{"id":"court_ctb_2292_84","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":2292,"sub_number":84,"doc_type":"EXHIBIT","filed_date":"2023-10-26","title":"Exhibit 84 ","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"## **Exhibit 84**\n\n\n\n**UBS AG**\n\n**Defendant**\n\n## **PARTICULARS OF CLAIM**\n\n#### **PARTIES**\n\n- 1. The First Claimant (\"**Mr Kwok**\") is a high net worth individual resident since early 2015 in New York State, USA. Mr Kwok was formerly resident in the People's Republic of China (\"**PRC**\"), where he was known by his Mandarin language name, Guo Wengui. Mr Kwok is a political opponent of the PRC government, and by the time of the events giving rise to these claims he was already in a hostile relationship with the PRC authorities.\n- 2. The Second Claimant (\"**Ace Decade**\") is a private limited company incorporated under the laws of the British Virgin Islands with its registered address at P.O. Box 957, Offshore Incorporations Centre, Road Town, Tortola, British Virgin Islands. Ace Decade was incorporated on 18 June 2014 and acquired by Mr Kwok on or around 10 November 2014 as part of the preparations for the (then) proposed acquisition of shares in the Chinese company, Haitong Securities Company Limited (\"**Haitong**\").\n- 3. The Third Claimant (\"**Dawn State**\") is also a private limited company incorporated under the laws of the British Virgin Islands with its registered address at P.O. Box 957, Offshore Incorporations Centre, Road Town, Tortola, British Virgin Islands.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2292-84 Filed 10/26/23 Entered 10/26/23 20:46:12 Page 3 of 39\n\n- 4. Since 18 September 2015, Dawn State has been owned and controlled by Ace Decade. Prior to 18 September 2015, Dawn State was owned and controlled by the Chinese investment services provider, Haixia Capital Management Company Ltd (\"**Haixia**\"), through a vehicle called Haixia Capital Investment Fund (Fujian) Limited Partnership (\"**Haixia Fund**\") which was managed by Haixia Huifu Asset Investment and Fund Management Co. Ltd (\"**Haixia Management**\"). Dawn State was the vehicle used for the acquisition of shares in Haitong in 2015 (as pleaded in more detail in the body of this Particulars of Claim (\"**PoC**\"), subject to a contractual right under which Ace Decade could acquire Dawn State after the Haitong share acquisition.\n- 5. The Defendant (\"**UBS**\"), is a company incorporated in Switzerland, with its registered office address at Bahnhofstrasse 45, 8001 Zurich, Switzerland. UBS conducts business globally, providing retail and investment banking, wealth management and other financial services. At all relevant times UBS conducted this business through both its Swiss headquarters and also branches located, inter alia, in Hong Kong (\"**UBS HK**\") and in London (\"**UBS London**\"), the latter being, by agreement of the parties, designated as the counterparty for all of the contracts relevant to the claims in this action, as pleaded further below. UBS London has at all times held permissions to provide regulated services from the Financial Conduct Authority (Reference Number 186958) and was authorised to act for and enter into contractual agreements as UBS.\n- 6. As pleaded at paragraphs [32](#page-8-0) to [57](#page-21-0) below, UBS entered into the contracts relevant to the subject matter of the Claimants' claims through UBS London. In the discussions and negotiations leading to those contracts, UBS was represented primarily by its employee Mr Stephen Wong (\"**Mr Wong**\"). Mr Wong was at that time a Managing Director in the Wealth Management Division of UBS, based at the offices of UBS HK. Mr Kwok was first introduced to Mr Wong in around 2006 or 2007.\n\n## **THE FACTS GIVING RISE TO THE CLAIMS**\n\n## **Background to the Haitong Investment**\n\n7. In or around Autumn 2013, Mr Kwok was approached by the CEO of Haitong, Mr Wang Kaiguo (\"**Mr Wang**\"), who was seeking to encourage Mr Kwok to make a substantial equity investment in Haitong. Haitong is a major Chinese securities firm, engaged in the provision of stocks and derivatives brokerage, as well as investment banking, asset management, private equity, alternative investments, and financial leasing services. Haitong is one of the largest and longest established financial services providers in the PRC. Haitong's shares are traded on the Shanghai and Hong Kong Stock Exchanges (\"**SSE**\" and \"**HKEX**\" respectively). Haitong's shares trading on the HKEX are known as \"**H-Shares**.\" Following the approach from Mr\n\nWang, Mr Kwok resolved to invest approximately US\\$3 billion in H-Shares in order to obtain a major stake in Haitong. This investment was to be made through the issue of new H-Shares by Haitong, and their allotment to companies controlled by Mr Kwok.\n\n# **Initial involvement of UBS**\n\n- 8. Following the discussions with Mr Wang, Mr Kwok communicated his intention to acquire a substantial stake in Haitong to Mr Hank Lo, a Hong Kong solicitor and partner in the firm Stevenson, Wong & Co (\"**Stevenson Wong**\"). Mr Kwok retained Stevenson Wong to advise him on the proposed acquisition.\n- 9. Mr Lo had an established relationship with Mr Wong and UBS, the details of which are not known to Mr Kwok, and it was Mr Lo who first introduced Mr Kwok to Mr Wong in or around 2006-7. By the end of 2013, Mr Wong had cultivated a close personal relationship with Mr Kwok and had successfully induced Mr Kwok to consider and treat him as a trusted adviser and personal friend.\n- 10. At some point in the fourth quarter of 2013, Mr Lo informed Mr Wong of Mr Kwok's intention to acquire a stake in Haitong. The Claimants do not know when Mr Lo communicated this to Mr Wong. Mr Kwok was not aware that Mr Lo intended to inform Mr Wong or UBS until after the event, although Mr Kwok did not (after the event) object to him doing so.\n- 11. In or around December 2013, Mr Wong visited Mr Kwok at his residence in Hong Kong. He informed Mr Kwok that UBS had become aware that Haitong would be issuing new H-Shares (the \"**Placement Shares**\") and that UBS wished to participate as a placing agent. Mr Wong used his mobile telephone to open a call with senior UBS executives, who Mr Kwok understood were based in Switzerland. Mr Kwok cannot now recall the names of the individuals. Those senior UBS executives and Mr Wong told Mr Kwok (the following sub-paragraphs pleading only the gist of what they said):\n\t- (1) UBS wished to become a broker in the sale of the Placement Shares, and wanted Mr Kwok to introduce and commend UBS to Haitong for that role;\n\t- (2) If Mr Kwok assisted UBS in that way, UBS would assist and advise him in acquiring the shares for which it was made broker or placement agent in a way which was advantageous for Mr Kwok;\n\t- (3) Although they knew that Mr Kwok's intention was to acquire the shares for himself, UBS itself or investors with whom UBS had a relations themselves would be interested in\n\npurchasing the shares at a substantial uplift on the likely offer price if Mr Kwok was willing to on-sell them.\n\n- 12. Following this meeting, Mr Kwok resolved to work with UBS and to this end, at some time in early 2014, Mr Kwok told Mr Wang that he intended to invest in the new issue of H-Shares, and asked Mr Wang to include UBS as one of the placees of the Placement Shares.\n- 13. In July or August 2014 Haitong resolved to issue the H-Shares via seven placees, one of which was UBS. Another company advising and assisting Mr Kwok on a separate acquisition of H-Shares, Macquarie Capital Securities Limited (\"**Macquarie**\"), was to be the placee in respect of three allocations of the Placement Shares. Together, UBS and Macquarie would place around 12% of Haitong's total issued shareholding.\n\n## **Mr Wong's initial advisory work**\n\n- 14. Following this meeting, Mr Kwok entered into discussions with UBS (through Mr Wong) in relation to the structuring of his planned investment (the \"**Investment**\") in the Placement Shares for which UBS was the placing agent (the \"**UBS H-Shares**\"). In discussions in and around late March and April 2014, Mr Wong said that he would provide a plan for the \"*Haitong project*,\" including a proposed structure through which Mr Kwok could acquire the UBS H-Shares.\n- 15. As a securities company incorporated and operating in the PRC, Haitong was at all relevant times subject to regulation by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (the \"**CSRC**\"). The relevant PRC laws required the CSRC to give approval if any person acquired or actually controlled more than 5% shareholdings of the total issued capital of Haitong.\n- 16. It was discussed between Mr Kwok and Mr Wong that Mr Kwok intended to invest in excess of US\\$3 billion in total, which would considerably exceed this threshold and therefore require approval by the CSRC. The advice which Mr Kwok received from UBS included, in particular, devising a structure for the acquisition of the Placement Shares which would avoid the requirement for CSRC approval in a manner which complied with the relevant PRC laws.\n- 17. In the course of these conversations:\n\t- (1) Mr Wong repeatedly told Mr Kwok that he, under the direction of UBS senior executives, would work to advance Mr Kwok's best interests in relation to the acquisition of the Placement Shares, in line with the commitment made in December 2013. From this period until the acquisition of the UBS H-Shares, Mr Kwok frequently repeated and reaffirmed\n\nthe assertion that he and UBS were working in Mr Kwok's interests, and that Mr Kwok should repose trust in and rely upon Mr Wong and UBS;\n\n- (2) Mr Wong said that he and UBS would devise the structure for the acquisition in a way which was as advantageous as possible for Mr Kwok; and\n- (3) Mr Wong held himself and UBS out as having the experience and expertise to devise an advantageous structure for the acquisition for Mr Kwok and advising Mr Kwok (and, subsequently, Ace Decade) with respect to investments in placements such as that for the Placement Shares, the structuring of the investments, and the financing thereof.\n- 18. In or around June 2014, UBS, through Mr Wong, gave initial advice regarding the structure for the acquisition of the UBS H-Shares. This advice was given orally at meetings in Mr Kwok's office (49/F, Bank of China Tower, No. 1, Garden Road, Hong Kong) and his personal residence in Hong Kong. In summary (the following sub-paragraphs pleading only the gist of UBS' advice), Mr Wong advised Mr Kwok: (1) Not to purchase the UBS H-Shares through a company beneficially owned or controlled by him, as this would require CSRC approval; (2) Instead, to set up a structure (which would be arranged by UBS) under which the UBS H-Shares would be acquired by a company controlled by a third-party intermediary, which acquisition would not require CSRC approval; and (3) To make the investment on a leveraged basis, with acquisition finance from UBS.\n- 19. Mr Kwok was initially reluctant to make a leveraged investment because he did not require bank finance in order to acquire the UBS H-Shares and had intended to make the acquisition using cash. However, Mr Wong advised him that:\n\t- (1) If UBS were to proceed with structuring the Investment it would have to be on the basis that the bank would provide margin finance for the purchase of the UBS H-Shares, as this would be how UBS would receive its profit from the transaction;\n\t- (2) It was anyway in Mr Kwok's best interests to make a leveraged investment, because it would enable him to obtain the desired number of shares without committing the full amount of his own capital;\n\t- (3) Any leveraged finance provided by UBS would in any event be upon the '*best possible terms*';\n\t- (4) The terms of any leveraged finance would be consistent with Mr Kwok's requirement that there should be no provisions requiring (i) the provision of additional collateral or (ii) the mandatory repayment of the loan (which were referred to compendiously by both Mr\n\nKwok and Mr Wong as \"**margin calls**\" without differentiation) as a result of short term price fluctuations of the Placement Shares;\n\n- (5) UBS would give Mr Kwok adequate time to meet any other margin calls, so that if Mr Kwok had (as in fact, he did) the ability to fund the whole of the acquisition without loan financing, UBS would not enforce against the security before additional funds could be provided by Mr Kwok;\n- (6) In illustrating the approach which UBS would take to requests for additional collateral or repayment of the loan in the event of fluctuation in the value of UBS H-Shares, Mr Wong repeatedly (during this period, and thereafter) referred to a previous high value leveraged transaction funded by UBS, under which it had provided funding for the acquisition of a much larger stake in the Chinese insurance company, Ping An (the \"**Ping An Deal**\"). The details of the information provided by Mr Wong in relation to the Ping An Deal between June 2014 and December 2014 are summarised at paragraph [42](#page-13-0) below.\n- 20. To the best of Mr Kwok's recollection, this advice was first given in or around June 2014. However, these matters were the subject of repeated discussion between Mr Wong and Mr Kwok in the summer and autumn of 2014, and thereafter. Mr Kwok cannot be certain as to what representations were made to him by UBS on each specific occasion, but recalls the effect of the advice as a whole.\n\n# **Further Structuring Advice**\n\n- 21. From in or around July 2014 onwards, UBS continued to advise Mr Kwok and (from 10 November 2014) Ace Decade regarding the proposed structure and financing for the acquisition of the UBS H-Shares. In particular, Mr Wong went on further to advise Mr Kwok (and, subsequently, Ace Decade) on the structuring of the acquisition, including further advising in relation to the requirement for approval by the CSRC of acquisitions of Haitong in excess of 5% of the company's share capital; and by advising that Mr Kwok and Ace Decade select Haixia as the intermediary for the Investment.\n- 22. In reliance on this advice, Mr Kwok and Ace Decade selected Haixia to act as intermediary for the acquisition of the UBS H-Shares, and ultimately appointed Haixia for that purpose under a Co-Investment Agreement dated 18 December 2014 (the \"**Co-Investment Agreement**\").\n- 23. Although Mr Wong had told Mr Kwok and Ace Decade that Haixia was independent of UBS, it is in fact controlled by State Development and Investment Corporation (\"**SDIC**\"), which is a joint venture partner of UBS, with both co-owning an investment fund called \"**UBS SDIC**\".\n\nTo facilitate the investment in the Placement Shares, on 23 October 2014 Haixia caused the incorporation of Dawn State through its subsidiary Haixia Fund. Dawn State was at all relevant times until its transfer to Ace Decade managed by Mr Lu Bo (\"**Mr Lu**\"), a senior employee of Haixia who was previously employed by UBS SDIC.\n\n24. Ace Decade was acquired on 10 November 2014 by Mr Kwok for the purpose of acting as the said investment vehicle. On the same day, on the advice of Mr Wong, an employee of Mr Kwok, Ms Yu Yong (\"**Ms Yu**\") became its nominee shareholder and director.\n\n# **Preparation of the December Contracts**\n\n- 25. In or around late October and early November 2014, UBS (primarily through Mr Wong), Haixia (primarily through Mr Lu) and Ace Decade (primarily through Mr Kwok and Ms Yu) began making preparations to subscribe for the UBS H-Shares.\n- 26. On or around 13 November 2014 there was an initial conference call between Stevenson Wong and Norton Rose Fulbright (\"**Norton Rose**\"), the lawyers engaged by Haixia to act on the transaction, at which they agreed that Norton Rose would draft a Co-Investment Agreement between Haixia, Dawn State and Ace Decade in relation to the acquisition of the UBS H-Shares.