECF No. 111, at 874:3–13, 874:16–875:6. Another reason things were \"heated\" was the social media campaign. Kindseth Cross, ECF No. 111, at 875:7–16.\n\n36. On November 17, 2022, there was a settlement meeting at the New York office of Brown Rudnick. Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 230:17–20; Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 672:23–673:5; Kindseth Direct, ECF No. 111, at 849:2–5. The Debtor, his attorneys Aaron Mitchell and Mr. Kindseth, and his translator Ms. Wilkinson, were all present at the meeting. The Chapter 11 Trustee and his attorney, Nicholas Bassett, were also present at the meeting. Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 230:21–231:20; Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 673:6–12; Kindseth Direct, ECF No. 111, at 841:15–17, 848:24–849:1; Kindseth Cross, ECF No. 111, at 891:22– 892:1. Prior to the meeting, the parties attending the meeting entered into a nondisclosure\n\nagreement. Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 228:6–8; Kindseth Cross, ECF No. 111, at 892:2– 893:2.\n\n37. During the meeting, the Chapter 11 Trustee spoke to the Debtor about the SEC and the IRS Proofs of Claim filed in the Debtor's Chapter 11 case, invoking Al Capone. Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 673:16–18, 693:17–22, 739:6–25, 740:1–5; Kindseth Direct, ECF No. 111, at 862:18–863:15. While Mr. Kindseth believed it was an unwarranted, thinly-veiled threat, he was aware that the SEC filed a Proof of Claim in the Debtor's Chapter 11 case, but was not aware of the contents of the SEC Proof of Claim. Mr. Kindseth was also not aware of the Chapter 11 Trustee's duties to the SEC and IRS. The Chapter 11 Trustee denied he was threatening the Debtor. Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 693:17–19; Despins Redirect, ECF No. 99, at 744:12–745:10; Despins Recross, ECF No. 99, at 745:17–746:10; Kindseth Direct, ECF No. 111, at 868:5–9; Kindseth Cross, ECF No. 111, at 871:18–872:22, 876:24–877:6. The Chapter 11 Trustee also told the Debtor that he believed the Debtor's legal arguments that various interests in property were not property of his bankruptcy estate were weak and he would lose in court. Kindseth Cross, ECF No. 111, at 898:15–899:2. The Chapter 11 Trustee asked for \\$250 million to resolve the Debtor's Chapter 11 case, which he meant – and Mr. Kindseth understood – was to be paid to the Estate as part of a settlement and not to the Chapter 11 Trustee personally. Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 638:24–639:1; Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 692:5–20, 741:3–22; Kindseth Direct, ECF No. 111, at 864:24–865:4; 881:25–882:4; 888:8– 14. Mr. Kindseth found this demand outrageous because it deviated greatly from the global settlement he envisioned. Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 740:11–741:2, 742:18–24; Kindseth Direct, ECF No. 111, at 866:1–8. Mr. Kindseth called the demand \"extortion\" in the \"heat of the moment\". Kindseth Direct, ECF No. 111, at 867:7–11, 867:25–868:4. The Chapter 11 Trustee\n\nmade it clear to Mr. Kindseth that the Debtor – or whoever paid the \\$250 million – could retain the surplus if less than \\$250 million in claims were allowed. Kindseth Cross, ECF No. 111, at 882:5–13. Mr. Kindseth believes it his duty to make sure the Debtor understands settlement proposals. Kindseth Cross, ECF No. 111, at 885:18–886:8. The Debtor believed he was close to accord and satisfaction with PAX, but the Chapter 11 Trustee's request for \\$250 million destroyed the deal. Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 247:8–19. Neither Mr. Kindseth nor his wife, with whom he discussed the issue, leaked the contents of the meeting on social media. Kindseth Cross, ECF No. 111, at 893:3–14.\n\n38. The Debtor did not report the alleged extortion to any authority. Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 118:25–119:6, 244:2–245:21. Mr. Kindseth did not report the alleged extortion to any authority. Kindseth Cross, ECF No. 111, at 899:12–18.\n\n39. On November 19, 2022, two days after the meeting with the Chapter 11 Trustee, the Debtor recorded a video which was posted on November 20, 2022, on the NFSCTV@chinatruth2022 account,10 a verified Gettr account. In the video, the Debtor represents he \"personally, strongly oppose[s]\" such protests \"in front of PAX office building and other places.\" The video makes no mention of protests in front of the homes of the Chapter 11 Trustee and his family, the offices of Paul Hastings, nor the homes of the PAG chairman and his family. The video also tells viewers \"if you really want to protest . . . be sure to consult a lawyer first, within the perimeter of the law, act within the perimeter of the law, and be sure to observe your state ordinances and local police . . . I strongly oppose and absolutely do not support such protests.\" Kwok 6A. Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 212:14–18.\n\n<sup>10</sup> It is unclear if, at the time of posting, the handle of this account was @Miles and the display name MILES GUO Official, because while Gettr handles are unique, multiple accounts could have the display name NFSCTV.\n\n40. On or before November 20, 2022, a subpoena was served on Jiao Bing Shang as the President of Himalaya New World, Inc. The subpoena was issued in accordance with an Order Granting a Motion for a Rule 2004 Examination of Himalaya New World, Inc. in the Debtor's Bankruptcy case. Upon being served with the subpoena, Ms. Jiao did not contact an attorney, she contacted Fay Fay. Jiao Cross, ECF No. 98, at 406:3–408:18, 409:3–5. Receipt of the legal papers was \"part of the reason\" why Ms. Jiao organized the protests in Washington D.C. at the offices of PAX's counsel, O'Melveny & Myers. Jiao Redirect, ECF No. 98, at 424:21–425:2.\n\n41. On November 20, 2022, the @NFSCSpeaks account posted a statement identifying the Chapter 11 Trustee's daughters and stating their father is aiding and abetting the CCP. The post also contained photographs of the Chapter 11 Trustee and his daughters and identified where they work. PAX 7. Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 589:24–590:1. The @Miles account reposted this @NFSCSpeaks post on its Gettr page. PAX 8.\n\n42. On November 20, 2022, protests occurred directly in front of the Chapter 11 Trustee's home. The protesters held signs which for the most part, were targeted directly at the Chapter 11 Trustee. PAX 9 and 91. Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 591:5–17.\n\n> *iii. Events following the filing by the Chapter 11 Trustee of a Statement About Social Media Campaign November 21, 2022*\n\n43. On or before November 21, 2022, protesters at the Chapter 11 Trustee's home distributed leaflets to neighbors describing the Chapter 11 Trustee and his Counsel as enablers of the CCP and accusing the Chapter 11 Trustee of racism. PAX 48 and 91. Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 614:21–615:8.\n\n44. On November 21, 2022, the Debtor participated in an internet broadcast acknowledging the 2004 subpoenas issued in the Main Case and advised the audience to avoid\n\nreceipt of subpoenas by, *inter alia*, not going home. The Debtor told viewers that, if they are \"stupid\" and receive subpoenas, the Himalaya Global Alliance and the Rule of Law foundation would hire attorneys to help them contest the subpoenas. PAX 38A, 38B, 38D, 38E.\n\n45. In the same internet broadcast described above, the Debtor stated, that the Chapter 11 Trustee and Paul Hastings would suffer \"calamities\" because of the 2004 subpoenas. The Debtor said \"To deal with this rogue, we have our rogue's ways. In a few days you will see what would happen to him. Calamities, I can tell you guys. They will suffer calamities!\" PAX 38B.\n\n*iv. Events following commencement of the Adversary Proceeding on November 22, 2022, and the entry of the TRO on November 23, 2022*\n\n46. The Debtor is aware of the TRO. Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 105:10–105:17, 119:25–120:3.\n\n47. On November 22, 2022, GNews conducted an internet broadcast from the protests outside O'Melveny & Myers New York, New York offices, stating that it was the third day of protests. The protesters held placards with stylized, inflammatory depictions of O'Melveny & Myers, attorneys as well as the Chapter 11 Trustee. PAX 45.\n\n48. On November 23, 2022, the @NFSCSpeaks Gettr account posted a video of protests that occurred immediately in front of the home of a family member of PAG's chairman. Protesters displayed signs with photographs of PAG's chairman with the word \"SPY\" and \"CCP\" prominently displayed. PAX 16 and 17.\n\n49. On November 24, 2022, a video was posted on YouTube, in which the Debtor personally called for \"Comrades\" to \"persevere with the 90-day protest.\" He stated ROLF supports the Debtor's legal efforts and protests. He cited the Chapter 11 Trustee's 2004\n\nsubpoenas as a reason for the protests, stating the Chapter 11 Trustee's behavior was mafia-like and worse than that of the Chinese Communist Party. PAX 3B and 3D.\n\n50. On November 24, 2022, the @MilesGuoLive account posted photographs of these protests occurring at the home of PAG's chairman's son with supportive emojis and stated \"Comrades who have worked so hard to protest on the frontline, rain or shine, salute you!\". The placards in the photograph are largely targeted at PAG's chairman. PAX 12 and 13.\n\n51. On November 25, 2022, the TRO was discussed on the Fay Fay Show, an internet broadcast. PAX 43B.\n\n52. On November 25, 2022, the @NFSCSpeaks account posted a video, with an internal timestamp of November 23, 2022, of protesters picketing and parading through the private lobby of 200 Park Avenue, New York, New York, the building which houses the New York Paul Hastings office. The protesters carried placards displaying inflammatory, edited photographs of the Chapter 11 Trustee, the Chapter 11 Trustee's counsel, and PAX's counsel. Several protesters wore hats with the G-Fashion logo. A large banner with the \"New Federal State of China\" emblem was carried by the protesters. Beile Li stated \"To everyone at Paul Hastings . . . Millions of People that have been persecuted by the CCP with curse you, will curse your family, curse every single person in your life because there is blood on your hands\" and \"the people of the New Federal State of China, 500 million of us . . . .we stand against Paul Hastings, and we stand against O'Melveny. There is no going back, there is no recourse. You have committed a crime, and now you're going to suffer the consequences of your actions.\" PAX 19B and 91. Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 581:10–583:7; Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 650:4–651:1.\n\n53. On November 25, 2022, the @Miles account posted an NFSCSpeaks broadcast, with an internal timestamp also of November 25, 2022, of protesters picketing in front of the Chapter\n\n11 Trustee's home with signs accusing him of various things and standing behind an NFSC banner. PAX 10B and 91. Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 576:21–578:18.\n\n54. On November 25, 2022, the @Miles account posted images of protests occurred at the home of relative of PAG's chairman. Protesters in front of the home carried signs with photographs of a targeted party. There are two NFSC flags displayed behind the protesters. PAX 15.\n\n55. On November 25, 2022, the Chapter 11 Trustee received a series of emails at his work email from the same unknown ProtonMail email address with consecutive subject lines \"I wish\" and \"i kill.\" The \"I wish\" email had the body text \"hhhhhhhhhahahahaha.\" The \"i kill\" email had no body text. PAX 29 and 91. Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 603:20–606:19, 607:19–608:14; Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 654:7–15. The Chapter 11 Trustee believed these emails to be a threat. Despins Redirect, ECF No. 99, at 744:2–4.\n\n56. On November 25, 2022, the @NFSCSpeaks account posted a video, with internal date stamp of November 25, 2022, depicting protests outside Paul Hasting's Tokyo office holding pickets directed at the Chapter 11 Trustee. PAX 20B and 91.\n\n57. On November 26, 2022, the @Miles account posted an NFSCSpeaks internet broadcast, with an internal timestamp also of November 26, 2022, of protesters picketing in front of the Chapter 11 Trustee's home with signs accusing him of various things and standing behind an NFSC banner. PAX 11B and 91. Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 579:8–581:2.\n\n58. On November 26, 2022, the @NFSCSpeaks Gettr account posted a link to a prfree.org article in support of a comment that stated \"\\$250 Million Dollar EXTORTION OF THE CENTURY\" and \"DOJ Appointed Trustee Despins Blackmails \\$250 Million, Threatens to 'Tear Apart' Chinese Dissidents.\" The post included an inflammatory photograph of the Chapter\n\n11 Trustee's face. On November 30, 2022, the @MilesGuoLive Gettr account posted the same text with a stylized image of the Chapter 11 Trustee. PAX 21 and 33.\n\n59. The \"\\$250 Million Dollar Extortion of the Century\" article from prfree.org fueled additional individuals to protest and/or organize protests. Jiao Cross, ECF No. 98, at 353:4– 354:14; Cheng Direct, ECF No. 98, at 434:13–435:13; Cheng Cross ECF No. 98, at 445:19– 446:22; Li Direct, ECF No. 98, at 477:23–478:6.\n\n60. On November 26, 2022, numerous Paul Hastings employees received emails from multiple senders with the same body text and attachment. The body of the email stated the New Federal State of China and \"Chinese whistleblowers\" called upon Paul Hastings employees to speak up against the Chapter 11 Trustee and/or leave the law firm. The email included a link to a prfree.com article on the alleged extortion, a Gettr post, and stated \"if you have any question, please contact NFSCspeaks@proton.me. The attachment to the email speaks about the alleged extortion and calls upon Paul Hastings employees to contact their elected officials and to \"request them to investigate Paul Hastings and Luc Despins.\" PAX 22A, 22B and 91. Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 594:12–595:1, 595:15–18, 596:3–598:9.\n\n61. On November 26, 2022, an unknown caller left a voicemail on the Chapter 11 Trustee's work telephone number stating \"Luc, you are CCP's running dog. You need to go to Hell. You just did something so ridiculous and your end is so close. F-U-C-K.\" PAX 23 and 91. Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 587:13–19, 588:13–20; Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 654:16– 655:11. The Chapter 11 Trustee believed this message to be a threat. Despins Redirect, ECF No. 99, at 743:23–744:1.\n\n62. On November 28, 2022, the @MilesGuoLive posted \"NDA . . . (Non-disclosure agreement)\" with an image of a post from an unknown social media site including an image of\n\nan NDA titled \"Agreement Regarding November 17, 2022 Case Status Meeting\" and including the caption of these Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases. PAX 32.\n\n63. On November 28, 2022, the @Miles Gettr account posted a broadcast of protests occurring in front of the O'Melveny & Myers's office in Washington, D.C. and New York. Protesters carried signs targeting PAG chairman Shan Weijan. The protests were reported and broadcast by a program with the NFSC emblem displayed, and two individuals wearing G-Fashion labels. PAX 18C and 18D.\n\n64. The Debtor was aware of protests at Grand Central Station on November 29, 2022, targeted at the Chapter 11 Trustee. PAX 50. Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 137:17–138:2.\n\n65. On December 3, 2022, the @Miles Gettr account posted a video of protesters picketing in front of PAX's counsel Attorney Sarnoff's apartment building in New York City. PAX 51B.\n\n66. On December 3, 2022, a video was posted on Gettr depicting protesters placing a placard including a stylized image of Attorney Sarnoff at the door of Attorney Sarnoff's home and sliding a letter under his door. PAX 93.\n\n67. On or before December 5, 2022, the protestors rented a home in California directly across from the home of a relative of PAG's chairman and placed on it with a billboard and signs targeting PAG's chairman. PAX 89. On December 5, 2022, on an internet broadcast hosted by Gettr, the Fay Fay Show discussed this activity. PAX 92.\n\n68. On or before December 6, 2022, and after his testimony during the Hearing on December 5, 2022, the Debtor filmed a video discussing his testimony and the proceedings in this Court. In the video, the Debtor identified several individuals, whose images had been\n\npresented to him during his testimony and about whom he had asserted his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. PAX 95A, 95B, 95D.\n\n69. On or before December 7, 2022, protests accusing the Chapter 11 Trustee of soliciting a bribe and seeking to destroy a Chinese dissident organization occurred at the Chapter 11 Trustee's daughter's and his ex-wife's homes. Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 621:8–622:2. The Chapter 11 Trustee hired a bodyguard for his daughter. Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 657:20–24. The protestors swarmed his ex-wife. Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 658:3–12.\n\n70. On or before December 7, 2022, protests accusing the Chapter 11 Trustee of being an antisemite and profiting from antisemitism accompanied with images of the Chapter 11 Trustee as a Nazi officer occurred at Grand Central Station, which is adjacent to Paul Hastings's New York City office. PAX 90. Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 618:7–619:17.\n\n71. On December 7, 2022, the Chapter 11 Trustee encountered protestors at his home when leaving for work in the morning at about 8:15 or 8:20 a.m. It was a peaceful encounter, but the protestors were trying to take photos of him. Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 592:17–594:1.\n\n#### *Debtor's Involvement With Protests*\n\n72. The Debtor has offered legal support to those individuals and entities served with subpoenas. PAX 38B. Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 176:1–12, 207:6–24\n\n73. The Debtor considers those protesting to be his comrades. PAX 3B and 3D. Kwok 6A. Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 207:25–208:8, 211:16–212:9.\n\n74. The Debtor, or someone the Debtor controls or directs, breached the NDA about the November 17, 2022, meeting for the purposes of creating the prfree.org article. PAX 21 and 33. Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 230:21–231:20, 231:21–232:2; Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at -\n\n673:6–12; Kindseth Direct, ECF No. 111, at 841:15–17, 848:24–849:1; Kindseth Cross, ECF No. 111, at 891:22–892:1, 893:3–14.\n\n75. The Debtor has the alias Seventh Brother. PAX 44, 95A. Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 191:17–20.\n\n76. The Debtor supports the protests. Facts 6–7, 14–15, 34–74, *supra*, and their supporting evidence. PAX 3B, 3D, 8, 86. Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 212:14–18, 215:17– 216:1.\n\n77. The Debtor supports, encourages, and is the leader of a social media and protest campaign targeting the Plaintiffs, their counsel, and their relatives, at personal homes and workplaces. The social media campaign and protests are tied to the Plaintiffs' involvement in the Chapter 11 cases, including the appointment of Chapter 11 Trustee which resulted in a divestiture of the Debtor's control over his Chapter 11 case, discovery efforts of the Chapter 11 Trustee and his efforts to discover and recover Estate assets, and the efforts of PAX to satisfy its claim which was reduced to judgment before the Debtor filed his Chapter 11 case. The social media and protest campaign accuses Plaintiffs and their counsel of, *inter alia*, being members or agents of the Chinese Communist Party, supporting and financing genocide in Xinjiang, seeking to destroy the NFSC and The Whistleblower Movement, anti-Chinese racism, and antisemitism. Facts 1–76, *supra*, and their supporting evidence. Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 220:1–5.\n\n#### *Plaintiffs' Connections With China*\n\n78. Paul Hastings LLP has offices in China. Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 640:17–18.\n\n79. The percentage of Paul Hastings LLP's revenue that comes from China is *de minimis*. Despins 1. Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 640:23–643:9. This revenue comes from American companies doing business in China as well as from Chinese companies. Despins\n\nCross, ECF No. 99, at 643:16–644:4. As an equity partner, the Chapter 11 Trustee would receive a portion of this revenue. Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 643:13–15. Paul Hastings LLP has previously represented PAG. Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 644:5–14.\n\n80. The Chapter 11 Trustee does not finance genocide. Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 591:20–22.\n\n81. The Chapter 11 Trustee has never been retained by the Chinese Communist Party for any purpose. Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 592:1–3.\n\n82. The Chapter 11 Trustee is not racist against Asian Americans. Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 623:7–9.\n\n83. The Chapter 11 Trustee has not served as counsel to companies in China. Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 639:2–3.\n\n84. O'Melveny & Myers has represented China VAST, whose founder, executive director, and president is a member and politician of the CCP. Kwok 14 and 17.\n\n# *Effects of Debtor's Social Media and Protest Campaign on the Chapter 11 Trustee's Investigation*\n\n85. The Chapter 11 Trustee plans his schedule around avoiding the protestors. Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 649:5–650:3.\n\n86. Because of the circumstances of these cases, Paul Hastings has neither billed for nor received any fees and expenses incurred in the Debtor's Chapter 11 case and all related cases. Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 647:19–24.\n\n87. The Chapter 11 Trustee is concerned that the Debtor's inflammatory rhetoric, and the response to such rhetoric, is escalating and is directed not only to the Chapter 11 Trustee, but also to others with no involvement in these cases. In support of this concern, the Chapter 11\n\nTrustee testified about an instance where a protestor chased and screamed at colleagues on their way up the escalator into Paul Hastings's office. The Chapter 11 Trustee is concerned that \"crazies\" might come to the conclusion to \"take out the Trustee.\" Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 622:3–20; Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 703:23–704:10, 704:24–705:9.\n\n88. Paul Hastings has had to hire multiple firms in relation to cyber security risks, exposing the firm to potential liability, given the current social media and protest campaign. Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 623:14–624:12; Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 707:12–708:6.\n\n89. Partners at Paul Hastings are concerned about how long the social media and protest campaign will last and how much it will impact the firm. Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 625:25–626:5. The Chapter 11 Trustee has spent dozens of hours meeting with partners not involved in these cases as a result of the current social media and protest campaign. Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 626:6–9. There have been discussions at Paul Hastings about having the Chapter 11 Trustee resign. Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 626:20–23.\n\n90. The Chapter 11 Trustee's counsel are nervous about coming to work through the gauntlet of protestors. Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 636:18–637:12. Hybrid work has slowed down the Chapter 11 Trustee's investigation into the Debtor's Estate compared to working together in person. Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 637:13–638:2.\n\n91. The Chapter 11 Trustee has spent numerous hours arranging protection with the U.S. Marshals and providing incoming evidence to the U.S. Marshals. Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 633:25–635:25.\n\n92. The Chapter 11 Trustee and Paul Hastings have been sued by Beile Li in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for being unregistered foreign agents for the Chinese Communist Party. The Chapter 11 Trustee believes Li's lawsuit is related to this\n\ncase because the filings also talk about PAX despite PAX not being a party to the case. Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 626:24–627:22.\n\n93. Mr. Dordick has filed an ethics complaint against the Chapter 11 Trustee and several of his counsel ostensibly because the Chapter 11 Trustee cited to an article about the Debtor in a counterclaim in a related adversary proceeding, which article itself Dordick asserts has run in papers that have also run allegedly antisemitic content. The Chapter 11 Trustee believes that Dordick's action relates to the placards depicting the Chapter 11 Trustee as a Nazi officer. Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 627:23–629:7.\n\n94. The Chapter 11 Trustee believes this adversary proceeding is a damaging diversion from his investigation into the assets of the Debtor – for both him and the Court – setting the investigation back weeks. Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 629:15–630:6; Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 708:7–709:3, 710:12–711:25. The process of attempting to recover assets of the estate has been delayed. The delay is particularly harmful because there may not be an adequate remedy at law to compensate for the delay. The Chapter 11 Trustee cannot hire professionals to assist with the investigation without Estate assets and Estate assets may be being placed outside the reach of creditors while the investigation continues to be delayed. Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 630:7–631:14.\n\nA [Despins]. . . we know that the assets that in front of us are, the Lady May, the Sherry-Netherland, the \\$37 million. Those Paul Hastings can see. We can deal with that. Up or down, the Court will rule, whether we prevail or not on that. So putting that aside, those assets are not sufficient to pay creditors. Far from it. So what we need to do is go after other assets, and Paul Hastings cannot do that on its own. It needs the assistance of forensic accountants. When you have a Debtor that testified that they're using burner phones, the only way to go after the cash that's in the system out there is through forensic investigation. That costs a lot of money. The only way to get there is to get money into the estate, and that's why it's so critical that we get to that point as soon as possible, or not, meaning the Court may rule that Mr. Kwok is right, and that—that will be the end of it. But\n\nwe—we need to get to that point, and without that, the passage of time –this case—this is not, like, good wine. It doesn't get better with age. The data gets stale. The funds can be moved all the time, and it's critical that we go forward. And this is a huge distraction and a costly distraction at that.\n\nDespins Direct, ECF No. 99, 630:18–631:14.\n\n95. The Chapter 11 Trustee's investigation has relied on unpaid informants who are very concerned by the social media and protest campaign, fearing it could turn against them. Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 631:15–633:12.\n\n96. The Chapter 11 Trustee is encountering creditor hesitancy to participate in the Debtor's case due to the social media and protest campaign, fearing such actions could turn against them. The Chapter 11 Trustee has had to devise methods for creditors to file confidential claims, necessitating that he seek to employ a claims agent – another cost to the Estate. Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 633:13–24; Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 703:17–22.\n\n97. The Chapter 11 Trustee feels obliged to fulfill his fiduciary obligations as Chapter 11 Trustee of the Debtor's Estate despite the difficulties presented by this case. Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 638:9–23.\n\n#### **V. DISCUSSION**\n\nThere are extremely difficult issues of law implicated by the Plaintiffs' requested relief and the Debtor's opposition to that relief. Despite these obvious difficulties, for the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that the law requires granting the Motion in part and, therefore, a Preliminary Injunction will issue.\n\n#### **A. Section 105(a) Preliminary Injunction Standard**\n\nThe Debtor argues that the Court should apply the Second Circuit's general standard for injunctive relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65, which standard is articulated in *Jackson Dairy, Inc. v.*\n\n*H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc.*, 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979). *See Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd.*, 598 F.3d 30, 35–38 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding *Jackson Dairy* remains the law of the Second Circuit). As set forth below, however, an alternate standard for injunctive relief is available in bankruptcy cases under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). *See e.g., Ball ex rel. Soundview Elite Ltd. v. Soundview Composite Ltd. (In re Soundview Elite Ltd.)*, 543 B.R. 78, 115 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016) (\"The Court issues a preliminary injunction under each of Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a) and Bankruptcy Code section 105(a), each of which provides separate authority for such measures.\"). The Plaintiffs have asserted their claims under section 105(a) and seek injunctive relief under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). The Court considers their request under that applicable standard.\n\nThe Second Circuit has \"repeatedly emphasized the importance of the bankruptcy court's equitable power,\" stating that \"[s]ection 105(a) should be 'construed liberally to enjoin [actions] that might impede the reorganization process.'\" *Momentum Mfg. Corp. v. Emp. Creditors Comm. (In re Momentum Mfg. Corp.)*, 25 F.3d 1132, 1136 (2d Cir. 1994) (upholding bankruptcy court equitably estopping debtor from objecting to claims) (internal citations omitted). While the Second Circuit clarified in *New England Dairies, Inc. v. Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc. (In re Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc.)*, 351 F.3d 86, 91–92 (2d Cir. 2003), that 11 U.S.C. § 105 cannot be used to \"'create substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under applicable law,'\" the Court is not being petitioned to do so here. Rather, the Court is being asked to insure the proper administration of the Estate under the provisions of the bankruptcy code. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs also invoke 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), the power of which \"extends, under appropriate circumstances, to persons who . . . are in a position to frustrate the implementation of\n\na court order or the proper administration of justice . . ..\" *United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co.*, 434 U.S.\n\n159, 174 (1977) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) supported an order requiring telephone company officials to provide technical assistance and facilities to law enforcement); *United States v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters*, 266 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2001) (in pertinent part, affirming that district court could issue an injunction in furtherance of a consent decree under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)).\n\nWhile the Second Circuit has not articulated a standard for injunctive relief under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), *see Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Butler*, 803 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1986), it has affirmed injunctions issued under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), *see, e.g.*, *Securities Inv. Protection v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Securities LLC (In re Madoff)*, 429 B.R. 423 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), *aff'd by Marshall v. Picard (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Securities LLC)*, 740 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2014). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and courts sitting in bankruptcy within the Second Circuit, have issued injunctive relief under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), with the \"traditional preliminary injunction standard as modified to fit the bankruptcy context.\" *Nev. Power Co. v. Calpine Corp. (In re Calpine Corp.)*, 365 B.R. 401, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (internal citations omitted); *see Solidus Networks, Inc. v. Excel Innovations, Inc., (In re Excel Innovations)*, 502 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying the Ninth Circuits preliminary injunction standard, modified to fit the bankruptcy context); *Dunaway*, 619 B.R. at 38; *Roman Catholic Diocese*, 628 B.R. at 571; *Soundview Elite*, 543 B.R. at 115; *Lyondell Chemical Co. v. CenterPoint Energy Gas Services (In re Lyondell Chemical Co.)*, 402 B.R. 571, 588–89 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); Complaint, *Purdue Pharms.*, Case No. 19-08289 (SHL) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2018), ECF No. 1, *requested relief granted by* Order, *Purdue Pharms.*, Case No. 19-08289 (SHL) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2019), ECF No. 82, *most recently amended by* Order, *Purdue Pharms.*, Case No. 19- 08289 (SHL) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2022), ECF No. 400.\n\nSection 105(a) injunctive relief may enter if (1) there is a likelihood of successful reorganization; (2) there is an imminent irreparable harm to the estate in the absence of an injunction; (3) the balance of harms tips in favor of the moving party; and (4) the public interest weighs in favor of an injunction. *Calpine*, 365 B.R. at 409; *see Soundview Elite*, 543 B.R. at 119; *Lyondell,* 402 B.R. 588–89. Injunctive relief may issue in a bankruptcy case without a showing of (2) imminent irreparable harm \"'where the action to be enjoined is one that threatens the reorganization process'\" and \"'the threat to the reorganization process must be imminent, substantial and irreparable.'\" *Calpine*, 365 B.R. at 409–10; *see Lyondell*, 402 B.R. at 590–91. Irreparable harm to the estate or the reorganization process must be \"likely,\" not merely possible, to support a preliminary injunction. *Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008).\n\n#### **B. Application of § 105(a) Standard**\n\n#### **i. Likelihood of a Successful Reorganization**\n\nTo establish the first element, there must be a \"'*reasonable* likelihood of a successful reorganization,'\" unless \"the acts sought to be enjoined *cause* it to fail.\" *Lyondell*, 402 B.R. at 589–90 (internal citation omitted; emphasis in original). The Plaintiffs argue this element has been met. Aside from the Debtor's intransigence, the Plaintiffs contend the Debtor's Chapter 11 case is not complex or difficult. Since the Debtor's Chapter 11 case has been pending in this Court, PAX has consistently and forcefully argued that the Debtor has many undisclosed assets that are hidden in a maze of corporate entities held by family members and associates. The Chapter 11 Trustee was appointed to investigate these claims for the benefit of creditors. The Plaintiffs argue that it is likely that the Debtor has ample disclosed and undisclosed assets to fund a Chapter 11 plan, which assets the Chapter 11 Trustee will liquidate or his investigation will\n\nuncover. The Debtor does not address this element, arguing as noted above, that the Court should instead be considering likelihood of success on the merits regarding an unasserted claim for defamation.\n\nThe Chapter 11 Trustee's investigation, which has been met with opposition at every step in the process, is likely to liquidate *disclosed* assets – such as the Debtor's malpractice action against Clark Hill PLC or the Debtor's U.K. action against UBS. The investigation is also likely to bring at least some of the currently *contested* assets – such as the Sherry-Netherland Apartment, subject to the outcome of the Bravo Luck Ltd. adversary proceeding, or the Lady May, subject to outcome of the HK International Funds Investments (USA) Ltd. LLC adversary proceeding– into the Estate for the benefit of creditors. The Court reaches this conclusion for several reasons. For example, despite his representations that he has no income or assets, the Debtor has demonstrated that he is able to marshal assets when he needs them. (*See, e.g.*, Main Case ECF Nos. 117 and 197.) Prior to the appointment of the Chapter 11 Trustee, the Debtor proposed a Plan of Reorganization in which the Lady May, a luxury yacht that the Debtor asserts he does not own or control, was pledged to the Estate for benefit of creditors. In addition, although the Debtor represented that he owned no assets and had no income when he filed his Chapter 11 case, he was able to obtain financing of more than \\$8,000,000.00 to fund the administration of the Estate. Furthermore, other courts that have entered a judgment against the Debtor have held that the Debtor hides assets in corporate entities and in the *de jure* ownership of family members and associates. *See, e.g.*, Decision & Order, *Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund, L.P. v. Kwok Ho Wan*, Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 2022), NYCEF No. 1181. The Court also notes that the Debtor has already asked the Court to enter the Partial Resolution Order of the contempt proceedings, which order finds he owns assets he previously\n\nstated he did not own. For these reasons, the Court concludes it is likely that the Chapter 11 Trustee will bring *some* assets into the Estate. Importantly, moreover, the Court concludes that the Chapter 11 Trustee's investigation will be more fulsome than the investigation of a hypothetical Chapter 7 trustee. Therefore, the Court believes the Chapter 11 Trustee's investigation will liquidate and recover enough assets to fund a confirmable Chapter 11 plan. The Court would consider such a plan, if confirmed, a successful result for the Debtor's Chapter 11 case.\n\nFurthermore, both the Debtor's own testimony and the testimony of his bankruptcy counsel support the Court's finding of fact that there was meaningful progress made towards reaching a settlement with PAX, by far the largest creditor in these cases. The Debtor's bankruptcy counsel believed a global settlement was within reach. Both the Debtor and his bankruptcy counsel blamed the Chapter 11 Trustee for the current lack of a global settlement. Regardless of that belief, the Court concludes that the Chapter 11 Trustee, an equity-partner and co-chair of the restructuring department at a large law firm with decades of experience in bankruptcy cases, is not at all opposed to reaching a settlement in this case. The Chapter 11 Trustee has fiduciary duties to creditors other than PAX, including those creditors who have not yet filed proofs of claim. Although the Debtor's bankruptcy counsel testified that he repeatedly asked the Chapter 11 Trustee to \"stand down,\" the Court appointed the Chapter 11 Trustee precisely to fulfill those fiduciary duties. The Debtor, for his part, has declared his wish to fairly and equitably resolve the claims of his creditors in these cases. (*See* Main Case ECF No. 107.) The Court has every reason to believe, while this case may be fraught with litigation for some time, that there is a reasonable likelihood that some form of settlement will be reached and a Chapter 11 plan will be advanced that meets the best interest of creditors test.\n\nAs discussed more fully in the succeeding section on irreparable harm, \"there is no reason to believe or suspect that [the Debtor's] reorganization will fail—unless, of course, the acts sought to be enjoined cause it to fail.\" *Lyondell*, 402 B.R. at 590. The Chapter 11 Trustee testified extensively about the effect of the Debtor's social media and protest campaign on his investigation. The Debtor's bankruptcy counsel testified regarding efforts to seek a settlement before things \"heated up.\" This fact, coupled with the Defendant's October 21, 2022, video calling for cessation of agitation against PAX so that reconciliation could be reached, establishes that at least the Debtor believes such behavior is not conducive to reaching such a global settlement. The Court agrees. The issuance of a preliminary injunction will support the ability to successfully reorganize, through the Chapter 11 Trustee's investigation and/or any attempt to reach a global settlement. If the actions that are enjoined were allowed to continue, the ability to successfully reorganize—through the Chapter 11 Trustee's investigation, settlement, or some combination thereof—will be greatly diminished. *See Lyondell*, 402 B.R. at 590.\n\n#### **ii. Irreparable Harm to the Estate or the Reorganization Process**\n\nThe Plaintiffs argue there is irreparable harm to the reorganization process for several reasons, including that the Debtor's conduct is disruptive of the investigation efforts and has a chilling effect on potential witnesses and creditors. The Plaintiffs further argue that the Chapter 11 Trustee's investigation is being stymied and distracted by this adversary proceeding, and that ultimately the economic realities of the case may force the Chapter 11 Trustee to resign. The Debtor does not argue this element and instead argues that defamation damages are not irreparable as they can be adequately compensated by legal remedies.\n\nThe Debtor is correct that the general rule is that a harm, to be irreparable, must be the sort that cannot be adequately compensated by legal remedies. *Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo*\n\n*S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc.*, 527 U.S. 308, 333 (1999) (holding that a district court \"had no authority to issue a preliminary injunction preventing petitioners from disposing of their assets pending adjudication of respondents' contract claim for money damages\"); *see CBS, Inc. v. Davis*, 510 U.S. 1315, 1318 (1994)(\"Even if economic harm were sufficient in itself to justify a prior restraint, however, we previously have refused to rely on such speculative predictions as based on 'factors unknown and unknowable'. . . . If CBS has breached its state law obligations, the First Amendment requires that Federal remedy its harms through a damages proceeding rather than through suppression of protected speech.\") (internal citation omitted). Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has held that this rule is not necessarily applicable in bankruptcy. *See Grupo Mexicano*, 527 U.S. at 322 (\"The law of fraudulent conveyances and bankruptcy was developed to prevent [the disposition of assets pending adjudication].\"); *Rubin v. Pringle ex rel. Focus Media Inc. (In re Focus Media Inc.)*, 387 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2004); *see also In re Owens Corning*, 419 F.3d 195, 208 n. 14 (3d Cir. 2005).\n\nMore importantly, however, as noted above, the Court does not agree with the Debtor's framing of the issue. The irreparable harm in this case is the harm to the Debtor's Chapter 11 Estate and the reorganization process itself. As noted above, the Court credits the Chapter 11 Trustee's testimony that (1) the Chapter 11 Trustee's investigation is currently unfunded and it is unsustainable unless it continues to press forward – this is about more than just cost: it is about whether there is an investigation at all, which investigation this Court concluded was necessary; (2) the Debtor's conduct is having a chilling effect on potential witnesses and creditors in these cases; and (3) there is a very real risk that the Chapter 11 Trustee will ultimately be forced to resign if the Debtor does not stop his conduct.\n\nAll of the Chapter 11 Trustee's testimony supports a finding of likely irreparable harm to the reorganization process or the Estate. *Calpine*, 365 B.R. at 409–10. As to (1), unnecessary delay is likely to lead to the dissipation of assets and reduced recoveries to creditors, which in bankruptcy, as discussed above, may be considered irreparable harm. *Cf. Grupo Mexicano*, 527 U.S. at 322. As to (2), any chilling of the investigation or of creditors coming forward would undermine the purpose of these proceedings, which were voluntarily initiated, as the Debtor states, to fairly and equitably bring finality to claims against him. As to (3), the Court granted a Motion to Appoint a Chapter 11 Trustee to investigate the affairs of the Debtor for the benefits of creditors. The resignation of the Chapter 11 Trustee, under these circumstances, is unlikely to lead to the appointment of a replacement Chapter 11 trustee and will thwart the Court's previous decision that a Chapter 11 trustee should be appointed in this case. Any replacement trustee would have to start over again and would likely face opposition from the Debtor immediately upon appointment, as the Chapter 11 Trustee has faced since his appointment. These enumerated harms establish that irreparable harm exists for which there is no adequate remedy at law.\n\nFurthermore, as noted above, the Debtor believed that actions consistent with the current social media and protest campaign were harmful to a settlement with PAX. On October 21, 2022, the Debtor called for the members of his movements – the NFSC and The Whistleblower Movement – as well as his personal followers, to cease doxing PAX to allow for peace and settlement between the Debtor and PAX.\n\nAlthough the Debtor argues that there is no evidence of irreparable harm to PAX, this objection is, again, working within the wrong framework. Nevertheless, the Court reinterprets the objection as an argument that the conduct leveled against PAX is not harm to the bankruptcy process.\n\nThe Court disagrees. PAX is a creditor in these cases. In fact, PAX is the largest creditor in the Debtor's case and has filed alter ego claims in the Corporate Debtors' cases. As discussed above, the Defendant is aware that his conduct damages the prospect of settlement with PAX. The Chapter 11 process provides a framework to encourage parties to settle and restructure debts within the guardrails provided by the confirmation requirements and the equitable powers of the Bankruptcy Court. Chilling the possibility of settlement is irreparable harm to the bankruptcy process and to the Debtor's Estate, particularly with respect to the Debtor's largest creditor, PAX.\n\nThe Court concludes, for all of these reasons, that the Debtor's conduct \"embarrass[es], burden[s], delay[s] or otherwise impede[s] the reorganization proceedings,\" *Lyondell*, 402 B.R. at 490, in that, for all of the above reasons, it makes the equitable resolution of the Estate's affairs much less likely. The Court also notes that the United States Supreme Court has stated \"'A State may protect against the possibility of a conclusion by the public under these circumstances that the judge's action was in part a product of intimidation and did not flow from the fair and orderly working of the judicial process.'\" *Cox v. State of Louisiana*, 379 U.S. 559, 565 (1965). The Court believes that it may similarly protect these bankruptcy proceedings from the possibility of the public drawing the conclusion that their results were the product of intimidation rather than the fair and orderly working of the judicial process. Such a conclusion is likely if the Debtor's conduct continues and causes the Chapter 11 Trustee to resign.\n\nFinally, the Court also notes that since the issuance of the TRO, the Plaintiffs have informed the Court that the social media and protest campaign is, at this point, still ongoing and in certain instances has escalated. The irreparable harm continues to occur, which is extremely alarming.\n\n#### **iii. Balance of the Harms**\n\nThe Plaintiffs argue that the above enumerated harms outweigh the harms to the Debtor's First Amendment rights, which they argue are limited upon the facts of this case. The Debtor argues that the harm to the Debtor's First Amendment rights grossly outweighs the likely harm, if any, to the Estate or the reorganization process.\n\nThe Debtor would be subject to a prior restraint on his speech if a preliminary injunction issues. The Debtor is generally correct that he would suffer a grave harm insofar as the speech is protected by the First Amendment. *Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson*, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). However, the extent to which his speech is protected under the First Amendment must be determined by the Court. Therefore, the Court's balancing of the harms is guided by First Amendment precedent. Accordingly, the Court applies strict scrutiny to the provisions of the preliminary injunction to be issued.\n\n#### **1. Narrowly Tailored to Serve Compelling State Interests**\n\nAs required by the United States Supreme Court, this Court's injunction must be looked at \"as we look at a statute [or ordinance], and if on its face it abridges rights guaranteed by the First Amendment, it should [not issue].\" *United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich.*, 401 U.S. 576 (1971). Content-based injunctions, such as this injunction, which prohibits expression with particular valences, \"are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.\" *Reed v. Town of Gilbert*, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015). Moreover, the injunction enjoins protesting in public streets – traditional public forums – also suggesting the application of strict scrutiny. *Frisby v. Schultz*, 487 U.S. 474, 480–81 (1988).\n\nUnlike in the plethora of cases cited by the Debtor, there are two established compelling\n\nstate interests supporting the present injunction.11\n\n# **a. Narrowly Tailored to Serve Quiet Enjoyment of Private Homes**\n\nIn *Frisby*, the United States Supreme Court held regarding \"'[t]he State's interest in\n\nprotecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home,\" 487 U.S. at 484, that\n\nThe type of picketers banned by the Brookfield ordinance generally do not seek to disseminate a message to the general public, but to intrude upon the targeted resident, and to do so in an especially offensive way. Moreover, even if some such picketers have a broader communicative purpose, their activity nonetheless inherently and offensively intrudes on residential privacy. The devastating effect of targeted picketing on the quiet enjoyment of the home is beyond doubt: \"To those inside . . . the home becomes something less than a home when and while the picketing . . . continue[s] . . .. [The] tensions and pressures may be psychological, not physical, but they are not, for that reason, less inimical to family privacy and truly domestic tranquility.\"\n\n<sup>11</sup> *Compare Frisby*, 487 U.S. at 484 (\"'The State's interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society.'\"); *Picard v. Magliano*, 42 F.4th 89, 103–05 (2d Cir. 2022) (finding *Cox*, 379 U.S. at 562 (\"There can be no question that a State has a legitimate interest in protecting its judicial system from the pressures which picketing near a courthouse might create. Since we are committed to a government of laws and not of men, it is of the utmost importance that the administration of justice be absolutely fair and orderly. This Court has recognized that the unhindered and untrammeled functioning of our courts is part of the very foundation of our constitutional democracy.\") remains good law) *with, e.g.*, *Snyder v. Phelps*, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) (no compelling state interest in allowing recovery for extreme emotional distress arising from protests that occurred 1000 feet away from funeral, involved matters of public concern, were peaceful and in accordance with law, and were overseen by the police); *Bartnicki v. Vopper*, 532 U.S. 514, 528–35 (2001) (Neither the deterrence of antisocial conduct nor the preservation of privacy of communication, as it relates to issues of public concern, is a compelling state interest supporting the punishment of the \"publisher of information [who] has obtained the information in question in a manner lawful in itself but from a source who has obtained it unlawfully . . ..\"); *Florida Star v. B.J.F.*, 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989) (Against the state interest in protecting B.J.F.'s privacy, \"[w]e hold only that where a newspaper publishes truthful information which it has lawfully obtained, punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all, only when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order, and that no such interest Is satisfactorily served by imposing liability under [statute prohibiting disclosure of sexual assault victims' names by police] to the appellant under the facts of this case [namely their receipt of disclosed name of a sexual assault victim, relating to a matter of public concern.]\"); *Texas v. Johnson*, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (no compelling state interest in prosecuting a protester who, without breaking the peace, burned the American flag in front of Dallas City hall); *Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart*, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (criminal defendant's right to an impartial jury was not a compelling state interest sufficient to enjoin the press from publishing information of public concern.); *N.Y. Times Co. v. United States*, 403 U.S. 670 (1971) (Government presented no compelling state interest to prevent publication of the Pentagon Papers); *Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe*, 402 U.S. 415, 429 (1971) (\"Designating the conduct as an invasion of privacy, the apparent basis for the injunction here, is not sufficient to support an injunction against peaceful distribution of informational literature of the nature revealed by this record,\" particularly where \". . . respondent is not attempting to stop the flow of information into his own household but to the public.\"); *N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan*, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (absent finding of actual malice, no compelling state interest in allowing public figures or officials from recovering for defamation.)\n\n487 U.S. at 486. *Frisby* distinguished *Keefe*, the case the Debtor has repeatedly relied on and cited as the most similar case to the instant case. *Id.* However, as *Frisby* noted, *Keefe* itself observed in reaching its conclusion that \"Designating the conduct as an invasion of privacy, the apparent basis for the injunction here, is not sufficient to support an injunction against peaceful distribution of informational literature of the nature revealed by this record,\" *particularly where*  \"*. . . respondent is not attempting to stop the flow of information into his own household but to the public*,\" *Keefe*, 402 U.S at 429 (emphasis added). *Frisby*, 487 U.S. at 486 (distinguishing *Keefe*).\n\nHere, as in *Frisby*, the injunction is attempting to stop the flow of information into households. *Id.* To the extent the Chapter 11 Trustee, his counsel, his children, and his former spouse, as well as PAG's chairman and his family and PAX's counsel are subject to targeted protests at their personal homes, the Court finds *Frisby* is controlling law – not *Keefe –* and that the state has a compelling interest in protecting the \"well-being, tranquility, and privacy of [their] home[s].\" *Frisby*, 487 U.S. at 484. \"The devastating effect of targeted picketing on the quiet enjoyment of the home is beyond doubt. . . *the actual size of the group is irrelevant; even a solitary picket can invade residential privacy*.\" *Frisby*, 487 U.S. at 486-87 (emphasis added).\n\n Under *Frisby*, the Court may, in serving this compelling state interest, completely ban picketing \"'before or about the residence or dwelling of any individual.'\" *Id.* at 477. Like in *Frisby*, this restraint on speech is narrowly tailored. *Id.* at 487–88 (\"Thus, the 'evil' of targeted residential picketing, ' the very presence of an unwelcome visitor at the home,' is 'created by the medium of expression itself.' Accordingly, the Brookfield ordinance's complete ban of that particular medium of expression is narrowly tailored.\") The Court accordingly adopts a\n\ncomplete ban on picketing \"before or about\" the residences at issue in this case, for the reasons stated in *Frisby*.\n\nAlthough the Court is issuing a complete ban on picketing \"before or about\" the residences, the Court may not ban \"'[g]eneral marching through residential neighborhoods, or even walking a route in front of an entire block of houses,'\" which would be accomplished if the injunction provided for a complete ban within a \"300-foot zone around the residences.\" *Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc*., 512 U.S. 753, 755 (1994) (internal citations omitted). Nevertheless, a court may issue \"a limitation on the time, duration of picketing, and number of pickets outside a smaller zone.\" *Madsen*, 512 U.S. at 755. For this reason, the Court additionally imposes a ban on picketing within 200-feet12 of the residences at issue during the hours the parties at issue are likely to be resting at home and traveling to and from work or school. The Court concludes that (a) the quiet enjoyment of the home includes quietude at night, which supports greater restriction on picketing at night,13 and (b) the quiet enjoyment of the home is also destroyed when the home is turned into a bunker where ingress and egress are subject to protest, which supports greater restrictions on picketing when people are leaving for work or school and coming home.14 The Chapter 11 Trustee testified as to his efforts to avoid leaving and returning to his targeted residence during protests. The Debtor could still picket or\n\n<sup>12</sup> The Court chooses 200-feet because the United States Supreme Court has held that 300 feet is too expansive, *Madsen*, 512 U.S. at 755, and because 200 feet should provide enough room for cars to safely drive into and out of a neighborhood. It should also provide ample room as a noise buffer for most unamplified noises.\n\n<sup>13</sup> The Court is concerned about noise at night. The Plaintiffs submitted into evidence photographs and videos which plainly displayed protesting, picketing, leafletting, and assemblage in front of residences in Connecticut, New York, Massachusetts, and California. The Court reviewed the codified ordinances in the relevant towns and cities for a survey of restrictions currently applicable in the area. All of the relevant towns and cities have nighttime noise ordinances.\n\n<sup>14</sup> The Court enjoins from 3:00 p m. to 10:00 a.m. because it has added the normal hours for commute to the 9:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. framework discussed in the previous footnote. This is extended to weekends because (a) many of the targeted parties are lawyers who are probably working at least Saturday and (b) it is normal to rest more on weekends.\n\nparade within the relevant neighborhoods – but not \"before or about\" the relevant homes – at other times of day.\n\nThe Court also finds that *Frisby* justifies enjoining the Debtor from inciting the picketing the Court is enjoining, such as by posting or reposting on social media the home addresses of the Chapter 11 Trustee, his counsel, and his family members and of PAG's chairman, his counsel, and his family members or by calling for protests at their homes. The Debtor cannot evade the injunction through calling on or supporting others to act in his stead.\n\n# **b. Narrowly Tailored to Serve the Integrity of the Judicial Process**\n\nIn addition, the United States Supreme Court in *Cox* stated\n\nThere can be no question that a State has a legitimate interest in protecting its judicial system from the pressures which picketing near a courthouse might create. Since we are committed to a government of laws and not of men, it is of the utmost importance that the administration of justice be absolutely fair and orderly. This Court has recognized that the unhindered and untrammeled functioning of our courts is part of the very foundation of our constitutional democracy. . . There is no room at any stage of the judicial proceeding for such intervention; mob law is the very antithesis of due process.\n\n379 U.S. at 562; *see Picard*, 42 F.4th at 103–05 (finding *Cox* remained good law as suggested by\n\n*Burson v. Freeman*, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (upholding restrictions to electioneering near polling location)); *cf. Alix v. McKinsey & Co., Inc.*, 23 F.4th 196, 204 (2d Cir. 2022) (\"More specifically (and more importantly) we believe the district court gave insufficient consideration to the fact that McKinsey's alleged misconduct targeted the federal judiciary. As a consequence, this case requires us to focus on the responsibilities that Article III courts must shoulder to ensure the integrity of the Bankruptcy Court and its processes. Litigants in all of our courts are entitled to expect that the rules will be followed . . ..\").\n\nWhile in both *Cox* and *Picard*, the statutes in question were found unconstitutional as applied, they were found facially constitutional. *Cox*, 379 U.S. at 560–64 & 568–75 (finding statute facially constitutional but unconstitutional as applied because, while \"near\" was not unconstitutionally vague, the protesters relied in good faith on the sheriff's representation that they were allowed to protest where they did so); *Picard*, 42 F.4th at 101 & 103–05 (finding the statute facially constitutional but unconstitutional as applied because the protest was \"general advocacy unconnected to any specific trial\" in combination with the protest being \"effected through leafletting rather than more overt and disruptive forms of communication\").\n\nThe statute at question in *Picard* prohibits\n\nOn or along a public street or sidewalk within a radius of two hundred feet of any building established as a court house . . . call[ing] aloud, shout[ing], hold[ing] or display[ing] placards or signs containing written or printed matter, concerning the conduct of a trial being held in such courthouse or the character of the court or jury engaged in such trial or calling for or demanding any such specified action or determination by such court or jury in connection with such trial.\n\n*Id.* at 95. The protests here, in contrast to the leafletting in *Picard* and in even starker contrast to *Keefe*, the Debtor's lead case, which did not involve protests targeting court proceedings, involve picketing and parading targeted at particular parties, namely, the Plaintiffs, including an officer of the Court, namely, the Chapter 11 Trustee, and at particular litigation, namely, these bankruptcy cases. This Preliminary Injunction and the TRO before it only enjoin future action (and only direct future action), so there is no issue of reliance as in *Cox*.\n\n The Court concludes that this injunction's measures relating to personal homes, discussed above, are also narrowly tailored in service of the compelling state interest articulated in *Cox* – targeted picketing of fellow parties in interest, their counsel, and their families at their homes threatens to transform the legal process into \"mob law\" – or at least the appearance thereof. *Cox*,\n\n379 U.S. at 562. The Court further concludes that the protests at the homes of uninvolved relatives only serve to intimidate the Plaintiffs and may be completely banned under *Cox.*\n\n*Cox's* concern about \"mob law\" also applies to the offices and other workplaces of the Chapter 11 Trustee and his counsel as well as PAX and its counsel. The Court enjoins picketing and parading within 100 feet15 during the likely hours of ingress and egress to these workplaces so as to avoid close encounters between protestors and workers, which encounters could, minimally, undermine the appearance that these bankruptcy cases are legal proceedings or, maximally, affect the outcome of these bankruptcy cases. *See id.*\n\nIn addition, the Court concludes that the provision of a 36-foot access corridor at all times, modeled after similar corridors discussed in abortion cases, *see Madsen*, 512 U.S. at 768– 770, burdens no more speech than is necessary to prevent the legal process from being dominated or appearing to be dominated by \"mob law,\" *Cox*, 379 U.S. at 562.\n\nThe Debtor may picket and parade near the workplaces of the Chapter 11 Trustee and his counsel, as well as PAX and its counsel, at distances and at times other than those restricted by this preliminary injunction. However, the Debtor may not, at any time, picket within 100 feet of the parties' relatives' offices and workplaces because the Court concludes that such picketing of uninvolved relatives only serves to intimidate the Plaintiffs and may be completely banned under *Cox*.\n\nThe Court also finds that *Cox* and *Picard* justify enjoining the Debtor from inciting the picketing it is enjoining, such as by calling for protests at the workplaces of the Chapter 11\n\n<sup>15</sup> The Court chooses 100 feet because it concludes most pedestrian traffic – from parked cars, transit stops, and homes – destined for the offices should occur within this distance from the offices.\n\nTrustee and his counsel or PAX and its counsel. As noted above, the Debtor cannot evade the injunction through calling on or supporting others to act in his stead.\n\n# **2. Under the Specific Facts and Circumstances of These Cases, the Debtor's Speech Is Due Less Protection**\n\nWhile the above rationale is sufficient to support the injunction, there are also circumstances in this case lessening the protection due the Debtor's speech. *See Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc.*, 418 U.S. 323, 345–48 (1974) (\"Thus, private individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury than public officials and public figures; they are also more deserving of recovery.\"); *Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.*, 472 U.S. 749, 758–61 (1985) (\"In contrast, speech on matters of purely private concern is of less First Amendment concern.\").\n\n#### **a. Chapter 11 Trustee is Not a Public Official or Public Figure**\n\nAlthough the Debtor argues to the contrary, the Court concludes that the Chapter 11 Trustee is not a public official. *See Obsidian Finance Grp., LLC v. Cox*, 740 F.3d 1284, 1292– 93 (9th Cir. 2014). Similarly, the Court concludes, despite the Debtor's contentions otherwise, that the Chapter 11 Trustee is not a public figure. *See Gertz*, 418 U.S. at 352 (\"We would not lightly assume that a citizen's participation in community and professional affairs rendered him a public figure for all purposes. Absent clear evidence of general fame or notoriety in the community, and pervasive involvement in the affairs of society, an individual should not be deemed a public personality for all aspects of his life. It is preferable to reduce the public-figure question to a more meaningful context by looking to the nature and extent of an individual's participation in the particular controversy.\"). The Chapter 11 Trustee appears in Court and meets and confers with parties in interest and professionals in these cases. His role is not public facing. These cases are not widely covered by the bankruptcy press or any press, other than Debtor\n\naffiliated media of limited reach. Because the Chapter 11 Trustee is neither a public official nor a public figure, the public has less of a vested interest in speaking about him than it would if he were a public figure. *Compare Gertz*, 418 U.S. at 339–48 *with Sullivan*, 376 U.S. at 269.\n\n There was no argument and no evidence in the record establishing that any of the other targeted parties were public officials or figures. *Gertz*, 418 U.S. at 352. Therefore, the Debtor's speech is due less protection. *Id.* at 345–48.\n\n#### **b. Debtor's Case Is Not a Matter of Public Concern**\n\n The Court also finds that the specific facts and circumstances in these cases are not an issue of public concern. Speech relates to public concerns \"when it can be 'fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,' or when it 'is subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public.'\" *Snyder*, 562 U.S. at 453.\n\nIn *Snyder*, in determining that the Westboro Baptist Church's protests were about an issue of public concern, the Supreme Court noted two factors that cut the other way in the instant case. The Supreme Court noted\n\nAnd even if a few of the signs – such as \"You're Going to Hell\" and \"God Hates You\" – were viewed as containing messages related to Matthew Snyder or the Snyders specifically, that would not change the fact that the overall and dominant theme of Westboro's demonstration spoke to broader issues.\n\n*Id.* at 454. Here, the overall and dominant theme of the signs are inflammatory assertions about the targeted individuals along-side inflammatory stylized portraits of their faces – and the few\n\nsigns that are arguably targeted at broader issues do not change this fact. The personal nature of the dispute is further underscored by the protests at uninvolved family members' homes.16\n\nIn addition, the Supreme Court noted\n\nWe are not concerned in this case that Westboro's speech on public matters was in any way contrived to insulate speech on a private matter from liability. Westboro had been actively engaged in speaking on the subjects addressed in the picketing long before it became aware of Matthew Snyder, and there can be no serious claim that Westboro's picketing did not represent its \"honestly believed\" views on public issues.\n\n*Id.* at 455. Here, the Court is very seriously concerned that the Debtor's speech on the only matters arguably of public concern – the alleged extortion and alleged pension theft – are contrived to insulate speech on a private matter. The other acknowledged issues animating the protests - the Chapter 11 Trustee's motion to hold the Debtor is in contempt for alleged violation of the Corporate Governance Order which the Debtor's bankruptcy counsel testified was \"heating up\" these cases and the Court-approved 2004 subpoenas which are repeatedly referred to in the Objection, several of the broadcasts, and Ms. Jiao's testimony – are not a matter of public concern. They are issues about the administration and investigation of an individual debtor's Chapter 11 bankruptcy estate relating to a bankruptcy that gets very little press other than from Debtor affiliated outlets, such as GNews.\n\nThe pension theft and extortion claims, however, are alleged crimes, and crimes are generally a matter of public concern. *Obsidian Finance*, 740 F.3d at 1291–92. However, the Court concludes the alleged pension theft is not a matter of public concern. There is no suggestion in the record that PAX is being investigated or prosecuted regarding its alleged involvement with the pension fund. Furthermore, Ms. Jiao's testimony about the alleged pension\n\n<sup>16</sup> The protests at the home and work addresses of relatives is afforded less protection under the First Amendment for this reason.\n\ntheft was not supported any evidence. She could not explain how PAX was stealing monies of the fund by investing it. For his part, Mr. Cheng did not know why he was protesting O'Melveny & Myers – his stated rationale was directed at the Chapter 11 Trustee – not PAX – and he was not entirely sure how O'Melveny & Myers was involved in these cases.\n\nThe Court also concludes the alleged extortion is not a matter of public concern. The Court finds there is no evidence that there is a criminal investigation into the alleged extortion. While the Debtor initially testified that he had reported the Chapter 11 Trustee to the authorities, he could not, when pressed, specify to what authority he had reported the Chapter 11 Trustee, ultimately suggesting he had merely discussed it with his counsel – not an authority.\n\nAlso, although the Debtor testified that he believed the Chapter 11 Trustee had attempted to extort him, the Debtor's bankruptcy counsel testified that he knew that the Chapter 11 Trustee was not asking to be personally paid \\$250 million, but was rather asking for \\$250 million to be paid to the Estate as part of a global settlement. In the heat of the moment, the Debtor's bankruptcy counsel did accuse the Chapter 11 Trustee of extortion at the November 17th settlement meeting. Despite that exclamation, he understood that extortion had not actually occurred but rather a settlement offer was made. The Debtor's bankruptcy counsel also testified that it was his duty to the Debtor to explain settlement terms, such as the Chapter 11 Trustee's demand for \\$250 million for the Estate. The Court infers from this testimony that he informed the Debtor that, despite his exclamation during the meeting, the Chapter 11 Trustee had not tried to extort the Debtor.\n\nAlthough the Debtor's testified that he was more afraid during the settlement meeting with the Chapter 11 Trustee than he was while he was in prison in China, that testimony is not persuasive. While the testimony suggests that the Chapter 11 Trustee made unfortunate\n\ncomments during the settlement meeting, the testimony did not establish the basis for such fear from the Debtor. Moreover, the Debtor's equivocation about whether he had reported the incident to the authorities and, if so, to whom, renders his testimony on this issue unpersuasive.\n\nFinally, at the time of the alleged extortion, the uncontroverted testimony of the Debtor, the Chapter 11 Trustee, and Mr. Kindseth is that there were six people – the Debtor, Mr. Kindseth, Mr. Mitchell representing the Debtor, the Debtor's translator, the Chapter 11 Trustee, and Mr. Bassett representing the Chapter 11 Trustee – present at the meeting and that they were bound by a non-disclosure agreement. The Court infers, given the nature of the accusation and how it was utilized as part of the social media and protest campaign, that the article was not leaked by the Chapter 11 Trustee or Mr. Bassett, but rather some party connected to the Debtor.\n\nTherefore, the Court concludes that neither the allegation of pension theft nor the allegation of extortion makes the present matter an issue of public concern. They are issues designed to cloak matters of private concern in the speech protection afforded matters of public concern. *Cf. Snyder*, 562 U.S. at 455. Therefore, the Debtor's speech is due less protection. *Greenmoss Builders*, 472 U.S. at 758–61.\n\n#### **3. Debtor Has No Standing Regarding Unnamed Parties**\n\nThe Debtor also argues that the request for a preliminary injunction is overbroad because it contains language based on Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2), which states\n\n(2) Persons Bound. The order binds only the following who receive actual notice of it by personal service or otherwise:\n\n(A) the parties;\n\n(B) the parties' officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and (C) other persons who are in active concert or participation with anyone described in Rule 65(d)(2)(A) or (B).\n\nAs the Plaintiffs note, however, the Debtor, a named party does not have standing to make this objection. *Madsen*, 512 U.S. at 775–76.\n\n For all of the above reasons, the Court finds that the balance of harms tips in favor of granting the preliminary injunction. As the Court noted above in the preceding section, the harm to the Plaintiffs continues to occur despite the existence of the TRO, which is alarming.\n\n#### **iv. Public Interest**\n\nFinally, the Court concludes that issuing injunctive relief vindicates the public's interest in the integrity of the bankruptcy process as well as court proceedings more generally. *Alix*, 23 F.4th at 204. Bankruptcy is a process through which a debtor's financial affairs are put in order and all claims against the debtor are treated fairly and equitably. Furthermore, in the case of an individual, such as the Debtor, a debtor gets a fresh start. *See Grogan v. Garner*, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) (\"This Court has certainly acknowledged that a central purpose of the Code is to provide a procedure by which certain insolvent debtors can reorder their affairs, make peace with their creditors, and enjoy 'a new opportunity in life with a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.'\"). It is a benefit to the public to have such a system and for that reason, its integrity must be maintained.\n\nIssuing injunctive relief also serves the public's interest in preserving the sanctity and privacy of the home and the rule of law, as discussed in the previous section. *Frisby*, 487 U.S. at 484; *Cox*, 379 U.S. at 562.\n\nThe Court further notes that the Chapter 11 Trustee is an \"officer in or of\" this Court for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1503. *United States v. Crispo*, 306 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2002). The Court does not opine as to whether this statute has yet been violated, but the Court is concerned by the threats the Chapter 11 Trustee has received and the intensity of the rhetoric. *See United*\n\n*States v. Turner*, 720 F.3d 411 (2d Cir. 2013). The Court is mindful of the escalating nature of the situation. There is potential for conflict in the current situation. Given that both sides have argued that the Debtor is the leader of the protesting movement – either as the Debtor's supporters would have it, as a Dalai Lama-esque figure, or as the Plaintiffs would have it, as a boss – the Court believes that efforts by the Debtor to pull back from the brink, in compliance with this Preliminary Injunction, would be successful in lowering the temperature in these cases.\n\n#### **C. Parties Bound**\n\nBased upon the clear language in Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 and binding Second Circuit law, \"persons in active concert\" is properly defined as a party who knowingly aids or abets the Debtor to violate the injunction. *Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Reinert & Duree, P.C.* 191 F.3d 297, 303 (2d Cir. 1999). While courts typically can bind only the parties to a proceeding, it is settled law that \"Rule 65(d) is designed to codify the common-law doctrine that defendants may not nullify a decree by carrying out prohibited acts through aiders and abettors, although they were not parties to the original proceeding.\" *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted). The relevant inquiry under 65(d) is whether the nonparty aided or abetted the defendant's violation of the court's orders. *Next Invs., LLC v. Bank of China* 12 F.4th 119, 134 (2d Cir. 2021) (Quoting *NML Cap. Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina*, 727 F.3d 230, 243 (2d Cir. 2013)).\n\nNon-parties to an injunction are in active concert with an enjoined party after receiving actual notice of the injunction and the challenged action was taken for the benefit of, or to assist, a party subject to a preliminary injunction. *Havens v. James*, 435 F. Supp. 3d 494, 504 (W.D.N.Y. 2020); *see also Artista Records, LLC*, 122 F. Supp. 3d 32, 35–36 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding a third-party internet service provider with knowledge of an injunction falls within an injunction's reach if those services are knowingly used to facilitate injunction violations). In\n\n*Havens*, a twenty-year permanent injunction was in place, enjoining protesters from protesting outside a specific abortion clinic, and protesters believed since they were not named in the injunction, they were not in active concert with the named parties. The court in *Havens* rejected this assertion, and found protesters were acting \"in concert\" with the named parties because: the non-parties had notice of the injunction, and both (1) coordinated efforts with the named parties in the injunction, and (2) shared the same common goal of deterring women from seeking abortion services at the facility providing those services. *Havens*, 435 F. Supp. 3d at 507.\n\nFurthermore, a successor-in-interest may be bound by an earlier injunction. The Second Circuit has upheld a preliminary injunction enjoining a successor-in-interest to a named enjoined entity and found protesters who were not named as parties to the prior injunction were also bound by the injunction and could be held in contempt for violating its terms. *People v. Operation Rescue Nat'l*, 80 F.3d 64, 70 (2d Cir. 1996) (\"We are aware of the difficulties faced by a trier of fact in cases such as this, where similarly situated groups of individuals move fluidly between multiple unincorporated associations that share the same basic leadership and goals.\"). Under *Operation Rescue Nat'l*, the relevant inquiry for successors-in-interest to an enjoined party is whether there is substantial continuity of identity between two organizations, *Id*., at 70, and whether they share the \"same basic leadership and goals\" with the named defendant. *Id.* at 71*.*\n\n Additionally, lower courts within the Second Circuit have found an unnamed party to an injunction may be considered bound by the injunction if the party is \"substantially intertwined\" with the named enjoined parties. 17 *John Wiley & Sons v. Book Dog Books, LLC*, 327 F. Supp.\n\n<sup>17</sup> Notably, in *Bank of China* 12 F.4th at 134, the Second Circuit briefly discusses the application of the \"substantially intertwined\" standard used in *John Wiley & Sons,* 327 F. Supp. 3d at 638, as applied in the district court, but opined \"The ultimate answer to this question might also depend on the common-law understanding of\n\n3d. 606 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting *In re Sledziejowski*, 533 B.R. 408, 424 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015) (\"Where an enjoined party is substantially intertwined with a non-party, including the shared occupation of office space, payment of employee expenses between the non-party and enjoined party, considerable control by the enjoined party over the non-party's operations, and other substantial interconnections.\")). However, such injunction must be limited to identified third parties and the parties the court finds to be \"in active concert\" with the defendant. *Spin Master Ltd. V. 158*, 463 F.Supp.3d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (Dismissing without prejudice the plaintiff's proposed permanent injunction, finding the language and effect of the injunction overbroad and beyond the Court's powers).\n\n The persons named in the Preliminary Injunction are bound by it. Applying the \"substantially intertwined\" standard set forth in *John Wiley & Sons* as to individuals, the Debtor has \"considerable control\" over a number of individuals, but more significantly, has \"substantial interconnections\" with several individuals involved in organizing and planning protests and evading subpoenas. Here, the Debtor has used multiple social media accounts to broadcast his views and to communicate to his associates his advice and support. While the Debtor himself does not always personally post videos of himself using social media, others may do so on his behalf using accounts associated with the Defendant, including @Miles, @MilesGuo, @MilesGuoLive, @NFSCSpeaks, and @chinatruth2022. The Debtor also uses his varied media outlets, which are substantially controlled by the Debtor, to broadcast his views through news anchors on \"GNews.\" These news anchors also appear at protests. The Debtor frequently appears on the Fay Fay Show, which show also appears on a GTV broadcast. The host of the\n\naiding and abetting, which would ask whether a nonparty's assistance is sufficiently 'substantial' to be proscribed by the Rule. . . . *but such an understanding is best uncertain and our sister courts have not adopted it*.\" (emphasis added, internal citations omitted).\n\nFay Fay Show, Fay Fay, has been a contact to others in the GSeries web through WhatsApp. Further, the Debtor appears with a small group of individuals at intimate gatherings at the Sherry-Netherlands apartment. Some of the individuals seen at the protests in front in individuals' private homes and the protests taking place at the Plaintiffs' counsels' office buildings attend these intimate gatherings and meals. Others involved in the protests have met the Debtor at 3 Columbus Circle, New York, NY and/or engaged with the Debtor via social media as members of at least one, if not many, of the Debtor's many affiliated organizations. Accordingly, based upon the evidence presented during the Hearing, the Court concludes that the Debtor and the following individuals are \"substantially intertwined:\" Fay Fay, Beile Li, Huo Lai, Pamela Tsai, Roy Guo, Jiao Bing Shang, Shan Mu, Yaqin Li, Ziheng Cheng, and Elliot Dordick, as well as any persons or entities acting at their direction or on their behalf are the Debtor's officers, are the Debtor's officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and/or other persons who are in active concert or participation with the Debtor, his officers, his agents, his servants, his employees, and his attorneys.\n\n In addition to the individuals, the entities named in the Preliminary Injunction are bound by it. Applying the standards established by the Second Circuit in *Operation Rescue Nat'l*, \"substantial continuity of identity\" and \"same leadership and goals\" to related entities, the Himalaya entities, NFSC, GTV, GNews, and ROLF are all under the leadership of the Debtor and share the same common goal of \"taking down the CCP.