{"id":"court_ctb_2273_1","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":2273,"sub_number":1,"doc_type":"MOTION","filed_date":"2023-10-22","title":"Exhibit 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"#### **Exhibit 1**\n\n#### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\nv.\n\nHO WAN KWOK, a/k/a \"Miles Guo,\" a/k/a \"Miles Kwok,\" a/k/a \"Guo Wengui,\" a/k/a \"Brother Seven,\" a/k/a \"The Principal,\"\n\nKIN MING JE, a/k/a \"William Je,\" and\n\nYANPING WANG, a/k/a \"Yvette,\"\n\nDefendants.\n\n**S1 23 Cr. 118 (AT)**\n\n#### **THE GOVERNMENT'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL**\n\nDAMIAN WILLIAMS United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York One St. Andrew's Plaza New York, New York 10007\n\nMicah F. Fergenson Ryan B. Finkel Juliana N. Murray Assistant United States Attorneys *Of Counsel*\n\n| BACKGROUND 1 | |\n|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|\n| I. The Mahwah Mansion 1 | |\n| II. Kwok's Bankruptcy Stay Motion 5 | |\n| III. The Instant Motion 7 | |\n| ARGUMENT 7 | |\n| I. Kwok Has Failed to Establish a Valid Basis For His Discovery Requests 7 | |\n| A. Applicable Law 7 | |\n| B. Discussion 13 | |\n| 1. Kwok's Request for SEC Communications Should Be Denied 14 | |\n| 2. Kwok's Request for Trustee Communications Should Be Denied 19 | |\n| CONCLUSION 25 | |\n\n#### **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\nKwok's motion seeking beyond-Rule-16 discovery—the Government's communications with the Securities and Exchange Commission (\"SEC\") and with Kwok's bankruptcy trustee (\"Trustee\")—is wholly unfounded. At best, Kwok's extraordinary discovery request is based on facts that are decidedly ordinary. The Government and the SEC conducted parallel investigations, and Kwok identifies nothing unusual about the Government's interactions with the SEC whatsoever, much less the substantial showing of bad faith required to receive the sort of discovery that Kwok seeks. So too with the Trustee. It is common—indeed, it is a best practice—for criminal prosecutors to coordinate and reach agreements with trustees where, as here, there are forfeitable assets that may also fall within the trustee's estate. Kwok's claims of spoliation with respect to the property located at 675 Ramapo Valley Road, Mahwah, New Jersey 07430 (the \"Mahwah Mansion\") are borderline frivolous. That is particularly true in view of the undisputed fact that Kwok's co-conspirators and associates, following Kwok's arrest and the unsealing of the Indictment's allegations regarding the Mahwah Mansion, tampered with the condition of the Mahwah Mansion to bolster Kwok's defense in this case—that is, they have fabricated evidence to obstruct justice in this very case. Kwok's other claims, regarding invasion of privilege (which has not happened, and simply would not happen) and a purported joint prosecution with the Trustee (for which there is no basis at all), are equally unfounded. There is simply nothing in the record indicative of any bad faith on the part of the Government. Kwok's motion should be denied without a hearing.\n\n#### **BACKGROUND**\n\n#### **I. The Mahwah Mansion**\n\nThe Mahwah Mansion was purchased, renovated, and furnished with proceeds of the fraud\n\ncharged in the Indictment—specifically, G|CLUBS membership funds that were funneled through bank accounts in other entities' names. (Dkt. 19 (\"Indictment\") ¶¶ 4, 16(b)-(c)). As alleged in the Indictment, Kwok and his conspirators used G|CLUBS to defraud victims by falsely promising them purportedly highly valuable stock in GTV (*i.e.*, using G|CLUBS as a vehicle to continue the unlawful private placement offering after the SEC intervened to stop the GTV offering) and falsely promising them \"a full spectrum of services\" once they became G|CLUBS \"members.\" (*Id*. ¶ 15). The Mahwah Mansion and furnishings that were purchased with misappropriated G|CLUBS membership funds were identified as specific property subject to forfeiture in the Indictment. (*Id.* ¶ 55(v)).\n\nAs previously described (*see* Dkt. 148, at 2-4), on March 15, 2023, agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (\"FBI\") executed a search warrant at the Mahwah Mansion. Multiple FBI photographers meticulously documented the premises and its contents, taking over 2,000 photographs during the search, which photographs have been produced to the defendants in discovery. The FBI also conducted aerial surveillance of the Mahwah Mansion prior to the search, which photographs and videos have been produced to the defendants. The Government also seized voluminous physical evidence from the Mahwah Mansion, including, for example, electronic devices, Kwok's personal items (*e.g.*, custom-designed Brioni suits embroidered with Kwok's name), and certain of the extravagant furnishings purchased with misappropriated G|CLUBS membership funds.\n\nSubsequent to the Government's public filing of the Indictment, which associated Kwok with the Mahwah Mansion, the defendants' associates and co-conspirators began to occupy the Mahwah Mansion. For example, on April 9, 2023, dozens of the defendants' associates went to the Mahwah Mansion to protest the defendants' detention, and on May 5, 2023, the defendants'\n\nassociates hosted another large gathering at the Mahwah Mansion. These activities threatened to diminish the value of the Mahwah Mansion.\n\nOn or about June 28, 2023, the Trustee advised the Government that he had concluded that the Mahwah Mansion is property of Kwok's chapter 11 estate; accordingly, the Trustee and the Government conferred regarding the possible disposition of the Mahwah Mansion. Unlike chattel or funds in a bank account, the Government generally cannot seize real property with a forfeiturebased seizure warrant prior to a final order of forfeiture—which order would come only after a criminal conviction, at the conclusion of the subsequent ancillary forfeiture proceeding. Given that the defendants' associates were actively using the Mahwah Mansion (itself purchased with fraud proceeds), and that their occupation of the Mahwah Mansion threatened to dissipate the property's substantial value to both the Bankruptcy creditors and the victims of Kwok's fraud in the Government's criminal case, on July 6, 2023, the Government provided the Trustee with 12 photographs taken during the Government's March 15, 2023 search, illustrating that Kwok used the Mahwah Mansion as a *personal* residence.\n\nOn July 13, 2023, the Government and the Trustee executed a stipulation that would permit the Trustee to secure the value of the Mahwah Mansion during the pendency of the criminal case. *In re Ho Wan Kwok, et al.*, Case No. 23-05017 (D. Conn. Bankr.) (JAM), Dkt. 24, Ex. 1; *see also id.* at Dkt. 53, 56. The stipulation further provided that the net proceeds from any sale of the Mahwah Mansion (less certain fees and administrative costs and a deemed expense of \\$1 million to be used to satisfy claims of allowed Bankruptcy creditors who are also victims in the criminal case) would serve as substitute *res* for the Mahwah Mansion.\n\nOn July 11, 2023, the Trustee filed an *ex parte* motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction regarding Kwok's associates' access to the Mahwah Mansion. *In re*\n\n*Ho Wan Kwok, et al.*, Case No. 23-05017, Dkt. 4 (D. Conn. Bankr.) (JAM). On August 1, 2023, Judge Manning granted the order in part. *See id.*, Dkt. 17. On August 31, 2023, following additional briefing and hearings, Judge Manning granted the Trustee's motion and issued a modified preliminary injunction to restrict access to the Mahwah Mansion to: (a) the Security Services (as defined in the Preliminary Injunction); (b) the Trustee and his representatives and/or professionals; (c) the United States Department of Justice and its employees and representatives; (d) the FBI and its employees and representatives; (e) other federal, New Jersey state, or Mahwah municipal law enforcement agencies and their employees and representatives; (f) any other persons expressly authorized by the Trustee in writing (which can include email); and (g) any other person expressly authorized by the United States District Court for the Southern District for New York or the bankruptcy court. *In re Ho Wan Kwok, et al.*, Case. No. 23-05017, Dkt. 58 (D. Conn. Bankr.) (JAM).\n\nOn September 1, 2023, the Trustee conducted a walkthrough of the Mahwah Mansion, which was video-recorded and photographed. Following an August 30, 2023 motion filed by Kwok that sought to \"preserv[e] the status quo\" of the Mahwah Mansion (Kwok Br. 3), on September 12, 2023, the Trustee provided the Government with six photographs from the Trustee's September 1, 2023 walkthrough. Significantly, those photographs illustrate that the defendants' associates and co-conspirators have been tampering with the interior of the property in an apparent effort to obstruct this criminal case by modifying the Mahwah Mansion to suit a defense narrative. Specifically, the defendants' co-conspirators posted placards at room entrances that appear to suggest that the rooms of Kwok's Mahwah Mansion are, in fact, NFSC and/or G|CLUBS offices or rooms, as shown in the photographs below:\n\n\n\nThese after-the-fact placards were not present as of March 15, 2023, when the Government searched the Mahwah Mansion pursuant to a search warrant issued in this case.\n\n#### **II. Kwok's Bankruptcy Stay Motion**\n\nPrior to the filing of the instant motion, on August 30, 2023, Kwok filed a motion in this Court to stay the bankruptcy proceedings that Kwok voluntarily initiated in February 2022 (the \"Bankruptcy Stay Motion\"). (Dkt. 131 (\"Bankr. Stay Mot.)). In the event the Court denied his request for a stay, the Bankruptcy Stay Motion also sought alternative relief. (Bankr. Stay Mot. 1, 28-30). The alternative relief sought by Kwok included requests related to the Mahwah Mansion. In particular, Kwok requested that his \"defense team\" have continued, unchaperoned access to the Mahwah Mansion and sought to prevent the sale of the property in bankruptcy proceedings. The alternative relief also included a request for an order that the Government not solicit or receive Kwok's privileged information or records from the Trustee.\n\nOn September 21, 2023, the Government filed its response. (Dkt. 148). Whereas the Trustee filed a brief opposing a stay of the bankruptcy, the Government took no position. (Dkt. 148, at 1). With respect to Kwok's alternative requests, the Government explained first that\n\n\"Kwok's request regarding potentially privileged materials should be denied as moot,\" because the Government \"has neither solicited nor received Kwok's potentially privileged information or records from the Trustee.\" (Dkt. 148, at 2). Further, the Government advised that it did not \"presently intend to do so, and will not do so absent agreement from Kwok's counsel (or the appropriate holder) or an order of this Court finding that such materials are not privileged and/or subject to the crime-fraud exception.\" (Dkt. 148, at 2). Regarding Kwok's request for unfettered access to the Mahwah Mansion, the Government set forth the background also described above relating to the condition of the Mahwah Mansion. (Dkt. 148, at 2-4). In light of that, the Government explained, it was \"*Kwok* and his associates who appear to have been doing what Kwok claims to seek to prevent, by materially altering the Mahwah Mansion to serve a defense narrative.\" (Dkt. 148, at 4). Moreover, Kwok already had \"voluminous documentation—comprising *thousands* of photographs, as well as videos—of the Mahwah Mansion.\" (Dkt. 148 at 5). In that regard, \"Kwok's attempt to analogize the circumstances\" of the Mahwah Mansion \"to thwarting access to a material witness is baseless.\" (Dkt. 148 at 5). Nevertheless, the Government stated it would not object to Kwok's or Wang's criminal defense attorneys conducting a site visit to the Mahwah Mansion. (Dkt. 148 at 5).\n\nOn October 5, 2023, Kwok filed a reply to the Government's response. (Dkt. 152). Kwok made several arguments in reply, none of which have merit. Most significant, however, was what Kwok did *not* argue about or dispute. Specifically, Kwok did *not* dispute that, since his arrest and the unsealing of the Indictment's allegations regarding the misappropriation of G|CLUBS funds to purchase, renovate, and furnish the Mahwah Mansion, Kwok's followers had materially altered the Mahwah Mansion by creating and posting placards suggesting that the Mahwah Mansion was a G|CLUBS facility. That is, nowhere did Kwok deny that the evidence he was purportedly\n\nseeking to maintain had, in reality, already been tampered with by his co-conspirators to suit a defense narrative.\n\n#### **III. The Instant Motion**\n\nBefore the Government filed its opposition to Kwok's Bankruptcy Stay Motion, Kwok filed the instant motion seeking discovery—beyond the discovery provided for in criminal law or procedure—of communications between the Government and the Trustee, and between the Government and the SEC. (Dkt. 143 (\"Br.\")).\n\n#### **ARGUMENT**\n\n#### **I. Kwok Has Failed to Establish a Valid Basis For His Discovery Requests**\n\n#### **A. Applicable Law**\n\n#### **1.** *Brady* **and Joint Prosecutions**\n\n\"Under *Brady* and its progeny, the government has an affirmative duty to disclose favorable evidence known to it.\" *United States v. Payne*, 63 F.3d 1200, 1208 (2d Cir. 1995). This duty extends to the prosecution team. In other words, a prosecutor \"is presumed . . . to have knowledge of all information gathered in connection with his office's investigation of the case and indeed 'has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police.'\" *United States v. Avellino*, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting *Kyles v. Whitley*, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995)); *accord United States v. Hunter*, 32 F.4th 22, 36 (2d Cir. 2022).\n\nThe Government's duty to obtain and produce Rule 16 and *Brady* material is limited to material in the possession of the prosecution team. *Hunter*, 32 F.4th at 36 (\"We have long rejected the notion that 'knowledge of any part of the government is equivalent to knowledge on the part of th[e] prosecutor.'\" (quoting *United States v. Quinn*, 445 F.2d 940, 944 (2d Cir. 1971))); *Avellino*,\n\n136 F.3d. at 255 (\"[T]he imposition of an unlimited duty on a prosecutor to inquire of other offices not working with the prosecutor's office would inappropriately require us to adopt a monolithic view of government that would condemn the prosecution of criminal cases to a state of paralysis.\"); *United States v. Bonventre*, No. 10 Cr. 228 (LTS), 2014 WL 3673550, at \\*22 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2014), *aff'd in part*, 646 F. App'x 73 (2d Cir. 2016) (*Brady* is \"not a discovery doctrine that c[an] be used to compel the Government to gather information for the defense.\").\n\nAlthough \"[t]he Second Circuit has not yet articulated a test to decide when knowledge of *Brady* material may be imputed from one agency to another,\" *United States v. Velissaris*, No. 22 Cr. 105 (DLC), 2022 WL 2392360, at \\*2 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2022), the Circuit has provided guidance, and courts within this District have articulated a number of factors for determining the scope of the prosecution team and whether a joint investigation occurred. The Circuit counsels that \"the relevant inquiry [for determining whether a person is a member of the prosecution team] is what the person did, not who the person is.\" *United States v. Stewart*, 433 F.3d 273, 298 (2d Cir. 2006). \"Individuals who perform investigative duties or make strategic decisions about the prosecution of the case are considered members of the prosecution team, as are police officers and federal agents who submit to the direction of the prosecutor and participate in the investigation.\" *United States v. Barcelo*, 628 F. App'x 36, 38 (2d Cir. 2015) (summary order). \"At bottom,\" the determination of who constitutes the prosecution team, \"involves a question of agency law: should a prosecutor be held responsible for someone else's actions?\" *United States v. Meregildo*, 920 F. Supp. 2d 434, 443-44 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), *aff'd sub nom. United States v. Pierce*, 785 F.3d 832 (2d Cir. 2015). \"Generally, a principal is responsible for the knowledge of an agent when that agent has a duty to give the principal information or when the agent acts on his knowledge regarding a matter that is within his power to bind the principal. An agent's duty to disclose is thus linked to\n\nhis power to bind the principal.\" *Id.* In the context of a criminal investigation and prosecution, the individuals empowered to bind the prosecutor consist generally of those who \"actively investigate[] the case, act[] under the direction of the prosecutor, or aid[] the prosecution in crafting trial strategy.\" *Meregildo*, 920 F. Supp. 2d at 442; *see also United States v. Barcelo*, No. 13 Cr. 38 (RJS), 2014 WL 4058066, at \\*9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2014) (\"To determine whether someone is a member of the prosecution team—in other words, whether the prosecution can be deemed to have constructive knowledge of information held by that individual—the Court considers the totality of the circumstances, including whether the individual actively investigates the case, acts under the direction of the prosecutor, or aids the prosecution in crafting trial strategy.\"), *aff'd*, 628 F. App'x 36 (2d Cir. 2015).\n\nApplying these principles, the Second Circuit and courts in this District have consistently rejected efforts to impose discovery obligations on the Government related to information held by entities that do not act as agents of the prosecution, including cooperating witnesses, expert witnesses for the Government, other government agencies, and even separate components of the Justice Department. *See, e.g.*, *Barcelo*, 628 F. App'x at 38 (holding that a cooperating witness was not a part of the prosecution team where he \"played no role in the investigation or in determining investigation or trial strategy,\" and \"did no more than provide information to the government and testify at trial\"); *Stewart*, 433 F.3d at 299 (holding that a civilian employee of the Secret Service who testified as an expert witness for the Government was not a member of the \"prosecution team\" for Giglio purposes); *United States v. Hutcher*, 622 F.2d 1083, 1088 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that for Giglio and Jencks Act purposes, the Government had no discovery obligation related to information filed in an unrelated bankruptcy proceeding); *United States v. Locascio*, 6 F.3d 924, 949 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that the reports made by FBI agents in the course\n\nof investigations unrelated to the defendants' prosecutions were not possessed by the prosecution team); *Pina v. Henderson*, 752 F.2d 47, 49 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that a prosecutor's constructive knowledge did not extend to a parole officer who \"did not work in conjunction with either the police or the prosecutor\"); *United States v. Quinn*, 445 F.2d 940, 944 (2d Cir. 1971) (rejecting \"completely untenable position that 'knowledge of any part of the government is equivalent to knowledge on the part of this prosecutor'\"); *United States v. Morgan*, 302 F.R.D. 300, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (\"[T]he prosecution team does not include federal agents, prosecutors, or parole officers who are not involved in the investigation.\"); *Meregildo*, 920 F. Supp. 2d at 444 (\"[I]n most cases, cooperating witnesses should not be considered part of the prosecution team.\"); *United States v. Merlino*, 349 F.3d 144, 154-55 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that Government not required to obtain prison calls of cooperating witness to satisfy disclosure obligations).\n\nCourts in this Circuit have held that the prosecutor's duty extends to reviewing the materials in the possession, custody or control of another agency for *Brady* evidence only where the Government conducts a \"joint investigation\" with another state or federal agency. *United States v. Rigas*, 583 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming district court opinion holding that there was \"no joint investigation with the SEC\" and therefore the Government did not need to produce documents in the custody of the SEC); *SEC v. Stanard,* No. 06 Civ. 7736 (GEL), 2007 WL 1834709, at \\*3 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2007) (finding it was \"clear that the investigations, while they may have overlapped, were not conducted jointly\" in denying the defendant's request for the Court to require the SEC to access and review FBI interview notes that were not in the SEC's possession, custody, or control); *United States v. Finnerty*, 411 F. Supp. 2d 428, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that the Government and the NYSE, even if it were a state actor, did not conduct a joint investigation related to the policies of the NYSE); *Ferreira v. United States*, 350 F. Supp. 2d 550,\n\n556-57 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that cooperation between the Government and NYPD was \"not sufficient to make the Government and the state prosecutor members of the same prosecutorial team\"); *United States v. Upton*, 856 F. Supp. 727, 749-50 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that the Government and FAA did not conduct a \"joint investigation\" even though the FAA provided two inspectors to assist the criminal investigation); *United States v. Guerrerio*, 670 F. Supp. 1215, 1219 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (denying Rule 16 discovery request for grand jury minutes at the Bronx District Attorney's Office where there was no joint investigation with the Government and the Government had no control over the material).\n\nTo determine whether the criminal prosecution conducted a \"joint investigation\" with another agency, such that the other agency should be considered part of the prosecution team, courts consider a number of factors, including whether the other agency \"(1) participated in the prosecution's witness interviews, (2) was involved in presenting the case to the grand jury, (3) reviewed documents gathered by or shared documents with the prosecution, (4) played a role in the development of prosecutorial strategy, or (5) accompanied the prosecution to court proceedings.\" *United States v. Middendorf*, 18 Cr. 36 (JPO), 2018 WL 3956494, at \\*4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2018) (citing *United States v. Blaszczak*, 308 F.Supp.3d 736, 741-42 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)); *see also United States v. Collins*, 409 F. Supp. 3d 228, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (finding no joint investigation where SEC and Government participated in some joint interviews); *United States v. Chow*, No. 17 Cr. 667 (GHW), ECF No. 69, at 87 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2018) (finding no joint investigation where agencies shared information but made their own determinations regarding what documents to obtain and what facts to ask a witness); *Stanard*, 2007 WL 1834709, at \\*3 (FBI and SEC did not conduct a joint investigation despite participating in joint interviews during which only FBI took notes); *United States v. Rigas*, No. 02 Cr. 1236 (LBS), 2008 WL 144824, at \\*2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2008) (finding that parallel civil and criminal investigations were not \"joint\").\n\n#### **2. Discovery Beyond** *Brady* **or Rule 16**\n\nIt has never been the case that any and all records or information in the Government's possession fall within the scope of its discovery obligations. Rather, \"[t]he prosecution has a constitutional duty to disclose evidence favorable to an accused when such evidence is material to guilt or punishment.\" *United States v. Coppa*, 267 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)). Similarly, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 16(a)(1)(E)(i) requires the Government to produce, upon defense request, items \"within the government's possession, custody, or control\" that are \"material to preparing the defense.\" An item is \"material to preparing the defense\" under Rule 16 \"if it could be used to counter the Government's case or bolster a defense.\" *United States v. Stevens*, 985 F.2d 1175, 1180–81 (2d Cir. 1993). In other words, as the Supreme Court has said, Rule 16(a)(1)(E)(i), authorizes production only of items that tend to \"refute the Government's arguments that the defendant committed the crime charged.\" *United States v. Armstrong*, 517 U.S. 456, 462 (1996); *see also United States v. Rigas*, 258 F. Supp. 2d 299, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (\"Rule 16(a)(1)(E)(i) entitles a defendant to documents or other items that are material to preparing arguments in response to the prosecution's case-in-chief.\"); *United States v. Allen*, No. 14 Cr. 272 (JSR), 2016 WL 315928, at \\*3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2016) (relying in part on *Armstrong* to deny a request for discovery to support a *Kastigar* claim).\n\nMoreover, the mere fact that an item may be \"useful\" to the defense does not render it \"material\" under Rule 16. *Rigas*, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 307; *see also United States v. Parnas*, No. 19-CR-725 (JPO), 2021 WL 2981567, at \\*8 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2021) (denying motion under Rule 16(a)(1)(E)(i) for documents that \"may contain evidence relevant to [defendant's] selective\n\nprosecution claim\" because defendant had \"failed to make the requisite showing for such a claim\"). \"There must be some indication that the pretrial disclosure of the disputed evidence would . . . enable[ ] the defendant significantly to alter the quantum of proof in his favor.\" *United States v. Maniktala*, 934 F.2d 25, 28 (2d Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). The defendant must make a prima facie showing of materiality, *United States v. Finnerty*, 411 F.Supp.2d 428, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), and must \"offer more than the conclusory allegation that the requested evidence is material,\" *Rigas*, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 307.\n\nWhile Rule 16 does not authorize the production of materials that the defense seeks to \"challenge the prosecution's conduct of the case,\" *Armstrong*, 517 U.S. at 462, courts sometimes authorize discovery on those issues. Before doing so, however, they require that the defendant make a substantial threshold showing that improper Government conduct in fact occurred. *See Wade v. United States*, 504 U.S. 181, 186 (1992) (defendant claiming that Government's refusal to file a 5K motion was based on an unconstitutional motive must make a \"substantial threshold showing\" before he can obtain discovery); *United States v. Berrios*, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974) (defendant seeking discovery on a claim of selective prosecution must provide \"some evidence tending to show the existence of the essential elements of the defense\" before discovery authorized); *United States v. Sanders*, 211 F.3d 711, 717 (2d Cir. 2000) (same in the context of a claim of vindictive prosecution).\n\n#### **B. Discussion**\n\nKwok's requests are baseless. To obtain discovery beyond what the criminal law provides, Kwok must make a substantial showing of bad faith. Kwok has merely identified commonplace, routine interactions between the Government and a regulatory agency with a parallel investigation or a trustee administering assets that are also criminally forfeitable, and has come nowhere close to satisfying his burden. Kwok's motion should be denied without a hearing.\n\n#### **1. Kwok's Request for SEC Communications Should Be Denied**\n\nKwok's request for the Government's communications with the SEC is unfounded, and his\n\nmotion to compel such discovery should be denied.\n\n#### **a. The Government and the SEC Conducted Parallel Investigations**\n\nAs an initial matter, while Kwok has not formally moved for a finding that the Government and the SEC conducted a joint investigation, that contention undergirds his discovery request and is equally meritless. The SEC is not part of the Government's prosecution team. Although the Government and the SEC at times conducted joint interviews for the convenience of witnesses, most aspects of the Government's investigation were conducted without any involvement of the SEC:\n\n- the SEC played no role in the Government's charging decisions or the development of the Government's prosecutorial strategy;\n- likewise, the Government played no role in the SEC's charging decisions or the development of the SEC's litigation strategy;\n- no one from the SEC was designated a special Assistant U.S. Attorney to work on the criminal investigation;\n- at jointly conducted interviews, the SEC did not take notes during the interviews and does not have any notes from joint interviews;\n- at jointly conducted interviews, witnesses were told that the agencies' investigations were separate, that the interviews were conducted together only as a matter of convenience, and that, if there were to be a proffer agreement, the witness would enter into a separate agreement with each agency;\n- the SEC was not involved in presenting this case to the grand jury and did not receive grand jury transcripts;\n- the SEC did not participate in the execution of search warrants or the responsiveness reviews of materials obtained pursuant to search warrants;\n\n- the SEC did not obtain materials produced to the Government pursuant to grand jury subpoenas; and\n- the SEC has not accompanied the Government to Court.\n\n(*See* Ex. A (\"Murray Decl.\") ¶ 2). *See Collins*, 409 F. Supp. 3d at 242 (citing many of these factors in support of a finding that the SEC and the Government did not conduct a joint investigation); *United States v. Alexandre*, No. 22 CR. 326 (JPC), 2023 WL 416405, at \\*6-8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2023) (same). These factors, considered together, weigh heavily in support of a finding that the Government and the SEC engaged in separate investigations, notwithstanding their focus on overlapping subject material.\n\nEven though the SEC is not part of the prosecution team, the Government has voluntarily requested from the SEC all documents that the SEC obtained from third parties, and has already turned over these documents to the defense. In the event the SEC produces additional documents to the Government that it received from third parties, the Government will promptly produce those documents to defense counsel.\n\nNone of the facts cited by Kwok establish the existence of a joint investigation in this case. Rather, Kwok seeks to paint as unusual or suspect facts that are routine in the parallel investigation context, such as the Government and the SEC bringing charges on the same date (Br. 21). *See, e.g.*, *SEC v. Shkreli*, No. 15 Civ. 7175 (KAM), 2016 WL 1122029, at \\*7 n.6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2016) (\"The court finds no fault in the SEC's commencement of the civil action at or around the time the criminal indictment was unsealed, given the SEC's independent mandate to enforce the securities laws and the need to commence an action before expiration of the statute of limitations.\"). Kwok also points to the fact that the Government obtained documents and information from the SEC that was cited in the Government's affidavits supporting search warrants (Br. 20), but that is entirely normal and appropriate. The Government routinely obtains documents\n\nand information from any number of individuals and entities in its investigations, and the Government is aware of no authority for the proposition that that bare fact transforms those sources of information into members of the prosecution team. To the contrary, courts have specifically rejected that proposition. *See, e.g.*, *Meregildo*, 920 F. Supp. 2d at 445-46 (holding that cooperating witness was not a member of the prosecution team); *United States v. Barcelo*, 628 F. App'x 36, 38-39 (2d Cir. 2015) (same); *Stewart*, 433 F.3d at 298-99 (holding that an expert witness who analyzed evidence, assisted the prosecution in preparing cross-examination questions, participated in a mock examination, and testified at trial was not a member of the prosecution team). Indeed, it would be highly unusual if the SEC refused to provide information to the Government in connection with an ongoing criminal inquiry into a massive fraud, such as the one perpetrated by Kwok. \"Moreover, 'there is no general rule' prohibiting a civil enforcement agency such as the SEC from 'sharing . . . evidence acquired through civil discovery with criminal prosecutors.'\" *United States v. Rhodes*, No. 18 Cr. 887 (JMF), 2019 WL 3162221, at \\*3 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2019) (quoting *United States v. Fiore*, 381 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2004)). \"Indeed, because '[s]ecurities fraud is a proper subject of both administrative and criminal investigations . . . SEC enforcement officials and prosecutors all expect coordination at some investigative level and perceive the various proceedings as integral to each other.\" *Rhodes*, 2019 WL 3162221, at \\*3 (quoting *Fiore*, 381 F.3d at 94). Kwok fails to cite any authority for the proposition that an independent agency becomes part of the prosecution team simply by complying with a voluntary information request.\n\nLikewise, the fact that the Government and the SEC—both tasked with enforcing antifraud laws and protecting victims, and both investigating the same conduct perpetrated by the same individuals against the same victims—may have shared certain evidence and informed each other of anticipated investigative or enforcement steps is wholly unremarkable and routine. Such\n\n\"coordination and sharing between the lawyers and agents on the criminal prosecution team, on the one hand, and [a civil enforcement authority], on the other, is, in itself, unexceptional and unproblematic.\" *Rhodes*, 2019 WL 3162221, at \\*3.\n\nIn short, applying these facts and circumstances to well-settled legal standards makes plain that the SEC conducted a parallel investigation and was not part of the Government's prosecution team.\n\n#### **b. Kwok's Discovery Request Is Meritless**\n\nIn light of the foregoing, Kwok's request for internal communications between the Government and the SEC is baseless. No rule of criminal discovery mandates the production of materials simply because the defense speculates that the materials may be useful in making a defense motion. To the contrary, courts in this District have specifically rejected such requests. *See, e.g.*, *Parnas*, 2021 WL 2981567, at \\*8 (denying motion under Rule 16(a)(1)(E)(i) for documents that \"may contain evidence relevant to [defendant's] selective prosecution claim\" because defendant had \"failed to make the requisite showing for such a claim\").\n\nKwok's reliance on *Rhodes* is particularly misplaced. *Rhodes* directly rejected the defense suggestion made here that it is unusual or problematic for criminal and civil authorities to share information, instead holding that such \"coordination and sharing between the lawyers and agents on the criminal prosecution team, on the one hand, and [a civil enforcement authority], on the other, is, in itself, unexceptional and unproblematic.\" 2019 WL 3162221, at \\*3. Judge Furman explained that such coordination is only problematic if it is done in \"bad faith,\" such as where a government authority \"made affirmative misrepresentations or conducted a civil investigation solely for purposes of advancing a criminal case.\" *Id.* (quoting *United States v. Stringer*, 535 F.3d 929, 937 (9th Cir. 2008), and also citing *United States v. Kordel*, 397 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1970) and\n\n*United States v. LaSalle National Bank*, 437 U.S. 298 (1978)).\n\nIn light of the \"unexceptional and unproblematic\" nature of coordination in parallel proceedings, *Rhodes* held that a criminal defendant is not entitled as a matter of course to internal communications between criminal and civil authorities. Rather, in order to obtain \"even limited discovery\" regarding a claim of improper coordination between civil and criminal authorities, a defendant must \"make a substantial preliminary showing of bad faith.\" *Rhodes*, 2019 WL 3162221, at \\*4 (quoting *United States v. Gel Spice Co*., 773 F.2d 427, 434 (2d Cir. 1985)). Judge Furman determined that the defendant in *Rhodes* had failed to make that showing, and therefore denied his discovery request, a fact that Kwok omits from his brief. S*ee Rhodes*, 2019 WL 3162221, at \\*5.\n\nKwok falls far short of satisfying his burden of making \"a substantial preliminary showing of bad faith.\" Indeed, Kwok has failed to point to *any* facts tending to show that the coordination between criminal and civil authorities was exceptional or problematic. As discussed above, the coordination in this case was wholly routine. Kwok notes that Judge Furman required the Government in *Rhodes* to submit an affidavit concerning coordination with civil authorities, but that stemmed from an unusual fact uniquely present in the *Rhodes* case: the SEC did not bring parallel charges against the defendant in *Rhodes* despite issuing him a subpoena for documents (to which the defendant responded), and the fruits of that subpoena were used in the parallel criminal case. In other words, it was the *absence* of a simultaneous and parallel civil enforcement action that Judge Furman found unusual, and which led him to require an affidavit from the Government. By contrast, this case involves the standard fact pattern of parallel criminal and civil actions being filed at the same time, which undermines any assertion that the SEC action was brought solely for purposes of advancing a criminal case. In any event, this opposition is an accompanied by an\n\naffidavit from a member of the prosecution team. (*See* Murral Decl.).\n\nIn sum, Kwok has failed to articulate even a facially plausible theory of bad faith under the relevant legal standards. That is unsurprising given that any coordination between the SEC and the Government in this case was, at all times, \"unexceptional and unproblematic.\" *Rhodes*, 2019 WL 3162221, at \\*3. Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth above, Kwok's motion for discovery concerning the Government's communications with the SEC should be denied.\n\n#### **2. Kwok's Request for Trustee Communications Should Be Denied**\n\nKwok's arguments with respect to the Trustee are equally meritless. Kwok's strained attempts to discern Government misconduct through unexceptional interactions with a bankruptcy trustee are contrary to the record and the law. Kwok comes nowhere close to meeting his burden to establish a \"substantial preliminary showing of bad faith.\" *Rhodes*, 2019 WL 3162221, at \\*4.\n\n*First*, Kwok has failed to show any basis for a claim of spoliation. Simply put, there is absolutely no risk of spoliation of evidence due to the Settlement Agreement between the Government and the Trustee concerning the Mahwah Mansion. Far from spoliating evidence of the Mahwah Mansion's condition, the Government has produced thousands of photographs of the Mahwah Mansion, from March 2023 and September 2023, as well as voluminous video surveillance recorded at various times between August 2022 and September 2023, as well as voluminous video of the Mahwah Mansion's interior from September 2023. Kwok does not explain how that voluminous documentary record of the Mahwah Mansion's condition on multiple dates—which is in Kwok's possession—has been, or would be, somehow spoliated; nor does Kwok explain why a site visit by his criminal defense attorneys of record would be somehow\n\ninsufficient to satisfy any further defense needs. [1](#page-31-0) Instead, Kwok simply asserts here, as in the Bankruptcy Stay Motion, that \"the existing state of the Mahwah [Mansion] must be maintained.\" (Br. 16). But two problems with that assertion remain. The first is that, in reality, Kwok's coconspirators are altering the state of Mahwah Mansion. They are attempting to obstruct justice in this case by tampering with the property's condition—following Kwok's arrest and the unsealing of the Indictment's allegations regarding the Mahwah Mansion—to make Mahwah Mansion look like a G|CLUBS facility. Indeed, Kwok could not and did not even dispute, in connection with the Bankruptcy Stay Motion, that his followers had tampered with the state of the Mahwah after the Government's allegations about the Mahwah Mansion became known. (*See* Dkt. 152). The second problem is that, as noted, Kwok does not explain why the voluminous evidence in his possession (including photographs and videos) documenting the Mahwah Mansion on particular dates has not \"maintained\" the state of the Mahwah Mansion. Kwok fails to address these points because this motion, like the Bankruptcy Stay Motion, is in fact an attempt for Kwok to obtain control over the Mahwah Mansion for the conspiracy's *continued* use. (*See* Br. 17-18 (\"evidence showing how the property was configured and used prior to Mr. Kwok's arrest *and how it continues to be used*—*barring the Trustee's interference*—in service to the Chinese prodemocracy dissident movement constitutes exculpatory evidence that Mr. Kwok is entitled to present to the jury.