{"id":"court_ctb_2317_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":2317,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2023-11-08","title":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT IN RE: KWOK, *Debtors*  ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) HO WAN KWOK, *Debtor-Ap","summary_zh":"地区法院驳回准予上诉动议裁定 —— Ho Wan Kwok 破产案（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo），CTB 22-50073 ECF #2317（2023-11-08立案）。美国联邦地区法院法官 Kari A. Dooley 作出裁定，驳回债务人 Ho Wan Kwok 就破产法院认定其拒绝提供文件构成藐视法庭所提起的中间上诉许可申请（案号 3:23-cv-01068），理由是受托人尚未申请且破产法院尚未确定制裁金额，该非终局裁定不符合中间上诉条件且尚不成熟。","summary_en":"District Court Order Denying Leave to Appeal —— In re Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo / Guo Wengui), CTB 22-50073 ECF #2317 (filed Nov 08, 2023). U.S. District Judge Kari A. Dooley denied debtor Ho Wan Kwok's motion for leave to file an interlocutory appeal (Civil No. 3:23-CV-1068) regarding the Bankruptcy Court's contempt order over his refusal to produce documents under Fifth Amendment privilege claims, ruling that the appeal was premature because the Bankruptcy Court had not yet imposed contempt sanctions.","body_en":"### **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\nIN RE: KWOK, *Debtors*  ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) HO WAN KWOK, *Debtor-Appellant*, v. LUC A. DESPINS, *Trustee-Appellee*.\n\nBANKR. NO. 22-50073 (JAM) *Chapter 11*\n\nCIVIL NO. 3:23-CV-1068 (KAD)\n\nNOVEMBER 8, 2023\n\n### **ORDER DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL (ECF No. 2)**\n\nKari A. Dooley, United States District Judge:\n\nHo Wan Kwok, the individual debtor in the underlying bankruptcy proceeding, moves for leave to appeal the Bankruptcy Court's order holding him in contempt for failing to comply with the Court's order to produce certain documents and denying his motion for a stay of the same order. *See In re Kwok*, No. 22-50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. July 26, 2023), ECF No. 2035. Appellant asserts that he cannot have been in contempt of the Bankruptcy Court's order to produce the records at issue because he properly invoked his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination when refusing to produce the records. Appellee opposes the motion. (ECF No. 10) For the reasons set forth below, the motion for leave to appeal is DENIED. (ECF No. 2)\n\n#### **Facts and Procedural History**\n\n The Court assumes the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts and repeats only those necessary for deciding the instant motion. Briefly, on July 28, 2022, Appellee filed a motion for Rule 2004 discovery from Appellant regarding, *inter alia*, information related to for-profit and not-for-profit entities that Appellant allegedly owned and controlled, which the Bankruptcy Court granted on August 16, 2022. Appellant reserved his right to object to the Rule 2004 subpoena (the\n\n\"Subpoena\") once it was served, which occurred on August 19, 2022. The Subpoena sought documents related to \"Associated Individuals\" and \"Associated Entities.\" While Appellant agreed to produce certain documents, Appellant objected to several document requests and requests for production, primarily related to the assets of his family.