\n- 27. On or around 14 November 2014, Ace Decade and Dawn State entered into a Memorandum of Understanding, pursuant to which Dawn State was to provide services to Ace Decade in return for a non-refundable fee equal to 65 basis points of the total invested capital, subject to a minimum of US\\$5,000,000.\n- 28. During this period, leading up to the agreement by Dawn State to subscribe for the UBS H-Shares, there were ongoing discussions between Mr Wong and Mr Kwok in relation to the structuring and financing of the acquisition. During those discussions Mr Wong repeated and elaborated on the representations pleaded at paragraph [19](#page-5-0) above. The Claimants plead further in relation to these representations at paragraphs [39](#page-12-0) to [40,](#page-13-1) [47](#page-15-0) and [78](#page-27-0) below.\n- 29. These preparations led to Ace Decade, Dawn State and UBS entering into a series of arrangements designed to allow Ace Decade to participate in the acquisition of UBS H-Shares through Dawn State (together, the \"**December Contracts**\"). The December Contracts were:\n\t- (1) A custody agreement between Dawn State and UBS dated 12 December 2014 (the \"**Custody Agreement**\");\n\t- (2) A Co-Investment Agreement between Ace Decade, Dawn State and Haixia dated 18 December 2014;\n- (3) A letter agreement between Haixia Management and Ace Decade dated 18 December 2014 (the \"**Letter Agreement**\");\n- (4) A financing letter entitled \"*Project Pipe – Financing Letter*\" between Dawn State and UBS London dated 19 December 2014 (the \"**Financing Letter**\").\n- 30. The Claimants plead further as to the entry into the December Contracts and their terms at paragraphs [32](#page-8-0) to [37](#page-10-0) below.\n- 31. These preparations also led to Dawn State entering into a subscription agreement with Haitong dated 19 December 2014 (the \"**Subscription Agreement**\"). The Claimants plead further in relation to the execution and terms of the Subscription Agreement at paragraph [44](#page-15-1) below.\n\n## **The December Contracts**\n\n- 32. On or around 12 December 2014, Dawn State and UBS London entered into the Custody Agreement in relation (among other things) to the custody of the UBS H-Shares. The Claimants will refer to the Custody Agreement at trial for its full terms and effect. Subject to that, under the terms of the Custody Agreement, Dawn State agreed that all of the UBS H-Shares (once acquired) would be held with UBS London. The purpose and effect of the Custody Agreement was to ensure that the UBS H-Shares would be available for enforcement by UBS London of its rights under the (then) proposed facility agreement and security agreement to be entered into by Dawn State and UBS London in relation to the provision of finance for the acquisition of the UBS H-Shares. The Custody Agreement was governed by the law of England and Wales, and provided for the exclusive jurisdiction of the English Courts in respect of any disputes.\n- 33. On or around 18 December 2014, Ace Decade, Dawn State and Haixia entered into the Co-Investment Agreement. The Claimants will refer to the Co-Investment Agreement at trial for its full terms and effect. Subject to that, this agreement provided that:\n\t- (1) Pursuant to this agreement, Haixia agreed to extend to Ace Decade a right to participate in the share subscription in the Target Company (i.e. Haitong) (defined as \"*the Project*\"), upon receipt by Haixia of US\\$500 million (the \"**Monetary Contribution**\"). In addition, it was noted that it was contemplated that Dawn State would arrange for loan financing in an amount of US\\$750 million, which together with the Monetary Contribution constitutes the \"Co-Investment Amount\".\n\t- (2) At Clause 1.1, for Haixia Fund to receive a substantial fee for its role in the Project.\n- (3) At Clause 3, headed \"**Nature of the Right**\", that Ace Decade would have only a contractual right to participate in the Project, and no immediate proprietary interest in Dawn State or the UBS H-Shares which it acquired.\n- (4) At Clause 6.5:\n\n*\"In the event that the Project is not completed for any reasons, in consideration of Haixia Fund and the Company arranging for the Project and the loan financing(s) with commercial banks for the benefit of the Investor:*\n\n*(a) the Investor agrees that the Company and/ or Haixia Fund shall receive an arrangement fee of the higher amount of (i) 0.065% of the Co-investment Amount (i.e. US\\$1,250 million); and (ii) US\\$500,000 upon the Company entering into the share subscription agreement(s) in relation to the Project\"*\n\n- 34. Also, on or around 18 December 2014, Haixia Management and Ace Decade entered into the Letter Agreement. The Claimants will refer to the Letter Agreement at trial for its full terms and effect. Among other things, the Letter Agreement provided as follows:\n\t- (1) Under the heading \"*Loan Financing*\":\n\n*\"[Ace Decade] acknowledges that [Dawn State] is arranging for loan financing(s) with commercial bank(s) at the request of and for the benefit of [Ace Decade] (the \"Financing\") pursuant to the relevant financing agreement of the Financing for the Project (the \"Financing Letter\").\"*\n\n*\"[Ace Decade] acknowledges that it has reviewed and agreed to the terms and conditions of the Financing as set out in the Financing Letter (including the term sheet), and further covenants and agrees with [Dawn State], Haixia Fund and Haixia Management that it shall be primarily and solely responsible for all the fees, costs, expenses and payments in connection with the Financing […]\"*\n\n- (2) Under the heading \"*Arrangements for the Transfer*\", that at any time after a two-month period after the completion of the Project or the lock-up period under the relevant subscription agreement to be entered into by Dawn State, whichever was longer, on receiving a request from Ace Decade, Haixia Management would procure the transfer of the UBS H-Shares to Ace Decade, or another entity nominated by Ace Decade.\n- 35. Although the Letter Agreement provided that Ace Decade had reviewed and agreed to the terms and conditions of the Financing as set out in the Financing Letter, the Financing Letter was not in fact fully executed until 20 December 2014. The Claimants plead further at paragraphs [36](#page-9-0) to [37](#page-10-0) below.\n- 36. On or around 19 December 2014, Dawn State and UBS London entered into the Financing Letter. By the Financing Letter UBS London agreed to provide the full amount of the loan\n\nfinancing envisioned for the Investment (the \"**Facility**\"), subject to the subsequent completion of more comprehensive financing documentation, in an amount in HKD equal to the product of 60%, the number of shares, and the initial price, not exceeding US\\$750 million) as defined in the Term Sheet. The Claimants will refer to the Financing Letter at trial for its full terms and effect. Among other things, the Financing Letter provided as follows:\n\n(1) Under the heading \"**LTV Ratio**\"\n\n*\"(c) Pre-utilisation margin*\n\n*[Dawn State] shall deliver such additional H.K. dollar cash to the Secured Account so as to ensure that on the date (the Utilisation Request Date) of the Utilisation Request… the LTV Ratio (calculated with reference to the Aggregate Share Value on the Utilisation Request Date and on a pro forma basis as if the relevant additional HK dollar cash has been delivered to the Secured Account on such date) is equal to or lower than the Initial LTV.\"*\n\n(2) Under the heading \"**Exclusivity**\"\n\n> *\"(b) the Borrower will, and will procure that its respective subsidiaries and affiliates will, ensure that no other debt financing shall be incurred, borrowed, syndicated, issued or privately placed in relation to or for the purposes of funding or refinancing any of the funding for or relating to the Acquisition…*\"\n\n- (3) Under the heading \"**Governing Law**\", that the Financing Letter and all associated documents (defined as the \"*Financing Commitment Documents*\") would be subject to English law and that the English Courts would have jurisdiction in respect of any dispute\n- 37. The Financing Commitment Documents included an indicative termsheet for the Facility (the \"**Indicative Termsheet**\"). The Indicative Termsheet did not contain any legally binding commitment to borrow or lend on the terms indicated or any terms. The Indicative Termsheet provided that under the facility agreement to be agreed between the parties, UBS would be entitled in certain circumstances to demand mandatory prepayment or make margin calls in respect of the facility, as follows:\n\t- (1) Under the heading \"**Margining Terms**\":\n\n*\"LTV Call Trigger: 66.7%, subject to adjustment by the Lender in the event that the Initial LTV is adjusted as described under \"Initial LTV\" (above).*\n\n*Margin Call: If on any Scheduled Trading Day following the Utilisation Date the LTV is higher that the LTV Call Trigger, the Borrower shall deposit into the Secured Account an amount of HKD cash only so that the LTV is restored to the Initial LTV and shall comply with all obligations described under the \"Margin Payment Schedule\" below.*\n\n*…*\n\n*…*\n\n*Margin Payment Schedule: Payments in respect of Margin Calls and Margin Releases shall be made by 5:00pm Hong Kong time on the Business Day (the \"Margin Payment Date\") immediately following the date of the Margin Call request or Margin Call Release, as applicable, provided such request is issued prior to 11:59pm (Hong Kong time)…\"*\n\n#### (2) Under the heading \"**Other Terms**\":\n\n*\"Full Mandatory Prepayment Events: The Lender, at its option, may terminate this Transaction if any of the following events occur after Utilisation Date:*\n\n- *(i) the Closing Price of the Reference Shares on any Scheduled Trading Day is less than 60% of the Initial Price;*\n- *(ii) the Closing Price of the Reference Shares on any Scheduled Trading Day is less than (a) 85% of the Closing Price on the previous Scheduled Trading Day; or (b) 75% of the Closing Price on any of the 5 immediately preceding Scheduled Trading Days;*\n\n*…*\n\n*If the Lender gives notice that it is terminating the Transaction following the occurrence of a Full Mandatory Prepayment Event, the Borrower must repay the Facility Amount together with all other amounts due in connection with the Transaction (the \"Aggregate Prepayment Amount\") in accordance with the following payment schedule:*\n\n- *(i) 25% of the Aggregate Payment Amount on the Business Day immediately following such notice;*\n- *(ii) 25% of the Aggregate Payment Amount on the second Business Day following such notice; and*\n- *(iii) the remaining 50% of the Aggregate Prepayment Amount on the third Business Day following such notice.\"*\n\n*… Makewhole: Upon (i) a Voluntary Prepayment on any date other than a Mutual Break Date or (ii) prepayment or termination in any other circumstances, including following a Full Mandatory Prepayment Event or an Event of Default, a Makewhole Amount is payable by the Borrower to the Lender.*\n\n*The Makewhole Amount is calculated as an amount equal to the Spread applied to the Facility Amount or the prepayment amount, as applicable, for the period from (and including) the date of prepayment or termination, as applicable, to the next occurring Mutual Break Date or, if none, the Maturity Date.\"*\n\n# **UBS's representations prior to execution of the December Contracts**\n\n38. During the course of the preparation of the December Contracts, in or around December 2014 and before 18 December 2014, Mr Kwok became aware that the terms of the proposed financing for the Investment from UBS included provisions for margin calls and mandatory prepayment (which, again, he referred to compendiously using the term \"margin calls\"). Mr Kwok cannot now recall whether he saw the Financing Letter and/or Indicative Termsheet, but\n\nhis knowledge must in any event have come from a description of the terms by someone else and not from review of the documents, because he did not read English.\n\n- 39. Mr Kwok objected to the inclusion of these terms, and raised this with Mr Wong. There was a discussion between them, which took place either in Mr Kwok's residence or his office in Hong Kong. The gist of what Mr Kwok said to Mr Wong was that that he was unhappy about these terms, and he wanted them taken out of any agreements with UBS. Mr Kwok said that he did not want UBS to be able to demand payments or repayment of the loan as a result of shortterm fluctuations in the price of the Haitong H-Shares. In response, Mr Wong made further representations and gave advice to Mr Kwok and Ace Decade on behalf of UBS, the effect of which was as follows:\n\t- (1) It was UBS's internal policy that where the bank was providing margin finance, it would have terms allowing it to make margin calls (i.e. to demand payment of margin or mandatory prepayment), and these were standard terms for UBS financing agreements;\n\t- (2) Nonetheless, Mr Wong intended to go back to the bank and try to get the terms removed from the agreements or changed;\n\t- (3) Even if Mr Wong could not get the margin call provisions removed or changed, Mr Kwok (and therefore Ace Decade) should not be concerned about them as:\n\t\t- (a) Such terms would not be strictly relied upon or executed by UBS in this case, because UBS had a policy which would apply to Ace Decade and Mr Kwok (and therefore, impliedly, to Dawn State as their intermediary) as highly valued customers not to make margin calls (i.e. to demand payment of margin or mandatory prepayment) if prices moved in the short term.\n\t\t- (b) If it were necessary for UBS to make a margin call (i.e. to demand payment of margin or mandatory prepayment) due to longer term price movements, UBS would work with Ace Decade to allow it to meet any demands and would allow a reasonable time for it to do so, including longer time periods for payment than those in the facility agreement if necessary, and would not sell any of the Shares as a result of any margin call without giving Ace Decade adequate time to pay.\n\t- (4) Mr Wong again referred to the Ping An Deal as demonstrating the approach which UBS would take to requests for additional collateral or repayment of the loan in the event of fluctuation in the value of H-Shares. The details of the information provided by Mr Wong\n\nin relation to the Ping An Deal between June 2014 and December 2014 are summarised at paragraph [42](#page-13-0) below.\n\n- 40. During the course of conversations and communications during this period (including in the conversations in which he gave the advice and made the representations pleaded in paragraph [39](#page-12-0) above), Mr Wong further repeated and reaffirmed the assertion that he and UBS were working to protect and advance Mr Kwok's interests, and that Mr Kwok and Ace Decade should repose trust in and rely upon UBS and in particular Mr Wong. From the context in which these assurances were given, it is to be inferred that they were intended to encourage Mr Kwok and Ace Decade to accept and rely upon the advice and representations pleaded in paragraph [39](#page-12-0) above.\n- 41. As a result of these conversations with Mr Wong, Mr Kwok reasonably believed: (1) that Mr Wong would get the margin call and mandatory prepayment terms removed from the Financing Commitment Documents, and in any event from the eventual facility agreement; and (2) that in any event he need not be concerned about such provisions which would not be relied upon in accordance with their strict terms, but only in accordance with the approach and policy described by Mr Wong. Mr Kwok did not thereafter read the Financing Letter or Indicative Termsheet prior to 19 December 2014 nor was he briefed on their terms. As a result, Mr Kwok was not aware that the margin call and mandatory prepayment provisions were included in these documents until around March 2015, as detailed at paragraph [46](#page-15-2) below.