\" (emphasis added))). This Court should reject Kwok's attempts, reflected in\n\n1 In his reply to Bankruptcy Stay Motion, Kwok asserts that having supervision for such a site visit is \"tantamount to condoning a government spy in the defense camp.\" (Dkt. 152 at 8). Rhetoric aside, the Government is willing to meet and confer with Kwok regarding the appropriate safeguards to ensure that there is no further tampering with the Mahwah Mansion by Kwok's associates and co-conspirators. As already noted in the Government's response to the Bankruptcy Stay Motion, Kwok's attorneys did not contact the Government regarding a site visit to the Mahwah Mansion prior to filing either of his motions. They still have not done so.\n\nthis motion and in the Bankruptcy Stay Motion, to have this Court greenlight the tampering of evidence—tampering that is being done to obstruct justice in this criminal case and to further a global conspiracy that already stole over a billion dollars from Kwok's followers.\n\nRelatedly, there is nothing exceptional or improper about the Government's settlement agreement with the Trustee regarding the Mahwah Mansion. The Government has worked with the Trustee to try to efficiently allocate resources to secure and recover some of the more than a billion dollars that Kwok and his co-conspirators stole or misappropriated. The Government intends to return the hundreds of millions of dollars of cash and property that it has seized to victims of the defendants' crimes—an action that necessarily implicates the Trustee's responsibilities regarding claims to those assets by Kwok's bankruptcy creditors. With respect to the Mahwah Mansion in particular, the Government and the Trustee maintain potentially competing claims to that property, and the agreement will allow the value of that property to be preserved—ceasing, among other things, the modifications made to the property by the defendant's co-conspirators and associates in an effort to impede justice—pending resolution of issues related to forfeiture, restitution, and the bankruptcy estate.[2](#page-31-0) There is absolutely nothing unusual about the Government working with a trustee regarding forfeitable assets in which the trustee also has an interest. The many precedents for such coordination—which the Trustee referenced during the bankruptcy court hearing that Kwok quotes repeatedly in his motion, albeit in a portion of the transcript that Kwok omits from his exhibit [3](#page-31-0)—go back years in multiple\n\n2 In his reply to the Bankruptcy Stay Motion, Kwok states the Government sought improperly to \"circumvent this Court\" by entering the agreement with the Trustee. (*See* Dkt. 152 at 7-8). That is not just hyperbolic. It is false. The agreement merely preserves the value of this forfeitable asset, and this Court will address forfeiture issues, including with respect to the Mahwah Mansion, following trial and conviction, as in every case.\n\n3 See pages 28-29 of the complete transcript, attached as Exhibit B.\n\njurisdictions. [4](#page-31-0) For example, in the criminal case against Marc Dreier, Judge Rakoff approved of various settlement agreements involving the Government and bankruptcy trustees, including a \"Coordination Agreement\" between the Government and the Chapter 11 Trustee in that case. *United States v. Dreir*, 09 Cr. 86 (JSR), Dkt. 141 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2010). As another example, in the massive Bernie Madoff fraud, the Government worked *extensively* with the court-appointed trustee who oversaw the liquidation of Madoff's company under the Securities Investor Protection Act (\"SIPA\").[5](#page-31-0) In fact, that same trustee—who has also overseen Madoff's personal bankruptcy\n\n4 *See, e.g.*, *In re Maresca*, No. 20-11483 (KHK), Dkt. 244 (E.D. Va. Bankr. Sept. 9, 2021) (bankruptcy trustee's motion for approval of a Coordination and Settlement Agreement with the Government, which had forfeiture and restitution claims, regarding a property that was \"the only significant asset of th[e] estate\"); *United States v. Merrill*, No. 14-40028 (TSH), Dkt. 367 (D. Mass. July 11, 2017) (restitution order \"provid[ing] for administration and payment of restitution to victims by the Trustee in the related Chapter 11 cases\"); *In re Rothstein*, No. 09-34791 (RBR), Dkt. 5704 (S.D. Fla. Bankr. July 14, 2014) (motion to approve settlement between Government and bankruptcy trustee regarding forfeiture and restitution); *In re Goldberg*, No. 09-23370 (ASD), Dkt. 424 (D. Conn. Bankr. May 31, 2011) (motion for bankruptcy trustee to administer restitution in criminal case); *id.* at Dkt. 462 (order granting motion); *United States v. Brandau*, No. 99-8215 (DMM), Dkt. 734 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2000) (agreement between Government and bankruptcy trustee regarding the sale and maintenance of assets identified for forfeiture); *id.* at Dkt. 759 (order approving agreement).\n\n5 In Wang's letter supporting the Bankruptcy Stay Motion, she cites a letter filed by the Government in an SEC action against Madoff. (*See* Dkt. 135 at 4). While it is true that the DOJ opposed the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings for Madoff's estate in that case, Wang's letter omits a critical point. Specifically, Wang omits the fact that the Government's letter concluded by noting that \"[t]his Office also continues to work with the SIP[A] Trustee to maximize recovery for victims,\" and that \"[g]iven this ongoing effort,\" the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings \"is particularly inapt.\" *SEC v. Madoff*, No. 08 Civ. 10791, Dkt. 50 at 5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2009). Indeed, two months after the Government's letter, the personal bankruptcy estate of Madoff was consolidated into the SIPA proceeding being administered by the SIPA trustee who has coordinated so closely and effectively with the Government regarding forfeiture and restitution. *See Sec. Investor Protection Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Investment Sec. LLC*, No. 09-11893 (BRL) (S.D.N.Y. Bankr. June 9, 2009), available at [http](http)\n\nestate since June 9, 2009[6](#page-31-0) —was even simultaneously appointed as a Special Master in the criminal case \"to oversee the process of remission or mitigation under the forfeiture laws.\" DOJ, *Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Agreement to Recover \\$7.2 Billion for Victims of Bernard L. Madoff's Ponzi Scheme from Estate of Jeffry M. Picower* (Dec. 17, 2010).[7](#page-31-0) In connection with \"the largest single forfeiture in U.S. history,\" of approximately \\$7.2 billion, to take one example, relevant settlement agreements stipulated that the trustee would administer approximately \\$5 billion of the funds \"through the SIPA liquidation proceedings,\" while administering approximately \\$2.2 billion through DOJ's remission or mitigation process. *Id.* Precedent also refutes Kwok's suggestion here, and in the Bankruptcy Stay Motion, that there is something untoward about the Trustee's receipt of fees for his work recovering assets on behalf of Kwok's creditors.Like a bankruptcy trustee, a SIPA trustee's fees are compensated and, to date, the SIPA trustee in *Madoff* has received over \\$2.2 billion in fees (while recovering over \\$14.6 billion in assets). *See* The Madoff Recovery Initiative, *Recoveries to Report Fees Ratio: December 11, 2008 to September 20, 2023*. [8](#page-31-0) Far from being improper or unusual, the Government coordinating with trustees, like the Trustee in Kwok's bankruptcy, is a best practice that prevents needless fighting over assets and results in maximal recovery in the aftermath of rampant frauds. [9](#page-31-0)\n\n6 *See Sec. Investor Protection Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Investment Sec. LLC*, No. 09-11893 (BRL) (S.D.N.Y. Bankr. June 9, 2009), available at [http](http)\n\n7 Available at http\n\n8 Available at http\n\n9 Nor is there anything improper about the Government providing a set of photographs to the courtappointed Trustee here. In his Bankruptcy Stay Motion, Kwok attempted to suggest that the Government violated the protective order in doing so (Kwok Br. 3, 21), but, as already explained in the Government's response (Dkt. 148, at 3 n.2), Kwok is wrong. Moreover, the photographs were responsive to the Government's search warrant executed at the Mahwah Mansion. As an\n\n*Second*, Kwok's argument regarding a supposed need to protect his privileged information residing with the Trustee is meritless. The Government has already explained that it has neither sought or received such information, and would do so only under appropriate circumstances. (Dkt. 148, at 2).[10](#page-31-0)\n\n*Third*, the interactions between the Government and the Trustee are unexceptional. Kwok's suggestion that the Trustee could be a member of the prosecution team is baseless based\n\non the circumstances:\n\n- the Government initiated its investigation independent of the Trustee, years before Kwok voluntarily filed for bankruptcy and the Trustee was even appointed;\n- the Trustee played no role in the Government's charging decisions or the development of the Government's prosecutorial strategy;\n- the Trustee has not participated in any of the Government's interviews;\n- the Trustee was not involved in presenting this case to the grand jury and did not receive grand jury transcripts;\n- the Trustee did not participate in the execution of search warrants or the responsiveness reviews of materials obtained pursuant to search warrants;\n- the Trustee did not obtain materials produced to the Government pursuant to grand jury subpoenas; and\n- the Trustee has not accompanied the Government to Court.\n\n(Murray Decl. ¶ 3).\n\nanalogy, materials responsive to search warrants are regularly shared with regulatory agencies engaged in parallel investigations, and such sharing is entirely proper and, indeed, commonplace.\n\n10 Kwok's reply in connection with the Bankruptcy Stay Motion argues that the Government's inclusion, in its description of appropriate circumstances where it could obtain the privileged information of Kwok, of agreement from Kwok \"or the appropriate holder [of the privilege]\" had created some kind of \"loophole.\" (Dkt. 152 at 8). Kwok is wrong. The Government included that parenthetical addition merely to encompass circumstances in which Kwok is not, in fact, the appropriate holder of the privilege, such as when a corporate entity, rather than an individual, actually holds the privilege.\n\nTo be clear, Kwok does not actually claim that the Trustee is part of the prosecution team. He seeks communications to \"fully investigate whether the Trustee\" is part of the prosecution team. (Br. 19). But, as set forth above, that is not a basis for obtaining discovery beyond what criminal law and procedure provides. Kwok identifies \"coordination\" and \"information sharing\" between the Government and the Trustee, but such coordination between the Government and another party is wholly \"unexceptional and unproblematic\" and provides no basis for the extraordinary discovery that Kwok seeks. *Rhodes*, 2019 WL 3162221, at \\*3; *see also Meregildo*, 920 F. Supp. 2d at 441-42 (\"Interacting with the prosecution team, without more, does not make someone a team member.\").\n\n#### **CONCLUSION**\n\nIt is plain that neither the SEC nor the Trustee are members of the prosecution team in this case. And in order to obtain discovery beyond what the criminal rules provide, a defendant must make a substantial showing of bad faith on the part of the Government. Kwok has not made that showing, because he cannot make that showing. The Government's interactions with the SEC and the Trustee have not only been in good faith, but such interactions are routine and unexceptional. To the extent there is anything exceptional about the circumstances presented here, it is that Kwok has filed two motions at least partly in pursuit of allowing his co-conspirators and associates to further obstruct justice and perpetuate his massive fraud by retaking possession of the Mahwah Mansion. Kwok's motion should be denied.\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\n DAMIAN WILLIAMS United States Attorney\n\nBy: */s/*\n\n Micah F. Fergenson Ryan B. Finkel Juliana N. Murray Assistant United States Attorneys 212-637-2190/-6612 /-2314\n\n# **EXHIBIT A**\n\n#### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\n\nv.\n\nHO WAN KWOK, a/k/a \"Miles Guo,\" a/k/a \"Miles Kwok,\" a/k/a \"Guo Wengui,\" a/k/a \"Brother Seven,\" a/k/a \"The Principal,\"\n\nKIN MING JE, a/k/a \"William Je,\" and\n\nYANPING WANG, a/k/a \"Yvette,\"\n\n*Defendants*.\n\n### **AUSA AFFIRMATION**\n\n**S1 23 Cr. 118 (AT)**\n\nSTATE OF NEW YORK ) COUNTY OF NEW YORK : ss.: SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK )\n\nJULIANA N. MURRAY, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, hereby affirms under penalty of perjury:\n\n1. I am an Assistant United States Attorney in the Office of Damian Williams, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York. I submit this affirmation to provide the Court with information concerning the nature and extent of the Government's[1](#page-31-0) relationship with the Securities and Exchange Commission (\"SEC\") during the Government's investigation of Ho\n\n1 References to the Government throughout this Affirmation refer to the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York.\n\nWan Kwok, Kin Ming Je, and Yanping Wang (the \"Kwok Investigation\"). I am one of the Assistant United States Attorneys currently responsible for this matter, and I have been involved with the investigation since 2021.\n\n2. Based on my participation in this investigation, my review of emails and text messages, my review of call notes, my conversations with attorneys for the SEC Enforcement Division team who conducted the parallel investigation of Kwok, Je, and Wang, and my conversations with other Assistant United States Attorneys who also participated in the Kwok Investigation, I have learned the following, among other things, about the Kwok Investigation:\n\na. The SEC played no role in the Government's charging decisions or the development of the Government's prosecutorial strategy.\n\nb. Likewise, based on my discussions with attorneys at the SEC, I understand that the Government played no role in the SEC's charging decisions or the developments of the SEC's litigation strategy.\n\nc. No one from the SEC was designated as a special Assistant U.S. Attorney to work on the criminal investigation.\n\nd. The SEC participated in certain of the interviews conducted by the Government in the course of the Kwok Investigation. The SEC did not take notes during those interviews.\n\ne. At interviews in which both the Government and the SEC participated, witnesses were told, in sum and substance, that the agencies' investigations were separate, that the interviews were conducted together only as a matter of convenience, and that, if there were to be a proffer agreement, the witness would enter into a separate agreement with each agency.[2](#page-31-0)\n\n2 Where a witness was interviewed on multiple occasions, these statements were made at the initial proffer but were not necessarily repeated at each subsequent proffer.\n\nf. The SEC was not involved in presenting the criminal case to the grand jury and did not receive grand jury transcripts.\n\ng. The SEC did not participate in the execution of search warrants, or the responsiveness reviews of materials obtained pursuant to search warrants.\n\nh. The Government did not produce to the SEC any materials that the Government obtained pursuant to grand jury subpoenas.\n\ni. The SEC has not accompanied the Government to Court in the criminal case.\n\n3. Based on my participation in this investigation, my review of the docket in Kwok's chapter 11 bankruptcy case, my review of emails and text messages, my review of call notes, my conversations with the Trustee and his associates, and my conversations with other Assistant United States Attorneys who also participated in the Kwok Investigation, I have learned the following, among other things, about the Kwok Investigation:\n\na. The Government initiated the Kwok Investigation in or about May 2020.\n\nb. Kwok filed a voluntary petition for chapter 11 bankruptcy on or about February 15, 2022. The Trustee was appointed on or about July 7, 2022.\n\nc. The Trustee played no role in the Government's charging decisions or the development of the Government's prosecutorial strategy.\n\nd. The Trustee was not involved in presenting the Kwok Investigation to the grand jury and did not receive grand jury transcripts.\n\ne. The Trustee did not participate in the execution of search warrants, or the responsiveness reviews of materials obtained pursuant to search warrants.\n\nf. The Trustee has not participated in any of the Government's interviews.\n\n3\n\ng. The Trustee did not obtain materials produced to the Government pursuant to grand\n\njury subpoenas.\n\nh. The Trustee has not accompanied the Government to Court in the criminal case.\n\nDated: New York, New York October 19, 2023\n\nJuliana N. Murray Assistant United States Attorney (212) 637-2314\n\n# **EXHIBIT B**\n\n| 120 | |\n|-----|--|\n| | |\n\n| In Re | | * | Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |\n|---------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | HO WAN KWOK and GENEVER | *
* | |\n| HOLDINGS CORPORATION, | | * | |\n| | Debtor. | *
* | |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, | | * | Adv. Proc. No. 22-05027 |\n| | Plaintiff, | *
* | |\n| | | * | |\n| v. | | * | |\n| | BRAVO LUCK, LIMITED, et al., | *
* | |\n| | | * | |\n| | Defendant. | * | |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, | | *
* | Adv. Proc. No. 23-05017 |\n| | | * | Bridgeport, Connecticut |\n| | Plaintiff, | * | August 29, 2023 |\n| v. | | *
* | |\n| | | * | |\n| TAURUS FUND, LLC, et al., | | * | |\n| | Defendants. | *
* | |\n| | | * | |\n| | * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * | | |\n| | TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS | | |\n| | BEFORE THE HONORABLE JULIE A. MANNING
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE | | |\n| APPEARANCES: | | | |\n| Chapter 11 Trustee: | | | LUC A. DESPINS, ESQ.
Paul Hastings LLP
200 Park Avenue |\n| | | | New York, NY
10166 |\n\n|---------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|\n| | | |\n| | 120 | |\n\n2\n\nAPPEARANCES: (Cont'd) For the Chapter 11 Trustee: PATRICK R. LINSEY, ESQ. Neubert Pepe and Monteith 195 Church Street,13th Floor New Haven, CT 06510 For U.S. Trustee: HOLLEY L. CLAIBORN, ESQ. Office of U.S. Trustee The Giaimo Federal Building 150 Court Street, Room 302 New Haven, CT 06510 For the Creditors Committee: IRVE J. GOLDMAN, ESQ. Pullman & Comley 850 Main Street Bridgeport, CT 06601 For Bravo Luck: FRANCIS J. LAWALL, ESQ. Troutman Pepper Hamilton Sanders, LLP 3000 Two Logan Square 18th and Arch Street Philadelphia, PA 19103 For Hing Chi Ngok and CHRISTOPHER J. MAJOR, ESQ. Greenwich Land, LLC: Meister Seelig & Fein LLP 125 Park Avenue New York, NY 10017 For Taurus Fund, LLC: MICHAEL T. CONWAY, ESQ. Lazare Potter Giacovas & Moyle, LLP 747 Third Avenue New York, NY 10017\n\n| | 3 |\n|---------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| #2049 | MOTION TO COMPROMISE CONTROVERSY W/BRAVO
LUCK LTD AND MILESON GUO a/k/a QIANG GUO AND/OR
GUO QIANG, P.O. BOX 957 OFFSHORE INC CENTRE, ROAD
TOWN, TORTOLA, BVI (BRAVO LUCK LTD); 5 PRINCESS |\n| | GATE, G3, LONDON, UK (Qiang Guo) |\n| # 111 | MOTION TO COMPROMISE CONTROVERSY WITH BRAVO LUCK |\n| | AND MILESON GUO a/k/a QIANG GUO AND/OR |\n| | GUO QIANG, P.O. BOX 957 OFFSHORE INC CENTRE, ROAD |\n| | TOWN, TORTOLA, BVI (BRAVO LUCK LTD); 5 PRINCESS |\n| | GATE, G3, LONDON, UK (Qiang Guo) |\n| #2083 | MOTION OF CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE, PURSUANT TO BANKR. |\n| | RULE 9019 FOR APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT WITH USA |\n| #
24 | MOTION OF CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE, PURSUANT TO BANKR. |\n| | RULE 9019 FOR APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT WITH USA |\n| #2079 | MOTION FOR 2004 EXAM OF ADDITIONAL ENTITIES AND |\n| | INDIVIDUALS AFFILIATED WITH DEBTOR AND RELEVANT |\n| | BANKS (SIXTH OMNIBUS) |\n| #2127 | ORDER SCHEDULING STATUS CONFERENCE |\n| | |\n\n|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
4 |\n| 1 | (Proceedings commenced at 2:01 p.m.) |\n| 2 | THE COURTROOM DEPUTY:
Case No. 22-50073, Ho Wan |\n| 3 | Kwok and Genever Holdings, LLC, 22-5027, Despins, et al, |\n| 4 | versus Bravo Luck Limited, et al, and 23-5017, Despins, et |\n| 5 | al, versus Taurus Fund, LLC, et al. |\n| 6 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Good afternoon.
If we could |\n| 7 | have appearances for the record starting with the Chapter 11 |\n| 8 | Trustee, please. |\n| 9 | MR. DESPINS:
Good afternoon, Your Honor.
Luc |\n| 10 | Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee. |\n| 11 | THE COURT:
Good afternoon. |\n| 12 | MR. LINSEY:
Good afternoon, Your Honor.
Patrick |\n| 13 | Linsey of Neubert, Pepe and Monteith for the Trustee. |\n| 14 | THE COURT:
Good afternoon. |\n| 15 | MR. GOLDMAN:
Good afternoon, Your Honor.
Irve |\n| 16 | Goldman, Pullman & Comley, for the creditors committee. |\n| 17 | THE COURT:
Good afternoon. |\n| 18 | MS. CLAIBORN:
Good afternoon.
Holley Claiborn |\n| 19 | for the U.S. Trustee. |\n| 20 | THE COURT:
Good afternoon. |\n| 21 | MR. LAWALL:
Good afternoon, Your Honor.
Fran |\n| 22 | Lawall, Bravo Luck. |\n| 23 | THE COURT:
Good afternoon. |\n| 24 | MR. MAJOR:
Good afternoon, Your Honor.
Chris |\n| 25 | Major, Meister Seelig & Fein.
We represent Hing Chi Ngok |\n\n| | 120 |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
5 |\n| 1 | and Greenwich Land, LLC. |\n| 2 | THE COURT:
Good afternoon. |\n| 3 | MR. CONWAY:
Good afternoon, Your Honor.
Michael |\n| 4 | Conway here for Taurus Fund, LLC |\n| 5 | THE COURT:
Good afternoon. |\n| 6 | All right.
We have, as I mentioned, several |\n| 7 | matters on the calendar this afternoon. |\n| 8 | Trustee Despins, I've look at the matters insofar |\n| 9 | as whether objections have been filed and things of that |\n| 10 | nature.
And with regard to the Bravo Luck motion to |\n| 11 | compromise, I see that no objections have been filed to |\n| 12 | that.
Am I correct on that? |\n| 13 | MR. DESPINS:
That's correct, Your Honor. |\n| 14 | THE COURT:
All right.
So does it make sense to |\n| 15 | proceed with the Bravo Luck matter first? |\n| 16 | MR. DESPINS:
Yes, Your Honor. |\n| 17 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Please proceed.
Thank you. |\n| 18 | MR. DESPINS:
Thank you.
Good afternoon, Your |\n| 19 | Honor.
Luc Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee. |\n| 20 | This is actually a pretty straightforward motion |\n| 21 | to settle the controversy between the various debtor's |\n| 22 | estates and Bravo Luck and the debtor's son with respect to |\n| 23 | the Sherry-Netherland. |\n| 24 | And basically you'll recall that we had brought, |\n| 25 | you know, three separate adversary proceedings against Bravo |\n| | |\n\n|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
6 |\n| 1 | Luck.
And also had objected to the claims of the son.
And |\n| 2 | there had been no answer to that or no response to that. |\n| 3 | And there was a lot of litigation and motions to dismiss, |\n| 4 | amendments, et cetera, et cetera. |\n| 5 | So to make a long story short, the parties have |\n| 6 | reached an agreement to settle this.
And I believe it's |\n| 7 | pretty straightforward in the sense that what I would call |\n| 8 | the Bravo Luck parties, Bravo Luck and the son, are |\n| 9 | abandoning any arguments that they have an interest in the |\n| 10 | Sherry-Netherland apartment, directly or indirectly. |\n| 11 | They're waiving claims, et cetera, et cetera. |\n| 12 | We are withdrawing the litigation that was |\n| 13 | commenced against them.
I mean everything I'm saying is |\n| 14 | subject to the settlement agreement, which is much more |\n| 15 | detailed, but that's, in a nutshell that's what's happening. |\n| 16 | So it's pretty straightforward. |\n| 17 | I would just point out that the releases are not |\n| 18 | symmetric, so that's important in the sense that they are |\n| 19 | releasing claims.
We're not releasing all our claims in the |\n| 20 | world against them.
So that we are releasing the claims |\n| 21 | asserted in the complaint. |\n| 22 | And again, what I'm saying is subject to the terms |\n| 23 | of settlement agreement, which is in much more detail, but |\n| 24 | conceptually I wanted to make sure the Court understood this |\n| 25 | is not a global release of claims. |\n| | |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023 7 THE COURT: I think I -- that was my thought, that it is not a global release of claims. MR. DESPINS: So unless the Court has questions, and Mr. Lawall wants to be heard, but I have nothing else at this time. THE COURT: I do want to hear from you, Counsel, Mr. Lawall, when you have a moment. I just -- there are many pending matters related to a pending objection to claim and the adversary proceedings that we haven't acted on because you've been talking, right? MR. DESPINS: Right. THE COURT: And you've made representations to the Court, even in pleadings or in court, that the parties have been working together toward resolution of these issues. So obviously you've worked hard. And you've come to a resolution, which is appreciated. That will mean, I think, assuming this is approved, that you may see, because the clerk's office has to do certain things, you know, motions terminated, or you're going to withdraw adversary proceedings, right? You're going to dismiss? Or what are you do -- what is the actual -- MR. DESPINS: Yeah. Frankly, I'm not sure of the plumbing, but there is plumbing that remains to be done in\n\n|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
8 |\n| 1 | terms of probably withdrawing the adversary proceeding, or |\n| 2 | perhaps the settlement (indiscernible).
I'll look at that. |\n| 3 | But -- |\n| 4 | THE COURT:
Well, I've got it here. |\n| 5 | MR. DESPINS:
Yeah. |\n| 6 | THE COURT:
I don't recall exactly. |\n| 7 | But what I'm saying is if you both see some |\n| 8 | entries made because it appears that certain matters that |\n| 9 | have been pending are resolved pursuant to an approval of |\n| 10 | the settlement, then that will be ministerial. |\n| 11 | MR. DESPINS:
Yes. |\n| 12 | THE COURT:
I just want you to understand that. |\n| 13 | Okay? |\n| 14 | MR. DESPINS:
Yes. |\n| 15 | The order provides that the plaintiff's authorized |\n| 16 | to execute, deliver, implement all sorts of documents or |\n| 17 | instruments necessary to implement this. |\n| 18 | THE COURT:
Right. |\n| 19 | MR. DESPINS:
I think that Mr. Lawall -- that |\n| 20 | there were signatures provided.
There were signatures to |\n| 21 | the settlement agreement provided by Bravo Luck.
There was |\n| 22 | no signature provided by the son because that's held in |\n| 23 | trust by Mr. Lawall.
They didn't want to provide the |\n| 24 | signature -- |\n| 25 | THE COURT:
But you have it? |\n\n| | 120 |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
9 |\n| 1 | MR. DESPINS:
Yeah. |\n| 2 | THE COURT:
I mean, you have the actual signature? |\n| 3 | MR. DESPINS:
That's what we've been told. |\n| 4 | THE COURT:
Okay. |\n| 5 | MR. DESPINS:
So that when -- if the Court |\n| 6 | approves the settlement, then the signature will be added. |\n| 7 | But to the extent there are ministerial things that need to |\n| 8 | happen, we will make those happen, Your Honor. |\n| 9 | THE COURT:
Yeah.
I don't know that there's a lot |\n| 10 | of things you need to do other than what you've just |\n| 11 | discussed.
I just want you to be aware that when I looked |\n| 12 | at this, and again, I'm looking at it again now to refresh |\n| 13 | my recollection, but there are matters that are outstanding |\n| 14 | in the adversary proceedings in the main case that I believe |\n| 15 | now are resolved by this settlement. |\n| 16 | MR. DESPINS:
Yes, they're all resolved.
Yes. |\n| 17 | THE COURT:
So that's the way I view it.
And I |\n| 18 | want to make sure that neither one of you view it |\n| 19 | differently, because I don't want to make a mistake in my |\n| 20 | view. |\n| 21 | MR. DESPINS:
That's correct, Your Honor.
The |\n| 22 | settlement agreement is pretty detailed in terms of -- |\n| 23 | THE COURT:
Yes, it is. |\n| 24 | MR. DESPINS:
-- this claim is waived, that claim |\n| 25 | is waived, so it's very precise.
I think these are self- |\n| | |\n\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
11 |\n| 1 | afternoon.
Fran Lawall, Troutman Pepper, on behalf of Bravo |\n| 2 | Luck. |\n| 3 | To answer, I guess, some of your procedural |\n| 4 | questions, I think the way the settlement agreement is |\n| 5 | structured is that the three adversaries will be dismissed |\n| 6 | with prejudice. |\n| 7 | THE COURT:
Right. |\n| 8 | MR. LAWALL:
The proofs of claim that were filed |\n| 9 | are deemed withdrawn. |\n| 10 | By having the complaints withdrawn with prejudice, |\n| 11 | that will obviously take off your calendar the motions to |\n| 12 | dismiss.
This is in the form of a typical settlement.
None |\n| 13 | of the defendants are admitting any of the -- any of the |\n| 14 | assertions within the complaints.
And in fact, there are |\n| 15 | specific denials.
But again, this is a settlement. |\n| 16 | THE COURT:
Yes. |\n| 17 | MR. LAWALL:
There are some things that will |\n| 18 | happen in the Virgin Islands with litigation that was |\n| 19 | ancillary to this, which will go away as well. |\n| 20 | But again, I agree with Mr. Despins.
The |\n| 21 | settlement agreement is sufficiently complex that we would |\n| 22 | rely upon the four corners of that settlement agreement. |\n| 23 | But generally I think your understanding of the essence of |\n| 24 | it is largely correct. |\n| 25 | THE COURT:
And I -- and again, I only raise the |\n\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
12 |\n| 1 | issue about what you may see coming across dockets to let |\n| 2 | you know that that would be ministerial from the clerk's |\n| 3 | office point of view. |\n| 4 | So for example, as you said, the adversaries will |\n| 5 | be withdrawn -- dismissed, I'm sorry, dismissed.
So I don't |\n| 6 | know, are you going to file a separate Rule 7041 dismissal |\n| 7 | or is this document the stipulation of dismissal? |\n| 8 | MR. LAWALL:
I think I can work that out with Mr. |\n| 9 | Despins' team. |\n| 10 | THE COURT:
Fine. |\n| 11 | MR. LAWALL:
And we'll -- I think we can take that |\n| 12 | off Your Honor.
And we'll -- if the clerk's office doesn't |\n| 13 | automatically take care of that, we can sign whatever is |\n| 14 | necessary to effectuate the settlement agreement. |\n| 15 | THE COURT:
Okay.
That's helpful. |\n| 16 | MR. LAWALL:
Okay. |\n| 17 | THE COURT:
Thank you. |\n| 18 | MR. LAWALL:
Okay. |\n| 19 | THE COURT:
It may be unfortunately.
But you |\n| 20 | know, it can be as simple as a stipulation, a two-line |\n| 21 | stipulation, that under Rule 7041(a)(1), (a)(2), or whatever |\n| 22 | it is the parties stipulate to dismissal of the adversary |\n| 23 | proceeding with prejudice and then it's self-effectuating |\n| 24 | and the clerk's office doesn't have to do anything other |\n| 25 | than close that adversary proceeding in the ordinary course |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023 13 of business. MR. LAWALL: Understood, Your Honor. Whatever the clerk's office needs, we'll get it. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. I appreciate that. MR. LAWALL: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: And then with regard to the motions to dismiss, I don't even -- I think we've just continued the hearings on those, right? MR. LAWALL: Yes. Yes. THE COURT: Okay. MR. LAWALL: They've all been pushed. I forget whether there were any ancillary motion practice. But again, my expectation is because they were all under the consolidated adversary everything effectively falls off the docket. THE COURT: I agree with you. Okay. I just wanted to make sure. That's how I view it. If there's any issues from the clerk's office perspective, someone will reach out and let you both know. How's that? MR. LAWALL: Not a problem. THE COURT: Okay. All right. So again, I do appreciate the efforts. We've been talking about this for some time. And I do find that under the bankruptcy rule and the standard that's been applied by courts in connection with a settlement or compromise under Rule 9019, that the\n\n| | 120 |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
14 |\n| 1 | settlement falls within the range of reasonableness.
I |\n| 2 | think it's a -- it is a positive step.
Although I |\n| 3 | understand, you know, no one's -- you're all doing what you |\n| 4 | can under the circumstances to move things forward and I |\n| 5 | think that's very positive. |\n| 6 | No one has filed any written objections to the |\n| 7 | motion to compromise.
And under our local rules the reason |\n| 8 | it has to be -- the motion has to be filed not just in the |\n| 9 | adversary proceedings, but in the main case, is so that all |\n| 10 | parties are served.
And they were served and no one has |\n| 11 | filed any written objections. |\n| 12 | So for all those reasons, the motion to compromise |\n| 13 | filed both in the main case and the adversary proceedings |\n| 14 | are granted. |\n| 15 | I have the proposed order here and it looks fine |\n| 16 | to me.
It does attach the settlement agreement as Exhibit 1 |\n| 17 | to the order, which is absolutely fine.
I think that's |\n| 18 | actually preferable to have it there so someone can look at |\n| 19 | it if they need to. |\n| 20 | And I think that I don't need to do anything else |\n| 21 | at the moment unless you think otherwise, Attorney Lawall? |\n| 22 | MR. LAWALL:
I think we're good, Judge. |\n| 23 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Thank you very much.
I |\n| 24 | appreciate that. |\n| 25 | MR. LAWALL:
Your Honor, my business with the |\n| | |\n\n| | 120 |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
15 |\n| 1 | Court is done today.
May I be excused? |\n| 2 | THE COURT:
Absolutely.
Thank you very much. |\n| 3 | MR. LAWALL:
Thank you, Your Honor. |\n| 4 | THE COURT:
All right.
So the first two matters |\n| 5 | on the calendar, ECF 2049 in the main case, and ECF 111 in |\n| 6 | the adversary, 22-5027, are granted for the reasons stated |\n| 7 | on the record.
And the proposed orders will enter. |\n| 8 | Now, the other settlement agreement has an |\n| 9 | objection, Trustee Despins.
And then there's also the |\n| 10 | motion for 2004 examination, I think there's an objection. |\n| 11 | I don't know if that's been resolved. |\n| 12 | MR. DESPINS:
That's correct, Your Honor. |\n| 13 | THE COURT:
That has an objection as well? |\n| 14 | MR. DESPINS:
Yes. |\n| 15 | THE COURT:
Okay.
And then the order scheduling |\n| 16 | the status conference in connection with the motion to |\n| 17 | remediate areas of the Sherry-Netherland, do you want to |\n| 18 | talk about that now or do you want to -- |\n| 19 | MR. DESPINS:
Sure, we can. |\n| 20 | THE COURT:
Okay.
That's ECF 2127 in the main |\n| 21 | case.
The only reason that was set for a status conference |\n| 22 | was because someone had brought to my attention that there |\n| 23 | was -- there were two things, well, actually I guess three |\n| 24 | things. |\n| 25 | The motion was filed under Section 363, so I |\n| | |\n\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
16 |\n| 1 | assume it was filed under, but I could be wrong, that it was |\n| 2 | filed under 363 because you're talking about use of estate |\n| 3 | property? |\n| 4 | MR. DESPINS:
Correct, Your Honor. |\n| 5 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Under our local rules, and it's |\n| 6 | not as clear as it could be, but normally, any motion |\n| 7 | seeking relief under 363 is automatically set for a hearing. |\n| 8 | And this was filed under the contested matter |\n| 9 | procedure.
So I don't know how you want to -- if you want |\n| 10 | to wait for a response period to go by, that's fine.
Or it |\n| 11 | can be automatically set for a hearing in which there will |\n| 12 | be an objection deadline, but that -- that is one of the |\n| 13 | reasons it was brought to my attention. |\n| 14 | MR. DESPINS:
Thank you, Your Honor.
You're |\n| 15 | correct. |\n| 16 | And we had -- pursuant to that contested matter |\n| 17 | rule, we had set forth as an exhibit an objection deadline |\n| 18 | of September 13th.
And we're content with that -- |\n| 19 | THE COURT:
Okay. |\n| 20 | MR. DESPINS:
-- as long as the hearing, if |\n| 21 | there's no objection, takes place soonish thereafter. |\n| 22 | THE COURT:
Well, we can -- we can do one of two |\n| 23 | things.
We can issue a notice of hearing right now setting |\n| 24 | an objection -- I don't mean right now, but today or |\n| 25 | tomorrow -- setting an objection deadline of September 13 |\n\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
17 |\n| 1 | and then a hearing a few days after that.
Or we can wait |\n| 2 | until the objection deadline and set a hearing.
But there's |\n| 3 | going to be a hearing regardless, so to me it seems to make |\n| 4 | sense to issue a notice of hearing with the objection |\n| 5 | deadline of September 13. |\n| 6 | MR. DESPINS:
That's right, Your Honor. |\n| 7 | THE COURT:
Okay. |\n| 8 | MR. DESPINS:
Better to do that.
Yes. |\n| 9 | THE COURT:
Okay.
So we'll do that.
And let me |\n| 10 | just look at the calendar as far as when the actual hearing |\n| 11 | would be held. |\n| 12 | I mean, we have matters on the calendar in the |\n| 13 | afternoon of September 19th, but -- and I don't know how |\n| 14 | long they would last, but it could last at least an hour or |\n| 15 | more in the afternoon.
We could either do it later that |\n| 16 | afternoon or we could do it on Wednesday the 20th, whatever |\n| 17 | you prefer. |\n| 18 | MR. DESPINS:
If we could do it on the 19th, that |\n| 19 | would be preferable, Your Honor. |\n| 20 | THE COURT:
Okay.
So I would schedule that.
I |\n| 21 | probably wouldn't schedule it before 3:30 because the matter |\n| 22 | on at 2:00 is either going to be contested or it's going to |\n| 23 | last for two minutes.
I don't know. |\n| 24 | So how -- or you can -- we can schedule it for |\n| 25 | 3:00.
Or we can schedule it for 2:00 and you just have to |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023 18 wait. MR. DESPINS: That's fine, Your Honor. THE COURT: So what time? Would you like 2:00 then? MR. DESPINS: Two o'clock is fine, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. So we'll schedule it at 2:00, but there is another matter that would go forward first if it -- if it is not resolved. Okay? MR. DESPINS: That other matter is not in this case. THE COURT: No. MR. DESPINS: Okay. THE COURT: No, it's not in this case. That's what I'm saying. MR. DESPINS: Okay. THE COURT: It's another case. So I can either schedule yours at 2:00 as well -- MR. DESPINS: That's fine. THE COURT: -- and then you'll just have to wait. Okay. All right. So let's do that. We're going to schedule what -- the underlying motion is ECF 2113. We're going to issue a notice of hearing on that motion for September 19th at 2 p.m. with an objection deadline of September 13. That's all we need to do with that. Then that -- then our status conference, we've\n\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
19 |\n| 1 | held the status conference with regard to that matter. |\n| 2 | The only other thing the U.S. Trustee's Office may |\n| 3 | want, I have no idea, Attorney Claiborn, but that motion |\n| 4 | that's seeking to remediate different issues at the Sherry |\n| 5 | Netherland apartment also seeks the employment.
So I don't |\n| 6 | know if you want the order to refer to Section 327 or |\n| 7 | something too.
I have no idea.
But maybe you can all work |\n| 8 | that out before we have a hearing. |\n| 9 | And maybe if you all come in and there's no |\n| 10 | problem, you'll go first at 2 p.m.
Okay? |\n| 11 | MR. DESPINS:
That's a good incentive. |\n| 12 | THE COURT:
All right.
So with regard to the |\n| 13 | status conference that was held today that -- the status |\n| 14 | conference has been held.
There's no need for any -- no |\n| 15 | further status conferences will be scheduled and a notice of |\n| 16 | hearing will issue on ECF No. 2113.
Okay? |\n| 17 | So then how would you like to proceed next? |\n| 18 | MR. DESPINS:
We'll go to Mahwah at this point. |\n| 19 | THE COURT:
Go right ahead. |\n| 20 | MR. DESPINS:
Thank you, Your Honor. |\n| 21 | So Your Honor, this is a motion to approve a |\n| 22 | settlement with the Department of Justice.
That's under |\n| 23 | document 24 in the adversary proceeding.
And I have already |\n| 24 | testified as to this, but I think it's important that we set |\n| 25 | the stage again on this because last time that was not the |\n\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
20 |\n| 1 | main focus.
I wanted the Court to know about it, but |\n| 2 | clearly that was not the purpose of that hearing. |\n| 3 | So the first question is why enter into a |\n| 4 | settlement with the DOJ?
Second question is what does the |\n| 5 | settlement do or not do?
And so let me try to address that. |\n| 6 | The first question is why? |\n| 7 | As we state in the motion, the DOJ has expressly |\n| 8 | targeted the Mahwah mansion as a -- that's not a verb -- |\n| 9 | forfeitable asset and they've actually identified that |\n| 10 | asset.
We did not know about it.
