{"id":"court_ctb_2344_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":2344,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2023-11-13","title":"IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT In re:","summary_zh":"上诉期间中止执行紧急动议通知 —— Ho Wan Kwok 破产案（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo），CTB 22-50073 ECF #2344（2023-11-13立案）。G Club Operations LLC 依据《联邦破产诉讼规则》第 8007 条向康涅狄格联邦地区法院提交紧急动议，请求在上诉审理期间中止执行破产法院 2023 年 11 月 13 日裁定。G Club 主张破产法院错误裁定其放弃了对 IT 供应商 HCHK 处文件的律师-委托人保密特权且仅给其四天履行期，若不予中止将导致保密权益遭受不可逆损害。","summary_en":"Notice and Emergency Motion to Stay Pending Appeal —— In re Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo / Guo Wengui), CTB 22-50073 ECF #2344 (filed Nov 13, 2023). G Club Operations LLC filed a notice and emergency motion under Bankruptcy Rule 8007 requesting a stay of the Bankruptcy Court's November 13, 2023 order pending appeal to the District Court. G Club argued that the order improperly found it had waived attorney-client privilege regarding records held by IT provider HCHK Technologies, Inc., giving it only four days to comply and risking irreparable disclosure.","body_en":"# **IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\nIn re:\n\nHO WAN KWOK, *et al.*,\n\nDebtors.\n\nChapter 11\n\nCase No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n(Jointly Administered)\n\n# **NOTICE RE: G CLUB OPERATIONS LLC'S** *EMERGENCY* **MOTION TO STAY PENDING APPEAL PURSUANT TO BANKRUPTCY RULE 8007 FILED WITH THE DISTRICT COURT**\n\nPLEASE TAKE NOTICE that G Club Operations LLC has filed an *Emergency Motion to Stay Pending Appeal Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 8007* on November 16, 2023 in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut pursuant to Fed. R . Civ. P. 8007(b) requests a stay of the Bankruptcy Court's Order, dated November 13, 2023, granting the Chapter 11 Trustee's *Motion that G-Club Operations LLC Has Waived any Privilege and Has No Right to Object to Responsiveness. Despins et al v. HCHK Technologies, Inc. et al*, No. 23-05013 (Bankr. D. Conn. Jun. 8, 2023) (Dkt No. 179). A copy of all documents filed in the District Court are attached hereto.\n\nDated: November 16, 2023\n\nBy: */s/ Jeffrey M. Sklarz* GREEN & SKLARZ LLC Jeffrey M. Sklarz Kellianne Baranowsky One Audubon St, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06511 Tel: 203-285-8545 jsklarz@gs-lawfirm.com kbaranowsky@gs-lawfirm.com\n\n> PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP Carolina A. Fornos (*pro hac vice*) 31 West 52nd Street New York, NY 10019 Tel: 212-858-1558 carolina.fornos@pillsburylaw.com\n\n*Attorneys for G Club Operations LLC*\n\n# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI hereby certify that on the date set forth below, a copy of the foregoing was served via CM/ECF. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF system.\n\nDate: November 16, 2023\n\n */s/ Jeffrey M. Sklarz* Jeffrey M. Sklarz\n\n# **IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\nIn re:\n\nHO WAN KWOK, *et al.,*\n\nDebtors.\n\nChapter 11\n\nCase No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n(Jointly Administered)\n\n## **G CLUB OPERATIONS LLC'S** *EMERGENCYMOTION* **TO STAY PENDING APPEAL PURSUANT TO BANKRUPTCY RULE 8007**\n\nPursuant to Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 8007(b) G Club Operations LLC (\"G Club Operations\") requests a stay (the \"Motion to Stay\") of the Bankruptcy Court's Order, dated November 13, 2023, granting the Chapter 11 Trustee's *Motion that G-Club Operations LLC Has Waived any Privilege and Has No Right to Object to Responsiveness. Despins et al v. HCHK Technologies, Inc. et al,* No. 23-05013 (Bankr. D. Conn. Jun. 8, 2023) (0kt No. 179) (the \"Order\").\n\nPursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8007(b)(2) and Local Rule 7(a), good cause exists for the United States District Court (the \"District Court\") to hear this Motion to Stay on an emergency basis because: (1) although G Club Operations has moved for a stay in the United States Bankruptcy Court (the \"Bankruptcy Court\"), the Bankruptcy Court has not yet ruled on the Motion to Stay; (2) the Bankruptcy Court's Order afforded G Club Operations only *four days* from entry of the Order to comply with the Order, despite Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a)(l) providing a fourteen day appeal period, and (3) given the time frame to address this matter, as set forth herein, District Court intervention is necessary to protect G Club Operations rights of appeal and access to due process. Emergency relief is required so that performance under the Order does not result in the effective loss of significant rights to protect privileged communications from disclosure by G Club\n\nOperations. Further, as fully briefed in the memorandum of law filed concurrently herewith, without a stay, G Club Operations' appeal will likely be mooted. Accordingly, G Club Operations requests that the District Court enter a stay of the Order until such time as the appeal is fully heard.\n\nDated: November 16, 2023\n\nBy: *Isl Jeffrev M Sklarz* GREEN & SKLARZ LLC Jeffrey M. Sklarz Kellianne Baranowsky One Audubon St, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06511 Tel: 203-285-8545 jsklarz@gs-lawfirm.com kbaranowsky@gs-lawfirm.com\n\n> PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP Carolina A. Fornos *(pro hac vice)* 31 West 52nd Street New York, NY 10019 Tel: 212-858-1558 carolina.fornos@pillsburylaw.com\n\n*Attorneys for G Club Operations LLC*\n\n# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI hereby certify that on the date set forth below, a copy of the foregoing was served via\n\nCM/ECF. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF system.\n\nAdditionally, a copy of the foregoing has been filed on the docket of the Bankruptcy Court\n\nas well as emailed as follows:\n\nCounsel for the Trustee A vi Luft aviluft@paulhastings.com Patrick Linsey plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\nCounsel for the Assignee, Brien W. Hofmeister Bonnie Mangan bonnie.mangan@manganlaw.com\n\nCounsel for HCHK Technologies, Inc; Holy City Hong Kong Ventures, LTD; Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc. John T. Shaban john@levinelevinelaw.com\n\nCounsel for HCHK Property Management, Inc. John T. Shaban john@levinelevinelaw.com Bonnie Mangan bonnie.mangan@manganlaw.com\n\nCounsel for Holy City Hong Kong Ventures, LTD. John T. Shaban john@levinelevinelaw.com\n\nDate: November 16, 2023\n\n*Isl Jeffrey M Sklarz* Jeffrey M. Sklarz\n\n|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|---------------|\n| | | |\n\n| JS 44 | (Rev. 04/21) |\n|-------|--------------|\n\n# JS 44 (Rev. 04/2 I) **CIVIL COVER SHEET**\n\n| The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as
provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the
purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. | | | (SliF INSTRUCTIONS ON NEXT PAGli OF ?HIS FO!llv!.) | | | | | | | | |\n|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|------------|\n| I. (a) PLAINTIFFS | | | | DEFENDANTS | | | | | | | |\n| G Club Operations, LLC - Appellant/Movant | | | | | | | Luc A. Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee - Appellee/Respondent | | | | |\n| (b) County of Residence offirst Listed Plaintiff | | | San Juan PR | | County of Residence of First Listed Defendant | | | | New York NY | | |\n| (l,XCliPT!N U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES) | | | | NOTE: | | | (IN US. PLlINl7FFCAShSONLY)
IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF
THE TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED. | | | | |\n| ( C) Attorneys (Firm Name, Address, and Telephone N11mbe1y | | | | | Attorneys (If Knm,·n) | | | | | | |\n| 3rd Fl., New Haven, CT 06511 (203) 285-8545 | | | Jeffrey M. Sklarz, Green & Sklarz LLC, 1 Audubon Street, | | | | | Patrick R. Linsey, Neubert Pepe & Monteith PC, 195 Church
St, New Haven, CT 06510, (203) 821-2000 | | | |\n| II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an \"X\" in One Box Only) | | | | | III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (Place an \"X\" in One Boxjbr Plaintiff | | | | | | |\n| D I U.S. Govenunent
Plaintiff | | (8) 3 Federal Question
(U.S. Gm-ernment Not a Party) | | | (For Diversity Cases Only)
Citizen of This State | PTF
D I | DEF
D I | Incorporated or P1incipal Place
of Business In This State | and One Box/or Defendant) | PTF
D 4 | DEF
D 4 |\n| D 2 U.S. Government
Defendant | D 4 Diversity | | (Indicate Citizenship o.lParties in Item !fl) | | Citizen of Another State | D2 | □ 2 | Incorporated and Principal Place
of Business In Another State | | □ 5 | Os |\n| | | | | | Citizen or Subject of a
Foreign Country | 03 | 3 | Foreign Nation | | | 6 |\n| IV. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an \"X\" in One Box Only) | | | | | | | | Click here for Nature of Suit Code Descriotions | | | |\n| CONTRACT
I
I IO Insurance | | PERSONAL INJURY | TORTS
PERSONAL INJURY | | FORFEITURE/PENAL TY
0 625 Drug Related Seizure | | | BANKRUPTCY
422 Appeal 28 USC 158 | | OTHER STATUTES | I |\n| 120 Marine
130 Miller Act | B 310 Aiq,lane | 315 Airplane Product | D 365 Personal lnjmy -
Product Liability | | of Prope1ty 21 USC 881
0690 Other | | 423 Withdrawal
~ | 28 USC 157 | B 375 False Claims Act
3729(a)) | 376 Qui Tarn (31 USC | |\n| 140 Negotiable Instrument
~ | Liability | | D 367 Health Care/ | | | | | INTELLECTUAL | = 400 State Reappo1tionment | | |\n| D 150 Recovery of Overpayment D 320 Assault, Libel &
& Enforcement of Judgment | Slander | | Phannaceutical
Personal Injmy | | | | | PROPERTY RIGHTS | 410 Antitrust
f--- 430 Banks and Banking | | |\n| B 151 Medicare Act | | 0 330 Federal Employers' | Product Liability
D 368 Asbestos Personal | | | | □ 820 Copyrights
B 830 Patent | | f--- 450 Commerce | | |\n| 152 Recove1y of Defaulted
Student Loans | Liability | | Inju1y Product | | | | | 835 Patent - Abbreviated
New Drug Application - | 460 Depmtation
- | 4 70 Racketeer Influenced and | |\n| (Excludes Veterans)
D 153 Recove1y of Overpayment | 8340 Mmine
Liability | 345 Marine Product | Liability
PERSONAL PROPERTY | | LABOR | | □ 840 Trademark | | tJ 480 Consumer Credit | Corrupt Organizations | |\n| of Veteran's Benefits
D 160 Stockholders' Suits | B 350 Motor Vehicle | | B 370 Other Fraud | | LJ 710 Fair Labor Standards | | | □ 880 Defend Trade Secrets
Act of20l6 | | (15 USC 1681 or 1692) | |\n| D 190 Other Contract | | 355 Motor Vehicle
Product Liability | 371 Trnth in Lending
D 380 Other Personal | | Act
::::J 720 Labor/Management | | | SOCIAL SECURITY | 17 485 Telephone Consumer | Protection Act | |\n| B 195 Contract Product Liability 0 360 Other Personal | | | Property Damage
D 385 Property Damage | | Relations | | | 861 HIA (1395ft) | d 490 Cable/Sat TV | | |\n| 196 Franchise | lnjmy
0 362 Personal Injmy - | | Product Liability | a | 740 Railway Labor Act
751 Family and Medical | | | 862 Black Lung (923)
863 DIWC/DIWW (405(g)) f--- | Exchange | 850 Securities/Commodities/ | |\n| REAL PROPERTY
I | | Medical Malpractice
CIVIL RIGHTS | PRISONER PETITIONS | | Leave Act
1790 Other Labor Litigation | | ~
□ 865 RSI ( 405(g)) | 864 SSID Title XVI | = | 890 Other Statutory Actions
891 Agricultural Acts | |\n| LJ 210 Land Condemnation | | = 440 Other Civil Rights | a
Habeas Corpus: | | _J 791 Employee Retirement | | | | = 893 Environmental ivlatters | | |\n| D 220 Foreclosure | = 441 Voting
~ 442 Employment | | 463 Ahen Detamee
5 10 Motions to Vacate | | Income Security Act | | | FEDERAL TAY S111' '\"
□ 870 Taxes (U,S. Plaintiff | Act | 895 Freedom of Infonnation | |\n| § 230 Rent Lease & Ejectment
240 T mis to Land | 443 1-Iousmg/
r- | Accommodations | Sentence | | | | | or Defendant)
n 871 IRS-Third Party | j 896 Arbitration | | |\n| 245 To,1 Product Liability
□ 290 All Other Real Property | | 0 445 Amer. w/Disabilities - | j 530 General
535 Death Penalty | | IMMIGRATION | | | 26 USC 7609 | | 899 Administrative Procedure
Act/Review or Appeal of | |\n| | | Employment
0 446 Amer. w/Disabilities - | =
Other:
540 Mandamus & Other | | =:] 462 Naturalization Application
465 Other Immigration | | | | ::::J 950 Constitutionality of | Agency Decision | |\n| | Other | | -
550 Civil Rights | | Actions | | | | | State Statutes | |\n| | ::::J 448 Education | | 555 Prison Condition
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560 Civil Detainee -
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Confinement | | | | | | | | |\n| V. 0 RIG IN (!'lace an \"X\" in One Box Only) | | | | | | | | | | | |\n| (8) I Original
Proceeding | D2 Removed from
State Court | 3 | Remanded from
Appellate Court | D 4 Reinstated or
Reopened | D 5 Transferred from | Another District
(specify) | | D 6 Multidistrict
Litigation -
Transfer | | D 8 Multidistrict
Litigation -
Direct File | |\n| | | | Cite the U.S, Civil Statute under which you are filing (Oo not citej11ri\\\"llictio11aI statutes 1111/ess diversity):
28 U,S,C, 158 - Bankruptcy Appeal; Fed. R Bankr, P, 8007(b) - Motion to Stay order of US Bankruptcy Court | | | | | | | | |\n| VI. CAUSE OF ACTION Brief description of cause: | | | Emergency Motion to Stay Order of US Bankruptcy Court (Manning, USBJ) | | | | | | | | |\n| VII. REQUESTED IN
COMPLAINT: | | UNDER RULE 23, FKCv.P, | 0 CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION | NA | DEMAND\\$ | | | CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint:
JURY DEMAND: | Yes | [8)No | |\n| VIII. RELATED CASE(S)
IF ANY | | (S'ee instructions): | JUDGE | | _______________ | | | DOCKET NUMBER | __________ | | _ |\n| DATE | | | SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD | | | | | | | | |\n| Nov 16, 2023 | | | isl Jeffrey M. Sklarz (ct20938) | | | | | | | | |\n| FOR OFFICE USE ONLY | | | | | | | | | | | |\n| RECEIPT# | AMOUNT | | APPL YING IFP | | JUDGE | | | MAG. JUDGE | | | |\n\n# Exhibit A\n\n# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\n| In re: | )
)
Chapter 11 |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| HO WAN KWOK, eta!., | )
)
Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |\n| 1
Debtors.