\n\n# **The Ping An Representations**\n\n- 42. As pleaded above, Mr Wong repeatedly referred to the Ping An Deal as an illustration of the approach which UBS would take to requests for additional collateral or repayment of the loan in the event of fluctuation in the value of H-Shares. Mr Wong also referred to the Ping An Deal as an illustration of UBS's expertise in structuring the acquisition of equities in companies incorporated in the PRC. Mr Kwok cannot recall every occasion on which the Ping An deal was discussed, but they included at least:\n\t- (1) The discussions between Mr Wong and Mr Kwok in the summer of 2014 pleaded at paragraphs [19](#page-5-0) and 27 above. These discussions were primarily between Mr Wong and Mr Kwok, but two of Mr Kwok's employees (Yang Ying and Lyu Tao) were each present on at least one occasion when Mr Wong made representations regarding the Ping An Deal during this period.\n\t- (2) The discussions between Mr Wong and Mr Kwok in or around December 2014, before 18 December 2014.\n- 43. In the course of those conversations as a whole, Mr Wong (on behalf of UBS) represented the following matters regarding the Ping An Deal:\n\t- (1) The Ping An Deal involved the acquisition of shares in a PRC company, namely the insurance company Ping An Insurance.\n\t- (2) UBS had advised the buyers of the stake in Ping An (the \"**Ping An Stake**\") in relation to the structuring of the acquisition and the funding of that acquisition.\n\t- (3) UBS had provided loan funding for that acquisition. The value of the Ping An Stake and the loan financing provided by UBS were substantially larger than the value of the UBS H-Shares or the loan financing which UBS was proposing to provide for the acquisition of the UBS H-Shares.\n\t- (4) Although the direct purchaser of the Ping An Stake was the Thai conglomerate, CP Group, CP Group was in fact acting as an intermediary for a Chinese businessman, the billionaire Xiao Jianhua (\"**Mr Xiao**\"). Mr Xiao was at that time the chairman of the Chinese conglomerate, the Tomorrow Group. UBS had advised the CP Group and Mr Xiao as to how to set up the intermediary structure for the acquisition. Like Mr Kwok, Mr Xiao was a very highly valued customer of UBS.\n\t- (5) Although the lending arrangements for the acquisition of the Ping An Stake included terms allowing UBS to make margin calls (i.e. to demand payment of margin or mandatory prepayment) on the basis of price fluctuations, and there had been price fluctuations, UBS had not strictly enforced those terms. Instead, UBS had worked with the shareholder and given the shareholder ample time within which either the value of the shares might recover, or the shareholder could arrange the payment of margin. UBS had offered temporary additional financing to make up any shortfall.\n\t- (6) As a result, there had never been a prospect that UBS would enforce against the Ping An shareholder's security, or that it would lose any of the Ping An shares which it had acquired.\n\t- (7) This was in accordance with UBS's policy for highly valued customers, which would also apply to Mr Kwok and Ace Decade, and UBS intended to give Mr Kwok and Ace Decade the same treatment as the Ping An shareholder in the event that it became entitled to a make a margin call (i.e. to demand payment of margin or mandatory prepayment).\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2292-84 Filed 10/26/23 Entered 10/26/23 20:46:12 Page 16\n\nof 39\n\n# **The Subscription Agreement**\n\n- 44. On or around 19 December 2014, Dawn State entered into a subscription agreement with Haitong (the \"**Subscription Agreement**\"), under which it agreed to purchase the UBS H-Shares (the \"**Subscription**\"), being 569,427,620 H-Shares, at a price of HK\\$15.62 per share, totalling HK\\$8,894,459,424.40 (the \"**Subscription Price**\"). The Subscription Agreement provided, among other things, that:\n\t- (1) Under Clause 2, the Subscription Price could be increased or reduced by up to HK\\$1.56 per share on the occurrence of certain conditions regarding an increase or decrease in the trading price of Haitong H-Shares during the period between the Subscription Agreement and Closing\n\t- (2) Closing of the sale and purchase of the UBS H-Shares was subject to the satisfaction of certain conditions set out in Clause 3.1 of the Subscription Agreement (the \"**Conditions**\").\n\t- (3) Under Clause 8.1, the Subscription Agreement could be terminated by either party if the Conditions had not been fulfilled on or before 30 June 2015.\n\n## **UBS's Representations prior to execution of the Lending Documents**\n\n- 45. In and around February and March 2015, the lending documents for UBS's financing of the acquisition of the UBS H-Shares by Dawn State (the \"**Lending Documents**\") were prepared. Although Ace Decade was not a party to any of the Lending Documents (the details of which are pleaded below), drafts of the Lending Documents were provided to Stevenson Wong, the lawyers acting for Ace Decade.\n- 46. In or around mid-March 2015, Mr Kwok was informed by Ms Yu that the draft agreements contained provisions allowing UBS to make margin calls and to require mandatory repayments in the event of short-term fluctuations in the value of the UBS H-Shares.\n- 47. In conversations with Mr Wong in around mid-to-late March 2015, Mr Kwok said that he objected to these terms, and repeated that he did not want UBS to be able to demand payments or repayment of the loan as a result of short-term fluctuations in the price of the Haitong H-Shares. Mr Wong, on behalf of UBS: (1) Further repeated and reaffirmed the assertion that he and UBS were working in Mr Kwok's interests, and that Mr Kwok and Ace Decade should repose trust in and rely upon Mr Wong and UBS; and (2) Restated the advice and representations particularised at paragraph [39](#page-12-0) above, which are repeated here as particulars of the gist of the advice given and representations made by UBS through Mr Wong in March 2015.\n\n-\n- 48. Mr Kwok believed these assurances and relied on them, and therefore did not object to the negotiations between Dawn State and UBS on the Lending Documents continuing or make efforts to cause or procure Ace Decade's withdrawal from the Co-Investment Agreement or otherwise prevent the completion of the Investment.\n\n# **The Lending Documents**\n\n- 49. On 1 April 2015, Dawn State and UBS executed the Lending Documents for UBS's financing of the acquisition of the UBS H-Shares by Dawn State.\n- 50. The \"**Facility Agreement**\" was made on behalf of Dawn State and UBS London. The Facility Agreement as agreed was a HK\\$5,336,675,654.64 term facility. The Claimants will refer to the Facility Agreement at trial for its full terms and effect. Subject to that, the terms of the Facility Agreement included the following provisions:\n\t- (1) Clause 1.1 (\"**Definitions**\"):\n\n\"*\"***Initial LTV Ratio***\" means sixty per cent (60.00%) […]*\"\n\n\"*\"***LTV Ratio***\" means, on any Scheduled Trading Day, the loan to value ratio (expressed as a percentage) calculated by the following: A/B where: \"A\" means the aggregate amount in HK Dollars of the Loan outstanding less the Margin Call Balance; and \"B\" means the Market Value multiplies by the number of Shares subject to the Transaction Security.*\"\n\n\"*\"***Margin Call Trigger***\" means sixty-six point seven per cent (66.70%) […]*\"\n\n#### (2) Clause 7.7 (\"**Mandatory Prepayment**\"):\n\n- *\"(a) If the Lender determines that:*\n\t- *(i) the Market Value of a Share on any Scheduled Trading Day is less than sixty per cent (60%) of the Initial Price;*\n\t- *(ii) the Market Value of a Share on any Scheduled Trading Day is less than:*\n\t\t- *(A) eighty-five per cent (85%) of the Market Value of the Shares on the immediately preceding Scheduled Trading Day; or*\n\t\t- *(B) seventy-five per cent (75%) of the Market Value of the Shares on any of the five immediately preceding Scheduled Trading Days;*\n\n*… Then (in each case) the Lender may, by notice to the Borrower, cancel the Facility and declare the outstanding Loan, together with accrued interest and all other amounts accrued under the Finance Documents, immediately due and payable, whereupon the Facility will be cancelled and all such outstanding amounts will become immediately due and payable in accordance with paragraph (b) below.*\n\n*(b) Any prepayment of the outstanding amounts referred to in paragraph (a) above shall be made in the following amounts and at the following times:*\n\n- *(i) on the Business Day immediately following delivery of notice by the Lender of such prepayment, twenty-five per cent (25%) of such outstanding amounts;*\n- *(ii) on the second Business Day immediately following delivery of notice by the Lender of such prepayment, twenty-five per cent (25%) of such outstanding amounts; and*\n- *(iii) on the third Business Day immediately following delivery of notice by the Lender of such prepayment, fifty per cent (50%) of such outstanding amounts.*\n\n#### (3) Clause 18.1 (\"**Margin Call**\"):\n\n*\"If, on any Scheduled Trading Day, the Lender determines that the LTV Ratio is greater than the applicable Margin Call Trigger, the Borrower shall as soon as practicable, and in any case no later than 5:00 p.m. on the Business Day after the date of a Margin Call Notice from the Lender requiring it to do so, deposit or procure to be deposited into the Secured Account such additional HK Dollar amounts in cash, to be charged in favour of the Lender under the Security Agreement, to ensure that the LTV Ratio, after being recalculated by taking into account the additional cash deposited, is equal to or less than the applicable Initial LTV Ratio.\"*\n\n- (4) Clause 20 sets out 16 events or circumstances which constitute an \"**Event of Default**\", including: (a) (at Clause 20.1) failure to pay on the due date any amount payable pursuant to a Finance Document; and (b) (at clause 20.2) failure to comply with Clause 18.1.\n- (5) Clause 20.17 (\"**Acceleration**\"):\n\n*\"On and at any time after the occurrence of an Event of Default which is continuing the Lender may, by notice to the Borrower:*\n\n- *(a) cancel the Commitment whereupon they shall immediately be cancelled;*\n- *(b) declare that all or part of the Loan, together with accrued interest, and all other amounts accrued or outstanding under the Finance Documents be immediately due and payable, whereupon they shall become immediately due and payable;*\n- *(c) declare that all or part of the Loan be payable on demand, whereupon they shall immediately become payable on demand by the Lender; and/or*\n- *(d) exercise any or all of its rights, remedies, powers or discretions under the Finance Documents.\"*\n- (6) At Clause 32: \"*This Agreement, and all non-contractual obligations arising from or in connection with this Agreement, are governed by English law*,\" and at Clause 33.1 (\"**Jurisdiction**\"), for the English Court to have exclusive jurisdiction to settle any dispute arising out of or in connection with any Finance Document.\n- 51. The \"**Security Agreement**\" was also made on behalf of Dawn State and UBS London. Under the Security Agreement Dawn State (the \"*Chargor*\") assigned first ranking security over its rights in or to certain assets, including in particular the UBS H-Shares to UBS. The Security Agreement further provided for the UBS H-Shares to be held by UBS London Branch, acting as Custodian, with the UBS H-Shares to be deposited into a charged account held with UBS on the terms of the Custody Agreement. The Claimants will refer to the Security Agreement at trial for its full terms and effect. Subject to that, the Security Agreement included the following provisions:\n\t- (1) Under Clause 3.1 (\"**Assignment by way of security**\"), that Dawn State assigned to UBS all its present and future right, title and interest (including those against the Custodian) in or to (*inter alia*) the Custody Agreement, the UBS H-Shares and the account in which they were held (the \"*Secured Account*\").\n\t- (2) Clause 3.2 (\"**Fixed Charge**\"), that Dawn State charged in favour of UBS its rights over (*inter alia*) the Secured Account and the UBS-H-Shares.\n\t- (3) Under Clause 8 (\"**ENFORCEMENT**\"):\n\t\t- (a) Clause 8.1 (\"**When enforceable**\"):\n\n*\"The Charges shall be immediately enforceable on the occurrence of an Enforcement Event which is continuing, and the powers conferred by the LPA on mortgagees including the power of sale and other powers conferred by Section 101 of the LPA as varied and extended by this Deed shall be immediately exercisable.\"*\n\n(b) Clause 8.2 (\"**Power of Sale**\"):\n\n> *\"The statutory power of sale, of appointing a receiver and the other statutory powers conferred on mortgagees by Section 101 of the LPA as varied and extended by this Deed shall arise (and the Secured Obligations shall be deemed due and payable for that purpose) on the date of this Deed.\"*\n\n#### (4) Clause 9.3 (\"**Financial Collateral Arrangement**\"):\n\n- *\"(a) The Chargor and the Lender intend that this Deed constitutes a \"financial collateral arrangement\" (as defined in the Financial Collateral Arrangements (No. 2) Regulations 2003 (the \"Regulations\") and, as such, the Lender shall have the right:*\n\t- *(i) to use and dispose of any Charged Asset which constitutes \"financial collateral\" (as defined in the Regulations (\"Financial Collateral\")), in which case the Lender shall comply with the requirements of the Regulations as to obtaining \"equivalent financial collateral\" (as defined in the Regulations);*\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2292-84 Filed 10/26/23 Entered 10/26/23 20:46:12 Page 20\n\nof 39\n\n-\n- *(ii) to set-off the value of any equivalent financial collateral against, or apply it in discharge of, any Secured Obligations in accordance with the Regulations; and*\n- *(iii) (at any time after the Charges become enforceable) to appropriate any Charged Asset which constitutes Financial Collateral in or towards satisfaction of the Secured Obligations in accordance with the Regulations.*\n- *(b) If the Lender is required to value any equivalent financial collateral for the purpose of paragraph (a)(ii) or (a)(iii) above, the value shall be:*\n\t- *(i) in the case of cash, its face value at the time of appropriation or set-off; and*\n\t- *(ii) in the case of financial instruments or other Financial Collateral, their market value at the time of appropriation, or set-off as determined (after appropriation) by the Lender by reference to a public index or other applicable generally recognised source or such other process as the Lender may select, including a valuation carried out by an independent investment bank, firm of accountants or other valuers appointed by the Lender.*\n\n*as converted, where necessary, into the currency in which the Secured Obligations are denominated at a market rate of exchange prevailing at the time of appropriation or set-off selected by the Lender.\"*\n\n(5) Clause 9.4 (\"**Sale of Charged Assets**\"):\n\n> *\"The Chargor acknowledges and agrees that the Share Collateral or other Charged Assets may decline speedily in value and are of a type customarily sold on a recognised market and therefore upon the enforcement of the Charges the Lender is not required to send any notice of its intention to sell or otherwise dispose of any Share Collateral or any other Charged Assets. Following the occurrence of an Enforcement Event which is continuing, the Lender or any Delegate or any Receiver may, in its sole and absolute discretion, sell Share Collateral or other Charged Assets in a private sale in such manner and under such circumstances as the Lender or Delegate or Receiver may deem necessary or advisable (with the Lender having the right to purchase any or all of the Share Collateral or other Charged Assets to be sold). The Chargor acknowledges that such sale shall be deemed to have been made in a commercially reasonable manner, notwithstanding that any such sale may be for a price less than that which might have been obtained had such Share Collateral or other Charged Assets been otherwise privately or publicly sold.