So we have to be candid |\n| 11 | with the Court.
We did not know about that asset until the |\n| 12 | indictment was released. |\n| 13 | And, however, the Department of Justice, their |\n| 14 | tools are sort of limited in the pre-conviction phase in the |\n| 15 | sense that they cannot obtain title to this property now or |\n| 16 | do much with it before there's a conviction, which is a |\n| 17 | final conviction.
Given that the trial is not going to last |\n| 18 | -- not going to start until April I think, at least until |\n| 19 | April of next year, obviously, the DOJ and we were aware of |\n| 20 | what was going there and we're really concerned about this |\n| 21 | very valuable asset being left in limbo for lack of a better |\n| 22 | term. |\n| 23 | So, however, because they identified this asset as |\n| 24 | a potentially forfeitable asset, we did not want to begin |\n| 25 | any adversary proceeding which could be perceived as hostile |\n| | |\n\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
21 |\n| 1 | towards the DOJ because obviously it's important we believe |\n| 2 | to work with them as cooperatively as possible.
Why? |\n| 3 | Because they have all sorts of tools that we don't |\n| 4 | have.
We don't want them to be fighting us and us being at |\n| 5 | cross purposes with them with respect to this asset, and |\n| 6 | this is where we came up with this idea of -- first of all, |\n| 7 | we did our homework.
We believe that this asset through the |\n| 8 | relief we're seeking in the adversary proceeding is an |\n| 9 | estate asset.
We're convinced of that.
The Court will have |\n| 10 | to determine if that's the case or not.
That's for another |\n| 11 | day. |\n| 12 | But we approached the DOJ and said we want to go |\n| 13 | forward with this adversary proceeding to try to establish |\n| 14 | that this is an asset of the estate.
And eventually, if the |\n| 15 | Court rules in our favor, to sell this asset to liquidate it |\n| 16 | for the benefit of holders of allowed claims. |\n| 17 | And so we had this discussion about, okay, how is |\n| 18 | that going to play out, because their view is that they have |\n| 19 | superior claims.
And I'm not going to go into all the |\n| 20 | details on this, but we pointed out and we cited in the |\n| 21 | motion some case law, because there's a lot of cases on this |\n| 22 | where Chapter 11 trustees or Chapter 7 trustees are battling |\n| 23 | against the DOJ over issues like that as to who has first |\n| 24 | dibs on an asset of the -- and I'm saying in those cases the |\n| 25 | alleged wrongdoer -- and, you know, obviously we want to |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023 22 avoid that. And we also wanted to avoid the following, which is we filed this adversary proceeding. In my dreams, we prevail. We sell the assets and the DOJ comes in and says thank you very much, we will take that money, and thank you for your work, and that's the end of it. We could not have that. This estate cannot be in a position where it's financing any other activity. It has to net neutral. And I believe move than net neutral, and I'll get to that piece in a second. So that we negotiated the fact that if we prevail, that's very important, only if we prevail. This settlement agreement does not dictate the sale of the property because it provides that certain things will happen if we prevail. So if we prevail and we sell the asset, we can use the net proceeds to pay all the expenses that the estate will have incurred. At that time, we thought we would incur not only legal fees, but security fees, a broker to sell the property, a mortgage if -- there's no mortgage on the property, but if there are people that have mechanics liens that need to be paid, that of course comes off the top. So that creates a concept of net proceeds. And the net proceeds under that stipulation, we're kicking down -- that down the road, which is to be determined. And I'll\n\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
23 |\n| 1 | come back to why there's not more progress on that.
So the |\n| 2 | net proceeds are very important. |\n| 3 | And what I said is, okay, that's great.
We're |\n| 4 | going to get all our expenses back.
That's good.
But this |\n| 5 | case is not being run for the professionals for the case. |\n| 6 | There has to be a benefit to the estate.
That's where we |\n| 7 | came in with the deemed expense of a million dollars. |\n| 8 | So that assuming for a second that we prevail, the |\n| 9 | mansion is sold, we get all the expenses paid, and the DOJ |\n| 10 | and us cannot agree on the distribution of the net proceeds, |\n| 11 | we're getting a million dollars to the estate guaranteed. |\n| 12 | And it says in there to be paid to the holders of allowed |\n| 13 | claims, so an allowed claim in your court, so it has to be |\n| 14 | an allowed claim, allowed claims of victims.
And, you know, |\n| 15 | people pointed out, well, victims is not defined. |\n| 16 | That's not an accident.
Meaning, I want to have a |\n| 17 | shot at convincing the DOJ that the victims -- first of all, |\n| 18 | you have to have an allowed claim.
You cannot receive a |\n| 19 | penny of this unless you have an allowed claim as determined |\n| 20 | by Your Honor.
But if you have an allowed claim, the issue |\n| 21 | of who's a victim or not, that's -- I would like that to be |\n| 22 | subject to further discussion. |\n| 23 | But the bottom line is this estate will end up |\n| 24 | with a million positive, if we're right that this property |\n| 25 | is part of the estate.
And we feel pretty strongly that is |\n\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
24 |\n| 1 | the case, but of course Your Honor will have to rule on |\n| 2 | that. |\n| 3 | So the estate is not worse off because the fees |\n| 4 | and expenses are covered.
It's better off by a million |\n| 5 | dollars.
And it can be better off by a lot more than that |\n| 6 | if we are successful in convincing the DOJ that the |\n| 7 | distribution of proceeds from this property -- and by the |\n| 8 | way, we're going to try that with other -- you know, for |\n| 9 | example, I've mentioned the cash that's being frozen right |\n| 10 | now, \\$630 million we -- that's not today's issue, but the |\n| 11 | game plan here, based on other cases where the DOJ has |\n| 12 | sought and obtained forfeiture of assets, is for the Chapter |\n| 13 | 11 Trustee to wear two hats, Chapter 11 Trustee and |\n| 14 | forfeiture receiver.
And it all comes back to this court |\n| 15 | for distribution. |\n| 16 | And I know there are issues there.
And they know |\n| 17 | that too, meaning the DOJ.
They're not naive.
They know |\n| 18 | that. |\n| 19 | The question is, okay, who's a victim?
In their |\n| 20 | book, a victim might be only the victim of certain alleged |\n| 21 | schemes.
But, you know, I can see that there are other |\n| 22 | people in this case that Mr. Goldman represents that also |\n| 23 | are victims. |\n| 24 | For example, Bru Ma(ph), you don't know her, but |\n| 25 | I'm using her as an example, because if you ever read her |\n| | |\n\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
25 |\n| 1 | proof of claim, you'll see that there's really bad -- that |\n| 2 | bad things are being alleged there.
Clearly she would say |\n| 3 | I'm a victim. |\n| 4 | So the point is, we're not asking the Court to |\n| 5 | determine who's a victim today.
The only point is that this |\n| 6 | would go to the victims of the debtor, TBD as to what that |\n| 7 | means, but that's going to be a clear benefit to the estate |\n| 8 | as long as they have an allowed claim, which Your Honor will |\n| 9 | need to determine. |\n| 10 | So you might say, well, if you're able to get the |\n| 11 | million, why didn't you negotiate the full package?
And the |\n| 12 | reason is very clear, and that's stated in the motion.
The |\n| 13 | DOJ cannot have -- there's a very strict procedure for the |\n| 14 | DOJ to do that.
There's a forfeiture team under the DOJ, |\n| 15 | and they need to get the approval of the Attorney General to |\n| 16 | agree to things like that have been done. |\n| 17 | And I believe one of them was done before Your |\n| 18 | Honor or a case that you may have inherited from another |\n| 19 | judge, but this has happened before. |\n| 20 | In that case, they went all the way to the |\n| 21 | Attorney General and got the approval.
They're not going to |\n| 22 | do that and cannot do that now until they have a finding of |\n| 23 | guilt that is final against the debtor or the other |\n| 24 | defendants.
So that is why we could not go further than |\n| 25 | that. |\n\n| | 120 |\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
26 |\n| 1 | but I would -- and I don't want to, you know, |\n| 2 | oversell, but I think that this is a blueprint for future |\n| 3 | discussions.
Of course there are no agreements as to that. |\n| 4 | They have not given us any indication they would consider |\n| 5 | that.
The point though is that I think it's very good for |\n| 6 | the estate to have that in place, to have this as the first |\n| 7 | step, to make sure that we are no worse off, and plus we're |\n| 8 | better off by a million dollars.
Again, if we prevail.
If |\n| 9 | we don't prevail, it's like any case that we bring.
If we |\n| 10 | don't prevail, we don't prevail.
And so that's the risk we |\n| 11 | take. |\n| 12 | Now, this settlement agreement, when it says that |\n| 13 | the extra million dollars, the deemed expense, will be |\n| 14 | distributed to the holders of allowed claims that are |\n| 15 | victims, you're not, I want to be clear about this, you're |\n| 16 | not approving that distribution today, meaning that the |\n| 17 | bankruptcy code needs to be complied with. |\n| 18 | The objection by Taurus, which was kind of |\n| 19 | confusing, said, oh, what about secured creditors?
If there |\n| 20 | are secured creditors, one, if there are secured creditors |\n| 21 | on the property, they will be paid off the top of that |\n| 22 | property, meaning out of the proceeds. |\n| 23 | Second, if there are secured creditors in the |\n| 24 | case, and we know of none, I'm pretty sure of that, I mean, |\n\nat least none have been alleged to date, then, you know, you\n\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
27 |\n| 1 | cannot confirm a plan that provides that secured creditors |\n| 2 | get paid after unsecured. |\n| 3 | So we want to be clear that approval of the |\n| 4 | settlement agreement is just approval of a way forward. |\n| 5 | You're not signing off on any plan, any future plan, and all |\n| 6 | that. |\n| 7 | So if you want to put in that section subject to |\n| 8 | applicable law, including the bankruptcy code, that's fine |\n| 9 | with us.
We're not trying to prejudge that.
What we're |\n| 10 | trying to prejudge is that this estate is going to get a |\n| 11 | million dollars on top of the expenses so that it cannot be |\n| 12 | said that we just did this, you know, to spin our wheels. |\n| 13 | You know, there's a net benefit to the estate and that was |\n| 14 | critical here. |\n| 15 | So that's a long description, but I think that |\n| 16 | covers the entire settlements. |\n| 17 | I want to leave, you know, Your Honor, with the |\n| 18 | following thought, right? |\n| 19 | This is not an approval of any distribution to |\n| 20 | anyone.
This is not the approval of a sale of the property. |\n| 21 | That will happen only if we prevail on the alter ego or |\n| 22 | inequitable ownership claims.
And, therefore, any objection |\n| 23 | on that is premature, because if we lose on that, none of |\n| 24 | this matters. |\n| 25 | And also there's another benefit here, which is |\n| | |\n\n| | 120 |\n|---|-----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
28 |\n| 1 | that it's possible that the DOJ will not gain -- get a |\n| 2 | conviction against Mr. Kwok.
That's not our -- it's not in |\n| 3 | my domain.
I have no views on that.
I know nothing of it. |\n| 4 | I'm not a criminal lawyer, so I'm not going to opine on |\n| 5 | that, but that happens every day.
And, therefore, this |\n| 6 | settlement, it says, you know, if they don't obtain a final |\n| 7 | conviction and forfeiture, all this settlement goes away, |\n| 8 | meaning it's all our money again if we prevail. |\n| | |\n\n So that sets that into motion today and it allows us to do what we did through the preliminary injunction, which Your Honor granted, which is to protect the property in the meantime, which is critical.\n\n So I believe that for all these reasons this is clearly to the benefit of the estate. It's a blueprint for future collaboration with the DOJ. This has been done before in other cases.\n\n And by the way, the other cases where this has been done, there's a clear order that says the bankruptcy -- when the DOJ's agreed to this, and they have not yet, to be clear, agreed to any of this -- but there's a clear procedure that says the bankruptcy court shall determine holders of allowed claims. Sometimes there's an allocation, X dollars can only go to the following types of creditors, that's a settlement with the DOJ.\n\nWe're not anywhere near that here, but I want to\n\n|------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|---------------|------------|\n| | | | | |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023 29 make sure Your Honor knows that this is not the first time that these types of agreements have been done, except that I think this is the first time that it's been done prior to a conviction and where they actually have obtained forfeiture. In the other cases, generally, they won, they got a conviction, they got a forfeiture order, and then there's either a battle with the trustee or a negotiation with the trustee and the estate to try to resolve things on a consensual basis. So unless Your Honor has questions, that would be really my presentation on this. I'm happy to answer any questions. Obviously, I want to cover any issues raised by Taurus here. THE COURT: The only question I have at the moment is, if, if this settlement is approved, does it -- does it get filed in the criminal action? I mean, how does this work as far as people? Does the judge in the criminal action know? I mean, I don't know if the judge in the criminal action cares. MR. DESPINS: Yeah. THE COURT: I'm just asking a question. MR. DESPINS: Yeah. That's a good question. I'm not sure I know the answer other than to say that my understanding is the DOJ was not going to seek approval of this in the criminal court, so I'm not sure if they would\n\n| 120 |\n|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
30 |\n| file something there or not. |\n| THE COURT:
Okay. |\n| MR. DESPINS:
They understood that we needed to do |\n| that with Your Honor, but more than that, no. |\n| THE COURT:
Okay.
Thank you. |\n| MR. DESPINS:
Thank you, Your Honor. |\n| THE COURT:
Attorney Conway, would you like to be |\n| heard? |\n| MR. CONWAY:
Thank you, Your Honor.
Michael |\n| Conway, Lazare Potter Giacovas & Moyle, for Taurus Fund, |\n| LLC. |\n| Obviously you've read the papers, but I want to |\n| just address the gaping hole that Mr. Despins just referred |\n| to, and that is there has been no identification of the |\n| victims here. |\n| What the settlement calls for is creating a res |\n| that certain creditors of the bankruptcy estate can claim |\n| against, others cannot.
We don't know who can and who |\n| can't. |\n| And the fundamental question on any motion like |\n| this is how is it fair and equitable?
We can't answer that |\n| question now for the simple reason that we don't know which |\n| creditors can or can't claim against it.
The obvious |\n| solution would have been for them to come to an agreement on |\n| who can claim against the res, who is a victim as they put |\n| |\n\n| | 120 | | | | |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|--|--|--|--|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
31 | | | | |\n| 1 | it? | | | | |\n| 2 | You know, we obviously take the position that it's | | | | |\n| 3 | premature to start divvying up our property, our client's | | | | |\n| 4 | property, before there's been any finding, but that's not | | | | |\n| 5 | really relevant here. | | | | |\n| 6 | But the fundamental concept is that there are | | | | |\n| 7 | people who put their money into this property and none of | | | | |\n| 8 | them had any idea and still don't really think they have a | | | | |\n| 9 | claim in the bankruptcy estate. | | | | |\n| 10 | If Your Honor were to find at the end of this case | | | | |\n| 11 | that the bankruptcy estate gets the house, then they'd have | | | | |\n| 12 | a claim to file.
And there's no protocol which says, okay, | | | | |\n| 13 | well, if that's the case, then people who invested their | | | | |\n| 14 | money into this house can file a late-filed claim, what have | | | | |\n| 15 | you. | | | | |\n| 16 | There's no identification of whether somebody with | | | | |\n| 17 | a personal injury claim -- I think I saw something on the | | | | |\n| 18 | claims registration, I didn't read all the claims -- but I | | | | |\n| 19 | saw something described as a personal injury claim.
Is that | | | | |\n| 20 | person going to have a claim against this res?
We don't | | | | |\n| 21 | know.
There's no protocol here in this settlement motion. | | | | |\n| 22 | And there needs to be in order to determine whether it's | | | | |\n| 23 | fair and reasonable to the creditors of this estate, whether | | | | |\n| 24 | it's fair and reasonable to the Taurus Fund, for one. | | | | |\n| 25 | But the Taurus Fund obviously is made up of the | | | | |\n\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
32 |\n|---|-----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | people who funded the Taurus Fund.
Those people are going |\n| 2 | to come in here in this case and they're going to tell you |\n| 3 | don't take away my house.
You know, this is my money.
You |\n| 4 | know.
I know that the Trustee and the Government want to |\n| 5 | say, you know, you were defrauded by Mr. Kwok, but I don't |\n| 6 | believe I was defrauded.
I don't think you should take away |\n| 7 | my property.
And if you do take the property away, then how |\n| 8 | are they going to be able to get their money back, because |\n| 9 | they're then going to need a process. |\n\n So I guess the general conclusion, and again, we rest on the papers that were filed, which point out that there's a distinct prejudice against the loss of rights in the forfeiture proceeding that Taurus Fund is suffering. Because we no longer will have the right, if, as Mr. Despins points out, there's no finding there against Mr. Kwok, and the forfeiture doesn't go forward, they won't get their house back, which they would be able to get if this process played the normal course.\n\n THE COURT: I almost followed you until the end there. I'm sorry. So you're saying your client's prejudiced because if the Government doesn't succeed in its charges it won't get their house back because Mr. Despins will have -- the Trustee of the estate will have an interest in the property? But don't I have to make that determination, which I haven't made yet?\n\n|------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|------------|\n| | | | |\n\n| | 120 |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
33 |\n| 1 | MR. CONWAY:
Yes.
And it's -- it is -- this is |\n| 2 | all -- we're all -- everybody's putting the cart before the |\n| 3 | horse here in that the hypothetical is this, Your Honor. |\n| 4 | This case gets finished first.
Mr. Despins sells |\n| 5 | the house.
There's a fund of money that's sitting there. |\n| 6 | Okay.
That sounds great to everybody but the people who |\n| 7 | bought the house. |\n| 8 | Now there's a finding in the criminal proceeding |\n| 9 | that, you know what?
There was no fraud here.
That house |\n| 10 | never should have been listed in the indictment.
Those |\n| 11 | people who bought the house should get the house back. |\n| 12 | There's no more house.
Now there's a fund of money. |\n| 13 | THE COURT:
But you'd have the ability -- I |\n| 14 | understand what you're saying, but you have the ability to |\n| 15 | object to any -- what you're saying, and I -- you're saying |\n| 16 | you're putting the cart before the horse, but I don't know |\n| 17 | if that's accurate yet.
Because unless and until Mr. |\n| 18 | Despins is successful in his claims, the house isn't an |\n| 19 | asset of the estate. |\n| 20 | What he appears to be doing, to me, and you can |\n| 21 | disagree and I'm happy to hear you on it, is he's attempting |\n| 22 | to have a mechanism in place to resolve what would be, what |\n| 23 | could be, could be, competing interests between the |\n| 24 | Government and this bankruptcy estate. |\n| 25 | My understanding of the reading of the papers is |\n| | |\n\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
34 |\n| 1 | that this is really a settlement that -- whose provisions |\n| 2 | won't go into effect unless and until certain things happen. |\n| 3 | And if Mr. Despins loses, right, and he doesn't -- |\n| 4 | and he doesn't prevail, then the estate has no interest. |\n| 5 | If the Government loses and they can't seek the |\n| 6 | property in forfeiture, then the Government loses, and then |\n| 7 | your clients haven't lost anything. |\n| 8 | So while I understand your argument, I'm having a |\n| 9 | little trouble with it insofar as I think your rights are |\n| 10 | still being protected.
You still will have a right. |\n| 11 | First of all, you're going to have a right to -- |\n| 12 | the preliminary injunction is issued, right?
You're going |\n| 13 | to have a right to file a pleading.
You're going to have a |\n| 14 | right to do discovery, do whatever you want to do in the |\n| 15 | adversary proceeding, and then we still have to have a |\n| 16 | trial, at which point you're going to represent the |\n| 17 | defendants.
And you're going to, you know, argue that |\n| 18 | Trustee Despins is wrong.
And you're to be able to present |\n| 19 | all your evidence and do all that.
And then the Court's |\n| 20 | going to have to rule. |\n| 21 | You also have a right -- you'd also have a right |\n| 22 | at some point, it seems to me -- right now, the Trustee's |\n| 23 | claims are alter ego and beneficial equitable ownership, |\n| 24 | right? |\n| 25 | You're saying today that there's people that put |\n\n| | 120 |\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
35 |\n| 1 | money into the house that have a right to recover |\n| 2 | essentially that money.
You might be right.
I don't know. |\n| 3 | But you'd have to put that information forward, right?
We |\n| 4 | don't have any of that information at this point.
And the |\n| 5 | only information that we have is the information that was |\n| 6 | found in the preliminary injunction, right, those findings |\n| 7 | that were in the preliminary injunction. |\n| 8 | So I'm not sure how this is negatively impacting |\n| 9 | your clients at this moment. |\n| 10 | MR. CONWAY:
If I may, Your Honor? |\n| 11 | THE COURT:
Yes. |\n| 12 | MR. CONWAY:
And I -- the point where you said |\n| 13 | that you were confused, when we draft briefs, you know, we |\n| 14 | put our best arguments first and our lesser important |\n| 15 | arguments last, that was our last argument because we felt |\n| 16 | there was a hypothetical problem. |\n| 17 | The more important one was the one I started with, |\n| 18 | was the fact that the victims have, you know, have not been |\n| 19 | identified. |\n| 20 | What the Trustee is attempting to do here is |\n| 21 | identify a res and saying that allowed claims will be |\n| 22 | allowed to recover from that res. |\n| 23 | What we're suggesting here is that in order to |\n| 24 | satisfy the fair and reasonable requirement, they're going |\n| 25 | to have to say what would you have to do to bring an allowed |\n| | |\n\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
36 |\n| 1 | claim in this situation? |\n| 2 | And if you did that, I think you'd also, in |\n| 3 | whatever order you would issue, have to include a procedure |\n| 4 | which allows for the people who determine they have a claim |\n| 5 | at the end of our case, would have a right, for instance, to |\n| 6 | file a proof of claim of that -- |\n| 7 | THE COURT:
Well, that's easy.
That part is easy. |\n| 8 | MR. CONWAY:
It certainly is, if it was in the |\n| 9 | order. |\n| 10 | THE COURT:
But the part of setting a deadline for |\n| 11 | filing claims with regard to an asset that was not deemed to |\n| 12 | be an asset of the estate, that's easy.
I mean, that part, |\n| 13 | when you talked about that initially, I said, okay, well, |\n| 14 | that's a -- that's a valid point, but that's easy.
I mean, |\n| 15 | that can be done. |\n| 16 | MR. CONWAY:
That's the easiest part of what I'm |\n| 17 | suggesting. |\n| 18 | The second part is not hard.
I think the Trustee |\n| 19 | has indicated that they haven't reached an agreement because |\n| 20 | it's difficult.
It's not difficult to identify who would |\n| 21 | have an allowed claim.
I think it's a simple matter of |\n| 22 | saying anybody who is claimed to have given money to the |\n| 23 | debtor that was used for the purpose of buying this house |\n| 24 | would have an allowed claim.
But the other claimants in the |\n| 25 | bankruptcy who may have a personal injury claim against the |\n\n|------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------|--------------------------------------------|------------|\n| | | | | |\n\n| | 120 |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
37 |\n| 1 | debtor do not. |\n| 2 | THE COURT:
I hear what you're saying.
But again, |\n| 3 | why would I need to do that now?
Why would I need to do |\n| 4 | that before the, before and if, because there may not be a |\n| 5 | determination that this property is property of the estate. |\n| 6 | So why would I need to go through that process now? |\n| 7 | MR. CONWAY:
Because I don't think that the code |\n| 8 | allows for this motion to be granted until it's shown that |\n| 9 | it's fair and reasonable, and -- |\n| 10 | THE COURT:
Well, it's -- I'm not sure -- the |\n| 11 | standard is does it fall below the range of reasonableness, |\n| 12 | that's the compromise standard that the courts all talk |\n| 13 | about.
And what I -- why I'm not hearing from you why your |\n| 14 | client is being harmed at the moment is because nothing's |\n| 15 | really happening right now. |\n| 16 | What's happening is this settlement agreement is |\n| 17 | conditioned upon events happening in the future which may or |\n| 18 | may not happen.
So if Mr. -- if Trustee Despins loses, then |\n| 19 | there's no settlement agreement.
Nothing's going to happen. |\n| 20 | There isn't going to be a million dollars in the estate. |\n| 21 | There aren't going to be repayment of fees.
There isn't |\n| 22 | going to be a res from which certain creditors could assert |\n| 23 | a claim that this court would have to determine is an |\n| 24 | allowed claim.
I wouldn't have to go through all that, |\n| 25 | right, if he loses? |\n| | |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023 38 So I'm still -- I'm struggling a little bit with how is this harmful to you at the moment? When I say you, I'm talking about your clients obviously. MR. CONWAY: Understood. I've done the same thing today myself. Your Honor, I guess maybe the easiest way to do this would be for me to suggest my objection is a limited objection then, that's nothing in any order that's issued from this motion that would prejudice the rights of the various parties who may have an allowed claim relating to that property, and nothing that would allow -- nothing in the order that would allow people that don't have a claim relating to that property to claim against any res that's created, and nothing that would prevent a late claim from being filed. Those protections, if they -- if they were in place -- THE COURT: Well, it wouldn't be a late claim, right, because we'd set up a process for the claims to be filed, number one. Number two, the claims will have to be filed. And so like any proof of claim in a bankruptcy case, they'll have to be supported by evidence saying that it would establish it to be a claim, to which the Trustee or any other party could file an objection, and then there still\n\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
40 |\n| 1 | no matter when it happens, it has issues. |\n| 2 | However, this process is saying, look, we don't |\n| 3 | know if it's going to happen.
But if it is, this is how it |\n| 4 | will play out.
And these are what these two parties have |\n| 5 | agreed to.
I think that fits within the range of |\n| 6 | reasonableness at this point in time. |\n| 7 | I don't think that you, your clients lose any |\n| 8 | rights to contest -- well, I know they don't.
Your clients |\n| 9 | don't lose any rights to contest the claims that Trustee |\n| 10 | Despins has to prove to this court and get a judgment in |\n| 11 | order for that asset to be an asset of the estate.
He has |\n| 12 | to do that. |\n| 13 | There is a preliminary injunction in effect, but |\n| 14 | there still hasn't been a trial on the merits.
So we still |\n| 15 | have to have that happen, number one. |\n| 16 | Number two, with regard to the claims issues, |\n| 17 | there is -- I don't see an issue from a bankruptcy court |\n| 18 | perspective of setting up a process for claimants to file |\n| 19 | claims in this, you know, in the -- in the case, in the -- |\n| 20 | against the estate with regard to an asset that was never an |\n| 21 | asset but now is.
Okay? |\n| 22 | But it still flows through the same process, just |\n| 23 | like all the other claims that's already -- that are already |\n| 24 | filed in this case, which is -- which are the process is as |\n| 25 | follows. |\n| | |\n\n| | 120 |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
41 |\n| 1 | Just because someone files a, and I think you know |\n| 2 | this, just because they file a proof of claim doesn't mean |\n| 3 | that that claim is an allowed claim.
It still has to go |\n| 4 | through the process.
And if someone objects to it, then the |\n| 5 | Court has to make a determination as to whether that claim |\n| 6 | is a claim that's allowed under Section 502 of the code or |\n| 7 | disallowed under Section 502 of the code.
So that comes |\n| 8 | down to the distribution issues, not -- because you have to |\n| 9 | have an allowed claim to receive a distribution. |\n| 10 | So I understand what you're saying, but I'm not |\n| 11 | convinced right now that your client is being harmed at this |\n| 12 | point in time.
So I don't know if there's anything else |\n| 13 | that you want to say. |\n| 14 | But if you want to take a moment to talk to |\n| 15 | Trustee Despins about it? |\n| 16 | I mean, you know, the preliminary injunction had |\n| 17 | some requirements associated with it.
And I saw the |\n| 18 | document I think that you filed last night -- |\n| 19 | MR. CONWAY:
Yes. |\n| 20 | THE COURT:
-- about there's no insurance on the |\n| 21 | property.
Well, in a bankruptcy case, you know, the United |\n| 22 | States Trustee's Office would immediately move to dismiss a |\n| 23 | case where there's no insurance over estate assets. |\n| 24 | Now, there hasn't been a determination that this |\n| 25 | is an estate asset yet, but, but, the preliminary injunction |\n\n| | 120 |\n|----|------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
42 |\n| 1 | in connection with your -- the arguments that you made that, |\n| 2 | you know, the Taurus Fund shouldn't be -- should be able to |\n| 3 | use the property in the manner in which the Taurus Fund |\n| 4 | believes it is allowed to, it doesn't seem to me in the |\n| 5 | context of the preliminary injunction that the Taurus Fund |\n| 6 | can have a property worth -- I don't know what it's worth, |\n| 7 | right?
People have thrown around numbers.
I didn't have to |\n| 8 | make a finding of a value, but somebody did and said it's, |\n| 9 | you know, I don't know -- |\n| 10 | MR. DESPINS:
Twenty-nine. |\n| 11 | THE COURT:
-- how many millions? |\n| 12 | MR. DESPINS:
Twenty-nine. |\n| 13 | MR. CONWAY:
They paid high 20s, but we're trying |\n| 14 | -- the insurance policy that we've asked for is 40, covers |\n| 15 | 40. |\n| 16 | THE COURT:
Okay.
So, you know, I think you need |\n| 17 | to have insurance. |\n| 18 | MR. CONWAY:
Oh, yeah.
And, Your Honor, you'll be |\n| 19 | -- |\n| 20 | THE COURT:
And I think that is, you know, with |\n| 21 | regard to the property and its contents.
I mean, that -- |\n| 22 | there are issues there. |\n| 23 | MR. CONWAY:
And, Your Honor, this obviously |\n| 24 | doesn't directly affect the motion, but just for your own |\n| 25 | benefit, the holdup was that your injunction order is being |\n| | |\n\n| | 120 |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
43 |\n| 1 | incorporated into this so that anybody who uses the property |\n| 2 | has to agree that they'll do it pursuant to your injunction |\n| 3 | order.
The insurance carrier wants that, and proof that |\n| 4 | anybody managing the property has separate liability |\n| 5 | insurance, which is all apparently being provided to the |\n| 6 | carrier today, so that they can write the property.
Forty |\n| 7 | million dollars -- |\n| 8 | THE COURT:
Good. |\n| 9 | MR. CONWAY:
-- I understand for the liability and |\n| 10 | then \\$10 million for property.
So I think we're -- I think |\n| 11 | everything will happen and be satisfactory to Your Honor and |\n| 12 | to the Trustee. |\n| 13 | THE COURT:
And when you say satisfactory, I just |\n| 14 | want to be clear about that, it's not my satisfaction.
It's |\n| 15 | the satisfaction of the bankruptcy code and the rules and |\n| 16 | the need to protect assets, right? |\n| 17 | I mean, one of the reasons the Trustee was |\n| 18 | appointed in this case was because of allegations that have |\n| 19 | been made by many parties that there were all these assets |\n| 20 | out there that were never disclosed. |\n| 21 | And that's why trustees are appointed in a Chapter |\n| 22 | 11 case to investigate those affairs and see whether or not |\n| 23 | those assets can be brought into an estate for the benefit |\n| 24 | of creditors. |\n| 25 | Trustee Despins filed this adversary proceeding, |\n| | |\n\n| | 120 |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
44 |\n| 1 | sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary |\n| 2 | injunction, which were granted in part.
Not every form of |\n| 3 | relief that was requested was granted, but a substantial |\n| 4 | part of the relief requested was granted. |\n| 5 | The reason that the insurance was part of that |\n| 6 | injunction is I don't know how you can protect the status |\n| 7 | quo if there isn't insurance.
You could say, well, there |\n| 8 | wasn't insurance.
That's not protecting the status quo. |\n| 9 | Well, then somebody could go burn down the house tomorrow, |\n| 10 | right, and that's not protecting the status quo. |\n| 11 | So in any event -- |\n| 12 | MR. CONWAY:
We're on the same page. |\n| 13 | THE COURT:
-- that sounds like you've made great |\n| 14 | progress on that. |\n| 15 | MR. CONWAY:
We're on the same page. |\n| 16 | THE COURT:
And hopefully you've been talking with |\n| 17 | the Trustee about security services and things of that |\n| 18 | nature as well. |\n| 19 | MR. CONWAY:
We did have a conversation about that |\n| 20 | and, you know, there's been a security service team on site |\n| 21 | since before the hearing.
And, you know, security protocol |\n| 22 | is in place, so I'm not overly concerned about that either. |\n| 23 | We're discussing that now. |\n| 24 | THE COURT:
Well, from your filing, it -- not |\n| 25 | yesterday, but the previous filing, where you did comply by |\n\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
45 |\n| 1 | filing what was in the contents of the house, the mansion, I |\n| 2 | mean, there's obviously substantial sophisticated security |\n| 3 | equipment throughout the whole place.
I mean -- |\n| 4 | MR. CONWAY:
Yes. |\n| 5 | THE COURT:
-- I don't even know what it is, but I |\n| 6 | think I said 59 cameras or something.
I mean, there was |\n| 7 | substantial security equipment at the property, so it didn't |\n| 8 | seem to be burdensome for -- and I'm not saying you said it |\n| 9 | was burdensome -- |\n| 10 | MR. CONWAY:
No. |\n| 11 | THE COURT:
-- I'm just saying it doesn't seem to |\n| 12 | be burdensome for the Taurus Fund to make sure -- |\n| 13 | MR. CONWAY:
We wanted it and still want it. |\n| 14 | THE COURT:
-- that this property is secure. |\n| 15 | MR. CONWAY:
We wanted it before and we still want |\n| 16 | it now, Your Honor.
So, yeah, it's not burdensome.
It's |\n| 17 | what we want. |\n| 18 | THE COURT:
Okay. |\n| 19 | MR. CONWAY:
So, you know, I think we're all on |\n| 20 | the same page. |\n| 21 | Again, I don't have anything more to say about the |\n| 22 | motion that's on right now other than to say that I'm happy |\n| 23 | to try and talk to the Trustee about the form of an order. |\n| 24 | But if he's not willing to talk to me, as long as |\n| 25 | it does not prejudice the rights down the road as |\n\n|------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|---------------|------------|\n| | | | | |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023 46 articulated by me today, I want to make sure that anybody who claims through the Taurus Fund to have an interest here can make it, file a proof of claim, and say that person with a personal injury claim should not take from this res. So as long as those issues are not prejudiced, those rights are not prejudiced, I have nothing more to say, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Trustee Despins? MR. DESPINS: Yes, Your Honor. So conceptually you're absolutely right, Your Honor, that if we prevail there should be a bar date. And we have not done that yet, but we will have to do that for various pockets that we're finding. For example, HCHK. If we prevail on that, these folks, without prejudging whether they have claims or equity or not, they should have a right to try to file a claim. So they will be -- unfortunately, there's going to be, there's going to be a lot of work, but we'll need to have a new bar date for -- and that's why I'm putting that to the side for now -- but if we prevail on this, people should be able to file a claim if they have a claim and their claim be processed by the Court. But if we prevail on this, people are not going to have a claim against the res. The finding by the Court\n\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
48 |\n| 1 | being the owner is just, we'll prove that. |\n| 2 | But the point is there should be no one on that |\n| 3 | property right now other than security guards when there's |\n| 4 | no insurance, zero.
These Kwok people who are going there |\n| 5 | to have, to do whatever, they should not be in there when |\n| 6 | there's no insurance. |\n| 7 | Because remember the Lady May, Your Honor, we |\n| 8 | forget sometimes the parts of the case, but remember that |\n| 9 | they tried to get insurance and nobody would -- yeah, they |\n| 10 | had very good conversations with insurance companies, but at |\n| 11 | the end insurance companies said, Kwok, no insurance.
This |\n| 12 | happened after March 15th. |\n| 13 | So god bless Mr. Conway if he's able to get |\n| 14 | insurance with full disclosure of what's going on, but I'm |\n| 15 | not comforted by the fact he's having good conversation, |\n| 16 | that's great, but until there's -- until there's insurance, |\n| 17 | no one should be in that house.
No one.
And I'm sorry to |\n| 18 | be strident about this, Your Honor, but this was part of the |\n| 19 | relief we sought.
You said you did not deny it.
You would |\n| 20 | -- but this is a critical issue. |\n| 21 | If he gets insurance tomorrow, god bless him, then |\n| 22 | they can go back.
But in the meantime, there should be no |\n| 23 | one on that property when there's no insurance in place. |\n| 24 | And also the fact there's no insurance tells you everything |\n| 25 | you need to know about the case.
It's just this is |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023 49 insanity. And so, Your Honor, this is part of our preliminary injunction. I know that's not before you, but you did reserve the right under your preliminary injunction order to order the relief that you did not grant. This relief should be granted today. If he gets insurance tomorrow, fine, they can all -- not all by the way. We're having a dispute over the way your order should be read. You know, Mr. Conway is of the view that all these friends can come in 20 at a time only and then they can come out and another 20 can come in an hour later, and then another 20 an hour later as long as there's no more than 20 at a particular time. This is exactly what we were concerned about, the college dorm syndrome. If they can pick the 20 people that they want to have access, god bless those people. Again, that's if they have insurance. But it's the 20 and that we're going to stick to that. We cannot have a rotation where people come in, 20 come in one day, leave, another 20 come in the next day. The owner has no interest in that. This is all to protect the Kwok regime and that should not be happening, Your Honor. I want to make sure this point is clear. I thought it was clear in the order that there was a 20\n\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|--|--|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
50 | | | |\n| 1 | person, not on a rotating 20, because then it becomes like | | | |\n| 2 | uncontrollable.
Who are all these people? | | | |\n| 3 | But certainly today, when there's no insurance in | | | |\n| 4 | place, there should be no one on the premises.
I would | | | |\n| 5 | really urge Your Honor to order that relief immediately. | | | |\n| 6 | Thank you. | | | |\n| 7 | THE COURT:
Thank you. | | | |\n| 8 | Any response, Attorney Conway? | | | |\n| 9 | MR. CONWAY:
Yeah.
A couple of points there. | | | |\n| 10 | Both offensive. | | | |\n| 11 | The property was purchased and then went through a | | | |\n| 12 | major rehabilitation.
It hasn't been finished yet.
It | | | |\n| 13 | stopped because of all this.