____________________ | )
(Jointly Administered)
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 86
) |\n| V. | )
) |\n| HCHK TECHNOLOGIES, INC., HCHK PROPERTY
MANAGEMENT, INC., LEXINGTON PROPERTY AND)
STAFFING, INC., HOLY CITY HONG KONG
VENTURES, LTD., ANTHONY DIBATTISTA,
YVETTE WANG, and BRIAN W. HOFMEISTER,
ASSIGNEE FOR THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS, | )
)
)
)
)
) |\n| Defendants.
____________________ | )
)
) |\n| | |\n\n# **ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ORDER REQUIRING PRODUCTION OF G-CLUB DOCUMENTS**\n\n# **I. INTRODUCTION**\n\nBefore the Court is the Memorandum of Law in Support of Chapter 11 Trustee's\n\nArgument that G-Club Operations LLC Has Waived any Privilege and Has No Right to Object to\n\n1The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, the Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\nResponsiveness (the \"Motion\") (ECF No. 86)2filed by Mr. Luc A. Despins, in his capacity as Chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") for the estate of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok, pursuant to decretal paragraph 6(b) of the Order Approving Chapter 11 Trustee's Settlement with Assignee of HCHK Entities (the \"Order Approving Settlement\") (ECF No. 70). For the reasons stated below, the relief requested in Motion is granted and an order requiring G-Club Operations LLC (\"G-Club\") and/or Mr. Brian Hofmeister, in his capacity as assignee for the benefit of creditors (the \"Assignee\") of HCHK Technologies, Inc. (\"HCHK Tech\"), HCHK Property Management, Inc., and Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc. (collectively, the \"HCHK Entities\") to produce documents possessed, previously as the case may be, by the Assignee, which documents were provided to G-Club by the Assignee pursuant to the Order Approving Settlement.\n\n## **II. BACKGROUND**\n\nOn July 11, 2023 and July 18, 2023, hearings were held on, respectively, the Motion Regarding Settlement with Assignee of HCHK Entities under New York Court Assignment Proceedings (the \"Settlement Motion\") (Main Case ECF No. 1936; ECF No. 25) and a revised proposed order (the \"Revised Proposed Order\") regarding the Settlement Motion (Main Case ECF No. 2004; ECF No. 55), both filed by the Trustee. G-Club filed objections to the Settlement Motion and the Revised Proposed Order. (Main Case ECF Nos. 1977, 2007.) On July 28, 2023, the Court entered the Order Approving Settlement, which granted the Settlement Motion and approved the settlement between the Trustee and the Assignee. (Main Case ECF No. 2038; ECF No. 70.)\n\n2References to the docket in this adversary proceeding will be styled \"ECF.\" References to the docket in the main case, *In re Kwok,* Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), will be styled \"Main Case ECF.\"\n\nParagraph 6 of the Order Approving Settlement addressed to G-Club's only remaining objection to the Settlement Motion (see Main Case ECF No. 2030, at 128:5-48:8) by setting a briefing schedule whereby the Trustee and G-Club would contest whether G-Club had the right to review G-Club documents in the possession of the Assignee for responsiveness to the Rule 2004 subpoena served on G-Club and for privilege prior to the documents being produced to the Trustee. (Main Case ECF No. 20381 6; ECF No. 7016.) On August 11, 2023, the Trustee timely filed the Motion arguing that G-Club did not have any right to review the documents for either responsiveness or privilege. (ECF No. 87.) On September 29, 2023, after certain developments (see Main Case ECF No. 2237), G-Club filed a response to the Trustee's memorandum (Main Case ECF No. 2244), arguing that G-Club had rights to review the documents for both responsiveness and privilege.\n\nOn October 24, 2023, a hearing was held on the arguments raised by the Trustee in the Motion. The Trustee and G-Club both appeared and argued their respective positions. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the matter under advisement.\n\nThe dispute between the Trustee and G-Club is ripe for decision.\n\n## III. **JURISDICTION**\n\nThe United States District Court for the District of Connecticut has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). This Court has authority to hear and determine this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) and the Order of Reference of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut dated September 21, 1984. The instant adversary proceeding in which the instant discovery dispute arises is a statutorily core proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § l 57(b )(2)(A), (E), (0).\n\nVenue in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.\n\n## **IV. DISCUSSION3**\n\nAt the outset, the Trustee and G-Club dispute the terms of the Order Approving Settlement and whether the Motion seeks relief from that order. The Trustee argues that the Order Approving Settlement provided for the parties to litigate the issues raised by the Motion. G-Club argues that it determined the issues in G-Club's favor. The Trustee is clearly correct. While decretal paragraph 6(a) of the Order Approving Settlement provides that the Assignee was to provide G-Club access to G-Club's documents in his possession and G-Club was afforded the opportunity to check for responsiveness to the Rule 2004 subpoena served on G-Club and privilege before producing the documents to the Trustee, decretal paragraph 6(b) provides that the Trustee and G-Club were to brief whether or not G-Club had any right to check the documents for responsiveness and/or privilege before G-Club and/or the Assignee produced them to the Trustee. Essentially, the Order Approving Settlement reserved the issues while providing a mechanism for discovery to continue pending a determination of the issues presently before the Comi.\n\nThe Comi did not previously decide the issues in G-Club's favor and will consider the parties' arguments regarding responsiveness and privilege below.\n\n### **A. Responsiveness**\n\nThe Trustee argues that G-Club cannot object to the Assignee's production of the HCHK Entities' documents pursuant to the Order Approving Settlement on the basis that such documents are not responsive to the Rule 2004 subpoena served on G-Club in Mr. Kwok's Chapter 11 case. Rather than relating to the G-Club subpoena, the Trustee contends, the\n\n3The following constitutes the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Court pursuant to Rule 7052 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, made applicable by Rule 7001 in adversary proceedings.\n\nsettlement reached with the Assignee relates to the discovery the Trustee would have otherwise pursued in this adversary proceeding and the Rule 2004 subpoena served on HCHK Tech in Mr. Kwok's Chapter 11 case.\n\nG-Club responds that the Trustee cannot obtain G-Club's property through discovery from HCHK Tech. Therefore, G-Club argues, the Trustee may only obtain documents from G-Club pursuant to the Rule 2004 subpoena served on it, subject to a responsiveness review by G-Club.\n\nThe Court agrees with the Trustee. First, the instant dispute is separate and distinct from the dispute over G-Club's compliance with the Rule 2004 subpoena served on it. The HCHK Entities provided the Assignee with the authority to settle with the Trustee in the deeds of assignment. *(See, e.g.,* Complaint Ex. 13, Affidavit and Petition of Brian Hofmeister Ex. B, § 4.) The Assignee did so: the Order Approving Settlement approved a settlement between the Trustee and the Assignee regarding this adversary proceeding and, in pertinent part, discovery therein not a settlement between the Trustee and G-Club regarding discovery in Mr. Kwok's Chapter 11 case.\n\nIn this adversary proceeding, the Trustee alleges that the HCHK Entities are the *alter egos* of Mr. Kwok and/or Mr. Kwok beneficially owns the HCHK Entities and/or their assets. The Trustee additionally alleges that Mr. Kwok operates a tangled network of entities, relatives, and loyal followers to hide assets from his creditors. G-Club is allegedly one of those entities. But for the settlement with the Assignee, the Trustee would have pursued discovery from the HCHK Entities relating to their connection to G-Club. Indeed, the Trustee sought such discovery pre-litigation through the service of Rule 2004 subpoenas. The settlement between the Assignee and the Trustee seeks to resolve discovery issues between the Trustee and the HCHK\n\nEntities. The Rule 2004 subpoena served on G-Club is a separate issue and does not provide a basis for G-Club to object to the Assignee producing G-Club documents to the Trustee pursuant to the settlement.\n\nSecond, the Assignee, with the powers and rights assigned to him by HCHK Tech, may disclose G-Club documents. (Complaint Ex. 13, Affidavit and Petition of Brian Hofmeister Ex. B, §§ 1, 4.) Under the terms of the Master Services Agreement (the \"MSA\") between HCHK Tech and G-Club, the Assignee may disclose G-Club's documents to a third party as required by law. (Mot. Ex. A, § 6.2.)\n\nBefore such disclosure, however, the Assignee must inform G-Club to provide an opportunity for G-Club to seek a protective order or other appropriate relief. The Assignee has complied with his obligations under the MSA. G-Club was provided notice of the Settlement Motion, which was filed in Mr. Kwok's Chapter 11 case pursuant to D. Conn. L. Bankr. R. 9019- 1 (a)(2) - in which G-Club receives notice through electronic notice and service upon appearing counsel - as well as in this adversary proceeding. Indeed, G-Club initially objected on confidentiality grounds - in line with the provisions of the MSA - as well as on responsiveness and privilege grounds. At the final hearing, however, G-Club abandoned its confidentiality objection because under the Revised Proposed Order, the Assignee would designate produced documents as \"confidential\" under the protective order entered in Mr. Kwok' s Chapter 11 case (Main Case ECF No. 923). (Main Case ECF No. 2030, Hr'g Tr. at 128:5-48:8.) As the abandonment of this objection demonstrates, the settlement protects G-Club as envisioned by the MSA.\n\nFor all these reasons, the Court concludes that the Assignee may produce G-Club's documents without such documents being subject to G-Club's review for responsiveness to the\n\n6\n\nRule 2004 subpoena served on G-Club in Mr. Kwok's Chapter 11 case. G-Club must, therefore, turn over to the Trustee the documents the Assignee produced to them pursuant to decretal paragraph 6a of the Order Approving Settlement without regard to whether any documents are responsive to the Rule 2004 subpoena served on it.\n\n## **B. Privilege**\n\nThe Trustee argues that G-Club has waived any privilege in the documents in the custody, control, and/or possession of the Assignee at the time of his settlement with the Trustee. G-Club, the Trustee asserts, waived any and all privilege in the documents when, first, G-Club entered into the MSA with HCHK Tech, wherein the Trustee contends HCHK Tech agreed to provide services beyond mere hosting of G-Club's documents and was provided access to those documents; second, G-club failed to object to the assignment of, allegedly, substantially all HCHK Tech's property to the Assignee, including G-Club's documents; and, third, G-Club failed to object to the Assignee's motion to sell HCHK Tech's assets to G-News Operations, LLC (\"G-News\").\n\nG-Club responds that the present facts and circumstances do not support the conclusion that G-Club has waived any privilege. Namely, G-Club argues that, notwithstanding the terms of the MSA, HCHK Tech merely hosted G-Club documents and did not access them; and G-Club's time to object to the assignment of HCHK Tech's assets to the Assignee and the proposed sale to G-News had not elapsed at the time the Court entered the temporary restraining order regarding the prosecution of the assignment proceedings. G-Club analogizes HCHK Tech's services to G-Club to Microsoft Corporation's (\"Microsoft\") provision of cloud storage and cloud-based office software to myriad individuals and entities and warns that an adverse ruling would have farreaching implications contrary to established law.\n\nThe Court agrees with the Trustee.\n\n\"[ A ]s with all privileges, the person claiming the attorney client privilege has the burden of establishing all essential elements.\" *In re Horowitz,* 482 F .2d 72, 82 (2d Cir. 1973) ( citing *United States v. Kave!,* 296 F.2d 918, 923 (2d Cir. 1961)). \"The party asserting the privilege ... bears the burden of establishing\" that the communications to be protected are \"communications ( 1) between a client and his or her attorney (2) that are intended to be, and in fact were, kept confidential (3) for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal advice.\" *United States v. Mejia,* 655 F.3d 126, 132 (2d Cir. 2011); *see Strougo v. BEA Assocs.,* 199 F.R.D. 515,519 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing *United States v. Constr. Prod. Rsch., Inc.,* 73 F.3d 464,473 (2d Cir. 1996)). \"A party seeking the protections of the attorney-client privilege must affirmatively act to protect her communications.\" *Niceforo v. UBS Glob. Asset Agmt. Ams., Inc.,* 20 F. Supp. 3d 428,437 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). Undertaking actions that '\"will predictably lead to the disclosure' of privileged communications\" results in waiver of the attorney-client privilege, *Niceforo,* 20 F. Supp. 3d at 437; *see Horowitz,* 482 F.2d at 82, \"unless such disclosure was 'necessary, or at least highly useful, for the effective consultation between the client and the lawyer which the privilege is designed to permit\"', *Strougo,* 199 F.R.D. at 522 (citing case quoting *Kave!,* 296 F.2d at 922). Nevetiheless, \"this extension [under *Kave!]* has always been a cabined one, and '[t]o that end, the privilege protects communications between a client and an attorney, not communications that prove important to an attorney's legal advice to a client.\"' *Mejia,* 655 F.3d at 132 (citing *United States v. Ackert,* 169 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir. 1999)); *see Horowitz,* 482 F.2d at 80-82 ( distinguishing *Kave!).*\n\nThe \"'common interest' doctrine\" presents an exception to waiver where multiple parties are represented by the same counsel and \"working together ... towards a common goal\" or are\n\nrepresented by different counsel engaged in \"a common legal enterprise\" such that \"the nature of the [ shared] interest be identical, not similar, and be legal, not solely commercial.\" *Strougo,* 199 F.R.D. at 520 (internal citations omitted). Nevertheless, the attorney-client privilege \"ought to be strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle.\" *Horowitz,* 482 F.2d at 81; *see Mejia,* 655 F.3d at 132.\n\nIn this case, the Affidavit and Petition of Brain Hofmeister similarly states that HCHK Tech provided \"a la carte consulting services across Technology, Product Development, Engineering, Human Resources, Recruitment, Legal, Finance, and R&D.\" (Complaint Ex. 13, Affidavit and Petition of Brian Hofmeister ,r 4.) G-Club was a consumer of these wide-ranging services pursuant to the terms of the MSA. *(Id.* Ex. 13, Affidavit and Petition of Brian Hofmeister ,r 5.) HCHK Tech provided those services as an independent contractor. (Mot. Ex. A, § 10.1.) Section 1. I of the MSA states that the services HCHK Tech will provide to G-Club are listed on an exhibit to the MSA. *(Id.* Ex. A, § 1.1.) Exhibit A to the MSA lists five categories of service in addition to information technology support services, the sole category of service acknowledged by G-Club in its arguments. *(Id.* Ex. A, Ex. A.) Additional categories of service include, among other things, legal services, human resources services, financial services, and engineering/development services. *(Id.* Ex. A, Ex. A.) Section 6.2 of the MSA makes clear that HCHK Tech may use G-Club's documents in the course of providing the services listed on exhibit A to the agreement. *(Id.* Ex. A, § 6.2.) Despite G-Club's assertions to the contrary, HCHK Tech's relationship to G-Club is disanalogous to the relationships Microsoft has with the average consumer of its cloud services and cloud-based office software.