\"*\n\n- 52. The \"**Facility Agreement Side Letter**\" was also made on behalf of Dawn State and UBS London. The Claimants will refer to the Security Agreement at trial for its full terms and effect. Subject to that, the terms of the Security Agreement included provision:\n\t- (1) For Dawn State to make a substantial additional payment in respect of any early repayment under the Facility Agreement, as follows:\n\n*\"On the date of any payment, repayment or prepayment of the Loan in whole or in part, the Borrower shall pay the applicable Make-Whole Amount…*\n\n*\"***Make-Whole Amount***\" means, in respect of the Loan to be repaid or prepaid, the amount of the spread that would have been applicable on the amount of the principal of the Loan repaid or prepaid for the period from the relevant date of repayment or prepayment up to the next occurring Mutual Break Date or, if none, the Final Repayment Date, had that amount so repaid or prepaid remained outstanding up to such Mutual Break Date or the Final Repayment Date, as the case may be.\"*\n\n- (2) And that \"*This Facility Agreement Side Letter, and all non-contractual obligations arising from or in connection with this agreement, are governed by English law.*\"\n- 53. Also on 1 April 2015, Dawn State provided UBS London (both in its capacity as lender under the Facility Agreement and as Custodian under the Custody Agreement) with a \"**Settlement Authorisation**.\" The Claimants will refer to the Security Agreement at trial for its full terms and effect. Subject to that, under the Settlement Authorisation:\n\t- (1) Dawn State authorised UBS London (as lender) to instruct and/or authorise the Custodian (also UBS London) to apply the Monetary Contribution made by Dawn State and Facility Amount advanced by UBS London towards funding the Subscription in accordance with the Subscription Agreement, and to transfer the UBS H-Shares allocated pursuant to the Subscription Agreement to the secured account subject to the Custody Agreement.\n\t- (2) It was agreed that the \"*Settlement Authorisation, and all non-contractual obligations arising from or in connection with this agreement, are governed by English law.*\"\n- 54. The Settlement Authorisation was updated by a document entitled \"**Amended and Restated Settlement Authorisation**\" following the price uplift pleaded at paragraph [55](#page-20-0) below.\n\n# **The Price Uplift**\n\n55. On 8 May 2015, Haitong sent a letter to Dawn State and other investors in the new H-Shares announcing that each of the conditions precedent to completing the issuance and sale of the new H-Shares in Haitong had been met and that Closing was expected to take place on 15 May 2015, and that because the trading price of H-Shares over the preceding 30 days had surpassed the agreed threshold, pursuant to Clause 2.2 of the Subscription Agreement the subscription price for the H-Shares was to be increased by HKD 1.56 per share, giving a share price of HKD 17.18 per share.\n\n- 56. Dawn State and UBS London therefore entered into an \"*Amendment Agreement relating to the Facility Agreement*\" on 13 May 2015 (the \"**Amendment Agreement**\"). 1 The Claimants will refer to the Amendment Agreement at trial for its full terms and effect. Subject to that, under the Amendment Agreement:\n\t- (1) At Clause 3.1, it was agreed to increase UBS's lending commitment to HK\\$6,011,236,393.92 and to increase in the initial LTV ratio to 61.45%, but the Margin Call Trigger remained 66.7%.\n\t- (2) At Clause 6.4, it was agreed that the \"*Amendment Agreement, and all non-contractual obligations arising from or in connection with this agreement, are governed by English law.*\"\n- 57. Also on 13 May 2015, Dawn State and UBS London entered into a further security agreement, entitled \"**Second Security Agreement**,\" updating the Security Agreement so as to reflect the amendments made to the Facility Agreement by the Amendment Agreement. The Claimants will refer to the Second Security Agreement at trial for its full terms and effect. The relevant terms of the Second Security Agreement are identical to those pleaded at paragraph [51](#page-18-0) above, and those terms are repeated as particulars of the provisions of the Second Security Agreement.\n\n### **Completion**\n\n- 58. On 13 May 2015, Mr Kwok and Ms Yu authorised the final payment to Dawn State for the cash portion of the subscription price under the Subscription Agreement pursuant to Clause 4.1 of the Co-Investment Agreement. Pursuant to its obligations under the Facility Agreement, this sum was subsequently paid by Dawn State to UBS London as the Subsequent Borrower Contribution.\n- 59. Also on 13 May 2015 Dawn State made a Utilisation Request to UBS London, in accordance with clause 5 of the Facility Agreement, for the sum of HKD 6,011,236,393.82.\n- 60. Completion under the Subscription Agreement took place on 15 May 2015, and the UBS H-Shares were transferred to Dawn State. Upon its registration as shareholder, Dawn State immediately deposited the shares in the Secured Account with UBS London pursuant to clause 6.2(a) of the Second Security Agreement. UBS London therefore took assignment of the \"**Acquired H-Shares**\" by way of security in accordance with the terms of the Second Security Agreement pleaded at paragraphs [51](#page-18-0) and [57](#page-21-0) above.\n\n1 Amendment Agreement dated 13 May 2015\n\n# **Consequences of the Advice and Representations**\n\n- 61. The particulars of the advice and representations of UBS pleaded at paragraphs [14](#page-4-0) to [20,](#page-6-0) [38](#page-11-0) to [43](#page-14-0) and [45](#page-15-3) to [48](#page-16-0) are repeated. Mr Kwok and Ace Decade entered into (and did not withdraw from) the Co-Investment Agreement with Dawn State and caused and permitted Dawn State to enter into the Lending Documents with UBS on the basis of and in reasonable reliance upon the adequacy of that advice and/or accuracy of those representations.\n- 62. In the absence of those representations:\n\t- (1) If UBS insisted on including the Margin Call and Mandatory Prepayment terms under the Facility Agreement, Mr Kwok and/or Ace Decade would have acquired the UBS H-Shares without using loan financing from UBS;\n\t- (2) Alternatively, Mr Kwok and/or Ace Decade would not have acquired the UBS H-Shares at all;\n\t- (3) Alternatively, if (contrary to the Claimants' case) Mr Kwok and Ace Decade would have acquired the UBS H-Shares through Dawn State using loan financing from UBS and on the same terms, Mr Kwok and Ace Decade would have ensured that Dawn State had sufficient funds available to meet any such margin calls and/or repayments immediately.\n- 63. The terms of the loan documents are very disadvantageous to Dawn State, and advantageous to UBS London. In particular:\n\t- (1) The Facility Agreement made provision for UBS to have both (a) the right to demand mandatory prepayment pursuant to Clause 7.7 and (b) to make margin calls pursuant to Clause 18.1.\n\t- (2) Under Clause 7.7, UBS was entitled to demand full repayment of the loan because of a 15% single day reduction or a 25% reduction over five days in the value of the UBS H-Shares, irrespective of the absolute value of the Haitong H-Shares, the LTV ratio, or the extent or absence of risk of loss to UBS London as Lender.\n\t- (3) Haitong H-Shares were, as UBS knew (through at least Mr Wong as a result of the discussions in 2014 and 2015, and in any event as a matter of general market knowledge), prone to short term fluctuations in value, and there was therefore a material risk that the entitlement to seek prepayment under Clause 7.7 would be triggered during the term of the Facility Agreement, including in circumstances in which there was not (or not materially) a risk of loss for UBS.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2292-84 Filed 10/26/23 Entered 10/26/23 20:46:12 Page 24\n\nof 39\n\n- (4) As UBS knew (at least through Mr Wong) or ought to have known:\n\t- (a) Dawn State was not the ultimate investor or the source of funds for the acquisition of the UBS H-Shares, and would not be the source of funds required to meet any margin call or demand for prepayment. This was a function of the structure for the investment which had been created on the advice of UBS, as pleaded at paragraphs [18](#page-5-1) above.\n\t- (b) The time periods allowed for mandatory prepayment pursuant to Clause 7.7 or payment of margin pursuant to Clause 18.1 of the Facility Agreement were not sufficient (or not reasonably likely to be sufficient) to allow the sums in question to be provided to Dawn State and by Dawn State to UBS. In particular, UBS had acknowledged on 19 December 2014, in a letter to Haixia, that it understood that Dawn State could not make payments within 24 hours of a demand being made.\n- (5) Accordingly, there was a substantial chance that there would be an Event of Default within Clause 20.1 and/or 20.2 of the Facility Agreement, and that UBS would become entitled to exercise remedies following on an Event of Default pursuant to Clause 20.17.\n- (6) Pursuant to the Facility Agreement Side Letter, in the event that UBS exercised its rights to demand prepayment of the loan, Dawn State had agreed to pay UBS the whole of the spread that would have been applicable on the amount of the principal of the Loan repaid or prepaid for the period from the relevant date of repayment or prepayment up to the next occurring Mutual Break Date or, if none, the Final Repayment Date. Such a clause, which is unusual in such arrangements compared to simple \"break costs\" provisions meant UBS would be financially advantaged by exercising its right to demand mandatory prepayment under Clause 7.7.\n\n### **Enforcement by UBS London**\n\n64. Between around 1 and 6 July 2015, there was a substantial drop in the trading price of Haitong shares, including H-Shares. By letter sent on the evening of 6 July 2015, UBS London served a notice on Dawn State pursuant to which it purported to exercise an entitlement to demand prepayment of the Facility advanced under the Facility Agreement pursuant to Clause 7.7 thereof. In that notice, UBS purported to demand payment of: (1) 25% of the Loan, together with accrued interest and all other amounts accrued under the Finance Documents (the \"**Relevant Prepayment Amount**\"), being approximately US\\$200 million, by 5pm the following day; (2) 25% of the Relevant Prepayment Amount, being approximately US\\$200 million, by 5pm on the second day after the notice was served; and (3) 50% of the Relevant\n\nPrepayment Amount, being approximately US\\$200 million, by 5pm on the second day after the notice was served.\n\n- 65. During the morning of 7 July 2015, Ace Decade informed UBS that, while it would be able to meet the liability '*quickly*', it could not do so by 5pm that day. Mr Kwok also contacted Mr Wong by telephone to ask for additional time to secure sufficient funds in accordance with UBS's representations and advice particularised at paragraphs [14](#page-4-0) to [20,](#page-6-0) [38](#page-11-0) to [43](#page-14-0) and [45](#page-15-3) to [48](#page-16-0) above. Mr Wong stated that no such time would be given, and that UBS London had resolved that the UBS H-Shares would be sold.\n- 66. Dawn State did not pay the sum demanded by 5 pm on 7 July 2015.\n- 67. During the evening of 7 July 2015, UBS London issued a \"*Notice of Acceleration Event*\" to Dawn State (the '**Notice**').\n\t- (1) By paragraph 3 of this Notice UBS stated that all of the Loan (including the prepayment amount due today), together with accrued interest, and all other amounts accrued or outstanding under the Finance Documents were immediately due and payable.\n\t- (2) Also in paragraph 3, UBS gave notice of its right to exercise the power of sale pursuant to Clause 9.4 of \"*each Security Document*\" (i.e. the Security Agreement and Second Security Agreement).\n- 68. By a further letter of 7 July 2015, UBS asserted that the sum payable totalled HKD 6,289,081,405.43 and comprised: (1) The loan principal (HKD 6,011,236,393.92); (2) Outstanding accrued interest (HKD 44,003,279.72); (3) 'Break costs' (HKD 1,873,883.54);and (4) The 'Make-Whole Amount' (HKD 231,967,848.24).\n\n# **Sale of the UBS H-Shares**\n\n- 69. UBS London has provided limited information regarding how, if at all, it sold or purported to sell the UBS H-Shares. To the best of the Claimants' knowledge and belief:\n\t- (1) On or about 8 July 2015 UBS London formally transferred 200,000,000 of the UBS H-Shares (from a total of 569,427,620) to Segantii Capital Management Limited (\"**Segantii**\") in a block trade at an average price of HK\\$11.12 for a total of HK\\$2,224,000,000.\n\t- (2) On or about 10 July 2015, UBS itself purported to acquire absolutely 58,284,114 of the UBS H-Shares for a price which is not known to the Claimants. The Claimants also do not know whether, or if so when and at what price UBS sold those shares to a third party.\n- (3) The Claimants do not know the details of any other sales made by UBS pursuant to the power of sale under Clause 9.4 of the Security Agreements.\n- 70. A price of HK\\$11.12 represented an unusually deep discount to the trading price of Haitong H-Shares, which closed at HK\\$13.90 per share on 7 July 2015.\n- 71. On the morning of 8 July 2015, Haitong announced a suspension of trading for its H-Shares, pending the release of announcements in respect of:\n\n*\"(1) a potential scheme of a repurchase of the shares of the Company which, if implemented, is subject to the shareholders' approval and (2) a potential purchase of the shares of the Company by the senior management and/or employees of the Company…\"*\n\n- 72. Accordingly, from the morning of 8 July it was generally known (including, it is to be inferred, by UBS) both that trading was suspended, and that there was at least likely to be a buy-back of Haitong's shares. On 9 July 2015, Haitong announced a buy-back of its own shares. On 10 July 2015, Haitong H-Shares recommenced trading. H-Shares opened at HK\\$14.24 and closed at HK\\$15.14.\n- 73. On 10 July 2015, UBS sent Haixia and its lawyers an email attaching \"*a sheet detailing the application of the proceeds of Enforcement*\", although the calculation was stated to be \"*in draft form and …subject to full settlement of the trade.*\" This provided that the payment to Dawn State would be calculated by reference to: (1) \"*HK closing price as of 7 July 2015: HKD 13.90*\"; (2) \"*Block discount (%) 20.0%*\"; (3) \"*Block placement price: 11.12*\"; (4) \"*Number of Shares sold (shares): 569,427,620*\" i.e. all of Dawn State's shareholding. UBS did not, then or subsequently, provide details of the actual buyers of any shares, how many shares were sold to each buyer, the price at which each sale was effected, when the sale was effected, or the terms of the sale.\n\n## **Transfer of Dawn State's Shares**\n\n74. On 18 September 2015, the entire share capital of Dawn State was transferred by Haixia Fund to Ace Decade, in accordance with Ace Decade's rights under the Letter Agreement.\n\n### **ACE DECADE'S AND MR KWOK'S CLAIMS**\n\n75. Ace Decade's and Mr Kwok's claims pleaded in the following paragraphs are pleaded on the basis and assumption that these claims are governed by the law of England and Wales. If it is asserted on behalf of UBS and/or found by the Court that the governing law of the claims is the law of Hong Kong, the same claims are pursued in the alternative under the law of Hong Kong, and the facts and matters pleaded below are relied on as particularising Mr Kwok and Ace Decades causes of action under Hong Kong law.