\" There are numerous additional entities which all share these qualities, and often an emblem for one entity will appear beside another. The entities are substantially related, existing within the \"GSeries.\" Accordingly, the Court finds entities NFSC, Himalaya, ROLF, GSeries entities, including GTV and GNews, as well as any persons or entities acting at their direction or on their behalf, are the Debtor's\n\nofficers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and/or other persons who are in active concert or participation with the Debtor, his officers, his agents, his servants, his employees, and his attorneys, and are bound by the preliminary injunction.\n\n#### **VI. CONCLUSION**\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiffs' Motion is **GRANTED IN PART** and a preliminary injunction will issue consistent with this Memorandum of Decision. The Debtor's cross-motion to dissolve the TRO is **DENIED** as moot, and the Debtor's cross-motion to dismiss is **DENIED**.\n\nDated at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 13th day of January, 2023.\n\n![](_page_154_Picture_5.jpeg)\n\n# **Exhibit 3**\n\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 318                                                                                                                                |   | USDC SDNY                                                                                                    |\n|                                                                                                                                    |   | DOCUMENT                                                                                                     |\n|                                                                                                                                    |   | ELECTRONICALLY FILED                                                                                         |\n|                                                                                                                                    |   | DOC #:                                                                                                       |\n| UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                                                                                                       |   | 08/02/2023                                                                                                   |\n| SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK                                                                                                      |   | DATE FILED:                                                                                                  |\n| --------------------------------------------------------------                                                                     | X |                                                                                                              |\n| TAO AN, CHUNGANG GUAN, CUI                                                                                                         | : |                                                                                                              |\n| QINGYUN, HUIMIN LIN, BEILE LI,                                                                                                     | : |                                                                                                              |\n| YANMING WANG, TAO ZHENG, ZHENG HU,                                                                                                 | : |                                                                                                              |\n| YUAN CAO, LINWAN FENG,                                                                                                             | : |                                                                                                              |\n|                                                                                                                                    | : | 22-CV-10062 (VEC)                                                                                            |\n| Plaintiffs,                                                                                                                        | : |                                                                                                              |\n|                                                                                                                                    | : | OPINION & ORDER                                                                                              |\n|                                                                                                                                    |   |                                                                                                              |\n| -against                                                                                                                           | : |                                                                                                              |\n|                                                                                                                                    | : |                                                                                                              |\n| LUC A. DESPINS and PAUL HASTINGS LLP,                                                                                              | : |                                                                                                              |\n|                                                                                                                                    | : |                                                                                                              |\n|                                                                                                                                    | : |                                                                                                              |\n| Defendants.                                                                                                                        | : |                                                                                                              |\n| --------------------------------------------------------------                                                                     | X |                                                                                                              |\n\nVALERIE CAPRONI, United States District Judge:\n\nPlaintiffs are various Chinese nationals residing in the United States who have sued Paul Hastings LLP (\"Paul Hastings\") and one of its partners, Luc A. Despins, for allegedly violating the Foreign Agents Registration Act (\"FARA\"), 22 U.S.C. §§ 611–621, by failing to register as an agent of the People's Republic of China (\"PRC\") or the Chinese Communist Party (\"CCP\"). *See* Am. Compl., Dkt. 10. Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for failing adequately to allege subject matter jurisdiction and Rule 12(b)(6) for failing to state a claim. *See* Defs. MTD Mem., Dkt. 15 at 1–2. Defendants also moved to sanction Plaintiffs' counsel pursuant to Rule 11(b) for bringing frivolous claims and allegedly initiating the lawsuit for an improper purpose. Defs. Sanctions Mem., Dkt. 12 at 1, 4. Plaintiffs opposed both motions. *See* Pls. Sanctions Opp., Dkt. 23; Pls. MTD Opp., Dkt. 22. For the following reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss and motion for sanctions are GRANTED, and the Court awards Defendants reasonable attorneys' fees and costs.\n\n#### **BACKGROUND**\n\nPlaintiffs allege that they are the victims of a harassment campaign brought by the CCP and PRC. Am. Compl. ¶ 24. Plaintiffs further allege that because Paul Hastings provided legal services related to the global public offering of Jinshang Bank, a bank controlled and operated by the CCP, it is an agent of the CCP or PRC and required to register as a foreign agent under FARA. *Id*. ¶¶ 39–49, 51–53. Defendants also allege that Mr. Despins is an agent of the CCP or PRC and has violated FARA's registration requirement.<sup>1</sup> *See id*. ¶¶ 3, 51.\n\nAt the center of this lawsuit is self-proclaimed billionaire Mr. Ho Wan Kwok, who is not a party to this action. On February 15, 2022, Mr. Kwok filed for bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut. *See generally Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Ho Wan Kwok* (*In re* Kwok), Ch. 11 Case Nos. 22-50073, 22-5032 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022). The Bankruptcy Court appointed Mr. Despins, represented by Paul Hastings, as the Chapter 11 trustee of Mr. Kwok's controlled entities. *See* Orders, Dkts. 523, 668, *In re* Kwok, Ch 11 Case Nos. 22-50073, 22-5032.\n\nSince at least November 2022, Mr. Kwok has weaponized his active social media presence to mobilize his supporters and launch a harassment campaign against Paul Hastings, Mr. Despins, and Mr. Despins's family. *See* Order, Dkt. 133 ¶¶ 34, 41–45, 49, *In re* Kwok, Ch 11 Case Nos. 22-50073, 22-5032 (hereinafter \"Bankr. Prelim. Inj. Mem.\"). Mr. Kwok has threatened Mr. Despins with \"rogue's ways,\" and promised that Defenands \"will suffer calamities.\" Bankr. Prelim. Inj. Mem. ¶ 45.\n\n<sup>1</sup> Defendants state that Mr. Despins was not involved in the Jinshang Bank transaction, and Plaintiffs do not allege any facts to suggest that Mr. Despins is in any other way connected to the People's Republic of China (\"PRC\") or Chinese Communist Party (\"CCP\"). Defs. MTD Mem., Dkt. 15 at 4.\n\nFollowing Mr. Kwok's call to action, his supporters have protested outside the homes of Mr. Despins, his daughter, and his ex-wife, as well as near Paul Hasting's New York office. *See id.* ¶¶ 42–43, 52–53, 57, 69–71. They have distributed fliers that depict Mr. Despins with blood dripping from his eyes and mouth and a sickle and hammer emblazoned on his forehead, with text that refers to Defendants as \"the CCP's running dog\" and an \"enabler\" of the CCP. First Andres Decl. Ex. 22, Dkt. 13. They have also distributed materials that refer to Mr. Despins as an extortionist, an anti-Semite, and a \"scumbag.\" *See* First Andres Decl. Exs. 15, 22–25.\n\nThe harassment campaign has also included numerous federal lawsuits alleging that those involved in Mr. Kwok's bankruptcy proceeding are agents of the PRC or CCP and have violated FARA's registration requirement. *See, e.g.*, Am. Compl., Dkt. 43 ¶ 60, *Gong v. Sarnoff et al*, No. 23-CV-343 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2023); Compl., Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 74, 118–25, *Wyatt v. U. of Md.*, No. 23-CV-742 (D. Md. Mar. 17, 2023). Contemporaneously with filing this lawsuit, Plaintiffs sued Weijian Shan, the executive director and chairman of Mr. Kwok's largest creditor, and his son, in *An v. Shan*, No. 22-CV-10060 (S.D.N.Y. 2023), for allegedly violating FARA's registration requirement. Mr. Kwok has lauded Plaintiff Li as a \"comrade[]\" and posted photographs of this complaint on social media. *See* First Andres Decl. Ex. 5.\n\nRichard Freeth, who represents the Plaintiffs in this case and in *Shan*, also represented the plaintiff in *Wyatt v. University of Maryland*, No. 23-CV-742 (D. Md. 2023). At issue in *Wyatt* was the decision of the University of Maryland, at which Mr. Shan's daughter is enrolled, to order Mr. Kwok's supporters to cease protesting on the college commons. Compl., Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 14, 16, *Wyatt*, No. 23-CV-742 (D. Md. Mar. 17, 2023). Mr. Freeth also represents the plaintiffs in *Gong v. Sarnoff*, No. 23-CV-00343 (S.D.N.Y. 2023), who accuse O'Melveny & Myers LLP and\n\nits partner Stuart Sarnoff of \"destroying the life of Ho Wan Kwok.\" <sup>2</sup> Op., Dkt. 57 at 3, *Gong*, No. 23-CV-343 (July 17, 2023) (internal quotation omitted).<sup>3</sup>\n\nOn January 11, 2023, the Bankruptcy Court enjoined Mr. Kwok and anyone \"in active concert\" with him, including Plaintiff Beile Li, from harassing or \"doxing\" Defendants. Order, Dkt. 134 ¶ 5, *In re* Kwok, Ch 11 Case Nos. 22-50073, 22-5032 (hereinafter \"Bankr. Prelim.\n\nInj.\"). In its decision, Bankruptcy Court found that Beile Li is an agent of Mr. Kwok. *Id.*\n\nOn December 15, 2022, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. *See* Am. Compl. On January 19, 2023, Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint and also moved for sanctions. *See* Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. 14; Mot. for Sanctions, Dkt. 11.\n\n# **DISCUSSION**\n\n# **I. The Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Plaintiffs' Claims**\n\n# **A. Legal Standard**\n\nA party who asserts that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over a particular claim \"has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it exists.\" *Makarova v. United States*, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). Subject matter jurisdiction exists if the case arises under federal law, *see* 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or if there is complete diversity between the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds \\$75,000.00, *see id*. § 1332. A court has federal question jurisdiction if a claim \"aris[es] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.\" *Id*. § 1331. To invoke federal question jurisdiction, a complaint must \"establish[] either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily\n\n<sup>2</sup> Judge Liman recently dismissed the complaint in *Gong v. Sarnoff et al.*, No. 23-CV-343 (S.D.N.Y. 2023), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. *See* Op., Dkt. 57, *Gong*, No. 23-CV-343 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2023).\n\n<sup>3</sup> Although only Richard Freeth has filed a notice of appearance on behalf of Plaintiffs, Yongbing Zhang, who represents plaintiffs in several of the parallel cases filed against Mr. Kwok's perceived adversaries, appears to have been actively involved in this litigation. *See, e.g.*, *Wyatt v. Univ. of Md.*, No. 23-CV-742 (D. Md. 2023). For example, Mr. Freeth copied Mr. Zhang on his most recent letter to this Court. Letter, Dkt. 28.\n\ndepends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.\" *Perpetual Secs., Inc. v. Tang*, 290 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 2002) (cleaned up).\n\nPlaintiffs urge the Court to find that it has federal question jurisdiction by inferring a private right of action under FARA.<sup>4</sup> *See* Pls. MTD Opp., Dkt. 22 ¶¶ 48–54. FARA requires any \"agent of a foreign principal\" to register with the Attorney General unless the entity qualifies for an exemption, and the statute vests the Attorney General with the sole authority to prosecute FARA violations.<sup>5</sup> 22 U.S.C. § 612; *see also id*. § 618(f) (granting the Attorney General authority to seek injunctive relief prohibiting actions taken on behalf of a foreign principal or requiring registration).\n\nAs Plaintiffs concede, there is no private right of action under FARA. *See* Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5–6. FARA vests the Attorney General with the exclusive authority to prosecute violations of the registration requirement, and there is no indication that Congress intended to create a private right of action. *See* 22 U.S.C. § 618(f). FARA's purpose is \"to provide [a] centralized reporting system to track activities of agents acting on behalf of foreign countries . . . and no language in [the] statute or its legislative history suggests that Congress intended to establish [a] cause of action in any entity other than [the] Federal Government.\" *See, e.g.*, *Weican Meng v. Xinhuanet Co.*, 2017 WL 3175609, at \\*3 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2017) (quoting *Comm'n for a Free Namibia v. S.W. Africa People's Org.*, 554 F. Supp. 722, 722 (D.D.C. 1982)).\n\n<sup>4</sup>\n\nPlaintiffs do not argue or allege any facts to suggest the existence of diversity jurisdiction.\n\n<sup>5</sup> An agent of a foreign principal is \"any person who acts as an agent, representative, employee, or servant, or any person who acts in any other capacity at the order, request, or under the direction or control, of a foreign principal or . . . whose activities are directly or indirectly . . . controlled . . . in whole or in major part by a foreign principal.\" 22 U.S.C. § 611(c). Agents of a foreign principal are exempt from FARA's registration requirement if they are \"engaging . . . only (1) in private and nonpolitical activities in furtherance of the bona fide trade or commerce of such foreign principal; or (2) in other activities not serving predominantly a foreign interest.\" *Id*. § 613(d).\n\nWhen a statute does not explicitly provide a private right of action, courts are reluctant to infer one. *See, e.g.*, *Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain*, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004) (noting that courts are hesitant to infer a private right of action, which \"permit[s] enforcement without the check imposed by prosecutorial discretion\"); *Olmsted v. Pruco Life Ins. Co. of N.J.*, 283 F.3d 429, 432 (2d Cir. 2002) (\"Without congressional intent, a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter . . . .\" *Id*. (cleaned up)). Accordingly, district courts that have considered whether FARA provides an implied private right of action have uniformly held, as far as this Court can tell, that it does not. *See, e.g.*, *Henry v. Washington*, 2022 WL 9491957, at \\*2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 16, 2022), *report and recommendation adopted*, 2022 WL 9372175 (Oct. 14, 2022); *Bey v. Epstein*, 2021 WL 8155603, at \\*4 (D. Conn. Aug. 6, 2021) (\"As a private individual, plaintiff lacks standing to sue under this statute because a private right of action cannot be inferred from FARA.\"); *Waterhouse v. Cufi Church Ass'n Inc.*, 2014 WL 1745098, at \\*3 (D. Haw. Apr. 29, 2014).\n\nPlaintiffs acknowledge that the text of FARA and caselaw counsel against finding a private right of action but nevertheless urge the Court to infer the existence of a private right of action due to an alleged lack of enforcement by the Attorney General. *See* Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5–6. The extent to which the Attorney General chooses to enforce FARA is irrelevant. The determinative issue is legislative intent, and Plaintiffs fail adequately to allege in their Amended Complaint or to present in their opposition to the motion to dismiss any facts about the statute or its legislative history that would suggest that Congress intended for there to be a private right of action under FARA.\n\nEven if the Court were to infer a private right of action, however, the Court would still lack subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiffs have not shown that they have standing. It is\n\nblack-letter law that to bring a claim, a plaintiff must show \"(1) an 'injury in fact,' (2) a 'causal connection' between that injury and the conduct at issue, and (3) a likelihood 'that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.'\" *Maddox v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co., N.A.*, 19 F.4th 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting *Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 560–561 (1992)). Plaintiffs have alleged no facts that would permit the Court plausibly to infer that they have suffered an injury in fact that is \"concrete and particularized,\" not \"conjectural or hypothetical,\" let alone an injury that might conceivably be traced to Defendants' failure to register as an agent of a foreign government. *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 560 (cleaned up).\n\nWithout subject matter jurisdiction, the Court must dismiss the case without prejudice. *See Bank v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.*, 708 F. App'x 43, 44–45 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order). The Court declines to grant Plaintiffs leave to amend. Plaintiffs have already amended their complaint once and failed to remedy the jurisdictional defect; granting Plaintiffs another bite at the apple would be futile.<sup>6</sup>\n\n# **II. Sanctions Are Appropriate Because Plaintiffs' Complaint Is Frivolous and Was Filed for an Improper Purpose**\n\n#### **A. Legal Standard**\n\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) requires an attorney presenting a filing to the court to certify that \"to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,\" the filing is not presented for an improper purpose, and the legal contentions are nonfrivolous and supported by the facts and law. Rule 11 also \"explicitly and unambiguously imposes an affirmative duty on each attorney to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the viability of a pleading before it is signed.\" *Int'l Shipping Co., S.A. v.*\n\n<sup>6</sup> Because the Court dismisses the Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court does not reach the merits of Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).\n\n*Hydra Offshore, Inc.*, 875 F.2d 388, 390 (2d Cir. 1989). Rule 11(c)(2)'s \"safe harbor\" provision states that a motion for sanctions \"must not be filed . . . if the challenged paper . . . is withdrawn or appropriately corrected within 21 days after service.\" \"If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that Rule 11(b) has been violated, the court may impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule . . . .\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1). In addition to the authority provided by Rule 11, district courts have \"inherent authority to sanction parties that appear before it acting in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.\" *Sassower v. Field*, 973 F.2d 75, 80–81 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing *Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.*, 501 U.S. 32, 44–45 (1991)).\n\nA district court also has \"broad discretion in tailoring appropriate and reasonable sanctions under rule 11.\" *O'Malley v. New York City Transit Auth.*, 896 F.2d 704, 709 (2d Cir. 1990).<sup>7</sup> In determining whether sanctions are appropriate, courts consider, *inter alia*, whether the improper conduct was \"willful[] or negligent,\" whether the conduct was \"part of a pattern or activity,\" or whether the party had \"engaged in similar conduct in other litigation.\"<sup>8</sup> *Colliton v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP*, 2008 WL 4386764, at \\*12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2008). \"The sanction may include . . . reasonable attorney's fees and other expenses directly resulting from the violation.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4).\n\n<sup>7</sup> Even if a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it retains the authority to impose sanctions against Plaintiffs and their counsel. *See, e.g.*, *Willy v. Coastal Corp.*, 503 U.S. 131, 137–39 (1992); *Schlaifer Nance & Co., Inc. v. Est. of Warhol*, 194 F.3d 323, 333 (2d Cir. 1999).\n\n<sup>8</sup> The Court may also consider whether the misconduct infected the entire pleading or only one particular count or defense; what effect the misconduct had on the litigation process in time or expense; and whether the responsible person is trained in the law. *Colliton v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP*, 2008 WL 4386764, at \\*12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2008).\n\n#### **B. Plaintiffs' Claims Are Frivolous**\n\nA legal argument is frivolous pursuant to Rule 11(b)(2) if it is \"clear\" that there is \"no chance of success and no reasonable argument to extend, modify or reverse the law as it stands\" according to an \"objective standard of reasonableness.\" *Morley v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.*, 66 F.3d 21, 25 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation omitted). A reasonable inquiry would have revealed that Plaintiffs' FARA claim was patently untenable for numerous reasons, not least of which was failing adequately to allege standing.\n\nPlaintiffs allege no facts to show that they have been \"concretely harmed\" by the Defendants' alleged violation of FARA as required to establish standing. *TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez*, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2205 (2021); *see also Holcombe v. Ingredients Sols., Inc.*, 797 F. App'x 630, 632 (2d Cir. 2020) (injury-in-fact must be \"concrete and particularized\"). The Amended Complaint describes concrete harm experienced by only one Plaintiff, Cui Qingyun. According to the Amended Complaint, at some unspecified time<sup>9</sup> Mr. Qingyun and his wife's extended family lost their fortunes to the PRC and, in April 2022, the PRC \"forcibly locked down\" him and his immediate family and fed them only intermittently for two weeks. Am. Compl. ¶ 28. The Amended Complaint alleges no facts, however, that connect the purported mistreatment of Cui Qingyun and his family by the PRC to Mr. Despins or Paul Hastings acting as an unregistered agent of the PRC or the CCP.\n\nAs to the other nine Plaintiffs, there are no allegations of any injury suffered. Instead, Plaintiffs rely on conclusory allegations of generalized injuries, including that they were \"subjected to an ongoing campaign of harassment by agents of the CCP and PRC.\" *Id*. ¶ 22. Conclusory statements of injury are insufficient adequately to allege standing. *See Gambles v.*\n\n<sup>9</sup> Although the Amended Complaint does not allege a date when these confiscations occurred, it was apparently decades ago when the CCP took control of China. *See* Am. Compl. ¶ 28.\n\n*Sterling Infosystems, Inc.*, 234 F. Supp. 3d 510, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). \"Article III grants federal courts the power to redress harms that defendants caused plaintiffs, not a freewheeling power to hold defendants accountable for legal infractions.\" *TransUnion LLC*, 141 S. Ct. at 2206 (internal quotation omitted).\n\nEven if the Court found that Plaintiffs had plausibly alleged some concrete injury, Plaintiffs have alleged no facts from which the Court can reasonably infer that Paul Hastings' provision of legal services to Jinshang Bank is an activity \"directly or indirectly . . . controlled . . . in whole or in part by a foreign principal\" such that Paul Hastings qualifies as an \"agent of a foreign principal\" within the meaning of FARA. 22 U.S.C. § 611(c). As thin as the allegations are against Paul Hastings, they are even thinner against Mr. Despins. The Amended Complaint alleges *no* facts specific to Mr. Despins beyond the fact that he is a resident of Connecticut. Am. Compl. ¶ 20. And even if Plaintiffs had alleged facts from which it would be plausible to infer that either Defendant was an agent of the PRC or CCP that is required to register pursuant to FARA, they do not explain how whatever harm they experienced is \"fairly traceable\" to Defendants' failure to register. *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 560. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants \"intimidated [them] into refraining from exercising their rights,\" Am. Compl. ¶ 25, but fail plausibly to allege any specific facts in support of this conclusory allegation or explain how registering as foreign agents would have prevented Defendants from inflicting this harm.10\n\nBecause even a cursory inquiry would have shown that the facts as alleged in the Amended Complaint fell far short of the threshold required to establish standing, Plaintiffs'\n\n<sup>10</sup> Plaintiffs also seem to argue that, because Paul Hastings provided legal services to Jinshang Bank, Defendants are responsible for any harm caused by the CCP or PRC. *See* Am. Compl. ¶¶ 39–49, 51–53. This claim is so tenuous as to be absurd. Plaintiffs also do not allege that Mr. Despins is connected to the CCP or PRC at all.\n\ncounsel clearly failed to fulfill the \"affirmative duty on each attorney to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the viability of the pleading before it is signed.\" *Int'l Shipping Co., S.A.*, 875 F.2d at 390 (internal quotation omitted). This is particularly true because Defendants notified Plaintiffs that Defendants believed that the complaint \"plainly was filed for the improper purpose of furthering Ho Wan Kwok's ongoing campaign to harass and intimidate Defendants,\" and that Plaintiffs' complaint was frivolous because FARA does not provide for a private right of action. *See* First Andres Decl. Ex. 1 at 1–2.\n\nThe Court finds that sanctions are appropriate. Defendants complied with Rule 11's safe harbor provision: they gave Plaintiffs notice of their intent to file sanctions because the complaint Plaintiffs filed was frivolous and served the Rule 11 motion papers to the last known address of Plaintiff's office more than twenty-one days before moving for sanctions.11 *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). Plaintiffs persisted by filing an Amended Complaint that cured none of the deficiencies Defendants had identified. *See* First Andres Decl. ¶ 2.\n\n<sup>11</sup> In what itself may well be a sanctionable argument, Mr. Freeth argues that Defendants did not comply with Rule 11's safe harbor provision because Defendants' service of the motion for sanctions was defective. Pls. Sanctions Opp., Dkt. 23 ¶¶ 7–8. This argument reeks of gamesmanship. Defendants properly served Mr. Freeth. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c)(2) requires a motion for sanctions to be served in accordance with Rule 5, which permits service by several methods, including \"mailing it to the person's last known address,\" \"handing it to the person,\" or leaving it \"at the person's office.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(B). As long as the sender mailed the documents to the recipient's last known address, however, service is considered complete, even if the recipient did not receive the mail. *See*, *e.g.*, *Greene v. WCI Holdings Corp.*, 136 F.3d 313, 315 (2d Cir. 1998).\n\nMr. Freeth's last known address is his office address, which he has listed on all of the papers that he has filed in this case, on ECF, and which is on record with the First Judicial Department in connection with his registration to practice law in New York. *See* Second Andres Decl. Ex. 5, Dkt. 26. ECF Rule 20.6 requires attorneys to keep their addressees current. *See* ECF Rules and Instructions (July 24, 2023), available at http gov/rules/ecf-related-instructions. On December 27, 2022, Defendants served Mr. Freeth via mail and in-person service at the last known address of his office. *See* Second Andres Decl. ¶¶ 12–13. Defendants also requested that Mr. Freeth provide a new address, but he did not do so. *See id*. ¶ 15. Because Defendants complied with Rule 11's safe harbor provision, Mr. Freeth cannot argue that Plaintiffs did not have a reasonable opportunity to respond.\n\n#### **C. Plaintiffs Filed the Lawsuit To Harass Defendants**\n\nPursuant to Rule 11(b)(1), an attorney cannot present a filing \"for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1). A court may infer an improper purpose if, in light of Plaintiffs' conduct during and outside of litigation, a complaint is so baseless as to suggest that there is an ulterior motive behind the lawsuit. *See, e.g.*, *S. Pac. Shipping Co. v. Redi-Fresh Produce Inc.,* 2014 WL 6968039, at \\*10 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2014) (holding that \"the deficiency of [plaintiff's] claim, coupled with its behavior\" in litigation in that and other courts \"gives rise to an inference of improper purpose\"); *see also Schlaifer Nance & Co, Inc.. v. Estate of Warhol*, 194 F.3d 323, 338 (2d Cir. 1999) (a court can infer bad faith when an action is \"so completely without merit as to require the conclusion [it] must have been undertaken for some improper purpose,\" *id*. (cleaned up)).\n\nIn this case, the context of Plaintiffs' filing demonstrates Plaintiffs' complete disregard for \"legal merit.\" *Galonsky v. Williams*, 1997 WL 759445, at \\*4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 1997). Plaintiffs failed to withdraw their complaint after the Bankruptcy Court enjoined Plaintiff Li and those \"in active concert\" with him from making baseless claims that Paul Hasting was an agent of the CCP. *See* Bankr. Prelim. Inj. at 60. Plaintiffs continued to violate that injunction even after Defendants notified Plaintiffs' counsel of numerous deficiencies in the complaint, which Mr. Feeth failed to cure when he subsequently filed the Amended Complaint. *See id.*; First Andres Decl. Ex. 1 at 1–2.\n\nPlaintiffs' papers reveal that their true preoccupation is with Mr. Kwok and trying to \"defend\" him by harassing those perceived to be his adversaries. Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Kwok's bankruptcy proceeding is \"irrelevant\" but nevertheless devote roughly half of their opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss discussing Mr. Kwok's supposed \"fight against the\n\nCCP.\" Pls. MTD Opp. ¶ 19; *see also See* Pls. Sanctions Opp. ¶ 16; Pls. MTD Opp. ¶¶ 13–47. Plaintiffs baselessly assert, with no factual allegations to support their conclusion, that Mr. Despins \"has behaved thoroughly adverse to Mr. Kwok throughout the proceedings, rather than serving as trustee in a neutral manner,\" Pls*.* MTD Opp. ¶ 41, as though that somehow explains why people other than Mr. Kwok might have a cause of action against Mr. Despins.\n\nThe existence of similar litigation in other courts further supports the Court's finding that Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in bad faith. Plaintiffs' counsel has a pattern of bringing meritless FARA claims against Mr. Kwok's adversaries — conduct that he has praised. 12 The copy-andpaste nature of these numerous lawsuits is evident from the fact that Plaintiffs' complaint contains an out-of-place paragraph that alleges \"Defendant Bo Shan is also working as a spy for the CCP.\" Am. Compl. ¶ 50.\n\nTogether, Plaintiffs' legal contentions within this lawsuit, Plaintiff's counsel's history of meritless FARA claims against others, and the harassment campaign against Defendants as documented by the Bankruptcy Court lead the Court to conclude that this lawsuit is just another part of a campaign of misbehavior designed to vex Defendants, most likely by frustrating Mr. Despins's ability to perform his duties as trustee. As such, the Court finds that sanctions are appropriate.\n\nRule 11(c) enables courts to impose a sanction that \"suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4). Attorneys' fees are an appropriate remedy to prevent harassment in the form of bad-faith litigation, especially when the sanctioned party has failed to comply with prior court orders. *See Pentagen Techs. Int'l Ltd. v. United States*, 172 F. Supp. 2d 464, 473–474 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)\n\n<sup>12</sup> *See supra*, pp. 3–4.\n\n(imposing sanctions and awarding attorneys' fees to punish plaintiffs for \"engag[ing] in a pattern of litigation designed to evade previous rulings\" that was \"frivolous and repetitive . . . [and] intentionally so\"), *aff'd*, 63 F. App'x 548 (2d Cir. 2003). \"It is well settled that Rule 11 empowers judges with discretion to award that portion of a defendant's attorney's fees thought reasonable to serve the sanctioning purpose of the Rule.\" *Int'l Shipping Co., S.A.*, 875 F.2d at 392. The Court finds that an award of the full amount of reasonable attorneys fees is an appropriate sanction and not more punitive than necessary in light of Plaintiffs' counsel's complete disregard for the merits of Plaintiffs' claims, his gamesmanship, and both Plaintiffs' and Plaintiffs' counsel's defiance of the Bankruptcy Court's injunction.\n\nRule 11 \"authorizes assessment of a fee against counsel, a party, or both.\" *Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York*, 821 F.2d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 1987). Here, certain aspects of Plaintiffs' lawsuit are \"issue[s] over which counsel exercise[d] principal responsibility,\" *United Republic Ins. Co., in Receivership v. Chase Manhattan Bank*, 315 F.3d 168, 171 (2d Cir. 2003), like ensuring that the complaints filed met a minimum merit threshold and pled adequate facts to establish subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs' behavior — including their decision to pursue this lawsuit after the Bankruptcy Court's injunction — demonstrates, however, that Plaintiffs also bear responsibility for the harassment and frivolity of this lawsuit. In light of this, the Court imposes the fee award jointly and severally upon Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' counsel.\n\n#### **CONCLUSION**\n\n For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss and motion for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs as sanctions are GRANTED. The Amended Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice. Defendants must submit an application for attorney's fees and costs not later\n\nthan **August 11, 2023**. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the open motions at docket entries 11 and 14.\n\n**SO ORDERED.**\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\n\n**Date: August 2, 2023 VALERIE CAPRONI**\n\n**New York, New York United States District Judge**\n\n# **Exhibit 4**\n\n|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|-------------------|--|--|--|\n| 318<br>UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT<br>SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK                                                                                                                                                                            |        | 08/22/2023        |  |  |  |\n| ---------------------------------------------------------------------                                                                                                                                                                           | X<br>: |                   |  |  |  |\n| JUNWU GONG,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | :<br>: |                   |  |  |  |\n| Plaintiff,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | :      |                   |  |  |  |\n| -v                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              | :<br>: |                   |  |  |  |\n|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | :      | 23-cv-343 (LJL)   |  |  |  |\n| STUART M. SARNOFF, O'MELVENY & MYERS                                                                                                                                                                                                            | :      |                   |  |  |  |\n| LLP, CARL M. STANTON, CITY OF NEW YORK,                                                                                                                                                                                                         | :      | OPINION AND ORDER |  |  |  |\n| OFFICER JOHN DOE 1, OFFICER JOHN DOE 2,                                                                                                                                                                                                         | :      |                   |  |  |  |\n| OFFICER JOHN DOE 3, OFFICER LAUREN A.<br>DUFFY,                                                                                                                                                                                                 | :<br>: |                   |  |  |  |\n|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | :      |                   |  |  |  |\n| Defendants.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | :      |                   |  |  |  |\n|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | :      |                   |  |  |  |\n| ---------------------------------------------------------------------                                                                                                                                                                           | X      |                   |  |  |  |\n\nLEWIS J. LIMAN, United States District Judge:\n\nDefendants Stuart M. Sarnoff (\"Sarnoff\") and O'Melveny & Myers LLP (\"O'Melveny\" and, together with Sarnoff, the \"Moving Defendants\") move, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, for an order granting them sanctions against Plaintiff's counsel, Yongbing Zhang and Richard Freeth, and enjoining Plaintiff Junwu Gong (\"Gong\" or \"Plaintiff\") and his counsel and those in active concert with them from filing other similar suits without leave of court. Dkt. No. 36. The motion is granted in part and denied in part.\n\n#### **BACKGROUND**\n\nThe Court assumes familiarity with the prior proceedings in this matter. The following facts are taken from the parties' submissions in connection with the motion for sanctions and the Court resolves factual disputes as necessary for the disposition of the motion. *See Chemiakin v. Yefimov*, 932 F.2d 124, 130 (2d Cir. 1991) (suggesting that on Rule 11 motions courts should act as fact finders and an evidentiary hearing is required when there are disputed facts).\n\n#### **I. The Allegations of the Complaint**\n\nPlaintiff initiated this action by complaint filed on January 18, 2023 (the \"Complaint\").1 Dkt. No. 2. Plaintiff is a foreign-born, ethnic Chinese U.S. Permanent Resident who has, on numerous occasions, joined with other ethnic Chinese individuals to protest against the Chinese Communist Party (\"CCP\"). *Id*. ¶¶ 15, 36–37. He alleges that he has been subjected to an ongoing campaign of harassment by agents of the CCP. *Id.* ¶ 70. O'Melveny is a Delawareregistered limited liability partnership, which conducts business as a law firm and regularly transacts business in the State of New York. *Id*. ¶ 50. Defendant Sarnoff is a lawyer at O'Melveny, *id*. ¶ 45, and is a resident of the State of New York, *id*. ¶ 49.\n\nThe Complaint alleged that Moving Defendants violated the Foreign Agents Registration Act, 22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(1) (\"FARA\"), by acting as unregistered agents or representatives of the People's Republic of China (\"PRC\"). *Id.* ¶¶ 173–79. It also alleges that Moving Defendants violated and conspired to violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, enforceable through 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3). *Id.* ¶¶ 126–55.\n\nThe Complaint's allegations grow out of a series of events from November 22, 2022 to December 20, 2022. On November 22, 2022, Plaintiff participated in what he claims were peaceful protests at the offices of O'Melveny in New York, because of what he alleges to be O'Melveny's relationship with the CCP. O'Melveny is alleged to have at least three offices in the PRC and to conduct work in the PRC that is \"extremely lucrative.\" *Id.* ¶¶ 42–43. In 2013, it represented a China-based genomic research and sequencing company, BGI, in the first ever\n\n<sup>1</sup> The complaint was initially filed on January 13, 2023 but was rejected for a filing error. *See*  Dkt. No. 1.\n\nacquisition of a United States publicly traded company by a Chinese acquiror. *Id.* ¶¶ 25–26.2 Beginning on December 2, 2022, Plaintiff participated in regular protests at a location believed to be near Sarnoff's home in New York City. *Id.* ¶ 68. Sarnoff is an O'Melveny lawyer, who is allegedly \"conspicuous[ly]\" involved in the firm's China practice. *Id.* ¶ 45. On the morning of December 20, 2022, Plaintiff again joined protests at a location believed to be near Sarnoff's home. *Id.* ¶ 71.\n\nPlaintiff alleged that he and other protesters were harassed at these protests by another Defendant, Carl M. Stanton (\"Stanton\"); the only identifying information provided about him in the Complaint is that he is alleged to be a resident of New York City and New York State. *Id.* ¶ 51. The Complaint focused on events that occurred on December 20, 2022, during which Plaintiff was hit by an automobile driven by Stanton. *Id.* ¶ 96. Officers of the New York Police Department (\"NYPD\") (one of whom is personally named in the Complaint) failed to file a police report after Plaintiff summoned them to the scene. *See id.* ¶¶ 101–08. Later, after Plaintiff had begun feeling ill and \"went into shock\" at a nearby restaurant, the protesters called an ambulance to assist Plaintiff but NYPD officers obstructed Plaintiff's efforts to get medical attention. *Id.* ¶¶ 112–19.\n\n<sup>2</sup> In 2020, two BGI entities were allegedly added to the Entity List of the United States Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security for \"conducting genetic analyses used to further the repression of Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,\" *id.* ¶ 27; in January 2021, Reuters allegedly reported that BGI has worked with the PRC's military on efforts to enhance soldiers' strength and other projects, *id.* ¶ 28; in July 2021, Reuters allegedly reported that BGI developed a prenatal test with the assistance of the People's Liberation Army which is also used for genetic data collection, including to \"single out Tibetan and Uyghur minorities to find links between their genes and their characteristics,\" *id.* ¶ 29; and, in October 2022, the United States Department of Defense allegedly added a BGI subsidiary to its list of Chinese military companies operating in the United States, *id.* ¶ 30.\n\nThe Complaint contained few, if any, allegations regarding the conduct of Moving Defendants and no allegations that tied Moving Defendants to any state action. It alleged that the December 20 protest occurred at a location believed to be near Sarnoff's residence. *Id.* ¶¶ 71–72. However, it does not allege that Sarnoff did anything during the protest or that he was even present in his residence at the time.3 The Complaint also alleged that, during a prior protest outside O'Melveny's offices in New York City, Stanton was observed \"on several instances\" taking pictures from inside the property where the protesters and members of the public were not permitted and using a swipe card to enter through the security entrance. *Id.* ¶¶ 76–77. Plaintiff alleged, upon information and belief, that Stanton is not an officer of the NYPD, *id.* ¶ 82, although the Complaint alleged that Stanton represented that he was \"with\" the police or had some kind of connection with the NYPD, *id.* ¶¶ 80–81. Further, there are no allegations that O'Melveny, much less Sarnoff, have any relationship with Stanton, and there are no allegations that O'Melveny or Sarnoff had any involvement with the conduct of Stanton, the NYPD, or any state actor on December 20. It was Plaintiff, not O'Melveny, Sarnoff, or Stanton, according to the Complaint, who called the NYPD after he was hit by Stanton's car and the protesters who called the ambulance. *Id.* ¶¶ 85, 88, 114.\n\nThe Complaint did allege that Moving Defendants had a connection to the CCP. Plaintiff asserted that \"O'Melveny is beholden to the CCP, and as such performs whatever acts are requested by the CCP—including acts within the United States that would require registration as foreign agents with the US Government,\" *id.* ¶ 47, and that the CCP's unregistered agents in the United States \"are now believed to be Defendant Sarnoff, Defendant O'Melveny and Defendant\n\n<sup>3</sup> The Complaint does not even allege that, as a matter of fact, the protest occurred near Sarnoff's residence.\n\nStanton,\" *id.* ¶ 64. The only factual allegations made to support these claims were that O'Melveny and Sarnoff performed legal work on behalf of a Chinese company, *id.* ¶¶ 25–26, and that O'Melveny has offices in the PRC from which it conducts \"lucrative\" business with a \"potentially significant impact on the country,\" *id.* ¶¶ 42–43. There are no factual allegations to support that Stanton has any connection to the PRC or CCP.\n\n#### **II. Procedural History Relevant to the Rule 11 Motion**\n\nOn March 23, 2023, Moving Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Dkt. No. 19. In their memorandum of law in support of the motion, Moving Defendants argued that Plaintiff failed to allege any conduct by either of them directed toward Plaintiff, Dkt. No. 20 at 1–2, and that the FARA claim was \"just as meritless\" because \"[c]ourt after court has held that there is no private right of action under FARA,\" Plaintiff had not alleged any injury traceable to Moving Defendant's conduct, and Plaintiff did not allege facts that would require FARA registration, *id.* at 2–3.\n\nOn March 28, 2023, Moving Defendants filed their motion for sanctions, along with a supporting memorandum of law and a declaration. Dkt. Nos. 26–28. Moving Defendants, however, withdrew the motion on March 29, 2023, because they had not complied \"with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c)(2)\" that the motion cannot be filed until after the party against whom the motion is made has been given an opportunity to withdraw the offending claim or papers. Dkt. No. 29.\n\nOn April 14, 2023, the Court held an initial pretrial conference. Dkt. No. 34. At the conference, the Court inquired whether Plaintiff's counsel had any additional factual \"allegations against either Mr. Sarnoff or O'Melveny that would suggest that they acted in collusion with the police department.\" *Id.* at 4. Counsel responded that his allegations were based on supposition:\n\n\"[T]he firm and the individual defendants were not pleased with being the target of these protests,\" and \"it would make sense that . . . the defendants in their position would send someone to . . . observe, get information.\" *Id.* at 7. Counsel admitted that he did not know or have factual allegations regarding Stanton's \"mandate.\" *Id.*. He also admitted that he did not know whether Stanton hit Plaintiff \"accidentally or on purpose.\" *Id.* at 8. As to the police, counsel claimed that the conduct of the officers was \"peculiar,\" because the officers refused to file a report. *Id.* Plaintiff's counsel nonetheless claimed that there was factual information that counsel had that was responsive to a number of issues raised in Moving Defendant's motion to dismiss. *Id.* at 13– 14. As a result, the Court stayed discovery pending a decision on the motion to dismiss and gave Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint by April 21, 2023. *Id.* at 15–16. The Court also warned Plaintiff's counsel: \"while I have not looked at the Rule 11 motion, I have looked at your complaint. And you should give it a second look because the motion does appear to be quite strong. And I will take the Rule 11 motion that is going to be filed very seriously.\" *Id.* at 16–17.\n\nOn April 26, 2023, Plaintiff filed the first amended complaint (\"Amended Complaint\").4 The Amended Complaint contains eleven new paragraphs quoting a report of the Heritage Foundation regarding the threat posed to the United States by the PRC and citing a news article regarding the arrest in New York of two alleged operatives for the PRC. Dkt. No. 43 ¶¶ 11–21. It also includes an allegation that O'Melveny has \"on several occasions yet discovered by Plaintiff,\" represented Chinese entities alleged to have tortured Chinese individuals or to have aided and abetted or ratified the same, *id.* ¶ 34, that \"O'Melveny and Sarnoff have, with other counsel, been part of the CCP team charged with destroying the life of Ho Wan Kwok (aka Miles\n\n<sup>4</sup> Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint on April 21, 2023, but it was rejected for a filing error. *See* Dkt. No. 41; Clerk's Entry (Apr. 24, 2023). The parties agreed to an extension of time to May 1, 2023 for Plaintiff to file an amended complaint, which the Court granted. Dkt. No. 44.\n\nGuo) and use whatever means necessary to have him returned to China for either additional jail and torture or execution,\" *id.* ¶ 55(f), and that the law firm represented a company named BYD America Corporation in *Jun Zhao v. BYD America Corp.*, in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, *id*. ¶ 35.<sup>5</sup> In all other respects the Amended Complaint is identical to the Complaint. It does not add any factual allegations with respect to the events of December 2020. It levels the same allegations that Moving Defendants participated in civil rights violations and a violation of FARA, *see id.* ¶¶ 140–80, 187–93, without any additional factual allegations supporting either set of claims.\n\nOn July 17, 2023, the Court issued an Opinion and Order granting Moving Defendants' motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint against them with prejudice. Dkt. No. 57. The Court concluded that Plaintiff failed to allege facts to support any of the theories under which Moving Defendants could be held liable under Section 1983 for any of the injuries he alleged he suffered. *Id.* at 13. The Court also concluded that Plaintiff had failed to plead any facts to support a conspiracy claim under Section 1985(3), including a failure to plead an agreement. *Id.* at 20–21. Finally, the Court concluded that Plaintiff did not plead facts to establish standing for his FARA claim. *Id.* at 21. The Court, however, retained jurisdiction to address Defendants' motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. *Id.* at 24.\n\nOn April 20, 2023, before the Amended Complaint was dismissed, Moving Defendants refiled the Rule 11 motion for sanctions, memorandum of law, and declaration, along with a declaration attesting to their compliance with Rule 11(c)(2). Dkt. No. 36–39. Plaintiff filed his\n\n<sup>5</sup> The Amended Complaint also refers to O'Melveny's work on two Hong Kong initial public offerings and a takeover of a biotech company, *id.* ¶ 56, and it attaches a blog post allegedly written by a former O'Melveny attorney accusing the firm of \"monetizing\" the relationships its partners have with the United States government, Dkt. No. 43-7.\n\nmemorandum in opposition to the motion on May 4, 2023, Dkt. No. 45. On May 17, 2023, Moving Defendants filed their reply memorandum of law.6 Dkt. No. 51. On July 27, 2023, the Court issued an order scheduling oral argument on the motion for sanctions and indicated that any party that desired to present evidence at the hearing should submit a letter to the Court on or before August 7, 2023, indicating what evidence, if any, it wished to present and that, in the absence of any additional evidence, the Court would decide the motion based on the evidence submitted in connection with the Rule 11 moving and opposition papers. Dkt. No. 63. Moving Defendants submitted a letter on August 7, 2023, indicating that they would not submit additional evidence.7 Dkt. No. 66. That same day, Plaintiff filed a letter indicating that he would submit evidence at oral argument and that he would testify. Dkt. No. 67. The Court held oral argument and the evidentiary hearing on August 16, 2023. *See* Minute Entry (Aug. 16, 2023). Plaintiff failed to appear at the Evidentiary Hearing. Plaintiff's counsel, Richard Freeth, offered a copy of his 2021 tax return, which was received without objection.\n\n<sup>6</sup> Moving Defendants filed their motion for sanctions on April 20, 2023, Dkt. No. 36, after the Court granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint, *see* Dkt. No. 34 at 16, but before Plaintiff actually filed his Amended Complaint, *see* Dkt. No. 43. On July 7, 2023, the Court directed the parties to file letter briefs addressed to the question whether Moving Defendants' Rule 11 motion is properly before this Court or whether the Rule 11 motion had to be re-served on Plaintiff's counsel upon the filing of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. Dkt. No. 54. Each party filed a letter brief addressed to that issue on July 13, 2023. *See* Dkt. Nos. 55–56. 7 Though the Court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing if there are no disputes of material fact, *see Chemiakin*, 932 F.2d at 130 (\"Although appellants attempt to engraft onto Rule 11 a requirement that an evidentiary hearing be held prior to the imposition of sanctions, there is no such requirement, absent disputed facts or issues of credibility.\"); *see also* Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory Committee's Note to 1993 Amendment (\"The court must to the extent possible limit the scope of sanction proceedings to the record.\"), the Court provided both parties with an opportunity to present additional evidence given the nature of the hearing and its reliance on facts outside the record.\n\n#### **III. Rule 11 Evidence**\n\nMoving Defendants argue that this lawsuit \"is merely one in a series of abusive, harassing tactics undertaken at the behest of Miles Kwok (also known as Wengui Guo and Ho Wan Kwok)\" against O'Melveny and Sarnoff arising from the assistance Moving Defendants provided their client, investment fund Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. (\"PAX\"), in a lawsuit against Kwok in New York State court. PAX obtained a \\$116.4 million judgment against Kwok and the state court-imposed contempt sanctions of \\$134 million against Kwok. Dkt. Nos. 38-9, 38-10.\n\nOn April 18, 2017, PAX sued Kwok in New York State court for breaching a \\$30 million loan agreement. Dkt. No. 38-11 (\"State Court Complaint\").8 PAX was represented by O'Melveny and Sarnoff. The State Court Complaint alleged that Kwok owed approximately \\$88 million including contractual interest. *Id.* at ECF p. 4. After nearly four years of litigation, Justice Barry Ostrager of the New York Supreme Court issued a judgment in favor of PAX and against Kwok in the amount of \\$116,402,019.57, on February 3, 2021. Dkt. No. 38-9. One year later, on February 9, 2022, Justice Ostrager, in a decision and order, imposed contempt sanctions on Kwok, ordering Kwok to pay \\$134 million—\\$500,000 per day for 268 days in contempt fines—to be paid in five business days or the court would \"exercise its full authority under New York Judiciary Law § 753.\" Dkt. No. 38-10.<sup>9</sup> Justice Ostrager's opinion was scathing. He found that, in order to avoid PAX's judgment, Kwok had \"park[ed] his substantial personal assets with a series of corporations, trusted confidants, and family members\" and \"secreted his\n\n<sup>8</sup> The Court can take \"judicial notice of a document filed in another court 'not for the truth of the matters asserted in the other litigation, but rather to establish the fact of such litigation and related filings.'\" *Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rotches Pork Packers, Inc.*, 969 F.2d 1384, 1388 (2d Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).\n\n<sup>9</sup> New York Judiciary Law gives the state court the power \"to punish, by fine or imprisonment, or either\" a contempt of court. N.Y. Jud. Law § 753.\n\nassets in a maze of corporate entities and with family members.\" *Id.* at 1. After addressing Kwok's violation of court orders with respect to his yacht, the Lady May, Justice Ostrager concluded: \"The machinations associated with the shell game Kwok has orchestrated with respect to the Lady May are of a piece with every other evasive and contemptuous act Kwok has taken during the five years this litigation has been pending, which is why there are 1,180 docket entries in this case.\" *Id.* at 8.\n\nOn February 15, 2022, on the eve of the contempt order's five-day deadline, Kwok filed for personal bankruptcy in the District of Connecticut under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Dkt. No. 38-15; *see also* Dkt. No. 45 at 9. In that proceeding, Kwok listed O'Melveny's client, PAX, as his largest creditor, to whom he owed approximately \\$254 million. Dkt. No. 38-15 at ECF p. 10; Dkt. No. 38-16. On or about July 7, 2022, upon application of the United States Trustee, Dkt. No. 38-17, and over Kwok's objection, the United States Bankruptcy Court in Connecticut (the \"Bankruptcy Court\") appointed a trustee, Luc Despins from Paul Hastings LLC, to administer Kwok's estate, *see* Dkt. No. 38-18; *see also* Dkt. No. 45 ¶ 38.10 On August 10, 2022, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order, upon the application of Despins, confirming that Despins held all economic and governance rights, for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate, with respect to all entities owned or controlled by Kwok. Dkt. No. 38-19. On August 16, 2022, the Court granted the Trustee's Rule 2004 motion to serve subpoenas on various legal and financial advisors to Kwok. Dkt. No. 38-20. That same day, the Court granted the Trustee's Rule 2004\n\n<sup>10</sup> On June 30, 2022, the United States Trustee Program (\"USTP\") applied to appoint Joe Whitley as the Chapter 11 Trustee, Dkt. No. 45 at 9, and then withdrew the application for the appointment of Whitley, Dkt. No. 45-15. Plaintiff asserts that the bankruptcy court \"repeatedly stat[es] its concerns about the violation of the removal process outlined in the Bankruptcy Code\" citing the notice of appointment, Dkt. No. 45-14, and withdrawal of the appointment application, Dkt. No. 45-15, for support, but neither exhibit contains the \"concerns\" referenced by Plaintiff.\n\nmotion to serve subpoenas on various entities and individuals affiliated with Kwok. Dkt. No. 38- 21.\n\nOn November 22, 2022, PAX (represented by Moving Defendants) filed an application for a temporary restraining order (\"TRO\") and preliminary injunction in the Bankruptcy Court, seeking to restrain and enjoin Kwok and all persons in active concert or participation with him from (1) posting false and harassing online materials about Despins, PAX's or PAG's officers or employees, counsel to the Trustee or PAX, and of any respective relatives; (2) publishing online the home addresses and other personal information of those individuals; and (3) encouraging, inciting, suggesting, or directly or indirectly funding protests at the home or office of any of those individuals (including former spouses). Dkt. No. 38-30 at 1–2. The Bankruptcy Court held an expedited hearing the next day and, on that same day, entered the TRO granting PAX the full relief requested. *See id.* at 6.11 The TRO extended to all \"other persons who are in active concert or participation with [Kwok] . . . upon receipt of actual notice by personal service or otherwise.\" *Id.* at 7.\n\nBeginning on December 5, 2022, the Bankruptcy Court held a four-day evidentiary hearing on PAX's motion for a preliminary injunction. *See* Dkt. No. 38-37 (transcript of the hearing for the motion for preliminary injunction). On January 13, 2023, the Bankruptcy Court\n\n<sup>11</sup> Moving Defendants repeatedly point to the Bankruptcy Court's findings of fact of its preliminary injunction decision throughout their briefing for the factual propositions contained therein. *See, e.g.*, Dkt. No. 37 at 2, 6, 7, 8. However, the Court is not able to take judicial notice of these findings, other than for the fact that they exist. *See Int'l Star Class Yacht Racing Ass'n v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc.*, 146 F.3d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that the district court erred when it took judicial notice of orders of a bankruptcy court \"to establish facts asserted therein\" because \"[f]acts adjudicated in a prior case do not meet either test of indisputability contained in Rule 201(b): they are not usually common knowledge, nor are they derived from an unimpeachable source\"). The Court thus limits itself to the direct evidence that Moving Defendants submitted with their motion papers.\n\nissued a preliminary injunction, among other things, \"enjoining [Kwok] from protesting, picketing, parading, or displaying or distributing harassing material, at any time, within two hundred feet (200 ft.) of the homes [or residences, or the offices or workplaces, or entrance thereof] of relatives (including former spouses) of . . . counsel to . . . PAX\" during certain time periods. Dkt. No. 38-3 at 3–4. The Bankruptcy Court noted that \"harassing materials\" include those that describe O'Melveny lawyers as \"Communists, agents of the Chinese Communist Party, extortionists, anti-Semites, racists, supporters of genocide, or otherwise make[] similarly disparaging allegations regarding such parties' actions or beliefs.\" *Id*. at 5. The preliminary injunction also extends to those in active concert with Kwok upon actual notice of the order. *Id.* at 7.\n\nMoving Defendants present additional evidence of the harassment against them and the connection between this harassment and New Federal State of China (the \"NFSC\"), and by association, Kwok—and they present evidence that this activity did not dissipate upon the Bankruptcy Court's issuance of the TRO or the preliminary injunction. The NFSC is closely associated with Kwok, who founded the organization. *See* Dkt. No. 38-5; Dkt. No. 38-22 at ECF p. 5. NFSC, according to a report published on GNews and seemingly authored by the news arm of NFSC, NFSC News, engaged in protests against Paul Hastings, O'Melveny, and lawyers for both firms for 80 days as of February 7, 2023.12 Dkt. No. 38-38 at ECF p. 4. The article reported that the \"NFSC . . . protests will continue for another 100 days after completing 90\n\n<sup>12</sup> Plaintiff admits in his Complaint that he attended these protests and suggests that he did so in connection with involvement in NFSC. As Plaintiff pleads, on November 22, 2022, \"the Plaintiff joined in peaceful protests at the office of Defendant O'Melveny,\" Dkt. No. 2 ¶ 67, and \"commencing on December 2, 2022, the Plaintiff with a number of other people, joined in regular peaceful protests at a location believed to be in proximity to the home of Defendant Sarnoff,\" *id.* ¶ 68.\n\ndays.\" *Id.* at ECF p. 5. According to Moving Defendants, \"[t]he protests . . . continued in violation of the preliminary injunction, culminating in a February 12, 2023, incident in which Kwok's followers assaulted one of Mr. Sarnoff's neighbors.\" Dkt. No. 37 at 10. Moving Defendants attached a security incident report signed by a reporting officer that reported on the alleged assault. *See* Dkt. No. 38-39.\n\nMoving Defendants also submit videos of protests in front of Sarnoff's home. *See, e.g.*, Dkt. No. 38-32. Another video shows protesters with images of O'Melveny lawyers, including Sarnoff, juxtaposed next to slogans including \"Supporters of Genocide\" and \"CCP's favorite lawyers.\" *See* Dkt. No. 33 at 5:20–5:50. And a video posted by GNews shows protesters outside of Sarnoff's home showing placards with a picture of Sarnoff juxtaposed next to hammers and sickles and the phrase \"Chinese Communist Party's Running Dog.\" *See* Dkt. No. 38-34. This language is identical to language used on the NFSC account on Gettr, a social media website, which, on December 4, 2022, posted that Sarnoff was \"a running dog paid for and owned by CCP to persecute Chinese dissidents.\" Dkt. No. 38-29. Finally, on November 29, 2022, NFSC supporters sent emails to 100 O'Melveny employees, calling out Sarnoff by name and \"express[ing] deep disturbance at O'Melveny partners . . . [for] attempts to persecute some of the world's loudest whistleblowers attempting to take down the Chinese Communist Party.\" Dkt. No. 38-35.\n\nMoving Defendants also present evidence of a relationship between Gong's counsel and Kwok. Yongbing Zhang, who signed the Complaint but not the Amended Complaint, *compare*  Dkt. No. 2 at ECF p. 25, *with* Dkt. No. 43 at ECF p. 29, appears in numerous photos of NFSCled protests circulating on social media, including a post on NFSC's Gettr account from November 20, 2022 showing Zhang picketing at the house of Despins' ex-wife in Westchester\n\nCounty, New York, and holding a sign calling the trustee an \"A-List Scumbag.\" Dkt. No. 38-24 ¶ 32. Zhang also appeared in photos with Kwok from June 4, 2022 at the NFSC Second Anniversary party. Dkt. No. 38-25.\n\nFinally, within days of the TRO, the lawyers who filed this lawsuit on behalf of Plaintiff filed three other near-identical lawsuits, targeting those who either were affiliated with PAX or represented PAX or who assisted the Bankruptcy Court. *See* Dkt. Nos. 38-40–38-42. On November 28, 2022, Zhang and Richard Freeth filed a lawsuit in this District against Paul Hastings and Chapter 11 Trustee Despins on behalf of a purported Chinese-born U.S. resident. *See* Dkt. No. 38-40 ¶ 2 (Complaint in *An et al. v. Despins et al.*, No. 22-cv-10062 (VEC) (S.D.N.Y.)). That complaint alleges that Paul Hastings and Despins \"operated covertly as unregistered agents of\" either or both of the PRC or the CCP, *id.*, and makes nearly identical allegations of a FARA violation to those made here, *see, e.g.*, *id.* ¶ 39. On November 28, 2022, Zhang and Freeth filed a lawsuit on behalf of the same plaintiffs against Weijan Shan, the chairman of PAX's managing member, Pacific Alliance Group, and Shan's son, Bo Leilei Shan. *See* Dkt. No. 38-41 (Complaint in *An et al. v. Shan et al.*, No. 22-cv-10060 (ALC) (S.D.N.Y)). The plaintiffs there allege that Weijan Shan and Bo Leilei Shan also acted \"as unregistered agents of either or both\" of the PRC or the CCP. *Id.* ¶ 29. The principal allegation against Weijan Shan was that he was photographed with United States Senator Diane Feinstein, who it is alleged \"has supported communist causes and more recently was revealed to have a CCP spy serving as her Senate office manager\" and received \"significant revenue from companies in China.\" *Id.* ¶ 72.13 The allegation against the son related to FARA follows principally from the\n\n<sup>13</sup> The allegations about Senator Feinstein are sourced from a website called \"Discover the Networks.\" Dkt. No. 41 ¶ 72.\n\nfact that he is Shan's son. *Id.* ¶ 79. Finally, on March 17, 2023, Zhang and Freeth (along with a third lawyer, Brian R. Della Rocca), filed a lawsuit in the District of Maryland against Weijan Shan and several other defendants, including the University of Maryland. Dkt. No. 38-42 (Complaint in *Wyatt et al. v. Univ. of Md.*, No. 23-cv-742 (JKB) (D. Md.)). The complaint contains identical FARA allegations against Weijan Shan. *Id.* ¶¶ 118–25. It also contains civil rights claims similar to the ones here, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 pursuant to the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments, *id.* ¶¶ 83–90; *id.* ¶¶ 101–10, and violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), *id.* ¶¶ 91–100. Plaintiffs allege that they were protesting at the University of Maryland where Weijan Shan's daughter is a doctoral student to inform other students about the \"Shan family's CCP background and their influence at U.S. public schools,\" *id.* ¶ 26, when they \"started experiencing some unexpected restrictions from Defendants\" and \"were instructed to discontinue holding signs, distributing flyers and conducting livestreaming online,\" *id.* ¶ 39. They also allege that, after the Bankruptcy Court issued its order and their permit was revoked, they were threatened with arrest if they continued protests at the University Commons. *Id.* ¶¶ 47, 55.\n\nThe Honorable Judge Valerie E. Caproni dismissed the complaint in *An et al. v. Despins et al.*, No. 22-cv-10062, without prejudice and sanctioned counsel and plaintiffs in that action under Rule 11. *See id.* Dkt. No. 29; *see also An v. Despins*, 2023 WL 4931832 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2023). A motion to dismiss and motion for sanctions remains pending in *An et al. v. Shan et al.*, No. 22-cv-10060 (ALC) (S.D.N.Y). *See id.* Dkt. Nos. 22, 31. Finally, in *Wyatt et al. v. University of Maryland*, No. 23-cv-742 (JKB) (D. Md.), the Honorable Chief Judge James K. Bredar dismissed Counts I, II, III, and V against defendants the University of Maryland, Darryll Pines, Joel Dewyer, and Bruce Perry with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction, *id.* Dkt. No. 29, and\n\ndismissed the case against the remaining defendants without prejudice for failure to serve under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), *id.* Dkt. No. 34.\n\n#### **LEGAL STANDARD**\n\nRule 11 requires an attorney to certify that (1) a pleading or motion \"is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;\" (2) \"the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law;\" and (3) \"the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). \"The text of Rule 11 makes only 'attorney[s]' and 'unrepresented part[ies]' subject to Rule 11(b)'s strictures, which means that only those individuals can violate it.\" *Int'l Techs. Mktg., Inc. v. Cognyte Techs. Israel Ltd.*, 2022 WL 11280876, at \\*11 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2022). However, Rule 11(c)(5) presents the only limitation on a court's ability to impose sanctions on represented parties: A court is prohibited from imposing monetary sanctions on a represented party for making frivolous legal arguments in violation of Rule 11(b)(2). Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(5); *see also* Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1) (\"[T]he court may impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule or is responsible for the violation.\"). \"[T]here is no question that once a court finds that Rule 11(b) has been violated by an attorney or unrepresented party, sanctions may be awarded against any 'attorney, law firm, *or party* that violated the rule or is responsible for the violation.'\" *Int'l Techs. Mktg., Inc.*, 2022 WL 11280876, at \\*12 (emphasis in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(5)).\n\nRule 11(c), in turn, permits a court to impose \"appropriate sanctions\" for violations of Rule 11(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1). Sanctions imposed under Rule 11(c)\n\nmust be limited to what suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. The sanction may include nonmonetary directives; an order to pay a penalty into court; or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of part or all of the reasonable attorney's fees and other expenses directly resulting from the violation.\n\nFed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4). \"When a court determines that Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate, it 'has significant discretion in determining what sanctions, if any, should be imposed for a violation.'\" *E. Gluck Corp. v. Rothenhaus*, 2008 WL 2944624, at \\*3 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2008) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)–(c), Advisory Committee Notes to 1993 Amendment).\n\n\"[T]he standard for triggering [sanctions] under Rule 11 is objective unreasonableness,\" *Margo v. Weiss*, 213 F.3d 55, 65 (2d Cir. 2000), and is \"not based on the subjective beliefs of the person making the statement,\" *Star Mark Mgmt., Inc. v. Koon Chun Hing Kee Soy & Sauce Factory, Ltd*., 682 F.3d 170, 177 (2d Cir. 2012); *see also In re Austl. & N.Z. Banking Grp. Ltd. Sec. Litig.*, 712 F. Supp. 2d 255, 265–66 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). Thus, an attorney files a pleading or motion in violation of Rule 11 if it is \"frivolous, legally unreasonable, or factually without foundation, even though not signed in subjective bad faith.\" *Wechsler v. Hunt Health Sys., Ltd*., 216 F. Supp. 2d 347, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); *see also Simon DeBartolo Grp., L.P. v. Richard E. Jacobs Grp., Inc*., 186 F.3d 157, 167 (2d Cir. 1999).\n\n#### **DISCUSSION**\n\n# **I. Defendants Have Satisfied the Safe-Harbor Provision**\n\nThe threshold question presented by Moving Defendants' motion is whether they have satisfied the 21-day safe-harbor period of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. Rule 11 provides that a motion for sanctions \"must not be filed or be presented to the court if the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, or denial is withdrawn or appropriately corrected within 21 days after service.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). Therefore, if, during this twenty-one day \"safe-harbor\"\n\nperiod, the adversary \"withdraw[s] or appropriately correct[s]\" the alleged violation, the adversary is insulated from Rule 11 liability for the offending filing. *Id*. If a Rule 11 motion is directed to a new filing, the moving party must re-notice the violation and give the alleged transgressor an additional twenty-one days to withdraw or correct. *See Lawrence v. Richman Grp. of CT LLC*, 620 F.3d 153, 158 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (\"[W]e conclude that where, as here, a defective complaint is dismissed and a party is granted leave to replead, the filing of an amended pleading resets the clock for compliance with the safe harbor requirements of Rule 11(c)(2) before a party aggrieved by the new filing can present a sanctions motion based on that pleading to the district court.\").\n\nMoving Defendants have satisfied the 21-day safe-harbor provision and need not have renoticed their motion after Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint. Moving Defendants served their motion and supporting papers on Plaintiff on March 29, 2023. Dkt. No. 39 ¶ 2. That motion identified \"the source of authority for the sanctions being considered; and . . . the specific conduct or omission for which the sanctions are being considered so that the subject of the sanctions motion can prepare a defense,\" as required by the principles of due process. *See Star Mark Mgmt., Inc.*, 682 F.3d at 175. The papers challenged the Complaint as violating Rule 11 and specifically identified that the action was initiated to harass Moving Defendants and that neither the FARA claim nor the civil rights claims were supported by fact or by law or a wellfounded argument for the extension of existing law. *See generally* Dkt. No. 37. Specifically, Moving Defendants charged that the civil rights and FARA allegations against them \"consist[ed] entirely of unadorned conclusions without any supporting factual matter,\" *id.* at 12, that FARA \"provides no private right of action, and there is no avenue for inferring one\" or basis upon which Plaintiff would have standing, *id.* at 2, and that the FARA allegations were factually\n\n\"incoherent,\" *id.* at 21. On April 20, 2023, twenty-one days after Plaintiff was served with the Rule 11 papers, Moving Defendants filed the sanctions motion. *See* Dkt. No. 39.\n\nThe motion was not mooted by Plaintiff's filing of the Amended Complaint. Plaintiff received leave to file the Amended Complaint on April 14, 2023, *see* Dkt. No. 34 at 16, and filed the Amended Complaint on April 26, 2023, *see* Dkt. No. 43. Although the Amended Complaint added new and unrelated allegations to the original Complaint that is the subject of this motion, it did not \"withdraw\" the challenged pleading or otherwise \"appropriately correc[t]\" it. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). The purpose of the safe-harbor requirement is to provide \"an opportunity to correct or withdraw the defective filing\" and to \"reduce, if not eliminate, the unnecessary expenditure of judicial time and adversary resource.\" *Lawrence*, 620 F.3d at 158. A pleading, including a complaint, is \"withdrawn\" either when it is dismissed, *see Hockley by Hockley v. Shan Enters. Ltd. P'ship*, 19 F. Supp. 2d 235, 241 (D.N.J. 1998) (\"Since [third-party plaintiff] withdrew its position [in its third party complaint] when it voluntarily dismissed its claims, it is not subject to Rule 11 sanctions.\"); *Brown v. Pierce Mfg., Inc.*, 169 F.R.D. 118, 119 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (holding that Rule 11 sanctions cannot be imposed when plaintiff moved to dismiss deficient complaint within twenty-one days of being served with defendant's Rule 11 motion); 5A C. Wright & A. Miller, *Federal Practice and Procedure* § 1337.2 (4th ed., Apr. 2023 Update) (\"[A] motion for sanctions will be rejected if the party subject to sanctions files for voluntary dismissal within the twenty-one day safe harbor period, because voluntary dismissal effectively constitutes a withdrawal of the offending paper for purposes of the safe harbor provision.\"), or when an amended pleading is filed that no longer asserts that claim, *see Team Obsolete Ltd. V. A.H.R.M.A. Ltd.*, 216 F.R.D. 29, 43 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that plaintiff \"effectively withdr[ew]\" sanctionable claims by dropping certain claims and certain defendants); 2 *Moore's Federal Practice* § 11.22(1)(b) (\"Filing a motion for leave to amend a pleading *to eliminate challenged claims* constitutes effective withdrawal of those claims.\" (emphasis added)).\n\nPlaintiff did not \"withdraw\" the challenged Complaint. Plaintiff continued to assert the same allegedly frivolous and harassing allegations and claims in the Amended Complaint as in the challenged Complaint. He reiterated his claims. Plaintiff also did not \"appropriately correc[t]\" the challenged Complaint. A pleading is \"appropriately corrected\" when the issues underlying a challenged claim or pleading are addressed. *See, e.g*., *Rates Tech. Inc. v. Mediatrix Telecom, Inc*., 2007 WL 1987787, at \\*4 (E.D.N.Y. June 29, 2007) (concluding that the relevant issue before the court was not whether the plaintiff sought leave to amend within the twenty-oneday safe harbor period but rather \"whether the proposed First Amended Complaint corrects the alleged deficiencies in the original Complaint\"). Moving Defendants did not seek sanctions on the basis that the Complaint lacked sufficient allegations of O'Melveny's and Sarnoff's legal work on behalf of Chinese entities or sufficient allegations of the threats that the PRC poses to United States interests, which were the topics addressed by the allegations added to the Amended Complaint. *See* Dkt. No. 43 ¶¶ 11–21, 35, 55. Moving Defendants sought sanctions because the Complaint itself was initiated to harass Moving Defendants, the FARA claim was legally and factually frivolous, and the Section 1983 and 1985(3) claims against Moving Defendants lacked any allegations that Moving Defendants were associated with the conduct of the NYPD on December 20, 2022. The Amended Complaint did not address any of those issues. Its very filing—and its failure to address the deficiencies of the Complaint—compounded the claimed injury to Moving Defendants. A party cannot escape Rule 11 sanctions by adding new\n\nallegations or claims but at the same time still \"insisting upon a position after it is no longer tenable.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)–(c), Advisory Committee Notes to the 1993 Amendment.14\n\nIt follows further that Moving Defendants were not required to re-notice the defects in Plaintiff's pleading after Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint or to give Plaintiff an additional twenty-one days to withdraw or correct its allegedly sanctionable claims. The twenty-one-day safe harbor time period has meaning. The longer a frivolous and harassing complaint remains outstanding the greater the harm. The twenty-one days corresponds with the time period under Rule 12(a)(1) to prepare and file an answer to a complaint, *see* Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1), and the time period under Rule 15(a)(1) to amend a pleading as of right, *see* Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). If, within the time period the framers of the Federal Rules believed was sufficient to file a responsive or amended pleading, the offending party fails to correct a pleading whose defects have been identified to him, the offending party is not entitled to relief from a Rule 11 sanction. The damage has been done and remains.\n\nMoving Defendants *would* have been required to re-notice Plaintiff if Moving Defendants sought sanctions based upon the Amended Complaint. A single Rule 11 motion does not function as an evergreen deposit serving as notice that whatever filings or papers follow are sanctionable without need of notice or an opportunity to be heard. The motion for sanctions is conduct specific; it \"must describe the specific conduct that allegedly violates Rule 11(b).\" Fed.\n\n<sup>14</sup> The court in *Sacerdote v. Cammack Larhette Advisors, LLC*, 2022 WL 2078012, at \\*9 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2022), stated that \"because Rule 11 is aimed at addressing particular defective or frivolous *documents*, a Rule 11 motion aimed at an initial complaint must be re-noticed upon the filing of an amended complaint.\" (emphasis in original) (citation and alteration omitted)). That language, however, is dicta in a case where the court held that the defendants never provided adequate notice as against the initial complaint and that, even if it had, its Rule 11 motion would have been meritless. *Id.* at \\*9–10. There is no reason to believe that the court would have reached the same result had proper notice been provided and the plaintiff—in the face of a Rule 11 motion—doubled down on its sanctionable conduct.\n\nR. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). But, here, Defendants do not seek sanctions based on the Amended Complaint; they seek to sanction the Complaint.15 Dkt. No. 38; Dkt. No. 56 at 3. Therefore, the filing of an amended complaint did not \"reset the clock,\" *Lawrence*, 620 F.3d at 158, and Moving Defendants' notice served on Plaintiff's two attorneys on March 29 and March 30, 2023 satisfies the dictates of Rule 11, *see* Dkt. No. 39.