\n\n On October 28, 2022, Appellee filed a motion to compel Appellant to comply with the Subpoena. On November 14, 2022, Appellant filed a joint objection to Appellee's motion to compel with HK International Investments (USA) Limited, LLC and Mei Guo (Appellant's daughter). The Bankruptcy Court granted Appellee's motion in part on January 20, 2023, and required Appellant to produce most of the requested documents<sup>1</sup> by January 31, 2023 and to file a sworn declaration by February 7, 2023 describing the efforts undertaken by him and his counsel to collect the documents at issue. However, on February 1, 2023, Appellant's counsel emailed Appellee's counsel to advise that Appellant would be asserting his Fifth Amendment rights, to include rights under the act of production doctrine,<sup>2</sup> in response to the Bankruptcy Court's January 20 order and would not be turning over any documents. On February 7, 2023, Appellant filed a sworn declaration stating that he was invoking his rights under the Fifth Amendment with respect to the entirety of the Subpoena.\n\n On February 10, 2023, Appellee filed a motion for an order to show cause why Appellant should not be held in contempt for failing to comply with the Bankruptcy Court's January 20 order that he comply with the Subpoena. On March 7, 2023, the Bankruptcy Court entered an Order to\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Bankruptcy Court limited the applicable time frame for the document production to June 1, 2014, rather than 2012 as was requested by Appellee. The Court also declined to compel Appellant to produce his passport.\n\n<sup>2</sup> The act of production doctrine is a Fifth Amendment privilege that can \"protect an individual from being required to produce documents, even if the documents' contents are not protected by the privilege, when the witness's simple act of producing the documents could be used against the witness—for example, in those cases when the simple fact that the witness possessed the documents would be incriminating.\" *In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated February 2, 2012*, 741 F.3d 339, 343 (2d Cir. 2013); *see also Fisher v. United States*, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).\n\nShow Cause. On April 10, 2023,<sup>3</sup> Appellant filed his objection to the Order to Show Cause along with a motion seeking a limited stay of the Bankruptcy Court's January 20 order compelling compliance with the Subpoena.\n\n On July 26, 2023, the Bankruptcy Court, after a series of hearings, issued an order holding that the act of production doctrine applied but that the requested documents fell under the required records exception to the doctrine.<sup>4</sup> The Bankruptcy Court found that Appellant was in contempt but that he may still purge himself of the contempt by September 29, 2023. On August 9, 2023, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal in this court as well as the instant motion for permission to appeal. (ECF Nos. 1, 2)\n\n#### **Standard of Review**\n\nDistricts courts have jurisdiction to hear appeals from \"final judgments, orders, and decrees . . . [and] with leave of the court, from other interlocutory orders and decrees . . . of bankruptcy judges.\" 28 U.S.C. § 158(a).<sup>5</sup> \"The decision as to whether to grant leave to appeal an interlocutory order of a bankruptcy court is committed to the discretion of the district court.\" *Osuji v. U.S. Bank, N.A.*, 285 F. Supp. 3d 554, 557 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (citing *In re Kassover*, 343 F.3d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 2003). The standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), which governs interlocutory appeals from\n\n<sup>3</sup> Briefing was somewhat delayed because on March 15, 2023, a twelve-count indictment against Appellant and a codefendant was unsealed in the Southern District of New York. Appellant was arrested the same day and has remained in federal custody since. On March 9, 2023, the Government filed a superseding indictment, which names a third codefendant. Therein, the Government alleges that Appellant and his co-defendants, through \"a series of complex fraudulent and fictious businesses and investment opportunities that connected dozens of interrelated entities,\" defrauded \"thousands of victims of more than approximately \\$1 billion.