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2292-84 Filed 10/26/23 Entered 10/26/23 20:46:12 Page 27\n\nof 39\n\n# **UBS' Duty of Care**\n\n- 76. UBS owed duties of care in tort to Ace Decade and to Mr Kwok, comprising (each further or in the alternative):\n\t- (1) A duty to exercise reasonable care and skill to ensure that information provided to or statements of fact made to them or either of them were accurate.\n\t- (2) A duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and judgment in giving advice to them or either of them regarding (*inter alia*): (a) the structuring of the acquisition of the UBS H-Shares; (b) the financing of the acquisition of the UBS H-Shares; (c) the terms and effect of the Financing Documents; (d) the risks associated with those terms; (e) and/or UBS' intended and likely conduct in exercise of those rights.\n- 77. The facts and matters establishing the assumption of responsibility by UBS include at least the following:\n\t- (1) At all relevant times Mr Wong was an agent of UBS with authority to enter into make representations and give undertakings on behalf of UBS.\n\t- (2) As pleaded at paragraph [9](#page-3-0) above, Mr Kwok (as UBS knew, at least through Mr Wong) at all material times treated Mr Wong as a trusted adviser and personal friend, and relied on him as such.\n\t- (3) Paragraphs [11](#page-3-1) to [13](#page-4-1) above are repeated. As pleaded there, the background to the relationship between UBS and Mr Kwok and Ace Decade was an arrangement whereby Mr Kwok (at the request of UBS) assisted UBS to become the placement agent for the UBS H-Shares, and UBS offered in return to assist and advise him in acquiring the shares for which it was made placement agent on advantageous terms.\n\t- (4) Mr Wong repeatedly held himself and UBS out as acting to protect and advance Mr Kwok and Ace Decade's best interests in relation to the acquisition of the Placement Shares and the funding thereof, including in respect of all of: (a) the devising of the structure and funding plan for the investment; (b) the provision of information in respect of the structure, funding and merits of the investment; and (c) advising as to the structure, funding and merits of the investment. Paragraphs [17,](#page-4-2) [40](#page-13-1) and [47](#page-15-0) above are repeated.\n\t- (5) Mr Wong repeatedly asserted that Mr Kwok and Ace Decade should repose trust in and rely upon Mr Wong and UBS. Paragraphs [17,](#page-4-2) [40](#page-13-1) and [47](#page-15-0) above are repeated.\n\n-\n- (6) UBS (through Mr Wong) in fact provided information and gave advice to Mr Kwok and Ace Decade, in circumstances in which it knew and intended that they would rely on that information and advice. Paragraphs [18](#page-5-1) to [20,](#page-6-0) [21](#page-6-1) to [23,](#page-6-2) [24,](#page-7-0) [28,](#page-7-1) [39](#page-12-0) and [47](#page-15-0) above are repeated.\n- (7) As pleaded at paragraph [17,](#page-4-2) Mr Wong held himself and UBS out as having the experience and expertise to devise an advantageous structure for the acquisition for Mr Kwok and advising Mr Kwok (and, subsequently, Ace Decade) with respect to investments in placements such as that for the Placement Shares, the structuring of the investments, and the financing thereof.\n- (8) In giving information and advice about the policies, intentions and/or likely conduct of UBS as the counterparty under the Lending Documents, Mr Wong and UBS addressed matters which were uniquely within UBS's knowledge, and which (as they knew) Mr Kwok and Ace Decade could not verify independently, and in respect of which Mr Kwok and Ace Decade would have to rely on the matters communicated to them by UBS.\n\n# **Breach of duty**\n\n- 78. UBS, by Mr Wong acting within the course and scope of his authority as UBS's agent, made false and misleading representations to Ace Decade and/or Mr Kwok prior to the execution of the December Contracts and thereafter prior to the execution of the Lending Documents, as set out above. In particular:\n\t- (1) UBS stated that it had a policy which would apply to Ace Decade and Mr Kwok (and therefore to Dawn State as their intermediary) not to demand payment of margin or mandatory prepayment if prices moved in the short term. Paragraphs [39,](#page-12-0) [43](#page-14-0) and [47](#page-15-0) above are repeated. These statements were false and misleading in that (as can be inferred from UBS's actual conduct pleaded at paragraphs [64](#page-23-0) to [68](#page-24-0) above) UBS (through the decision makers acting for UBS London and/or, insofar as relevant, UBS HK in relation to the entry into and enforcement of rights under the Lending Documents (the \"**Decision Makers**\")) did not have such a policy and/or did not intend to apply it to Mr Kwok, Ace Decade and/or Dawn State.\n\t- (2) UBS stated that it had a policy which would apply to Ace Decade and Mr Kwok (and therefore to Dawn State as their intermediary) if it were necessary for UBS to make a demand payment of margin or mandatory prepayment, pursuant to which UBS would work with them to allow them to meet any demands and would allow a reasonable time for them to do so, including longer time periods for payment than those in the Facility\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2292-84 Filed 10/26/23 Entered 10/26/23 20:46:12 Page 29\n\nof 39\n\nAgreement if necessary, and would not sell any of the Shares as a result of any margin call without giving Ace Decade adequate time to pay. Paragraphs [39,](#page-12-0) [43](#page-14-0) and [47](#page-15-0) above are repeated. These statements were false and misleading in that (as can be inferred from UBS's actual conduct pleaded at paragraphs [64](#page-23-0) to [68](#page-24-0) above) UBS through its Decision Makers did not have such a policy and/or did not intend to apply it to Mr Kwok, Ace Decade and/or Dawn State.\n\n- (3) UBS stated that it intended to treat Ace Decade and Mr Kwok (and therefore to Dawn State as their intermediary) in the manner in which it claimed to have treated the Ping An shareholder. Paragraphs [19,](#page-5-0) [39,](#page-12-0) [42](#page-13-0) to [43](#page-14-0) and [47](#page-15-0) above are repeated. These statements were false and misleading in that (as can be inferred from UBS's actual conduct pleaded at paragraphs [64](#page-23-0) to [68](#page-24-0) above) UBS through its Decision Makers did not have such an intention, but instead intended to exercise all and any rights conferred on them under the Lending Documents in accordance with their terms and/or in the manner most advantageous to UBS.\n- (4) UBS stated that it had in fact treated the Ping An shareholder in a manner which was in accordance with the supposed policies pleaded at sub-paragraphs (3) and (4) above, and that this evidenced the approach which UBS intended to take and would (or could be expected to) take under the Lending Documents. Paragraphs [19,](#page-5-0) [39,](#page-12-0) [42](#page-13-0) to [43](#page-14-0) and [47](#page-15-0) above are repeated. These statements were false and misleading in that:\n\t- (a) In conversations between Mr Wong and Mr Kwok in or around the middle of July 2015, Mr Wong indicated that (contrary to his earlier representations) the Ping An shareholder had in fact been the subject of margin calls (i.e. to demands for payment of margin or mandatory prepayment) and had met those demands in accordance with the terms of the relevant Lending Documents. If that is true, it follows that UBS's earlier representations were false and misleading.\n\t- (b) Alternatively, if UBS did treat the Ping An shareholder in the manner pleaded at paragraphs [42](#page-13-0) to [43](#page-14-0) above, UBS's statements were false and misleading in that the treatment of the Ping An shareholder did not evidence the approach which UBS through its Decision Makers intended to take and would (or could be expected to) take under the Lending Documents.\n- (5) UBS stated that it intended to act and was acting in Mr Kwok and Ace Decade's best interests in relation to the acquisition of the Placement Shares and the funding thereof. Paragraphs [17,](#page-4-2) [40](#page-13-1) and [47](#page-15-0) above are repeated. These statements were false and misleading\n\nin that (as can be inferred from UBS's actual conduct pleaded at paragraphs [63](#page-22-0) to [68](#page-24-0) above) UBS through its Decision Makers did not intend to act in Mr Kwok or Ace Decade's best interest but instead intended to act in its own interests as Dawn State's contractual counterparty regardless of the consequences for Mr Kwok and Ace Decade.\n\n- (6) UBS stated that it was providing loan financing for Dawn State (and therefore, in practice, Ace Decade) on advantageous terms, or on \"*the best possible terms*.\" Paragraphs [11](#page-3-2) and [19](#page-5-0) above are repeated. These statements were false and misleading in that (as can be inferred from the matters pleaded at paragraph [63](#page-22-0) above) UBS through its Decision Makers intended to offer them financing which was advantageous to UBS and very disadvantageous to Dawn State, Ace Decade and Mr Kwok.\n- 79. UBS, by Mr Wong acting within the course and scope of his authority as UBS's agent, was negligent in making those false representations in that, at the time of or before he made the representations, Mr Wong had:\n\n# PARTICULARS OF NEGLIGENCE\n\n- (1) Failed to take reasonable care to ascertain whether UBS, and in particular UBS London, (through the relevant Decision Makers) intended to act and/or was acting in Mr Kwok and/or Ace Decade's best interests.\n- (2) Failed to take reasonable care to ascertain whether UBS, and in particular UBS London, (through the relevant Decision Makers) would be offering Mr Kwok and/or Ace Decade finance on advantageous terms and/or on the \"*best possible terms*\".\n- (3) Failed to take reasonable care to ascertain whether UBS had the policies pleaded at paragraph [78\\(1\\)](#page-27-1) and [78\\(2\\)](#page-27-2) above, and/or whether UBS London (through the relevant Decision Makers) in fact intended to apply those policies to Mr Kwok and/or Ace Decade (and therefore to Dawn State as their intermediary) as pleaded at paragraph [78\\(3\\)](#page-28-0) t[o 78\\(6\\)](#page-29-0) above.\n- (4) Failed to take reasonable care to ascertain whether UBS, and in particular UBS London, (through the relevant Decision Makers) in fact intended to treat Mr Kwok and/or Ace Decade in the same way in which it claimed to have treated the Ping An shareholder.\n- (5) Failed to take reasonable care to ascertain whether UBS had in fact treated the Ping An shareholder in the manner pleaded at paragraphs [42](#page-13-0) to [43](#page-14-0) above.\n\n- (6) Failed to take additional or further reasonable steps to protect Mr Kwok and Ace Decade from suffering loss or damage as a result of the false or misleading representations made by UBS.\n- 80. UBS, by Mr Wong acting within the course and scope of his authority as UBS's agent, gave negligent advice to Ace Decade and/or Mr Kwok, as set out above. As regards the content of the advice given by UBS:\n\t- (1) As pleaded at paragraph [19,](#page-5-0) UBS advised Mr Kwok and Ace Decade that it was in their best interests to make a leveraged investment using loan funding from UBS London, and that any leveraged finance provided by UBS would in any event be on the best possible terms.\n\t- (2) As pleaded at paragraphs [39](#page-12-0) and [47](#page-15-0) UBS advised Mr Kwok and Ace Decade:\n\t\t- (a) that they should not be concerned about the presence of margin call and mandatory prepayment provisions on the terms which appeared in the Facility Agreement; and, therefore\n\t\t- (b) That the loan documents were nonetheless commercially advantageous for Ace Decade. That advice was supported by reference to UBS's representations pleaded at paragraph [78.](#page-27-0)\n- 81. UBS, by Mr Wong acting within the course and scope of his authority as UBS's agent, was negligent in giving that advice, in that:\n\n# PARTICULARS OF NEGLIGENCE\n\n- (1) It was not (as must or ought to have been apparent to Mr Wong and UBS) in the interests of Mr Kwok and/or Ace Decade to use loan funding from UBS London to make the Investment, and in any event to do so on the terms of the Lending Documents, including because:\n\t- (a) As Mr Kwok had explained to Mr Wong, he and Ace Decade did not require loan funding to make the investment, but could have done so out of their own resources; and\n\t- (b) The loan funding from UBS London (in particular, on the terms of the Lending Documents and in circumstances in which the representations pleaded at paragraph [78](#page-27-0) above were false) created a risk (and/or an excessive risk) that UBS would\n\nenforce against the UBS H-Shares in the event of a fluctuation in the value of those shares, causing loss to Mr Kwok and Ace Decade.\n\n- (2) UBS ought, taking reasonable care, to have advised Mr Kwok and/or Ace Decade that there was a substantial chance that UBS London would (contrary to the representations pleaded at paragraph [78\\)](#page-27-0) enforce its strict rights under Clauses 7.7 and 18 of the Facility Agreement in accordance with their terms, and that it would not proceed in accordance with the policies which were the subject of the representations pleaded at paragraph [78](#page-27-0) above. Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, having made the representations pleaded at paragraph 98 above, UBS came under a duty to correct any misapprehension, misunderstanding or ill-informed basis on which Mr Kwok and/or Ace Decade were operating.\n- (3) UBS ought, taking reasonable care, to have advised Mr Kwok and/or Ace Decade that there was a substantial chance that in the event of any fluctuation in the value of the UBS H-Shares, UBS London would enforce against the UBS H-Shares in accordance with the strict terms of the Financing and Security Agreements.\n- (4) UBS ought therefore, taking reasonable care, to have advised that making the Investment subject to the terms of the Lending Documents was not in accordance with Mr Kwok's (and therefore Ace Decade's) express wish that any leveraged investment should only be made on the basis that the provision of additional collateral or repayment of the loan should not be triggered by short term price fluctuations of the Placement Shares.\n- (5) The loan funding provided by UBS to Mr Kwok and Ace Decade was (as UBS must or ought to have known) not on advantageous terms (or *a fortiori* on the best possible terms), but was on very disadvantageous terms. Paragraph [63](#page-22-0) above is repeated.\n- (6) Given the actual policies and intentions of UBS London, Mr Kwok and Ace Decade should (as UBS must or ought to have known) have been concerned about the presence of the mandatory prepayment and margin call terms under Clauses 7.7 and 18.1 of the Facility Agreement, and UBS ought to have advised that these terms posed a substantial risk to the outcome of the Investment.\n- (7) UBS failed to reasonable steps to protect the best interests of Mr Kwok and/or Ace Decade by:\n\t- (a) Informing Mr Kwok and/or Ace Decade that the financing proposed UBS was not financing on advantageous terms or '*on the best possible terms*';\n- (b) Informing Mr Kwok and/or Ace Decade of the risks associated with the terms of Clauses 7.7 and 18.1 of the Facility Agreement;\n- (i) Informing Mr Kwok and Ace Decade as soon as it became aware or suspected that any representation or any advice given to him was false, defective, misleading or incomplete.\n- (ii) Taking additional or further reasonable steps to protect Mr Kwok and Ace Decade from suffering loss or damage or otherwise protecting their interest.\n\n## **Ace Decade's claim**\n\n- 82. Ace Decade brings the primary claim arising from UBS's breaches of duty pleaded above.