\n\nFor that reason, *Metro Storage International v. Harron,* 275 A.2d 810, 868-72 (Del. Ch. 2022), cited by G-Club, is not persuasive on the instant facts. In that case, in pertinent part, the\n\nemployee defendant argued that the corporate plaintiffs' argument that he had breached confidentiality provisions in the plaintiffs' operating agreements through, *inter alia,* arguing that the plaintiffs had waived confidentiality by sharing their documents with a non-party corporation. *Harron,* 275 A.2d at 822-24, 868, 870-71. In *Harron,* the non-party corporation provided property management and related services as well as information technology services and stored all of the plaintiffs' electronic documents on its servers. *Id.* at 870-71. The Delaware Court of Chancery equated these technical services to those of, *e.g.,* g-mail or Microsoft 365, *Id.* at 871 n. 35, and held that the non-party was the plaintiffs' agent bound to maintain the confidentiality of the documents and, hence, in sharing the documents with the non-party did not constitute a waiver of confidentiality, *Id.* at 871.\n\nAs discussed above, however, unlike in *Harron,* in this case, HCHK Tech provided \"a la carte\" services over a variety of fields under the MSA, including fields that would require it to access the contents of the documents. (Mot. Ex. A, Ex. A.) Notwithstanding the terms of the MSA, G-Club argues that HCHK Tech was only the information technology manager for G-Club' s domain name and did not have access to the documents. (ECF 168, Hr'g Tr. at 34:10- 37: 13.) G-Club provides no evidence supporting this assertion and contradicting the MSA. G-Club additionally contends the Trustee has not proven that HCHK Tech accessed G-Club's documents. *(Id.)* In making these arguments, G-Club attempts to shirk its burden. *Mejia,* 655 F.3d at 132; *Horowitz,* 482 F.2d at 82; *Kovel,* 296 F.2d at 923; *Strougo,* 199 F.R.D. at 519. The Court declines to follow G-Club into error.\n\nThe burden is not on the Trustee to prove that HCHK accessed documents. Indeed, the Second Circuit held in *Horowitz* that a party waived the attorney-client privilege where he \"treated the communications between himself and counsel on the same basis as all other records,\n\nwith Horowitz, who was an independent contractor and not a servant, having a free run to look at what he pleased,\" 482 F.2d at 82, despite noting that \"[t]he record concerning Horowitz' use of the files containing communications between the Kassers and lawyers is meagre,\" *;d.* at 80, and acknowledging Horowitz's contradictory testimony. The former was the basis of the holding in *Horowitz,* not the latter. *Id.* at 82.\n\nG-Club has not sought to fit its disclosure of privileged documents to HCHK Tech within an exception to waiver. G-Club makes no argument that disclosure to HCHK Tech was either necessary or highly useful in its consultation with its counsel. Similarly, G-Club makes no argument that HCHK Tech and G-Club share a common legal interest, either in shared representation or as part of a shared legal enterprise.\n\nTherefore, the Court concludes that through disclosure of its communications with HCHK Tech, G-Club waived the attorney-client privilege. Moreover, while it is true that G-Club's time to object to the assignment proceedings and/or the proposed sale of, *inter alia,* HCHK Tech to G-News through said assignment proceedings had not passed before the issuance of the temporary restraining order in this adversary proceeding, the Trustee is correct that G-Club has not established that it had any intent to oppose either the assignment or the sale. This further establishes that G-Club has treated its communications in ways that '\"predictably lead to the disclosure' of privileged communications.\" *Niceforo,* 20 F. Supp. 3d at 437; *see Horowitz,* 482 F .2d at 82.\n\nFor all these reasons, the Court concludes that G-Club has not met its burden to establish that the attorney-client privilege applies. The Assignee may produce G-Club's documents without such documents being subject to G-Club's review for privilege. G-Club must, therefore, turn over to the Trustee the documents the Assignee produced to them pursuant to decretal\n\nparagraph 6a of the Order Approving Settlement without regard to whether any documents are privileged.\n\n# **V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER**\n\nAccordingly, for the reasons stated above, it is hereby\n\n**ORDERED:** The relief requested in the Motion is **GRANTED.** On or before November 17, 2023, G-Club shall make available to the Trustee all documents provided to G-Club by the Assignee in accordance with paragraph 6(a) of the Order Approving Settlement; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** On or before November 17, 2023, the Assignee shall make available to the Trustee all copies retained by the Assignee of documents provided to G-Club by the Assignee in accordance with paragraph 6(a) of the Order Approving Settlement; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** All documents produced to the Trustee pursuant to this order shall be considered documents designated as \"confidential\" and subject to the protective order entered as ECF No. 923 in the jointly administered cases captioned *In re Kwok,* Case 22-50073 (JAM); and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** On or before November 14, 2023, the Trustee shall serve this Order on G-Club and the Assignee. On or before November, 15, 2023, the Trustee shall file a certificate of service evidencing compliance with this Order.\n\nDated at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 13th day of November, 2023.\n\n# Exhibit B\n\n# **IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\nIn re:\n\nHO WAN KWOK, *eta!.,*\n\nDebtors.\n\nChapter 11\n\nCase No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n(Jointly Administered)\n\n## **G CLUB OPERATIONS LLC'S MOTION TO STAY PENDING APPEAL PURSUANT TO BANKRUPTCY RULE 8007**\n\nPursuant to Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 8007(a)(l)(A), G Club Operations LLC (\"G Club Operations\") requests a stay of the Court's Order, dated November 13, 2023, granting the Chapter 11 Trustee's *Motion that G-Club Operations LLC Has Waived any Privilege and Has No Right to Object to Responsiveness. Despins et al v. HCHK Technologies, Inc. et al,* No. 23-05013 (Bankr. D. Conn. Jun. 8, 2023) (0kt No. 179) (the \"Order\"). That final appealable Order requires that G Club Operations and the Assignee of HCHK Technologies turn over to the Trustee privileged communications of G Club Operations, among other documents, by November 17, 2023 (less than the 14 days a party has to appeal an Order) because HCHK Technologies acted as an internet administrator to G Club Operations, as well as other customers. This Order is erroneous and creates a dangerous precedent that essentially holds that when a business or individual outsources its IT services to a provider which may also provide additional services, then that business or individual loses all rights to and in its documents, including the right to protect from disclosure attorney-client and work-product privileged communications. Respectfully, the Court erred in issuing this Order and G Club Operations has filed a Notice of Appeal to the District Court challenging the Order.\n\nAs explained herein, G Club Operations satisfies the requisite elements for a stay pending\n\nappeal because (l) failure to grant the stay and forcing G Club Operations to turn privileged communications over to the Trustee before an appeal is heard will effectively deprive G Club Operations of the right to appeal by rendering the appeal moot and irrevocably impacting its due process rights; (2) there is no harm to the Trustee as the Trustee has already received more than 140,000 documents from G Club Operations in connection with the Rule 2004 process, in addition to having issued far in excess of 200 Rule 2004 subpoenas; (3) the ruling is against public policy as it implicates the privacy and constitutionally protected rights of millions of customers; and ( 4) G Club Operations is likely to succeed on the merits because the Court's reasoning is incorrect. Accordingly, a stay pending appeal should be granted so protected documents are not turned over before the issues on appeal are finally resolved.\n\nBecause the Order requires compliance by November 17, 2023, exigent circumstances exist to address this motion on an emergency motion. Further, G Club Operations respectfully requests that, to the extent practical, the Court rule on this motion no later than Thursday, November 16, 2023, so that G Club Operations may have the opportunity to seek further appropriate relief from the District Court if necessary. In the absence of a ruling, G Club Operations intends to file a motion to stay in the District Court on Friday, November 15, 2023.\n\n## **RELEVANTPROCEDURALBACKGROUND1**\n\n1. On June 23, 2023, the Trustee filed a Motion, Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019, Regarding Settlement with Assignee of HCHK Entities Under New York Court Assignment\n\n1 The Order arises from a Rule 9019 Motion relating to HCHK Technologies, Inc. (\"HCHK Technologies\"), HCHK Prope1iy Management, Inc. (\"HCHK Property\") and Lexington Prope1iy and Staffing, Inc. (\"HCHK Lexington\") (collectively, \"HCHK Entities\") via the alleged authority of an Assignee, with the subject matter of the Order resolving a final discrete issue - G Club's objection on due process grounds. The Order is a final order for purposes of appeal because it \"definitively dispose of [a] discrete disputes within the overarching bankruptcy case.\" *Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson 1vfasonry, LLC,* 140 S. Ct. 582, 586 (2020) (citation omitted). The Court has approved the Rule 9019 Motion.\n\nProceedings (No. 22-50073, 0kt No. 1936) (the \"9019 Motion\"). The 9019 Motion included a Proposed Order that HCHK Technologies turn over to the Trustee all documents to which it may have had access. *(Id.,* Dkt. No. 2004) (the \"Revised Proposed Order\"). Specifically, Paragraph 6 of the Revised Proposed Order stated:\n\n**\"Corporate Records.** The Assignee shall immediately make available to the Trustee all non-privileged corporate records (including in electronic form) and other documents pertaining to the HCHK Entities in the possession of the Assignee. All such corporate records and other documents shall be considered documents designated as \"confidential\" and subject to the protective order entered in this Chapter 11 Case on October 6, 2022 [Main Case Docket No. 923].\"\n\n*Id.* at 3, ~- 2\n\n2. On July 5, 2023, and again on July 14, 2023 *(id.,* Dkt. Nos. 1977 and 2007 respectively), G Club Operations objected to Paragraph 6 of the Proposed Order and requested an orderly process by which to preclude a wholesale turnover of confidential and privileged materials to the Trustee simply because it outsourced IT services.\n\n3. On July 28, 2023, the Court ruled on the 9019 Motion, granting the 9019 Motion\n\nbut modifying Paragraph 6 of the Proposed Order to provide:\n\n**Corporate Records:** (a) The Assignee shall immediately secure and safeguard all corporate records (including in electronic form) and other documents pertaining to the HCHK Entities in the possession of the Assignee. Within ten (10) days from the date of the entry of this Order, the Assignee shall make available to the Trustee all non-privileged corporate records (including in electronic form) and other documents pertaining to the HCHK Entities in the possession of the Assignee, *except those that were at any point the property of G-Club Operation LLC (\"G-Club \").* All such corporate records and other documents shall be considered documents designated as \"confidential\" and subject to the protective order entered in this Chapter 11 Case on October 6, 2022 [Main Case Docket No. 923] (the \"Protective Order\"). Also within ten (10) days from the date of the entry of this Order, the Assignee shall make available to G-Club all corporate records (including in electronic form) and other documents pertaining to the HCHK Entities in the possession of the Assignee, *which were at any point the property ofG-Club. Upon receipt, G-Club shall immediately review such corporate records and other*\n\n2 The Rule 9019 was entered into between the Assignee of the HCHK Entities and the Trustee. Various issues related to that Rule 9019 Order are the subject of an appeal. See No. 23-05013, Dkt. Nos. 70, 80, and 98.\n\n*documents for privilege and responsiveness to the Trustee's Rule 2004 subpoena of G-Club and produce a privilege log and responsiveness log.* G-Club may designate materials it will produce to the Trustee as \"confidential\" or \"highly confidential\" in accordance with the Protective Order.\n\n*Id.,* 0kt. No. 2038 at 4, ~ 6(a)) (emphasis added).\n\n4. The Comi also provided that\"[ o ]nor before August 11, 2023, the Trustee shall file a brief in support of the Trustee's argument that G-Club has waived any privilege and has no right to object to responsiveness. On or before August 18, 2023, G-Club shall file any response to the Trustee's brief.\" *Id.* at 5, ~ 6(6).\n\n5. On August 11, 2023, the Trustee filed a *Memorandum of Law in Support of Chapter 11 Trustee's Argument that G-Club Operations LLC has Waived any Privilege and has no Right to Object to Responsiveness as to G-Club Documents Turned Over from the Assignee of HCHK Technologies, Inc. to the Trustee Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 Settlement Agreement* (the \"Waiver Motion\"), which the Trustee filed in Adversary Proceeding No. 23-05013, ECF No. 86 (and not in No. 22-50073, as all other filings had previously been made).\n\n6. G Club Operations opposed the Waiver Motion on September 29, 2023, filing its *Response to Trustee's Memorandum Challenging* G *Club's Privilege Assertions In Documents In HCHK's Possession and Opposition To The Trustee's Related Proposed Order.* (No. 22-50073, 0kt. No. 2244).3\n\n7. On November 13, 2023, the Court issued the Order granting the Trustee's Waiver Motion and ordering production by G Club Operations and the Assignee of HCHK Technologies by November 17, 2023, which is less than the time afforded G Club Operations to appeal the Order pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 8002. This Order is final.\n\n3G Club filed on a different date for the reasons set fmih in its *Opposition To Trustee's Proposed Supplemental Order Regarding G-Club Documents Pursuant To Order Approving Chapter 11 Trustee's Settlement With Assignee of HCHK Entities Under New York Court Assignment Proceedings* (No. 22-50073, Dkt. No. 2233).\n\n## **A STAY OF THE ORDER PENDING APPEAL IS PROPER**\n\n8. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has established the\n\nfollowing four-pati test for determining whether to grant a motion for stay pending appeal:\n\n( 1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and ( 4) where the public interest lies.\n\n*In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig.,* 503 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). Each factor favors a stay in this case. A stay is \"'an exercise of judicial discretion,' and '[t]he party requesting a stay bears the burden of showing that the circumstances justify an exercise of that discretion.\"' *Uniformed Fire Officers Ass 'n v. de Blasio,* 973 F .3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2020) ( quoting *Nken v. Holder,* 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1760 (2009)).\n\n# **A. Absent a Stay, G Club Operations Will Be Irreparably Harmed by Deprivation of Appeal Rights and a Waiver of Privilege**\n\n9. Absent a stay, G Club Operations will suffer irreparable injury because one cannot effectively undo the wholesale turnover of privileged communications to the Trustee and, as a result, that turnover may render the appeal moot. Courts have found that irreparable injury exists when the denial of a stay creates the potential for a complete loss of a right for the moving patty. *In re St. Johnsbury Trucking Co., Inc.,* 185 B.R. 687,690 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding that if the government's appeal here is mooted, it will lose the ability to enforce some provisions of CERCLA and the Internal Revenue Code; it is that threatened loss rather than the loss of the right to appeal *vel non* that gives rise to the Court's irreparable injury finding). \"[W]here the denial of a stay pending appeal risks mooting *any* appeal of *significant* claims of error, the irreparable harm requirement is satisfied.\" *In re BGI, Inc.,* 504 B.R. 754, 763 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, alterations added).