\n\n#### **II. Plaintiff's FARA Claim Was Frivolous**\n\nThe Court has no difficulty concluding that Plaintiff's FARA claim is frivolous. \"An argument constitutes a frivolous legal position for purposes of Rule 11 sanctions if, under an 'objective standard of reasonableness' . . . it is 'clear . . . that there is no chance of success and no reasonable argument to extend, modify or reverse the law as it stands.'\" *Galonsky v. Williams*, 1997 WL 759445, at \\*3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 1997) (quoting *Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole–CNCA v. Valcorp, Inc*., 28 F.3d 259, 264 (2d Cir.1995)). Although \"Rule 11 provides room for litigants to make 'nonfrivolous argument[s] for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law,'\" *Doe v. 239 Park Ave. S. Assocs., LLC*, 2022 WL 4592713, at \\*4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2022) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2)), the Rule is violated \"where it is patently clear that a claim has absolutely no chance of success under the existing precedents, and where no reasonable argument can be advanced to extend, modify or reverse the law as it stands,\" *Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York*, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985), *superseded on other grounds by rule*. The standard is objective. It is not a defense that the offending party acted with\n\n<sup>15</sup> For this reason, *Lawrence v. Richman Group of CT LLC*, 620 F.3d 153, is distinguishable. There, the district court imposed sanctions on the plaintiff for filing a second amended complaint based on a Rule 11 motion noticed and filed with respect to the first amended complaint. *See id.*  at 157 (noting that \"the sanctioned conduct was the filing of the second amended complaint\" and that the panel was only reviewing the \"safe harbor argument as it pertains to the filing of the second amended complaint,\" not the first amended complaint, which was properly noticed). Here, Moving Defendants seek sanctions with respect to the Complaint, not the Amended Complaint, and the Rule 11 motion is properly noticed with respect to that document.\n\na pure heart but an empty head. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)–(c), Advisory Committee Notes to the 1993 Amendment. \"[T]he extent to which a litigant has researched the issues and found support for its theories even in minority opinions, in law review articles, or through consultation with other attorneys\" is taken into account in determining whether Rule 11 has been violated. *Id.*\n\nPlaintiff's FARA claim here lacked any chance of success and was objectively frivolous. Plaintiff admitted that there is no \"explicit 'private right of action' provision in the FARA statute,\" Dkt. No. 2 ¶ 178, and he relied on the notion that the court should imply that Congress intended to create such a right of action. But every court to have considered the issue, in this Circuit and elsewhere, has held that no private right of action can be implied in FARA. *See, e.g.*, *Dvoinik v. Rolff*, 2023 WL 3276398, at \\*5 (M.D. Fla. May 5, 2023) (\"Nothing in the statutory scheme suggests an intent to create a private cause of action for FARA violations.\"); *Henry v. Washington*, 2022 WL 9491957, at \\*2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 16, 2022), *report and recommendation adopted*, 2022 WL 9372175 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 14, 2022) (\"[T]here is no private cause of action provided for in the act such that Plaintiff could sue for a violation of it.\"); *Bey v. Epstein*, 2021 WL 8155603, at \\*9 (D. Conn. Aug. 6, 2021) (\"[A] private right of action cannot be inferred from FARA.\"); *Weican Meng v. Xinhuanet Co*., 2017 WL 3175609, at \\*5 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2017) (holding that FARA does not contain a private right of action); *Comm. for a Free Namibia v. S. W. Afr. People's Org.*, 554 F. Supp. 722, 725 (D.D.C. 1982).\n\nPlaintiff's assertion that the Court was free to imply that Congress intended to fashion a private right of action because \"the statute is silent on the creation of a private right of action,\" Dkt. No. 45 at 14 ¶ 66, only highlights counsel's abject failure to do any research into the basis of his claim before he filed it. The Supreme Court has been clear since at least its decision fortyfour years ago in *Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington*, 442 U.S. 560, 571 (1979), where the Court\n\nheld that where Congress is silent as to its intent to create a private cause of action and there is no basis to find one in the structure of the statute or in the legislative history, the courts are not free simply to imply one. *See also Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.*, 430 U.S. 1, 25 (1977) (examining \"legislative history to discern the congressional purpose underlying the specific statutory prohibition\" to determine \"whether the creation by judicial interpretation of the implied cause of action . . . is necessary to effectuate Congress' goals\"). Indeed, twenty years ago, the Court held that a court cannot imply a private right of action unless the federal law, on its face, \"manifests an intent 'to create not just a private right but also a private remedy.'\" *Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe*, 536 U.S. 273, 284 (2002) (quoting *Alexander v. Sandoval*, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001)); *see also Olmsted v. Pruco Life Ins. Co*., 283 F.3d 429, 432 (2d Cir. 2002) (\"A court . . . cannot ordinarily conclude that Congress intended to create a right of action when none was explicitly provided.\"). \"[T]he Supreme Court has come to view the implication of private remedies in regulatory statutes with increasing disfavor.\" *Republic of Iraq v. ABB AG*, 768 F.3d 145, 170 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting *Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P. v. Gotham Partners, L.P.*, 286 F.3d 613, 618 (2d Cir. 2002)). The Supreme Court has \"clarified in a series of cases that, when deciding whether to recognize an implied cause of action, the 'determinative' question is one of statutory intent.\" *Ziglar v. Abbasi*, 582 U.S. 120, 131 (2017) (quoting *Sandoval*, 532 U.S. at 286). Congress must have \"'unambiguously conferred' 'individual rights upon a class of beneficiaries' to which the plaintiff belongs.\" *Health & Hosp. Corp. v. Talevski*, 143 S. Ct. 1444, 1457 (2023) (quoting *Gonzaga Univ.*, 536 U.S. at 285–86). Thus, \"implied rights of action are disfavored.\" *Moya v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec*., 975 F.3d 120, 128 (2d Cir. 2020) (declining to find a private right of action under the Rehabilitation Act against executive agencies). Since *Ziglar*, the Second Circuit has only found an implied right of action in one case,\n\nand then only after determining that \"[t]he text . . . unambiguously evinces Congressional intent to authorize a private action\" and the statute \"also identifies a 'class of persons'\" who benefit from the availability of the right of action. *Oxford Univ. Bank v. Lansuppe Feeder, LLC*, 933 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 2019).\n\nNeither in his Complaint, nor in his opposition to the motion to dismiss, nor in his opposition to the Rule 11 motion, has Plaintiff identified any reason to believe that FARA would be an exception to the numerous regulatory statutes as to which the courts have held no private right of action exists. FARA was originally enacted \"[t]o protect the national defense, internal security, and foreign relations of the United States by requiring public disclosure by persons engaging in propaganda activities for or on behalf of foreign governments, foreign political parties, and other foreign principals.\" *Meese v. Keene*, 481 U.S. 465, 469 (1987) (quoting Amendment to Foreign Agents Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 77-532, 56 Stat. 248, 248–49 (Apr. 29, 1942)). To that end, FARA requires a foreign agent as defined therein to file required documents with the Attorney General, 22 U.S.C. § 612(a), and it gives \"the Attorney General [the authority to] make an application to the appropriate United States district court for an order enjoining such [violating] acts,\" 22 U.S.C. § 618(f). Moreover, Section 618(e) \"criminalize[s] the failure to satisfy the requirements of . . . sections 612(a) and 612(b) [(*i.e.*, the failure to register)].\" *United States v. McGoff*, 831 F.2d 1071, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1987). All of these rights of enforcement attach to the Attorney General, not private parties. And \"[P]laintiff cannot point to any language in the statute or its legislative history which suggests that Congress intended to establish a cause of action in any entity other than the federal government.\" *Comm. for a Free Namibia*, 554 F. Supp. at 725.\n\nThe best that Plaintiff has been able to muster is to state that (1) \"only District Courts have, as of yet, opined on the issue, and there has been no appellate or Supreme Court ruling,\" Dkt. No. 2 ¶ 178, and (2) \"there has been a lack of enforcement action—resulting in the violation of constitutional rights, and a blatant disregard of the rule of law,\" *id*. ¶ 179. It is not necessary, however, for the Second Circuit or the Supreme Court to have explicitly rejected an argument for a district court to have the authority to conclude that the argument is frivolous. The number of issues that reach the appellate courts, much less the Supreme Court, is limited. Those courts do not have the resources to address every frivolous issue. Thus, that a claim has not previously been rejected by a circuit court does not alone give the plaintiff the license to make the claim, any more than the fact that an issue that previously has been addressed and rejected by a circuit court necessarily precludes a subsequent plaintiff from raising it. At all times, the critical question is not whether the circuit courts or Supreme Court has spoken directly on a particular issue—the question is whether the claim is \"warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2). If the claim is warranted by existing law or a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, a party can make that claim without violating Rule 11(b)(2). If it is not so warranted, the pleading is sanctionable.\n\nPlaintiff's suggestion that he is entitled to enforce FARA because the United States government has not adequately done so fares no better; Plaintiff does not gain the right to step into the shoes of the United States Attorney General merely because he disagrees with his or her enforcement decisions. Plaintiff \"did not come forward at any point with any authority or coherent explanation as to why he has\" a private right of action, and the claim was \"thus objectively frivolous.\" *Thompson v. Steinberg*, 2021 WL 3914079, at \\*7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1,\n\n2021), *aff'd*, 2023 WL 353359 (2d Cir. Jan. 23, 2023); *see also Biocad JSC v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd.*, 2022 WL 268102, at \\*5 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (imposing sanctions because \"several courts . . . have previously\" ruled against the legal argument, and yet plaintiff \"did not cite a single case\" explaining why the legal argument is still viable).\n\nMoreover, even if the Court somehow found that FARA conferred a right of action on any private party, Plaintiff never articulated a basis upon which he could have asserted a FARA claim. As the Court concluded in its opinion dismissing Plaintiff's FARA claim in the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff did \"not allege any harm associated with his allegation of Defendants' violation of\" FARA and did not allege that any potential harm was \"traceable to Defendants' failure to register under FARA or how a declaratory judgment compelling registration would redress his alleged injury.\" *Gong v. Sarnoff*, 2023 WL 4561800, at \\*11 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2023). The same conclusion applies with equal force to the Complaint.\n\nFinally, Plaintiff's allegations lacked evidentiary support and there was no basis to believe that they would have evidentiary support. Plaintiff alleged that \"O'Melveny is beholden to the CCP, and as such performs whatever acts are requested by the CCP—including acts within the United States that would require registration as foreign agents with the US Government.\" Dkt. No. 2 ¶ 47. Plaintiff further alleged that the CCP's unregistered agents in the United States \"are now believed to be Defendant Sarnoff, Defendant O'Melveny and Defendant Stanton.\" *Id.* ¶ 64. However, the only factual allegations made to support these claims with respect to Moving Defendants are that they have performed legal work on behalf of a Chinese company, *id.* ¶¶ 25– 26, and that O'Melveny has offices in the PRC from which it conducts \"lucrative\" business with a \"potentially significant impact on the country,\" *id.* ¶¶ 42–43. However, FARA exempts from registration (1) \"[a]ny person engaging or agreeing to engage only . . . in private and nonpolitical\n\nactivities in furtherance of the bona fide trade or commerce of such foreign principal,\" 22 U.S.C. § 613(d), and (2) \"[a]ny person qualified to practice law, insofar as he engages or agrees to engage in the legal representation of a disclosed foreign principal before any court of law or any agency of the Government of the United State,\" *id.*§ 613(g). Further, \"agent of a foreign principal\" is defined only to apply to activities performed by agents \"within the United States.\" *Id.* § 611(c). There is no allegation of fact that O'Melveny or Sarnoff took any actions that would fall within the ambit of FARA and not be reached by one of FARA's exemptions.\n\n#### **III. Plaintiff Initiated this Action with an Improper Purpose**\n\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 permits a court to impose sanctions when a pleading has been filed \"for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1); *see also Fox v. Boucher*, 794 F.2d 34, 37–38 (2d Cir. 1986) (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 \"permits the imposition of sanctions when an attorney signs a pleading that is interposed for an improper purpose without reasonable inquiry or without grounds justifying the argument advanced.\"). \"There is a clear line between zealous advocacy and abuse of the legal system that an attorney may not cross.\" *Galonsky v. Williams*, 1997 WL 759445, at \\*1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 1997) (citing *Baffa v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp.*, 222 F.3d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 2000)). But \"[a] party should not be penalized for or deterred from seeking and obtaining warranted judicial relief merely because one of his multiple purposes in seeking that relief may have been improper.\" *Sussman v. Bank of Isr.*, 56 F.3d 450, 459 (2d Cir. 1995); *see also In re Firestar Diamond, Inc.*, 634 B.R. 265, 308 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2021) (\"While the 'improper purpose' and 'frivolousness' inquiries are separate and distinct, they often overlap, and courts have found that a complaint is not filed for an improper purpose if it is nonfrivolous.\"). However, \"[a] court may infer an improper purpose if, in light of Plaintiffs' conduct during and outside of litigation, a complaint is so\n\nbaseless as to suggest that there is an ulterior motive behind the lawsuit.\" *An*, 2023 WL 4931832, at \\*6.\n\nThe Court also has no difficulty finding that Plaintiff here initiated this action for an improper purpose. The Complaint's allegations and claims against Moving Defendants are legally frivolous and factually flawed. Plaintiff's FARA claim is devoid of all factual and legal basis and is independently sanctionable. *See supra* Section II. Plaintiff's Sections 1983 and 1985 claims are similarly without merit.16 Plaintiff alleged he was injured when he was hit by Stanton's car, Dkt. No. 2 ¶ 96, that no police report was filed, *id.* ¶ 108, and that the NYPD obstructed his ability to get medical attention, *id.* ¶¶ 112–19. However, Plaintiff never asserted any facts to support that Moving Defendants had any involvement in the events of December 20, 2022, exercised state authority, or acted in concert with the police. Nor did he assert any basis to believe that such evidence exists. *See Gutierrez v. Fox*, 141 F.3d 425, 427 (2d Cir. 1998) (Rule 11 \"explicitly and unambiguously imposes an affirmative duty on each attorney to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the viability of a pleading before it is signed.\"). There was no reason to believe that either of Moving Defendants had any involvement in the offending conduct. The Complaint contains no non-conclusory allegations that either Moving Defendant was present at the scene when the offending conduct occurred or that Stanton or the NYPD was acting at the direction of the Moving Defendants.\n\nIn fact, when asked what his basis to believe that \"Sarnoff and O'Melveny actually did collude with the police\" during the initial pretrial conference, counsel for Plaintiff, Richard\n\n<sup>16</sup> In its Opinion and Order on Moving Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, the Court dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3) claims, which were supported by substantively identical allegations to those asserted in the Complaint, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.\n\nFreeth, responded with speculation and conjecture. *See Craig v. City of New York*, 2022 WL 2238451, at \\*6, \\*12 (E.D.N.Y. June 22, 2022) (complaint is sanctionable when it rests \"on conjecture and speculation\"); *see also Katzman v. Victoria's Secret Catalogue*, 167 F.R.D. 649, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (\"The total lack of substance [of a complaint] gives rise to the inference that the action was filed for improper purposes.\"). Counsel stated that he \"would imagine\" that Moving Defendants had a connection with Stanton and that \"it would make sense that, you know, the defendants [Sarnoff and O'Melveny] in their position would send someone to, at least, observe, get information.\" Dkt. No. 34 at 6–7. Imagination is guess work; it does not permit one to sue a party for violation of a law enforceable by criminal penalties. The Complaint is similarly devoid of allegations regarding Stanton's connection with the police; though it alleges that Stanton \"indicated that he worked with or had some kind of connection [with the] NYPD,\" it concludes \"[u]pon information and belief, [that] Defendant Stanton is not an officer with the NYPD.\" Dkt. No. 2 ¶¶ 80, 82. Moreover, pressed for clarification about what the state action in this case was, Freeth suggested that \"it seems strange[,] [s]eems very, you know, suspect to me\" that when Plaintiff fell \"down in the street after making contact with a vehicle,\" the police didn't \"do anything.\" Dkt. No. 34 at 8–9. In response to a question from the Court about whether \"discovery would help [Plaintiff] sustain this complaint,\" Plaintiff's counsel responded, \"Well, maybe it would, and maybe it would turn out to be that there isn't anything to support [the Complaint]. I don't know.\" Dkt. No. 34 at 9.\n\nThere is every reason to believe, and the Court finds, that the Complaint was filed not to redress any injury Plaintiff suffered on December 20, 2022, or to obtain judicial relief, but to harass Moving Defendants because of their representation of a client in litigation against Kwok and to deter others from doing the same. Plaintiff and his counsel Zhang are affiliated with\n\nKwok and sympathetic to him and his interests. *See supra* pp. 12–14. Plaintiff experienced his alleged injury at a protest outside Sarnoff's house. *See* Dkt. No. 2 ¶ 71. He previously attended protests outside O'Melveny's office. *Id.* ¶ 67. The Court rejects the notion that Plaintiff attended those protests solely or even primarily because of Moving Defendants' representation of Chinese clients or offices in China. Numerous other law firms represent Chinese clients in litigation in the United States and have (or until recently had) offices in China. The protests singled out Moving Defendants and they singled out Moving Defendants after they had assisted a client in litigation against Kwok. The inference is inescapable that Plaintiff attended the protests because of the assistance that Moving Defendants provided their client against Kwok and to deter and prevent Moving Defendants from continuing to do so.\n\nThe conclusion that the lawsuit was filed to harass Moving Defendants, to punish them for their representation of PAX, and to deter others from also representing clients with interests that are opposed to Kwok's is further reinforced by the language of Plaintiff's brief in opposition to the motion for sanctions. Plaintiff argues that Moving Defendants' accusations are \"dismissive\" because they \"suggest that Plaintiff is simply an empty-headed follower of Mr. Kwok.\" Dkt. No. 45 ¶ 13. Nowhere in his opposition brief does he dispute that he is a follower of Kwok or make anything other than the most superficial and conclusory argument that the lawsuit was filed for reasons other than to harass Moving Defendants for their involvement in the PAX litigation and Bankruptcy Court litigation.17 In fact, he spends 31 paragraphs of his opposition devoted to the argument Kwok has been unfairly targeted by the CCP and the United\n\n<sup>17</sup> Plaintiff argues that he \"has initiated this matter because his Constitutional rights have been violated [and] he feels threatened by the CCP, and its agents, facilitators and/or co-conspirators.\" *Id.* ¶ 52. However, that argument as against Moving Defendants is belied, as described in detail above, by the frivolousness of the claims brought against them.\n\nStates government, that the PAX litigation and bankruptcy proceedings were part of some broader conspiracy against Kwok, and that the CCP has \"weaponize[ed]\" the \"U.S. Courts to target Mr. Kwok.\" *Id.* ¶¶ 15–46.\n\nAnd if there is any doubt of the harassing purpose of this lawsuit, the history of lawsuits Zhang and Freeth have filed in this Court and elsewhere against PAX, persons associated with PAX, PAX's counsel, and those assisting the Bankruptcy Court settles that doubt. \"Although a party should not be sanctioned for 'greater litigiousness' alone, a court may infer improper purpose where multiplicative filings are coupled with 'objectively unreasonable statements.'\" *LCS Grp., LLC v. Shire LLC*, 2019 WL 1234848, at \\*14 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2019) , *judgment aff'd, appeal dismissed in part sub nom. LCS Grp., LLC v. Shire Dev. LLC*, 2022 WL 1217961 (2d Cir. Apr. 26, 2022) (quoting *Storey v. Cello Holdings, LLC*, 347 F.3d 370, 393 (2d Cir. 2003)); *see also* Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)–(c), Advisory Committee Notes to 1993 Amendment (noting that \"whether *the person*\"—and not specifically \"the litigant\"—\"has engaged in similar conduct in other litigation . . . may in a particular case be [a] proper consideration[]\" in determining whether and what kind of sanctions to impose). Plaintiff's counsel has engaged in repeated frivolous litigation in this Court and the District of Maryland. *See supra* pp. 14–16. These cases are unmistakably directed at parties and lawyers, who are either involved in Kwok's bankruptcy or in the PAX litigation. They contain similar allegations and similarly frivolous claims. The inescapable conclusion is that Zhang and Freeth are targeting those with interests opposed to Kwok's with the aim of chilling what they perceive as advocacy against him. The plaintiffs in the actions brought by Zhang and Freeth could have pursued relief from any number of individuals and entities engaged in similar activity in the PRC and for PRC companies for allegedly violating the registration requirements of FARA, but they did not. They only went\n\nafter individuals and entities who were involved in the Kwok bankruptcy or the PAX action. Although not dispositive here, this conclusion adds force to the Court's finding that sanctions are necessary and should be applied against Plaintiff's counsel. *See Billewicz v. Town of Fair Haven*, 2022 WL 4115966, at \\*13 (D. Vt. Aug. 11, 2022), *aff'd*, 2023 WL 3961437 (2d Cir. June 13, 2023) (\"This repeated litigation suggests a pattern of abusive litigation and gives rise to an inference of improper motives.\").\n\nLastly, the inference that the litigation was not filed to obtain judicial relief but to harass PAX's lawyers because they are PAX's lawyers is reinforced by the failure of Plaintiff and his counsel to pursue—before the Court prompted counsel to do so—the persons Plaintiff alleges to be those who inflicted harm against him by violating his constitutional rights: the NYPD and its officers. Plaintiff's Complaint was accepted for filing on January 18, 2023, *see* Dkt. No. 2, and Plaintiff requested that summonses be issued as to Moving Defendants and Stanton approximately a month later on February 23, 2023, *see* Dkt. Nos. 5–7. Plaintiff did not then, or within the requisite 90 days, serve or attempt to serve the City of New York or any of the officers allegedly involved in the December 20 incident—who he alleges were the principal wrongdoers. He served the summonses and Complaint on Moving Defendants and Stanton alone on March 20, 2023. Dkt. No. 18. Indeed, it was not until over four months later that Plaintiff served the state actors named as defendants in this case, *see* Dkt. Nos. 59, 64, and even then, only after the Court alerted Plaintiff to the defect and ordered Plaintiff to show cause why the case should not be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) for failure to serve the City of New York and the named police officer—Lauren A. Duffy—*see* Dkt. No. 58. There is every reason to believe that had the Court not issued the Order to Show Cause the City of New York would *never* have been served. And there is thus every reason to believe that Plaintiff did not\n\nfile this lawsuit as a result of some grievance he had with the City of New York as a result of the conduct of the NYPD or to obtain relief from an injury he alleges he suffered as a result of conduct by the NYPD. The inference is inescapable that he filed the lawsuit to harass and deter O'Melveny and Sarnoff for their conduct on behalf of a client who opposed Kwok's interests and not because of any injury Plaintiff suffered on December 20, 2020.\n\n#### **IV. Sanctions Award**\n\nRule 11 permits a court to \"impose an appropriate sanction\" if it finds the Rule 11(b) has been violated \"after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond.\" \"A sanction imposed under [Rule 11] must be limited to what suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4). Still, \"[u]nder Rule 11, a District Court retains broad discretion to fashion an appropriate sanction based on the facts and circumstances of a particular case.\" *Colliton v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP*, 2008 WL 4386764, at \\*15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2008), *aff'd*, 356 F. App'x 535 (2d Cir. 2009); *see also Lawrence v. Wilder Richman Sec. Corp.*, 417 F. App'x 11, 15 (2d Cir. 2010) (\"[A] district court has 'broad discretion' to 'tailor[ ] appropriate and reasonable sanctions under [R]ule 11,' including an award of attorney's fees where warranted.\" (internal citations omitted) (quoting *O'Malley v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth.*, 896 F.2d 704, 709 (2d Cir. 1990))).\n\nA court considering sanctions must be sensitive to the concern that it is not chilling legitimate advocacy. There is nothing inherently wrong in pursuing those persons believed to be supporters of the PRC based on legitimate legal arguments or arguments based on a wellfounded belief in the reversal of existing law. But Plaintiff here, and his attorneys, are not seeking to use the legal system to vindicate rights; they are seeking to use the legal system to chill legal advocacy and to harass Moving Defendants because of their association with a\n\nparticular client. It is this behavior, coupled with the frivolousness of Plaintiff's FARA claim, that merits sanctions.\n\nMoving Defendants request that the Court require that Zhang and Freeth \"pay all attorneys' fees and costs that Defendants Mr. Sarnoff and O'Melveny have incurred in defending against this action.\"18 Dkt. No. 37. The Court finds that an award of attorneys' fees and costs for defending this action—but not for bringing the Moving Defendants' motion under Rule 11 is no greater than what is necessary to \"deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4). These costs and attorneys' fees are to be borne by Freeth, Zhang, and Plaintiff. *See An v. Despins*, 2023 WL 4931832, at \\*8 (concluding that sanctions should be imposed on plaintiff's counsel for \"issue[s] over which counsel exercise[d] principal responsibility,\" like ensuring that the complaints filed met a minimum merit threshold and pled adequate facts to establish subject matter jurisdiction\" (alterations in original) (quoting *United Republic Ins. Co., in Receivership v. Chase Manhattan Bank*, 315 F.3d 168, 171 (2d Cir. 2003))). Moving Defendants are directed to file an application for fees and costs within fourteen days of the date of this Order.\n\nFreeth has pleaded that he lacks the ability to pay Moving Defendants' attorneys' fees and costs. It is appropriate to consider ability to pay at this stage. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4) (\"A sanction imposed under this rule must be limited to what suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated.\"); *see also* Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)–(c),\n\n<sup>18</sup> Although Zhang has not made an appearance in this action, he, along with Freeth, signed the Complaint and thus \"certifie[d] [to the Court] to the best of [his] knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstance.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). Rule 11(c) permits a court to sanction \"any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule or is responsible for the violation.\" Fed. R. C. P. 11(c)(1). It does not limit a court's ability to sanction attorneys to those who have made an appearance in a case. The Court finds that Zhang, alongside Freeth, is responsible for the violations of Rule 11 detailed in this Opinion and Order.\n\nAdvisory Committee Notes to 1993 Amendment (noting that \"what amount, given the financial resources of the responsible person, is needed to deter that person from repetition in the same case; what amount is needed to deter similar activity by other litigants . . . may in a particular case be proper considerations\" in determining whether and what kind of sanctions to impose); *Star Mark Mgmt., Inc.*, 682 F.3d at 179 (noting that a \"district court[ has] broad discretion to lower a sanctions award based on inability to pay\"); *Oliveri v. Thompson*, 803 F.2d 1265, 1281 (2d Cir. 1986) (\"[G]iven the underlying purpose of sanctions—to punish deviations from proper standards of conduct with a view toward encouraging future compliance and deterring further violations—it lies well within the district court's discretion to temper the amount to be awarded against an offending attorney by a balancing consideration of his ability to pay.\"). Accordingly, within seven days of the date that the application for fees and costs is submitted, Plaintiff and his counsel may submit any information they desire the Court to consider in apportioning (or not apportioning) the fee award.19\n\nAdditionally, Zhang and Freeth are directed to pay the Court a fine of \\$2,500 each for the burden that litigating the Complaint placed on the Court and its personnel and to deter the two from filing such frivolous and harassing litigation in the future. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)–(c), Advisory Committee Notes to 1993 Amendment (noting that the \"court has available a variety of possible sanctions to impose for violations, such as . . . ordering a fine payable to the court\"). Such payments shall be made to the Clerk of Court of the Southern District of New York within fourteen days of the date of this Opinion and Order and proof of payment shall be filed on the docket.\n\n<sup>19</sup> Moving Defendants may request leave to submit a reply brief, if necessary, within two business days of any response by Plaintiff.\n\nMoving Defendants also seek an order \"enjoining Plaintiff, Plaintiff's counsel, and those in active concert with them from filing other similar suits without leave of court.\" Dkt. No. 37. \"If a litigant has a history of filing vexatious, harassing or duplicative lawsuits, courts may impose sanctions, including restrictions on future access to the judicial system.\" *Hong Mai Sa v. Doe*, 406 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Factors that a court should consider \"in restricting a litigant's future access to courts\" include:\n\n(1) the litigant's history of litigation and in particular whether it entailed vexatious, harassing or duplicative lawsuits; (2) the litigant's motive in pursuing the litigation, e.g., does the litigant have an objective good faith expectation of prevailing?; (3) whether the litigant is represented by counsel; (4) whether the litigant has caused needless expense to other parties or has posed an unnecessary burden on the courts and their personnel; and (5) whether other sanctions would be adequate to protect the courts and other parties.\n\n*Iwachiw v. N.Y. State Dep't of Motor Vehicles*, 396 F.3d 525, 528 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting *Safir v. U.S. Lines, Inc.*, 792 F.2d 19, 24 (2d Cir. 1986)). \"Ultimately, the question the court must answer is whether a litigant who has a history of vexatious litigation is likely to continue to abuse the judicial process and harass other parties.\" *Newman v. Jewish Agency for Isr.*, 2017 WL 6628616, at \\*6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2017), *aff'd sub nom. Eliahu v. Jewish Agency for Isr.*, 919 F.3d 709 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting *Safir*, 792 F.2d at 24).\n\nThe Court finds that an anti-suit injunction is not appropriate or necessary based on the current record. Although the Court has found that Plaintiff filed this suit to harass Moving Defendants and that he and his counsel did not have an objective good faith expectation of prevailing in this suit, Moving Defendants point to no other lawsuits that Plaintiff has filed for harassing purposes nor have they pointed to a real risk that Plaintiff himself will continue to file such harassing lawsuits if not enjoined. As to Plaintiff's counsel, while they appear to have engaged in repeated frivolous and harassing litigation over the course of several lawsuits, they have not, to the Court's knowledge, filed other actions since sanctions have been awarded\n\nagainst them in the case currently before the Honorable Valerie E. Caproni, *see An et al. v. Despins et al.*, No. 22-cv-10062 (VEC) (S.D.N.Y.). Moving Defendants themselves concede that they are not seeking referral to any disciplinary committee that would have the authority to restrict Moving Defendants' practice of law and the Court sees no such basis to do so on the present record. That counsel proceeded in the face of accusations that they violated Rule 11 (prior to any judicial finding that they did so) is an insufficient basis to impose any restrictions on the ability of counsel to file cases on behalf of their future clients.\n\nDuring Oral Argument, Moving Defendants requested that the Court order Plaintiff to strike the allegations against them from the Amended Complaint and, if he elects to pursue his claims against the other defendants, that he file an amended complaint before doing so. Plaintiff's counsel did not object to this request. Moving Defendants are directed to identify in their memorandum in support of attorneys' fees and costs the paragraphs that should be stricken from the Complaint and the Amended Complaint. Plaintiff may respond two weeks thereafter. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)–(c), Advisory Committee Notes to 1993 Amendment (\"The court has available a variety of possible sanctions to impose for violations, such as striking the offending paper.\").\n\nFinally, the Court will require Plaintiff, Zhang, and Freeth to file a copy of this Opinion and Order in all future actions opened by them for a period of one year from the date of this Opinion and Order.\n\n#### **CONCLUSION**\n\nThe motion for sanctions is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Moving Defendants are directed to submit an application for reasonable costs and attorneys' fees by no later than fourteen days from the date of this Opinion and Order. If Zhang, Freeth, and Plaintiff wish to offer evidence not already received by the Court, they are directed to do so alongside any objections to Moving Defendants' application for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs within seven days of the filing of such application.\n\nThe Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to close Dkt. No. 36.\n\nSO ORDERED.\n\nNew York, New York LEWIS J. LIMAN\n\nDated: August 22, 2023 \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\n\nUnited States District Judge\n\n# **Exhibit 5**\n\n# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\nIN RE: )\n\nHO WAN KWOK, )\n\nDEBTOR. )\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\n\n) CASE No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n) CHAPTER 11\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_) RE: ECF No. 183\n\n# **APPEARANCES1**\n\nJeffrey L. Jonas Brown Rudnick LLP Seven Times Square New York, NY 10036 *Attorney for the Debtor*\n\nPeter Friedman O'Melveny & Myers LLP 1625 Eye Street NW Washington, DC 20006 *Attorney for Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund, L.P.*\n\nCarollynn Callari Callari Partners, LLC One Rockefeller Plaza, 10th Floor New York, New York 10020 *Attorney for Creditors Rui Ma, Weican Meng, and Zheng Wu*\n\nHolley L. Claiborn Office of the United States Trustee 150 Court Street, Room 302 New Haven, CT 06510 *Attorney for the United States Trustee*\n\nIrve J. Goldman Pullman & Comley 850 Main Street, 8th Floor Bridgeport, CT 06604 *Attorney for the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors*\n\n# **MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND GRANTING JOINDER TO MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE**\n\n#### **I. Introduction**\n\nOn February 15, 2022, Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"), filed a voluntary Chapter 11\n\npetition commencing this case. Although the Debtor's case has been pending for only four\n\n<sup>1</sup> William R. Baldiga and Bennett S. Silverberg for the Debtor, Laura Aronsson and Patrick M. Birney for PAX, and Kristin Mayhew for Creditors Ma, Meng, and Wu also appeared at the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss.\n\nmonths, numerous motions and applications have been filed by the Debtor, the Office of the United States Trustee, creditors, and entities or individuals related to the Debtor. Several extensive hearings have been held, including the most recent evidentiary hearing on a motion to dismiss the Debtor's case or appoint a Chapter 11 trustee.\n\nThe issues raised by the parties in the voluminous pleadings, and the information and evidence presented during hearings held in this case, confirm that the Debtor's case is unusual, complicated, and often contentious. Based on the specific facts and circumstances of this case, including the review of the record, the evidence presented by the parties, and the complex factual and legal issues that have been brought before the Court, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b), the Court finds that it is in the best interests of creditors and the estate not to dismiss or convert the Debtor's case at this time and to instead appoint a Chapter 11 trustee.2\n\n#### **II. Jurisdiction**\n\nThis Court has jurisdiction over this motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334. This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b). This Court has the authority to hear this matter pursuant to the General Order of Reference entered on September 21, 1984 by the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut.\n\n#### **III. History of Proceedings**\n\nIt is essential to examine the events that have occurred in the Debtor's case to determine whether dismissal, conversion, or the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee is in the best interests\n\n<sup>2</sup> Section 1112(b)(3) requires the Court to rule on a Motion to Dismiss within 15 days after commencement of the hearing. During a June 9, 2022, status conference to address corrections to the official transcript of the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, the Court informed the parties that a ruling on the Motion to Dismiss would likely be issued more than 15 days after the hearing for several reasons, including the complexity of the Debtor's case and numerous hearings scheduled to be held in other cases during the 15-day period.\n\nof creditors and the estate. At the core of the Debtor's case is a luxury yacht known as the \"Lady May,\" allegedly purchased for €41,000,000.00, and other assets that may belong to the Debtor including an apartment in the Sherry-Netherlands Hotel in Manhattan allegedly purchased for approximately \\$70,000,000.00 in 2015. When viewed as a whole, the circumstances surrounding the Debtor's case demonstrate why the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee, as opposed to dismissal or conversion of the Debtor's case, is in the best interests of creditors and the estate.\n\n#### **The Debtor's Motion to Extend Time to File Schedules and Statements**\n\nAs noted above, the Debtor commenced this case on February 15, 2022, by filing a voluntary Chapter 11 petition. The Debtor filed the list of the twenty largest unsecured creditors with the petition and identified Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. (\"PAX\") as the Debtor's largest creditor with a debt of approximately \\$254,000,000.00. ECF No. 4 at p. 1.\n\nThe Debtor did not file the Schedules or the Statement of Financial Affairs with his petition, but did timely file a Motion to Extend Deadline to File Schedules or Provide Required Information to May 2, 2022 (the \"Motion to Extend Time to File Schedules and Statements,\" ECF No. 27). In support of the requested extension of time, the Debtor states that his 'background is admittedly extraordinary\" and additional time would allow him to retain professionals necessary to assist with the preparation and filing of the Schedules and Statements and to secure the financing to administer his Chapter 11 case. ECF No. 27 at p. 2.\n\nOn February 28, 2022, the Office of the United States Trustee (the \"UST\") and PAX filed strenuous objections to the Motion to Extend Time to File Schedules and Statements. In the objections, both the UST and PAX assert the Debtor's case was filed in direct response to a \\$134,000,000.00 contempt order entered against the Debtor arising out of his involvement in\n\nsecreting the Lady May out of New York to protect it from being seized. PAX's objection also asserts that the Debtor has flouted the New York state court orders and abused the judicial process in an attempt to evade enforcement of the \\$116,000,000.00 judgment PAX won against him. PAX notes that the New York state court found \"Kwok, who is a self-declared multibillionaire, had secreted his assets in a maze of corporate entities and with family members,\" and as a result of his elaborate schemes to avoid his creditors, the New York Supreme Court docket contains over 1,180 entries, \"almost all of which involve . . . [Kwok's] efforts to avoid and deceive his creditors by parking his substantial personal assets with a series of corporations, trusted confidants, and family members.\" PAX Objection, ECF No. 50 at p. 2. Furthermore, PAX asserts that there are at least three materially false and/or misleading statements in the Debtor's petition, including his sworn (mis)representation that he has less than \\$100,000.00 in assets which is completely incompatible with the New York state court's finding just days before that Kwok \"holds a beneficial interest in and controls the Lady May.\" *Id*.\n\n#### **PAX's Automatic Stay Motion**\n\nOn March 1, 2022, just two weeks after the Debtor's case was filed, PAX filed a Motion for Entry of Order Confirming Inapplicability of the Automatic Stay or, in the alternative, Relief from the Automatic Stay (the \"Automatic Stay Motion,\" ECF No. 57). The Automatic Stay Motion sets forth extensive, detailed, and serious allegations against the Debtor. PAX argues that the automatic stay did not apply in this case due to the imposition of sanctions entered against the Debtor in the pre-petition New York state court action. PAX states that the court's sanctions held the Debtor in civil contempt for failure to return the Lady May to New York in violation of its orders. The Debtor filed an Objection to the Automatic Stay Motion, in which the Debtor does not dispute the imposition of the sanctions, but instead argues that he does not\n\nown or control the Lady May. Debtor's Objection to Automatic Stay Motion, ECF No. 83 at p. 7.\n\n#### **The Debtor's Schedules and Statement of Financial Affairs**\n\nOn March 9, 2022, the Debtor filed his Statement of Financial Affairs, ECF No. 77, and Schedules, ECF No. 78. The Debtor asserts in the Schedules and Statement of Financial Affairs that he owns assets valued at \\$3,850.00 and lists liabilities in the amount of \\$373,803,498.09. In global notes that limit and disclaim the Debtor's declarations made under penalty of perjury in the Statement of Financial Affairs, the Debtor further asserts he: (i) has the use and occupancy of, but not title to, real property in Greenwich, Connecticut owned by a limited liability company wholly owned by his wife; (ii) wholly owns the membership interests in another limited liability company that holds all of the cooperative shares in an apartment in the Sherry-Netherlands Hotel in Manhattan in trust for a separate limited liability company owned by his son, Qiang Guo; and (iii) had access to the use of the Lady May owned by HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited (\"HK\"), a limited liability company owned by his daughter, Mei Guo. ECF No. 77 at p. 4-5.\n\n#### **The UST Motion for Examiner or Chapter 11 Trustee**\n\nOn March 18, 2022, less than two weeks after the Debtor filed his Schedules and Statement of Financial Affairs, the UST filed a Motion for Order Directing the Appointment of an Examiner, or in the alternative, Motion for Order Directing the Appointment of a Chapter 11 Trustee (the \"UST Motion for Examiner or Chapter 11 Trustee,\" ECF No. 102). The UST argues that it is in the best interests of creditors and the estate to appoint an examiner or a trustee because the Debtor, a public figure and a self-proclaimed billionaire living in exile from his native China, claims that he has no regular income and virtually no assets yet seemingly has\n\naccess to significant funds, including the ability to procure a \\$1,000,000.00 retainer for his counsel in this case. The UST notes its concerns about the \"odd combination of what appears to be artificial self-created 'poverty' by the Debtor to insulate himself from creditors\" and the Debtor's filing of this case to \"obtain protection from creditors owed millions.\" ECF No. 102 at p. 2. Furthermore, the UST states that its concerns are validated by: (i) \"the Debtor's marginalization of his schedules and statement of financial affairs to the point of being meaningless;\" (ii) the Debtor \"brazenly disclaims any responsibility or liability for any of the information in the bankruptcy documents pursuant to self-serving, anti-fiduciary language in the 'Global Notes;'\" and (iii) \"the Debtor's inability and/or unwillingness to recognize and accept his obligations to provide full, complete and accurate information, to fulfill fiduciary obligations to his estate and his creditors, and to meet his obligations as a debtor in possession.\" *Id*.\n\n#### **The Notice of Appointment of the Committee of Unsecured Creditors**\n\nOn March 21, 2022, three days after the UST filed the Motion for Examiner or Chapter 11 Trustee, the UST filed a Notice of Appointment of Creditor Committee in this case (ECF No. 108). The members of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the \"Committee\"), who are among the largest unsecured creditors of the Debtor and have indicated a willingness to serve on the Committee, are the following creditors: (i) Rui Ma, (ii) Ning Ye, and (iii) Samuel Dan Nunberg.\n\n#### **The DIP Financing Motion**\n\nOn March 22, 2022, one day after the appointment of the Committee, the Debtor filed a Motion for Entry of Interim and Final Debtor in Possession Financing Orders (the \"DIP Motion,\" ECF No. 117). In the DIP Motion, the Debtor seeks approval of a loan in the amount of \\$8,000,000.00 to be made to the estate on an unsecured basis, subordinated to the claims of the\n\nDebtor's pre-petition creditors, without any administrative or priority repayment rights. The loan would be available to pay the estate's professionals and would be repaid if, and only if, all allowed claims of the Debtor's creditors are paid in full or otherwise satisfied pursuant to the terms of a plan. The proposed lender, Golden Spring (New York) Ltd. (the \"DIP Lender\"), is an entity owned and controlled by the Debtor's son, Qiang Guo.\n\nThe DIP Motion asserts that the Debtor filed his Chapter 11 case to: (a) create a single forum to orderly address the various competing claims asserted against him; (b) afford stakeholders an efficient opportunity to investigate his assets, liabilities, and financial affairs; (c) establish what assets are estate property and, in turn, available for distribution to holders of allowed claims; and (d) reach consensus with his creditors on a fair and equitable resolution of claims and distribution of assets pursuant to a Chapter 11 plan. DIP Motion, ECF No. 117 at p. 5.\n\n#### **PAX's Motion to Dismiss and Joinder**\n\nOn April 6, 2022, approximately three weeks after the UST's Motion for Appointment of Examiner or Chapter 11 Trustee and DIP Motion were filed, PAX filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, Partial Joinder to the USTs Motion for the Appointment of a Chapter 11 Trustee (the \"Motion to Dismiss or Joinder,\" ECF No. 183). In support of the Motion to Dismiss or Joinder, PAX argues that the filing of the Debtor's case \"is the latest, most strident gambit\" of the Debtor to \"delay, deceive, and defraud his creditors, and to continue to evade legitimate court orders\" and that the Debtor's \"*modus operandi* is to park, shield and secrete his assets through family members and shell companies to protect his fortune and to avoid repaying his debt to PAX.\" ECF No. 183 at p. 7. The Debtor, PAX argues, has \"secreted his assets in a maze of corporate entities and with family members.\" *Id*. at p. 7-8.\n\nAlong with the Motion to Dismiss or Joinder, PAX filed a Motion to schedule status on the Motion to Dismiss or Joinder. The Court granted PAX's motion in part and scheduled a Status Conference on the Motion to Dismiss or Joinder to be held on April 13, 2022, the same date of a hearing on several other matters in the case, including the continued hearing on the Automatic Stay Motion and the initial hearing on the Motion for Appointment of Examiner or Chapter 11 Trustee and the DIP Motion.\n\n#### **The Debtor's Chapter 11 Plan**\n\nOn April 10, 2022, the Debtor filed a proposed Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization (the \"Plan,\" ECF No. 197). Among other things, the Plan provides for the creation of a \"Creditor Trust\" for the benefit of all creditors with allowed claims. ECF No. 197 at p. 20-24. The Plan further provides that title to the Lady May will be transferred to the Creditor Trust for the benefit of all creditors with allowed claims. ECF No. 197 at p. 21.\n\n#### **HK's Statement regarding the Automatic Stay Motion**\n\nOn April 11, 2022, the day after the Debtor filed the Plan, HK (which as noted above is a limited liability company owned by the Debtor's daughter) filed a Statement regarding the Automatic Stay Motion (the \"Statement,\" ECF No. 203). In the Statement, HK asserts that it is the registered agent of the Lady May and that it consents to the entry of a proposed order compelling it to transport and deliver the Lady May to the navigable waters of Connecticut under certain conditions. HK further asserts that it provided a copy of the Proposed Order to counsel for PAX, the Debtor, the UST, and the Committee for their respective comments and that entry of the proposed order compelling HK to return the Lady May to Connecticut would \"moot\" the Automatic Stay Motion. Statement at p. 2.\n\n#### **The April 13, 2022 hearing**\n\nSeveral matters were scheduled to be heard on April 13, 2022, including the continued hearing on the Automatic Stay Motion and the initial hearing on the DIP Motion and the UST Motion for Examiner or Chapter 11 Trustee. At the conclusion of the lengthy hearing, the Court again continued the hearing on PAX's Automatic Stay Motion, continued the hearing on the UST Motion for Examiner or Chapter 11 Trustee, and scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the DIP Motion and the Debtor's Application to Employ Financial Advisor to be held on April 27, 2022.\n\n# **April 27, 2022 evidentiary hearing, the resolution of the Automatic Stay Motion, and the scheduling of an evidentiary hearing on the Motion to Dismiss or Joinder**\n\nThe Debtor, PAX, the UST, the Committee, the creditors Rui Ma and Zheng Wu, Golden Spring, and HK appeared at the April 27th evidentiary hearing. At the start of the hearing, counsel for the Debtor reported to the Court that the parties had resolved the Automatic Stay Motion. The predominant terms of the resolution were that \\$37,000,000.00 would be posted by HK and held in escrow pending the return of the Lady May to the navigable waters of Connecticut. The parties agreed that a resolution of the Automatic Stay Motion had been reached subject to the review of and revisions to a stipulated order that would be submitted to the Court. Counsel for HK was then excused from the hearing to continue revisions to the draft of a stipulated order. The Court noted on the record, and ultimately on the docket, that the Automatic Stay Motion was resolved by agreement of the parties subject to an agreed upon order to be submitted to the Court on or before May 2, 2022.\n\nTestimony, evidence, and arguments were also presented regarding the Debtor's Motion to Retain a Financial Advisor and the DIP Motion. At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the Court took the Debtor's Motion to Retain a Financial Advisor under advisement and\n\ncontinued the hearing on the DIP Motion to May 4, 2022. In addition, the provisions of a scheduling order regarding an evidentiary hearing on the Motion to Dismiss or Joinder were agreed to by the parties on the record. On April 28, 2022, the Court entered a Scheduling Order Regarding the Motion to Dismiss scheduling the evidentiary hearing for May 24, 2022.\n\n#### **The Stipulated Order regarding the Lady May**\n\nOn April 29, 2022, the Court entered the Stipulated Order Compelling HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC to Transport and Deliver that Certain Yacht, the \"Lady May,\" which was executed by and among HK, PAX, the Debtor, the Committee, and the creditors Rui Ma and Zheng Wu (the \"Stipulated Order,\" ECF No. 299). Among other things, the Stipulated Order provides: (i) HK has deposited \\$37,000,000.00 into escrow; (ii) HK will deliver the Lady May to the navigable waters of Connecticut on or before July 15, 2022; and (iii) the captain of the Lady May and the purported yacht management company will submit a declaration that each shall be subject to the jurisdiction of this Court and are bound by the provisions of the Stipulated Order, including that they are restrained from removing the Lady May from the navigable waters of Connecticut until further order of this Court.\n\n# **The continued DIP Motion hearing, the Consent to Dismissal, and the Withdrawal of the DIP Motion**\n\nOn May 3, 2022, the Debtor filed an amended proposed order regarding the DIP Motion. The amended proposed order contained a chart indicating when and in what amount the DIP funds would be spent. The amended proposed order provided that professional fees would be paid on a weekly basis, including the fees of the Debtor's counsel and counsel for the Committee.\n\nOn May 4, 2022, the continued hearing on the DIP Motion was held. The Debtor and the Committee argued that the DIP Motion should be granted and the amended proposed order should enter. PAX and the UST reiterated their respective objections to the DIP Motion. The Court then asked several questions about the asserted need to pay several million dollars of professional fees through the end of May, 2022. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court stated that a ruling on the DIP Motion would issue which would determine the appropriate amounts to be spent through the end of May, 2022.\n\nOn May 11, 2022, one week after the conclusion of the DIP Motion hearing, the Debtor filed a Notice of Consent to Dismissal of Case (the \"Consent to Dismissal\"). In the Consent to Dismissal, the Debtor asserts that he consents to dismissal of his case due to the tremendous costs imposed on him from unrelenting litigation by PAX and others, and his inability to access funds to meet those costs. Also on May 11, 2022, while the DIP Motion was under advisement and the Court was preparing to rule on the motion, the Debtor filed a Withdrawal of the DIP Motion.\n\n#### **The Evidentiary Hearing on the Motion to Dismiss or Joinder**\n\nOn May 24, 2022, the evidentiary hearing on PAX's Motion to Dismiss or Joinder was held. At the start of the hearing, all of the parties acknowledged that the Consent to Dismissal changed the posture of the Debtor's case. In addition, all of the parties agreed that cause exists under section 1112(b) to dismiss or convert the Debtor's case or to appoint a Chapter 11 trustee. PAX and the Debtor argued that the Debtor's case should be dismissed. The Committee and certain creditors argued that conversion is most appropriate, but absent conversion, a Chapter 11 trustee should be appointed. The UST did not argue in favor of any one of the three alternatives, but urged the Court to decide the matter as quickly as possible.\n\n## **IV. Analysis**\n\nSection 1112(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:\n\n[O]n request of a party in interest, and after notice and a hearing, the court shall convert a case under this chapter to a case under chapter 7 or dismiss a case under this chapter, whichever is in the best interests of creditors and the estate, for cause unless the court determines that the appointment under section 1104(a) of a trustee or an examiner is in the best interests of creditors and the estate.\n\n11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1); *see also In re Sillerman*, 605 B.R. 631, 657 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019); *In re TP, Inc.*, 455 B.R. 455, 457 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2011); *In re Products Intern. Co.*, 395 B.R. 101, 107 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2008).\n\nDuring the evidentiary hearing on the Motion to Dismiss or Joinder, all of the parties stipulated that cause exists to dismiss the case, convert the case to Chapter 7, or to appoint a Chapter 11 trustee. The Debtor asserts that cause exists to dismiss his case under section 1112(b)(4)(A) because there was a substantial or continuing loss to or diminution of the estate and the absence of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation. PAX argues that cause exists to dismiss the case under section 1112(b) for many reasons, including the Debtor's alleged bad faith in filing the case and the Debtor's gross mismanagement of the estate. Because the parties stipulated that cause exists under section 1112(b), the Court does not need to determine the specific \"cause.\" The only issue the Court needs to decide is whether dismissal, conversion, or appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee is in the best interests of creditors and the estate.\n\nThrough a balancing test, a court must determine which of three alternatives—dismissal, conversion, or the appointment of a Chapter 11 Trustee—is in the best interests of creditors and the estate based on the record of the case. *In re Products Intern. Co.*, 395 B.R. at 108. In determining which option is in the best interests of creditors and the estate, a court should evaluate, among other things, the prospects for collection and payment of the claims of creditors.\n\n*In re Corona Care Convalescent Corp.*, 527 B.R. 379, 384 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2015). \"When considering appointing a trustee or converting the case to one under chapter 7, 'the distinguishing factor . . . is the expanded possibility in Chapter 11 for a trustee using independent judgment and good management to direct the affairs of the estate[] including on-going operations (if any) in order to optimize recovery for the creditors and the estate.'\" *In re NOA, LLC*, 578 B.R. 534, 541 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2017).\n\nThe appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee in this case is warranted because the record suggests a prospect for collection and payment of creditors' claims. During this case, the Debtor has demonstrated he can obtain millions of dollars in funds, including the \\$8,000,000.00 that was the subject of the DIP Motion. The Debtor also proposed a Chapter 11 plan in the early stages of this case which provided, among other things, the transfer of title to the Lady May to a creditor trust for the benefit of all creditors. In addition, during the four months that the case has been pending, divergent parties heavily negotiated a stipulation resolving the Automatic Stay Motion. The Stipulated Order resulted in \\$37,000,000.00 being placed in escrow in exchange for the delivery of the Lady May to the navigable waters of Connecticut, something the Debtor opposed to the point of having contempt sanctions entered against him in the New York state court action. Performance of the most significant obligation in the Stipulated Order—the delivery of the Lady May to the navigable waters of Connecticut—is not yet due. However, there has been timely compliance with other provisions of the Stipulated Order. HK has filed progress reports indicating that repairs to the Lady May have been made and that the Lady May may arrive in the navigable waters of Connecticut ahead of the July 15, 2022 Stipulated Order delivery date. Dismissal of the Debtor's case, or conversion of the Debtor's case to Chapter 7, would erase the substantial progress made with respect to the Lady May. A Chapter 11 trustee can serve as an\n\nindependent party to ensure continued compliance with the Stipulated Order and can assist with the development of a Chapter 11 plan with a reasonable likelihood of confirmation. The appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee will also uphold the policy of enforcement of settlements, avoid a race to the courthouse, and provide the opportunity for a pro rata distribution to creditors consistent with the priority scheme in the Bankruptcy Code. *See Corona Care*, 527 B.R. at 387 (appointing a trustee to uphold the policy of enforcement of settlements and avoid a race to the courthouse).\n\nIn several pleadings, the Debtor has stated that he filed this case to create a single forum to orderly address competing claims asserted against him and to afford stakeholders an efficient opportunity to investigate his assets, liabilities, and financial affairs. Dismissal of the Debtor's case would defeat the Debtor's stated reasons for filing this case. Similarly, conversion of this case to Chapter 7 will not allow for the orderly liquidation of competing claims asserted against the Debtor. The appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee is the most efficient and effective method to address competing creditor claims asserted against the Debtor, including contingent and unliquidated personal injury tort claims. The appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee will also allow for the effective investigation of the Debtor's assets, liabilities, and financial affairs. Accordingly, when balancing whether to dismiss, convert, or appoint a Chapter 11 trustee, the record supports the conclusion that the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee in this case is in the best interests of creditors and the estate.\n\nWhen faced with a similar choice under section 1112(b), bankruptcy courts have appointed a Chapter 11 trustee as opposed to dismissing or converting the case. For example, the *Sillerman* case concerned an individual debtor who was a serial entrepreneur. The debtor listed his interests in forty-seven limited liability companies in his schedules, had sold multiple\n\nbusinesses for billions of dollars, and proposed a Chapter 11 plan that would be funded once the debtor was able to secure financing to invest in certain affiliated entities. *Sillerman*, 605 B.R. at 636. The *Sillerman* creditors first filed a motion for appointment of an examiner because they asserted that the \"lack of independent managerial oversight\" allowed the debtor to avoid disclosing the true nature and value of his assets and that the debtor's \"use of multilayered transactions involving complicated corporate structures\" made his assets difficult to find. *Id.* at 636-37. The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors appointed later in the case instead moved for the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee or, in the alternative, an order converting the case to a Chapter 7 case. Given the totality of the circumstances in the debtor's case, the *Sillerman* court held that the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee, instead of conversion of the case, was in the best interests of creditors and the estate. *Id.* at 657.\n\n Like the creditors in *Sillerman,* PAX, the Committee, and other creditors have argued that the Debtor and his family have interests in numerous limited liability companies that may obfuscate the true nature and value of the Debtor's assets. They also argue that the Debtor has engaged in multilayer transactions involving complicated corporate structures like Golden Spring, Genever Holdings, Lamp Funding, and HK that make it difficult to identify and locate the Debtor's assets. PAX cites to the findings of the New York Supreme Court that the Debtor had \"secreted his assets in a maze of corporate entities and with family members\" and that the thousands of docket entries \"involve defendant Kwok's efforts to avoid and deceive his creditors by parking his substantial personal assets with a series of corporations, trusted confidants, and family members.\" ECF No. 183 at p. 7-8. When balanced against dismissal or conversion, the complexity of the Debtor's financial affairs and lack of independent managerial oversight in this\n\ncase warrants the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee who can investigate, identify, and locate the Debtor's assets for the benefit of creditors and the estate.\n\n Bankruptcy courts have also appointed a Chapter 11 trustee rather than dismiss or convert a case in situations where a debtor has violated a stipulated order. In *NOA*, the debtor willfully violated a stipulated order between the debtor and creditors specifically restraining the debtor from shipping bulk clothing out of the United States until full payment for the goods was received. 578 B.R. at 537-40. The court appointed a Chapter 11 trustee because of the \"expanded possibility in Chapter 11 for a trustee using independent judgment and good management to direct the affairs of the estate[] including on-going operations (if any) in order to optimize recovery for the creditors and the estate.\" *Id.* at 541. As was true in *NOA*, the parties in this case negotiated the Stipulated Order. As noted above, performance of the delivery of the Lady May to the navigable waters of Connecticut is not yet due. The appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee will enable that trustee to use independent judgment to ensure compliance with the Stipulated Order and to optimize recovery of assets for the creditors and the estate.\n\n*Corona Care* is another case in which a bankruptcy court exercised its discretion to appoint a Chapter 11 trustee instead of dismissing or converting a case where a debtor defaulted under the terms of a stipulation. *Corona Care*, 527 B.R. at 387. In *Corona Care*, the debtors entered into a stipulation with the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors and other partiesin-interest dismissing some of the jointly administered cases of the more profitable nursing facilities to allow the remaining debtors more time to confirm a plan of reorganization. 527 B.R. at 380. The debtors then defaulted under the terms of the stipulated agreement. *Id.* at 385. In evaluating the prospects for collection and payment of the claims to creditors, the *Corona Care* court found that a sale of the debtors' businesses offered some prospect of payment of creditors\n\nbecause the assets would be monetized for the payment of their claims, which reflected the bargain reached in the stipulation. *Id.* at 384-85. Likewise, delivery of the Lady May to the navigable waters of Connecticut will result in the prospect of collection and payment of creditor claims which may include the pledge of the Lady May to a Chapter 11 plan and/or a finding that the Lady May is property of the Debtor's estate.\n\n*TP, Inc*. is another bankruptcy case in which a Chapter 11 trustee was appointed as opposed to dismissing or converting the debtor's case. 455 B.R. at 459. In *TP, Inc.*, Bank of America had commenced a foreclosure proceeding in state court against TP, Inc., its principal, and its principal's wife, and had obtained a judgment against the principal and principal's wife, who were guarantors of the promissory note. *Id.* at 456. The debtor's principal leased Bank of America's collateral during the pendency of the case without court approval and collected rents attributable to that collateral. *Id*. The *TP, Inc*. court held that the debtor's misuse of numerous parcels of real property that served as Bank of America's collateral, and the misuse of the cash collateral rents derived from that collateral, warranted the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee. *Id.* at 459. The court pointed to its concerns about future instances of fraud, incompetence, dishonesty, or gross mismanagement in deciding that the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee was in the best interests of creditors and the estate, as opposed to dismissal or conversion, because a trustee could use independent judgment and good management to direct the affairs of the estate. *Id*. In this case, a state court similarly entered a judgment against the Debtor based on a default on a promissory note and a contempt order for contravention of a state court order restraining the Debtor, among others, from removing the Lady May from the navigable waters of New York. Like the decision in *TP, Inc*., the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee in this case will address concerns about any future misconduct by the Debtor while bringing independent\n\njudgment and good management to direct the affairs of the estate and optimize recovery for all creditors.\n\n#### **V. CONCLUSION**\n\n Because the parties stipulate that cause exists under section 1112(b) to dismiss this case, convert this case to a case under Chapter 7, or appoint a Chapter 11 trustee, the Court has evaluated, among other things, the prospects for collection and payment of the claims of all creditors. The Court finds that the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee is in the best interests of creditors and the estate because a Chapter 11 trustee can: (i) use independent judgment and good management to direct the affairs of the estate to attempt to satisfy the claims of creditors; (ii) determine whether a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation exists for this Debtor, including whether a Plan of Reorganization can be proposed and confirmed; and (iii) optimize recovery for the creditors and the estate by, among other things, allowing the Chapter 11 trustee to investigate the Debtor's assets, liabilities, and financial affairs and to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Stipulated Order.\n\nAccordingly, it is hereby:\n\n**ORDERED:** Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 1112(b), the Motion to Dismiss or Joinder is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the extent it seeks to dismiss the Debtor's case at this time and is GRANTED to the extent that a Chapter 11 trustee shall be appointed in the Debtor's case; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** The Chapter 11 trustee shall perform all of the duties set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 1106; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** Within fourteen (14) days of the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee, a Status Conference will be scheduled to discuss, among other things, the progress of the Chapter\n\n11 trustee regarding the statements to be filed in accordance with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1106(a)(4) and\n\n(a)(5), compliance with the Stipulated Order, the Chapter 11 trustee's proposed management of\n\nthe estate, and the continued administration of the Debtor's case.\n\nDated at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 15th day of June, 2022.\n\n318\n\n**Notice Recipients**\n\n| District/Off: 0205−5 | User: admin      | Date Created: 6/15/2022 |\n|----------------------|------------------|-------------------------|\n| Case: 22−50073       | Form ID: pdfdoc1 | Total: 108              |\n\n| 20<br>cr<br>20<br>20<br>intp<br>crcm<br>intp<br>intp<br>cr<br>cr<br>cr<br>9343402 | Recipients submitted to the BNC (Bankruptcy Noticing Center) without an address:<br>Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.<br>Zheng Wu<br>Rui Ma<br>Weican Meng<br>Golden Spring (New York) LTD<br>Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors<br>HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC<br>Mei Guo<br>Baosheng Guo<br>Yan Zhao<br>Ning Ye<br>22−50073 |           |\n|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|\n|                                                                                   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | TOTAL: 12 |\n|                                                                                   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |           |\n| ust                                                                               | Recipients of Notice of Electronic Filing:<br>U. S. Trustee<br>USTPRegion02.NH.ECF@USDOJ.GOV                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |           |\n| aty                                                                               | Aaron Romney<br>aromney@zeislaw.com                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |           |\n| aty                                                                               | Annecca H. Smith<br>asmith@rc.com                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |           |\n| aty                                                                               | Bennett Silverberg<br>bsilverberg@brownrudnick.com                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |           |\n| aty                                                                               | Carollynn H.G. Callari<br>ccallari@callaripartners.com                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |           |\n| aty                                                                               | David S. Forsh<br>dforsh@callaripartners.com                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |           |\n| aty                                                                               | David V. Harbach, II<br>dharbach@omm.com                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |           |\n| aty                                                                               | Dylan Kletter<br>dkletter@brownrudnick.com                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |           |\n| aty                                                                               | Holley L. Claiborn<br>holley.l.claiborn@usdoj.gov                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |           |\n| aty                                                                               | Irve J. Goldman<br>igoldman@pullcom.com                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |           |\n| aty                                                                               | Jay Marshall Wolman<br>jmw@randazza.com                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |           |\n| aty                                                                               | Jeffrey L Jonas<br>jjonas@brownrudnick.com                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |           |\n| aty<br>aty                                                                        | John L. Cesaroni<br>jcesaroni@zeislaw.com<br>Jonathan Kaplan<br>jkaplan@pullcom.com                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |           |\n| aty                                                                               | Kenneth Aulet<br>kaulet@brownrudnick.com                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |           |\n| aty                                                                               | Kristin B. Mayhew<br>kmayhew@mdmc−law.com                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |           |\n| aty                                                                               | Laura Aronsson<br>laronsson@omm.com                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |           |\n| aty                                                                               | Mia N. Gonzalez<br>mgonzalez@omm.com                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |           |\n| aty                                                                               | Patrick M. Birney<br>pbirney@rc.com                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |           |\n| aty                                                                               | Peter Friedman<br>pfriedman@omm.com                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |           |\n| aty                                                                               | Peter J. Zarella<br>pzarella@mdmc−law.com                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |           |\n| aty                                                                               | Sara Pahlavan<br>spahlavan@omm.com                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |           |\n| aty                                                                               | Scott D. Rosen<br>srosen@cb−shea.com                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |           |\n| aty                                                                               | Stephen M. Kindseth<br>skindseth@zeislaw.com                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |           |\n| aty                                                                               | Stuart M. Sarnoff<br>ssarnoff@omm.com                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |           |\n| aty                                                                               | Timothy D. Miltenberger<br>Tmiltenberger@cbshealaw.com                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |           |\n| aty                                                                               | William Baldiga<br>wbaldiga@brownrudnick.com                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |           |\n| aty                                                                               | William R. Baldiga<br>wbaldiga@brownrudnick.com                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |           |\n\nTOTAL: 28\n\n|         | Recipients submitted to the BNC (Bankruptcy Noticing Center):                                           |\n|---------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| db      | Ho Wan Kwok<br>373 Taconic Road<br>Greenwich, CT 06831                                                  |\n| cr      | Logan Cheng<br>c/o Randazza Legal Group, PLLC<br>100 Pearl Street<br>14th Floor<br>Hartford, CT         |\n|         | 06103                                                                                                   |\n| ca      | Stretto<br>410 Exchange, Suite 100<br>Irvine, CA 92602                                                  |\n| dbaty   | Brown Rudnick LLP<br>One Financial Center<br>Boston, MA 02111                                           |\n| crcm    | Pullman & Comley, LLC<br>850 Main Street<br>Bridgeport, CT 06601                                        |\n| 20      | Huizhen Wang<br>c/o TroyGould PC<br>1801 Century Park East, 16th Floor<br>Attn: Christopher A.          |\n|         | Lilly<br>Los Angeles, CA 90067−2367                                                                     |\n| cr      | Chao−Chih Chiu<br>c/o TroyGould PC<br>1801 Century Park East, 16th Floor<br>Attn: Christopher A.        |\n|         | Lilly<br>Los Angeles, CA 90067−2367                                                                     |\n| cr      | Yunxia Wu<br>c/o TroyGould PC<br>1801 Century Park East, 16th Floor<br>Attn: Christopher A.             |\n|         | Lilly<br>Los Angeles, CA 90067                                                                          |\n| cr      | Keyi Zilkie<br>c/o TroyGould PC<br>1801 Century Park East, 16th Floor<br>Attn: Christopher A.           |\n|         | Lilly<br>Los Angeles, CA 90067                                                                          |\n| aty     | Andrew M. Carty<br>Brown Rudnick LLP<br>Seven Times Square<br>New York, NY 10036                        |\n| aty     | Steven E. Mackey<br>Office of the U.S. Trustee<br>The Giaimo Federal Building<br>150 Court Street, Room |\n|         | 302<br>New Haven, CT 06510                                                                              |\n| 9343455 | Bi Hai Ge Lin<br>C/O Kevin Tung, Esq.<br>38th Avenue, Suite 3d<br>Flushing, NY 11354 USA                |\n| 9343450 | Chao−Chih Chiu<br>c/o TroyGould PC<br>1801 Century Park East, 16th Floor<br>Attn: Christopher A.        |\n|         | Lilly<br>Los Angeles, CA 90067                                                                          |\n\n|         | 318                                                                                                   |\n|---------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 9358703 | Xiqiu \"Bob\" Fu<br>c/o Irve J. Goldman<br>Pullman & Compley, LLC<br>850 Main St., P O Box              |\n|         | 7006<br>Bridgeport, CT 06601                                                                          |\n| 9343423 | Xiqiu Fu<br>c/o The Lanier Law Firm<br>10940 W. Sam Houston Pkwy N., Suite 100<br>Houston, TX 77064   |\n|         | USA<br>Attn: Lawrence P. Wilson                                                                       |\n| 9343444 | Yan Gao<br>C/O Thompson Hine<br>335 Madison Avenue, 12th Floor<br>New York, NY 10017                  |\n|         | USA<br>Attn: Brian P. Lanciault, Esq.                                                                 |\n| 9343413 | Yan Zhao<br>C/O Law Office of Ning Ye, Esq.<br>135−11 38th Avenue, Suite 1A<br>Flushing, NY 11354     |\n|         | USA<br>Attn: Ning Ye, Esq.                                                                            |\n| 9343409 | Yang Lan and Wu Zheng<br>900 Third Avenue, 18th Floor<br>c/o Arkin Solbakken, LLP<br>New York, NY     |\n|         | 10022<br>Attn: Robert C. Angelillo                                                                    |\n| 9343445 | Yi Li<br>C/O Thompson Hine<br>335 Madison Avenue, 12th Floor<br>New York, NY 10017                    |\n|         | USA<br>Attn: Brian P. Lanciault, Esq.                                                                 |\n| 9343446 | Ying Liu<br>C/O Thompson Hine<br>335 Madison Avenue, 12th Floor<br>New York, NY 10017                 |\n|         | USA<br>Attn: Brian P. Lanciault, Esq.                                                                 |\n| 9343414 | Yua Hua Zhuang Shi<br>C/O Kevin Kerveng Tung, P.C.<br>136−20 38th Avenue, Suite 3D & 3F<br>Flushing,  |\n|         | NY 11354 USA<br>Attn: Kevin Tung, Esq.                                                                |\n| 9344053 | Yue Hua Zhu Shi<br>136−20 38th Avenue, Suite 3D<br>c/o Kevin Kerveng Tung, P.C.<br>Flushing, NY       |\n|         | 11354<br>Attn: Kevin Tung, Esq.                                                                       |\n| 9343456 | Zhen Yuan Jian Zhu<br>C/O Kevin Tung, Esq.