\n- 83. Ace Decade reasonably and foreseeably relied upon the representations and/or advice particularised above and the skill and judgment of UBS by (each further or in the alternative):\n\t- (1) Entering into the Co-Investment Agreement as particularised at paragraph [33;](#page-8-1)\n\t- (2) Not withdrawing from the Co-Investment Agreement or otherwise preventing the completion of the Investment before the completion of the Subscription;\n\t- (3) Causing or permitting Dawn State to enter into the Financing Letter as particularised at paragraph [36](#page-9-0) above.\n\t- (4) Not preventing Dawn State from entering into the Lending Documents, and instead procuring that it acquired the UBS H-Shares without loan funding from UBS; and/or\n\t- (5) If (contrary to the Claimants' case) Dawn State would have acquired the UBS H-Shares using loan financing from UBS and on the same terms, not ensuring that Dawn State had immediate access to sufficient funds to meet any such margin calls and/or repayments.\n\t- (6) The Claimants repeat paragraphs [61](#page-22-1) and [62](#page-22-2) above.\n- 84. UBS's negligence has caused Ace Decade loss and damage. In particular (each further or in the alternative):\n\n### ACE DECADE'S PARTICULARS OF LOSS\n\n(1) Ace Decade has lost the entirety of its Monetary Contribution, being US\\$500 million, less the sum of HK\\$36,621,693.83, being approximately US\\$4.7 million at the prevailing exchange rate accounted for by UBS to Ace Decade after the sale of the Acquired Shares: US\\$495,300,000;\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2292-84 Filed 10/26/23 Entered 10/26/23 20:46:12 Page 34 of 39\n\n- (2) If Ace Decade would have withdrawn from the Investment altogether after the execution of the Co-Investment Agreement (rather than making the investment through Dawn State but funding it from either Mr Kwok and/or Ace Decade's own resources or alternative loan financing), Ace Decade has lost the entirety of its Monetary Contribution, being US\\$500 million, less the sum of HK\\$36,621,693.83, being approximately US\\$4.7 million at the prevailing exchange rate accounted for by UBS to Ace Decade after the sale of the Acquired Shares, and the fee of US\\$812,500 which would have been payable to Haixia Fund under Clause 6.5 of the Co-Investment Agreement: US\\$494,487,500;\n- (3) Losses representing returns which it would have achieved from investing in the UBS H-Shares, to be quantified on the basis of expert evidence.\n\n# **Mr Kwok's Claim**\n\n- 85. Mr Kwok's claim is only pursued in the alternative to that of Ace Decade, on the premise that UBS denies and successfully disputes that any of its wrongdoing pleaded above is actionable at the suit of Ace Decade.\n- 86. Mr Kwok also reasonably and foreseeably relied upon the representations and/or advice particularised above and the skill and judgment of UBS by (each further or in the alternative):\n\t- (1) Causing or permitting Ace Decade to enter into the Co-Investment Agreement as particularised at paragraph [33;](#page-8-1)\n\t- (2) Not causing Ace Decade to withdraw from the Co-Investment Agreement or otherwise preventing the completion of the Investment before the completion of the Subscription;\n\t- (3) Causing or permitting Dawn State to enter into the Financing Letter as particularised at paragraph [36](#page-9-0) above.\n\t- (4) Not preventing Dawn State from entering into the Lending Documents, and instead procuring that it acquired the UBS H-Shares without loan funding from UBS; and/or\n\t- (5) If (contrary to the Claimants' case) Dawn State would have acquired the UBS H-Shares using loan financing from UBS and on the same terms, not ensuring that Dawn State had immediate access to sufficient funds to meet any such margin calls and/or repayments.\n\t- (6) The Claimants repeat paragraphs [61](#page-22-1) and [62](#page-22-2) above.\n- 87. UBS's negligence has caused Mr Kwok loss and damage, in the same measure as Ace Decade. Paragraph [84](#page-32-0) above is repeated *mutatis mutandis*.\n\n## **DAWN STATE'S CLAIM**\n\n#### **Sale of the Acquired H-Shares**\n\n\n\n- 88. On 7 July 2015, as a result of an Event of Default, UBS purported to give notice to Dawn State regarding its right to exercise a '*power of sale*' in relation to the Charged Assets (being the UBS H-Shares). Paragraph [67](#page-24-1) above is repeated. UBS London's contractual entitlement to sell the UBS H-Shares was found under Clauses 9.3(a)(i) and 9.4 of the Security Agreement.\n- 89. To the best of the Claimants' knowledge and belief, UBS did thereafter purport to exercise its power of sale and sold all of the UBS H-Shares. Save as pleaded at paragraph [69](#page-24-2) above, the Claimants do not know the details of the sales made pursuant to that purported entitlement.\n- 90. Paragraph [51](#page-18-0)[\\(3\\)](#page-18-1) above is repeated. In selling the UBS H-Shares, UBS was exercising a statutory '*power of sale*' under s.101 of the Law of Property Act 1925 (the \"**LPA**\") as preserved and modified by clause 8 of the Security Agreements, and was (and is) therefore subject to the duties and obligations imposed upon a mortgagee or chargee exercising such powers at law and in equity.\n- 91. In the premises, any purported sale(s) of the UBS H-Shares which caused or was/were designed to enable the Acquired Shares to be acquired absolutely by UBS were therefore invalid and of no effect. Any UBS H-Shares purportedly sold to UBS itself will have remained subject to Dawn State's rights and UBS's obligations under the terms of the Lending Documents.\n- 92. Otherwise (and subject to any provable costs and liabilities of Dawn State were satisfied out of said proceeds or profits) UBS was and remains under an immediate duty to account to Dawn State: (1) for its dealings with the Acquired H-Shares mortgaged to it, charged in its favour or otherwise held by it as Custodian; and/or (2) for any proceeds of said Acquired H-Shares obtained by it as a result of the sales; and (3) for any profits made by it as a result of the sales particularised in paragraph [69](#page-24-2) above or other dealings as aforesaid;\n- 93. Further or alternatively, the aforementioned proceeds and/or profits are held on statutory trusts pursuant to s.105 of the LPA, alternatively on constructive trust, for Dawn State.\n- 94. Further or alternatively, UBS also owed a duty to exercise reasonable skill and care to obtain a proper price for the Acquired H-Shares when exercising its power of sale. Insofar as any purported sales of the UBS H-Shares were valid, the Claimants believe that UBS failed to act with reasonable skill in making the sales, by reason of the fact that it:\n\n### PARTICULARS OF NEGLIGENCE\n\n- (1) Failed or failed adequately to consider whether the discount applied to the H-Shares was an inappropriately large discount in the context of block sales on the HKEX;\n- (2) Failed or failed adequately to consider whether those shares could have been sold with a smaller discount;\n- (3) Failed or failed adequately to consider the effects of the suspension (or likely suspension) of trading in Haitong shares;\n- (4) Failed or failed adequately to consider the effects of the share buy-back by Haitong. Paragraphs [72](#page-25-0) and [72](#page-25-1) above are repeated;\n- (5) Failed to allow adequate time for the share buy-back to take effect; and\n- (6) Failed to take additional or further reasonable steps to ensure a proper price was obtained for the Acquired H-Shares.\n- 95. As a result of UBS's negligence, Dawn State suffered loss comprising the difference between the price for which the shares were sold and the price that could reasonably have been obtained for those shares. The Claimants reserve the right to plead further on provision by UBS of particulars of the sales of the UBS H-Shares which it effected.\n\n## **Alternative claim in the event of appropriation by UBS**\n\n- 96. UBS did not, on 7 July 2015 or at any time subsequently, take any definitive steps to appropriate the Acquired H-Shares or alternatively to communicate such steps to UBS. As a result, UBS has at no time appropriated the Acquired H-Shares in accordance with clause 9.3(a)(ii) of the Security Agreement or Regulation 17 of the 2003 Regulations.\n- 97. If, contrary to the Claimants' case, UBS did purport to and did effectively appropriate the Acquired H-Shares pursuant to Regulation 17 of the 2003 Regulations, that appropriation could not have occurred prior to receipt of the notice from UBS to Dawn State of the exercise of the right of appropriation. No such notice was given prior to (if, contrary to the Claimants' case, such notice was ever given) 14 July 2015.\n- 98. In the event of exercise of a right of appropriation, UBS was at all times and remains under a duty to: (1) Value the UBS H-Shares in a commercially reasonable manner at the time of appropriation; and (2) Properly account for any amount by which that value exceeded Dawn State's liabilities to UBS under the Security Agreements.\n- 99. UBS's purported credit at a value of HK\\$11.12 per share (particularised at paragraph [73](#page-25-2) above) could not reflect the commercially reasonable value of the Acquired H-Shares on any relevant\n\ndate. In particular (but without limitation) that credit of HK\\$11.12 per share was purportedly calculated by applying a discount to the closing price on 7 July 2015, and not on any possible date of appropriation.\n\n100. UBS would therefore be under a duty to: (1) satisfy the court that the UBS H-Shares were valued in a commercially reasonable manner at the date of appropriation; and (2) insofar as it cannot do so, account to Dawn State for any amount by which the commercially reasonable value of the UBS H-Shares at the date of appropriation exceeded Dawn State's liabilities to UBS under the Security Agreements.\n\n# **RELIEF SOUGHT**\n\n- 101. In the premises, Ace Decade is entitled to:\n\t- (1) Damages as pleaded at paragraph [84](#page-32-0) above, in the amount of at least US\\$495,300,000. This sum is equivalent to approximately £402,032,000 as at the date of this Claim based upon the XE.com mid-market rate.\n\t- (2) Simple interest on that sum pursuant to s.35A Senior Courts Act 1981 (\"**SCA 1981**\") at a rate of 8% per annum.\n- 102. Alternatively to paragraph [101](#page-36-0) above, Mr Kwok is entitled to:\n\t- (1) Damages as pleaded at paragraph [87](#page-33-0) above in the amount of at least US\\$495,300,000. This sum is equivalent to approximately £402,032,000 as at the date of this Claim based upon the XE.com mid-market rate.\n\t- (2) Simple interest on that sum pursuant to SCA 1981 s.35A at a rate of 8% per annum.\n- 103. The amounts claimed at paragraphs [101](#page-36-0) and [102](#page-36-1) above are claimed in US Dollars (US\\$) as this is the currency in which the Claimant felt those losses.\n- 104. Further, or alternatively, in the premises Dawn State is entitled to:\n\t- (1) An order that UBS render an account in common form in relation to the Acquired H-Shares held by it as Custodian. Paragraph [92](#page-34-0) above is repeated.\n\t- (2) An order that UBS render an account of profits arising from the circumstances particularised in paragraph [92\\(](#page-34-0)3) above.\n\t- (3) A declaration that any of identifiable profits or proceeds referred to in paragraphs [92](#page-34-0) above are held on statutory, alternatively constructive, trusts for Dawn State. Paragraph [93](#page-34-1) above is repeated;\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2292-84 Filed 10/26/23 Entered 10/26/23 20:46:12 Page 38\n\nof 39\n\n- (4) Further or alternatively, damages or equitable compensation for the difference between the sum at which UBS sold the Acquired H-Shares and the value which could have been reasonably obtained for said shares. Paragraph [94](#page-34-2) and [95](#page-35-0) above are repeated.\n- (5) Alternatively, the difference between the amount accounted for by UBS to Dawn State and the commercially reasonable value of assets at the time of appropriation, which is claimed as a debt. Paragraph [100](#page-36-2) above is repeated.\n- (6) Further, Dawn State is entitled, under the court's equitable jurisdiction and/or SCA 1981 s.35A, to: (a) compound, alternatively simple, interest on the sums specified in subparagraphs (1) to (3) above; and (b) simple interest on the sums specified in paragraphs (4) and (5) above at a rate of 8%.\n\n# **AND the Claimants claim:**\n\n- (1) Damages as specified above\n- (2) Orders as specified above\n- (3) A declaration as specified above\n- (4) The difference between the sum accounted for by UBS and the commercially reasonable value of the H-Shares as a debt\n- (5) Interest as specified above\n- (6) Further and other relief\n- (7) Costs\n\n# **SA'AD HOSSAIN QC**\n\n# **SEBASTIAN ISAAC**\n\n# **MATTHEW HOYLE**\n\nI (the First Claimant) believe that the facts stated in these Particulars of Claim are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.\n\nSigned:\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2292-84 Filed 10/26/23 Entered 10/26/23 20:46:12 Page 39\n\nof 39\n\nName: Kwok Ho Wan\n\nDate: 23 September 2020\n\n\n\nThe Second Claimant believes that the facts stated in these Particulars of Claim are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.\n\nSigned:\n\nName: Yanping (Yvette) Wang\n\nDate: 23 September 2020\n\nThe Third Claimant believes that the facts stated in these Particulars of Claim are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.\n\nSigned:\n\nName: Yanping (Yvette) Wang\n\nDate: 23 September 2020","body_zh":"附件84\n\nUBS AG（瑞银集团）\n\n被告\n诉状\n当事人\n\n1．第一原告人（“郭先生”（Mr Kwok））为一名自2015年初起居住于美国纽约州的高净值个人。郭先生此前居住于中华人民共和国（“PRC”），其在该地以普通话姓名Guo Wengui（郭文贵）为人所知。郭先生是中华人民共和国政府的政治反对者，在引起本案请求的事件发生时，他与中华人民共和国当局之间已处于敌对关系。\n\n2．第二原告人Ace Decade（艾斯十年）是一家依英属维尔京群岛法律注册成立的私人有限公司，注册地址为P.O. Box 957, Offshore Incorporations Centre, Road Town, Tortola, British Virgin Islands。Ace Decade于18 June 2014注册成立，并于10 November 2014前后由郭先生收购，作为当时拟收购中国公司Haitong Securities Company Limited（海通证券股份有限公司；“Haitong”）股份的准备工作的一部分。\n\n3．第三原告人Dawn State（曙光国度）亦是一家依英属维尔京群岛法律注册成立的私人有限公司，注册地址为P.O. Box 957, Offshore Incorporations Centre, Road Town, Tortola, British Virgin Islands。\n\n案件22-50073 文件2292-84 提交于10/26/23 录入于10/26/23 20:46:12 第3页，共39页\n\n4．自18 September 2015起，Dawn State一直由Ace Decade拥有和控制。在18 September 2015之前，Dawn State由中国投资服务提供商Haixia Capital Management Company Ltd（海峡资本管理有限公司；“Haixia”）通过名为Haixia Capital Investment Fund (Fujian) Limited Partnership（海峡资本投资基金（福建）有限合伙企业；“Haixia Fund”）的载体拥有和控制；该基金由Haixia Huifu Asset Investment and Fund Management Co. Ltd（海峡汇富资产投资及基金管理有限公司；“Haixia Management”）管理。Dawn State是2015年用于收购海通股份的载体（详见本诉状正文所述（“PoC”）），但受一项合同权利约束，据此Ace Decade可在完成海通股份收购后收购Dawn State。\n\n5．被告UBS（瑞银集团）是一家在瑞士注册成立的公司，注册地址为Bahnhofstrasse 45, 8001 Zurich, Switzerland。UBS在全球开展业务，提供零售及投资银行、财富管理及其他金融服务。在所有相关期间，UBS均通过其瑞士总部以及位于包括香港（“UBS HK”）和伦敦（“UBS London”）在内的分支机构开展该等业务；经双方当事人协议，后者被指定为与本案请求相关的所有合同的相对方，如下文进一步所述。UBS London始终持有由Financial Conduct Authority（金融行为监管局，Reference Number 186958）授予的提供受监管服务的许可，并获授权代表UBS行事及订立合同协议。\n\n6．如下文第[32]至[57]段所述，UBS通过UBS London订立了与原告人请求标的有关的合同。在促成该等合同的讨论和谈判中，UBS主要由其雇员Stephen Wong（黄先生；“Mr Wong”）代表。黄先生当时为UBS财富管理部的董事总经理，工作地点在UBS HK的办公场所。郭先生于2006或2007年前后首次被介绍认识黄先生。\n\n引起本案请求的事实\n海通投资背景\n\n7．于2013年秋季前后，郭先生受到海通首席执行官Wang Kaiguo（王开国先生；“Mr Wang”）接洽，王先生寻求鼓励郭先生对海通作出重大股权投资。海通是一家主要的中国证券公司，从事股票及衍生品经纪业务，以及投资银行、资产管理、私募股权、另类投资和融资租赁服务。海通是中华人民共和国最大且历史最悠久的金融服务提供商之一。海通股份在Shanghai and Hong Kong Stock Exchanges（上海及香港证券交易所；分别为“SSE”和“HKEX”）交易。海通在HKEX交易的股份称为“H-Shares”。在王先生接洽后，郭先生决定投资约US\\$3 billion购买H-Shares，以取得海通的重要持股。该项投资将通过海通发行新H-Shares，并将其配发给由郭先生控制的公司而作出。\n\nUBS的初步参与\n\n8．在与王先生讨论后，郭先生向Hank Lo（罗先生；“Mr Lo”）传达了其拟收购海通重要持股的意图；罗先生是一名香港律师，也是Stevenson, Wong & Co（史蒂文森、黄律师事务所；“Stevenson Wong”）的合伙人。郭先生聘请Stevenson Wong就拟议收购向其提供意见。\n\n9．罗先生与黄先生及UBS之间存在既有关系，相关细节郭先生并不知悉；罗先生于2006-7年前后首次将郭先生介绍给黄先生。至2013年底，黄先生已与郭先生建立密切的私人关系，并成功促使郭先生考虑并将其视为可信赖的顾问和私人朋友。\n\n10．在2013年第四季度的某个时候，罗先生告知黄先生郭先生拟收购海通持股的意图。原告人并不知悉罗先生何时向黄先生传达该信息。郭先生直至事后才知悉罗先生拟将该信息告知黄先生或UBS，尽管郭先生在事后并未反对其如此行事。\n\n11．于2013年12月前后，黄先生在郭先生位于香港的住所拜访郭先生。他告知郭先生，UBS已知悉海通将发行新的H-Shares（“Placement Shares”），且UBS希望作为配售代理参与其中。黄先生使用其手机接通与UBS高级管理人员的通话，郭先生理解该等人员位于瑞士。郭先生现已无法忆起该等人员的姓名。