Every contractor that's gone, | | | |\n| 14 | set foot there, has had to provide insurance.
There's been | | | |\n| 15 | insurance for every person that's done work at that | | | |\n| 16 | property.
I don't know if the security company has its own | | | |\n| 17 | certificate of insurance.
I haven't seen that, but I would | | | |\n| 18 | imagine they probably do. | | | |\n| 19 | You know, it's not a matter of, oh, well, there's | | | |\n| 20 | no consideration of insurance.
The property is not ready | | | |\n| 21 | yet for its intended purposes.
It's intended purpose, and | | | |\n| 22 | this goes to the second point, was to be used by the | | | |\n| 23 | putative owners of Taurus Fund. | | | |\n| 24 | THE COURT:
Then why are people coming and going? | | | |\n| 25 | MR. CONWAY:
They're not coming and going.
That's | | | |\n\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
51 | |\n| 1 | just coming out of his mouth.
That's not what's -- | |\n| 2 | THE COURT:
Well, no.
We saw some evidence about | |\n| 3 | that during the hearing.
I mean, we saw people coming in | |\n| 4 | and out of the, which wasn't controverted, coming in and out | |\n| 5 | of the house in numbers.
And we saw two people talking | |\n| 6 | about the fact that it's -- well, we saw more than two | |\n| 7 | people. | |\n| 8 | We saw several video clips where different people | |\n| 9 | from different parts of the country talked about using the | |\n| 10 | house, the mansion, as their base, and that they were | |\n| 11 | thanking the debtor for making that available to them.
And | |\n| 12 | there were people coming and going. | |\n| 13 | And if there are people -- if there are people | |\n| 14 | coming and going who are not these people that are working | |\n| 15 | that you say are insured, then that is a problem. | |\n| 16 | And I understand everything you're saying, but | |\n| 17 | there's no evidence in the record right now to support | |\n| 18 | anything you're saying. | |\n| 19 | The only evidence in the record supports the fact | |\n| 20 | that people are coming and going from this house.
That they | |\n| 21 | -- that the evidence established that the individuals who | |\n| 22 | started talking about using the mansion for a clubhouse or a | |\n| 23 | base didn't even know about the mansion until April 9th. | |\n| 24 | That was -- that was their words.
And no one else came in | |\n| 25 | here and said anything to the contrary.
No one. | |\n| | | |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023 52 You didn't -- I mean, I understand you appeared the morning of and you -- MR. CONWAY: I tried. THE COURT: Yeah. But you didn't bring any witnesses. You didn't -- where's your people? MR. CONWAY: I tried to -- THE COURT: Where's anybody from Taurus Fund that has filed any kind of things that say I am the so-and-so of Taurus Fund. These are my responsibilities. I make sure that I have insurance, do not have insurance. That I'm only allowing this. I mean, you've had time now. You've had a little bit of time. And by the way, if you -- if you watched the timing in this adversary proceeding, it was filed on July 11th. It's August 29th. And the temporary restraining order didn't go in effect until August 1st, so there's been time. And we had a trial. And as I said, you know, your clients, whoever they are, made a determination not to pen the mail I guess when they got served with these things. And Mr. Bennett, now that you represent him, I mean, his wife was served. I haven't seen anything that he's filed. He's not here. I don't see anybody else in the courtroom. Mr. Bennett, is Mr. Bennett here?\n\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
53 |\n| 1 | (No audible response) |\n| 2 | THE COURT:
Your entity has to work through a |\n| 3 | human being, at least one.
And so that human being has to |\n| 4 | do something or not do something. |\n| 5 | But to say there aren't people coming and going, |\n| 6 | the evidence that's in the record right now does not support |\n| 7 | that statement.
The evidence in the record supports the |\n| 8 | statement that there are people coming and going and that |\n| 9 | there's no insurance at the property. |\n| 10 | MR. CONWAY:
Well, the evidence in the record was |\n| 11 | about four events that took place long before the hearing. |\n| 12 | The Trustee just said to you that this is a college dorm |\n| 13 | with 20 people going in every hour.
That's not -- there's |\n| 14 | no evidence to support that.
You've got to grant me that, |\n| 15 | Your Honor. |\n| 16 | THE COURT:
Well, he didn't say there were 20 |\n| 17 | people going in every hour.
He said he doesn't want 20 |\n| 18 | people going in every hour.
He doesn't want a group of 20 |\n| 19 | coming in, then leaving, and another group of 20 coming in, |\n| 20 | then leaving.
That's what he was saying. |\n| 21 | MR. CONWAY:
Nor does anybody else. |\n| 22 | THE COURT:
He wasn't talking about the |\n| 23 | interpretation of that provision of the preliminary |\n| 24 | injunction. |\n| 25 | MR. CONWAY:
Right. |\n| | |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023 54 THE COURT: But all I'm saying to you is we need to have someone responsible be responsible, right? MR. CONWAY: Absolutely, Your Honor. THE COURT: And -- MR. CONWAY: And Your Honor issued an order saying that nothing further should be filed with respect to the injunction hearing the day after -- the night of the hearing or the day after the hearing, so -- THE COURT: Well, I also said that you could move for -- you could file a motion if you wanted more than 20 people there. You could. It says that. It says in the order somewhere. I can pull it up. MR. CONWAY: And if we do, I'm sure we will. We have so far, right now, we're trying to get everything settled. We're not trying to have people there at all right now. We're trying to get this -- all the administrative issues resolved here. You know, to my knowledge, there are not movement people going in and out right now. We're trying to make sure that everything gets squared away. The issue is not one where, you know, I've been told, oh, my god, they want to have this event there. You've got to get the judge's permission to do it. There's nobody that said that. There's no reason to come to Your Honor and make a motion to have more than 20 people there\n\nHo Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023 55 right now. But the fact of the matter is that if Your Honor were to say, well, it has to be the same 20 people throughout this case, what you've done is you've said I'm giving the property to the Trustee in advance of the decision in this case, because the people who invested in this property are not 20 people. There may be two people who want to use it next month. There might be ten people who want to use it the following month. But it's not going to be used as a base of operations for a hundred people. THE COURT: What do you mean the people that invested in this entity? I mean, you're an entity. So you have -- you're out there -- your clients are out there fund- raising or raising money for the operations of the LLC? MR. CONWAY: Your Honor, it shouldn't be that difficult to visualize why the Taurus Fund, LLC was created as a special purpose vehicle to buy a property by the fund that was subscribed to by its investors. The people who -- THE COURT: But who are its investors? MR. CONWAY: The people who took the money and put it into the fund. THE COURT: I understand. But they have names I would assume and identifies. MR. CONWAY: They certainly do, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay.\n\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
56 |\n| 1 | MR. CONWAY:
And so they're the ones who want to |\n| 2 | -- |\n| 3 | THE COURT:
So they need to come here and make |\n| 4 | their case. |\n| 5 | MR. CONWAY:
Well, they don't have to come here. |\n| 6 | The fund can come here and say here's what we offered them. |\n| 7 | We said if you -- if you want a -- us to go out and buy this |\n| 8 | house so that you can use it, here's what we'll do.
We'll |\n| 9 | buy the house with your money. |\n| 10 | THE COURT:
But the evidence to the -- the |\n| 11 | evidence that was submitted at the preliminary injunction |\n| 12 | doesn't support what you just said, because the two people |\n| 13 | that talked about and did the tour of the land, the lands, |\n| 14 | the grounds, said they didn't even know about the mansion |\n| 15 | until August, April 9th, excuse me, so how would they have |\n| 16 | invested in something to use it as a clubhouse or a base? |\n| 17 | MR. CONWAY:
Those people weren't members of G |\n| 18 | Clubs.
Those people were members of the movement that were |\n| 19 | making a video for the purpose -- |\n| 20 | THE COURT:
So you're saying G Club is the |\n| 21 | investors? |\n| 22 | MR. CONWAY:
G Club Internationals is the one that |\n| 23 | invested money. |\n| 24 | THE COURT:
In the Mahwah -- you mean it funded |\n| 25 | the purchase of the Mahwah mansion? |\n| | |\n\n| | 120 |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
57 |\n| 1 | MR. CONWAY:
Absolutely. |\n| 2 | THE COURT:
Okay. |\n| 3 | MR. CONWAY:
Specific people, specific |\n| 4 | investments, it will all come out in this case. |\n| 5 | THE COURT:
Okay. |\n| 6 | MR. CONWAY:
I can't prove my case without being |\n| 7 | specific. |\n| 8 | THE COURT:
I agree. |\n| 9 | MR. CONWAY:
To a point. |\n| 10 | THE COURT:
I agree. |\n| 11 | MR. CONWAY:
The Trustee should be held to the |\n| 12 | same standard, but I certainly will be. |\n| 13 | THE COURT:
Well, he put forth substantial |\n| 14 | evidence that no one controverted. |\n| 15 | MR. CONWAY:
Well, I asked him specifically where |\n| 16 | did Mr. Kwok get the money to do this?
He said, well, Mr. |\n| 17 | Kwok doesn't do it that way.
He just gets money from other |\n| 18 | people and, therefore, it's his.
That's not evidence. |\n| 19 | That's just speculation. |\n| 20 | THE COURT:
That's not -- that wasn't -- |\n| 21 | MR. CONWAY:
That's exactly what he said. |\n| 22 | THE COURT:
It may be your conversation, but |\n| 23 | that's not what happened in the courtroom. |\n| 24 | MR. CONWAY:
That's exactly what happened when he |\n| 25 | was on the stand.
When I asked him where the money came |\n| | |\n\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
58 |\n| 1 | from, he said, I don't know.
That's just not the way Mr. |\n| 2 | Kwok does business.
And I don't know where the money came |\n| 3 | from.
He speculates. |\n| 4 | I will put forth the actual evidence in this case. |\n| 5 | We're not here to debate what the evidence will be.
We're |\n| 6 | not here to try the case today, Your Honor. |\n| 7 | The point is that the people who, when they put |\n| 8 | the money in, thought that they would have the right to go |\n| 9 | and sleep at the house shouldn't be prevented from going and |\n| 10 | sleeping at the house.
And that's just the same as if -- |\n| 11 | THE COURT:
Then you'll have to file a motion and |\n| 12 | they'll have to come to tell me why they should be able to |\n| 13 | sleep at the house. |\n| 14 | MR. CONWAY:
Well, then you might as well just |\n| 15 | grant the motion in its entirety, because you're taking the |\n| 16 | house away. |\n| 17 | THE COURT:
No, I don't agree with you.
I don't |\n| 18 | agree.
I gave that -- I don't agree with you. |\n| 19 | What we -- what happened was the preliminary |\n| 20 | injunction issued to attempt to preserve the status quo. |\n| 21 | And according to the testimony and the evidence submitted, |\n| 22 | none of these people that have been going in and out of the |\n| 23 | mansion even knew about the mansion before April 9th. |\n| 24 | MR. CONWAY:
It wasn't in use.
Why would they |\n| 25 | know about it?
Everybody agrees and should agree because |\n\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
59 |\n| 1 | the evidence is absolutely crystal clear that they bought |\n| 2 | the house and started rehabbing it.
And that the house was |\n| 3 | not ready. |\n| 4 | THE COURT:
Who's they?
Who's they?
You keep |\n| 5 | saying they.
I don't know who they is. |\n| 6 | MR. CONWAY:
Well, Taurus Fund bought the house. |\n| 7 | THE COURT:
Okay. |\n| 8 | MR. CONWAY:
Taurus Fund hired contractor after |\n| 9 | contractor after contractor.
I've seen the invoices.
I've |\n| 10 | seen the work.
They were doing this work.
They haven't |\n| 11 | even finished the work yet. |\n| 12 | THE COURT:
Then why are people going in and out |\n| 13 | if the work isn't finished? |\n| 14 | MR. CONWAY:
Because the work that needs to be |\n| 15 | done doesn't prevent people from going in and out.
They're |\n| 16 | not having people in and out like we saw on the screen from |\n| 17 | months ago.
They're having people right now going in and |\n| 18 | out that are security, people staying there who are |\n| 19 | security.
People who are going in and out now are people |\n| 20 | trying to make sure that the house is secure and run |\n| 21 | properly.
But right now -- |\n| 22 | THE COURT:
Are those people employees of the |\n| 23 | Taurus Fund? |\n| 24 | MR. DESPINS:
No. |\n| 25 | MR. CONWAY:
Those people are employees of a |\n\n| | 120 |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
60 |\n| 1 | management company. |\n| 2 | THE COURT:
And is the management -- |\n| 3 | MR. CONWAY:
The Taurus Fund is an LLC. |\n| 4 | THE COURT:
I understand what the Taurus Fund is. |\n| 5 | But they have obligations as an LLC.
They can't just -- |\n| 6 | MR. CONWAY:
To hire a management company. |\n| 7 | THE COURT:
All right.
So who's the managing |\n| 8 | company? |\n| 9 | MR. CONWAY:
I'm going to give the Trustee by |\n| 10 | September 1 all the information about the security company |\n| 11 | and the management company.
We're trying to make sure now |\n| 12 | that there is absolutely nothing that the Trustee or this |\n| 13 | court can take issue with.
That everybody agrees to |\n| 14 | everything that's in the preliminary injunction order. |\n| 15 | It's all -- you know, Your Honor, we're trying our |\n| 16 | best to do exactly what we were ordered to do and what -- |\n| 17 | exactly what the Trustee says he wants. |\n| 18 | THE COURT:
I understand.
I understand that.
All |\n| 19 | I'm saying is I raised -- you filed a document.
And I |\n| 20 | appreciate you filed the document because it was required by |\n| 21 | the preliminary injunction order, but it says there's no |\n| 22 | insurance.
That's concerning.
Okay?
That's very |\n| 23 | concerning. |\n| 24 | As I said, the United States Trustee's Office, if, |\n| 25 | if there had been a determination, which there is not at |\n| | |\n\n|------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------|----------------|---------------|------------|--|\n| | | | | | | |\n\n| | 120 |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
61 |\n| 1 | this point, that this asset was an asset of the estate, the |\n| 2 | United States Trustee's Office would run into this courtroom |\n| 3 | and say you have to dismiss this case immediately.
There is |\n| 4 | no insurance.
The rights of the estate aren't being |\n| 5 | protected and this case cannot continue. |\n| 6 | And we have that happen a lot.
I mean, that's one |\n| 7 | of the requirements is that there has to be insurance. |\n| 8 | Okay? |\n| 9 | So you're now telling me you're going to get |\n| 10 | insurance and you have to -- but Trustee Despins is saying, |\n| 11 | well, until you get insurance, nobody should be able to come |\n| 12 | in and out of the building.
You say, well, the only people |\n| 13 | coming in and out of the building are people who are |\n| 14 | insured.
Well, I don't know that. |\n| 15 | MR. CONWAY:
No.
I'm saying that that's what has |\n| 16 | been the case.
I don't think any of the contractors are |\n| 17 | doing work right now.
I think right now the people who are |\n| 18 | at the premises are security. |\n| 19 | THE COURT:
Okay. |\n| 20 | MR. DESPINS:
No. |\n| 21 | THE COURT:
Well, that would be good.
And |\n| 22 | hopefully they're keeping a log on all the things that the |\n| 23 | preliminary injunction has asked them to do. |\n| 24 | MR. CONWAY:
And I've asked whether that was being |\n| 25 | kept before.
I was told it was.
I'm going to make sure |\n\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
62 |\n| 1 | that the log is as detailed as possible going forward. |\n| 2 | But, Your Honor, as Mr. Despins also said, this |\n| 3 | case and all the stigma around it makes getting insurance |\n| 4 | more difficult.
So asking for us to get a \\$40 million |\n| 5 | policy in 24 hours, which is what would have happened |\n| 6 | essentially, is difficult.
I think everybody can see that. |\n| 7 | I think we're going to have that policy either |\n| 8 | today, they may have it now, I've been here in court, but |\n| 9 | the only -- the only stumbling blocks were that they wanted |\n| 10 | the confirmation that this -- that the preliminary |\n| 11 | injunction requirements were agreed to by the people who are |\n| 12 | going to be on that premises.
They signed that.
I think |\n| 13 | that that's something that both Your Honor and the Trustee |\n| 14 | should welcome.
They also wanted the evidence of other |\n| 15 | business insurance by the management company. |\n| 16 | So I don't see how anything that has happened |\n| 17 | here, this, you know, a matter of a couple of days since the |\n| 18 | order issued, should be a concern.
We're doing our best. |\n| 19 | And I think we're going to succeed.
If we can't, Your |\n| 20 | Honor, I'm an officer of the court, I'll the Trustee, look, |\n| 21 | I tried, I can't get it.
Let's go back to the judge and see |\n| 22 | what we need to do. |\n| 23 | THE COURT:
All right.
With regard to the |\n| 24 | settlement with the United States, what I'd like you both to |\n| 25 | do is I'd like you to confer on the form of a proposed |\n| | |\n\n|------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|------------|\n| | | | |\n\n| | 120 |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
63 |\n| 1 | order.
And if you can't agree, then I'd like you to both |\n| 2 | submit your proposed orders by 5 p.m. tomorrow.
And I'll |\n| 3 | take a look at them.
And I'll decide which one, if either, |\n| 4 | I'll enter.
Or I'll make, you know, comments to them and |\n| 5 | tell you that's what the order is going to say. |\n| 6 | As I stated already, the test is does this |\n| 7 | settlement fall below the range of reasonableness? |\n| 8 | And because I am not convinced or I'm not |\n| 9 | persuaded at this point that there's any harm to your client |\n| 10 | if this settlement agreement is approved under the terms and |\n| 11 | conditions that exist right now, which is nothing's going to |\n| 12 | happen unless and until Mr. Despins is successful on a trial |\n| 13 | on the merits, and, you know, I guess I don't recall what it |\n| 14 | says about that, but, you know, final, non-appealable order, |\n| 15 | whatever the situation may be, then I don't see how your |\n| 16 | client's being harmed. |\n| 17 | So I do think that this settlement is within the |\n| 18 | range of reasonableness. |\n| 19 | I'm going to give you an opportunity -- and you |\n| 20 | stated and I appreciate that maybe your objection is more |\n| 21 | limited than you thought originally, because if the order |\n| 22 | can provide for language that works for your clients, then |\n| 23 | you might be okay with it, but you might not.
So I'm going |\n| 24 | to let you both take the opportunity to figure that out. |\n| 25 | And then you file on the docket of the case by 5 p.m. |\n| | |\n\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
64 |\n| 1 | tomorrow whether there's an agreed order or there's two |\n| 2 | separate orders and we'll go from there.
Okay? |\n| 3 | MR. CONWAY:
I think that's very fair, Your Honor. |\n| 4 | Thank you very much. |\n| 5 | THE COURT:
All right.
Thank you. |\n| 6 | MR. DESPINS:
Your Honor? |\n| 7 | THE COURT:
Yes. |\n| 8 | MR. DESPINS:
This argument that somehow they're |\n| 9 | working really fast in getting insurance, that's |\n| 10 | interesting, but anybody that owns a \\$29 million house |\n| 11 | should have insurance long before Your Honor told them to |\n| 12 | show that they had insurance. |\n| 13 | So, Your Honor, I renew my request until -- and if |\n| 14 | he wants a 24-hour, you know, standstill on that, that's |\n| 15 | fine, but there should be a very short fuse where there |\n| 16 | should be a complete prohibition on anyone other than |\n| 17 | security people and the Trustee representative to go to this |\n| 18 | house until they have insurance.
It's just a fundamental |\n| 19 | issue.
Thank you, Your Honor. |\n| 20 | THE COURT:
Yes.
And I understand your concern |\n| 21 | and I'm going to give him until 5 p.m. tomorrow to show you |\n| 22 | and the United States Trustee's Office that the property is |\n| 23 | insured. |\n| 24 | And then if not, you'll have to file something, |\n| 25 | Mr. Despins, after that time frame saying you want an |\n\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
65 |\n| 1 | immediate order prohibiting people from going on the |\n| 2 | property or in the property other than security until and |\n| 3 | unless insurance is obtained.
Okay? |\n| 4 | MR. DESPINS:
Thank you, Your Honor. |\n| 5 | THE COURT:
All right.
Thank you. |\n| 6 | MR. CONWAY:
Your Honor, may I be excused? |\n| 7 | THE COURT:
Yes.
Thank you. |\n| 8 | All right.
So then the only other matter on the |\n| 9 | calendar is the Rule 2004 examination motion. |\n| 10 | And I think, Attorney Major, you're here on that |\n| 11 | as well, is that correct? |\n| 12 | MR. MAJOR:
Yes, Your Honor. |\n| 13 | THE COURT:
Okay.
All right. |\n| 14 | Mr. Linsey, are you going to start? |\n| 15 | MR. LINSEY:
Yes.
May I approach, Your Honor? |\n| 16 | THE COURT:
Yes, you may. |\n| 17 | MR. LINSEY:
Thank you. |\n| 18 | The Trustee's sixth omnibus 2004 exam motion seeks |\n| 19 | to extend the Trustee's Rule 2004 investigation to |\n| 20 | additional relevant banks where the Trustee's investigation |\n| 21 | suggests that relevant transactions have occurred and to |\n| 22 | additional entities and individuals who were employed or |\n| 23 | otherwise involved with the debtor's financial affairs via |\n| 24 | certain associated entities. |\n| 25 | To date, Rule 2004 has been one of the most |\n\n|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|--|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
66 | |\n| 1 | effective tools for the Trustee to investigate the debtor's | |\n| 2 | finances. | |\n| 3 | As the Court is aware, the debtor has pursued his | |\n| 4 | business activities through a complicated and convoluted web | |\n| 5 | of dozens, if not hundreds, of associated entities and | |\n| 6 | individuals.
Money and property have flowed through that | |\n| 7 | web to the point that there are tens of thousands, if not | |\n| 8 | hundreds of thousands, of individual transfers that are | |\n| 9 | reflected in financial records. | |\n| 10 | As such, it is imperative that the Trustee's Rule | |\n| 11 | 2004 examination be able to undertake a holistic review of | |\n| 12 | the debtor's financial affairs. | |\n| 13 | The only objection to the sixth 2004 exam motion | |\n| 14 | is the objection that was filed by Greenwich Land and Hing | |\n| 15 | Chi Ngok, who I'll refer to as the Greenwich Land parties. | |\n| 16 | The basis for their objection is that the Trustee's Rule | |\n| 17 | 2004 examination relates to issues relevant to the pending | |\n| 18 | adversary proceeding that Trustee has brought against the | |\n| 19 | Greenwich Land parties. | |\n| 20 | The Court has already considered Greenwich Land's | |\n| 21 | position and twice decided it against the position in favor | |\n| 22 | of the Trustee. | |\n| 23 | In the first instance, Mei Guo and HK USA made a | |\n| 24 | substantively and nearly identical objection to the | |\n| 25 | Trustee's second omnibus 2004 exam motion.
That was back in | |\n\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|--|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
67 | | |\n| 1 | December.
And the Court ruled that while the Trustee may | | |\n| 2 | not seek Rule 2004 discovery from parties to pending | | |\n| 3 | adversary proceedings, the Trustee is free to continue his | | |\n| 4 | investigation with respect to non-parties, even to the | | |\n| 5 | extent that matters may relate to pending adversary | | |\n| 6 | proceedings. | | |\n| 7 | That decision is at docket no. 1184 in the main | | |\n| 8 | case.
So that means that this issue was decided almost ten | | |\n| 9 | months ago. | | |\n| 10 | Then several months ago, in May, Greenwich Land | | |\n| 11 | and Hing Chi Ngok again objected on this identical basis | | |\n| 12 | citing their own pending adversary proceeding. | | |\n| 13 | At that time, Trustee's counsel explained to the | | |\n| 14 | Greenwich Land parties that the Court has already ruled on | | |\n| 15 | this issue, but the parties insisted on objecting anyway. | | |\n| 16 | And so the Court decided that same issue again. | | |\n| 17 | Unsurprisingly, the Court decided it the same way. | | |\n| 18 | The Trustee may continue his 2004 investigation as | | |\n| 19 | to non-parties even if some of the subject matter may bear | | |\n| 20 | on a pending adversary proceeding. | | |\n| 21 | The first point that the Trustee made in response | | |\n| 22 | to Greenwich Land's last objection is the first point that | | |\n| 23 | we make here, which is that this issue is law of the case. | | |\n| 24 | The complexities of this Chapter 11 case are manifest.
The | | |\n| 25 | number of docket entries exceeds many other Chapter 11 cases | | |\n\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
68 |\n| 1 | in this district by an order of magnitude. |\n| 2 | If this case is to proceed in an orderly manner, |\n| 3 | parties should not be free to relitigate decided issues at |\n| 4 | will, much less on multiple occasions.
Beyond that, the |\n| 5 | Court was right the first time it ruled.
And the Court for |\n| 6 | that matter was right the second time it ruled. |\n| 7 | I hesitate to go too far down the rabbit hole here |\n| 8 | because I don't want to take the Greenwich Land parties' |\n| 9 | bait, but they have selectively quoted and cited authority |\n| 10 | in their objection to stand for a proposition that simply |\n| 11 | doesn't exist, that continuing a Rule 2004 investigation |\n| 12 | with respect to non-parties that may have some subject |\n| 13 | matter overlap with pending adversary proceedings is not |\n| 14 | allowed. |\n| 15 | The case law does not stand for that proposition. |\n| 16 | In fact, the case law contradicts it and that's why Your |\n| 17 | Honor has twice ruled what Your Honor ruled. |\n| 18 | There's one more concerning feature of the |\n| 19 | objection that was filed by the Greenwich Land parties and |\n| 20 | that is the way that it discusses the investigation that is |\n| 21 | sought to be continued by the sixth Rule 2004 motion. |\n| 22 | Just looking at the summary of that investigation |\n| 23 | as it's described, as it excerpts from the subpoenas and |\n| 24 | requests for production, one would think that the Rule 2004 |\n| 25 | motion is being conducted solely to investigate Greenwich |\n| | |\n\n|------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|----------|\n| | | | |\n\n| of 120 |\n|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
69 |\n| Land parties' alleged assets.
In fact, looking at the RFPs |\n| themselves, one finds that they implicate a range of assets |\n| that go well beyond the Greenwich Land parties' claimed |\n| assets.
For example, and these are just examples, the RFPs |\n| also implicate the property at the Sherry-Netherland Hotel. |\n| We just settled the Bravo Luck adversary proceedings today. |\n| If this 2004 exam is really a substitute for |\n| adversary proceeding discovery, why would we possibly be |\n| seeking discovery, an investigation that implicates those |\n| matters? |\n| The same thing with the Lady May.
The Lady May is |\n| listed in their RFPs.
The Lady May has already been sold. |\n| We're not -- we're not listing things for fun. |\n| We're not listing things as a substitute for Part 7 |\n| discovery under the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. |\n| The reality here is, and this court has lived with |\n| this case long enough to know, the Trustee's finances or |\n| rather the debtor's finances are an intricate, supremely |\n| complicated spider web.
And to unravel his business and his |\n| assets you can't hack chunks out of the web and expect |\n| everything to fit together.
There has to be a holistic |\n| review.
I think that the Court's two prior rulings have |\n| recognized that. |\n| Beyond that, the Greenwich Land parties argue |\n| |\n| |\n\n|------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|----------|\n| | | | |\n\n| | of 120
Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
70 |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | adversary proceeding.
And while I want to be very clear, |\n| 2 | the Trustee disagrees with the Greenwich Land parties' |\n| 3 | position as to what they're entitled to and what they're not |\n| 4 | entitled to in the adversary proceeding, the proper way to |\n| | |\n| 5 | litigate a discovery dispute in an adversary proceeding is |\n| 6 | not to object to a 2004 exam motion. |\n| 7 | Finally, I will just briefly note that even if the |\n| 8 | Court overrules the Greenwich Land parties' objection, |\n| 9 | there's already prejudice to the estate here.
The objection |\n| 10 | will delay the granting of the 2004 exam motion and thus the |\n| 11 | issuance of subpoenas by several weeks. |\n| 12 | And this reminds me of being in high school when |\n| 13 | my parents would say you've got to do your math homework |\n| 14 | every week because what you learn next week builds on what |\n| 15 | you do this week, the Trustee's investigation is the same |\n| 16 | way.
The subject matter, the people that we're issuing |\n| 17 | subpoenas to under this motion, the terms of the RFPs, the |\n| 18 | subject matter, that's all -- a large portion of it is |\n| 19 | subject matter that the Trustee has learned through his |\n| 20 | existing 2004 exam investigation.
And to the extent that |\n| 21 | that 2004 exam investigation is delayed, the delay builds on |\n| 22 | itself, everything takes longer, everything's more |\n| 23 | expensive, the docket entries continue to click, the |\n| 24 | administrative expenses continue to build. |\n| 25 | So we would ask that Your Honor grant the sixth |\n\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
71 |\n| 1 | 2004 exam motion, overrule the objection, and make clear |\n| 2 | that this time Your Honor's ruling should be respected and |\n| 3 | further objections in this -- in this respect should not be |\n| 4 | -- should not be filed. |\n| 5 | And I'm happy to answer any questions the Court |\n| 6 | may have. |\n| 7 | THE COURT:
Thank you.
I do not have any |\n| 8 | questions at this time. |\n| 9 | MR. MAJOR:
Thank you, Your Honor.
Chris Major, |\n| 10 | Meister Seelig & Fein representing Hing Chi Ngok and |\n| 11 | Greenwich Land, LLC. |\n| 12 | I want to address the point that counsel for the |\n| 13 | Trustee led and closed with, with the idea that we should be |\n| 14 | prohibited from objecting to the motions. |\n| 15 | And we didn't cost the Trustee weeks.
We filed |\n| 16 | our objection on August 18th.
It's August 29th and the |\n| 17 | matter is being heard. |\n| 18 | We have not just the right, but the obligation to |\n| 19 | make a record in the case.
Also I want to protect our |\n| 20 | clients' rights to make future objections, for example, |\n| 21 | evidentiary objections at trial. |\n| 22 | If the Trustee tries to spring evidence that he's |\n| 23 | collected in the 2004 about the issues in the adversary |\n| 24 | proceeding, and he doesn't turn them over to us and then |\n| 25 | tries to put them in at trial, I don't want the Trustee, |\n| | |\n\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|--|--|--|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
72 | | | | |\n| 1 | when I object to say, well, you didn't object to our sixth | | | | |\n| 2 | omnibus motion.
So I think it's entirely appropriate that | | | | |\n| 3 | we asserted our objection. | | | | |\n| 4 | The issues are similar, not identical, but, and | | | | |\n| 5 | for that reason I will be brief.
I'm mindful of what the | | | | |\n| 6 | Court's prior orders are, but I have to make the record.
I | | | | |\n| 7 | can't just say, well, the Court did this and, therefore, | | | | |\n| 8 | we'll just acquiesce with it.
Because if we're in front of | | | | |\n| 9 | an appellate tribunal or in front of any trial court and I | | | | |\n| 10 | make an objection I don't want to hear a waiver argument. | | | | |\n| 11 | So it's an objection that I felt we were obligated to make | | | | |\n| 12 | and I think it's entirely appropriate. | | | | |\n| 13 | As I said, I'll be particularly brief on the legal | | | | |\n| 14 | issue.
I'm mindful of the Court's prior rulings.
There's | | | | |\n| 15 | no dispute about the existence of the pending procedures | | | | |\n| 16 | rule, which is this rule against taking discovery under 2004 | | | | |\n| 17 | for use in an adversary proceeding.
There's no dispute that | | | | |\n| 18 | the discovery that is sought in this sixth omnibus motion | | | | |\n| 19 | for 2004 discovery addresses issues in the Greenwich Land | | | | |\n| 20 | adversary proceeding. | | | | |\n| 21 | And counsel for the Trustee took exception to the | | | | |\n| 22 | fact that our objection focuses on all of the discovery | | | | |\n| 23 | requests relating to Greenwich Land and doesn't mention the | | | | |\n| 24 | others, well, Your Honor, the filing, I believe, the omnibus | | | | |\n| 25 | motion, when you include the subpoenas, it's like over 300 | | | | |\n\n|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|--|--|--|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
73 | | | |\n| 1 | pages I believe.
It's at least over 200 pages. | | | |\n| 2 | So certainly we weren't going to spend a lot of | | | |\n| 3 | time talking about issues that are outside our very narrow | | | |\n| 4 | in this bankruptcy proceeding, which is the Greenwich Land | | | |\n| 5 | adversary proceeding. | | | |\n| 6 | So we were of course, and appropriately so, | | | |\n| 7 | focused on the request to the extent they mentioned | | | |\n| 8 | Greenwich Land.
And even in the body of the Trustee's sixth | | | |\n| 9 | omnibus motion, Greenwich Land is mentioned as the reason | | | |\n| 10 | for seeking discovery from one of the targets. | | | |\n| 11 | So I think that the key legal issue, and I'll be | | | |\n| 12 | very brief here, is, again, not the existence of the prior | | | |\n| 13 | pending proceeding rule, or that these subpoenas are seeking | | | |\n| 14 | information concerning the issues in the Greenwich Land | | | |\n| 15 | adversary proceeding, those are undisputed, but what the | | | |\n| 16 | Trustee says is, well, we can get discovery relating to the | | | |\n| 17 | adversary proceeding as long as we're not getting it from | | | |\n| 18 | you. | | | |\n| 19 | And I just want to put into the record two | | | |\n| 20 | quotations from cases that we cite. | | | |\n| 21 | Number one is In re Bennett Funding Group, Inc., | | | |\n| 22 | which is 203 B.R. 24.
It's from the Northern Bankruptcy | | | |\n| 23 | Court in the Northern District of New York.
It's a 1996. | | | |\n| 24 | At page 29 of that decision the Court wrote, \"Thus, a | | | |\n| 25 | Trustee like a creditor must look to Federal Rules of | | | |\n| | | | | |\n\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
74 |\n| 1 | Bankruptcy Procedure 7026 et seq. after an adversary |\n| 2 | proceeding is commenced for discovery as to both entities |\n| 3 | affected by the proceeding and issues addressed in this |\n| 4 | proceeding.\" |\n| 5 | The second case, In re Southeastern Materials, |\n| 6 | Inc., 2010 Westlaw 5128608, from the Middle District of |\n| 7 | North Carolina.
It's a 2010 case.
At page 3 of that |\n| 8 | decision, the Court wrote, \"In order to prevent injustice |\n| 9 | and to ensure the parties in bankruptcy adversary |\n| 10 | proceedings have the same rights as parties to a federal law |\n| 11 | suit in a non-bankruptcy context, it is important to ensure |\n| 12 | the procedural safeguards of the discovery process provided |\n| 13 | in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 through 37, |\n| 14 | incorporated by reference in Federal Rules of Bankruptcy |\n| 15 | Procedure 7026 through 7037, are not avoided by permitting a |\n| 16 | Rule 2004 examination while an adversary proceeding is |\n| 17 | pending.\" |\n| 18 | Your Honor, we also, with respect to that legal |\n| 19 | argument, rest on the other case law that we cite and |\n| 20 | discuss in our objection. |\n| 21 | I want to touch on -- I mentioned at the top that |\n| 22 | this situation is similar, but not identical, to where we |\n| 23 | were back in June when we objected to the fifth omnibus |\n| 24 | motion for Rule 2004 discovery. |\n| 25 | There's another inequity here with what the |\n\n|------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|----------|\n| | | | |\n\n| | of 120 | | | | | | |\n|---|------------------------------------------------------------|----|--|--|--|--|--|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023 | 75 | | | | | |\n| 1 | Trustee is proposing to do, which is discovery -- the | | | | | | |\n| 2 | Trustee advocated for and achieved an extremely quick | | | | | | |\n| 3 | discovery schedule in our adversary proceeding.
That's | | | | | | |\n| 4 | coming to a close.
He's come into court now and said he | | | | | | |\n| 5 | wants to take 2004 discovery relevant to the issues in the | | | | | | |\n| 6 | Greenwich Land proceeding, adversary proceeding. | | | | | | |\n| | | | | | | | |\n\n We're going to be cut off from being able to take any discovery. We're not -- we're not allowed to participate in the discovery he's taking concerning the issues in the adversary proceeding that we're defending, and he'll be able to continue to do that. I guess his position is he can do that right up to the time through trial. And if he finds something he can try to use it, we will of course object to that.\n\n But what he's calling an investigation as it relates to Greenwich Land is discovery for claims he's already made and preliminary relief he's already obtained, and so I think that the appropriate way to do this would be discovery that the parties can participate in.\n\n So, Your Honor, those are our arguments. I'm happy to answer any questions the Court has.\n\n THE COURT: Thank you. No. I don't have any questions at the moment, but thank you.\n\n MR. MAJOR: Thank you, Your Honor. MR. LINSEY: Very quickly, Your Honor?\n\nHo Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023 76 THE COURT: Yes. MR. LINSEY: First of all, again, the adversary proceeding discovery disputes are an issue for the adversary proceeding. We disagree with the characterization of discovery on negotiations in the adversary proceeding, but if there are disputes, then I expect either party has the -- any party has the ability to bring them there. But with respect to the brief discussion of the case law, Your Honor substantively considered this issue. To the extent the *Bennett* case sounds familiar, it's because it's one of the cases that Your Honor cited in Your Honor's last decision, and Your Honor noted in the parenthetical after that cite that that was a prohibition on 2004 discovery as to a party to the pending proceeding, not as to a non-party. With respect to the *Southeastern Materials* case of 120\n\n that was cited, it's easy to take a snippet from a case without a context. I'll take a snippet from the *Southeastern Materials* case. \"A handful of decisions have considered the allowable scope of a Rule 2004 examination where it related civil or criminal proceedings are taking place or are likely to occur in another court, the general rule in these cases is that the existence of or a potential for collateral litigation is insufficient reason to deny an examination.\" That's from that case, Your Honor.\n\n|------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | |\n\n| | of 120 |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
77 |\n| 1 | Your Honor looked at these cases.
This is not a |\n| 2 | -- there's not a Second Circuit ruling that's directly on |\n| 3 | point here.