<br>38th Avenue, Suite 3d<br>Flushing, NY 11354 USA         |\n| 9358087 | Zheng (\"Bruno\") Wu and Yang Lan<br>Carollynn HG Callari, Esq/Callari Partne<br>100 Somerset Corporate |\n|         | Blvd., Suite 206<br>Bridgewater, NJ 08807                                                             |\n| 9343428 | Zhengjun Dong<br>C/O HGT Law<br>250 Park Avenue, 7th Floor<br>New York, NY 10177 USA<br>Attn:         |\n|         | Hung Ta                                                                                               |\n| 9343448 | yunxia Wu<br>c/o TroyGould PC<br>1801 Century Park East, 16th Floor<br>Attn: Christopher A.           |\n|         | Lilly<br>Los Angeles, CA 90067                                                                        |\n|         |                                                                                                       |\n\nTOTAL: 68\n\n# **Exhibit 6**\n\n# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n§ § § § §\n\nIN RE:\n\nHO WAN KWOK\n\nDebtor.\n\nCHAPTER 11\n\nCASE NO. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n# **NOTICE OF FILING OF DECLARATION OF MR. HO WAN KWOK CONCERNING INVOCATION OF 5TH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE IN REGARD TO RULE 2004 DISCOVERY**\n\nThe debtor, Ho Wan Kwok, hereby provides notice that attached hereto as Exhibit A is\n\nthe February 6, 2023, Declaration of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok Concerning Invocation of 5th\n\nAmendment Privilege in Regard to Rule 2004 Discovery.\n\nDated at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 7th day of February, 2023.\n\n# **THE DEBTOR, HO WAN KWOK,**\n\n*/s/ James M. Moriarty* Aaron A. Romney (ct28144) James M. Moriarty (ct21876) 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604 Telephone: (203) 368-4234 Facsimile: (203) 368-5487 Email: [aromney@zeislaw.com](mailto:aromney@zeislaw.com) [jmoriarty@zeislaw.com](mailto:jmoriarty@zeislaw.com)\n\n# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI hereby certify that on this 7th day of February 2023, a copy of foregoing was filed electronically. Notice of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties by operation of the Court's electronic filing system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as indicated on the Notice ofElectronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF System.\n\n> */s/ James M. Moriarty* James M. Moriarty\n\n# **Exhibit A**\n\n# **Exhibit 7**\n\n# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\n ) )\n\n)\n\nIn re: ) Chapter 11 ) Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) HO WAN KWOK, *et al.*, ) (Jointly Administered)\n\nDebtors. ) Re: ECF Nos. 1453 and 1649\n\n#### **APPEARANCES**\n\nLuc A. Despins (argued) Avram E. Luft G. Alexander Bongartz Douglass Barron Paul Hastings LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166\n\nDouglass S. Skalka Patrick R. Linsey Neubert, Pepe & Montieth 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, CT 06510\n\nand\n\nNicholas A. Bassett (argued) Paul Hastings LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C. 20036\n\n*Counsel for Movant and Cross-Respondent Mr. Luc A. Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee for the Estate of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok*\n\nStephen R. Cook Brown Rudnick LLP 2211 Michelson Drive, 7th Floor Irvine, California 92612\n\nand\n\nStephen A. Best (argued) Brown Rudnick LLP 601 13th Street, NW, Suite 600 Washington, DC 20005\n\nEric Henzy (argued) James M. Moriarty Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. 10 Middle Street Bridgeport, CT 06604\n\nand\n\nWilliam Baldiga (argued) Brown Rudnick LLP Seven Times Square New York, NY 10036\n\n*Counsel for Respondent and Cross-Movant Mr. Ho Wan Kwok, Debtor1*\n\n# **MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER HOLDING INDIVIDUAL DEBTOR IN CONTEMPT OF COURT AND DENYING MOTION FOR STAY OF ORDER COMPELLING PRODUCTION**\n\nJulie A. Manning, United States Bankruptcy Judge\n\n# **I. INTRODUCTION**\n\nBefore the Court are the Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Debtor Should Not Be Held in Contempt of Court (the \"Contempt Motion\"), (ECF No. 14532 ), filed by Mr. Luc A. Despins, in his capacity as Chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") for the bankruptcy estate (the \"Estate\") of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Individual Debtor\"), and the Motion for a Limited Stay of Order Granting in Part Motion to Compel Compliance (the \"Stay Motion,\" and together with the Contempt Motion, each a \"Cross-Motion\" and, collectively, the \"Cross-Motions\"), (ECF No. 1649), filed by the Individual Debtor. The Trustee seeks to hold the Individual Debtor in civil contempt of court for failure to comply with the Order Granting in Part Motion to Compel Compliance (the \"Order Compelling Production\"). (ECF No. 1353.) The Individual Debtor cross-moves to stay the Order Compelling Production in light of the criminal action *United States v. Kwok*, Case No. 23 Cr. 118 (AT) (S.D.N.Y.) (the \"Criminal Action\") pending in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (the \"Criminal Court\"). For\n\n<sup>1</sup> The attorneys at Brown Rudnick LLP have withdrawn their appearances since these matters were argued. (ECF No. 2034.)\n\n<sup>2</sup> Various pleadings and orders discussed in this memorandum of decision were omnibus in nature. For the sake of clarity and coherence, the titles of pleadings and orders have been set forth only insofar as they concern the parties before the Court on the instant matters.\n\nthe reasons stated below, the Court holds the Individual Debtor in civil contempt of court and denies the Stay Motion.\n\n#### **II. BACKGROUND**\n\nThe Individual Debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition in this Court on February 15, 2022. (ECF No. 1.) The Individual Debtor's case is jointly administered with two affiliated corporate Chapter 11 cases. (ECF Nos. 970 and 1141.) For the reasons set forth therein, on June 15, 2022, the Court entered a memorandum of decision and order appointing a Chapter 11 trustee. (ECF No. 465.) *In re Kwok*, 640 B.R. 514 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022). On July 8, 2022, Mr. Despins was appointed as the Trustee. (ECF No. 523.)\n\nOn July 28, 2022, the Trustee filed the Motion for 2004 Examination of the [Individual] Debtor, (ECF No. 636), which motion the Court granted, (ECF No. 757), on August 16, 2022. On August 19, 2022, the Individual Debtor was served with the Rule 2004 subpoena. (*See, e.g.*, ECF No. 1650 ¶ 7.) On October 28, 2022, the Trustee filed a Motion for Order Compelling Individual Debtor to Comply with Rule 2004 Subpoena (the \"Motion to Compel\"). (ECF No. 1046.) On November 14, 2022, the Individual Debtor filed an objection to the Motion to Compel. (ECF No. 1090.) On November 30, 2022, a hearing was held on the Motion to Compel. The Court took the Motion to Compel under advisement. On January 20, 2023,3 the Court entered the Order Compelling Production. (ECF No. 1353.)\n\n<sup>3</sup> Between November 16, 2022, and January 13, 2023, the Court was engaged with matters in an adversary proceeding related to these Chapter 11 cases styled *Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund v. Kwok (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 22-05032 (JAM) (Bankr D. Conn. Jan. 13, 2023) (hereinafter the \"Social Media/Protest Adversary\"). Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(3), the Court was required to address the matters in that adversary proceeding \"at the earliest possible time, taking precedence over all other matters except hearings on older matters of the same character.\"\n\nOn February 7, 2023, the Individual Debtor filed a declaration in response to the Order Compelling Production (the \"Declaration\"). (ECF No. 1444 Ex. A.) In the Declaration, the Individual Debtor stated under penalty of perjury that he invoked his \"rights under the 5th Amendment to the United States Constitution, including under the act of production doctrine[,] with respect to the Subpoena dated August 17, 2022, in its entirety, including all requests for documents and information set forth therein.\" (*Id.* Ex. A.) On February 10, 2023, the Trustee filed the Contempt Motion, arguing that (i) the Individual Debtor needed to show cause why his invocation of the Fifth Amendment was proper and why he should not be held in contempt of court; (ii) even if the Individual Debtor's invocation was proper, he needed to assert it in response to each request for documents and information; and (iii) the Declaration did not comply with the Order Compelling Production because it did not detail the efforts undergone to search for documents and information responsive to the subpoenas. (ECF No. 1453.) On March 7, 2023, a hearing was held on the Contempt Motion. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court set a briefing schedule on the issues raised by the Contempt Motion.\n\nOn March 15, 2023, at the start of an evidentiary hearing in a related adversary proceeding, the Individual Debtor's counsel informed the Court that an indictment against the Individual Debtor had been unsealed in the Criminal Action and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (the \"FBI\") had arrested the Individual Debtor earlier that morning. On March 22, 2023, the Court granted the Individual Debtor's motion for an extension of time to respond to the Contempt Motion. (ECF No. 1585.)\n\nOn April 10, 2023, the Individual Debtor filed an objection to the Contempt Motion. (ECF No. 1650.) The Individual Debtor's objection argues that he has complied with the Order Compelling Production because he has properly invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-\n\nincrimination. (*Id.*) Contemporaneously, the Individual Debtor, through his counsel in the Criminal Action appearing in these Chapter 11 cases as his special (criminal) counsel, filed the Stay Motion. (ECF No. 1649.) The Stay Motion argues that to preserve the Individual Debtor's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, this Court must stay the Order Compelling Production pending resolution of the Criminal Action. (*Id.*) On April 14, 2023, the Trustee filed a reply to the objection to the Contempt Motion. (ECF No. 1670.) On April 19, 2023, the Trustee filed an objection to the Stay Motion. (ECF No. 1680.)\n\nOn April 20, 2023, a hearing was held on the Cross-Motions. At the conclusion of argument, the Trustee and the Individual Debtor seemingly reached a consensual resolution of the Cross-Motions. However, on April 24, 2023, the parties filed competing proposed orders. (ECF Nos. 1698, 1699.) On April 27, 2023, a Status Conference on the Cross-Motions was held to discuss the competing orders. The parties agreed to proceed consensually where they could agree, but expressed disagreement as to the terms of the previous agreement. On May 1, 2023, the Court entered a consent order requiring the Individual Debtor to make individual invocations of his Fifth Amendment right to each of two-hundred two (202) questions posed by the Trustee. (ECF No. 1740.) Also on that date, the Individual Debtor filed a supplemental pleading in support of his interpretation of the April 20th agreement. (ECF No. 1737.)\n\nOn May 2, 2023, a second hearing was held on the Cross-Motions resulting in an impasse as to the terms of the April 20th agreement. The Trustee argued that the parties had agreed the Individual Debtor would file a motion in the Criminal Action seeking permission to share the prosecution's production to him with the Trustee, provided the Trustee complied with protective orders and other confidentiality orders and use restrictions issued in the Criminal Action. The Individual Debtor argued that the parties had agreed that the Individual Debtor would seek,\n\npotentially by motion, to have the prosecution agree to produce documents simultaneously to the Individual Debtor and the Trustee, provided the Trustee complied with protective orders and other confidentiality orders and use restrictions issued in the Criminal Action. Citing the impasse, the Court concluded it had to rule on the Cross-Motions. However, the Individual Debtor's bankruptcy counsel asked the Court to wait before ruling on the Cross-Motions to allow the Individual Debtor time to appreciate the nature of the prosecution's production to him in the Criminal Action.\n\nGiven the serious nature of the issues involved, the Court waited. On June 13, 2023, a final hearing was held on the Cross-Motions. The Court inquired whether the parties had made any progress toward a consensual resolution of the Cross-Motions. The parties reported that the Individual Debtor had prepared a supplemental declaration (the \"Supplemental Declaration\"), wherein he invoked the Fifth Amendment on an individuated basis to each of the Trustee's questions. (*See Despins ex rel. Kwok v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073, Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 8, 2023), ECF No. 1 Ex. 1.) Beyond the Supplemental Declaration, however, the parties reported that the impasse remained and asked the Court to rule on the Cross-Motions. The Court took the Cross-Motions under advisement.\n\nThe Cross-Motions are ripe for decision.\n\n#### **III. JURISDICTION**\n\nThe United States District Court for the District of Connecticut has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). This Court has authority to hear and determine this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) and the Order of Reference of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut dated September 21, 1984. The instant proceedings are statutorily core proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A). The Court concludes its exercise of\n\njurisdiction is not precluded by Constitutional concerns. *Cf. Stern v. Marshall*, 564 U.S. 462, 487–99 (2011). Moreover, the Trustee and the Individual Debtor have impliedly consented to this Court entering a final order on the Cross-Motions by filing dispositive motions without contesting this Court's authority to enter a final order. *See Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif*, 575 U.S. 665, 686 (2015) (holding that parties may consent to entry of a final order by bankruptcy courts notwithstanding the holding in *Stern*); *True Traditions, LC v. Wu*, 552 B.R. 826, 838 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (holding that implied consent is given by filing a dispositive motion).\n\nVenue in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.\n\n# **IV. DISCUSSION4**\n\nThe Cross-Motions present serious issues. The Trustee seeks to hold the Individual Debtor in contempt for failure to comply with the Order Compelling Production. The Individual Debtor argues that the invocation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is compliance and must be protected by a stay of the Order Compelling Production. For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination does not apply under the specific facts and circumstances before the Court. Therefore, the Court holds the Individual Debtor in contempt of court and denies the Stay Motion.\n\n#### **A. Is the Individual Debtor in civil contempt of court?**\n\nThe Court first considers whether the Individual Debtor is in contempt of court for failure to comply with the Order Compelling Production. This Court has the power to hold parties in contempt of court under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9020. *Taggart v. Lorenzen ex*\n\n<sup>4</sup> The following constitutes the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Court pursuant to Rule 7052 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, which is made applicable to contested matters by Rule 9014(c).\n\n*rel. Brown*, 139 S. Ct. 1795, 1801 (2019); *PHH Mortg. Corp. v. Sensenich ex rel. Gravel (In re Gravel)*, 6 F.4th 503, 512 (2d Cir. 2021); *Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chauteaugay Corp.)*, 920 F.2d 183, 187 (2d. Cir. 1990). Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37(b)(1) and 37(b)(2)(A)(vii), made applicable by D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 37 and D. Conn. Bankr. L.R. 1001-1(a)(1) and 2004-1(a), provide further authority to hold parties in contempt of an order compelling production of discovery materials.\n\nContempt may be sought to \"'coerce the defendant into compliance'\" with a court order or to \"'compensate the complainant for losses'\" resulting from noncompliance with a court order. *Taggart*, 139 S. Ct. at 1801 (citing *United States v. United Mine Workers*, 330 U.S. 258, 303–04 (1947)). A finding of civil contempt requires that \"(1) the order the contemnor failed to comply with is clear and unambiguous, (2) the proof of noncompliance is clear and convincing, and (3) the contemnor has not diligently attempted to comply in a reasonable manner.\" *King v. Allied Vision, Ltd.*, 65 F.3d 1051, 1058 (2d Cir. 1995). The contemnor must also (4) have notice of the relevant order. *Gravel*, 6 F.4th at 512.\n\n#### **1. Is the Order Compelling Compliance clear and unambiguous?**\n\nAn order is clear and unambiguous where \"'there is [no] *fair ground of doubt* as to the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct.'\" *Taggart*, 139 S. Ct. at 1801 (citing *Cal. Artificial Stone Paving Co. v. Molitor*, 113 U.S. 609 (1885)). A court generally applies an objective standard – a \"party's subjective belief that she was complying with an order ordinarily will not insulate her from civil contempt if that belief was objectively unreasonable.\" *Taggart*, 139 S. Ct. at 1802 (citing *McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co.*, 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949) (\"The absence of wilfulness [sic] does not relieve from civil contempt.\")). Nevertheless, a party's bad faith may justify \"placing 'the burden of any uncertainty in the decree . . . on [the] shoulders' of the party\n\nwho violated the court order,\" and \"a party's good faith, even where it does not bar civil\n\ncontempt, may help to determine an appropriate sanction.\" *Taggart*, 139 S. Ct. at 1802 (citing\n\n*McComb*, 336 U.S. at 192–93 and *Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A.*, 481 U.S.\n\n787, 801 (1987)).\n\nThe Order Compelling production states, in pertinent part, the following:\n\n**ORDERED:** The Objection is **OVERRULED** as it relates to discovery requests directed to the [Individual] Debtor except as to the requests that seek documents dated earlier than June 1, 2014, and to the requests that seek the [Individual] Debtor's passport(s), to which extent the Objection is **SUSTAINED**, without prejudice to the Trustee to seek documents dated earlier than June 1, 2014, and the [Individual] Debtor's passport(s) at a later date as the investigation proceeds upon cause shown. The [Individual] Debtor shall, by 5:00 p.m. on January 31, 2023, search for and produce to the Trustee:\n\n(i) documents responsive to the Trustee's requests dated June 1, 2014, or later, unless a particular request specifies a different time period that does not begin before June 1, 2014;\n\n(ii) documents responsive to the Trustee's requests as to both assets he acknowledges he owns and assets allegedly belonging to persons or entities other than the [Individual] Debtor, including without limitation his family members and associated entities; and\n\n(iii) documents responsive to the Trustee's requests that are within his custody, possession, or control, including without limitation documents in the files of his current or former counsel and other agents and advisors, unless such documents have already been produced by his current or former counsel and other agents and advisors but without consideration of any potential future production by his current or former counsel and other agents and advisors;\n\nand it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** The [Individual] Debtor shall, by 5:00 p.m. on February 7, 2023, file on the docket of this case a sworn declaration describing in detail the document collection, search, and review actions taken by him and his counsel in response to the subpoena, including without limitation a detailed description of the processes that he and his counsel performed to:\n\n(i) identify all of the [Individual] Debtor's electronic devices; all online document repositories to which he has access; all social media, email, and other accounts associated with electronic documents; all bank accounts and related\n\naccount statements; and all other potential sources of responsive hard copy and electronic documents that may exist; and\n\n(ii) search the foregoing sources for responsive documents, including without limitation for documents responsive to the requests related to expenses or money transfers, to assets or financial or business transactions or records related to the [Individual] Debtor's family or associated entities, and to business interests associated with the [Individual] Debtor . . .\n\n(ECF No. 1353.) The Individual Debtor did not raise any argument in pleadings or during oral argument that there is \"a fair ground of doubt\" as to the meaning of the Order Compelling Production.5 The Court concludes the Order Compelling Production is clear and unambiguous as it relates to the Individual Debtor.6\n\n# **2. Did the Individual Debtor comply with the Order Compelling Production?**\n\nRegarding the second element, the Trustee must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the Individual Debtor has not complied with the Order Compelling Production. *King*, 65 F.3d at 1058. The Trustee argues that because (i) the Individual Debtor has failed to produce documents or records and (ii) the Individual Debtor has failed to file a declaration identifying potential sources of documents or records as well as the efforts undertaken to search those sources, the Individual Debtor has not complied with the Order Compelling Production.\n\nIn response, the Individual Debtor makes two arguments. First, the Individual Debtor argues that it is impossible for him to comply because he is presently being detained pending trial without the possibility of pre-trial release. Second, the Individual Debtor argues that the\n\n<sup>5</sup> The Individual Debtor argues that there is a fair ground of doubt as to whether the Individual Debtor could invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in response to the Order Compelling Production. The Court considers this argument below in the discussion of whether the Individual Debtor has diligently attempted to comply with the Order Compelling Production.\n\n<sup>6</sup> The Court has previously held that the Order Compelling Production is clear and unambiguous as to other parties. (*See* ECF No. 1537.)\n\n\"act of production\" doctrine permits him to invoke his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination in response to requests for the production of documents and records. On this basis, the Individual Debtor asserts that he has complied with the Order Compelling Production.\n\n#### **i. Is it impossible for the Individual Debtor to comply?**\n\nWhile the Individual Debtor is correct that \"[a] long recognized defense to a civil contempt citation is the cited individual's inability to comply with the court's order,\" *United States v. Wendy*, 575 F.2d 1025, 1030 (2d Cir. 1978), and that the proper time to assess impossibility of compliance is at the time of issuing the ruling on contempt, *United States v. Rylander*, 460 U.S. 752, 757 (1983), the Court concludes compliance remains possible for the Individual Debtor. While it is true that the prosecution has seized documents and records of the Individual Debtor in connection with the Criminal Action, the Individual Debtor has not established that (a) all of his documents and records have been seized and (b) he has no additional copies of the seized records. Moreover, based on the statements of his counsel, the Court understands the prosecution's production to the Individual Debtor in the Criminal Action should begin soon – if it has not already. While it is (i) likely that the Trustee would have to become a signatory to and comply with confidentiality requirements and use restrictions in the Criminal Action and (ii) possible that production to the Trustee may be opposed by the prosecution or not allowed by the Criminal Court, it is not impossible for the Individual Debtor to petition the Criminal Court to allow production to the Trustee. Although, the Individual Debtor is presently detained pending trial, his attorneys are not. The Individual Debtor may produce documents through his attorneys and/or other agents. Therefore, it is not impossible for the Individual Debtor to comply with the Order Compelling Production.\n\n11\n\n#### **ii. Has the Individual Debtor properly invoked the Fifth Amendment?**\n\n## **a. Does the act of production doctrine apply?**\n\nThe Individual Debtor's argument that he has complied with the Order Compelling Production relies on the \"act of production\" doctrine. In *Fisher v. United States*, which held that the act of production at issue in that case was not protected by the Fifth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court nevertheless held that\n\nThe act of producing evidence in response to a subpoena nevertheless has communicative aspects of its own, wholly aside from the contents of the papers produced. Compliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes the existence of the papers demanded and their possession or control by the taxpayer. It also would indicate the taxpayer's belief that the papers are those described in the subpoena.\n\n425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976); *see United States v. Hubbell*, 530 U.S. 27, 36–37 (2000). In *Fisher*, the Supreme Court held the test to determine if the act of production could be protected by the Fifth Amendment is whether the \"tacit averments\" involved in the act of production are both \"testimonial\" and \"incriminating\" under prevailing Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. 425 U.S. at 410–11. In particular, the Supreme Court expressed concern regarding tacit averments as to: (i) the existence of the documents or records; (ii) the producing party's possession or control over the documents or records; and (iii) the producing party's belief that the documents and records were those requested by the subpoena. *Id.* The act of production doctrine does not protect the testimonial and incriminating contents of documents – it only protects testimonial and incriminating *production*. *Id.*; *Hubbell*, 530 U.S. at 40–41.\n\nUnder binding precedent of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the act of production *may* entail testimonial tacit averments \"(1) 'if the existence and location of the subpoenaed papers are unknown to the government'; or (2) where production would 'implicitly authenticate' the documents.\" *United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Subpoena)*, 1\n\nF.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 1993) (hereinafter \"*Grand Jury 1993*\") (citing *United States v. Fox*, 721 F.2d 32, 36 (2d Cir.1983)). If the Trustee can show (1) the existence and location; and (2) the authenticity of the documents is a \"foregone\" conclusion or already established by other evidence, then the production is not protected by the Fifth Amendment. *Grand Jury 1993*, 1 F.3d at 93. Moreover, even if the tacit averments involved in production are testimonial under *Fox*, the Individual Debtor must also establish that revealing the existence, location, or authenticity of the documents or records is incriminating. *See Hoffman v. United States*, 341 U.S. 479, 486–87 (1951); *Fox*, 721 F.2d at 40; *In re Schick*, 215 B.R. 4, 9 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997); *cf. Martin-Trigona v. Belford (In re Martin-Trigona)*, 732 F.2d 170, 176 (2d Cir. 1984).\n\nThe Individual Debtor's burden to establish that the act of production is testimonial and incriminating is less than a normal burden of proof: \"To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.\" *Hoffman*, 341 U.S. at 486–87. In determining whether the Individual Debtor may invoke the Fifth Amendment, the Court must use its \"personal perception of the peculiarities of the case\" as much as factual support submitted by the Individual Debtor. *Id.* at 487. The act of production is incriminating if it could be \"a link in the chain of evidence\" used to prosecute the Individual Debtor. *Id.* at 486.\n\nThe Individual Debtor argues that producing documents and records under compulsion of the Order Compelling Production would be testimonial because the production could be construed as a tacit averment that he beneficially owns and/or controls various entities and assets and that he has authority over various persons. Such tacit averments, the Individual Debtor argues, would be incriminating because the present Criminal Action and an alleged investigation\n\ninto bankruptcy crimes involve allegations about the Individual Debtor's beneficial ownership and control of entities and/or assets and the Individual Debtor's authority and/or control over certain individuals.\n\nThe Trustee raises numerous objections to the Individual Debtor's argument. The Trustee's primary objection is that the \"required records\" doctrine applies and is an exception to the act of production doctrine. In support of this argument, the Trustee asserts that the Individual Debtor, as a debtor in bankruptcy, cannot properly invoke the Fifth Amendment to avoid production of documents and records relating to his financial affairs, assets, and liabilities as required by the Bankruptcy Code – whether or not the act of production is testimonial and incriminating. The Trustee's required records argument involving the Individual Debtor's duties in his bankruptcy case will be addressed below. The Court will first address the Trustee's various objections as to whether the Individual Debtor has met his burden of proof to show that compliance with the Order Compelling Production would be both testimonial and incriminating.\n\n#### *The Supplemental Declaration*\n\nThe Individual Debtor and the Trustee have reached a resolution regarding one of the Trustee's objections. Before the Contempt Motion was filed and the hearings on it were held, the Individual Debtor's Declaration made a blanket assertion of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The Trustee argued that this was improper because (a) such a blanket assertion did not evidence that the Individual Debtor had properly considered each of the Trustee's requests before invoking the Fifth Amendment; and (b) these Chapter 11 cases are civil proceedings, meaning that the Individual Debtor's invocation of the Fifth Amendment may, under proper circumstances, be admitted as evidence. However, the Individual Debtor has since provided the Supplemental Declaration pursuant to a consent order, wherein he answers each\n\nquestion posed by the Trustee on an individual basis and asserts his Fifth Amendment right in response to each of the two-hundred two (202) questions. Although the Individual Debtor has now properly invoked his Fifth Amendment right to the Trustee's specific questions, issues related to the production of documents remain.\n\n#### *Pre-indictment invocation of the Fifth Amendment*\n\nOne of the Trustee's remaining objections to the Individual Debtor's proof of compliance with the Order Compelling Production is unpersuasive. The Trustee argues that the Individual Debtor was in contempt before the unsealing of the indictment against him and cannot now invoke the Fifth Amendment in light of the Criminal Action to avoid being held in contempt. However, the Individual Debtor is correct that the Fifth Amendment may be invoked prior to the commencement of a criminal action. *See United States v. Miranti*, 253 F.2d 135, 139 (2d Cir. 1958) (allowing a witness to invoke the Fifth Amendment where there was only a slight *possibility* of prosecution). Just as the Individual Debtor could assert his Fifth Amendment right during the evidentiary hearing in December 2022 and during his March 2023 deposition, he could do so in February 2023 so long as he had \"reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer\" and his Fifth Amendment right was otherwise applicable. *Hoffman*, 341 U.S. at 486.\n\n#### *Documents in possession of the prosecution*\n\nA second argument of the Trustee also fails. The Trustee argues that there is no harm to the Individual Debtor because the prosecution is already in possession of his documents and records. The Trustee is correct insofar as the existence and location of these documents is known and, hence, the first prong of the *Fox* test fails. *Grand Jury 1993*, 1 F.3d at 93. Nevertheless, whether the act of producing the Individual Debtor's documents and records\n\nalready in the possession of the prosecution would result in authenticating those documents and records remains an issue. *Id.* The Individual Debtor is concerned that his act of production would authenticate the documents. The Court has not seen these documents and records. Nor has the Trustee. The Court recognizes the Trustee is in a difficult position because he is not a party to the Criminal Action. Nevertheless, the Trustee has not shown that it would be a foregone conclusion that the documents and records are authentic. Therefore, under the second prong of the *Fox* test, the tacit averment as to the authenticity of the documents and records in the possession of the prosecution may be testimonial. *Id.*\n\nMoreover, because the documents and records seized by the prosecution may be used in the Criminal Action to prosecute the Individual Debtor, the Court finds the Individual Debtor's argument that his implicit authentication of those documents and records could be \"a link in the chain of evidence\" used to prosecute him is persuasive. *Hoffman*, 341 U.S. at 486. Therefore, unless the Trustee can show that it would be a foregone conclusion that the documents and records are authentic, the act of production doctrine applies to the documents held by the prosecution, unless an exception to the doctrine applies.\n\n#### *Documents not in the possession of the prosecution*\n\nThe Individual Debtor argues that the entire universe of documents and records the Order Compelling Production compels him to produce have been seized by the prosecution. The Court does not agree and, therefore, continues its discussion. As the Trustee contends, the blanket assertion that the Individual Debtor has no documents or records in his possession, custody, or control because he is now incarcerated is not convincing. The FBI apparently seized many documents, records, and electronic devices at the Individual Debtor's residences despite previous representations that the Individual Debtor maintained almost no documents, records, and devices.\n\nSimilarly, the Trustee is correct that there is no evidentiary basis to support the contention that there are no records within the Individual Debtor's possession, custody, or control that are not already among the documents and records seized by the prosecution. Given past descriptions of the efforts – or, as the case may be, the lack thereof – conducted by the Individual Debtor's counsel, the Individual Debtor has not established that a reasonably diligent search occurred. (*See* Order Compelling Production ¶ 9.) For both of these reasons, the Court concludes that the Individual Debtor has not established that all potentially responsive documents and records have been seized by the prosecution.\n\nAs to documents and records that were not seized by the prosecution, the Trustee has not shown that the location, existence, or authenticity of these documents is a foregone conclusion. Therefore, if the Individual Debtor establishes that they are incriminating, the act of production doctrine would apply. *Fox*, 721 F.2d at 36. The Trustee argues that the Individual Debtor has not met his burden to establish that the requested documents and records are incriminating. The Trustee is correct that even with the Supplemental Declaration, the Individual Debtor has not established that each requested production would be incriminating.\n\nNevertheless, the Court is mindful of the lessened burden the Individual Debtor must meet. The Court is also mindful that it must rely on its own perception of the facts and circumstances of these Chapter 11 cases and related adversary proceedings. *Hoffman*, 341 U.S. at 486–87. Moreover, as the Individual Debtor's counsel notes, \"[t]he privilege afforded not only extends to answers that would in themselves support a conviction under a federal criminal statute but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a federal crime.\" *Id.* at 486. However, the Court's \"personal perception of the peculiarities of the case\" includes the observation that the Individual Debtor\n\nhas obstructed lawful inquiry into his assets, liabilities, and financial affairs in addition to his avowed desire to avoid self-incrimination. *Id.* at 487. (*See, e.g.*, Social Media/Protest Adversary, ECF No. 133.)\n\nThe indictment in the Criminal Action is not alone sufficient for the Individual Debtor to meet his burden with respect to the documents and records that the prosecution has *not* seized. The indictment alleges fraud going back to approximately 2018, whereas many of the assets of interest to the Trustee thus far – that certain yacht, the Lady May; the apartment at the Sherry-Netherland Hotel; the Ace Decade Holdings Limited cause of action – were allegedly acquired prior to 2018. While some of these assets, *e.g.*, the Lady May, are discussed in the indictment, the Court cannot, with its \"personal perception of the peculiarities of the case\" and the Individual Debtor's scant evidentiary showing, hold that the Individual Debtor has sufficiently supported his blanket assertion of the Fifth Amendment on the basis of the Criminal Action. *Id.* at 487. The Individual Debtor has not established that all of his assets, liabilities, and financial affairs relate to the alleged fraud or may somehow present a \"link in the chain of evidence\" regarding the alleged fraud. *Id.* at 486.\n\nIn support of his argument that he has complied with the Order Compelling Production, the Individual Debtor also presented a subpoena directed at the Trustee relating to an alleged investigation into potential bankruptcy crimes committed in these Chapter 11 cases. (ECF No. 1719, at \\*80:20–81:8.) As noted above, it does not matter if prosecution due to this investigation is likely when determining if production of the documents is incriminating. *Miranti*, 253 F.2d at 139.\n\nTitle 18 of the United States Code, sections 152, 156, 157, 1519, and 3284 set forth crimes related to the concealment of assets in a bankruptcy case. Sections 152, 156, 157, and\n\n1519 require knowing, intentional, or fraudulent acts. Section 3284 requires \"concealment.\" The tacit averments that the Individual Debtor has possession or control over documents or records responsive to the Rule 2004 subpoena and that such documents or records are authentic are not themselves incriminating because they do not establish that the Individual Debtor knowingly, intentionally, or fraudulently withheld assets – or documents and records pertaining to assets – from the Estate. Debtors routinely mistakenly overlook assets and liabilities and amend their statements and schedules and/or update their disclosures.\n\nNevertheless, the Court must consider whether such tacit averments are a \"link in the chain of evidence\" regarding a potential prosecution of the Individual Debtor for concealment of his assets from the Trustee, this Court, and his creditors. *Hoffman*, 341 U.S. at 486. The Trustee alleges that the Individual Debtor has a multitude of business interests and should have commensurate documents and records. While the Individual Debtor denies these allegations, it is the Court's \"personal perception of the peculiarities of the case,\" on the basis of prior findings of this and other courts, that the Individual Debtor has at least *some* business interests beyond those he presently admits. *See Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund, L.P. v. Kwok Ho Wan*, Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 2022), NYCEF No. 1181; *E. Profit Corp. Ltd. v. Strategic Vision US LLC*, Case No. 18-cv-2185 (LJL), 2021 WL 2554631, at \\*1 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2021). (*See* ECF No. 1110; *HK Int'l Funds Invs. (USA) Ltd., LLC v. Despins ex rel. Kwok (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 22-05003 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. May 18, 2023), ECF Nos. 177, 221; Social Media/Protest Adversary, ECF No. 133 ¶ 7.) The Court perceives that the Individual Debtor's production may be similarly expansive to the production at issue in *Hubbell*. *See* 530 U.S. at 40–43. Even though *Hubbell* was a case involving immunity granted to a party where the scope of the production was known and the burden had shifted to the\n\nprosecution, it *may* be similarly necessary for the Individual Debtor \"to make extensive use of 'the contents of his own mind' in identifying the hundreds of documents responsive to the requests in the subpoena\" and essentially create a map of his assets, liabilities, and business interests. *See id.* at 43. Regarding the alleged investigation into bankruptcy crimes, such a map may aid in discovery of evidence of knowledge, intent, or fraud. Using its perception of the specific facts and circumstances of these Chapter 11 cases and related adversary proceedings, the Court finds that such admissions could be links in the chain of evidence because they could have a \"derivative use.\" *See id.* at 41–43.\n\n#### *The Individual Debtor's production is testimonial and incriminating*\n\nFor the above reasons, the Court concludes that production in compliance with the Order Compelling Production would be testimonial and incriminating both with regards to the documents in the possession of the prosecution and the documents that have not been seized by the prosecution. *See Fisher*, 425 U.S. at 410–11. The Court notes, however, that the evidentiary record to date is not strong. If in the future the Trustee can (i) show that the location, existence, and authenticity of any document is a foregone conclusion; (ii) establish with regard to any document or category of documents that the Individual Debtor has not met his burden; or (iii) establish that he already has a map of the Individual Debtor's assets, liabilities, and business interests with respect to any documents or category of documents, this finding may be revisited upon a proper motion.\n\n#### **b. Does the 'required records' exception apply?**\n\nAlthough the act of production doctrine applies, that does not end the Court's analysis or necessarily determine the result of the Contempt Motion. As noted above, the Trustee's primary argument is that the required records doctrine applies on the specific facts and circumstances\n\nbefore the Court and presents an exception to the act of production doctrine. The Trustee therefore argues that it does not matter whether the act of production doctrine would allow the Individual Debtor to properly invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in response to the Order Compelling Production because the required records exception applies in this case.\n\nIn support of his argument, the Trustee relies on *Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight*, 493 U.S. 549 (1990). In *Bouknight*, the Supreme Court restated and reaffirmed the existence of the required records doctrine post-*Fisher*. 493 U.S. at 555–59. Under the required records doctrine, \"the Fifth Amendment privilege may not be invoked to resist compliance with a regulatory regime constructed to effect the State's public purposes unrelated to the enforcement of its criminal laws.\" *Id.* at 556; *see Grosso v. United States*, 390 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1968) (articulating factors to consider regarding required records doctrine); *Shapiro v. United* States, 335 U.S. 1, 32 (1948) (originating the required records doctrine).\n\nThe Individual Debtor asserts *Bouknight* does not describe an exception to the act of production doctrine set forth in *Fisher* and that the required records doctrine does not provide for the compelled testimonial and incriminating production of documents and records. The Individual Debtor's assertion contradicts the clear text of *Bouknight* which states:\n\nThe possibility that a production order will compel testimonial assertions that may prove incriminating does not, in all contexts, justify invoking the privilege to resist production. Even assuming that this limited testimonial assertion is sufficiently incriminating and \"sufficiently testimonial for purposes of the privilege,\" Bouknight may not invoke the privilege to resist the production order because she has assumed custodial duties related to production and because production is required as part of a noncriminal regulatory regime.\n\n*Bouknight*, 493 U.S. at 555–56 (discussing *Fisher*) (internal citations omitted). In addition to the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit has also clearly rejected the Individual Debtor's assertion:\n\n\"[T]he required records doctrine is an exception to the Fifth Amendment privilege. As such, it necessarily overrides the privilege in instances in which the privilege would otherwise apply. *Fisher* was not concerned with required records and nothing in its analysis could be construed as weakening the required records exception.\"\n\n*United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Subpoena)*, 741 F.3d 339, 346 (2d Cir. 2013) (hereinafter \"*Grand Jury 2013*\") (quoting *Doe v. United States (In re Doe)*, 711 F.2d 1187, 1192–93 (2d Cir. 1983)). Indeed, the Second Circuit has emphatically stated \"[t]his Court has twice explicitly rejected the idea that the required records exception has been abrogated by the act of production doctrine.\" *Grand Jury 2013*, 741 F.3d at 346. This binding Supreme Court and Second Circuit precedent makes clear that the required records doctrine is an exception to the act of production doctrine.7 Therefore, if the required records exception applies in this case, the Individual Debtor has failed to comply with the Order Compelling Production regardless of the conclusion that such production would be testimonial and incriminating.\n\nIn determining whether the required records doctrine applies, the Second Circuit turns to the *Grosso* factors. *Grand Jury 2013*, 741 F.3d at 345. In *Grosso*, the Supreme Court applied the following factors: \"[F]irst, the purposes of the United States' inquiry must be essentially regulatory; second, information is to be obtained by requiring the preservation of records of a kind which the regulated party has customarily kept; and third, the records themselves must have assumed 'public aspects' which render them at least analogous to public documents.\" 390 U.S.\n\n<sup>7</sup> The Individual Debtor observes that one of the cases cited by the Trustee, *In re Ross*, 156 B.R. 272, 279 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993), both found the production of the requested documents to be insufficiently testimonial and found that the required records doctrine applied. From this observation, the Individual Debtor concluded that the latter holding required the former. The Court concludes otherwise. The court in *Ross*, like many courts – particularly lower courts subject to review, advanced multiple bases for its conclusion that the debtor in that case could not properly invoke the Fifth Amendment. 156 B.R. at 281 (\"Fifth, *even if the act of production involved here was both testimonial and incriminating*, the nature of chapter 7 as a regulatory regime directed toward society as a whole, and not toward inherently suspect criminal classes, renders the act of production outside the protection of the Fifth Amendment.\") (emphasis added).\n\nat 67–68. Here, the Trustee is seeking documents and records that the Order Compelling Production holds relate to \"the acts, conduct, or property or to the liabilities and financial condition of the [Individual Debtor], or to any matter which may affect the administration of the [Estate].\" Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004(b). Hence, the Individual Debtor is obligated to produce the documents and records the Trustee seeks under sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4). Therefore, the issue is whether the documents and records the Individual Debtor is obligated to produce under sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4) are required records under the *Grosso* test.\n\n#### *What is the purpose of Bankruptcy Code sections 521(a)(3) and 521(a)(4)?*\n\nIn determining whether the first factor supports application of the required records doctrine, a court must consider whether the relevant \"legislation is not 'directed at the public at large' and concerns 'an area permeated with criminal statutes.'\" *Grand Jury 2013*, 741 F.3d at 347 (citing *Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd.*, 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965)); *see Marchetti v. United States*, 390 U.S. 39, 57 (1968); *Haynes v. United States*, 390 U.S. 85, 99 (1968). A court must make this determination as to the specific statutory sections at issue, rather than in reference to the entire surrounding statutory context. *Grand Jury 2013*, 741 F.3d at 348 (citing *California v. Byers*, 402 U.S. 424, 430 (1971)).\n\nSection 521 of the Bankruptcy Code is titled \"Debtor's duties.\" Sections 521(a)(3) and 521(a)(4) provide, respectively, that, where a bankruptcy trustee is serving in the case, as here, a debtor must cooperate with the trustee in the performance of the trustee's duties and must surrender to the trustee all property of the estate and any recorded information, including books, documents, records, and papers, relating to property of the estate.\n\nSection 109 of the Bankruptcy Code allows individuals or entities to file for bankruptcy under Chapters 7, 11, 11 Subchapter V, 12, or 13. In proceedings under Chapters 7, 12, and 13\n\nas well as Chapter 11 Subchapter V, a bankruptcy trustee is automatically appointed upon the commencement of the case. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701, 702, 1183, 1202, 1302. Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases are the most common among the general public and always involve a bankruptcy trustee to whom the debtor owes obligations under sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4).\n\nWhile in a Chapter 11 case the appointment of a bankruptcy trustee is an extraordinary remedy, *see* 11 U.S.C. § 1112, the effect of this extraordinary relief is that a dispossessed Chapter 11 debtor has the same obligations under sections 521(a)(3) and 521(a)(4) as a Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 debtor. By operation of law, upon filing a Chapter 11 case a debtor is automatically deemed to be a debtor-in-possession and assumes the role of a bankruptcy trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a). However, a debtor in a Chapter 11 case may be 'dispossessed' of the estate through appointment of a bankruptcy trustee \"for cause,\" provided it is in the best interest of the creditors and the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1).\n\nChapter 11 is distinct because it is designed for debtors with complex business interests, assets, and liabilities, such as large corporations and high net worth individuals. *See* H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 220 (1977). As such, Chapter 11 is guided by three basic presumptions: (i) debtors with substantial business interests and operations have more value as a continuing economic entity than divided up and liquidated, (ii) debtors with complex financial affairs, assets, and liabilities are better equipped than an appointed trustee to manage their own affairs for the benefit of creditors, and (iii) allowing debtors with substantial business interests and operations to reorganize preserves the interests of debtors, owners, employees, etc. in addition to the interests of creditors. *See id.* Ultimately, however, Chapter 11 is properly used wherever its specific provisions maximize the distribution to creditors. *See Toibb v. Radloff*, 501 U.S. 157, 163–64 (1991). Many of the enumerated examples of \"cause\" to appoint a bankruptcy trustee –\n\nor dismiss the case or convert the case to a proceeding under Chapter 7 – involve the rebuttal of the presumptions listed above or the debtor-in-possession's failure to comply with its obligations to manage the estate for the benefit of creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4); *see* 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 1112.04[6][b]–[k] (16th ed. 2023).\n\nWhen one is appointed, the bankruptcy trustee is the representative of the debtor's estate. 11 U.S.C. § 323. The purpose of sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4) is to enable the bankruptcy trustee to administer the debtor's bankruptcy estate in accordance with the bankruptcy trustee's duties. *See* 11 U.S.C. §§ 704, 1106, 1116, 1183, 1202, 1302; 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 521.15[5], 521.16. The administration of the bankruptcy estate requires the debtor's disclosure, surrender, and cooperation with the trustee because a case in bankruptcy is an all-encompassing action intended to equitably and finally resolve, adjust, or reorganize myriad debtor-creditor relationships. *See, e.g.*, 11 U.S.C. §§ 704(a)(5) (\"The trustee shall . . . examine proofs of claims and object to the allowance of any claim that is improper . . ..\"), 704(a)(7) (\"The trustee shall . . . furnish such information concerning the estate and the estate's administration as is requested by a party in interest . . .\"), 704(a)(8) (\"The trustee shall . . . file with the court, with the United States trustee, and with any governmental unit charged with responsibility for collection or determination of any tax arising out of such operations, periodic reports and summaries of the operation of such business . . ..\"), 1106(a)(3) (\"A trustee shall . . . investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial condition of the debtor, the operation of the debtor's business and the desirability of the continuance of such business, and other matters relevant to the case or to the formulation of a plan . . ..\"); 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1116.01 (\"The trustee's investigation and reporting duties provide a mechanism for full disclosure of the debtor's state of\n\naffairs so as to enable parties in interest to protect their rights and obtain the successful reorganization of the debtor.\").\n\nA debtor's failure to fulfill its obligations to (i) cooperate with the trustee, (ii) disclose financial affairs, assets, and liabilities, and (iii) surrender property of the bankruptcy estate and records relating thereto severely impedes a trustee's ability to administer the estate. *See United States v. Stone*, 282 F. 547, 553 (2d Cir. 1960) (\"[T]he very purpose of the statement of affairs is to give dependable information without need of going further.\") (upholding conviction in criminal action prosecuting debtor for bankruptcy crimes related to failure to properly disclose loan information on statement of financial affairs in proceeding under former Bankruptcy Act). This failure causes expense and delay to the estate's creditors which are cognizable injuries. *See Andrews v. McCarron (In re Vincent Andrews Mgmt. Corp.)*, 414 B.R. 1, 7 (D. Conn. 2009).\n\nFurthermore, the broad and extraordinary nature of much of the relief provided by the Bankruptcy Code is premised upon proper disclosure and notice. *See, e.g.*, 11 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (defining adequate information for the disclosure statement that must be served before plan solicitation may commence); *Till v. SCS Credit Corp.*, 541 U.S. 465, 475 n. 12 (2004) (finding that the \"Bankruptcy Code's extensive disclosure requirements reduce the risk that the debtor has significant undisclosed obligations,\" undergirding a court's \"authority to modify the number, timing, or amount of the installment payments from those set forth in the debtor's original contract\"); *In re Motors Liquidation Co.*, 829 F.3d 135, 158–61 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that failure to properly serve undisclosed known creditors with a sale motion rendered a sale order unenforceable against the creditors). A trustee, as the bankruptcy estate's representative, is the party tasked with; in the first instance, seeking much of this relief for: (i) the benefit of the estate, *Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub*, 471 U.S. 343, 352\n\n(1985); and (ii) the debtor who may receive, upon exiting the gauntlet, a \"fresh start,\" *see Grogan v. Garner*, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991).\n\nThe Court concludes that sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4) are targeted at the general public. Bankruptcy trustees are automatically appointed in a wide range of cases. The duty to disclose and surrender property and records to the trustee is essential to the fundamental and required administrative duties of the trustee and the exercise of the trustee's powers under the bankruptcy code.\n\nThe remaining issue is whether sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4) are concerned with an area \"permeated with criminal statutes.\" *Albertson*, 382 U.S. at 79. Title 18, sections 151 *et sequitur*, 1519, and 3284 of the United States Code criminalize certain actions taken in relation to proceedings under the Bankruptcy Code. Among these \"bankruptcy crimes\" are several related to the concealment of assets of the bankruptcy estate to protect them from distribution to the estate's creditors. The issue before the Court is not, however, whether certain failures to fulfill a debtor's duty under sections 521(a)(3) and (4) leave a debtor vulnerable to criminal prosecution, but rather whether sections 521(a)(3) and (4) are \"directed at a 'selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities.'\" *Marchetti*, 390 U.S. at 57.\n\nIn *Grosso* and *Marchetti*, the problem was not the criminal laws enforcing the statutory requirement to file tax returns, which are akin to the bankruptcy crimes enumerated above. *Grosso*, 390 U.S. at 64–65; *see Marchetti*, 390 U.S. at 57. Rather, in both cases the Supreme Court determined that the requirement to file a federal wagering tax return squarely targeted conduct already criminalized by state law, namely gambling. *Grosso*, 390 U.S. at 64–65; *Marchetti*, 390 U.S. at 57. At issue in *Albertson* was the requirement that members of the Communist Party of America personally register with the Subversive Activities Control Board.\n\n382 U.S. at 77–78. Affiliation with the Communist Party was criminalized at the time. *Id.* In *Haynes*, the issue was a requirement that persons who obtained firearms *other than in the normal course* – which the Supreme Court observed would be mostly persons acquiring firearms illegally – register their firearms. 390 U.S. at 95–97.\n\nThe facts before the Supreme Court in *Grosso*, *Marchetti*, *Albertson*, and *Haynes* are each dissimilar to the instant facts. First, all of those cases involved the creation of a new record rather than the production of existing documents and records. *Haynes*, 390 U.S. at 95–97; *Grosso*, 390 U.S. at 64–65; *Marchetti*, 390 U.S. at 57; *Albertson*, 382 U.S. at 77–78. More importantly, the routine administration of a bankruptcy case does not as a matter of course implicate criminal activity. The administration of the estate is intended to be separate from issues of criminal liability. *Compare* 11 U.S.C. §§ 323 (the trustee is the party to sue and be sued on behalf of the estate with regards to civil litigation), 362(a)(1) (generally, civil actions against the debtor or the estate are stayed by the filing of a voluntary bankruptcy petition) *with*  11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1) (criminal actions against the debtor are not stayed by the commencement of a case under Title 11). Debtors are generally not exposed to criminal liability for the disclosures they are required to make in their bankruptcy cases. The intent of disclosure requirements in bankruptcy proceedings is to lay bare *civil liability* to allow for the equitable and final resolution of all claims against the debtor. *See Byers*, 402 U.S. at 430–31 (finding that, while the California Vehicle Code involved some criminal statutes, \"it was not intended to facilitate criminal convictions but to promote the satisfaction of civil liabilities arising from automobile accidents\" and holding that the required records exception applied).\n\nTherefore, the purpose of sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4) is \"essentially regulatory,\" which supports the applicability of the required records exception to the production of documents by\n\nthe Individual Debtor compelled by the Order Compelling Production. *Grosso*, 390 U.S. at 67– 68.\n\n#### *Are the purported required records customarily kept?*\n\nAs to the second factor, whether the purportedly required records are customarily kept, the Trustee is seeking, *e.g.*, financial and banking records, money transfer records, records relating to the Individual Debtor's business interests, etc. As the Second Circuit observed with respect to foreign bank account information, common sense dictates that persons and entities retain basic financial transaction and account information in order to manage their affairs and access their accounts. *Grand Jury 2013*, 741 F.3d at 350 (citing *M.H. v. United States (In re Grand Jury Investigation)*, 648 F.3d 1067, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011)). The Court finds this is especially true regarding individuals and entities with complex financial affairs, assets, and liabilities. Pointedly, the Second Circuit went on to say that although \"some individuals engaged in wrongdoing are advised not to keep even this basic information[,] . . . [w]e decline to look at the custom of only the miscreants . . ..\" *Grand Jury 2013*, 741 F.3d at 350. Therefore, the Court concludes that the records required by sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4) are \"customarily kept.\" *Grosso*, 390 U.S. at 67–68.\n\n#### *Did the purported required records assume 'public aspects?'*\n\nAs to the third factor, whether the purportedly required records have assumed 'public aspects,' the question is whether the overall regulatory context of section 521(a)(3) and (a)(4) – requires the particular records be kept. *Grand Jury 2013*, 741 F.3d at 351–52.\n\nThe Bankruptcy Code requires disclosure both at the outset of a case and as a case proceeds. Section 521(a)(1) requires any debtor – including the Individual Debtor – to file a list of creditors, statement of financial affairs, and schedules of, *inter alia*, the debtor's assets,\n\nliabilities, income, and expenses. *See* 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 521.06[3][a] (\"The schedule is a statement of *all* property, both *real* and personal, within the broad definition of property of the estate under section 541(a), which includes 'all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.'\"), 521.06[3][b] (\"The scheduling of interests in property, both real and personal, is a very important duty.\"), 521.09 (\"The purpose of the requirement of filing a statement of financial affairs is to furnish the trustee and creditors with detailed information about the debtor's financial condition, thereby saving the expense and long and protracted examination for the purpose of soliciting information.\"). Section 341 requires any debtor to submit to an examination conducted by a trustee, in which its creditors may participate. *See* 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 341.01.\n\nRegarding Chapter 11 in particular, section 1107 provides that while a Chapter 11 debtor is a debtor-in-possession, such a debtor, as a fiduciary of the bankruptcy estate, would have many of the same disclosure obligations of a trustee discussed above, including reporting requirements. *See* 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 1107.02[3]–[4]. A debtor's failure to properly disclose financial affairs, assets, and liabilities in a Disclosure Statement required to be filed in connection with a Chapter 11 Plan would prevent confirmation of that plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1125; *see* 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 1125.02 (\"Disclosure is the pivotal concept in reorganization practice under the Bankruptcy Code.\") (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 226–31 (1977)), 1125.02[2]. Failures to make appropriate disclosures can and do constitute cause to convert a Chapter 11 reorganization case to a Chapter 7 liquidation case, dismiss the Chapter 11 bankruptcy case, or appoint a Chapter 11 trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(f); *see* 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1112.04[6][f].\n\nMuch like the mother in *Bouknight*, the Individual Debtor assumed these obligations upon voluntarily commencing his Chapter 11 case, submitting himself to the *in personam*  jurisdiction of this Court, and submitting all of his legal and equitable interests in property – \"wherever located and by whomever held\" – to the *in rem* jurisdiction of this Court. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1); *Bouknight*, 493 U.S. at 559 (\"Bouknight submitted to the routine operation of the regulatory system and agreed to hold Maurice in a manner consonant with the State's regulatory interests and subject to inspection by BCDSS.\"). Moreover, as in *Bouknight*, where the mother was required to produce her child to the Baltimore City Department of Social Services upon cause shown, the Bankruptcy Code requires the Individual Debtor to produce documents and records relating to property of the estate to the Trustee, because cause was shown to appoint a trustee. 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(4), 1112; *Bouknight*, 493 U.S. at 555–56. Because the Individual Debtor voluntarily filed his Chapter 11 case and became a debtor-in-possession, he assumed a bankruptcy trustee's duties to manage the Estate for the benefit of its creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a). The Individual Debtor was a custodian of the Estate and its books and records while a debtor-in-possession. *See Bouknight*, 493 U.S. at 555–56. Although his status as a debtor-inpossession ended upon the appointment of the Trustee, his resultant obligation to provide information to the Trustee did not.\n\nThe Court concludes that the records required to be produced by the Individual Debtor pursuant to sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4) have assumed \"public aspects\" because the Individual Debtor's case is a voluntary Chapter 11 case and because the specific facts and circumstances of these Chapter 11 cases and related adversary proceedings support this conclusion. *See Bouknight*, 493 U.S. at 555–56; *Grosso*, 390 U.S. at 67–68.\n\n31\n\n#### *The 'required records' exception applies*\n\nAll three factors of the *Grosso* test support the applicability of the required records exception to the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination under the specific facts and circumstances before the Court. 390 U.S. at 67–68; *see Bouknight*, 493 U.S. at 555–56; *Grand Jury 2013*, 741 F.3d at 345; *Ross*, 156 B.R. at 279–81; *In re Fairbanks*, 135 B.R. 717, 730–33 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991).\n\nApplication of the required records exception is also supported by Supreme Court precedent relating to the former Bankruptcy Act. *In re Harris*, 221 U.S. 274 (1911) (holding Fifth Amendment did not protect a debtor from producing its books and records to the receiver in bankruptcy). *Bouknight*, in upholding the required records exception post-*Fisher*, cited *Harris*  approvingly as an example of the required records doctrine, confirming the continuing vitality of *Harris* today despite the evolution of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence since *Harris* was decided. *Bouknight*, 439 U.S. at 556–57; *see Fisher*, 425 U.S. 411–13 (discussing *Harris* without calling into question its holding); *see also Cohen v. de la Cruz*, 523 U.S. 213, 221 (1998) (holding that precedent under the Bankruptcy Act is not displaced unless there is a clear indication that Congress intended to do so); *Ross*, 156 B.R. at 279; 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 344.03[4] (\"[I]t is doubtful that a debtor, as opposed to other witnesses, may successfully refuse to turn over the property, books and records that every debtor under the Code is required to surrender to the trustee on the basis that this 'act of production' might itself tend to incriminate.\"); *but see Butcher v. Bailey*, 753 F.2d 465, 468 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding, pre-*Bouknight* and in an *involuntary* Chapter 7 case rather than a voluntary Chapter 11 case, that *Harris* was no longer good law after *Fisher* and section 521 did not require the production of documents to which the act of production doctrine applied).\n\nThe Individual Debtor objects that, nevertheless, *Harris* and the required records exception do not reach Rule 2004 subpoenas under *McCarthy v. Arndstein*. 266 U.S. 34 (1924). However, the Supreme Court in *Arndstein* distinguished its prior opinion in *Harris* on the basis that *Harris* concerned the surrender of documents and records and *Arndstein* concerned the issue of compelled *testimony*. 266 U.S. at 41–42. The Trustee is not objecting to the Individual Debtor answering interrogatories or questions during deposition or in-court testimony by invoking the Fifth Amendment. Instead, the Trustee is objecting to the Individual Debtor invoking the Fifth Amendment in response to requests for the production of documents and records. Therefore, *Arndstein* is inapposite.\n\nThe Court concludes that, both under an analysis of the *Grosso* factors and by application of Supreme Court precedent under the Bankruptcy Act, the required records exception applies.\n\n#### **iii. The Individual Debtor did not comply with the Order Compelling Production**\n\nFor all of the above reasons, the Court concludes that (i) it is not impossible for the Individual Debtor to comply with the Order Compelling Production and (ii) under the required records exception, the Individual Debtor may not properly invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in response to the Order Compelling Production. Therefore, the Trustee has established by clear and convincing evidence that the Individual Debtor has not complied with the Order Compelling Production.\n\n# **3. Did the Individual Debtor diligently attempt to comply with the Order Compelling Production?**\n\nThe Trustee must also establish that the Individual Debtor did not diligently attempt to comply in a reasonable manner with the Order Compelling Production. *King*, 65 F.3d at 1058. The Trustee argues that the Individual Debtor has made no attempt to comply with the Order Compelling Production. In response, the Individual Debtor argues that there is a fair ground of\n\ndoubt as to whether the Individual Debtor could properly assert his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and that the Declaration and Supplemental Declaration represent his good faith efforts to comply with the Order Compelling Production.\n\nThe Individual Debtor's operative mistake is a mistake of law – not fact. Namely, the Individual Debtor has mistakenly concluded that the required records exception to the act of production doctrine does not apply and that he may invoke the Fifth Amendment in response to the Order Compelling Production. For the reasons stated above, whether producing each document or record would factually be testimonial and incriminating does not affect the outcome.\n\nGenerally, absent a requirement of willfulness or intention, mistake of law is not a defense to civil liability. *Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA*, 559 U.S. 573, 583–85 (2010). As noted above, \"[t]he absence of wilfulness [sic] does not relieve from civil contempt.\" *McComb*, 336 U.S. at 191. Therefore, the Court concludes that the Individual Debtor's mistake of law is not a defense to civil contempt. *Cf. Yellin v. United States*, 374 U.S. 109, 123 (1963) (holding mistake of law was no defense to contempt of Congress); *United States v. Remini*, 967 U.S. 754, 758 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding mistake of law was no defense to criminal contempt of court). This conclusion accords with the Supreme Court's observation in *Taggert*  that \"a party's good faith, *even where it does not bar civil contempt*, may help to determine an appropriate sanction.\" 139 S. Ct. at 1802 (emphasis added). Therefore, the Trustee has established that the Individual Debtor did not diligently attempt to comply with the Order Compelling Production.\n\n34\n\n#### **4. Did the Individual Debtor have notice of the Order Compelling Production?**\n\nThe final element of civil contempt is notice of the relevant order. *Gravel*, 6 F.4th at 512. The Declaration admits the Individual Debtor had notice of the Order Compelling Production. (ECF No. 1444 Ex. A.) This element of civil contempt has been established.\n\n#### **5. The Individual Debtor is in civil contempt of court**\n\nAll four elements having been established, the Contempt Motion is granted. The Court holds the Individual Debtor in civil contempt of court for failure to comply with the Order Compelling Production. As set forth in the decretal paragraphs below, the Individual Debtor will be afforded the opportunity to purge himself of contempt. In light of the serious nature of the circumstances facing the Individual Debtor and the good faith shown in answering the Trustee's two-hundred two (202) questions in his Supplemental Declaration, the Court will provide the Individual Debtor with ample time to purge himself of contempt. *Taggert*, 139 S. Ct. at 1802. However, if the Individual Debtor does not purge himself of contempt, the Trustee may request appropriate sanctions.\n\nThe Individual Debtor's counsel are reminded that \"[c]ounsel have an obligation, as officers of the court, to assist in the discovery process by making diligent, good-faith responses to legitimate discovery requests.\" *McLeod, Alexander, Powel & Apffel, P.C. v. Quarles*, 894 F.2d 1482, 1486 (5th Cir. 1990). To that end, the Individual Debtor's counsel are further reminded that this Court has already found that \"counsel to the [Individual Debtor and others] has not established that they were sufficiently diligent under the circumstances.\" (Order Compelling Production ¶ 9.) The Individual Debtor was ordered to comply with the Order Compelling Production at or before 5:00 p.m. on January 31, 2023, but did not do so. \"[N]either\n\n[counsel] nor [a party has] a unilateral right to decide whether or when to comply with discovery demands.\" *535 Broadway Assocs. v. Com. Corp. of Am.*, 159 B.R. 403, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).\n\nThe Individual Debtor and his counsel are to take reasonable and diligent steps, whether or not this Court has articulated those steps directly, to bring the Individual Debtor into compliance with the Order Compelling Production. As the Individual Debtor's counsel has stated on the record, reasonable steps include filing a motion in the Criminal Court seeking to allow production to the Trustee of documents and records produced to the Individual Debtor by the prosecution which are responsive to the Rule 2004 subpoena, subject to the Trustee abiding by whatever conditions the Criminal Court may impose. In seeking to purge himself of contempt, the Individual Debtor would be acting under compulsion of the Order Compelling Production and, therefore, not waiving any Fifth Amendment right by moving in the Criminal Court to produce to the Trustee. *See Bouknight*, 493 U.S. at 561–62. In considering any sanctions motion, the Court will consider the diligence with which the Individual Debtor seeks relief in the Criminal Court.\n\n#### **B. Should the Order Compelling Production be stayed?**\n\nHaving ruled on the Contempt Motion, the Court turns to the Stay Motion. The Individual Debtor argues that the Order Compelling Production must be stayed pending the end of the Criminal Action in order to preserve the Individual Debtor's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. In response, the Trustee argues that there is no basis to impose a stay of the Order Compelling Production and that such a stay would substantially injure the Trustee.\n\nThe Court first notes that while the Stay Motion was filed by the Individual Debtor and seems to only concern the Individual Debtor, the attached proposed order would stay the Order Compelling Production entirely, including the decretal paragraphs relevant to the Individual\n\nDebtor's daughter, Ms. Mei Guo, and the Individual Debtor's adjudged corporate *alter ego*, HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC. To the extent that the Stay Motion seeks relief as to these additional parties, the Court denies the Stay Motion.\n\nTurning to the merits, the Court must determine whether to stay the Order Compelling Production within its sound discretion. *Kashi v. Grastos*, 790 F.2d 1050, 1057 (2d Cir. 1986). There is no strict requirement that a court stay civil proceedings due to pending criminal proceedings. *United States v. Kordel*, 397 U.S. 1 (1970); *Kashi*, 790 F.2d at 1057. In considering whether to stay civil proceedings in light of criminal proceedings, courts consider, *inter alia*:\n\n1) the extent to which the issues in the criminal case overlap with those presented in the civil case; 2) the status of the case, including whether the defendants have been indicted; 3) the private interests of the plaintiffs in proceeding expeditiously weighed against the prejudice to plaintiffs caused by the delay; 4) the private interests of and burden on the defendants; 5) the interests of the courts; and 6) the public interest.\n\n*Trs. of Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat'l Pension Fund v. Transworld Mech., Inc.*, 886 F. Supp. 1134, 1139 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).\n\nThe Court first considers the private interests of the Estate in proceeding expeditiously weighed against the prejudice to the Estate caused by delay. There is substantial prejudice to the Estate and the Individual Debtor's creditors in staying the Order Compelling Production. As discussed above, a debtor's disclosure of his financial affairs, assets, and liabilities is fundamental in bankruptcy proceedings. The Estate continues to incur enormous expense and delay because the Individual Debtor has not cooperated with and has instead obstructed the Trustee's investigation. Pursuant to section 521, the Trustee should have had all documents and records relating to the Individual Debtor's financial affairs, assets, liabilities, businesses, etc. immediately following his appointment more than a year ago. Instead, the Trustee has had to\n\nidentify other appropriate subpoena targets, issue countless subpoenas, and engage in ceaseless motion practice. While the Trustee's efforts have substantially benefitted the Estate, the Estate has also borne a heavy cost on account of these efforts.\n\nMoreover, these heavy costs are incurred in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding. It is likely that there already is not enough money to satisfy the claims of creditors, and creditors are losing the time value of their ultimate recovery due to the ongoing, incomplete investigation into the Individual Debtor's affairs. 11 U.S.C. §§ 726(a)(5), 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii). Furthermore, Congress has determined that the ultimate goal of a Chapter 11 case – confirmation of a plan – must occur within a specified timeframe. *See* 11 U.S.C. §§ 1106(a)(5), 1121(a), 1121(d). Delay in confirmation of a plan, which must provide for the ultimate realization of creditor's claims, results in substantial injury to creditors and the Estate. *See Andrews*, 414 B.R. at 7. The Trustee should not be forced to operate without the Individual Debtor's required cooperation and disclosures. *See Stone*, 282 F.2d at 553.\n\nThe Court next considers the private interests and burden on the Individual Debtor. There is no cognizable interest in delaying or obstructing these lawful bankruptcy proceedings. There is also no cognizable burden on the Individual Debtor to comply with the Order Compelling Production. For the reasons stated above, he cannot properly invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Moreover, in upholding the required records exception post-*Fisher*, the Supreme Court in *Bouknight* noted that\n\nThe State's regulatory requirement in the usual case may neither compel incriminating testimony nor aid a criminal prosecution, but the Fifth Amendment protections are not thereby necessarily unavailable to the person who complies with the regulatory requirement after invoking the privilege and subsequently faces prosecution.\n\n493 U.S. at 561–62; *but see Johnson v. United States*, 228 U.S. 457 (1913) (holding, pre-*Fisher*, that books and records produced under *Harris* could be used in a criminal proceeding).\n\nNext the Court considers the status of the pending criminal inquiries and the interest of the Criminal Court. There are two pending criminal inquiries to consider: the Criminal Action and the alleged investigation into bankruptcy crimes. The Individual Debtor has been indicted in the Criminal Action. There has been no evidence submitted to the Court that he has been indicted regarding any investigation into bankruptcy crimes. These Chapter 11 cases and related adversary proceedings do overlap with the Criminal Action – (a) many of the Individual Debtor's creditors are also his alleged victims in the Criminal Action, (b) some of the Individual Debtor's purported assets were alleged to have been bought with proceeds of the fraud alleged in the Criminal Action, and (c) some of the Individual Debtor's purported affiliates and corporate *alter egos* are alleged to be involved in the fraud alleged in the Criminal Action – but at the same time, there are incongruities – (d) there are creditors in these Chapter 11 cases that are not alleged fraud victims, (e) there are purported assets of the Estate that were purchased prior to the alleged fraud, and (f) there are purported affiliates and *alter egos* of the Individual Debtor *not* alleged to be involved in the fraud. However, any issue implicated by any investigation into bankruptcy crimes are directly related to these Chapter 11 cases.\n\nThe Court concludes this Order does not substantially interfere with the Criminal Court's interest in the orderly administration of the Criminal Action. The Individual Debtor raises the specter that requiring the Individual Debtor to produce documents to the Trustee would damage the prosecution's case against him and cause litigation about evidence in the Criminal Court. This argument is unpersuasive. The Individual Debtor producing documents and records under compulsion in these proceedings does not change the reality that the prosecution apparently already possesses voluminous evidence. While, as the Individual Debtor argues, the prosecution *may* not be allowed to use the Individual Debtor's production to the Trustee as evidence of the\n\nIndividual Debtor's control over or the authenticity of documents and records already in the prosecution's possession, the Individual Debtor's argument describes the *status quo*. Moreover, the Criminal Court will review and determine any motion to produce to the Trustee documents and records from the prosecution's production to the Individual Debtor.\n\nRegarding any investigation into bankruptcy crimes, because (a) there is no evidence that the Individual Debtor has been indicted and (b) there is no evidence that there are proceedings in relation to it in any court, the Court concludes that the interests of any such investigation should be given less weight. As stated above, the Bankruptcy Code does not exist for the purpose of creating bankruptcy crimes. It exists for the purpose of equitably and finally resolving, adjusting, and reorganizing the assets, liabilities, and financial affairs of a debtor for the benefit of all creditors and, ultimately, the debtor itself. It is not proper to hobble the Trustee's investigation into the affairs, assets, and liabilities of the Individual Debtor for the benefit of some speculative prosecution of the Individual Debtor for bankruptcy crimes. Bankruptcy crimes are an enforcement mechanism to promote proper disclosure in bankruptcy proceedings. If the Individual Debtor complies with the Order Compelling Production, he would remedy the harm the bankruptcy crimes exist to prevent, while also allowing these Chapter 11 cases to be administered appropriately.\n\nFinally, the Court concludes that the public's interest in \"the expeditious administration of bankruptcy cases is impaired by obstructing a trustee's efforts to collect, liquidate and distribute assets to creditors of the estate.\" *In re MGL Corp.*, 262 B.R. 324, 330 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001). The public has an interest in a well-functioning bankruptcy system. It benefits the economy, debtors, and creditors. Obstruction of that process and efforts at dilation of that process are not in the public interest. Moreover, as set forth above, the production of documents\n\nand records by the Individual Debtor in accordance with the Order Compelling Production does not offend the Fifth Amendment.