该等UBS高级管理人员及黄先生向郭先生表示（以下各分项仅陈述其所言要旨）：（1）UBS希望成为Placement Shares销售的经纪商，并希望郭先生向海通介绍及推荐UBS担任该角色；（2）如郭先生以该方式协助UBS，UBS将协助并建议其以对郭先生有利的方式收购UBS担任经纪商或配售代理的股份；（3）尽管他们知悉郭先生意图为其本人收购该等股份，如郭先生愿意转售该等股份，UBS本身或与UBS有关系的投资者将有兴趣以较可能的发行价大幅溢价的价格购买该等股份。\n\n12．在该次会议后，郭先生决定与UBS合作；为此，郭先生于2014年初的某个时候告知王先生其拟投资新发行的H-Shares，并要求王先生将UBS列为Placement Shares的配售方之一。\n\n13．于2014年7月或8月，海通决定通过七名配售方发行H-Shares，其中之一为UBS。另一家就另行收购H-Shares向郭先生提供建议及协助的公司Macquarie Capital Securities Limited（麦格理资本证券有限公司；“Macquarie”）将就Placement Shares的三项配售担任配售方。UBS和Macquarie合计将配售约占海通已发行股份总数12%的股份。\n\n黄先生的初步顾问工作\n\n14．在该次会议后，郭先生就其计划对由UBS担任配售代理的Placement Shares（“UBS H-Shares”）作出的投资（“Investment”）的架构，与UBS（通过黄先生）展开讨论。在2014年3月底及4月前后的讨论中，黄先生称其将为“Haitong project”提供一项计划，包括郭先生可据以收购UBS H-Shares的拟议架构。\n\n15．作为一家在中华人民共和国注册成立并运营的证券公司，海通在所有相关期间均受China Securities Regulatory Commission（中国证券监督管理委员会；“CSRC”）监管。相关中华人民共和国法律规定，若任何人收购或实际控制海通已发行资本总额中超过5%的持股，则须取得CSRC批准。\n\n16．郭先生与黄先生曾讨论，郭先生拟投资的总额超过US\\$3 billion，这将大幅超过该门槛，因而需要CSRC批准。郭先生从UBS获得的意见尤其包括：设计一种收购Placement Shares的架构，以在遵守相关中华人民共和国法律的方式下避免取得CSRC批准的要求。\n\n17．在该等谈话过程中：（1）黄先生一再向郭先生表示，其将在UBS高级管理人员的指导下，按照2013年12月作出的承诺，就收购Placement Shares为推进郭先生的最佳利益而工作。自该期间起直至收购UBS H-Shares，黄先生经常重复并重申他和UBS正为郭先生的利益行事，且郭先生应信任并依赖黄先生和UBS；（2）黄先生称，其和UBS将以尽可能有利于郭先生的方式设计收购架构；及（3）黄先生声称其本人及UBS具备经验和专业知识，能够为郭先生设计有利的收购架构，并就诸如Placement Shares配售的投资、投资架构及其融资事宜向郭先生（及其后向Ace Decade）提供意见。\n\n18．于2014年6月前后，UBS通过黄先生就收购UBS H-Shares的架构提供初步意见。该意见在郭先生位于香港的办公室（49/F, Bank of China Tower, No. 1, Garden Road, Hong Kong）及其香港私人住所的会议中以口头方式提供。概而言之（以下各分项仅陈述UBS意见的要旨），黄先生向郭先生建议：（1）不要通过由其实益拥有或控制的公司购买UBS H-Shares，因为这将需要CSRC批准；（2）改为设立一种架构（将由UBS安排），据此UBS H-Shares将由一家受第三方中介机构控制的公司收购，而该收购无需CSRC批准；及（3）以杠杆方式作出该项投资，并由UBS提供收购融资。\n\n19．郭先生起初不愿作出杠杆投资，因为其收购UBS H-Shares无需银行融资，并原拟以现金完成收购。然而，黄先生向其建议：（1）如UBS要继续为该Investment设计架构，须以银行为购买UBS H-Shares提供保证金融资为基础，因为这将是UBS从该交易获取利润的方式；（2）作出杠杆投资无论如何均最符合郭先生的利益，因为这将使其无需投入其自有资本的全额即可获得所需数量的股份；（3）UBS提供的任何杠杆融资在任何情况下均将按“best possible terms”提供；（4）任何杠杆融资的条款将符合郭先生的要求，即不应存在任何条款规定，由于Placement Shares的短期价格波动而导致（i）提供额外担保物，或（ii）强制偿还贷款（郭先生和黄先生均将两者统称为“margin calls”，未作区分）。\n\n- （5）UBS（瑞银集团）会给予郭先生充分时间应对任何其他追加保证金要求，因此，如郭先生（事实上确实如此）有能力在不以贷款融资的情况下为全部收购提供资金，UBS不会在郭先生能够提供额外资金之前对担保物进行执行；\n- （6）为说明在UBS H股价值波动时，UBS将如何处理追加抵押品或偿还贷款的请求，Wong先生（黄先生）反复（在该期间及此后）提及一项由UBS提供资金的此前高价值杠杆交易；根据该交易，UBS曾为收购中国保险公司Ping An（中国平安）的更大股权提供资金（“Ping An交易”）。Wong先生于2014年6月至2014年12月期间就Ping An交易提供的信息详情，概述于下文第[42]段。\n\n- 20. 据郭先生所能回忆，该等建议最初是在2014年6月前后提出的。然而，Wong先生与郭先生在2014年夏季和秋季及此后反复讨论了这些事项。郭先生无法确定UBS在每一具体场合向其作出了何种陈述，但记得该等建议整体所产生的效果。\n\n进一步的结构安排建议\n\n- 21. 自2014年7月前后起，UBS继续就拟议的UBS H股收购架构及融资向郭先生，并自2014年11月10日起向Ace Decade（艾斯迪凯德）提供建议。特别是，Wong先生进一步就收购的结构安排向郭先生（及随后向Ace Decade）提供建议，包括进一步就收购Haitong（海通）超过该公司股本5%须经CSRC（中国证券监督管理委员会）批准的要求提供建议；并建议郭先生及Ace Decade选择Haixia（海峡）作为该项投资的中介方。\n\n- 22. 郭先生及Ace Decade依赖该等建议，选择Haixia作为收购UBS H股的中介方，并最终根据日期为2014年12月18日的《共同投资协议》（“《共同投资协议》”）委任Haixia担任该职。\n\n- 23. 尽管Wong先生曾告知郭先生及Ace Decade，Haixia独立于UBS，但Haixia事实上由State Development and Investment Corporation（国家开发投资集团有限公司，“SDIC”）控制；SDIC为UBS的合资伙伴，双方共同拥有一只名为“UBS SDIC”的投资基金。\n\n为便利对配售股份的投资，Haixia于2014年10月23日通过其子公司Haixia Fund（海峡基金）促成设立Dawn State（晨州）。在转让给Ace Decade之前的所有相关期间，Dawn State均由Lu Bo先生（卢波先生，“Lu先生”）管理；Lu先生是Haixia的高级雇员，先前受雇于UBS SDIC。\n\n- 24. 郭先生于2014年11月10日收购Ace Decade，用作上述投资载体。同日，根据Wong先生的建议，郭先生的一名雇员Yu Yong女士（俞勇女士，“Yu女士”）成为其名义股东及董事。\n\n2014年12月合同的准备\n\n- 25. 于2014年10月底及11月初前后，UBS（主要通过Wong先生）、Haixia（主要通过Lu先生）及Ace Decade（主要通过郭先生及Yu女士）开始为认购UBS H股作准备。\n\n- 26. 于2014年11月13日前后，Stevenson Wong（史蒂文森·黄）与Norton Rose Fulbright（诺顿罗氏富布赖特，“Norton Rose”）之间进行了初步电话会议；Norton Rose受Haixia聘请担任该交易的律师。会议中，各方同意由Norton Rose起草Haixia、Dawn State与Ace Decade之间关于收购UBS H股的《共同投资协议》。\n\n- 27. 于2014年11月14日前后，Ace Decade与Dawn State订立一份《谅解备忘录》，据此，Dawn State将向Ace Decade提供服务，以换取相当于总投资资本65个基点、且最低为US\\$5,000,000的不可退还费用。\n\n- 28. 在此期间，即Dawn State同意认购UBS H股之前，Wong先生与郭先生持续就收购的结构安排及融资进行讨论。在该等讨论中，Wong先生重复并进一步阐述了上文第[19]段所主张的陈述。原告进一步就该等陈述于下文第[39]至[40,]、[47]及[78]段作出主张。\n\n- 29. 该等准备工作促使Ace Decade、Dawn State及UBS订立一系列安排，以使Ace Decade得以通过Dawn State参与收购UBS H股（合称“2014年12月合同”）。2014年12月合同包括：\n- （1）Dawn State与UBS于2014年12月12日订立的托管协议（“《托管协议》”）；\n- （2）Ace Decade、Dawn State与Haixia于2014年12月18日订立的《共同投资协议》；\n- （3）Haixia Management（海峡管理）与Ace Decade于2014年12月18日订立的函件协议（“《函件协议》”）；\n- （4）Dawn State与UBS London（瑞银伦敦）于2014年12月19日订立的、题为“Project Pipe – Financing Letter”的融资函（“《融资函》”）。\n\n- 30. 原告进一步就订立2014年12月合同及其条款，于下文第[32]至[37]段作出主张。\n\n- 31. 该等准备工作还促使Dawn State与Haitong于2014年12月19日订立一份认购协议（“《认购协议》”）。原告进一步就《认购协议》的签署及条款，于下文第[44]段作出主张。\n\n2014年12月合同\n\n- 32. 于2014年12月12日前后，Dawn State与UBS London就（其中包括）UBS H股的托管订立《托管协议》。原告将在审判中援引《托管协议》的完整条款及效力。在此前提下，根据《托管协议》的条款，Dawn State同意所有UBS H股（一经收购）将由UBS London持有。《托管协议》的目的及效力是确保UBS H股可供UBS London执行其根据Dawn State与UBS London就为收购UBS H股提供融资而将订立的（当时拟议的）信贷协议及担保协议所享有的权利。《托管协议》受英格兰和威尔士法律管辖，并规定任何争议由英格兰法院专属管辖。\n\n- 33. 于2014年12月18日前后，Ace Decade、Dawn State及Haixia订立《共同投资协议》。原告将在审判中援引《共同投资协议》的完整条款及效力。在此前提下，该协议规定：\n- （1）根据该协议，Haixia同意在收到US\\$500 million（“货币出资”）后，授予Ace Decade参与认购目标公司（即Haitong）股份（定义为“该项目”）的权利。此外，协议载明，拟由Dawn State安排金额为US\\$750 million的贷款融资，该贷款融资连同货币出资构成“共同投资金额”。\n- （2）在第1.1条中，Haixia Fund将就其在该项目中的角色收取一笔可观费用。\n- （3）在题为“权利的性质”的第3条中，Ace Decade仅享有参与该项目的合同权利，并不对Dawn State或其所收购的UBS H股享有任何即时物权权益。\n- （4）在第6.5条中：\n\n“如该项目因任何原因未能完成，鉴于Haixia Fund及公司为投资者的利益安排该项目及与商业银行的贷款融资：\n\n（a）投资者同意，公司及/或Haixia Fund应在公司订立与该项目有关的股份认购协议时，收取以下两项中金额较高者作为安排费：(i) 共同投资金额（即US\\$1,250 million）的0.065%；及(ii) US\\$500,000。”\n\n- 34. 此外，于2014年12月18日前后，Haixia Management与Ace Decade订立《函件协议》。原告将在审判中援引《函件协议》的完整条款及效力。《函件协议》除其他事项外规定如下：\n- （1）在题为“贷款融资”的部分：\n\n“[Ace Decade]确认，[Dawn State]正应[Ace Decade]的请求并为其利益，根据该项目融资的相关融资协议（“《融资函》”），与商业银行安排贷款融资（“融资”）。”\n\n“[Ace Decade]确认其已审阅并同意《融资函》（包括条款清单）所载融资的条款及条件，并进一步向[Dawn State]、Haixia Fund及Haixia Management承诺并同意，其将主要且独自负责与融资有关的所有费用、成本、开支及付款[…]”\n\n- （2）在题为“转让安排”的部分，在该项目完成后两个月期限届满或Dawn State将订立的相关认购协议项下锁定期届满之后（以较长者为准）的任何时间，Haixia Management在收到Ace Decade的请求后，将促成把UBS H股转让给Ace Decade或Ace Decade指定的另一实体。\n\n- 35. 尽管《函件协议》规定Ace Decade已审阅并同意《融资函》所载融资的条款及条件，但《融资函》事实上直至2014年12月20日才完成签署。原告于下文第[36]至[37]段进一步作出主张。\n\n- 36. 于2014年12月19日前后，Dawn State与UBS London订立《融资函》。根据《融资函》，UBS London同意提供该项投资所设想的全额贷款融资（“信贷额度”），但须随后完成更为全面的融资文件；其金额按条款清单所定义，以60%、股份数量及初始价格的乘积计算的等值港元计，不超过US\\$750 million。原告将在审判中援引《融资函》的完整条款及效力。《融资函》除其他事项外规定如下：\n\n（1）在题为“贷款价值比”的部分：\n\n“（c）使用前追加保证金\n\n[Dawn State]应向担保账户交付该等额外港元现金，以确保在使用请求之日（使用请求日期）……贷款价值比（参照使用请求日期的股份总价值计算，并按备考基础计算，犹如相关额外港元现金已于该日交付至担保账户）等于或低于初始贷款价值比。”\n\n（2）在题为“排他性”的部分：\n\n“（b）借款人将，并将促使其各自子公司及关联方，确保不会就任何与收购有关的资金或为收购提供资金或再融资的目的，发生、借入、银团化、发行或私募任何其他债务融资……”\n\n（3）在“管辖法律”标题下，融资函以及所有相关文件（定义为“融资承诺文件”）将受英国法律管辖，且英国法院（English Courts）对任何争议拥有管辖权\n\n37. 融资承诺文件包括一份有关该融资额度的指示性条款清单（“指示性条款清单”）。指示性条款清单并未载有任何按所示条款或任何条款借款或放款的具有法律约束力的承诺。指示性条款清单规定，根据双方将达成一致的融资协议，UBS（瑞银）在特定情况下有权要求强制提前还款或就该融资额度发出追加保证金通知，具体如下：\n\n（1）在“保证金条款”标题下：\n\n“LTV 追加保证金触发点：66.7%，如‘初始 LTV’（上文）所述的初始 LTV 作出调整，则贷款人可相应调整。\n\n追加保证金通知：如在提款日后的任何预定交易日，LTV 高于 LTV 追加保证金触发点，则借款人应仅以港元现金向担保账户存入一笔金额，使 LTV 恢复至初始 LTV，并应遵守下文‘保证金付款时间表’所述的所有义务。\n\n……\n\n……\n\n保证金付款时间表：就追加保证金通知和保证金返还所作的付款，应于提出追加保证金通知请求或保证金返还（视情况而定）之日紧接后的营业日（‘保证金付款日’）香港时间下午 5:00 前作出，但前提是该请求于香港时间晚上 11:59 前发出……”\n\n（2）在“其他条款”标题下：\n\n“全部强制提前还款事件：如在提款日后发生以下任何事件，贷款人可自行选择终止本交易：\n\n（i）任何预定交易日的参考股份收盘价低于初始价格的 60%；\n（ii）任何预定交易日的参考股份收盘价低于：(a) 上一预定交易日收盘价的 85%；或 (b) 紧接此前 5 个预定交易日中任何一个预定交易日收盘价的 75%；\n\n……\n\n如在发生全部强制提前还款事件后，贷款人通知其正在终止本交易，则借款人必须按照下列付款时间表，偿还融资额度金额连同与本交易有关的所有其他应付款项（‘合计提前还款金额’）：\n\n（i）在该通知发出后紧接的营业日支付合计付款金额的 25%；\n（ii）在该通知发出后的第二个营业日支付合计付款金额的 25%；以及\n（iii）在该通知发出后的第三个营业日支付余下 50%的合计提前还款金额。”\n\n“……补偿金：在 (i) 除共同终止日之外的任何日期自愿提前还款，或 (ii) 在任何其他情况下提前还款或终止，包括在发生全部强制提前还款事件或违约事件之后，借款人应向贷款人支付补偿金。\n\n补偿金的计算方式为：就融资额度金额或提前还款金额（视情况而定），按利差计算自提前还款或终止之日（视情况而定）起（包括该日）至下一个共同终止日，或如无共同终止日，则至到期日止期间的金额。”\n\nUBS 在签署十二月合同之前作出的陈述\n\n38. 在筹备十二月合同期间，即约于 2014 年 12 月且在 2014 年 12 月 18 日之前，Kwok 先生（郭文贵）得知，UBS 就该项投资拟提供融资的条款包括追加保证金通知和强制提前还款的规定（他再次以“追加保证金通知”一词概称该等规定）。Kwok 先生现已无法忆起他是否看过融资函和/或指示性条款清单，但无论如何，他的知悉必定来自他人对条款的说明，而非审阅该等文件，因为他不懂英语。\n\n39. Kwok 先生反对纳入该等条款，并向 Wong 先生提出此事。二人曾进行讨论，地点为 Kwok 先生在香港的住所或办公室。Kwok 先生向 Wong 先生所说内容的要旨是，他对该等条款感到不满，并希望将其从与 UBS 的任何协议中删除。Kwok 先生表示，他不希望 UBS 因海通 H-Shares（H股）价格的短期波动而能够要求付款或偿还贷款。作为回应，Wong 先生代表 UBS 向 Kwok 先生和 Ace Decade（艾斯迪凯德）作出进一步陈述并提供建议，其效力如下：\n\n（1）UBS 的内部政策是，在银行提供保证金融资时，将有允许其发出追加保证金通知的条款（即要求支付保证金或强制提前还款），且该等条款是 UBS 融资协议中的标准条款；\n\n（2）尽管如此，Wong 先生打算回到银行，尝试从协议中删除该等条款或对其作出修改；\n\n（3）即使 Wong 先生无法删除或修改追加保证金通知条款，Kwok 先生（因此包括 Ace Decade）亦不应对此担忧，因为：\n\n（a）在本案中，UBS 不会严格依赖或执行该等条款，因为 UBS 有一项适用于 Ace Decade 和 Kwok 先生（因此默示亦适用于作为其居间人的 Dawn State（道恩州））这一类高度重视客户的政策，即如价格发生短期变动，不发出追加保证金通知（即不要求支付保证金或强制提前还款）。\n\n（b）如因较长期的价格变动而有必要由 UBS 发出追加保证金通知（即要求支付保证金或强制提前还款），UBS 将与 Ace Decade 合作，使其能够满足任何要求，并允许其有合理时间这样做，包括在必要时给予比融资协议所规定的付款期限更长的期限；未经给予 Ace Decade 充足付款时间，UBS 不会因任何追加保证金通知而出售任何股份。\n\n（4）Wong 先生再次提及平安交易（Ping An Deal），以表明在 H-Shares 价值波动时，UBS 将就追加抵押品或偿还贷款的请求采取的做法。Wong 先生于 2014 年 6 月至 2014 年 12 月期间就平安交易提供的信息详情，概述于下文第 [42] 段。\n\n40. 在此期间的谈话和通信过程中（包括他提供上文第 [39] 段所主张的建议及作出陈述的谈话中），Wong 先生进一步反复并重申，他和 UBS 正在努力保护并促进 Kwok 先生的利益，且 Kwok 先生和 Ace Decade 应信任并依赖 UBS，尤其是 Wong 先生。根据作出该等保证的上下文，可以推断其目的在于鼓励 Kwok 先生和 Ace Decade 接受并依赖上文第 [39] 段所主张的建议和陈述。\n\n41. 由于与 Wong 先生进行该等谈话，Kwok 先生合理相信：(1) Wong 先生将从融资承诺文件中，并且无论如何从最终融资协议中，删除追加保证金通知和强制提前还款条款；以及 (2) 无论如何，他无需担忧该等规定，因为不会按照其严格条款加以依赖，而只会按照 Wong 先生所述的做法和政策加以依赖。在 2014 年 12 月 19 日之前，Kwok 先生此后并未阅读融资函或指示性条款清单，亦未获告知其条款。因此，Kwok 先生直到约于 2015 年 3 月才知悉该等文件中包含追加保证金通知和强制提前还款规定，详情载于下文第 [46] 段。\n\n有关平安的陈述\n\n42. 如上文所主张，Wong 先生反复提及平安交易，以说明在 H-Shares 价值波动时，UBS 将就追加抵押品或偿还贷款的请求采取的做法。Wong 先生亦提及平安交易，以说明 UBS 在安排收购于中华人民共和国（PRC）注册成立的公司股权方面的专业能力。Kwok 先生无法忆起每次讨论平安交易的场合，但至少包括：\n\n（1）上文第 [19] 段及第 27 段所主张的、Wong 先生与 Kwok 先生在 2014 年夏季进行的讨论。该等讨论主要在 Wong 先生与 Kwok 先生之间进行，但在此期间 Wong 先生就平安交易作出陈述时，Kwok 先生的两名雇员 Yang Ying（杨英）和 Lyu Tao（吕涛）各自在至少一次场合在场。\n\n（2）Wong 先生与 Kwok 先生约于 2014 年 12 月、在 2014 年 12 月 18 日之前进行的讨论。\n\n43. 在上述整体谈话过程中，Wong 先生（代表 UBS）就平安交易陈述如下事项：\n\n（1）平安交易涉及收购一家中华人民共和国公司，即保险公司 Ping An Insurance（平安保险）的股份。\n\n（2）UBS 曾就收购结构安排及该收购的融资，向平安权益（“平安权益”）的买方提供建议。\n\n（3）UBS 曾为该收购提供贷款融资。平安权益的价值及 UBS 所提供的贷款融资，均大幅高于 UBS H-Shares 的价值或 UBS 拟为收购 UBS H-Shares 提供的贷款融资。\n\n（4）尽管平安权益的直接买方是泰国企业集团 CP Group（正大集团），但 CP Group 实际上是作为一名中国商人、亿万富翁 Xiao Jianhua（肖建华，“Xiao 先生”）的居间人行事。Xiao 先生当时是中国企业集团 Tomorrow Group（明天集团）的董事长。UBS 曾向 CP Group 和 Xiao 先生就如何为该收购建立居间结构提供建议。与 Kwok 先生一样，Xiao 先生也是 UBS 高度重视的客户。\n\n（5）尽管收购平安权益的贷款安排包括允许 UBS 基于价格波动发出追加保证金通知的条款（即要求支付保证金或强制提前还款），且确实发生过价格波动，UBS 并未严格执行该等条款。相反，UBS 与该股东合作，并给予该股东充足时间，使股份价值得以恢复，或该股东能够安排支付保证金。UBS 曾提供临时额外融资，以弥补任何不足。\n\n（6）因此，从未出现 UBS 将执行平安股东提供的担保，或该股东将失去其所收购的任何平安股份的可能性。\n\n（7）这符合 UBS 针对高度重视客户的政策，该政策亦将适用于 Kwok 先生和 Ace Decade；如 UBS 有权发出追加保证金通知（即要求支付保证金或强制提前还款），UBS 打算给予 Kwok 先生和 Ace Decade 与平安股东相同的待遇。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2292-84 Filed 10/26/23 Entered 10/26/23 20:46:12 Page 16\n\nof 39\n认购协议\n\n44. 2014年12月19日前后，Dawn State（曙光州）与Haitong（海通）订立了一份认购协议（以下简称“《认购协议》”），据此其同意以每股HK\\$15.62的价格购买569,427,620股UBS H-Shares（瑞银H股）（以下简称“认购”），总计HK\\$8,894,459,424.40（以下简称“认购价”）。《认购协议》尤其规定：\n\n（1）根据第2条，如在《认购协议》订立至交割期间，Haitong H-Shares（海通H股）的交易价格发生上涨或下跌而满足某些条件，认购价可每股上调或下调最多HK\\$1.56。\n\n（2）UBS H-Shares的买卖交割须以满足《认购协议》第3.1条规定的若干条件（以下简称“条件”）为前提。\n\n（3）根据第8.1条，如条件未于2015年6月30日或之前得到满足，任何一方均可终止《认购协议》。\n\nUBS（瑞银）在签署贷款文件前作出的陈述\n\n45. 2015年2月和3月前后，为UBS就Dawn State收购UBS H-Shares提供融资而拟定的贷款文件（以下简称“贷款文件”）已编制完成。尽管Ace Decade（艾斯十年）并非任何贷款文件的一方当事人（其详情如下文所述），贷款文件草案仍被提供给代表Ace Decade行事的律师Stevenson Wong（黄史蒂文森）。\n\n46. 2015年3月中旬前后，Yu女士（俞女士）告知Kwok先生（郭文贵），协议草案载有条款，允许UBS在UBS H-Shares价值发生短期波动时提出保证金追缴要求并要求强制还款。\n\n47. 2015年3月中下旬前后，在与Wong先生的交谈中，Kwok先生表示反对这些条款，并重申其不希望UBS因Haitong H-Shares价格的短期波动而能够要求付款或偿还贷款。Wong先生代表UBS：（1）进一步重复并确认其本人和UBS正为Kwok先生的利益行事的主张，并称Kwok先生及Ace Decade应信赖并依靠Wong先生和UBS；及（2）重申上文第[39]段所详述的意见和陈述，该等内容在此重复列载，以作为UBS于2015年3月通过Wong先生作出的意见和陈述要旨的详情。\n\n48. Kwok先生相信并依赖这些保证，因此并未反对Dawn State与UBS继续就贷款文件进行谈判，亦未作出努力促成或取得Ace Decade退出共同投资协议，或以其他方式阻止该投资完成。\n\n贷款文件\n\n49. 2015年4月1日，Dawn State和UBS签署了有关UBS为Dawn State收购UBS H-Shares提供融资的贷款文件。\n\n50. 《融资协议》由Dawn State及UBS London（瑞银伦敦）代表订立。经同意的《融资协议》为一项HK\\$5,336,675,654.64的定期融资。原告将在审判中援引《融资协议》的完整条款及效力。在不影响前述内容的前提下，《融资协议》的条款包括以下规定：\n\n（1）第1.1条（“定义”）：\n\n“‘初始LTV比率’是指百分之六十（60.00%）[…]”\n\n“‘LTV比率’是指，于任何预定交易日，按照以下方法计算的贷款价值比率（以百分比表示）：A/B，其中：‘A’指未偿贷款的港元总额减去保证金追缴余额；‘B’指市值乘以受交易担保约束的股份数目。”\n\n“‘保证金追缴触发点’是指百分之六十六点七（66.70%）[…]”\n\n（2）第7.7条（“强制提前还款”）：\n\n“（a）如贷款人确定：\n\n（i）于任何预定交易日，一股股份的市值低于初始价格的百分之六十（60%）；\n\n（ii）于任何预定交易日，一股股份的市值低于：\n\n（A）紧接前一个预定交易日股份市值的百分之八十五（85%）；或\n\n（B）紧接前五个预定交易日中任何一个预定交易日股份市值的百分之七十五（75%）；\n\n……则（在每种情况下），贷款人可向借款人发出通知，取消融资并宣布未偿贷款连同应计利息及根据融资文件应计的所有其他款项立即到期应付；届时，该融资将被取消，且所有该等未偿款项均应按照下文第（b）款立即到期应付。\n\n（b）上文第（a）款所述未偿款项的任何提前还款，应按以下金额及于以下时间作出：\n\n（i）于贷款人发出该提前还款通知后紧接的营业日，支付该等未偿款项的百分之二十五（25%）；\n\n（ii）于贷款人发出该提前还款通知后紧接的第二个营业日，支付该等未偿款项的百分之二十五（25%）；及\n\n（iii）于贷款人发出该提前还款通知后紧接的第三个营业日，支付该等未偿款项的百分之五十（50%）。”\n\n（3）第18.1条（“保证金追缴”）：\n\n“如于任何预定交易日，贷款人确定LTV比率高于适用的保证金追缴触发点，借款人应在切实可行的情况下尽快，并且无论如何不得迟于贷款人发出要求其如此行事的保证金追缴通知之日后一个营业日下午5:00，将或促使将额外港元现金存入担保账户，并根据《担保协议》以贷款人为受益人对该等现金设定担保，以确保在计入所存入的额外现金后重新计算的LTV比率等于或低于适用的初始LTV比率。”\n\n（4）第20条列明构成“违约事件”的16项事件或情形，包括：（a）（第20.1条）未于到期日支付根据任何融资文件应付的任何款项；及（b）（第20.2条）未遵守第18.1条。\n\n（5）第20.17条（“加速到期”）：\n\n“在持续发生违约事件时及其后的任何时间，贷款人可向借款人发出通知：\n\n（a）取消承诺额度，届时该等承诺额度将立即被取消；\n\n（b）宣布全部或部分贷款，连同应计利息及根据融资文件应计或未偿的所有其他款项，立即到期应付，届时其将立即到期应付；\n\n（c）宣布全部或部分贷款须见票即付，届时该等贷款应立即应贷款人要求偿付；及／或\n\n（d）行使其根据融资文件享有的任何或全部权利、救济、权力或酌处权。”\n\n（6）第32条规定：“本协议及因本协议产生或与本协议有关的一切非合同义务，均受英格兰法律管辖”；第33.1条（“管辖权”）规定，English Court（英格兰法院）对因任何融资文件产生或与之有关的任何争议享有专属管辖权。\n\n51. 《担保协议》亦由Dawn State及UBS London代表订立。根据《担保协议》，Dawn State（以下简称“设押人”）向UBS转让其对若干资产所享有权利的第一顺位担保权益，尤其包括UBS H-Shares。《担保协议》进一步规定，UBS H-Shares应由作为托管人的UBS London Branch（瑞银伦敦分行）持有，且UBS H-Shares应根据《托管协议》的条款存入在UBS开立的已设押账户。原告将在审判中援引《担保协议》的完整条款及效力。在不影响前述内容的前提下，《担保协议》包括以下规定：\n\n（1）根据第3.1条（“作为担保的转让”），Dawn State向UBS转让其在或对以下各项所享有的所有现有及未来权利、所有权及权益（包括其针对托管人的权利、所有权及权益）：尤其包括《托管协议》、UBS H-Shares及持有该等股份的账户（以下简称“担保账户”）。\n\n（2）第3.2条（“固定押记”）规定，Dawn State以UBS为受益人，对其在或对以下各项享有的权利设定押记：尤其包括担保账户及UBS H-Shares。\n\n（3）根据第8条（“执行”）：\n\n（a）第8.1条（“何时可执行”）：\n\n“在持续发生执行事件时，押记应立即可执行，并且LPA授予抵押权人的权力，包括出售权，以及经本契据变更和扩展的LPA第101条授予的其他权力，应立即可行使。”\n\n（b）第8.2条（“出售权”）：\n\n“经本契据变更和扩展的LPA第101条授予抵押权人的法定出售权、指定接管人的权力及其他法定权力，应自本契据之日起产生（且就此目的而言，担保义务应被视为到期应付）。”\n\n（4）第9.3条（“金融担保安排”）：\n\n“（a）设押人和贷款人拟使本契据构成‘金融担保安排’（定义见《2003年金融担保安排（第2号）条例》（以下简称‘条例’）），因此，贷款人有权：\n\n（i）使用和处分构成‘金融担保品’（定义见条例（以下简称‘金融担保品’））的任何已设押资产，在此情形下，贷款人应遵守条例有关取得‘等值金融担保品’（定义见条例）的要求；\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2292-84 Filed 10/26/23 Entered 10/26/23 20:46:12 第20页\n\n共39页\n\n（ii）根据条例，将任何等值金融担保品的价值与任何担保义务相抵销，或将其用于清偿任何担保义务；及\n\n（iii）（在押记变为可执行后的任何时间）根据条例，将构成金融担保品的任何已设押资产据为己有，以清偿或部分清偿担保义务。\n\n（b）如贷款人为上文第（a）（ii）或（a）（iii）款之目的而须对任何等值金融担保品进行估值，其价值应为：\n\n（i）如属现金，于据为己有或抵销时的面值；及\n\n（ii）如属金融工具或其他金融担保品，于据为己有或抵销时的市值，该市值由贷款人于据为己有后参照公共指数或其他适用的普遍认可来源，或贷款人可选择的其他程序确定，包括由贷款人指定的独立投资银行、会计师事务所或其他估值师进行的估值。\n\n在必要时，按贷款人选定的、于据为己有或抵销时适用的市场汇率，换算为担保义务计价所使用的货币。”\n\n（5）第9.4条（“已设押资产的出售”）：\n\n“出质人确认并同意，股份担保物或其他设押资产可能迅速贬值，且属于通常在认可市场上出售的类型，因此，在执行该等担保权益时，贷款人无须发出任何有关其拟出售或以其他方式处置任何股份担保物或任何其他设押资产的通知。在发生且持续存在执行事件后，贷款人、任何受托代理人或任何接管人可依其独自及绝对酌情决定权，以贷款人、受托代理人或接管人认为必要或适宜的方式及在其认为必要或适宜的情形下私下出售股份担保物或其他设押资产（贷款人有权购买拟出售的任何或全部股份担保物或其他设押资产）。出质人确认，该等出售应视为以商业上合理的方式作出，即使任何该等出售的价格低于在其他私下或公开出售该等股份担保物或其他设押资产时可能获得的价格。”\n\n52. 《融资协议附函》亦代表 Dawn State（Dawn State）及 UBS London（瑞银伦敦）订立。原告将在审理中援引《担保协议》的完整条款及效力。在此前提下，《担保协议》的条款包括如下规定：\n\n(1) Dawn State 就《融资协议》项下任何提前还款作出一笔大额额外付款，具体如下：\n\n“在全部或部分支付、偿还或提前偿还贷款的任何日期，借款人应支付适用的补偿金额……”\n\n“补偿金额”就拟偿还或提前偿还的贷款而言，系指就已偿还或提前偿还的贷款本金金额，自相关偿还或提前偿还日期起至下一互相终止日期，或如无该日期，则至最终还款日期期间内本应适用于该本金金额的利差金额，假若该已偿还或提前偿还的金额在该互相终止日期或最终还款日期（视情况而定）前仍未清偿。”\n\n(2) 并且，“本《融资协议附函》以及因本协议产生或与本协议有关的所有非合同义务，均受英国法律管辖。”\n\n53. 同样于 1 April 2015，Dawn State 向 UBS London（其同时以《融资协议》项下贷款人及《托管协议》项下托管人身份行事）提供了一份《结算授权书》。原告将在审理中援引《担保协议》的完整条款及效力。在此前提下，根据《结算授权书》：\n\n(1) Dawn State 授权 UBS London（作为贷款人）指示及/或授权托管人（亦为 UBS London）将 Dawn State 作出的货币出资及 UBS London 垫付的融资金额，用于根据《认购协议》为认购提供资金，并将根据《认购协议》配发的 UBS H 股转入受《托管协议》约束的担保账户。\n\n(2) 双方同意，“《结算授权书》以及因本协议产生或与本协议有关的所有非合同义务，均受英国法律管辖。”\n\n54. 在下文第 [55] 段所陈述的价格上调后，《结算授权书》经题为《经修订及重述的结算授权书》的文件更新。\n\n价格上调\n\n55. 于 8 May 2015，Haitong（海通）向 Dawn State 及新 H 股的其他投资者发送函件，宣布完成海通新 H 股发行及出售的各项先决条件均已满足，且预计交割将于 15 May 2015 进行；又因 H 股在此前 30 日内的交易价格已超过约定门槛，根据《认购协议》第 2.2 条，H 股认购价格将每股上调 HKD 1.56，致使每股价格为 HKD 17.18。\n\n56. 因此，Dawn State 与 UBS London 于 13 May 2015 订立了一份《有关融资协议的修订协议》（“修订协议”）。1 原告将在审理中援引《修订协议》的完整条款及效力。在此前提下，根据《修订协议》：\n\n(1) 第 3.1 条约定，将 UBS 的贷款承诺额提高至 HK\\$6,011,236,393.92，并将初始贷款价值比提高至 61.45%，但追加保证金触发比例仍为 66.7%。\n\n(2) 第 6.4 条约定，“《修订协议》以及因本协议产生或与本协议有关的所有非合同义务，均受英国法律管辖。”