\" The Government alleges that Appellant and his co-defendants did so by transferring victim funds through \"approximately 500 accounts held in the name of at least 80 different entities or individuals,\" and named several entities and individuals that were the subject of the Subpoena. 4 Under the required records exception, \"the Fifth Amendment privilege may not be invoked to resist compliance with a regulatory regime constructed to effect the State's public purposes unrelated to the enforcement of its criminal laws.\" *Baltimore City Department of Social Servs. v. Bouknight*, 493 U.S. 549, 556 (1990). 5\n\nAlthough Appellant briefly contends that he is appealing a final order, he filed this motion for leave to appeal if this Court determined that the contempt order is not a final order. *See* Appellant Br., ECF No. 2 at 11. Appellee contends that this is an interlocutory appeal of a non-final order. Appellee Br., ECF No. 10 at 1–2. As discussed below, the Court concludes that the contempt order is not an appealable final order, and thus, leave of court is required.\n\ndistrict courts to courts of appeals, similarly governs such interlocutory appeals from bankruptcy courts to district courts. *In re Quigley Co.*, 323 B.R. 70, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (\"[C]ourts in this Circuit have invariably held[ ] all appeals governed by Section 158(a)(3) . . . should refer to the standards articulated by Section 1292(b) to determine whether leave to appeal shall be granted.\" (citation omitted)). Section 1292(b) provides:\n\nWhen a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order.\n\n28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Accordingly, Appellant must establish that \"the order (1) involves a controlling question of law (2) as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion, and (3) an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.\" *Osuji*, 285 F. Supp. at 558; *see also In re Salvatore*, No. 3:18-cv-1429 (SRU), 2019 WL 1284815, at \\*1 (D. Conn. Mar. 20, 2019).\n\n The first inquiry is satisfied \"if the reversal of the bankruptcy court's order would (1) terminate the action or (2) materially affect the outcome of the litigation.\" *In re Salvatore*, 2019 WL 1284815, at \\*2 (quoting *Buckskin Realty Inc., v. Greenberg,* 552 B.R. 40, 44 (E.D.N.Y. 2016)). \"The question of law must be a pure question that does not require resort to the case docket for study.\" *Id.* at \\*2. The second inquiry is satisfied where there is either conflicting authority on the issue or the issue is particularly difficult and of first impression in the Second Circuit. *Osuji*, 285 F. Supp. 3d at 558. Alternatively, there must be \"a genuine doubt as to whether the bankruptcy court applied the correct legal standard. . . . [M]erely claiming that the bankruptcy court's decision was incorrect is insufficient to establish substantial ground for difference of opinion.\" *In re Salvatore,* 2019 WL 1284815 at \\*2. The third inquiry is satisfied \"when the appeal promises to\n\nadvance the time for trial or to shorten the time required for trial.\" *Id.