\n\n10. That is precisely the issue here; G Club Operations' rights absent a stay will forever be lost as production of privileged information likely would moot any meaningful remedy if the Order is overturned on appeal. The production deadline in the Order requires compliance by November 17, 2023. This production includes privileged communications between G Club Operations and its counsel. If G Club Operations, or HCHK, is forced to comply with the Order, G Club Operations will effectively forever lose its right to protect confidential communications with its attorneys. Once obtained, the Trustee and his advisors cannot unlearn the privileged communications they will see and review.\n\n## **B. A Stay Will Not Prejudice the Trustee**\n\n11. Unlike any other party in this bankruptcy matter, the Trustee has availed itself of the broad discovery afforded under Rule 2004. Indeed, the Trustee has already sought leave to file 255 Rule 2004 subpoenas.4 With respect to G Club Operations specifically, the Trustee has served G Club Operations with a Rule 2004 Subpoena and G Club Operations has produced in excess of 140,000 documents. In addition, and in accordance with the Court's Order on the Rule 9019 Motion, G Club Operations also produced a privilege log to the Trustee.\n\n12. Accordingly, the Trustee will not suffer any \"substantial injury\" by allowing G\n\n4Specifically: (i) the Trustee's First Supplemental Omnibus Motion (Dkt. No. 839) seeking twenty-five (25) subpoenas; (ii) the Trustee's Second Supplemental Omnibus Motion (Dkt. No. 1116) seeking fifty-three (53) subpoenas; (iii) the Trustee's Third Supplemental Omnibus Motion (Dkt. No. 1259) seeking nineteen (19) subpoenas; (iv) the Trustee's Fowih Supplemental Omnibus Motion (Dkt. No. 1592) seeking fifty-seven (57) subpoenas; (v) the Trustee's Fifth Supplemental Omnibus Motion (Dkt. No. 1789) seeking eight (8) subpoenas; (vi) the Trustee's Sixth Supplemental Omnibus Motion (Dkt. No. 2079) seeking twenty (20) subpoenas; (vii) the Trustee's Seventh Supplemental Omnibus Motion (Dkt. No. 2249) seeking six (6) subpoenas; (viii) the Trustee's Eighth Supplemental Omnibus Motion (Dkt. No. 2304) seeking eight (8) subpoenas; and (ix) the Trustee's Ninth Supplemental Omnibus Motion (Dkt. No. 2308) seeking twenty-nine (29) subpoenas. The latter two are presently subject to objections. *See, e.g., Objection of Shin Hsin Yu and Jie Zhang to Eighth Supplemental Omnibus 1vfotion of Chapter 11 Trustee for Entty of Order Under Rule 2004* (Dkt. No. 2319); *G Club Operation LLC* 's *Limited Objection to Eighth Supplemental Omnibus i'vfotion of Chapter 11 Trustee for Entty of Order Under Rule 2004* (Dkt No. 2320); *Objection of Shin Hsin Yu, 1332156 B.C LTD, GWGOPNZ Limited, and lie Zhang to Ninth Supplemental Omnibus J\\;Jotion of Chapter 11 Trustee for En* fly *of Order Under Rule 2004* (Dkt No. 2326); *G Club Operations LLC* 's *Objection to Ninth Supplemental Omnibus 1vfotion of Chapter 11 Trustee for Ent1y of Order Under Rule 2004* (Dkt. No. 2331 ).\n\nClub Operations to appeal the Order which, once complied with, will render any appeal moot and will forever infringe G Club Operations' due process rights.\n\n# **C. The Order Is Against Public Policy**\n\n13. The Order poses an immediate threat to the privacy and constitutionally-protected interests of customers who outsource their IT services. The Order is contrary to authority holding that utilization of \"hosting services did not result in a waiver.\" *See Metro Storage Int'! LLC v. Harron,* 275 A.3d 810, 871 (Del. Ch. 2022) (alterations added). There is no legal support for the proposition that simply using an outsourced, cloud-based data hosting service results in a waiver of privilege or otherwise transfers the information maintained on the cloud to the administrator.\n\n# **D. G Club Operations Has A Substantial Possibility of Success on Appeal Because the Order Is Erroneous**\n\n14. As a preliminary matter, \"[t]he requisite showing of \"substantial possibility\" of success is \"inversely propo11ional to the amount of irreparable injury plaintiff1 ] will suffer absent the stay.\" *In re BG!, Inc.,* 504 B.R. at 764 (second alteration in original, citations omitted). As noted above, the harm to G Club Operations of an unstayed order forcing the turnover of its privileged documents is a change in circumstances that cannot be undone. As such, G Club Operations \"need not always show a \"probability of success' on the merits; instead, the movant need only present a substantial case on the merits when a serious legal question is involved and show that the balance of the equities weighs heavily in favor of granting the stay.\" *Id.* ( citation omitted). As explained below, however, the Order reaches an erroneous legal conclusion, assuming waiver and improperly shifting the burden to G Club Operations to establish an exception when no waiver took place, which makes it likely G Club Operations will prevail on appeal.\n\n# • **The Order Conflates Documents \"Disclosed\" to HCHK** *with* **G Club Operations Documents on the Cloud for which HCHK Acted as IT Administrator**\n\n15. In addressing the issue of responsiveness and privilege, the Order conflates documents G Club Operations *disclosed* to HCHK that became property of HCHK *versus* G Club Operations emails maintained on the cloud for which HCHK acted as IT manager and administrator and which belong only to G Club Operations, with a *gclub.com* domain name, and never became HCHK's property. This extends to any other customer that HCHK has as a customer. As a result, the Order improperly relies on the Master Services Agreement between HCHK and G Club Operations as a basis to transfer gigabytes of cloud data to the Trustee that was never *disclosed* to HCHK.\n\n16. Illustrating this mistake is the Order's improper characterization of G Club Operations' position in No. 22-50073, 0kt. No. 2244, as a review process. The Order states \"that G-Club had rights to review the documents for both responsiveness and privilege.\" Order at 3. In other words, the Court improperly framed the issue as G Club Operations' demand to review documents that HCHK was intending to produce to the Trustee as if G Club Operations had *disclosed* the documents on the cloud to HCHK in the first instance.\n\n17. That was not the issue raised by the Waiver Motion and challenged by G Club Operations. As G Club Operations argued in its filings:\n\n\"G Club contracted with HCHK for the administration of a cloud-based storage and email system for its communications (among other services). That system, Microsoft 365, is a cloud-based enterprise system which is routinely utilized by corporations and law firms. That HCHK was the system's administrator is not relevant to G Club's assertion of privilege; the documents were maintained in \"the cloud,\" and the Trustee has made no assertions (nor can he) that a single individual other than G Club employees ever reviewed documents maintained on the cloud that hosted G Club domain names. Privileged documents stored in a cloud system administered by a third party simply do not lose their protected status.\"\n\n## No. 22-50073, 0kt. No. 2244, at 2-3, **13.**\n\n18. Thus, the issue is whether privileged documents lose their protected status merely as a result of outsourcing IT services when there is no factual contention that the IT service provider ever had access to the privileged material.\n\n19. Underscoring this confusion is the Order's improper reliance on the Master Services Agreement (\"MSA\") between HCHK and G Club Operations. In quoting the MSA, the Court erroneously stated: \"Under the terms of the Master Services Agreement (the \"MSA\") between HCHK Tech and G-Club, the Assignee may disclose G-Club's documents to a third party as required by law. (Mot. Ex. A, § 6.2.)\" Order at 6.\n\n20. Section 6.2, however, cannot be read without Section 6.1, which provides: \"Confidential Information\" means any information *disclosed* under this Agreement by either party *(\"Disclosing* Party\") to the other party *(\"Receiving* Party\").\" MSA § 6.1 ( emphasis added). G Club Operations documents that are maintained \"in the cloud\" are not documents *disclosed* to HCHK.\n\n21. Indeed, there is a clear distinction between documents *sent* to HCHK or *shared* with HCHK (which should not be turned over to the Trustee without a review by G Club Operations of responsiveness and privilege) *versus* the gigabytes of data on the cloud which were not disclosed to HCHK and belong to G Club Operations and G Club Operations only.\n\n22. As such, the MSA's provisions-which describes the parties in terms of\"Receiving Party\" and \"Disclosing Party\" -do not inform the Court's analysis of whether privileged material maintained \"in the cloud\" thereby lose their protected status.\n\n# • **The Order Improperly Assumed Waiver and Erroneously Shifted the Burden to G Club Operations to Establish an Exception to Waiver**\n\n23. With respect to privilege, the Order improperly assumed waiver based solely on the Trustee's conclusory assertion \"that G-Club has waived any privilege in the documents in the\n\ncustody, control, and/or possession of the Assignee at the time of his settlement with the Trustee.\" Order at 7. \"Documents\" is not precisely defined, failing to account for the distinction explained above. And thereafter, the Order improperly concludes that there must have been a waiver because HCHK provided \"a la carte consulting services\" and \"Section 6.2 of the MSA makes clear that HCHK Tech may use G-Club's documents in the course of providing the services listed on exhibit A to the agreement. *(Id.* Ex. A, § 6.2.)\" Order at 9. However, documents \"in the cloud\" are not documents to which HCHK had access or otherwise reviewed. In effect, the Court assumed access and review and waiver, and then improperly shifted the burden to G Club to establish an exception to waiver when there was no waiver in the first instance.\n\n24. As stated, the Court based its effective burden shifting on the concept that G Club Operations' privilege had been waived merely as a result of HCHK's provision of data hosting in the cloud together with other services under the MSA. But, there is no legal support for the proposition that the mere provision of \"a la carte consulting services\" separate and apart from data hosting (particularly where there are no facts that could show that the host actually accessed privileged material) results in waiver of privilege - unless, of course, documents are actually exchanged, shared, disclosed, or otherwise reviewed by a party. Once again, the Order improperly conflates documents that would have been exchanged in the course of providing services (like communications between G Club Operations and HCHK) *versus* an outsourced IT service for cloud administration. The Order erroneously *assumes* waiver, and thus improperly shifted the burden to G Club Operation to demonstrate an exception to waiver under \"common interest\" or *Kave!.* Order at 9-11.\n\n## **CONCLUSION**\n\n25. Under these circumstances, a stay pending appeal is proper to preserve the status\n\nquo and prevent the irreparable harm to G Club Operations of effectively losing its due process and privilege rights.\n\n# **RELIEF REQUESTED**\n\n26. G Club Operations respectfully requests that the Court enter a stay pending appeal\n\nof the Order.\n\nDated: November 15, 2023\n\nBy: *Isl Je{fi'ey M Sklarz* GREEN & SKLARZ LLC Jeffrey M. Sklarz Kellianne Baranowsky One Audobon St, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06511 Tel: 203-285-8545 jsklarz@gs-lawfirm.com kbaranowsky@gs-lawfirm.com\n\n> PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP Carolina A. Fornos *(pro hac vice)* 31 West 52nd Street New York, NY 10019 Tel: 212-858-1558 carolina.fornos@pillsburylaw.com\n\n*Attorneys.for G Club Operations LLC*\n\n# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI hereby certify that on the date set fo1ih below, a copy of the foregoing was served via\n\nCM/ECF. Patiies may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF system.\n\nDate: November 15, 2023.\n\n*Isl Jeffrey M Sklarz* Jeffrey M. Sklarz\n\n# **IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\nIn re:\n\nHO WAN KWOK, *eta!.,*\n\nDebtors.\n\nChapter 11\n\nCase No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n(Jointly Administered)\n\n# *EX-PARTE* **MOTION TO EXPEDITE HEARING AND LIMIT NOTICE RE: MOTION TO STAY PENDING APPEAL, FILED BY G. CLUB OPERATIONS, LLC**\n\nPursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(c)(l) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8007, G Club Operations, LLC **(\"G Club Operations\"),** respectfully moves that the Court expedite the hearing on *G Club Operations, LLC Emergency Motion to Stay Pending Appeal* (the **\"Motion to Stay\"),** filed concurrently herewith. G Club Operations seeks a hearing on **Thursday, November 16, 2023** (at any time, either in person or via Zoom.gov) as the Comi has set Friday, November 17, 2023 (a date 4 days after entry of the November 13, 2023 *Order Granting Motion for Order Requiring Production ofG-Club Documents* (Filed only in the Adv. Proc. 23-5013, the **\"Ruling\"), 1**as the deadline for compliance with the Ruling.\n\n- 1. The background of this matter is well known to the Court and summarized in the Motion to Stay.\n- 2. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(c)(l) provides that the Court may reduce the notice period for a motion upon cause shown.\n\n1 G Club Operations is not a party to, was never served in, and no counsel has an appearance in Adv. Proc.23-5013 (the **\"HCHK AP\").** The Ruling relates to G Club's opposition to certain elements of an order entered under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9019 (Main Case ECF No. 2038), approving certain aspects of a settlement of the HCHK AP between the Trustee and HCHK. See Main Case ECF Nos. 2270, 2242, 2237, 2233, 2077, 2038, 1977). A Notice of Appeal has been filed in both the Main Case and HCHK AP.\n\n3. The Motion to Stay requires immediate consideration as the compliance date set by the Court is November 17, 2023, 4 days after the Court issued its Ruling.\n\n4. As detailed in the Motion to Stay, G Club Operations satisfies the requisite elements for a stay pending appeal because (1) failure to grant the stay and forcing G Club Operations to turn privileged communications over to the Trustee before an appeal is heard will effectively deprive G Club Operations of the right to appeal by rendering the appeal moot and irrevocably impacting its due process rights; (2) there is no harm to the Trustee as the Trustee has already received more than 140,000 documents from G Club Operations in connection with the Rule 2004 process, in addition to having issued far in excess of 200 Rule 2004 subpoenas; (3) the ruling is against public policy as it implicates the privacy and constitutionally protected rights of millions of customers; and (4) G Club Operations is likely to succeed on the merits because the Comi's reasoning is mistaken in fact and law. Accordingly, a stay pending appeal should be granted so protected documents are not turned over before the issues on appeal are finally resolved.\n\n5. Because the Order requires compliance by November 17, 2023, exigent circumstances exist to address this motion on an emergency motion. *Further, G Club Operations respectfully requests that, to the extent practical, the Court rule on this motion no later than Thursday, November 16, 2023, so that G Club Operations may have the opportunity to seek further appropriate relief from the District Court if necessary.* In the absence of a ruling, G Club Operations intends to file a motion to stay in the District Court on Friday, November 15, 2023.\n\n6. Thus, cause exists for the Court to grant this Motion to Expedite and to schedule an expedited hearing on the Motion to Stay.\n\n**WHEREFORE,** G Club Operations respectfully requests that the Court expedite the\n\nhearing on the Motion to Stay to **Thursday, November 16, 2023,** and for such other and further\n\nrelief as the Court deems just, proper, and necessary.\n\nDated: November 15, 2023\n\nG CLUB OPERATIONS, LLC\n\nBy: *Isl Jeffrey M Sklarz* GREEN & SKLARZ LLC Jeffrey M. Sklarz Kellianne Baranowsky One Audobon St, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06511 Tel: 203-285-8545 j sklarz@gs-lawfirm.com kbaranowsky@gs-lawfirm.com\n\n> PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP Carolina A. Fornos *(pro hac vice)* 31 West 52nd Street New York, NY 10019 Tel: 212-858-1558 carolina.fornos@pillsburylaw.com\n\n*Attorneysfor G Club Operations LLC*\n\n# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI hereby certify that on the date set forth below, a copy of the foregoing was served via\n\nCM/ECF. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF system.\n\nDate: November 15, 2023.\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz *Isl Jefjjey M Sklarz*\n\n# **IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\nIn re:\n\nChapter 11\n\nHO WAN KWOK, *et al.,* Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\nDebtors. (Jointly Administered)\n\n## **ORDER GRANTING EX-PARTE MOTION TO EXPEDITE HEARING AND LIMIT NOTICE RE: MOTION TO STAY PENDING APPEAL, FILED BY G. CLUB OPERATIONS, LLC**\n\nPursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(c)(l) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8007, G Club Operations,\n\nLLC **(\"G Club Operations\"),** moved the Court to expedite the hearing on *G Club Operations, LLC 's Emergency Motion to Stay Pending Appeal* (the **\"Motion to Stay\"),** it appears that the relief in the motion to expedite should be granted, it is hereby:\n\n**ORDERED,** that a hearing on the Motion to Stay will be held on **November 16, 2023** at\n\n\\_:\\_ a.m./p.m., via zoom platform/ in person at the United States Bankruptcy Court,\n\nBridgeport, Connecticut.\n\n**ORDERED,** that service of this Order and the motion to expedite must be made on all\n\nparties entitled to notice on or before :\\_ a.m./p.m., on November\\_, 2023; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED,** that a certificate of service demonstrating that the provisions of the Order\n\nGranting the motion to expedite have been complied with must be filed on or before\\_:\\_\n\na.m./p.m., on November \\_\\_ , 2023.\n\n# Exhibit C\n\n# **IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\nIn re:\n\nHO WAN KWOK, *eta!.,*\n\nDebtors. 1\n\nChapter 11\n\nCase No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n(Jointly Administered)\n\nNovember 15, 2023\n\n# **NOTICE OF APPEAL**\n\nPLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8001 *et seq.,* G Club\n\nOperations, LLC **(\"G Club Operations\"),** hereby files notice of its appeal from the Bankruptcy Court's November 13, 2023 *Order Granting Motionfor Order Requiring Production ofG-Club Documents* (Filed only in the Adv. Proc. 23-5013, the **\"Ruling\"),2** granting the Trustee, Luc A. Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee (the **\"Trustee\")** access to all G Club Operations documents stored electronically with HCHK Technologies, Inc. **(\"HCHK\")** further to the *Trustee's Memorandum of Law in Support of Chapter 11 Trustee's Argument that G-Club Operations LLC Has Waived any Privilege and Has No Right to Object to Responsiveness* (the **\"Motion\")** (filed only in Adv. Proc. 23-5013, ECF No. 86). A copy of the Ruling is attached hereto as Exhibit A\n\n1The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595) (the \"Debtor\"), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and the Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\n2 G Club Operations is not a party to, was never served in, and no counsel has an appearance in Adv. Proc. 23-5013 (the **\"HCHK AP\").** The Ruling relates to G Club's opposition to certain elements of an order entered under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9019 (Main Case ECF No. 2038), approving certain aspects of a settlement of the HCHK AP between the Trustee and HCHK. See Main Case ECF Nos. 2270, 2242, 2237, 2233, 2077, 2038, 1977). The Ruling appealed from, however, was entered only in the Adversary Proceeding, and thus this Notice is also filed in the Adversary Proceeding. {00340394.2 }\n\nThe names of all parties to the Court's order appealed from and the names, addresses and\n\ntelephone numbers of their respective attorneys are as follows:\n\n**Jeffrey M. Sklarz Kellianne T. Baranowsky** Green & Sklarz LLC One Audubon Street, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06511 (203) 285-8545 Fax: (203) 823-4546 jsklarz@gs-lawfirm.com kbaranowsky@gs-lawfirm.com *Representing* **G Club Operations LLC**\n\n53 Calle Palmeras, Suite 1401 Puerta De Tierra San Juan, Puerto Rico 00901\n\n*Party-in-Interest and Appellant*\n\nand\n\nCarolina A. Fornos *(pro hac vice)* PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP 31 West 52nd Street New York, NY 10019 Tel: 212-858-1558 carolina.fornos@pillsburylaw.com\n\n\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\n\nDouglas S. Skalka ( ct006 l 6) Patrick R. Linsey (ct29437) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 781- 2847 dskalka@npmlaw.com plinsey@npmlaw.com and\n\nand\n\nNicholas A. Bassett (pro hac vice) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C., 20036 (202) 551-1902 nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\nand {00340394.2 } *Representing* **Luc A. Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee** PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park A venue New York, New York 10166\n\n*Chapter I I Trustee and Appellee*\n\nAvram E. Luft (pro hac vice) Douglass Barron (pro hac vice) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park A venue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6079 aviluft@paulhastings.com\n\nCounsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee\n\n# THE PARTY-IN-INTEREST G CLUB OPERATIONS LLC\n\nBy: ls/Jeffrey M. Sklarz Jeffrey M. Sklarz (ct20938) Green & Sklarz LLC 700 State St, Suite 100 New Haven, CT 06511 (203) 285-8545 Fax: (203) 823-4546 j sklarz@gs-lawfirm.com\n\n# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI hereby certify that on the date set forth below a copy of the foregoing was served by CMECF and/or mail on anyone unable to accept electronic filing. Notice of this filing will be sent by email to all parties by operation of the Comi's electronic filing system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as indicated on the Notice of Electronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF System.\n\nDate: November 15, 2017 /s/ Jeffrey M. Sklarz\n\n{00340394.2 }\n\n## **EXHIBIT A**\n\n{00340394.2 }\n\n# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\n| In re: | )
)
Chapter 11 |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| HO WAN KWOK, eta!.,
1
Debtors.
____________________ | )
)
Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)
)
(Jointly Administered)
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (JAM)
)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 86
) |\n| V.
HCHK TECHNOLOGIES, INC., HCHK PROPERTY
MANAGEMENT, INC., LEXINGTON PROPERTY AND)
STAFFING, INC., HOLY CITY HONG KONG
VENTURES, LTD., ANTHONY DIBATTISTA,
YVETTE WANG, and BRIAN W. HOFMEISTER,
ASSIGNEE FOR THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS, | )
)
)
)
)
)
)
) |\n| Defendants.
____________________ | )
)
) |\n\n## **ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ORDER REQUIRING PRODUCTION OF G-CLUB DOCUMENTS**\n\n# I. **INTRODUCTION**\n\nBefore the Court is the Memorandum of Law in Support of Chapter 11 Trustee's\n\nArgument that G-Club Operations LLC Has Waived any Privilege and Has No Right to Object to\n\n1The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, the Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\nResponsiveness (the \"Motion\") (ECF No. 86)2 filed by Mr. Luc A. Despins, in his capacity as Chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") for the estate of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok, pursuant to decretal paragraph 6(b) of the Order Approving Chapter 11 Trustee's Settlement with Assignee of HCHK Entities (the \"Order Approving Settlement\") (ECF No. 70). For the reasons stated below, the relief requested in Motion is granted and an order requiring G-Club Operations LLC (\"G-Club\") and/or Mr. Brian Hofmeister, in his capacity as assignee for the benefit of creditors (the \"Assignee\") of HCHK Technologies, Inc. (\"HCHK Tech\"), HCHK Property Management, Inc., and Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc. (collectively, the \"HCHK Entities\") to produce documents possessed, previously as the case may be, by the Assignee, which documents were provided to G-Club by the Assignee pursuant to the Order Approving Settlement.\n\n## II. **BACKGROUND**\n\nOn July 11, 2023 and July 18, 2023, hearings were held on, respectively, the Motion Regarding Settlement with Assignee of HCHK Entities under New York Court Assignment Proceedings (the \"Settlement Motion\") (Main Case ECF No. 1936; ECF No. 25) and a revised proposed order (the \"Revised Proposed Order\") regarding the Settlement Motion (Main Case ECF No. 2004; ECF No. 55), both filed by the Trustee. G-Club filed objections to the Settlement Motion and the Revised Proposed Order. (Main Case ECF Nos. 1977, 2007.) On July 28, 2023, the Court entered the Order Approving Settlement, which granted the Settlement Motion and approved the settlement between the Trustee and the Assignee. (Main Case ECF No. 2038; ECF No. 70.)\n\n2 References to the docket in this adversary proceeding will be styled \"ECF.\" References to the docket in the main case, *In re Kwok,* Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), will be styled \"Main Case ECF.\"\n\nParagraph 6 of the Order Approving Settlement addressed to G-Club's only remaining objection to the Settlement Motion *(see* Main Case ECF No. 2030, at 128:5-48:8) by setting a briefing schedule whereby the Trustee and G-Club would contest whether G-Club had the right to review G-Club documents in the possession of the Assignee for responsiveness to the Rule 2004 subpoena served on G-Club and for privilege prior to the documents being produced to the Trustee. (Main Case ECF No. 2038 ~ 6; ECF No. 70 ~ 6.) On August 11, 2023, the Trustee timely filed the Motion arguing that G-Club did not have any right to review the documents for either responsiveness or privilege. (ECF No. 87.) On September 29, 2023, after certain developments *(see* Main Case ECF No. 2237), G-Club filed a response to the Trustee's memorandum (Main Case ECF No. 2244), arguing that G-Club had rights to review the documents for both responsiveness and privilege.\n\nOn October 24, 2023, a hearing was held on the arguments raised by the Trustee in the Motion. The Trustee and G-Club both appeared and argued their respective positions. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the matter under advisement.\n\nThe dispute between the Trustee and G-Club is ripe for decision.\n\n### **III. JURISDICTION**\n\nThe United States District Court for the District of Connecticut has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). This Court has authority to hear and determine this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) and the Order of Reference of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut dated September 21, 1984. The instant adversary proceeding in which the instant discovery dispute arises is a statutorily core proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (E), (0).\n\nVenue in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.\n\n## **IV. DISCUSSION3**\n\nAt the outset, the Trustee and O-Club dispute the terms of the Order Approving Settlement and whether the Motion seeks relief from that order. The Trustee argues that the Order Approving Settlement provided for the parties to litigate the issues raised by the Motion. O-Club argues that it determined the issues in O-Club's favor. The Trustee is clearly correct. While decretal paragraph 6(a) of the Order Approving Settlement provides that the Assignee was to provide O-Club access to O-Club's documents in his possession and G-Club was afforded the opportunity to check for responsiveness to the Rule 2004 subpoena served on G-Club and privilege before producing the documents to the Trustee, decretal paragraph 6(b) provides that the Trustee and O-Club were to brief whether or not G-Club had any right to check the documents for responsiveness and/or privilege before G-Club and/or the Assignee produced them to the Trustee. Essentially, the Order Approving Settlement reserved the issues while providing a mechanism for discovery to continue pending a determination of the issues presently before the Court.\n\nThe Court did not previously decide the issues in G-Club's favor and will consider the parties' arguments regarding responsiveness and privilege below.\n\n### **A. Responsiveness**\n\nThe Trustee argues that O-Club cannot object to the Assignee's production of the HCHK Entities' documents pursuant to the Order Approving Settlement on the basis that such documents are not responsive to the Rule 2004 subpoena served on G-Club in Mr. Kwok's Chapter 11 case. Rather than relating to the G-Club subpoena, the Trustee contends, the\n\n3 The following constitutes the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Court pursuant to Rule 7052 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, made applicable by Rule 7001 in adversary proceedings.\n\nsettlement reached with the Assignee relates to the discovery the Trustee would have otherwise pursued in this adversary proceeding and the Rule 2004 subpoena served on HCHK Tech in Mr. Kwok's Chapter 11 case.\n\nG-Club responds that the Trustee cannot obtain G-Club's property through discovery from HCHK Tech. Therefore, G-Club argues, the Trustee may only obtain documents from G-Club pursuant to the Rule 2004 subpoena served on it, subject to a responsiveness review by G-Club.\n\nThe Court agrees with the Trustee. First, the instant dispute is separate and distinct from the dispute over G-Club's compliance with the Rule 2004 subpoena served on it. The HCHK Entities provided the Assignee with the authority to settle with the Trustee in the deeds of assignment. *(See, e.g.,* Complaint Ex. 13, Affidavit and Petition of Brian Hofmeister Ex. B, § 4.) The Assignee did so: the Order Approving Settlement approved a settlement between the Trustee and the Assignee regarding this adversary proceeding and, in pertinent part, discovery therein not a settlement between the Trustee and G-Club regarding discovery in Mr. Kwok's Chapter 11 case.\n\nIn this adversary proceeding, the Trustee alleges that the HCHK Entities are the *alter egos* of Mr. Kwok and/or Mr. Kwok beneficially owns the HCHK Entities and/or their assets. The Trustee additionally alleges that Mr. Kwok operates a tangled network of entities, relatives, and loyal followers to hide assets from his creditors. G-Club is allegedly one of those entities. But for the settlement with the Assignee, the Trustee would have pursued discovery from the HCHK Entities relating to their connection to G-Club. Indeed, the Trustee sought such discovery pre-litigation through the service of Rule 2004 subpoenas. The settlement between the Assignee and the Trustee seeks to resolve discovery issues between the Trustee and the HCHK\n\n5\n\nEntities. The Rule 2004 subpoena served on G-Club is a separate issue and does not provide a basis for G-Club to object to the Assignee producing G-Club documents to the Trustee pursuant to the settlement.\n\nSecond, the Assignee, with the powers and rights assigned to him by HCHK Tech, may disclose G-Club documents. (Complaint Ex. 13, Affidavit and Petition of Brian Hofmeister Ex. B, §§ 1, 4.) Under the terms of the Master Services Agreement (the \"MSA\") between HCHK Tech and G-Club, the Assignee may disclose G-Club's documents to a third party as required by law. (Mot. Ex. A, § 6.2.)\n\nBefore such disclosure, however, the Assignee must inform G-Club to provide an opportunity for G-Club to seek a protective order or other appropriate relief. The Assignee has complied with his obligations under the MSA. G-Club was provided notice of the Settlement Motion, which was filed in Mr. Kwok's Chapter 11 case pursuant to D. Conn. L. Bankr. R. 9019- 1 (a)(2) - in which G-Club receives notice through electronic notice and service upon appearing counsel - as well as in this adversary proceeding. Indeed, G-Club initially objected on confidentiality grounds in line with the provisions of the MSA - as well as on responsiveness and privilege grounds. At the final hearing, however, G-Club abandoned its confidentiality objection because under the Revised Proposed Order, the Assignee would designate produced documents as \"confidential\" under the protective order entered in Mr. Kwok' s Chapter 11 case (Main Case ECF No. 923). (Main Case ECF No. 2030, Hr'g Tr. at 128:5-48:8.) As the abandonment of this objection demonstrates, the settlement protects G-Club as envisioned by the MSA.