\n\nHaving considered the equities, the Court concludes within its sound discretion that a stay\n\nof the Order Compelling Production is not warranted. Accordingly, the Stay Motion is denied.\n\n# **C. Should monetary sanctions enter for discovery abuse?**\n\nFinally, Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C), made applicable by D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 37 and D.\n\nConn. Bankr. L.R. 1001-1(a)(1) and 2004-1(a), provides\n\n(C) *Payment of Expenses.* Instead of or in addition to the orders above, the court must order the disobedient party, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.\n\nUnder the specific facts and circumstances, the Court concludes an award of expenses is not warranted at this time.\n\n# **V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER**\n\nFor the reasons stated above, the Court (A) holds the Individual Debtor in civil contempt of Court for failure to comply with the Order Compelling Production, and (B) denies the Stay Motion and declines in its sound discretion to stay the Order Compelling Production pending the resolution of the Criminal Action. Accordingly, it is hereby\n\n**ORDERED:** The Court holds Mr. Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Individual Debtor\") in civil\n\ncontempt of court for failure to comply with the Order Granting in Part Motion to Compel Compliance (the \"Order Compelling Production\"), ECF No. 1353; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** Should the Individual Debtor fail to purge himself of contempt by failing to bring himself into full compliance with the Order Compelling Production on or before September 29, 2023, Mr. Luc A. Despins, in his capacity as Chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\")\n\nfor the bankruptcy estate (the \"Estate\") of the Individual Debtor, may move for whatever sanctions are appropriate; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** The Motion for a Limited Stay of Order Granting in Part Motion to\n\nCompel Compliance (the \"Stay Motion\"), ECF No. 1649, is **DENIED**.\n\nDated at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 26th day of July, 2023.\n\n# **Exhibit 8**\n\n# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\n| In re:                                                                 | )<br>)<br>Chapter 11              |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|\n| HO WAN KWOK, et al.,                                                   | )<br>)<br>Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |\n| Debtors.                                                               | )<br>)<br>(Jointly Administered)  |\n|                                                                        | )<br>)                            |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR )<br>THE ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK, | Adv. P. No. 23-05017 (JAM)<br>)   |\n|                                                                        | )<br>RE: ECF<br>Nos. 47, 57       |\n| Plaintiff,                                                             | )                                 |\n| v.                                                                     | )                                 |\n| TAURUS FUND LLC; SCOTT BARNETT, AS                                     | )<br>)                            |\n| TRUSTEE FOR TAURUS FUND LLC; and                                       | )                                 |\n| TAURUS MANAGEMENT<br>LLC, AS TRUSTEE                                   | )                                 |\n| FOR<br>TAURUS FUND LLC,                                                | )                                 |\n| Defendants.                                                            | )<br>)<br>)                       |\n\n# **ORDER GRANTING EMERGENCY MOTION TO MODIFY PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**\n\nOn August 24, 2023, the Court issued the Memorandum of Decision and Order Granting in Part Motion for Preliminary Injunction (the \"PI\"). (ECF No. 47.) In pertinent part, the PI ordered that \"[a]t or before 5:00 p.m. on August 28, 2023, the Defendants shall file proof of insurance for (i) all assets and property of Taurus Fund, including the Mahwah Mansion; and (ii) all personalty and/or fixtures in, on, or at the Mahwah Mansion . . ..\" (*Id.* at \\*23.)\n\nOn August 28, 2023, Defendant Taurus Fund LLC (\"Taurus Fund\") filed a Response re: Preliminary Injunction (the \"Response\"). (ECF No. 52.) The Response indicated the Defendants did not have the required insurance and had not managed to obtain insurance by 5:00 p.m. on August 28, 2023, but were working diligently to do so. (*Id.*)\n\nOn August 29, 2023, a hearing was held in this adversary proceeding on another matter. During the hearing, the Court inquired about the insurance issue. The Defendants indicated that efforts were ongoing. The Plaintiff, Mr. Luc A. Despins, Chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") for the estate of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok, indicated he was concerned by the lack of insurance and orally moved the Court to amend the PI to prevent all access to 675 Ramapo Valley Road, Mahwah, NJ 07430 (the \"Mahwah Mansion\") except to certain personnel. The Court told the Trustee that it would consider a motion to amend the PI filed after 5:00 p.m. on August 30, 2023 should the Defendants fail to file proof of insurance as required by the PI.\n\nOn August 30, 2023, Taurus Fund filed an Amended Response re: Preliminary Injunction (the \"Amended Response\"). (ECF No. 55.) The Amended Response indicated that the Defendants had not yet acquired insurance, but were in meetings with insurance providers. (*Id.*) Also, the Defendants stated that as of the Amended Response, security for the Mahwah Mansion was presently not allowing entry to the Mahwah Mansion because of the ongoing insurance issue. (*Id.*) Later that day, the Trustee filed an Emergency Motion to Modify Preliminary Injunction (the \"Emergency Motion\"). (ECF No. 57.) The Emergency Motion continues to express serious concern that absent a Court order modifying the PI the Defendants may allow access to the Mahwah Mansion without acquiring insurance. (*Id*.)\n\nFinding good cause to grant the Emergency Motion in light of the failure of Defendants to file proof of insurance and in consideration of the Amended Response, which tacitly acknowledges the Trustee's concerns regarding the present lack of insurance, it is hereby\n\n**ORDERED:** The Motion is **GRANTED** as set forth herein; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** Effective immediately, the PI is modified such that access to the Mahwah Mansion is restricted solely to (a) the Security Services (as defined in the Preliminary\n\nInjunction); (b) the Trustee and his representatives and/or professionals; (c) the United States Department of Justice and its employees and representatives; (d) the FBI and its employees and representatives; (e) other federal, New Jersey state, or Mahwah municipal law enforcement agencies and their employees and representatives; (f) any other persons expressly authorized by the Trustee in writing (which can include email); and (g) any other person expressly authorized by the United States District Court for the Southern District for New York or this Court; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** Upon a showing that the Defendants have obtained sufficient insurance coverage for property titled to Taurus Fund, including the Mahwah Mansion, and the all personalty and/or fixtures in, on, or at the Mahwah Mansion, and that such insurance coverage is in effect, the Defendants may move to modify the foregoing restriction to access to the Mahwah Mansion. The Trustee may respond or object to any such motion; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** Except as expressly modified by this Order, the PI shall remain in full force and effect.\n\nDated at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 31st day of August, 2023.\n\n*Juli* **'L'Mr** *IN1.ning\\_ '/J11ite,{ S ptcy Judge 'lJistr t {cut*\n\n# **Exhibit 9**\n\n# SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF NEW YORK\n\nPACIFIC ALLIANCE ASIA OPPORTUNITY FUND L.P.,\n\nPlaintiff,\n\nv.\n\nKWOK HO WAN, a/k/a KWOK HO, a/k/a GWO WEN GUI, a/k/a GUO WENGUI, a/k/a GUO WEN GUI, a/k/a WAN GUE HAOYUN, a/k/a MILES KWOK, a/k/a HAOYUN GUO, GENEVER HOLDINGS CORPORATION, and GENEVER HOLDINGS LLC,\n\nIndex No: 652077/2017\n\nHon. Barry R. Ostrager, J.S.C.\n\n# **RESTRAINING NOTICE**\n\nDefendants.\n\nTO: Greenwich Land, LLC C/O Corporate Creations Network, Inc. 3411 Silverside Rd. Tatnall Building Ste. 104 Wilmington, DE 19810\n\nWHEREAS, in an action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York, Index No. 652077/2017, between Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. (\"Judgment Creditor\") and Defendants Miles Kwok (\"Judgment Debtor\"), Genever Holdings Corporation, and Genever Holdings LLC, being all the parties to the action, on February 3, 2021, the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York, entered judgment in favor of Judgment Creditor and against Judgment Debtor in the amount of \\$116,402,019.57. This amount, together with statutory interest, remains due and unpaid.\n\ninterference with, any property in which Judgment Debtor has an interest, except as provided in CPLR § 5222(b). We understand the Judgment Debtor may have direct, indirect, or beneficial ownership in, or the right or ability to direct or control, you and your assets.\n\n#### **CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES § 5222(b)**\n\n5222(b) Effect of restraint; prohibition of transfer; duration. A judgment debtor or obligor served with a restraining notice is forbidden to make or suffer any sale, assignment, transfer or interference with any property in which he or she has an interest, except as set forth in subdivisions (h) and (i) of this section, and except upon direction of the sheriff or pursuant to an order of the court, until the judgment or order is satisfied or vacated. A restraining notice served upon a person other than the judgment debtor or obligor is effective only if, at the time of service, he or she owes a debt to the judgment debtor or obligor or he or she is in the possession or custody of property in which he or she knows or has reason to believe the judgment debtor or obligor has an interest, or if the judgment creditor or support collection unit has stated in the notice that a specified debt is owed by the person served to the judgment debtor or obligor or that the judgment debtor or obligor has an interest in specified property in the possession or custody of the person served. All property in which the judgment debtor or obligor is known or believed to have an interest then in and thereafter coming into the possession or custody of such a person, including any specified in the notice, and all debts of such a person, including any specified in the notice, then due and thereafter coming due to the judgment debtor or obligor, shall be subject to the notice except as set forth in subdivisions (h) and (i) of this section. Such a person is forbidden to make or suffer any sale, assignment or transfer of, or any interference with, any such property, or pay over or otherwise dispose of any such debt, to any person other than the sheriff or the support collection unit, except as set forth in subdivisions (h) and (i) of this section, and except upon direction of the sheriff or pursuant to an order of the court, until the expiration of one year after the notice is served upon him or her, or until the judgment or order is satisfied or vacated, whichever event first occurs. A judgment creditor or support collection unit which has specified personal property or debt in a restraining notice shall be liable to the owner of the property or the person to whom the debt is owed, if other than the judgment debtor or obligor, for any damages sustained by reason of the restraint. If a garnishee served with a restraining notice withholds the payment of money belonging or owed to the judgment debtor or obligor in an amount equal to twice the amount due on the judgment or order, the restraining notice is not effective as to other property or money.\n\n#### PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that disobedience of this Restraining Notice is\n\npunishable as a contempt of Court.\n\nDATED: May 4, 2021 New York, New York\n\nRespectfully submitted, O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP\n\nB\n\nStuart Sarnoff (ssarnoff@omm.com) Edward Moss (emoss@omm.com) 7 Times Square New York, NY 10036 (212) 326-2000\n\n*Attorneys for Plaintiff Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.*\n\n# **Exhibit 10**\n\n| 318 |\n|-----|\n|-----|\n\n|                                                                                                      | UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT<br>DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT<br>BRIDGEPORT DIVISION                                  |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| In Re                                                                                                | *<br>Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)                                                                                      |\n| HO WAN KWOK and GENEVER<br>HOLDINGS CORPORATION,                                                     | *<br>*<br>Bridgeport, Connecticut<br>*<br>September 12, 2023<br>*                                                 |\n| Debtor.                                                                                              | *                                                                                                                 |\n| * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *                                                                      | *                                                                                                                 |\n|                                                                                                      | TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS<br>BEFORE THE HONORABLE JULIE A. MANNING<br>UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE              |\n| APPEARANCES:                                                                                         |                                                                                                                   |\n| Chapter 11 Trustee:                                                                                  | LUC A. DESPINS, ESQ.<br>Paul Hastings LLP<br>200 Park Avenue<br>New York, NY<br>10166                             |\n| For the Chapter 11 Trustee:                                                                          | G. ALEXANDER BONGARTZ, ESQ.<br>Paul Hastings LLP<br>200 Park Avenue<br>New York, NY<br>10166                      |\n| Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording,<br>transcript produced by transcription service. |                                                                                                                   |\n|                                                                                                      | Fiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.<br>4 Research Drive, Suite 402<br>Shelton, CT 06484 (203)929-9992 |\n\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n|    | Ho Wan Kwok - September 12, 2023<br>29                                                                                                                                      |\n| 1  | overturning the sale of the Lady May.                                                                                                                                       |\n| 2  | The only change we'd need to make is just to add                                                                                                                            |\n| 3  | the hearing date in the first paragraph of the proposed                                                                                                                     |\n| 4  | order that appears on pages 5 and 6 of ECF 2186.                                                                                                                            |\n| 5  | So for all those reasons, the second interim                                                                                                                                |\n| 6  | application for compensation of Neubert, Pepe and Monteith                                                                                                                  |\n| 7  | is granted, and the proposed order will enter with the                                                                                                                      |\n| 8  | minor, with the very minor changes noted on the record.                                                                                                                     |\n| 9  | MR. LINSEY:<br>Thank you, Your Honor.                                                                                                                                       |\n| 10 | THE COURT:<br>Thank you.                                                                                                                                                    |\n| 11 | All right.<br>That concludes all the matters on                                                                                                                             |\n| 12 | today's calendar, unless someone has something they have a                                                                                                                  |\n| 13 | question about.                                                                                                                                                             |\n| 14 | MR. DESPINS:<br>Yes, Your Honor.<br>If I may?                                                                                                                               |\n| 15 | THE COURT:<br>Yes.<br>Go ahead.                                                                                                                                             |\n| 16 | MR. DESPINS:<br>I'm really duty bound to inquire                                                                                                                            |\n| 17 | about the status of the criminal stay in our motion to stop                                                                                                                 |\n| 18 | that the -- Kwok and Yvette Wang from pursuing that criminal                                                                                                                |\n| 19 | stay matter because we have a deadline coming up of                                                                                                                         |\n| 20 | September 21st in that case.<br>And obviously we would want to                                                                                                              |\n| 21 | avoid that.<br>So I'm sorry.<br>I wanted to bring that up.                                                                                                                  |\n| 22 | THE COURT:<br>Well, there was an objection filed to                                                                                                                         |\n| 23 | your motion in this, in this court.                                                                                                                                         |\n| 24 | At the same time, my understanding is that, and                                                                                                                             |\n| 25 | you can correct me if I'm wrong, that the district court in                                                                                                                 |\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n|    | Ho Wan Kwok - September 12, 2023<br>30                                                                                                                                      |\n| 1  | the Southern District of New York criminal proceeding is                                                                                                                    |\n| 2  | allowing you, as the Trustee of the estates, to file some                                                                                                                   |\n| 3  | sort of repsonse, is that correct, to the motion --                                                                                                                         |\n| 4  | MR. DESPINS:<br>That's correct, Your Honor.                                                                                                                                 |\n| 5  | THE COURT:<br>-- to the motion to stay filed by Mr.                                                                                                                         |\n| 6  | Kwok's criminal counsel in the criminal proceedings,                                                                                                                        |\n| 7  | correct?                                                                                                                                                                    |\n| 8  | MR. DESPINS:<br>That's correct.                                                                                                                                             |\n| 9  | THE COURT:<br>Okay.<br>So to -- so I'm going to wait                                                                                                                        |\n| 10 | to see what the district court does.                                                                                                                                        |\n| 11 | This is -- this is not -- I don't know that the                                                                                                                             |\n| 12 | bankruptcy court has any authority, and I haven't been able                                                                                                                 |\n| 13 | to find any, that would allow a bankruptcy court to tell a                                                                                                                  |\n| 14 | party in a criminal proceeding that they can't seek some                                                                                                                    |\n| 15 | form of relief from the court in that criminal proceeding.                                                                                                                  |\n| 16 | I haven't seen any authority that would provide this court                                                                                                                  |\n| 17 | with the authority to do that.                                                                                                                                              |\n| 18 | MR. DESPINS:<br>Well, I -- I don't know if you've                                                                                                                           |\n| 19 | had a chance to look at the joinder filed by --                                                                                                                             |\n| 20 | THE COURT:<br>I did.<br>I did.                                                                                                                                              |\n| 21 | MR. DESPINS:<br>-- the committee in PAX because I                                                                                                                           |\n| 22 | thought they cited a number of cases where --                                                                                                                               |\n| 23 | THE COURT:<br>They cited -- they cited one case                                                                                                                             |\n| 24 | which was helpful.<br>I think the committee cited one case                                                                                                                  |\n| 25 | which held that the district court in the criminal                                                                                                                          |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - September 12, 2023 31 proceedings ruled on that motion, not the bankruptcy court. If I'm, Attorney Mayhew, if I'm saying something incorrect, please correct me, but my recollection of the review of the joinder was -- I understand the committee joins and they cited a case which was helpful, because I don't think there were any cases cited before that, but I think what that case said, well, my recollection of what that case said, is that the district court made that, in the criminal action made that determination, not the bankruptcy court, and I think that is an important distinction with a difference.\n\n I'm not sure that the bankruptcy court has authority, any authority, to enjoin anyone from doing anything in a criminal proceeding that is not part of the bankruptcy -- I don't know how a criminal proceeding could be part of the bankruptcy case.\n\n So I understand you may be frustrated. And I understand that, you know, you may feel that you would rather this court address the issue, and maybe I'll still have to address the issue after the district court rules, but I don't see -- I am not convinced or persuaded that there's any authority that exists that would authorize a bankruptcy court to stay a debtor who is no longer in possession, who is not only the subject of a criminal proceeding, but, in fact, incarcerated, from seeking relief\n\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n|    | Ho Wan Kwok - September 12, 2023<br>32                                                                                                                                      |\n| 1  | in that criminal proceeding.<br>It doesn't mean he's going to                                                                                                               |\n| 2  | obtain that relief, but I don't -- I don't see how the                                                                                                                      |\n| 3  | bankruptcy court has the authority to do that, any                                                                                                                          |\n| 4  | bankruptcy court.                                                                                                                                                           |\n| 5  | MR. DESPINS:<br>Your Honor, it's because this is an                                                                                                                         |\n| 6  | attempt to control property of the estate.<br>I mean, if this                                                                                                               |\n| 7  | Chapter 11 case is stayed, the effect on property of the                                                                                                                    |\n| 8  | estate would be huge.<br>You know.<br>It's just I can't even                                                                                                                |\n| 9  | conceive of it.                                                                                                                                                             |\n| 10 | We had a deadline, for example, the two-year                                                                                                                                |\n| 11 | statute of limitations is coming up in February.<br>If this                                                                                                                 |\n| 12 | case is stayed, what's going to happen to all these                                                                                                                         |\n| 13 | important questions?                                                                                                                                                        |\n| 14 | THE COURT:<br>Well, you're going to have to move to                                                                                                                         |\n| 15 | extend that statute of limitations, number one.<br>Number two,                                                                                                              |\n| 16 | the Mahwah mansion is not property of the estate at this                                                                                                                    |\n| 17 | time.<br>That determination hasn't been made.                                                                                                                               |\n| 18 | MR. DESPINS:<br>I know.<br>No.<br>But I want to be                                                                                                                          |\n| 19 | clear, they're seeking a stay of the entire Chapter 11 case.                                                                                                                |\n| 20 | THE COURT:<br>No.<br>I understand.                                                                                                                                          |\n| 21 | MR. DESPINS:<br>Not only --                                                                                                                                                 |\n| 22 | THE COURT:<br>I read it.<br>I understand.                                                                                                                                   |\n| 23 | MR. DESPINS:<br>Okay.                                                                                                                                                       |\n| 24 | THE COURT:<br>I understand what they're seeking.                                                                                                                            |\n| 25 | MR. DESPINS:<br>Okay.                                                                                                                                                       |\n|    |                                                                                                                                                                             |\n\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n|    | Ho Wan Kwok - September 12, 2023<br>33                                                                                                                                      |\n| 1  | THE COURT:<br>But the case that the committee cited,                                                                                                                        |\n| 2  | the district court did not grant that relief.                                                                                                                               |\n| 3  | MR. DESPINS:<br>Understood.                                                                                                                                                 |\n| 4  | But I don't think there's any precedent.<br>Your                                                                                                                            |\n| 5  | point is that there's no precedent where a bankruptcy court                                                                                                                 |\n| 6  | has enjoined such a proceeding.                                                                                                                                             |\n| 7  | THE COURT:<br>Correct.                                                                                                                                                      |\n| 8  | MR. DESPINS:<br>I hear that.<br>But I don't think                                                                                                                           |\n| 9  | there's any case where the relief was sought, except for                                                                                                                    |\n| 10 | that Boston District Court case, which sought in the                                                                                                                        |\n| 11 | district court, usually sought in the court where the case                                                                                                                  |\n| 12 | is pending.                                                                                                                                                                 |\n| 13 | But I understand your -- understand your views and                                                                                                                          |\n| 14 | I appreciate the feedback, Your Honor.                                                                                                                                      |\n| 15 | THE COURT:<br>It may -- I have no idea what's going                                                                                                                         |\n| 16 | to occur, but I understand your request.<br>And it doesn't                                                                                                                  |\n| 17 | mean that your request might not be addressed in some way,                                                                                                                  |\n| 18 | shape or form at some point, but I don't see any authority                                                                                                                  |\n| 19 | to have a bankruptcy court enjoin a criminal defendant from                                                                                                                 |\n| 20 | seeking relief in a criminal case.                                                                                                                                          |\n| 21 | MR. DESPINS:<br>Understood.                                                                                                                                                 |\n| 22 | THE COURT:<br>Thank you.                                                                                                                                                    |\n| 23 | MR. DESPINS:<br>Thank you, Your Honor.                                                                                                                                      |\n| 24 | THE COURT:<br>Is there anything further anyone would                                                                                                                        |\n| 25 | like to add to the record this afternoon?                                                                                                                                   |\n\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|\n|    | Ho Wan Kwok - September 12, 2023<br>34                                                                                                                                      |  |\n| 1  | (No response)                                                                                                                                                               |  |\n| 2  | THE COURT:<br>Okay.<br>That conclude the hearings in                                                                                                                        |  |\n| 3  | the Kwok and Genever-related Chapter 11 cases this                                                                                                                          |  |\n| 4  | afternoon.<br>Those are the last matters on the calendar, so                                                                                                                |  |\n| 5  | court is adjourned.<br>Thank you, all.                                                                                                                                      |  |\n| 6  | ALL COUNSEL:<br>Thank you, Your Honor.                                                                                                                                      |  |\n| 7  | (Proceedings concluded at 2:54 p.m.)                                                                                                                                        |  |\n| 8  | I, CHRISTINE FIORE, court-approved transcriber and                                                                                                                          |  |\n| 9  | certified electronic reporter and transcriber, certify that                                                                                                                 |  |\n| 10 | the foregoing is a correct transcript from the official                                                                                                                     |  |\n| 11 | electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above                                                                                                                  |  |\n| 12 | entitled matter.                                                                                                                                                            |  |\n| 13 |                                                                                                                                                                             |  |\n| 14 |                                                                                                                                                                             |  |\n| 15 | September 14, 2023                                                                                                                                                          |  |\n| 16 | Christine Fiore, CERT                                                                                                                                                       |  |\n| 17 |                                                                                                                                                                             |  |\n| 18 |                                                                                                                                                                             |  |\n| 19 |                                                                                                                                                                             |  |\n| 20 |                                                                                                                                                                             |  |\n| 21 |                                                                                                                                                                             |  |\n| 22 |                                                                                                                                                                             |  |\n| 23 |                                                                                                                                                                             |  |\n| 24 |                                                                                                                                                                             |  |\n| 25 |                                                                                                                                                                             |  |\n|    |                                                                                                                                                                             |  |\n\n# **Exhibit 11**\n\n|      | <br><br><br><br><br><br>!\"\"#\\$%&#'()*'**+,-#'%<br>./0'%%'*12'3*'4%#\\$'*5%# 6'-7%0%4''*)*'*+*\\$%<br>/'-*8(9#\\$*2%'*+:*%';:/0/#''*<#=/'4;,*\\$%5%4'*<br><br>><br>#\\$<#=/'4;7/ %?!@'-%A\\$%\"AB,C3*D?!ED \t\"\"#<br>-%#(#\\$%F'# 4*+%%4%6%%-% \\$'-%4#0%0G*' ;#\\$20'%%\\$/\\$%<br>'-%4#'*H%I6*=\"%'# \",#0%3*DF<br>!#\\$'-%#\\$J%0#;*4%%\\$(0<br>4*0* \\$#'%\\$/\\$%'-%4#'*K%00\"%'# DJD<#J*1/4=12'%\\$\"%'# D\"\\$JD<br>:*D3*DF<br>!DK/('-%-%#(#\\$%F'# 4*+%%4%\"4*/0% +*<#J*<br>1/4=2#\\$%#*# )*'*+*7% %++*2L/\\$(2%'*\\$%/0/#''*C%\\$D7D<br>,JD:D?#\\$C%\\$D7D<#=D:D>@'-%A)*'*AE%(#\\$('-%\\$%D<br>\"\"#-%#(6#0-% \\$*'-%)*'*DK/('-%-%#(\"'-%,-#'%<br>./0'%%0'#'%\\$*'-%%4*\\$'-#''-%*%';'*9%#9#\\$*%\\$0*'*%';*+<br><#J*1/4=\"#\\$-#0*2#4'*'-%5-%;F3%'-% #\\$#'2%'D.-%%+*%\"<br>*%*+'-%(*/\\$0+*% %+0%'+*'-C%\\$%# 7/ %*+,J :*4%\\$/%?#\\$<br>C%\\$%# 7/ %*+<#=/'4;:*4%\\$/%>@9E%M0''*% %J%<#J*1/4=+*2<br>'-%\\$%D44*\\$( ;\"'0-%%9;<br>N.-%)*'*+*7% %++*2L/\\$(2%'\\$%/0/#''*C%\\$%#<br>7/ %*+,J :*4%\\$/%?#\\$C%\\$%# 7/ %*+<#=/'4;:*4%\\$/%> |\n|------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| <br> | 0  D5(%\\$9;L/\\$(%L/ %D)#(*)#;\"D@20E@B'%%\\$O<br><br>E                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |\n\n# **Exhibit 12**\n\n**From:** Barron, Douglass E. **Sent:** Friday, August 18, 2023 4:17 PM **To:** Eric Henzy <ehenzy@zeislaw.com> **Cc:** Despins, Luc A. <lucdespins@paulhastings.com>; Maza, Shlomo <shlomomaza@paulhastings.com>; Luft, Avi E. <aviluft@paulhastings.com>; Sutton, Ezra <ezrasutton@paulhastings.com>; 'mconway@lpgmlaw.com' <mconway@lpgmlaw.com> **Subject:** Motion to Seal Exhibit to Mahwah Complaint\n\nEric:\n\nPlease see attached a draft of a joint motion to seal an exhibit to the Mahwah complaint, per your discussions with Luc. Please let us know if you have any comments.\n\nThanks Doug\n\n| Douglass Barron   Associate   Financial Restructuring Group                                     |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| Paul Hastings LLP   200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166   Direct: +1.212.318.6690   Main:       |\n| +1.212.318.6000   Fax: +1.212.230.7690   douglassbarron@paulhastings.com   www.paulhastings.com |\n\n| Luc Despins   Partner   Financial Restructuring Group                                     |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| Paul Hastings LLP   200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166   Direct: +1.212.318.6001   Main: |\n| +1.212.318.6000   Fax: +1.212.230.7771   lucdespins@paulhastings.com '                    |\n\n# **Exhibit 4**\n\n# **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK**\n\n| UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                                 | :<br>:      |\n|-----------------------------------------------------------|-------------|\n|                                                           | :           |\n| v.                                                        | :<br>:<br>: |\n| HO WAN KWOK,                                              | :<br>:      |\n| Defendant.<br>__________________________________________: | :           |\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\n\nPlaintiff, : Case No. 1:23-CR-118-1 (AT)\n\n# **JOINDER OF THE OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED CREDITORS IN SUPPORT OF THE RESPONSE OF CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE AND GENEVER DEBTORS IN OPPOSITION TO DEFEDANT HO WAN KWOK'S MOTION FOR AN ORDER AND WRIT STAYING BANKRUPTCY CASES OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR OTHER RELIEF**\n\nThe Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the \"Committee\") appointed in the Chapter 11 bankruptcy case of Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"), pending in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut (the \"Bankruptcy Case\"), by and through its undersigned counsel, hereby submits this Joinder in Support of the Response of Chapter 11 Trustee and Genever Debtors in Opposition to Defendant Ho Wan Kwok's Motion for An Order and Writ Staying Bankruptcy Cases or in the Alternative for Other Relief (the \"Objection\") and respectfully represents in support thereof as follows:\n\n1. The Committee joins in and incorporates by reference the arguments made in the Trustee's Objection and submits this statement and joinder to set forth additional reasons that further support the denial of Defendant Ho Wan Kwok's Motion for an Order and Writ Staying Bankruptcy Cases or in the Alternative for Other Relief (the \"Motion\").\n\n2. The Committee was appointed by the Office of the United States Trustee in the Debtor's Bankruptcy Case on March 21, 2022. The Committee is charged with representing the interests of thousands of general unsecured creditors holding in excess of \\$30 billion dollars in claims against the Debtor.\n\n3. Since the commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings, the Committee, as the fiduciary on behalf of the unsecured creditor body, has been involved in every major aspect of the Chapter 11 proceedings in order to protect the interests of the creditors.\n\n4. The Committee has sought to ensure that the rights of the creditors are protected and to prevent the Defendant from avoiding his obligations under the Bankruptcy Code.\n\n5. As a result of the Committee's opposition to the dismissal of the Debtor's Chapter 11 case (Bankruptcy Case, ECF Nos. Nos. 346, 406, 408), which was sought by his single largest creditor, Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity L.P. (\"PAX\"), and consented to by the Debtor (Bankruptcy Case, ECF No. 344), and after a hearing held on May 25, 2022 (Bankruptcy Case, ECF No. 433), the Bankruptcy Court directed the appointment of a Chapter 11 Trustee by Memorandum of Decision entered June 15, 2022 (Bankruptcy Case, ECF No. 465). Thereafter, the Chapter 11 Trustee was appointed on July 8, 2022. The Committee strongly supported the Chapter 11 Trustee's appointment in light of the clear abuses by the Defendant of his obligations to his creditors and the Bankruptcy Court.\n\n6. Shortly after his appointment, the Defendant sought to have the Chapter 11 Trustee removed (Bankruptcy Case, ECF No. 1274). The Committee opposed the Defendant's efforts (Bankruptcy Case, ECF No. 1313) on the basis that it was in the best interests of the creditors for the Chapter 11 Trustee to thoroughly investigate the Defendant's financial affairs and tenaciously pursue the recovery of the Defendant's assets that had been fraudulently\n\ntransferred or were otherwise held with family members or their companies that were alter egos of the Debtor or equitably owned by the Debtor. The Chapter 11 Trustee has been highly successful thus far in recovering such assets for the Chapter 11 estate and its creditors.\n\n7. Any stay of the Defendant's Chapter 11 proceedings will cause significant harm to the creditors as the path to a potential recovery of their claims will grind to a halt for an undetermined period of time leaving open the possibility for the Defendant's family and associates to abscond with, and further dissipate, assets beneficially, if not legally, owned by the Defendant. The Committee thus strongly opposes a stay of the bankruptcy proceedings.\n\n# **A. The Bankruptcy Court Is the Proper Forum To Adjudicate The Debtor's Stay Motion**\n\n8. As the Trustee correctly points out in his Objection, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), \"the district courts shall have original *and exclusive* jurisdiction of all cases under title 11.\" (emphasis added). In turn, 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) provides that \"[e]ach district court may provide that any or all cases under title 11 and any or all proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11 shall be referred to the bankruptcy judges for the district.\" Such a referral was made in the Connecticut District by the standing Order of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Daly, J.), entered September 21, 1984, whereby the Connecticut District Court \"referred to the Bankruptcy Judges of this District\" \"all cases under Title 11, U.S.C., and all proceedings arising under Title 11, U.S.C., or arising in or related to a case under Title 11, U.S.C., pending on June 27, 1984, or filed on or after June 28, 1984….\"<sup>1</sup> Thus, by virtue of the foregoing, the Connecticut Bankruptcy Court has the exclusive jurisdiction over the Debtor's Chapter 11 case and is the only court that has the jurisdictional authority to stay same.\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Standing Order may be found at http (last visited September 5, 2023).\n\n9. The Connecticut Bankruptcy Court's exclusive jurisdiction as it relates to staying proceedings in a bankruptcy case or other disputed litigation over which it is presiding is further confirmed by 11 U.S.C. § 305(a), which provides in pertinent part that a bankruptcy court \"may dismiss a case …, or suspend all proceedings in a case under this title, at any time if — (1) the interests of creditors and the debtor would be better served by such dismissal or suspension.\" While a court also has the inherent power \"to control the disposition of the causes on its docket,\" which is the source of its authority to stay a civil proceeding over which it is presiding \"'when the interests of justice seem to require such action',\" *Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc.,* 676 F.3d 83, 96-97 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting *United States v. Kordel*, 397 U.S. 1, 12 n. 7 (1970)), the prerogative to do so is with the court presiding over the proceedings for which a stay is requested – which in this case is the Connecticut Bankruptcy Court. *See Matter of Nichols*, 615 B.R. 588, 593 (D. Ariz. 2020) (affirming bankruptcy court's denial of a stay of bankruptcy proceedings pending conclusion of parallel criminal proceedings against the debtors and observing that \"[t]he bankruptcy court, being privy to the unique situation of its own proceedings, is the ultimate factfinder as to which considerations are most appropriate\" to support or deny such a stay request).\n\n10. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has previously acknowledged that while a District Court has jurisdiction to decide whether the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. §362 applies, it should not exercise such jurisdiction where to do so would interfere with the Bankruptcy Court's ability to oversee reorganization proceedings.\n\n11. *In re Baldwin-United, Corp. Litigation*, 765 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1985), is instructive on this issue, and provides guidance as to the appropriate exercise of jurisdiction by the District Court over matters involving the automatic stay under the Bankruptcy Code. At issue in that case was whether the Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of Ohio or the District Court in the\n\nSouthern District of New York ought to be the first court to determine whether the automatic stay arising from the filing of the Chapter 11 proceedings applied to indemnity and contribution claims brought against the debtor after the bankruptcy filing. *Id.* at 345. The Second Circuit concluded that the Bankruptcy Court was the appropriate court to determine the applicability of the stay and reversed the order of the District Court enjoining the debtor from applying to the Bankruptcy Court for relief. *Id.*\n\n12. That case involved an involuntary Chapter 11 brought against Baldwin-United Corporation and its subsidiary (\"Baldwin\") in Ohio arising from the debtor's sale of Single Premium Deferred Annuities (\"SPDAs\") and subsequent state court insurance rehabilitation proceedings. *Id.* at 345. Shortly after the bankruptcy filing, holders of the SPDAs sued the brokerdealers, including Paine Webber, who had marketed the policies alleging securities fraud and other claims. *Id.* Over three dozen of these lawsuits were ultimately consolidated into multidistrict litigation by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation pending in the Southern District of New York. *Id.* The District Court ordered that one consolidated complaint be filed against each brokerdealer and a class action against Paine Webber was ultimately filed. *Id.*\n\n13. Thereafter, Paine Webber filed a proof of claim in the Ohio bankruptcy proceedings against Baldwin asserting a claim for \\$700 million in damages for indemnity and contribution with respect to the class action. *Id.* It also filed a third-party complaint in the class action against Baldwin in the Southern District of New York. *Id.* Baldwin took the position that the filing of the third-party complaint violated the automatic stay and informed Paine Webber that it intended to put the issue before the Ohio Bankruptcy Court. However, before Baldwin took action in the Bankruptcy Court, Paine Webber obtained an *ex parte* temporary restraining order preventing Baldwin from applying to the Bankruptcy Court for relief. *Id.* The District Court subsequently\n\nissued a preliminary injunction finding that the District Court, rather than the Bankruptcy Court, was the appropriate court to determine the scope of the automatic stay and that it would be an \"unnecessary and improper intrusion on the jurisdiction\" of the District Court if the Bankruptcy Court were to determine that the stay applied to Paine Webber's third-party complaint. *Id.* at 346.\n\n14. On appeal, the Second Circuit preliminarily noted that the \"District Court has jurisdiction to determine the applicability of the automatic stay.\" *Id.* Nevertheless, the Circuit Court held that the District Court's \"issuance of the injunction challenged on this appeal was a misuse of its equitable power.\" *Id.* at 347.\n\n15. The Court stated, \"[b]y prohibiting Baldwin from applying to the Bankruptcy Court in Ohio for any relief against any defendant in MDL No. 581 the injunction improperly interferes with the reorganization proceedings in two respects.\" *Id.* at 347. First, the Court held that the injunction prevented \"Baldwin from invoking the vital authority of the Bankruptcy Court to 'issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions' of the Bankruptcy Code.\" *Id.* at 348 *citing* 11 U.S.C. §105. The Court further stated that under its Section 105 powers, the Bankruptcy Court can \"use its equitable powers to assure the orderly conduct of the reorganization proceedings.\" *Id.*\n\n16. While acknowledging that the District Court has the power to issue all writs in aid of its jurisdiction and its proceedings by virtue of the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, the Second Circuit nevertheless stated, \"to whatever extent a conflict may arise between the authority of the Bankruptcy Court to administer this complex reorganization and the authority of the District Court to administer consolidated pretrial proceedings, the equities favor maintenance of the unfettered authority of the Bankruptcy Court.\" *Id.*\n\n17. Second, the Circuit Court held that the injunction issued by the District Court prevented Baldwin from applying to the Bankruptcy Court for a determination of whether the automatic stay applied. The Court found that this impermissibly prevented the Bankruptcy Court from construing its own stay and reflected the District Court's implicit ruling that the stay was inapplicable to the third-party complaint. *Id.* at 348. The Court held, \"[i]n the circumstances of Baldwin's Chapter 11 reorganization, the equities do not warrant either preventing the Bankruptcy Court from construing its stay or determining in the District Court whether the stay applies.\" *Id.*\n\n18. As in *Baldwin*, the Bankruptcy Court is the appropriate forum to adjudicate any stay request made by the Debtor. Second Circuit precedent dictates this result as do the equities in this case. The Bankruptcy Court has been overseeing the Chapter 11 proceedings for the past 19 months and is intimately familiar with the web of sham corporations established by the Debtor and his close associates where he has hidden valuable assets from the creditors of his estate.\n\n19. Should this Court choose to reach the merits of the Motion because it is not viewed as violative of the automatic stay, the Committee respectfully submits that it should be denied. The Chapter 11 Trustee has successfully recovered (and in some instances, liquidated for the benefit of creditors): (i) two luxury yachts; (ii) a \\$37 million dollar escrow fund; and (iii) the 100% equity interest in an entity known as Genever BVI, which in turn is the sole owner of Genever US which owns the Debtor's multi-million dollar apartment at the Sherry-Netherland hotel in New York pursuant to a settlement with Bravo Luck Limited (a company ostensibly owned by the Debtor's son, Mileson Guo a/k/a Qiang Guo and/or Guo Qiang) and Mileson Guo (both of whom were claiming an equity interest in Genever BVI). The Trustee is additionally pursuing recoveries for the estate of a valuable home in Greenwich, Connecticut and a mansion in Mahwah, New Jersey. The creditors will greatly benefit from the recoveries already obtained by the Chapter 11\n\nTrustee and those assets that he continues to pursue, and will be prejudiced by delay and further opportunity for dissipation of assets if the Motion is granted.\n\n20. Finally, to the extent the Court is inclined to consider the Debtor's request for alternative relief, the Committee acknowledges the jurisdiction of the Court to adjudicate same. Moreover, the Committee consents to the Debtor's request for alternative relief to the same extent and on the same basis as the Chapter 11 Trustee.\n\nWHEREFORE, the Committee respectfully requests that the Court deny the Debtor's Motion for the reasons set forth herein and those set forth in the Trustee's Objection, and grant such other and further relief as is necessary and just.\n\n# Dated: September 21, 2023 **OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED CREDITORS OF HO WAN KWOK**\n\nBy: */s/Kristin B. Mayhew* Irve J. Goldman Kristin B. Mayhew PULLMAN & COMLEY, LLP 850 Main Street, 8th Floor, P.O. Box 7006 Bridgeport, CT 06601-7006 Telephone: (203) 330-2213 [igoldman@pullcom.com](mailto:igoldman@pullcom.com) [kmayhew@pullcom.com](mailto:kmayhew@pullcom.com)\n\nIts Attorneys\n\n# **Exhibit 5**\n\n318\n\n![](_page_314_Picture_2.jpeg)\n\nSeptember 21, 2023 Sherry Millman Direct Dial: 212.806.5434 Fax: 212.806.6006 smillman@stroock.com\n\nThe Honorable Analisa Torres United States District Judge Southern District of New York Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl St. New York, NY 10007-1312\n\nRe: *United States v Ho Wan Kwok, et al. No 23 Cr. 118 (AT)*\n\nDear Judge Torres:\n\nThis firm represents The Sherry-Netherland, Inc. (the \"Sherry\") as creditor in the chapter 11 bankruptcy case of Genever Holdings LLC (\"Genever US\") pending in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut (the \"Bankruptcy Court\") which is jointly administered with the individual chapter 11 bankruptcy case of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok (\"Kwok\"). [1](#page-314-0) The Sherry also holds a substantial claim in the Kwok bankruptcy based upon Kwok's guarantee of Genever US' obligations to the Sherry.\n\nWe recently became aware of Kwok's Motion for an Order and Writ Staying Bankruptcy Cases (which refer to, inter alia, the Genever US and Kwok bankruptcy cases as well as related adversary proceedings), or in the Alternative for Other Relief [ECF No. 129] (the \"Stay Motion\") made to this Court in Kwok's criminal case, and we write to respectfully request that Your Honor consider the position of the Sherry as an interested party which could be adversely impacted by the disposition of the Stay Motion.\n\nThe Sherry strongly objects to the proposed imposition of a stay with respect to the Genever US and Kwok bankruptcy cases (together the \"Bankruptcy Cases\") for the\n\n<span id=\"page-314-0\"></span><sup>1</sup> By order dated November 21, 2022, the Bankruptcy Court approved the joint administration of the Chapter 11 cases of Kwok, Genever US and its immediate parent, Genever Holdings Corporation, known as Genever BVI. For avoidance of doubt, these cases are jointly administered but are not substantively consolidated or otherwise tied together and proceed independently and at their own pace.\n\nSeptember 21, 2023\n\nreasons set forth in the Response of Chapter 11 Trustee (of Kwok) and the Genever Debtors in opposition to the Stay Motion [ECF No. 145] (the \"Opposition\"), and joins in the Opposition. The Sherry takes no position with respect to the alternative relief sought in the Stay Motion.\n\nRespectfully, the Sherry submits that the only court with jurisdiction to stay the Bankruptcy Cases is the Bankruptcy Court under 28 U.S.C. §1334. Accordingly, the Stay Motion should be denied as a matter of law. Further, the Bankruptcy Court alone has the benefit of access to the facts underlying the Bankruptcy Cases and of hearing from all interested parties when relief is sought.\n\nNotwithstanding the foregoing, if Your Honor is inclined to consider the Stay Motion, the Sherry seeks to provide the pertinent facts to this Court, as they apply to the Genever US case, which are as follows:\n\nGenever US purchased an apartment comprising the entire 18th floor, and related maids' quarters (the \"Apartment\") at the Sherry, which is a New York residential cooperative, from the Apartment's prior owner in 2015. More specifically, in accordance with New York State coop law, Genever US purchased the shares attributable to the Apartment and took an assignment as lessee under the proprietary leases appurtenant to the Apartment (together the \"Proprietary Lease\") which Proprietary Lease governs the rights and obligations of Genever US as lessee and the Sherry as lessor. The Sherry has an undisputed statutory and contractual first lien on the shares attributable to the Apartment to secure Genever US' obligations under the Proprietary Lease which obligations include payment of monthly maintenance and assessments to the Sherry.\n\nIn January of 2020, Genever US stopped paying its maintenance, assessment and other obligations and the Sherry was compelled to commence proceedings in New York state court to recover the amounts owed and to remove Genever US as owner of the Apartment. On October 12, 2020, when the Sherry was in the process of obtaining the relief to which it was entitled, Genever US, whose sole major asset is the Apartment, filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 11 in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the \"SDNY Bankruptcy Court\"), likely to stay the Sherry's efforts in state court. Notwithstanding that nearly four years have passed, the Sherry still has not been paid the money it was owed in January, 2020. As of the October, 2020 bankruptcy filing, the Sherry was owed \\$1,096,186.54 for maintenance, assessment, legal fees and other costs, all of which remains outstanding. In addition, the Sherry is owed not less than \\$1,462,881.84 for amounts incurred post-petition, which amount is subject to increase with time pursuant to the Proprietary Lease and as a matter of law.\n\nTo be clear, the Sherry is not a faceless corporate creditor- these unpaid obligations by Genever US burden the other shareholders at the Sherry, apartment owners who are simply trying to meet their own obligations and who, for the last four years and\n\n**STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP** New York Los Angeles Miami Washington, DC 180 Maiden Lane, New York, NY 10038-4982 T. 212.806.5400 F. 212.806.6006 www.stroock.com 2 September 21, 2023\n\nforeseeable future until the Apartment is sold through the Genever US bankruptcy case, are compensating out of their own pockets for monies owed by Genever US.\n\nOn October 8, 2021, the SDNY Bankruptcy Court approved a consensual arrangement among all parties in the Genever US case establishing a framework for the sale of the Apartment and for the appointment of a sales officer to undertake the process of marketing the Apartment for sale (the \"Sale Order\"). On January 13, 2022, the SDNY Bankruptcy Court approved the retention of Sotheby's International Realty as real estate broker to spearhead the marketing effort. The sale was recognized as a necessary step to provide a recovery to the Sherry and any other creditor, install a responsible financially sound party as the owner of the Apartment, and bring the Genever US bankruptcy to a conclusion. Notably, the filing of the Genever US bankruptcy and implementation of the sale process occurred prior to Kwok filing his individual Chapter 11 case in 2022 and certainly long before criminal charges were brought against him in 2023.\n\nOn February 15, 2022, Kwok filed his individual Chapter 11 before the Bankruptcy Court and on July 8, 2022, Luc Despins was appointed as the Chapter 11 Trustee of Kwok. Given that Kwok was the ultimate parent of Genever US, the Trustee took over the management of Genever US and on November 3, 2022, together with Genever US, obtained an order granting a transfer of venue of the Genever US bankruptcy to the Bankruptcy Court in Connecticut. The Trustee then asked the Bankruptcy Court to continue the sale process and honor the terms of the Sale Order, which the Bankruptcy Court did.\n\nThe sale process was on track in the Genever US bankruptcy (with the Apartment having been listed by the real estate broker) when a fire broke out at the Apartment on March 15, 2023, following Kwok's arrest at the Apartment earlier that day. The fire not only ravaged the Apartment, it caused substantial damage to the Sherry and displaced some fifty other apartment owners from their apartments for months. Some have yet to return. Because of the extensive damage to the Apartment, remediation measures needed to be implemented on an immediate basis. The Sherry has been working tirelessly to address the fallout from the fire and to assist the Trustee as he restores the Apartment for sale. Through the bankruptcy process, Genever US is pursuing litigation against its insurance carrier to recover under its policies for damages resulting from the fire. It has also obtained authority from the Bankruptcy Court to undertake the remediation process and approval for financing of that process while not releasing Genever US' insurance carrier of its liability therefor.\n\nA stay of the Genever US bankruptcy would be devastating to the remediation process and the necessary sale of the Apartment. The delay would unfairly harm creditors, in particular, the Sherry and the shareholders of the Sherry who have waited years to recover from Genever US on its unpaid obligations and to have a suitable shareholder in the Apartment.\n\n**STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP** New York Los Angeles Miami Washington, DC 180 Maiden Lane, New York, NY 10038-4982 T. 212.806.5400 F. 212.806.6006 www.stroock.com 3 September 21, 2023\n\nEqually important, a stay would do nothing for Kwok because there is no \"overlap\" between his criminal case and the Genever US bankruptcy case. He has no economic interest in the Apartment; any funds in the Genever US estate will go first to pay creditors and then, if anything remains, to Genever US's parent and lastly, to the Kwok bankruptcy estate as the ultimate equity holder, not to Kwok himself. Further, the path for Genever US to exit bankruptcy through a sale of the Apartment was well underway before Kwok was criminally charged such that there is no impact on Kwok's rights occasioned by continuing the Genever US bankruptcy on its long established path to conclusion.\n\nWe cannot speak to the underlying reason that the Stay Motion was brought, but we submit that the Sherry and other creditors should not be collateral damage of a litigation and forum shopping strategy by Kwok in his criminal case that has no connection to the Bankruptcy Cases.\n\nThe Sherry and the undersigned as its counsel remain at this Court's disposal to address any inquiries Your Honor may have.\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\n/s/ *Sherry Millman*\n\nSherry Millman\n\ncc: All Counsel of Record (by ECF) Nicholas Bassett, Paul Hastings LLP (by email) Irve J. Goldman, Pullman & Comley (by email) Taruna Garg, Murtha Cullina LLP, co counsel to the Sherry- Netherland, Inc. (by email)","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院 布里奇波特分院\n\n------------------------------------------------------　x\n\n关于：　：\n：　第11章\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，　：\n：　案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。1　：\n：　联合管理\n\nx\n第11章受托人及 GENEVER 债务人就债务人在刑事案件中提出请求裁定中止本第11章案件及相关对抗程序之动议的最新情况所发通知\n\n根据日期为 August 30, 2023 的通知 [Docket No. 2158]，Luc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯）作为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（“债务人”）的第11章受托人（“受托人”），告知本院及利害关系方，债务人已在 United States District Court for the Southern District of New York（纽约南区联邦地区法院）审理中的针对其本人的刑事案件 [Case No. 1:23-cr-00118-AT]（“刑事案件”）中提交动议，请求中止上述第11章案件及所有相关对抗程序。2\n\n受托人、Genever Holdings LLC（吉尼弗控股有限责任公司）及 Genever Holdings Corporation（吉尼弗控股公司）谨就债务人动议向本院及利害关系方提供最新情况。具体而言，刑事案件中已就债务人动议提交以下答复：\n\n1　本第11章案件的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（又名 Guo Wengui（郭文贵）、Miles Guo（郭文贵）及 Miles Kwok（郭文贵），以及众多其他别名）（税务识别号码后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（吉尼弗控股有限责任公司）（税务识别号码后四位：8202）以及 Genever Holdings Corporation（吉尼弗控股公司）。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC（吉尼弗控股有限责任公司）及 Genever Holdings Corporation（吉尼弗控股公司）的邮寄地址为：Paul Hastings LLP（普衡律师事务所），200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166，转交 Luc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯），作为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）遗产的受托人（仅用于通知及通信目的）。\n\n2　随 August 30, 2023 通知附有以下文件副本：(a) 债务人关于请求裁定及令状以中止破产案件，或备选请求其他救济的动议通知 [Criminal Case ECF No. 129]（“动议”）；以及 (b) 相关法律备忘录 [Criminal Case ECF No. 131]。\n\n1. United States Department of Justice（美国司法部）日期为 September 21, 2023 的函件答复 [Criminal Case ECF No. 148]，其副本作为附件1随附于此；以及\n\n2. 日期为 September 21, 2023 的《第11章受托人及 Genever 债务人反对被告 Ho Wan Kwok 请求裁定及令状以中止破产案件，或备选请求其他救济之动议的答复》[Criminal Case ECF No. 145]，以及 Nicholas A. Bassett（尼古拉斯·A·巴塞特）的相关声明 [Criminal Case ECF No. 146]，其副本分别作为附件2及附件3随附于此；\n\n3. 日期为 September 21, 2023 的《无担保债权人官方委员会支持第11章受托人及 Genever 债务人反对被告 Ho Wan Kwok 请求裁定及令状以中止破产案件，或备选请求其他救济之动议答复的参加书》[Criminal Case ECF No. 147]，其副本作为附件4随附于此；\n\n4. The Sherry-Netherland, Inc.（谢里-内瑟兰公司）日期为 September 21, 2023 的函件答复 [Criminal Case ECF No. 149]，其副本作为附件5随附于此。\n\n日期：September 27, 2023　New York, New York\n\n签署人：/s/ G. Alexander Bongartz\nAvram E. Luft（阿夫拉姆·E·卢夫特）（获准临时出庭）\nG. Alexander Bongartz（G·亚历山大·邦加茨）（获准临时出庭）\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP（普衡律师事务所）\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, New York 10166\n(212) 318-6079\naviluft@paulhastings.com\nalexbongartz@paulhastings.com\n\n以及\n\nNicholas A. Bassett（尼古拉斯·A·巴塞特）（获准临时出庭）\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP（普衡律师事务所）\n2050 M Street NW\nWashington, D.C., 20036\n(202) 551-1902\nnicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n以及\n\nDouglas S. Skalka（道格拉斯·S·斯卡尔卡）（ct00616）\nPatrick R. Linsey（帕特里克·R·林赛）（ct29437）\nNEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C.（诺伊伯特、佩佩及蒙蒂斯律师事务所）\n195 Church Street, 13th Floor\nNew Haven, Connecticut 06510\n(203) 781-2847\ndskalka@npmlaw.com\nplinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n第11章受托人、Genever Holdings LLC（吉尼弗控股有限责任公司）及 Genever Holdings Corporation（吉尼弗控股公司）的律师\n美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院 布里奇波特分院\n\n------------------------------------------------------　x\n\n关于：　：\n：\n第11章\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，1　：\n：\n案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。　：\n：\n（联合管理）\n\n送达证明\n\n下列签署人特此证明，于 September 27, 2023，前述通知已以电子方式提交。本院电子提交（“CM/ECF”）系统已通过电子邮件向上述第11章案件的所有当事人发送本次提交的通知；对于无法接受电子提交者，则按电子提交通知中所示通过邮件发送。当事人可通过本院 CM/ECF 系统查阅本次提交文件。\n\n日期：September 27, 2023　New York, New York\n\n签署人：/s/ G. Alexander Bongartz\nG. Alexander Bongartz（G·亚历山大·邦加茨）（获准临时出庭）\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP（普衡律师事务所）\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, New York 10166\n(212) 318-6079\nalexbongartz@paulhastings.com\n\n第11章受托人、Genever Holdings LLC（吉尼弗控股有限责任公司）及 Genever Holdings Corporation（吉尼弗控股公司）的律师\n\n1　本第11章案件的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（又名 Guo Wengui（郭文贵）、Miles Guo（郭文贵）及 Miles Kwok（郭文贵），以及众多其他别名）（税务识别号码后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（吉尼弗控股有限责任公司）（税务识别号码后四位：8202）以及 Genever Holdings Corporation（吉尼弗控股公司）。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC（吉尼弗控股有限责任公司）及 Genever Holdings Corporation（吉尼弗控股公司）的邮寄地址为：Paul Hastings LLP（普衡律师事务所），200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166，转交 Luc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯），作为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）遗产的受托人（仅用于通知及通信目的）。\n\n附件1\n\n美国司法部\n\n纽约南区美国联邦检察官办公室\n\nSilvio J. Mollo 大楼\nOne Saint Andrew's Plaza\nNew York, New York 10007\n\nSeptember 21, 2023\n\n通过 ECF\n尊敬的 Analisa Torres（阿娜丽莎·托雷斯）法官\nDaniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse\n500 Pearl St.\nNew York, NY 10007-1312\n事由：United States v. Ho Wan Kwok, et al., S1 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\n尊敬的 Torres 法官：\n\n政府谨提交本函件式书状，以答复被告 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）于 August 30, 2023 提交的动议。（见 Dkt. 131（“Kwok Br.”）。）\n\nKwok 的动议主要请求中止其本人于 February 2022 自愿启动的破产程序。（同上。）Kwok 的共同被告 Yanping Wang（王雁平）已参加该动议。（见 Dkt. 135（“Wang Ltr.”）。）\n\n如中止请求被驳回，Kwok 还提出数项备选请求。（Kwok Br. 1, 28-30）。第一，Kwok 请求修改本案保护令，以允许将刑事证据开示材料提供给破产受托人。（同上，第 28-29 页。）第二，Kwok 请求裁定允许其“辩护团队”持续且不受陪同地进入位于 675 Ramapo Valley Road, Mahwah, New Jersey 07430 的房产（“Mahwah Mansion”）。（同上，第 29-30 页。）与此相关，Kwok 动议请求“禁止”政府在本案终结前“协助出售”Mahwah Mansion。（同上。）最后，Kwok 请求裁定禁止政府向受托人索取或从其接收 Kwok 的特权信息或记录。（同上。）\n\nA. 政府对中止破产程序的立场\n\n政府目前对 Kwok 请求中止破产程序的动议不持立场。\n\nB. Kwok 的备选请求应予驳回\n\n如本院决定不予中止破产程序，Kwok 的备选请求亦应基于下述理由予以驳回。\n\n1. Kwok 的两项请求已无实际争议\n\nKwok 的第一项及最后一项备选请求应因已无实际争议而予以驳回。\n\n第一，Kwok 请求修改保护令的请求应因已无实际争议而予以驳回。Kwok 的律师主张，不存在进行该等修改的正当理由，并且仅因受托人取得一项要求 Kwok 如此办理的命令，才寻求该等修改。（Kwok Br. 29）。受托人目前已不再寻求执行该命令。（Dkt. 145（“Trustee Br.”）第 6、23 页）。因此，Kwok 的请求已无实际争议。\n\n第二，Kwok 关于可能享有特权材料的请求应因已无实际争议而予以驳回。政府既未向受托人索取、亦未从受托人接收 Kwok 可能享有特权的信息或记录，目前无意如此，并且除非获得 Kwok 律师（或适格持有人）同意，或本院裁定该等材料不享有特权及/或适用犯罪—欺诈例外，否则不会如此。因此，Kwok 关于可能享有特权材料的请求已无实际争议。\n\n因此，即使本院审理备选请求，该两项请求均应因已无实际争议而予以驳回。\n\n2. Kwok 请求不受限制地进入 Mahwah Mansion 的请求应予驳回\n\nKwok 请求裁定允许其“辩护团队”在本案及任何上诉终结前不受陪同地进入 Mahwah Mansion 的请求，应基于如下理由予以驳回。\n\n作为背景，Mahwah Mansion 由欺诈所得购买、翻修和布置，具体为在资金经由以其他实体名义开立的银行账户转移后所使用的 G|CLUBS 会员资金。（Dkt. 19（“起诉书”）第 16(b)-(c) 段。）如起诉书所述，Kwok 及其共谋者利用 G|CLUBS，通过虚假承诺向受害人提供据称极具价值的 GTV 股票（即，在 SEC 介入制止 GTV 发行后，将 G|CLUBS 用作继续进行非法私募发行的工具），并虚假承诺受害人成为“会员”后将获得“一整套服务”，从而诈骗受害人。（同上，第 15 段。）以被侵占的 G|CLUBS 会员资金购置的 Mahwah Mansion 及其家具陈设，在起诉书中被列为应予没收的特定财产。（同上，第 55(v) 段。）\n\n于 March 15, 2023，Federal Bureau of Investigation（联邦调查局）（“FBI”）的探员在 Mahwah Mansion 执行搜查令。多名 FBI 摄影师细致记录了该处所及其内容物，在搜查过程中拍摄了逾 2,000 张照片，且该等照片已在证据开示中提供给各被告。FBI 还于搜查前对 Mahwah Mansion 实施空中监视，相关照片及视频已提供给各被告。政府还从 Mahwah Mansion 扣押了大量实物证据，例如电子设备、Kwok 的个人物品（例如定制 Brioni（布里奥尼）西装），以及部分以被侵占的 G|CLUBS 会员资金购置的奢华家具陈设。\n\n在 Kwok 被捕后，声称与“New Federal State of China”（“NFSC”）有关联的人员开始将 Mahwah Mansion 作为其新的行动基地。NFSC 是 Kwok 创立的、声称代表中国人民的替代政府，并与起诉书所述的 Himalaya Farm Alliance（喜马拉雅农场联盟）有关联。（见起诉书第 14 段。）根据政府调查，NFSC 成员对 Kwok 极为忠诚，NFSC 中的人员亦与属于 Kwok 欺诈企业组成部分的实体有关联。被告控制的社交媒体服务、GNews 及其他欺诈工具上公开发布的视频和直播，记录了 NFSC 对 Mahwah Mansion 的占用。（见，例如，所附附件 A〔受托人针对 Mahwah Mansion 的起诉状〕第 41-42、55-66 段〔通过引文记录该等证据〕。）[1] 换言之，在 Kwok 被捕后，Kwok 的追随者及代理人试图延续 Kwok 的犯罪企业——以 Kwok 及其共同共谋者用欺诈所得购置的同一处豪宅作为行动基地。\n\n在政府就 Mahwah Mansion（马瓦大宅）所作的公开提交文件，以及占据马瓦大宅的被告关联人员所作的公开广播之后——该等广播可能降低该房产的价值——受托人与政府就马瓦大宅的处置进行了协商。与动产或银行账户中的资金不同，政府通常不能在最终没收令作出之前，凭借基于没收的扣押令状扣押不动产；而该命令只能在刑事定罪之后、随后的附带没收程序结束时作出。鉴于被告的关联人员正在使用马瓦大宅（该房产本身系以欺诈所得购得），且其对马瓦大宅的占用可能耗减该房产的价值，2023年7月6日，政府向受托人提供了政府于2023年3月15日搜查期间拍摄的12张照片，显示 Kwok（郭文贵）将马瓦大宅用作个人住所。[2]\n\n2023年7月11日，受托人就 Kwok 的关联人员进入马瓦大宅一事提交了单方临时限制令及初步禁令动议。In re Ho Wan Kwok, et al., Case No. 23-05017, Dkt. 4 (D. Conn. Bankr.) (JAM)。2023年8月1日，Manning 法官部分准许了该命令。见同案，Dkt. 17。2023年7月13日，政府与受托人签署了一项拟议和解协议，该协议将允许受托人在刑事案件审理期间保全马瓦大宅的价值。In re Ho Wan Kwok, et al., Case No. 23-05017 (D. Conn. Bankr.) (JAM), Dkt. 24, Ex. 1；另见同案 Dkt. 53, 56。2023年8月31日，在补充提交书面材料并举行听证后，Manning 法官准许了受托人的动议，并发布经修改的初步禁令，将进入马瓦大宅的权限限制为：(a) Security Services（安保服务，定义见《初步禁令》）；(b) 受托人及其代表和/或专业人士；(c) United States Department of Justice（美国司法部）及其雇员和代表；(d) FBI（联邦调查局）及其雇员和代表；(e) 其他联邦、新泽西州或马瓦市执法机构及其雇员和\n\n1 FBI 在2023年3月15日搜查之后，曾两次对马瓦大宅实施空中监视——即 NFSC 成员及被告的企业开始居住于马瓦大宅并从该处进行广播之后。该空中监视的照片和视频也已向被告提供。\n\n2 Kwok 主张，这违反了《保护令》。（Kwok Br. 3, 21）。Kwok 的主张错误。《保护令》适用于政府根据其证据开示义务向被告“披露”的证据，并限制被告对从政府取得的该等材料的使用。（Dkt. 63 ¶ 1）。其并不限制政府对其证据的使用。（见同案）。\n\n代表；(f) 受托人以书面形式明确授权的任何其他人员（可包括电子邮件）；以及 (g) United States District Court for the Southern District for New York（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）或破产法院明确授权的任何其他人员。In re Ho Wan Kwok, et al., Case. No. 23-05017, Dkt. 58 (D. Conn. Bankr.) (JAM)。\n\n2023年9月1日，受托人对马瓦大宅进行了现场查看，并进行了录像和拍照。在 Kwok 提出本动议、寻求“维持”马瓦大宅的“现状”之后（Kwok Br. 3），2023年9月12日，受托人向政府提供了其于2023年9月1日现场查看时拍摄的六张照片。重要的是，该等照片显示，被告的共谋者一直在篡改该房产内部，显然意图通过改造马瓦大宅以符合辩护叙事，从而妨碍本刑事案件。具体而言，被告的共谋者在房间入口处张贴了标牌，该等标牌似乎暗示 Kwok 的马瓦大宅中的房间实际上是 NFSC 和/或 G|CLUBS [3] 的办公室或房间，如下列照片所示：\n\n截至2023年3月15日政府依据本案签发的搜查令搜查马瓦大宅时，这些事后张贴的标牌并不存在。\n\n鉴于上述情况，本院不应采信 Kwok 的主张，即不利于他的裁决将“允许破产案件中的受托人控制并可能改动对本程序具有至关重要意义的所谓犯罪现场。”（Kwok Br. 4（强调系后加））。事实上，似乎是 Kwok 及其关联人员正在实施 Kwok 声称其意图防止的行为，即对马瓦大宅进行实质性改造，以服务于辩护叙事。\n\n3 Kwok 的动议称，马瓦大宅是为“推进 GTV 的业务”而购置。（Kwok Br. 20（强调系后加））。Kwok 未说明为何标牌却标注为“NFSC”和“G|CLUBS”。\n\n简言之，案卷中没有任何依据允许“辩护团队[4]”不受限制且无人陪同地进入该房产；被告及其关联人员一直将该房产作为试图妨碍司法的工具。该等进入并无必要，特别是鉴于被告已持有关于马瓦大宅的大量资料——包括数千张照片以及视频——（且还将有更多证据提供）。[5] 与 Kwok 的主张相反，有关马瓦大宅状况及使用情况的证据并非“超出 Kwok 先生的可及范围”。（Kwok Br. 20）。相反，该等证据由 Kwok 和 Wang（王雁平）的律师持有，而 Kwok 试图将此处情形类比为阻挠接触重要证人的做法毫无根据。（同上，第22页）。Kwok 的“团队”完全没有必要持续不断地、可能长达数年地进入马瓦大宅。如获准，Kwok 的请求可能无端产生费用，以受害人和债权人的共同利益为代价降低马瓦大宅的价值，并有可能为寻求利用以欺诈所得购得的大宅、代表 NFSC 领导人即被告推进妨碍本刑事起诉方案的 NFSC 成员提供机会。\n\n尽管如此，如 Kwok 或 Wang 的登记在案刑事辩护律师寻求对马瓦大宅进行现场查看——正如经政府同意，他们获准对 Sherry Netherland apartment（谢里内德兰公寓）所做的那样（见 Dkt. 72, 78, 79）——政府不会反对在与查看谢里内德兰公寓类似的条件下进行该等查看。（另见 Trustee Br. 6-7, 27, 29-30（受托人不会反对该等现场查看，“但须遵守围绕 [Kwok] 律师进入马瓦大宅的潜在保障措施”）。）[6]\n\n最后，在本案结束前，本院没有必要“禁止”政府“协助出售”马瓦大宅。（Kwok Br. 29-30）。首先，该表述的含义并不明确。无论如何，Kwok 的请求至少为时过早，因为目前不存在即将进行的出售，且任何该等出售均须遵循 Kwok 正在参与的破产程序中的通常程序。（见 Trustee Br. 7, 26, 30）。\n\n4 Kwok 的书面陈述未界定“辩护团队”的成员为何人，任一被告也均未就该请求向本院提交拟议命令。\n\n5 政府已向受托人送达传票，要求提供其于2023年9月1日现场查看所产生的视频和照片，并将在收到后立即向被告提供该等材料。政府已于今日早些时候向被告提供受托人已提供的、该次现场查看中的六张照片。\n\n6 Kwok 在提交其动议之前，未就该等请求与政府进行协商。\n\n因此，应驳回 Kwok 的请求。\n\n谨此提交，\n\nDAMIAN WILLIAMS\n美国联邦检察官\n\n签字：/s/\n\nMicah F. Fergenson\nRyan B. Finkel\nJuliana N. Murray\n助理美国联邦检察官\n(212) 637-2190 / -6612 / -2314\n\n抄送：所有登记在案的律师（通过 ECF）\n附件 A\n美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院\n布里奇波特分部\n\n--------------------------------------------------------　x\n\n关于：　：\n：\n第11章\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等人，\n1　：\n：\nCase No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。　：\n：\n（合并管理）\n-------------------------------------------------------　x\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，第11章受托人，　：\n对抗程序 [•]\n原告，　：\n：\n2023年7月11日\n诉：　：\n\nTAURUS FUND LLC（Taurus Fund 有限责任公司），　：\nSCOTT BARNETT（斯科特·巴内特），作为 TAURUS　：\nFUND LLC 的受托人，以及　：\nTAURUS MANAGEMENT LLC（Taurus Management 有限责任公司），作为　：\nTAURUS FUND LLC 的受托人，　：\n被告。2\n\nx\n第11章 Ho Wan Kwok 遗产受托人根据《破产法》第541、542及544条提起的诉状，请求：(I) 宣告判决确认债务人为马瓦大宅的衡平法所有人，且该财产属于破产财产；以及 (II) 相关救济\n\nLuc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯）以在 Ho Wan Kwok（“债务人”或“Kwok”）第11章案件（“第11章案件”）中被任命的第11章受托人（“受托人”）身份，对被告 Taurus Fund LLC（“Taurus Fund”）、Scott Barnett（作为 Taurus Fund 的受托人）及 Taurus Management LLC（作为 Taurus Fund 的受托人）（“Taurus Management”，并与 Taurus Fund 及 Scott Barnett 合称“被告”）提起本对抗性诉状（“诉状”），并陈述如下：\n\n1 本第11章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（亦称 Guo Wengui、Miles Guo 和 Miles Kwok，以及其他众多别名）（税务识别号码后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（税务识别号码后四位：8202）以及 Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人及 Genever 债务人的邮寄地址为 Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166，c/o Luc A. Despins，作为 Ho Wan Kwok 遗产的受托人（仅用于通知及通信目的）。\n\n2 被列为被告的 Taurus Fund 受托人将被送达本诉状。\n\n诉讼性质\n\n1. 受托人提起本诉状，旨在追回债务人借助其看似无穷无尽的空壳公司网络向债权人隐匿的又一项价值数百万美元的资产。涉案资产是美国最大的宅邸之一，位于 675 Ramapo Valley Road, Mahwah, New Jersey 07430，为一栋城堡式私人住宅，拥有21间卧室、50,000平方英尺面积及12.5英亩土地（“马瓦大宅”）。该项极具价值的财产由债务人所有，但由空壳公司 Taurus Fund 持有或登记在其名下。基于下文所述理由，马瓦大宅以及位于马瓦大宅内的固定装置和动产应移交给受托人，并纳入第11章破产财产，以使债务人的债权人受益。\n\n2. 马瓦大宅于2021年12月以 \\$26.5 million 购得，此后一直由债务人个人使用。根据其组织章程，该房产的名义所有人 Taurus Fund 是一家由经理管理的 LLC，其管理人是：(i) 债务人的司机和/或保镖 Scott Barnett；以及 (ii) 另一家空壳公司 Taurus Management。\n\n3. 如下文进一步所述，Taurus Fund 根据内华达州法律处于行政违约状态。其特许权已被撤销，经营权被没收。因此，自2023年1月1日起，Taurus Fund 的管理人 Scott Barnett 和 Taurus Management 一直以信托方式持有 Taurus Fund 的所有财产和资产——包括马瓦大宅。\n\n4. 尽管Taurus Fund（Taurus基金）持有Mahwah Mansion（马瓦庄园）的名义产权，但实际上，其仅为名义上的所有人。债务人对马瓦庄园的控制昭然若揭，该房产的实际控制权和所有权仅以极其薄弱的掩饰予以隐藏。在被逮捕和拘留之前，债务人将马瓦庄园作为其住所，置入其个人物品，并通过Taurus Fund为该房产数百万美元的翻修提供资金。与此同时，据称这座价值数千万美元的历史性庄园的“管理”工作委托给债务人的司机和/或保镖Barnett先生。\n\n5. 上述事实及本文所述的其他事实表明，债务人在所有相关期间均为（且仍然是）该房产的衡平所有人。由于马瓦庄园由债务人衡平所有，其属于债务人第11章破产财产。\n\n6. 基于上述事实，受托人依据《破产法》第541、542和544条请求作出裁定：(i) 宣告债务人为马瓦庄园的衡平所有人，且马瓦庄园属于由受托人管理的债务人第11章破产财产；以及(ii) 命令将马瓦庄园及位于马瓦庄园内的附属物和动产交付给受托人。\n\n7. 受托人另行主张：(i) 债务人衡平拥有Taurus Fund本身，或者，作为备选，(ii) Taurus Fund为债务人的另一自我。在任何一种情况下，Taurus Fund或其资产（或其价值）均应纳入债务人第11章破产财产。\n\n管辖权与审判地\n\n8. 本院依据28 U.S.C. § 1334(b)对本对抗程序具有事项管辖权。本对抗程序已依据28 U.S.C. §157(a)移送本院。依据28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409，本院为适当审判地。\n\n当事人\n\n9. 受托人系本院于July 8, 2022作出的命令[Main Case Docket No. 523]指定的第11章案件中的第11章受托人。\n\n10. Taurus Fund是一家在Nevada State（内华达州）设立的有限责任公司，并为马瓦庄园的声称的名义所有人。\n\n11. Scott Barnett（斯科特·巴内特）是Taurus Fund的两名管理人之一，并且据知悉和相信，是Taurus Fund的受托人。Barnett亦为债务人的司机和/或保镖。\n\n12. Taurus Management（Taurus管理公司）是一家在New Mexico State（新墨西哥州）设立的有限责任公司。Taurus Management是Taurus Fund的另一名管理人，并且据知悉和相信，是Taurus Fund的受托人。\n\n事实\n\n一、债务人大量使用空壳公司\n\n13. 如本院充分知悉，债务人利用看似取之不尽的空壳公司，这些公司表面上由家庭成员或商业下属拥有，以使其资产和活动免受债权人追索。债务人的“空壳游戏”使其能够继续否认其资产的所有权并拒绝偿还其债务。\n\n14. 例如，本院在认定债务人藐视法庭、违反本院公司治理命令的裁定中认定，债务人是Ace Decade Limited（Ace Decade有限公司）（并通过该公司成为Dawn State Limited（Dawn State有限公司））的受益所有人，且债务人控制并使用Ace Decade Limited的名义所有人Yvette Wang（王燕）。3\n\n3 准予认定债务人藐视公司治理命令之动议的裁定，第¶¶ 1、4段（Jan. 24, 2023, Docket No. 1372）（“Corp. Governance Contempt Order”）。\n\n15. 同样，在债务人于February 2022提交第11章案件之前紧接进行的、债务人在New York State Court（纽约州法院）对PAX（PAX）提起的申请前诉讼中，Ostrager法官认定，债务人的惯常做法是利用空壳公司保护其资产免受债权人追索。4 Ostrager法官还认定，尽管该游艇的产权名义上由据称归Mei Guo（郭美）所有的HK USA持有，但Lady May（Lady May号）游艇由债务人受益所有并控制。\n\n16. 此前，United States District Court for the Southern District of New York（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）的Liman法官在一项2021年判决中认定，Eastern Profit Corporation Limited（Eastern Profit有限公司）这一最初由债务人的另一名司机拥有、后转让给债务人女儿的实体，“实质上是”债务人的“空壳公司”。5 Eastern Profit Corporation Limited是众多表面独立实体之一，该等实体的财务账户被2018年Hong Kong Court（香港法院）命令认定“受债务人的有效控制”。6\n\n17. 与此相关，受托人在Docket No. 1327项下密封提交、并作为支持本起诉状的证据通过援引并入的保密证人声明（“Confidential Witness Declaration”）尤其证明：\n\n4 Ex. 1, 判决与命令，第1页，PAX v. Kwok, Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 2022) [Docket No. 1181]（“Final Contempt Decision”）。\n\n5 Eastern Profit Corp. Ltd. v. Strategic Vision US LLC, No. 18-CV-2185 (LJL), 2021 WL 2554631, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2021).\n\n6 Ex. 2, Hong Kong Restraint Order，第7-18页。\n\n18. 与本起诉状尤其相关的是，本院已认定New Federal State of China（“NFSC”）（中华新联邦国）以及Gettr、GClubs、GNews、GFashion、GMusic和GEdu等GSeries Entities（“GSeries实体”）7均“由债务人领导”，8“服务于债务人的目的，作为债务人的商业工具，其成员对债务人个人忠诚。”9\n\n19. 最后，且同样与本起诉状尤其相关的是，债务人一直利用这一空壳游戏为其奢侈生活方式和豪华住所提供资金，直至其最近被FBI（美国联邦调查局）逮捕。例如：\n\n— Lamp Capital LLC（Lamp Capital有限责任公司）和Golden Spring (New York) Ltd.（Golden Spring（纽约）有限公司）（据称由债务人之子拥有的空壳公司）已支付债务人的生活费用和律师费；\n\n— Bravo Luck Limited（Bravo Luck有限公司）（另一家据称由债务人之子拥有、且债务人对其享有直接所有权权益的空壳公司）已主张对债务人在Sherry Netherland Hotel（Sherry Netherland酒店）的$70 million豪华公寓享有受益所有权；10\n\n— Hong Kong International Investments (USA) Limited（“HK USA”）（香港国际投资（美国）有限公司）（据称由债务人之女Mei Guo拥有、且最近被本院裁定为债务人的另一自我11的空壳公司）曾持有债务人游艇Lady May的产权——尽管HK USA名义上拥有该游艇，本院仍裁定该游艇属于破产财产；\n\n7 本院还认定：“GSeries中的G代表Guo。”部分准予初步禁令动议之经更正判决备忘录，第¶¶ 2、3段（Adv. Proc. No. 22-05032, Jan. 13, 2023）[Docket No. 133]（“PI Decision”）（“GSeries包括以下实体：Himalaya Exchange、Gettr、GFashion、GMusic、GClubs、GNews和GEdu。”）。\n\n8 PI Decision，第¶ 7段（“债务人是The Whistleblower Movement、NFSC、ROLF和Himalaya的领导人。”）。\n\n9 同上。（“The Whistleblower Movement、NFSC、ROLF、GSeries和Himalaya服务于债务人的目的，作为债务人的商业工具，其成员对债务人个人忠诚。”）。\n\n10 受托人已对Bravo Luck Limited就Sherry Netherland公寓所主张的权益提出异议。参见经修正的针对Bravo Luck和Qiang Guo（郭强）的对抗起诉状，请求：(I) 宣告为Bravo Luck利益订立的声称信托协议无效；以及，(II) 作为备选，裁定债务人依据由《破产法》第544条适用的New York Debtor and Creditor Law（纽约州债务人与债权人法）第276条，为Bravo Luck和Qiang Guo之利益实施欺诈性转让（Adv. Proc. No. 22-05027, Feb. 28, 2023）[Docket No. 40]。\n\n— Greenwich Land LLC（Greenwich Land有限责任公司）（据称由债务人妻子拥有的空壳公司）持有债务人Connecticut（康涅狄格州）住所的名义产权；12\n\n— Anton Development Limited（Anton Development有限公司）（最初由债务人一名司机拥有、后转让给债务人女儿的空壳公司）曾持有一架Bombardier Global XRS（庞巴迪Global XRS）私人飞机的产权；以及\n\n— HCHK Technologies, Inc.