What the cases boil down to is the purpose of |\n| 4 | the discovery examination to substitute for discovery -- |\n| 5 | rather the 2004 examination is to substitute for discovery |\n| 6 | in an adversary proceeding under Part 7 of the rules to gain |\n| 7 | some strategic advantage or are they a proper examination, |\n| 8 | holistic examination, of a debtor's finances. |\n| 9 | And I believe in this case, given the record that |\n| 10 | has built up to date, it's exceptionally clear that what |\n| 11 | we're undertaking is the latter. |\n| 12 | THE COURT:
Thank you. |\n| 13 | MR. LINSEY:
Thank you. |\n| 14 | THE COURT:
Attorney Major, any response? |\n| 15 | MR. MAJOR:
Your Honor, with respect to the case |\n| 16 | law, we've accurately described what the courts have held. |\n| 17 | And the two that I read are not the only cases.
We've cited |\n| 18 | several cases in the brief that support our argument. |\n| 19 | THE COURT:
And I understand that.
Thank you. |\n| 20 | And I have seen that you've cited other cases, so I |\n| 21 | understand that. |\n| 22 | Okay.
With regard to this motion, the Court is |\n| 23 | going to take the matter under advisement.
But I think the |\n| 24 | ruling will not -- I mean, I'm not going to take a |\n| 25 | substantial amount of time to rule, but I will rule after |\n| | |\n\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
78 |\n| 1 | going back and reviewing your arguments and looking at the |\n| 2 | documents and the cases one more time.
Okay? |\n| 3 | Is there anything further we need to address this |\n| 4 | afternoon?
I think that's the last matter on the calendar. |\n| 5 | MR. DESPINS:
That's correct, Your Honor. |\n| 6 | THE COURT:
Nothing else from any party? |\n| 7 | MR. DESPINS:
Actually, Your Honor, let me take a |\n| 8 | chance at this.
And the question is, is there a procedure |\n| 9 | before Your Honor to seek relief in the middle of a |\n| 10 | deposition where there are issues that arise?
Because in |\n| 11 | some courts -- |\n| 12 | THE COURT:
There's no -- we don't have a, you |\n| 13 | know, a procedure that I could point to that says this is |\n| 14 | what you do, but what has happened in the past is the |\n| 15 | parties contact the courtroom deputy and ask the Court to |\n| 16 | have an emergency hearing. |\n| 17 | MR. DESPINS:
Okay. |\n| 18 | THE COURT:
And if the Court's available, the |\n| 19 | Court can do that.
Then if not, then what the Court has |\n| 20 | said to parties is continue with as much of the deposition |\n| 21 | as you can.
Hold whatever questions or issues there are |\n| 22 | until the Court can actually conduct that hearing. |\n| 23 | Now, that's not I know ideal because that means |\n| 24 | you'd have to reconvene for a deposition or an examination, |\n| 25 | but -- |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023 79 MR. DESPINS: Okay. THE COURT: -- there is no time -- you know, the Court isn't always available unfortunately. MR. DESPINS: Understood. That's helpful. Thank you. THE COURT: So I don't know how you'd want to proceed, but there have been occasions where both of things has happened. Parties have called, court was available, able to have an emergency hearing. But there's also been occasions where the parties have called, the Court has not been available, and then we'd have to have scheduled a specific hearing to address that issue as soon as possible. I think that's all I can tell you. We don't have a process in place in our local rules or anything like that. MR. DESPINS: Okay. Thank you. Very helpful. Thank you. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. There are some matters that are -- that are not on the calendar today that are what I would say somewhat ministerial. Like, there's a motion to redact that's been filed. Redactions are usually granted, so that probably will be addressed in the next few days. Otherwise, I think that the majority of matters in the main case and in the adversary proceeding are either set for hearing or there are response dates coming up. of 120\n\n| | of 120 |\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
80 |\n| 1 | Oh, that was the other thing I was going to say. |\n| 2 | Mr. Major, you may not know this either. |\n| 3 | But the district court in Connecticut, when a |\n| 4 | motion is filed in what you would call a civil action, |\n| 5 | plaintiff and defendant, has an automatic 21-day response |\n| 6 | period that just gets set.
And so we follow that rule.
So |\n| 7 | immediately upon a pleading in an adversary, the CM/ECF |\n| 8 | system populates this language that says, I don't remember |\n| 9 | what it says, but it says something like response due 21 |\n| 10 | days and then it calculates the date I think. |\n| 11 | What I have said to people, and our local rules |\n| 12 | don't address it, but we're in the process of looking at our |\n| 13 | local rules again, is if someone believes that there should |\n| 14 | be some other date for a response, or there's some emergency |\n| 15 | issue, or an extension of that response date, then that |\n| 16 | doesn't preclude anyone from filing something asking for |\n| 17 | that relief.
Okay? |\n| 18 | It's a -- I think, you know, in the bankruptcy |\n| 19 | context it often is the 21 days cannot always apply as |\n| 20 | neatly as it does in a district court action.
And I'm not |\n| 21 | saying it applies neatly in a district court action all the |\n| 22 | time either because I'm sure there are circumstances where |\n| 23 | someone would want something either before that. |\n| 24 | But I wanted to make that clear to the parties, is |\n| 25 | that that 21-day period is automatically populated.
The |\n| | |\n\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
81 |\n| 1 | Court has nothing to do with that.
It's just it's there. |\n| 2 | It's part of the program, and following the district court |\n| 3 | rules, which we follow. |\n| 4 | So there may be a circumstance where any party |\n| 5 | could seek to change that date or get some form of a status |\n| 6 | conference or something prior to that.
You're not -- no |\n| 7 | party is precluded from seeking that.
Whether it's going to |\n| 8 | be granted or not is a wholly different issue. |\n| 9 | But I've noticed recently that there have been |\n| 10 | some motions filed where, you know, I could understand why a |\n| 11 | party would want some other form of relief and not have to |\n| 12 | wait for the 21 days, but nothing's necessarily been filed, |\n| 13 | so I just wanted parties to understand that.
Okay? |\n| 14 | MR. LINSEY:
Your Honor, that reminded me of an |\n| 15 | issue.
In the HCHK adversary proceeding, there is -- |\n| 16 | without getting in to the substance of it, there's a |\n| 17 | recently filed motion for extension of time for a pleading |\n| 18 | deadline.
It indicates that the Trustee has no objection. |\n| 19 | We are planning to file a response.
That response should be |\n| 20 | filed this week.
I say that only because I'm aware that, |\n| 21 | you know, that has the same 21-day thing in the docket text |\n| 22 | as Your Honor noted typically occurs, but also it is, you |\n| 23 | know, typically or oftentimes we see motions for extension |\n| 24 | granted in advance of the 21-day deadline.
So I just wanted |\n| 25 | to mention to Your Honor there is going to be a response |\n\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
82 |\n| 1 | forthcoming this week for the Trust -- |\n| 2 | THE COURT:
I thought there already was an |\n| 3 | objection to that extension of time. |\n| 4 | MR. LINSEY:
There's an objection that's indicated |\n| 5 | in the motion, but we will be filing a substantive -- |\n| 6 | THE COURT:
Oh.
Okay.
I understand. |\n| 7 | MR. LINSEY:
-- objection explaining the grounds. |\n| 8 | THE COURT:
I understand. |\n| 9 | MR. LINSEY:
And I just -- |\n| 10 | THE COURT:
I understand what you're saying. |\n| 11 | MR. LINSEY:
We're not going to hold -- we're not |\n| 12 | going to -- we're not going to string them out 21 days to do |\n| 13 | that.
We're going to get that on file. |\n| 14 | THE COURT:
I understand.
Okay.
I appreciate |\n| 15 | that. |\n| 16 | MR. LINSEY:
Thank you. |\n| 17 | MR. DESPINS:
And, Your Honor, the issue you |\n| 18 | raised in the leave to appeal context is kind of dangerous |\n| 19 | in the sense that the docket will say you have 21 days, and |\n| 20 | it gives you the date as you indicated, but the Bankruptcy |\n| 21 | Rule, 8004, says you have ten days. |\n| 22 | THE COURT:
I know. |\n| 23 | MR. DESPINS:
So that's like -- |\n| 24 | THE COURT:
That's part of the problem. |\n| 25 | MR. DESPINS:
Yeah. |\n| | |\n\n|------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | |\n\n| | of 120 |\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
83 |\n| 1 | THE COURT:
The box, everything doesn't fit into |\n| 2 | the box. |\n| 3 | MR. DESPINS:
Yeah. |\n| 4 | THE COURT:
Right?
So that's part of the problem. |\n| 5 | MR. DESPINS:
But we didn't take any chance.
We |\n| 6 | applied that 10-day rule. |\n| 7 | THE COURT:
No.
That is part of the problem.
And |\n| 8 | we're going to review that.
And I've said that to the bar |\n| 9 | -- not I, everyone that -- all the judges who are involved |\n| 10 | with the standing committee on local rules have raised |\n| 11 | issues saying, you know, a lot of times -- there isn't a |\n| 12 | local rule that says anything about the 21 days because it's |\n| 13 | a district court rule.
It just says the district court |\n| 14 | rule's adopted.
But we might need to say something that |\n| 15 | says unless provided by applicable statute or rule or order |\n| 16 | or otherwise ordered by the Court, blah, blah, blah.
You |\n| 17 | know. |\n| 18 | I think that -- so you all think about that, make |\n| 19 | your -- tell us what the rules should say and we'll try to |\n| 20 | do that.
Okay?
But we are thinking about it is the point. |\n| 21 | And I just wanted, you know, someone who, you're |\n| 22 | not here all the time, you're not worrying about the |\n| 23 | district court rules necessarily.
It doesn't preclude any |\n| 24 | party from seeking something prior to that 21 days.
Whether |\n| 25 | they'll get it or not is a wholly different question.
Okay? |\n\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - August 29, 2023
85 |\n| 1 | same box.
And, you know, we could probably spend weeks |\n| 2 | going through the local rules figuring out all the things |\n| 3 | that don't fit into the box. |\n| 4 | But in any event, I just say that so parties are |\n| 5 | aware that it -- I don't want anyone to think that that |\n| 6 | means they couldn't seek relief in some way, shape or form |\n| 7 | prior to the 21 days.
Whether or not you get it is a wholly |\n| 8 | different issue.
Okay? |\n| 9 | All right.
Well, that concludes the hearings |\n| 10 | today, so -- |\n| 11 | (Proceedings concluded at 3:47 p.m.) |\n| 12 | I, CHRISTINE FIORE, Certified Electronic Court |\n| 13 | Reporter and Transcriber, certify that the foregoing is a |\n| 14 | correct transcript from the official electronic sound |\n| 15 | recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter. |\n| 16 | |\n| 17 | |\n| 18 | |\n| 19 | September 6, 2023 |\n| 20 | Christine Fiore, CERT |\n| 21 | Transcriber |\n| 22 | |\n| 23 | |\n| 24 | |\n| 25 | |\n| | |","body_zh":"证据附件1\n美国联邦地区法院 纽约南区\n\n美利坚合众国，\n\n诉\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），又名“Miles Guo”，又名“Miles Kwok”，又名“Guo Wengui”，又名“Brother Seven”，又名“The Principal”，\n\nKIN MING JE，又名“William Je”，以及\n\nYANPING WANG，又名“Yvette”，\n\n被告人。\n\nS1 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n政府方反对强制提供动议的法律备忘录\n\nDAMIAN WILLIAMS\n纽约南区联邦检察官\nOne St. Andrew's Plaza\nNew York, New York 10007\n\nMicah F. Fergenson\nRyan B. Finkel\nJuliana N. Murray\n助理联邦检察官\n诉讼代理律师\n\n背景 1\n\n一、Mahwah Mansion（马瓦大宅） 1\n二、Kwok 的破产中止动议 5\n三、本动议 7\n论证 7\n一、Kwok 未能为其证据开示请求确立有效依据 7\nA. 适用法律 7\nB. 讨论 13\n1. 应驳回 Kwok 关于 SEC 通信记录的请求 14\n2. 应驳回 Kwok 关于受托人通信记录的请求 19\n结论 25\n初步陈述\n\nKwok 请求获得超出规则16范围的证据开示——政府与 Securities and Exchange Commission（证券交易委员会，以下简称“SEC”）及 Kwok 的破产受托人（以下简称“受托人”）之间的通信记录——的动议，完全没有依据。充其量，Kwok 的非常规证据开示请求是以显然普通的事实为基础。政府与 SEC 进行了平行调查，而 Kwok 完全没有指出政府与 SEC 的互动有任何异常之处，更不用说证明其恶意的实质性依据；而该等证明正是获得 Kwok 所寻求类型证据开示所必需的。受托人的情况亦然。在如本案般存在可能被没收、且可能同时属于受托人破产财产范围内的资产时，刑事检察官与受托人协调并达成协议是常见做法——事实上，这是一项最佳做法。Kwok 就位于 675 Ramapo Valley Road, Mahwah, New Jersey 07430 的房产（以下简称“Mahwah Mansion”）提出的毁损证据主张，几近轻率。鉴于以下无争议事实，这一点尤其明显：在 Kwok 被捕以及起诉书中关于 Mahwah Mansion 的指控被解封后，Kwok 的共谋者和关联人士篡改了 Mahwah Mansion 的状况，以强化 Kwok 在本案中的辩护——即，他们在本案中伪造证据以妨害司法公正。Kwok 关于侵犯特权（该情形未曾发生，也根本不会发生）以及所谓与受托人共同起诉（毫无任何依据）的其他主张，同样毫无根据。案卷中完全没有任何迹象表明政府存在恶意。应在不举行听证的情况下驳回 Kwok 的动议。\n\n背景\n\n一、Mahwah Mansion\n\nMahwah Mansion 的购置、翻修和布置，均使用了起诉书所指控欺诈行为的所得款项——具体而言，是经由以其他实体名义开设的银行账户转移的 G|CLUBS（G|俱乐部）会员资金。(Dkt. 19 (“Indictment”) ¶¶ 4, 16(b)-(c))。如起诉书所指控，Kwok 及其共谋者利用 G|CLUBS 欺骗受害人，虚假承诺向其提供据称价值极高的 GTV 股票（即，在 SEC 介入以制止 GTV 发行后，利用 G|CLUBS 作为继续非法私募发行的工具），并虚假承诺其一旦成为 G|CLUBS“会员”，即可获得“全方位服务”。(Id. ¶ 15)。使用被侵占的 G|CLUBS 会员资金购置的 Mahwah Mansion 及其中陈设，在起诉书中被列为应予没收的特定财产。(Id. ¶ 55(v))。\n\n如先前所述（见 Dkt. 148，第 2-4 页），2023 年 3 月 15 日，Federal Bureau of Investigation（联邦调查局，以下简称“FBI”）探员在 Mahwah Mansion 执行了搜查令。多名 FBI 摄影师对该处所及其内容物进行了细致记录，在搜查期间拍摄了超过 2,000 张照片，该等照片已作为证据开示材料提供给被告人。FBI 还在搜查前对 Mahwah Mansion 进行了空中监视，相关照片和视频已提供给被告人。政府还从 Mahwah Mansion 查扣了大量实物证据，包括例如电子设备、Kwok 的个人物品（例如绣有 Kwok 名字的定制 Brioni 西装）以及使用被侵占的 G|CLUBS 会员资金购置的部分奢华陈设。\n\n在政府公开提交将 Kwok 与 Mahwah Mansion 相关联的起诉书后，被告人的关联人士和共谋者开始占用 Mahwah Mansion。例如，2023 年 4 月 9 日，数十名被告人的关联人士前往 Mahwah Mansion 抗议对被告人的羁押；2023 年 5 月 5 日，被告人的关联人士又在 Mahwah Mansion 举办了另一场大型聚会。这些活动有可能降低 Mahwah Mansion 的价值。\n\n2023 年 6 月 28 日前后，受托人告知政府，其已认定 Mahwah Mansion 属于 Kwok 的第 11 章破产财产；因此，受托人与政府就 Mahwah Mansion 的可能处置进行了协商。与动产或银行账户中的资金不同，政府通常无法在最终没收裁定作出之前，凭没收扣押令查扣不动产——该裁定只有在刑事定罪后、随后附属没收程序结束时才会作出。鉴于被告人的关联人士正在积极使用 Mahwah Mansion（其本身即以欺诈所得购置），且其对 Mahwah Mansion 的占用可能耗散该房产对于破产债权人及政府刑事案件中 Kwok 欺诈行为受害人的重大价值，2023 年 7 月 6 日，政府向受托人提供了政府在 2023 年 3 月 15 日搜查期间拍摄的 12 张照片，表明 Kwok 将 Mahwah Mansion 用作个人住所。\n\n2023 年 7 月 13 日，政府与受托人签署了一项约定，允许受托人在刑事案件审理期间保障 Mahwah Mansion 的价值。In re Ho Wan Kwok, et al., Case No. 23-05017 (D. Conn. Bankr.) (JAM), Dkt. 24, Ex. 1; 另见 id. at Dkt. 53, 56。该约定还规定，任何出售 Mahwah Mansion 所得的净收益（扣除特定费用和管理成本，以及视为用于满足同时也是刑事案件受害人的已获准破产债权人债权的 $1 million 支出）将作为 Mahwah Mansion 的替代物。\n\n2023 年 7 月 11 日，受托人就 Kwok 关联人士进入 Mahwah Mansion 一事，提出了单方临时限制令及初步禁令动议。In re Ho Wan Kwok, et al., Case No. 23-05017, Dkt. 4 (D. Conn. Bankr.) (JAM)。2023 年 8 月 1 日，Manning 法官部分准予该命令。见 id., Dkt. 17。2023 年 8 月 31 日，在补充书面陈述和听证后，Manning 法官准予受托人的动议，并发布经修改的初步禁令，将进入 Mahwah Mansion 的权限限制于：(a) 安保服务人员（定义见初步禁令）；(b) 受托人及其代表和/或专业人士；(c) United States Department of Justice（美国司法部）及其雇员和代表；(d) FBI 及其雇员和代表；(e) 其他联邦、新泽西州或 Mahwah 市执法机构及其雇员和代表；(f) 受托人以书面形式明确授权的任何其他人员（可包括电子邮件）；以及 (g) United States District Court for the Southern District of New York（纽约南区联邦地区法院）或破产法院明确授权的任何其他人员。In re Ho Wan Kwok, et al., Case. No. 23-05017, Dkt. 58 (D. Conn. Bankr.) (JAM)。\n\n2023 年 9 月 1 日，受托人对 Mahwah Mansion 进行了现场查看，并进行了录像和拍照。在 Kwok 于 2023 年 8 月 30 日提出寻求“维持”Mahwah Mansion“现状”的动议后（Kwok Br. 3），受托人于 2023 年 9 月 12 日向政府提供了受托人 2023 年 9 月 1 日现场查看时拍摄的六张照片。值得注意的是，这些照片显示，被告人的关联人士和共谋者一直在篡改该房产的内部，显然意图通过改造 Mahwah Mansion 以迎合某一辩护叙事来妨害本刑事案件。具体而言，被告人的共谋者在房间入口处张贴了标牌，似乎表明 Kwok 的 Mahwah Mansion 中的房间实际上是 NFSC 和/或 G|CLUBS 的办公室或房间，如下方照片所示：\n\n这些事后张贴的标牌，在政府于 2023 年 3 月 15 日依本案签发的搜查令搜查 Mahwah Mansion 时尚不存在。\n\n二、Kwok 的破产中止动议\n\n在提交本动议之前，Kwok 于 2023 年 8 月 30 日向本院提出动议，请求中止其于 2022 年 2 月自愿启动的破产程序（以下简称“破产中止动议”）。(Dkt. 131 (“Bankr. Stay Mot.”))。如本院驳回其暂停请求，破产中止动议还请求替代性救济。(Bankr. Stay Mot. 1, 28-30)。Kwok 所请求的替代性救济包括与 Mahwah Mansion 有关的请求。特别是，Kwok 请求其“辩护团队”继续不受陪同地进入 Mahwah Mansion，并试图阻止在破产程序中出售该房产。替代性救济还包括请求作出命令，禁止政府向受托人索取或从受托人处接收 Kwok 的特权信息或记录。\n\n2023 年 9 月 21 日，政府提交了答复。(Dkt. 148)。受托人提交了反对中止破产程序的书面意见，而政府未持立场。(Dkt. 148, at 1)。关于 Kwok 的替代性请求，政府首先说明，“Kwok 关于可能享有特权材料的请求应因已无实际意义而被驳回”，因为政府“既未向受托人索取，也未从受托人处收到 Kwok 可能享有特权的信息或记录”。(Dkt. 148, at 2)。此外，政府表示，其“目前无意如此行事，且除非获得 Kwok 律师（或适格权利持有人）的同意，或本院作出裁定认定该等材料不享有特权和/或适用犯罪—欺诈例外，否则不会如此行事”。(Dkt. 148, at 2)。关于 Kwok 要求不受限制地进入 Mahwah Mansion 的请求，政府陈述了上文亦已说明的、与 Mahwah Mansion 状况有关的背景。(Dkt. 148, at 2-4)。鉴于此，政府说明，“看来正是 Kwok 及其关联人士在实施 Kwok 所称其试图防止的行为，即实质性改造 Mahwah Mansion 以服务于某一辩护叙事”。(Dkt. 148, at 4)。此外，Kwok 已经拥有关于 Mahwah Mansion 的“大量资料——包括数千张照片和视频”。(Dkt. 148 at 5)。就此而言，“Kwok 试图将”Mahwah Mansion 的情形“类比为阻碍接触重要证人，毫无根据”。(Dkt. 148 at 5)。尽管如此，政府表示，其不会反对 Kwok 或 Wang 的刑事辩护律师对 Mahwah Mansion 进行现场访问。(Dkt. 148 at 5)。\n\n2023年10月5日，Kwok（郭文贵）就政府的答复提交了回复。（Dkt. 152）。Kwok 在回复中提出了若干论点，但均无根据。然而，最重要的是 Kwok 未就何事提出论证或争议。具体而言，Kwok 未争议：自其被捕且起诉书中关于挪用 G|CLUBS 资金购买、翻修及布置 Mahwah Mansion（马瓦庄园）的指控被解封以来，Kwok 的追随者已通过制作并张贴暗示 Mahwah Mansion 是 G|CLUBS 设施的标牌，对 Mahwah Mansion 作出了实质性改动。换言之，Kwok 从未否认，他据称试图维持的证据实际上已被其共谋者篡改，以迎合一种辩护叙事。\n\nIII. 本动议\n\n在政府提交其对 Kwok 的破产中止动议的反对意见之前，Kwok 提交了本动议，寻求获取超出刑事实体法或诉讼程序所规定的证据开示范围的材料，即政府与受托人之间以及政府与 SEC（美国证券交易委员会）之间的通信。（Dkt. 143（“Br.”））。\n\n论证\n\nI. Kwok 未能为其证据开示请求确立有效依据\n\nA. 适用法律\n\n1. Brady（布雷迪案）与联合起诉\n\n“根据 Brady 及其后续判例，政府有积极义务披露其知悉的有利证据。”United States v. Payne（美国诉佩恩案）, 63 F.3d 1200, 1208 (2d Cir. 1995)。该义务延伸至控方团队。换言之，检察官“被推定……知悉与其办公室对本案的调查相关而收集的所有信息，并且确实‘有义务了解本案中代表政府行事的其他人所知悉的任何有利证据，包括警方。’”United States v. Avellino（美国诉阿韦利诺案）, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998)（引自 Kyles v. Whitley（凯尔斯诉惠特利案）, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995)）；另见 United States v. Hunter（美国诉亨特案）, 32 F.4th 22, 36 (2d Cir. 2022)。\n\n政府获取并提供 Rule 16 和 Brady 材料的义务，仅限于控方团队占有的材料。Hunter, 32 F.4th at 36（“我们早已否定如下观念，即‘政府任何部分的知情等同于该检察官的知情。’”（引自 United States v. Quinn（美国诉奎因案）, 445 F.2d 940, 944 (2d Cir. 1971)））；Avellino, 136 F.3d. at 255（“[T]若对检察官施加无限义务，要求其向未与检察官办公室合作的其他机构查询，将不当地要求我们采纳一种政府一体化的观点，这将使刑事案件的起诉陷入瘫痪状态。”）；United States v. Bonventre（美国诉邦文特雷案）, No. 10 Cr. 228 (LTS), 2014 WL 3673550, at \\*22 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2014), aff'd in part, 646 F. App'x 73 (2d Cir. 2016)（Brady“并非一种可被用来强制政府为辩方收集信息的证据开示原则。”）。\n\n尽管“第二巡回上诉法院尚未阐明一项测试，以决定何时可将 Brady 材料的知情从一个机构归责于另一机构”，United States v. Velissaris（美国诉韦利萨里斯案）, No. 22 Cr. 105 (DLC), 2022 WL 2392360, at \\*2 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2022)，该巡回区已提供指引，本辖区内的法院亦已阐明多项因素，以确定控方团队的范围及是否发生联合调查。该巡回区指出，“相关的审查[即确定某人是否为控方团队成员]在于该人做了什么，而非该人是谁。”United States v. Stewart（美国诉斯图尔特案）, 433 F.3d 273, 298 (2d Cir. 2006)。“履行调查职责或就本案起诉作出战略决定的个人，被视为控方团队成员；服从检察官指挥并参与调查的警察及联邦探员亦然。”United States v. Barcelo（美国诉巴塞洛案）, 628 F. App'x 36, 38 (2d Cir. 2015)（简易命令）。“归根结底”，对谁构成控方团队的认定，“涉及一个代理法问题：检察官是否应对他人的行为负责？”United States v. Meregildo（美国诉梅雷希尔多案）, 920 F. Supp. 2d 434, 443-44 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Pierce（美国诉皮尔斯案）, 785 F.3d 832 (2d Cir. 2015)。“一般而言，当代理人有义务向本人提供信息，或者代理人基于其知悉的、属于其有权约束本人的事项采取行动时，本人应对该代理人的知情负责。因此，代理人的披露义务与其约束本人的权力相关联。”Id. 在刑事调查和起诉的情形下，有权约束检察官的个人通常包括那些“积极调查案件、在检察官指挥下行事，或协助控方制定审判策略”的人。Meregildo, 920 F. Supp. 2d at 442；另见 United States v. Barcelo, No. 13 Cr. 38 (RJS), 2014 WL 4058066, at \\*9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2014)（“为确定某人是否为控方团队成员——换言之，控方是否可被视为对该个人所持信息具有推定知情——法院考虑全部情形，包括该个人是否积极调查案件、在检察官指挥下行事，或协助控方制定审判策略。”）, aff'd, 628 F. App'x 36 (2d Cir. 2015)。\n\n适用这些原则，第二巡回上诉法院和本辖区内法院一贯驳回试图就由并非作为控方代理人行事的实体所持有的信息向政府施加证据开示义务的主张；这些实体包括合作证人、政府方专家证人、其他政府机构，甚至司法部的独立组成部分。参见，例如，Barcelo, 628 F. App'x at 38（认定一名合作证人并非控方团队的一部分，因其“未在调查中或在决定调查或审判策略时发挥任何作用”，且“仅向政府提供信息并在审判中作证”）；Stewart, 433 F.3d at 299（认定一名作为政府专家证人作证的特勤局文职雇员，就 Giglio（吉利奥案）目的而言并非“控方团队”成员）；United States v. Hutcher（美国诉赫彻案）, 622 F.2d 1083, 1088 (2d Cir. 1980)（认定就 Giglio 和 Jencks Act（詹克斯法）目的而言，政府对于在无关破产程序中提交的信息不负证据开示义务）；United States v. Locascio（美国诉洛卡西奥案）, 6 F.3d 924, 949 (2d Cir. 1993)（认定 FBI（联邦调查局）探员在与被告人起诉无关的调查过程中作出的报告，并非由控方团队占有）；Pina v. Henderson（皮纳诉亨德森案）, 752 F.2d 47, 49 (2d Cir. 1985)（认定检察官的推定知情不及于一名“未与警方或检察官任何一方协同工作”的假释官）；United States v. Quinn, 445 F.2d 940, 944 (2d Cir. 1971)（驳回“‘政府任何部分的知情等同于本检察官的知情’这一完全站不住脚的立场”）；United States v. Morgan（美国诉摩根案）, 302 F.R.D. 300, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)（“[T]控方团队不包括未参与调查的联邦探员、检察官或假释官。”）