\n\nFor all these reasons, the Court concludes that the Assignee may produce G-Club's documents without such documents being subject to G-Club's review for responsiveness to the\n\n6\n\nRule 2004 subpoena served on G-Club in Mr. Kwok's Chapter 11 case. G-Club must, therefore, turn over to the Trustee the documents the Assignee produced to them pursuant to decretal paragraph 6a of the Order Approving Settlement without regard to whether any documents are responsive to the Rule 2004 subpoena served on it.\n\n### **B. Privilege**\n\nThe Trustee argues that G-Club has waived any privilege in the documents in the custody, control, and/or possession of the Assignee at the time of his settlement with the Trustee. G-Club, the Trustee asserts, waived any and all privilege in the documents when, first, G-Club entered into the MSA with HCHK Tech, wherein the Trustee contends HCHK Tech agreed to provide services beyond mere hosting of G-Club's documents and was provided access to those documents; second, G-club failed to object to the assignment of, allegedly, substantially all HCHK Tech's property to the Assignee, including G-Club's documents; and, third, G-Club failed to object to the Assignee's motion to sell HCHK Tech's assets to G-News Operations, LLC (\"G-News\").\n\nG-Club responds that the present facts and circumstances do not support the conclusion that G-Club has waived any privilege. Namely, G-Club argues that, notwithstanding the terms of the MSA, HCHK Tech merely hosted G-Club documents and did not access them; and G-Club's time to object to the assignment of HCHK Tech's assets to the Assignee and the proposed sale to G-News had not elapsed at the time the Court entered the temporary restraining order regarding the prosecution of the assignment proceedings. G-Club analogizes HCHK Tech's services to G-Club to Microsoft Corporation's (\"Microsoft\") provision of cloud storage and cloud-based office software to myriad individuals and entities and warns that an adverse ruling would have farreaching implications contrary to established law.\n\nThe Comi agrees with the Trustee.\n\n\"[A]s with all privileges, the person claiming the attorney client privilege has the burden of establishing all essential elements.\" *In re Horowitz,* 482 F .2d 72, 82 (2d Cir. 1973) ( citing *United States v. Kovel,* 296 F.2d 918, 923 (2d Cir. 1961 )). \"The party asserting the privilege ... bears the burden of establishing\" that the communications to be protected are \"communications (1) between a client and his or her attorney (2) that are intended to be, and in fact were, kept confidential (3) for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal advice.\" *United States v. Mejia,* 655 F.3d 126, 132 (2d Cir. 2011); *see Strougo v. BEA Assocs.,* 199 F.R.D. 515, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ( citing *United States v. Constr. Prod. Rsch., Inc.,* 73 F .3d 464,473 (2d Cir. 1996)). \"A party seeking the protections of the attorney-client privilege must affirmatively act to protect her communications.\" *Nice.faro v. UBS Glob. Asset Agmt. Ams., Inc.,* 20 F. Supp. 3d 428,437 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). Undertaking actions that \"'will predictably lead to the disclosure' of privileged communications\" results in waiver of the attorney-client privilege, *Nice.fora,* 20 F. Supp. 3d at 437; *see Horowitz,* 482 F.2d at 82, \"unless such disclosure was 'necessary, or at least highly useful, for the effective consultation between the client and the lawyer which the privilege is designed to permit\"', *Strougo,* 199 **F.R.D.** at 522 (citing case quoting *Kovel,* 296 F.2d at 922). Nevertheless, \"this extension [under *Kovel]* has always been a cabined one, and '[t]o that end, the privilege protects communications between a client and an attorney, not communications that prove impotiant to an attorney's legal advice to a client.\"' *Mejia,* 655 F.3d at 132 (citing *United States v. Ackert,* 169 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir. 1999)); *see Horowitz,* 482 F.2d at 80-82 ( distinguishing *Kovel).*\n\nThe '\"common interest' doctrine\" presents an exception to waiver where multiple parties are represented by the same counsel and \"working together ... towards a common goal\" or are\n\n8\n\nrepresented by different counsel engaged in \"a common legal enterprise\" such that \"the nature of the [ shared] interest be identical, not similar, and be legal, not solely commercial.\" *Strougo,* 199 F.R.D. at 520 (internal citations omitted). Nevertheless, the attorney-client privilege \"ought to be strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle.\" *Horowitz,* 482 F.2d at 81; *see Mejia,* 655 F.3d at 132.\n\nIn this case, the Affidavit and Petition of Brain Hofmeister similarly states that HCHK Tech provided \"a la carte consulting services across Technology, Product Development, Engineering, Human Resources, Recruitment, Legal, Finance, and R&D.\" (Complaint Ex. 13, Affidavit and Petition of Brian Hofmeister 1 4.) G-Club was a consumer of these wide-ranging services pursuant to the terms of the MSA. *(Id.* Ex. 13, Affidavit and Petition of Brian Hofmeister 1 5.) HCHK Tech provided those services as an independent contractor. (Mot. Ex. A, § 10.1.) Section 1.1 of the MSA states that the services HCHK Tech will provide to G-Club are listed on an exhibit to the MSA. *(Id.* Ex. A, § 1.1.) Exhibit A to the MSA lists five categories of service in addition to information technology support services, the sole category of service acknowledged by G-Club in its arguments. *(Id.* Ex. A, Ex. A.) Additional categories of service include, among other things, legal services, human resources services, financial services, and engineering/development services. *(Id.* Ex. A, Ex. A.) Section 6.2 of the MSA makes clear that HCHK Tech may use G-Club's documents in the course of providing the services listed on exhibit A to the agreement. *(Id.* Ex. A, § 6.2.) Despite G-Club's assertions to the contrary, HCHK Tech's relationship to G-Club is disanalogous to the relationships Microsoft has with the average consumer of its cloud services and cloud-based office software.\n\nFor that reason, *Metro Storage International v. Harron,* 275 A.2d 810, 868-72 (Del. Ch. 2022), cited by G-Club, is not persuasive on the instant facts. In that case, in pertinent part, the\n\nemployee defendant argued that the corporate plaintiffs' argument that he had breached confidentiality provisions in the plaintiffs' operating agreements through, *inter alia,* arguing that the plaintiffs had waived confidentiality by sharing their documents with a non-party corporation. *Harron,* 275 A.2d at 822-24, 868, 870-71. In *Harron,* the non-party corporation provided property management and related services as well as information technology services and stored all of the plaintiffs' electronic documents on its servers. *Id.* at 870-71. The Delaware Court of Chancety equated these technical services to those of, *e.g.,* g-mail or Microsoft 365, *Id.* at 871 n. 35, and held that the non-party was the plaintiffs' agent bound to maintain the confidentiality of the documents and, hence, in sharing the documents with the non-party did not constitute a waiver of confidentiality, *Id.* at 871.\n\nAs discussed above, however, unlike in *Harron,* in this case, HCHK Tech provided \"a la carte\" services over a variety of fields under the MSA, including fields that would require it to access the contents of the documents. (Mot. Ex. A, Ex. A.) Notwithstanding the terms of the MSA, G-Club argues that HCHK Tech was only the information technology manager for G-Club's domain name and did not have access to the documents. (ECF 168, Hr'g Tr. at 34:10- 37: 13.) G-Club provides no evidence supporting this assertion and contradicting the MSA. G-Club additionally contends the Trustee has not proven that HCHK Tech accessed G-Club's documents. *(Id.)* In making these arguments, G-Club attempts to shirk its burden. *Mejia,* 655 F.3d at 132; *Horowitz,* 482 F.2d at 82; *Kovel,* 296 F.2d at 923; *Strougo,* 199 F.R.D. at 519. The Comi declines to follow G-Club into error.\n\nThe burden is not on the Trustee to prove that HCHK accessed documents. Indeed, the Second Circuit held in *Horowitz* that a party waived the attorney-client privilege where he \"treated the communications between himself and counsel on the same basis as all other records,\n\nwith Horowitz, who was an independent contractor and not a servant, having a free run to look at what he pleased,\" 482 F.2d at 82, despite noting that \"[t]he record concerning Horowitz' use of the files containing communications between the Kassers and lawyers is meagre,\" *id.* at 80, and acknowledging Horowitz's contradictory testimony. The former was the basis of the holding in *Horowitz,* not the latter. *Id.* at 82.\n\nG-Club has not sought to fit its disclosure of privileged documents to HCHK Tech within an exception to waiver. G-Club makes no argument that disclosure to HCHK Tech was either necessary or highly useful in its consultation with its counsel. Similarly, G-Club makes no argument that HCHK Tech and G-Club share a common legal interest, either in shared representation or as part of a shared legal enterprise.\n\nTherefore, the Court concludes that through disclosure of its communications with HCHK Tech, G-Club waived the attorney-client privilege. Moreover, while it is true that G-Club's time to object to the assignment proceedings and/or the proposed sale of, *inter alia,* HCHK Tech to G-News through said assignment proceedings had not passed before the issuance of the temporary restraining order in this adversary proceeding, the Trustee is correct that G-Club has not established that it had any intent to oppose either the assignment or the sale. This further establishes that G-Club has treated its communications in ways that \"'predictably lead to the disclosure' of privileged communications.\" *Niceforo,* 20 F. Supp. 3d at 437; *see Horowitz,* 482 F .2d at 82.\n\nFor all these reasons, the Court concludes that G-Club has not met its burden to establish that the attorney-client privilege applies. The Assignee may produce G-Club's documents without such documents being subject to G-Club's review for privilege. G-Club must, therefore, turn over to the Trustee the documents the Assignee produced to them pursuant to decretal\n\nparagraph 6a of the Order Approving Settlement without regard to whether any documents are privileged.\n\n## **V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER**\n\nAccordingly, for the reasons stated above, it is hereby\n\n**ORDERED:** The relief requested in the Motion is **GRANTED.** On or before November 17, 2023, G-Club shall make available to the Trustee all documents provided to G-Club by the Assignee in accordance with paragraph 6(a) of the Order Approving Settlement; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** On or before November 17, 2023, the Assignee shall make available to the Trustee all copies retained by the Assignee of documents provided to G-Club by the Assignee in accordance with paragraph 6(a) of the Order Approving Settlement; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** All documents produced to the Trustee pursuant to this order shall be considered documents designated as \"confidential\" and subject to the protective order entered as ECF No. 923 in the jointly administered cases captioned *In re Kwok,* Case 22-50073 (JAM); and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** On or before November 14, 2023, the Trustee shall serve this Order on G-Club and the Assignee. On or before November, 15, 2023, the Trustee shall file a certificate of service evidencing compliance with this Order.\n\nDated at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 13th day of November, 2023.\n\n# Exhibit D\n\n| UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
BRIDGEPORT DIVISION
----------------------------------------------------------------x | | | | |\n|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|--|--|--|\n| In re: | Chapter 11 | | | |\n| 1
HO WAN KWOK, etal., | Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) | | | |\n| Debtors. | (Jointly Administered) | | | |\n| ----------------------------------------------------------------x
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11
TRUSTEE,
Plaintiff,
v. | Adv. Proceeding No. 23-05013 (JAM) | | | |\n| HCHK TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
HCHK PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC.,
LEXINGTON PROPERTY AND STAFFING, INC.,:
HOLY CITY HONG KONG VENTURES, LTD.,
ANTHONY DIBATTISTA, YVETTE WANG,
and BRIAN HOFMEISTER (in his capacity
as assignee), | | | | |\n| Defendants. | | | | |\n| ----------------------------------------------------------------x | | | | |\n\n# **MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE'S ARGUMENT THAT G-CLUB OPERATIONS LLC HAS WAIVED ANY PRIVILEGE AND HAS NO RIGHT TO OBJECT TO RESPONSIVENESS AS TOG-CLUB DOCUMENTS TURNED OVER FROM THE ASSIGNEE OF HCHK TECHNOLOGIES, INC. TO THE TRUSTEE PURSUANT TO BANKRUPTCY RULE 9019 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT**\n\nThe Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and the Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\nLuc A. Despins, in his capacity as the chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") appointed in the chapter 11 case (the \"Chapter 11 Case\") of Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\" or \"Kwok\"), files this Memorandum of Law (the \"Memorandum\") in support of the Trustee's argument that G-Club Operations LLC (\"G-Club\") should not be permitted to prevent the turnover of HCHK Technologies, Inc.'s (\"HCHK Technologies\") corporate records from the Assignee of the HCHK Entities2to the Trustee as part of the Trustee's Rule 9019 Settlement Agreement, based on G-Club' s assertion that documents it assetis are G-Club property are either privileged or nonresponsive to the Rule 2004 Subpoena served upon G-Club. In support of this Memorandum, the Trustee states as follows:\n\n## **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\nl. G-Club seeks to prevent the turnover of portions ofHCHK Technologies' corporate documents under the Rule 9019 Settlement Agreement on grounds that such documents are nonresponsive to the Rule 2004 Subpoena served upon G-Club, and that G-Club maintains a privilege over a subset of the documents. Neither argument has merit.\n\n2. First, regardless of whether the documents at issue are responsive to the Rule 2004 Subpoena the Trustee served on G-Club, there is no question they are responsive to the Rule 2004 Subpoena the Trustee served *upon HCHK Technologies.* The Rule 2004 requests to HCHK Technologies specifically sought documents related to Kwok-affiliated entities, the Debtor, his family, his agents (including Yvette Wang, the 99.999% owner of HCHK Technologies), and any assets, funds or business transactions related to such entities and individuals. These requests plainly encompass documents related to G-Club, which the Trustee has alleged to be a Debtorcontrolled entity. Despite this-and the fact that it is now known that HCHK Technologies had\n\nCapitalized terms not yet defined take the meaning assigned to them below.\n\ntens of thousands of responsive documents-its former counsel produced less than 150 documents total and only a single document related to G-Club. All additional documents of HCHK Technologies related to G-Club must be produced.\n\n3. Requiring HCHK Technologies to produce these documents also promotes judicial efficiency. A key aspect of the Rule 9019 Settlement Agreement was to preserve the Chapter 11 estate's resources, including those that would be expended on contested discovery. If the Trustee is not able obtain HCHK Technologies' documents under the settlement agreement, he would need to pursue burdensome and costly formal discovery against HCHK Technologies in connection with the litigation of his alter-ego and equitable ownership claims, including to obtain documents related to the Debtor's movement of funds through entities he owns and controls. Such documents squarely would have included documents related to G-Club: an entity this Couti has found to be controlled by the Debtor and which the Government alleges in the criminal indictment of the Debtor (and his co-conspirators Yvette Wang and William Je) was a pillar of his fraudulent movement of funds. Given the need for the production of these documents without the attendant costs of discovery, the parties agreed that it was most efficient to simply allow the Trustee access to HCHK Technologies' corporate records.