（HCHK科技公司）（另一家据称由债务人员工拥有的空壳公司）已支付与Lady May及债务人的Bombardier飞机管理有关的费用，并已支付近$2.8 million为债务人购置一架新的私人飞机。13\n\n20. 总而言之，尽管本起诉状聚焦于马瓦庄园和Taurus Fund，受托人认为，有关债务人广泛利用空壳公司保护资产免受债权人追索之策略的背景资料，将有助于本院理解受托人的立场。受托人还明确保留在适当时候对其他实体提起主张权利之诉的全部权利。\n\n11 参见准予就第二项反诉部分简易判决动议之判决备忘录和命令，第36页（Adv. Proc. No. 22-05003, May 18, 2023）[Docket No. 221]。\n\n12 受托人已在对抗程序23-05005中针对该实体请求作出另一自我判决；在该程序中，本院已对Greenwich Land LLC和债务人妻子作出判决前救济及临时限制令。参见部分准予单方临时限制令及初步禁令动议的命令（Adv. Proc. No. 23-05005, Mar. 28, 2023, Docket No. 14）（“Greenwich TR & PI Order”）；准予第11章受托人经修正的单方判决前救济申请的命令（Adv. Proc. No. 23-05005, Mar. 28, 2023）[Docket No. 15]（“Greenwich PR Order”）。\n\n13 受托人已在对抗程序23-05013中针对HCHK Technologies, Inc.、HCHK Property Management, Inc.（HCHK物业管理公司）及Lexington Property and Staffing, In.（Lexington物业与人事公司）请求作出另一自我判决；在该程序中，本院已对该实体作出临时限制令及初步禁令。参见部分准予紧急单方临时限制令及初步禁令动议的命令（Adv. Proc. No. 23-05013, June 12, 2023, Docket No. 18）（“HCHK TR & PI Order”）。另参见Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）破产财产第11章受托人依据《破产法》第105、362、363、541、542、544和549条提起的起诉状，请求(i) 宣告HCHK Technologies, Inc.、HCHK Property Management, Inc.及Lexington Property And Staffing, Inc.为：(A) 债务人的另一自我；或(B) 作为备选，命令债务人衡平拥有该等实体和/或其财产；以及(II) 禁令救济（Adv. Proc. No. 23-05013, June 8, 2023）[Docket No. 1]。\n\n二、债务人空壳公司Taurus Fund的名义所有权\n\n21. 于December 16, 2021（“Purchase Date”），Taurus Fund以约$26.5 million从Crocker Mansion Estate LLC（Crocker Mansion Estate有限责任公司）购买马瓦庄园。14 地契于同日在New Jersey（新泽西州）Bergen County（卑尔根县）登记。15\n\n22. Taurus Fund于December 16, 2021在Nevada设立，与Purchase Date为同日。16\n\n23. 除马瓦庄园外，Taurus Fund还持有一架由F.A. Porsche（F.A.保时捷）设计的Bösendorfer（贝森朵夫）三角钢琴（“Porsche Piano”）的产权，据认为其价值超过$250,000。Porsche Piano此前位于债务人位于3 Columbus Circle（哥伦布圆环3号）的GSeries办公室。据知悉和相信，债务人的员工或代理人已将该钢琴移走并带至未知地点。17 截至本起诉状提交之时，尽管受托人的调查仍在进行中，除马瓦庄园及Porsche Piano外，受托人并不知悉Taurus Fund持有任何其他资产。18\n\n24. 尽管其成员仍然不明，Taurus Fund由(i) 债务人的司机和/或保镖Scott Barnett及(ii) Taurus Management管理。19\n\n25. Scott Barnett是债务人的司机和/或保镖，并且截至本起诉状之日，Barnett仍受债务人雇用并积极为债务人工作。事实上，\n\n14 参见Ex. 3, 马瓦庄园地契。\n\n15 同上。\n\n16 参见Ex. 4, Taurus Fund LLC组织章程。\n\n17 受托人获债务人控制的 GSeries（G系列）实体之一 GNews（G新闻）的律师告知，Porsche Piano（保时捷钢琴）应被放回债务人位于 3 Columbus Circle（哥伦布圆环3号）的 GSeries 办公室，但受托人并不知悉此事是否已经完成。\n\n18 在 Taurus Fund（陶鲁斯基金）拥有任何其他资产的范围内，该等资产亦应纳入债务人的第 11 章破产财产。\n\n19 见证据4，Taurus Fund LLC 的组织章程。\n\n2023年6月20日，债务人的律师 Aaron A. Romney（亚伦·A.·罗姆尼）在发给受托人的电子邮件中通知受托人：“曾在 Sherry [Netherland]（谢里[尼德兰]）为 Kwok（郭文贵）先生从事安保工作的 Scott Barnett（斯科特·巴尼特）将从 Sherry Netherland 取走装有债务人及其家属衣物和个人物品的[若干]箱子。”20 Barnett 还被列为 AIG（美国国际集团）向 Golden Spring (New York) Ltd.（金泉（纽约）有限公司）签发的一份保险单项下的承保驾驶员，21 后者是债务人众多空壳公司之一。22 Barnett 还曾由至少另外两家空壳公司支付报酬，即 Greenwich Land, LLC（格林威治土地有限责任公司）23（据称由债务人的妻子所有，并持有债务人在 Connecticut（康涅狄格州）Greenwich（格林威治）住所的产权）24，以及 Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc.（列克星敦地产与人事服务公司，“Lexington Property”）25（Lexington Property 的 99.999% 由 Holy City Hong Kong Ventures, Ltd.（圣城香港投资有限公司）所有，而该实体本身由债务人的助理 Yvette Wang（王雁）100% 所有）。26\n\n26. Taurus Fund 的另一名列名经理 Taurus Management（陶鲁斯管理公司）于 2021年12月15日，即购买日的前一天，在 State of New Mexico（新墨西哥州）作为有限责任公司成立。27\n\n20 见证据5，Aaron A. Romney 致受托人 Stephen Kindseth（斯蒂芬·金德塞斯）和 Eric Henzy（埃里克·亨齐）的电子邮件（2023年6月20日下午1:01）。\n\n21 见证据6，AIG Property Casualty Company（AIG财产保险公司）与 Golden Spring (New York) Ltd. 之间的纽约机动车保险声明页，保险期间为 Apr. 1, 2022 至 Apr. 1, 2023）。\n\n22 如上所述，债务人此前曾利用其司机和/或保镖持有其空壳公司。\n\n23 见证据7，Greenwich Land, LLC 于 February 2, 2021 向 Scott Barnett 开具的支票，金额为 \\$619.99。\n\n24 受托人已在对抗程序 23-05005 中就该实体申请揭开公司面纱判决；就该程序，法院已针对 Greenwich Land LLC 及债务人的妻子作出判决前救济和临时限制令。见 Greenwich TR &PI Order；Greenwich PR Order。\n\n25 见证据8，Lexington Property 按供应商汇总的费用，January – December 2021，Scott Barnett 由 Lexington Property 支付 \\$115.08。\n\n26 受托人已在对抗程序 23-05013 中就 Lexington Property、HCHK Technologies, Inc.（HCHK科技公司）及 HCHK Property Management, Inc.（HCHK物业管理公司）申请揭开公司面纱判决；就该程序，法院已作出临时限制令和初步禁令。见 HCHK TR & PI Order。\n\n27 见证据9，Taurus Management LLC 的组织章程。\n\n27. Taurus Management 的公开可获得的设立文件表明，Taurus Management 是一家由经理管理的有限责任公司。然而，该等文件未指明经理或成员。28\n\n28. 尽管 Taurus Management 是 New Mexico（新墨西哥州）实体，但其与 Taurus Fund 在 Nevada（内华达州）使用相同地址，即 6628 Sky Pointe Drive, Suite 129-1071, Las Vegas, NV 89131。29\n\n29. Taurus Fund 未履行 Nevada 法律规定的义务，即向州务卿提交年度清单，其中应包含其所有经理的姓名、职务和地址等信息，以及经理或获授权代表的签名。因此，其在 Nevada 州务卿维护的网站上被标记为“in default”。30\n\n30. Taurus Fund 还未遵守 New Jersey（新泽西州）法律。根据 New Jersey 法律，Taurus Fund 在 New Jersey 拥有财产，要求其向 New Jersey 州务卿登记为外国商业实体。然而，对公开记录的审查显示，尚未作出此类申报。\n\nIII. Scott Barnett 和 Taurus Management 成为 Taurus Fund 的受托人\n\n31. 根据 Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 86.263(2)，Taurus Fund 的年度信息清单应于 December 31, 2022 到期。由于其未及时提交该清单，根据 Nevada 法律，Taurus Fund 视为违约。\n\n28 同上。\n\n29 同上。\n\n30 见证据10，Taurus Fund LLC，Secretary of State of Nevada，Entity Search，http nv.gov/EntitySearch/BusinessInformation。\n\n32. 2023年1月1日，根据 Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 86.274(2)，Taurus Fund 的公司特许状被 Nevada 州务卿撤销，其经营业务的权利被没收。\n\n33. 在 Taurus Fund 的特许状被撤销及其经营业务的权利被没收后，根据 Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 86.274(5)，Taurus Fund 的所有财产和资产，包括 Mahwah Mansion（马瓦庄园），必须由其经理——即 Scott Barnett 和 Taurus Management——以信托方式持有；并且可就其财产和资产进行与根据 Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 86.505 和 86.521 解散有限责任公司所适用的相同程序。\n\n34. 据悉并相信，截至本起诉状之日，Taurus Fund 尚未申请恢复其特许状，且仍处于违约状态。\n\n35. 据悉并相信，截至本起诉状之日，Scott Barnett 和 Taurus Management 仍为 Taurus Fund 的受托人，并根据 Nevada 法律以信托方式持有 Mahwah Mansion 及 Taurus Fund 的所有其他资产。\n\nIV. 债务人衡平法上拥有 Mahwah Mansion\n\n36. 尽管 Taurus Fund 名义上持有 Mahwah Mansion 的产权，债务人在其于 March 15, 2023 被捕前对该财产享有完全的受益所有权和控制权。截至本起诉状之日，债务人已被拒绝保释，且仍被联邦羁押。\n\n37. 针对债务人的刑事起诉书载有多项证券欺诈、电信欺诈和洗钱指控（“刑事起诉书”），该起诉书披露了债务人在 Mahwah Mansion 的住所及其对该处的衡平所有权。31 刑事起诉书将 Mahwah Mansion 确认为债务人在 United States（美国）的豪华住所之一，另包括其位于 Sherry-Netherland 的公寓和位于 Connecticut 的住所。\n\n38. 事实上，以债务人姓名进行的“公开记录”检索将 Mahwah Mansion 列为债务人的个人地址。32\n\nA. 债务人作出购买 Mahwah Mansion 的决定\n\n39. 城堡风格的 Mahwah Mansion 建于 1907 年，位于距 New York City（纽约市）25英里以内，被描述为世界上最宏伟、最罕见的庄园之一。该庄园拥有21间卧室、超过19间浴室、一间大厅、图书馆、茶室、正式餐厅、餐厅式厨房、电影院、台球室、带水疗设施的室内健身泳池、按摩室、酒室、游戏室、健身房、带凉亭的室外泳池、拥有两座喷泉的壮丽花园、网球场、可容纳8辆车的车库，以及遍布城堡各处的珍稀木材、石工和工艺。33 此外，Mahwah Mansion 拥有自己的 Wikipedia（维基百科）页面，并于 1997 年被列入 National Register of Historic Places（国家史迹名录）。34\n\n40. Mahwah Mansion 的恢宏与奢华，与债务人对豪华住宅的偏好相一致，正如价值 \\$70 million 的 Sherry Netherland 公寓和债务人在 Connecticut 价值数百万美元的住所。\n\n31 见 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）和 Kin Ming Je（闫明）的刑事起诉书，United States v. Kwok et al.，23 Cr. 118，filed Mar. 6, 2023 [ECF No. 2]。刑事起诉书副本作为附件11附于本文件。\n\n32 见证据25，Lexis Public Record Comprehensive Person Report（将 Mahwah Mansion 列为债务人的地址）。\n\n33 见 675 Ramapo Valley Road, Mahwah, New Jersey 07430, United States，CHRISTIE'S INTERNATIONAL REAL ESTATE GROUP，http（最后访问于 July 6, 2023）（描述 Mahwah Mansion 的恢宏及奢华设施）。\n\n34 见 Crocker-McMillin Mansion（克罗克-麦克米林庄园），WIKIPEDIA，http（最后访问于 July 6, 2023）。\n\n41. 2023年4月12日，NFSC（新联邦国家中国）在 Gettr 发布了一段视频；如本法院所认定，NFSC 受债务人控制并为债务人的目的服务。35 该视频以 Pamela Tsai（蔡霞），又名 Nicole（“Tsai”）36 和 Qidong Xia（夏启东），又名 Changdao Brother 或 David Xia（大卫·夏）（“Xia”）主持的 Mahwah Mansion 参观活动为内容（“第一次视频参观”）。37 Xia 目前为 NFSC 的秘书长及 Rule of Law Society（法治协会）主席，并且是债务人仍与之保持联系的人。38 例如，2023年4月17日，在 Tsai、Roy Guo（郭宝胜）39 和 Xia 进行的 Gettr 直播期间，债务人在联邦羁押期间据称向 Xia 拨打了长达十五分钟的电话。40 根据该通电话，债务人敦促其追随者效仿 Xia。41\n\n42. 在第一次视频参观期间，Xia 和 Tsai 表示，债务人大约在 2020 年和 2021 年有购买房产的想法；债务人在 2021 年参观了多处房产；债务人亲自选定了 Mahwah Mansion；债务人在 2021 年底决定购买 Mahwah Mansion；且债务人指示，凡与 Mahwah Mansion 有关的一切事项均应秘密进行。42\n\n43. 总而言之，债务人于 December 16, 2021 决定购买 Mahwah Mansion（马瓦庄园），即在债务人于 February 15, 2022 自愿提交第11章申请前两个月。他还决定隐瞒其对马瓦庄园的购买及衡平所有权（不出所料，该房产未列入债务人的财产和负债清单）；若非美国政府于 March 15, 2023 提起刑事起诉书，该事项本将继续被隐瞒。43\n\n40 参见 NFSCTV (@chinatruth2022), Nicole Looks at Brother Seven, GETTR (Apr. 17, 2023), http (last visited July 6, 2023) at 45:48-46:05（该视频包含债务人与其商业伙伴的所谓电话通话，债务人在通话中要求其追随者“遵从长岛哥的安排”）（长岛哥为 Xia（夏）的昵称）。本脚注所引用视频的译本已收录于视频闪存盘，并作为本文件的证据附件13并入。\n\n41 同上。\n\n42 参见证据附件12，首次视频参观，http (last visited July 6, 2023)［显示 Xia（夏）和 Tsai（蔡）参观马瓦庄园的视频］，例如，at 2:10-2:20, 3:40-3:50, 6:25-6:30, 10:00-10:25, 14:20-14:25, 26:30-26:45, 28:55-29:40, 31:30-31:50, 32:41-33:48。\n\n43 受托人与司法部正就一项协议进行协商，以解决其对马瓦庄园最终出售所得款项可能存在的竞争性请求权（即，所得款项是否应通过第11章程序分配给受害人/债权人，或应依照与针对债务人的刑事指控有关的没收程序进行分配）。受托人预计将在近期向本院提交该协议。\n\nB. 债务人为购买及翻修马瓦庄园提供资金\n\n44. 尽管 Taurus Fund（Taurus Fund基金）名义上拥有马瓦庄园的所有权，债务人使用其控制下的资金，指示并亲自参与了该庄园的购买及翻修。具体而言，根据刑事起诉书，债务人“使用通过欺诈取得的受害人资金，为[马瓦庄园]的$26.5 million购买提供购买款、资金或融资，以供[债务人]及其家人使用。”44\n\n45. 刑事起诉书还说明，用于购买马瓦庄园的资金经由其他空壳公司转移。具体而言，于 November 2022 前后，即债务人自愿提交第11章申请前不久，债务人通过其共同被告及被指控的共谋者 William Je（Je），45 指示将资金从 G Club Operations, LLC（G-Club）经由以其他实体名义开立的银行账户，转移用于购买马瓦庄园46，以供债务人、其妻子 Hing Chi Ngok（Hing Chi Ngok）、其女儿 Mei Guo（Mei Guo）及其儿子 Qiang Guo（Qiang Guo）使用并使其受益。47\n\n46. 根据受托人的调查，被 Mei Guo 称为“William叔叔”、目前正逃避执法机关追捕的 Je，是债务人信赖的家庭朋友及\n\n44 参见证据附件11，刑事起诉书第4段；另参见证据附件14，驳回 Kwok（郭文贵）审前释放动议的命令，第3页，United States v. Kwok, 23 Cr. 118-1 (AT) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2023) [Docket No. No. 51]（指出，“通过该会员组织筹集的大部分资金，被用于支付[债务人]及其家人的个人开支，并购买高价商品和不动产，例如[债务人]位于 New Jersey（新泽西州）的庄园。”）。\n\n45 政府认为 William Je 仍然在逃，据信位于 UAE。参见美国关于反对被告 Yanping Wang（Yanping Wang）审前释放动议的法律备忘录（“USAO备忘录”），第4页，作为证据附件B附于第11章受托人对 G Club Operations LLC 就受托人强制履行动议及相关救济请求提出的补充异议的答复（“G-Club答复”）(June 23, 2023) [Main Case Docket No. 1934]。\n\n46 证据附件11，刑事起诉书第15b段。\n\n47 参见证据附件15，起诉状第104(b)段，S.E.C. v. Kwok, 23 Civ. 2200 (PGG) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2023) [Docket No.1]（“SEC起诉状”）。\n\n债务人的财务顾问。Je 一直密切参与债务人的房地产购买事宜，此前曾参与考虑债务人购买多处潜在房产。Je 还根据债务人的指示，安排转移$37 million并存入托管账户，作为一项所谓的“贷款”，以支付 Lady May 的费用。正如本院已经认定，Lady May 以及该$37 million托管资金，分别已构成并仍构成债务人第11章破产财产的财产［Adv. P. No. 22-05003, ECF No. 221］。\n\n47. 债务人不仅为购买马瓦庄园提供资金，还为该房产的重大改造提供资金。在 December 2021 至 March 2022 期间，他安排将额外的$13 million转入一个托管账户，以支付马瓦庄园的奢华陈设及翻修费用。这些大额支出包括分别为其儿子和女儿设置的侧翼房区，以及各类家具和装饰物品，例如价值约$978,000的中国和波斯地毯、一台$62,000的电视、一件$53,000的壁炉柴架托座、一个$59,000的手表收纳盒和一张$35,000的床垫。48\n\n48. 在首次视频参观中，Tsai 在参观马瓦庄园餐厅时，评论了多件精致的中国书法和绘画作品，这些作品均“由 Kwok 先生亲自挑选”。49 Xia 特别强调，马瓦庄园内有许多重要古董，据称这些古董“由[债务人]的\n\n48 参见证据附件15，SEC起诉状第104(c)段。另参见证据附件11，刑事起诉书第15(c)段。\n\n49 参见证据附件12，首次视频参观，at 26:00-26:20。\n\n家族基金”50“捐赠”，这些古董“远比房屋本身更值钱”，51 且只有债务人知道并能够讲述每件古董背后的故事。52 根据所获信息及信念，债务人家族基金的任何资金均为债务人的资金。\n\n49. 在 Xia 和 Tsai 于 April 15, 2023 进行的另一段马瓦庄园视频参观中，上述说法亦被重复（“第二次视频参观”，其与首次视频参观合称“视频参观”）。53\n\nC. 债务人居住于马瓦庄园\n\n50. 连同其位于 Sherry-Netherland Hotel（雪莉-荷兰酒店）的公寓及其位于 Greenwich, Connecticut（康涅狄格州格林尼治）的住所，马瓦庄园是债务人在美国拥有的至少三处豪华住所之一。54\n\n51. 在搜查马瓦庄园期间，Federal Bureau of Investigation（FBI，联邦调查局）发现了多件债务人的个人物品，包括：(i) 以其名义开具的处方药物，55 (ii) 均签发给债务人的国际驾驶许可证和 New York（纽约州）学习驾照，56 (iii) 家庭照片，57 (iv) 寄送给债务人的 Ferrari（法拉利）汽车真品证书，58 以及 (iv) 在看似债务人个人更衣室的房间内，“约30套 Brioni（布里奥尼）定制西装，每套西装的夹克内侧均手工缝有‘Brioni for Miles Kwok’字样”，59\n\n52. 除个人物品及豪华家具和商品外，FBI还在庄园内发现了一个保险箱，该保险箱位于一个与看似债务人个人更衣室相连的壁橱内，内有“约$394,000、€5000、HK$188,050和[RMB] 250现金，以及约156枚金币（连同一张收据，该收据显示该等金币价值约$109,555）。”60\n\n53. FBI还从马瓦庄园取得了债务人境外旅行证件的证据，包括债务人已过期的 United Arab Emirates（阿拉伯联合酋长国）护照副本，以及债务人使用的62 10台电脑或笔记本电脑、16个外部媒体存储设备（USB和硬盘）、九部手机和一部手机加扰器。61\n\n54. 在债务人于 March 15, 2023 被捕前，债务人曾频繁在包括 Gettr（Gettr平台）在内的社交媒体平台上，从马瓦庄园进行直播。于 January 11, 2023 至 February 19, 2023 期间，债务人使用其在 Gettr 上的个人账户 @milesguo，至少进行了11次直播\n\n50 同上，at 33:08-33:25。\n\n51 同上，at 33:25-33:29, 33:48-33:56。\n\n52 同上，at 33:29-33:33。\n\n53 参见 NFSCTV (@chinatruth2022), Nicole Looks at Brother Seven, GETTR (Apr. 15, 2023), http (last visited July 6, 2023)，例如，at 21:55-22:20, 33:05-33:30, 35:20- 35:35, 40:00-40:23。本脚注所引用视频的译本已收录于视频闪存盘，并作为本文件的证据附件16并入。\n\n54 参见证据附件17，美国关于反对 Wang（王雁平）保释动议的答复，第3页，United States v. Yanping Wang, 23 Mag. 2007 (UA) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2023 [Docket No. 10]。\n\n55 执法机关拍摄的该药物照片（已遮盖个人可识别信息）作为本文件的证据附件18附后。\n\n56 执法机关拍摄的该驾驶执照照片（已遮盖个人可识别信息）作为本文件的证据附件19附后。\n\n57 执法机关拍摄的这些家庭照片作为本文件的证据附件20附后。\n\n，地点为马瓦庄园，日期为 January 11,63 15,64 22,65 23,66 和29,67 以及 February 1,68 8,69 12,70 15,71 16,72 和19。73\n\nD. 债务人向其关联人士提供马瓦庄园\n\n55. 根据所获信息及信念，于 April 2023，在债务人被捕以及刑事起诉书披露马瓦庄园后，为继续向其债权人隐匿有价值的资产，债务人指示其关联人士声称马瓦庄园为 NFSC（新中国联邦）的新基地。\n\n56. 于 April 9, 2023，NFSC在马瓦庄园举办了一场活动，据称有500名追随者进入庄园，并在包括 Gettr 在内的各种互联网平台上直播其演讲。74\n\n63 参见 GNews (@milesguo), GETTR (Jan. 11, 2023), http\n\n64 参见 GNews (@milesguo), GETTR (Jan. 15, 2023), http\n\n65 参见 GNews (@milesguo), GETTR (Jan. 22, 2023), http\n\n66 参见 GNews (@milesguo), GETTR (Jan. 23, 2023), http\n\n67 参见 GNews (@milesguo), GETTR (Jan. 29, 2023), http\n\n68 参见 GNews (@milesguo), GETTR (Feb. 1, 2023), http\n\n69 参见 GNews (@milesguo), GETTR (Feb. 8, 2023), http\n\n70 参见 GNews (@milesguo), GETTR (Feb. 12, 2023), http\n\n71 参见 GNews (@milesguo), GETTR (Feb. 15, 2023),http\n\n72 参见 GNews (@milesguo), GETTR (Feb. 16, 2023), http\n\n73 参见 GNews (@milesguo), GETTR (Feb. 19, 2023), http\n\n74 参见 NFSCTV (@chinatruth2022), GETTR (Apr. 9, 2023), http (last visited July 6, 2023)（时长约3.5小时的完整直播视频，显示追随者排队进入马瓦庄园并在庄园内发表演讲）。\n\n57. 如本院先前认定，NFSC和 Gettr“服务于债务人的目的，作为债务人的商业载体，其成员则在个人上忠于债务人。”75\n\n58. NFSC官方网站亦发布了视频，显示追随者\n\n进入马瓦庄园并发表演讲。76 特别是，该等视频包含字幕，转录了 NFSC追随者在看到该庄园后的陈述，其中包括\n\n“[债务人]已为 NFSC成员准备了一个基地”，77 以及“[债务人]所拥有的一切”\n\n为同袍战士［在马瓦庄园（Mahwah Mansion）］准备的是最好的，”78 并且他们希望\n\n“在［债务人］曾经直播居住的房间里留下他们的印记。”79\n\n59. 自 2023 年 4 月 9 日起，Xia（夏）及其他 NFSC 成员已开始在马瓦庄园的一间办公室开展其\n\n事务。80\n\n77 同上。\n\n75 初步禁令裁定（PI Decision）¶ 7（“告密者运动（The Whistleblower Movement）、NFSC、ROLF、GSeries 和 Himalaya 服务于债务人的目的，充当债务人的商业工具，其成员对债务人个人忠诚。”）。\n\n76 参见 NFSC Fellow Fighter Feels that the Air at the NFSC Base is Sweet, NEW FEDERAL STATE OF CHINA（2023 年 4 月 12 日），http（最后访问于 2023 年 7 月 6 日）（包括追随者于 2023 年 4 月 9 日进入马瓦庄园的直播视频）。\n\n78 参见 Everything Mr. Miles Guo has Prepared for the Fellow Fighters in the NFSC Base is the Best, NEW FEDERAL STATE OF CHINA（2023 年 4 月 19 日），http（最后访问于 2023 年 7 月 6 日）（视频显示追随者在马瓦庄园内发表讲话，视频标题为“Everything Mr. Miles Guo Has Prepared For the Follow Fighters In the NFSC Base Is The Best”）。\n\n79 参见 Fellow Fighters are Excited to Leave their Footprints on the Base of the NFSC, NEW FEDERAL STATE OF CHINA（2023 年 4 月 16 日），http（最后访问于 2023 年 7 月 6 日）（视频显示追随者在马瓦庄园内发表讲话，说明文字称追随者“认为该庄园非常豪华。”）。\n\n80 参见证据 16，Second Video Tour，第 2:05-2:30 分钟（显示 Xia 坐在马瓦庄园办公室内）。\n\n60. 2023 年 4 月 12 日，在 First Video Tour 中，81 Xia 指出，债务人还将马瓦庄园指定为 G-Club 成员的高级休息室，以及供各 Himalaya 组织和 Farms 举行会议的场所。82\n\n61. 如本院所知，G-Club 和 Himalaya 是与 NFSC 一样的实体，“服务于债务人的目的，充当债务人的商业工具，其成员对债务人个人忠诚。”83\n\n62. 如上所述，2023 年 4 月 17 日，在债务人的关联人 Tsai（蔡）、Roy Guo（郭）和 Xia（现任 NFSC 秘书长兼法治协会〔Rule of Law Society〕主席）于 Gettr 进行的一场直播中，据称债务人在被联邦羁押期间向 Xia 拨打了 15 分钟电话。84 根据该通电话，债务人敦促其追随者以 Xia 为榜样。85\n\n63. 根据所知信息及确信，债务人指示 Xia 居住于马瓦庄园，意图维持对该庄园的控制，同时继续向其债权人隐匿有价值的资产。\n\n81 参见证据 12，First Video Tour，第 6:35-7:00 分钟。\n\n82 受托人未获悉任何证据表明这并非空头承诺；该等承诺与债务人作为针对其所指控欺诈的一部分而作出的其他 GClub 承诺一致。\n\n83 初步禁令裁定（PI Decision）¶ 7（“告密者运动（The Whistleblower Movement）、NFSC、ROLF、GSeries 和 Himalaya 服务于债务人的目的，充当债务人的商业工具，其成员对债务人个人忠诚。”）。\n\n84 参见证据 13，NFSCTV (@chinatruth2022), Nicole Looks at Brother Seven, GETTR（2023 年 4 月 17 日），http（最后访问于 2023 年 7 月 6 日），第 45:48-46:05 分钟（视频包含债务人与其商业关联人的据称电话通话，其中债务人称“follow the arrangement of Changdao Brother”）（Changdao Brother 是 Xia 的昵称）。\n\n85 同上。\n\n64. 2023 年 5 月 5 日，Xia 带领一小群债务人的关联人在马瓦庄园会见\n\n美国众议员 George Santos（乔治·桑托斯）86，该会面在 Gettr 上直播。87\n\n65. 2023 年 5 月 19 日，就 SEC v. Mountains of Spices et al. 一案，\n\nMountains of Spices（“MOS”）的律师 William J. Quinlan（威廉·J·昆兰）提交了一封信，其中确认，除其他事项外，Xia 居住于马瓦庄园，是因为他及其他人已被政府从 NFSC 原先的办公室中迁出。88\n\n66. 2023 年 6 月 4 日，NFSC 在马瓦庄园举行聚会，逾 100 名宾客出席，以庆祝其三周年纪念，十余名不同 Himalaya Farms 的负责人出席。89 该活动在 Gettr 上直播。如本院已认定，Himalaya Farms 是关联的 Himalaya 实体，受债务人控制。90 一名农场负责人评论道\n\n86 十一天后，即 2023 年 5 月 16 日，众议员 Santos 在众议院议场发言，将债务人称为“无害的政治目标”，并呼吁（包括）DOJ “释放 Miles Guo”。参见 http（最后访问于 2023 年 7 月 6 日）。\n\n87 例如，参见 NFSCTV (@chinatruth2022), GETTR（2023 年 5 月 5 日），http（最后访问于 2023 年 7 月 6 日）（显示 George Santos 对马瓦庄园访问的直播）；另参见 NFSCTV (@chinatruth2022), GETTR（2023 年 5 月 5 日），http（最后访问于 2023 年 7 月 6 日）（该视频的封面照片显示 Xia 和 Santos 位于马瓦庄园大厅内）；Congressman George Santos, visited the homebase of the New Federal State of China, GNEWS（2023 年 5 月 5 日 15:02:28），http（Gnews 发布的讨论 Santos 访问马瓦庄园的文章）。。\n\n88 参见证据 24。MOS 就 DOJ 反对解除对 MOS 的中止令所作回复函，第 2 页，S.E.C. v. Mountains of Spices, No. 1:23-cv-02200-PGG (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2023) [Docket No. 49]（“‘MOS 的领导人’是否在新泽西州一处住所直播视频并不相关；而且，无论如何，他仅因据所知信息及确信，政府指定了一名接管人，将该运动从其原先办公室中迁出，才居住于该处。”）。\n\n89 参见 NFSCTV (@chinatruth2022), GETTR（2023 年 6 月 4 日），http（最后访问于 2023 年 7 月 6 日）（马瓦庄园 NFSC 活动的完整直播）。\n\n90 初步禁令裁定（PI Decision）¶¶ 4, 7（“NFSC 与 Himalaya Global Alliance 〔连同关联的 Himalaya 实体，例如 Himalaya Exchange 和 Himalaya Farms，合称‘Himalaya’〕相关联、附属和/或具有联系”）（“债务人是告密者运动、NFSC、ROLF 和 Himalaya 的领导人。告密者运动、NFSC、ROLF 和 Himalaya 服务于债务人的目的，充当债务人的商业工具，其成员对债务人个人忠诚”）。\n\n马瓦庄园的奢华程度，称“［债务人］为我们安排的一切纯粹令人感动。”91\n\n67. 大量证据表明，尽管名义上由 Taurus Fund（托罗斯基金）所有，即使在被捕后，债务人仍继续为其自身利益使用马瓦庄园，包括将其提供给 NFSC、G-Club 和 Himalaya 使用；本院已经认定，债务人将这些实体用于其自身目的。\n\n第一项请求\n（确认债务人为马瓦庄园的衡平法所有人，并命令向受托人移交马瓦庄园以及马瓦庄园内的固定装置和个人财产的确认判决）\n\n68. 受托人重述并再次主张第 1 至 67 段所载指控。\n\n69. 新泽西州法律适用于衡平法所有权请求，因为马瓦\n\n庄园位于新泽西州。92\n\n70. 法院曾基于以下一项或多项理由认定债务人对财产享有衡平法权益：(1) 债务人的资金被用于取得该财产；(2) 债务人表示其对该财产享有权益，或使用该财产取得信贷；或 (3) 所涉财产曾由债务人所有，后被转让给第三方（通常是在面对债权人施压时）。93 适用新泽西州衡平法\n\n所有权法的法院还曾根据债务人欺诈行为的模式和做法认定债务人为财产的衡平法所有人；在该案中，债务人出资购买财产，\n\n将财产所有权置于第三方名下，同时维持事实上的控制权和所有权。94\n\n71. 如上详述，马瓦庄园由债务人衡平法所有。除其他事项外，债务人为购买及翻修马瓦庄园提供资金，居住于该处，并将其置于由其司机和/或保镖管理的空壳公司名下。公开记录还显示，债务人的地址位于马瓦庄园。即使在其被捕和监禁后，债务人仍通过将该财产作为 NFSC 的运营基地而持续从中受益；如本院已经认定，NFSC 受债务人控制。此外，由空壳公司购买并持有债务人豪华住所的所有权，与债务人的一贯模式和做法相符，包括但不限于其位于 Sherry-Netherland 的公寓及其位于康涅狄格州 Greenwich 的住所。\n\n72. 在 Taurus Fund 持有马瓦庄园所有权的范围内，其仅为名义持有，债务人始终作为该庄园真正的受益所有人。\n\n73. 因为马瓦庄园由债务人衡平法所有，其属于债务人第 11 章破产财产。95 基于该等事实和情形，受托人根据《破产法典》第 541、542 和 544 条请求裁定：(i) 宣告马瓦庄园构成债务人第 11 章破产财产，应由\n\n94 In re NJ Affordable Homes Corp., No. 05-60442 (DHS), 2006 WL 2128624, \\*8 (Bankr. D.N.J. June 29, 2006)（认定仅因财产所有权登记于第三方名下这一事实，并不意味着债务人对该财产不享有衡平法权益；无论该权益多么具有推测性，均足以使其成为破产财产）。\n\n95 如 Porsche Piano（保时捷钢琴）目前不在马瓦庄园内，受托人请求无论其位于何处，均予以移交。\n\n受托人管理；以及 (ii) 命令 Taurus Fund（和/或作为 Taurus Fund 受托人的 Scott Barnett（斯科特·巴内特）及 Taurus Management（托罗斯管理公司））向受托人交付马瓦庄园以及马瓦庄园内的固定装置和个人财产。\n\n第二项请求\n（确认债务人为 Taurus Fund 的衡平法所有人，并命令向受托人移交 Taurus Fund 及其资产的确认判决）\n\n74. 受托人重述并再次主张第 1 至 67 段所载指控。\n\n75. 内华达州法律适用于衡平法所有权请求，因为 Taurus Fund 是\n\n一家内华达州实体。96\n\n76. 法院在对债务人与 Taurus Fund 的\n\n关系适用内华达州衡平法所有权分析时，将着重考察：(1) 债务人是否对 Taurus Fund 拥有积极或实质性控制\n\n权，以及 (2) 债务人是否正在使用并从 Taurus Fund 的\n\n资产中获得利益。97\n\n77. 债务人为 Taurus Fund 的衡平法所有人。首先，债务人对 Taurus Fund 拥有积极\n\n且实质性的控制，原因包括：\n\na. Taurus Fund 由债务人的司机和/或保镖，以及另一家受债务人控制的空壳公司管理；\n\nb. Taurus Fund 未遵守任何公司形式要求，包括遵守内华达州和新泽西州关于商业组织披露和登记的法律；\n\nc. Taurus Fund 对马瓦庄园的购买由债务人控制的资金提供；以及\n\n96 参见 United States v. 74.05 Acres, 428 F. Supp. 2d 57, 61 (D. Conn. 2006)（“所有权权益由该权益产生所在州的法律界定。”）。\n\n97 参见 In re Twin Lakes Vill., Inc., 2 B.R. 532 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1980)。\n\nd. Taurus Fund 所有的 Porsche Piano 位于 GSeries 实体的办公室内；如本院已认定，该等实体受债务人控制。\n\n78. 第二，债务人将 Taurus Fund（“金牛基金”）的资产——Mahwah Mansion（马瓦豪宅）——作为其住所；公共记录将马瓦豪宅列为债务人的地址；且金牛基金使用由债务人出资并控制的资金支付债务人与该住所相关的费用，包括建造和维护费用。\n\n79. 由于 Taurus Fund 在其章程依内华达州法被撤销前由债务人享有衡平法上的所有权，故在申请日之后，对 Taurus Fund 的所有权及公司控制权，以及 Taurus Fund 的资产，均属于债务人第11章破产财产的一部分。\n\n80. 因此，受托人依据《破产法》第541、542和544条请求作出裁定：（1）宣告：（a）债务人在任何时候均为 Taurus Fund 的衡平法上的所有人；（b）Taurus Fund 在债务人2022年2月15日申请日之前任何时候持有的任何及全部资产，均构成债务人的财产；以及（c）Taurus Fund 自债务人于2022年2月15日提出第11章破产申请之日起至今任何时候持有的任何及全部资产，视情况而定，过去及现在均构成债务人第11章破产财产；以及（2）命令将 Taurus Fund 及 Taurus Fund 的任何及全部资产移交给受托人。\n\n第三项请求\n（备选请求宣告 Taurus Fund 为债务人的另我，并命令向受托人移交 Taurus Fund 及其资产）\n\n81. 受托人重述并再次主张第1至67段所载的指控。\n\n82. 由于 Taurus Fund 是内华达州实体，内华达州法适用于另我／揭开公司面纱请求。98\n\n83. 根据内华达州法，法院在对债务人与 Taurus Fund 之间的关系适用内华达州的另我分析时，将重点考察：（1）Taurus Fund 是否受债务人影响和支配；（2）是否存在利益和所有权的一致性，以致 Taurus Fund 与债务人不可分离；以及（3）在此等情形下，遵循该独立实体的公司拟制是否会认可欺诈或助长不公。99 可能表明存在另我关系的因素包括：（1）资金混同；（2）资本不足；（3）未经授权挪用资金；（4）将公司资产作为个人资产对待；以及（5）未遵守公司形式要件。100\n\n84. 债务人对 Taurus Fund 具有影响力并行使控制，以致 Taurus Fund 独立于债务人不存在任何独立存续；债务人利用 Taurus Fund 的公司形式实施欺诈和不公。Taurus Fund 是债务人的另我，原因包括：\n\na. Taurus Fund 由债务人的司机和／或保镖，以及另一家受债务人控制的空壳公司管理；\n\nb. Taurus Fund 未遵守任何公司形式要件，包括遵守内华达州和新泽西州有关商业组织披露及登记的法律；\n\n98 参见 Hyundai-Wia Mach. Am. Corp. v. Rouette (In re Rouette), 564 B.R. 157, 174 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2017)（“在不存在优先的联邦利益或政策时，联邦法院依据公司注册地所在州的法律，确定是否揭开公司的面纱。”）（引述 In re Carterhouse, Inc., 94 B.R. 271, 276 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1988)）。\n\n99 参见 Bermuda Rd. Properties, LLC v. EcoLogical Steel Sys., Inc., No. 2:12–cv–01579–JAD–GWF, 2017 WL 797092, *3 (D. Nev. Mar. 1, 2017)（引述 LFC Mktg. Grp., Inc. v. Loomis, 8 P.3d 841, 845 (Nev. 2000) 和 Polaris Indust. Corp v. Kaplan, 747 P.2d 884, 886 (Nev. 1987)）。\n\n100 同上。\n\nc. Taurus Fund 对 Mahwah Mansion 的购买由债务人控制的资金出资；\n\nd. 债务人将 Mahwah Mansion 作为其住所，且 Taurus Fund 使用由债务人出资并控制的资金支付债务人与该住所相关的费用，包括建造和维护费用；以及\n\ne. Taurus Fund 拥有的 Porsche Piano（保时捷钢琴）位于 GSeries entities（GSeries实体）的办公室内，本院已认定该等实体受债务人控制。\n\n85. 债务人不当且不公正地利用其对 Taurus Fund 的另我控制，除其他事项外，促使 Taurus Fund 为债务人的使用和利益持有资产，同时声称使该等资产处于债务人债权人的追索范围之外，从而使债务人能够在不偿还债务的情况下过着奢侈生活。\n\n86. 在所有相关期间，债务人对一名或多名债权人负有债务。该等债权人本可行使其权利，寻求受托人在此请求的救济。\n\n87. 因此，受托人依据《破产法》第541、542和544条请求作出裁定：（1）宣告：（a）Taurus Fund 在任何时候均为债务人的另我；（b）Taurus Fund 在债务人2022年2月15日申请日之前任何时候持有的任何及全部资产，均构成债务人的财产；以及（c）Taurus Fund 自债务人于2022年2月15日提出第11章破产申请之日起至今任何时候持有的任何及全部资产，视情况而定，过去及现在均构成债务人第11章破产财产；以及（2）命令将 Taurus Fund 的任何及全部资产移交给受托人。\n\n诉请\n\n因此，基于上述理由，受托人谨请求作出如下判决：\n\n1. 对第一项请求，依据《破产法》第541、542和544条作出命令：（1）宣告：（a）债务人为 Mahwah Mansion 的衡平法上的所有人，以及（b）Mahwah Mansion 属于由受托人管理的债务人第11章破产财产；以及（2）命令 Taurus Fund（和／或作为 Taurus Fund 受托人的 Scott Barnett（斯科特·巴内特）和 Taurus Management（“金牛管理”））向受托人移交 Mahwah Mansion 或其价值，以及 Mahwah Mansion 内的固定装置和动产；\n\n2. 对第二项请求，依据《破产法》第541、542和544条作出命令：（1）宣告：（a）债务人在任何时候均为 Taurus Fund 的衡平法上的所有人；（b）Taurus Fund 在债务人2022年2月15日申请日之前任何时候持有的任何及全部资产，均构成债务人的财产；以及（c）Taurus Fund 自债务人于2022年2月15日提出第11章破产申请之日起至今任何时候持有的任何及全部资产，视情况而定，过去及现在均构成债务人第11章破产财产；以及（2）命令将 Taurus Fund 及 Taurus Fund 的任何及全部资产移交给受托人。\n\n3. 对第三项请求，依据《破产法》第541、542和544条作出命令：（1）宣告：（a）Taurus Fund 在任何时候均为债务人的另我；（b）Taurus Fund 在债务人2022年2月15日申请日之前任何时候持有的任何及全部资产，均构成债务人的财产；以及（c）Taurus Fund 自债务人于2022年2月15日提出第11章破产申请之日起至今任何时候持有的任何及全部资产，视情况而定，过去及现在均构成债务人第11章破产财产；以及（2）命令将 Taurus Fund 的任何及全部资产移交给受托人。\n\n4. 本案发生的合理律师费、诉讼费和支出；以及\n\n5. 法院在此等情形下认为公正、适当或符合衡平原则的其他及进一步救济。\n\n【本页其余部分特意留白。】\n\n日期：July 11, 2023\nNew York, New York\nLUC A. DESPINS\n第11章受托人\n\n签署人：/s/ Douglass Barron\n\nAvram E. Luft（获准特别出庭）\nDouglass Barron（获准特别出庭）\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, New York 10166\n(212) 318-6000\naviluft@paulhastings.com\ndouglassbarron@paulhastings.com\n\n以及\n\nNicholas A. Bassett（获准特别出庭）\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP\n2050 M Street NW\nWashington, D.C. 20036\n(202) 551-1902\nnicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n以及\n\nDouglas S. Skalka (ct00616)\nPatrick R. Linsey (ct29437)\nNEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C.\n195 Church Street, 13th Floor\nNew Haven, Connecticut 06510\n(203) 781-2847\ndskalka@npmlaw.com\nplinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n第11章受托人的代理律师\n\n附件2\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT（美国联邦地区法院）\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（纽约南区）\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA（美利坚合众国）\n\n诉\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），\n\nCase No. 1:23-CR-118-1 (AT)\n\n被告。\n\n申请举行口头辩论\n\n第11章受托人和 GENEVER 债务人反对被告 HO WAN KWOK 要求作出中止破产案件的命令及令状，或备选请求其他救济之动议的答辩\n\nLuc A. Despins\nAdam J. Fee\nG. Alexander Bongartz\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, New York 10166\n(212) 318-6000\nlucdespins@paulhastings.com\nadamfee@paulhastings.com\nalexbongartz@paulhastings.com\n\n以及\n\nNicholas A. Bassett\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP\n2050 M Street NW\nWashington, D.C., 20036\n(202) 551-1902\nnicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n作为第11章受托人的 Luc A. Despins、Genever Holdings Corporation（吉尼弗控股公司）及 Genever Holdings LLC（吉尼弗控股有限责任公司）的代理律师\n\n目录\n页码\n\n初步陈述  1\n\n事实背景  7\nI.　破产案件  7\nII.　受托人的调查  8\nIII.　Mahwah 对抗程序  9\n论证  11\nI.　破产法院是裁决中止动议的适当法院  11\nII.　中止动议在实体上不能成立  15\nA.　中止请求适用的法律标准  16\ni.　衡量测试  16\nii.　其他考量因素  17\nB.　债务人未满足获得所请求中止的举证责任  18\ni.　因素1：破产案件与刑事案件之间的重叠有限  18\nii.　因素3：全面中止破产案件将不当地损害数千名债权人  19\niii.　因素4：允许破产案件继续进行不会损害债务人  22\niv.　因素5：破产法院的利益不利于中止破产案件  28\nv.　因素6：公共利益不利于中止破产案件  28\nIII.　答辩人不反对债务人所提备选救济中的第（i）、（ii）和（iv）类  29\nIV.　法院应驳回 Wang 女士要求全面中止破产案件的请求  30\n结论  30\n\n判例目录\n\nAn v. Despins,\n22-cv-10062 (VEC) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2023) [Docket No. 29] 2\n\nIn re Atlas,\n183 B.R. 978 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995) 13\n\nIn re Baldwin-United Corp.,\n770 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1985)14\n\nIn re Bame,\n251 B.R. 367 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2000) 23, 24\n\nBernard v. Lombardo,\nNo. 16 CV. 863, 2017 WL 2984022 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2017) 16, 19\n\nCitibank, N.A. v. Super Sayin' Publ'n, LLC,\n86 F. Supp. 3d 244 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) 14, 15, 16\n\nCommodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub,\n471 U.S. 343 (1985) 23\n\nEastern Profit Corp. Ltd. v. Strategic Vision US LLC,\nNo. 18-CV-2185 (LJL), 2021 WL 2554631 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2021) 2\n\nErti v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc. (In re Baldwin-United Corp. Litig.),\n765 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1985)13, 14\n\nGong v. Sarnoff,\n23-cv-343 (LJL) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2023) [Docket No. 72] 3\n\nGran Sabana Corp. N.V. v. Kossoff,\nNo. 21-CV-3154 (RA), 2021 WL 3666116 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2021) 16, 17\n\nKarimona Invs., LLC v. Weinreb,\nNo. 02CV1792WHPTHK, 2003 WL 941404 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2003) 14\n\nLayng v. Garcia (In re Garcia),\n569 B.R. 480 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2017) 28\n\nLouis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc.,\n676 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2012)15, 16, 17, 27\n\nMango Labs, LLC v. Eisenberg,\nNo. 23-CV-00665 (LJL), 2023 WL 3510908 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2023) 14\n\n全国黑人公民参与联盟（Nat'l Coal. on Black Civic Participation）诉 Wohl，\nNo. 20 CIV. 8668 (VM), 2021 WL 694557 (Southern District of New York（纽约南区） Feb. 22, 2021) 14, 16\n\nPAX 诉 Kwok（郭文贵），\nIndex No. 652077/2017 (New York Supreme Court（纽约州最高法院） Feb. 9, 2022) [Docket No. 1181] 1, 2\n\nIn re Randolph Hosp., Inc.，\nNo. 20-10247, 2022 WL 19298765 (Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of North Carolina（北卡罗来纳州中区破产法院） Apr. 25, 2022) 21\n\nS.E.C. 诉 Credit Bancorp, Ltd.，\n93 F. Supp. 2d 475 (Southern District of New York（纽约南区） 2000) 11, 12\n\nIn re Sturman，\nNo. 10 CIV. 6725 RJS, 2011 WL 4472412 (Southern District of New York（纽约南区） Sept. 27, 2011) 12\n\nIn re U.S. Lines Inc.，\n262 B.R. 223 (Southern District of New York（纽约南区） 2001) 21\n\nUnited States（美国）诉 LaRouche Campaign，\n682 F. Supp. 627 (District of Massachusetts（马萨诸塞州联邦地区法院） 1987) 3, 11, 13\n\nUnited States（美国）诉 Simon，\n373 F.2d 649 (Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院） 1967)11, 18\n\nIn re Walnut Hill, Inc.，\nNo. 16-20960 (JJT), 2018 WL 2672242 (Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut（康涅狄格州联邦地区破产法院） June 1, 2018) 21\n\n法律\n\n11 U.S.C. §§ 108(a)(2); 546(a) 21\n\nLuc A. Despins，以其作为在 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（“债务人”或“Kwok 先生”）第11章案件中获任命的第11章受托人（“受托人”）的身份，以及 Genever Holdings Corporation（“Genever BVI”）和 Genever Holdings LLC（“Genever US”，并与受托人及 Genever BVI 合称“答辩方”）1，特此提交本答辩（“Response”），反对：(i) 债务人提出的《请求作出中止破产案件的裁定及令状，或备选请求其他救济的动议》[ECF No. 129]（“中止动议”）及相关法律备忘录[ECF No. 131]（“法律备忘录”）；以及 (ii) Yanping Wang（“Wang 女士”）加入中止动议[ECF No. 135]（“加入申请”）。2 为支持本答辩，答辩方还同时提交《Nicholas A. Bassett 为支持第11章受托人及 Genever 债务人反对被告 Ho Wan Kwok 提出的〈请求作出中止破产案件的裁定及令状，或备选请求其他救济的动议〉所作声明》（“Bassett 声明”），并谨陈如下：\n\n初步陈述\n\n1. 债务人声称，其需要对其第11章案件实行前所未有的全球性中止，以保护其作为本院刑事被告的权利。但实际上，中止动议与本刑事案件关联甚少，而完全关乎债务人希望获得破产程序的全部益处——包括其对针对债务人的民事诉讼施加的全球自动中止——同时不承担任何负担。债务人于2022年2月自愿向破产法院提交其第11章案件，其自利目的在于避免执行一项对其作出的、超过 $250 million 的纽约州法院判决书。3\n\n1 债务人、Genever BVI 和 Genever US 合称“债务人”。\n\n2 本答辩中使用但未定义的首字母大写术语，具有中止动议中规定的含义。\n\n3 同样，债务人选择启动 Genever US 的第11章案件；在该公司于2020年10月提交第11章申请时，他控制该公司。\n\n如今，其第11章案件对债务人及其亲近之人造成了极其糟糕的后果，他正不惜一切地试图令其停止。\n\n2. 在申请破产之前，债务人向公众展现自己是一名亿万富翁，享受极度奢华生活的一切排场，包括游艇、私人飞机、豪华汽车和价值数百万美元的住所。然而，在其于第11章案件中提交的资产清单中，债务人竟声称其名下仅有 $3,850 的资产。正如数家法院现已指出，债务人通过构建一个庞大的空壳公司迷宫，将其财富隐藏在家属和亲密关联人士（如 Wang 女士）名下，从而在声称自己实际上并无资产的同时，得以维持其奢华生活方式。4 受托人已花费数月，通过调查债务人的财务事务来拆解债务人的“空壳游戏”，并已为破产财产的利益追回数千万美元。追回更多有价值资产的工作仍在进行中。\n\n3. 债务人的回应是设法以一切可能手段阻挠和干扰受托人的调查，包括两次试图罢免受托人、拒绝遵从受托人的证据开示请求，甚至动员其全球各地的追随者骚扰受托人、其律师、其家属成员以及债务人最大的无担保债权人之一——该等骚扰已被破产法院禁止。5\n\n4 参见，例如，PAX 诉 Kwok，Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 2022) [Docket No. 1181]（“Ostrager 藐视法庭裁定”）第1页的《动议裁决及命令》（将债务人描述为“自称拥有数十亿美元身家、[其]将资产藏匿于公司实体和家属构成的迷宫中的人”），作为 Bassett 声明的附件1附上；另见 Eastern Profit Corp. Ltd. 诉 Strategic Vision US LLC，No. 18-CV-2185 (LJL), 2021 WL 2554631, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2021)（认定 Eastern Profit Corporation Limited——该实体最初由债务人的一名司机拥有，后转让给债务人的女儿——实质上是债务人的“空壳公司”。）\n\n5 参见《部分准许初步禁令动议的经更正裁决备忘录》第7段（Adv. Proc. No. 22-05032, Jan. 13, 2023）[Docket No. 133]（“骚扰初步禁令裁决”），作为 Bassett 声明的附件2附上。此外，多名个人在本区提起诉讼，指称受托人及其律师未登记为中华人民共和国或中国共产党的代理人，因而违反《外国代理人登记法》。地区法院认定，尽管债务人并非当事人，但其“处于”本诉讼的“中心”。An 诉 Despins，22-cv-10062 (VEC) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2023) [Docket No. 29]《意见及命令》第2页，作为 Bassett 声明的附件3附上。地区法院驳回该诉讼并施加 Rule 11 制裁。同上，第13页（“[本]诉讼只是旨在滋扰[受托人和 Paul Hastings]的一场不当行为运动的又一部分。”）。本区其他法官亦作出类似认定，驳回并制裁了依据 FARA 对破产案件其他参与者提起的诉讼。参见 Gong 诉 Sarnoff，23-cv-343 (LJL) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2023) [Docket No. 72]《意见及命令》第32页（“不可避免的结论是，Zhang 和 Freeth 正在针对与 Kwok 利益相对立者，目的在于压制他们所认为的针对他的倡导。”），作为 Bassett 声明的附件4附上。\n\n中止动议不过是债务人为不惜一切代价阻挠受托人持续调查的最新策略。\n\n4. 为掩饰其在中止动议中的真实动机，债务人捏造其第11章案件中据称涉及其在本案中权利的、并不存在的问题。例如，债务人毫无根据地声称，其中包括：(i) 受托人已处分位于债务人原 Sherry Netherland 公寓内的债务人个人财产；(ii) 债务人位于新泽西州 Mahwah 的豪宅已被“移交”给受托人以供处分；以及 (iii) 受托人未遵从与债务人特权相关的破产法院命令。6 如下文详述，即使只是粗略审阅破产法院的记录——债务人及其破产律师本应对此极为熟悉——也会表明，这些陈述中的每一项均完全不实。\n\n5. 尽管其指控毫无依据，债务人在2023年9月21日向本院提交的另一份文件中仍坚持这些指控。参见 ECF No. 143。尽管该新文件被称为要求政府提交文件的强制动议，但显然是债务人试图重复并强化其在中止动议中作出的同样虚假指控。例如，他重复其错误指控，称受托人与政府正在合作“快速推进”出售 Mahwah 豪宅，而这完全不实，因为除非且直至受托人在其待决对抗程序中就实体问题胜诉，否则甚至无法启动任何出售程序。同样毫无根据的是债务人关于受托人与政府在针对债务人的起诉书提交之前以某种方式进行了不当沟通的主张。他援引时间记录作出该指控，该记录显示受托人于2023年3月16日和18日与政府讨论了起诉书；他称该时间是在起诉书于2023年3月29日提交前两周。然而，债务人粗心地援引了日期为2023年3月29日的替代起诉书，该起诉书仅将 Wang 女士列为被告，却未承认针对债务人的最初起诉书已于2023年3月15日解封。当然，受托人于3月中旬事后与 DOJ 讨论的正是该最初起诉书。\n\n6. 剔除其中的事实错误和夸张言辞后，中止动议毫无依据，应予驳回。然而，作为门槛事项，答辩方主张，中止动议应由对破产财产的所有财产享有专属管辖权的破产法院审议和裁定。中止动议未提出任何依据，以支持其所请求中止整个破产案件这一非常救济。恰恰相反，在 United States 诉 LaRouche Campaign，682 F. Supp. 627, 628 (D. Mass. 1987) 一案中，地区法院被请求中止其审理的一宗刑事案件中两名被告所涉的破产案件，该地区法院裁定其无管辖权这样做。其他判例——包括第二巡回上诉法院撤销一项本会暂时禁止债务人（或受托人）在更广泛的破产案件中采取某些有限行动的命令的案件——表明，其他法院对于侵入破产法院的管辖权或损害其管理破产财产的能力持谨慎态度。7\n\n7 如受托人于2023年9月6日告知本院，受托人此前已在破产法院提交紧急动议（及相关加速审理动议），请求禁止债务人推进中止\n\n7. 即使本院倾向于审议暂缓动议的实体理由，也应驳回该动议，因为债务人远未达到根据第二巡回法院法律获得暂缓所应承担的举证责任。债务人几乎完全无视其所请求的全面中止将给其债权人造成的严重损害。与债务人毫无根据的主张相反，破产案件并非为了某一家大型对冲基金的利益而进行。事实上，破产案件中已提交了超过1,400份债权申报，几乎全部由个人提交，主张的债权金额达数十亿美元。尽管受托人预计其中许多债权将被调减或不予认可（且受托人对此的分析仍在进行中），但已明显可见，这些债权涵盖广泛范围，包括侵权债权（包括债务人的一名前雇员指称债务人实施性侵犯）、诽谤债权、违约债权，以及当然包括债务人被指称的欺诈计划之相对方提出的债权（为明确起见，该等债权并不限于本刑事案件中的指控）。所有这些债权人均已等待多年以获得清偿，如今必须依靠受托人收集破产财产、解决其债权并进行分配。\n\n8. 分配延迟并非暂缓将对债权人造成的唯一损害。延迟受托人的调查，将大大增加债务人、其家庭成员及其商业伙伴继续努力将资产转移至受托人无法追及范围之外的风险。这并非单纯猜测，因为已有若干事例表明，债务人、其家庭成员和/或其关联人未经破产法院批准即转移或处分重大资产，其中包括在债务人及Wang 女士（Wang）的起诉书及其后被羁押之后。此外，对破产案件的全面中止，实际上将使受托人无法提起撤销权诉讼以追回有价值的破产财产，因为提起该等诉讼的诉讼时效将于February 15, 2024届满，即远早于本案预定于April 2024进行的审判。\n\n动议。破产法院驳回了加速审理动议，但指出，如有必要，在本院就暂缓动议作出处理后，将安排就紧急动议举行听证。在暂缓动议的听证会上，受托人可在必要时回应破产法官Manning（Manning）在加速审理动议听证会上所作的评论，包括与延长提起撤销权诉讼的诉讼时效有关的评论。\n\n9. 虽然债务人的破产财产及其债权人将因暂缓遭受巨大损害，但债务人并未可信地表明破产案件以任何方式损害其作为刑事被告人的权利。债务人主张受托人正在就与其刑事案件重叠的问题提起诉讼，但受托人的目标和论点与政府完全不同。受托人寻求追回资产（无论该等资产是否为犯罪所得），而非证明刑事责任。并且，债务人就特权问题及其他证据事项提出的担忧并不真实，因为最终将由本院而非破产法院决定本案中哪些证据可采，而且无论如何，这些担忧均不足以证明债务人在此寻求的非常救济具有正当性。\n\n10. 或许意识到其所请求的全面中止性质可疑，债务人备选请求四类救济，即由本院作出命令：(i) 授权债务人向受托人披露政府向其提供的信息；(ii) 允许债务人进入Mahwah Mansion（马瓦庄园）；(iii) 禁止政府在破产案件中协助出售马瓦庄园；以及(iv) 禁止受托人向政府分享受债务人享有的特权保护的任何文件或信息。这些请求大多为受托人所接受。关于第一项请求，受托人目前已不再打算寻求披露政府向债务人提供的信息，且受托人将请求破产法院相应修改藐视法庭命令。原则上，就第(ii)类救济而言，在遵守某些保障措施的前提下，受托人愿与债务人会面协商；受托人不反对作出命令，准予第(ii)类和第(iv)类所载的救济。最后，关于第(iii)类救济，受托人不清楚债务人请求禁止政府“协助出售”究竟何意。尽管如此，该请求的救济尚不成熟，因为马瓦庄园尚未被认定为破产财产，更遑论其受到任何出售动议的约束。\n\n事实背景\n\n一、破产案件\n\n11. 于February 15, 2022，债务人在破产法院根据《美国法典》第11编（“破产法”）第11章提交了自愿救济申请。值得注意的是，债务人在其最大无担保债权人之一Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙企业，“PAX”）获得纽约州法院的一项命令后四个营业日提交了申请；该命令(a) 以债务人将其豪华超级游艇移出法院管辖范围为由认定其藐视法庭（PAX拟使用该游艇履行一项$116.4 million判决书），以及(b) 对债务人处以$134 million的藐视法庭罚款，该罚款应于该命令作出后五个营业日到期。8\n\n12. 于June 15, 2022，在债务人提出第11章计划的努力失败后，破产法院作出一份决定备忘录及命令[Bankr. ECF No. 465]9（“受托人命令”），指示美国受托人任命一名第11章受托人。于July 8, 2022，破产法院作出命令[Bankr. ECF No. 523]，任命受托人。\n\n13. Genever BVI（Genever 英属维尔京群岛公司）是一家由Kwok 先生（郭文贵）全资拥有的实体，其全资子公司Genever US（Genever 美国公司）亦为第11章债务人，其案件已与债务人的第11章案件行政合并。Genever BVI的唯一资产是其持有的Genever US股份；Genever US的主要资产是位于曼哈顿Sherry Netherland（谢里-内德兰酒店）的18层公寓（“Sherry Netherland Apartment（谢里-内德兰公寓）”）。10\n\n二、受托人的调查\n\n14. 债务人于March 2022提交的破产财产清单仅列报$3,850资产，而负债则达数亿美元。11 债务人在破产法院主张，其实质上身无分文，其豪华住宅、Lady May 号游艇及其他公开炫示的财富象征并不属于其本人，而是属于据称由其家庭成员拥有的公司。12\n\n15. 自受任以来，受托人一直努力识别并为破产财产利益追回债务人隐匿的资产。为此，根据破产法院的指示，受托人已启动复杂而全面的调查及诉讼程序，重点关注债务人的“空壳把戏”——即其利用替身公司向债权人隐匿资产的行为。概括而言，该程序包括：(a) 根据《联邦破产程序规则》（“破产规则”）第2004条进行的证据开示；以及(b) 为追回特定财产和资产而提起的诉讼。\n\n16. 由于债务人及其他人拒绝遵守受托人的传票，受托人被迫就多项证据开示争议进行诉讼。其中一项争议涉及债务人的主张，即其可通过援引律师—当事人特权及其他特权或保护，阻止受托人从其律师及其他专业人士处获取信息。该争议最终得到解决：在广泛协商后，债务人同意作出一项规范特权向受托人移转的命令[Bankr. ECF No. 856]（“特权命令”）。\n\n17. 针对另一项证据开示争议，债务人主张其第五修正案权利使其有理由拒绝向受托人提交任何文件，或拒绝说明其如何搜寻文件。13 受托人不同意债务人笼统援引第五修正案。于July 26, 2023，破产法院作出一项详尽且论证审慎的42页裁定，认同受托人的立场，并认定债务人藐视法庭[Bankr. ECF No. 2035]（“藐视法庭命令”）。14\n\n18. 尽管债务人及其他人未遵从受托人的证据开示工作，受托人仍提起了多项对立程序，以为破产财产利益追回特定资产。迄今为止，受托人已追回超过$60 million的资产，且随着其调查和追回工作的持续进行，预计还将追回更多资产。\n\n三、Mahwah 对立程序\n\n19. 在本案起诉书中，政府就包括位于675 Ramapo Valley Road, Mahwah, New Jersey 07430的一处拥有21间卧室、50,000平方英尺、城堡式的私人住宅提出没收指控；该住宅占地12.5英亩（“Mahwah Mansion（马瓦庄园）”），最初购买价约为$26.5 million。\n\n8 见Ostrager 藐视法庭裁定，第10页，Bassett 声明附件A。\n\n9 作为Bassett 声明的附件5附上。行政合并的破产案件，案号22-50073，其案卷中的文件称为“Bankr. ECF No. ____”。\n\n10 暂缓动议未提出任何依据，说明应中止Genever BVI和Genever US的第11章案件。仅基于此理由，即应驳回该动议中涉及这些债务人的部分。债务人对Genever BVI、Genever US或谢里-内德兰公寓亦不享有任何经济利益。Genever BVI此前已转让给受托人（且如上所述，Genever BVI全资拥有Genever US），而Bravo Luck Limited（好运有限公司，据称由债务人之子拥有）和/或债务人之子此前在Genever BVI、Genever US或谢里-内德兰公寓中主张的任何受益权益，均已作为与Bravo Luck Limited及债务人之子达成和解的一部分予以放弃。见Bankr. ECF. 2153。\n\n11 见资产与负债清单，第1页[Bankr. ECF No. 78]。\n\n12 见Ho Wan Kwok 先生（郭文贵）支持第11章案件及若干动议的声明[Bankr. ECF No. 107]。\n\n13 见Bankr. ECF No. 1444（载明债务人“就日期为August 17, 2022的传票整体，包括其中所载的一切文件及信息请求，援引其根据《美国宪法》第五修正案享有的权利，包括根据提交行为原则享有的权利”），作为Bassett 声明的附件6附上。\n\n14 作为Bassett 声明的附件7附上。除藐视法庭命令外，破产法院还因未交出破产财产或未遵守受托人发出的经法院批准的传票，对债务人及与债务人有关联的实体作出了六(6)项其他藐视法庭命令。见Bankr. ECF Nos. 1372, 1537, 1709, 1892, 2009, and 2093。\n\n20. 受托人已就 Mahwah Mansion（马瓦庄园）是否属于破产财产进行了调查，并于 July 11, 2023，在 Bankruptcy Court（破产法院）对该庄园的名义所有人提起了一项对抗性程序（下称“Mahwah Adversary Proceeding（马瓦对抗性程序）”）。15 该起诉状请求作出命令，宣告除其他事项外，Mahwah Mansion 属于债务人破产财产，应由受托人进行管理。受托人随起诉状一并提交了一项动议，请求除其他事项外，初步禁止 Mahwah Defendants（马瓦被告）对 Mahwah Mansion 设定负担、转让、耗散或以其他方式干扰该庄园，并限制对其的进入。破产法院于 August 24, 2023 作出的命令中批准了该动议 [ECF No. 47 in Adv. Proc. No. 23-05017]16（下称“PI Order（初步禁令命令）”）。\n\n21. 于 August 30, 2023，在马瓦被告承认 Mahwah Mansion 及其内部物品未投保之后，17 受托人提交了一项紧急动议 [ECF No. 57 in Adv. Proc. No. 23-05017]（下称“Emergency Motion（紧急动议）”），请求破产法院立即修改 PI Order，以将进入 Mahwah Mansion 的权限限制于某些安保服务人员、官员以及经受托人同意或经本院或\n\n15 被告为 Taurus Fund LLC（Taurus Fund有限责任公司，下称“Taurus Fund”）、Scott Barnett（斯科特·巴内特，债务人的保镖和司机）以及 Taurus Management LLC（Taurus Management有限责任公司；与 Taurus Fund 合称“Mahwah Defendants（马瓦被告）”）。\n\n16 马瓦对抗性程序案卷上的提交文件称为“ECF No. ____ in Adv. Proc. No. 23-05017”。\n\n17 作为 PI Order 的一部分，破产法院命令马瓦被告于 August 28, 2023 前提交 Taurus Fund 的所有资产和财产（包括 Mahwah Mansion）以及位于 Mahwah Mansion 内、上方或该处的一切动产和/或附着物的保险证明。破产法院后来将截止日期延至 August 30, 2023；在该日，马瓦被告提交了一份答复，披露 Taurus Fund 的财产——包括 Mahwah Mansion 及其内部物品——未投保，见 ECF No. 55 in Adv. Proc. No. 23-05017，且 Mahwah Mansion 至今仍未投保。\n\n破产法院批准的其他人员（合称“Authorized Parties（获授权人员）”）。破产法院于 August 31, 2023 批准了紧急动议。见 ECF No. 58 in Adv. Proc. No. 23-05017。18\n\n22. 受托人在提起马瓦对抗性程序时即知悉，鉴于 Mahwah Mansion 在刑事案件中可能被没收、在破产案件中可能被追回，可能会因此产生问题。受托人与政府联系，以一种能够使马瓦对抗性程序不受中断地继续进行的方式处理这些问题。由此达成了一份日期为 July 13, 2023 的和解协议（下称“Settlement Agreement（和解协议）”）。根据和解协议，(i) 受托人将在不受政府反对或干扰的情况下继续进行马瓦对抗性程序，以及 (ii) 受托人与政府均保留其关于 Mahwah Mansion 处置所得净收益分配的权利（在支付破产财产为接管及出售 Mahwah Mansion 所发生的费用后）。受托人已提交动议，请求破产法院批准和解协议，并于 August 30, 2023 举行了听证会。破产法院尚未对该动议作出裁决。\n\n论证\n\nI. 破产法院是裁定中止动议的适当法院\n\n23. 作为门槛问题，被申请人谨此恭请，本案应由破产法院裁定是否应中止破产案件。根据 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a)，破产法院（通过适用地区法院作出的移送命令）对破产案件及破产财产享有专属管辖权。\n\n18 作为 Bassett Declaration（巴塞特声明）的附件8附上。\n\n24. 值得注意的是，中止动议未援引任何一个地区法院准许债务人在此所寻求的非常救济——即中止整个破产案件——的案件。19 在 LaRouche 案中，地区法院被请求中止一宗涉及该院审理的一宗刑事案件中两名被告的破产案件，而地区法院认定其对此不具有管辖权。LaRouche, 682 F. Supp. at 628。该法院对“对一个地区内刑事案件拥有管辖权的联邦法院，是否有管辖权禁止美国、美国破产法官，或在该法官面前的破产事项中参与的其他人，以中止该事项中的全部程序”表示怀疑。Id. 因此，该法院“得出结论，认为判例中并无直接支持行使此类管辖权的依据”。Id.\n\n25. 债务人指出，《全令状法》“赋予联邦地区法院维持其管辖权的实质性权力”，20 并援引 S.E.C. v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 93 F. Supp. 2d 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)。然而，Credit Bancorp 判决通过说明应由破产法院而非本院裁定中止动议的原因，支持了受托人的立场。\n\n26. 在 Credit Bancorp 案中，SEC（美国证券交易委员会）在 Southern District of New York（纽约南区）对 Credit Bancorp（Credit Bancorp公司）、其子公司及数名个人提起执法诉讼。地区法院指定了一名接管人，以除其他事项外追索保险赔款。被诉讼指控的其中一名个人在 Eastern District of Kentucky（肯塔基东区）对两家保险公司提起了其自身的民事诉讼，法院指定的接管人则在纽约案件中提出动议，请求中止肯塔基案件。法院批准了中止，解释称：“如本案，当法院指定了接管人并取得对接管财产的管辖权时，中止竞争性诉讼的权力属于法院防止干扰该财产管理的固有权力范围。”Credit Bancorp, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 477。与本案受托人相同，Credit Bancorp 案中的接管人被指定为“保护破产财产，并最终将该财产返还给适格利害关系方”，并负责“归集和保存破产财产资产，以实现对破产财产有序、高效及公平的管理”。Id. at 476-77。\n\n27. 实质上，Credit Bancorp 所确立的命题是：在法院指定的受托人负有公平管理某项财产的职责时，防止对该财产进行干扰——包括禁止平行程序——的权力和义务属于监督该财产的法院。事实上，该原则在破产案件中更有力地适用；国会已将对债务人破产财产的专属管辖权赋予破产法院，而自动中止禁止干扰该管辖权。一般见 In re Sturman, No. 10 CIV. 6725 RJS, 2011 WL 4472412, at \\*2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2011)（州法院要求“禁止在破产财产中进行任何进一步活动”的动议，明显违反自动中止）。21\n\n28. 根据上述权威依据，受托人谨此恭请，裁定中止动议的管辖权属于破产法院，而非本院。但即使本院可以裁定中止动议，也应拒绝这样做，而应尊重破产法院。LaRouche 案的地区法院亦得出了这一替代性结论，其理由如下：\n\n即使确实存在管辖权，我也认为在本案中行使该管辖权并不适当。破产程序不仅涉及美国和本院面前部分（或可能全部）被告的利益，也涉及可能作为该等程序债权人提出请求的许多其他人的利益。在此向他们发出通知并给予其陈述机会既不可行也不合理；在未适当考虑其利益的情况下作出如被告所寻求的、产生中止效力的禁令，将违背裁判的基本原则。\n\nLaRouche Campaign, 682 F. Supp. at 628-29。\n\n29. LaRouche 法院的推理与 Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）具有说服力的判例相一致。Erti v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc. (In re Baldwin-United Corp. Litig.), 765 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1985)，涉及一宗在纽约南区审理的多地区证券欺诈诉讼。其中一名经纪交易商被告在 Baldwin（鲍德温）于俄亥俄州进行的独立 chapter 11（第11章）案件中提交了债权证明，并在证券诉讼中对 Baldwin 提起了第三方起诉。该经纪交易商随后请求并由纽约南区签发了一项 TRO（临时限制令），禁止债务人在证券诉讼中向任何被告（包括该经纪交易商）寻求任何救济，包括请求俄亥俄州破产法院作出命令以执行自动中止。22 在上诉中，第二巡回上诉法院裁定，地区法院确实有管辖权“确定自动中止是否适用”，id. at 347，但“其签发本次上诉所质疑的禁令”\n\n19 法律备忘录援引 United States v. Simon, 373 F.2d 649, 651-52 (2d Cir. 1967)，该案中，地区法院禁止破产受托人在九十日期间对同时被列入另一独立刑事事项的某些个人进行证言录取。但地区法院并未中止破产案件本身。此外，第二巡回上诉法院推翻了地区法院。因此，该案并未为债务人提供任何支持。事实上，如下文所述，该案强有力地支持受托人的立场。\n\n20 Mem. of Law at 14.\n\n21 债务人请求本院裁定中止动议，还违反了所谓 Barton doctrine（巴顿原则）；该原则禁止非破产法院对会干扰破产受托人履行正式职责的问题作出裁决。如一家破产法院所解释：“根据已有一百多年历史的最高法院判例，当事人不得通过在另一法院寻求禁令救济来干扰受托人的正式职责，除非他们已获得指定该受托人的破产法院许可。”In re Atlas, 183 B.R. 978, 980 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995)。\n\n22 法律备忘录援引 Baldwin 事项中的另一项第二巡回上诉法院裁决，In re Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328, 339 (2d Cir. 1985)。见 Mem. of Law at 15。在该意见中，第二巡回上诉法院维持了地区法院签发的另一项 TRO，该命令禁止31个上诉州（及其总检察长）对证券诉讼中的任何被告提起任何诉讼。值得注意的是，债务人援引该意见；该意见与 Baldwin 独立破产案件中任何拟议或正在进行的行动毫无关系，亦未讨论该等行动，而债务人却忽略了第二巡回上诉法院仅在两个月前作出的裁决；该裁决直接探讨了与本案完全相关的问题，即破产法院管理其案件的权限与地区法院管理另一独立民事程序的权限之间的相互关系。\n\n属于对其衡平权力的滥用。”同上。该法院解释称，该禁令干扰了破产法院的管辖权，因为其阻止债务人“援引破产法院的关键权限”以实施《破产法》的规定（包括自动中止的适用性）。同上，见第357-48页。尽管地区法院确实也拥有“为协助其管辖权而签发一切令状的权力”，同上，见第348页，但“破产法院管理这一复杂重整的权限与地区法院管理合并审前程序的权限”之间的任何冲突，均应以维护“破产法院不受限制的权限”为原则予以解决。同上（原文强调）。23\n\n30. 被申请人主张，与该先例一致，本院应将对暂停动议的审议交由破产法院处理。24\n\nII. 暂停动议在实体上不能成立\n\n31. 即使本院仍倾向于对暂停动议进行实体审议，本院亦应驳回该动议，因为债务人未能根据第二巡回区先例履行其举证责任，以证明有理由适用暂停破产案件这一非常救济。\n\n23 Baldwin法院还指出下级法院的程序经过，并认为动议人的程序“操作”及其“就中止范围所采取的诉讼立场，显示出几乎没有、即使有也是极少的对其有利的衡平考量。”765 F.2d at 349。同样地，本案中的暂停动议，至多是出于诉讼技巧和策略的动机，而非对债务人宪法权利的真实关切。\n\n24 这也符合对此类动议的一般规则（即不一定专门适用于破产案件）：暂停诉讼的动议应向该诉讼正在审理的法院提出。参见，例如，Mango Labs, LLC v. Eisenberg, No. 23-CV-00665 (LJL), 2023 WL 3510908, at \\*1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2023)（政府动议“根据《联邦民事诉讼规则》第24条介入本案，并请求全面暂停本案，包括暂停所有证据开示，直至平行刑事案件结束”）；Nat'l Coal. on Black Civic Participation v. Wohl, No. 20 CIV. 8668 (VM), 2021 WL 694557, at \\*1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2021)（“法院面前的是被告提出的第二项动议，请求在针对其进行的刑事程序解决前暂停诉讼”）；Citibank, N.A. v. Super Sayin' Publ'n, LLC, 86 F. Supp. 3d 244, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)（“被告已动议暂停这两项相关民事诉讼，直至相关刑事调查和起诉得到解决”）；Karimona Invs., LLC v. Weinreb, No. 02CV1792WHPTHK, 2003 WL 941404, at \\*1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2003)（在违约及欺诈诉讼中，驳回被告“在相关刑事事项解决前暂停其证言录取的动议”）。此外，在本案中，政府曾向主持针对债务人的美国证券交易委员会（SEC）诉讼的地区法院请求暂停该诉讼。\n\nA. 暂停请求的适用法律标准\n\n32. 法律备忘录中长篇讨论了债务人所称适用于准予暂停请求的“适用法律”。25 然而，债务人未承认，在第二巡回区，“为允许相关刑事[程序]终结而暂停民事案件”属于“一种非常救济”。Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 98 (2d Cir. 2012)（经修订）（省略内部引号及引文）。债务人还未提及，“[为援引在相关刑事程序结束前暂停民事案件这一非常救济，被告负有证明其受到不当损害……或其宪法权利受到干扰的责任。”Citibank, N.A. v. Super Sayin' Pub., LLC, 86 F. Supp. 3d 244, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)（省略内部引号及引文）。事实上，美国宪法“即使有，也极少要求此类暂停”。Louis Vuitton, 676 F.3d at 98（原文强调）。26 这是因为，“被告并无绝对权利不被迫在就民事事项作证与主张其第五修正案特权之间作出选择。”同上（省略内部引号）。\n\ni. 平衡测试\n\n33. 在确定是否准予暂停平行程序时，第二巡回区的法院通常考量以下六项因素：\n\n1）刑事案件中的争议与民事案件中提出的争议重叠的程度；\n\n2）案件状态，包括被告是否已被起诉；\n\n3）原告迅速推进程序的私人利益，与因延误对原告造成的不利影响之间的权衡；\n\n4）被告的私人利益及其负担；\n\n5）法院的利益；以及\n\n6）公共利益。\n\n25 参见法律备忘录第14-17页。\n\n26 另参见同上，第100页（“只有在至少拒绝暂停将对被告造成‘重大损害’的情况下，才会提出一种貌似合理的宪法论点[要求暂停]”）（原文强调）。\n\n参见 Citibank, N.A., 86 F. Supp. 3d at 246-47。另参见 Gran Sabana Corp. N.V. v. Kossoff, No. 21-CV-3154 (RA), 2021 WL 3666116, at \\*2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2021)；Nat'l Coal. on Black Civic Participation v. Wohl, No. 20 CIV. 8668 (VM), 2021 WL 694557, at \\*3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2021)；Bernard v. Lombardo, No. 16 CV. 863 (RMB), 2017 WL 2984022, at \\*2 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2017)（均适用六因素测试并驳回暂停请求）。\n\n34. 债务人似乎要求本院基于第二巡回区将该测试描述为一种“机械装置”，而摒弃该平衡测试。27 这歪曲了第二巡回区在 Louis Vuitton 案中的裁判及指引。事实上，本巡回区的法院压倒性地继续适用该平衡测试。Louis Vuitton 仅支持一个并无特别之处的命题：在适用平衡测试时，审判法院不得忽视总体问题，即“是否应基于摆在其面前的特定事实暂停该民事诉讼，以及此类暂停将在何种程度上给一方当事人、公众或法院造成困难、不公平或不正义。”Louis Vuitton, 676 F.3d at 99-100。\n\nii. 其他考量\n\n35. Louis Vuitton 的另一个被暂停动议刻意忽略的方面是，第二巡回区指出，与暂停请求相关的关切也可通过“替代性救济形式加以处理，例如量身定制的暂停、保护令、撤销或修改传票，[或]封存保密材料。”Louis Vuitton, 676 F.3d at 102。换言之，“全面暂停民事诉讼并非保障[被告]权利及缓解其可能合理持有的关切的唯一手段。”Gran Sabana Corp., 2021 WL 3666116, at \\*3。\n\n27 参见法律备忘录第16页（引用 Louis Vuitton, 676 F.3d at 99）。\n\n36. 较温和措施的可用性直接引出 Louis Vuitton 所强调的另一项考量，即所请求暂停背后的真实动机或目的。第二巡回区指出，“记录中没有任何内容表明被告曾寻求过此类替代性救济”，并据此认定，被告“坚持要求暂停民事程序”实际上“是整体拖延和混淆这一更大模式的一部分”。Louis Vuitton, 676 F.3d at 102。第二巡回区进一步指出，鉴于被告“明显拖延的策略……甚至在其被起诉之前”，其支持所请求暂停的论点“听来空洞无物”。同上（原文强调）。\n\nB. 债务人未满足取得所请求暂停的举证责任\n\n37. 将平衡测试及 Louis Vuitton 所阐述的其他考量适用于本案事实，显然完全不存在任何依据——更不用说非常情形——可准予对破产案件的全面暂停。事实上，除第二项因素（即债务人已被起诉）外，评估暂停动议的所有因素及考量均支持驳回暂停动议。\n\ni. 因素1：破产案件与刑事案件之间的重叠有限\n\n38. 与债务人的夸大其词相反，受托人为识别和追回破产财产所作的努力与该等刑事程序之间仅存在有限重叠。\n\n39. 在 United States v. Simon, 373 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1967) 一案中，地区法院禁止破产受托人（为期九十日）对同时在另一独立刑事事项中被列名的某些个人进行证言录取。第二巡回区撤销地区法院的裁定，认为地区法院依赖民事与刑事事项源于相同或相关交易的案件存在错误，因为受托人“正代表[债务人]的债权人和证券持有人追究一项独立诉因，该诉因在起诉书被提出一年多以前即已开始。”同上，第653-54页。\n\n40. 如同 Simon 案中的受托人，受托人仅为履行其对破产财产及其债权人的信义义务而行事。受托人并非寻求确立债务人的刑事责任，而是着重证明：某些名义上由债务人家庭成员或商业伙伴拥有的公司，实际上是债务人的替身实体，及／或其资产在衡平法上归债务人所有。这并不要求受托人证明债务人实施了任何犯罪，或证明用于购买相关财产的资金系所称欺诈计划的收益。无论如何，在债务人认为受托人的调查在某些情形下侵犯其作为刑事被告的权利的范围内，没有理由认为破产法院或 Connecticut District Court（康涅狄格地区法院）不能处理该等问题。债务人亦仍可在个案基础上向本院寻求具体救济。\n\nii. 因素3：全面暂停破产案件将对数千名债权人造成不当损害\n\n41. 在该等刑事程序期间全面暂停破产案件，将对债务人的债权人造成重大损害。暂停破产案件将大幅延迟——可能长达数年——数千项债权的解决以及对债务人资产的任何分配。鉴于自动中止，债务人的债权人没有其他法院可供解决其针对债务人的债权或从债务人资产中获得清偿。这与债务人选择启动其 chapter 11 案件的情形形成鲜明对比（尽管其不满该案件的发展过程）。\n\n42. 然而，延迟分配并非对债权人的唯一损害。暂停受托人的调查将大幅增加以下风险：债务人、其家庭成员及其商业伙伴将继续试图将资产转移至受托人无法触及的范围之外。参见 Bernard, 2017 WL 2984022, at \\*3（“原告面临的风险在本案中尤为重大，因为法院已认定，除其他事项外，Lombardo先生滥用了公司形式……”）。这绝非纯粹猜测，因为在破产案件期间，债务人的家庭成员和关联人士已经多次采取行动，试图转移或控制可能属于破产财产的资产。例如：\n\n如本院在驳回王雁平（Yvette Wang）女士的保释请求时已认定，2023年1月，王女士将郭文贵（Ho Wan Kwok）关联实体 Ace Decade Holdings Limited（艾斯十年控股有限公司，以下简称“Ace Decade”）的股份转让给债务人在瑞士的另一名关联人。参见 ECF No. 110。该转让发生时，破产法院（Bankruptcy Court）正在审理受托人要求裁定债务人因未将 Ace Decade 转让给受托人而藐视法庭的动议（该动议最终获破产法院准许）。更严重的是，在该转让发生时，债务人已同意（根据破产法院作出的命令）不对破产法院认定其事实上为 Ace Decade 的受益所有人提出异议。28 参见 Bankr. ECF No. 1110。\n\n同样，本院认定，“在王雁平因本案被捕后，她仍继续指示共谋者从与涉嫌欺诈计划所涉实体关联的账户中转移资金。”参见 ECF No. 110。\n\n2022年夏季，另一家据称由债务人女儿所有的空壳公司 Whitecroft Shore Limited（怀特克罗夫特海岸有限公司）以超过 $10 million 的购买价将一架私人飞机转让给身份不明的第三方。令人难以置信的是，债务人的女儿作证称，她不知道买方的姓名，也不知道该出售所得款项的去向。受托人认为该私人飞机由债务人实际受益所有，并已提起对抗诉讼，以追回此次未经授权的破产申请提交后出售所得款项。\n\n2022年4月，据称由债务人妻子所有的实体 Greenwich Land（格林尼治地产）以 $2.2 million 出售了位于康涅狄格州格林尼治的一处房产。受托人已对 Greenwich Land 提起对抗诉讼，请求裁定，其中包括，Greenwich Land 是债务人的另一个自我，且债务人是 Greenwich Land 的衡平所有人。2022年4月的房产出售尤为恶劣，因为该出售违反了一名债务人债权人针对债务人在纽约州法院提起的诉讼中发出的限制通知。29\n\n28. 受托人拟就此公然违反自动中止的行为对王女士提起诉讼。\n\n29. 该限制通知除其他事项外告知 Greenwich Land：“我们了解到，[债务人]可能对贵方及贵方资产拥有直接、间接或受益所有权，或者拥有指示或控制贵方及贵方资产的权利或能力”，并且“特此禁止贵方就任何[债务人]享有权益的财产进行或容许进行任何出售、让与或转让，或对该等财产实施任何干扰，除非 New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 5222(b) 另有规定。”该限制通知的副本作为 Adv. Proc. No. 23-5005 中 ECF No. 1-47 的一部分提交，并作为 Bassett 声明的附件9附后。\n\n43. 根据受托人的调查，上述事例仅是债务人及其关联人为剥夺债务人债权人追偿而持续采取行动的冰山一角。受托人正继续调查各类空壳公司进行的数百万美元转让；受托人认为，这些空壳公司由债务人实际受益所有。若破产案件被中止，这些转让将得以不受阻碍地继续进行。更严重的是，在全面中止期间，此类转让的信息将变得陈旧；一旦中止解除，受托人将不得不以高昂成本重新开始调查，并进一步延误破产财产的管理。\n\n44. 此外，所请求的中止将危及受托人在适用的两年时效期间内提起有价值撤销诉讼的能力；该期限将于2024年2月届满（即债务人提交第11章申请两周年）。参见 11 U.S.C. §§ 108(a)(2); 546(a)。受托人承认破产法院所述，即受托人或可寻求延长该期限；30 然而，除非获得每名被告的同意（这并不可能，尤其是在受托人的调查被中止的情况下）及/或适用衡平时效中止（其结果并不确定，且将需要昂贵的附带诉讼），权威观点的主流明确表明，该期限通常无法延长。参见，例如，In re U.S. Lines Inc., 262 B.R. 223, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)（认定通常允许延长破产期限的 Bankruptcy Rule 9006，“依其文本，并未授权法院延长该等[时效期限及 11 U.S.C. § 108(c)]期限。该规则仅授权法院延长‘由本规则、根据本规则发出的通知或法院命令……’所设定的期限。Bankr. R. 9006(b)(1).”）；In re Walnut Hill, Inc., No. 16-20960 (JJT), 2018 WL 2672242, at *2 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 1, 2018)（“Rule 9006(b) 不得适用于 Section 546(a)，否则将违反宪法所保留的权力分立原则。立法机关既已作出权威性规定，修改其决定并非司法机关的职责。”）；In re Randolph Hosp., Inc., No. 20-10247, 2022 WL 19298765, at *1 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2022)（“Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9006(b) 不得用于延长诸如根据 11 U.S.C. §§ 108 and 546 所设定的法定期限。”）。\n\n30. 参见 Sept. 12, 2023 Hr'g Tr. at 32:14-15。听证会记录的相关摘录作为 Bassett 声明的附件10附后。\n\n45. 鉴于受托人可以质疑在债务人提交第11章申请之日前最早可追溯至10年的、可能涉及数百万美元的申请前转让，无法主张破产财产诉因将对债权人造成极大损害。\n\niii. 因素4：允许破产案件继续进行不会对债务人造成不利影响\n\n46. 债务人在中止动议中提出了破产案件近期发生的若干事项；在其看来，这些事项侵犯了其作为刑事被告人的宪法权利。然而，经过仔细审视，无论单独还是合并考察，这些事项均不会对债务人造成不利影响。\n\n1. 藐视法庭裁定不会损害债务人的宪法权利，且无论如何现已无实际争议\n\n47. 在整个破产案件过程中，债务人均有充分且公平的机会在破产法院就受托人的证据开示请求提出异议——事实上也确实提出了异议——包括其可以基于第五修正案不自证其罪权利拒绝提交文件的主张。破产法院最终驳回债务人的主张，并不意味着其因此受到不利影响。破产法院也并非听命于受托人；31 事实上，藐视法庭裁定驳回了受托人的许多主张，包括关于提交行为原则适用的主张。即使仅对藐视法庭裁定进行粗略审阅，也应当显而易见，Manning 破产法官（Bankruptcy Judge Manning）极为严肃地履行了其审查债务人宪法权利范围的职责。\n\n31. 债务人主张，受托人以某种方式从破产法院“取得”了藐视法庭裁定。Mem. of Law at 2。\n\n48. 债务人主张，其向受托人提交其在本案中从政府取得的披露材料，会以某种方式损害其作为刑事被告人的权利。然而，藐视法庭裁定仅要求债务人作为传递渠道，向受托人提交政府向债务人提供的信息，因此债务人不会因提交该等文件而对其进行认证。但无论如何，该论点现已无实际争议，因为如上所述，受托人目前并未追索这些文件，并将相应请求破产法院修改藐视法庭裁定。\n\n49. 若债务人对藐视法庭裁定的任何其他方面不满，其当然可以向 Connecticut District Court（康涅狄格联邦地区法院）及 Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）寻求上诉审查，包括以加急方式寻求审查。事实上，债务人已向康涅狄格联邦地区法院提交动议，请求准许就藐视法庭裁定提起上诉（受托人已对此动议提出反对）。32 值得注意的是，债务人尚未请求加急审理其上诉许可申请，亦未申请在上诉期间中止执行。\n\n32. 截至提交本反对意见时，康涅狄格联邦地区法院尚未就债务人的动议作出裁定。\n\n2. 特权裁定并不支持所请求的中止\n\n50. 债务人声称受托人以某种方式侵犯了债务人的律师—委托人保密特权，这一主张完全没有依据。法律基本原理是，在指定受托人后，债务人或其律师本可根据任何适用法律主张的债务人律师—委托人保密特权及律师工作成果保护，均转移给受托人。参见 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 353-54 (1985)（“显然，受托人所扮演的角色最接近于有偿付能力公司的管理层”，而且“将公司律师—委托人保密特权的控制权授予受托人，最符合破产程序外将放弃特权的权力分配给管理层的做法，且丝毫不会妨碍 Bankruptcy Code 的周密设计。”）。当然，受托人承认，当债务人为个人时，法院通过对申请前33 通讯进行利益衡量测试来实施 Weintraub 裁决，以确定所涉特权最密切相关的是受托人在 Bankruptcy Code 下的权利、义务及责任分配，还是该特权主要关涉债务人作为个人的利益。参见，例如，In re Bame, 251 B.R. 367, 375 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2000)。事实上，在受托人获指定后不久，所有这些问题均已在破产法院进行书面陈述和辩论，债务人强烈反对受托人请求作出命令确认债务人的特权已转移给受托人（受前述限制约束）。\n\n33. 对于在破产申请提交后、但在指定受托人之前制作的特权文件，法院不适用利益衡量测试。相反，当受托人接管破产财产管理时，该等文件的特权自动转移给受托人。参见，例如，Bame, 251 B.R. at 375（“我认定，就债务人作为 DIP 期间 Kennedy & Graven 与债务人之间的通讯而言，凡涉及破产财产管理的一切事项，特别是资产披露及追回，律师—委托人保密特权均已转移给受托人。”）。\n\n51. 最终，鉴于压倒性的权威观点支持受托人的立场，债务人同意采用特权裁定所体现的协商一致解决方案；该裁定包含多项经协商确定的、对债务人的保护措施。其中包括：\n\n受托人无权在未经债务人书面同意或法院进一步命令的情况下放弃任何受托人特权（例如，通过在公开法庭或任何公开案卷中披露特权文件或信息，或与第三方分享该等文件或信息）；并且，受托人所提交的任何包含或描述受托人特权所涵盖文件或信息的文件，均应当密封提交。\n\nPrivilege Order ¶ 8。此外，特权裁定规定，其中任何内容均不妨碍债务人“就与调查事项无关的法律事项主张任何及全部特权，例如无关的刑事指控……”。同上 ¶ 4（着重号为原文所加）。\n\n52. 鉴于特权已移转给受托人（正如Privileges Order（特权命令）所确认的那样），受托人向债务人的律师寻求文件并无任何不当之处，即使所有这些文件均受特权保护（而这绝非已成定局）。基于这些及其他原因，破产法院适当地授权受托人向债务人的律师发出传票。与特权命令一致，该等传票并不寻求与调查事项（Investigation Topics）无关的受特权保护材料。34\n\n34. 如特权命令所界定，“调查事项”涉及“(i) 资产（包括实际或潜在的诉因），该等资产(A) 现由或曾由债务人持有，(B) 现由或曾由他人持有，且受托人正根据Rule 2004 Subpoenas（规则2004传票）对其进行调查，以确定其是否持有或可能持有关于债务人现持有或可能曾持有权益的资产的信息，或(C) 以其他方式与债务人的破产财产有关，或可能被纳入债务人的破产财产，(ii) 债务人的财务状况（包括但不限于破产财产的负债），或(iii) 与破产财产管理有关的活动……。”Privileges Order ¶ 2.\n\n53. 此外，受托人并未与政府分享受特权保护的通信，亦未以其他方式违反其在特权命令下的义务。债务人称受托人会毫无“顾忌”地这样做，完全没有根据。35 尽管受托人确曾与政府分享其关于Mahwah Mansion（Mahwah庄园）由债务人衡平拥有的结论，但他并未如债务人所称分享其法律分析；而且无论如何，该法律分析并非基于受托人在证据开示过程中获得的受特权保护的信息。\n\n35. Mem. of Law at 25.\n\n54. 倘若受托人将来寻求放弃任何特权，他当然会遵守特权命令的条款——在未经债务人同意的情况下，该命令将要求向破产法院申请救济。受托人放弃特权的能力可能存在“争议”，这一点毫无意义。36 如发生此类争议，将在通知债务人的情况下启动，且债务人将有机会陈述意见。\n\n36. Mem. of Law at 14.\n\n3. Mahwah对抗程序不会不利影响债务人作为刑事被告人的权利\n\n55. 债务人所称其因PI Order（初步禁令命令）而将失去获取Mahwah庄园内证据的机会这一担忧，也是另一项转移视线的说辞。债务人纯粹出于策略目的捏造了该论点。债务人基于Mahwah庄园已被移交受托人处置这一观点提出其担忧，但这完全不实。除非受托人的对抗程序已完成诉讼，破产法院不会决定该庄园是否属于破产财产。即使如此，假设受托人在所有权问题上胜诉，他仍须就任何出售取得破产法院进一步批准，并向所有利害关系方发出通知和举行听证。届时，债务人将有机会提出其对受托人拟议出售可能存在的任何担忧。37 在此之前，债务人的刑事辩护律师可以进入Mahwah庄园，或对其拍照或录制必要的视频，并无任何阻碍。\n\n37. 本院亦不应采信债务人关于受托人已放弃或寻求放弃Sherry Netherland Apartment（Sherry Netherland公寓）内财产的主张。这显然不实。事实上，2023年4月14日，受托人提交了一项动议，请求限制就放弃某些财产的概括性动议发出通知[Bankr. ECF No. 1666]。在Bravo Luck Limited提出异议后（其提出担忧，认为该即将提出的动议将寻求放弃Sherry Netherland公寓内的财产），受托人在2023年4月20日的听证会上记录在案地表示，其寻求放弃的财产不会对Sherry Netherland公寓产生影响；破产法院在其后续命令中采纳了该陈述。见Bankr. ECF No. 1809，作为Bassett Declaration（Bassett声明）的附件11附后。\n\n56. PI命令提供临时救济以保护Mahwah庄园，且绝不会损害债务人。恰恰相反，PI命令旨在将该庄园及其内部物品维持于现状，因此有利于债务人。PI命令中没有任何内容阻止债务人或其律师访问该财产。事实上，PI命令明确规定，任何人经本院或破产法院批准均可进入该财产，38 并且还允许各方在获得受托人同意后进入该庄园。受托人不反对债务人的律师在遵守适当保障措施的前提下访问该庄园，亦不争议本院作出该等批准的权限。然而，迄今为止，债务人的律师从未向受托人提出任何此类请求，这进一步表明该论点是出于策略目的而捏造的。39\n\n38. 此情形与Sherry Netherland公寓的情形并无不同；破产法院就该公寓作出的相关命令允许债务人向本院申请授权访问该公寓，而其律师确已如此办理。见ECF No. 79\n\n39. 无论如何，债务人所称其对其被指称受害人在最终没收程序中权利的担忧尤其令人难以苟同，因为仅在债务人被定罪时才会发生没收。\n\n57. 债务人与Settlement Agreement（和解协议）有关的论点同样毫无根据。和解协议的唯一目的，是处理Mahwah庄园同时是(i) 债务人第11章破产财产中被主张的一项资产，以及(ii) 政府确定在债务人被定罪时将予以没收的一项财产这一事实。该协议不仅适当，而且对于保护债务人在其第11章案件中的债权人以及其被指称欺诈行为受害人的权利亦属必要。和解协议中没有任何内容损害债务人的权利，亦不体现受托人与政府之间的不当协调。\n\n58. 最后，债务人对受托人将于Mahwah庄园拍摄的某些照片附于其在Mahwah对抗程序中的起诉状一事所表现出的所谓愤慨，完全不得其所。受托人在将这些照片附于其起诉状之前，已删节其中所有私密／个人信息。受托人并未如债务人所称承认这些照片被“无意中”提交至公开案卷。40 实际上，受托人曾联系债务人的律师，以协调提交一项联合动议，要求密封Mahwah起诉状的某些附件，41 而债务人的律师从未回应受托人，这充分说明了债务人在该问题上的“担忧”。\n\n40. Mem. of Law at 10 n. 4.\n\n41. 见致Eric Henzy就密封Mahwah起诉状附件动议所发的电子邮件，作为Bassett声明的附件12附后。\n\niv. 因素5：破产法院的利益不利于暂停破产案件\n\n59. 破产法院与任何法院一样，对“以节约其自身时间和精力的方式处理其案卷上的诉讼事项”具有“公认的利益”。Louis Vuitton, 676 F.3d at 104 (quoting Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)). 鉴于债务人、其家庭成员及其商业伙伴为拖延受托人的调查而采取了众多拖延手段，这一利益在本案中尤为突出。债务人的第11章案件已待决近19个月，导致破产法院多次对债务人及其他人引发的各种拖延表示不满。将整个案件暂停数月乃至数年，显然将违背破产法院最终解决债务人案件并将其从法院案卷中移除的利益。\n\nv. 因素6：公共利益不利于暂停破产案件\n\n60. 公众对运作良好的破产制度具有利益。然而，暂停动议寻求将破产案件搁置一段不确定的时间；事实上，与该等刑事程序有关的所有上诉可能需要数年才能得到解决。债务人不应当既享受破产的利益（包括针对债权人行动的全球自动暂停），又无需履行其任何负担（包括与受托人合作以及交出破产财产和任何记录的信息）。正如一法院恰当地指出：\n\n除非存在更多情形，不能认为给予一名被指称欺诈的债务人的保护，凌驾于保护债权人和整个破产制度的需要之上。……[如果情况如此，]……债务人将有权在有关不当行为的指控得到处理期间，无限期地使其债权人处于等待状态。这样做将挫败公众对迅速解决破产程序的利益。\n\nLayng v. Garcia (In re Garcia), 569 B.R. 480 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2017). 债务人请求的暂停将引发正是这些担忧，因为该暂停将允许债务人在其本人及其资产仍免受民事责任追究的同时，使其债权人被无限期挟持。因此，公共利益强烈不利于准许暂停动议。\n\nIII. 答辩方不反对债务人所提替代救济的第(i)、(ii)及(iv)类别\n\n61. 债务人默示承认，存在比全面暂停破产案件更温和的措施可处理其所称担忧，因此备选地寻求四类救济。具体而言，他请求本院：\n\n(i) 修改Protective Order（保护令），允许将本案中的证据开示材料提供给受托人；(ii) 指示在本案及任何由此产生的上诉待决期间，继续允许Kwok先生的辩护团队进入Mahwah Facility（Mahwah设施）；(iii) 禁止政府在本案及任何由此产生的上诉待决期间，在破产案件中促成出售Mahwah设施；(iv) 命令政府不得向受托人招揽或接收任何受属于Kwok先生的任何特权保护的信息或记录，并标明受托人已提供的任何此类材料。42\n\n42. Mem. of Law at 30.\n\n62. 受托人总体上对这些请求少有异议。关于第一项，如上所述，受托人目前正撤回其对该等证据开示材料的请求。因此，债务人在这方面的担忧已获处理，此事现已无实际意义。第(ii)项和第(iv)项总体上可为受托人接受，但须就债务人律师进入Mahwah庄园设置可能的保障措施。最后，第(iii)项目前并非争议，因为与最终出售Mahwah庄园有关的任何救济均为时过早。破产法院尚未认定Mahwah庄园属于破产财产，因此受托人不能出售该庄园。债务人对出售该庄园可能存在的任何担忧，可在拟议出售被提交至破产法院时或如被提交时再行处理；或者，如属适当，债务人可向本院重新提出其请求。\n\nIV. 本院应驳回Wang女士关于全面暂停破产案件的请求\n\n63. 最后，基于上述同样理由，法院亦应驳回王女士（Ms. Wang）提出的全面中止请求。事实上，她的请求所依据的理由甚至比债务人（Debtor）的请求更为薄弱，因为她既不是破产案件（Bankruptcy Case）中的债务人，也不是破产案件中任何未决对抗程序（adversary proceedings）的被告。由于不存在任何与破产案件相关、针对王女士的未决程序，法院甚至不存在可以就王女士予以中止的程序。\n\n结论\n\n64. 基于上述理由，中止动议（Stay Motion）应由破产法院（Bankruptcy Court）审议并裁决。在法院倾向于审议中止动议实体理由的范围内，被申请人（Respondents）主张，应驳回中止动议及加入动议（Joinder）中关于中止的请求，但应准许所请求的替代救济形式（但须受本文所讨论修改的约束）。\n\n[本页其余部分特意留空。]\n\n日期：September 21, 2023\n\n签署人：/s/ Nicholas A. Bassett\n\nNicholas A. Bassett（尼古拉斯·A·巴塞特） PAUL HASTINGS LLP（普衡律师事务所） 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C., 20036 (202) 551-1902 nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n以及\n\nLuc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯潘） Adam J. Fee（亚当·J·费） G. Alexander Bongartz（G·亚历山大·邦加茨） PAUL HASTINGS LLP（普衡律师事务所） 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6000 lucdespins@paulhastings.com adamfee@paulhastings.com alexbongartz@paulhastings.com\n\n作为第11章受托人（Chapter 11 Trustee）的 Luc A. Despins、Genever Holdings Corporation（Genever Holdings 公司）及 Genever Holdings LLC（Genever Holdings 有限责任公司）的律师\n\n附件3\n\n美国联邦地区法院（UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT）纽约南区（SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK）\n\n美利坚合众国（UNITED STATES OF AMERICA）\n\n—诉—\n\n案号：1:23-CR-118-1 (AT)\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），\n\n被告。\n\n第11章受托人及 GENEVER 债务人就反对被告 HO WAN KWOK 要求作出中止破产案件的命令及令状，或备选请求其他救济之动议的答复所提交的 NICHOLAS BASSETT 声明\n\n1. 本人系 Paul Hastings LLP（普衡律师事务所）的合伙人，该所担任上述标题所列 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）第11章案件（以下简称“第11章案件”）中第11章受托人（以下简称“受托人”）Luc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯潘）的律师。本人作出本声明（以下简称“声明”），以支持第11章受托人及 Genever 债务人就反对被告 Ho Wan Kwok 要求作出中止破产案件的命令及令状，或备选请求其他救济之动议（以下简称“反对意见”）所提交的答复。\n\n2. 随附于此的是下列文件的真实、正确副本：\n\n附件　附件说明\n\n1.　关于动议的裁决及命令，PAX v. Kwok，案卷号 652077/2017（N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 2022）[Docket No. 1181]\n\n2.　部分准许初步禁令动议的更正裁决备忘录（Adv. Proc. No. 22-05032, Jan. 13, 2023）[Bankr. ECF No. 133]\n\n3.　意见及命令，An v. Despins，22-cv-10062 (VEC)（S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2023）[Docket No. 29]\n\n4.　意见及命令，Gong v. Sarnoff，23-cv-343 (LJL)（S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2023）[Docket No. 72]\n\n5.　驳回撤诉动议（不妨碍重新提出）并准许加入任命第11章受托人动议的裁决备忘录及命令 [Bankr. ECF No. 465]\n\n6.　提交 Ho Wan Kwok 先生关于在涉及 Rule 2004 证据开示中援引第五修正案特权之声明的通知 [Bankr. ECF No. 1444]\n\n7.　认定个人债务人藐视法庭并驳回中止强制提交命令之动议的裁决备忘录及命令 [Bankr. ECF No. 2035]\n\n8.　准许修改初步禁令的紧急动议之命令 [ECF No. 58 in Adv. Proc. No. 23-5017]\n\n9.　限制通知 [作为 Adv. Proc. No. 23-5005 中 ECF No. 1-47 的一部分提交]\n\n10.　September 12, 2023 听证会记录（节选）\n\n11.　驳回请求免除判决书/命令之动议的命令\n[Bankr. ECF No. 1809]\n\n12.　关于密封 Mahwah 起诉状附件之动议的 August 2023 电子邮件\n\n本人在伪证处罚的约束下声明，上述内容真实且正确。\n\n签署人：/s/ Nicholas A. Bassett\n\nNicholas A. Bassett（尼古拉斯·A·巴塞特） PAUL HASTINGS LLP（普衡律师事务所） 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C., 20036 (202) 551-1902 nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n附件1\n\n纽约州最高法院（SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK）纽约县（NEW YORK COUNTY）\n\n出庭：　HON. BARRY R. OSTRAGER（巴里·R·奥斯特拉格法官）　审判庭　IAS MOTION 61EFM\n\n法官\n\nPACIFIC ALLIANCE ASIA OPPORTUNITY FUND L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙企业），　案卷号　652077/2017\n\n原告，\n\n诉　—　动议日期\n\nKWOK HO WAN（郭浩云），又名 KWOK HO，又名 GWO WEN GUI，又名 GUO WENGUI，又名 GUO WEN-GUI，又名　动议序号　019\n\nWAN GUE HAOYUN，又名 MILES KWOK，又名 HAOYUN GUO，GENEVER HOLDINGS LLC（Genever Holdings 有限责任公司），以及　关于动议的裁决及命令\n\nGENEVER HOLDINGS CORPORATION（Genever Holdings 公司），\n\n被告。 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------X　HON. BARRY R. OSTRAGER（巴里·R·奥斯特拉格法官）\n\n在本案这宗始于2017年、已有1,180项案卷记录的案件中——其中几乎全部涉及被告 Kwok Ho Wan（以下简称“Kwok”）通过将其巨额个人资产存放于一系列公司、受信赖的亲信及家庭成员名下，以规避并欺骗其债权人的行为——本院被要求裁定，原告 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（以下简称“PAX”）是否已满足举证责任，以确立本院应对 Kwok 作出最终民事藐视法庭命令。基于下述理由，本院同时作出最终民事藐视法庭命令。\n\nPAX 于 February 3, 2021 获得针对 Kwok 的 $116,402,019.57 判决书（NYSCEF Doc. No. 716）。此后，PAX 开展了长达一年的工作以执行其判决书，先识别、继而试图对 Kwok 在美国的资产实施扣押。PAX 在识别由 Kwok 行使控制权的资产时遇到困难，因为自称为亿万富翁的 Kwok 已将其资产藏匿于错综复杂的公司实体及家庭成员名下。该安排使 Kwok 得以声称其没有资产，尽管其生活奢华；原告已通过社交媒体剪报、照片和录像汇集材料，显示 Kwok 奢靡生活并炫耀其财富、昂贵住宅、私人飞机及游艇。如 February 2, 2022 诉讼记录所指出，该证据的证明价值甚微，因为提供该证据的证人对该“证据”的真实性并无第一手了解，仅知其可在各种网站上获取。\n\n于 February 2, 2022，本院举行了一次证据听证会，七名证人通过宣誓书提交直接证词，并可供交叉询问。该听证会之前，PAX 曾进行长期程序，以查找并扣押属于被告 Kwok 的资产。这些程序尤其确立，Kwok 对名为 Lady May 的游艇行使支配和控制，并因此产生一系列命令，限制 Kwok 和/或名为 Lady May 的游艇的登记船主将 Lady May 移出本院的管辖范围。如下文详细说明，首项该等命令于 September 30, 2020 作出，随后于 October 15, 2020 作出的命令限制“Kwok 先生和/或……该游艇，即‘Lady May’的登记船主”离开本院管辖范围。(NYSCEF Doc. No. 630)。如下文详细说明，Kwok 于2020年7月、8月及9月的大部分时间均在 Lady May 上度过。在导致 September 30 和 October 15, 2020 限制命令的程序进行期间，Kwok 及其同伙安排 Lady May 于2020年10月初驶往佛罗里达州，此后前往巴哈马。于 March 16, 2021，法院作出有条件民事藐视法庭命令，指示如 Kwok 未能于 May 31, 2021 前将 Lady May 送回本院管辖范围，则 Lady May 每在本院管辖范围外停留一日，他须缴纳 $500,000.00 罚款。\n\n上诉庭第一部门（Appellate Division, First Department）维持了本院认定 Kwok 构成有条件民事藐视法庭的命令，并认定“每日 $500,000.00 的罚款旨在强力鼓励被告消除其藐视法庭行为；尽管其获准这样做，但他并未显示出任何这样做的兴趣。……”NYSCEF Doc. No. 953, 199 AD3d 423 (2021)。上诉庭还裁定：\n\n动议法院在认定被告构成民事藐视法庭时，行使了其裁量权，因为原告已以清楚且令人信服的证据证明，被告违反了其知悉的一项合法、明确的法院命令，且该违反行为造成对原告权利的损害（见 El-Dehdan v El-Dehdan, 26 NY3d 19, 29 [2015]；Judiciary Law § 753）。……动议法院被指示继续举行证据听证会，以解决关于游艇所有权和控制权的争议，并评估适当的处罚。\n\n依照上诉庭的命令，本院安排了 February 2, 2022 的证据听证会，以解决 Kwok 是否实益拥有并控制该游艇的问题。Kwok 未在 February 2, 2022 听证会上作证；此前，为回应 PAX 的资产证据开示工作，他曾援引第五修正案赋予的权利，拒绝就与 Lady May 有关的证据开示请求作证或答复。PX 27, 28, 29, 30.1 尽管援引了第五修正案，Kwok 仍是多个法域中的积极诉讼当事人，并且此前曾在本案及其他程序中作证。\n\nKwok 还在本院提交了一份题为 Guo Wengui a/k/a Miles Kwok v Hong Zeng, 157025/2020 的起诉状，其中提及 Freebeacon.com 于 September 8, 2017 发布的一篇博客文章；Kwok 在该文中抱怨“涉及其152英尺机动游艇 Lady May 的若干事件……”（起诉状第8段，NYSCEF Doc. No. 001）（以下简称“Zeng 起诉状”）。Zeng 起诉状将 Kwok 描述为“一名直言不讳批评中国共产党的人士”，其已竭尽全力“揭露中国共产党及中国政府内部猖獗的腐败”。《华盛顿邮报》（The Washington Post）报道称，前特朗普总统顾问 Steve Bannon（史蒂夫·班农）于2020年在 Lady May 船上被捕，并将班农先生描述为 Kwok 的朋友和商业伙伴；Kwok 是“一名直言不讳的中国政府网络批评者，他曾与该国情报机构关系密切，但现因欺诈、勒索和贿赂指控而被北京当局通缉”。\n\n1 “PX”是指原告的审判证据附件。\n\n其他新闻媒体报道称，班农先生曾不止一次使用 Kwok 的私人飞机前往政治集会。\n\n听证会上从被告证人口中获得的证词，以清楚且令人信服的方式证明，Kwok 实益拥有并控制 Lady May，且其对本院和司法程序抱有彻底蔑视。\n\nKwok 曾是 Hong Kong Investments Limited（以下简称“HK International”）的唯一股东。听证会上获得的证词表明，于2014年，Kwok 无偿将 HK International 的100%权益转让给一名 Qu Guo Jiao。Qu 女士是 Kwok 家族信赖的商业伙伴。此后，Kwok 逃离中国，并于 February 23, 2015，HK International 以 £ 28 million GBP 购得 Lady May。听证会上获得的证词未能确定购买 Lady May 的资金来源，但 Kwok 的女儿 Mei Guo 无可反驳的证词证明，Qu 女士并未提供购买该游艇的资金。Tr. 44. 2 因此，可以作出合理推论，即 Kwok 向 HK International 提供了用于购买该游艇的资金。无争议的是，Qu 女士于 June 17, 2017 前后，以 $1 或无偿将 Lady May 的所有权转让给 Kwok 的女儿 Mei Guo。Tr. 47. 根据 Guo 女士的宣誓书（NYSCEF Doc. No. 1162），Guo 女士最终将 Lady May 的所有权转让给现任登记所有人 HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC（以下简称“HK USA”）。Guo 女士进一步声明，她是 HK USA 的唯一所有人，尽管所有数百万美元的年度开支用于\n\n2 “Tr.”系指证据听证会记录，载于 NYSCEF Doc. No. 1179。\n\nLady May（“五月女士”号）游艇的费用，包括燃油、维护以及船长和船员的费用，均由 Golden Spring (New York) Ltd.（金泉（纽约）有限公司，以下简称“Golden Spring”）支付；据称该公司为 Kwok（郭文贵）家族办公室。\n\n在听证会上，Guo 女士作证称，她的兄长为她购买了 Lady May。Tr. 46。本院无法采信该证词，因为没有证据表明 Guo 女士的兄长参与了导致 Guo 女士取得该游艇所有权的公司交易。事实上，针对本院的提问，Guo 女士承认，在她取得该游艇之前发生的任何转让中，她的兄长均未参与。Tr. 47。\n\n听证会上提出的其他证词表明，Kwok 每年夏季均多次登上该游艇，而 Guo 女士极少登艇。Trial Tr. 88:8-20。Lady May 的船长作证称，Kwok 在 2020 年 7 月、8 月和 9 月的大部分时间均在该游艇上，这与其夏季的一贯做法相符。Trial Tr. 87:24-88:7。在本院于 September 30, 2020 作出禁止令之后，Lady May 于 October 2020 被送往 Florida，随后前往 Bahamas 维修，之后又于 October 2021 被派往 Italy，据称系依 Golden Spring 的指示。Guo 女士承认，她知悉本院的 September 30, 2020 禁止令，以及本院随后于 March 16, 2021 作出的命令，要求将 Lady May 送回本院管辖范围。Tr. 55; 57-60; 62。\n\nGuo 女士作证称，一方面，她决定 Lady May 的航行路线；但另一方面，她又作证称，对 Kwok 的安保如此担忧，以致不会留存任何航行路线记录。Tr. 52。她进一步作证称，当其父亲未由她陪同而在游艇上时，他可自由选择前往任何想去的地方。Tr. 50。然而，根本问题在于，谁指示于 October 2020 将该游艇移出本院管辖范围。Guo 女士主张，在 October 2020 初，她不再希望\n\n使用该游艇，并将该指示传达给 Golden Spring；Golden Spring 随即将其指示转达给当时的船长 Captain Heaslop（希斯洛普船长）。Tr. 53。\n\n经进一步询问，Guo 女士承认，是 Golden Spring 告知她该游艇需要移往较温暖的地方。Tr. 55。Guo 女士随后重复了其已收回的证词，即其兄长将该游艇赠与她，并称其兄长是 Golden Spring 的唯一所有人。Tr. 56。该证词不可信，因为在 September 30, 2020，本院作出临时禁止令，禁止 Kwok\n\n. . . 作出或导致作出任何出售、让与、转让，或干扰其享有任何权益的任何财产，或支付、以其他方式处分现已到期或此后到期应付给他的任何债务，但 CPLR 5222 及正常业务过程中规定的例外情形除外。\n\nNYSCEF Doc. No. 591。值得注意的是，Captain Heaslop，即当时 Lady May 的船长，作证称，在 Lady May 于 October 2020 初启程前往 Florida 前“数日”，Kwok 告知 Captain Heaslop，Kwok 将不再作为 Lady May 的宾客登艇（且显然是在本院 September 30, 2020 命令作出之后）。Tr. 89。Captain Heaslop 还反驳了 Guo 女士关于由其向 Captain Heaslop 发出游艇移动指示的证词。Tr. 94。\n\nGuo 女士还承认，其后来阅读了本院 March 16, 2021 作出的命令，该命令要求在 May 31, 2021 前将 Lady May 送回本院管辖范围（NYSCEF Doc. No. 728）。她还承认，她已与其律师讨论该命令（该律师服务费由 Golden Spring 支付），且她无视了该命令。\n\nRussell Stockil（罗素·斯托基尔），Yachtzoo SARL（游艇动物园有限责任公司）的游艇管理总监，作证称，其公司与 HK USA（香港美国公司）订有一份日期为 May 2021 的管理合同；他与 HK USA 和 Golden Spring 沟通，但从未与 Guo 女士沟通。Tr. 78。继任船长 Captain Momchil Ivanov（莫姆奇尔·伊万诺夫船长）亦作出相同证词。Tr. 82。简言之，Guo 女士关于其拥有并\n\n控制 Lady May 的证词，在任何方面均无法采信。Guo 女士看似为一名二十多岁的女性，未提出任何证据证明其曾对 Lady May 行使支配和控制，亦未提供任何证明表明其取得 Lady May 的占有，除非这只是为保护 Lady May 免遭其父亲债权人扣押而设的幌子。\n\nKwok 就 Lady May 所策划的这一连串空壳游戏操作，与 Kwok 在本诉讼待决五年期间采取的其他一切逃避性和藐视法庭的行为如出一辙；这也正是本案有 1,180 项案卷记录的原因。\n\n本院有权根据 Judiciary Law\n\n§ 753 认定 Kwok 构成民事藐视法庭——并“以罚款和监禁处罚[其]”——在如本案所示的情形下，本院“明确认定[Kwok]的行为意图或实际导致挫败、减损、阻碍或损害民事诉讼当事人的权利或救济”。Oppenheimer v. Oscar Shoes, Inc., 111 A.D.2d 28, 28 (1st Dep't 1985)（引用 N.Y. Judiciary Law § 753）。第 753 条规定四项要求：\n\n“[为]认定某一案件发生藐视法庭，必须确定：[1] 明确表达无歧义命令的法院合法命令当时有效；[2] 必须以合理确定性表明，该命令未被遵守……；[3] 此外，被认定藐视法庭的一方必须知悉法院命令，尽管该命令无需实际送达该方……；[4] 最后，必须证明对诉讼一方权利造成损害。”\n\nFleetwood Fin. v Walter J. Dowd, Inc., 2016 WL 11546917, at \\*2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 14, 2016)（引用 McCormick v Axelrod, 59 N.Y.2d 574, 583, amended, 60 N.Y.2d 652 (1983)）。本案提出的证词满足该标准的每项要件。事实上，上诉分庭已暗示如此。See Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙）, 199 A.D.3d 423 (1 st Dep't 2021)（“[PAX]已通过清楚且令人信服的证据证明，[Kwok]违反了其知悉的法院合法、明确命令，且该等违反损害了原告的权利……”。）\n\nPAX 的持续“损害”程度取决于 PAX 是否证明，其最终可以对 Lady May 进行扣押，以满足其现对 Kwok 享有的近 \\$120 million 判决。根据 CPLR § 5225，如债务人持有必要的“权益”，则“金钱或其他动产”可被扣押。为满足该要求，“判决债务人不必拥有该财产的法定所有权；受益权益已足够。”Weinstein, Korn & Miller, New York Civil Practice: CPLR ¶ 5225.09。“受益权益是‘对某物享有的权利或期待……，与对该物享有法定所有权相对。’”Peterson v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 2013 WL 1155576, at \\*30 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2013)（引用 Black's Law Dictionary, Interest (9th ed. 2009)）。Kwok 对 Lady May 的权益远不止受益权益。Kwok 不仅控制该游艇，看来还是其购置资金的提供者，并且是主要享用该游艇之人。\n\n关键因素在于，该“财产是否使[受益所有人]获益，如同他直接取得了该财产一般。”Id.（引用 Exp.-Imp. Bank of U.S. v. Asia Pulp & Paper Co., Ltd., 609 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Gliklad v. Chernoi, 129 A.D.3d 604 (1st Dep't 2015)（维持驳回判决债务人的主张，即因其将财产权益转让给女儿而不再持有该财产权益）；Colfin Bulls Funding B, LLC v. Ampton Invs., Inc., 112 N.Y.S.3d 868 (Table), at \\*2, 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018)（尽管判决债务人主张其已将财产转让给一家公司，仍准许判决债权人的交付动议，因为即使该主张属实，证据也表明其“保留了对该财产的控制和/或权益”）。）\n\n证据清楚且令人信服地表明，Kwok 对 Lady May 持有受益权益并予以控制。就后一点而言，本院对 Zeng 案的立案予以司法认知，并根据全部案卷事实推断，Kwok 已采取非常措施，以使该游艇免受其债权人追索。此外，Kwok 的“家族办公室”为该游艇的日常运营和维护提供资金。\n\n本院认定，Guo 女士的证词不仅前后矛盾且不实陈述，而且受到 Captain Heaslop、Captain Ivanov 和 Stockil 先生证词的重大削弱；三人均称，在 Guo 女士直接或间接持有该游艇所有权的四年半期间，他们从未接受过 Guo 女士就游艇相关事项发出的指示。\n\n此外，纽约州法律已确立，当事人在民事诉讼中援引第五修正案权利“可构成作出不利事实推定的基础”。DeBonis v. Corbisiero, 155 AD2d 299, 300 (1st Dep't 1989)。只要有必要或允许作出事实认定，即可适用不利推定，包括在藐视法庭动议的情形中。S.E.C. v. Durante, No. 01 Civ. 9056 (DAB) (AJP), 2013 WL 6800226, at \\*10 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2013), aff'd, 641 F. App'x 73 (2d Cir. 2016); LiButti v. United States, 107 F.3d 110, 120–25 (2d Cir. 1997)。\n\n同样，根据缺席证人规则，“事实审判者可以对未出庭作证的证人作出对方证据所允许的最强推定。”Crowder v. Wells & Wells Equip., Inc., 11 A.D.3d 360, 361 (1st Dep't 2004)（在未出庭的被告“将了解证据所涉重要争点”时适用不利推定）。\n\nPAX 有权根据上述两种途径获得不利推定。Kwok 在回应 PAX 的判决后取证时援引其第五修正案反自证其罪权，包括对专门涉及 Lady May 的请求作出的回应。尽管 Kwok\n\n主张，此处不宜作出不利推定，因为“[只有]在初步证明某项证据真实后，当事人才有义务对其作出回应”，但该主张本身即不能成立。PAX 已提出大量可采证据，证明 Kwok 对 Lady May 享有必要的受益权益并实施控制。See People v. Primo, 96 N.Y.2d 351, 753 N.E.2d 164 (2001)（解释称，如证据“倾向于证明某一重要事实，即案件中直接争议的事实，存在或不存在”，则该证据具有证明力）。\n\n截至 February 7, 2022，Lady May 已在本院管辖范围之外停留 268 天。根据本院施加且经上诉分庭确认的每日 \\$500,000 罚款，由此产生的罚款将达 \\$134,000,000.00，超过 PAX 尚未清偿的近 \\$120 million 判决，且为 Lady May GBP £ 28 million 购买价的数倍。然而，如果亿万富翁诉讼当事人能够同时寻求利用 New York 及 United States 其他地区的法院程序，同时明知且故意违反法院命令，则法治将不复存在。Kwok 必须在本院附送立案通知命令送达后五个工作日内向 PAX 支付 \\$134,000,000.00。如未及时缴纳罚款，本院准备根据 Judiciary Law § 753 行使其全部权限。\n\n日期：February 9, 2022\n\n勾选一项：案件已处理 X 非终局性处置 X 准许 驳回 部分准许 其他申请：和解命令 提交命令 如适当请勾选：包括移送/改派 受托人任命 移交\n\n附件2\n\n美国康涅狄格地区联邦破产法院\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等人，） （合并管理）\n\n） 债务人。 ）\n\n）\n\n）\n\nPacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙企业）及 ） 对抗程序案号 22-05032 (JAM)\nLuc A. Despins（卢克·A.·德斯平斯），作为 ） Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）财产的第11章受托人，） 关于：ECF No. 3\n\n） 原告 ）\n\n）\n\n诉 ）\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵），）\n\n） 被告。 ）\n\n关于：） 第11章 ） 案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n出庭人员\n\nStuart M. Sarnoff（斯图尔特·M.·萨诺夫） Patrick M. Birney（帕特里克·M.·伯尼） Daniel Cantor（丹尼尔·坎托） Annecca H. Smith（安妮卡·H.·史密斯） Mia N. Gonzalez（米娅·N.·冈萨雷斯） Robinson & Cole LLP（罗宾逊与科尔律师事务所） O'Melveny & Myers LLP（欧麦伦文律师事务所） 280 Trumbull Street Seven Times Square Hartford, CT 06103 New York, NY 10036\n\n及\n\nPeter Friedman（彼得·弗里德曼） David V. Harbach II（戴维·V.·哈巴赫二世） O'Melveny & Myers LLP（欧麦伦文律师事务所） 1625 Eye Street NW Washington, D.C. 20006\n\nPacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙企业）原告的律师\n\nLuc A. Despins（卢克·A.·德斯平斯） Douglas S. Skalka（道格拉斯·S.·斯卡尔卡） Paul Hastings LLP（普衡律师事务所） Nancy Bohan Kinsella（南希·博汉·金塞拉） 200 Park Avenue Patrick R. Linsey（帕特里克·R.·林赛）\n\nNew York, N.Y. 10166 Neubert Pepe & Montieth P.C.（纽伯特·佩佩与蒙蒂斯律师事务所） 195 Church Street 及 New Haven, CT 06510\n\nNicholas A. Bassett（尼古拉斯·A.·巴塞特） Paul Hastings LLP（普衡律师事务所） 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C. 20036\n\n原告 Luc A. Despins（卢克·A.·德斯平斯）、作为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）财产的第11章受托人，及其律师\n\nDavid S. Wachen（戴维·S.·瓦亨）　Jeffrey Hellman（杰弗里·赫尔曼）\n\nWachen LLC（瓦亨有限责任公司）　Law Offices of Jeffrey Hellman, LLC（杰弗里·赫尔曼律师事务所）\n11065 Montague Court　195 Church Street, 10th Floor\nPotomac, MD 20854　New Haven, CT 06510\n\n及\n\nAaron A. Mitchell（亚伦·A.·米切尔） Lawall & Mitchell, LLC（拉沃尔与米切尔有限责任公司） 55 Madison Avenue, Suite 400 Morristown, NJ 07960\n\n被告 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）、债务人的律师\n\n部分准许初步禁令动议的更正后裁决备忘录\n\nJulie A. Manning（朱莉·A.·曼宁），美国破产法官\n\n根据 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a) 及 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024，对2023年1月11日发布的裁决备忘录（以下简称“备忘录”，ECF No. 128）予以更正，以处理该备忘录中的笔误及因疏忽或遗漏而产生的错误。所更正的错误主要涉及印刷错误及引文格式。在一处，更正旨在澄清串列引文中引用了哪个案件。见下文第36页。此外，为处理在2023年1月13日举行的状态会议期间向本院提出的问题，本院更正该备忘录，以确认关于办公室和工作场所存在两项独立禁令——(i) 围绕入口处36英尺范围内的禁令；及(ii) 在一天中特定时段适用的一般性100英尺禁令。见下文第50页；以及将提交的更正后命令第(d)及(f)项。\n\n一、引言\n\n现由本院审理的是 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（以下简称“PAX”）提出的临时限制令申请及初步禁令动议（以下简称“该动议”）。（ECF Nos. 3（经删节）及5（密封）。）PAX尤其请求本院禁止 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）先生（以下简称“债务人”或“被告”）实施与据称由债务人组织的社交媒体及抗议活动相关的多种行为。鉴于本对抗程序中提出的证据性质，本院指出，债务人的中文姓名在普通话中发音为 Guo Wengui，在粤语中发音为 Kwok Ho Wan。1 Guo/Kwok 是债务人的姓氏，Wengui/Ho Wan 是其名字。2 债务人还以众多别名中的 Miles Kwok 或 Miles Guo 为人所知。3\n\nLuc A. Despins（卢克·A.·德斯平斯）先生，债务人第11章案件中获任命的第11章受托人（以下简称“第11章受托人”，并与PAX合称“原告”），已介入本对抗程序并加入该动议。（ECF No. 25。）\n\n本对抗程序及该动议中提出的主张涉及极为重要、重大且严肃的问题。这些问题包括破产法院制度完整性与宪法所载言论自由保护之间的交汇。经广泛审查适用法律，并考虑听证期间提出的证据及进行的辩论，基于下述理由，本院部分准许初步禁令动议。\n\n二、背景\n\n债务人于2022年2月15日在本院提交了一份自愿第11章申请。（主案 ECF No. 1。）4 债务人的案件与两个关联公司第11章案件合并管理。（主案 ECF Nos. 970 and 1141。）\n\n在债务人第11章案件的早期进展中，债务人最大的债权人PAX提交了驳回或转换债务人案件的动议（以下简称“驳回动议”，主案 ECF No. 183）。尽管围绕该驳回动议的事实复杂，且在债务人的第11章案件中有更全面的阐述，2022年6月15日，本院作出了无偏见驳回驳回动议并准许加入任命第11章受托人动议的裁决备忘录及命令（以下简称“准许任命第11章受托人动议的命令”，ECF No. 465）。In re Kwok, 640 B.R. 514 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022)。2022年7月8日，Luc A. Despins（卢克·A.·德斯平斯）先生获任命为第11章受托人（以下简称“准许任命第11章受托人的命令”，主案 ECF No. 523）。\n\n自第11章受托人获任命以来，债务人、PAX、第11章受托人及其他当事人在债务人的第11章案件中提交了大量且篇幅广泛的诉状。众多问题已提交本院，包括，与本案相关的，第11章受托人对债务人资产进行调查所涉的众多证据开示问题（见主案 ECF Nos. 756–58, 856, 923, 995, 1046, 1184, 1303）、与债务人第11章破产财产（以下简称“财产”）对某些不动产权益相关的问题（见，例如，HK Int'l Fund Invs. (USA) Ltd. LLC v. Despins ex rel. Kwok, Adv. P. No. 22-05003 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn.) 及 Despins ex rel. Kwok v. Bravo Luck Ltd., Adv. P. No. 22-05027 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn.)），以及与第11章受托人对债务人的经济及公司治理权利进行控制有关的问题（见主案 ECF No. 717，即“公司治理命令”）。\n\n2022年11月16日，就包括受托人提出的因债务人据称未履行其根据破产法及公司治理命令应尽职责而请求认定债务人藐视法庭的动议举行了听证会（主案 ECF No. 913）。在藐视法庭听证会上，第11章受托人首次向本院及美国受托人办公室提示了本对抗程序的事项，即据称为骚扰和恐吓原告而进行的社交媒体及抗议活动，该活动涉及其参与这些案件、第11章受托人正在进行的对财产资产的调查，以及PAX对债务人总额逾$200 million的债权进行的多年追索。（见主案 ECF No. 1108。）2022年11月21日，第11章受托人提交了一份附有附件的声明，进一步详述了该据称活动。（主案 ECF Nos. 1133（经删节）及1136（密封）。）\n\n2022年11月22日，PAX对债务人提起本对抗程序。（ECF No. 1，即“起诉状”。）起诉状就据称的社交媒体及抗议活动提出了更多指控。PAX随同起诉状提交了临时限制令申请及初步禁令动议。2022年11月22日，第11章受托人申请作为本对抗程序中的额外原告介入，该申请获准。（ECF No. 25。）\n\n2022年11月23日，就临时限制令申请举行了听证会。尽管债务人在其第11章案件中由律师代理，且该律师出席了临时限制令听证会，债务人直至2022年12月1日才通过律师在本对抗程序中出庭。（ECF No. 47。）\n\n在临时限制令听证会结束时，本院准许了该动议所请求救济的一部分，并作出了临时限制令（以下简称“TRO”）。（ECF No. 26。）该TRO限制债务人：(1) 发布有关原告、其律师及其亲属的虚假和骚扰性材料；(2) 在线公布原告、其律师及其亲属的住址及其他个人信息；(3) 鼓励、煽动、建议，或直接或间接资助在原告、其律师及其亲属的住所和办公室举行抗议活动；及(4) 干扰这些第11章案件的完整性。该TRO还命令债务人删除以下社交媒体帖子：(a) 在线公布原告、其律师及其亲属的住址及其他个人信息的帖子；或(b) 鼓励、煽动或建议在原告、其律师及其亲属的住所和办公室举行抗议活动的帖子。\n\n该TRO还安排于2022年12月2日开始就初步禁令请求举行证据听证会（以下简称“听证会”）。（ECF No. 39。）经债务人动议，本院将听证会延后一工作日至2022年12月5日。（ECF No. 51。）2022年12月2日，债务人提交了其对该动议的异议。（ECF No. 58，即“异议”。）根据 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(2)，该TRO应于2022年12月7日下午6:00届满。在听证会第三日，证据仍在继续提出期间，但在该TRO届满之前，本院于2022年12月7日下午5:57作出命令，依照 Rule 65(b)(1)(2) 以正当理由延长该TRO（以下简称“延长TRO命令”，ECF No. 80）。听证会于2022年12月12日结束。PAX的律师、第11章受托人及其律师、以及债务人及其律师，以专业且尊重的方式提出了证人、证据及各自的论点。\n\n为全面且公正地分析和裁定这些复杂问题，本院必须考虑并审查在为期四天的听证会期间提出的大量证据。九名证人在听证会期间被传唤作证，其中包括债务人、一名专家证人，以及参与听证会的三名口译员中的一名。当事人在听证会期间提出了100项证物，其中大部分为在各种互联网平台上制作的视频及其他帖子。基于视频证据及其他非文件形式的证据作出具体事实认定具有挑战性，不仅需要额外时间，也需要额外技术资源。尽管当事人能够在听证会期间展示视频及互联网平台截图，该等证据随后仍需提交给本院，以成为本对抗程序正式记录的一部分。在所有证据均成为正式记录的一部分后，本院得以编制如下所述的事实认定及法律结论。\n\n三、管辖权\n\n美国康涅狄格地区联邦地区法院根据 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) 对本事项具有管辖权。本院根据 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) 及美国康涅狄格地区联邦地区法院于1984年9月21日作出的移交命令，有权审理并裁定本事项。本程序是法定核心程序，涉及本院处理与财产管理、财产资产清算及调整有关事项的能力。\n\n依照Title 11的规定处理债务人与债权人之间的关系。28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(A) and (O).\n\n法院认定，其行使管辖权并不违反Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 487–99 (2011)的宪法要求，因为法院并未如Stern案中那样裁决人身伤害侵权请求或诽谤请求的实体问题。尽管债务人持不同意见，起诉状并未主张诽谤诉因，而是主张依据28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)和11 U.S.C. § 105(a)提出的诉因。原告可依据11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a)和1109(b)以及Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(7)主张此类诉因。法院认定该起诉状并非借口性的。\n\n债务人主张，起诉状所请求的救济不当使用了§ 105(a)。法院不同意，并指出这在对抗程序中属于常见做法。参见，例如，Dunaway v. Purdue Pharms. L.P. (In re Purdue Pharms. L.P.), 619 B.R. 38 (S.D.N.Y. 2020); Roman Catholic Diocese v. Doe (In re Roman Catholic Diocese), 628 B.R. 571 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2021); Mgmt. Tech. Corp. v. Pardo (In re Mgmt. Tech. Corp.), 56 B.R. 357 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1985); Complaint, Purdue Pharms. L.P. v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts (In re Purdue Pharms. L.P.), Case No. 19-08289 (SHL) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2018), ECF No. 1, 所请求的救济经Order, Purdue Pharms., Case No. 19-08289 (SHL) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2019), ECF No. 82批准，最近一次经Order, Purdue Pharms., Case No. 19-08289 (SHL) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2022), ECF No. 400修订。\n\n如复审法院不同意本院行使管辖权，本院依照Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052将本《裁决备忘录》作为拟议事实认定和法律结论提交。原告同意本院对本对抗程序中请求的管辖权，但债务人不同意。参见Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 575 U.S. 665 (2015)。\n\n依据28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409，本区的审判地适当。\n\nIV. 事实认定\n\n根据听证期间采纳的证词和证物，并对共同管理的Chapter 11案件及相关对抗程序中提交的诉状予以司法认知，法院作出如下事实认定：5\n\n与债务人有关的实体\n\n1. 债务人发起了所谓的“The Whistleblower Movement（爆料革命）”。他是New Federal State of China（中国新联邦国，以下简称“NFSC”）和Rule of Law Foundation（法治基金会，以下简称“ROLF”）的创始人。ROLF的邮寄地址与债务人在其破产申请书中列为个人地址的地址相同。PAX 356 , 40B, 55A, 64. Main Case ECF No. 1.\n\n5 鉴于听证期间证词的性质，法院指出，在如本对抗程序的民事程序中，当事人拒绝就针对其提出的有证明力证据作证，或者存在该当事人拒绝回答之事实的独立证据时，事实裁判者可以对该当事人作出不利推断。Mirlis v. Greer, 952 F.3d 36, 47 (2d Cir. 2020) (citing Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976) (\"[T]he Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them: the Amendment 'does not preclude the inference where the privilege is claimed by a party to a civil cause.\") (原文强调)); Doe ex rel. Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d 1258, 1264 (9th Cir. 2000) (\"[A]n adverse inference can be drawn when independent evidence exists of the fact to which the party refuses to answer.\"))。仅在不利推断具有相关性、可靠性且不会造成不当偏见时，方可适当地作为证据采纳。Brink's Inc. v. City of New York, 717 F.2d 700, 710 (2d Cir. 1983)。但参见Woods v. Start Treatment & Recovery centers, Inc., 864 F.3d 158, (2d Cir. 2017)（认定法院不当将被告人在其证言中援引第五修正案反对自证其罪特权作为证据采纳，因为该援引与程序无关且造成不当偏见）。债务人确实出席听证并作证，且在回应原告律师的提问时援引其第五修正案特权近200次。\n\n6 对PAX证物的引用将标示为PAX [No.]。对债务人证物的引用将标示为Kwok [No.]。对证人曾为法院写下内容的证物的引用将标示为[证人姓氏] [No.]。\n\nKwok Direct, 7 ECF No. 97, at 106:10–25, 123:25–124:12, 124:15–21, 148:5–149:6, 149:17– 151:19, 189:2–23, 190:4–11; Cheng Direct, ECF No. 98, at 432:21–25.\n\n2. NFSC与债务人、ROLF、Farms（农场）、The Whistleblower Movement、Miles Guo Live Broadcast（郭文贵直播）及GSeries（G系列）有关联、从属关系和/或联系。GSeries包括下列实体：Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）、Gettr、GFashion、GMusic、GClubs、GNews和GEdu。Farms亦称Himalaya Farms（喜马拉雅农场），系供NFSC成员相互沟通的社交媒体群组。NFSC主页通过超链接引导访问者前往The Farms。PAX 34–36. Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 187:8–18; 188:9–19; Jiao Cross, ECF No. 98, at 374:17–376:25.\n\n3. GSeries中的G代表Guo（郭）。债务人创立并控制GNews。GNews与Saraca Media有关联。债务人创设了GFashion。GFashion与GNews、Gettr和GCoin有关联。PAX 34–36. Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 187:8–18, 188:4–19, 192:24– 193:2. 债务人还控制Saraca Media Group和关联实体“GTV”，二者通常统称为GTV。Jiao Cross, ECF No. 98, at 377:11–16, 413:23–24. GTranslators为GNews广播提供翻译服务。PAX 26B, 40B.\n\n4. NFSC与Himalaya Global Alliance（喜马拉雅全球联盟）（连同关联的喜马拉雅实体，例如Himalaya Exchange和Himalaya Farms，统称“Himalaya（喜马拉雅）”）有关联、从属关系和/或联系。PAX 6B.\n\n5. Himalaya实体，例如Himalaya New World（喜马拉雅新世界），组织反对CCP（中国共产党）。\n\nHimalaya New World撰写文章并制作社交媒体内容，以揭露关于中国和CCP的真相。Jiao Bing Shang（尚焦冰）是Himalaya New World, Inc.的总裁。Jiao Cross,\n\n7 法院将以[证人姓氏] [证词类型]，后接卷宗中所示经删节庭审记录的引文，来指称证词。为便利起见连续编页的底层庭审记录页码被采用，而非Electronic Case Filling（“ECF”）戳记上的页码。\n\nECF No. 98 at 373: 11–24, 397:25–398:6. Himalaya New World, Inc.还协助人们购买G-Club。Jiao Cross, ECF No. 98, at 413:25– 14:11.\n\n6. The Whistleblower Movement、NFSC、ROLF和Himalaya参与抗议活动。PAX 3B, 3D, 6B, 9, 10B, 11B, 19B, 20B, 23, 24B, 26B, 28B, 38B, 39B, 40B, 42, 43B, 45, 47B, 51B. Kwok 8. Jiao Cross, ECF No. 98, at 353:19–354:1, 357:18–21, 367:11–19, 373:8–374:3; Cheng Direct, ECF No. 98, at 434:17–435:13; Cheng Cross, ECF No. 98, at 465:12–15; Li Direct, ECF No. 98, at 475:3–476:18; Li Cross, ECF No. 98, at 490:8–12, 22–23.\n\n7. 债务人是The Whistleblower Movement、NFSC、ROLF和Himalaya的领导人。The Whistleblower Movement、NFSC、ROLF、GSeries和Himalaya服务于债务人的目的，充当债务人的商业工具，其成员个人忠于债务人。PAX 6B, 34–36, 39B, 40B, 55A, 59, 64. Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 106:10–25, 123:25–124:12, 124:15–21, 148:3–149:6, 149:17–151:19, 187:8–18, 188:4–19, 189:2–23, 190:4–11; 192:24–193:2; Jiao Direct, ECF No. 98, at 340:22–24; Cheng Direct, ECF No. 98, at 435:4–6; Cheng Cross, ECF No. 98, at 450:6–11; Li Cross, ECF No. 98, at 491:4– 492:25. 债务人的追随者否认与债务人存在任何关联，但坚持称其抗议的动机是：“……[债务人]是精神领袖，是中国爆料人的领袖，至少有5亿热爱自由的中国人追随他……这就像达赖喇嘛，是全世界数亿人的精神领袖。当他遭受迫害或受到CCP攻击时，世界各地的人们都会挺身而出……”Kwok 8.\n\n8. 债务人通过包括群聊在内的方式，与NFSC、The Whistleblower Movement和Himalaya的成员沟通，其中包括WhatsApp群聊。例如，债务人在一则WhatsApp帖子中称呼一名在听证中作证的证人Yaqin Li（李亚琴）为“伟大、睿智、美丽的姐妹”，以表彰其抗议努力。PAX 86. Li Cross, ECF No. 98, at 498:4–499:4, 503:9–505:19, 507:5–19.\n\n9. 债务人使用包括一次性“burner” phones（匿名手机）在内的方式，与NFSC、The Whistleblower Movement和Himalaya的成员沟通。Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 125:24– 126:10, 126:17–127:2. 债务人知悉其就其通信与Chapter 11 Trustee（第11章受托人）合作的义务。Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 235:2–6. 债务人曾使用匿名手机就与其破产案件有关的事项进行通信。Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 125:24–126:10, 126:17–127:2, 235:7–10.\n\n10. 债务人的关联人士曾到访其位于3 Columbus Circle, New York, NY的办公地址。PAX 85, 56, 57; Jiao Cross, ECF No. 98, at 418:15–419:20; Cheng Cross, ECF No. 98, at 463:8–19. GNews网络广播，以及债务人在2022年10月向其追随者发布的停止抗议的网络公告——该公告发布于NFSCTV的YouTube频道——与在3 Columbus Circle, New York, N.Y.拍摄的一张照片具有相同背景。PAX 39B, 40B, 67, 68. 与债务人密切关联的这些实体的关联人士，也出现在债务人曾居住和/或现居住的Sherry-Netherland公寓内拍摄的照片中。PAX 38A, 38B, 38D, 38E, 41B, 41C, 44, 58.\n\n与债务人有关的人员\n\n11. 债务人熟悉名为Fay Fay（菲菲，亦称Fei Fei）、Beile Li（李贝乐，亦称Xiao Wangzi、Prince Li、Prince或Little Prince）、Huo Lai（霍来，亦称Fire Lai）、Pamela Tsai（蔡帕梅拉，亦称Meiling Pam或Nicole）、Jiao Bing Shang（尚焦冰，亦称Ah Bing）、Shan Mu（山木）、Roy Guo（郭荣）、Elliot Dordick（埃利奥特·多迪克）和Yaqin Li（李亚琴）的人员。PAX 3B, 3D, 8, 38A, 38B, 38D, 38E, 41B, 41C, 42, 43B, 44, 45, 56–58, 67–79, 81, 85, 86, 94, 95A, 95B, 95D. Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 163:23–166:9, 168:2– 170:6, 171:13–173:1, 173:6–11, 173:16–174:23, 175:2–10, 177:24–178:7, 178:18–22, 180:21– 181:10, 187:19–24; 191:24–192:3, 192:13–15, 193:13–193:22, 194:22–195:9, 195:14–21, 195:25–196:11, 206:12–14, 206:20–207:1. 债务人就其是否认出照片和视频中的人员这一问题所提出的数个问题，援引第五修正案反对自证其罪特权。然而，债务人在听证证词结束后，于2022年12月5日或6日发布的一段视频中称：“今天最重要的是，Prince、Huo Lai、Shan Mu、Nicole和Luoyi都在那里——他们要求我逐一辨认——我花了一整天看你们的脸。”PAX 95B and 95D.\n\n12. Fay Fay、Beile Li、Huo Lai、Pamela Tsai、Jiao Bing Shang、Shan Mu、Yaqin Li、Roy Guo和Ziheng Cheng（程子恒）与The Whistleblower Movement、NFSC、G-Series、Himalaya和/或ROLF有关联。PAX 3B, 3D, 8, 38B, 56–58, 67–79, 81, 85, 86, 93, 94, 95A, 95B, 95D. Jiao Cross, ECF No. 98, at 353:19–354:1, 357:18–21, 367:11–19, 373:8–374:3; Cheng Direct, ECF No. 98, at 434:17–435:13; Cheng Cross, ECF No. 98, at 465:12–15; Li Direct, ECF No. 98, at 475:3–476:18; Li Cross, ECF No. 98, at 490:8–12, 22–23.\n\n13. Elliot Dordick是Gettr的雇员。PAX 47B, 94.\n\n14. Fay Fay（费费）、Beile Li（李贝乐）、Huo Lai（来火）、Pamela Tsai（蔡帕梅拉）、Jiao Bing Shang（尚焦冰）、Shan Mu（木山）、Yaqin Li（李雅琴）、Ziheng Cheng（程子恒）和 Elliot Dordick（埃利奥特·多迪克）是债务人的朋友、雇员、受雇人、关联人士、追随者和/或同事。PAX 3B, 3D, 8, 38A, 38B, 38D, 38E, 41B, 41C, 42, 43B, 44, 45, 56–58, 67–79, 81, 85, 86, 94, 95A, 95B, 95D。Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 163:23–166:9, 168:2–170:6, 171:13–173:1, 173:6–11, 173:16–174:23, 175:2–10, 177:24–178:7, 178:18–22, 180:21–181:10, 187:19–24; 191:24–192:3, 192:13–15, 193:13–193:22, 194:22–195:9, 195:14–21, 195:25–196:11, 206:12–14, 206:20–207:1。\n\n15. Fay Fay（费费）、Beile Li（李贝乐）、Huo Lai（来火）、Pamela Tsai（蔡帕梅拉）、Jiao Bing Shang（尚焦冰）、Shan Mu（木山）、Yaqin Li（李雅琴）、Roy Guo（郭荣）、Ziheng Cheng（程子恒）和 Elliot Dordick（埃利奥特·多迪克）参与了抗议活动。PAX 19B, 24B, 38B, 40B, 42, 43B, 45, 47B, 58, 86, 93, 94。Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 170:7–171:10。Jiao Direct, ECF No. 98, at 334:10–335:10; Cheng Direct, ECF No. 98, at 434:13–24; Li Direct, ECF No. 98, at 473:25–474:14。\n\n与债务人有关的社交媒体账户\n\n16. Guidepost Solutions, LLC（Guidepost Solutions有限责任公司，以下简称“Guidepost”）的情报分析师 Brian Napierala（布赖恩·纳皮耶拉）先生在听证会上被认定具备专家证人资格，就有关社交媒体帖文的开源情报和网络调查作证。Napierala Direct, ECF No. 97, at 36:15–19。Gettr 的显示名称可由使用相关 Gettr 账户的任何人在任何时候更改。Napierala Direct, ECF No. 97, at 64:3–7。账户标识符（亦称用户名）则“更为固定”，因为更改该标识符需要某种形式的双重认证。Napierala Direct, ECF No. 97, at 64:19–65:2, 67:24–68:10。尽管多个账户可能使用相同的显示名称，但账户标识符对于每个账户均是唯一的。Napierala Direct, ECF No. 97, at 65:3–15, 68:11–17。Napierala Cross, ECF No. 97, at 80:11–13。Gettr 以红色圆圈内的白色“v”标识已验证账户。Napierala Direct, ECF No. 97, at 66:2–19。Gettr 通过一项程序验证账户，以确认账户持有人确为其所声称之人。Napierala Direct, ECF No. 97, 66:2–19。在某些情况下，Gettr 账户受密码保护，并可能要求双重认证。Napierala Direct, ECF No. 97, at 68:18–70:8。用户可以在 Gettr 上发布帖文、转发他人帖文及点赞他人帖文等。Napierala Direct, ECF No. 97, 73:1–74:1。\n\n17. Gettr 会生成帖文的日期，或者生成帖文/转发帖文相对于其被查看时间的发布时间度量。Napierala Direct, ECF No. 97, at 74:2–17, 75:24–76:4。当帖文/转发帖文底部显示时间戳时，该时间戳由 Gettr 生成，并且是正确的，但时区方面可能除外。ECF No. 97, at 90:8–91:2。视频内的时间戳由录制程序生成。Napierala Direct, ECF No. 97, at 78:19–21。Guidepost 在其能够辨别时间的情况下记录了截取时间。Napierala Direct, ECF No. 97, at 75:7–19, 76:11–77:3。\n\n18. @Miles Gettr 账户已获 Gettr 验证。见上文事实第16项。@Miles Gettr 账户先前使用“MILES GUO Official”作为其显示名称。见下文事实第19项。@Miles Gettr 账户使用了一张债务人的照片；该照片亦被 NFSC Website（新中国联邦网站）用于标题为“Who is Miles Guo”的栏目下，并且是 @MilesGuo Gettr 账户的个人资料图片。Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 107:17–19。@Miles Gettr 账户顶部有一条横幅，其中载有 NFSC（新中国联邦）徽标和 Rule of Law Foundation（法治基金会）徽标。该账户的说明写道：“We are the Citizens of the New Federal State of China”及“Our Mission is to Take Down the EVIL Chinese Communist Party.” @Miles Gettr 账户转发 @NFSCSpeaks 的帖文、@himalaya\\_mos 的帖文、@gmusic 的帖文及 @QMAY007（显示名称为“QMAY”）的帖文，上述账户均已获 Gettr 验证。@Miles 账户发布其自身的原创内容，包括“Miles Guo's Broadcast Highlights”，以及 G-News 视频内容和 Fay Fay Show（又称 Fei Fei Show）视频。若干帖文和转发帖文含有与抗议活动有关的内容。PAX 8, 35, 61。\n\n19. @Miles 账户的显示名称在 Gettr 上被改为“NFSCTV”，个人资料图片亦从债务人的照片改为 NFSC 徽标。尚不清楚该账户的说明是否维持不变。PAX 60。\n\n20. @MilesGuo Gettr 账户已获 Gettr 验证。见上文事实第16项。@MilesGuo Gettr 账户在截取时使用“MILES GUO”作为其显示名称，并且使用一张债务人的照片；该照片亦被 NFSC Website（新中国联邦网站）用于标题为“Who is Miles Guo”的栏目下，并且先前曾是 @Miles 账户的个人资料图片。Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 111:12–14。该 Gettr 账户顶部有一条横幅，其中载有 NFSC 徽标和 Rule of Law Foundation 徽标。@MilesGuo 账户曾对 @Miles 账户的帖文，以及由账户标识符中包含 NFSC 和“Himalaya”一词的多个账户发布、讨论抗议活动的帖文点赞。PAX 8, 35, 53, 61。Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 127:21–128:6。\n\n21. 债务人控制 @Miles 和 @MilesGuo 账户，并且有时亲自使用该等账户。他人也可能代表其在该等账户上发帖。Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 126:14–16。尽管债务人不一定就其 Gettr 账户经历过验证程序，但作为 GSeries（G系列）一部分、与其有关联的实体 Gettr 验证了其账户。见上文事实第16项。PAX 8, 34–36, 61。Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 107:22–108:2, 111:17–19, 112:2–113:8, 117:22–118:12, 161:17–162:8; Jiao Cross, ECF No. 98, at 356:5–357:17; Cheng Cross, ECF No. 98, at 464:23–465:9。\n\n22. @MilesGuoLive Gettr 账户已获 Gettr 验证，并使用债务人的一张照片作为其个人资料图片。见上文事实第16项。@MilesGuoLive 账户转发 @NFSCSpeaks 和 @MilesGuo 的帖文。PAX 50。\n\n23. 债务人控制 @MilesGuoLive。PAX 50。Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 132:6–8, 132:25–133:5, 135:25–137:4。\n\n24. 债务人使用 Gettr 接触广泛受众。Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 118:13–19。\n\n25. @NFSCSpeaks Gettr 账户由 NFSC 控制——其由相关实体 Gettr 验证。见上文事实第16项。PAX 34–36。\n\n26. NFSCTV 的 YouTube 页面在页面顶部横幅中醒目展示了一幅债务人的艺术肖像。该页面可供观看的视频缩略图表明，债务人是发布于 NFSCTV YouTube 页面的视频中经常出现的主题。PAX 59。\n\n相关事件时间线\n\ni. 2022年7月8日第11章受托人获任命后的事件\n\n27. 2022年7月8日，@Miles 账户发布了债务人的一份声明，称“the entire process of changing the trustee and my personal bankruptcy case is among the greatest treasures of our New Federal State of China and is of immense significance.” 债务人认为，第11章受托人因被指存在利益冲突，应从其案件中被撤换。PAX 30A。Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 110:24–111:4, 243:2–11, 245:22–247:5。\n\n28. 2022年7月13日，@Miles Gettr 账户发布了债务人的一份声明，称债务人及未披露的其他方将尽最大努力调查第11章受托人过去作为破产受托人及从事首次公开募股业务的律师所开展的工作。该帖文嵌入了一段视频，显示债务人在一段由 G Translators（G翻译者）添加字幕的 GNews 广播中作出同一主张。PAX 28A and 28B。\n\n29. 2022年7月19日，@Miles Gettr 账户发布了一份有关第11章受托人的声明，称：“Please spread the words about the revelations of the CCP military intelligence and the truths about the trustee of my bankruptcy case. All the U.S. DOJ officials and lawyers from various law firms who want to deport me and harm me will be sent to prison. I have the most unique voice in the world because almost every part of my body that can voice has been tortured by the CCP.” PAX 26A。\n\n30. Stephen Kindseth（斯蒂芬·金塞思）先生是债务人在其第11章案件中的律师，其作证称，在《关于准许任命第11章受托人动议的命令》于2022年6月15日作出后，PAX 与债务人进行了和解讨论。和解讨论发生于2022年7月至2022年9月之间。Kindseth Direct, ECF No. 111, at 844:1–844:19。债务人本应根据和解向 PAX 支付款项。Kindseth Cross, ECF No. 111, at 869:4–7, 870:9–15。与债权人委员会的和解讨论始于2022年9月，并持续至2022年10月。Kindseth Direct, ECF No. 111, at 844:17–21。Kindseth 先生在整个和解讨论期间请求受托人放缓其调查，以为和解谈判留出空间。Kindseth Cross, ECF No. 111, at 894:11–895:11。\n\n31. 2022年10月21日，债务人在发布于 NFSCTV YouTube Channel（NFSCTV YouTube频道）的一段 GNews 广播中发表声明，请求包括“fellow fighters”“friends of the New Federal State of China”及其个人支持者在内的受众停止传播 PAG^8 高管、其家人及律师的个人信息。债务人称，其认识到这是和解与和好的必要条件。债务人称，其曾指控支持中国共产党的众多当事方可能有一天会成为 NFSC 的朋友。作为和解讨论的一部分，PAX 曾要求债务人停止对 PAG 高管及其家人的人肉搜索^9。PAX 39B。\n\n问 [Friedman 律师]：好的。您是否——您是否记得 Kwok 先生曾在社交媒体上发表声明，呼吁人们不要人肉搜索 PAX，也不要人肉搜索与 PAX 有关的人，该声明是在进行中的和解讨论中作出的？\n\n答 [Kindseth 律师]：我记得我的当事人应 PAX 的要求，遵守了条款清单中的一项条款，发布了一段视频。他按照 PAX 及 PAX 律师的要求发布了一段视频。\n\n问：您是否记得，其中一部分是他表示会呼吁支持者不要人肉搜索 PAX？\n\n答：是的。\n\n问：并且不要骚扰 PAX 以及在 PAX 工作的家属？\n\n答：据我所能回忆，因为那是通过电子邮件发给我的，视频中应当包含的条款。我记得该请求，而且我相信他满足了该请求。我从未看过该视频，但根据与律师的交谈，我认为他遵守了该请求。\n\n问：好的。您是否记得他表示，为了在美国开展有效的破产程序，不进行人肉搜索是必要的？\n\n答：谁会这么说？\n\n问：您的当事人。\n\n答：我不记得。\n\nKindseth Cross, ECF No. 111, at 870:16–871:14。\n\n8 PAG 是 PAX 的管理合伙人。\n\n9 人肉搜索的定义为：“公开识别或公布某人的私人信息，尤其作为惩罚或报复的一种形式。”见 Dox, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http（最后访问于2023年1月10日）。\n\n32. 2022年10月30日，第11章受托人就全面和解向债务人及其律师提交了一份条款清单，谈判延续至2022年11月。Kindseth Direct, ECF No. 111, at 844:20–16。11月，PAX 还要求进一步的财务担保，但 Kindseth 先生认为，截至2022年11月16日，已与 PAX 达成安排。Kindseth Direct, ECF No. 111, at 845:17–23。\n\n33. 2022年11月11日，第11章受托人就其寻求裁定债务人藐视《公司治理命令》的动议对债务人进行了证言录取。在就 Yvette Wang（王伊维特）参与名为 Ace Decade Holdings（艾斯十年控股）的实体一事进行询问期间——该实体是藐视法庭程序的对象——债务人的回答逐渐变成指控 Paul Hastings（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所）如同中国共产党。Main Case ECF No. 1096 Ex. 27。为部分解决《藐视法庭动议》，法院后来作出一项命令，其中债务人同意不对以下认定提出上诉：至少在第11章受托人获任命之前，其为 Ace Decade Holdings 的实益所有人。Main Case ECF No. 1110, the Partial Resolution Order。\n\n34. 2022年11月15日，NFSC Gettr Page（NFSC Gettr 页面）@NFSCSpeaks 发布了第11章受托人、第11章受托人的家庭成员、PAG（PAG）主席、PAG主席的家庭成员，以及第11章受托人律师和PAX（PAX）律师事务所的个人住址。@NFSCSpeaks 的帖子呼吁在这些地点进行为期90天的抗议。该帖子还包含居住在帖子所列住址的一些个人的照片。PAX 6B。\n\nii. 围绕于2022年11月16日至18日举行的藐视法庭听证会的事件，包括本院于2022年11月16日获悉抗议号召\n\n35. 2022年11月16日，Kindseth 先生向第11章受托人发送了一封信，概述了债务人可接受的整体和解条款。Kindseth Direct, ECF No. 111, at 841:24–843:24。第11章受托人致电 Kindseth 先生的合伙人，寻求举行会面，债务人同意举行该会面。Kindseth Direct, ECF No. 111, at 841:18–23, 846:19–21。Kindseth 先生希望在和解因本院内外事态“升温”而破裂之前解决本案。Kindseth Direct, ECF No. 111, at 845:24–846:18。藐视法庭程序、2004规则传票，以及第三方向债务人的律师支付用于就藐视法庭和传票进行抗辩的款项，均是事态“升温”的原因。Kindseth Cross, ECF No. 111, at 874:3–13, 874:16–875:6。事态“升温”的另一原因是社交媒体活动。Kindseth Cross, ECF No. 111, at 875:7–16。\n\n36. 2022年11月17日，在 Brown Rudnick（Brown Rudnick 律师事务所）的纽约办公室举行了一次和解会议。Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 230:17–20; Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 672:23–673:5; Kindseth Direct, ECF No. 111, at 849:2–5。债务人、其律师 Aaron Mitchell（Aaron Mitchell）和 Kindseth 先生，以及其翻译 Wilkinson 女士均出席了该会议。第11章受托人及其律师 Nicholas Bassett（Nicholas Bassett）也出席了该会议。Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 230:21–231:20; Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 673:6–12; Kindseth Direct, ECF No. 111, at 841:15–17, 848:24–849:1; Kindseth Cross, ECF No. 111, at 891:22–892:1。会议前，出席会议的各方签订了一份保密协议。Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 228:6–8; Kindseth Cross, ECF No. 111, at 892:2–893:2。\n\n37. 会议期间，第11章受托人就美国证券交易委员会（SEC）和美国国税局（IRS）在债务人第11章案件中提交的债权申报与债务人交谈，并提及 Al Capone（阿尔·卡彭）。Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 673:16–18, 693:17–22, 739:6–25, 740:1–5; Kindseth Direct, ECF No. 111, at 862:18–863:15。尽管 Kindseth 先生认为这是毫无根据且掩饰不严的威胁，但他知悉 SEC 已在债务人的第11章案件中提交债权申报，但并不了解 SEC 债权申报的内容。Kindseth 先生也不了解第11章受托人对 SEC 和 IRS 所负的职责。第11章受托人否认其曾威胁债务人。Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 693:17–19; Despins Redirect, ECF No. 99, at 744:12–745:10; Despins Recross, ECF No. 99, at 745:17–746:10; Kindseth Direct, ECF No. 111, at 868:5–9; Kindseth Cross, ECF No. 111, at 871:18–872:22, 876:24–877:6。第11章受托人还告知债务人，其认为债务人关于各种财产权益不属于其破产财产的法律论点薄弱，并且债务人将在法庭上败诉。Kindseth Cross, ECF No. 111, at 898:15–899:2。第11章受托人要求支付 $250 million 以解决债务人的第11章案件；其本意是——且 Kindseth 先生亦如此理解——该款项应作为和解的一部分支付给破产财产，而非支付给第11章受托人个人。Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 638:24–639:1; Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 692:5–20, 741:3–22; Kindseth Direct, ECF No. 111, at 864:24–865:4; 881:25–882:4; 888:8–14。Kindseth 先生认为该要求荒谬至极，因为其与他所设想的整体和解相去甚远。Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 740:11–741:2, 742:18–24; Kindseth Direct, ECF No. 111, at 866:1–8。Kindseth 先生在“情绪激动之时”称该要求为“敲诈”。Kindseth Direct, ECF No. 111, at 867:7–11, 867:25–868:4。第11章受托人向 Kindseth 先生明确表示，债务人——或者任何支付 $250 million 的人——如获准的债权少于 $250 million，即可保留剩余款项。Kindseth Cross, ECF No. 111, at 882:5–13。Kindseth 先生认为，确保债务人理解和解提案是其职责。Kindseth Cross, ECF No. 111, at 885:18–886:8。债务人认为其已接近与 PAX 达成和解并履行，但第11章受托人提出的 $250 million 要求毁掉了该交易。Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 247:8–19。Kindseth 先生及其与之讨论该问题的妻子均未将会议内容泄露至社交媒体。Kindseth Cross, ECF No. 111, at 893:3–14。\n\n38. 债务人未向任何主管机关报告所称敲诈。Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 118:25–119:6, 244:2–245:21。Kindseth 先生未向任何主管机关报告所称敲诈。Kindseth Cross, ECF No. 111, at 899:12–18。\n\n39. 2022年11月19日，即与第11章受托人会面两日后，债务人录制了一段视频，该视频于2022年11月20日发布于经认证的 Gettr 账户 NFSCTV@chinatruth2022。10 在该视频中，债务人表示其“个人强烈反对”在“PAX 办公楼前及其他地点”举行此类抗议。视频未提及在第11章受托人及其家属住所、Paul Hastings（Paul Hastings 律师事务所）办公室前，或 PAG 主席及其家属住所前举行的抗议。视频还告知观看者：“如果你们确实想要抗议……务必先咨询律师，在法律范围内，在法律范围内行动，并务必遵守你们所在州的条例和当地警方……我强烈反对并绝不支持此类抗议。”Kwok 6A。Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 212:14–18。\n\n10 尚不清楚在发布时，该账户的用户名是否为 @Miles，显示名称是否为 MILES GUO Official，因为虽然 Gettr 用户名具有唯一性，多个账户可以使用显示名称 NFSCTV。\n\n40. 在2022年11月20日或之前，Jiao Bing Shang（Jiao Bing Shang）作为 Himalaya New World, Inc.（Himalaya New World, Inc.）总裁被送达了一份传票。该传票系根据债务人破产案件中准许对 Himalaya New World, Inc. 进行 Rule 2004 审查的命令签发。Jiao 女士收到传票后，未联系律师，而是联系了 Fay Fay（Fay Fay）。Jiao Cross, ECF No. 98, at 406:3–408:18, 409:3–5。收到法律文书是 Jiao 女士在 Washington D.C. 的 PAX 律师 O'Melveny & Myers（O'Melveny & Myers 律师事务所）办公室组织抗议的“部分原因”。Jiao Redirect, ECF No. 98, at 424:21–425:2。\n\n41. 2022年11月20日，@NFSCSpeaks 账户发布了一份声明，指明第11章受托人的女儿，并称其父亲正在协助和教唆 CCP。该帖子还包含第11章受托人及其女儿的照片，并指明她们的工作地点。PAX 7。Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 589:24–590:1。@Miles 账户在其 Gettr 页面转发了该 @NFSCSpeaks 帖子。PAX 8。\n\n42. 2022年11月20日，第11章受托人住所正前方发生了抗议。抗议者举着的标语牌大多直接针对第11章受托人。PAX 9 and 91。Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 591:5–17。\n\niii. 第11章受托人于2022年11月21日提交《关于社交媒体活动的声明》后的事件\n\n43. 在2022年11月21日或之前，第11章受托人住所处的抗议者向邻居散发传单，称第11章受托人及其律师为 CCP 的帮凶，并指控第11章受托人存在种族主义。PAX 48 and 91。Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 614:21–615:8。\n\n44. 2022年11月21日，债务人参与了一场网络直播，承认主案中签发了2004规则传票，并建议观众通过包括不回家在内的方式避免收到传票。债务人告知观看者，如果他们“愚蠢”而收到传票，Himalaya Global Alliance（喜马拉雅全球联盟）和 Rule of Law foundation（法治基金会）将聘请律师帮助他们对传票提出异议。PAX 38A, 38B, 38D, 38E。\n\n45. 在上述同一网络直播中，债务人表示，第11章受托人和 Paul Hastings 将因2004规则传票而遭受“灾难”。债务人称：“为了对付这个流氓，我们有我们的流氓手段。几天后你们就会看到他会发生什么事。灾难，我可以告诉你们。他们将遭受灾难！”PAX 38B。\n\niv. 于2022年11月22日启动对抗程序以及于2022年11月23日作出 TRO 后的事件\n\n46. 债务人知悉 TRO。Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 105:10–105:17, 119:25–120:3。\n\n47. 2022年11月22日，GNews（GNews）从 O'Melveny & Myers 位于 New York, New York 的办公室外的抗议现场进行了网络直播，并称这是抗议的第三天。抗议者举着标语牌，上有对 O'Melveny & Myers、律师以及第11章受托人的风格化、煽动性描绘。PAX 45。\n\n48. 2022年11月23日，@NFSCSpeaks Gettr 账户发布了一段视频，内容为 PAG 主席一名家庭成员住所正前方发生的抗议。抗议者展示了带有 PAG 主席照片的标语牌，并显著标有“SPY”和“CCP”字样。PAX 16 and 17。\n\n49. 2022年11月24日，YouTube 上发布了一段视频，债务人在其中亲自呼吁“战友们”“坚持进行90天抗议”。其表示 ROLF 支持债务人的法律行动和抗议。其援引第11章受托人的2004规则传票作为抗议理由，称第11章受托人的行为具有黑手党作风，且比中国共产党的行为更糟。PAX 3B and 3D。\n\n50. 2022年11月24日，@MilesGuoLive 账户发布了这些在 PAG 主席儿子住所发生的抗议的照片，附有支持性的表情符号，并称：“在前线风雨无阻辛勤抗议的战友们，向你们致敬！”照片中的标语牌主要针对 PAG 主席。PAX 12 and 13。\n\n51. 2022年11月25日，TRO 在一场名为 Fay Fay Show 的网络直播中被讨论。PAX 43B。\n\n52. 2022年11月25日，@NFSCSpeaks 账户发布了一段视频，其内部时间戳为2022年11月23日，内容为抗议者在 New York, New York 的 200 Park Avenue 私人大堂内纠察和游行，该建筑设有 Paul Hastings 的纽约办公室。抗议者携带标语牌，上面展示了经煽动性编辑的第11章受托人、第11章受托人律师和 PAX 律师的照片。数名抗议者佩戴印有 G-Fashion（G-Fashion）标志的帽子。抗议者携带一面大型横幅，上有“New Federal State of China”徽章。Beile Li（Beile Li）称：“致 Paul Hastings 的每一个人……数百万遭到 CCP 迫害的人将诅咒你们，将诅咒你们的家人，诅咒你们生命中的每一个人，因为你们手上沾有鲜血”，并称：“New Federal State of China 的人民，我们五亿人……我们反对 Paul Hastings，我们反对 O'Melveny。没有回头路，也没有补救办法。你们已经犯罪，现在将承受你们行为的后果。”PAX 19B and 91。Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 581:10–583:7; Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 650:4–651:1。\n\n53. 2022年11月25日，@Miles 账户发布了一段 NFSCSpeaks 直播，其内部时间戳同样为2022年11月25日，内容为抗议者在第11章受托人前纠察\n\n第11章受托人住所前的抗议者举着指控其各种事项的标语，并站在一面 NFSC 横幅后。PAX 10B and 91. Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 576:21–578:18.\n\n54. 2022年11月25日，@Miles 账户发布了在 PAG 主席亲属住所发生的抗议活动图片。住所前的抗议者举着印有被针对方照片的标语。抗议者身后展示着两面 NFSC 旗帜。PAX 15.\n\n55. 2022年11月25日，第11章受托人在其工作邮箱中收到来自同一未知 ProtonMail 邮箱地址的一系列电子邮件，其主题行依次为“I wish”和“i kill”。“I wish”电子邮件的正文为“hhhhhhhhhahahahaha.”。“i kill”电子邮件没有正文。PAX 29 and 91. Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 603:20–606:19, 607:19–608:14; Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 654:7–15. 第11章受托人认为这些电子邮件构成威胁。Despins Redirect, ECF No. 99, at 744:2–4.\n\n56. 2022年11月25日，@NFSCSpeaks 账户发布了一段视频，其内部日期戳为2022年11月25日，显示在 Paul Hastings（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所）东京办公室外举行的抗议活动，抗议者手持针对第11章受托人的标语牌。PAX 20B and 91.\n\n57. 2022年11月26日，@Miles 账户发布了 NFSCSpeaks 的互联网直播，其内部时间戳同为2022年11月26日，显示抗议者在第11章受托人住所前举着指控其各种事项的标语，并站在一面 NFSC 横幅后。PAX 11B and 91. Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 579:8–581:2.\n\n58. 2022年11月26日，@NFSCSpeaks Gettr 账户发布了一个指向 prfree.org 文章的链接，以支持一则称“\\$250 Million Dollar EXTORTION OF THE CENTURY”和“DOJ Appointed Trustee Despins Blackmails \\$250 Million, Threatens to 'Tear Apart' Chinese Dissidents.”的评论。该帖子包含一张第11章受托人面部的煽动性照片。2022年11月30日，@MilesGuoLive Gettr 账户发布了相同文字，并附有第11章受托人的风格化图像。PAX 21 and 33.\n\n59. prfree.org 上题为“\\$250 Million Dollar Extortion of the Century”的文章促使更多个人进行抗议和/或组织抗议活动。Jiao Cross, ECF No. 98, at 353:4–354:14; Cheng Direct, ECF No. 98, at 434:13–435:13; Cheng Cross ECF No. 98, at 445:19–446:22; Li Direct, ECF No. 98, at 477:23–478:6.\n\n60. 2022年11月26日，多名 Paul Hastings 员工收到来自多个发件人的电子邮件，其正文和附件相同。电子邮件正文称，New Federal State of China（新中国联邦）和“中国举报人”呼吁 Paul Hastings 员工发声反对第11章受托人和/或离开该律师事务所。该电子邮件包含一个指向有关所谓敲诈的 prfree.com 文章的链接、一个 Gettr 帖子，并称“if you have any question, please contact NFSCspeaks@proton.me.”。该电子邮件的附件谈及所谓敲诈，并呼吁 Paul Hastings 员工联系其民选官员，并“request them to investigate Paul Hastings and Luc Despins（卢克·德斯平斯）。”PAX 22A, 22B and 91. Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 594:12–595:1, 595:15–18, 596:3–598:9.\n\n61. 2022年11月26日，一名未知来电者在第11章受托人的工作电话号码上留下语音留言，称：“Luc, you are CCP's running dog. You need to go to Hell. You just did something so ridiculous and your end is so close. F-U-C-K.”PAX 23 and 91. Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 587:13–19, 588:13–20; Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 654:16–655:11. 第11章受托人认为该留言构成威胁。Despins Redirect, ECF No. 99, at 743:23–744:1.\n\n62. 2022年11月28日，@MilesGuoLive 发布了“NDA . . . (Non-disclosure agreement)”，并附有来自未知社交媒体网站的帖子图像；该帖子包含一份题为“Agreement Regarding November 17, 2022 Case Status Meeting”的保密协议图像，以及这些第11章破产案件的案名说明。PAX 32.\n\n63. 2022年11月28日，@Miles Gettr 账户发布了一段在 O'Melveny & Myers（欧麦律师事务所）位于华盛顿哥伦比亚特区及纽约的办公室前发生的抗议活动直播。抗议者举着针对 PAG 主席 Shan Weijan（单伟建）的标语。该抗议活动由展示 NFSC 徽标的节目报道和直播，并有两名佩戴 G-Fashion 标签的个人。PAX 18C and 18D.\n\n64. 债务人知悉于2022年11月29日在 Grand Central Station（中央车站）发生的、针对第11章受托人的抗议活动。PAX 50. Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 137:17–138:2.\n\n65. 2022年12月3日，@Miles Gettr 账户发布了一段视频，显示抗议者在纽约市 PAX 律师 Sarnoff 律师（萨尔诺夫律师）的公寓楼前进行抗议。PAX 51B.\n\n66. 2022年12月3日，Gettr 上发布了一段视频，显示抗议者将一块包含 Sarnoff 律师风格化图像的标语牌放置在 Sarnoff 律师住所门口，并将一封信从其门下塞入。PAX 93.\n\n67. 于2022年12月5日或之前，抗议者在加利福尼亚州直接位于 PAG 主席亲属住所对面租赁了一处房屋，并在该房屋上放置了广告牌和针对 PAG 主席的标语。PAX 89. 2022年12月5日，在 Gettr 主办的一场互联网直播中，Fay Fay Show（菲菲秀）讨论了该活动。PAX 92.\n\n68. 于2022年12月6日或之前，并在其于2022年12月5日听证会作证之后，债务人录制了一段视频，讨论其证词及本法院的诉讼程序。在该视频中，债务人指认了数名个人；这些个人的图像曾在其作证期间向其出示，且其曾就这些个人主张第五修正案反对自证其罪权。PAX 95A, 95B, 95D.\n\n69. 于2022年12月7日或之前，在第11章受托人的女儿及其前妻住所发生了抗议活动，抗议者指控第11章受托人索取贿赂并试图摧毁一个中国异议人士组织。Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 621:8–622:2. 第11章受托人为其女儿雇佣了一名保镖。Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 657:20–24. 抗议者围堵了其前妻。Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 658:3–12.\n\n70. 于2022年12月7日或之前，在紧邻 Paul Hastings 纽约市办公室的中央车站发生了抗议活动，抗议者指控第11章受托人为反犹主义者并从反犹主义中获利，同时展示将第11章受托人描绘为纳粹军官的图像。PAX 90. Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 618:7–619:17.\n\n71. 2022年12月7日，第11章受托人在上午约8:15或8:20离家上班时，在其住所遇到抗议者。这是一次和平的相遇，但抗议者试图拍摄其照片。Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 592:17–594:1.\n\n债务人参与抗议活动\n\n72. 债务人为被送达传票的个人和实体提供了法律支持。PAX 38B. Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 176:1–12, 207:6–24\n\n73. 债务人将参加抗议者视为其同志。PAX 3B and 3D. Kwok 6A. Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 207:25–208:8, 211:16–212:9.\n\n74. 债务人，或债务人控制或指示的某人，为制作 prfree.org 文章之目的，违反了有关2022年11月17日会议的保密协议。PAX 21 and 33. Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 230:21–231:20, 231:21–232:2; Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 673:6–12; Kindseth Direct, ECF No. 111, at 841:15–17, 848:24–849:1; Kindseth Cross, ECF No. 111, at 891:22–892:1, 893:3–14.\n\n75. 债务人的别名为 Seventh Brother。PAX 44, 95A. Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 191:17–20.\n\n76. 债务人支持抗议活动。上述事实6–7、14–15、34–74及其支持性证据。PAX 3B, 3D, 8, 86. Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 212:14–18, 215:17–216:1.\n\n77. 债务人支持、鼓励并领导了一场针对原告、原告律师及其亲属的社交媒体和抗议活动，该活动发生在个人住所和工作场所。该社交媒体和抗议活动与原告参与第11章案件有关，包括第11章受托人的任命；该任命导致债务人丧失对其第11章案件的控制权；第11章受托人的证据开示工作及其发现和追回破产财团资产的努力；以及 PAX 为清偿其债权所作的努力，该债权在债务人提交其第11章案件之前已获判决确认。该社交媒体和抗议活动指控原告及其律师，其中包括，是中国共产党的成员或代理人、支持和资助新疆种族灭绝、试图摧毁 NFSC 和 The Whistleblower Movement、具有反华种族主义及反犹主义。上述事实1–76及其支持性证据。Kwok Direct, ECF No. 97, at 220:1–5.\n\n原告与中国的关联\n\n78. Paul Hastings LLP 在中国设有办公室。Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 640:17–18.\n\n79. Paul Hastings LLP 来自中国的收入所占比例微不足道。Despins 1. Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 640:23–643:9. 该收入既来自在中国开展业务的美国公司，也来自中国公司。Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 643:16–644:4. 作为权益合伙人，第11章受托人将获得该收入的一部分。Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 643:13–15. Paul Hastings LLP 此前曾代理 PAG。Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 644:5–14.\n\n80. 第11章受托人不资助种族灭绝。Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 591:20–22.\n\n81. 第11章受托人从未因任何目的受中国共产党聘任。Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 592:1–3.\n\n82. 第11章受托人并不歧视亚裔美国人。Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 623:7–9.\n\n83. 第11章受托人未曾担任中国公司的律师。Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 639:2–3.\n\n84. O'Melveny & Myers 曾代理 China VAST（华景川），该公司的创始人、执行董事兼总裁是中国共产党的成员及政治人物。Kwok 14 and 17.\n\n债务人的社交媒体和抗议活动对第11章受托人调查的影响\n\n85. 第11章受托人围绕避开抗议者来安排其日程。Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 649:5–650:3.\n\n86. 由于这些案件的情形，Paul Hastings 对在债务人的第11章案件及所有相关案件中发生的任何费用和开支，既未开具账单，也未收到款项。Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 647:19–24.\n\n87. 第11章受托人担忧，债务人的煽动性言论及对此类言论的反应正在升级，且不仅针对第11章受托人，也针对与这些案件毫无关联的其他人。为支持该担忧，第11章受托人就一宗事件作证，其中一名抗议者在同事乘扶梯前往 Paul Hastings 办公室途中追赶并对其尖叫。第11章受托人担忧“疯子”可能会得出“除掉受托人”的结论。Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 622:3–20; Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 703:23–704:10, 704:24–705:9.\n\n88. 鉴于当前的社交媒体和抗议活动，Paul Hastings 不得不就网络安全风险聘请多家机构，使该律所面临潜在责任。Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 623:14–624:12; Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 707:12–708:6.\n\n89. Paul Hastings 的合伙人担忧社交媒体和抗议活动将持续多久，以及将对该律所造成多大影响。Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 625:25–626:5. 由于当前的社交媒体和抗议活动，第11章受托人已花费数十小时与未参与这些案件的合伙人会面。Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 626:6–9. Paul Hastings 内部曾讨论让第11章受托人辞职。Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 626:20–23.\n\n90. 第11章受托人的律师对于穿过抗议者的重重阻拦前来工作感到紧张。Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 636:18–637:12。与亲自共同工作相比，混合办公减缓了第11章受托人对债务人破产财产的调查。Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 637:13–638:2。\n\n91. 第11章受托人花费了大量时间与美国法警（U.S. Marshals）安排保护事宜，并向美国法警提供新收到的证据。Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 633:25–635:25。\n\n92. Beile Li（李蓓蕾）在United States District Court for the Southern District of New York（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）起诉第11章受托人和Paul Hastings（普衡律师事务所），指称其为中国共产党的未登记外国代理人。第11章受托人认为，Li的诉讼与本案有关，因为诉状文件也提及PAX，尽管PAX并非本案当事人。Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 626:24–627:22。\n\n93. Dordick先生对第11章受托人及其数名律师提出职业道德投诉，表面理由是第11章受托人在相关对抗诉讼程序的一项反诉中援引了一篇关于债务人的文章，而Dordick主张，该文章刊载于亦曾刊载据称反犹内容的报纸上。第11章受托人认为，Dordick的行动与将第11章受托人描绘成纳粹军官的标语牌有关。Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 627:23–629:7。\n\n94. 第11章受托人认为，本对抗诉讼程序对其调查债务人资产而言是一项有害的干扰——无论对其本人还是对法院均是如此——使调查倒退数周。Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 629:15–630:6; Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 708:7–709:3, 710:12–711:25。尝试追回破产财产资产的程序已被延误。该延误尤其有害，因为可能不存在足以赔偿该延误的充分法律救济。第11章受托人在没有破产财产资产的情况下无法聘请专业人士协助调查，而在调查持续延误期间，破产财产资产可能正被置于债权人追索范围之外。Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 630:7–631:14。\n\n答 [Despins]：……我们知道，摆在我们面前的资产是Lady May、Sherry-Netherland和$37 million。Paul Hastings能够看到这些。我们可以处理这些。无论结果如何，法院都会作出裁定，不论我们是否能就此胜诉。因此，暂且不论这些，这些资产不足以清偿债权人。远远不足。因此，我们需要追索其他资产，而Paul Hastings无法独自做到这一点。它需要法务会计师的协助。当债务人作证称他们使用一次性手机时，追索系统中现金的唯一途径是进行法务调查。这需要花费大量金钱。实现这一点的唯一方式是将资金纳入破产财产，因此至关重要的是，我们必须尽快达到那一步，或者不达到那一步，也就是说，法院可能裁定Kwok先生是正确的，而那——那将是事情的终结。但是，我们——我们需要达到那一步；如果没有达到，时间的流逝——本案——这不像好酒。它不会随着年份增长而变得更好。数据会过时。资金随时可能被转移，至关重要的是我们必须继续推进。而这是一项巨大的干扰，也是一项代价高昂的干扰。\n\nDespins Direct, ECF No. 99, 630:18–631:14。\n\n95. 第11章受托人的调查依赖于未获报酬的线人；这些线人对社交媒体和抗议活动非常担忧，害怕其可能转而针对他们。Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 631:15–633:12。\n\n96. 由于社交媒体和抗议活动，第11章受托人遇到债权人不愿参与债务人案件的情况，债权人担心此类行动可能转而针对他们。第11章受托人不得不设计让债权人秘密申报债权的方法，因此需要寻求聘用一名债权申报代理人——这又是破产财产的一项成本。Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 633:13–24; Despins Cross, ECF No. 99, at 703:17–22。\n\n97. 尽管本案带来种种困难，第11章受托人认为自己有义务履行其作为债务人破产财产第11章受托人的信义义务。Despins Direct, ECF No. 99, at 638:9–23。\n\nV. 讨论\n\n原告方所请求的救济及债务人对该救济的反对，涉及极其困难的法律问题。尽管存在这些显而易见的困难，基于下文所述理由，法院认定法律要求部分准许该动议，因此将发布初步禁令。\n\nA. 第105(a)条初步禁令标准\n\n债务人主张，法院应适用Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）根据Fed. R. Civ. P. 65规定的一般禁令救济标准，该标准载于Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979)。见Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 35–38 (2d Cir. 2010)（裁定Jackson Dairy仍为第二巡回上诉法院的法律）。然而，如下所述，根据11 U.S.C. § 105(a)，破产案件中可适用另一项禁令救济标准。见，例如，Ball ex rel. Soundview Elite Ltd. v. Soundview Composite Ltd. (In re Soundview Elite Ltd.), 543 B.R. 78, 115 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016)（“法院根据Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)和破产法第105(a)条分别发布初步禁令，两者均为该等措施提供独立授权。”）。原告方已根据第105(a)条主张其请求，并根据11 U.S.C. § 105(a)寻求禁令救济。法院根据该适用标准审理其请求。\n\n第二巡回上诉法院“反复强调破产法院衡平权力的重要性”，并指出，“[第]105(a)条应被‘从宽解释，以禁止可能妨碍重整程序的[行动]’。”Momentum Mfg. Corp. v. Emp. Creditors Comm. (In re Momentum Mfg. Corp.), 25 F.3d 1132, 1136 (2d Cir. 1994)（维持破产法院通过衡平禁止反言阻止债务人对债权提出异议）（省略内部引文）。尽管第二巡回上诉法院在New England Dairies, Inc. v. Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc. (In re Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc.), 351 F.3d 86, 91–92 (2d Cir. 2003)中澄清，11 U.S.C. § 105不得用于“‘创设适用法律下本不可获得的实体权利’”，但本案中法院并未被请求这样做。相反，法院被请求依照破产法规定确保对破产财产的适当管理。此外，原告方还援引28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)，该条授予的权力“在适当情况下，延及那些……有能力阻挠法院命令实施或妥善执行司法公正的人……”。United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174 (1977)（裁定28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)支持一项命令，要求电话公司管理人员向执法部门提供技术协助和设施）；United States v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 266 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2001)（就相关部分而言，维持地区法院可根据28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)为促进同意判决而发布禁令的裁定）。\n\n尽管第二巡回上诉法院尚未阐明根据11 U.S.C. § 105(a)发布禁令救济的标准，见Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Butler, 803 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1986)，其已维持根据11 U.S.C. § 105(a)发布的禁令，见，例如，Securities Inv. Protection v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Securities LLC (In re Madoff), 429 B.R. 423 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), aff'd by Marshall v. Picard (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Securities LLC), 740 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2014)。Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals（第九巡回上诉法院）以及第二巡回上诉法院辖区内审理破产案件的法院，均根据11 U.S.C. § 105(a)发布过禁令救济，并适用“经修改以适应破产背景的传统初步禁令标准”。Nev. Power Co. v. Calpine Corp. (In re Calpine Corp.), 365 B.R. 401, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)（省略内部引文）；见Solidus Networks, Inc. v. Excel Innovations, Inc., (In re Excel Innovations), 502 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2007)（适用第九巡回上诉法院经修改以适应破产背景的初步禁令标准）；Dunaway, 619 B.R. at 38; Roman Catholic Diocese, 628 B.R. at 571; Soundview Elite, 543 B.R. at 115; Lyondell Chemical Co. v. CenterPoint Energy Gas Services (In re Lyondell Chemical Co.), 402 B.R. 571, 588–89 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); Complaint, Purdue Pharms., Case No. 19-08289 (SHL) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2018), ECF No. 1, requested relief granted by Order, Purdue Pharms., Case No. 19-08289 (SHL) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2019), ECF No. 82, most recently amended by Order, Purdue Pharms., Case No. 19- 08289 (SHL) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2022), ECF No. 400。\n\n如满足以下条件，可发布第105(a)条禁令救济：(1)存在成功重整的可能性；(2)在没有禁令的情况下，破产财产将遭受迫在眉睫且不可弥补的损害；(3)损害衡量倾向于动议方；以及(4)公共利益支持发布禁令。Calpine, 365 B.R. at 409; 见Soundview Elite, 543 B.R. at 119; Lyondell, 402 B.R. 588–89。在破产案件中，即使未证明第(2)项所述迫在眉睫且不可弥补的损害，如“‘拟被禁止的行动会威胁重整程序’”，亦可发布禁令救济，而“‘对重整程序的威胁必须是迫在眉睫、实质性且不可弥补的’”。Calpine, 365 B.R. at 409–10; 见Lyondell, 402 B.R. at 590–91。为支持初步禁令，对破产财产或重整程序造成的不可弥补损害必须是“可能的”，而非仅仅可能发生。Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008)。\n\nB. 第105(a)条标准的适用\n\ni. 成功重整的可能性\n\n为确立第一项要件，必须存在“‘成功重整的合理可能性’”，除非“拟被禁止的行为会导致其失败”。Lyondell, 402 B.R. at 589–90（省略内部引文；原文强调）。原告方主张该要件已获满足。除债务人的不合作外，原告方认为债务人的第11章案件并不复杂或困难。自债务人的第11章案件在本法院审理以来，PAX一直持续且有力地主张，债务人拥有许多未披露资产，该等资产隐藏于由家庭成员和关联人士持有的错综复杂公司实体之中。第11章受托人被指定为调查这些主张，以使债权人受益。原告方主张，债务人很可能拥有充足的已披露和未披露资产，为第11章计划提供资金；第11章受托人将变现该等资产，或者其调查将发现该等资产。债务人未回应该要件，而是如上所述主张，法院应转而审议一项尚未提出的诽谤请求在实体问题上胜诉的可能性。\n\n第11章受托人的调查在程序的每一步均遭到反对，但很可能会变现已披露的资产——例如债务人针对 Clark Hill PLC 的专业失职诉讼，或债务人针对 UBS 的英国诉讼。该调查还很可能会将至少部分目前存在争议的资产——例如取决于 Bravo Luck Ltd. 对抗程序结果的 Sherry-Netherland Apartment，或取决于 HK International Funds Investments (USA) Ltd. LLC 对抗程序结果的 Lady May——纳入破产财产，以惠及债权人。法院基于若干理由得出这一结论。例如，尽管债务人声称其没有收入或资产，但他已表明，在需要时能够调集资产。（参见，例如，主案 ECF Nos. 117 and 197。）在任命第11章受托人之前，债务人曾提出一项重整计划，其中 Lady May——一艘债务人声称其并不拥有或控制的豪华游艇——被质押给破产财产，以惠及债权人。此外，尽管债务人在提交其第11章案件时声称其不拥有任何资产且没有收入，但他仍能够获得超过 $8,000,000.00 的融资，用于资助破产财产的管理。进一步而言，其他已对债务人作出判决的法院认定，债务人将资产隐藏在公司实体中，以及隐藏在家庭成员和关联人的法定名义所有权之下。参见，例如，Decision & Order, Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund, L.P. v. Kwok Ho Wan, Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 2022), NYCEF No. 1181。法院还指出，债务人已经请求法院就藐视法庭程序作出部分解决裁定，该裁定认定其拥有此前声称并不拥有的资产。基于上述理由，法院认为，第11章受托人很可能会将部分资产纳入破产财产。更重要的是，法院认为，第11章受托人的调查将比假设的第7章受托人的调查更为全面。因此，法院相信，第11章受托人的调查将变现并追回足够的资产，以资助一项可获确认的第11章计划。若此类计划获得确认，法院将认为该结果对债务人的第11章案件而言是成功的结果。\n\n此外，债务人本人的证词及其破产法律顾问的证词，均支持法院关于在与 PAX 达成和解方面已取得实质性进展的事实认定；PAX 是这些案件中迄今为止最大的债权人。债务人的破产法律顾问认为，全面和解已近在咫尺。债务人及其破产法律顾问均将目前未能达成全面和解归咎于第11章受托人。无论该信念如何，法院认为，第11章受托人作为一家大型律师事务所重组部门的权益合伙人兼联席主管，且拥有数十年破产案件经验，完全不反对在本案中达成和解。第11章受托人对 PAX 以外的债权人负有信义义务，包括尚未提交债权证明的债权人。尽管债务人的破产法律顾问作证称，他曾反复要求第11章受托人“退让”，但法院任命第11章受托人正是为了履行该等信义义务。就债务人而言，他已声明希望公平且衡平地解决这些案件中债权人的债权。（参见主案 ECF No. 107。）法院完全有理由相信，尽管本案可能在一段时间内充满诉讼，但以某种形式达成和解并推进一项符合债权人最佳利益测试的第11章计划，具有合理可能性。\n\n如在下文关于不可弥补损害的章节中更充分论述的那样，“没有理由相信或怀疑[债务人]的重整将会失败——当然，除非所请求禁止的行为导致其失败。”Lyondell, 402 B.R. at 590。第11章受托人就债务人的社交媒体及抗议活动对其调查的影响作了广泛证言。债务人的破产法律顾问则就事态“升温”前寻求和解的努力作证。该事实，加之被告于 October 21, 2022 发布的视频呼吁停止针对 PAX 的煽动，以便实现和解，证明至少债务人认为此类行为不利于达成该等全面和解。法院同意这一点。发布初步禁令将通过第11章受托人的调查和/或任何达成全面和解的尝试，支持成功重整的能力。若允许被禁止的行为继续，则通过第11章受托人的调查、和解或两者的某种组合实现成功重整的能力将大幅减弱。参见 Lyondell, 402 B.R. at 590。\n\nii. 对破产财产或重整程序的不可弥补损害\n\n原告主张，重整程序遭受不可弥补损害的理由有数项，包括债务人的行为扰乱调查工作，并对潜在证人和债权人产生寒蝉效应。原告进一步主张，第11章受托人的调查正受到该对抗程序的阻挠和干扰，并且最终，本案的经济现实可能迫使第11章受托人辞职。债务人并未对该要件提出争辩，而是主张诽谤损害并非不可弥补，因为可以通过法律救济获得充分赔偿。\n\n债务人正确地指出，一般规则是，要构成不可弥补的损害，必须属于无法通过法律救济获得充分赔偿的类型。Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 333 (1999)（认定地区法院“无权在对被申请人就金钱损害赔偿提出的合同请求作出裁判之前，发布禁止申请人处分其资产的初步禁令”）；参见 CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315, 1318 (1994)（“即使经济损害本身足以证明事先限制具有正当性，然而，我们此前也拒绝依赖此类基于‘未知且不可知因素’的推测性预测。……如果 CBS 违反了其州法义务，第一修正案要求联邦政府通过损害赔偿程序而非压制受保护言论来救济其损害。”）（省略内部引文）。然而，美国最高法院已认定，该规则未必适用于破产案件。参见 Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 322（“欺诈性转让和破产法是为防止[在裁判待决期间处分资产]而发展起来的。”）；Rubin v. Pringle ex rel. Focus Media Inc. (In re Focus Media Inc.), 387 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2004)；另参见 In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 208 n. 14 (3d Cir. 2005)。\n\n然而，更重要的是，如上所述，法院不同意债务人对争议问题的界定。本案中的不可弥补损害，是对债务人第11章破产财产及重整程序本身造成的损害。如上所述，法院采信第11章受托人的证词，即：(1) 第11章受托人的调查目前没有资金支持，除非其继续推进，否则将无法持续——这不仅仅关乎成本：而是关乎是否还会有调查，而本法院已认定该调查是必要的；(2) 债务人的行为正在对这些案件中的潜在证人和债权人产生寒蝉效应；以及 (3) 如债务人不停止其行为，第11章受托人最终很可能被迫辞职。\n\n第11章受托人的全部证词均支持作出重整程序或破产财产很可能遭受不可弥补损害的认定。Calpine, 365 B.R. at 409–10。关于第(1)项，不必要的拖延很可能导致资产耗散及债权人回收额减少，而在破产案件中，如上所述，这可被视为不可弥补的损害。参见 Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 322。关于第(2)项，对调查或债权人出面所产生的任何寒蝉效应，均会破坏这些程序的目的；如债务人所述，这些程序是其自愿发起，以公平且衡平地最终解决针对其的债权。关于第(3)项，法院批准了一项任命第11章受托人的动议，以为债权人的利益调查债务人的事务。在此情形下，第11章受托人的辞职不太可能导致任命替代的第11章受托人，并将阻碍法院先前作出的应在本案中任命第11章受托人的决定。任何替代受托人均须从头开始，而且很可能会在获任命后立即面临债务人的反对，正如第11章受托人自其获任命以来所面临的反对一样。这些列举的损害证明存在不可弥补的损害，且对此不存在充分的法律救济。\n\n此外，如上所述，债务人认为，与当前社交媒体及抗议活动一致的行为有害于与 PAX 的和解。于 October 21, 2022，债务人呼吁其运动——NFSC 和 The Whistleblower Movement（吹哨人运动）——的成员以及其个人追随者，停止曝光 PAX 的个人信息，以便债务人与 PAX 之间实现和平与和解。\n\n尽管债务人主张不存在 PAX 遭受不可弥补损害的证据，但该异议再次是在错误的框架下提出的。尽管如此，法院将该异议重新理解为一种主张，即针对 PAX 的行为并不构成对破产程序的损害。\n\n法院不同意。PAX 是这些案件中的债权人。事实上，PAX 是债务人案件中最大的债权人，并已在公司债务人案件中提出另我责任主张。如上所述，被告知悉其行为损害与 PAX 达成和解的前景。第11章程序提供了一个框架，以鼓励各方在确认要求及破产法院衡平权力所设定的边界内，就债务进行和解及重组。削弱达成和解的可能性，构成对破产程序及债务人破产财产的不可弥补损害，尤其是就债务人的最大债权人 PAX 而言。\n\n基于上述全部理由，法院认为，债务人的行为“使重整程序尴尬、负担、延误或以其他方式受阻”，Lyondell, 402 B.R. at 490，因为基于上述全部理由，该行为使对破产财产事务进行衡平解决的可能性大为降低。法院还指出，美国最高法院曾表示：“‘在此等情形下，一州可以防止公众得出如下结论的可能性：法官的行为部分是恐吓的产物，而非源于司法程序的公平有序运作。’”Cox v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 565 (1965)。法院认为，其同样可以保护这些破产程序，避免公众可能得出其结果是恐吓的产物而非司法程序公平有序运作的结论。如债务人的行为继续并导致第11章受托人辞职，则很可能得出此类结论。\n\n最后，本院还注意到，自临时限制令（TRO）签发以来，原告已告知本院，社交媒体和抗议活动目前仍在持续，并且在某些情况下已经升级。不可弥补的损害仍在发生，令人极为担忧。\n\niii. 损害衡量\n\n原告主张，上述列举的损害超过了对债务人《美国宪法第一修正案》权利的损害，并主张根据本案事实，该等权利受到限制。债务人主张，对债务人《美国宪法第一修正案》权利的损害，远远超过对破产财产或重整程序可能造成的损害（如有）。\n\n如果签发初步禁令，债务人的言论将受到事前限制。债务人一般而言正确地指出，只要该等言论受《美国宪法第一修正案》保护，他将遭受严重损害。Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 然而，其言论在何种程度上受《美国宪法第一修正案》保护，必须由本院决定。因此，本院对损害的衡量受《美国宪法第一修正案》判例的指引。据此，本院对将予签发的初步禁令条款适用严格审查。\n\n1. 为实现极其重大的政府利益而作出狭义限定\n\n如美国联邦最高法院所要求，本院的禁令必须被审视为“如同我们审视一项法规［或条例］，如果其表面上限制了《美国宪法第一修正案》所保障的权利，则其不应［签发］。”United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576 (1971). 基于内容的禁令，例如本禁令，其禁止具有特定倾向的表达，“推定违宪，且仅在政府证明其为实现极其重大的政府利益而作出狭义限定时方可被正当化。”Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015). 此外，该禁令禁止在公共街道——传统公共论坛——进行抗议，这也表明应适用严格审查。Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480–81 (1988).\n\n与债务人援引的众多案件不同，有两项既已确立的极其重大的政府利益支持本禁令。11\n\na. 为保障私人住宅的安宁使用而作出狭义限定\n\n在 Frisby 一案中，美国联邦最高法院就“‘州保护住宅福祉、安宁与隐私的利益’，487 U.S. at 484”作出如下认定：\n\n《Brookfield 条例》所禁止的那类纠察者通常并非寻求向公众传播信息，而是要侵扰被针对的住户，并以特别冒犯的方式这样做。此外，即使某些此类纠察者具有更广泛的传播目的，其活动仍然固有地且冒犯性地侵扰住宅隐私。针对性纠察对住宅安宁使用造成的毁灭性影响毋庸置疑：“对于住宅内的人而言……当纠察……持续……时，住宅变得不再像住宅……。［该等］紧张和压力可能是心理上的，而非身体上的，但并不因此就较少损害家庭隐私和真正的家庭安宁。”\n\n11 Compare Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484 (“‘州保护住宅福祉、安宁与隐私的利益，在一个自由文明社会中无疑属于最高等级。’”); Picard v. Magliano, 42 F.4th 89, 103–05 (2d Cir. 2022)（认定 Cox, 379 U.S. at 562（“毫无疑问，州对保护其司法制度免受法院附近纠察可能造成的压力具有合法利益。既然我们致力于法治而非人治，司法行政绝对公正而有序至关重要。本院已确认，法院不受阻碍、不受束缚地运作，乃是我们宪政民主的根基之一。”）仍为有效法律）with, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011)（对于允许就发生在距葬礼 1000 feet 外、涉及公共关切事项、和平且依法进行并受警方监督的抗议所引起的严重精神痛苦获得赔偿，不存在极其重大的政府利益）；Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 528–35 (2001)（无论是威慑反社会行为，还是保护通信隐私，就与公共关切事项有关的问题而言，均非支持惩罚“以本身合法的方式获得涉案信息、但该信息来源以非法方式获得该信息的［信息发布者］……”的极其重大的政府利益）；Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989)（与州保护 B.J.F. 隐私的利益相对，“［我院］仅认定，在报纸发表其合法获得的真实信息时，如可合法施加惩罚，亦仅可在为实现最高等级的州利益而作出狭义限定的情况下施加；并且，根据本案事实［即上诉人收到披露的性侵受害人姓名，该事项涉及公共关切］，依［禁止警方披露性侵受害人姓名的法规］对上诉人施加责任，并未充分实现任何此类利益。”）；Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)（对于起诉一名未扰乱治安、在达拉斯市政厅前焚烧美国国旗的抗议者，不存在极其重大的政府利益）；Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976)（刑事被告获得公正陪审团的权利，并非足以禁止媒体发布公共关切信息的极其重大的政府利益）；N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 670 (1971)（政府未提出阻止发表《五角大楼文件》的极其重大的政府利益）；Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 429 (1971)（“将该行为定性为侵犯隐私——显然是本案禁令的依据——不足以支持禁止和平散发本记录所披露性质的信息性文献”，尤其是在“……被申请人并非试图阻止信息流入其本人家庭，而是流向公众”的情况下）；N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)（在未认定存在实际恶意的情况下，不存在允许公众人物或官员就诽谤获得赔偿的极其重大的政府利益。）\n\n487 U.S. at 486. Frisby 区分了 Keefe 一案；债务人反复依赖并援引该案为与本案最相似的案件。Id. 然而，正如 Frisby 指出，Keefe 本身在得出结论时即认为，“将该行为定性为侵犯隐私——显然是本案禁令的依据——不足以支持禁止和平散发本记录所披露性质的信息性文献”，尤其是在“……被申请人并非试图阻止信息流入其本人家庭，而是流向公众”的情况下，Keefe, 402 U.S at 429（着重号后加）。Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486（区分 Keefe）。\n\n本案中，如同 Frisby 一案，禁令试图阻止信息流入家庭。Id. 就第 11 章受托人、其律师、其子女及其前配偶，以及 PAG（PAG）的主席及其家人和 PAX（PAX）的律师在其私人住宅受到针对性抗议而言，本院认定 Frisby 而非 Keefe 为控制性法律，并认定州在保护“［其］住宅的福祉、安宁和隐私”方面具有极其重大的利益。Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484. “针对性纠察对住宅安宁使用造成的毁灭性影响毋庸置疑。……团体的实际规模无关紧要；即使一名孤立的纠察者也能侵扰住宅隐私。”Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486-87（着重号后加）。\n\n根据 Frisby，本院为实现该极其重大的政府利益，可以完全禁止在“‘任何个人的住所或住宅之前或周围’”进行纠察。Id. at 477. 如同 Frisby 一案，该言论限制作出了狭义限定。Id. at 487–88（“因此，针对性住宅纠察的‘弊害’——‘不受欢迎的访客出现在住宅的本身’——‘是由表达媒介本身造成的。’据此，《Brookfield 条例》对该特定表达媒介的全面禁止，作出了狭义限定。”）因此，本院基于 Frisby 所述理由，对本案所涉住宅“之前或周围”的纠察采取全面禁止。\n\n尽管本院对在住宅“之前或周围”进行纠察作出全面禁止，但本院不得禁止“‘在住宅社区内的一般游行，甚至不得禁止沿一整排住宅前方行走路线’”；如果禁令规定在“住宅周围 300-foot 区域”内全面禁止，即会产生该效果。Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 755 (1994)（内部引注略）。然而，法院可以对“在较小区域外的纠察时间、持续时长及纠察者人数作出限制。”Madsen, 512 U.S. at 755. 因此，本院还禁止在所涉当事人可能在家休息以及往返工作地点或学校的时段内，在本案所涉住宅 200-feet12 范围内进行纠察。本院认定：(a) 住宅的安宁使用包括夜间安静，这支持对夜间纠察作出更大限制，13；以及 (b) 当住宅变成出入均受抗议影响的堡垒时，住宅的安宁使用亦被破坏，这支持在人们离家上班或上学以及返家时对纠察作出更大限制。14 第 11 章受托人就其在抗议期间避免离开及返回其被针对住宅的努力作证。债务人仍可在相关社区内进行纠察或\n\n12 本院选择 200-feet，是因为美国联邦最高法院认定 300 feet 过于宽泛，Madsen, 512 U.S. at 755，且因为 200 feet 应可为车辆安全驶入和驶出社区提供足够空间。其亦应为大多数未经扩音的噪声提供充足的噪声缓冲空间。\n\n13 本院关注夜间噪声。原告提交了作为证据的照片和视频，其中清楚显示在康涅狄格州、纽约州、马萨诸塞州及加利福尼亚州的住宅前进行抗议、纠察、散发传单和聚集。本院审阅了相关城镇和城市中已编纂的条例，以调查目前在该地区适用的限制。所有相关城镇和城市均有夜间噪声条例。\n\n14 本院禁止自下午 3:00 至上午 10:00 的行为，因为本院已将通常的通勤时段加入前一脚注所讨论的晚上 9:00 至上午 7:00 的框架。该限制延伸至周末，因为：(a) 许多被针对当事人是律师，他们可能至少在星期六工作；且 (b) 周末休息更多是正常的。\n\n在一天中的其他时段在相关社区内游行——但不得在相关住宅“之前或周围”进行。\n\n本院还认定，Frisby 证明有理由禁止债务人煽动本院所禁止的纠察，例如通过在社交媒体上发布或转发第 11 章受托人、其律师及其家庭成员，以及 PAG 主席、其律师及其家庭成员的住址，或呼吁在其住宅进行抗议。债务人不得通过呼吁或支持他人代其行事来规避该禁令。\n\nb. 为维护司法程序完整性而作出狭义限定\n\n此外，美国联邦最高法院在 Cox 一案中指出\n\n毫无疑问，州对于保护其司法系统免受法院附近纠察可能造成的压力，具有正当利益。既然我们致力于法治而非人治，司法行政绝对公正且有序便至关重要。本院已确认，我国法院不受阻碍、不受束缚地运作，是我们宪政民主的根基本身的一部分。……司法程序的任何阶段均不容许此类干预；暴民法恰恰是正当程序的对立面。\n\n379 U.S. at 562；参见 Picard, 42 F.4th at 103–05（认定 Cox 仍为有效判例，如 Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) 所表明〔该案维持了对投票地点附近竞选拉票活动的限制〕）；参照 Alix v. McKinsey & Co., Inc.（艾利克斯诉麦肯锡公司）, 23 F.4th 196, 204 (2d Cir. 2022)（“更具体地说（也更重要的是），我们认为地区法院未充分考虑到麦肯锡被指控的不当行为针对的是联邦司法机构。因此，本案要求我们关注第三条法院为确保破产法院及其程序的完整性所必须承担的责任。我们所有法院的诉讼当事人均有权期待规则将得到遵守……。”）。\n\n虽然在 Cox 和 Picard 两案中，所涉法规均被认定为适用违宪，但均被认定为表面合宪。Cox, 379 U.S. at 560–64 & 568–75（认定该法规表面合宪但适用违宪，因为尽管“near”并非违宪地含糊不清，抗议者善意依赖治安官作出的陈述，即允许其在实际抗议地点进行抗议）；Picard, 42 F.4th at 101 & 103–05（认定该法规表面合宪但适用违宪，因为该抗议是“与任何具体审判无关的一般倡议”，并且抗议是“通过散发传单而非更为公开和扰乱性的沟通形式实施的”）。\n\nPicard 案中所涉法规禁止：\n\n在任何作为法院建筑设立的建筑物半径二百英尺范围内的公共街道或人行道上或沿线……就正在该法院进行的审判程序，或参与该审判的法院或陪审团的性质，高声呼喊、喊叫、持有或展示载有书写或印刷内容的标语牌或标志，或者呼吁或要求该法院或陪审团就该审判作出任何此类特定行为或决定。\n\nId. at 95。与 Picard 案中的散发传单相比，且与债务人引用的主要判例 Keefe 形成更鲜明对比——该案不涉及针对法院程序的抗议——本案抗议涉及针对特定当事方的纠察和游行，即包括法院官员、第11章受托人在内的原告，以及针对特定诉讼，即这些破产案件。本初步禁令及其之前的临时限制令仅禁止未来行为（且仅指示未来行为），因此不存在 Cox 案中的信赖问题。\n\n本院认定，上文讨论的本禁令中有关私人住宅的措施，也系为实现 Cox 案所阐明的重大州利益而作出的狭义限定——在共同利害关系方、其律师及其家属住宅处进行有针对性的纠察，威胁将法律程序转变为“暴民法”——或者至少造成其表象。Cox, 379 U.S. at 562。本院进一步认定，在未涉入案件的亲属住宅处进行的抗议仅会恐吓原告，且根据 Cox 可以被完全禁止。\n\nCox 对“暴民法”的关切同样适用于第11章受托人及其律师，以及 PAX 及其律师的办公室和其他工作场所。本院禁止在这些工作场所可能的出入时段内，于其周边 100 feet15 范围内进行纠察和游行，以避免抗议者与工作人员近距离接触；此类接触最低限度可能损害这些破产案件属于法律程序的表象，最高限度可能影响这些破产案件的结果。参见 id.\n\n此外，本院认定，任何时候设置一条 36-foot 通行走廊——以堕胎案件中讨论的类似走廊为范本，参见 Madsen, 512 U.S. at 768–770——对言论施加的负担不超过防止法律程序受“暴民法”支配或显得受其支配所必需的程度。Cox, 379 U.S. at 562。\n\n债务人可以在第11章受托人及其律师，以及 PAX 及其律师的工作场所附近，于本初步禁令所限制的距离和时间以外进行纠察和游行。但是，债务人不得在任何时候于各方亲属的办公室和工作场所 100 feet 范围内进行纠察，因为本院认定，对未涉入案件的亲属进行此类纠察仅会恐吓原告，且根据 Cox 可以被完全禁止。\n\n本院还认定，Cox 和 Picard 证明有理由禁止债务人煽动其被禁止的纠察，例如呼吁在第11章受托人及其律师或 PAX 及其律师的工作场所进行抗议。\n\n15 本院选择 100 feet，因为其认定，大多数前往办公室的行人交通——来自停放车辆、公共交通站点和住宅——应发生在距办公室该距离之内。\n\n如上所述，债务人不得通过呼吁或支持他人代其行事来规避该禁令。\n\n2. 根据本案的具体事实和情形，债务人的言论应获较少保护\n\n虽然上述理由足以支持该禁令，但本案还存在降低债务人言论应受保护程度的情形。参见 Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc.（格茨诉罗伯特·韦尔奇公司）, 418 U.S. 323, 345–48 (1974)（“因此，私人个体不仅比政府官员和公众人物更容易受到伤害；他们也更应获得赔偿。”）；Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.（邓白氏公司诉格林莫斯建筑商公司）, 472 U.S. 749, 758–61 (1985)（“相反，涉及纯粹私人关切事项的言论，与第一修正案的关联较少。”）。\n\na. 第11章受托人不是政府官员或公众人物\n\n尽管债务人提出相反主张，本院认定第11章受托人不是政府官员。参见 Obsidian Finance Grp., LLC v. Cox（黑曜石金融集团有限责任公司诉考克斯）, 740 F.3d 1284, 1292–93 (9th Cir. 2014)。同样，尽管债务人作出相反主张，本院认定第11章受托人不是公众人物。参见 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352（“我们不会轻率地假定公民参与社区和专业事务便使其就所有目的而言成为公众人物。在没有明确证据表明其在社区中享有普遍声誉或知名度，并广泛参与社会事务的情况下，不应就其生活的所有方面将个人视为公众人物。通过考察个人参与特定争议的性质和程度，将公众人物问题缩小至更具意义的语境，乃属可取。”）。第11章受托人出庭，并与本案利害关系方及专业人士会面协商。他的角色并不面向公众。这些案件并未受到破产媒体或任何媒体的广泛报道，债务人关联且传播范围有限的媒体除外。由于第11章受托人既不是政府官员也不是公众人物，公众对于谈论他的既得利益低于其为公众人物时的程度。比较 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339–48 与 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269。\n\n记录中既无任何论证，也无任何证据证明其他任何被针对方是政府官员或公众人物。Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352。因此，债务人的言论应获较少保护。Id. at 345–48。\n\nb. 债务人的案件并非公众关切事项\n\n本院还认定，这些案件的具体事实和情形并非公众关切事项。言论在“可被‘公平地视为涉及任何政治、社会或其他与社区相关的事项’”时，或在其“‘属于正当新闻关注的对象；即公众普遍感兴趣且对公众具有价值和关切的对象’”时，涉及公众关切。Snyder, 562 U.S. at 453。\n\n在 Snyder 案中，在认定 Westboro Baptist Church（韦斯特伯勒浸信会）的抗议涉及公众关切事项时，最高法院指出了本案中指向相反结论的两个因素。最高法院指出：\n\n即使少数标语——例如“你将下地狱”和“上帝恨你”——被视为包含特别涉及 Matthew Snyder（马修·斯奈德）或 Snyder 一家的信息，这也不会改变 Westboro 示威的整体和主导主题涉及更广泛问题这一事实。\n\nId. at 454。此处，标语的整体和主导主题是对被针对个人作出的煽动性断言，以及对其面容的煽动性风格化肖像——而少数可被认为针对更广泛问题的标语并不改变这一事实。针对未涉入案件的家属住宅进行抗议，进一步凸显了该争议的个人性质。16\n\n此外，最高法院指出：\n\n在本案中，我们并不担心 Westboro 关于公共事项的言论是以任何方式人为设计，以使有关私人事项的言论免于承担责任。早在其得知 Matthew Snyder 之前，Westboro 就已积极就纠察所涉及的主题发声，且不能认真主张 Westboro 的纠察并不代表其对公共问题“真诚相信”的观点。\n\nId. at 455。此处，本院极为严重地担心，债务人就唯一可被认为涉及公众关切的事项——被指控的敲诈和被指控的养老金盗窃——所作的言论，是为使有关私人事项的言论免于承担责任而人为设计的。促成抗议的其他已承认事项——第11章受托人要求因债务人被指控违反 Corporate Governance Order 而认定债务人藐视法庭的动议，债务人的破产律师作证称该事项正在使这些案件“升温”，以及经本院批准的 2004 传票，该等传票在异议书、数次广播及 Jiao 女士的证言中被反复提及——并非公众关切事项。它们是关于管理和调查个别债务人的第11章破产财产的问题，涉及的破产案除债务人关联媒体，例如 GNews，外几乎未获媒体报道。\n\n然而，养老金盗窃和敲诈主张属于被指控的犯罪，而犯罪通常是公众关切事项。Obsidian Finance, 740 F.3d at 1291–92。然而，本院认定，被指控的养老金盗窃并非公众关切事项。记录中没有任何迹象表明，PAX 正因其被指控参与该养老金基金事项而受到调查或起诉。此外，Jiao 女士关于被指控养老金盗窃的证言未获任何证据支持。她无法解释 PAX 如何通过投资该基金来盗取基金资金。至于 Cheng 先生，他不知道自己为何抗议 O'Melveny & Myers（欧麦律师事务所）——其陈述的理由针对的是第11章受托人，而非 PAX——并且他并不完全确定 O'Melveny & Myers 如何参与这些案件。\n\n法院还认定，所称讹诈并非公共关切事项。法院认定，没有证据表明针对所称讹诈存在刑事调查。尽管债务人最初作证称其已向有关部门举报第11章受托人，但在被追问时，他无法具体说明其向何一机关举报了第11章受托人，最终表示他只是与其律师讨论过此事——而非向任何机关举报。\n\n此外，尽管债务人作证称其认为第11章受托人曾试图讹诈他，债务人的破产律师作证称，他知道第11章受托人并非要求向其个人支付 $250 million，而是要求作为一项全面和解的一部分，向破产财产支付 $250 million。在 11 月 17 日的和解会议上，债务人的破产律师一时激动，确实指控第11章受托人构成讹诈。尽管作出该呼喊，他理解实际上并未发生讹诈，而是提出了一项和解要约。债务人的破产律师还作证称，向债务人解释和解条款——例如第11章受托人为破产财产提出的 $250 million 要求——是其对债务人负有的职责。法院从该证词推断，尽管他在会议期间作出该呼喊，但他已告知债务人，第11章受托人并未试图讹诈债务人。\n\n尽管债务人作证称，在与第11章受托人举行的和解会议期间，其恐惧程度超过其在中国服刑期间的恐惧程度，但该证词并无说服力。尽管该证词表明第11章受托人在和解会议期间作出了令人遗憾的评论，但该证词并未确立债务人产生此种恐惧的依据。此外，债务人对于其是否向有关部门举报该事件，以及如有举报，向何人举报，含糊其辞，使其就该问题所作证词缺乏说服力。\n\n最后，在所称讹诈发生时，债务人、第11章受托人和 Kindseth 先生（Kindseth）的无争议证词表明，会议上有六人出席——债务人、Kindseth 先生、代表债务人的 Mitchell 先生（Mitchell）、债务人的翻译、第11章受托人以及代表第11章受托人的 Bassett 先生（Bassett）——且他们受保密协议约束。鉴于该指控的性质及其被用作社交媒体和抗议活动的一部分，法院推断，该文章并非由第11章受托人或 Bassett 先生泄露，而是由与债务人有关联的某一方泄露。\n\n因此，法院认定，养老金盗窃指控和讹诈指控均未使本案成为公共关切问题。它们旨在将私人关切事项掩饰于赋予公共关切事项的言论保护之中。参见 Snyder, 562 U.S. at 455。因此，债务人的言论应受到较少保护。Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. at 758–61。\n\n3. 债务人对未具名当事人不具有诉讼资格\n\n债务人还主张，请求作出初步禁令的范围过宽，因为其中包含基于 Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2) 的措辞，该规则规定：\n\n(2) 受约束人员。该命令仅约束以下通过个人送达或其他方式实际知悉该命令的人员：\n\n(A) 当事人；\n\n(B) 当事人的高级职员、代理人、雇员、职工及律师；以及 (C) 与 Rule 65(d)(2)(A) 或 (B) 所述任何人积极协同行动或参与的其他人员。\n\n然而，正如原告指出的，作为具名当事人的债务人不具有提出该异议的诉讼资格。Madsen, 512 U.S. at 775–76。\n\n基于上述所有理由，法院认定，损害衡量倾向于准予初步禁令。正如法院在上文前一节所指出的，尽管存在 TRO，原告所受损害仍在持续发生，这令人担忧。\n\niv. 公共利益\n\n最后，法院认定，发布禁令救济维护了公众对于破产程序完整性以及更一般而言法院程序完整性的利益。Alix, 23 F.4th at 204。破产是一项程序，通过该程序，债务人的财务事务得以整理，对债务人的所有债权均得到公平和衡平的处理。此外，就如债务人这样的个人而言，债务人可获得重新开始的机会。参见 Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991)（“本法院当然已承认，《法典》的一个核心目的，是提供一项程序，使某些无力清偿债务的债务人能够重新安排其事务，与其债权人达成和解，并享有‘人生中的新机会，未来努力有一片清晰的天地，不受既有债务压力和挫折的阻碍。’”）。拥有此种制度对公众有益，因此必须维护其完整性。\n\n如前一节所述，发布禁令救济也服务于公众维护住宅神圣性和私密性以及法治的利益。Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484; Cox, 379 U.S. at 562。\n\n法院还指出，就 18 U.S.C. § 1503 而言，第11章受托人是本法院的“in or of”官员。United States v. Crispo, 306 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2002)。法院不就该法条是否已遭违反发表意见，但法院对第11章受托人收到的威胁及言辞的激烈程度感到担忧。参见 United States v. Turner, 720 F.3d 411 (2d Cir. 2013)。法院注意到该局势正在升级。当前局势存在发生冲突的可能性。鉴于双方均主张债务人是抗议运动的领导者——无论如债务人的支持者所称，是一位类似达赖喇嘛的人物，还是如原告所称，是一名头目——法院认为，债务人遵守本初步禁令而努力悬崖勒马，将能成功降低这些案件中的紧张程度。\n\nC. 受约束的当事人\n\n根据 Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 的明确文字及具有约束力的第二巡回法院判例法，“积极协同行动的人员”恰当地界定为明知而帮助或教唆债务人违反禁令的一方。Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Reinert & Duree, P.C. 191 F.3d 297, 303 (2d Cir. 1999)。尽管法院通常只能约束诉讼中的当事人，但已确定的法律是，“Rule 65(d) 旨在将普通法原则编纂成文，即被告不得通过帮助者和教唆者实施被禁止的行为，从而使一项判令失效，尽管该等人员不是原始诉讼的当事人。”同上（省略内部引号）。根据 65(d)，相关审查是非当事人是否帮助或教唆被告违反法院命令。Next Invs., LLC v. Bank of China 12 F.4th 119, 134 (2d Cir. 2021)（引用 NML Cap. Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230, 243 (2d Cir. 2013)）。\n\n禁令的非当事人在实际知悉禁令后，如被质疑的行为系为受初步禁令约束的一方的利益而采取，或为协助该方而采取，即与被禁令约束的一方积极协同行动。Havens v. James, 435 F. Supp. 3d 494, 504 (W.D.N.Y. 2020)；另参见 Artista Records, LLC, 122 F. Supp. 3d 32, 35–36 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)（认定，知悉禁令的第三方互联网服务提供商，如明知其服务被用于促成违反禁令的行为，即属于禁令的适用范围）。在 Havens 案中，一项为期二十年的永久禁令正在生效，禁止抗议者在某一特定堕胎诊所外进行抗议；抗议者认为，由于他们未被列入禁令，因此并未与具名当事人积极协同行动。Havens 案法院驳回了该主张，并认定抗议者与具名当事人“协同行动”，因为：非当事人知悉禁令，且其既（1）与禁令中的具名当事人协调行动，又（2）与具名当事人具有同一共同目标，即阻止妇女在提供该等服务的设施寻求堕胎服务。Havens, 435 F. Supp. 3d at 507。\n\n此外，权利继受人可受先前禁令约束。第二巡回法院维持了一项禁止某具名被禁令约束实体的权利继受人的初步禁令，并认定，未作为先前禁令当事人被具名列出的抗议者亦受该禁令约束，并可因违反其条款而被认定藐视法庭。People v. Operation Rescue Nat'l, 80 F.3d 64, 70 (2d Cir. 1996)（“我们意识到，在如本案的案件中，事实裁判者面临困难：处境相似的个人群体在多个具有相同基本领导层和目标的非公司协会之间流动转换。”）。根据 Operation Rescue Nat'l，对于受禁令约束一方的权利继受人，相关审查是两个组织之间是否存在身份上的实质连续性，同上，第 70 页，以及其是否与具名被告具有“相同基本领导层和目标”。同上，第 71 页。*.*\n\n此外，第二巡回法院辖区内的下级法院认定，如未在禁令中具名的一方与具名被禁令约束当事人“实质性地相互交织”，则该方可被视为受禁令约束。17 John Wiley & Sons v. Book Dog Books, LLC, 327 F. Supp. 3d. 606 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)（引用 In re Sledziejowski, 533 B.R. 408, 424 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015)（“如受禁令约束的一方与非当事人实质性地相互交织，包括共用办公场所、非当事人与受禁令约束一方之间支付雇员费用、受禁令约束一方对非当事人运营具有相当大的控制权，以及其他实质性联系。”））。然而，该等禁令必须限于已确定的第三方以及法院认定与被告“积极协同行动”的当事人。Spin Master Ltd. V. 158, 463 F.Supp.3d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)（在不妨碍再次提起的情况下驳回原告拟议的永久禁令，认定该禁令的措辞和效力范围过宽，超出法院权限）。\n\n17 值得注意的是，在 Bank of China 12 F.4th at 134 中，第二巡回法院简要讨论了 John Wiley & Sons, 327 F. Supp. 3d at 638 所采用并由地区法院适用的“实质性相互交织”标准的适用，但认为：“该问题的最终答案还可能取决于对帮助和教唆的普通法理解，即审查非当事人的协助是否足够‘实质性’，以致受该规则禁止。. . . 但该等理解至多并不确定，且本巡回区的姊妹法院尚未采纳该理解。”（着重号为原文所加，省略内部引文）。\n\n初步禁令中列明的人员受其约束。就个人而言，适用 John Wiley & Sons 所确立的“实质性相互交织”标准，债务人对若干个人具有“相当大的控制权”，但更重要的是，与数名参与组织和策划抗议活动及规避传票的个人存在“实质性联系”。在本案中，债务人使用多个社交媒体账户传播其观点，并向其关联人士传达其建议和支持。尽管债务人本人并不总是亲自发布其使用社交媒体的视频，但其他人可以代表其使用与被告相关联的账户代为发布，包括 @Miles、@MilesGuo、@MilesGuoLive、@NFSCSpeaks 和 @chinatruth2022。债务人还利用其受到债务人实质性控制的各类媒体渠道，通过“GNews”上的新闻主播传播其观点。这些新闻主播也出现在抗议活动中。债务人经常出现在 Fay Fay Show 中，该节目也出现在 GTV 播出中。该节目的主持人\n\nFay Fay Show（Fay Fay）的Fay Fay一直通过WhatsApp与GSeries网络中的其他人保持联系。此外，债务人似乎与一小群人在Sherry-Netherlands公寓举行私密聚会。在原告律师办公楼前举行的抗议活动中，以及在个人私人住宅前举行的抗议活动中出现的一些人，也参加了这些私密聚会和餐叙。参与抗议活动的其他人曾在纽约州纽约市3 Columbus Circle与债务人会面，及/或作为债务人众多关联组织中至少一个（如非多个）的成员，通过社交媒体与债务人互动。因此，根据听证会期间提交的证据，法院认定债务人与下列人员“实质上密切交织”：Fay Fay、Beile Li、Huo Lai、Pamela Tsai、Roy Guo、Jiao Bing Shang、Shan Mu、Yaqin Li、Ziheng Cheng和Elliot Dordick，以及任何依其指示或代表其行事的人员或实体，均为债务人的高级管理人员、债务人的高级管理人员、代理人、雇员、受雇人、员工、律师，及/或与债务人、其高级管理人员、其代理人、其受雇人、其员工及其律师积极共同行动或参与的其他人员。\n\n除上述个人外，初步禁令中列明的实体亦受其约束。根据第二巡回法院在Operation Rescue Nat'l案中确立的标准，即对关联实体适用“身份的实质连续性”及“相同的领导层和目标”标准，Himalaya实体、NFSC、GTV、GNews和ROLF均由债务人领导，并具有“推翻中共”这一共同目标。另有众多实体同样具有这些特征，且一个实体的标志经常会出现在另一实体标志的旁边。这些实体实质上相互关联，存在于“GSeries”之内。因此，法院认定，NFSC、Himalaya、ROLF、GSeries实体（包括GTV和GNews），以及任何依其指示或代表其行事的人员或实体，均为债务人的高级管理人员、代理人、受雇人、员工、律师，及/或与债务人、其高级管理人员、其代理人、其受雇人、其员工及其律师积极共同行动或参与的其他人员，并受初步禁令约束。\n\nVI. 结论\n\n基于上述理由，原告的动议予以部分准许，并将发布与本裁决备忘录一致的初步禁令。债务人请求解除临时限制令的交叉动议因已无实际意义而被驳回，债务人请求驳回诉讼的交叉动议被驳回。\n\n2023年1月13日于康涅狄格州布里奇波特签署。\n\n证据3\n\n318　纽约南区联邦地区法院\n文件\n电子提交\n文件编号：\n美国联邦地区法院　08/02/2023\n纽约南区　提交日期：\n--------------------------------------------------------------　X\nTAO AN、CHUNGANG GUAN、CUI　：\nQINGYUN、HUIMIN LIN、BEILE LI，　：\nYANMING WANG、TAO ZHENG、ZHENG HU，　：\nYUAN CAO、LINWAN FENG，　：\n：　22-CV-10062 (VEC)\n原告，　：\n：　意见与命令\n\n—诉—　：\n\nLUC A. DESPINS（卢克·A·德斯平斯）和PAUL HASTINGS LLP（普衡律师事务所），　：\n\n被告。　：\n--------------------------------------------------------------　X\n\nVALERIE CAPRONI（瓦莱丽·卡普罗尼），美国联邦地区法官：\n\n原告为居住在美国的多名中国国民，其起诉Paul Hastings LLP（“Paul Hastings”）及其一名合伙人Luc A. Despins，指称其未登记为中华人民共和国（People's Republic of China，“PRC”）或中国共产党（Chinese Communist Party，“CCP”）的代理人，从而违反《外国代理人登记法》（Foreign Agents Registration Act，“FARA”），22 U.S.C. §§ 611–621。见修正起诉书，Dkt. 10。被告依据《联邦民事诉讼规则》12(b)(1)条，以未充分主张事项管辖权为由，并依据12(b)(6)条，以未能提出可获救济的请求为由，提出驳回修正起诉书的动议。见被告驳回动议备忘录，Dkt. 15，第1–2页。被告还依据规则11(b)，以原告提出无理请求并据称为不当目的提起本案为由，请求对原告律师实施制裁。被告制裁备忘录，Dkt. 12，第1、4页。原告反对两项动议。见原告制裁反对意见，Dkt. 23；原告驳回动议反对意见，Dkt. 22。基于以下理由，被告的驳回动议及制裁动议均予以准许，法院裁定被告获得合理的律师费和费用。\n\n背景\n\n原告主张，其为CCP和PRC实施的骚扰行动的受害人。修正起诉书第24段。原告进一步主张，由于Paul Hastings就由CCP控制和经营的银行Jinshang Bank的全球公开发行提供法律服务，其系CCP或PRC的代理人，并须依FARA登记为外国代理人。同上，第39–49、51–53段。原告还主张，Despins先生系CCP或PRC的代理人，并违反FARA的登记要求。1 见同上，第3、51段。\n\n本案的核心人物是自称亿万富翁的Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）先生，其并非本案当事人。2022年2月15日，Kwok先生在美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院（United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut）申请破产。概见Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Ho Wan Kwok (In re Kwok), Ch. 11 Case Nos. 22-50073, 22-5032 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022)。破产法院任命由Paul Hastings代理的Despins先生担任Kwok先生所控制实体的第11章受托人。见命令，Dkts. 523、668，In re Kwok，Ch 11 Case Nos. 22-50073、22-5032。\n\n至少自2022年11月起，Kwok先生利用其活跃的社交媒体影响力动员支持者，并对Paul Hastings、Despins先生及Despins先生的家人发动骚扰行动。见命令，Dkt. 133，第34、41–45、49段，In re Kwok，Ch 11 Case Nos. 22-50073、22-5032（以下简称“Bankr. Prelim. Inj. Mem.”）。Kwok先生曾以“无赖的手段”威胁Despins先生，并承诺被告“将遭受灾祸”。Bankr. Prelim. Inj. Mem. 第45段。\n\n1 被告称，Despins先生并未参与Jinshang Bank交易，而原告未主张任何事实表明Despins先生以其他任何方式与中华人民共和国（“PRC”）或中国共产党（“CCP”）存在关联。被告驳回动议备忘录，Dkt. 15，第4页。\n\n在Kwok先生发出行动号召后，其支持者曾在Despins先生、其女儿及其前妻住所外，以及Paul Hastings纽约办公室附近举行抗议。见同上，第42–43、52–53、57、69–71段。他们散发传单，传单描绘Despins先生的眼睛和嘴巴滴着鲜血，额头印有镰刀和锤子，并载有将被告称为“中共的走狗”和中共“帮凶”的文字。First Andres Decl. Ex. 22，Dkt. 13。他们还散发材料，称Despins先生为敲诈者、反犹主义者和“人渣”。见First Andres Decl. Exs. 15、22–25。\n\n该骚扰行动还包括多起联邦诉讼，指称参与Kwok先生破产程序的人是PRC或CCP的代理人，并违反FARA的登记要求。见，例如，修正起诉书，Dkt. 43，第60段，Gong v. Sarnoff et al, No. 23-CV-343 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2023)；起诉书，Dkt. 1，第74、118–25段，Wyatt v. U. of Md., No. 23-CV-742 (D. Md. Mar. 17, 2023)。在提起本案的同时，原告在An v. Shan, No. 22-CV-10060 (S.D.N.Y. 2023)案中起诉Kwok先生最大债权人的执行董事兼董事长Weijian Shan及其儿子，指称其违反FARA的登记要求。Kwok先生曾称赞原告Li为“同志[]”，并在社交媒体上发布本起诉书的照片。见First Andres Decl. Ex. 5。\n\n本案及Shan案中代理原告的Richard Freeth，也曾代理Wyatt v. University of Maryland, No. 23-CV-742 (D. Md. 2023)案中的原告。Wyatt案争议事项为马里兰大学（University of Maryland）作出的决定；Shan先生的女儿就读于该校，该校命令Kwok先生的支持者停止在校园公共区域抗议。起诉书，Dkt. 1，第14、16段，Wyatt，No. 23-CV-742 (D. Md. Mar. 17, 2023)。Freeth先生还代理Gong v. Sarnoff, No. 23-CV-00343 (S.D.N.Y. 2023)案中的原告，该案原告指控O'Melveny & Myers LLP及其合伙人Stuart Sarnoff“毁掉了Ho Wan Kwok的生活”。2 意见，Dkt. 57，第3页，Gong，No. 23-CV-343 (July 17, 2023)（引文内部省略）。3\n\n2023年1月11日，破产法院禁止Kwok先生及任何与其“积极共同行动”的人（包括原告Beile Li）骚扰或“人肉搜索”被告。命令，Dkt. 134，第5段，In re Kwok，Ch 11 Case Nos. 22-50073、22-5032（以下简称“Bankr. Prelim. Inj.”）。破产法院在其裁决中认定，Beile Li是Kwok先生的代理人。同上。\n\n2022年12月15日，原告提交修正起诉书。见修正起诉书。2023年1月19日，被告提出驳回修正起诉书的动议，并提出制裁动议。见驳回动议，Dkt. 14；制裁动议，Dkt. 11。\n\n讨论\n\nI. 法院对原告的请求不具有事项管辖权\n\nA. 法律标准\n\n主张法院对特定请求具有事项管辖权的一方“负有以优势证据证明该管辖权存在的责任”。Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000)。如案件源于联邦法律，见28 U.S.C. § 1331；或当事人之间存在完全多元管辖且争议金额超过\\$75,000.00，见同上§ 1332，则事项管辖权存在。若请求“源于美国宪法、法律或条约”，法院即具有联邦问题管辖权。同上§ 1331。为援引联邦问题管辖权，起诉书必须“确立联邦法律创设诉因，或者原告获得救济的权利必然取决于对联邦法律重大问题的解决”。Perpetual Secs., Inc. v. Tang, 290 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 2002)（引文整理）。\n\n原告请求法院通过推定FARA项下存在私人诉权，认定其具有联邦问题管辖权。4 见原告驳回动议反对意见，Dkt. 22，第48–54段。FARA要求任何“外国委托人的代理人”向总检察长登记，除非该实体符合豁免条件；该法赋予总检察长对FARA违法行为提起追诉的专属权力。5 22 U.S.C. § 612；另见同上§ 618(f)（授予总检察长寻求禁令救济的权力，以禁止代表外国委托人采取的行为或要求登记）。\n\n如原告方所承认，《外国代理人登记法》（FARA）项下不存在私人诉权。参见修正起诉状（Am. Compl.）¶¶ 5–6。《外国代理人登记法》赋予总检察长对违反登记要求的行为进行起诉的专属权限，且没有迹象表明国会意图创设私人诉权。参见 22 U.S.C. § 618(f)。《外国代理人登记法》的宗旨是“提供[一]个集中报告系统，以追踪代表外国行事的代理人的活动……，且[该]法规或其立法史中没有任何语言表明国会意图为联邦政府以外的任何实体设立[一]项诉因。”参见，例如，Weican Meng v. Xinhuanet Co., 2017 WL 3175609, at \\*3 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2017)（引自 Comm'n for a Free Namibia v. S.W. Africa People's Org., 554 F. Supp. 722, 722 (D.D.C. 1982)）。\n\n原告方未主张或陈述任何事实，以表明存在多元管辖权。\n\n5 外国委托人的代理人是指“作为外国委托人的代理人、代表、雇员或受雇人行事的任何人，或按照外国委托人的命令、请求，或在其指示或控制下以任何其他身份行事的任何人，或……其活动直接或间接地……全部或主要部分由外国委托人控制的任何人。”22 U.S.C. § 611(c)。如果外国委托人的代理人“仅从事……（1）促进该外国委托人真实贸易或商业的私人且非政治性活动；或（2）其他并非主要服务于外国利益的活动”，则免于《外国代理人登记法》的登记要求。Id. § 613(d)。\n\n当法规未明确规定私人诉权时，法院不愿推定存在该权利。参见，例如，Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004)（指出法院不愿推定私人诉权，该等诉权“允许在不受检察裁量权所施加制约的情况下进行执行”）；Olmsted v. Pruco Life Ins. Co. of N.J., 283 F.3d 429, 432 (2d Cir. 2002)（“没有国会意图，就不存在诉因，法院不得创设诉因，无论从政策角度而言这可能多么可取……。”Id.（引文清理））。因此，据本院所知，审议过《外国代理人登记法》是否规定默示私人诉权的地区法院一致认定，该法并未规定此种权利。参见，例如，Henry v. Washington, 2022 WL 9491957, at \\*2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 16, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 9372175 (Oct. 14, 2022)；Bey v. Epstein, 2021 WL 8155603, at \\*4 (D. Conn. Aug. 6, 2021)（“作为私人个人，原告无权依据该法规提起诉讼，因为不能从《外国代理人登记法》中推定私人诉权。”）；Waterhouse v. Cufi Church Ass'n Inc., 2014 WL 1745098, at \\*3 (D. Haw. Apr. 29, 2014)。\n\n原告方承认，《外国代理人登记法》的文本和判例法均不支持认定存在私人诉权，但仍敦促本院因总检察长据称未予执行而推定存在私人诉权。参见 Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5–6。总检察长选择在何种程度上执行《外国代理人登记法》无关紧要。决定性问题是立法意图，而原告方未能在其修正起诉状中充分陈述，或在其对驳回动议的反对意见中提出任何有关该法规或其立法史的事实，以表明国会意图在《外国代理人登记法》项下设立私人诉权。\n\n然而，即使本院推定存在私人诉权，本院仍将缺乏事项管辖权，因为原告方未能表明其具有诉讼资格。确立的法律原则是，原告要提出诉求，必须表明“（1）‘事实上的损害’，（2）该损害与所涉行为之间的‘因果联系’，以及（3）‘有利裁决将救济该损害’的可能性。”Maddox v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co., N.A., 19 F.4th 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2021)（引自 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–561 (1992)）。原告方未陈述任何事实，使本院能够合理推定其遭受了“具体且个别化”的、而非“推测性或假设性”的事实上的损害，更不用说可被设想为可追溯至被告方未登记为外国政府代理人的损害。Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560（引文清理）。\n\n在缺乏事项管辖权的情况下，本院必须不损害权利地驳回本案。参见 Bank v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 708 F. App'x 43, 44–45 (2d Cir. 2018)（简易命令）。本院拒绝准许原告方修改。原告方已经修改过一次起诉状，仍未纠正管辖权瑕疵；再给予原告方一次机会将属徒劳。6\n\nII. 因原告方的起诉状毫无依据且为不当目的而提交，制裁是适当的\n\nA. 法律标准\n\n《联邦民事诉讼规则》第 11(b) 条要求向法院提交文件的律师证明，其“基于在当时情形下合理调查后形成的、该人士所知、所获信息及所信”，该文件并非为不当目的而提出，其法律主张并非毫无依据，且有事实和法律支持。第 11 条还“明确且毫不含糊地对每位律师施加积极义务，要求其在签署诉状前，就该诉状的可成立性进行合理调查。”Int'l Shipping Co., S.A. v.\n\n6 由于本院以缺乏事项管辖权为由驳回修正起诉状，本院不审理被告方依据第 12(b)(6) 条、以未能陈述可获救济的请求为由提出的驳回动议的实体理由。\n\nHydra Offshore, Inc., 875 F.2d 388, 390 (2d Cir. 1989)。《规则》第 11(c)(2) 条的“安全港”规定指出，如受质疑的文件“在送达后 21 日内被撤回或得到适当更正”，则制裁动议“不得提交……”。“在通知后并给予合理答复机会后，如法院认定违反了第 11(b) 条，法院可以对违反该规则的任何律师、律师事务所或当事人施加适当制裁……。”Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)。除第 11 条所赋予的权限外，地区法院还拥有“固有权限，可制裁以恶意、无理纠缠、恣意或压迫性理由在其面前出庭的当事人。”Sassower v. Field, 973 F.2d 75, 80–81 (2d Cir. 1992)（引自 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44–45 (1991)）。\n\n地区法院在根据第 11 条量定适当且合理的制裁时，也享有“广泛裁量权”。O'Malley v. New York City Transit Auth., 896 F.2d 704, 709 (2d Cir. 1990)。7 在确定制裁是否适当时，法院考虑的因素包括，不当行为是否“故意[]或疏忽”，该行为是否“构成一种模式或活动的一部分”，或者当事人是否“在其他诉讼中从事过类似行为”。8 Colliton v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, 2008 WL 4386764, at \\*12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2008)。“制裁可以包括……因该违规行为直接产生的合理律师费及其他开支。”Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4)。\n\n7 即使法院缺乏事项管辖权，其仍保有对原告方及其律师施加制裁的权限。参见，例如，Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 137–39 (1992)；Schlaifer Nance & Co., Inc. v. Est. of Warhol, 194 F.3d 323, 333 (2d Cir. 1999)。\n\n8 法院还可考虑该不当行为是否影响整个诉状，抑或仅影响某一特定罪名项或抗辩；该不当行为在时间或费用方面对诉讼程序产生何种影响；以及责任人是否受过法律训练。Colliton v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, 2008 WL 4386764, at \\*12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2008)。\n\nB. 原告方的主张毫无依据\n\n根据第 11(b)(2) 条，若依“客观合理性标准”，显然“毫无成功可能，且不存在任何合理理由可以扩展、修改或推翻现行法律”，则法律论点毫无依据。Morley v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 66 F.3d 21, 25 (2d Cir. 1995)（省略内部引文）。合理调查本会表明，原告方的《外国代理人登记法》主张因多项理由而显然站不住脚，其中尤其包括未能充分陈述诉讼资格。\n\n原告方未陈述任何事实，以表明其如确立诉讼资格所要求的那样，因被告方被指违反《外国代理人登记法》的行为而受到“具体损害”。TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2205 (2021)；另参见 Holcombe v. Ingredients Sols., Inc., 797 F. App'x 630, 632 (2d Cir. 2020)（事实上的损害必须是“具体且个别化的”）。修正起诉状仅描述了一名原告，即 Cui Qingyun（崔庆云）所遭受的具体损害。根据修正起诉状，在某个未说明的时间9，Qingyun 先生及其妻子的大家族被 PRC（中华人民共和国）夺走了全部财产，并且于 April 2022，PRC“强制封控”了他及其直系亲属，并在两周内仅断断续续地向其提供食物。Am. Compl. ¶ 28。然而，修正起诉状未陈述任何事实，将 PRC 对 Cui Qingyun 及其家人所称的不当对待，与 Despins 先生或 Paul Hastings（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所）作为 PRC 或 CCP（中国共产党）未登记代理人的行为联系起来。\n\n对于其余九名原告，起诉状未指称其遭受任何损害。相反，原告方依赖于概括性的损害指称，包括其“遭受了 CCP 和 PRC 代理人持续进行的骚扰活动。”Id. ¶ 22。概括性的损害陈述不足以充分陈述诉讼资格。参见 Gambles v. Sterling Infosystems, Inc., 234 F. Supp. 3d 510, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)。“《宪法》第三条赋予联邦法院救济被告对原告造成之损害的权力，而非赋予其一种不受约束的权力，以追究被告法律违规行为的责任。”TransUnion LLC, 141 S. Ct. at 2206（省略内部引文）。\n\n9 尽管修正起诉状未指称该等没收发生的日期，但显然是在 CCP 控制中国时，即数十年前发生的。参见 Am. Compl. ¶ 28。\n\n即使本院认定原告方合理地陈述了某些具体损害，原告方也未陈述任何事实，使本院能够合理推定 Paul Hastings 向 Jinshang Bank（金商银行）提供法律服务，是一项“全部或部分直接或间接地……由外国委托人控制”的活动，从而使 Paul Hastings 在《外国代理人登记法》的含义内构成“外国委托人的代理人”。22 U.S.C. § 611(c)。针对 Paul Hastings 的指称已经十分单薄，针对 Despins 先生的指称则更为单薄。修正起诉状除 Despins 先生系 Connecticut（康涅狄格州）居民这一事实外，未陈述任何针对他的具体事实。Am. Compl. ¶ 20。即使原告方陈述了事实，使人可以合理推定任一被告是根据《外国代理人登记法》须登记的 PRC 或 CCP 代理人，原告方也未说明其所遭受的任何损害如何能够“公平地追溯至”被告方未登记的行为。Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560。原告方指称，被告方“恐吓[其]不行使其权利”，Am. Compl. ¶ 25，但未合理地陈述任何具体事实以支持这一概括性指称，也未说明登记为外国代理人将如何阻止被告方施加该等损害。10\n\n由于即使是粗略调查也会表明，修正起诉状所陈述的事实远未达到确立诉讼资格所需的门槛，原告方的\n\n10 原告似乎还主张，由于 Paul Hastings（宝盛律师事务所）向 Jinshang Bank（晋商银行）提供法律服务，被告应对 CCP（中国共产党）或 PRC（中华人民共和国）造成的任何损害负责。见修正后起诉书 ¶¶ 39–49, 51–53。该主张牵强到荒谬的程度。原告亦未主张 Despins 先生与 CCP 或 PRC 存在任何关联。\n\n律师显然未能履行“每位律师在签署诉状前对其可行性进行合理调查的积极义务”。Int'l Shipping Co., S.A., 875 F.2d at 390（内部引文略）。尤其如此，因为被告已通知原告，被告认为该起诉书“显然是为进一步推进 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）持续骚扰和恐吓被告的活动这一不当目的而提起”，且原告的起诉书毫无根据，因为 FARA 未规定私人诉权。见 First Andres Decl. Ex. 1 at 1–2。\n\n本院认定适宜实施制裁。被告遵守了规则 11 的安全港条款：其通知原告，因原告提交的起诉书毫无根据，被告拟申请制裁；并在提出制裁申请前超过二十一日，向原告律师事务所的最后已知地址送达了规则 11 动议文件。11 见 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2)。原告仍坚持提交修正后起诉书，而该起诉书未弥补被告已指出的任何缺陷。见 First Andres Decl. ¶ 2。\n\n11 Freeth 先生主张，被告未遵守规则 11 的安全港条款，因为被告对制裁动议的送达存在瑕疵；该主张本身很可能构成可受制裁的论点。Pls. Sanctions Opp., Dkt. 23 ¶¶ 7–8。该论点充满投机取巧。被告已适当向 Freeth 先生送达。联邦民事诉讼规则 11(c)(2) 要求制裁动议须依照规则 5 送达，而规则 5 允许通过多种方式送达，包括“邮寄至该人士最后已知地址”、“交付给该人士”或留置于“该人士的办公室”。Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(B)。只要发送人将文件邮寄至收件人的最后已知地址，即使收件人未收到邮件，送达仍视为完成。见，例如，Greene v. WCI Holdings Corp., 136 F.3d 313, 315 (2d Cir. 1998)。\n\nFreeth 先生的最后已知地址是其办公地址；他在本案提交的所有文件、ECF 中均列明该地址，该地址亦已在其纽约州执业登记相关的 First Judicial Department（第一司法部门）备案。见 Second Andres Decl. Ex. 5, Dkt. 26。ECF Rule 20.6 要求律师保持其地址为最新。见 ECF Rules and Instructions (July 24, 2023), available at http gov/rules/ecf-related-instructions。2022年12月27日，被告通过邮寄和亲自送达的方式，向 Freeth 先生办公室的最后已知地址送达。见 Second Andres Decl. ¶¶ 12–13。被告还要求 Freeth 先生提供新地址，但其未予提供。见 id. ¶ 15。由于被告遵守了规则 11 的安全港条款，Freeth 先生不能主张原告未获得合理的答复机会。\n\nC. 原告提起本诉讼系为骚扰被告\n\n根据规则 11(b)(1)，律师不得“为任何不当目的，例如骚扰、造成不必要的拖延或无谓增加诉讼成本”而提交文件。Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1)。若结合原告在诉讼中及诉讼外的行为，起诉书毫无依据到表明诉讼背后存在不正当动机，法院可推定存在不当目的。见，例如，S. Pac. Shipping Co. v. Redi-Fresh Produce Inc., 2014 WL 6968039, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2014)（认定原告主张的“缺陷，加之其”在该法院及其他法院诉讼中的行为，“引发了对不当目的的推定”）；另见 Schlaifer Nance & Co, Inc.. v. Estate of Warhol, 194 F.3d 323, 338 (2d Cir. 1999)（当诉讼“完全毫无根据，以至于必须得出结论认为其必定是出于某种不当目的而提起”时，法院可推定恶意，id.（引文经整理））。\n\n在本案中，原告提交诉讼的背景表明原告完全无视“法律依据”。Galonsky v. Williams, 1997 WL 759445, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 1997)。在破产法院禁止原告 Li（李）及与其“积极协同行动者”提出毫无根据的主张，即 Paul Hastings 是 CCP 代理人之后，原告未撤回其起诉书。见 Bankr. Prelim. Inj. at 60。即使在被告已向原告律师通知起诉书存在诸多缺陷之后，原告仍继续违反该禁令；Freeth 先生随后提交修正后起诉书时未予补救。见 id.; First Andres Decl. Ex. 1 at 1–2。\n\n原告的文件显示，他们真正关注的是 Kwok 先生，并试图通过骚扰那些被认为是其对手的人来“维护”他。原告主张 Kwok 先生的破产程序“无关”，却在其对被告驳回动议的异议中，以约一半篇幅讨论 Kwok 先生所谓的“反对 CCP 的斗争”。Pls. MTD Opp. ¶ 19；另见 Pls. Sanctions Opp. ¶ 16；Pls. MTD Opp. ¶¶ 13–47。原告毫无根据地断言，且未提出任何事实主张支持其结论，Despins 先生“在整个程序中始终彻底与 Kwok 先生对立，而非以中立方式履行受托人职责”，Pls. MTD Opp. ¶ 41，仿佛这能以某种方式解释为何 Kwok 先生以外的人可能对 Despins 先生享有诉因。\n\n其他法院存在类似诉讼，进一步支持本院认定原告系恶意提起本诉讼。原告律师一贯对 Kwok 先生的对手提出毫无依据的 FARA 主张——而他曾称赞该等行为。12 这些大量诉讼的复制粘贴性质，明显可见于原告起诉书中一段不合上下文的内容：该段主张“被告 Bo Shan（薄山）也作为 CCP 的间谍活动”。修正后起诉书 ¶ 50。\n\n12 见上文，第 3–4 页。\n\n原告在本诉讼中的法律主张、原告律师对他人提出毫无依据的 FARA 主张的历史，以及破产法院所记载的针对被告的骚扰活动，共同使本院得出结论：本诉讼只是旨在滋扰被告的一系列不当行为的又一部分，最可能是通过妨碍 Despins 先生履行其受托人职责的能力。因此，本院认定适宜实施制裁。\n\n规则 11(c) 使法院得以施加“足以阻止重复该行为或处于类似情形的其他人实施类似行为”的制裁。Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4)。律师费是防止以恶意诉讼形式进行骚扰的适当救济，尤其是在受制裁方未能遵守先前法院命令的情况下。见 Pentagen Techs. Int'l Ltd. v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 2d 464, 473–474 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)（施加制裁并裁定原告支付律师费，以惩罚其“从事旨在规避先前裁决的一系列诉讼”之行为，该行为“毫无依据且重复……［并且］系故意为之”），aff'd, 63 F. App'x 548 (2d Cir. 2003)。“规则 11 授予法官酌处权，以判给其认为为实现该规则制裁目的而合理的被告律师费部分。”Int'l Shipping Co., S.A., 875 F.2d at 392。本院认定，鉴于原告律师完全无视原告主张的是非曲直、其投机取巧行为，以及原告和原告律师均蔑视破产法院禁令，裁定支付合理律师费的全额是一项适当制裁，且并未超出必要的惩罚程度。\n\n规则 11“授权向律师、一方当事人或两者评定费用”。Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 1987)。在此，原告诉讼的某些方面属于“律师行使主要责任的问题”，United Republic Ins. Co., in Receivership v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 315 F.3d 168, 171 (2d Cir. 2003)，例如确保所提交的起诉书达到最低的法律依据门槛，并提出足以确立事项管辖权的事实。原告的行为——包括其在破产法院禁令后决定继续推进本诉讼——然而表明，原告亦须对本诉讼的骚扰性和毫无依据性负责。鉴于此，本院判令原告与原告律师就费用裁定承担连带责任。\n\n结论\n\n基于上述理由，被告的驳回动议以及请求将合理律师费和费用作为制裁的动议，均获准。修正后起诉书被驳回，但不妨碍再行起诉。被告必须不迟于 2023年8月11日提交律师费和费用申请。谨责成书记官终止案卷记录第 11 和 14 项中尚未处理的动议。\n\n特此命令。\n\n________________________________\n\n日期：2023年8月2日　VALERIE CAPRONI（瓦莱丽·卡普罗尼）\n\n纽约州纽约市　美国联邦地区法院法官\n\n附件 4\n\n美国联邦地区法院\nSouthern District of New York（纽约南区）　08/22/2023\n---------------------------------------------------------------------　X\n\nJUNWU GONG（龚军武），　：\n\n原告，　：\n-v　：\n\n：　23-cv-343 (LJL)\nSTUART M. SARNOFF（斯图尔特·M·萨诺夫）、O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP（欧麦律师事务所）、CARL M. STANTON（卡尔·M·斯坦顿）、CITY OF NEW YORK（纽约市），　：　意见和命令\nOFFICER JOHN DOE 1（警员无名氏 1）、OFFICER JOHN DOE 2（警员无名氏 2），　：\nOFFICER JOHN DOE 3（警员无名氏 3）、OFFICER LAUREN A.\nDUFFY（警员劳伦·A·达菲），　：\n\n被告。　：\n\n---------------------------------------------------------------------　X\n\nLEWIS J. LIMAN（刘易斯·J·利曼），美国联邦地区法院法官：\n\n被告 Stuart M. Sarnoff（“Sarnoff”）和 O'Melveny & Myers LLP（“O'Melveny”，与 Sarnoff 合称“申请动议被告”）依据联邦民事诉讼规则 11 提出动议，请求作出命令，对原告律师 Yongbing Zhang（张永兵）和 Richard Freeth（理查德·弗里思）实施制裁，并禁止原告 Junwu Gong（“Gong”或“原告”）、其律师及与其积极协同行动者未经法院许可提交其他类似诉讼。Dkt. No. 36。该动议部分获准，部分驳回。\n\n背景\n\n本院假定各方熟悉本案此前程序。下述事实取自各方就制裁动议提交的材料；本院在处置该动议所必需的范围内解决事实争议。见 Chemiakin v. Yefimov, 932 F.2d 124, 130 (2d Cir. 1991)（指出，在规则 11 动议中，法院应作为事实认定者行事，且在存在争议事实时须举行证据听证）。\n\nI. 起诉书中的指控\n\n原告于 2023年1月18日提交起诉书（“起诉书”），由此提起本案。1 Dkt. No. 2。原告是一名出生于外国的华裔美国永久居民，曾多次与其他华裔人士共同抗议 Chinese Communist Party（“CCP”）。Id. ¶¶ 15, 36–37。他主张，其一直遭受 CCP 代理人持续进行的骚扰活动。Id. ¶ 70。O'Melveny 是一家在 Delaware（特拉华州）注册的有限责任合伙企业，以律师事务所形式经营，并经常在纽约州开展业务。Id. ¶ 50。被告 Sarnoff 是 O'Melveny 的一名律师，id. ¶ 45，且为纽约州居民，id. ¶ 49。\n\n起诉状称，提出动议的被告违反了《外国代理人登记法》，22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(1)（“FARA”），因其作为中华人民共和国（“PRC”）未登记的代理人或代表行事。Id. ¶¶ 173–79。起诉状还称，提出动议的被告违反并共谋违反了原告根据《美国宪法》第一、第四及第十四修正案享有的宪法权利，该等权利可通过 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 和 1985(3) 执行。Id. ¶¶ 126–55。\n\n起诉状中的指控源于自 November 22, 2022 至 December 20, 2022 发生的一系列事件。November 22, 2022，原告参与了其声称在纽约 O'Melveny（欧迈伦律师事务所）办公地点举行的和平抗议活动，原因是其所称 O'Melveny 与中国共产党（“CCP”）之间的关系。据称，O'Melveny 在 PRC 至少设有三个办事处，并在 PRC 开展“极具盈利性”的业务。Id. ¶¶ 42–43。2013 年，其代理了一家总部设在中国的基因组研究及测序公司 BGI（华大基因），参与中国收购方首次收购一家美国公开交易公司。\n\n1 起诉状最初于 January 13, 2023 提交，但因提交错误被拒绝。见 Dkt. No. 1。\n\nId. ¶¶ 25–26。2 自 December 2, 2022 起，原告定期参与在纽约市一处被认为靠近 Sarnoff（萨诺夫）住所的地点举行的抗议活动。Id. ¶ 68。Sarnoff 是 O'Melveny 的一名律师，据称其“显著地”参与该所的中国业务。Id. ¶ 45。December 20, 2022 上午，原告再次参加了在一处被认为靠近 Sarnoff 住所的地点举行的抗议活动。Id. ¶ 71。\n\n原告称，其本人及其他抗议者在这些抗议活动中受到另一被告 Carl M. Stanton（斯坦顿）的骚扰；起诉状中关于其身份的唯一信息是，据称其为纽约市及纽约州居民。Id. ¶ 51。起诉状着重叙述了 December 20, 2022 发生的事件，当时原告被 Stanton 驾驶的汽车撞击。Id. ¶ 96。纽约市警察局（“NYPD”）的警员（其中一人在起诉状中被具名）在原告将其召至现场后，未提交警方报告。见 id. ¶¶ 101–08。其后，原告在附近一家餐馆开始感到不适并“陷入休克”后，抗议者呼叫救护车协助原告，但 NYPD 警员阻碍原告获得医疗救治的努力。Id. ¶¶ 112–19。\n\n2 据称，2020 年，两个 BGI 实体因“进行基因分析以进一步压迫新疆维吾尔自治区的维吾尔族及其他穆斯林少数群体”而被列入美国商务部工业与安全局的实体清单，id. ¶ 27；据称，January 2021，Reuters（路透社）报道称，BGI 曾与 PRC 军方合作开展增强士兵体能及其他项目的工作，id. ¶ 28；据称，July 2021，Reuters 报道称，BGI 在中国人民解放军协助下开发了一项产前检测，该检测亦被用于收集基因数据，包括“筛选出藏族和维吾尔族少数群体，以发现其基因与其特征之间的关联”，id. ¶ 29；并且，据称，October 2022，美国国防部将一家 BGI 子公司列入其在美国经营的中国军工企业名单，id. ¶ 30。\n\n起诉状几乎没有、即便有也极少涉及提出动议的被告行为的指控，且没有任何指控将提出动议的被告与任何州行为相联系。其称，December 20 的抗议活动发生在一处被认为靠近 Sarnoff 住所的地点。Id. ¶¶ 71–72。然而，其并未称 Sarnoff 在抗议期间有任何行为，甚至未称其当时在其住所内。3 起诉状还称，在此前于纽约市 O'Melveny 办公地点外举行的一次抗议活动中，Stanton 曾“数次”被观察到在禁止抗议者和公众进入的物业内拍照，并使用刷卡进入安检入口。Id. ¶¶ 76–77。原告基于信息和信念称，Stanton 并非 NYPD 警员，id. ¶ 82，尽管起诉状称 Stanton 曾表示其“与”警方在一起，或者与 NYPD 存在某种联系，id. ¶¶ 80–81。此外，没有任何指控称 O'Melveny，更不用说 Sarnoff，与 Stanton 存在任何关系，也没有任何指控称 O'Melveny 或 Sarnoff 于 December 20 参与 Stanton、NYPD 或任何州行为人的行为。根据起诉状，在原告被 Stanton 的汽车撞击后，是原告而非 O'Melveny、Sarnoff 或 Stanton 呼叫了 NYPD，而呼叫救护车的是抗议者。Id. ¶¶ 85, 88, 114。\n\n起诉状确实称，提出动议的被告与 CCP 存在联系。原告主张，“O'Melveny 受制于 CCP，因此实施 CCP 所要求的任何行为——包括在美国境内实施的、将要求其作为外国代理人向美国政府登记的行为”，id. ¶ 47，并称 CCP 在美国的未登记代理人“现被认为是被告 Sarnoff、被告 O'Melveny 及被告\n\n3 起诉状甚至未就事实而言称，抗议活动发生在 Sarnoff 住所附近。\n\nStanton”，id. ¶ 64。为支持这些主张而提出的唯一事实指控是，O'Melveny 和 Sarnoff 曾代表一家中国公司从事法律工作，id. ¶¶ 25–26，以及 O'Melveny 在 PRC 设有办事处，并从该等办事处与“可能对国家产生重大影响”的对象开展“有利可图”的业务，id. ¶¶ 42–43。没有任何事实指控支持 Stanton 与 PRC 或 CCP 存在任何联系。\n\nII. 与第 11 条动议有关的程序经过\n\nMarch 23, 2023，提出动议的被告根据《联邦民事诉讼规则》12(b)(1) 和 12(b)(6)，提交了驳回起诉状的动议。Dkt. No. 19。在支持该动议的法律备忘录中，提出动议的被告主张，原告未指称其任一方针对原告实施的任何行为，Dkt. No. 20 at 1–2，并称 FARA 请求“同样毫无根据”，因为“法院一再认定 FARA 不存在私人诉权”，原告未指称任何可追溯至提出动议的被告行为的损害，且原告未指称将要求进行 FARA 登记的事实，id. at 2–3。\n\nMarch 28, 2023，提出动议的被告提交了制裁动议，以及支持该动议的法律备忘录和声明。Dkt. Nos. 26–28。然而，提出动议的被告于 March 29, 2023 撤回该动议，原因是其未遵守《联邦民事诉讼规则》11(c)(2) 的“要求”，即在针对其提出动议的一方获得撤回违规请求或文书的机会之前，不得提交该动议。Dkt. No. 29。\n\nApril 14, 2023，本院举行了初步审前会议。Dkt. No. 34。在会议上，本院询问原告代理律师是否还有任何关于“针对 Sarnoff 先生或 O'Melveny 的事实指控，以表明其与警察部门串通行事”。Id. at 4。律师答复称，其指控基于推测：\n\n“该律所和个人被告并不乐于成为这些抗议活动的目标”，并且“可以理解……处于其地位的被告会派人……观察、获取信息”。Id. at 7。律师承认，其不了解亦无关于 Stanton “授权”的事实指控。Id.。其还承认，其不知道 Stanton 撞击原告是“意外还是故意”。Id. at 8。就警方而言，律师称警员的行为“反常”，因为警员拒绝提交报告。Id.。尽管如此，原告代理律师仍主张，其掌握的事实信息可回应提出动议的被告驳回动议所提出的若干问题。Id. at 13–14。因此，本院在等待对驳回动议作出决定期间中止了证据开示，并准许原告于 April 21, 2023 前提交修正起诉状。Id. at 15–16。本院还警告原告代理律师：“尽管我尚未审阅第 11 条动议，但我已审阅了你们的起诉状。你们应当重新审视它，因为该动议似乎相当有力。我将非常认真地对待将要提交的第 11 条动议。”Id. at 16–17。\n\nApril 26, 2023，原告提交了第一次修正起诉状（“修正起诉状”）。4 修正起诉状新增十一段，引用 Heritage Foundation（传统基金会）关于 PRC 对美国构成威胁的报告，并援引一篇关于两名据称为 PRC 工作人员者在纽约被捕的新闻文章。Dkt. No. 43 ¶¶ 11–21。其还包括如下指控：O'Melveny 曾“在原告迄今发现的若干场合”代理据称曾折磨中国个人、或协助、教唆或追认该等行为的中国实体，id. ¶ 34；“O'Melveny 和 Sarnoff 与其他律师一道，曾是 CCP 团队的一部分，该团队负责摧毁 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（又名 Miles\n\n4 原告于 April 21, 2023 提交修正起诉状，但该起诉状因提交错误被拒绝。见 Dkt. No. 41；书记官记录（Apr. 24, 2023）。双方同意将原告提交修正起诉状的期限延长至 May 1, 2023，本院予以准许。Dkt. No. 44。\n\nGuo）的生活，并不择手段将其送回中国，以使其遭受进一步监禁和酷刑或者被处决”，id. ¶ 55(f)；以及该律师事务所在 Jun Zhao v. BYD America Corp. 一案中代理了一家名为 BYD America Corporation（比亚迪美国公司）的公司，该案在 United States District Court for the Central District of California（美国加利福尼亚中区联邦地区法院）审理，id. ¶ 35。5 在其他所有方面，修正起诉状与起诉状完全相同。其未就 December 2020 的事件增加任何事实指控。其提出了相同的指控，即提出动议的被告参与侵犯民权及违反 FARA，见 id. ¶¶ 140–80, 187–93，但并无支持任一组请求的任何额外事实指控。\n\nJuly 17, 2023，本院发布意见和命令，准许提出动议的被告驳回针对其的修正起诉状之动议，并有偏见地驳回。Dkt. No. 57。本院认定，原告未能指称事实，以支持提出动议的被告可依据 Section 1983 对其所称遭受的任何损害承担责任的任何理论。Id. at 13。本院还认定，原告未能提出任何事实以支持依据 Section 1985(3) 提出的共谋请求，包括未能主张存在协议。Id. at 20–21。最后，本院认定，原告未能提出事实以确立其 FARA 请求的诉讼资格。Id. at 21。然而，本院保留管辖权，以处理被告根据《联邦民事诉讼规则》第 11 条提出的动议。Id. at 24。\n\nApril 20, 2023，在修正起诉状被驳回之前，提出动议的被告重新提交了第 11 条制裁动议、法律备忘录和声明，以及证明其遵守 Rule 11(c)(2) 的声明。Dkt. Nos. 36–39。原告提交了其\n\n5 修正起诉状还提及 O'Melveny 就两宗香港首次公开募股及对一家生物科技公司的收购所从事的工作，id. ¶ 56，并附有一篇据称由 O'Melveny 前律师撰写的博客文章，该文章指控该律所将其合伙人与美国政府之间的关系“货币化”，Dkt. No. 43-7。\n\n2023年5月4日提交了反对该动议的法律备忘录，Dkt. No. 45。2023年5月17日，动议被告提交了其答辩法律备忘录。6 Dkt. No. 51。2023年7月27日，法院发布命令，安排就制裁动议进行口头辩论，并表示，任何希望在听证会上出示证据的一方应于2023年8月7日或之前向法院提交信函，说明其希望出示何种证据（如有）；如无额外证据，法院将根据与《规则》第11条动议及反对文件相关提交的证据裁决该动议。Dkt. No. 63。动议被告于2023年8月7日提交信函，表示其不会提交额外证据。7 Dkt. No. 66。同日，原告提交信函，表示其将在口头辩论中出示证据并将作证。Dkt. No. 67。法院于2023年8月16日举行口头辩论和证据听证会。见会议记录（2023年8月16日）。原告未出席证据听证会。原告律师Richard Freeth（理查德·弗里斯）提交了其2021年纳税申报表副本，该副本在无人异议的情况下被接收。\n\n6 动议被告于2023年4月20日提交其制裁动议，Dkt. No. 36，彼时法院已准许原告提交修订起诉状，见Dkt. No. 34第16页，但原告尚未实际提交其修订起诉状，见Dkt. No. 43。2023年7月7日，法院指示各方提交信函式法律陈述，就动议被告的《规则》第11条动议是否适当地提交至本法院，或该《规则》第11条动议是否必须在原告提交修订起诉状后重新向原告律师送达的问题发表意见。Dkt. No. 54。各方均于2023年7月13日就该问题提交了信函式法律陈述。见Dkt. Nos. 55–56。7 尽管在不存在重大事实争议时，法院无需举行证据听证会，见Chemiakin, 932 F.2d at 130（“尽管上诉人试图将一项在实施制裁前必须举行证据听证会的要求附加于《规则》第11条之上，但除非存在争议事实或可信度问题，并无此种要求。”）；另见Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory Committee's Note to 1993 Amendment（“法院必须在可能的范围内将制裁程序的范围限制于记录之内。”），但鉴于听证会的性质及其依赖记录之外事实的情况，法院向双方提供了出示额外证据的机会。\n\nIII. 《规则》第11条证据\n\n动议被告主张，本诉讼“仅是应Miles Kwok（郭文贵，亦称Wengui Guo及Ho Wan Kwok）之要求，对O'Melveny（欧麦律师事务所）和Sarnoff（萨诺夫）采取的一系列滥用性、骚扰性策略中的一项”；该等策略源于动议被告在纽约州法院针对郭文贵的诉讼中，向其客户投资基金Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（太盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙企业，以下简称“PAX”）提供的协助。PAX取得了针对郭文贵的$116.4 million判决书，以及州法院对郭文贵处以的$134 million藐视法庭制裁。Dkt. Nos. 38-9, 38-10。\n\n2017年4月18日，PAX在纽约州法院起诉郭文贵违反一项$30 million贷款协议。Dkt. No. 38-11（“州法院起诉状”）。8 PAX由O'Melveny和Sarnoff代理。州法院起诉状主张，郭文贵连同合同利息共欠约$88 million。Id. at ECF p. 4。经近四年诉讼后，纽约州最高法院的Barry Ostrager法官于2021年2月3日作出有利于PAX且不利于郭文贵的判决书，金额为$116,402,019.57。Dkt. No. 38-9。一年后，即2022年2月9日，Ostrager法官在一项判决及命令中对郭文贵处以藐视法庭制裁，命令郭文贵支付$134 million——268天的藐视法庭罚款，每日$500,000——并须在五个营业日内支付，否则法院将“根据New York Judiciary Law § 753行使其全部权力”。Dkt. No. 38-10。9 Ostrager法官的意见措辞严厉。他认定，为规避PAX的判决，郭文贵曾“将其大量个人资产停放于一系列公司、受信赖的密友和家庭成员名下”，并“将其资产藏匿于由公司实体和家庭成员构成的迷宫之中”。Id. at 1。在论及郭文贵就其游艇Lady May（梅夫人号）违反法院命令一事后，Ostrager法官结论称：“郭文贵就Lady May所策划的空壳游戏相关运作，与郭文贵在本案待决的五年间所采取的其他一切规避性及藐视法庭行为如出一辙，这也正是本案有1,180项案卷记录的原因。”Id. at 8。\n\n8 法院可对在另一法院提交的文件进行“司法认知，‘并非为了证明另一诉讼中所主张事项的真实性，而是为了确立该诉讼及相关提交文件这一事实。’”Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rotches Pork Packers, Inc., 969 F.2d 1384, 1388 (2d Cir. 1992)（引文省略）。\n\n9 New York Judiciary Law赋予州法院“以罚金或监禁，或两者并用”处罚藐视法庭行为的权力。N.Y. Jud. Law § 753。\n\n2022年2月15日，即藐视法庭命令五日期限届满前夕，郭文贵根据《破产法典》第11章在District of Connecticut（康涅狄格联邦地区）申请个人破产。Dkt. No. 38-15；另见Dkt. No. 45 at 9。在该程序中，郭文贵将O'Melveny的客户PAX列为其最大债权人，其对该债权人负有约$254 million债务。Dkt. No. 38-15 at ECF p. 10；Dkt. No. 38-16。2022年7月7日前后，应United States Trustee（美国受托人）的申请，Dkt. No. 38-17，且不顾郭文贵的异议，United States Bankruptcy Court in Connecticut（康涅狄格联邦破产法院，以下简称“破产法院”）指定来自Paul Hastings LLC（普衡律师事务所）的Luc Despins（吕克·德斯潘）担任受托人，管理郭文贵的破产财产，见Dkt. No. 38-18；另见Dkt. No. 45 ¶ 38。10 2022年8月10日，破产法院应德斯潘申请作出命令，确认德斯潘为破产财产利益，就郭文贵拥有或控制的所有实体持有一切经济及治理权利。Dkt. No. 38-19。2022年8月16日，法院准许受托人根据《规则》第2004条提出的动议，向郭文贵的各类法律及财务顾问送达传票。Dkt. No. 38-20。同日，法院准许受托人根据《规则》第2004条提出的动议，向与郭文贵有关联的各实体及个人送达传票。Dkt. No. 38-21。\n\n10 2022年6月30日，United States Trustee Program（美国受托人计划，以下简称“USTP”）申请指定Joe Whitley（乔·惠特利）为第11章受托人，Dkt. No. 45 at 9，后又撤回了指定惠特利的申请，Dkt. No. 45-15。原告援引指定通知Dkt. No. 45-14和撤回指定申请Dkt. No. 45-15作为依据，主张破产法院“反复表明其对违反《破产法典》所列撤换程序的关切”，但两份证据均未包含原告所称的该等“关切”。\n\n2022年11月22日，PAX（由动议被告代理）在破产法院提出临时限制令（“TRO”）及初步禁令申请，寻求限制并禁止郭文贵及所有与其积极协同行动或参与者：（1）在网上发布有关德斯潘、PAX或PAG的高级职员或雇员、受托人或PAX的律师及其各自任何亲属的虚假和骚扰性材料；（2）在网上公布该等人士的住址及其他个人信息；以及（3）鼓励、煽动、提议或直接或间接资助在该等人士（包括前配偶）的住所或办公室举行抗议。Dkt. No. 38-30 at 1–2。破产法院于翌日举行加急听证会，并于同日作出TRO，向PAX授予其请求的全部救济。见id. at 6。11 TRO适用于所有“在通过亲自送达或其他方式收到实际通知后，与[郭文贵]……积极协同行动或参与的其他人士”。Id. at 7。\n\n自2022年12月5日起，破产法院就PAX的初步禁令动议举行了为期四天的证据听证会。见Dkt. No. 38-37（初步禁令动议听证会笔录）。2023年1月13日，破产法院发布初步禁令，其中包括“禁止[郭文贵]在特定时段内，于……PAX律师……亲属（包括前配偶）的住宅[或住所，或办公室或工作场所，或其入口]二百英尺（200 ft.）范围内，随时进行抗议、纠察、游行，或展示或散发骚扰性材料”。Dkt. No. 38-3 at 3–4。破产法院指出，“骚扰性材料”包括将O'Melveny律师描述为“共产主义者、中国共产党的代理人、勒索者、反犹太主义者、种族主义者、种族灭绝支持者，或以其他方式对该等当事人的行为或信念提出类似贬损性指控”的材料。Id. at 5。初步禁令亦适用于在实际收到该命令通知后与郭文贵积极协同行动者。Id. at 7。\n\n11 动议被告在其书面陈述中反复援引破产法院初步禁令裁决中的事实认定，以支持其中所载的事实主张。见，例如，Dkt. No. 37 at 2, 6, 7, 8。然而，除该等认定存在这一事实外，法院无法对其进行司法认知。见Int'l Star Class Yacht Racing Ass'n v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc., 146 F.3d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 1998)（指出地区法院为“确立其中所主张的事实”而对破产法院命令进行司法认知系属错误，因为“先前案件中裁决的事实不符合《规则》第201(b)条中无争议性的任一检验标准：它们通常并非众所周知，亦非源自无可置疑的来源”）。因此，法院仅限于审查动议被告随其动议文件提交的直接证据。\n\n动议被告提出了有关针对其的骚扰以及该骚扰与New Federal State of China（新中国联邦，以下简称“NFSC”）之间联系的补充证据，并进而表明该活动并未在破产法院发布TRO或初步禁令后消散。NFSC与创立该组织的郭文贵关系密切。见Dkt. No. 38-5；Dkt. No. 38-22 at ECF p. 5。根据GNews（G新闻）发布、且似由NFSC新闻机构NFSC News（NFSC新闻）撰写的一篇报道，截至2023年2月7日，NFSC已对Paul Hastings、O'Melveny及两家律所的律师进行了80天的抗议。12 Dkt. No. 38-38 at ECF p. 4。该文章报道称，“NFSC……在完成90天后，抗议将再持续100天”。Id. at ECF p. 5。根据动议被告的说法，“抗议……违反初步禁令持续进行，最终导致2023年2月12日的一起事件，在该事件中，郭文贵的追随者袭击了Sarnoff先生的一名邻居。”Dkt. No. 37 at 10。动议被告附上了一份由报告警官签署的安保事件报告，其中记载了所称袭击。见Dkt. No. 38-39。\n\n12 原告在其起诉状中承认其参加了这些抗议，并表示其如此做与参与NFSC有关。正如原告所主张，2022年11月22日，“原告参加了在被告O'Melveny办公室进行的和平抗议”，Dkt. No. 2 ¶ 67，并且“自2022年12月2日起，原告与其他若干人参加了在据信靠近被告Sarnoff住所的一处地点定期进行的和平抗议”，id. ¶ 68。\n\n动议被告还提交了在萨尔诺夫（Sarnoff）住所前举行抗议活动的视频。参见，例如，案卷编号 38-32。另一段视频显示，抗议者手持奥麦利文（O'Melveny）律师（包括萨尔诺夫）的照片，照片旁并列有“种族灭绝的支持者”和“中国共产党的最爱律师”等标语。参见案卷编号 33 第 5:20–5:50。GNews 发布的另一段视频显示，萨尔诺夫住所外的抗议者展示的标语牌上，有一张萨尔诺夫的照片，旁边并列着镰刀和铁锤以及“中国共产党的走狗”这一表述。参见案卷编号 38-34。该措辞与社交媒体网站 Gettr 上 NFSC（新中国联邦）账户所使用的措辞完全相同；该账户于 December 4, 2022 发文称，萨尔诺夫是“一条由中共付费并拥有、用以迫害中国异见人士的走狗”。案卷编号 38-29。最后，于 November 29, 2022，NFSC 支持者向 100 名奥麦利文员工发送电子邮件，点名萨尔诺夫，并“对奥麦利文合伙人……［为］企图迫害一些试图扳倒中国共产党的世界上最敢于发声的吹哨人”表示“深切不安”。案卷编号 38-35。\n\n动议被告还提出了龚（Gong）的律师与郭文贵（Kwok）之间存在关系的证据。永兵·张（Yongbing Zhang）签署了起诉状，但未签署修正起诉状，比较案卷编号 2 第 ECF 第 25 页与案卷编号 43 第 ECF 第 29 页；其出现在社交媒体上流传的众多由 NFSC 领导的抗议活动照片中，包括 NFSC 的 Gettr 账户于 November 20, 2022 发布的一则帖子，该帖子显示张在纽约州威斯特彻斯特县（Westchester County, New York）德斯平斯（Despins）前妻的住所前纠察，并举着一块称该受托人为“A-List Scumbag”的标语牌。案卷编号 38-24 ¶ 32。张还出现在与郭文贵于 June 4, 2022 在 NFSC 两周年聚会上合影的照片中。案卷编号 38-25。\n\n最后，在临时限制令（TRO）发布后的数日内，代表原告提起本案的律师又提起了另外三起几乎完全相同的诉讼，针对的是与 PAX 有关联、代表 PAX，或者协助破产法院（Bankruptcy Court）的人士。参见案卷编号 38-40–38-42。于 November 28, 2022，张和理查德·弗里思（Richard Freeth）代表一名据称出生于中国的美国居民，在本区对保罗·黑斯廷斯（Paul Hastings）和第 11 章受托人德斯平斯提起诉讼。参见案卷编号 38-40 ¶ 2（An et al. v. Despins et al., No. 22-cv-10062 (VEC) (S.D.N.Y.) 中的起诉状）。该起诉状指称，保罗·黑斯廷斯和德斯平斯“秘密地作为”中华人民共和国（PRC）或中国共产党（CCP）其中之一或两者的“未登记代理人”行事，id.，并就违反《外国代理人登记法》（FARA）提出与本案几乎相同的指控，参见，例如，id. ¶ 39。于 November 28, 2022，张和弗里思代表同一批原告，对 PAX 管理成员太平洋联盟集团（Pacific Alliance Group）的董事长单伟建（Weijan Shan）及单伟建之子单博蕾（Bo Leilei Shan）提起诉讼。参见案卷编号 38-41（An et al. v. Shan et al., No. 22-cv-10060 (ALC) (S.D.N.Y) 中的起诉状）。该案原告指称，单伟建和单博蕾也“作为”中华人民共和国或中国共产党其中之一或两者的“未登记代理人”行事。Id. ¶ 29。针对单伟建的主要指控是，有照片显示其与美国参议员黛安·范斯坦（Diane Feinstein）在一起；据称范斯坦“曾支持共产主义事业，且最近披露其参议院办公室经理曾由一名中共间谍担任”，并从“中国公司”获得了“大量收入”。Id. ¶ 72.13。针对其儿子有关 FARA 的指控主要源自以下事实：\n\n13 关于范斯坦参议员的指控引自一个名为“Discover the Networks”的网站。案卷编号 41 ¶ 72。\n\n即其为单伟建之子。Id. ¶ 79。最后，于 March 17, 2023，张和弗里思（连同第三名律师布赖恩·R·德拉罗卡（Brian R. Della Rocca））在马里兰联邦地区法院（District of Maryland）对单伟建及包括马里兰大学（University of Maryland）在内的数名其他被告提起诉讼。案卷编号 38-42（Wyatt et al. v. Univ. of Md., No. 23-cv-742 (JKB) (D. Md.) 中的起诉状）。该起诉状对单伟建提出了相同的 FARA 指控。Id. ¶¶ 118–25。该起诉状还包含与本案类似的民权主张，指称依据第一、第四和第十四修正案违反 42 U.S.C. § 1983，id. ¶¶ 83–90；id. ¶¶ 101–10，以及违反 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)，id. ¶¶ 91–100。原告指称，他们在马里兰大学抗议；单伟建的女儿为该校博士生，他们在该处抗议是为了向其他学生告知“单氏家族的中共背景及其在美国公立学校的影响力”，id. ¶ 26；当时他们“开始遭遇被告施加的一些意外限制”，并“被指示停止举牌、散发传单和进行在线直播”，id. ¶ 39。他们还指称，在破产法院作出命令且其许可被撤销后，若他们继续在大学公地（University Commons）抗议，便会受到逮捕威胁。Id. ¶¶ 47, 55。\n\n尊敬的瓦莱丽·E·卡普罗尼法官（Judge Valerie E. Caproni）在 An et al. v. Despins et al., No. 22-cv-10062 一案中无偏见地驳回了起诉状，并依据第 11 条规则对该案律师和原告实施制裁。参见 id. 案卷编号 29；另参见 An v. Despins, 2023 WL 4931832 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2023)。在 An et al. v. Shan et al., No. 22-cv-10060 (ALC) (S.D.N.Y) 一案中，驳回动议和制裁动议仍在审理中。参见 id. 案卷编号 22, 31。最后，在 Wyatt et al. v. University of Maryland, No. 23-cv-742 (JKB) (D. Md.) 一案中，尊敬的首席法官詹姆斯·K·布雷达尔（Chief Judge James K. Bredar）因缺乏管辖权，有偏见地驳回了针对被告马里兰大学、达里尔·派恩斯（Darryll Pines）、乔尔·杜耶尔（Joel Dewyer）和布鲁斯·佩里（Bruce Perry）的第一、第二、第三和第五罪名项，id. 案卷编号 29，并\n\n因未能依照《联邦民事诉讼规则》第 4(m) 条送达，对其余被告无偏见地驳回了该案，id. 案卷编号 34。\n\n法律标准\n\n第 11 条规则要求律师证明：(1) 诉状或动议“并非为任何不正当目的而提出，例如骚扰、造成不必要的延误，或者无谓地增加诉讼成本”；(2)“该等主张、抗辩及其他法律论点均有现行法律依据，或有不属轻率的论据支持扩展、修改或推翻现行法律，或确立新法律”；以及 (3)“事实主张具有证据支持，或者，如被明确如此指出，在获得进一步调查或证据开示的合理机会后，很可能具有证据支持。” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)。“第 11 条规则的文本仅使‘律师’和‘未由律师代理的当事人’受第 11(b) 条规则约束，这意味着只有这些个人可以违反该规则。” Int'l Techs. Mktg., Inc. v. Cognyte Techs. Israel Ltd., 2022 WL 11280876, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2022)。然而，第 11(c)(5) 条规则对法院向由律师代理的当事人实施制裁的能力提出了唯一限制：法院不得因由律师代理的当事人作出违反第 11(b)(2) 条规则的轻率法律论点而对其施加金钱制裁。Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(5)；另参见 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)（“［法院］可以对任何违反该规则或应对该违反行为负责的律师、律师事务所或当事人施加适当制裁。”）。“毫无疑问，一旦法院认定律师或未由律师代理的当事人违反了第 11(b) 条规则，即可对任何‘违反该规则或应对该违反行为负责的律师、律师事务所或当事人’裁定制裁。” Int'l Techs. Mktg., Inc., 2022 WL 11280876, at *12（原文强调）（引述 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(5)）。\n\n继而，第 11(c) 条规则允许法院对违反第 11(b) 条规则的行为施加“适当制裁”。Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)。根据第 11(c) 条规则施加的制裁\n\n必须限于足以阻止该行为或处境相似者实施类似行为的程度。制裁可以包括非金钱性指令；命令向法院缴纳罚金；或者，如系依动议施加且为有效威慑所必需，则命令向动议方支付直接因该违反行为产生的部分或全部合理律师费及其他费用。\n\nFed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4)。“当法院认定第 11 条规则制裁适当时，对于应否因违反行为施加制裁以及施加何种制裁，其享有重大裁量权。” E. Gluck Corp. v. Rothenhaus, 2008 WL 2944624, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2008)（引述 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)–(c), Advisory Committee Notes to 1993 Amendment）。\n\n“触发第 11 条规则项下［制裁］的标准是客观不合理性”，Margo v. Weiss, 213 F.3d 55, 65 (2d Cir. 2000)，并且“并非基于作出陈述之人的主观信念”，Star Mark Mgmt., Inc. v. Koon Chun Hing Kee Soy & Sauce Factory, Ltd., 682 F.3d 170, 177 (2d Cir. 2012)；另参见 In re Austl. & N.Z. Banking Grp. Ltd. Sec. Litig., 712 F. Supp. 2d 255, 265–66 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)。因此，如律师提交的诉状或动议“属轻率、法律上不合理，或在事实方面缺乏依据，即使其并非基于主观恶意而签署”，即构成违反第 11 条规则。Wechsler v. Hunt Health Sys., Ltd., 216 F. Supp. 2d 347, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)；另参见 Simon DeBartolo Grp., L.P. v. Richard E. Jacobs Grp., Inc., 186 F.3d 157, 167 (2d Cir. 1999)。\n\n讨论\n\n一、被告已满足安全港条款\n\n动议被告所提动议提出的门槛问题是，其是否已满足《联邦民事诉讼规则》第 11 条规定的 21 日期安全港期间。第 11 条规则规定，如被质疑的文书、主张、抗辩、论点或否认事项“在送达后 21 日内被撤回或得到适当纠正”，则制裁动议“不得提交或呈交法院”。Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2)。因此，如在该二十一日“安全港”期间，对方“撤回或适当纠正”所指称的违反行为，则对方就该违规提交文件免于承担第 11 条规则责任。Id. 如第 11 条规则动议针对新的提交文件，动议方必须重新通知该违反行为，并给予被指称的违反者额外二十一日以撤回或纠正。参见 Lawrence v. Richman Grp. of CT LLC, 620 F.3d 153, 158 (2d Cir. 2010)（per curiam）（“［我院］认定，如同本案，存在瑕疵的起诉状被驳回且当事人获准重新起诉，则在因新提交文件而受损害的一方向地区法院提出基于该诉状的制裁动议之前，提交修正诉状将重新计算满足第 11(c)(2) 条规则安全港要求的期限。”）。\n\n动议被告已满足 21 日期安全港条款，在原告提交修正起诉状后无需重新通知其动议。动议被告于 March 29, 2023 向原告送达其动议及支持性文件。案卷编号 39 ¶ 2。该动议指明了“所考虑制裁措施的授权依据；以及……所考虑制裁措施所针对的具体行为或不作为，以便制裁动议的对象能够准备抗辩”，此为正当程序原则所要求。参见 Star Mark Mgmt., Inc., 682 F.3d at 175。该等文件质疑起诉状违反第 11 条规则，并具体指明，该诉讼系为骚扰动议被告而提起，且 FARA 主张和民权主张均不受事实或法律支持，亦无支持扩展现行法律的充分论据。概参见案卷编号 37。具体而言，动议被告指控，针对其的民权和 FARA 指控“完全由未经修饰的结论构成，且没有任何支持性事实材料”，id. at 12，FARA“并未规定私人诉权，且不存在可推断出该诉权的途径”，原告也没有任何可据以取得诉讼资格的依据，id. at 2，并且 FARA 指控在事实方面\n\n“语无伦次，” id. at 21。2023年4月20日，即向原告送达第11条文件后二十一日，动议被告提交了制裁动议。见 Dkt. No. 39。\n\n原告提交修正起诉书并未使该动议失去意义。原告于2023年4月14日获准提交修正起诉书，见 Dkt. No. 34 at 16，并于2023年4月26日提交了修正起诉书，见 Dkt. No. 43。尽管修正起诉书向作为本动议对象的原起诉书增加了新的且无关的指控，但其并未“撤回”受到质疑的诉状，亦未以其他方式“适当纠正”该诉状。Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2)。安全港要求的目的在于提供“纠正或撤回有缺陷提交文件的机会”，并“减少，即使不能消除，不必要地耗费司法时间和对方当事人资源”。Lawrence, 620 F.3d at 158。包括起诉书在内的诉状，在其被驳回时即被“撤回”，见 Hockley by Hockley v. Shan Enters. Ltd. P'ship, 19 F. Supp. 2d 235, 241 (D.N.J. 1998)（“由于[第三方原告]在其自愿撤回其请求时撤回了[其第三方起诉书中的]立场，因此其不受第11条制裁。”）；Brown v. Pierce Mfg., Inc., 169 F.R.D. 118, 119 (E.D. Wis. 1996)（裁定当原告在收到被告第11条动议后二十一日内申请驳回有缺陷的起诉书时，不得施加第11条制裁）；5A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1337.2 (4th ed., Apr. 2023 Update)（“[如]受制裁的一方在二十一日安全港期限内申请自愿驳回，制裁动议将被驳回，因为为安全港条款之目的，自愿驳回实际上构成对违规文件的撤回。”），或者在提交不再主张该项请求的修正诉状时即被“撤回”，见 Team Obsolete Ltd. V. A.H.R.M.A. Ltd., 216 F.R.D. 29, 43 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)（裁定原告通过删除某些请求和某些被告，“实际上撤回了”可受制裁的请求）；2 Moore's Federal Practice § 11.22(1)(b)（“提交申请许可修正诉状以删除受到质疑的请求，构成对该等请求的有效撤回。”（强调为原文所加））。\n\n原告并未“撤回”受到质疑的起诉书。原告在修正起诉书中继续主张与受到质疑的起诉书中相同的、被指称为轻率且具有骚扰性的指控和请求。他重申了其请求。原告亦未“适当纠正”受到质疑的起诉书。当导致受到质疑的请求或诉状的问题得到处理时，该诉状即被“适当纠正”。例如，见 Rates Tech. Inc. v. Mediatrix Telecom, Inc., 2007 WL 1987787, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 29, 2007)（认定法院面前的相关问题并非原告是否在二十一日安全港期限内申请许可修正，而是“拟议的第一次修正起诉书是否纠正了原起诉书中所称的缺陷”）。动议被告并非以起诉书缺乏关于 O'Melveny（欧麦文律师事务所）和 Sarnoff（萨诺夫）代表中国实体所作法律工作的充分指控，或者缺乏关于中华人民共和国对美国利益构成威胁的充分指控为由寻求制裁；该等主题正是修正起诉书所增加指控所涉及的主题。见 Dkt. No. 43 ¶¶ 11–21, 35, 55。动议被告寻求制裁，是因为起诉书本身的提出旨在骚扰动议被告，FARA 请求在法律和事实层面均属轻率，以及针对动议被告的第1983条和第1985(3)条请求缺乏任何关于动议被告与纽约市警察局（NYPD）于2022年12月20日的行为有关联的指控。修正起诉书并未处理其中任何问题。其提交本身——以及其未处理起诉书缺陷——加重了对动议被告所称的损害。当事人不能通过增加新的指控或请求、但同时仍然“坚持一项已不再站得住脚的立场”，来逃避第11条制裁。Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)–(c), Advisory Committee Notes to the 1993 Amendment.14\n\n由此进一步可见，动议被告无须在原告提交修正起诉书后再次通知原告诉状中的缺陷，或给予原告额外二十一日以撤回或纠正其被指称可受制裁的请求。二十一日安全港期限具有意义。轻率且具有骚扰性的起诉书未获解决的时间越长，损害越大。该二十一日期限对应于第12(a)(1)条规定的准备并提交起诉书答辩状的期限，见 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)，以及第15(a)(1)条规定的依法当然修正诉状的期限，见 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)。如果在《联邦规则》起草者认为足以提交回应性或修正诉状的期限内，违规方未纠正已经向其指出缺陷的诉状，则该违规方无权免受第11条制裁。损害已经造成，并且仍然存在。\n\n如果动议被告基于修正起诉书寻求制裁，则动议被告本应再次通知原告。单一的第11条动议并非永久有效的存款，作为通知表明其后提交的任何文件或文书均可受制裁，而无须通知或听证机会。制裁动议针对特定行为；其“必须说明被指称违反第11(b)条的具体行为”。Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2)。但是，在本案中，被告并非基于修正起诉书寻求制裁；其寻求对起诉书予以制裁。15 Dkt. No. 38; Dkt. No. 56 at 3。因此，提交修正起诉书并未“重置时钟”，Lawrence, 620 F.3d at 158，而动议被告于2023年3月29日和3月30日向原告的两名律师送达的通知，符合第11条的要求，见 Dkt. No. 39。\n\n14 Sacerdote v. Cammack Larhette Advisors, LLC, 2022 WL 2078012, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2022) 一案中的法院指出，“由于第11条旨在处理特定的有缺陷或轻率文书，针对原始起诉书的第11条动议必须在提交修正起诉书后再次通知。”（原文强调）（引文和改动省略）。然而，该表述属于附带意见；在该案中，法院认定被告从未就原始起诉书提供充分通知，并且即使其已提供通知，其第11条动议亦毫无根据。Id. at *9–10。没有理由认为，若已提供适当通知，且原告——面对第11条动议——变本加厉地坚持其可受制裁的行为，法院仍会得出同样的结果。\n\nII. 原告的 FARA 请求属轻率请求\n\n本院毫不困难地得出结论：原告的 FARA 请求属轻率请求。“就第11条制裁而言，如依据‘客观合理性标准’……‘显然……毫无胜诉可能，且不存在任何合理论点可以扩展、修改或推翻现行法律’，则一项论点构成轻率的法律立场。”Galonsky v. Williams, 1997 WL 759445, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 1997)（引自 Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole–CNCA v. Valcorp, Inc., 28 F.3d 259, 264 (2d Cir.1995)）。尽管“第11条允许诉讼当事人为扩展、修改或推翻现行法律提出‘非轻率论点’”，Doe v. 239 Park Ave. S. Assocs., LLC, 2022 WL 4592713, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2022)（引自 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2)），但“当依据现有判例显然一项请求绝无胜诉可能，且无法提出任何合理论点来扩展、修改或推翻现行法律时”，即违反该规则，Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985), superseded on other grounds by rule。该标准具有客观性。违规方怀有纯粹之心却缺乏判断，并不构成抗辩。见 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)–(c), Advisory Committee Notes to the 1993 Amendment。在确定是否违反第11条时，应考虑“诉讼当事人研究相关问题并在少数意见、法律评论文章或与其他律师咨询中为其理论找到支持的程度”。Id.\n\n原告在本案中的 FARA 请求毫无胜诉可能，并且在客观上属轻率请求。原告承认，FARA 法律中并无明确的“私人诉权”规定，Dkt. No. 2 ¶ 178，并且其依赖于法院应推定国会有意创设此类诉权的主张。然而，本巡回区及其他地区审理过该问题的每一法院均认为，不能在 FARA 中推定存在私人诉权。例如，见 Dvoinik v. Rolff, 2023 WL 3276398, at *5 (M.D. Fla. May 5, 2023)（“法定体系中没有任何内容表明有意为违反 FARA 的行为创设私人诉因。”）；Henry v. Washington, 2022 WL 9491957, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 16, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 9372175 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 14, 2022)（“该法并未规定私人诉因，以使原告可就违反该法提起诉讼。”）；Bey v. Epstein, 2021 WL 8155603, at *9 (D. Conn. Aug. 6, 2021)（“不能从 FARA 推断出私人诉权。”）；Weican Meng v. Xinhuanet Co., 2017 WL 3175609, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2017)（认定 FARA 不包含私人诉权）；Comm. for a Free Namibia v. S. W. Afr. People's Org., 554 F. Supp. 722, 725 (D.D.C. 1982)。\n\n原告主张，由于“该法对于创设私人诉权保持沉默”，Dkt. No. 45 at 14 ¶ 66，本院可以自由推定国会有意创设私人诉权；该主张仅突显出其律师在提交请求之前完全未对其请求的依据进行研究。至少自四十四年前其在 Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 571 (1979) 一案中作出裁决以来，最高法院已明确指出，在该案中，法院\n\n认定，在国会对于是否意图创设私人诉因保持沉默，且无法从法条结构或立法史中找到创设该诉因的依据时，法院不得仅凭推断创设该诉因。另见 Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 25 (1977)（考察“立法史，以探明特定法定禁止规定所依据的国会目的”，从而确定“通过司法解释创设默示诉因……是否为实现国会目标所必需”）。事实上，二十年前，最高法院认定，除非联邦法律在其文本上“表明意图‘不仅创设一项私人权利，而且创设一项私人救济’”，否则法院不得默示私人诉权。Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284 (2002)（引自 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001)）；另见 Olmsted v. Pruco Life Ins. Co., 283 F.3d 429, 432 (2d Cir. 2002)（“法院……通常不能在未明确规定的情况下认定国会意图创设诉权。”）。“最高法院日益不赞成在监管性法条中默示私人救济。”Republic of Iraq v. ABB AG, 768 F.3d 145, 170 (2d Cir. 2014)（引自 Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P. v. Gotham Partners, L.P., 286 F.3d 613, 618 (2d Cir. 2002)）。最高法院“在一系列案件中澄清，在决定是否承认一项默示诉因时，‘决定性’问题是法定意图问题。”Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 131 (2017)（引自 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286）。国会必须已“‘明确无误地赋予’原告所属受益人类别‘个人权利’。”Health & Hosp. Corp. v. Talevski, 143 S. Ct. 1444, 1457 (2023)（引自 Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 285–86）。因此，“不受鼓励承认默示诉权。”Moya v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 975 F.3d 120, 128 (2d Cir. 2020)（拒绝认定《康复法》项下针对行政机关的私人诉权）。自 Ziglar 以来，第二巡回法院仅在一个案件中认定存在默示诉权，\n\n且仅在认定“文本……明确无误地表明国会意图授权提起私人诉讼”以及该法条“还确定了从诉权可得性中受益的‘一类人’”之后，才作出该认定。Oxford Univ. Bank v. Lansuppe Feeder, LLC, 933 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 2019).\n\n原告既未在其起诉状中，也未在其反对驳回动议的文件中，亦未在其反对 Rule 11 动议的文件中，指出任何理由说明为何应相信 FARA 会成为法院已认定不存在私人诉权的众多监管性法条中的例外。FARA 最初颁布的目的在于“通过要求代表或为外国政府、外国政党及其他外国委托人从事宣传活动的人员进行公开披露，以保护美国的国防、国内安全和外交关系。”Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 469 (1987)（引自 Amendment to Foreign Agents Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 77-532, 56 Stat. 248, 248–49 (Apr. 29, 1942)）。为此，《外国代理人登记法》（Foreign Agents Registration Act，FARA）要求其中界定的外国代理人向 Attorney General（司法部长）提交所需文件，22 U.S.C. § 612(a)，并赋予“Attorney General [the authority to] 向适当的 United States district court（美国联邦地区法院）申请命令，以禁止该等[违法]行为”的权力，22 U.S.C. § 618(f)。此外，第 618(e) 条“将未满足……第 612(a) 条和第 612(b) 条[即未登记]之要求的行为定为犯罪。”United States v. McGoff, 831 F.2d 1071, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1987)。所有这些执法权均归属于 Attorney General，而非私人当事人。并且，“原告无法指出该法条或其立法史中的任何文字表明，国会意图在联邦政府以外的任何实体中设立诉因。”Comm. for a Free Namibia, 554 F. Supp. at 725.\n\n原告所能提出的最有力说法是：（1）“迄今为止，只有 District Courts（联邦地区法院）就该问题发表过意见，且尚无上诉法院或最高法院的裁决”，Dkt. No. 2 ¶ 178；以及（2）“一直缺乏执法行动——导致宪法权利受到侵犯，并公然漠视法治”，id. ¶ 179。然而，第二巡回法院或最高法院无需已明确驳回某项论点，地区法院即可有权认定该论点毫无根据。能够到达上诉法院的议题数量有限，更不用说最高法院。这些法院没有资源处理每一个毫无根据的问题。因此，一项主张此前未被巡回法院驳回，并不当然赋予原告提出该主张的许可；正如某一议题此前已被巡回法院审理并驳回，也不必然阻止后续原告再次提出该议题。任何时候，关键问题都不是巡回法院或最高法院是否已直接就某一特定问题表态——问题在于该主张是否“为现行法律或为扩展、修改或推翻现行法律，或确立新法律的非毫无根据的论点所支持。”Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2)。如果该主张受到现行法律或扩展、修改或推翻现行法律的非毫无根据论点支持，当事人可以提出该主张而不违反 Rule 11(b)(2)。如果未获如此支持，该诉状可受制裁。\n\n原告关于其有权执行 FARA、理由是美国政府未充分执行该法的主张同样不能成立；原告仅因不同意 United States Attorney General（美国司法部长）的执法决定，并不因此获得取代其地位的权利。原告“在任何时候均未提出任何权威依据或连贯解释，说明其为何拥有”私人诉权，因此该主张“在客观上毫无根据。”Thompson v. Steinberg, 2021 WL 3914079, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2021), aff'd, 2023 WL 353359 (2d Cir. Jan. 23, 2023)；另见 Biocad JSC v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., 2022 WL 268102, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2022)（因“数家法院……此前已”作出不利于该法律论点的裁决，而原告“未援引任何一例”解释该法律论点为何仍然成立，故施加制裁）。\n\n此外，即使本院以某种方式认定 FARA 向任何私人当事人赋予诉权，原告也从未阐明其据以主张 FARA 请求的依据。正如本院在驳回原告修正起诉状中 FARA 请求的意见书中所认定，原告“未主张与其关于被告违反”FARA 的指控相关的任何损害，亦未主张任何潜在损害“可追溯至被告未依 FARA 登记，或强制登记的确认判决将如何补救其所称损害。”Gong v. Sarnoff, 2023 WL 4561800, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2023)。同一结论同样完全适用于起诉状。\n\n最后，原告的指控缺乏证据支持，也没有理由相信其将获得证据支持。原告指称，“O'Melveny（欧麦律师事务所）受制于 CCP（中国共产党），因此实施 CCP 要求的任何行为——包括在美国境内实施须向 US Government（美国政府）登记为外国代理人的行为。”Dkt. No. 2 ¶ 47。原告进一步指称，CCP 在美国未登记的代理人“现被认为是被告 Sarnoff、被告 O'Melveny 和被告 Stanton。”Id. ¶ 64。然而，为支持这些针对提出动议的被告的主张，所作出的唯一事实指控是，他们曾代表一家中国公司从事法律工作，id. ¶¶ 25– 26，以及 O'Melveny 在 PRC（中华人民共和国）设有办事处，并从该等办事处开展对“该国可能具有重大影响”的“有利可图”业务，id. ¶¶ 42–43。然而，FARA 免除下列人员的登记义务：（1）“仅……从事或同意从事促进该外国委托人真实贸易或商业的私人和非政治活动的任何人”，22 U.S.C. § 613(d)；以及（2）“具备执业律师资格的任何人，只要其在任何法院或 United State 政府的任何机构面前从事或同意从事对已披露外国委托人的法律代理”，id.§ 613(g)。此外，“外国委托人的代理人”仅被界定为适用于代理人在“美国境内”实施的活动。Id. § 611(c)。没有任何事实指控表明 O'Melveny 或 Sarnoff 采取了任何属于 FARA 适用范围且不受 FARA 任一豁免规定覆盖的行动。\n\nIII. 原告以不当目的提起本案\n\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 11（《联邦民事诉讼规则》第11条）允许法院在诉状为“任何不当目的，例如骚扰、造成不必要的拖延，或无谓增加诉讼成本”而提交时施加制裁。Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1)；另见 Fox v. Boucher, 794 F.2d 34, 37–38 (2d Cir. 1986)（Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11“允许在律师未经合理调查，或没有支持所提出论点的依据，而签署为不当目的而提交的诉状时施加制裁。”）。“积极代理与滥用法律制度之间存在一条律师不得逾越的明确界线。”Galonsky v. Williams, 1997 WL 759445, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 1997)（引自 Baffa v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 222 F.3d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 2000)）。但是，“当事人不应仅因其寻求并获得有根据的司法救济的多个目的之一可能不当，而因此受到处罚或被阻止寻求并获得该救济。”Sussman v. Bank of Isr., 56 F.3d 450, 459 (2d Cir. 1995)；另见 In re Firestar Diamond, Inc., 634 B.R. 265, 308 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2021)（“尽管‘不当目的’和‘毫无根据性’的审查彼此独立且不同，但二者经常重叠，法院已认定，若起诉状并非毫无根据，则其并非出于不当目的而提交。”）。然而，“如果根据原告在诉讼期间和诉讼外的行为，一项起诉状毫无依据到足以表明诉讼背后存在隐蔽动机，法院可以推定存在不当目的。”An, 2023 WL 4931832, at *6.\n\n法院亦毫不困难地认定，原告在本案中提起诉讼系出于不当目的。起诉状中针对提出动议的被告的指控和请求在法律上毫无依据，在事实层面亦存在缺陷。原告依据 FARA 提出的请求毫无事实及法律依据，并可独立构成制裁事由。见上文第二部分。原告依据第 1983 条和第 1985 条提出的请求同样毫无根据。16 原告主张，其被 Stanton 的汽车撞击而受伤，Dkt. No. 2 ¶ 96，未制作任何警方报告，id. ¶ 108，且 NYPD 妨碍其获得医疗救治的能力，id. ¶¶ 112–19。然而，原告从未主张任何事实以支持提出动议的被告参与了 2022 年 12 月 20 日发生的事件、行使国家权力，或与警方共同行动。其亦未主张有任何理由相信该等证据存在。见 Gutierrez v. Fox, 141 F.3d 425, 427 (2d Cir. 1998)（第 11 条“明确且毫不含糊地规定，每名律师在签署诉状前均有积极义务，就该诉状的可行性进行合理调查。”）。没有理由相信任何一名提出动议的被告参与了被指控的不当行为。起诉状不包含任何非结论性的指控，表明任何一名提出动议的被告在该不当行为发生时在场，或表明 Stanton 或 NYPD 是依提出动议的被告指示行事。\n\n事实上，在首次审前会议期间，当被问及其相信“Sarnoff 和 O'Melveny 确实与警方串通”的依据时，原告的律师 Richard Freeth（理查德·弗里思）作出了推测性和臆测性的回应。见 Craig v. City of New York, 2022 WL 2238451, at *6, *12 (E.D.N.Y. June 22, 2022)（起诉状若“基于臆测和猜测”，即可构成制裁事由）；另见 Katzman v. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, 167 F.R.D. 649, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)（“[起诉状]完全缺乏实质内容，足以推断该诉讼系为不当目的而提起。”）。律师称，他“会认为”提出动议的被告与 Stanton 有关联，并称“有理由认为，你知道，处于其位置的被告[Sarnoff 和 O'Melveny]会派人至少去观察、获取信息。”Dkt. No. 34 at 6–7。想象属于猜测；其并不允许任何人以违反可处刑事处罚之法律为由起诉一方当事人。起诉状同样没有关于 Stanton 与警方关系的指控；尽管其指称 Stanton“表示他曾与 NYPD 共事或与 NYPD 有某种联系”，但其结论为“根据所知和相信，被告 Stanton 并非 NYPD 警官。”Dkt. No. 2 ¶¶ 80, 82。此外，在被要求澄清本案中的国家行为究竟为何时，Freeth 表示，当原告“在与一辆车辆发生接触后倒在街上”时，警方没有“采取任何行动”，这“似乎奇怪，似乎非常，你知道，令我怀疑。”Dkt. No. 34 at 8–9。针对法院就是否“通过证据开示将有助于[原告]维持本起诉状”的提问，原告律师回答：“嗯，也许会，也许最终会发现没有任何东西支持[起诉状]。我不知道。”Dkt. No. 34 at 9。\n\n16 在法院就提出动议的被告针对原告修正起诉状提出的驳回动议作出的意见和命令中，法院根据第 12(b)(6) 条，因未提出可获得救济的请求，有偏见地驳回了原告依据 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 和 1985(3) 提出的请求；该等请求所依据的指控在实质上与起诉状中提出的指控完全相同。\n\n有充分理由相信，并且法院认定，提起该起诉状并非为救济原告于 2022 年 12 月 20 日所遭受的任何损害，或获得司法救济，而是为了因提出动议的被告在针对 Kwok（郭文贵）的诉讼中代理客户而骚扰该等被告，并阻止他人作出同样行为。原告及其律师 Zhang（张）与 Kwok 有关联，并同情其本人及其利益。见上文第 12–14 页。原告在 Sarnoff 住宅外的一次抗议活动中遭受其所称损害。见 Dkt. No. 2 ¶ 71。其此前曾参加在 O'Melveny 办公室外举行的抗议活动。Id. ¶ 67。法院不接受原告参加该等抗议活动仅仅、甚至主要是因为提出动议的被告代理中国客户或在中国设有办事处的观点。众多其他律师事务所在美国诉讼中代理中国客户，并在中国设有办事处（或直至最近仍设有办事处）。抗议活动特别针对提出动议的被告，并且是在该等被告协助一名客户进行针对 Kwok 的诉讼之后特别针对他们。不可避免的推论是，原告参加抗议活动是因为提出动议的被告为其客户针对 Kwok 提供了协助，并且是为了阻止和防止提出动议的被告继续如此行事。\n\n原告反对制裁动议的书状所使用的语言，进一步强化了如下结论：本案是为骚扰提出动议的被告、因其代理 PAX（PAX）而惩罚他们，并阻止他人亦代理利益与 Kwok 相对立的客户而提起。原告主张，提出动议的被告的指控具有“轻蔑性”，因为其“暗示原告只是 Kwok 先生的一个没有头脑的追随者。”Dkt. No. 45 ¶ 13。在其反对书状中，他从未否认自己是 Kwok 的追随者，也未提出任何非最为肤浅和结论性的论据，以说明本案系因提出动议的被告参与 PAX 诉讼和破产法院诉讼以外的理由而提起，而非为骚扰该等被告。17 事实上，其反对书状中有 31 个段落致力于主张，Kwok 一直受到中国共产党（CCP）和美国政府的不公平针对，PAX 诉讼和破产程序是针对 Kwok 的某一更广泛阴谋的一部分，以及 CCP 已将“美国法院”“武器化”以针对 Kwok 先生。Id. ¶¶ 15–46。\n\n17 原告主张，其“提起本案是因为其宪法权利遭到侵犯[且]其感到受到 CCP 及其代理人、协助者和/或共同谋划者的威胁。”Id. ¶ 52。然而，如上文详细说明，该项针对提出动议的被告的论点因针对他们提出的请求毫无依据而被否定。\n\n而且，如对本案的骚扰目的仍有任何疑问，Zhang 和 Freeth 在本法院及其他法院针对 PAX、与 PAX 有关联的人员、PAX 的律师以及协助破产法院的人员所提起诉讼的历史，已消除了该等疑问。“尽管一方当事人不应仅因‘更频繁地诉讼’而受到制裁，但当重复提交的诉讼文件伴随‘客观上不合理的陈述’时，法院可以推断存在不当目的。”LCS Grp., LLC v. Shire LLC, 2019 WL 1234848, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2019), judgment aff'd, appeal dismissed in part sub nom. LCS Grp., LLC v. Shire Dev. LLC, 2022 WL 1217961 (2d Cir. Apr. 26, 2022)（引自 Storey v. Cello Holdings, LLC, 347 F.3d 370, 393 (2d Cir. 2003)）；另见 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)–(c), Advisory Committee Notes to 1993 Amendment（指出，在确定是否施加制裁及施加何种制裁时，“该人”——而非特别指“诉讼当事人”——“是否在其他诉讼中从事过类似行为……在特定案件中可能是适当的考量因素”）。原告律师在本法院和 District of Maryland（马里兰联邦地区法院）反复进行毫无根据的诉讼。见上文第 14–16 页。这些案件明确针对当事人和律师，而该等人员或参与 Kwok 的破产程序，或参与 PAX 诉讼。该等案件包含类似的指控及同样毫无根据的请求。不可避免的结论是，Zhang 和 Freeth 正在针对利益与 Kwok 相对立者，旨在压制他们所认为的针对 Kwok 的倡导行为。Zhang 和 Freeth 所提起案件中的原告本可针对任何数量的个人和实体寻求救济，该等个人和实体在中华人民共和国（PRC）从事类似活动，并代表 PRC 公司，且被指违反 FARA 的登记要求，但他们没有这样做。他们仅针对参与 Kwok 破产程序或 PAX 诉讼的个人和实体。\n\n尽管这一结论在此并非决定性因素，但其强化了法院的认定，即有必要实施制裁，并应对原告律师实施制裁。见 Billewicz v. Town of Fair Haven, 2022 WL 4115966, at *13 (D. Vt. Aug. 11, 2022), aff'd, 2023 WL 3961437 (2d Cir. June 13, 2023)（“这种反复诉讼表明存在滥用诉讼的模式，并引发对不当动机的推断。”）。\n\n最后，原告及其律师在法院促使其律师如此行事之前，未追究原告指称通过侵犯其宪法权利而对其造成损害之人，即 NYPD 及其警官，这进一步强化了如下推论：该诉讼并非为获得司法救济而提起，而是为了因 PAX 的律师是 PAX 的律师而骚扰他们。原告的起诉状于 2023 年 1 月 18 日获准提交，见 Dkt. No. 2，约一个月后，即 2023 年 2 月 23 日，原告请求就提出动议的被告和 Stanton 签发传票，见 Dkt. Nos. 5–7。原告当时并未，亦未在规定的 90 天内，向纽约市（City of New York）或任何据称参与 12 月 20 日事件的警官——其指称为主要侵权人者——送达或尝试送达。他仅于 2023 年 3 月 20 日向提出动议的被告和 Stanton 送达传票及起诉状。Dkt. No. 18。事实上，直至四个多月后，原告才向本案中被列为被告的国家行为者送达，见 Dkt. Nos. 59, 64，而且即便如此，也是在法院提醒原告该项瑕疵并命令原告说明理由，解释为何不应依据 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) 因未向纽约市及被列名的警官 Lauren A. Duffy（劳伦·A·达菲）送达而驳回本案之后，见 Dkt. No. 58。有充分理由相信，若法院未发出说明理由命令，纽约市将永远不会被送达。因此，也有充分理由相信，原告并非因其对纽约市因 NYPD 行为所产生的某种不满，或为就其主张因 NYPD 行为所遭受的损害获得救济，而提起本案。\n\n不可避免的推论是，其提起本案是为了因 O'Melveny 和 Sarnoff 代表一名反对 Kwok 利益的客户而骚扰和阻止他们，而非因为原告于 2020 年 12 月 20 日遭受的任何损害。\n\nIV. 制裁裁定\n\n第 11 条允许法院在认定第 11(b) 条被违反后，“在通知并给予合理答复机会后”“施加适当制裁”。“根据[第 11 条]施加的制裁必须限于足以阻止该行为或处境相似者实施类似行为再次发生的范围。”Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4)。尽管如此，“根据第 11 条，地区法院仍保有根据具体案件的事实和情形制定适当制裁的广泛裁量权。”Colliton v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, 2008 WL 4386764, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2008), aff'd, 356 F. App'x 535 (2d Cir. 2009)；另见 Lawrence v. Wilder Richman Sec. Corp., 417 F. App'x 11, 15 (2d Cir. 2010)（“[地区法院]拥有‘广泛裁量权’，可根据[第] 11 条‘制定适当且合理的制裁’，其中包括在适当时裁定律师费。”（内部引文略）（引自 O'Malley v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 896 F.2d 704, 709 (2d Cir. 1990)）。\n\n审理制裁问题的法院必须注意，不得对正当的诉讼代理活动造成寒蝉效应。基于正当的法律论据，或基于对现行法律将被推翻的合理确信，追究被认为是中华人民共和国支持者的人员，本身并无不当之处。但本案原告及其律师并非寻求利用法律制度维护权利；他们寻求利用法律制度压制法律代理活动，并因申请制裁的被告与某一特定客户的关联而对其进行骚扰。正是这种行为，加之原告根据 FARA 提出的主张毫无根据，构成应予制裁的理由。\n\n申请制裁的被告请求本院责令 Zhang（张）和 Freeth（弗里斯）“支付被告 Sarnoff（萨尔诺夫）和 O'Melveny（奥麦文）为抗辩本案所产生的全部律师费和费用。”18 Dkt. No. 37. 本院认为，裁定支付抗辩本案所产生的律师费和费用——但不包括申请制裁的被告依据第 11 条提出动议所产生的费用——并未超过为“遏制重复该行为或其他处境相同者实施类似行为”所必需的程度。Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4). 该等费用和律师费应由 Freeth、Zhang 和原告承担。见 An v. Despins, 2023 WL 4931832, at *8（认定应当对原告律师施加制裁，因为其对“由律师承担主要责任的问题”负有责任，例如确保所提交的起诉状达到最低的实质依据门槛，并充分陈述事实以确立事项管辖权”（原文改动）（引自 United Republic Ins. Co., in Receivership v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 315 F.3d 168, 171 (2d Cir. 2003)））。申请制裁的被告须于本裁定作出之日起十四日内提交费用和律师费申请。\n\nFreeth 主张其无力支付申请制裁的被告的律师费和费用。在此阶段考虑支付能力是适当的。见 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4)（“根据本规则施加的制裁必须限于足以遏制重复该行为或其他处境相同者实施类似行为的程度。”）；另见 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)–(c)，\n\n18 尽管 Zhang 尚未在本案中出庭，但其与 Freeth 一同签署了起诉状，因而“证明[向本院]，据其在根据具体情形作出合理调查后形成的所知、所掌握的信息和所信赖的判断。”Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). 第 11(c) 条允许法院对“违反本规则或对该违反行为负有责任的任何律师、律师事务所或当事人”施加制裁。Fed. R. C. P. 11(c)(1). 该条并未将法院对律师施加制裁的权力限于已在案件中出庭的律师。本院认定，Zhang 与 Freeth 一样，应对本意见及命令中详述的第 11 条违反行为负责。\n\n1993 年修正案咨询委员会说明（指出，在决定是否施加制裁以及施加何种制裁时，“鉴于责任人的财务资源，为遏制该人在同一案件中重复行为所需的金额；为遏制其他诉讼人从事类似活动所需的金额……在特定案件中可能是适当的考量因素”）；Star Mark Mgmt., Inc., 682 F.3d at 179（指出“地区法院[拥有]基于无力支付而降低制裁金额的广泛酌处权”）；Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1281 (2d Cir. 1986)（“[鉴于]制裁的根本目的——惩罚偏离适当行为标准的行为，以促进今后遵守并遏制进一步违反——地区法院完全有权酌情通过衡量违规律师的支付能力，酌减应向其判处的金额。”）