* Further, district courts have \"unfettered discretion to deny certification of an order for interlocutory appeal even when a party has demonstrated that the criteria of [section] 1292(b) are met.\" *Buckskin Realty Inc.*, 552 B.R. at 44.\n\n#### **Discussion**\n\n Appellant contends that an interlocutory appeal is appropriate here because whether his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is overridden is a pure question of law and a matter of first impression, which will resolve his obligations as to the production order, and which will provide him greater clarity as to the scope of such rights in his bankruptcy case. Appellant also contends that exceptional circumstances warrant an interlocutory appeal because he is facing criminal prosecution and the Bankruptcy Court order places his right against self-incrimination at risk. Appellee argues that an interlocutory appeal of this issue is not appropriate at this time and because Appellant may still purge himself of his contempt, and even if he does not purge, the Trustee has not yet sought, and the Bankruptcy Court has therefore not issued, any sanction for the Appellant's contempt. Although the Court agrees that the appeal would present an issue that involves a pure question of law, and that this issue is one for which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion, thus satisfying two of the § 1292(b) criteria, he has neither demonstrated that an interlocutory appeal would materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation nor that exceptional circumstances are present. To the contrary, an appeal at this time would constitute an inefficient and potentially wasteful expenditure of resources.\n\n It is well-established in the Second Circuit that \"an order finding a party in contempt is not final until after the sanction has been determined.\" *In re Fugazy Express, Inc.*, 982 F.2d 769, 775 (2d Cir. 1992). Even though the concept of finality is more flexible in bankruptcy matters than it\n\nis in typical civil litigation, when it comes to contempt disputes, \"the dispute is not completely resolved until the bankruptcy court determines the amount of damages to be awarded.\" *Id.* at 776. Although the time by which Appellant was permitted to purge himself of contempt has since passed, Appellee has not sought sanctions for Appellant's failure to purge his contempt, and the Bankruptcy Court has therefore not considered or ordered any sanctions.<sup>6</sup> Accordingly, an interlocutory appeal at this juncture is premature as the need for this Court to decide the issues presented is dependent upon a series of contingencies that may or may not come to pass.<sup>7</sup> This is precisely the type of piecemeal litigation that district courts are instructed to avoid when considering whether leave to appeal is appropriate and this aversion is not overcome by the exceptional circumstances that Appellant believes are present. *See id.* at 775 (there is a \"strong federal policy against piecemeal appeals\").\n\n The Court would also decline to allow an interlocutory appeal even if Appellant \"has demonstrated that the criteria of [section] 1292(b) are met.\" *See Buckskin Realty Inc.*, 552 B.R. at 44.\n\n#### **Conclusion**\n\n For the reasons set forth above, Appellant's motion for leave to appeal (ECF No. 2) is DENIED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case.\n\n<sup>6</sup> A review of the bankruptcy court docket reveals that no such request has been made.