\n\n4. For these reasons, G-Club cannot prevent the disclosure of HCHK Technologies' documents to the Trustee on the basis that the documents may not be responsive to the Rule 2004 Subpoena served upon G-Club.\n\n5. Second, no privilege prevents disclosure of the documents. Any privilege that G-Club may have had over the documents in HCHK Technologies' possession was waived, first, when they were freely shared with HCHK Technologies for the myriad of services G-Club outsourced to HCHK Technologies, and, again, when those documents were provided to the\n\nAssignee and then G-News. Having freely shared its allegedly privileged documents with three third-parties, G-Club cannot now claim the documents are privileged to keep them from the Trustee.\n\n## **FACTUAL BACKGROUND**\n\n6. The Court is quite familiar with the underlying facts relating to the HCHK Entities' 3 assignment proceedings initiated in New York state court by Brian Hofmeister (the \"Assignee\"), the Assignee's submission of a verified petition (the \"Application\") seeking entry of an order authorizing and approving his entry into an Interim Management Agreement (\"IMA\") with G-News Operations, LLC (\"G-News\"), the Trustee's adversary proceeding brought against the HCHK Entities and the Assignee (the \"Adversary Proceeding\") [Adv. Proc. 23-05013, Docket No. 1], and the Assignee's subsequent settlement agreement with the Trustee (the \"Rule 9019 Settlement Agreement\"), G-Club's objections, and the resulting hearings. Accordingly, in the interest of judicial economy, the Trustee will only highlight here those facts directly pertinent to the issue in this Memorandum.\n\n7. On December 7, 2022, the Trustee served a Rule 2004 Subpoena on HCHK Technologies. 4 Pursuant to that Subpoena, the Trustee received a document production from HCHK Technologies on or around March 10, 2023, containing a total of 148 total documents. Only one of those documents, an Excel spreadsheet, mentions G-Club in passing.\n\n8. In the wake of the Trustee's action in response to the assignment proceedings, and following the Comi's Order granting a temporary restraining order, the Trustee and the Assignee\n\n"HCHK Entities\" is defined as HCHK Technologies, HCHK Property Management, Inc. (\"HCHK Property\"), and Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc. (\"Lexington Property\").\n\nThe Affidavit of Service is attached hereto as **Exhibit C.** The Subpoena and document requests served on HCHK Technologies is attached hereto as **Exhibit D.**\n\nengaged in good faith discussions resulting in the Rule 9019 Settlement Agreement, which was designed to (I) transfer, on an interim basis and pending the outcome of the Adversary Proceeding, over \\$38 million of the HCHK Entities' cash, currently held in accounts controlled by the Assignee, into accounts controlled by the Trustee and (2) provide for the resolution of other open issues related to the Adversary Proceeding, including providing for the turnover by the Assignee of all non-privileged corporate records and other documents pertaining to the HCHK Entities to the Trustee. This provision was of upmost importance to the Rule 9019 Settlement Agreement because it allowed both sides to avoid the costs associated with the Trustee's need for discovery from the HCHK Entities, while also ensuring the Trustee had access to all of the documents in the possession of the HCHK Entities that are relevant to the Trustee's claims that the HCHK Entities are alter egos of, and equitably owned by, the Debtor.\n\n9. On July 5, 2023, G-Club filed *G-Club Operations LLC's Notice RE: Motion, Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019, Regarding Settlement with Assignee of HCHK Entities Under New York Court Assignment Proceedings* [Main Case Docket No. 1977] (the \"G-Club Notice\"). The G-Club Notice informed the Court that HCHK Technologies is in possession of G-Club confidential information and documents as a result of HCHK Technologies \"administer[ing] and manag[ing] G Club's emails and other applications\" pursuant to a Master Services Agreement 5 between G-Club and HCHK Technologies. 6 The G-Club Notice also requested that HCHK Technologies return to G-Club all of G-Club's confidential information and documents prior to\n\nof the Master Services A eement between G-Club and HCHK Technolo ies is attached hereto as **Exhibit**\n\nSee G-Club Notice at **,i** 4.\n\nturnover to the Trustee Pursuant to the Rule 9019 Settlement Agreement to enable G-Club to review and provide responsive information to the Trustee pursuant to the Trustee's Rule 2004 Subpoena served on G-Club. 7\n\n10. On July 7, 2023, the Trustee filed an *Omnibus Reply of Chapter 11 Trustee (I) in Support of Motion, Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019, Regarding Settlement With Assignee of HCHK Entities Under New York Court Assignment Proceedings, And (11) In Response to Objections* [Adv. Proc. 23-05013, Docket No. 45].\n\n11. Hearings were held regarding the G-Club Notice and the Rule 9019 Settlement Agreement on July 11, 2023 and July 18, 2023. During the July 18, 2023 hearing, 8counsel for G-Club argued that G-Club was primarily concerned with privileged information, as opposed to confidential information, which would presumably be subject to the Protective Order entered in the main case [Main Case Docket No. 923]. 9\n\n12. On July 28, 2023, the Court entered an *Order Approving, Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019, Chapter II Trustee's Settlement With Assignee of HCHK Entities Under New York Court Assignment Proceedings* [Adv. Proc. 23-05013, Docket No. 70] (the \"Rule 9019 Settlement Order\"). Among other things, the Rule 9019 Settlement Order provided the following:\n\nWithin ten (I 0) days from the date of the entry of this Order, the Assignee shall make available to the Trustee all non-privileged corporate records (including in electronic form) and other documents pertaining to the HCHK Entities in the\n\n*See id.* at **,i** 5. The Trustee served a Rule 2004 subpoena on G-Club (the \"G-Club Subpoena\") on December 9, 2022. On May 18, 2023, the Trustee filed an omnibus motion seeking to compel G-Club, among others, to comply with the G-Club Subpoena (the \"Motion to Compel\") [Main Case Docket No. 1805). On June 26, 2023, the Court entered an order granting the Motion to Compel as to G-Club [Main Case Docket No. 1960).\n\nA copy of the transcript from the July 18, 2023 hearing is attached hereto as **Exhibit B.**\n\n*See* **Ex. B** at 130: 10-18 (Attorney Sklarz on behalf of G-Club said, \"The confidentiality stuff I'm sure we can, you know, I'm sure Attorney Fortis who's been working with Attorney [Luft] to resolve the discovery disputes, I think they're all essentially resolved. We can certainly, you know, we can confer on the issue, but it's really the access and the privilege[d] information that we're most concerned about.\").\n\npossession of the Assignee, except those that were at any point the property of [G-Club] .... Also within ten (10) days from the date of the entry of this Order, the Assignee shall make available to G-Club all corporate records (including in electronic form) and other documents pertaining to the HCHK Entities in the possession of the Assignee, which were at any point the property of G-Club. Upon receipt, G-Club shall immediately review such corporate records and other documents for privilege and responsiveness to the Trustee's Rule 2004 subpoena of G-Club and produce a privilege log and responsiveness log. G-Club may designate materials it will produce to the Trustee as 'confidential' or 'highly confidential' in accordance with the Protective Order. 10\n\n13. The Rule 9019 Settlement Order also ordered the Trustee to file a Memorandum of Law on or before August 11, 2023 in support of his argument that G-Club waived any privilege and has no right to object to responsiveness to the Assignee's turnover of HCHK Technologies'\n\ndocuments related to G-Club pursuant to the 9019 Settlement Order. 11\n\n# **BASIS FOR RELIEF**\n\n# I. **G-Club has no right to object to responsiveness as to documents in possession of HCHK Technologies**\n\n14. G-Club argues it can prevent the production of documents in **HCHK** Technologies' files to the Trustee on grounds that such documents may be non-responsive to the Rule 2004 Subpoena served upon G-Club. 12 This argument fails because the issue of the Trustee's right to review HCHK Technologies' documents is not dependent on what is responsive to G-Club's Subpoena. Rather, the question is whether the documents possessed and controlled by HCHK Technologies, including those deriving from G Club, are responsive to the Trustee's Rule 2004 Subpoena to HCHK Technologies or are related to the Trustee's Adversary Proceeding against\n\n10 Rule 9019 Settlement Order at if 6.\n\n11See id.\n\n12 The Rule 9019 Settlement Order required the Assignee to return to G-Club all documents that are, or were at any point the property of G-Club. To be sure, independent work product from HCHK Technologies that happens to mention G-Club, without more, is not the property of G-Club.\n\nHCHK Technologies. G-Club cannot use its own Rule 2004 Subpoena to prevent the Trustee from obtaining valid Rule 2004 discovery from other patties or from seeking additional discovery in this Adversary Proceeding. 13\n\n# **a.** *HCHK Technologies' documents, including any in its possession from G-Club, are relevant and responsive to HCHK Technologies' own Rule 2004 subpoena*\n\n15. As mentioned above, the Trustee, as pati of his Rule 2004 investigation, served HCHK Technologies with its own Rule 2004 Subpoena. The document requests attached to that Subpoena list G-Club within the Trustee's definition of \"Associated Entities,\" 14and numerous individual requests ask for documents concerning \"Associated Entities.\" 15\n\n16. Despite this, HCHK Technologies' productions to the Trustee have been woefully deficient. The Trustee has only received 148 documents, which do not include the documents related to G-Club despite those documents plainly being responsive to HCHK Technologies' Subpoena.\n\n17. Just as G-Club cannot demand that its documents be deleted from HCHK Technologies in the midst of HCHK Technologies fully complying with a valid subpoena, G-Club should not now be able to prevent HCHK Technologies from turning over responsive documents in its possession in response to its own Rule 2004 Subpoena, even if they originated from G-Club.\n\n# b. *Turnover of HCHK Technologies' documents in lieu of discovery, including any in its possession from G-C/ub, was key aspect of Rule 9019 Settlement Agreement*\n\n13 To the extent the Trustee has misunderstood G-Club 's motivations, and it merely seeks to review for responsiveness to its Rule 2004 Subpoena documents in the possession of HCHK Technologies that it claims are its property *without* preventing the Trustee from reviewing all of HCHK Technologies' corporate records as they are responsive to this Adversary Proceeding and HCHK Technologies' Rule 2004 Subpoena, while finding it redundant, he would not object.\n\n14*See* **Ex. D** at pg. 9\n\n15*See* **Ex. D** at RFPs I, 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, and 18.\n\n18. The agreement to turn over HCHK Technologies' corporate records to the Trustee was intended to avoid undue and unnecessary discovery costs to both parties. It in no way meant that documents otherwise relevant to the Adversary Proceeding and discoverable from HCHK Technologies no longer needed to be produced. Given the Trustee's Adversary Proceeding against HCHK Technologies, if no settlement agreement had been reached, the Trustee would have sought discovery relevant to its claims in the Adversary Proceeding, including the documents concerning G-Club, which are clearly pertinent to linking HCHK Technologies to the Debtor.\n\n19. This Court, in its *Corrected Memorandum of Decision Granting in Part Motion for Preliminary Injunction* (the \"Preliminary Injunction Decision\") [Adv. P. No 22-05032, ECF No. 133], found that the Debtor is the leader of G-Series, which was defined to include G-Club. 16 Similarly, the United States Attorney's Office in its criminal indictment of the Debtor, alleges that G-Club was one of the entities used in the four pillars of the Debtor's massive fraud scheme to enrich himself (at the expense of his creditors and victims). 17 Accordingly, documents at HCHK Technologies relating to G-Club, are responsive and powerful discovery in this action.\n\n20. HCHK Technologies' whole business purports to be the provision of business services to companies the Trustee believes are all strongly linked to the Debtor. The Trustee believes that HCHK Technologies' documents will show that in fact, not only was it an operating hub for the Debtor's businesses, but it was a pass through for monies he was attaining through his \"business\" activities that he used in part to fund his opulent lifestyle, including throughout the period of this bankruptcy proceeding. Getting documents related to the services provided, and to\n\n16*See* Preliminary Injunction Decision at pgs. 10-11.\n\n17*See USA v. Ho Wan K11*1*ok and Kin 1vfing Je, Sealed Indictment,* United States District Court Southern District of New York, l:23-cr-00118-AT (March 6, 2023) **at112;** 14-15.\n\nwhich entities those services were provided, including for G-Club, is at the center of the Trustee's Adversary Proceeding against HCHK Technologies. G-Club cannot prevent the turnover of these documents based on whether they are also responsive to G-Club's Subpoena.\n\n21. Finally, it is likely not coincidental that the Trustee just received a letter from counsel for Gettr, which, like G-Club, the Trustee contends is another Debtor-controlled entity, demanding that HCHK Technologies return all of its documents before the Trustee can review them. It appears the new strategy for entities like G-Club and Gettr is to demand the return of their documents, with the goal being that if all \"clients\" of HCHK Technologies demand the return of their documents prior to the Trustee's ability to review them, there will be no documents left. The Court should see through this gamesmanship and order that all the documents be produced.\n\n# **II. G-Club has waived any privilege as to its documents in possession of HCHK Technologies** 18\n\n22. \"A party asserting the attorney-client privilege bears the burden of showing: '(I) a communication between client and counsel, which (2) was intended to be and was in fact kept confidential, and (3) made for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal advice.\"' *Strougo v. BEA Assocs.,* 199 F.R.D. 515, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citations omitted). \"The privilege 'exists to protect not only the giving of professional advice to those who can act on it, but also the giving of information to the lawyer to enable the lawyer to give sound and informed advice.\"' *Id.* (citation omitted). The attorney-client privilege applies to both individuals and corporate entities. *See id.*\n\n23. The common interest doctrine protects some communications that would otherwise waive the attorney-client privilege, and \"typically applies where multiple persons are represented\n\n18 The Trustee reserves all rights to challenge G-Club's assertion of privilege as to specific documents if the Court finds that no waiver occurred.\n\nby the same party[.]\" *Id.* at 520. The common interest doctrine can also apply where parties are represented by separate counsel that engage in a common legal enterprise. *See id.*\n\nThe key consideration is that the nature of the interest be identical, not similar, and be legal, not solely commercial. The fact that there may be an overlap of a commercial and legal interest for a third party does not negate the effect of the legal interest in establishing a community of interest.\n\n*North River Ins. Co. v. Columbia Cas. Co.,* 1995 WL 5792, at \\*3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 1995) (internal quotation omitted). \"What is impo1iant is not whether the parties theoretically share similar interests but rather whether they demonstrate actual cooperation toward a common legal goal.\" *Id.* at \\*4.\n\n24. \"A party seeking the protections of the attorney-client privilege must affirmatively act to protect her communications.