；Meregildo, 920 F. Supp. 2d at 444（“[I]在大多数案件中，合作证人不应被视为控方团队的一部分。”）；United States v. Merlino（美国诉梅利诺案）, 349 F.3d 144, 154-55 (3d Cir. 2003)（认定政府无需取得合作证人的监狱通话记录以履行披露义务）。\n\n本巡回区内的法院认为，只有在政府与另一州或联邦机构进行“联合调查”时，检察官的义务才延伸至审查另一机构占有、保管或控制的材料，以寻找 Brady 证据。United States v. Rigas（美国诉里加斯案）, 583 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009)（维持地区法院意见，该意见认定“未与 SEC 进行联合调查”，因此政府无需提供由 SEC 保管的文件）；SEC v. Stanard（证券交易委员会诉斯坦纳德案）, No. 06 Civ. 7736 (GEL), 2007 WL 1834709, at \\*3 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2007)（在驳回被告请求法院要求 SEC 调取并审查不在 SEC 占有、保管或控制之下的 FBI 讯问笔录时，认定“显然，尽管调查可能有所重叠，但并非联合进行”）；United States v. Finnerty（美国诉芬纳蒂案）, 411 F. Supp. 2d 428, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)（认定政府与 NYSE（纽约证券交易所），即使后者是国家行为者，也未就 NYSE 的政策进行联合调查）；Ferreira v. United States（费雷拉诉美国案）, 350 F. Supp. 2d 550, 556-57 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)（认定政府与 NYPD（纽约市警察局）之间的合作“不足以使政府和州检察官成为同一控方团队的成员”）；United States v. Upton（美国诉厄普顿案）, 856 F. Supp. 727, 749-50 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)（认定政府与 FAA（联邦航空管理局）并未进行“联合调查”，即便 FAA 提供了两名检查员协助刑事调查）；United States v. Guerrerio（美国诉格雷里奥案）, 670 F. Supp. 1215, 1219 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)（在未与政府进行联合调查且政府对材料不具有控制权的情况下，驳回针对 Bronx District Attorney's Office（布朗克斯地区检察官办公室）所持大陪审团记录提出的 Rule 16 证据开示请求）。\n\n为确定刑事起诉是否与另一机构进行了“联合调查”，从而应将该另一机构视为控方团队的一部分，法院考虑多项因素，包括该另一机构是否“(1)参与控方对证人的讯问，(2)参与向大陪审团呈现案件，(3)审阅控方收集的文件或与控方共享文件，(4)在制定起诉策略中发挥作用，或(5)陪同控方出席法庭程序。”United States v. Middendorf（美国诉米登多夫案）, 18 Cr. 36 (JPO), 2018 WL 3956494, at \\*4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2018)（引自 United States v. Blaszczak（美国诉布拉什恰克案）, 308 F.Supp.3d 736, 741-42 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)）；另见 United States v. Collins（美国诉柯林斯案）, 409 F. Supp. 3d 228, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)（认定 SEC 与政府参与了一些联合讯问的情形下不存在联合调查）；United States v. Chow（美国诉周案）, No. 17 Cr. 667 (GHW), ECF No. 69, at 87 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2018)（认定各机构虽共享信息，但各自决定取得何种文件及向证人询问何种事实的情形下不存在联合调查）；Stanard, 2007 WL 1834709, at \\*3（FBI 与 SEC 虽参与联合讯问、但仅由 FBI 记录笔录，仍未进行联合调查）；United States v. Rigas, No. 02 Cr. 1236 (LBS), 2008 WL 144824, at \\*2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2008)（认定平行的民事和刑事调查并非“联合”调查）。\n\n2. 超出 Brady 或 Rule 16 范围的证据开示\n\n政府所持有的任何及所有记录或信息，从来都不当然属于其证据开示义务的范围。相反，“当对被告人有利的证据对于罪责或量刑具有实质性时，检方负有披露该证据的宪法义务。”United States（美国） v. Coppa（科帕）, 267 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Brady v. Maryland（马里兰州）, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)). 同样，Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure（联邦刑事诉讼规则） Rule 16(a)(1)(E)(i) 要求政府应辩方请求，提供“属于政府占有、保管或控制之下”且“对准备辩护具有实质性”的物品。根据 Rule 16，如某一物品可用于反驳政府的案件或加强辩护，即属“对准备辩护具有实质性”。United States v. Stevens（史蒂文斯）, 985 F.2d 1175, 1180–81 (2d Cir. 1993). 换言之，正如 Supreme Court（最高法院）所述，Rule 16(a)(1)(E)(i) 仅授权提供那些倾向于“反驳政府关于被告人实施了所控罪行之主张”的物品。United States v. Armstrong（阿姆斯特朗）, 517 U.S. 456, 462 (1996); see also United States v. Rigas（里加斯）, 258 F. Supp. 2d 299, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Rule 16(a)(1)(E)(i) 赋予被告人获得对准备回应检方主案陈述的论点具有实质性的文件或其他物品的权利。”); United States v. Allen（艾伦）, No. 14 Cr. 272 (JSR), 2016 WL 315928, at \\*3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2016)（部分依据 Armstrong 驳回为支持 Kastigar 主张而提出的证据开示请求）。\n\n此外，某一物品可能对辩方“有用”这一事实本身，并不使其在 Rule 16 下成为“具有实质性”的物品。Rigas, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 307; see also United States v. Parnas（帕纳斯）, No. 19-CR-725 (JPO), 2021 WL 2981567, at \\*8 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2021)（驳回根据 Rule 16(a)(1)(E)(i) 就“可能包含与[被告人]选择性起诉主张相关证据”的文件提出的动议，理由是被告人“未能就该等主张作出必要的证明”）。“必须有某些迹象表明，对争议证据的审前披露将……使被告人能够显著改变有利于其自身的证据分量。”United States v. Maniktala（马尼克塔拉）, 934 F.2d 25, 28 (2d Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). 被告人必须初步证明实质性，United States v. Finnerty（芬纳蒂）, 411 F.Supp.2d 428, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)，并且必须“提出的不仅仅是所请求证据具有实质性的结论性主张”，Rigas, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 307.\n\n尽管 Rule 16 不授权提供辩方为“质疑检方对案件的处理”而寻求的材料，Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 462，法院有时会授权就该等问题进行证据开示。然而，在此之前，法院要求被告人作出实质性的初步证明，证明政府确实存在不当行为。See Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 186 (1992)（主张政府拒绝提出 5K 动议系基于违宪动机的被告人，必须在获得证据开示前作出“实质性的初步证明”）; United States v. Berrios（贝里奥斯）, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974)（寻求就选择性起诉主张进行证据开示的被告人，必须在获准证据开示前提供“某些倾向于表明该项抗辩之必要要素存在的证据”）; United States v. Sanders（桑德斯）, 211 F.3d 711, 717 (2d Cir. 2000)（在报复性起诉主张的情形下同样如此）。\n\nB. 讨论\n\nKwok（郭文贵）的请求毫无根据。为获得超出刑事法律规定范围的证据开示，Kwok 必须实质性证明存在恶意。Kwok 仅指出了政府与进行平行调查的监管机构，或与管理同样可被刑事没收资产的受托人之间常见、例行的互动，远未履行其举证责任。Kwok 的动议应在不举行听证的情况下予以驳回。\n\n1. 应驳回 Kwok 关于 SEC 通信的请求\n\nKwok 请求取得政府与 SEC（美国证券交易委员会）之间的通信，毫无根据；其要求强制进行该等证据开示的动议应予驳回。\n\na. 政府与 SEC 进行了平行调查\n\n首先，尽管 Kwok 未正式申请认定政府与 SEC 进行了联合调查，但该项主张构成其证据开示请求的基础，同样毫无根据。SEC 并非政府起诉团队的一部分。尽管政府与 SEC 有时为方便证人而共同进行访谈，但政府调查的大多数方面均未有 SEC 参与：\n\n— SEC 未参与政府的指控决定或政府起诉策略的制定；\n\n— 同样，政府未参与 SEC 的指控决定或 SEC 诉讼策略的制定；\n\n— SEC 没有任何人员被指定为负责该刑事调查工作的特别联邦助理检察官；\n\n— 在共同进行的访谈中，SEC 未在访谈期间记录笔记，也不持有任何共同访谈的笔记；\n\n— 在共同进行的访谈中，证人被告知，两机构的调查彼此独立，访谈仅为便利起见而共同进行；如将达成陈述协议，证人将与各机构分别订立协议；\n\n— SEC 未参与向大陪审团呈交本案，亦未获得大陪审团记录；\n\n— SEC 未参与执行搜查令，亦未参与对根据搜查令取得材料的相关性审查；\n\n— SEC 未获得根据大陪审团传票向政府提交的材料；以及\n\n— SEC 未陪同政府出庭。\n\n(See Ex. A (“Murray Decl.”（默里声明）) ¶ 2). See Collins（柯林斯）, 409 F. Supp. 3d at 242（援引其中多项因素，以支持认定 SEC 与政府未进行联合调查）; United States v. Alexandre（亚历山大）, No. 22 CR. 326 (JPC), 2023 WL 416405, at \\*6-8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2023)（同上）。综合考虑这些因素，尽管二者关注的事项存在重叠，仍强有力地支持认定政府与 SEC 进行了各自独立的调查。\n\n尽管 SEC 并非起诉团队的一部分，政府仍已自愿向 SEC 请求其从第三方取得的全部文件，并已将这些文件交付辩方。如 SEC 向政府提供其从第三方取得的额外文件，政府将立即向辩护律师提供该等文件。\n\nKwok 所援引的任何事实均不能证明本案存在联合调查。相反，Kwok 试图将平行调查情形下常规的事实描绘为异常或可疑，例如政府与 SEC 在同一日期提出指控（Br. 21）。See, e.g., SEC v. Shkreli（什克雷利）, No. 15 Civ. 7175 (KAM), 2016 WL 1122029, at \\*7 n.6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2016)（“鉴于 SEC 具有独立执行证券法的职责，以及必须在诉讼时效届满前提起诉讼的需要，法院认为 SEC 在刑事起诉书解封时或前后提起民事诉讼并无不当。”）。Kwok 还指出，政府从 SEC 获得了在政府支持搜查令的宣誓书中被援引的文件和信息（Br. 20），但这完全正常且恰当。政府在其调查中通常从众多个人和实体获取文件和信息，政府不知道有任何权威依据认为，仅凭该事实即可将这些信息来源转变为起诉团队成员。相反，法院已明确驳回该项主张。See, e.g., Meregildo（梅雷吉尔多）, 920 F. Supp. 2d at 445-46（认定合作证人不是起诉团队成员）; United States v. Barcelo（巴塞洛）, 628 F. App'x 36, 38-39 (2d Cir. 2015)（同上）; Stewart（斯图尔特）, 433 F.3d at 298-99（认定一名分析证据、协助检方准备交叉询问问题、参与模拟询问并在审判中作证的专家证人，不是起诉团队成员）。事实上，如 SEC 拒绝就针对 Kwok 所实施之类重大欺诈行为正在进行的刑事调查向政府提供信息，反而将极不寻常。“此外，‘并无一般规则’禁止诸如 SEC 的民事执法机构‘与刑事检察官分享……通过民事证据开示取得的证据。’”United States v. Rhodes（罗兹）, No. 18 Cr. 887 (JMF), 2019 WL 3162221, at \\*3 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2019) (quoting United States v. Fiore（菲奥雷）, 381 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2004)). “事实上，由于‘证券欺诈是行政调查和刑事调查的适当对象……SEC 执法官员和检察官都预期在某一调查层面进行协调，并认为各种程序彼此不可或缺。’”Rhodes, 2019 WL 3162221, at \\*3 (quoting Fiore, 381 F.3d at 94). Kwok 未能援引任何权威依据，证明独立机构仅因遵从自愿信息请求即成为起诉团队的一部分。\n\n同样，政府与 SEC——二者均负责执行反欺诈法律和保护受害人，且均在调查由相同个人针对相同受害人实施的相同行为——可能共享某些证据并相互告知预期的调查或执法步骤，这一事实完全不值得注意且属例行。“一方面，刑事起诉团队中的律师和特工，与另一方面[民事执法机关]之间的该等协调和共享，本身并无例外或问题。”Rhodes, 2019 WL 3162221, at \\*3.\n\n简言之，将这些事实和情形适用于确立已久的法律标准，清楚表明 SEC 进行了平行调查，并非政府起诉团队的一部分。\n\nb. Kwok 的证据开示请求毫无依据\n\n鉴于上述情况，Kwok 要求取得政府与 SEC 之间内部通信的请求毫无根据。没有任何刑事证据开示规则规定，仅因辩方推测材料可能有助于提出辩方动议，即必须提供该等材料。相反，本地区法院已明确驳回此类请求。See, e.g., Parnas, 2021 WL 2981567, at \\*8（驳回根据 Rule 16(a)(1)(E)(i) 就“可能包含与[被告人]选择性起诉主张相关证据”的文件提出的动议，理由是被告人“未能就该等主张作出必要的证明”）。\n\nKwok 对 Rhodes 的依赖尤其不当。Rhodes 直接驳回了本案中辩方提出的、认为刑事与民事机关共享信息属异常或有问题的主张，反而认定，一方面刑事起诉团队中的律师和特工，与另一方面[民事执法机关]之间的该等“协调和共享，本身并无例外或问题。”2019 WL 3162221, at \\*3. Furman（弗曼）法官解释称，只有在“恶意”进行该等协调时才会存在问题，例如政府机关“作出积极虚假陈述，或仅为推进刑事案件之目的而进行民事调查。”Id. (quoting United States v. Stringer（斯金格）, 535 F.3d 929, 937 (9th Cir. 2008), and also citing United States v. Kordel（科德尔）, 397 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1970) and United States v. LaSalle National Bank（拉萨尔国民银行）, 437 U.S. 298 (1978)).\n\n鉴于平行程序中协调的“并不例外且不存在问题”的性质，Rhodes 裁定，刑事被告并非当然有权获得刑事机关与民事机关之间的内部通信。相反，为就民事机关与刑事机关不当协调的主张获得“即使是有限的证据开示”，被告必须“初步作出实质性的恶意证明”。Rhodes, 2019 WL 3162221, at *4 (quoting United States v. Gel Spice Co., 773 F.2d 427, 434 (2d Cir. 1985)). Furman 法官认定，Rhodes 案中的被告未能作出该等证明，因而驳回了其证据开示请求；Kwok（郭文贵）在其书状中省略了这一事实。See Rhodes, 2019 WL 3162221, at *5.\n\nKwok 远未达到其负有的“初步作出实质性恶意证明”的举证责任。事实上，Kwok 未能指出任何倾向于表明刑事机关与民事机关之间的协调具有例外性或存在问题的事实。如上所述，本案中的协调完全属于常规。Kwok 指出，Furman 法官要求 Rhodes 案中的政府就其与民事机关的协调提交宣誓书，但这源于 Rhodes 桡中独有的一项异常事实：SEC（美国证券交易委员会）虽向 Rhodes 案被告发出文件传票（该被告已作出回应），却未对其提起平行指控，而该传票取得的材料被用于平行刑事案件。换言之，Furman 法官认为异常的，是不存在同时进行的平行民事执法行动；这也促使其要求政府提交宣誓书。相比之下，本案涉及的标准事实模式是刑事与民事诉讼同时提起，这削弱了任何关于 SEC 诉讼仅为推进刑事案件而提起的主张。无论如何，本反对书附有检方团队成员的一份宣誓书。（See Murral Decl.）。\n\n总而言之，Kwok 未能根据相关法律标准阐明任何表面上可信的恶意理论。鉴于本案中 SEC 与政府之间的任何协调在任何时候均“并不例外且不存在问题”，这并不令人意外。Rhodes, 2019 WL 3162221, at *3. 因此，基于上述理由，应驳回 Kwok 关于政府与 SEC 通信的证据开示动议。\n2. 应驳回 Kwok 关于受托人通信的请求\n\nKwok 就受托人提出的论点同样毫无根据。Kwok 试图通过与破产受托人的并不例外的互动来推断政府不当行为，这种牵强尝试既与记录不符，也与法律不符。Kwok 远未达到其须证明“初步作出实质性恶意证明”的举证责任。Rhodes, 2019 WL 3162221, at *4.\n\n首先，Kwok 未能证明存在任何提出毁损证据主张的依据。简言之，政府与受托人就 Mahwah Mansion（马瓦大厦）达成的和解协议，绝不会导致证据毁损的风险。政府非但没有毁损关于马瓦大厦状况的证据，反而已提供数千张摄于 March 2023 和 September 2023 的马瓦大厦照片，以及大量在 August 2022 至 September 2023 期间不同时段录制的视频监控录像，和大量摄于 September 2023 的马瓦大厦内部视频。Kwok 未解释其持有的、记录马瓦大厦多个日期状况的大量文书记录，如何已经或将会以某种方式被毁损；Kwok 也未解释，为何其登记在案的刑事辩护律师进行现场查看会以某种方式不足以满足进一步的任何辩护需要。[1] 相反，Kwok 仅如其在破产中止动议中所作的一样，在此主张“Mahwah [Mansion] 的现状必须得到维持。”(Br. 16). 但该主张仍存在两个问题。第一个问题是，实际上，Kwok 的共谋者正在改变马瓦大厦的状态。他们在 Kwok 被捕及起诉书中关于马瓦大厦的指控被公开后，正通过篡改该物业的状况，试图妨碍本案司法公正，以使马瓦大厦看起来像一处 GCLUBS 设施。事实上，就破产中止动议而言，Kwok 甚至无法也没有争议：在政府关于马瓦大厦的指控为人所知后，其追随者篡改了马瓦大厦的状态。(See Dkt. 152). 第二个问题是，如前所述，Kwok 未解释为何其持有的、记录马瓦大厦特定日期状况的大量证据（包括照片和视频）未能“维持”马瓦大厦的状态。Kwok 未回应这些要点，因为本动议与破产中止动议一样，实际上是 Kwok 试图取得对马瓦大厦的控制，以供该共谋活动继续使用。(See Br. 17-18 (\"evidence showing how the property was configured and used prior to Mr. Kwok's arrest and how it continues to be used—barring the Trustee's interference—in service to the Chinese prodemocracy dissident movement constitutes exculpatory evidence that Mr. Kwok is entitled to present to the jury.\" (emphasis added))). 本法院应驳回 Kwok 在本动议及破产中止动议中所反映的、试图让本法院认可篡改证据的企图——该等篡改是为妨碍本刑事案件中的司法公正，并推进一项已从 Kwok 追随者处窃取逾十亿美元的全球共谋活动。\n\n1 在其对破产中止动议的回复中，Kwok 主张，对该等现场查看进行监督“无异于纵容政府间谍进入辩护阵营。”(Dkt. 152 at 8). 撇开修辞不谈，政府愿意就适当保障措施与 Kwok 会面并协商，以确保 Kwok 的同伙和共谋者不会进一步篡改马瓦大厦。如政府在其对破产中止动议的答复中已指出，Kwok 的律师在提交其两项动议中的任何一项之前，均未就马瓦大厦现场查看事宜联系政府。他们至今仍未如此做。\n\n与此相关，政府与受托人就马瓦大厦达成的和解协议并无任何例外或不当之处。政府一直与受托人合作，努力有效分配资源，以确保并追回 Kwok 及其共谋者窃取或侵占的逾十亿美元中的部分款项。政府拟将其查封的数亿美元现金和财产返还给被告犯罪行为的受害人——该行动必然涉及受托人就 Kwok 的破产债权人对该等资产提出的债权所承担的职责。具体就马瓦大厦而言，政府与受托人对该物业维持可能相互竞争的权利主张，而该协议将使该物业的价值得以保全——其中包括停止被告共谋者和同伙为妨碍司法公正而对该物业作出的改造——直至与没收、赔偿和破产财产有关的问题得到解决。[2] 对于受托人同样享有权益的可没收资产，政府与受托人开展合作绝无任何异常之处。此类协调存在众多先例——受托人在破产法院听证会上曾提及这些先例；Kwok 在其动议中反复引用该听证会，但其证据附件中遗漏了该部分庭审记录[3]——这些先例在多个司法辖区已延续多年。[4] 例如，在针对 Marc Dreier（马克·德雷尔）的刑事案件中，Rakoff 法官批准了涉及政府和破产受托人的多项和解协议，其中包括政府与该案 Chapter 11 受托人之间的一项“协调协议”。United States v. Dreir, 09 Cr. 86 (JSR), Dkt. 141 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2010). 再如，在规模巨大的 Bernie Madoff（伯纳德·麦道夫）欺诈案中，政府与法院指定的受托人进行了广泛合作，该受托人负责依照 Securities Investor Protection Act（证券投资者保护法）(“SIPA”) 监督麦道夫公司清算。[5] 事实上，同一名受托人——其亦监督了麦道夫的个人破产案——\n\n2 在其对破产中止动议的回复中，Kwok 称政府通过与受托人签订该协议，不当地试图“规避本法院”。(See Dkt. 152 at 7-8). 这不仅是夸张。这是虚假的。该协议仅保全该可没收资产的价值；与所有案件一样，本法院将在审判和定罪后处理没收问题，包括与马瓦大厦有关的问题。\n\n3 See pages 28-29 of the complete transcript, attached as Exhibit B.\n\n4 See, e.g., In re Maresca, No. 20-11483 (KHK), Dkt. 244 (E.D. Va. Bankr. Sept. 9, 2021)（破产受托人请求批准与政府达成协调与和解协议的动议；政府对作为“该破产财产唯一重大资产”的一项物业拥有没收和赔偿请求权）；United States v. Merrill, No. 14-40028 (TSH), Dkt. 367 (D. Mass. July 11, 2017)（赔偿命令“规定由相关 Chapter 11 案件中的受托人管理并向受害人支付赔偿”）；In re Rothstein, No. 09-34791 (RBR), Dkt. 5704 (S.D. Fla. Bankr. July 14, 2014)（请求批准政府与破产受托人就没收和赔偿达成和解的动议）；In re Goldberg, No. 09-23370 (ASD), Dkt. 424 (D. Conn. Bankr. May 31, 2011)（请求破产受托人管理刑事案件中赔偿的动议）；id. at Dkt. 462（准许该动议的命令）；United States v. Brandau, No. 99-8215 (DMM), Dkt. 734 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2000)（政府与破产受托人就出售和维护被确定为没收对象的资产达成的协议）；id. at Dkt. 759（批准该协议的命令）。\n\n5 在 Wang（王雁）支持破产中止动议的信函中，她引用了政府在针对麦道夫的 SEC 诉讼中提交的一封信函。(See Dkt. 135 at 4). 尽管在该案中 DOJ（美国司法部）确实反对就麦道夫的破产财产启动破产程序，但 Wang 的信函遗漏了一个关键点。具体而言，Wang 遗漏了政府信函最后指出：“[本办公室]亦继续与 SIP[A] 受托人合作，以最大限度地为受害人追回款项”，并且“鉴于该项持续努力”，启动破产程序“尤其不适当”。SEC v. Madoff, No. 08 Civ. 10791, Dkt. 50 at 5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2009). 事实上，在政府发函两个月后，麦道夫的个人破产财产被合并至由该 SIPA 受托人管理的 SIPA 程序中；该受托人一直就没收和赔偿事项与政府进行了密切且有效的协调。See Sec. Investor Protection Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Investment Sec. LLC, No. 09-11893 (BRL) (S.D.N.Y. Bankr. June 9, 2009), available at [http]\n\n自 June 9, 2009[6] 起一直管理该遗产——并且甚至同时被任命为该刑事案件的特别专员，“负责监督没收法项下返还或减免程序”。DOJ，Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Agreement to Recover $7.2 Billion for Victims of Bernard L. Madoff's Ponzi Scheme from Estate of Jeffry M. Picower（Dec. 17, 2010）。[7] 例如，就这项约 $7.2 billion、“美国历史上最大单笔没收”而言，相关和解协议规定，受托人将通过“SIPA 清算程序”管理约 $5 billion 的资金，同时通过 DOJ 的返还或减免程序管理约 $2.2 billion。Id. 判例同样驳斥了 Kwok 在此处及在破产程序中止动议中所提出的暗示，即受托人因代表 Kwok 的债权人追收资产所开展的工作而收取费用，有任何不当之处。如同破产受托人一样，SIPA 受托人的费用亦获得报酬；迄今为止，Madoff 案中的 SIPA 受托人已收取超过 $2.2 billion 的费用（同时追回超过 $14.6 billion 的资产）。见 The Madoff Recovery Initiative, Recoveries to Report Fees Ratio: December 11, 2008 to September 20, 2023。[8] 政府与受托人协调配合，例如与 Kwok 破产案中的受托人协调配合，远非不当或反常，而是一项最佳做法；该做法避免了围绕资产进行不必要的争斗，并在猖獗欺诈发生后实现最大限度的追偿。[9]\n\n6 见 Sec. Investor Protection Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Investment Sec. LLC, No. 09-11893 (BRL) (S.D.N.Y. Bankr. June 9, 2009)，可见于 [http]\n\n7 可见于 http\n\n8 可见于 http\n\n9 政府向本案中由法院任命的受托人提供一组照片，也并无任何不当。Kwok 在其破产程序中止动议中试图暗示，政府此举违反了保护令（Kwok Br. 3, 21），但如政府答复中已经说明（Dkt. 148, at 3 n.2），Kwok 是错误的。此外，该等照片与政府在 Mahwah Mansion（马瓦庄园）执行的搜查令有关。作为类比，依据搜查令取得的材料通常会与开展平行调查的监管机构共享；此类共享完全正当，而且确属常见。\n\n第二，Kwok 关于需要保护由受托人持有的其特权信息这一所谓必要性的论点毫无根据。政府已说明，其既未寻求也未收到该等信息，并且仅会在适当情形下如此行事。（Dkt. 148, at 2）。[10]\n\n第三，政府与受托人之间的互动并无异常。Kwok 所称受托人可能是控方团队成员的说法，基于下列情形毫无根据：\n\n- 政府在 Kwok 自愿申请破产及受托人获任命之前数年，已独立启动调查；\n- 受托人未参与政府的指控决定或政府公诉策略的制定；\n- 受托人未参与政府进行的任何访谈；\n- 受托人未参与向大陪审团提交本案，亦未收到大陪审团笔录；\n- 受托人未参与执行搜查令，亦未参与对依据搜查令取得材料的相关性审查；\n- 受托人未取得根据大陪审团传票向政府提交的材料；且\n- 受托人未陪同政府出庭。\n\n（Murray Decl. ¶ 3）。\n\n10 Kwok 就破产程序中止动议提交的答复称，政府在说明其可取得 Kwok 特权信息的适当情形时，包括了来自 Kwok “或适当的[特权]持有人”的同意，从而形成了某种“漏洞”。（Dkt. 152 at 8）。Kwok 是错误的。政府纳入该括号说明，仅是为了涵盖 Kwok 实际上并非适当特权持有人的情形，例如由公司实体而非个人实际持有该特权的情形。\n\n为明确起见，Kwok 实际上并未主张受托人是控方团队的一部分。他寻求取得通信记录，以“全面调查受托人是否”属于控方团队。（Br. 19）。但是，如上所述，这并非取得超出刑事法律和程序所规定范围之证据开示的依据。Kwok 指出政府与受托人之间存在“协调”和“信息共享”，但政府与另一方之间的该等协调完全“无异常且无问题”，并不能为 Kwok 所寻求的非常规证据开示提供任何依据。Rhodes, 2019 WL 3162221, at *3; 亦见 Meregildo, 920 F. Supp. 2d at 441-42（“仅与控方团队互动，并不会使某人成为团队成员。”）。\n\n结论\n\n显然，SEC 和受托人均非本案控方团队成员。为取得超出刑事规则所规定范围的证据开示，被告必须就政府存在恶意作出实质性证明。Kwok 未作出该证明，因为他无法作出该证明。政府与 SEC 及受托人之间的互动不仅是善意的，而且该等互动属于常规且无异常。就本案所呈现情形而言，若有任何异常之处，那就是 Kwok 已提出两项动议，至少部分目的是让其共同阴谋者和关联人能够通过重新占有 Mahwah Mansion，进一步妨碍司法并延续其大规模欺诈。应驳回 Kwok 的动议。\n\n谨此提交，\n\nDAMIAN WILLIAMS（达米安·威廉姆斯）\n美国检察官\n\n签署人：/s/\n\nMicah F. Fergenson（迈卡·F·弗格森）\nRyan B. Finkel（瑞安·B·芬克尔）\nJuliana N. Murray（朱莉安娜·N·默里）\n助理美国检察官\n212-637-2190/-6612 /-2314\n\n附件 A\n\n美国联邦地区法院\nSouthern District of New York（纽约南区）\n\n美利坚合众国\n\n诉\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），又名 “Miles Guo”，又名 “Miles Kwok”，又名 “Guo Wengui”，又名 “Brother Seven”，又名 “The Principal”，\n\nKIN MING JE（介明杰），又名 “William Je”，以及\n\nYANPING WANG（王雁平），又名 “Yvette”，\n\n被告。\n\n助理美国检察官声明\n\nS1 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\n纽约州 ）纽约县 ：ss.：纽约南区 ）\n\nJULIANA N. MURRAY（朱莉安娜·N·默里）依 28 U.S.C. § 1746，特在伪证处罚下声明如下：\n\n1. 本人系纽约南区美国检察官 Damian Williams（达米安·威廉姆斯）办公室的一名助理美国检察官。本人提交本声明，旨在向法院提供有关政府[1]在调查 Ho Wan Kwok、\n\n1. 本声明中对政府的提述，均指纽约南区美国检察官办公室。\n\nKin Ming Je 和 Yanping Wang（“Kwok 调查”）期间，与 Securities and Exchange Commission（证券交易委员会，简称“SEC”）之间关系的性质和范围的信息。本人是目前负责本案的助理美国检察官之一，并自 2021 年起参与该项调查。\n\n2. 基于本人参与该项调查、审阅电子邮件和短信、审阅通话记录、与 SEC 执法部门团队中负责对 Kwok、Je 和 Wang 开展平行调查的律师交谈，以及与同样参与 Kwok 调查的其他助理美国检察官交谈，本人获悉有关 Kwok 调查的下列事实及其他事项：\n\na. SEC 未参与政府的指控决定或政府公诉策略的制定。\n\nb. 同样，基于本人同 SEC 律师的交谈，本人了解到，政府未参与 SEC 的指控决定或 SEC 诉讼策略的制定。\n\nc. SEC 无任何人员被指定为特别助理美国检察官从事该刑事调查。\n\nd. SEC 参与了政府在 Kwok 调查过程中进行的某些访谈。SEC 未在该等访谈中做笔记。\n\ne. 在政府和 SEC 均参与的访谈中，概而言之，证人被告知：两个机构的调查彼此独立；共同进行访谈仅为便利起见；如达成陈述协议，证人将分别与每个机构订立协议。[2]\n\n2 如证人曾在多个场合接受访谈，该等说明在首次陈述时作出，但未必在其后的每次陈述时重复作出。\n\nf. SEC 未参与向大陪审团提交刑事案件，亦未收到大陪审团笔录。\n\ng. SEC 未参与执行搜查令，亦未参与对依据搜查令取得材料的相关性审查。\n\nh. 政府未向 SEC 提供政府依据大陪审团传票取得的任何材料。\n\ni. SEC 未在该刑事案件中陪同政府出庭。\n\n3. 基于本人参与该项调查、审阅 Kwok 第 11 章破产案的案卷、审阅电子邮件和短信、审阅通话记录、与受托人及其同事交谈，以及与同样参与 Kwok 调查的其他助理美国检察官交谈，本人获悉有关 Kwok 调查的下列事实及其他事项：\n\na. 政府于约 May 2020 启动 Kwok 调查。\n\nb. Kwok 于约 February 15, 2022 自愿提交第 11 章破产申请。受托人于约 July 7, 2022 获任命。\n\nc. 受托人未参与政府的指控决定或政府公诉策略的制定。\n\nd. 受托人未参与向大陪审团提交 Kwok 调查，亦未收到大陪审团笔录。\n\ne. 受托人未参与执行搜查令，亦未参与对依据搜查令取得材料的相关性审查。\n\nf. 受托人未参与政府进行的任何访谈。\n\ng. 受托人未取得根据大陪审团传票向政府提交的材料。\n\nh. 受托人未在该刑事案件中陪同政府出庭。\n\n日期：New York, New York October 19, 2023\n\nJuliana N. Murray（朱莉安娜·N·默里）\n助理美国检察官\n(212) 637-2314\n\n附件 B\n\n关于 * 案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）及 GENEVER\n*\nHOLDINGS CORPORATION（Genever Holdings Corporation）， *\n债务人。 *\n*\nLUC A. DESPINS（吕克·A·德斯平）， * 对抗程序案号 22-05027\n原告， *\n*\n*\n诉 *\nBRAVO LUCK, LIMITED（Bravo Luck, Limited）等， *\n*\n*\n被告。 *\nLUC A. DESPINS（吕克·A·德斯平）， *\n* 对抗程序案号 23-05017\n* Bridgeport, Connecticut\n原告， * August 29, 2023\n诉 *\n*\n*\nTAURUS FUND, LLC（Taurus Fund, LLC）等， *\n被告。 *\n*\n*\n* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *\n庭审记录\n于尊敬的 JULIE A. MANNING（朱莉·A·曼宁）法官面前\n美国破产法官\n出庭人员：\n第 11 章受托人： LUC A. DESPINS，ESQ.\nPaul Hastings LLP（Paul Hastings 律师事务所）\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, NY\n\n出庭人员：（续）代表第11章受托人：PATRICK R. LINSEY, ESQ. Neubert Pepe and Monteith（纽伯特·佩佩与蒙蒂思律师事务所）195 Church Street,13th Floor New Haven, CT 06510 代表美国受托人：HOLLEY L. CLAIBORN, ESQ. Office of U.S. Trustee（美国受托人办公室）The Giaimo Federal Building（贾伊莫联邦大楼）150 Court Street, Room 302 New Haven, CT 06510 代表债权人委员会：IRVE J. GOLDMAN, ESQ. Pullman & Comley（普尔曼与康利律师事务所）850 Main Street Bridgeport, CT 06601 代表Bravo Luck（布拉沃·拉克）：FRANCIS J. LAWALL, ESQ. Troutman Pepper Hamilton Sanders, LLP（特劳特曼·佩珀·汉密尔顿·桑德斯律师事务所）3000 Two Logan Square 18th and Arch Street Philadelphia, PA 19103 代表Hing Chi Ngok（邢志岳）及CHRISTOPHER J. MAJOR, ESQ. Greenwich Land, LLC（格林威治地产有限责任公司）：Meister Seelig & Fein LLP（迈斯特·西利格与范恩律师事务所）125 Park Avenue New York, NY 10017 代表Taurus Fund, LLC（金牛基金有限责任公司）：MICHAEL T. CONWAY, ESQ. Lazare Potter Giacovas & Moyle, LLP（拉扎尔·波特·贾科瓦斯与莫伊尔律师事务所）747 Third Avenue New York, NY 10017\n\n#2049 就与BRAVO LUCK LTD及MILESON GUO，又名QIANG GUO和/或GUO QIANG之间的争议达成和解的动议，P.O. BOX 957 OFFSHORE INC CENTRE, ROAD TOWN, TORTOLA, BVI（BRAVO LUCK LTD）；5 PRINCESS GATE, G3, LONDON, UK（Qiang Guo）\n111 就与BRAVO LUCK及MILESON GUO，又名QIANG GUO和/或GUO QIANG之间的争议达成和解的动议，P.O. BOX 957 OFFSHORE INC CENTRE, ROAD TOWN, TORTOLA, BVI（BRAVO LUCK LTD）；5 PRINCESS GATE, G3, LONDON, UK（Qiang Guo）\n\n#2083 第11章受托人根据《破产程序规则》9019条提出的动议，请求批准与USA（美国）达成的和解\n\n#24 第11章受托人根据《破产程序规则》9019条提出的动议，请求批准与USA（美国）达成的和解\n\n#2079 就与债务人有关联的其他实体和个人以及相关银行进行2004审查的动议（第六项综合动议）\n\n#2127 排定状态会议的命令\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- August 29, 2023\n\n1 （程序于下午2:01开始。）\n\n2 法庭书记员：\n案号22-50073，Ho Wan\n\n3 Kwok（郭文贵）和Genever Holdings, LLC（吉尼弗控股有限责任公司），22-5027，Despins（德斯平斯）等人，\n\n4 诉Bravo Luck Limited（布拉沃·拉克有限公司）等人，以及23-5017，Despins（德斯平斯）等人\n\n5 诉Taurus Fund, LLC（金牛基金有限责任公司）等人。\n\n6 法庭：\n好的。下午好。请\n\n7 从第11章受托人开始，为记录在案说明\n\n8 出庭情况。\n\n9 DESPINS先生：\n下午好，法官阁下。