\n\n57. 同样于 13 May 2015，Dawn State 与 UBS London 订立了一份进一步的担保协议，题为《第二担保协议》，以更新《担保协议》，从而反映《修订协议》对《融资协议》作出的修订。原告将在审理中援引《第二担保协议》的完整条款及效力。《第二担保协议》的相关条款与上文第 [51] 段所陈述的条款相同，该等条款在此重复作为《第二担保协议》条文的细节说明。\n\n交割\n\n58. 于 13 May 2015，Kwok 先生（郭文贵）及 Yu 女士（Yu）根据《共同投资协议》第 4.1 条，授权向 Dawn State 支付《认购协议》项下认购价款现金部分的最终付款。根据其在《融资协议》项下的义务，该款项随后由 Dawn State 作为后续借款人出资支付给 UBS London。\n\n59. 同样于 13 May 2015，Dawn State 根据《融资协议》第 5 条，向 UBS London 提交了一份金额为 HKD 6,011,236,393.82 的提款请求。\n\n60. 《认购协议》项下的交割于 15 May 2015 完成，UBS H 股被转让给 Dawn State。在登记为股东后，Dawn State 随即根据《第二担保协议》第 6.2(a) 条，将该等股份存入 UBS London 的担保账户。因此，UBS London 根据上文第 [51] 及 [57] 段所陈述的《第二担保协议》条款，以担保方式受让“已取得 H 股”。\n\n1 日期为 13 May 2015 的修订协议\n\n建议及陈述的后果\n\n61. 上文第 [14] 至 [20,]、[38] 至 [43] 及 [45] 至 [48] 段所陈述的 UBS 建议及陈述的细节在此重复。Kwok 先生及 Ace Decade（Ace Decade）基于并合理依赖于该等建议的充分性及/或该等陈述的准确性，与 Dawn State 订立（且未退出）《共同投资协议》，并促使及允许 Dawn State 与 UBS 订立贷款文件。\n\n62. 如无该等陈述：\n\n(1) 如 UBS 坚持在《融资协议》中纳入追加保证金及强制提前还款条款，Kwok 先生及/或 Ace Decade 将不会使用 UBS 提供的贷款融资而取得 UBS H 股；\n\n(2) 或者，Kwok 先生及/或 Ace Decade 根本不会取得 UBS H 股；\n\n(3) 或者，如（与原告主张相反）Kwok 先生及 Ace Decade 会通过 Dawn State 使用 UBS 提供的贷款融资并按相同条款取得 UBS H 股，Kwok 先生及 Ace Decade 将确保 Dawn State 有足够可用资金，以立即满足任何该等追加保证金要求及/或还款要求。\n\n63. 贷款文件的条款对 Dawn State 极为不利，而对 UBS London 有利。尤其是：\n\n(1) 《融资协议》规定 UBS 同时拥有：(a) 根据第 7.7 条要求强制提前还款的权利；及 (b) 根据第 18.1 条提出追加保证金要求的权利。\n\n(2) 根据第 7.7 条，UBS 有权因 UBS H 股价值在单日内下跌 15% 或在五日内下跌 25% 而要求全额偿还贷款，而不论海通 H 股的绝对价值、贷款价值比，或 UBS London 作为贷款人发生损失的风险程度或不存在该等风险。\n\n(3) 如 UBS 所知（至少 Wong 先生（Wong）因 2014 年及 2015 年的讨论而知悉，且无论如何作为一般市场常识），海通 H 股易于发生短期价值波动，因此，在《融资协议》期限内，根据第 7.7 条寻求提前还款的权利存在重大风险会被触发，包括 UBS 并不存在（或不存在重大）损失风险的情形。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2292-84 Filed 10/26/23 Entered 10/26/23 20:46:12 Page 24\n\nof 39\n\n(4) 如 UBS 所知（至少通过 Wong 先生）或理应知悉：\n\n(a) Dawn State 并非 UBS H 股取得的最终投资者或资金来源，亦不会是满足任何追加保证金要求或提前还款要求所需资金的来源。这是 UBS 提供建议所建立的投资结构所致，如上文第 [18] 段所陈述。\n\n(b) 根据第 7.7 条进行强制提前还款或根据《融资协议》第 18.1 条支付保证金所允许的期限，不足以（或不大可能足以）使有关款项得以提供给 Dawn State，再由 Dawn State 提供给 UBS。尤其是，UBS 曾于 19 December 2014 在致 Haixia（海峡）的信函中确认，其理解 Dawn State 无法在提出要求后 24 小时内付款。\n\n(5) 因此，《融资协议》第 20.1 条及/或第 20.2 条项下很有可能发生违约事件，且 UBS 将有权根据第 20.17 条行使违约事件发生后的救济。\n\n(6) 根据《融资协议附函》，如 UBS 行使其要求贷款提前还款的权利，Dawn State 已同意向 UBS 支付以下全部利差：就已偿还或提前偿还的贷款本金金额，自相关偿还或提前偿还日期起至下一互相终止日期，或如无该日期，则至最终还款日期期间内本应适用的利差。与简单的“终止成本”条款相比，此类条款在该等安排中并不常见，意味着 UBS 将因行使其根据第 7.7 条要求强制提前还款的权利而在财务上获益。\n\nUBS London 的执行\n\n64. 大约在 1 至 6 July 2015 期间，海通股份（包括 H 股）的交易价格大幅下跌。UBS London 于 6 July 2015 晚间向 Dawn State 送达函件通知，据此其声称根据《融资协议》第 7.7 条行使要求提前偿还该《融资协议》项下已垫付融资的权利。在该通知中，UBS 声称要求支付：(1) 贷款的 25%，连同应计利息及财务文件项下应计的所有其他金额（“有关提前还款金额”），即约 US\\$200 million，于次日 5pm 前支付；(2) 有关提前还款金额的 25%，即约 US\\$200 million，于通知送达后第二日 5pm 前支付；及 (3) 有关提前还款金额的 50%，即约 US\\$200 million，于通知送达后第二日 5pm 前支付。\n\n- 65. 2015年7月7日上午，Ace Decade（艾斯迪凯德）告知UBS（瑞银集团），虽然其能够“迅速”履行该项债务，但无法在当日17时之前履行。Kwok先生（郭文贵）亦通过电话联系Wong先生（王先生），要求给予额外时间以便根据上文第[14]至[20]、[38]至[43]及[45]至[48]段具体陈述的UBS陈述和建议筹集足够资金。Wong先生表示不会给予此类时间，并称UBS London（瑞银伦敦）已决定出售UBS H-Shares（瑞银H股）。\n\n- 66. Dawn State（道恩州）未于2015年7月7日17时前支付被要求的款项。\n\n- 67. 2015年7月7日晚间，UBS London向Dawn State发出“加速到期事件通知”（以下简称“通知”）。\n\n\t- (1) UBS在该通知第3段中称，全部贷款（包括于今日到期的提前还款金额）、连同应计利息，以及根据融资文件产生或未清偿的所有其他款项，均立即到期应付。\n\n\t- (2) UBS亦在第3段中通知其有权依据“每一份担保文件”（即《担保协议》和《第二担保协议》）第9.4条行使出售权。\n\n- 68. UBS在2015年7月7日的另一封信中主张，应付款项合计为HKD 6,289,081,405.43，包括：(1) 贷款本金（HKD 6,011,236,393.92）；(2) 未偿应计利息（HKD 44,003,279.72）；(3) “解除成本”（HKD 1,873,883.54）；以及(4) “全额补偿金额”（HKD 231,967,848.24）。\n\n出售UBS H-Shares（瑞银H股）\n\n- 69. UBS London就其如何（如有）出售或声称出售UBS H-Shares提供的信息有限。就原告所知及所信：\n\n\t- (1) 于2015年7月8日前后，UBS London通过大宗交易，以平均每股HK$11.12的价格，正式向Segantii Capital Management Limited（森甘提资本管理有限公司，以下简称“Segantii”）转让了200,000,000股UBS H-Shares（总数为569,427,620股），总价为HK$2,224,000,000。\n\n\t- (2) 于2015年7月10日前后，UBS自身声称以原告不知的价格绝对取得了58,284,114股UBS H-Shares。原告亦不知道UBS是否将该等股份出售给第三方；如出售，亦不知道出售时间及价格。\n\n- (3) 原告不知道UBS依据《担保协议》第9.4条所规定的出售权进行的任何其他出售的细节。\n\n- 70. HK$11.12的价格相对于海通H股的交易价格构成异常深幅的折价；海通H股于2015年7月7日收市时每股为HK$13.90。\n\n- 71. 2015年7月8日上午，Haitong（海通）宣布暂停其H股交易，等待发布关于下列事项的公告：\n\n“(1) 一项可能的本公司股份回购计划，该计划如获实施，须经股东批准；及(2) 本公司高级管理人员及／或雇员可能购买本公司股份……”\n\n- 72. 因此，自7月8日上午起，交易已暂停且海通股份至少很可能进行回购一事已属普遍知悉（应可推断UBS亦知悉）。2015年7月9日，海通宣布回购其自身股份。2015年7月10日，海通H股恢复交易。H股开市价为HK$14.24，收市价为HK$15.14。\n\n- 73. 2015年7月10日，UBS向Haixia（海峡）及其律师发送了一封电子邮件，附有“一份详细列明执行所得款项运用情况的表格”，但该计算被称为“草稿形式，且……须视乎交易完全结算而定”。该表格规定，向Dawn State支付的款项将参照以下项目计算：(1) “截至2015年7月7日的香港收市价：HKD 13.90”；(2) “大宗交易折让（%）20.0%”；(3) “大宗配售价格：11.12”；(4) “已出售股份数目（股）：569,427,620”，即Dawn State持有的全部股份。UBS当时或其后均未提供任何股份实际买方的详情、向每名买方出售的股份数目、每笔出售成交的价格、出售成交的时间或出售条款。\n\n转让Dawn State的股份\n\n74. 2015年9月18日，Dawn State的全部股本由Haixia Fund（海峡基金）依照Ace Decade在《函件协议》项下的权利转让给Ace Decade。\n\nACE DECADE及KWOK先生的请求\n\n75. 下列各段所述Ace Decade及Kwok先生的请求，是基于并假定该等请求受英格兰和威尔士法律管辖而提出的。如UBS一方主张及／或法院认定该等请求的准据法为香港法律，则同样的请求以香港法律为备选依据提出，并依赖下文所述的事实和事项，作为具体陈述Kwok先生及Ace Decade根据香港法律提出诉因的依据。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2292-84 Filed 10/26/23 Entered 10/26/23 20:46:12 Page 27\n\nof 39\n\nUBS的注意义务\n\n- 76. UBS对Ace Decade及Kwok先生负有侵权法上的注意义务，包括（各项均为进一步主张或备选主张）：\n\n\t- (1) 有义务采取合理注意和技能，以确保向其二者或其中任何一方提供的信息或作出的事实陈述准确无误。\n\n\t- (2) 有义务就下列事项向其二者或其中任何一方提供建议时采取合理注意、技能及判断力，包括但不限于：(a) 收购UBS H-Shares的架构安排；(b) 收购UBS H-Shares的融资；(c) 融资文件的条款及效力；(d) 与该等条款相关的风险；(e) 及／或UBS在行使该等权利时拟采取及可能采取的行为。\n\n- 77. 证明UBS承担责任的事实和事项至少包括下列各项：\n\n\t- (1) 于所有相关时间，Wong先生均为UBS的代理人，有权代表UBS作出陈述及给予承诺。\n\n\t- (2) 如上文第[9]段所述，Kwok先生（如UBS所知，至少通过Wong先生所知）于所有重要时间均将Wong先生视为值得信赖的顾问及私人朋友，并据此倚赖他。\n\n\t- (3) 上文第[11]至[13]段在此重述。如其中所述，UBS与Kwok先生及Ace Decade之间关系的背景，是一项安排：Kwok先生应UBS要求协助UBS成为UBS H-Shares的配售代理，而UBS作为回报，提出协助及建议其以优惠条件收购UBS获委任为配售代理的股份。\n\n\t- (4) Wong先生多次宣称其本人及UBS为保护和促进Kwok先生及Ace Decade就收购配售股份及为此提供资金的最佳利益而行事，包括涉及以下所有事项：(a) 制定该项投资的架构和融资计划；(b) 提供有关该项投资架构、融资及优点的信息；及(c) 就该项投资的架构、融资及优点提供建议。上文第[17]、[40]及[47]段在此重述。\n\n\t- (5) Wong先生多次称，Kwok先生及Ace Decade应当信任并倚赖Wong先生及UBS。上文第[17]、[40]及[47]段在此重述。\n\n-\n\n- (6) UBS（通过Wong先生）事实上向Kwok先生及Ace Decade提供了信息并给予建议，且其明知并意图使二者倚赖该等信息和建议。上文第[18]至[20]、[21]至[23]、[24]、[28]、[39]及[47]段在此重述。\n\n- (7) 如第[17]段所述，Wong先生宣称其本人及UBS具备经验和专长，可为Kwok先生设计有利的收购架构，并就配售股份此类配售投资、投资架构安排及其融资事宜向Kwok先生（以及随后向Ace Decade）提供建议。\n\n- (8) 在就UBS作为贷款文件项下对手方的政策、意图及／或可能行为提供信息及建议时，Wong先生及UBS涉及的事项为UBS独有知悉的事项，且（如其所知）Kwok先生及Ace Decade无法独立核实，并且Kwok先生及Ace Decade必须倚赖UBS向其传达的事项。\n\n违反义务\n\n- 78. UBS通过Wong先生在其作为UBS代理人的授权过程及范围内行事，在签署十二月合同之前及其后在签署贷款文件之前，向Ace Decade及／或Kwok先生作出了如上所述虚假及误导性的陈述。尤其是：\n\n\t- (1) UBS称，其有一项适用于Ace Decade及Kwok先生（从而适用于作为其居间方的Dawn State）的政策，即如价格在短期内发生变动，不会要求支付保证金或强制提前还款。上文第[39]、[43]及[47]段在此重述。该等陈述虚假且具有误导性，因为（可由上文第[64]至[68]段所述UBS的实际行为推断）UBS（通过代表UBS London及／或在与订立及执行贷款文件项下权利有关的范围内代表UBS HK（瑞银香港）行事的决策者（以下简称“决策者”））并无该等政策，及／或无意将其适用于Kwok先生、Ace Decade及／或Dawn State。\n\n\t- (2) UBS称，其有一项适用于Ace Decade及Kwok先生（从而适用于作为其居间方的Dawn State）的政策，即如UBS有必要要求支付保证金或强制提前还款，UBS将与其合作，使其能够满足任何要求，并将允许其在合理时间内如此行事，包括在必要时允许长于融资协议所规定的付款期限，且不会因任何追加保证金要求而出售任何股份，除非给予Ace Decade充足的付款时间。上文第[39]、[43]及[47]段在此重述。该等陈述虚假且具有误导性，因为（可由上文第[64]至[68]段所述UBS的实际行为推断）UBS通过其决策者并无该等政策，及／或无意将其适用于Kwok先生、Ace Decade及／或Dawn State。\n\n- （3）UBS（瑞银）表示，其拟以其声称对待平安股东的方式对待Ace Decade及Kwok先生（郭文贵），并因此以Dawn State作为其二者的中间人。重复援引上文第[19]、[39]、[42]至[43]及[47]段。上述陈述属虚假及具误导性，因为（可从上文第[64]至[68]段所述UBS的实际行为推断），UBS通过其决策人员并无该等意图，而是意图依照《借贷文件》的条款及／或以最有利于UBS的方式行使该等文件赋予其的一切及任何权利。\n- （4）UBS表示，其事实上已按照上文第（3）及（4）子段所述的所谓政策对待平安股东，且该做法证明UBS拟在《借贷文件》项下采取，并将会（或可合理预期会）采取的方式。重复援引上文第[19]、[39]、[42]至[43]及[47]段。上述陈述属虚假及具误导性，因为：\n\t- （a）在2015年7月中旬或前后Wong先生（黄先生）与Kwok先生之间的交谈中，Wong先生表示，（与其先前的陈述相反）平安股东事实上曾收到追加保证金通知（即要求支付保证金或强制提前还款的要求），并已依照相关《借贷文件》的条款满足该等要求。如属实，则UBS先前的陈述即属虚假及具误导性。\n\t- （b）作为替代，如UBS确实以上文第[42]至[43]段所述方式对待平安股东，则UBS的陈述属虚假及具误导性，因为对待平安股东的方式并不能证明UBS通过其决策人员拟在《借贷文件》项下采取，并将会（或可合理预期会）采取的方式。\n- （5）UBS表示，就收购配售股份及为该收购提供资金而言，其拟为且正在为Kwok先生及Ace Decade的最佳利益行事。重复援引上文第[17]、[40]及[47]段。上述陈述属虚假及具误导性，因为（可从上文第[63]至[68]段所述UBS的实际行为推断），UBS通过其决策人员无意为Kwok先生或Ace Decade的最佳利益行事，而是意图作为Dawn State的合同相对方，为其自身利益行事，而不顾对Kwok先生及Ace Decade造成的后果。\n\n- （6）UBS表示，其正以优惠条款或“尽可能最优条款”为Dawn State（并因此在实践中为Ace Decade）提供贷款融资。重复援引上文第[11]及[19]段。上述陈述属虚假及具误导性，因为（可从上文第[63]段所述事项推断），UBS通过其决策人员意图向其提供对UBS有利、但对Dawn State、Ace Decade及Kwok先生极为不利的融资。\n- 79. UBS通过Wong先生在其作为UBS代理人的授权过程及范围内行事，在作出该等虚假陈述时存在过失，因为在Wong先生作出该等陈述时或之前，其曾：\n过失详情\n\n- （1）未采取合理谨慎措施查明UBS，尤其是UBS London（伦敦瑞银）（通过相关决策人员），是否意图为及／或是否正在为Kwok先生及／或Ace Decade的最佳利益行事。\n- （2）未采取合理谨慎措施查明UBS，尤其是UBS London（通过相关决策人员），是否将会以优惠条款及／或以“尽可能最优条款”向Kwok先生及／或Ace Decade提供融资。\n- （3）未采取合理谨慎措施查明UBS是否具有上文第[78(1)]及[78(2)]段所述政策，及／或UBS London（通过相关决策人员）是否事实上意图将该等政策适用于Kwok先生及／或Ace Decade（并因此适用于作为其二者中间人的Dawn State），如上文第[78(3)至78(6)]段所述。\n- （4）未采取合理谨慎措施查明UBS，尤其是UBS London（通过相关决策人员），是否事实上意图以其声称对待平安股东的相同方式对待Kwok先生及／或Ace Decade。\n- （5）未采取合理谨慎措施查明UBS是否事实上以上文第[42]至[43]段所述方式对待平安股东。\n\n- （6）未采取额外或进一步的合理措施，以保护Kwok先生及Ace Decade免因UBS作出的虚假或具误导性陈述而遭受损失或损害。\n- 80. UBS通过Wong先生在其作为UBS代理人的授权过程及范围内行事，向Ace Decade及／或Kwok先生提供了如上所述的过失建议。就UBS所提供建议的内容而言：\n\t- （1）如第[19]段所述，UBS建议Kwok先生及Ace Decade，为其最佳利益计，应使用由UBS London提供的贷款资金进行杠杆投资，并且无论如何，UBS提供的任何杠杆融资均将按尽可能最优条款提供。\n\t- （2）如第[39]及[47]段所述，UBS建议Kwok先生及Ace Decade：\n\t\t- （a）其不应对《融资协议》中载明的追加保证金通知及强制提前还款条款的存在感到担忧；并且因此\n\t\t- （b）《贷款文件》对Ace Decade而言仍具商业优势。该建议得到UBS在第[78]段所述陈述的支持。\n- 81. UBS通过Wong先生在其作为UBS代理人的授权过程及范围内行事，在提供该等建议时存在过失，因为：\n过失详情\n\n- （1）使用由UBS London提供的贷款资金进行该项投资并不符合（Wong先生及UBS必定或应当已明显知悉）Kwok先生及／或Ace Decade的利益；无论如何，按照《借贷文件》的条款进行该项投资亦不符合其利益，原因包括：\n\t- （a）如Kwok先生向Wong先生所说明，其及Ace Decade并不需要贷款资金进行该项投资，而能够以其自有资源进行投资；及\n\t- （b）由UBS London提供的贷款资金（特别是在《借贷文件》的条款下，并在上文第[78]段所述陈述属虚假的情况下）造成一项风险（及／或过度风险），即UBS会在该等股份价值波动时就UBS H股行使权利执行，从而使Kwok先生及Ace Decade遭受损失。\n\n- （2）UBS本应在采取合理谨慎措施后建议Kwok先生及／或Ace Decade，UBS London有很大可能会（与第[78]段所述陈述相反）依照其条款行使《融资协议》第7.7及18条下的严格权利，且不会按照上文第[78]段所述陈述所涉政策行事。在不限制前述一般性的情况下，UBS既已作出上文第[78]段所述陈述，即负有义务纠正Kwok先生及／或Ace Decade据以行事的任何误解、误会或信息不足的基础。\n- （3）UBS本应在采取合理谨慎措施后建议Kwok先生及／或Ace Decade，在UBS H股价值发生任何波动时，UBS London有很大可能会依照《融资及担保协议》的严格条款就UBS H股行使权利执行。\n- （4）因此，UBS本应在采取合理谨慎措施后建议，以《借贷文件》的条款为条件进行该项投资，不符合Kwok先生（并因此Ace Decade）的明确意愿，即任何杠杆投资仅应在以下基础上进行：不应因配售股份的短期价格波动而触发提供额外担保品或偿还贷款。\n- （5）UBS向Kwok先生及Ace Decade提供的贷款资金并非（UBS必定或应当已知悉）按优惠条款提供（更遑论按尽可能最优条款提供），而是按极为不利的条款提供。重复援引上文第[63]段。\n- （6）鉴于UBS London的实际政策及意图，Kwok先生及Ace Decade本应（UBS必定或应当已知悉）对《融资协议》第7.7及18.1条下强制提前还款及追加保证金通知条款的存在感到担忧，而UBS本应建议该等条款对该项投资的结果构成重大风险。\n- （7）UBS未采取合理措施以保护Kwok先生及／或Ace Decade的最佳利益，具体如下：\n\t- （a）告知Kwok先生及／或Ace Decade，UBS拟议的融资并非按优惠条款或“尽可能最优条款”提供的融资；\n- （b）告知Kwok先生及／或Ace Decade与《融资协议》第7.7及18.1条条款相关的风险；\n- （i）在其知悉或怀疑向Kwok先生作出的任何陈述或提供的任何建议属虚假、有缺陷、具误导性或不完整时，尽快告知Kwok先生及Ace Decade。\n- （ii）采取额外或进一步的合理措施，以保护Kwok先生及Ace Decade免遭损失或损害，或以其他方式保护其利益。\nAce Decade的请求\n\n- 82. Ace Decade提出因UBS违反上文所述义务而产生的主位请求。\n- 83. Ace Decade通过以下方式（各项均为进一步或替代性主张），合理且可预见地依赖上文详述的陈述及／或建议，以及UBS的技能和判断：\n\t- （1）如第[33]段所详述，订立《共同投资协议》；\n\t- （2）未在认购完成前退出《共同投资协议》，或以其他方式阻止该项投资完成；\n\t- （3）促使或允许Dawn State如上文第[36]段所详述订立《融资函》。\n\t- （4）未阻止Dawn State订立《借贷文件》，反而促使其在未使用UBS贷款资金的情况下收购UBS H股；及／或\n\t- （5）如Dawn State（与原告方的主张相反）本会使用UBS贷款融资并按相同条款收购UBS H股，未确保Dawn State可立即获得足够资金以满足任何该等追加保证金通知及／或还款要求。\n\t- （6）原告方重复援引上文第[61]及[62]段。\n- 84. UBS的过失已导致Ace Decade遭受损失及损害。尤其是（各项均为进一步或替代性主张）：\nAce Decade的损失详情\n\n（1）Ace Decade已损失其全部货币出资，即US$500 million，减去UBS在出售已收购股份后向Ace Decade结算的HK$36,621,693.83，按当时汇率约为US$4.7 million：US$495,300,000；\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2292-84 Filed 10/26/23 Entered 10/26/23 20:46:12 Page 34 of 39\n\n- （2）如Ace Decade在签署《共同投资协议》后本会完全退出该项投资（而非通过Dawn State进行投资，但由Kwok先生及／或Ace Decade的自有资源或替代贷款融资提供资金），Ace Decade已损失其全部货币出资，即US$500 million，减去UBS在出售已收购股份后向Ace Decade结算的HK$36,621,693.83，按当时汇率约为US$4.7 million，以及根据《共同投资协议》第6.5条本应向Haixia Fund支付的US$812,500费用：US$494,487,500；\n- （3）其本可通过投资UBS H股获得的回报所代表的损失，将以专家证据为基础予以量化。\nKwok先生的请求\n\n85. 郭文贵的请求仅作为 Ace Decade（艾斯十年）的请求之备位请求提出，其前提是 UBS（瑞银集团）否认并成功抗辩其上述所主张的任何不法行为可由 Ace Decade 提起诉讼主张。\n\n86. 郭文贵还通过以下各项进一步或备位行为，合理且可预见地依赖了上述所具体陈述的陈述及／或建议，以及 UBS 的专业技能和判断：\n\n(1) 致使或允许 Ace Decade 按照第[33]段所具体陈述的内容订立共同投资协议；\n\n(2) 未致使 Ace Decade 退出共同投资协议，或未在认购完成前以其他方式阻止该投资完成；\n\n(3) 致使或允许 Dawn State（曙光州）按照上文第[36]段所具体陈述的内容订立融资函；\n\n(4) 未阻止 Dawn State 订立贷款文件，反而促使其在未获得 UBS 贷款融资的情况下取得 UBS H股；及／或\n\n(5) 如 Dawn State（与原告主张相反）本会使用 UBS 的贷款融资并按相同条款取得 UBS H股，则未确保 Dawn State 可即时取得足够资金，以应付任何该等追加保证金要求及／或还款。\n\n(6) 原告重述上文第[61]及[62]段。\n\n87. UBS 的过失已对郭文贵造成损失及损害，其金额与 Ace Decade 的损失及损害相同。上文第[84]段经必要变通后予以重述。\n\nDAWN STATE 的请求\n\n已取得H股的出售\n\n88. 2015年7月7日，由于发生违约事件，UBS 声称向 Dawn State 发出通知，告知其有权就担保资产（即 UBS H股）行使“出售权”。上文第[67]段予以重述。UBS London（瑞银伦敦）出售 UBS H股的合同权利载于担保协议第9.3(a)(i)及9.4条。\n\n89. 据原告所知及所信，UBS 此后确实声称行使其出售权，并出售了全部 UBS H股。除上文第[69]段所主张的内容外，原告并不知悉根据该声称权利作出的出售的详情。\n\n90. 上文第[51][\\(3\\)]段予以重述。UBS 在出售 UBS H股时，系行使经担保协议第8条保留及修改的《1925年财产法》（Law of Property Act 1925，以下简称“LPA”）第101条规定的法定“出售权”，因此当时及现在均受法律和衡平法上对行使该等权力的抵押权人或担保权人施加的职责和义务约束。\n\n91. 在此情况下，任何导致或旨在使 UBS 绝对取得已取得股份的、声称对 UBS H股作出的出售，均属无效且不产生效力。任何声称出售给 UBS 自身的 UBS H股，仍应受 Dawn State 根据贷款文件享有的权利以及 UBS 根据贷款文件承担的义务约束。\n\n92. 否则，UBS 当时及现在仍负有立即向 Dawn State 结算的义务（但以 Dawn State 的任何可证明成本及负债已从所述收益或利润中得到清偿为限）：(1) 就其对已向其抵押、以其为受担保人的方式设定担保权益或由其以保管人身份持有的已取得H股所作的处置；及／或 (2) 就其因出售所述已取得H股而取得的任何收益；以及 (3) 就其因上文第[69]段所具体陈述的出售或上述其他处置而获得的任何利润；\n\n93. 进一步或备位地，上述收益及／或利润根据 LPA 第105条为 Dawn State 设立法定信托，或备位地，为 Dawn State 设立推定信托。\n\n94. 进一步或备位地，UBS 还负有在行使其出售权时运用合理技能和谨慎，以为已取得H股取得适当价格的义务。就任何声称出售 UBS H股属有效的范围而言，原告相信 UBS 在作出出售时未运用合理技能，理由如下：\n\n过失具体事项\n\n(1) 未考虑或未充分考虑，就在 HKEX（香港交易及结算所有限公司）进行大宗交易而言，对H股适用的折让是否过高；\n\n(2) 未考虑或未充分考虑，该等股份是否可以较低折让出售；\n\n(3) 未考虑或未充分考虑暂停（或可能暂停）海通（Haitong）股份交易的影响；\n\n(4) 未考虑或未充分考虑海通回购股份的影响。上文第[72]及[72]段予以重述；\n\n(5) 未给予股份回购产生效力的充分时间；及\n\n(6) 未采取额外或进一步的合理步骤，以确保已取得H股获得适当价格。\n\n95. 由于 UBS 的过失，Dawn State 遭受的损失包括股份出售价格与可合理取得的该等股份价格之间的差额。原告保留在 UBS 提供其所作 UBS H股出售的具体资料后进一步主张的权利。\n\n如 UBS 取得已取得H股的备位请求\n\n96. UBS 于2015年7月7日或此后任何时候，均未采取任何明确步骤取得已取得H股，或备位地，未将该等步骤通知 UBS。因此，UBS 从未根据担保协议第9.3(a)(ii)条或《2003年条例》（2003 Regulations）第17条取得已取得H股。\n\n97. 如 UBS（与原告主张相反）确实声称并实际根据《2003年条例》第17条取得已取得H股，则该取得不可能发生在 UBS 向 Dawn State 发出行使取得权通知之前。此类通知并未在2015年7月14日之前发出（如与原告主张相反，该通知曾经发出）。\n\n98. 如行使取得权，UBS 在任何时候均负有且现在仍负有以下义务：(1) 于取得时以商业上合理的方式对 UBS H股进行估值；以及 (2) 就该价值超过 Dawn State 根据担保协议对 UBS 所负债务的任何金额作出适当结算。\n\n99. UBS 声称按每股 HK\\$11.12 作出的入账（具体陈述于上文第[73]段），不可能反映已取得H股在任何相关日期的商业上合理价值。特别是（但不限于），该每股 HK\\$11.12 的入账据称是通过对2015年7月7日的收盘价适用折让计算得出，而非基于任何可能的取得日期。\n\n100. 因此，UBS 应负有以下义务：(1) 令法院信纳 UBS H股于取得日期已以商业上合理的方式估值；以及 (2) 在其无法做到的范围内，就取得日期 UBS H股的商业上合理价值超过 Dawn State 根据担保协议对 UBS 所负债务的任何金额，向 Dawn State 作出结算。\n\n请求的救济\n\n101. 在此情况下，Ace Decade 有权获得：\n\n(1) 上文第[84]段所主张的损害赔偿，金额至少为 US\\$495,300,000。按 XE.com 中间市场汇率计算，该金额于本诉状日期约等于 £402,032,000。\n\n(2) 根据《1981年高级法院法》（Senior Courts Act 1981，以下简称“SCA 1981”）第35A条，就该金额按年利率8%计算的单利。\n\n102. 作为上文第[101]段的备位请求，郭文贵有权获得：\n\n(1) 上文第[87]段所主张的损害赔偿，金额至少为 US\\$495,300,000。按 XE.com 中间市场汇率计算，该金额于本诉状日期约等于 £402,032,000。\n\n(2) 根据 SCA 1981 第35A条，就该金额按年利率8%计算的单利。\n\n103. 上文第[101]及[102]段所请求的金额以美元（US\\$）提出，因为这是原告遭受该等损失所使用的货币。\n\n104. 进一步或备位地，在此情况下 Dawn State 有权获得：\n\n(1) 命令 UBS 就其以保管人身份持有的已取得H股作出通常形式的结算。上文第[92]段予以重述。\n\n(2) 命令 UBS 就上文第[92\\(]3)段所具体陈述情形产生的利润作出结算。\n\n(3) 宣告上文第[92]段所述任何可识别的利润或收益，均依据法定信托，或备位地依据推定信托，为 Dawn State 持有。上文第[93]段予以重述；\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 2292-84 于 10/26/23 提交 于 10/26/23 20:46:12 登记 第38页\n\n共39页\n\n(4) 进一步或备位地，就 UBS 出售已取得H股所得金额与可合理取得的所述股份价值之间的差额，支付损害赔偿或衡平法补偿。上文第[94]及[95]段予以重述。\n\n(5) 或者，UBS 向 Dawn State 结算的金额与取得时资产商业上合理价值之间的差额，该差额作为债务主张。上文第[100]段予以重述。\n\n(6) 进一步地，Dawn State 有权根据法院的衡平法管辖权及／或 SCA 1981 第35A条获得：(a) 就上文第(1)至(3)项所列金额计算复利，或备位地计算单利；以及 (b) 就上文第(4)及(5)项所列金额按8%的利率计算单利。\n\n并且原告请求：\n\n(1) 如上所述的损害赔偿\n\n(2) 如上所述的命令\n\n(3) 如上所述的宣告\n\n(4) UBS 所结算金额与H股商业上合理价值之间的差额，作为债务\n\n(5) 如上所述的利息\n\n(6) 进一步及其他救济\n\n(7) 诉讼费用\n\nSA'AD HOSSAIN QC（萨阿德·侯赛因御用大律师）\n\nSEBASTIAN ISAAC（塞巴斯蒂安·艾萨克）\n\nMATTHEW HOYLE（马修·霍伊尔）\n\n本人（第一原告）相信本诉状所述事实属实。本人明白，任何人在未经诚实相信其真实性的情况下，就经真实性声明核实的文件作出或促成作出虚假陈述，均可能被提起藐视法庭程序。\n\n签署：\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 2292-84 于 10/26/23 提交 于 10/26/23 20:46:12 登记 第39页\n\n共39页\n\n姓名：Kwok Ho Wan（郭文贵）\n\n日期：23 September 2020\n\n第二原告相信本诉状所述事实属实。本人明白，任何人在未经诚实相信其真实性的情况下，就经真实性声明核实的文件作出或促成作出虚假陈述，均可能被提起藐视法庭程序。\n\n签署：\n\n姓名：Yanping (Yvette) Wang（王雁平〔伊薇特〕）\n\n日期：23 September 2020\n\n第三原告相信本诉状所述事实属实。本人明白，任何人在未经诚实相信其真实性的情况下，就经真实性声明核实的文件作出或促成作出虚假陈述，均可能被提起藐视法庭程序。\n\n签署：\n\n姓名：Yanping (Yvette) Wang（王雁平〔伊薇特〕）\n\n日期：23 September 2020","key_entities":["Kwok","Je","CIPA","Guo"],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":15420,"status":"published","published_at":"2023-10-26 00:00:00","created_at":"2023-10-26","updated_at":"2026-08-23 21:43:17"}