\n\n<sup>7</sup> Nor is the Court persuaded that allowing this appeal to proceed is appropriate because it would obviate his need to make a request in his criminal proceeding for the Government to turn over documents relevant to the Rule 2004 subpoena to the Trustee. Indeed, whether and to the extent that Appellant is mandated by the Bankruptcy Court's order to make such a request and whether such request would be granted adds an additional layer of uncertainty that the Court declines to wade through at this time. While it might be more efficient for Appellant to not have to file such a request in his pending criminal case in the Southern District of New York, such efficiency is not likewise passed onto this Court, and does not change the fact that Appellee has not sought contempt sanctions and the Bankruptcy Court has not awarded contempt sanctions.\n\n**SO ORDERED** at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 8th day of November 2023.\n\n */s/ Kari A. Dooley*  KARI A. DOOLEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE","body_zh":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT（美国康涅狄格区联邦地区法院）\n\n关于：KWOK，债务人\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），债务人-上诉人，对 LUC A. DESPINS，受托人-被上诉人。\n\n破产案号：22-50073 (JAM) 第11章\n\n民事案号：3:23-CV-1068 (KAD)\n\n2023年11月8日\n驳回上诉人上诉许可动议的裁定 (ECF No. 2)\n\nKari A. Dooley，美国联邦地区法官：\n\n底层破产程序中的个人债务人 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵），提出动议请求准予对破产法院认定其因未能遵守该法院关于提交特定文件的命令而构成藐视法庭并驳回其关于中止执行该命令之动议的裁定提起上诉。参见 In re Kwok, No. 22-50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. July 26, 2023), ECF No. 2035。上诉人主张，其不可能因不服从破产法院提交涉案记录的命令而构成藐视法庭，因为其在拒绝提交这些记录时正当地援引了《第五修正案》赋予的反自证其罪的权利。被上诉人反对该动议。(ECF No. 10) 基于下文阐述的理由，准予上诉的动议被驳回。(ECF No. 2)\n\n事实与审理经过\n\n本院推定各方当事人对底层事实均已知悉，仅重述裁决本动议所必需的事实。简而言之，于2022年7月28日，被上诉人就上诉人提出《规则2004》调查动议，涉及（其中包括）据称由上诉人所有和控制的营利性及非营利性实体相关的信息，破产法院于2022年8月16日批准了该动议。上诉人保留了在《规则2004》传票（下称“《传票》”）送达后对其提出异议的权利，《传票》于2022年8月19日完成送达。《传票》要求提供与“关联个人”和“关联实体”相关的文件。尽管上诉人同意提供某些文件，但上诉人对多项文件要求和提交要求提出了异议，这些要求主要与其家庭财产有关。\n\n于2022年10月28日，被上诉人提出动议，请求强制作出命令以要求上诉人遵守《传票》。于2022年11月14日，上诉人与 HK International Investments (USA) Limited, LLC 以及 Mei Guo（郭美，上诉人之女）就被上诉人的强制动议共同提出了异议。破产法院于2023年1月20日部分批准了被上诉人的动议，并要求上诉人在2023年1月31日之前提供大部分所要求的文件1，并在2023年2月7日之前提交一份宣誓声明，说明其本人及律师为收集涉案文件所作出的努力。然而，于2023年2月1日，上诉人的律师向被上诉人的律师发送电子邮件，告知上诉人将针对破产法院1月20日的命令主张其《第五修正案》权利，包括提交行为原则（act of production doctrine）2项下的权利，并且不会交出任何文件。于2023年2月7日，上诉人提交了一份宣誓声明，声明其就《传票》的全部内容援引其在《第五修正案》项下的权利。\n\n于2023年2月10日，被上诉人提出动议，申请发布述因命令（show cause order），要求上诉人说明为何不应因未遵守破产法院1月20日要求其服从《传票》的命令而被认定为藐视法庭。于2023年3月7日，破产法院作出一份《述因命令》。\n\n1 破产法院将文件提交的适用时间范围限制在自2014年6月1日起，而非被上诉人所要求的2012年。法院亦拒绝强制上诉人交出其护照。\n\n2 提交行为原则是一项《第五修正案》特权，当“即使文件内容不受特权保护，只要证人提交文件的单纯行为本身可能被用来对其不利——例如，在该证人单纯持有该文件的事实本身即构成自证其罪的情况下，可以保护个人免于被要求提交文件。”In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated February 2, 2012, 741 F.3d 339, 343 (2d Cir. 2013)；另见 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976)。\n\n于2023年4月10日3，上诉人对《述因命令》提交了异议，并同时提出动议，请求有限中止执行破产法院1月20日强制遵守《传票》的命令。\n\n于2023年7月26日，破产法院在进行一系列听证后作出一项裁定，认定提交行为原则适用，但所要求的文件属于该原则的法定记录例外（required records exception）4。破产法院认定上诉人构成藐视法庭，但其仍可在2023年9月29日之前通过补救行为解除藐视（purge himself of the contempt）。于2023年8月9日，上诉人向本院提交了上诉通知书以及本件请求准予上诉的动议。(ECF Nos. 1, 2)\n\n审查标准\n\n地区法院对破产法官作出的“最终判决书、裁定和法令……以及经法院许可后对破产法官的其他中间裁定和法令……”具有审理上诉的管辖权。28 U.S.C. § 158(a)。5“是否准予对破产法院的中间裁定提起上诉的决定权属于地区法院的自由裁量范围。”Osuji v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 285 F. Supp. 3d 554, 557 (E.D.N.Y. 2018)（引用 In re Kassover, 343 F.3d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 2003)）。28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) 规定的管辖从地区法院向上诉法院提起中间上诉的标准，同样适用于从破产法院向地区法院提起的此类中间上诉。