Luc\n\n10 Despins（吕克·德斯平斯），第11章受托人。\n\n11 法庭：\n下午好。\n\n12 LINSEY先生：\n下午好，法官阁下。Patrick\n\n13 Linsey（帕特里克·林西），Neubert, Pepe and Monteith（纽伯特·佩佩与蒙蒂思律师事务所），代表受托人。\n\n14 法庭：\n下午好。\n\n15 GOLDMAN先生：\n下午好，法官阁下。Irve\n\n16 Goldman（欧文·戈德曼），Pullman & Comley（普尔曼与康利律师事务所），代表债权人委员会。\n\n17 法庭：\n下午好。\n\n18 CLAIBORN女士：\n下午好。Holley Claiborn（霍莉·克莱伯恩）\n\n19 代表美国受托人。\n\n20 法庭：\n下午好。\n\n21 LAWALL先生：\n下午好，法官阁下。Fran\n\n22 Lawall（弗朗·拉沃尔），代表Bravo Luck（布拉沃·拉克）。\n\n23 法庭：\n下午好。\n\n24 MAJOR先生：\n下午好，法官阁下。Chris\n\n25 Major（克里斯·梅杰），Meister Seelig & Fein（迈斯特·西利格与范恩律师事务所）。我们代表Hing Chi Ngok（邢志岳）\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- August 29, 2023\n\n1 及Greenwich Land, LLC（格林威治地产有限责任公司）。\n\n2 法庭：\n下午好。\n\n3 CONWAY先生：\n下午好，法官阁下。Michael\n\n4 Conway（迈克尔·康威）在此代表Taurus Fund, LLC（金牛基金有限责任公司）。\n\n5 法庭：\n下午好。\n\n6 好的。正如我提到的，今天下午日程上有数项\n\n7 事项。\n\n8 Despins受托人，我已查看这些事项，\n\n9 包括是否已经提出异议及诸如此类的情况。\n\n10 关于Bravo Luck（布拉沃·拉克）就和解提出的动议，\n\n11 我看到没有人对此\n\n12 提出异议。我的理解正确吗？\n\n13 DESPINS先生：\n是的，法官阁下。\n\n14 法庭：\n好的。那么是否适宜\n\n15 先处理Bravo Luck（布拉沃·拉克）事项？\n\n16 DESPINS先生：\n是的，法官阁下。\n\n17 法庭：\n好的。请继续。谢谢。\n\n18 DESPINS先生：\n谢谢。下午好，法官阁下。\n\n19 Luc Despins（吕克·德斯平斯），第11章受托人。\n\n20 这实际上是一项相当直接的动议，\n\n21 旨在解决各债务人财产与Bravo Luck（布拉沃·拉克）及债务人之子之间\n\n22 就Sherry-Netherland（谢里-内瑟兰）有关的争议。\n\n23 \n\n24 基本上，您会记得，我们曾对Bravo\n\n25 Luck（布拉沃·拉克）提起三项独立的对抗程序。\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- August 29, 2023\n\n1 我们也曾对该儿子的债权申报提出异议。而且\n\n2 对此没有答辩，也没有回应。\n\n3 其间有大量诉讼以及驳回动议、\n\n4 修正等，诸如此类。\n\n5 长话短说，\n\n6 各方已达成协议解决此事。我认为\n\n7 这相当直接，即我所谓的\n\n8 Bravo Luck（布拉沃·拉克）各方，即Bravo Luck（布拉沃·拉克）和该儿子，\n\n9 放弃其对Sherry-Netherland（谢里-内瑟兰）公寓享有直接或间接权益的\n\n10 任何主张。\n\n11 他们放弃债权，诸如此类。\n\n12 我们撤回针对他们提起的\n\n13 诉讼。我的意思是，我所说的一切均以\n\n14 和解协议为准；该协议更为详细，但\n\n15 概言之，情况就是如此。\n\n16 因此，这相当直接。\n\n17 我只想指出，免责并非\n\n18 对等的；这一点很重要，即他们正在\n\n19 放弃债权。我们并未放弃对他们在世上的一切债权。\n\n20 因此，我们放弃的是\n\n21 起诉状中主张的债权。\n\n22 再次说明，我所说的内容以和解协议条款\n\n23 为准；该协议详细得多，但\n\n24 从概念上说，我想确保法庭理解，\n\n25 这并非对债权作出的全面免责。\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- August 29, 2023\n\n法庭：我认为我——我的理解也是，这并非对债权作出的全面免责。DESPINS先生：因此，除非法庭有问题，且Lawall先生希望陈述意见，否则我目前没有其他事项。法庭：我确实想听取您的意见，Lawall律师，等您方便时。我只是——有许多与待决的债权异议及对抗程序有关的待决事项，由于你们一直在谈判，我们尚未处理，对吗？DESPINS先生：对。法庭：而且你们已向法庭作出陈述，无论是在书状中还是在法庭上，称各方一直共同努力解决这些问题。因此，显然你们付出了很大努力。你们已经达成解决方案，值得感谢。我认为，这意味着，假定此项和解获批准，你们可能会看到，因为书记员办公室必须办理某些事项，动议被终止，或者你们将撤回对抗程序，对吗？你们将予以驳回？还是你们将如何——实际情况是——DESPINS先生：是的。坦率地说，我不确定具体程序，但仍有程序性事项需要完成，\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- August 29, 2023\n\n1 可能是撤回对抗程序，或者\n\n2 或许是和解（听不清）。我会查看该问题。\n\n3 但是——\n\n4 法庭：\n嗯，我这里有。\n\n5 DESPINS先生：\n是的。\n\n6 法庭：\n我不完全记得。\n\n7 但我要说的是，如果你们双方看到作出了一些\n\n8 记录，因为看来某些\n\n9 待决事项依和解获批而得到解决，\n\n10 那么那将是事务性的。\n\n11 DESPINS先生：\n是。\n\n12 法庭：\n我只是希望你们理解这一点。\n\n13 好吗？\n\n14 DESPINS先生：\n是。\n\n15 该命令规定，原告获授权\n\n16 签署、交付、实施为执行本和解所必需的各类文件或\n\n17 文书。\n\n18 法庭：\n对。\n\n19 DESPINS先生：\n我认为Lawall先生——\n\n20 已经提供了签字。Bravo Luck（布拉沃·拉克）已经提供了\n\n21 和解协议的签字。该儿子没有提供签字，\n\n22 因为该签字由Lawall先生代为信托持有。他们不愿提供\n\n23 签字——\n\n24 法庭：\n但你们持有该签字？\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- August 29, 2023\n\n1 DESPINS先生：\n是。\n\n2 法庭：\n我的意思是，你们持有实际签字？\n\n3 DESPINS先生：\n这是我们得到的告知。\n\n4 法庭：\n好的。\n\n5 DESPINS先生：\n因此，当——如果法庭\n\n6 批准和解，届时将补上签字。\n\n7 但凡有任何需要完成的事务性事项，\n\n8 我们都会完成，法官阁下。\n\n9 法庭：\n是的。我不认为你们除刚才\n\n10 讨论的事项外还需要做很多事情。我只是希望你们注意到，当我审阅\n\n11 此事时，而且再次说明，我现在再次查看以\n\n12 唤起记忆，但我认为在主案的对抗程序中\n\n13 仍有未决事项，\n\n14 而这些事项\n\n15 现已由本和解解决。\n\n16 DESPINS先生：\n是的，均已解决。是的。\n\n17 法庭：\n所以这是我的看法。我\n\n18 想确保你们双方都不会以不同方式看待此事，\n\n19 因为我不想在我的理解上犯错误。\n\n20 \n\n21 DESPINS先生：\n正确，法官阁下。该\n\n22 和解协议关于——的内容相当详细。\n\n23 法庭：\n是的，确实如此。\n\n24 DESPINS先生：\n——这项债权被放弃，那项债权\n\n25 被放弃，因此非常明确。我认为这些是自行——\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- August 29, 2023\n\n1 下午好。Fran Lawall（弗朗·拉沃尔），Troutman Pepper（特劳特曼·佩珀律师事务所），代表Bravo\n\n2 Luck（布拉沃·拉克）。\n\n3 为回答，我想，您的一些程序性\n\n4 问题，我认为和解协议的\n\n5 结构是，三项对抗程序将被有偏见地驳回。\n\n6 \n\n7 法庭：\n对。\n\n8 LAWALL先生：\n已提交的债权申报\n\n9 视为撤回。\n\n10 通过有偏见地撤回起诉状，\n\n11 显然将使驳回动议从您的日程中移除。\n\n12 这是典型和解的形式。没有任何被告承认起诉状中的任何——任何\n\n13 主张。\n\n14 事实上，其中载有具体否认。但再次说明，\n\n15 这是和解。\n\n16 法庭：\n是。\n\n17 LAWALL先生：\n在维尔京群岛，将就与此相关的\n\n18 附带诉讼办理一些事项，\n\n19 该等诉讼也将消失。\n\n20 但再次说明，我同意Despins先生。该\n\n21 和解协议已足够复杂，因此我们将\n\n22 以该和解协议的完整文本为准。\n\n23 但总体而言，我认为您对其要旨的理解\n\n24 大体正确。\n\n25 法庭：\n而我——再次说明，我仅提出该问题，\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- August 29, 2023\n\n1 即你们可能会在案卷中看到什么，是为了让\n\n2 你们知道，从书记员办公室的\n\n3 角度看，那将是事务性的。\n\n4 例如，如您所说，对抗程序将被\n\n5 撤回——驳回，抱歉，是驳回。因此我不知道，你们是否会单独提交一项根据规则7041提出的驳回，\n\n6 还是本文件就是驳回协议？\n\n7 \n\n8 LAWALL先生：\n我认为我可以与\n\n9 Despins先生的团队解决该问题。\n\n10 法庭：\n很好。\n\n11 LAWALL先生：\n我们将——我认为我们可以将该事项从法官阁下那里\n\n12 移走。如果书记员办公室未自动\n\n13 处理该事项，我们可以签署为实施和解协议所必需的任何文件。\n\n14 \n\n15 法庭：\n好的。这很有帮助。\n\n16 LAWALL先生：\n好的。\n\n17 法庭：\n谢谢。\n\n18 LAWALL先生：\n好的。\n\n19 法庭：\n这可能很不幸。但您知道，\n\n20 它可以简单到一项协议，一项两行的\n\n21 协议，即根据规则7041(a)(1)、(a)(2)或其他适用规定，\n\n22 当事人协议有偏见地驳回对抗程序，\n\n23 然后该协议自行生效，\n\n24 书记员办公室除在通常程序中关闭该对抗程序外，无需做任何其他事项。\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2023年8月29日\n\n事务。劳沃尔律师：明白，法官大人。书记官办公室需要什么，我们都会提供。法庭：好的。谢谢。我对此表示感谢。劳沃尔律师：谢谢，法官大人。法庭：至于驳回动议，我甚至不——我想我们刚刚延续了关于这些动议的听证会，对吗？劳沃尔律师：是。是的。法庭：好的。劳沃尔律师：它们都被延期了。我不记得是否还有任何附带动议程序。但同样，我预期由于它们都属于合并对立程序，因此一切实际上都会从案卷中撤下。法庭：我同意你的看法。好的。我只是想确认一下。这也是我的看法。如果从书记官办公室的角度来看有任何问题，工作人员会联系并告知你们双方。这样可以吗？劳沃尔律师：没有问题。法庭：好的。好。那么再次感谢各方的努力。我们已经就此讨论了一段时间。我认定，根据破产程序规则以及法院就《规则》9019项下的和解或妥协所适用的标准，该和解处于合理范围之内。\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2023年8月29日\n\n该和解处于合理范围之内。我认为这——这是一项积极的举措。尽管我理解，你知道，没有人——你们都在这种情况下尽力推动事情向前发展，我认为这非常积极。\n\n没有人就妥协动议提交任何书面异议。根据我们的地方法规，该动议之所以不仅必须在对立程序中提交，而且必须在主案中提交，是为了向所有当事人送达。并且已经向他们送达，没有人提交任何书面异议。\n\n因此，基于所有这些理由，在主案和对立程序中提交的妥协动议均获准。\n\n我这里有拟议命令，看起来没有问题。该命令确实将和解协议作为附件1附于命令之后，这完全没有问题。我认为实际上最好将其附在那里，以便有人在需要时可以查阅。\n\n我认为目前我无需再做任何事情，除非劳沃尔律师认为并非如此？\n\n劳沃尔律师：我认为我们没有问题，法官。\n\n法庭：好的。非常感谢。我对此表示感谢。\n\n劳沃尔律师：法官大人，我今天在法庭上的事务已处理完毕。我可以离席吗？\n\n法庭：当然可以。非常感谢。\n\n劳沃尔律师：谢谢，法官大人。\n\n法庭：好的。那么，日程表上的前两项事项，即主案中的ECF 2049以及对立程序22-5027中的ECF 111，基于庭审记录中陈述的理由获准。拟议命令将予签发。\n\n现在，另一份和解协议有异议，德斯平斯受托人。此外，还有关于2004审查的动议，我认为对此也有异议。我不知道该问题是否已经解决。\n\n德斯平斯先生：确实如此，法官大人。\n\n法庭：对此也有异议？\n\n德斯平斯先生：是。\n\n法庭：好的。还有，与修复Sherry-Netherland（谢里-内瑟兰）相关区域的动议有关的、安排状态会议的命令，你现在想谈谈此事，还是想要——\n\n德斯平斯先生：当然，我们可以谈。\n\n法庭：好的。这是主案中的ECF 2127。之所以仅就此安排状态会议，是因为有人提醒我，有——有两件事，嗯，实际上我想是三件事。\n\n该动议是根据第363条提出的，因此我假定——但我可能错了——该动议是根据第363条提出，因为你们谈到的是使用破产财产？\n\n德斯平斯先生：正确，法官大人。\n\n法庭：好的。根据我们的地方法规，这一点并不像本应有的那样明确，但通常，任何寻求第363条项下救济的动议都会自动安排听证会。\n\n而本案是根据争议事项程序提交的。因此，我不知道你希望如何处理——如果你希望等待答复期限届满，也可以。或者，可以自动安排听证会，并设定异议截止日期，但——这就是此事被提请我注意的原因之一。\n\n德斯平斯先生：谢谢，法官大人。您说得对。\n\n并且我们——根据该争议事项规则，我们在附件中列明了9月13日的异议截止日期。我们对此感到满意——\n\n法庭：好的。\n\n德斯平斯先生：——只要在没有异议的情况下，听证会能在其后不久举行。\n\n法庭：嗯，我们可以——我们可以采取两种做法之一。我们可以现在签发听证通知，设定一个异议——我的意思不是现在，而是在今天或明天——设定9月13日为异议截止日期，并在数日后举行听证会。或者我们可以等到异议截止日期后再安排听证会。但无论如何都会有听证会，所以在我看来，签发听证通知并将异议截止日期定为9月13日是合理的。\n\n德斯平斯先生：是的，法官大人。\n\n法庭：好的。\n\n德斯平斯先生：这样做更好。是的。\n\n法庭：好的。那么我们就这样做。让我看一下日历，以确定实际听证会何时举行。\n\n我的意思是，我们在9月19日下午有事项安排在日程表上，但——我不知道它们会持续多久，不过下午至少可能持续一小时或更长时间。我们可以在当天下午晚些时候进行，也可以在20日星期三进行，随你选择。\n\n德斯平斯先生：如果可以在19日进行，那会更可取，法官大人。\n\n法庭：好的。那么我会安排在那天。我可能不会安排在3:30之前，因为下午2:00的事项要么会有争议，要么只会持续两分钟。我不知道。\n\n那么如何——或者你可以——我们可以安排在3:00。或者我们可以安排在2:00，而你只需要等待。\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2023年8月29日\n\n等待。德斯平斯先生：可以，法官大人。法庭：那么什么时间？那么你希望定在2:00吗？德斯平斯先生：两点可以，法官大人。法庭：好的。那么我们会安排在2:00，但还有另一事项将会优先进行，如果它——如果它没有解决。可以吗？德斯平斯先生：另一事项不在本案中。法庭：不是。德斯平斯先生：好的。法庭：不，它不在本案中。这正是我所说的。德斯平斯先生：好的。法庭：那是另一个案件。因此，我可以将你的事项也安排在2:00——德斯平斯先生：可以。法庭：——然后你只需要等待。好的。好。那么就这样办。我们将安排什么——基础动议是ECF 2113。我们将就该动议签发听证通知，听证时间为9月19日下午2点，异议截止日期为9月13日。关于该事项，我们只需要做这些。然后那——那么我们的状态会议，我们已经\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2023年8月29日\n\n就该事项举行了状态会议。\n\n美国受托人办公室可能还希望——我不知道，克莱伯恩律师——但那项寻求修复Sherry Netherland（谢里·内瑟兰）公寓中不同问题的动议，也请求批准聘用。因此，我不知道你是否希望该命令也提及第327条之类的内容。我不知道。但也许在我们举行听证会之前，你们都可以处理好这一问题。\n\n也许如果你们都出庭而且没有问题，你们将在下午2点优先进行。可以吗？\n\n德斯平斯先生：这是一个很好的激励。\n\n法庭：好的。那么，关于今天举行的状态会议，该状态会议已经举行。无需再——不会再安排进一步的状态会议，并将就ECF No. 2113签发听证通知。可以吗？\n\n那么接下来你希望如何进行？\n\n德斯平斯先生：我们现在转到Mahwah（马瓦）。\n\n法庭：请继续。\n\n德斯平斯先生：谢谢，法官大人。\n\n那么，法官大人，这是请求批准与Department of Justice（司法部）达成和解的动议。这是对立程序中的文件24。我此前已经就此作证，但我认为重要的是，我们再次为此事设定背景，因为上次这不是主要焦点。我想让法庭知道此事，但显然那不是该次听证会的目的。\n\n因此，第一个问题是，为什么要与司法部达成和解？第二个问题是，该和解做了什么，或者没有做什么？那么请让我尝试回答这个问题。\n\n第一个问题是为什么？\n\n正如我们在动议中所述，司法部已明确将Mahwah mansion（马瓦庄园）列为一项——这不是一个动词——可没收资产，并且他们实际上已经确认了该资产。我们此前并不知道此事。因此，我们必须坦诚地向法庭说明。在起诉书公布之前，我们并不知道该资产。\n\n然而，司法部在定罪前阶段的手段在某种程度上是有限的，因为在作出定罪之前，他们现在无法取得该不动产的所有权，也无法对其采取太多措施，而该定罪必须是最终定罪。鉴于审判不会——我认为至少要到明年4月才会开始，显然，司法部和我们都知道正在发生什么，并且我们确实担心这一非常有价值的资产，姑且这么说，会处于悬而未决的状态。\n\n然而，由于他们已将该资产确认为一项可能被没收的资产，我们不希望启动任何可能被视为对司法部具有敌意的对立程序，因为显然，我们认为尽可能与他们合作是很重要的。为什么？\n\n因为他们拥有各种我们所没有的手段。我们不希望他们与我们对抗，也不希望我们就该资产与他们目标相冲突，这就是我们提出这一想法的缘由——首先，我们做了功课。我们相信，通过我们在对立程序中寻求的救济，该资产属于破产财产。我们对此深信不疑。法庭将必须裁定是否确实如此。那是另一天的事情。\n\n但我们接触了司法部，并表示我们希望推进该对立程序，以尝试确认该资产属于破产财产。并且最终，如果法庭作出有利于我们的裁定，将出售该资产并将其变现，以使获准债权的持有人受益。\n\n于是我们讨论了，好吧，这将如何展开，因为他们的观点是，他们拥有优先权利。我不会详述所有细节，但我们指出，并在动议中援引了一些判例法，因为在这方面有很多案件，即第11章受托人或第7章受托人正与司法部就诸如此类的问题展开争执，以确定谁对某项属于——我指的是在那些案件中被指称的不法行为人——资产享有优先取得权，而且，你知道，显然我们希望\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- August 29, 2023 22 避免那种情况。我们还希望避免以下情况，即我们提起了这项对抗程序。在我的梦想中，我们胜诉。我们出售资产，DOJ（美国司法部）进来并说，非常感谢，我们将收取那笔钱，也感谢你们所做的工作，事情到此结束。我们不能接受这种情况。该破产财产不能处于为任何其他活动提供资金的地位。它必须收支平衡。我相信不仅要收支平衡，我稍后会谈到那一部分。因此，我们协商达成的内容是，如果我们胜诉——这一点非常重要，只有在我们胜诉的情况下——该和解协议并不决定出售该财产，因为它规定，如果我们胜诉，某些事情将会发生。因此，如果我们胜诉并出售该资产，我们可以使用净收益支付该破产财产将产生的所有费用。当时，我们认为我们不仅会产生律师费，还会产生安保费用、出售该财产的经纪人费用、抵押贷款费用——该财产上没有抵押贷款，但如果有需要支付的机械留置权人，当然应当优先从中支付。因此，这就形成了净收益的概念。而根据该约定，净收益问题我们暂时搁置，留待日后确定。我将\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- August 29, 2023\n\n1 回过头来说明为什么这方面没有取得更多进展。\n因此，\n2 净收益非常重要。\n3 我所说的是，好，这很好。\n我们\n4 将收回我们所有的费用。\n这很好。\n但本\n5 案并非为本案的专业人士而运作。\n6 必须对该破产财产有利益。\n这就是我们\n7 提出视为费用一百万美元的原因。\n8 因此，暂且假设我们胜诉，\n9 该豪宅被出售，我们获得所有费用的支付，而 DOJ\n10 与我们无法就净收益的分配达成一致，\n11 我们将保证为该破产财产获得一百万美元。\n12 其中规定，将支付给获准债权的持有人，\n13 即在您的法院中获准的债权，因此必须是\n14 获准债权，即受害人的获准债权。而且，您知道，\n15 有人指出，受害人并未被定义。\n16 这并非偶然。也就是说，我希望有机会\n17 说服 DOJ，关于受害人——首先，\n18 你必须拥有获准债权。除非你拥有由\n19 法官阁下确定的获准债权，否则你一分钱也\n20 不能获得。但如果你拥有获准债权，\n21 谁是受害人、谁不是受害人的问题——我希望\n22 该问题留待进一步讨论。\n23 但归根结底，如果我们关于该财产\n24 属于破产财产的主张正确，该破产财产最终将\n25 净增一百万美元。我们强烈认为情况确实如此，\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- August 29, 2023\n\n1 但当然，法官阁下必须就此作出裁定。\n2 \n3 因此，由于费用和开支均得到覆盖，\n4 该破产财产并未处于更不利的地位。它净增了一百万\n5 美元。如果我们成功说服 DOJ，关于该财产\n6 收益的分配——顺便说一句，我们还将就其他事项尝试\n7 这样做——您知道，例如，我提到目前被冻结的\n8 现金，\n9 即 \\$630 million——这不是今天的问题，但\n10 这里的总体计划，基于 DOJ 曾寻求并取得资产没收的其他案件，\n11 是让 Chapter 11 Trustee（第11章受托人）\n12 身兼两职，即第11章受托人\n13 和没收接管人。所有事项均将回到本法院\n14 进行分配。\n15 \n16 我知道其中存在问题。他们也知道，\n17 即 DOJ。他们并不天真。他们\n18 知道这一点。\n19 问题是，好，谁是受害人？在他们\n20 看来，受害人可能仅限于某些被指控计划的\n21 受害人。但您知道，我认为本案中还有\n22 由 Goldman 先生代理的其他人\n23 也是受害人。\n24 例如，Bru Ma(ph)（布鲁·马〔音〕），你们不认识她，但\n25 我以她为例，因为如果你们读过她的\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- August 29, 2023\n\n1 债权证明，就会看到其中确实提出了非常严重的——\n2 严重不当行为指控。显然，她会说\n3 我是受害人。\n4 因此，关键在于，我们并未请求法院\n5 今天确定谁是受害人。唯一的要点是，\n6 这将给予债务人的受害人，至于这意味着什么尚待确定，\n7 但只要他们拥有获准债权，这将为破产财产带来\n8 明确利益，而法官阁下\n9 将需要对此作出认定。\n10 因此，您可能会说，好，如果你们能够获得\n11 这一百万，为什么没有协商完整方案？原因\n12 非常明确，并且已在该动议中说明。DOJ\n13 不能这样做——DOJ 有一套非常严格的程序\n14 来这样做。DOJ 之下设有没收团队，\n15 他们需要获得 Attorney General（司法部长）的批准，\n16 才能同意已经完成的此类事项。\n17 我相信，其中一项曾在法官阁下审理的案件中完成，\n18 或者是在您从另一位法官处承接的某一案件中完成，\n19 但此前确实发生过这种情况。\n20 在该案中，他们一路报请\n21 司法部长并取得批准。在针对债务人或其他\n22 被告作出最终有罪认定之前，他们现在不会、也不能\n23 这样做。因此，这就是我们无法\n24 进一步推进的原因。\n25 \n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- August 29, 2023\n\n1 但是，我会——我不想，您知道，\n2 夸大其词，但我认为这是一份用于未来\n3 讨论的蓝图。当然，关于此事并无任何协议。\n4 他们没有向我们表示会考虑\n5 这一点。不过，关键是，我认为让破产财产\n6 具备这一安排、将其作为第一步非常有益，\n7 以确保我们不会处于更不利的地位，并且我们\n8 净增一百万美元。再次强调，前提是我们胜诉。如果\n9 我们不胜诉，那就像我们提起的任何案件一样。如果我们\n10 不胜诉，我们就是不胜诉。这就是我们\n11 承担的风险。\n12 现在，该和解协议规定，\n13 额外的一百万美元，即视为费用，将\n14 分配给属于受害人的获准债权持有人，\n15 我想对此明确说明，您并不是\n16 今天批准该分配，也就是说，\n17 必须遵守 bankruptcy code（破产法典）。\n18 Taurus（陶鲁斯）提出的异议有些\n19 令人困惑，称，哦，有担保债权人怎么办？如果\n20 存在有担保债权人，第一，如果该财产上存在\n21 有担保债权人，他们将优先从该\n22 财产中获得清偿，也就是从收益中获得清偿。\n23 第二，如果本案中存在有担保债权人，\n24 而我们知道并无此类债权人，我对此相当确定，我是说，\n\n至少迄今尚未有人主张存在此类债权人，那么，您知道，你\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- August 29, 2023\n\n1 不能确认一项规定有担保债权人\n2 在无担保债权人之后受偿的计划。\n3 因此，我们希望明确，批准该\n4 和解协议仅仅是批准一种推进方式。\n5 您并非认可任何计划、任何未来计划，\n6 以及诸如此类事项。\n7 因此，如果您希望在该部分中加入“受\n8 适用法律，包括破产法典约束”，我们对此没有异议。\n9 我们并非试图预先判断该问题。我们\n10 试图预先确定的是，该破产财产将在费用之外\n11 获得一百万美元，从而不能说我们这样做只是，\n12 您知道，徒劳无功。\n13 该破产财产有净利益，这一点在此至关重要。\n14 \n15 因此，这是很长的说明，但我认为这\n16 涵盖了整个和解协议。\n17 我希望，您知道，法官阁下，向您\n18 留下以下想法，对吗？\n19 这并非批准向任何人进行任何分配。\n20 这并非批准出售该财产。\n21 只有在我们就 alter ego（另我）或\n22 inequitable ownership（不公平所有权）主张胜诉时，才会发生该出售。因此，\n23 对此提出的任何异议均为时过早，因为如果我们在该问题上败诉，\n24 这一切都无关紧要。\n25 此外，此处还有另一项利益，即\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- August 29, 2023\n\n1 DOJ 有可能不会获得对 Kwok 先生的\n2 定罪。这不属于我们——不属于我的职权范围。\n3 我对此没有观点。我对此一无所知。\n4 我不是刑事律师，因此不会就此发表意见，\n5 但这种情况每天都在发生。因此，\n6 该和解协议规定，您知道，如果他们未能取得最终\n7 定罪和没收，则该和解协议全部失效，\n8 也就是说，如果我们胜诉，这一切又全都归我们所有。\n\n因此，这在今天启动该程序，并使我们能够通过法官阁下已经批准的 preliminary injunction（初步禁令）所做的那样，在此期间保护该财产，这至关重要。\n\n因此，我相信，基于所有这些理由，这显然有利于该破产财产。这是未来与 DOJ 合作的蓝图。此前在其他案件中已经这样做过。\n\n顺便说一句，在此前这样做的其他案件中，有一项明确命令规定，当 DOJ 同意这样做时——为明确起见，他们尚未同意其中任何事项——存在一套明确程序，规定破产法院应确定获准债权的持有人。有时会有一项分配安排，X dollars 只能支付给以下类型的债权人，这是与 DOJ 达成的和解。\n\n我们目前远未到那一步，但我希望\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- August 29, 2023 29 确保法官阁下知道，这并非首次达成此类协议，只是我认为，这是首次在定罪之前以及他们实际取得没收之前达成此类协议。在其他案件中，通常是他们胜诉，取得定罪，取得没收命令，然后与受托人发生争议，或者与受托人及破产财产进行谈判，试图在协商一致的基础上解决问题。因此，除非法官阁下有问题，否则这就是我对此所作的陈述。我很乐意回答任何问题。显然，我希望回应 Taurus 提出的任何问题。\n\n法院：我目前唯一的问题是，如果，如果批准该和解协议，它——它是否会提交到刑事诉讼中？我是说，就相关人员而言，这是如何运作的？刑事诉讼中的法官知道吗？我是说，我不知道刑事诉讼中的法官是否在意。\n\nDESPINS 先生：是。\n\n法院：我只是提出一个问题。\n\nDESPINS 先生：是。这是一个好问题。除了说，据我了解，DOJ 不会寻求在刑事法院批准该协议之外，我不确定我是否知道答案，因此我不确定他们是否会在那里\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- August 29, 2023\n\n提交文件。\n\n法院：好的。\n\nDESPINS 先生：他们理解我们需要与法官阁下办理该事项，但除此之外，没有。\n\n法院：好的。谢谢。\n\nDESPINS 先生：谢谢，法官阁下。\n\n法院：Conway 律师，您希望发表意见吗？\n\nCONWAY 先生：谢谢，法官阁下。Michael Conway（迈克尔·康威），Lazare Potter Giacovas & Moyle（拉扎尔·波特·贾科瓦斯与莫伊尔律师事务所），代表 Taurus Fund, LLC（陶鲁斯基金有限责任公司）。\n\n显然，您已经阅读了书面材料，但我想谈谈 Despins 先生刚才提到的明显漏洞，即此处尚未确认受害人身份。\n\n该和解协议要求设立一项财产，由破产财产中的某些债权人可以对其主张权利，而其他人则不能。我们不知道谁可以、谁不可以。\n\n关于此类任何动议的根本问题是，它如何做到公平且公正？我们现在无法回答该问题，原因很简单，我们不知道哪些债权人可以或不可以对其主张权利。\n\n显而易见的解决办法本应是，他们就谁可以对该项财产主张权利、谁是他们所称的受害人达成协议。\n\n它吗？\n\n您知道，我们显然的立场是，在尚未作出任何认定之前，就开始分配我们的财产、我们委托人的财产，尚属过早，但这与此处并不真正相关。\n\n但基本概念是，有些人将其资金投入该财产，他们当中没有任何人知道，而且至今也并不真正认为自己对破产财产享有债权。\n\n如果法庭阁下在本案结束时认定破产财产取得该房屋，那么他们将有债权可供申报。\n\n并不存在任何程序规定说，好吧，如果是这种情况，那么向该房屋投入资金的人可以申报逾期债权，诸如此类。\n\n也没有确认，某个提出人身伤害索赔的人——我想我在债权登记中看到过一些内容，我没有阅读全部债权申报——但我看到有一项被描述为人身伤害索赔。\n\n该人是否会对该项标的财产享有债权？我们不知道。该和解动议中没有任何程序规定。\n\n而为了确定其对本破产财产的债权人是否公平合理、例如对 Taurus Fund（金牛基金）是否公平合理，就需要有此类程序。\n\n但 Taurus Fund 显然是由向该基金出资的人组成的。\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵） - August 29, 2023\n\n向 Taurus Fund 出资的人。那些人将会在本案中出庭，他们将会告诉您：不要拿走我的房屋。您知道，这是我的钱。您知道。\n\n我知道受托人和政府想要说，您知道，您被 Kwok 先生欺诈了，但我不相信自己受到了欺诈。我认为您不应当拿走我的财产。如果您确实拿走该财产，那么他们将如何取回他们的钱，因为届时他们将需要一个程序。\n\n因此，我想一般性的结论是，而且再次说明，我们依赖已提交的书面文件；这些文件指出，Taurus Fund 正因在没收程序中丧失权利而遭受明显损害。因为我们将不再享有该项权利；如果正如 Despins 先生所指出的，对 Kwok 先生没有作出不利认定，并且没收程序未继续进行，他们将无法取回其房屋；而如果该程序按正常进程进行，他们本可取回该房屋。\n\n法庭：我几乎跟上您的意思，直到最后那里。抱歉。那么，您的意思是，您的委托人受到损害，因为如果政府未能成功证明其指控，它将无法取回他们的房屋，因为 Despins 先生将会——破产财产受托人将会——对该财产享有权益？但我不是必须先作出该认定吗？而我尚未作出该认定。\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵） - August 29, 2023\n\nCONWAY 律师：是的。而且这——确实是——这全都是——我们所有人——每个人都在本末倒置，法庭阁下，假设情况是这样的。\n\n本案先行结束。Despins 先生出售该房屋。会有一笔资金留在那里。好吧。除购买该房屋的人之外，这对所有人听起来都很好。\n\n现在，刑事程序中作出认定，您知道吗？这里不存在欺诈。该房屋根本不应被列入起诉书。购买该房屋的人应当取回该房屋。\n\n房屋已经不存在了。现在只剩下一笔资金。\n\n法庭：但您将有能力——我理解您所说的，但您有能力对任何——您所说的，以及我——您说我们是在本末倒置，但我还不知道这是否准确。因为除非且直到 Despins 先生的主张获得成功，该房屋并非破产财产的资产。\n\n在我看来，他似乎正在做的事情——您可以不同意，我也很愿意听取您的意见——是试图建立一种机制，以解决政府与该破产财产之间将会、可能会、可能会存在的相互竞争的权益。\n\n根据我对书面文件的理解，\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵） - August 29, 2023\n\n这实际上是一项和解，其条款除非且直到某些事情发生才会生效。\n\n而且，如果 Despins 先生败诉，对吗，他没有——他没有胜诉，那么破产财产便不享有任何权益。\n\n如果政府败诉，且其不能通过没收取得该财产，那么政府败诉，而您的委托人并未失去任何东西。\n\n因此，虽然我理解您的论点，但我对此有些难以理解，因为我认为您的权利仍然受到保护。您仍然享有权利。\n\n首先，初步禁令已被签发，对吗？您将有权提交诉状。您将有权进行证据开示，并在对抗程序中进行任何您想进行的事项，之后我们仍必须进行审判，届时您将代理被告。\n\n而且，您将会，您知道，主张受托人 Despins 是错误的。并且您将能够提交所有证据并完成所有这些事项。然后法庭必须作出裁决。\n\n您还享有一项权利——在我看来，您在某个时候也将享有一项权利——目前，受托人的主张是自我另体和受益衡平所有权，对吗？\n\n您今天说，有些人向该房屋投入了资金，并且有权实质上收回该资金。您可能是对的。我不知道。\n\n但您必须提交该信息，对吗？目前我们没有任何此类信息。我们唯一拥有的信息，是初步禁令中所作出的认定，对吗，即初步禁令中的那些认定。\n\n因此，我不确定这目前如何对您的委托人产生不利影响。\n\nCONWAY 律师：法庭阁下，如果可以？\n\n法庭：可以。\n\nCONWAY 律师：而且我——您说您感到困惑的那一点，当我们起草书状时，您知道，我们将最有力的论点放在前面，将较不重要的论点放在后面；那是我们最后一个论点，因为我们认为存在一个假设性问题。\n\n较重要的是我最开始提出的那一点，即受害人，您知道，尚未被确定。\n\n受托人试图在此确认一项标的财产，并称经认可的债权将可以从该标的财产中获得清偿。\n\n我们在此建议，为满足公平合理的要求，他们必须说明，在这种情况下，您必须做什么才能提出一项经认可的债权？\n\n而且如果您这样做，我认为您还必须在您将作出的任何命令中纳入一项程序，使得在本案结束时确定自己享有债权的人，例如，有权提交一份关于该项——的债权申报。\n\n法庭：嗯，这很容易。那部分很容易。\n\nCONWAY 律师：当然，如果它被写入命令中。\n\n法庭：但就一项尚未被认定为破产财产资产的资产设定债权申报期限，那很容易。我的意思是，那部分，当您最初谈到该问题时，我说，好吧，那是——那是一个有效的观点，但那很容易。我的意思是，那可以做到。\n\nCONWAY 律师：那是我所建议事项中最容易的部分。\n\n第二部分也不难。我认为受托人已表示，他们尚未达成协议，因为这很困难。确定谁会享有经认可的债权并不困难。\n\n我认为，只需简单地规定，任何被主张曾向债务人提供资金、且该资金被用于购买该房屋的人，都将享有经认可的债权即可。但破产程序中的其他债权人，如可能对债务人提出人身伤害索赔的债权人，则不享有该项债权。\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵） - August 29, 2023\n\n法庭：我听到了您所说的。但再次说明，我为什么现在需要这样做？为什么我需要在此之前，在此之前且如果——因为可能根本不会认定该财产属于破产财产——进行该程序？\n\nCONWAY 律师：因为我认为法典不允许在未证明该动议公平合理之前批准该动议，而且——\n\n法庭：嗯，这——我不确定——标准是其是否低于合理性范围，这是各法院都在谈论的和解标准。而我——我没有听到您说明为什么您的委托人目前受到损害，因为目前实际上没有发生任何事情。\n\n正在发生的是，该和解协议以未来可能发生也可能不发生的事件为条件。因此，如果——如果受托人 Despins 败诉，那么便不存在和解协议。不会发生任何事情。\n\n破产财产中不会有一百万美元。不会有费用偿还。不会存在某些债权人可以据以主张债权、且本法庭必须确定为经认可债权的标的财产。如果他败诉，我不必经历所有这些程序，对吗？\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵） - August 29, 2023\n\n因此，我仍然——我有些难以理解，这目前如何对您造成损害？当我说您时，显然是指您的委托人。\n\nCONWAY 律师：明白。我今天自己也做了同样的事情。法庭阁下，我想也许最容易的方式是，我建议我的异议是一项有限异议，即根据该动议作出的任何命令均不得损害可能对该财产享有经认可债权的各方权利，也不得——命令中不得允许不对该财产享有债权的人就所设立的任何标的财产提出主张，也不得阻止提交逾期债权申报。如果这些保护——如果它们——如果它们已经到位——\n\n法庭：嗯，那不会是逾期债权申报，对吗，因为我们将设立一个程序来提交债权申报，这是第一点。第二点，必须提交债权申报。因此，如同破产案件中的任何债权申报一样，它们必须有证据支持，以证明其构成债权；受托人或任何其他当事人均可对此提出异议，然后仍然\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵） - August 29, 2023\n\n无论何时发生，仍然会有问题。\n\n然而，该程序是在说，看，我们不知道这是否会发生。但如果发生，这就是其将如何进行。这就是这两个当事方所同意的内容。我认为，在目前这个时点，这符合合理性范围。\n\n我不认为您、您的委托人失去了对……提出异议的任何权利——嗯，我知道他们没有。您的委托人并未失去对受托人 Despins 必须向本法庭证明并取得判决、以使该资产成为破产财产资产的主张提出异议的任何权利。他必须这样做。\n\n初步禁令目前有效，但仍未就实体问题进行审判。因此，我们仍必须先进行该程序。\n\n第二，就债权问题而言，从破产法院的角度，我看不出为债权人设立程序、使其能够在本案中，您知道，在——在本案中，就一项原本不是、但现在成为破产财产资产的资产向破产财产提出债权申报有什么问题。好吧？\n\n但这仍然遵循同样的程序，就像本案中已经——已经提交的所有其他债权申报一样，其程序如下。\n\n仅因有人提交了索赔证明，而且我认为你知道这一点，仅因其提交索赔证明，并不意味着该索赔是获准的索赔。它仍须经过程序审查。如果有人对此提出异议，则本院必须就是否该索赔属于依据《法典》第 502 条获准的索赔，还是依据《法典》第 502 条不获准的索赔，作出裁定。因此，这涉及分配问题，而非——因为必须拥有获准的索赔才能获得分配。\n\n因此，我理解你的意思，但目前我并不确信你的当事人在此时受到损害。所以我不知道你是否还有其他想说的。\n\n但如果你想花一点时间与 Despins 受托人谈谈此事？\n\n我的意思是，你知道，初步禁令附带了一些要求。我看到了我认为你昨晚提交的文件——\n\nCONWAY 先生：是。\n\n本院：——关于该物业没有保险的文件。嗯，在破产案件中，你知道，如果破产财产资产没有保险，美国受托人办公室会立即申请驳回案件。\n\n现在，尚未作出该项资产属于破产财产资产的认定，但是，但是，初步禁令\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- August 29, 2023\n\n与你——你所提出的论点有关；你主张 Taurus Fund（“金牛基金”）不应当——应当能够按照 Taurus Fund 认为其获准的方式使用该物业。在初步禁令的背景下，在我看来，Taurus Fund 不能拥有一项价值——我不知道其价值是多少，对吗？人们一直在谈论各种数字。我无需对价值作出认定，但有人作出了认定，并称其价值为，你知道，我不知道——\n\nDESPINS 先生：二十九。\n\n本院：——多少百万？\n\nDESPINS 先生：二十九。\n\nCONWAY 先生：他们以两千多万接近三千万的价格购买，但我们正在努力——我们申请的保险单是 40，承保 40。\n\n本院：好的。因此，你知道，我认为你们需要有保险。\n\nCONWAY 先生：哦，是的。而且，法官阁下，您将会——\n\n本院：而且我认为，这涉及该物业及其内部物品。我的意思是，那里——存在一些问题。\n\nCONWAY 先生：而且，法官阁下，这显然并不直接影响该动议，但仅供您参考，延误的原因是，您的禁令命令正被\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- August 29, 2023\n\n纳入其中，因此任何使用该物业的人都必须同意其将依照您的禁令命令使用该物业。保险承保人要求这样做，并要求证明任何管理该物业的人均有单独的责任保险；显然，所有这些材料今天都会提供给承保人，以便其为该物业承保。四千万美元——\n\n本院：很好。\n\nCONWAY 先生：——我理解为责任险，另有 $10 million 用于物业。因此，我认为我们——我认为一切都会落实，并令法官阁下及受托人满意。\n\n本院：当你说“满意”时，我只想澄清，那并非令我满意。这是为了满足破产法和规则的要求，以及保护资产的需要，对吗？\n\n我的意思是，本案任命受托人的原因之一，是许多当事人提出指控称，存在所有这些从未披露的资产。\n\n这也是为何在 Chapter 11（第 11 章）案件中任命受托人，以调查这些事务，并确定这些资产能否为债权人的利益被纳入破产财产。\n\nDespins 受托人提起了本对立程序，\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- August 29, 2023\n\n申请了临时限制令和初步禁令，两者均获部分准许。