。因此，自费用和律师费申请提交之日起七日内，原告及其律师可提交其希望本院在分摊（或不分摊）费用裁定时予以考虑的任何信息。19\n\n此外，Zhang 和 Freeth 须各向本院缴纳 $2,500 罚金，以针对诉讼起诉状给本院及其工作人员造成的负担，并遏制二人在未来提起此类毫无根据且具有骚扰性的诉讼。见 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)–(c), 1993 年修正案咨询委员会说明（指出“法院可就违反行为施加多种可能的制裁，例如……责令向法院缴纳罚金”）。该等款项须于本意见及命令作出之日起十四日内支付给 Southern District of New York（纽约南区）书记官，并须将付款证明提交至案卷。\n\n19 如有必要，申请制裁的被告可于原告作出任何答复后两个工作日内请求准许提交回复状。\n\n申请制裁的被告还请求作出命令，“禁止原告、原告律师及与其积极共同行动的人员，未经法院许可提起其他类似诉讼。”Dkt. No. 37. “如果诉讼人具有提起无理缠讼、骚扰性或重复性诉讼的历史，法院可施加制裁，包括限制其今后使用司法系统。”Hong Mai Sa v. Doe, 406 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 2005)（省略内部引号和引文）。法院在“限制诉讼人今后诉诸法院”时应考虑的因素包括：\n\n（1）诉讼人的诉讼历史，尤其是其中是否包含无理缠讼、骚扰性或重复性诉讼；（2）诉讼人提起诉讼的动机，例如，诉讼人是否客观上善意地预期会胜诉？；（3）诉讼人是否由律师代理；（4）诉讼人是否给其他当事人造成不必要的费用，或给法院及其工作人员造成不必要的负担；以及（5）其他制裁措施是否足以保护法院和其他当事人。\n\nIwachiw v. N.Y. State Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 396 F.3d 525, 528 (2d Cir. 2005)（引自 Safir v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 19, 24 (2d Cir. 1986)）。“归根结底，法院必须回答的问题是，具有无理缠讼历史的诉讼人是否可能继续滥用司法程序并骚扰其他当事人。”Newman v. Jewish Agency for Isr., 2017 WL 6628616, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2017), aff'd sub nom. Eliahu v. Jewish Agency for Isr., 919 F.3d 709 (2d Cir. 2019)（引自 Safir, 792 F.2d at 24）。\n\n本院认定，根据现有记录，反诉禁令既不适当，也无必要。尽管本院认定原告提起本案是为了骚扰申请制裁的被告，且其及其律师对在本案中胜诉并无客观上的善意预期，但申请制裁的被告未指出原告曾为骚扰目的提起的任何其他诉讼，也未指出如不受禁令约束，原告本人将继续提起此类骚扰性诉讼的现实风险。就原告律师而言，尽管他们似乎在数起诉讼中反复从事毫无根据且具有骚扰性的诉讼活动，但据本院所知，自在目前由 Valerie E. Caproni（瓦莱丽·E·卡普罗尼）法官审理的案件中被判处制裁以来，他们未再提起其他诉讼，见 An et al. v. Despins et al., No. 22-cv-10062 (VEC) (S.D.N.Y.). 申请制裁的被告自身承认，他们并未寻求移送任何有权限制申请制裁的被告执业的纪律委员会；本院根据现有记录亦未见有任何依据这样做。律师在被指控违反第 11 条后（在尚未有司法认定其确已违反之前）仍继续进行诉讼，尚不足以构成对其代表未来客户提起案件的能力施加任何限制的依据。\n\n在口头辩论期间，申请制裁的被告请求本院命令原告从修正起诉状中删除针对他们的指控，并且，如其选择继续向其他被告追诉其主张，则在此之前提交一份修正起诉状。原告律师未对该请求提出异议。申请制裁的被告须在其支持律师费和费用的书面意见中明确应从起诉状和修正起诉状中删除的段落。原告可在此后两周内作出答复。见 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)–(c), 1993 年修正案咨询委员会说明（“法院可就违反行为施加多种可能的制裁，例如删除违规文件。”）。\n\n最后，本院将要求原告、Zhang 和 Freeth 在本意见及命令作出之日起一年期间内，在其日后提起的所有诉讼中提交本意见及命令的副本。\n\n结论\n\n制裁动议部分准许、部分驳回。申请制裁的被告须不晚于本意见及命令作出之日起十四日内提交合理费用和律师费申请。若 Zhang、Freeth 和原告希望提出本院尚未收到的证据，则须在该申请提交之日起七日内，连同对申请制裁的被告关于合理律师费和费用申请的任何异议一并提出。\n\n书记官谨奉命关闭 Dkt. No. 36。\n\n特此命令。\n\n纽约州纽约市                                  LEWIS J. LIMAN（刘易斯·J·利曼）\n\n日期：August 22, 2023  ________________________________________\n\n美国地区法官\n\n证物 5\n\n美国康涅狄格州破产法院\n\n关于：)\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），)\n\n债务人。)\n\n_______________________________________________________________\n\n) 案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n\n) 第 11 章\n\n_______________________________________________________________) 关于：ECF No. 183\n\n出庭人员1\n\nJeffrey L. Jonas（杰弗里·L·乔纳斯） Brown Rudnick LLP（布朗·拉德尼克律师事务所） Seven Times Square New York, NY 10036 债务人的律师\n\nPeter Friedman（彼得·弗里德曼） O'Melveny & Myers LLP（奥麦文律师事务所） 1625 Eye Street NW Washington, DC 20006 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund, L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙企业）的律师\n\nCarollynn Callari（卡罗琳·卡拉里） Callari Partners, LLC（卡拉里合伙人有限责任公司） One Rockefeller Plaza, 10th Floor New York, New York 10020 债权人 Rui Ma（马蕊）、Weican Meng（孟伟灿）和 Zheng Wu（吴铮）的律师\n\nHolley L. Claiborn（霍利·L·克莱伯恩） Office of the United States Trustee（美国受托人办公室） 150 Court Street, Room 302 New Haven, CT 06510 美国受托人的律师\n\nIrve J. Goldman（欧文·J·戈德曼） Pullman & Comley（普尔曼与康利律师事务所） 850 Main Street, 8th Floor Bridgeport, CT 06604 无担保债权人正式委员会的律师\n\n驳回撤诉动议（不妨碍再次提出）并准许加入任命第 11 章受托人动议的裁决备忘录及命令\n\n一、引言\n\n2022 年 2 月 15 日，Ho Wan Kwok（“债务人”）提交自愿第 11 章破产申请，从而启动本案。尽管债务人的案件仅待决四个月，\n\n1 债务人的律师 William R. Baldiga（威廉·R·巴尔迪加）和 Bennett S. Silverberg（贝内特·S·西尔弗伯格）、PAX 的律师 Laura Aronsson（劳拉·阿伦松）和 Patrick M. Birney（帕特里克·M·伯尼），以及债权人 Ma、Meng 和 Wu 的律师 Kristin Mayhew（克里斯汀·梅休）亦出席了关于撤诉动议的听证会。\n\n债务人、美国受托人办公室、债权人以及与债务人有关的实体或个人已经提交了大量动议和申请。已举行数次广泛的听证会，其中包括最近一次就驳回债务人案件或任命第 11 章受托人的动议举行的证据听证会。\n\n当事人在大量书状中提出的问题，以及在本案举行的听证期间提交的信息和证据，确认债务人的案件非同寻常、复杂且常具争议性。基于本案的具体事实和情形，包括对案卷的审查、当事人提交的证据，以及已提交本院审理的复杂事实和法律问题，根据 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)，本院认定，目前不驳回或转换债务人的案件，而是任命一名第11章受托人，最符合债权人和破产财团的利益。2\n\nII. 管辖权\n\n本院根据 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334 对本动议具有管辖权。根据 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)，本案属于核心程序。本院依据 United States District Court for the District of Connecticut（康涅狄格联邦地区法院）于 September 21, 1984 作出的 General Order of Reference（一般移送命令），有权审理本事项。\n\nIII. 程序经过\n\n为确定驳回、转换或任命第11章受托人是否最符合债权人和破产财团的利益，审查债务人案件中已发生的事件至关重要。债务人案件的核心是一艘名为“Lady May”的豪华游艇，据称以 €41,000,000.00 购得，以及可能属于债务人的其他资产，包括据称于 2015 年以约 \\$70,000,000.00 购得的位于曼哈顿 Sherry-Netherlands Hotel（雪莉-荷兰酒店）的一套公寓。综合来看，围绕债务人案件的情形表明，为何相较于驳回或转换债务人的案件，任命第11章受托人最符合债权人和破产财团的利益。\n\n2 第 1112(b)(3) 条要求本院在听证开始后 15 日内就驳回动议作出裁定。在 June 9, 2022 为处理驳回动议听证会正式记录更正而举行的状态会议期间，本院告知当事人，基于若干理由，包括债务人案件的复杂性，以及在该 15 日期限内安排于其他案件举行的大量听证会，就驳回动议作出的裁定可能会在听证会后超过 15 日才发布。\n\n债务人延期提交清单和说明书的动议\n\n如上所述，债务人于 February 15, 2022 通过提交自愿第11章破产申请而启动本案。债务人与申请书一并提交了二十大无担保债权人名单，并将 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙企业，“PAX”）列为债务人的最大债权人，债务额约为 \\$254,000,000.00。ECF No. 4 at p. 1.\n\n债务人未随其申请书提交清单或财务状况说明书，但及时提交了将提交清单或提供所需信息的期限延长至 May 2, 2022 的动议（“延期提交清单和说明书动议”，ECF No. 27）。为支持所请求的延期，债务人称其“背景确实非同寻常”，而额外时间将使其能够聘请协助编制和提交清单及说明书所必需的专业人士，并取得管理其第11章案件所需的融资。ECF No. 27 at p. 2.\n\n于 February 28, 2022，Office of the United States Trustee（美国受托人办公室，“UST”）和 PAX 对延期提交清单和说明书动议提出强烈异议。在异议中，UST 和 PAX 均主张，债务人提交本案是直接回应一项针对债务人的 \\$134,000,000.00 藐视法庭命令，该命令源于其参与将 Lady May 号秘密转移出纽约以防止其被扣押。PAX 的异议还主张，债务人藐视纽约州法院命令并滥用司法程序，企图逃避执行 PAX 对其获得的 \\$116,000,000.00 判决书。PAX 指出，New York Supreme Court（纽约州最高法院）认定，“Kwok（郭文贵）这名自称的亿万富翁，已将其资产隐藏于错综复杂的公司实体和家族成员之中”，且由于其为逃避债权人而实施的精心策划，纽约州最高法院案卷中有超过 1,180 项记录，“其中几乎所有记录均涉及……[Kwok]通过将其大量个人资产存放于一系列公司、受信赖的亲信和家族成员名下，逃避和欺骗其债权人的行为。”PAX Objection, ECF No. 50 at p. 2. 此外，PAX 主张，债务人的申请书中至少有三项重大虚假和/或误导性陈述，包括其经宣誓作出的（不实）陈述，即其资产不足 \\$100,000.00；这与纽约州法院仅在数日前作出的认定——Kwok“对 Lady May 号享有实益权益并控制该游艇”——完全不相容。Id.\n\nPAX 的自动中止动议\n\n于 March 1, 2022，即债务人案件提交后仅两周，PAX 提交了请求作出确认自动中止不适用之命令的动议，或备选地请求解除自动中止的动议（“自动中止动议”，ECF No. 57）。自动中止动议对债务人提出了广泛、详细且严重的指控。PAX 主张，由于在申请前的纽约州法院诉讼中对债务人施加了制裁，自动中止在本案中不适用。PAX 称，法院的制裁因债务人违反其命令、未将 Lady May 号返还纽约而认定债务人民事藐视法庭。债务人对自动中止动议提出异议；在该异议中，债务人并不对制裁的施加提出争议，而是主张其并不拥有或控制 Lady May 号。Debtor's Objection to Automatic Stay Motion, ECF No. 83 at p. 7.\n\n债务人的清单和财务状况说明书\n\n于 March 9, 2022，债务人提交了其财务状况说明书，ECF No. 77，及清单，ECF No. 78。债务人在清单和财务状况说明书中主张，其拥有价值 \\$3,850.00 的资产，并列示金额为 \\$373,803,498.09 的负债。在限制并否认债务人于财务状况说明书中在伪证处罚下所作陈述的总体注释中，债务人还主张其：(i) 对其妻子全资拥有的一家有限责任公司所拥有的位于康涅狄格州格林尼治的不动产享有使用和居住权，但不享有所有权；(ii) 全资拥有另一家有限责任公司的成员权益，该公司以信托形式持有位于曼哈顿 Sherry-Netherlands Hotel 的一套公寓的全部合作公寓股份，受益人为其子 Qiang Guo（郭强）拥有的一家独立有限责任公司；及 (iii) 可使用由其女 Mei Guo（郭美）拥有的一家有限责任公司 HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited（HK国际基金投资（美国）有限公司，“HK”）所拥有的 Lady May 号。ECF No. 77 at p. 4-5.\n\nUST 关于任命审查员或第11章受托人的动议\n\n于 March 18, 2022，即债务人提交其清单和财务状况说明书后不足两周，UST 提交了请求作出命令指示任命审查员的动议，或备选地请求作出命令指示任命第11章受托人的动议（“UST 关于任命审查员或第11章受托人的动议”，ECF No. 102）。UST 主张，任命审查员或受托人最符合债权人和破产财团的利益，因为债务人是一名流亡于其原籍中国的公众人物和自称的亿万富翁，其主张自己没有固定收入且几乎没有资产，却似乎能够获得大量资金，包括有能力为其在本案中的律师取得 \\$1,000,000.00 的预付聘金。UST 指出，其担忧的是“债务人为使自己免受债权人追索而人为制造的‘贫困’这一奇怪组合”，以及债务人提交本案以“获得对欠其数百万款项之债权人的保护”。ECF No. 102 at p. 2. 此外，UST 称，其担忧得到以下事项的证实：(i) “债务人将其清单和财务状况说明书边缘化至毫无意义的程度”；(ii) 债务人“根据‘总体注释’中自利且反受托义务的措辞，公然否认对破产文件中任何信息承担任何责任或义务”；及 (iii) “债务人无能力和/或不愿承认及接受其提供完整、全面和准确信息的义务、履行对其破产财团及债权人的受托义务，以及履行其作为占有债务人的义务。”Id.\n\n无担保债权人委员会任命通知\n\n于 March 21, 2022，即 UST 提交关于任命审查员或第11章受托人的动议后三日，UST 在本案中提交了债权人委员会任命通知（ECF No. 108）。Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors（无担保债权人正式委员会，“委员会”）的成员，是债务人最大的无担保债权人之一，并表示愿意在委员会任职；其成员为以下债权人：(i) Rui Ma（马蕊），(ii) Ning Ye（叶宁），及 (iii) Samuel Dan Nunberg（塞缪尔·丹·努伯格）。\n\nDIP 融资动议\n\n于 March 22, 2022，即委员会任命后一日，债务人提交了请求作出临时及最终占有债务人融资命令的动议（“DIP 动议”，ECF No. 117）。在 DIP 动议中，债务人寻求批准一笔金额为 \\$8,000,000.00 的贷款，该贷款将在无担保基础上向破产财团提供，从属于债务人申请前债权人的债权，且不享有任何管理费用或优先偿还权。该贷款可用于支付破产财团的专业人士费用，并且当且仅当债务人债权人的所有获准债权获全额清偿或以其他方式根据计划条款得到满足时，才予以偿还。拟议贷款人 Golden Spring (New York) Ltd.（金泉〈纽约〉有限公司，“DIP Lender”）为债务人之子 Qiang Guo 所拥有和控制的实体。\n\nDIP 动议主张，债务人提交其第11章案件是为了：(a) 创建一个单一平台，以有序处理对其提出的各种相互竞争的债权主张；(b) 为利益相关方提供有效机会，以调查其资产、负债和财务状况；(c) 确定哪些资产属于破产财团财产，并进而可供分配给获准债权持有人；及 (d) 根据第11章计划，就公平和衡平地解决债权主张及分配资产一事与其债权人达成共识。DIP Motion, ECF No. 117 at p. 5.\n\nPAX 的驳回动议及加入\n\n于 April 6, 2022，即 UST 关于任命审查员或第11章受托人的动议及 DIP 动议提交后约三周，PAX 提交了驳回动议，或备选地部分加入 UST 关于任命第11章受托人的动议（“驳回动议或加入”，ECF No. 183）。为支持驳回动议或加入，PAX 主张，债务人提交本案“是其为‘拖延、欺骗和诈欺其债权人，并继续逃避合法法院命令’而采取的最新且最激烈的策略”，且债务人的“惯常做法是通过家族成员和空壳公司存放、遮蔽和隐藏其资产，以保护其财富并避免偿还其对 PAX 所负债务”。ECF No. 183 at p. 7. PAX 主张，债务人“已将其资产隐藏于错综复杂的公司实体和家族成员之中”。Id. at p. 7-8.\n\n除《驳回或追加当事人动议》外，PAX还提交了一项动议，请求就《驳回或追加当事人动议》安排案件状态会议。法院部分准许了PAX的动议，并安排于2022年4月13日就《驳回或追加当事人动议》举行案件状态会议；该日期亦为本案其他若干事项的听证日期，包括就《自动中止动议》继续举行听证，以及就《任命审查员或第11章受托人动议》和《DIP动议》举行首次听证。\n\n债务人的第11章计划\n\n2022年4月10日，债务人提交了一份拟议的第11章重整计划（以下简称“该计划”，ECF No. 197）。除其他事项外，该计划规定设立一项“债权人信托”，以使所有获准债权的债权人受益。ECF No. 197，第20-24页。该计划进一步规定，“Lady May”号的所有权将转移至该债权人信托，以使所有获准债权的债权人受益。ECF No. 197，第21页。\n\nHK就《自动中止动议》提交的声明\n\n2022年4月11日，即债务人提交该计划的次日，HK（如上所述，其为债务人女儿所有的有限责任公司）就《自动中止动议》提交了一份声明（以下简称“该声明”，ECF No. 203）。在该声明中，HK主张其为“Lady May”号的登记代理人，并同意在特定条件下作出一项拟议命令，强制其将“Lady May”号运送并交付至康涅狄格州的通航水域。HK进一步主张，其已将拟议命令副本提供给PAX、债务人、UST及委员会的律师，以征求各自意见；作出强制HK将“Lady May”号返还康涅狄格州的拟议命令，将使《自动中止动议》“失去争议意义”。声明，第2页。\n\n2022年4月13日听证会\n\n若干事项原定于2022年4月13日进行听证，包括就《自动中止动议》继续举行听证，以及就《DIP动议》和UST提出的《任命审查员或第11章受托人动议》举行首次听证。在长时间听证会结束时，法院再次延期审理PAX的《自动中止动议》，延期审理UST提出的《任命审查员或第11章受托人动议》，并安排于2022年4月27日就《DIP动议》及债务人《聘用财务顾问申请》举行证据听证会。\n\n2022年4月27日证据听证会、《自动中止动议》的解决，以及就《驳回或追加当事人动议》安排证据听证会\n\n债务人、PAX、UST、委员会、债权人Rui Ma（马锐）和Zheng Wu（吴征）、Golden Spring（Golden Spring）以及HK出席了4月27日的证据听证会。听证会开始时，债务人律师向法院报告，当事人已解决《自动中止动议》。该解决方案的主要条款为：HK将提供并存入托管账户$37,000,000.00，直至“Lady May”号返还至康涅狄格州的通航水域。当事人同意，待法院审阅并修订将提交法院的协议命令后，《自动中止动议》即告解决。随后，HK律师获准离开听证会，以继续修订协议命令草案。法院在庭审记录中，并最终在案卷中，注明《自动中止动议》已由当事人协议解决，但须于2022年5月2日或之前向法院提交一项经同意的命令。\n\n就债务人的《聘用财务顾问动议》和《DIP动议》亦提出了证词、证据和辩论。证据听证会结束时，法院将债务人的《聘用财务顾问动议》留待裁定，并\n\n将《DIP动议》的听证会延期至2022年5月4日。此外，当事人在庭审记录中同意了一项关于就《驳回或追加当事人动议》举行证据听证会的排期命令条款。2022年4月28日，法院作出《关于驳回动议的排期命令》，将证据听证会安排于2022年5月24日举行。\n\n关于“Lady May”号的协议命令\n\n2022年4月29日，法院作出《强制HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC将特定游艇“Lady May”号运送并交付的协议命令》，该命令由HK、PAX、债务人、委员会以及债权人Rui Ma（马锐）和Zheng Wu（吴征）签署（以下简称“协议命令”，ECF No. 299）。除其他事项外，协议命令规定：(i) HK已将$37,000,000.00存入托管账户；(ii) HK将于2022年7月15日或之前将“Lady May”号交付至康涅狄格州的通航水域；以及(iii) “Lady May”号的船长和据称的游艇管理公司将提交声明，表明双方均受本法院管辖，并受协议命令条款约束，包括在本法院进一步命令作出之前，不得将“Lady May”号移离康涅狄格州通航水域的限制。\n\n继续审理《DIP动议》、同意驳回，以及撤回《DIP动议》\n\n2022年5月3日，债务人就《DIP动议》提交了一项经修订的拟议命令。该经修订的拟议命令载有一张图表，说明DIP资金将在何时及以何种金额支出。经修订的拟议命令规定，专业费用将按周支付，包括债务人律师和委员会律师的费用。\n\n2022年5月4日，就《DIP动议》的续行听证会举行。债务人和委员会主张应准许《DIP动议》，并应作出经修订的拟议命令。PAX和UST重申了其各自对《DIP动议》的异议。法院随后就所主张的、在2022年5月底前支付数百万美元专业费用的必要性提出若干问题。听证会结束时，法院表示将就《DIP动议》作出裁定，以确定截至2022年5月底应支出的适当金额。\n\n2022年5月11日，即《DIP动议》听证会结束一周后，债务人提交了《同意驳回案件通知》（以下简称“同意驳回”）。债务人在《同意驳回》中主张，因PAX及其他方持续不断的诉讼给其造成巨大成本，且其无法取得资金以承担该等成本，故其同意驳回其案件。同于2022年5月11日，在《DIP动议》留待裁定且法院正准备就该动议作出裁定期间，债务人提交了《撤回DIP动议》。\n\n就《驳回或追加当事人动议》举行的证据听证会\n\n2022年5月24日，就PAX的《驳回或追加当事人动议》举行了证据听证会。听证会开始时，所有当事人均承认，《同意驳回》改变了债务人案件的态势。此外，所有当事人均同意，根据第1112(b)条，存在驳回或转换债务人案件，或任命一名第11章受托人的理由。PAX和债务人主张应驳回债务人案件。委员会和某些债权人主张，转换最为适当，但如不转换，则应任命一名第11章受托人。UST未主张三种替代方案中的任何一种，但敦促法院尽快作出决定。\n\nIV. 分析\n\n《破产法典》第1112(b)条规定：\n\n“经利害关系方请求，并在通知和举行听证后，法院应将本章项下案件转换为第7章项下案件，或驳回本章项下案件，以何者最符合债权人和破产财团的最佳利益为准；但如法院认定根据第1104(a)条任命受托人或审查员最符合债权人和破产财团的最佳利益，则不在此限。”\n\n11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1)；另见 In re Sillerman, 605 B.R. 631, 657 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019)；In re TP, Inc., 455 B.R. 455, 457 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2011)；In re Products Intern. Co., 395 B.R. 101, 107 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2008)。\n\n在就《驳回或追加当事人动议》举行的证据听证会期间，所有当事人约定，存在驳回案件、将案件转换为第7章案件，或任命一名第11章受托人的理由。债务人主张，根据第1112(b)(4)(A)条，存在驳回其案件的理由，因为破产财团遭受重大或持续损失或价值减损，且不存在合理的重整可能性。PAX主张，基于诸多理由，根据第1112(b)条存在驳回案件的理由，包括债务人据称在提交案件时存在恶意，以及债务人对破产财团的严重管理不善。由于当事人约定根据第1112(b)条存在理由，法院无需确定具体的“理由”。法院唯一需要决定的问题是，驳回、转换，还是任命一名第11章受托人，最符合债权人和破产财团的最佳利益。\n\n法院必须通过利益衡量测试，根据案件记录确定三种替代方案——驳回、转换或任命一名第11章受托人——中的哪一种最符合债权人和破产财团的最佳利益。In re Products Intern. Co., 395 B.R. at 108。在确定何种方案最符合债权人和破产财团的最佳利益时，法院应评估的事项包括债权人债权的收回和支付前景。\n\nIn re Corona Care Convalescent Corp., 527 B.R. 379, 384 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2015)。“在考虑任命受托人或将案件转换为第7章项下案件时，‘区别因素……在于，第11章为受托人运用独立判断和良好管理来指导破产财团事务，包括持续经营（如有），从而使债权人和破产财团的回收最大化，提供了更广泛的可能性。’” In re NOA, LLC, 578 B.R. 534, 541 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2017)。\n\n本案任命一名第11章受托人具有正当性，因为案件记录表明存在收回并支付债权人债权的前景。在本案期间，债务人已表明其能够获得数百万美元资金，包括作为《DIP动议》标的的$8,000,000.00。债务人还在本案早期阶段提出了一项第11章计划，其中规定的事项包括将“Lady May”号的所有权转移至债权人信托，以使所有债权人受益。此外，在本案待决的四个月期间，立场不同的当事人就解决《自动中止动议》的协议进行了深入谈判。该协议命令促成将$37,000,000.00存入托管账户，以换取将“Lady May”号交付至康涅狄格州的通航水域，而债务人对此持反对态度，以致纽约州法院诉讼中对其作出了藐视法庭制裁。履行协议命令中最重要的义务——将“Lady May”号交付至康涅狄格州的通航水域——尚未到期。然而，协议命令的其他条款已得到及时遵守。HK已提交进展报告，表明已对“Lady May”号进行维修，且“Lady May”号可能在2022年7月15日协议命令规定的交付日期之前抵达康涅狄格州的通航水域。驳回债务人案件，或将债务人案件转换为第7章案件，将抹去就“Lady May”号所取得的实质性进展。一名第11章受托人可以担任一名\n\n独立第三方，以确保持续遵守约定命令，并可协助制定具有合理确认可能性的第11章计划。指定第11章受托人还将维护执行和解的政策，避免争相向法院提起诉讼，并为债权人提供依照《破产法》优先顺位制度按比例分配的机会。参见 Corona Care，527 B.R. 第387页（指定受托人以维护执行和解的政策并避免争相向法院提起诉讼）。\n\n在数份诉状中，债务人表示，其提起本案是为了建立一个统一的审理平台，以有序处理针对其提出的相互竞争的请求，并为利益相关方提供有效机会，以调查其资产、负债和财务状况。驳回债务人的案件将违背债务人提出本案所述的理由。同样，将本案转换为第7章案件亦不能有序清算针对债务人提出的相互竞争的请求。指定第11章受托人，是处理针对债务人提出的相互竞争的债权人请求的最有效率且最有效的方法，包括附条件及未确定数额的人身伤害侵权请求。指定第11章受托人还将能够有效调查债务人的资产、负债和财务状况。因此，在权衡驳回、转换或指定第11章受托人时，案卷材料支持以下结论：本案指定第11章受托人符合债权人和破产财团的最佳利益。\n\n在面临根据第1112(b)条作出类似选择时，破产法院曾指定第11章受托人，而非驳回或转换案件。例如，Sillerman 案涉及一名连续创业者的个人债务人。该债务人在其清单中列出了其在四十七家有限责任公司中的权益，曾以数十亿美元出售多项业务，并提出了一项第11章计划，该计划将在债务人能够获得融资以投资于某些关联实体后获得资金支持。Sillerman，605 B.R. 第636页。Sillerman 案的债权人首先提出指定审查员的动议，因为他们主张，“缺乏独立的管理监督”使债务人得以避免披露其资产的真实性质和价值，而债务人“使用涉及复杂公司结构的多层交易”使其资产难以查找。同上，第636-37页。本案后期指定的无担保债权人官方委员会，转而请求指定第11章受托人，或者作为替代，请求作出将本案转换为第7章案件的命令。鉴于债务人案件中的整体情形，Sillerman 法院裁定，指定第11章受托人而非转换案件，符合债权人和破产财团的最佳利益。同上，第657页。\n\n与 Sillerman 案中的债权人一样，PAX（PAX）、委员会及其他债权人主张，债务人及其家人在众多有限责任公司中拥有权益，这些公司可能掩盖债务人资产的真实性质和价值。他们还主张，债务人从事了涉及复杂公司结构的多层交易，例如 Golden Spring（金泉）、Genever Holdings（Genever控股）、Lamp Funding（Lamp Funding）和 HK（HK），从而难以识别和定位债务人的资产。PAX 援引纽约最高法院的认定：债务人“将其资产隐匿于公司实体和家庭成员构成的迷宫之中”，且数千项案卷记录“涉及被告 Kwok（郭文贵）通过将其大量个人资产存放于一系列公司、可信赖的密友和家庭成员处，以规避和欺骗其债权人的行为。”ECF No. 183，第7-8页。与驳回或转换相比，本案中债务人财务状况的复杂性及缺乏独立管理监督，足以支持指定一名第11章受托人，以便为债权人和破产财团的利益调查、识别和定位债务人的资产。\n\n在债务人违反约定命令的情形下，破产法院也曾指定第11章受托人，而非驳回或转换案件。在 NOA 案中，债务人故意违反债务人与债权人之间的一项约定命令；该命令明确限制债务人在收到货物全额付款之前，不得将大宗服装运出美国。578 B.R. 第537-40页。法院指定第11章受托人，是因为“第11章扩大了受托人运用独立判断和良好管理来指导破产财团事务［包括持续经营（如有）］的可能性，以便为债权人和破产财团实现最佳回收。”同上，第541页。与 NOA 案相同，本案当事人协商形成了该约定命令。如上所述，尚未到向康涅狄格州通航水域交付 Lady May（Lady May）的履行期限。指定第11章受托人将使该受托人能够运用独立判断，确保遵守约定命令，并为债权人和破产财团实现资产回收的最大化。\n\nCorona Care 是另一宗破产法院行使裁量权，在债务人未履行约定条款时指定第11章受托人而非驳回或转换案件的案件。Corona Care，527 B.R. 第387页。在 Corona Care 案中，债务人与无担保债权人官方委员会及其他利害关系方达成约定，驳回部分共同管理的、较具盈利能力护理机构的案件，以使其余债务人有更多时间确认重组计划。527 B.R. 第380页。随后，债务人未履行该约定协议项下的条款。同上，第385页。在评估债权人请求的收回和支付前景时，Corona Care 法院认定，出售债务人的业务为向债权人付款提供了一定前景，因为资产将被变现以支付其请求，这反映了约定中达成的交易。同上，第384-85页。同样，将 Lady May 交付至康涅狄格州通航水域，将带来收回和支付债权人请求的前景，其中可能包括将 Lady May 质押用于第11章计划，及/或认定 Lady May 属于债务人破产财团的财产。\n\nTP, Inc.（TP公司）是另一宗指定第11章受托人而非驳回或转换债务人案件的破产案件。455 B.R. 第459页。在 TP, Inc. 案中，Bank of America（美国银行）已在州法院对 TP, Inc.、其负责人及该负责人的妻子启动止赎程序，并已获得针对该负责人及其妻子的判决书；二人为本票的保证人。同上，第456页。案件审理期间，债务人的负责人未经法院批准出租美国银行的担保物，并收取归属于该担保物的租金。同上。TP, Inc. 法院裁定，债务人不当使用作为美国银行担保物的多处不动产，以及不当使用源自该担保物的现金担保物租金，足以支持指定第11章受托人。同上，第459页。法院指出，其对未来可能发生的欺诈、无能、不诚实或严重管理不善情形的担忧，促使其认定指定第11章受托人符合债权人和破产财团的最佳利益，而非驳回或转换，因为受托人可运用独立判断和良好管理来指导破产财团事务。同上。在本案中，州法院同样基于本票项下的违约对债务人作出判决书，并因债务人违反州法院命令作出藐视法庭命令；该州法院命令限制债务人及其他人将 Lady May 从纽约通航水域移走。与 TP, Inc. 案的裁决一样，本案指定第11章受托人将处理对债务人未来任何不当行为的担忧，同时运用独立判断和良好管理来指导破产财团事务，并为全体债权人实现最佳回收。\n\nV. 结论\n\n由于当事人约定，根据第1112(b)条存在理由驳回本案、将本案转换为第7章案件，或指定第11章受托人，法院已评估了包括全体债权人请求的收回和支付前景在内的事项。法院认定，指定第11章受托人符合债权人和破产财团的最佳利益，因为第11章受托人可以：(i) 运用独立判断和良好管理来指导破产财团事务，以尝试清偿债权人的请求；(ii) 确定该债务人是否具有合理的重整可能性，包括能否提出并确认重组计划；以及 (iii) 通过包括允许第11章受托人调查债务人的资产、负债和财务状况，并确保遵守约定命令条款在内的方式，为债权人和破产财团实现最佳回收。\n\n据此，现命令如下：\n\n命令：根据 11 U.S.C. §§ 1112(b)，在其请求现时驳回债务人案件的范围内，驳回动议或加入动议被无损害地驳回；在应于债务人案件中指定第11章受托人的范围内，该动议获准；并进一步\n\n命令：第11章受托人应履行 11 U.S.C. § 1106 规定的全部职责；并进一步\n\n命令：在指定第11章受托人后十四（14）日内，将安排一次状态会议，以讨论包括第11章受托人就依照 11 U.S.C. §§ 1106(a)(4) 和 (a)(5) 应提交陈述的进展、对约定命令的遵守、第11章受托人拟议的破产财团管理以及债务人案件的持续管理在内的事项。\n\n日期：2022年6月15日，康涅狄格州布里奇波特。\n\n通知收件人\n\n地区/办事处：0205−5　用户：admin　创建日期：6/15/2022\n\n案件：22−50073　表格 ID：pdfdoc1　总计：108\n\ncr\n\nintp\ncrcm\nintp\nintp\ncr\ncr\ncr\n9343402　已提交至 BNC（破产通知中心）且未附地址的收件人：\nPacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙企业）\nZheng Wu（吴峥）\nRui Ma（马睿）\nWeican Meng（孟伟灿）\nGolden Spring (New York) LTD（金泉〔纽约〕有限公司）\nOfficial Committee of Unsecured Creditors（无担保债权人官方委员会）\nHK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC（HK国际基金投资〔美国〕有限责任公司）\nMei Guo（郭梅）\nBaosheng Guo（郭宝胜）\nYan Zhao（赵岩）\nNing Ye（叶宁）\n22−50073\n\n总计：12\n\n美国受托人　电子提交通知收件人：\n美国受托人\nUSTPRegion02.NH.ECF@USDOJ.GOV\n律师　Aaron Romney（阿伦·罗姆尼）\naromney@zeislaw.com\n律师　Annecca H. Smith（安妮卡·H·史密斯）\nasmith@rc.com\n律师　Bennett Silverberg（本内特·西尔弗伯格）\nbsilverberg@brownrudnick.com\n律师　Carollynn H.G. Callari（卡罗琳·H.G.·卡拉里）\nccallari@callaripartners.com\n律师　David S. Forsh（戴维·S·福什）\ndforsh@callaripartners.com\n律师　David V. Harbach, II（戴维·V·哈巴赫二世）\ndharbach@omm.com\n律师　Dylan Kletter（迪伦·克莱特）\ndkletter@brownrudnick.com\n律师　Holley L. Claiborn（霍莉·L·克莱伯恩）\nholley.l.claiborn@usdoj.gov\n律师　Irve J. Goldman（欧文·J·戈德曼）\nigoldman@pullcom.com\n律师　Jay Marshall Wolman（杰伊·马歇尔·沃尔曼）\njmw@randazza.com\n律师　Jeffrey L Jonas（杰弗里·L·乔纳斯）\njjonas@brownrudnick.com\n律师\n律师　John L. Cesaroni（约翰·L·切萨罗尼）\njcesaroni@zeislaw.com\nJonathan Kaplan（乔纳森·卡普兰）\njkaplan@pullcom.com\n律师　Kenneth Aulet（肯尼斯·奥莱特）\nkaulet@brownrudnick.com\n律师　Kristin B. Mayhew（克里斯汀·B·梅休）\nkmayhew@mdmc−law.com\n律师　Laura Aronsson（劳拉·阿伦松）\nlaronsson@omm.com\n律师　Mia N. Gonzalez（米娅·N·冈萨雷斯）\nmgonzalez@omm.com\n律师　Patrick M. Birney（帕特里克·M·伯尼）\npbirney@rc.com\n律师　Peter Friedman（彼得·弗里德曼）\npfriedman@omm.com\n律师　Peter J. Zarella（彼得·J·扎雷拉）\npzarella@mdmc−law.com\n律师　Sara Pahlavan（萨拉·帕拉万）\nspahlavan@omm.com\n律师　Scott D. Rosen（斯科特·D·罗森）\nsrosen@cb−shea.com\n律师　Stephen M. Kindseth（斯蒂芬·M·金德塞思）\nskindseth@zeislaw.com\n律师　Stuart M. Sarnoff（斯图尔特·M·萨尔诺夫）\nssarnoff@omm.com\n律师　Timothy D. Miltenberger（蒂莫西·D·米尔滕贝格）\nTmiltenberger@cbshealaw.com\n律师　William Baldiga（威廉·鲍尔迪加）\nwbaldiga@brownrudnick.com\n律师　William R. Baldiga（威廉·R·鲍尔迪加）\nwbaldiga@brownrudnick.com\n\n合计：28\n\n提交至 BNC（破产通知中心）的收件人：\n\n债务人　Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）\n373 Taconic Road\nGreenwich, CT 06831\n债权人　Logan Cheng（程龙）\n转交 Randazza Legal Group, PLLC（兰达扎法律集团，专业有限责任公司）\n100 Pearl Street\n14th Floor\nHartford, CT\n\nca　Stretto\n410 Exchange, Suite 100\nIrvine, CA 92602\n债务人律师　Brown Rudnick LLP（布朗·拉德尼克律师事务所）\nOne Financial Center\nBoston, MA 02111\n债权人委员会　Pullman & Comley, LLC（普尔曼与康利有限责任公司）\n850 Main Street\nBridgeport, CT 06601\n20　Huizhen Wang（王慧珍）\n转交 TroyGould PC（特洛伊·古尔德专业公司）\n1801 Century Park East, 16th Floor\n收件人：Christopher A.\nLilly（莉莉）\nLos Angeles, CA 90067−2367\n债权人　Chao−Chih Chiu（邱昭智）\n转交 TroyGould PC\n1801 Century Park East, 16th Floor\n收件人：Christopher A.\nLilly\nLos Angeles, CA 90067−2367\n债权人　Yunxia Wu（吴云霞）\n转交 TroyGould PC\n1801 Century Park East, 16th Floor\n收件人：Christopher A.\nLilly\nLos Angeles, CA 90067\n债权人　Keyi Zilkie（凯伊·齐尔基）\n转交 TroyGould PC\n1801 Century Park East, 16th Floor\n收件人：Christopher A.\nLilly\nLos Angeles, CA 90067\n律师　Andrew M. Carty（安德鲁·M·卡蒂）\nBrown Rudnick LLP\nSeven Times Square\nNew York, NY 10036\n律师　Steven E. Mackey（史蒂文·E·麦基）\nOffice of the U.S. Trustee（美国受托人办公室）\nThe Giaimo Federal Building\n150 Court Street, Room\n\nNew Haven, CT 06510\n9343455　Bi Hai Ge Lin（碧海格林）\n转交 Kevin Tung, Esq.（董凯文律师）\n38th Avenue, Suite 3d\nFlushing, NY 11354 USA\n9343450　Chao−Chih Chiu\n转交 TroyGould PC\n1801 Century Park East, 16th Floor\n收件人：Christopher A.\nLilly\nLos Angeles, CA 90067\n\n9358703　Xiqiu \"Bob\" Fu（傅希秋，“鲍勃”）\n转交 Irve J. Goldman\nPullman & Compley, LLC\n850 Main St., P O Box\n\nBridgeport, CT 06601\n9343423　Xiqiu Fu（傅希秋）\n转交 The Lanier Law Firm（拉尼尔律师事务所）\n10940 W. Sam Houston Pkwy N., Suite 100\nHouston, TX 77064\nUSA\n收件人：Lawrence P. Wilson（劳伦斯·P·威尔逊）\n9343444　Yan Gao（高燕）\n转交 Thompson Hine（汤普森·海因）\n335 Madison Avenue, 12th Floor\nNew York, NY 10017\nUSA\n收件人：Brian P. Lanciault, Esq.（布赖恩·P·兰西奥律师）\n9343413　Yan Zhao（赵岩）\n转交 Law Office of Ning Ye, Esq.（叶宁律师事务所）\n135−11 38th Avenue, Suite 1A\nFlushing, NY 11354\nUSA\n收件人：Ning Ye, Esq.（叶宁律师）\n9343409　Yang Lan（杨澜）和 Wu Zheng（吴征）\n900 Third Avenue, 18th Floor\n转交 Arkin Solbakken, LLP（阿金·索尔巴肯有限责任合伙）\nNew York, NY\n\n收件人：Robert C. Angelillo（罗伯特·C·安杰利洛）\n9343445　Yi Li（李毅）\n转交 Thompson Hine\n335 Madison Avenue, 12th Floor\nNew York, NY 10017\nUSA\n收件人：Brian P. Lanciault, Esq.\n9343446　Ying Liu（刘颖）\n转交 Thompson Hine\n335 Madison Avenue, 12th Floor\nNew York, NY 10017\nUSA\n收件人：Brian P. Lanciault, Esq.\n9343414　Yua Hua Zhuang Shi（裕华装饰）\n转交 Kevin Kerveng Tung, P.C.（凯文·凯文·董专业公司）\n136−20 38th Avenue, Suite 3D & 3F\nFlushing,\nNY 11354 USA\n收件人：Kevin Tung, Esq.\n9344053　Yue Hua Zhu Shi（悦华珠饰）\n136−20 38th Avenue, Suite 3D\n转交 Kevin Kerveng Tung, P.C.\nFlushing, NY\n\n收件人：Kevin Tung, Esq.\n9343456　Zhen Yuan Jian Zhu（振源建筑）\n转交 Kevin Tung, Esq.\n38th Avenue, Suite 3d\nFlushing, NY 11354 USA\n9358087　Zheng (\"Bruno\") Wu（吴征，“布鲁诺”）和 Yang Lan\nCarollynn HG Callari, Esq/Callari Partne\n100 Somerset Corporate\nBlvd., Suite 206\nBridgewater, NJ 08807\n9343428　Zhengjun Dong（董正军）\n转交 HGT Law\n250 Park Avenue, 7th Floor\nNew York, NY 10177 USA\n收件人：\nHung Ta（洪达）\n9343448　yunxia Wu\n转交 TroyGould PC\n1801 Century Park East, 16th Floor\n收件人：Christopher A.\nLilly\nLos Angeles, CA 90067\n\n合计：68\n附件6\n美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院布里奇波特分院\n\n§ § § § §\n\n关于：\n\nHO WAN KWOK\n\n债务人。\n\n第11章\n\n案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n关于提交 Ho Wan Kwok 先生就与规则2004取证有关的援引第五修正案特权所作声明的通知\n\n债务人 Ho Wan Kwok 特此通知，随附于本通知后作为附件A的是\n\n2023年2月6日 Ho Wan Kwok 先生就与规则2004取证有关的援引第五修正案特权所作的声明。\n\n2023年2月7日，于康涅狄格州布里奇波特。\n债务人 HO WAN KWOK，\n\n/s/ James M. Moriarty Aaron A. Romney (ct28144) James M. Moriarty (ct21876) 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604 电话：(203) 368-4234 传真：(203) 368-5487 电子邮件：[aromney@zeislaw.com] [jmoriarty@zeislaw.com]\n送达证明\n\n本人特此证明，于2023年2月7日，上述文件的副本已通过电子方式提交。本次提交的通知将通过法院电子提交系统的运行以电子邮件发送给所有当事人，或按《电子提交通知》中所示以邮寄方式发送给无法接受电子提交的任何人。当事人可通过法院的 CM/ECF 系统查阅本次提交。\n\n/s/ James M. Moriarty James M. Moriarty\n附件A\n附件7\n美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院\n\n ) )\n\n)\n\n关于： ) 第11章 ) 案号：22-50073 (JAM) HO WAN KWOK 等， ) （合并管理）\n\n债务人。 ) 相关：ECF 编号1453和1649\n出庭人员\n\nLuc A. Despins（吕克·A·德斯平斯）（出庭辩论） Avram E. Luft（阿夫拉姆·E·卢夫特） G. Alexander Bongartz（G·亚历山大·邦加茨） Douglass Barron（道格拉斯·巴伦） Paul Hastings LLP（保罗·黑斯廷斯有限责任合伙） 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166\n\nDouglass S. Skalka（道格拉斯·S·斯卡尔卡） Patrick R. Linsey（帕特里克·R·林赛） Neubert, Pepe & Montieth（纽伯特、佩佩与蒙蒂斯） 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, CT 06510\n\n以及\n\nNicholas A. Bassett（尼古拉斯·A·巴塞特）（出庭辩论） Paul Hastings LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C. 20036\n\n动议人及交叉被申请人 Luc A. Despins 先生的律师，Luc A. Despins 先生系 Ho Wan Kwok 先生破产财产的第11章受托人\n\nStephen R. Cook（斯蒂芬·R·库克） Brown Rudnick LLP 2211 Michelson Drive, 7th Floor Irvine, California 92612\n\n以及\n\nStephen A. Best（斯蒂芬·A·贝斯特）（出庭辩论） Brown Rudnick LLP 601 13th Street, NW, Suite 600 Washington, DC 20005\n\nEric Henzy（埃里克·亨齐）（出庭辩论） James M. Moriarty（詹姆斯·M·莫里亚蒂） Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（泽斯勒与泽斯勒专业公司） 10 Middle Street Bridgeport, CT 06604\n\n以及\n\nWilliam Baldiga（出庭辩论） Brown Rudnick LLP Seven Times Square New York, NY 10036\n\n被申请人及交叉动议人 Ho Wan Kwok 先生（债务人）的律师1\n关于认定个人债务人藐视法庭并驳回中止要求提交命令之动议的判决备忘录和命令\n\nJulie A. Manning（朱莉·A·曼宁），美国联邦破产法官\n一、引言\n\n本院现审理的事项包括：Luc A. Despins 先生以 Ho Wan Kwok 先生（“个人债务人”）破产财产（“破产财产”）第11章受托人（“受托人”）的身份提出的《要求说明为何不应认定债务人藐视法庭的命令动议》（“藐视法庭动议”），（ECF No. 14532）；以及个人债务人提出的《部分准许强制遵守动议的命令之有限中止动议》（“中止动议”，与藐视法庭动议合称时，各称“一项交叉动议”，统称“交叉动议”），（ECF No. 1649）。受托人请求因个人债务人未遵守《部分准许强制遵守动议的命令》（“强制提交命令”）而认定其构成民事藐视法庭。（ECF No. 1353。）个人债务人交叉动议请求，鉴于 United States v. Kwok, Case No. 23 Cr. 118 (AT) (S.D.N.Y.)（“刑事案件”）正在 United States District Court for the Southern District of New York（纽约南区联邦地区法院）（“刑事法院”）审理，中止强制提交命令。基于\n\n1 Brown Rudnick LLP 的律师在对这些事项进行辩论后已撤回其出庭代理。（ECF No. 2034。）\n\n2 本判决备忘录中讨论的各项诉状和命令具有综合性。为清晰和连贯起见，诉状和命令的名称仅在其涉及本院就当前事项所审理的当事人的范围内列出。\n\n下述理由，本院认定个人债务人构成民事藐视法庭，并驳回中止动议。\n二、背景\n\n个人债务人于2022年2月15日在本院提交自愿第11章破产申请。（ECF No. 1。）个人债务人的案件与两个关联公司第11章案件合并管理。（ECF Nos. 970 and 1141。）基于其中所述理由，本院于2022年6月15日作出任命第11章受托人的判决备忘录和命令。（ECF No. 465。）In re Kwok, 640 B.R. 514 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022)。2022年7月8日，Despins 先生获任命为受托人。（ECF No. 523。）\n\n2022年7月28日，受托人提交了《关于对［个人］债务人进行2004审查的动议》，（ECF No. 636），本院于2022年8月16日准许该动议，（ECF No. 757）。2022年8月19日，个人债务人被送达规则2004传票。（参见，例如，ECF No. 1650 ¶ 7。）2022年10月28日，受托人提交《要求个人债务人遵守规则2004传票的命令动议》（“强制动议”）。（ECF No. 1046。）2022年11月14日，个人债务人就强制动议提交异议。（ECF No. 1090。）2022年11月30日，就强制动议举行听证。本院将强制动议留待审议。2023年1月20日，3本院作出强制提交命令。（ECF No. 1353。）\n\n3 在2022年11月16日至2023年1月13日期间，本院处理了与这些第11章案件相关、案名为 Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund v. Kwok (In re Kwok), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 22-05032 (JAM) (Bankr D. Conn. Jan. 13, 2023)（下称“社交媒体／抗议对抗程序”）的对抗程序事项。根据 Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(3)，本院必须“在最早可能的时间”处理该对抗程序中的事项，并且该事项优先于所有其他事项，但同类较早事项的听证除外。\n\n2023年2月7日，个人债务人针对强制提交命令提交声明（“该声明”）。（ECF No. 1444 Ex. A。）在该声明中，个人债务人在伪证处罚的约束下表示，其就“2022年8月17日作出的传票整体，包括其中载明的所有文件和信息请求，援引其根据《美国宪法》第五修正案享有的权利，包括基于提交行为原则享有的权利[，]”。（同上，附件A。）2023年2月10日，受托人提交藐视法庭动议，主张：(i) 个人债务人须说明理由，证明其援引第五修正案适当，以及为何不应认定其藐视法庭；(ii) 即使个人债务人的援引适当，其亦须针对每一项文件和信息请求提出该主张；以及 (iii) 该声明未遵守强制提交命令，因为其未详述为寻找回应传票的文件和信息所作的努力。（ECF No. 1453。）2023年3月7日，就藐视法庭动议举行听证。听证结束时，本院就藐视法庭动议提出的问题制定了书面陈述时间表。\n\n2023年3月15日，在相关对抗程序证据听证开始时，个人债务人的律师通知本院，针对个人债务人的起诉书已在刑事案件中解封，联邦调查局（“FBI”）于当日上午早些时候逮捕了个人债务人。2023年3月22日，本院准许个人债务人延长答复藐视法庭动议期限的动议。（ECF No. 1585。）\n\n2023年4月10日，个人债务人对藐视法庭动议提出异议。（ECF No. 1650。）个人债务人的异议主张，其已遵守强制提交命令，因为其已适当援引《美国宪法第五修正案》规定的不自证其罪权利。（同上。）与此同时，个人债务人通过其在刑事诉讼中担任代理人、并以其特别（刑事）律师身份出庭参与本第11章案件的律师，提交了中止动议。（ECF No. 1649。）中止动议主张，为维护个人债务人依据《美国宪法第五修正案》享有的不自证其罪权利，本院必须在刑事诉讼获得解决之前中止强制提交命令。（同上。）2023年4月14日，受托人就对藐视法庭动议的异议提交了答复。（ECF No. 1670。）2023年4月19日，受托人对中止动议提出异议。（ECF No. 1680。）\n\n2023年4月20日，就交叉动议举行了听证会。辩论结束时，受托人与个人债务人似乎就交叉动议达成了一致解决方案。然而，2023年4月24日，当事人提交了相互竞争的拟议命令。（ECF Nos. 1698, 1699。）2023年4月27日，就交叉动议举行了状态会议，以讨论相互竞争的命令。当事人同意在能够达成一致的范围内以协商方式推进，但就先前协议的条款表示存在分歧。2023年5月1日，本院作出同意命令，要求个人债务人就受托人提出的二百零二（202）个问题中的每一个问题，单独援引其依据《美国宪法第五修正案》享有的权利。（ECF No. 1740。）同日，个人债务人提交了一份补充书状，以支持其对4月20日协议的解释。（ECF No. 1737。）\n\n2023年5月2日，就交叉动议举行了第二次听证会，双方就4月20日协议的条款陷入僵局。受托人主张，当事人已同意个人债务人将在刑事诉讼中提出动议，请求准许其与受托人分享控方已向其提交的材料，条件是受托人遵守刑事诉讼中作出的保护令、其他保密命令及使用限制。个人债务人主张，当事人已同意个人债务人将寻求——可能通过动议——使控方同意同时向个人债务人和受托人提交文件，条件是受托人遵守刑事诉讼中作出的保护令、其他保密命令及使用限制。鉴于该僵局，本院认定其必须对交叉动议作出裁决。然而，个人债务人的破产律师请求本院在对交叉动议作出裁决前等待，以给予个人债务人时间了解控方在刑事诉讼中向其提交材料的性质。\n\n鉴于所涉问题的严重性，本院予以等待。2023年6月13日，就交叉动议举行了最终听证会。本院询问当事人是否在就交叉动议达成协商解决方案方面取得任何进展。当事人报告称，个人债务人已准备一份补充声明（“补充声明”），其中其就受托人的每一个问题逐一援引《美国宪法第五修正案》。（参见 Despins（德斯平斯）代表 Kwok（郭文贵）诉 HCHK Techs., Inc.（HCHK 科技公司）案（Kwok（郭文贵）案），Case No. 22-50073, Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 8, 2023), ECF No. 1 Ex. 1。）然而，除补充声明外，当事人报告称僵局仍然存在，并请求本院对交叉动议作出裁决。本院将交叉动议留待审议。\n\n交叉动议现已具备裁决条件。\n\nIII. 管辖权\n\nUnited States District Court for the District of Connecticut（康涅狄格联邦地区法院）依据 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) 对本事项享有管辖权。本院依据 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) 及 United States District Court for the District of Connecticut（康涅狄格联邦地区法院）于 September 21, 1984 作出的移送命令，有权审理并裁决本事项。本程序依法属于核心程序。28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A)。本院认定，其行使管辖权不受宪法方面问题的排除。参见 Stern v. Marshall（斯特恩诉马歇尔案）, 564 U.S. 462, 487–99 (2011)。此外，受托人与个人债务人通过提交实体性动议且未对本院作出最终命令的权限提出异议，默示同意本院就交叉动议作出最终命令。参见 Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd.（健康国际网络有限公司）v. Sharif（谢里夫案）, 575 U.S. 665, 686 (2015)（认定尽管 Stern 案作出裁决，当事人仍可同意由破产法院作出最终命令）；True Traditions, LC（真传统有限责任公司）v. Wu（吴案）, 552 B.R. 826, 838 (N.D. Cal. 2015)（认定提交实体性动议即构成默示同意）。\n\n依据 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409，本地区的审判地适格。\n\nIV. 讨论4\n\n交叉动议提出了严重问题。受托人寻求因个人债务人未遵守强制提交命令而认定其藐视法庭。个人债务人主张，援引其依据《美国宪法第五修正案》享有的不自证其罪权利即构成遵守，并且必须通过中止强制提交命令予以保护。基于下述理由，本院认定，在本院面前的具体事实和情形下，《美国宪法第五修正案》规定的不自证其罪权利不适用。因此，本院认定个人债务人藐视法庭，并驳回中止动议。\n\nA. 个人债务人是否构成民事藐视法庭？\n\n本院首先审议个人债务人是否因未遵守强制提交命令而构成藐视法庭。本院依据 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) 和 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9020，拥有认定当事人藐视法庭的权力。Taggart v. Lorenzen ex rel. Brown（塔格特诉洛伦岑（代表布朗）案）, 139 S. Ct. 1795, 1801 (2019); PHH Mortg. Corp.（PHH 抵押贷款公司）v. Sensenich ex rel. Gravel（森塞尼奇代表格拉维尔案）(In re Gravel（格拉维尔案）), 6 F.4th 503, 512 (2d Cir. 2021); Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic（海事石棉沉着病法律诊所）v. LTV Steel Co.（LTV 钢铁公司）(In re Chauteaugay Corp.（肖托盖公司案）), 920 F.2d 183, 187 (2d. Cir. 1990)。Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37(b)(1) and 37(b)(2)(A)(vii)，经 D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 37 以及 D. Conn. Bankr. L.R. 1001-1(a)(1) and 2004-1(a) 适用，进一步授权认定当事人藐视强制提交发现材料的命令。\n\n可寻求藐视法庭，以“强制被告遵守”法庭命令，或“赔偿申诉人因未遵守法庭命令而产生的损失”。Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1801（引用 United States v. United Mine Workers（美国诉联合矿工工会案）, 330 U.S. 258, 303–04 (1947)）。认定民事藐视法庭须满足以下条件：“(1) 被藐视者未遵守的命令明确且不存在歧义，(2) 不遵守的证据明确且有说服力，以及 (3) 被藐视者未以合理方式勤勉地尝试遵守。”King v. Allied Vision, Ltd.（金诉联合视觉有限公司案）, 65 F.3d 1051, 1058 (2d Cir. 1995)。被藐视者还必须 (4) 知悉相关命令。Gravel, 6 F.4th at 512。\n\n1. 强制遵守命令是否明确且不存在歧义？\n\n如“对于被告行为的不当性不存在任何合理疑义”，则命令明确且不存在歧义。Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1801（引用 Cal. Artificial Stone Paving Co.（加利福尼亚人造石铺路公司）v. Molitor（莫利托案）, 113 U.S. 609 (1885)）。法院通常适用客观标准——“当事人主观上认为其正在遵守命令，若该信念在客观上不合理，通常并不能使其免于民事藐视法庭。”Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1802（引用 McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co.（麦库姆诉杰克逊维尔纸业公司案）, 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949)（“不存在故意性[sic]并不免除民事藐视法庭责任。”））。尽管如此，一方当事人的恶意可能证明有理由“将判决中任何不确定性的负担……置于违反法庭命令一方的肩上”，而且“一方当事人的善意，即使并不阻却民事藐视法庭，也可能有助于确定适当的制裁”。Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1802（引用 McComb, 336 U.S. at 192–93 和 Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A.（杨诉美国代表路易威登父子股份有限公司案）, 481 U.S. 787, 801 (1987)）。\n\n强制提交命令的相关部分如下：\n\n命令如下：就针对[个人]债务人的证据开示请求而言，异议予以驳回；但对于寻求日期早于 June 1, 2014 的文件的请求，以及寻求[个人]债务人护照的请求，异议予以支持，但不妨碍受托人在调查推进并有正当理由证明时，于日后寻求日期早于 June 1, 2014 的文件及[个人]债务人的护照。[个人]债务人应于 January 31, 2023 下午5:00前，检索并向受托人提交：\n\n(i) 对受托人日期为 June 1, 2014 或之后的请求作出回应的文件，除非某一特定请求明确规定了不同的期间，且该期间并非始于 June 1, 2014 之前；\n\n(ii) 对受托人就其承认拥有的资产以及据称属于[个人]债务人以外的个人或实体的资产所提出请求作出回应的文件，包括但不限于其家庭成员及关联实体；以及\n\n(iii) 对受托人请求作出回应、且处于其保管、占有或控制之下的文件，包括但不限于其现任或前任律师以及其他代理人和顾问档案中的文件，除非该等文件已由其现任或前任律师以及其他代理人和顾问提交，但不考虑其现任或前任律师以及其他代理人和顾问未来可能作出的任何提交；\n\n并进一步命令如下：\n\n[个人]债务人应于 February 7, 2023 下午5:00前，在本案案卷中提交一份经宣誓的声明，详细说明其本人及其律师为回应传票而采取的文件收集、检索和审查行动，包括但不限于详细说明其本人及其律师为进行下列事项所实施的程序：\n\n(i) 确定[个人]债务人的所有电子设备；其有权访问的所有在线文件存储库；与电子文件相关联的所有社交媒体、电子邮件及其他账户；所有银行账户及相关账户对账单；以及其他所有可能存在、可能含有回应性纸质及电子文件的潜在来源；以及\n\n(ii) 检索上述来源中的回应性文件，包括但不限于与费用或资金转移相关请求、与[个人]债务人家庭或关联实体的资产或财务或商业交易或记录相关请求，以及与[个人]债务人相关商业利益有关请求作出回应的文件……\n\n（ECF No. 1353。）个人债务人并未在书状中或在口头辩论期间提出任何论点，表明对于强制提交命令的含义存在“合理疑义”。5 本院认定，就个人债务人而言，强制提交命令明确且不存在歧义。6\n\n2. 个人债务人是否遵守了强制提交命令？\n\n关于第二项要件，受托人必须以明确且令人信服的证据证明，个人债务人未遵守强制提交命令。King, 65 F.3d at 1058。受托人主张，由于 (i) 个人债务人未能提交文件或记录，且 (ii) 个人债务人未提交声明以确定文件或记录的潜在来源以及为查找该等来源所作的努力，个人债务人未遵守强制提交命令。\n\n作为回应，个人债务人提出两项主张。第一，个人债务人主张，其目前正被羁押候审且无法获得审前释放，因此其无法遵守该命令。第二，个人债务人主张，\n\n5 个人债务人主张，对于其是否可以针对强制提交命令援引第五修正案规定的不自证其罪权，存在公平的疑义。本院将在下文讨论个人债务人是否已勤勉尝试遵守强制提交命令时审议该主张。\n\n6 本院此前已裁定，就其他当事人而言，强制提交命令明确且无歧义。（See ECF No. 1537.）\n\n“提交行为”原则允许其针对提交文件和记录的请求援引第五修正案规定的不自证其罪权。据此，个人债务人主张其已遵守强制提交命令。\n\ni. 个人债务人是否无法遵守？\n\n尽管个人债务人正确指出，“对民事藐视法庭认定的一项长期公认抗辩是，被认定者无力遵守法院命令”，United States v. Wendy, 575 F.2d 1025, 1030 (2d Cir. 1978)，且评估是否无法遵守的适当时点是在作出藐视法庭裁决之时，United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 757 (1983)，本院认定，个人债务人仍有可能遵守。尽管控方确实已就刑事案件扣押个人债务人的文件和记录，但个人债务人未能证明：(a) 其全部文件和记录均已被扣押；以及 (b) 其并无被扣押记录的额外副本。此外，根据其律师的陈述，本院了解到，控方在刑事案件中向个人债务人提供材料应很快开始——如尚未开始。尽管 (i) 受托人很可能必须成为刑事案件中保密要求和使用限制的签署方并遵守该等要求和限制，且 (ii) 控方可能反对向受托人提供材料，或者刑事法院可能不允许向受托人提供材料，但个人债务人并非不可能向刑事法院申请准许向受托人提供材料。尽管个人债务人目前被羁押候审，其律师并未被羁押。个人债务人可以通过其律师和/或其他代理人提交文件。因此，个人债务人并非无法遵守强制提交命令。\n\nii. 个人债务人是否适当援引了第五修正案？\n\na. 提交行为原则是否适用？\n\n个人债务人关于其已遵守强制提交命令的主张，依赖于“提交行为”原则。在 Fisher v. United States 一案中，美国最高法院（United States Supreme Court）裁定该案所涉提交行为不受第五修正案保护，但仍裁定：\n\n尽管如此，依传票提交证据的行为本身具有沟通性方面，完全独立于所提交文件的内容。遵守传票即默示承认所要求文件的存在，以及纳税人对该等文件的占有或控制。该行为还表明纳税人相信该等文件即为传票所描述的文件。\n\n425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976); see United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 36–37 (2000)。在 Fisher 一案中，最高法院裁定，确定提交行为是否可受第五修正案保护的标准是，提交行为中涉及的“默示陈述”是否依现行第五修正案判例法同时具有“证言性”和“自证其罪性”。425 U.S. at 410–11。特别是，最高法院对以下有关默示陈述表示关切：(i) 文件或记录的存在；(ii) 提交方对文件或记录的占有或控制；以及 (iii) 提交方相信该等文件和记录即为传票所要求的文件和记录。Id. 提交行为原则不保护文件具有证言性和自证其罪性的内容——其仅保护具有证言性和自证其罪性的提交行为。Id.; Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 40–41。\n\n根据美国第二巡回上诉法院（United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit）具有约束力的判例，提交行为可能包含具有证言性的默示陈述：“(1) ‘如果政府不知道被传唤文件的存在和所在地’；或 (2) 如提交将‘默示认证’该等文件。”United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Subpoena), 1\n\nF.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 1993) (hereinafter “Grand Jury 1993”) (citing United States v. Fox, 721 F.2d 32, 36 (2d Cir.1983))。如果受托人能够证明：(1) 文件的存在和所在地；以及 (2) 文件的真实性，属于“既成”结论或已由其他证据确立，则该提交不受第五修正案保护。Grand Jury 1993, 1 F.3d at 93。此外，即使根据 Fox，提交行为中涉及的默示陈述具有证言性，个人债务人还必须证明，披露文件或记录的存在、所在地或真实性具有自证其罪性。See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486–87 (1951); Fox, 721 F.2d at 40; In re Schick, 215 B.R. 4, 9 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997); cf. Martin-Trigona v. Belford (In re Martin-Trigona), 732 F.2d 170, 176 (2d Cir. 1984)。\n\n个人债务人为证明提交行为具有证言性和自证其罪性所负担的责任低于通常的证明责任：“为维持该特权，只需从问题的含义以及提出该问题的情境中显而易见地看出，对该问题作出回答或说明为何无法回答可能具有危险性，因为可能导致有害的披露。”Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486–87。在确定个人债务人是否可以援引第五修正案时，本院必须运用其“对案件特殊性的个人感知”，并同等考量个人债务人提交的事实支持。Id. at 487。如果提交行为可能成为用于起诉个人债务人的“证据链中的一环”，则该提交行为具有自证其罪性。Id. at 486。\n\n个人债务人主张，根据强制提交命令被强制提交文件和记录将具有证言性，因为该提交可能被解释为默示陈述：其对各个实体和资产享有实益所有权和/或控制权，并且其对各个人员具有权力。个人债务人主张，该等默示陈述将具有自证其罪性，因为目前的刑事案件以及据称对破产犯罪的调查，均涉及关于个人债务人对实体和/或资产的实益所有权和控制权，以及个人债务人对某些个人的权力和/或控制权的指控。\n\n受托人对个人债务人的主张提出多项异议。受托人的主要异议是，“应保存记录”原则适用，并构成提交行为原则的例外。为支持该主张，受托人认为，作为破产债务人，个人债务人不得适当援引第五修正案，以避免提交《破产法》要求的与其财务事务、资产和负债有关的文件和记录——无论提交行为是否具有证言性和自证其罪性。下文将处理受托人有关个人债务人在其破产案件中所负义务的应保存记录主张。本院将首先处理受托人就个人债务人是否已履行其举证责任、证明遵守强制提交命令将同时具有证言性和自证其罪性而提出的各项异议。\n\n补充声明\n\n个人债务人与受托人已就受托人的一项异议达成解决。在提出藐视法庭动议并就该动议举行听证会之前，个人债务人的声明笼统主张其第五修正案规定的不自证其罪权。受托人主张此举不当，因为：(a) 该等笼统主张并未表明个人债务人在援引第五修正案之前已适当审议受托人的每一项请求；且 (b) 这些第 11 章案件属于民事程序，这意味着在适当情形下，个人债务人援引第五修正案可能被采纳为证据。然而，个人债务人此后已依同意命令提交补充声明，其中其逐一回答受托人提出的每一\n\n个问题，并就二百零二（202）个问题中的每一个援引其第五修正案权利。尽管个人债务人现已就受托人的具体问题适当援引其第五修正案权利，与提交文件有关的问题仍然存在。\n\n起诉书公布前援引第五修正案\n\n受托人对个人债务人证明其遵守强制提交命令所提出的其余异议之一没有说服力。受托人主张，个人债务人在针对其的起诉书解封之前已构成藐视法庭，且其现不能鉴于刑事案件援引第五修正案以避免被认定构成藐视法庭。然而，个人债务人正确指出，可以在刑事案件开始之前援引第五修正案。See United States v. Miranti, 253 F.2d 135, 139 (2d Cir. 1958)（允许证人在仅存在轻微被起诉可能性的情况下援引第五修正案）。正如个人债务人可在 2022 年 12 月的证据听证会期间以及其 2023 年 3 月的证言录取期间主张其第五修正案权利一样，只要其具有“合理理由担心直接回答会带来危险”，且其第五修正案权利在其他方面适用，其也可于 2023 年 2 月这样做。Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486。\n\n控方占有的文件\n\n受托人的第二项主张同样不能成立。受托人主张，控方已占有个人债务人的文件和记录，故个人债务人不会受到损害。就该等文件的存在和所在地已为人所知而言，受托人是正确的，因此 Fox 检验的第一项不成立。Grand Jury 1993, 1 F.3d at 93。然而，提交个人债务人的文件和记录的行为是否\n\n检方已持有的文件和记录是否会因提交行为而得到认证，仍是一个问题。Id. 个人债务人担心其提交行为将认证这些文件。法院未见过这些文件和记录，受托人亦未见过。法院认识到，受托人因并非该刑事诉讼的一方而处于困难境地。尽管如此，受托人并未证明这些文件和记录的真实性将是一个不言自明的结论。因此，根据 Fox（福克斯）检验的第二项要件，关于检方所持文件和记录真实性的默示陈述可能具有证言性质。Id.\n\n此外，由于检方扣押的文件和记录可能在刑事诉讼中被用于起诉个人债务人，法院认为，个人债务人提出其对这些文件和记录的默示认证可能成为用于起诉他的“证据链中的一环”的论点具有说服力。Hoffman（霍夫曼）, 341 U.S. at 486. 因此，除非受托人能够证明这些文件和记录的真实性是不言自明的结论，否则，提交行为原则适用于检方持有的文件，除非该原则存在例外。\n\n检方未持有的文件\n\n个人债务人主张，责令提交命令强制其提交的全部文件和记录均已被检方扣押。法院不同意该主张，因此继续讨论。如受托人所主张，个人债务人因现被监禁而不再拥有、保管或控制任何文件或记录的笼统主张并不令人信服。尽管此前曾称个人债务人几乎不保存任何文件、记录和设备，FBI 显然仍在个人债务人的住所扣押了大量文件、记录和电子设备。\n\n同样，受托人正确指出，没有证据基础支持以下主张：个人债务人拥有、保管或控制的记录中，不存在检方已扣押的文件和记录以外的记录。鉴于此前对个人债务人律师所进行努力——或者视情况而定，未进行努力——的描述，个人债务人未能证明已进行了合理勤勉的搜索。（见责令提交命令 ¶ 9。）基于这两个理由，法院认定，个人债务人未能证明所有可能具有响应性的文件和记录均已被检方扣押。\n\n对于检方未扣押的文件和记录，受托人未能证明这些文件的位置、存在或真实性是不言自明的结论。因此，如个人债务人证明其具有罪证性，提交行为原则即应适用。Fox, 721 F.2d at 36. 受托人主张，个人债务人未履行其证明所请求文件和记录具有罪证性的举证责任。受托人正确指出，即使有补充声明，个人债务人仍未证明每一项被请求提交均具有罪证性。\n\n尽管如此，法院注意到个人债务人须满足的较低举证负担。法院亦注意到，其必须依赖自身对这些 Chapter 11 案件及相关对抗程序的事实和情形的认识。Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486–87. 此外，如个人债务人的律师所指出，“该特权不仅延及其本身足以支持依据联邦刑事法规作出有罪判决的回答，也同样涵盖那些将提供起诉主张人犯有联邦罪行所需证据链中一环的回答。”Id. at 486. 然而，法院对“本案特殊性的个人认识”包括以下观察：个人债务人除其公开表示希望避免自证其罪外，\n\n还妨碍了对其资产、负债和财务事务的合法调查。Id. at 487. （例如，见 Social Media/Protest Adversary（社交媒体/抗议对抗程序）, ECF No. 133。）\n\n仅凭刑事诉讼中的起诉书，不足以使个人债务人就检方未扣押的文件和记录履行其举证责任。起诉书指称的欺诈行为大约可追溯至 2018，而迄今为止受托人关注的许多资产——该游艇 Lady May；位于 Sherry-Netherland Hotel（雪莉-尼德兰酒店）的公寓；Ace Decade Holdings Limited（艾斯十年控股有限公司）的诉因——据称均于 2018 年之前取得。尽管其中一些资产，例如 Lady May，已在起诉书中讨论，但法院不能基于其“对本案特殊性的个人认识”及个人债务人微薄的证据呈现，认定个人债务人已基于该刑事诉讼充分支持其对第五修正案的笼统主张。Id. at 487. 个人债务人未能证明其全部资产、负债和财务事务均与被指称的欺诈有关，或可能以某种方式构成有关被指称欺诈的“证据链中的一环”。Id. at 486.\n\n为支持其已遵守责令提交命令的主张，个人债务人还提出了一份针对受托人的传票，该传票涉及对这些 Chapter 11 案件中可能实施的破产犯罪的所谓调查。（ECF No. 1719, at \\*80:20–81:8。）如上所述，在判断文件的提交是否具有罪证性时，因该调查而被起诉是否可能并不重要。Miranti（米兰蒂）, 253 F.2d at 139.\n\n《United States Code（美国法典）》Title 18 的 sections 152、156、157、1519 和 3284 规定了与破产案件中隐匿资产有关的犯罪。Sections 152、156、157 和 1519 要求存在明知、故意或欺诈行为。Section 3284 要求存在“隐匿”。个人债务人拥有或控制对 Rule 2004 subpoena（Rule 2004 传票）具有响应性的文件或记录，以及该等文件或记录真实的默示陈述，本身不具有罪证性，因为它们并未证明个人债务人明知、故意或欺诈性地向 Estate（破产财产）隐匿资产——或与资产有关的文件和记录。债务人经常因错误而遗漏资产和负债，并修改其陈述和清单及/或更新其披露。\n\n尽管如此，法院必须考虑，该等默示陈述是否构成有关可能起诉个人债务人向受托人、本法院及其债权人隐匿其资产的“证据链中的一环”。Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486. 受托人指称，个人债务人拥有大量商业权益，并应当相应持有文件和记录。尽管个人债务人否认这些指称，但根据本法院及其他法院先前的认定，法院“对本案特殊性的个人认识”是，个人债务人至少拥有一些超出其目前承认范围的商业权益。See Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund, L.P. v. Kwok Ho Wan（郭文贵）, Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 2022), NYCEF No. 1181; E. Profit Corp. Ltd.（E. Profit 有限公司） v. Strategic Vision US LLC（美国战略愿景有限责任公司）, Case No. 18-cv-2185 (LJL), 2021 WL 2554631, at \\*1 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2021). （见 ECF No. 1110; HK Int'l Funds Invs. (USA) Ltd., LLC（香港国际基金投资〈美国〉有限责任公司） v. Despins（德斯平斯） ex rel. Kwok（郭文贵） (In re Kwok), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 22-05003 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. May 18, 2023), ECF Nos. 177, 221; Social Media/Protest Adversary, ECF No. 133 ¶ 7。）法院认为，个人债务人的提交范围可能与 Hubbell（哈贝尔）案中争议的提交同样广泛。See 530 U.S. at 40–43. 尽管 Hubbell 是一宗涉及向当事人授予豁免权、提交范围已知且举证责任已转移至检方的案件，个人债务人同样可能必须“广泛运用‘其自身思想的内容’来识别传票请求所涉数百份具有响应性的文件”，并实质上制作一份其资产、负债及商业权益的地图。See id. at 43. 就所称针对破产犯罪的调查而言，该地图可能有助于发现有关明知、故意或欺诈的证据。法院运用其对这些 Chapter 11 案件及相关对抗程序具体事实和情形的认识，认定该等承认可能构成证据链中的环节，因为其可能具有“派生使用”。See id. at 41–43.\n\n个人债务人的提交具有证言性和罪证性\n\n基于上述理由，法院认定，遵守责令提交命令而作出的提交，就检方持有的文件以及检方未扣押的文件而言，均将具有证言性和罪证性。See Fisher（费舍尔）, 425 U.S. at 410–11. 但法院指出，截至目前的证据记录并不充分。如果将来受托人能够：(i) 证明任何文件的位置、存在和真实性是不言自明的结论；(ii) 就任何文件或文件类别证明个人债务人未履行其举证责任；或 (iii) 证明其就任何文件或文件类别已经掌握个人债务人的资产、负债和商业权益的地图，则可经适当动议重新审议该认定。\n\nb. “必备记录”例外是否适用？\n\n尽管提交行为原则适用，但这并不终结法院的分析，也不必然决定藐视法庭动议的结果。如上所述，受托人的主要论点是，必备记录原则在本法院审理的具体事实和情形下适用，并构成提交行为原则的一项例外。因此，受托人主张，鉴于本案适用必备记录例外，提交行为原则是否允许个人债务人针对责令提交命令适当地援引其第五修正案不自证其罪权利并不重要。\n\n为支持其论点，受托人援引 Baltimore City Department of Social Services（巴尔的摩市社会服务局） v. Bouknight（布克奈特）, 493 U.S. 549 (1990). 在 Bouknight 案中，最高法院在 Fisher 案后重申并确认了必备记录原则的存在。493 U.S. at 555–59. 根据必备记录原则，“不得援引第五修正案特权以拒绝遵守为实现与执行其刑法无关的国家公共目的而建立的监管制度。”Id. at 556; see Grosso（格罗索） v. United States（美国）, 390 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1968)（阐明审议必备记录原则时应考虑的因素）；Shapiro（夏皮罗） v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 32 (1948)（创设必备记录原则）。\n\n个人债务人主张，Bouknight 并未描述 Fisher 所规定的提交行为原则的一项例外，且必备记录原则并不允许强制提交具有证言性和罪证性的文件和记录。个人债务人的主张与 Bouknight 的明确文本相矛盾，该文本规定：\n\n生产命令可能强制作出可能被证明具有自证其罪性质的证言性陈述，并不在所有情境下都足以证明援引该特权以拒绝提交具有正当性。即使假定这一有限的证言性陈述已充分具有自证其罪性质，并且“就该特权而言充分具有证言性”，Bouknight亦不得援引该特权以拒绝生产命令，因为她已承担与提交有关的保管职责，且提交要求系非刑事监管制度的一部分。\n\nBouknight, 493 U.S. at 555–56（讨论Fisher）（省略内部引注）。除最高法院（Supreme Court）外，第二巡回上诉法院（Second Circuit）也明确驳回了个人债务人（Individual Debtor）的主张：\n\n“[T]he required records doctrine is an exception to the Fifth Amendment privilege. As such, it necessarily overrides the privilege in instances in which the privilege would otherwise apply. Fisher was not concerned with required records and nothing in its analysis could be construed as weakening the required records exception.”\n\nUnited States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Subpoena), 741 F.3d 339, 346 (2d Cir. 2013)（下称“Grand Jury 2013”）（引自Doe v. United States (In re Doe), 711 F.2d 1187, 1192–93 (2d Cir. 1983)）。事实上，第二巡回上诉法院着重指出：“[t]his Court has twice explicitly rejected the idea that the required records exception has been abrogated by the act of production doctrine.” Grand Jury 2013, 741 F.3d at 346。这些具有约束力的最高法院和第二巡回上诉法院判例明确表明，必备记录例外是对提交行为原则的例外。7 因此，如果本案适用必备记录例外，则无论得出该等提交具有证言性和自证其罪性质的结论为何，个人债务人均未遵守强制提交命令（Order Compelling Production）。\n\n在确定必备记录原则是否适用时，第二巡回上诉法院采用Grosso因素。Grand Jury 2013, 741 F.3d at 345。在Grosso案中，最高法院适用了以下因素：“[F]irst, the purposes of the United States' inquiry must be essentially regulatory; second, information is to be obtained by requiring the preservation of records of a kind which the regulated party has customarily kept; and third, the records themselves must have assumed 'public aspects' which render them at least analogous to public documents.” 390 U.S.\n\n7 个人债务人指出，受托人（Trustee）援引的案件之一In re Ross, 156 B.R. 272, 279 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993)，既认定所请求文件的提交不足以具有证言性，也认定必备记录原则适用。个人债务人据此观察得出结论，后一项裁决要求前一项裁决。法院得出不同结论。Ross案法院与许多法院一样——特别是受上级审查约束的下级法院——为其关于该案债务人不能适当援引第五修正案的结论提出了多项依据。156 B.R. at 281（“Fifth, even if the act of production involved here was both testimonial and incriminating, the nature of chapter 7 as a regulatory regime directed toward society as a whole, and not toward inherently suspect criminal classes, renders the act of production outside the protection of the Fifth Amendment.”）（强调部分为原文所加）。\n\nat 67–68. 在本案中，受托人正在寻求强制提交命令认定与“[个人债务人]的行为、作为或财产，或者与其负债和财务状况，或者与可能影响[遗产]管理的任何事项”有关的文件和记录。Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004(b)。因此，个人债务人有义务根据sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4)提交受托人所寻求的文件和记录。因此，争议在于，个人债务人根据sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4)有义务提交的文件和记录，是否为根据Grosso检验所称的必备记录。\n\n破产法典（Bankruptcy Code）sections 521(a)(3) and 521(a)(4)的目的是什么？\n\n在确定第一项因素是否支持适用必备记录原则时，法院必须考虑相关“立法是否并非‘针对广大公众’，并且是否涉及‘一个充斥刑事法规的领域’”。Grand Jury 2013, 741 F.3d at 347（引自Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965)）；参见Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 57 (1968)；Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 99 (1968)。法院必须就争议中的具体法条作出该项判断，而非参照其周边的全部法定背景。Grand Jury 2013, 741 F.3d at 348（引自California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 430 (1971)）。\n\n破产法典Section 521的标题为“债务人的义务”。Sections 521(a)(3) and 521(a)(4)分别规定，在如本案有破产受托人履职的情形下，债务人必须配合受托人履行受托人的职责，并且必须向受托人交出遗产的全部财产以及与遗产财产有关的任何已记录信息，包括账簿、文件、记录和文书。\n\n破产法典Section 109允许个人或实体根据Chapter 7、11、11 Subchapter V、12或13申请破产。在根据Chapters 7、12和13进行的程序中，以及在Chapter 11 Subchapter V中，案件开始时即自动指定破产受托人。11 U.S.C. §§ 701, 702, 1183, 1202, 1302。Chapter 7和Chapter 13案件在普通公众中最为常见，且始终涉及破产受托人，债务人根据sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4)对其负有义务。\n\n尽管在Chapter 11案件中指定破产受托人属于非常救济，见11 U.S.C. § 1112，但该非常救济的效果是，被剥夺占有权的Chapter 11债务人承担与Chapter 7或Chapter 13债务人相同的、依据sections 521(a)(3) and 521(a)(4)所负的义务。根据法律的适用，债务人提交Chapter 11案件时，即自动被视为占有中债务人，并承担破产受托人的角色。11 U.S.C. § 1107(a)。但是，在Chapter 11案件中，若符合债权人和遗产的最佳利益，可因“事由”指定破产受托人，从而剥夺债务人对遗产的占有。11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1)。\n\nChapter 11具有特殊性，因为其为拥有复杂商业利益、资产和负债的债务人而设计，例如大型公司和高净值个人。见H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 220 (1977)。因此，Chapter 11受三个基本推定指引：(i)拥有重大商业利益和经营活动的债务人，作为持续经营的经济实体比被拆分和清算更具价值；(ii)财务事务、资产和负债复杂的债务人，比获指定的受托人更有能力为债权人的利益管理其自身事务；以及(iii)允许拥有重大商业利益和经营活动的债务人重组，除维护债权人的利益外，还维护债务人、所有人、雇员等的利益。见同上。不过，归根结底，只要Chapter 11的具体规定能够最大化对债权人的分配，即可适当使用Chapter 11。见Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 163–64 (1991)。“事由”的许多列举示例——据此可指定破产受托人，或驳回案件，或将案件转换为根据Chapter 7进行的程序——均涉及对上述推定的推翻，或占有中债务人未履行其为债权人利益管理遗产的义务。11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)；见7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 1112.04[6][b]–[k] (16th ed. 2023)。\n\n破产受托人一经指定，即为债务人遗产的代表。11 U.S.C. § 323。sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4)的目的在于，使破产受托人能够依照其职责管理债务人的破产遗产。见11 U.S.C. §§ 704, 1106, 1116, 1183, 1202, 1302；4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 521.15[5], 521.16。破产遗产的管理要求债务人向受托人披露、交出并予以配合，因为破产案件是一项包罗万象的诉讼，旨在公平且最终地解决、调整或重组众多债务人与债权人之间的关系。见，例如，11 U.S.C. §§ 704(a)(5)（“The trustee shall . . . examine proofs of claims and object to the allowance of any claim that is improper . . ..”）, 704(a)(7)（“The trustee shall . . . furnish such information concerning the estate and the estate's administration as is requested by a party in interest . . .”）, 704(a)(8)（“The trustee shall . . . file with the court, with the United States trustee, and with any governmental unit charged with responsibility for collection or determination of any tax arising out of such operations, periodic reports and summaries of the operation of such business . . ..”）, 1106(a)(3)（“A trustee shall . . . investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial condition of the debtor, the operation of the debtor's business and the desirability of the continuance of such business, and other matters relevant to the case or to the formulation of a plan . . ..”）；7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1116.01（“The trustee's investigation and reporting duties provide a mechanism for full disclosure of the debtor's state of affairs so as to enable parties in interest to protect their rights and obtain the successful reorganization of the debtor.”）。\n\n债务人未履行其以下义务：(i)配合受托人，(ii)披露财务事务、资产和负债，以及(iii)交出破产遗产财产及与之相关的记录，将严重妨碍受托人管理遗产的能力。见United States v. Stone, 282 F. 547, 553 (2d Cir. 1960)（“[T]he very purpose of the statement of affairs is to give dependable information without need of going further.”）（维持在依据原破产法进行的程序中，就债务人未能在财务状况说明书上适当披露贷款信息所涉破产犯罪而提起的刑事诉讼中的定罪）。该等未履行给遗产债权人造成费用和延误，构成可认定的损害。见Andrews v. McCarron (In re Vincent Andrews Mgmt. Corp.), 414 B.R. 1, 7 (D. Conn. 2009)。\n\n此外，破产法典规定的大部分救济具有广泛且非常的性质，其前提是适当披露和通知。见，例如，11 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)（界定在开始征集计划前必须送达的披露说明书所需的充分信息）；Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 475 n. 12 (2004)（认定“破产法典广泛的披露要求降低了债务人存在重大未披露义务的风险”，从而支撑法院“变更债务人原始合同规定的分期付款次数、时间或金额的权力”）；In re Motors Liquidation Co., 829 F.3d 135, 158–61 (2d Cir. 2016)（裁定未适当向未披露的已知债权人送达出售动议，致使出售命令对该等债权人不可执行）。作为破产遗产代表的受托人，是首要负责寻求该等大量救济的一方，以便：(i)使遗产受益，Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 352 (1985)；以及(ii)使债务人受益，债务人可能在闯过重重关卡后获得“重新开始”，见Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991)。\n\n本院认定，第521(a)(3)和(a)(4)条面向一般公众。破产受托人在广泛类型的案件中自动获任命。向受托人披露并交付财产和记录的义务，对于受托人的基本且必要的管理职责以及受托人依破产法典行使职权而言至关重要。\n\n剩余问题在于，第521(a)(3)和(a)(4)条是否涉及一个“充斥着刑事法规”的领域。Albertson, 382 U.S. at 79。美国法典第18编第151条及以下条款、第1519条和第3284条将与《破产法典》项下程序有关的某些行为规定为犯罪。这些“破产犯罪”中包括若干与隐匿破产财产资产有关的犯罪，目的在于使该等资产免于向破产财产的债权人分配。然而，本院面临的问题并非未能履行债务人在第521(a)(3)和(4)条项下的义务是否会使债务人面临刑事追诉，而是第521(a)(3)和(4)条是否“针对‘一个本质上被怀疑从事犯罪活动的特定群体’”。Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 57。\n\n在 Grosso 案和 Marchetti 案中，问题并非是执行提交纳税申报表这一法定义务的刑法，该等刑法与上文列举的破产犯罪相类似。Grosso, 390 U.S. at 64–65; see Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 57。相反，在这两案中，美国最高法院认定，提交联邦博彩税申报表的要求直接针对已被州法规定为犯罪的行为，即赌博。Grosso, 390 U.S. at 64–65; Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 57。Albertson 案所涉问题是，要求美国共产党成员亲自向颠覆活动控制委员会登记。\n\n382 U.S. at 77–78。当时，与共产党有关联已被规定为犯罪。Id.。在 Haynes 案中，所涉问题是，要求并非通过正常途径取得枪支的人——美国最高法院指出，这些人大多将是非法取得枪支的人——登记其枪支。390 U.S. at 95–97。\n\nGrosso、Marchetti、Albertson 和 Haynes 案中提交至美国最高法院的事实，均不同于本案事实。首先，所有这些案件均涉及创建新的记录，而非提交现有文件和记录。Haynes, 390 U.S. at 95–97; Grosso, 390 U.S. at 64–65; Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 57; Albertson, 382 U.S. at 77–78。更重要的是，破产案件的日常管理通常并不涉及犯罪活动。财产的管理旨在与刑事责任问题相分离。比较 11 U.S.C. §§ 323（受托人是代表破产财产就民事诉讼起诉和应诉的一方），362(a)(1)（通常而言，针对债务人或破产财产的民事诉讼因提交自愿破产申请而中止）与 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1)（针对债务人的刑事诉讼不因根据第11编启动案件而中止）。债务人通常不会因其在破产案件中被要求作出的披露而承担刑事责任。破产程序中披露要求的目的，是揭示民事责任，以便对针对债务人的全部请求作出公平且最终的解决。See Byers, 402 U.S. at 430–31（认定，尽管《加利福尼亚州车辆法典》涉及某些刑事法规，“其目的并非促成刑事定罪，而是促进清偿因机动车事故产生的民事责任”，并裁定必备记录例外适用）。\n\n因此，第521(a)(3)和(a)(4)条的目的“本质上具有监管性质”，这支持将必备记录例外适用于个人债务人依强制提交命令而被强制提交文件的情形。Grosso, 390 U.S. at 67–68。\n\n所谓必备记录是否属于通常保存的记录？\n\n关于第二项因素，即所谓必备记录是否通常被保存，受托人正在寻求例如财务和银行记录、资金转账记录、与个人债务人商业权益有关的记录等。正如第二巡回上诉法院就外国银行账户信息所指出的，常识表明，个人和实体会保留基本的金融交易和账户信息，以管理其事务并访问其账户。Grand Jury 2013, 741 F.3d at 350 (citing M.H. v. United States (In re Grand Jury Investigation), 648 F.3d 1067, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011))。本院认定，对于财务事务、资产和负债复杂的个人和实体而言，这一点尤其如此。值得注意的是，第二巡回上诉法院接着指出，尽管“某些从事不法行为的个人被建议不要保存即使是这些基本信息[,] . . . [w]e decline to look at the custom of only the miscreants . . ..” Grand Jury 2013, 741 F.3d at 350。因此，本院认定，第521(a)(3)和(a)(4)条所要求的记录属于“通常保存”的记录。Grosso, 390 U.S. at 67–68。\n\n所谓必备记录是否已具有“公共属性”？\n\n关于第三项因素，即所谓必备记录是否已具有“公共属性”，问题在于，第521(a)(3)和(a)(4)条的整体监管背景是否要求保存有关具体记录。Grand Jury 2013, 741 F.3d at 351–52。\n\n《破产法典》要求在案件开始时以及案件进行过程中作出披露。第521(a)(1)条要求任何债务人——包括个人债务人——提交债权人名单、财务状况说明书，以及尤其包括债务人资产、负债、收入和支出的清单。See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 521.06[3][a]（“清单是对第541(a)条项下广义破产财产定义范围内所有不动产和动产的陈述，其中包括‘截至案件开始时债务人在财产中拥有的所有法定或衡平权益。’”），521.06[3][b]（“对不动产和动产权益进行列示是一项非常重要的义务。”），521.09（“要求提交财务状况说明书的目的，是向受托人和债权人提供有关债务人财务状况的详细信息，从而节省为取得信息而进行冗长且漫长审查的费用。”）。第341条要求任何债务人接受由受托人进行的审查，其债权人可以参与该审查。See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 341.01。\n\n就第11章而言，第1107条规定，在第11章债务人为占有中的债务人期间，该债务人作为破产财产的受托人，将承担上文所述的受托人的许多相同披露义务，包括报告要求。See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 1107.02[3]–[4]。债务人未能在与第11章计划相关而必须提交的披露声明中适当披露财务状况、资产和负债，将阻碍该计划获得确认。11 U.S.C. § 1125; see 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 1125.02（“披露是《破产法典》项下重组实践的关键概念。”）(citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 226–31 (1977)), 1125.02[2]。未作出适当披露可以且确实构成理由，将第11章重组案件转换为第7章清算案件、驳回第11章破产案件，或任命第11章受托人。11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(f); see 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1112.04[6][f]。\n\n与 Bouknight 案中的母亲极为相似，个人债务人在自愿启动其第11章案件、使其自身受本院对人管辖权管辖，以及使其在财产中的所有法定和衡平权益——“无论位于何处且由何人持有”——受本院对物管辖权管辖时，即承担了这些义务。11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1); Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 559（“Bouknight 接受了监管体系的常规运作，并同意以符合该州监管利益的方式持有 Maurice，且接受 BCDSS 的检查。”）。此外，如同 Bouknight 案中在证明存在理由后要求该母亲向巴尔的摩市社会服务部交出其子女一样，《破产法典》要求个人债务人向受托人提交与破产财产有关的文件和记录，因为已证明存在任命受托人的理由。11 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(4), 1112; Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 555–56。由于个人债务人自愿提交其第11章案件并成为占有中的债务人，他承担了破产受托人为债权人利益管理破产财产的职责。11 U.S.C. § 1107(a)。个人债务人在作为占有中的债务人期间，是破产财产及其账簿和记录的保管人。See Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 555–56。尽管其作为占有中的债务人的身份在受托人获任命后终止，其因而产生的向受托人提供信息的义务并未终止。\n\n本院认定，个人债务人根据第521(a)(3)和(a)(4)条须提交的记录已具有“公共属性”，因为个人债务人的案件是自愿第11章案件，并且这些第11章案件及相关对抗程序的具体事实和情况支持这一结论。See Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 555–56; Grosso, 390 U.S. at 67–68。\n\n“必备记录”例外适用\n\nGrosso 检验的全部三项因素均支持，在本院面前的具体事实和情形下，将必备记录例外适用于第五修正案免于自证其罪的权利。390 U.S. at 67–68; see Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 555–56; Grand Jury 2013, 741 F.3d at 345; Ross, 156 B.R. at 279–81; In re Fairbanks, 135 B.R. 717, 730–33 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991)。\n\n适用必备记录例外亦得到与原《破产法》有关的美国最高法院判例的支持。In re Harris, 221 U.S. 274 (1911)（裁定第五修正案并不保护债务人免于向破产接管人提交其账簿和记录）。Bouknight 案在 Fisher 案之后维持必备记录例外时，援引 Harris 案并予以认可，作为必备记录原则的一个例子，确认尽管自 Harris 案作出以来第五修正案判例法已有发展，Harris 案至今仍具持续效力。Bouknight, 439 U.S. at 556–57; see Fisher, 425 U.S. 411–13（讨论 Harris 案但未对其裁定提出质疑）；see also Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 221 (1998)（裁定，除非有明确迹象表明国会有意如此，否则《破产法》项下的先例不会被取代）；Ross, 156 B.R. at 279; 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 344.03[4]（“[I]t is doubtful that a debtor, as opposed to other witnesses, may successfully refuse to turn over the property, books and records that every debtor under the Code is required to surrender to the trustee on the basis that this 'act of production' might itself tend to incriminate.”）；but see Butcher v. Bailey, 753 F.2d 465, 468 (6th Cir. 1985)（在 Bouknight 案之前，并且在非自愿第7章案件而非自愿第11章案件中，裁定 Harris 案在 Fisher 案后已不再是有效法律，且第521条并不要求提交适用提交行为原则的文件）。\n\n个人债务人提出异议称，尽管如此，根据 McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924)，Harris 及必备记录例外并不适用于《规则》第 2004 条传票。然而，最高法院在 Arndstein 一案中基于以下理由区别了其在 Harris 一案中的先前意见：Harris 涉及交出文件和记录，而 Arndstein 涉及被强制作证的问题。266 U.S. at 41–42。受托人并未反对个人债务人在回答书面询问、讯问或庭内证言时援引第五修正案。相反，受托人反对个人债务人针对提交文件和记录的请求援引第五修正案。因此，Arndstein 一案不适用。\n\n本院认定，无论依照对 Grosso 因素的分析，还是依照最高法院在《破产法》下的判例，必备记录例外均适用。\n\niii. 个人债务人未遵守强制提交命令\n\n基于上述全部理由，本院认定：(i) 个人债务人遵守强制提交命令并非不可能；以及 (ii) 根据必备记录例外，个人债务人不得针对强制提交命令适当地援引其第五修正案不自证其罪权。因此，受托人已以清楚且令人信服的证据证明，个人债务人未遵守强制提交命令。\n\n3. 个人债务人是否以合理方式勤勉地尝试遵守强制提交命令？\n\n受托人还必须证明，个人债务人未以合理方式勤勉地尝试遵守强制提交命令。King, 65 F.3d at 1058。受托人主张，个人债务人未作出任何尝试以遵守强制提交命令。对此，个人债务人主张，对于其能否适当地援引第五修正案不自证其罪权存在合理疑义，并且该声明及补充声明代表其为遵守强制提交命令所作出的善意努力。\n\n个人债务人所犯的实质性错误是法律错误，而非事实错误。具体而言，个人债务人错误地认定，提交行为原则的必备记录例外不适用，且其可以针对强制提交命令援引第五修正案。基于上述理由，提交每一份文件或记录在事实上是否具有证言性质并构成自我归罪，并不影响结论。\n\n通常，在不存在故意或意图要求的情况下，法律错误不是民事责任的抗辩理由。Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573, 583–85 (2010)。如上所述，“不存在故意 [原文如此] 并不免除民事藐视法庭责任。”McComb, 336 U.S. at 191。因此，本院认定，个人债务人的法律错误不是民事藐视法庭的抗辩理由。参见 Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 123 (1963)（认定法律错误不是藐视国会罪的抗辩理由）；United States v. Remini, 967 U.S. 754, 758 (2d Cir. 1992)（认定法律错误不是刑事藐视法庭罪的抗辩理由）。该结论符合最高法院在 Taggert 一案中的意见，即“当事人的善意，即使并不排除民事藐视法庭，也可能有助于确定适当的制裁。”139 S. Ct. at 1802（着重号系后加）。因此，受托人已证明个人债务人未勤勉地尝试遵守强制提交命令。\n\n4. 个人债务人是否知悉强制提交命令？\n\n民事藐视法庭的最后一个要件是知悉相关命令。Gravel, 6 F.4th at 512。该声明承认个人债务人知悉强制提交命令。(ECF No. 1444 Ex. A.) 民事藐视法庭的该项要件已经成立。\n\n5. 个人债务人构成民事藐视法庭\n\n既然四项要件均已成立，准予藐视法庭动议。本院认定个人债务人因未遵守强制提交命令而构成民事藐视法庭。如以下主文段落所述，个人债务人将获给予消除其藐视法庭状态的机会。鉴于个人债务人所面临情势的严重性质，以及其在补充声明中回答受托人二百零二（202）个问题时表现出的善意，本院将给予个人债务人充足时间以消除其藐视法庭状态。Taggert, 139 S. Ct. at 1802。然而，如个人债务人未消除其藐视法庭状态，受托人可请求适当制裁。\n\n提醒个人债务人的律师：“作为法院官员，律师负有义务，通过对正当取证请求作出勤勉、善意的回应，协助取证程序。”McLeod, Alexander, Powel & Apffel, P.C. v. Quarles, 894 F.2d 1482, 1486 (5th Cir. 1990)。为此，进一步提醒个人债务人的律师，本院已认定，“[个人债务人及其他人]的律师并未证明其在该等情形下已足够勤勉。”(Order Compelling Production ¶ 9.) 个人债务人被命令于 2023 年 1 月 31 日下午 5:00 前遵守强制提交命令，但其未予遵守。“无论是[律师]还是[当事人]，均无单方面决定是否或何时遵守取证要求的权利。”535 Broadway Assocs. v. Com. Corp. of Am., 159 B.R. 403, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)。\n\n个人债务人及其律师应采取合理且勤勉的措施，无论本院是否已直接阐明该等措施，以使个人债务人遵守强制提交命令。正如个人债务人的律师在记录中所述，合理措施包括向刑事法院提出动议，请求准许将控方提交给个人债务人、且对《规则》第 2004 条传票有回应性的文件和记录提交给受托人，但以受托人遵守刑事法院可能施加的任何条件为前提。个人债务人为消除其藐视法庭状态而采取行动时，将是在强制提交命令的强制下行事，因此，其向刑事法院提出动议以向受托人提交文件，并不放弃任何第五修正案权利。见 Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 561–62。在审议任何制裁动议时，本院将考虑个人债务人在刑事法院寻求救济时所表现出的勤勉程度。\n\nB. 是否应中止强制提交命令？\n\n在对藐视法庭动议作出裁决后，本院转而审理中止动议。个人债务人主张，为维护其第五修正案不自证其罪权，强制提交命令必须中止至刑事诉讼结束。对此，受托人主张，没有依据中止强制提交命令，且该等中止将对受托人造成重大损害。\n\n本院首先指出，尽管中止动议由个人债务人提出，且似乎仅涉及个人债务人，但所附拟议命令将完全中止强制提交命令，包括与个人债务人的女儿 Ms. Mei Guo（郭梅）及个人债务人被裁定为公司另我之 HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC 有关的主文段落。就中止动议寻求对该等额外当事人提供救济而言，本院驳回中止动议。\n\n转向实体问题，本院必须在其合理裁量权范围内决定是否中止强制提交命令。Kashi v. Grastos, 790 F.2d 1050, 1057 (2d Cir. 1986)。法院并无严格要求必须因未决刑事诉讼而中止民事诉讼。United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1 (1970); Kashi, 790 F.2d at 1057。在考虑是否鉴于刑事诉讼而中止民事诉讼时，法院尤其考虑：\n\n1）刑事案件中的争点与民事案件中提出的争点重叠的程度；2）案件的状态，包括被告是否已被起诉；3）原告迅速推进程序的私人利益与因延误对原告造成的损害之间的权衡；4）被告的私人利益及其所承受的负担；5）法院的利益；以及 6）公共利益。\n\nTrs. of Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat'l Pension Fund v. Transworld Mech., Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1134, 1139 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).\n\n本院首先考虑破产财产迅速推进程序的私人利益，并权衡延误对破产财产造成的损害。中止强制提交命令将对破产财产及个人债务人的债权人造成重大损害。如上所述，债务人披露其财务状况、资产和负债，是破产程序的基本内容。由于个人债务人未与受托人的调查合作，反而加以阻挠，破产财产持续承担巨额费用并遭受延误。根据第 521 条，受托人在一年多前获任命后，本应立即取得与个人债务人的财务状况、资产、负债、业务等有关的全部文件和记录。相反，受托人不得不确定其他适当的传票对象，发出无数传票，并不断进行动议实践。尽管受托人的努力已为破产财产带来重大利益，破产财产亦因该等努力承担了沉重成本。\n\n此外，该等沉重成本是在破产程序的背景下产生的。很可能本已没有足够资金可清偿债权人的债权，而由于对个人债务人事务持续进行但尚未完成的调查，债权人正在丧失其最终受偿的时间价值。11 U.S.C. §§ 726(a)(5), 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii)。此外，国会已确定，第 11 章案件的最终目标——确认一项计划——必须在特定期限内实现。见 11 U.S.C. §§ 1106(a)(5), 1121(a), 1121(d)。延误确认必须规定债权人债权最终实现的计划，将对债权人和破产财产造成重大损害。见 Andrews, 414 B.R. at 7。不得强迫受托人在缺乏个人债务人应有的合作及披露的情况下开展工作。见 Stone, 282 F.2d at 553。\n\n本院接着考虑个人债务人的私人利益及其所承受的负担。延误或阻挠该等合法破产程序不存在可认定的利益。个人债务人遵守强制提交命令也不存在可认定的负担。基于上述理由，其不能适当地援引第五修正案不自证其罪权。此外，最高法院在 Bouknight 一案中于 Fisher 之后维持必备记录例外时指出：\n\n在通常情形下，州的监管要求可能既不会强制自证其罪的证言，也不会协助刑事起诉，但第五修正案保护并不因此必然不适用于在援引该特权后遵守监管要求、随后又面临起诉之人。\n\n493 U.S. at 561–62；但见 Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457 (1913)（在 Fisher 之前认定，根据 Harris 提交的账簿和记录可在刑事程序中使用）。\n\n接下来，法院审议尚未结案的刑事调查的现状以及刑事法院的利益。需要审议的尚未结案的刑事调查有两项：刑事案件以及所称对破产犯罪的调查。个人债务人已在刑事案件中被起诉。没有向法院提交任何证据表明其已就任何破产犯罪调查而被起诉。这些第11章案件及相关对抗程序确实与刑事案件存在重叠——(a) 个人债务人的许多债权人也是刑事案件中所称的其受害人，(b) 个人债务人的某些所谓资产被指称系以刑事案件中所称欺诈的所得购得，及 (c) 个人债务人的某些所谓关联方及公司替身实体被指称参与了刑事案件中所称的欺诈——但与此同时，也存在不一致之处——(d) 这些第11章案件中存在并非所称欺诈受害人的债权人，(e) 遗产的某些所谓资产于所称欺诈发生之前购得，及 (f) 个人债务人的某些所谓关联方及替身实体未被指称参与该欺诈。然而，任何破产犯罪调查所涉及的任何问题均与这些第11章案件直接相关。\n\n法院认定，本命令并未实质干扰刑事法院对刑事案件有序管理的利益。个人债务人提出一种担忧，即要求个人债务人向受托人提交文件将损害控方针对其的案件，并导致在刑事法院就证据产生诉讼。该论点不具说服力。个人债务人在本程序中被强制提交文件和记录，并未改变控方显然已经掌握大量证据这一事实。尽管如个人债务人所主张，控方可能不得将个人债务人向受托人提交的材料作为证据，以证明已在控方掌握之中的文件和记录由个人债务人控制或具有真实性，但个人债务人的论点所描述的是现状。此外，刑事法院将审查并裁定任何要求控方向个人债务人提交的材料中向受托人提供文件和记录的动议。\n\n关于任何破产犯罪调查，由于 (a) 没有证据表明个人债务人已被起诉，且 (b) 没有证据表明任何法院中存在与之相关的程序，法院认定应当对任何此类调查的利益给予较低权重。如上所述，《破产法典》并非旨在制造破产犯罪。其目的在于，为全体债权人以及最终债务人自身的利益，公平且最终地解决、调整及重组债务人的资产、负债和财务事务。为了某种推测性的针对个人债务人破产犯罪的起诉，而阻碍受托人对个人债务人的事务、资产和负债进行调查，并不恰当。破产犯罪是一种执法机制，用以促进在破产程序中进行适当披露。如果个人债务人遵守《强制提交命令》，其将补救破产犯罪旨在防止的损害，同时也使这些第11章案件得以得到适当管理。\n\n最后，法院认定，公众对于“破产案件迅速管理的利益，会因阻碍受托人向遗产债权人收集、变现及分配资产的努力而受损。”In re MGL Corp., 262 B.R. 324, 330 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001)。公众对一个运行良好的破产制度具有利益。这有益于经济、债务人和债权人。对该程序的阻碍以及拖延该程序的努力，不符合公众利益。此外，如上所述，个人债务人依照《强制提交命令》提交文件和记录，并不违反《美国宪法第五修正案》。\n\n经衡量衡平因素，法院认定，在其合理裁量权范围内，没有理由中止《强制提交命令》。因此，中止动议被驳回。\n\nC. 是否应就证据开示滥用作出金钱制裁？\n\n最后，经 D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 37 以及 D. Conn. Bankr. L.R. 1001-1(a)(1) 和 2004-1(a) 适用的 Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C) 规定：\n\n(C) 费用支付。除上述命令之外或作为其补充，法院必须命令不服从命令的一方、向该方提供建议的律师，或二者，支付因未履行义务所致的合理费用，包括律师费，除非该未履行具有实质正当理由，或其他情形使费用裁定不公正。\n\n根据具体事实和情形，法院认定目前不宜裁定费用。\n\nV. 结论及命令\n\n基于上述理由，法院 (A) 因个人债务人未遵守《强制提交命令》而认定其构成民事藐视法庭，及 (B) 驳回中止动议，并在其合理裁量权下拒绝在刑事案件解决前中止《强制提交命令》。因此，现命令：\n\n命令：法院认定 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵，以下简称“个人债务人”）因未遵守《部分准许强制遵守动议的命令》（以下简称“强制提交命令”），ECF No. 1353，构成民事藐视法庭；并进一步\n\n命令：如个人债务人未能在 September 29, 2023 当日或之前通过完全遵守《强制提交命令》而消除其藐视法庭状态，则 Luc A. Despins（吕克·A·德斯潘斯）以其作为个人债务人破产遗产（以下简称“遗产”）第11章受托人（以下简称“受托人”）的身份，可申请任何适当制裁；并进一步\n\n命令：《有限中止部分准许强制遵守动议的命令之动议》（以下简称“中止动议”），ECF No. 1649，予以驳回。\n\n签署于 Connecticut（康涅狄格州）Bridgeport（布里奇波特），2023年7月26日。\n\n证据8\n\nUNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT（美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院）\n\n关于：　)\n\n)\n\n第11章\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，　)\n\n)\n\n案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n\n债务人。　)\n\n)\n\n（合并管理）\n\n)\n\n)\n\nLUC A. DESPINS（吕克·A·德斯潘斯），作为　)\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）遗产的第11章受托人，　对抗程序案号：23-05017 (JAM)\n\n)\n\n)\n\n关于：ECF Nos. 47, 57\n\n原告，　)\n\n诉　)\n\nTAURUS FUND LLC；SCOTT BARNETT（斯科特·巴内特），作为　)\n\n)\n\nTAURUS FUND LLC的受托人；以及　)\n\nTAURUS MANAGEMENT LLC，作为　)\n\nTAURUS FUND LLC的受托人，　)\n\n被告。　)\n\n)\n\n)\n\n准许紧急修改初步禁令动议的命令\n\n2023年8月24日，法院发布《部分准许初步禁令动议的裁决备忘录和命令》（以下简称“PI”）。（ECF No. 47。）PI的相关部分命令：“于2023年8月28日下午5:00或之前，被告应提交以下保险证明：(i) Taurus Fund的全部资产和财产，包括 Mahwah Mansion（马瓦大厦）；及 (ii) 位于、置于或处于 Mahwah Mansion 内、上或处的全部动产及/或附属物……。”（同上，第 \\*23 页。）\n\n2023年8月28日，被告 Taurus Fund LLC（以下简称“Taurus Fund”）提交了《关于初步禁令的答复》（以下简称“答复”）。（ECF No. 52。）答复表明，被告并未具有所需保险，且截至2023年8月28日下午5:00尚未成功获得保险，但正积极努力获得保险。（同上。）\n\n2023年8月29日，本对抗程序就另一事项举行了听证会。听证期间，法院询问了保险问题。被告表示相关努力仍在进行。原告 Luc A. Despins（吕克·A·德斯潘斯）先生，作为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）先生遗产的第11章受托人（以下简称“受托人”），表示其对缺乏保险感到担忧，并口头申请法院修改 PI，以禁止除特定人员外的一切人员进入 675 Ramapo Valley Road, Mahwah, NJ 07430（以下简称“Mahwah Mansion”）。法院告知受托人，如被告未能按照 PI 要求在2023年8月30日下午5:00后提交保险证明，法院将审议在该时间之后提出的修改 PI 的动议。\n\n2023年8月30日，Taurus Fund 提交了《关于初步禁令的修正答复》（以下简称“修正答复”）。（ECF No. 55。）修正答复表明，被告尚未获得保险，但正在与保险提供商会面。（同上。）此外，被告表示，截至修正答复提交时，Mahwah Mansion 的安保人员目前因持续存在的保险问题而不允许任何人进入 Mahwah Mansion。（同上。）当日稍后，受托人提交了《紧急修改初步禁令动议》（以下简称“紧急动议”）。（ECF No. 57。）紧急动议继续表示严重关切，即如无法院命令修改 PI，被告可能在未获得保险的情况下允许进入 Mahwah Mansion。（同上。）\n\n鉴于被告未能提交保险证明，并考虑到修正答复默示承认受托人对目前缺乏保险的担忧，法院认定存在准许紧急动议的正当理由，现命令：\n\n命令：本动议按本命令所述予以准许；并进一步\n\n命令：立即生效，PI 修改如下：进入 Mahwah Mansion 的权限仅限于 (a) 安保服务人员（定义见《初步禁令》）；(b) 受托人及其代表和/或专业人员；(c) United States Department of Justice（美国司法部）及其雇员和代表；(d) FBI（联邦调查局）及其雇员和代表；(e) 其他联邦、New Jersey（新泽西州）州级或 Mahwah（马瓦）市级执法机构及其雇员和代表；(f) 经受托人以书面明确授权的任何其他人员（可包括电子邮件）；及 (g) 经 United States District Court for the Southern District for New York（纽约南区联邦地区法院）或本院明确授权的任何其他人员；并进一步\n\n命令：在证明被告已就登记于 Taurus Fund 名下的财产，包括 Mahwah Mansion，以及位于、置于或处于 Mahwah Mansion 内、上或处的全部动产及/或附属物，取得充分保险保障，并且该保险保障已生效后，被告可申请修改上述对进入 Mahwah Mansion 的限制。受托人可对任何此类动议作出答复或提出异议；并进一步\n\n命令：除非本命令明确修改，PI 应继续完全有效。\n\n签署于 Connecticut（康涅狄格州）Bridgeport（布里奇波特），2023年8月31日。\n\nJulie A. Manning（朱莉·A·曼宁）\nUnited States Bankruptcy Judge（美国破产法官）\nDistrict of Connecticut（康涅狄格地区）\n\n证据9\n\nSUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF NEW YORK（纽约州纽约县最高法院）\n\nPACIFIC ALLIANCE ASIA OPPORTUNITY FUND L.P.，\n\n原告，\n\n诉\n\nKWOK HO WAN（郭文贵），又名 KWOK HO，又名 GWO WEN GUI，又名 GUO WENGUI，又名 GUO WEN GUI，又名 WAN GUE HAOYUN，又名 MILES KWOK，又名 HAOYUN GUO，GENEVER HOLDINGS CORPORATION，以及 GENEVER HOLDINGS LLC，\n\n索引号：652077/2017\n\nHon. Barry R. Ostrager, J.S.C.（巴里·R·奥斯特拉格法官）\n\n限制通知\n\n被告。\n\n致：Greenwich Land, LLC，转 Corporate Creations Network, Inc.\n3411 Silverside Rd.\nTatnall Building Ste. 104\nWilmington, DE 19810\n\n鉴于，在 New York State Supreme Court, County of New York（纽约州纽约县最高法院）审理的 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机遇基金有限合伙企业，以下简称“判决债权人”）与被告 Miles Kwok（郭文贵，以下简称“判决债务人”）、Genever Holdings Corporation（Genever Holdings Corporation）及 Genever Holdings LLC（Genever Holdings LLC）之间的诉讼中，该等主体为该诉讼的全体当事人；于 February 3, 2021，New York State Supreme Court, County of New York 作出有利于判决债权人并针对判决债务人的判决，金额为 \\$116,402,019.57。该金额连同法定利息，至今仍到期未付。\n\n对判决债务人享有权益的任何财产进行干预，但 CPLR § 5222(b) 另有规定的除外。我们了解到，判决债务人可能直接、间接或实益拥有贵方及贵方资产，或有权或能够指示或控制贵方及贵方资产。\n民事诉讼法及规则 § 5222(b)\n\n5222(b) 限制的效力；禁止转让；期限。被送达限制通知的判决债务人或义务人，除本条第 (h) 及 (i) 款规定的情形外，以及除非依治安官指示或根据法院命令，在判决或命令得到履行或被撤销之前，不得作出或容许作出对其享有权益的任何财产的出售、让与、转让或干预。向判决债务人或义务人以外的人送达的限制通知，仅在送达时该人欠判决债务人或义务人债务，或该人占有或保管其知道或有理由相信判决债务人或义务人享有权益的财产，或判决债权人或抚养费征收机构已在通知中声明受送达人对判决债务人或义务人负有特定债务，或判决债务人或义务人对受送达人占有或保管的特定财产享有权益时，方为有效。该人当时占有或保管以及此后取得占有或保管的、已知或相信判决债务人或义务人享有权益的所有财产，包括通知中指明的任何财产，以及该人当时到期应付及此后到期应付判决债务人或义务人的所有债务，包括通知中指明的任何债务，均受该通知约束，但本条第 (h) 及 (i) 款规定的情形除外。除本条第 (h) 及 (i) 款规定的情形外，以及除非依治安官指示或根据法院命令，在通知向其送达后满一年之前，或者在判决或命令得到履行或被撤销之前，以先发生者为准，该人不得作出或容许作出对任何该等财产的出售、让与或转让，或对任何该等财产进行干预，亦不得向治安官或抚养费征收机构以外的任何人支付或以其他方式处置任何该等债务。若判决债权人或抚养费征收机构在限制通知中指明了动产或债务，则如该财产所有人或债务受领人并非判决债务人或义务人，该判决债权人或抚养费征收机构应对因该限制所遭受的任何损害承担责任。若被送达限制通知的扣押义务人扣留属于或应付判决债务人或义务人的款项，金额相当于判决或命令项下到期金额的两倍，则该限制通知对其他财产或款项不发生效力。\n\n特此进一步通知，不遵守本限制通知的行为将\n\n作为藐视法庭行为受到惩处。\n\n日期：May 4, 2021，New York, New York\n\n谨此提交，O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP（奥麦伦律师事务所）\n\nB\n\nStuart Sarnoff（斯图尔特·萨诺夫，ssarnoff@omm.com） Edward Moss（爱德华·莫斯，emoss@omm.com） 7 Times Square New York, NY 10036 (212) 326-2000\n\n原告 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. 的代理律师\n附件 10\n\nUNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT（美国破产法院）\nDISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT（康涅狄格州地区）\nBRIDGEPORT DIVISION（布里奇波特分庭）\n\n关于　*\n案号 22-50073 (JAM)\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）及 GENEVER\nHOLDINGS CORPORATION（Genever Holdings Corporation），　*\n*\nBridgeport, Connecticut\n*\nSeptember 12, 2023\n*\n债务人。　*\n* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *　*\n庭审程序记录\n于尊敬的 JULIE A. MANNING（朱莉·A·曼宁）法官前\n美国破产法院法官\n出庭人员：\nChapter 11 受托人：　LUC A. DESPINS, ESQ.（卢克·A·德斯平斯律师）\nPaul Hastings LLP（保尔·哈斯廷斯律师事务所）\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, NY\n\n代表 Chapter 11 受托人：　G. ALEXANDER BONGARTZ, ESQ.（G. 亚历山大·邦加茨律师）\nPaul Hastings LLP\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, NY\n\n庭审程序以电子录音记录，\n记录文本由速记服务机构制作。\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷记录与速记服务公司）\n4 Research Drive, Suite 402\nShelton, CT 06484 (203)929-9992\n\nHo Wan Kwok - September 12, 2023\n\n1　推翻对 Lady May（“Lady May”号）的出售。\n2　我们唯一需要作出的修改，只是增加\n3　拟议命令第一段中的听证日期，\n4　该拟议命令载于 ECF 2186 第 5 页和第 6 页。\n5　因此，基于上述所有理由，Neubert, Pepe and Monteith\n6　的第二份临时报酬申请\n7　获准，拟议命令将予以作出，但须作出\n8　记录中指出的轻微、极其轻微的修改。\n9　LINSEY 先生：\n谢谢您，法官阁下。\n10　法庭：\n谢谢。\n11　好的。\n这就结束了\n12　今日日程表上的全部事项，除非有人有\n13　问题要提出。\n14　DESPINS 先生：\n是的，法官阁下。\n如果可以？\n15　法庭：\n可以。\n请讲。\n16　DESPINS 先生：\n我确有职责询问\n17　我们要求制止\n18　Kwok 和 Yvette Wang（王雁）推进该刑事中止事项之动议中\n19　有关刑事中止的状态，因为我们在该案中即将面临\n20　September 21st 的截止日期。\n显然我们希望\n21　避免该情况。\n抱歉。\n我想提出这一点。\n22　法庭：\n嗯，就此而言，已有针对\n23　贵方动议的异议在本院提交。\n24　同时，我的理解是，并且\n25　如果我有误你可以纠正我，地区法院在\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\nHo Wan Kwok - September 12, 2023\n\n1　Southern District of New York（纽约南区）的刑事程序中，\n2　正允许贵方作为遗产的受托人提交某种\n3　答复，是否正确，针对该动议——\n4　DESPINS 先生：\n正确，法官阁下。\n5　法庭：\n——针对 Kwok 先生的刑事辩护律师在刑事程序中\n6　提出的中止动议，\n7　对吗？\n8　DESPINS 先生：\n正确。\n9　法庭：\n好的。\n因此——因此我将等待\n10　观察地区法院如何处理。\n11　这——这并不是——我不知道\n12　破产法院是否拥有任何权限，而且我未能找到任何\n13　依据，能够允许破产法院告知\n14　刑事程序中的一方当事人，其不得在该刑事程序中\n15　向法院寻求某种形式的救济。\n16　我未见有任何依据会赋予本院\n17　作出此种处理的权限。\n18　DESPINS 先生：\n嗯，我——我不知道您是否\n19　有机会审阅由——提交的参加诉讼书——\n20　法庭：\n我审阅了。\n我审阅了。\n21　DESPINS 先生：\n——PAX 的委员会提交的参加诉讼书，因为我\n22　认为他们列举了若干案件，其中——\n23　法庭：\n他们列举了——他们列举了一宗案件，\n24　该案很有帮助。\n我认为委员会列举了一宗案件，\n25　该案认为地区法院在刑事\n\nHo Wan Kwok - September 12, 2023 31 程序中就该动议作出了裁决，而不是破产法院。如果我——Mayhew 律师，如果我说得不正确，请纠正我，但我对审阅该参加诉讼书的记忆是——我理解委员会参加了诉讼，他们列举了一宗很有帮助的案件，因为我认为在此之前没有列举任何案件，但我认为该案所说的是，嗯，我记得该案所说的是，地区法院在刑事诉讼中作出了该项决定，而不是破产法院，我认为这是一个具有差异的重要区别。\n\n我不确定破产法院是否拥有任何权限，能够禁止任何人在并非破产程序组成部分的刑事程序中从事任何行为——我不知道刑事程序如何能够成为破产案件的一部分。\n\n因此，我理解您可能感到沮丧。我也理解，您知道，您可能认为更希望由本院处理该问题，也许在地区法院作出裁决后，我仍须处理该问题，但我看不出——我并不确信或认同存在任何依据，会授权破产法院中止一名已不再占有财产的债务人寻求救济；该债务人不仅是刑事程序的对象，而且事实上已被监禁，\n\nHo Wan Kwok - September 12, 2023\n\n1　在该刑事程序中寻求救济。\n这并不意味着他将\n2　获得该救济，但我——我看不出\n3　破产法院有权这样做，任何\n4　破产法院都没有。\n5　DESPINS 先生：\n法官阁下，这是因为这是一项\n6　试图控制遗产财产的行为。\n我的意思是，如果这起\n7　Chapter 11 案件被中止，对遗产财产的\n8　影响将会极大。\n您知道。\n这简直是我无法\n9　想象的。\n10　例如，我们有一项截止日期，\n11　两年的诉讼时效将在 February 到期。\n如果本\n12　案被中止，所有这些\n13　重要问题将会如何？\n14　法庭：\n嗯，第一，您将必须申请\n15　延长该诉讼时效。\n第二，Mahwah mansion（马瓦豪宅）目前\n16　并非遗产财产。\n17　该项认定尚未作出。\n18　DESPINS 先生：\n我知道。\n不。\n但我想\n19　明确的是，他们正在寻求中止整个 Chapter 11 案件。\n20　法庭：\n不。\n我明白。\n21　DESPINS 先生：\n不仅仅——\n22　法庭：\n我读过。\n我明白。\n23　DESPINS 先生：\n好的。\n24　法庭：\n我明白他们所寻求的内容。\n25　DESPINS 先生：\n好的。\n\nHo Wan Kwok - September 12, 2023\n\n1　法庭：\n但是委员会所列举的案件中，\n2　地区法院并未准予该救济。\n3　DESPINS 先生：\n明白。\n4　但我认为不存在任何先例。\n您的\n5　观点是，没有先例表明破产法院\n6　曾禁止此类程序。\n7　法庭：\n正确。\n8　DESPINS 先生：\n我明白这一点。\n但我认为\n9　没有任何案件曾寻求过该救济，除\n10　该 Boston District Court（波士顿地区法院）案件外；该案是在\n11　地区法院寻求该救济，通常是在案件审理所在的法院\n12　寻求。\n13　但是我理解您的——理解您的观点，\n14　并感谢您的反馈，法官阁下。\n15　法庭：\n这可能——我完全不知道将会\n16　发生什么，但我理解您的请求。\n这并不意味着\n17　您的请求不会以某种\n18　方式、形式或形态在某个时候得到处理，但我看不出有任何依据\n19　允许破产法院禁止刑事被告\n20　在刑事案件中寻求救济。\n21　DESPINS 先生：\n明白。\n22　法庭：\n谢谢。\n23　DESPINS 先生：\n谢谢您，法官阁下。\n24　法庭：\n今天下午还有任何人希望\n25　补充记录吗？\n\nHo Wan Kwok - September 12, 2023\n\n1　（无人答复）\n2　法庭：\n好的。\n这结束了\n3　今天下午与 Kwok 和 Genever 相关的 Chapter 11 案件的听证。\n4　这些是日程表上的最后事项，因此\n5　休庭。\n谢谢各位。\n6　全体律师：\n谢谢您，法官阁下。\n7　（庭审程序于下午 2:54 结束。）\n8　本人，CHRISTINE FIORE（克里斯廷·菲奥雷），经法院认可的记录转写员以及\n9　认证电子记录员和转写员，特此证明\n10　上述内容系根据上文所列事项庭审程序的正式\n11　电子录音制作的正确记录文本。\n\n15　September 14, 2023\n16　Christine Fiore, CERT\n\n附件 11\n\n!\"\"#\\$%&#'()'*+,-#'%\n./0'%%'*12'3*'4%#\\$'*5%# 6'-7%0%4'')'+\\$%\n/'-*8(9#\\$*2%'+:%';:/0/#''<#=/'4;,\\$%5%4'*\n\nE\n\n证物12\n\n发件人：Barron, Douglass E.（道格拉斯·E·巴伦） 发送时间：Friday, August 18, 2023 4:17 PM 收件人：Eric Henzy（埃里克·亨齐）<ehenzy@zeislaw.com> 抄送：Despins, Luc A.（吕克·A·德斯潘）<lucdespins@paulhastings.com>；Maza, Shlomo（什洛莫·马扎）<shlomomaza@paulhastings.com>；Luft, Avi E.（阿维·E·卢夫特）<aviluft@paulhastings.com>；Sutton, Ezra（埃兹拉·萨顿）<ezrasutton@paulhastings.com>；'mconway@lpgmlaw.com' <mconway@lpgmlaw.com> 主题：就 Mahwah（马瓦）起诉状附件提出密封动议\n\n埃里克：\n\n根据您与吕克的讨论，请查收随附的就马瓦起诉状附件提出的联合密封动议草案。如有任何意见，请告知我们。\n\n谢谢\n道格\n\nDouglass Barron（道格拉斯·巴伦）   律师   金融重组组\n\nPaul Hastings LLP（普衡律师事务所）   200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166   直线电话：+1.212.318.6690   总机：\n+1.212.318.6000   传真：+1.212.230.7690   douglassbarron@paulhastings.com   www.paulhastings.com\n\nLuc Despins（吕克·德斯潘）   合伙人   金融重组组\n\nPaul Hastings LLP（普衡律师事务所）   200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166   直线电话：+1.212.318.6001   总机：\n+1.212.318.6000   传真：+1.212.230.7771   lucdespins@paulhastings.com '\n\n证物4\n\n美国纽约南区联邦地区法院\n\n美利坚合众国，　：\n\n诉　：\n：\n：\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），　：\n\n被告。\n__________________________________________：　：\n\n原告，：案号 1:23-CR-118-1 (AT)\n\n无担保债权人正式委员会加入支持第11章受托人及 Genever 债务人对被告 HO WAN KWOK 提出的要求作出中止破产案件的命令及令状，或作为替代寻求其他救济的动议之异议的文件\n\n在 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（以下简称“债务人”）于 United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut（美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院）（以下简称“破产案件”）待决的第11章破产案件中获委任的无担保债权人正式委员会（以下简称“委员会”），通过其下列签署律师，特此提交本加入支持第11章受托人及 Genever 债务人对被告 Ho Wan Kwok 提出的要求作出中止破产案件的命令及令状，或作为替代寻求其他救济的动议之异议（以下简称“异议”）的文件，并谨就此陈述如下：\n\n1. 委员会加入并援引受托人异议中提出的论点，并提交本陈述及加入文件，以阐明进一步支持驳回被告 Ho Wan Kwok 提出的要求作出中止破产案件的命令及令状，或作为替代寻求其他救济的动议（以下简称“动议”）的其他理由。\n\n2. 委员会于 March 21, 2022 由 United States Trustee（美国受托人）办公室在债务人的破产案件中委任。委员会负责代表数千名普通无担保债权人的利益，该等债权人对债务人持有超过 $30 billion dollars 的债权。\n\n3. 自破产程序开始以来，委员会作为代表无担保债权人群体的受托人，为保护债权人的利益，已参与第11章程序的每一重大方面。\n\n4. 委员会一直力求确保债权人的权利得到保护，并防止被告逃避其在 Bankruptcy Code（破产法）项下的义务。\n\n5. 由于委员会反对驳回债务人第11章案件的申请（Bankruptcy Case, ECF Nos. Nos. 346, 406, 408），该申请由其最大单一债权人 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity L.P.（“PAX”）提出，并经债务人同意（Bankruptcy Case, ECF No. 344）；并且在 May 25, 2022 举行听证会后（Bankruptcy Case, ECF No. 433），破产法院通过于 June 15, 2022 登记的裁决备忘录（Bankruptcy Case, ECF No. 465）指示委任一名第11章受托人。此后，于 July 8, 2022 委任了第11章受托人。鉴于被告对其债权人及破产法院所负义务的明显滥用，委员会强烈支持委任第11章受托人。\n\n6. 在获委任后不久，被告寻求撤换第11章受托人（Bankruptcy Case, ECF No. 1274）。委员会反对被告的努力（Bankruptcy Case, ECF No. 1313），理由是，由第11章受托人彻底调查被告的财务事务，并坚决追索被告被欺诈转让的资产，或由家庭成员或其公司持有的资产，符合债权人的最佳利益；该等公司是债务人的另一个自我，或在衡平法上由债务人拥有。迄今为止，第11章受托人在为第11章破产财产及其债权人追回该等资产方面取得了极大成功。\n\n7. 对被告第11章程序的任何中止，均将对债权人造成重大损害，因为其债权可能获得清偿的途径将无限期停滞，并为被告的家人及关联人士携带逃离并进一步耗散在受益所有权上、即使并非在法律所有权上、属于被告的资产留下可能性。因此，委员会强烈反对中止破产程序。\n\nA. 破产法院是裁决债务人中止动议的适当法院\n\n8. 如受托人在其异议中正确指出，根据 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a)，“地区法院对根据第11编提出的一切案件享有初审及专属管辖权。”（着重号为原文所加）。继而，28 U.S.C. § 157(a) 规定：“每一地区法院均可规定，将根据第11编提出的任何或全部案件，以及根据第11编产生、在根据第11编提出的案件中产生或与该案件有关的任何或全部程序，移送至该地区的破产法官。”United States District Court for the District of Connecticut（美国康涅狄格州联邦地区法院）（Daly 法官）于 September 21, 1984 作出的常设命令在康涅狄格地区作出了该等移送，据此，康涅狄格州地区法院将“根据第11编 U.S.C. 提出的所有案件，以及根据第11编 U.S.C. 产生、在根据第11编 U.S.C. 提出的案件中产生或与该案件有关的所有程序，于 June 27, 1984 待决的，或于 June 28, 1984 当日或之后提交的……”“移送至本地区的破产法官。”1 因此，基于前述，康涅狄格州破产法院对债务人的第11章案件享有专属管辖权，并且是唯一有管辖权中止该案件的法院。\n\n1 该常设命令可在 http 查阅（最后访问于 September 5, 2023）。\n\n9. 康涅狄格州破产法院就中止其正在审理的破产案件中的程序或其他有争议诉讼所享有的专属管辖权，进一步得到 11 U.S.C. § 305(a) 的确认；该条相关部分规定，破产法院“如出现下列情形，可随时驳回案件……或中止根据本编提出的案件中的所有程序：（1）债权人及债务人的利益将因该等驳回或中止而得到更好服务。”虽然法院亦具有“控制其案卷所列案件处理”的固有权力，而该权力是其在“司法利益似乎要求采取该等行动时”中止其正在审理的民事程序之权力的来源，Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 96-97 (2d Cir. 2012)（引述 United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 12 n. 7 (1970)），作出此决定的特权属于正在审理被请求中止之程序的法院——本案中即康涅狄格州破产法院。参见 Matter of Nichols, 615 B.R. 588, 593 (D. Ariz. 2020)（维持破产法院驳回在针对债务人的平行刑事程序结束前中止破产程序的申请，并指出“破产法院知悉其自身程序的独特情形，是就何种考量最适于支持或驳回该等中止请求作出认定的最终事实裁判者”）。\n\n10. 第二巡回上诉法院此前已承认，虽然地区法院有管辖权决定 11 U.S.C. §362 的自动中止是否适用，但如行使该管辖权将妨碍破产法院监督重整程序的能力，则不应行使该管辖权。\n\n11. In re Baldwin-United, Corp. Litigation, 765 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1985)，对该问题具有指导意义，并就地区法院适当行使对涉及 Bankruptcy Code 项下自动中止事项的管辖权提供指引。该案所涉问题是，Ohio Southern District（俄亥俄州南区）的破产法院或 Southern District of New York（纽约南区）的地区法院，何者应首先裁定因提交第11章程序而产生的自动中止是否适用于在破产申请后对债务人提出的赔偿及分担责任请求。Id. at 345. 第二巡回法院认定破产法院是决定该中止适用性的适当法院，并撤销了地区法院禁止债务人向破产法院申请救济的命令。Id.\n\n12. 该案涉及因债务人出售 Single Premium Deferred Annuities（“SPDAs”）及其后的州法院保险重整程序，而在俄亥俄州对 Baldwin-United Corporation 及其子公司（“Baldwin”）提出的非自愿第11章程序。Id. at 345. 在提交破产申请后不久，SPDAs 持有人起诉包括 Paine Webber 在内的经纪交易商；Paine Webber 曾销售该等保单，诉讼主张证券欺诈及其他请求。Id. 最终，其中超过三十起诉讼由 Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation（多地区诉讼司法小组）合并为在纽约南区待决的多地区诉讼。Id. 地区法院命令针对每一经纪交易商提交一份合并起诉状，并最终对 Paine Webber 提起了一项集体诉讼。Id.\n\n13. 此后，Paine Webber 在俄亥俄州破产程序中就 Baldwin 提交债权证明，就该集体诉讼主张 $700 million 的赔偿及分担责任债权。Id. 它还在纽约南区的集体诉讼中针对 Baldwin 提交了第三方起诉状。Id. Baldwin 认为提交该第三方起诉状违反自动中止，并通知 Paine Webber 其拟将该问题提交俄亥俄州破产法院。然而，在 Baldwin 向破产法院采取行动之前，Paine Webber 获得了一项单方临时限制令，阻止 Baldwin 向破产法院申请救济。Id. 地区法院随后作出初步禁令，认定地区法院而非破产法院是决定自动中止范围的适当法院，并认定如破产法院裁定该中止适用于 Paine Webber 的第三方起诉状，将构成对地区法院管辖权“不必要且不适当的侵入”。Id. at 346.\n\n14. 在上诉中，Second Circuit（美国第二巡回上诉法院）初步指出，“地区法院有管辖权确定自动中止是否适用。”同上。尽管如此，巡回上诉法院认为，地区法院“签发本次上诉所质疑的禁令，是对其衡平权力的滥用。”同上，第347页。\n\n15. 法院指出，“[通]过禁止 Baldwin（鲍德温）向俄亥俄州破产法院申请针对 MDL No. 581 中任何被告的任何救济，该禁令在两个方面不当地干涉了重整程序。”同上，第347页。第一，法院认为，该禁令阻止“Baldwin 援引破产法院的重要权限，即‘签发为执行《破产法典》规定所必需或适当的任何命令、程序或判决书’。”同上，第348页，引自 11 U.S.C. §105。法院进一步指出，破产法院可根据其第105条权力，“运用其衡平权力，以确保重整程序有序进行。”同上。\n\n16. 虽然承认地区法院依据《全案令状法》28 U.S.C. § 1651，有权签发一切协助其管辖权和程序的令状，但美国第二巡回上诉法院仍指出，“无论管理这一复杂重整事项的破产法院权限与管理合并审前程序的地区法院权限之间可能产生何种冲突，衡平原则均有利于维持破产法院不受限制的权限。”同上。\n\n17. 第二，巡回上诉法院认为，地区法院签发的禁令阻止 Baldwin 向破产法院申请裁定自动中止是否适用。法院认定，这不当阻止破产法院解释其自身的中止，并反映出地区法院默示裁定该中止不适用于第三方起诉书。同上，第348页。法院认为，“在 Baldwin 的 Chapter 11 重整情况下，衡平原则并不支持既阻止破产法院解释其自身的中止，或在地区法院确定该中止是否适用。”同上。\n\n18. 如同 Baldwin 案，破产法院是审理债务人提出的任何中止请求的适当法院。美国第二巡回上诉法院的判例以及本案的衡平原则均要求得出这一结论。破产法院在过去19个月中一直监督 Chapter 11 程序，并且非常熟悉债务人及其密切关联人设立的虚假公司网络，债务人一直在其中向其破产财产的债权人隐匿有价值的资产。\n\n19. 如果本院因认为该动议并未违反自动中止而选择审理该动议的实体问题，委员会谨陈，该动议应予驳回。Chapter 11 受托人已成功追回（并在某些情况下为债权人的利益予以变现）：(i) 两艘豪华游艇；(ii) 一笔 \\$37 million dollar 的托管资金；以及 (iii) 名为 Genever BVI（英属维尔京群岛 Genever）的实体的 100% 股权权益；该实体继而是 Genever US（美国 Genever）的唯一所有人，而 Genever US 根据其与 Bravo Luck Limited（Bravo Luck有限公司）（表面上由债务人之子 Mileson Guo（又名 Qiang Guo 和/或 Guo Qiang）所有的公司）及 Mileson Guo 达成的和解，拥有债务人在纽约 Sherry-Netherland hotel（雪莉-内瑟兰酒店）价值数百万美元的公寓（两者均主张对 Genever BVI 享有股权权益）。受托人还正在为破产财产追索位于 Connecticut（康涅狄格州）Greenwich（格林尼治）的一处有价值住宅和位于 New Jersey（新泽西州）Mahwah（马瓦）的一处豪宅。债权人将从 Chapter 11 受托人已经追回的财产以及其继续追索的资产中获得重大利益；如准许该动议，延误以及进一步耗散资产的机会将使其受到不利影响。\n\n20. 最后，如本院倾向于考虑债务人提出的替代救济请求，委员会承认本院有管辖权审理该请求。此外，委员会在与 Chapter 11 受托人相同的范围内并基于相同理由，同意债务人提出的替代救济请求。\n\n因此，委员会谨请求本院基于本文所述理由及受托人异议中所述理由，驳回债务人的动议，并给予其他必要且公正的进一步救济。\n\n日期：September 21, 2023　HO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）无担保债权人正式委员会\n\n签署人：/s/Kristin B. Mayhew\nIrve J. Goldman（欧文·J·戈德曼）\nKristin B. Mayhew（克里斯汀·B·梅休）\nPULLMAN & COMLEY, LLP（普尔曼及康利律师事务所）\n850 Main Street, 8th Floor, P.O. Box 7006\nBridgeport, CT 06601-7006\n电话：(203) 330-2213\n[igoldman@pullcom.com]\n[kmayhew@pullcom.com]\n\n其代理律师\n附件5\n\nSeptember 21, 2023\nSherry Millman（雪莉·米尔曼）\n直线电话：212.806.5434\n传真：212.806.6006\nsmillman@stroock.com\n\nThe Honorable Analisa Torres（尊敬的阿娜丽萨·托雷斯法官）\nUnited States District Judge（美国联邦地区法院法官）\nSouthern District of New York（纽约南区）\nDaniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse（丹尼尔·帕特里克·莫伊尼汉美国法院大楼）\n500 Pearl St.\nNew York, NY 10007-1312\n\n事由：United States（美国） v Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）等人，No 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\n尊敬的托雷斯法官：\n\n本所代表 The Sherry-Netherland, Inc.（雪莉-内瑟兰公司）（“Sherry”），该公司作为 Genever Holdings LLC（杰内弗控股有限责任公司，“Genever US”）的 Chapter 11 破产案件中的债权人；该案件正在 United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut（美国康涅狄格联邦破产法院）（“破产法院”）审理，并与 Ho Wan Kwok（“Kwok”）个人的 Chapter 11 破产案件共同管理。[1] Sherry 还基于 Kwok 对 Genever US 向 Sherry 所负债务的保证，在 Kwok 破产案中持有一项数额重大的债权请求。\n\n我们最近获悉，Kwok 在其刑事案件中向本院提出了关于作出命令并签发令状以中止破产案件（其中包括 Genever US 和 Kwok 破产案件以及相关对抗性程序）的动议，或备选地请求其他救济 [ECF No. 129]（“中止动议”）。我们谨致函请求阁下考虑 Sherry 作为可能因中止动议的处置而受到不利影响的利害关系方的立场。\n\nSherry 强烈反对就 Genever US 和 Kwok 破产案件（合称“破产案件”）拟议实施中止，理由如 Chapter 11 受托人（Kwok 的）及 Genever 债务人提交的反对中止动议的答复 [ECF No. 145]（“反对意见”）所述，并加入该反对意见。对于中止动议中寻求的替代救济，Sherry 不持立场。\n\n1　根据日期为 November 21, 2022 的命令，破产法院批准对 Kwok、Genever US 及其直接母公司 Genever Holdings Corporation（即 Genever BVI）的 Chapter 11 案件进行共同管理。为免疑义，这些案件虽进行共同管理，但并未实质合并，亦未以其他方式相互捆绑，而是独立并按各自进度推进。\n\nSeptember 21, 2023\n\n反对意见中所述理由，并加入该反对意见。对于中止动议中寻求的替代救济，Sherry 不持立场。\n\nSherry 谨陈，根据 28 U.S.C. §1334，唯一有管辖权中止破产案件的法院是破产法院。因此，中止动议应依法驳回。此外，只有破产法院能够掌握破产案件所依据的事实，并在寻求救济时听取所有利害关系方的意见。\n\n尽管如此，如阁下倾向于考虑中止动议，Sherry 希望向本院提供与 Genever US 案件有关的相关事实如下：\n\nGenever US 于2015年从该公寓的前所有人处购买了位于 Sherry 的一套占据整个18层及相关女佣住处的公寓（“该公寓”）；Sherry 是一栋纽约住宅合作公寓。更具体而言，根据纽约州合作公寓法，Genever US 购买了与该公寓相对应的股份，并受让了该公寓附随专有租约项下承租人的权益（合称“专有租约”）；该专有租约规定了 Genever US 作为承租人与 Sherry 作为出租人的权利和义务。Sherry 对与该公寓相对应的股份享有无争议的法定及合同第一顺位留置权，以担保 Genever US 在专有租约项下的义务，该等义务包括向 Sherry 支付每月维护费和评估费。\n\n2020年1月，Genever US 停止支付其维护费、评估费及其他义务款项，Sherry 被迫在纽约州法院启动程序，以追收所欠款项并取消 Genever US 作为该公寓所有人的资格。2020年10月12日，当 Sherry 正在取得其有权获得的救济时，Genever US（其唯一主要资产为该公寓）向 United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York（美国纽约南区联邦破产法院）（“SDNY Bankruptcy Court”）提交了 Chapter 11 自愿申请，可能是为了中止 Sherry 在州法院所作的努力。尽管近四年已经过去，Sherry 至今仍未获得其于2020年1月应得的款项。截至2020年10月提交破产申请时，Sherry 就维护费、评估费、律师费及其他费用获欠 \\$1,096,186.54，该等款项至今仍全部未偿。此外，Sherry 就申请提交后发生的款项获欠不少于 \\$1,462,881.84；该金额将根据专有租约及依法随时间增加。\n\n为明确起见，Sherry 并非一个没有面孔的公司债权人——Genever US 的这些未付义务给 Sherry 的其他股东造成负担；这些股东即公寓业主，只是在努力履行其自身义务，并且在过去四年以及在可预见的未来、直至该公寓通过 Genever US 破产案件出售之前，一直自掏腰包补偿 Genever US 所欠款项。\n\nSTROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP（斯特鲁克、斯特鲁克及拉文律师事务所）\nNew York　Los Angeles　Miami　Washington, DC\n180 Maiden Lane, New York, NY 10038-4982\n电话：212.806.5400　传真：212.806.6006\nwww.stroock.com\n2\nSeptember 21, 2023\n\n2021年10月8日，SDNY Bankruptcy Court 批准了 Genever US 案件中全体当事人达成的一项合意安排，该安排确立了出售该公寓以及任命一名销售官员负责开展该公寓出售营销程序的框架（“出售命令”）。2022年1月13日，SDNY Bankruptcy Court 批准聘任 Sotheby's International Realty（苏富比国际地产）担任房地产经纪人，以带头开展营销工作。该出售被认为是为 Sherry 和任何其他债权人提供回收、指定一名负责任且财务稳健的一方作为该公寓所有人，以及结束 Genever US 破产案的必要步骤。值得注意的是，Genever US 提交破产申请及实施出售程序，发生在 Kwok 于2022年提交其个人 Chapter 11 案件之前，当然也远早于2023年对其提起刑事指控。\n\n2022年2月15日，Kwok 向破产法院提交了其个人 Chapter 11 申请；2022年7月8日，Luc Despins（吕克·德斯平）被任命为 Kwok 的 Chapter 11 受托人。鉴于 Kwok 是 Genever US 的最终母公司，受托人接管了 Genever US 的管理，并于2022年11月3日与 Genever US 一同取得一项命令，将 Genever US 破产案的审理地移送至康涅狄格州破产法院。受托人随后请求破产法院继续出售程序并遵守出售命令的条款，破产法院予以准许。\n\n在Genever US破产案中，出售程序原本正按计划进行（该公寓已由房地产经纪人挂牌出售）；2023年3月15日当天早些时候，Kwok（郭文贵）在该公寓被捕，随后该公寓发生火灾。该火灾不仅严重毁坏了该公寓，还对Sherry（雪莉大厦）造成重大损害，并导致约五十名其他公寓业主数月无法居住于其公寓。部分业主至今尚未返回。鉴于该公寓遭受的严重损害，必须立即实施修复措施。雪莉大厦一直不懈努力处理火灾后果，并在受托人为出售而修复该公寓的过程中协助受托人。通过破产程序，Genever US正对其保险承保人提起诉讼，以根据其保险单追偿火灾造成的损失。其还已获得Bankruptcy Court（破产法院）的授权，可开展修复程序，并获得该程序融资的批准，同时并未解除Genever US的保险承保人就此承担的责任。\n\n中止Genever US破产案将对修复程序及该公寓的必要出售造成毁灭性影响。该延误将不公平地损害债权人，尤其是雪莉大厦及雪莉大厦的股东；他们多年来一直等待Genever US偿还其未履行的债务，并等待该公寓拥有一名适当的股东。\n\nSTROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP\n纽约  洛杉矶  迈阿密  华盛顿哥伦比亚特区\n180 Maiden Lane, New York, NY 10038-4982\n电话：212.806.5400  传真：212.806.6006\nwww.stroock.com  3  2023年9月21日\n\n同样重要的是，中止程序对Kwok不会有任何益处，因为其刑事案件与Genever US破产案之间不存在“重叠”。他对该公寓不享有任何经济利益；Genever US破产财产中的任何资金将首先用于偿还债权人，其后如有剩余，则归Genever US的母公司，最后归作为最终权益持有人的Kwok破产财产，而非归Kwok本人。此外，在Kwok受到刑事指控之前，Genever US通过出售该公寓退出破产程序的路径已在顺利推进，因此，按照Genever US早已确立的路径继续推进其破产程序直至终结，不会影响Kwok的权利。\n\n我们无法就提出中止动议的根本原因发表评论，但我们恭请认为，雪莉大厦及其他债权人不应成为Kwok在其与破产案件毫无关联的刑事案件中所采取的诉讼及择地诉讼策略的附带受害者。\n\n雪莉大厦及其下列签署的代理律师，随时听候本院就阁下可能提出的任何询问作出答复。\n\n谨此提交，\n\n/s/ Sherry Millman（谢莉·米尔曼）\n\nSherry Millman（谢莉·米尔曼）\n\n抄送：全体登记在案的代理律师（通过ECF）\nNicholas Bassett（尼古拉斯·巴塞特），Paul Hastings LLP（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所）（通过电子邮件）\nIrve J. Goldman（欧文·J·戈德曼），Pullman & Comley（普尔曼与康利律师事务所）（通过电子邮件）\nTaruna Garg（塔鲁娜·加格），Murtha Cullina LLP（默萨·卡利纳律师事务所），雪莉—荷兰公司（Sherry-Netherland, Inc.）的共同代理律师（通过电子邮件）","key_entities":["Kwok","Je","Despins","Guo","GETTR","Ho Wan Kwok","Paul Hastings","CCP","CIPA","Himalaya","Miles Guo","Chinese Communist Party","forfeiture","HCHK","GTV","Luc Despins","Yanping Wang","Torres","Himalaya Exchange","William Je","Analisa Torres","Saraca","Kin Ming Je","Fergenson","Murray","Finkel","RICO"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":1,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":4,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":10,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":11,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":12,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":13,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":14,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":15,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":17,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":18,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":19,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":20,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":22,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":23,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":24,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":25,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":26,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":27,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":28,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":29,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":33,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":34,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":36,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":37,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":38,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":39,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":41,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":43,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":44,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":45,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":47,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":50,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":51,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":52,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":53,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":54,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":55,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":56,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":57,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":58,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":63,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":66,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":67,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":72,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":77,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":78,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":79,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":80,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":82,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":83,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":97,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":98,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":99,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":102,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":107,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":108,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":110,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":111,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":117,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":128,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":129,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":131,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":133,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":134,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":135,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":143,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":145,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":146,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":147,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":148,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":149,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":183,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":197,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":203,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":221,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":299,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":344,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":400,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":433,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":465,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":523,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":636,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":717,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":757,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":856,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":913,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1046,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1090,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1096,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1108,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1110,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1274,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1313,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1353,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1444,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1453,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1537,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1585,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1649,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1650,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1666,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1670,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1680,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1719,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1737,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1740,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1809,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2034,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2035,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2186,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":94369,"status":"published","published_at":"2023-08-30 00:00:00","created_at":"2023-08-30","updated_at":"2026-08-24 00:18:34"}