In re Quigley Co., 323 B.R. 70, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)（“[本巡回区内的法院一贯认为[ ]，所有由第158(a)(3)条管辖的上诉……均应参照第1292(b)条阐明的标准来确定是否应当准予上诉许可。”（引文省略））。第1292(b)条规定：\n\n当地区法官在民事诉讼中作出一项依本条其他规定不可上诉的裁定时，认为该裁定涉及具有重大意见分歧实质根据的控制性法律问题，并且从该裁定立即提起上诉可能会实质性推进诉讼的最终终结，其应在该裁定中以书面形式明确声明。\n\n3 提交简要诉状的时间有所延误，因为在2023年3月15日，Southern District of New York（纽约南区）启封了一份针对上诉人和一名共同被告的十二项罪名项的起诉书。上诉人于同日被捕，自此一直处于联邦羁押之中。于2023年3月9日，政府提交了一份追加起诉书，其中列出了第三名共同被告。政府在其中指控上诉人及其共同被告通过“一系列连接了数十个相互关联实体的复杂欺诈和虚构业务及投资机会”，欺诈了“数千名受害者超过约 10 亿美元”。政府指控上诉人及其共同被告通过“以至少80个不同实体或个人名义开立的约500个账户”转移受害者资金来实现上述行为，并列出了作为《传票》标的的若干实体和个人。\n\n4 根据法定记录例外，“《第五修正案》特权不得被援用来拒绝遵守旨在实现与刑事法律执行无关的国家公共目的而构建的监管机制。”Baltimore City Department of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 556 (1990)。\n\n5 尽管上诉人简要主张其系针对一项最终裁定提起上诉，但其提交了本许可上诉动议，以备在本院认定该藐视裁定并非最终裁定时使用。参见上诉人诉状，ECF No. 2 第 11 页。被上诉人主张这是针对非最终裁定的中间上诉。被上诉人诉状，ECF No. 10 第 1–2 页。如下文所述，本院认定该藐视裁定并非可上诉的最终裁定，因此需要获得法院的许可。\n\n28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)。相应地，上诉人必须证明“该裁定(1)涉及控制性法律问题，(2)该问题存在重大意见分歧的实质根据，且(3)立即从该裁定提起上诉可能会实质性推进诉讼的最终终结。”Osuji, 285 F. Supp. at 558；另见 In re Salvatore, No. 3:18-cv-1429 (SRU), 2019 WL 1284815, at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 20, 2019)。\n\n“如果推翻破产法院的裁定将(1)终结诉讼或(2)实质性影响诉讼结果”，则满足第一项审查要求。In re Salvatore, 2019 WL 1284815, at *2（引用 Buckskin Realty Inc., v. Greenberg, 552 B.R. 40, 44 (E.D.N.Y. 2016)）。“该法律问题必须是一个纯粹的问题，不需要借助案件卷宗进行研读。”同上，at *2。当该问题存在相互冲突的判例，或者该问题在第二巡回区尤为困难且属于首发先例（first impression）时，即满足第二项审查要求。Osuji, 285 F. Supp. 3d at 558。或者，必须存在“对破产法院是否适用了正确的法律标准的真实疑问。……仅声称破产法院的裁决是不正确的，不足以确立存在重大意见分歧的实质根据。”In re Salvatore, 2019 WL 1284815 at *2。当上诉“有望提前审判时间或缩短审判所需时间时”，即满足第三项审查要求。同上。此外，“即使当事人已证明符合[第]1292(b)条的标准，地区法院仍享有不受约束的自由裁量权来拒绝签发允许中间上诉的证明。”Buckskin Realty Inc., 552 B.R. at 44。\n\n讨论\n\n上诉人主张此处进行中间上诉是适当的，因为其《第五修正案》反自证其罪的权利是否被排除是一个纯粹的法律问题，且属于首发先例，这将解决其在提交命令项下的义务，并将使其在破产案件中对该等权利的范围有更清晰的认识。上诉人还主张，存在特殊情况使得中间上诉具有正当性，因为其正面临刑事起诉，而破产法院的命令将其反自证其罪的权利置于危险之中。被上诉人辩称，此时就该问题提起中间上诉并不适当，因为上诉人仍可通过补救行为解除藐视，且即使其未解除，受托人尚未申请、破产法院因此也尚未就上诉人的藐视行为作出任何惩戒。尽管本院同意该上诉将提出一个涉及纯粹法律问题的事项，并且该事项具有重大意见分歧的实质根据，从而符合了§ 1292(b)条的三项标准中的两项，但他既未证明中间上诉会实质性推进诉讼的最终终结，也未证明存在特殊情况。相反，此时提起上诉将构成低效且可能浪费资源的支出。\n\n在第二巡回区，确立已久的规则是“认定当事人构成藐视法庭的裁定在确定惩戒之后才构成最终裁定。”In re Fugazy Express, Inc., 982 F.2d 769, 775 (2d Cir. 1992)。尽管在破产事务中终局性的概念比其他情况更为灵活\n\n与典型的民事诉讼中一样，涉及藐视法庭争议时，“在破产法院确定应裁定的损害赔偿金额之前，该争议并未完全解决。”出处同上，第 776 页。尽管上诉人被允许洗脱其藐视法庭罪责的期限自那以后已经届满，但被上诉人并未因上诉人未能洗脱其藐视法庭罪责而寻求制裁，因此破产法院尚未审议或命令进行任何制裁。6 相应地，在此时进行中间上诉尚不成熟，因为本法院裁决所提出问题的必要性取决于一系列可能发生也可能不发生的不确定情况。7 这恰恰是地区法院在审议准予上诉是否适当时被指示应当避免的支离破碎诉讼，而上诉人认为存在的例外情况并不能克服这种规避倾向。参见出处同上，第 775 页（存在“反对支离破碎上诉的强有力联邦政策”）。\n\n即便上诉人“已证明符合 [第] 1292(b) 条的标准”，本法院也将拒绝准予中间上诉。参见 Buckskin Realty Inc.，552 B.R.，第 44 页。\n结论\n\n基于上述理由，上诉人关于准予上诉的动议（ECF No. 2）被驳回。法院书记官受命关闭本案。\n\n6 对破产法院案卷目录的审查显示，并未提出过此类请求。\n\n7 本法院亦不认为准予此项上诉继续进行是恰当的，尽管这可使其无需在其刑事诉讼程序中请求政府将与第 2004 条传票相关的文件移交给受托人。事实上，破产法院的命令是否以及在多大程度上强制要求上诉人提出此类请求，以及该请求是否会获得准许，增加了额外一层不确定性，本法院目前拒绝介入解决。虽然上诉人无需在其悬而未决的 Southern District of New York（纽约南区）刑事案件中提交此类请求可能会提高其自身效率，但这种效率并未同样传递给本法院，且并未改变被上诉人尚未寻求藐视法庭制裁以及破产法院尚未作出藐视法庭制裁裁决的事实。\n\n特此裁定，于 2023 年 11 月 8 日作于康涅狄格州布里奇波特（Bridgeport, Connecticut）。\n\n/s/ Kari A. Dooley  KARI A. DOOLEY 美国地区法官","key_entities":["Je","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Guo","Despins"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":2,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":10,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":13,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2035,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":2250,"status":"published","published_at":"2023-11-08 00:00:00","created_at":"2023-11-08","updated_at":"2026-08-23 13:09:47"}