并非所有申请的救济均获准许，但所申请救济中的很大一部分获准许。\n\n保险成为该禁令一部分的原因是，如果没有保险，我不知道如何能够保护现状。你可以说，嗯，原本就没有保险。但那不是保护现状。\n\n那么有人明天就可能去烧毁那栋房子，对吗？那不是保护现状。\n\n无论如何——\n\nCONWAY 先生：我们意见一致。\n\n本院：——听起来你们在这方面取得了很大进展。\n\nCONWAY 先生：我们意见一致。\n\n本院：而且希望你们也一直在与受托人讨论安保服务及诸如此类的事项。\n\nCONWAY 先生：我们确实就此进行过交谈，而且，你知道，自听证会之前起，现场就一直有安保服务团队。而且，你知道，安保规程已经到位，所以我对此也并不过度担心。我们目前正在讨论此事。\n\n本院：嗯，根据你提交的文件——不是昨天提交的，而是此前提交的那份文件；其中你通过提交房屋、也就是豪宅内物品的清单而遵从了要求——我的意思是，显然整个地方都配备了大量先进的安保设备。我的意思是——\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- August 29, 2023\n\nCONWAY 先生：是。\n\n本院：——我甚至不知道那是什么，但我想我说过有 59 个摄像头之类的。我的意思是，该物业有大量安保设备，所以对于——而且我并不是说你曾表示这很繁重——\n\nCONWAY 先生：没有。\n\n本院：——我只是说，对 Taurus Fund 而言，确保——\n\nCONWAY 先生：我们以前想要，现在仍然想要。\n\n本院：——该物业安全，似乎并不繁重。\n\nCONWAY 先生：法官阁下，我们以前想要，现在仍然想要。所以，是的，这并不繁重。这正是我们想要的。\n\n本院：好的。\n\nCONWAY 先生：所以，你知道，我认为我们意见一致。\n\n再说一次，除了表示我乐于尝试与受托人讨论命令的形式外，对于目前审理的动议，我没有更多要说的。\n\n但如果他不愿与我交谈，只要不会如我今天所阐述的那样损害今后的权利，我想确保任何通过 Taurus Fund 主张在此具有权益的人，都可以提出该主张、提交索赔证明，并表示拥有个人伤害索赔的人不应从该标的财产中取得任何利益。只要这些问题不受损害，这些权利不受损害，我就没有更多要说的了，法官阁下。\n\n本院：好的。谢谢。Despins 受托人？\n\nDESPINS 先生：是，法官阁下。因此，从概念上讲，您完全正确，法官阁下，即如果我们胜诉，应当设定申报截止日期。我们尚未这样做，但对于我们正在发现的各种资产类别，我们将不得不这样做。例如，HCHK。如果我们在该事项上胜诉，这些人——在不预先判断他们是否拥有索赔或权益的情况下——应当有权尝试提交索赔。因此，他们将会——遗憾的是，将会有、将会有很多工作，但我们将需要为——这也是为什么我目前暂且搁置该问题——设定新的申报截止日期；但是，如果我们在此事项上胜诉，人们如有索赔，应当能够提交索赔，并由本院处理其索赔。\n\n但是，如果我们在此事项上胜诉，人们将不会对该标的财产拥有索赔。本院作出\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- August 29, 2023\n\n其为所有人的认定，只是，我们将证明这一点。\n\n但关键是，在没有保险的情况下，目前该物业内除安保人员外不应有任何人，零。这些前往那里进行、做任何事情的 Kwok（郭文贵）一方人员，在没有保险时不应在里面。\n\n因为请记住 Lady May（“五月女士”），法官阁下，我们有时会忘记案件的各个部分，但请记住，他们曾试图获得保险，而没有人会——是的，他们与保险公司进行了很好的沟通，但最终保险公司说，Kwok，没有保险。这发生在 March 15th 之后。\n\n因此，如果 CONWAY 先生能够在充分披露正在发生的事情的情况下获得保险，那就谢天谢地；但他与保险公司进行良好沟通这一事实并不能令我放心，那很好，但在有保险之前——在有保险之前，不应有任何人在那栋房子里。任何人都不应在里面。对于这一点我很抱歉如此强硬，法官阁下，但这是我们所请求救济的一部分。您说您没有驳回它。您会——但这是一个关键问题。\n\n如果他明天获得保险，那就谢天谢地，他们可以回去。但在此期间，在没有保险到位的情况下，该物业上不应有任何人。\n\n此外，没有保险这一事实告诉了您了解本案所需的一切。这简直是\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- August 29, 2023 49\n\n荒谬。因此，法官阁下，这是我们初步禁令的一部分。我知道该事项目前不在您面前，但您确实在初步禁令命令中保留了命令给予您未曾准许的救济的权利。这项救济应当今天就予以准许。如果他明天获得保险，没问题，他们全都可以——顺便说一句，并非所有人。我们对如何解读您的命令存在争议。你知道，CONWAY 先生认为，所有这些朋友可以一次仅 20 人进入，然后他们可以出来，一小时后另 20 人可以进入，然后又一小时后另 20 人可以进入，只要在任何特定时间不超过 20 人。这正是我们所担心的，大学宿舍综合征。如果他们可以选择希望允许进入的 20 个人，愿上帝保佑那些人。再说一次，那是在他们有保险的前提下。但就是那 20 人，我们将坚持这一点。我们不能允许轮换，让 20 人一天进入、离开，另 20 人第二天进入。所有人对此并无利益。这一切都是为了保护 Kwok 体制，而这不应发生，法官阁下。我想确保这一点明确。我原以为命令中已明确规定为 20\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- August 29, 2023\n\n人，而不是轮换的 20 人，因为那样就会变得无法控制。这些人都是谁？\n\n但当然，在今天没有保险到位的情况下，场所内不应有任何人。我强烈敦请法官阁下立即命令给予该项救济。谢谢。\n\n本院：谢谢。CONWAY 律师，有任何回应吗？\n\nCONWAY 先生：有。关于这一点有几点。两者都令人反感。\n\n该物业被购买后经历了重大翻修。尚未完成。由于这一切，工程停止了。每一位去过那里、踏入过那里的人，都必须提供保险。在该物业从事过工作的每个人都有保险。我不知道安保公司是否有其自己的保险凭证。我没有见过，但我想他们很可能有。\n\n你知道，这并非“哦，好吧，完全没有考虑保险”的问题。该物业尚未为其预定用途准备就绪。其预定用途，而且这涉及第二点，是供 Taurus Fund 的推定所有人使用。\n\n本院：那为什么有人进进出出？\n\nCONWAY 先生：他们没有进进出出。那是\n\n1 只是从他嘴里说出来的。那并不是——\n\n2 法院：嗯，不是。我们在听证期间看到了有关这方面的一些证据。\n\n3 我的意思是，我们看到有人进出——这一点没有争议——大量进出该房屋。\n\n4 我们还看到两个人谈到这一事实——嗯，我们看到的不止两个人。\n\n5 我们看到数段视频片段，来自全国不同地区的不同人员谈到将该房屋、该宅邸作为其基地，并感谢债务人向他们提供该处。\n\n6 而且有人进进出出。\n\n7 如果有进进出出的人员并非你所称已投保的那些工作人员，那么这就是一个问题。\n\n8 我理解你所说的一切，但目前案卷中没有任何证据支持你所说的任何内容。\n\n9 案卷中唯一的证据支持这样一个事实：有人进出该房屋。证据表明，那些开始谈论将该宅邸用作会所或基地的人员，直到4月9日才知道该宅邸的存在。\n\n10 这是——这是他们的原话。没有其他人在这里作出任何相反陈述。没有人。\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2023年8月29日 52\n\n你没有——我的意思是，我理解你在当天上午出庭，而且你——\n\nCONWAY先生（康威先生）：我尽力了。\n\n法院：是的。但你没有带任何证人。你没有——你的人在哪里？\n\nCONWAY先生：我试图——\n\n法院：Taurus Fund（Taurus基金）中有谁提交过任何文件，说“我是Taurus Fund的某某。这是我的职责。我确保我有保险，或者没有保险。我只允许这样做。”我的意思是，你现在已有时间。你已有一些时间。\n\n顺便说一句，如果你——如果你看一下这一对抗程序的时间安排，它于7月11日提起。现在是8月29日。而临时限制令直到8月1日才生效，所以已有时间。我们也进行了审判。\n\n而且，如我所说，你知道，你的当事人，无论他们是谁，在收到这些文件送达时，我想他们作出了不打开邮件的决定。\n\nBennett先生（贝内特先生），既然你代表他，我的意思是，他的妻子已被送达。我没有看到他提交的任何文件。他不在这里。我也没有看到法庭内的其他任何人。Bennett先生，Bennett先生在这里吗？\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2023年8月29日\n\n1 （无可听见的回应）\n\n2 法院：你们的实体必须通过一个自然人行事，至少一个。因此，该自然人必须做些什么，或者不做些什么。\n\n3 但是，要说没有人员进进出出，目前案卷中的证据并不支持该说法。案卷中的证据支持这样的说法：有人进进出出，而且该房产没有保险。\n\n4 CONWAY先生：嗯，案卷中的证据涉及的是发生在听证会很久以前的四起事件。受托人刚刚对您说，这里是一个大学宿舍，每小时有20人进出。那不是——没有证据支持这一点。您必须承认这一点，法官阁下。\n\n5 法院：嗯，他并没有说每小时有20人进出。他说他不希望每小时有20人进出。他不希望一组20人进来后离开，然后另一组20人进来后离开。他说的是这个意思。\n\n6 CONWAY先生：其他人也不希望如此。\n\n7 法院：他谈论的并不是对初步禁令该项规定的解释。\n\n8 CONWAY先生：是的。\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2023年8月29日 54\n\n法院：但我对你说的只是，我们需要有负责人承担责任，对吗？\n\nCONWAY先生：完全同意，法官阁下。\n\n法院：并且——\n\nCONWAY先生：而且，法官阁下在禁令听证会次日——听证会当晚或次日——下达了一项命令，规定不得再就禁令听证会提交任何材料，所以——\n\n法院：嗯，我也说过，如果你想让那里有超过20人，你可以提出动议——你可以提交动议。你可以。命令中写了这一点。命令中某处写着。我可以调出来。\n\nCONWAY先生：如果我们这样做，我相信我们会这样做。目前到目前为止，我们正在努力解决一切。我们目前根本不打算让人员在那里。我们正努力解决这里所有行政方面的问题。\n\n据我所知，目前没有人员进进出出。我们正努力确保一切都得到妥善处理。问题并不是有人告诉我，“天啊，他们想在那里举办这个活动。你必须获得法官许可才能这样做。”没有人这样说过。没有理由向法官阁下提出动议，要求目前允许超过20人在那里。\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2023年8月29日 55\n\n但事实是，如果法官阁下要说，嗯，在本案期间必须始终是同样的20人，那么您所做的，就是在本案作出裁决之前将该房产交给受托人，因为投资该房产的人员并非20人。\n\n下个月可能有两个人想使用它。再下个月可能有10个人想使用它。但它不会被用作100人的行动基地。\n\n法院：你所说的投资这个实体的人员是什么意思？我的意思是，你是一个实体。那么你——你在外面——你的当事人在外面为该有限责任公司的运营筹集资金或募款？\n\nCONWAY先生：法官阁下，不应当如此难以理解，为什么Taurus Fund, LLC（Taurus基金有限责任公司）作为一个特殊目的载体成立，以便由其投资人认购的基金购买一处房产。这些人——\n\n法院：但谁是其投资人？\n\nCONWAY先生：把钱投入该基金的人。\n\n法院：我明白。但我想他们有姓名和身份。\n\nCONWAY先生：当然有，法官阁下。\n\n法院：好的。\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2023年8月29日\n\n1 CONWAY先生：因此，他们就是想要——\n\n2 法院：那么他们需要到这里来陈述其主张。\n\n3 CONWAY先生：嗯，他们不必到这里来。基金可以到这里来说，这是我们向他们提供的条件。我们说，如果你——如果你希望我们出去购买这栋房子以供你使用，我们会这样做。我们会用你们的钱购买这栋房子。\n\n4 法院：但是，在初步禁令阶段提交的证据并不支持你刚才所说的，因为那两名谈论并参观该土地、该地块、该庭院的人说，他们直到8月——抱歉，4月9日才知道该宅邸的存在，那么他们怎么会投资于某项事物，以将其用作会所或基地呢？\n\n5 CONWAY先生：那些人不是G Clubs的成员。那些人是该运动的成员，他们制作视频的目的——\n\n6 法院：所以你是说G Club是投资人？\n\n7 CONWAY先生：G Club Internationals（G Club国际）是投资资金的一方。\n\n8 法院：关于Mahwah mansion（马瓦宅邸）——你的意思是，它为购买马瓦宅邸提供了资金？\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2023年8月29日\n\n1 CONWAY先生：完全是。\n\n2 法院：好的。\n\n3 CONWAY先生：具体人员、具体投资，都会在本案中披露出来。\n\n4 法院：好的。\n\n5 CONWAY先生：如果不具体说明，我无法证明我的案件。\n\n6 法院：我同意。\n\n7 CONWAY先生：在一定程度上。\n\n8 法院：我同意。\n\n9 CONWAY先生：受托人也应当受同样标准约束，但我当然会受此约束。\n\n10 法院：嗯，他提出了大量没有任何人反驳的证据。\n\n11 CONWAY先生：嗯，我具体问他，Kwok先生从哪里得到钱来做这件事？他说，嗯，Kwok先生不是这样做事的。他只是从别人那里拿钱，因此那就是他的。这不是证据。这只是推测。\n\n12 法院：那不是——那并不是——\n\n13 CONWAY先生：这正是他说的。\n\n14 法院：这可能是你们之间的谈话，但这并不是法庭上发生的事情。\n\n15 CONWAY先生：当他在证人席上时，这正是发生的事情。当我问他钱从哪里来时，他说，我不知道。Kwok先生并不是那样做生意的。我不知道钱从哪里来。他在推测。\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2023年8月29日\n\n1 我将在本案中提出实际证据。我们现在不是来争论证据会是什么。我们今天不是来审理本案的，法官阁下。\n\n2 关键在于，那些在投入资金时认为自己将有权前往该房屋住宿的人，不应被阻止前往该房屋住宿。这就如同——\n\n3 法院：那么你将不得不提出动议，而他们将不得不到这里来告诉我，为什么他们应当能够在该房屋住宿。\n\n4 CONWAY先生：嗯，那么您不如干脆完全准许该动议，因为您是在拿走这栋房子。\n\n5 法院：不，我不同意你。我不同意。我作出了那项——我不同意你。\n\n6 发生的事情是，初步禁令的签发是为了试图维持现状。根据所提交的证词和证据，这些进出该宅邸的人员，没有一个人在4月9日之前甚至知道该宅邸的存在。\n\n7 CONWAY先生：它当时没有投入使用。他们为什么会知道它？每个人都同意，而且应当同意，因为证据绝对清楚地表明，他们购买了这栋房子并开始翻修。该房屋尚未准备就绪。\n\n8 法院：他们是谁？他们是谁？你一直说“他们”。我不知道“他们”是谁。\n\n9 CONWAY先生：嗯，Taurus Fund购买了这栋房子。\n\n10 法院：好的。\n\n11 CONWAY先生：Taurus Fund雇用了一个又一个承包商。我看过发票。我看过工程。他们一直在进行这项工程。他们甚至尚未完成工程。\n\n12 法院：那么如果工程尚未完成，为什么有人进进出出？\n\n13 CONWAY先生：因为需要完成的工程并不妨碍人员进进出出。他们并没有像我们在屏幕上看到的几个月前那样让人员进进出出。他们现在让进出的是安保人员，住在那里的是安保人员。\n\n14 目前进进出出的人员，是努力确保该房屋安全并正常运行的人员。但目前——\n\n15 法院：这些人是Taurus Fund的雇员吗？\n\n16 DESPINS先生（德斯平斯先生）：不是。\n\n17 CONWAY先生：这些人是某一……的雇员。\n\n管理公司。\n\n法官：\n该管理——\n\n康韦先生（Conway）：\nTaurus Fund（金牛基金）是一家LLC。\n\n法官：\n我知道Taurus Fund是什么。\n\n但其作为LLC负有义务。它们不能只是——\n\n康韦先生：\n聘请一家管理公司。\n\n法官：\n好的。那么，管理公司是谁？\n\n康韦先生：\n我将在9月1日之前向受托人提供有关安保公司和管理公司的所有信息。我们现在正努力确保绝对不存在任何会令受托人或本院提出异议的事项。每个人都同意初步禁令命令中的一切内容。\n\n这就是——您知道，法官阁下，我们正在尽最大努力，完全按照命令要求我们做的去做，并且——完全按照受托人说他希望的去做。\n\n法官：\n我明白。我明白这一点。我只是说，我提出了这个问题——你们提交了一份文件。我感谢你们提交了这份文件，因为初步禁令命令要求提交该文件，但文件称没有保险。这令人担忧，明白吗？这非常令人担忧。\n\n正如我所说，美国受托人办公室（United States Trustee's Office），如果已有认定——目前尚无此认定——认为该资产属于破产财产，美国受托人办公室就会冲进这个法庭并说，你们必须立即驳回本案。没有保险。破产财产的权利没有得到保护，本案不能继续进行。\n\n而且这种情况经常发生。我的意思是，其中一项要求就是必须有保险。明白吗？\n\n所以你现在告诉我，你们将取得保险，而且你们必须——但Despins受托人（Trustee Despins）说，在你们取得保险之前，任何人都不应能够进出该建筑物。你说，进出该建筑物的唯一人员都是已投保人员。嗯，我不知道这一点。\n\n康韦先生：\n不。我是说，情况一直如此。我认为目前没有任何承包商在施工。我认为现在在该处所的人员是安保人员。\n\n法官：\n好的。\n\nDespins先生：\n不。\n\n法官：\n嗯，那就好。而且希望他们正在对初步禁令要求他们做的所有事项保留记录。\n\n康韦先生：\n而且我此前已询问是否保留了该记录。有人告诉我是的。我将确保今后的记录尽可能详细。\n\n但是，法官阁下，正如Despins先生也说过的，本案及其周围的一切污名使取得保险更加困难。因此，要求我们在24小时内取得一份\\$40 million保单——这实质上本会发生——是困难的。我认为每个人都能看出这一点。\n\n我认为我们将在今天取得该保单；他们现在可能已经取得了，我一直在法庭上，但唯一——唯一的障碍是，他们希望确认将在该处所的人员同意初步禁令的要求。他们已签署该文件。我认为这是法官阁下和受托人都应欢迎的事情。他们还希望取得管理公司其他商业保险的证据。\n\n因此，我看不出这里发生的任何事情——即命令发布以来几天的事情——为何应当令人担忧。我们正在尽最大努力。而且我认为我们会成功。如果不能，法官阁下，我是法院官员，我会告诉受托人，看，我努力过了，我无法取得。让我们回到法官那里，看看我们需要做什么。\n\n法官：\n好的。关于与美国政府的和解，我希望你们双方就拟议命令的形式进行协商。如果你们无法达成一致，那么我希望你们双方在明天下午5点前提交各自的拟议命令。我会审阅它们，并决定我将签发哪一份——如果有任何一份的话。或者我会——你知道——就其提出意见，并告诉你们该命令将如何表述。\n\n正如我已经说明的，检验标准是：这项和解是否低于合理性范围？\n\n而且，因为此时我并不确信或并未被说服，如果在目前存在的条款和条件下批准这份和解协议，会对你们的委托人造成任何损害——即，除非且直到Despins先生在实体审判中胜诉，否则不会发生任何事情，并且，你知道，我想我不记得其中对此怎么说，但你知道，最终、不可上诉的命令，不论情况如何——那么我看不出你们的委托人如何受到损害。\n\n因此，我确实认为这项和解处于合理性范围内。\n\n我将给你们一个机会——你已经表示过，而且我很感谢，也许你们的异议比你们最初所认为的更有限，因为如果该命令能够规定适用于你们委托人的措辞，那么你们可能会接受，但也可能不会。因此，我将让你们双方利用这个机会弄清楚这一点。然后在明天下午5点前在本案案卷中提交，是有一致同意的命令，还是有两份单独的命令，我们将据此继续进行。明白吗？\n\n康韦先生：\n我认为这非常公平，法官阁下。非常感谢。\n\n法官：\n好的。谢谢。\n\nDespins先生：\n法官阁下？\n\n法官：\n是。\n\nDespins先生：\n他们声称他们正在非常迅速地取得保险，这很有意思，但任何拥有一栋\\$29 million房屋的人，早在法官阁下要求他们证明他们有保险之前，就应当已经有保险了。\n\n因此，法官阁下，我重申我的请求，除非——如果他希望对此有24小时的、你知道的、暂停期，那也可以，但应当有一个非常短的期限，在他们取得保险之前，应当完全禁止安保人员和受托人代表以外的任何人前往这栋房屋。这只是一个根本性问题。谢谢，法官阁下。\n\n法官：\n是。我理解你的担忧，我将给他到明天下午5点，以向你和美国受托人办公室证明该财产已投保。\n\n然后，如果没有，你必须在该期限后提交某种文件，Despins先生，说明你要求立即签发一项命令，禁止安保人员以外的人员进入该财产或在该财产内活动，除非且直到取得保险。明白吗？\n\nDespins先生：\n谢谢，法官阁下。\n\n法官：\n好的。谢谢。\n\n康韦先生：\n法官阁下，我可以离席吗？\n\n法官：\n可以。谢谢。\n\n好的。那么日程表上唯一的其他事项是Rule 2004审查动议。我认为Major律师（Attorney Major），你也就该事项出席，是吗？\n\nMajor先生：\n是，法官阁下。\n\n法官：\n好的。好的。\n\nLinsey先生（Linsey），你要开始吗？\n\nLinsey先生：\n是。法官阁下，我可以上前吗？\n\n法官：\n可以。\n\nLinsey先生：\n谢谢。\n\n受托人的第六项综合Rule 2004审查动议，寻求将受托人的Rule 2004调查扩展至其他相关银行——受托人的调查表明相关交易曾在这些银行发生——并扩展至通过某些关联实体受雇于债务人的财务事务或以其他方式参与其中的其他实体和个人。\n\n迄今为止，Rule 2004一直是受托人调查债务人财务状况的最有效工具之一。\n\n如本院所知，债务人通过由数十个、甚至数百个关联实体和个人构成的复杂而错综的网络开展其商业活动。资金和财产在该网络中流动，以至于财务记录中反映了数以万计、甚至数十万计的单笔转移。\n\n因此，受托人的Rule 2004审查能够对债务人的财务事务进行整体审查，至关重要。\n\n对第六项2004审查动议的唯一异议，是Greenwich Land（格林尼治地产）和Hing Chi Ngok（邢志诺）提出的异议，我将其称为Greenwich Land各方。\n\n其异议的依据是，受托人的Rule 2004审查涉及受托人针对Greenwich Land各方提起的待决对抗程序所涉的相关问题。\n\n本院已经考虑过Greenwich Land的立场，并两次作出不支持该立场而支持受托人的裁决。\n\n第一次，Mei Guo（郭美）和HK USA（香港美国）对受托人的第二项综合Rule 2004审查动议提出了实质上且几乎完全相同的异议。那是在去年12月。本院裁定，尽管受托人不得向待决对抗程序的当事方寻求Rule 2004调查取证，但受托人可继续就非当事方进行调查，即使相关事项可能涉及待决对抗程序。\n\n该裁决载于主案案卷第1184号。因此，这意味着该问题在近十个月前已被裁决。\n\n随后数月前的5月，Greenwich Land和Hing Chi Ngok再次以同一依据提出异议，援引其自身待决的对抗程序。\n\n当时，受托人的律师向Greenwich Land各方解释，本院已就该问题作出裁决，但各方仍坚持提出异议。因此，本院再次裁决了同一问题。不出所料，本院作出了同样的裁决。即使部分主题事项可能与待决对抗程序有关，受托人仍可继续对非当事方进行其2004调查。\n\n受托人在回应Greenwich Land上一次异议时提出的第一点，也是我们在此提出的第一点，即该问题已构成本案既判事项。本Chapter 11案件的复杂性显而易见。案卷条目数量比本辖区许多其他Chapter 11案件高出一个数量级。\n\n如果本案要有序进行，当事方不应可以随意重新诉讼已裁决的问题，更不应多次这样做。除此之外，本院第一次作出裁决时是正确的。而且，本院第二次作出裁决时同样正确。\n\n我不愿在这里过多深究，因为我不想上Greenwich Land各方的当，但他们在其异议中选择性地引用和援引判例，以支持一个根本不存在的主张，即不允许继续就非当事方进行Rule 2004调查，即便其可能与待决对抗程序存在某些主题重叠。\n\n判例法并不支持该主张。事实上，判例法与之相矛盾，这就是为什么法官阁下两次作出了法官阁下所作出的裁决。\n\nGreenwich Land各方提出的异议还有一个更令人担忧的特点，那就是其讨论第六项Rule 2004动议所寻求继续进行的调查的方式。\n\n仅看对该调查的概述——即其中摘录传票和文件出示请求的部分——人们会认为Rule 2004动议仅仅是为了调查Greenwich\n\n格林尼治地产（Greenwich Land）各方当事人所称的资产。\n\n事实上，查看这些文件出示请求（RFPs）本身即可发现，它们涉及的资产范围远远超出格林尼治地产各方当事人所称的资产。\n\n例如，且这仅仅是示例，这些文件出示请求还涉及谢里-尼德兰酒店（Sherry-Netherland Hotel）的物业。\n\n我们今天刚刚就布拉沃·拉克（Bravo Luck）对抗程序达成和解。\n\n如果这项 2004 审查确实是对抗程序中证据开示的替代，那么我们为何还会寻求涉及这些事项的证据开示和调查？\n\n“梅夫人”号（Lady May）也是如此。\n\n“梅夫人”号被列在其文件出示请求中。\n\n“梅夫人”号已经出售。\n\n我们并非为了好玩而列举这些事项。\n\n我们并非将这些事项列为《联邦破产程序规则》第 7 编下证据开示的替代。\n\n实际情况是，本院审理本案已久，足以知悉受托人的财务状况，或者更准确地说，债务人的财务状况，是一张错综复杂至极的蜘蛛网。\n\n要理清其业务和资产，不能从这张网中硬砍下几块，就期待一切能够相互吻合。\n\n必须进行整体审查。\n\n我认为，本院此前的两项裁定已认可这一点。\n\n除此之外，格林尼治地产各方当事人主张\n\n第 / 共 120 页\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2023年8月29日\n1 对抗程序。虽然我想非常明确地说明，\n2 受托人不同意格林尼治地产各方当事人关于其在\n3 对抗程序中有权获得什么、无权获得什么的立场，\n4 但在对抗程序中处理证据开示争议的适当方式\n\n5 并不是反对 2004 审查动议。\n6 \n7 最后，我仅简要指出，即使本院\n8 驳回格林尼治地产各方当事人的异议，\n9 破产财产已经因此受到不利影响。该异议\n10 将使 2004 审查动议的批准以及因此发出的\n11 传票延迟数周。\n12 这使我想起高中时，\n13 我父母会说，你每周都必须完成数学作业，\n14 因为你下周所学的内容建立在你本周所做的事情之上；\n15 受托人的调查也是如此。\n16 本动议项下我们将向其发出传票的对象、\n17 文件出示请求的条款、所涉事项，\n18 这些全部——其中很大一部分——都是\n19 受托人通过其现有的 2004 审查调查所了解的\n20 事项。而只要\n21 该 2004 审查调查被延误，延误就会不断累积，\n22 一切都会花费更长时间，一切都会更加\n23 昂贵，案卷条目将继续增加，\n24 管理费用也将继续累积。\n25 因此，我们请求阁下批准第六次\n\nHo Wan Kwok—2023年8月29日\n\n1 2004 审查动议，驳回异议，并明确\n2 本次阁下的裁定应受到尊重，\n3 今后不应再就此——就此方面\n4 提出异议。\n5 我很乐意回答本院\n6 可能提出的任何问题。\n7 法庭：谢谢。我目前没有任何\n8 问题。\n9 MAJOR 律师：谢谢，阁下。Chris Major（克里斯·梅杰），\n10 Meister Seelig & Fein（迈斯特·西利格与费因）律师事务所，代理 Hing Chi Ngok（兴志岳）和\n11 Greenwich Land, LLC（格林尼治地产有限责任公司）。\n12 我想回应受托人律师\n13 开头和结尾均提出的观点，即我们应当被\n14 禁止反对这些动议。\n15 而且我们并未使受托人耽搁数周。我们于\n16 August 18th 提交异议。今天是 August 29th，\n17 本事项正在审理。\n18 我们不仅有权，而且有义务\n19 在本案中留下记录。我还想保护\n20 我方当事人将来提出异议的权利，例如\n21 审判中的证据异议。\n22 如果受托人试图突然提出其在 2004 审查中\n23 就对抗程序中的争议事项所收集的证据，\n24 而未将其交给我们，随后又试图在审判中提交该等证据，\n25 我不希望受托人\n\nHo Wan Kwok—2023年8月29日\n\n1 在我提出异议时说，嗯，你没有反对我们的第六次\n2 综合动议。因此，我认为\n3 我们提出异议完全适当。\n4 争议事项相似，但并不完全相同，而且\n5 基于该原因，我将简要陈述。我知悉本院\n6 此前的命令为何，但我必须留下记录。我\n7 不能仅仅说，嗯，本院此前如此裁定，因此\n8 我们就接受它。因为如果我们出现在\n9 上诉审裁机构面前，或者出现在任何审判法院面前，而我\n10 提出异议，我不希望听到权利放弃的论点。\n11 因此，这是我认为我们有义务提出的异议，\n12 并且我认为其完全适当。\n13 如我所述，我将就法律\n14 问题尤其简要地陈述。我知悉本院此前的裁定。对于\n15 待决程序规则的存在并无争议，该规则禁止为在\n16 对抗程序中使用而依据 2004 规则进行证据开示。对于\n17 本第六次 2004 证据开示综合动议所寻求的\n18 证据开示\n19 涉及格林尼治地产\n20 对抗程序中的争议事项，也无争议。\n21 受托人律师对\n22 我方异议聚焦于所有与格林尼治地产有关的证据开示\n23 请求而未提及其他请求这一事实提出异议；不过，阁下，我相信，\n24 该提交文件，即综合动议，\n25 连同传票计算，我相信，超过 300\n\nHo Wan Kwok—2023年8月29日\n\n1 页。我相信，至少超过 200 页。\n2 因此，我们当然不会花费大量\n3 时间讨论在本破产程序中超出我们极为狭窄的\n4 范围之外的事项，而该范围就是格林尼治地产\n5 对抗程序。\n6 所以，我们当然且适当地\n7 聚焦于这些请求中提及\n8 格林尼治地产的部分。即使在受托人第六次\n9 综合动议的正文中，格林尼治地产也被提及为向其中一个对象\n10 寻求证据开示的理由。\n11 因此，我认为关键的法律问题，我在此将\n12 非常简要地说明，再次强调，并不是\n13 此前待决程序规则是否存在，也不是这些传票是否寻求\n14 有关格林尼治地产\n15 对抗程序争议事项的信息；这些均无争议。但\n16 受托人所说的是，嗯，只要我们不是从你们那里获得，\n17 我们就可以取得与对抗程序有关的\n18 证据开示。\n19 我只想将我们所引案件中的两段\n20 引文载入记录。\n21 第一项是 In re Bennett Funding Group, Inc.（贝内特融资集团公司破产案），\n22 即 203 B.R. 24。该案来自纽约北区（Northern District of New York）\n23 破产法院。这是 1996 年的案件。\n24 该判决书第 29 页中，法院写道：“因此，受托人与债权人一样，必须在\n25 对抗程序开始后，依据《联邦破产程序规则》\n\nHo Wan Kwok—2023年8月29日\n\n1 第 7026 条及以下规定，就受该程序影响的实体以及本\n2 程序所处理的争议事项寻求证据开示。”\n3 \n4 第二个案件是 In re Southeastern Materials, Inc.（东南材料公司破产案），2010 Westlaw 5128608，来自\n5 北卡罗来纳州中区（Middle District of North Carolina）。这是 2010 年案件。\n6 该判决书\n7 第 3 页中，法院写道：“为防止不公正，\n8 并确保破产\n9 对抗程序中的当事人享有与非破产情形下联邦诉讼当事人相同的权利，\n10 \n11 重要的是，应确保《联邦民事诉讼规则》第 26 条至第 37 条所规定的\n12 证据开示程序保障，\n13 \n14 并通过援引纳入《联邦破产程序规则》第\n15 7026 条至第 7037 条的该等保障，不会因在\n16 对抗程序待决期间允许进行 2004 规则审查而被\n17 规避。”\n18 阁下，关于该法律\n19 论点，我们还依赖于我方异议中所引用和\n20 讨论的其他判例法。\n21 我想谈及——我在开头提到，\n22 本情形与我们在 June 就第五次\n23 2004 规则证据开示综合动议提出异议时的情形相似，\n24 但并不完全相同。\n25 受托人拟议采取的做法还存在另一项不公平之处，\n\n第 / 共 120 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok—2023年8月29日 75\n1 即证据开示——受托人曾主张并取得在我方\n2 对抗程序中极为快速的\n3 证据开示时间表。该时间表\n4 即将结束。他现在来到法庭并称，\n5 他希望进行与格林尼治地产程序、\n6 对抗程序争议事项相关的 2004 证据开示。\n\n我们将被禁止进行任何证据开示。我们——我们不得参与他就我们正在抗辩的对抗程序争议事项所进行的证据开示，而他将能够继续这样做。我想，他的立场是，他可以一直这样做直至审判期间。如果他发现了什么，他可以尝试使用它；我们当然会对此提出异议。\n\n但就格林尼治地产而言，他所谓的调查，是针对他已经提出的主张和已经获得的临时救济进行的证据开示，因此我认为，适当的做法应是由各方均可参与的证据开示。\n\n因此，阁下，以上是我方论点。我很乐意回答本院提出的任何问题。\n\n法庭：谢谢。没有。我目前没有任何问题，但谢谢。\n\nMAJOR 律师：谢谢，阁下。LINSEY 律师：阁下，我很快说几句可以吗？\n\nHo Wan Kwok—2023年8月29日 76 法庭：可以。LINSEY 律师：首先，再次说明，对抗程序中的证据开示争议应在对抗程序中处理。我们不同意对抗程序中就谈判所作证据开示的定性，但如果存在争议，那么我预计任何一方——任何当事人都有能力在该程序中提出。至于对判例法的简要讨论，阁下已就这一问题作出实体审理。Bennett 案之所以听起来耳熟，是因为它是阁下在上一次判决书中援引的案件之一，而且阁下在该引证之后的括号说明中指出，该案禁止的是针对待决程序当事人的 2004 证据开示，而非针对非当事人的 2004 证据开示。至于所援引的 Southeastern Materials 案\n\n第 / 共 120 页\n\n中的内容，脱离上下文很容易从案件中摘取片段。我将引用 Southeastern Materials 案中的一段：“少数判决曾考虑，在其他法院正在进行或可能发生相关民事或刑事程序时，2004 规则审查的允许范围；这些案件的一般规则是，存在附带诉讼或可能存在附带诉讼，并不足以成为拒绝审查的理由。”这段话出自该案，阁下。\n\n第 / 共 120 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok—2023年8月29日\n\n阁下审阅了这些案件。这并非——\n\n并没有一项第二巡回上诉法院的裁决直接适用于本案。上述案例归根结底在于，证据开示审查的目的是否是为了替代证据开示——\n\n或者更准确地说，第2004条审查是否旨在替代依据规则第7部分在对抗程序中进行的证据开示，以获取某种战略优势；抑或它们是对债务人财务状况进行适当的、全面的审查。\n\n我认为，在本案中，鉴于迄今形成的记录，极其明确的是，我们正在进行的是后者。\n\n法院：\n谢谢。\n\n林西先生（Mr. Linsey）：\n谢谢。\n\n法院：\n梅杰律师（Attorney Major），您有任何回应吗？\n\n梅杰先生（Mr. Major）：\n阁下，就判例法而言，我们已准确说明法院作出了何种裁判。我所宣读的两项并非仅有的案例。我们在书面意见中援引了数个支持我方论点的案例。\n\n法院：\n我明白。谢谢。\n\n我也看到你们援引了其他案例，因此我明白。\n\n好的。关于本动议，法院将留待裁定。但我认为裁决不会——我的意思是，我不会花费大量时间作出裁决，但我会在回去重新审阅你们的论点，并再次查看文件和案例后作出裁决。\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵） - August 29, 2023\n\n好的？\n\n今天下午还有任何需要处理的事项吗？我认为这是日程表上的最后一项事项。\n\n德斯平斯先生（Mr. Despins）：\n是的，阁下。\n\n法院：\n任何一方都没有其他事项吗？\n\n德斯平斯先生：\n实际上，阁下，请允许我就此一试。问题是，在证言录取过程中出现问题时，是否有在阁下面前寻求救济的程序？因为在某些法院——\n\n法院：\n没有——我们没有一个我可以指出并说明这就是你应当如何做的程序；但过去发生的情况是，当事人联系法庭书记员，并请求法院举行紧急听证。\n\n德斯平斯先生：\n好的。\n\n法院：\n如果法院有空，法院可以这样做。如果没有，那么法院对当事人所说的是，尽可能继续进行证言录取。将任何问题或争议保留至法院能够实际举行该听证时再处理。\n\n现在，我知道这并不理想，因为这意味着你们必须重新召开证言录取或审查，但——\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵） - August 29, 2023\n\n德斯平斯先生：\n好的。\n\n法院：\n——没有时间——您知道，不幸的是，法院并非总是有空。\n\n德斯平斯先生：\n明白。这很有帮助。谢谢。\n\n法院：\n所以我不知道你们希望如何推进，但曾有两种情况发生过。当事人致电时，法院有空，能够举行紧急听证。但也曾有当事人致电而法院没有空的情况，此后我们必须尽快安排专门的听证来处理该问题。\n\n我认为我能告诉你们的就这些。我们的地方法规或类似规定中没有既定程序。\n\n德斯平斯先生：\n好的。谢谢。非常有帮助。谢谢。\n\n法院：\n好的。谢谢。今天有一些未列入日程表、我认为属于某种程序性事务的事项。例如，已有一项删节动议提出。删节通常会获准，因此该事项大概会在未来几天内处理。\n\n除此之外，我认为主案和对抗程序中的大多数事项，要么已经排期举行听证，要么即将到达答复期限。\n\nof 120\n\nof 120\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵） - August 29, 2023\n\n哦，那是我原本还要说的另一件事。梅杰先生，您可能也不知道这一点。\n\n但是，康涅狄格联邦地区法院（district court in Connecticut）在提出你们所谓民事诉讼的动议时，即原告和被告之间的诉讼，会自动设定21天的答复期限。因此我们遵循该规则。因此，一旦在对抗程序中提交诉状，CM/ECF 系统即会自动填入相关文字，我不记得具体写的是什么，但大意是答复应于21天内提交，然后我认为它会计算该日期。\n\n我已对人们说过，我们的地方法规并未对此作出规定，但我们正在再次审议地方法规：如果有人认为答复应有其他日期，或存在某种紧急问题，或需要延长该答复日期，这并不妨碍任何人提交文件请求该项救济。好的？\n\n这是一个——我认为，您知道，在破产背景下，这21天并不总能像在地区法院诉讼中那样适用得如此妥当。我也并不是说它在地区法院诉讼中任何时候都适用得妥当，因为我确信会有一些情形，有人希望在该期限之前获得某些事项。\n\n但我想向各方澄清的是，该21天期限是自动填入的。法院与此无关。它只是存在于系统中，是程序的一部分，并且是遵循我们所遵循的地区法院规则。\n\n因此，可能存在某种情形，任何一方均可寻求变更该日期，或在此之前获得某种案件状态会议或其他事项。没有任何一方被禁止寻求该等救济。是否会获准则完全是另一回事。\n\n但我最近注意到已有一些动议提出，其中，您知道，我能理解为何一方希望获得其他形式的救济，而不必等待21天，但并非一定已提出任何请求，所以我只是想让各方明白这一点。好的？\n\n林西先生：\n阁下，这使我想起一个问题。在 HCHK 对抗程序中，有——在不涉及其实质内容的情况下，最近提出了一项延长诉状期限的动议。该动议表明受托人（Trustee）不反对。我们计划提交答复。该答复应于本周提交。\n\n我之所以提及此事，仅因为我知道，您知道，该事项与阁下所指出的通常会发生的情形一样，在案卷文字中有同样的21天期限；但同时，您知道，我们通常或经常看到延长期限的动议在21天期限届满前获准。因此，我只是想向阁下说明，本周将代表信托提交一份答复——\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵） - August 29, 2023\n\n法院：\n我以为已经有人对该延期提出异议。\n\n林西先生：\n该动议中表明存在异议，但我们将提交一份实质性——\n\n法院：\n哦。好的。我明白。\n\n林西先生：\n——说明理由的异议。\n\n法院：\n我明白。\n\n林西先生：\n我只是——\n\n法院：\n我明白您的意思。\n\n林西先生：\n我们不会拖延——我们不会——我们不会花21天才去做这件事。我们将把该文件提交备案。\n\n法院：\n我明白。好的。我感谢这一点。\n\n林西先生：\n谢谢。\n\n德斯平斯先生：\n而且，阁下，您在许可上诉的背景下提出的问题有些危险，因为案卷会显示您有21天，并如您所述给出日期，但《破产规则》（Bankruptcy Rule）8004 规定您有十天。\n\n法院：\n我知道。\n\n德斯平斯先生：\n所以那就像是——\n\n法院：\n那是问题的一部分。\n\n德斯平斯先生：\n是的。\n\nof 120\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵） - August 29, 2023\n\n法院：\n这个框，所有事项并不都能装进这个框里。\n\n德斯平斯先生：\n是的。\n\n法院：\n对吗？所以那是问题的一部分。\n\n德斯平斯先生：\n但我们没有冒任何风险。我们适用了该10天规则。\n\n法院：\n不。那是问题的一部分。我们将审议此事。我已向律师界说过——不是我，所有参与地方法规常设委员会（standing committee on local rules）的法官都提出了问题，说，您知道，很多时候——并没有地方法规规定有关21天的任何事项，因为那是地区法院规则。它只是说采纳地区法院规则。\n\n但我们可能需要说明某些内容，例如，除非适用法律、规则或命令另有规定，或法院另有命令，诸如此类。您知道。\n\n我认为——因此，你们都对此加以考虑，向我们说明规则应当如何规定，我们将尝试这样做。好的？但重点是，我们正在考虑此事。\n\n我只是想让你们知道，对于并非一直在这里、也未必会关注地区法院规则的人而言，这并不妨碍任何一方在该21天期限之前寻求某些事项。是否会获得则完全是另一回事。好的？\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵） - August 29, 2023\n\n同一个框。而且，您知道，我们可能要花数周审阅地方法规，找出所有不适合装进这个框的事项。\n\n但无论如何，我之所以这样说，是为了让各方明白，我不希望任何人认为这意味着他们不能以某种方式在21天之前寻求救济。是否获得该救济则完全是另一回事。好的？\n\n好的。那么，今天的听证至此结束，因此——\n\n（程序于下午3:47结束。）\n\n本人，克里斯汀·菲奥雷（CHRISTINE FIORE），认证电子法庭记录员及誊录员，特此证明，前述内容系以上述事项的正式电子录音所制作的正确誊本。\n\nSeptember 6, 2023\n\nChristine Fiore, CERT\n\n誊录员","key_entities":["Kwok","Je","Ho Wan Kwok","Despins","CIPA","forfeiture","Guo","Brady","Murray","Yanping Wang","Kin Ming Je","Miles Guo","William Je","Fergenson","Finkel","HCHK","GTV","Giglio","Luc Despins","Paul 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