\" *Niceforo v. UBS Glob. Asset Mgmt. Americas, Inc.,* 20 F. Supp. 3d 428, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citation omitted) (even if the contents of employee's notebook, which was kept in employee's desk, were privileged, employee waived any claim of privilege by delaying her attempts to seek the return of the notebook for more than 15 months after her termination, despite having several opp01iunities to do so).\n\n25. \"[V]oluntarily disclosing the information contained in the documents to nonparties waives the attorney-client privilege, unless such disclosure was 'necessary, or at least highly useful, for the effective consultation between the client and the lawyer which the privilege is designed to permit.\"' *Strougo,* 199 F.R.D. at 522 (citation omitted). *See also United States v. Kovel,* 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir.1961) (disclosure to outside accountant whose advice was necessary to litigation preparation did not waive privilege). However, the *Kovel* doctrine \"has always been a cabined one, and 'to that end, the privilege protects communications between a client and an attorney, not communications that prove important to an attorney's legal advice to a client.\"' *United States v. Mejia,* 655 F.3d 126, 132 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). *See also United States*\n\n*v. Ackert,* 169 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir.1999) (third party involvement must be necessary \"to improve the comprehension of the communication between attorney and client.\"); *Ampa Ltd. v. Kentjield Capital LLC, No. 00 Civ. 0508 NRB AJP,* 2000 WL 1156860, \\* 1 (S.D.N. Y. Aug. 16, 2000) (board minutes not privileged where outside accountant was present and not involved in legal issue discussed).\n\n26. Here, G-Club has waived any privilege as to its documents in possession of HCHK Technologies because G-Club voluntarily disclosed the contents of those documents to three thirdpaiiies. G-Club should not now be able to asseti privilege to prevent the Trustee from receiving its documents when it has both waived the privilege and shown absolutely no regard for preserving it previously.\n\n## a. *G-Club waived any privilege to its documents provided to HCHK Technologies*\n\n27. G-Club waived privilege to the documents in question when it voluntarily gave HCHK Technologies, a third-party, access to its allegedly privileged documents. Having chosen to share its purportedly privileged information with HCHK Technologies, thus waiving any attorney-client privilege, it cannot now seek to have those documents treated as privileged again with the hope of now preventing their disclosure to the Trustee.\n\n28. G-Club told the Court that HCHK Technologies provided mere \"IT services including cloud computing services, data hosting and email hosting\" 19and \"administered and managed G Club's emails and other applications.\" 20\n\n19 Ex.Batl28:10-ll.\n\n20G-Club Notice at **,r** 4.\n\n\n\n29. G-Club cannot give HCHK Technologies access to its documents and still retain privilege over them. *See Ackert,* 169 F.3d at 139 (2d Cir.1999) (third party involvement must be necessary \"to improve the comprehension of the communication between attorney and client.\"); *Ampa ltd.,* 2000 WL at \\* 1 (board minutes not privileged where outside accountant was present and not involved in legal issue discussed). *See also In re Horowitz,* 482 F.2d 72, 82 (2d Cir. 1973) (privilege waived where documents were indiscriminately mingled with other routine documents and no special protections were made as to the potentially privileged records, and accountant, an independent contractor, was given free rein to examine all records).\n\n# **b.** *Appointment of Assignee resulted in waiver of any remaining privilege*\n\n30. To the extent G-Club asserts (wrongly) that the privilege had not already been waived, the privilege was waived when HCHK Technologies assigned all of its assets (including\n\n\n\nG-Club's documents) to the Assignee, another third-party who had free rein over all G-Club documents.\n\n31. G-Club did not object to its documents being assigned to the Assignee, and the Assignee's possession and free rein over G-Club's documents supports an independent finding of waiver. To the extent G-Club asserts that HCHK Technologies is not a true third-party to effectuate waiver because G-Club shares a common interest with HCHK Technologies, due to both entities' relationship to the Debtor, any common interest would cease to exist when the independent Assignee assumed control of the HCHK Entities. 24\n\n# **c.** *G-Club failed to object to asset sale of HCHK Technologies to G-News*\n\n32. Under the Application and IM Agreement, G-News, yet another third-party, intended to acquire substantially all of HCHK Technologies' assets (including G-Club's corporate records) and gain operational control of HCHK Technologies. As part of that agreement, G-News was granted operational control ofHCHK Technologies for an interim period, exposing all G-Club documents to G-News. G-Club did not secure and claw back its documents prior to this, which it would have done had it truly been concerned about protecting its allegedly privileged documents from third-parties. G-Club should not be permitted to selectively assert its alleged privileged. *See Niceforo,* 20 F. Supp. at 437 (\"A party seeking the protections of the attorney-client privilege must affirmatively act to protect her communications.\").\n\n# *[Remainder of Page Intentionally Left Blank]*\n\n24The Trustee notes that such an argument also fails because this is not a common interest over a legal issue, as is required to assert the common interest privilege.\n\nWHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the Trustee respectfully requests entry of an order holding that G-Club Operations LLC has waived any privilege and has no right to object to responsiveness as to G-Club documents turned over from the Assignee of HCHK Technologies, Inc. to the Trustee pursuant to a Bankruptcy Rule 9019 Settlement Agreement and such other relief as is just and proper.\n\nDated: August 11, 2023 New Haven, Connecticut LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTERllTRUSTEE\n\nBy: *Isl Avram E. Luft*\n\nAvram E. Luft (admitted *pro hac vice)* Douglass Barron (admitted *pro hac vice)* PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park A venue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6079 aviluft@paulhastings.com douglassbarron@paulhastings.com\n\n*and*\n\nNicholas A. Bassett (admitted *pro hac vice)* PAUL HASTINGS **LLP** 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C., 20036 (202) 551-1902 nic ho las bassett@pau !hastings. com\n\n*and*\n\nPatrick R. Linsey (ct29437) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 781-2847 plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n*Counsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee*\n\n| UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
BRIDGEPORT DIVISION
----------------------------------------------------------------x | |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|\n| In re: | Chapter 11 |\n| HO WAN KWOK, et al., 1 | Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |\n| Debtors. | (Jointly Administered) |\n| ----------------------------------------------------------------x
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11
TRUSTEE,
Plaintiff,
V.
HCHK TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
HCHK PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC., | Adv. Proceeding No. 23-05013 (JAM) |\n| LEXINGTON PROPERTY AND STAFFING, INC.,:
HOLY CITY HONG KONG VENTURES, LTD.,
ANTHONY DIBATTISTA, YVETTE WANG,
and BRIAN HOFMEISTER (in his capacity
as assignee), | |\n| Defendants.
----------------------------------------------------------------x | |\n\n## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nThe undersigned hereby certifies that on August 11, 2023, the foregoing *Memorandum of Law in Support of Chapter 11 Trustee's Argument that G-Club Operations LLC has Waived Any*\n\n*Privilege and has No Right to Object to Responsiveness as to G-Club Documents Turned Over*\n\nThe Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and the Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park A venue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\n*From the Assignee of HCHK Technologies, Inc. to the Trustee Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 Settlement Agreement* was electronically filed. Notice of this filing was sent by e-mail to all parties to the above-captioned chapter 11 case by operation of the Court's electronic filing (\"CM/ECF\") system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as indicated on the Notice of Electronic Filing.2Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF system.\n\nDated: August 11, 2023 New Haven, Connecticut LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER II TRUSTEE\n\nBy: *Isl Avram E. Luft*\n\nAvram E. Luft (admitted *pro hac vice)* Douglass Barron (admitted *pro hac vice)* PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park A venue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6079 aviluft@paulhastings.com douglass barro n@pau !hastings. com\n\n*and*\n\nNicholas A. Bassett (admitted *pro hac vice)* PAUL HASTINGS **LLP** 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C., 20036 (202) 551-1902 nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n*and*\n\nPatrick **R.** Linsey (ct29437) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 781-2847 plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\nTo the extent that the foregoing was filed outside regular business hours, service by mail on recipients unable or not qualified to accept electronic notice was made on the next business day.\n\n*Counsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee*\n\n# Exhibit E\n\n# **IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\nIn re:\n\nHO WAN KWOK, *eta!.,*\n\nDebtors. 1\n\nChapter 11\n\nCase No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n(Jointly Administered)\n\nSeptember 29, 2023\n\n# **G CLUB OPERATIONS LLC'S RESPONSE TO TRUSTEE'S MEMORANDUM CHALLENGING G CLUB'S PRIVILEGE ASSERTIONS IN DOCUMENTS IN HCHK'S POSSESSION AND OPPOSITION TO THE TRUSTEE'S RELATED PROPOSED ORDER**\n\nG Club Operations LLC **(\"G Club\")** objects to the Chapter 11 Trustee's *Memorandum of*\n\n*Law in Support of Chapter 11 Trustee's Argument that G-Club Operations LLC has Waived any Privilege and has no Right to Object to Responsiveness as to G-Club Documents Turned Over ji·om the Assignee of HCHK Technologies, Inc. to the Trustee Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 Settlement Agreement* (Adv. Proc. 23-05013, ECF No. 86) 2(the \"Memorandum\" or \"Mem.\"). For the reasons set forth below, the Court properly considered the arguments and properly issued an\n\norder that protects G Club's due process rights and does not prejudice the Trustee.\n\n# **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\n1. In its July 28, 2023 Order Approving Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 the Chapter 11 Trustee's Settlement With Assignee of HCHK Entities Under New York Cou1i Assignment Proceedings (ECF No. 2038, the **\"Order\"),** the Court ordered the Assignee to \"make available to G-Club all corporate records (including in electronic form) and other documents\" that\n\n1 The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595) (the \"Debtor\"), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and the Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\n2 G Club refers to Adv. Proc.23-05013 as the \"Adversary Proceeding\" or \"Adv. Proc.\" herein.\n\n\"were at any point the property of G Club.\" (Order **,r** 6(a)). G Club was to \"review such corporate records and other documents for privilege and responsiveness to the Trustee's Rule 2004 subpoena ofG-Club and produce a privilege log and responsiveness log.\" *Id.* The Court's Order thus strikes a balance between G Club's rights and the Chapter 11 Trustee's demands. The procedure set out by the Order is sufficient, and only stands to prevent the Chapter 11 Trustee (the **\"Trustee\")** from reviewing documents that are either privileged or non-responsive documents to which the Trustee is not entitled to review in the first instance.\n\n2. Nevetiheless, the Trustee accuses G Club of \"gamesmanship,\" claiming its \"goal\" is \"to demand the return of [its] documents\" from its vendor, HCHK Technologies **(\"HCHK\")** so that \"there will be no documents left.\" (Mem. **,r** 21). To date, G Club has produced 124,876 documents to the Trustee and G Club is in the process of finishing its review ahead of a production of an additional 10,000 documents, as well as a privilege log. Thus, the facts contradict the Trustee's assertion that G Club's goal was to prevent the Trustee from reviewing G Club's documents. Instead, the Trustee's efforts to obtain G Club's property through a settlement agreement with a different entity, HCHK, are an attempt to deny G Club its right to determine which documents are responsive and non-privileged and circumvent the proper and orderly process by which document review and production is conducted.\n\n3. Contrary to the Trustee's assertions, which lack basis in both fact and law, G Club has not waived any rights. G Club contracted with HCHK for the administration of a cloud-based storage and email system for its communications (among other services). That system, Microsoft 365, is a cloud-based enterprise system which is routinely utilized by corporations and law firms. That HCHK was the system's administrator is not relevant to G Club's assertion of privilege; the documents were maintained in \"the cloud,\" and the Trustee has made no assertions (nor can he)\n\nthat a single individual other than G Club employees ever reviewed documents maintained on the cloud that hosted G Club domain names. Privileged documents stored in a cloud system administered by a third party simply do not lose their protected status.\n\n4. The Trustee also erroneously claims that *HCHK* must produce G Club documents that are not responsive to the Trustee's subpoena (the **\"Subpoena\")** (Mem. if2), but the Trustee cannot avoid the limits of his own Subpoena. G Club is entitled to perform its review of its own documents in due course like any other party. The Trustee does not get access to any and all documents in existence, to then determine, for himself, what documents are responsive to his own Subpoena or constitute a privileged communication between G Club and its counsel.\n\n5. Recognizing his argument's weaknesses, the Trustee pivots and now argues that G Club documents in HCHK's possession may actually be responsive to the Trustee's subpoena of *HCHK,* complaining that HCHK has turned over fewer than 150 documents. (Mem. **,r,r14,** 16). Conspicuously, while the Memorandum mentions the size of HCHK's production to date three times (Mem. **,r,r** 2, 7, 16), it does not mention the size of G Club's production once, because G Club has complied and continues to comply with its discovery obligations.\n\n6. If the Trustee has an issue with HCHK's document production, that dispute is between the Trustee and HCHK; G Club's documents should not be dragged into that dispute. There is no basis for the Trustee to demand HCHK supplement its own production with any documents, much less privileged and non-responsive documents, that belong to G Club.\n\n### **RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY**\n\n7. In its Order, the Court properly protected G Club's due process rights in connection with the Rule 9019 Settlement by allowing G Club to access its documents. Specifically, the Order stated:\n\nthe Assignee shall make available to G-Club all corporate records (including in electronic form) and other documents pertaining to the HCHK Entities in the possession of the Assignee, which were at any point the property of G-Club. Upon receipt, G-Club shall immediately review such corporate records and other documents for privilege and responsiveness to the Trustee's Rule 2004 subpoena of G-Club and produce a privilege log and responsiveness log. G-Club may designate materials it will produce to the Trustee as \"confidential\" or \"highly confidential\" in accordance with the Protective Order. (Order~ 6(a)).\n\n8. This procedure, as set out by the Court, ensures that G Club can access its information and perform the review that any party undertakes before producing documents. The Order followed the Court's consideration of G Club's submissions and arguments relating the Rule 9019 Motion, including G Club's Notice of Position Regarding 9019 Motion and Proposed Order (ECF No. 1977, the \"Notice\") and G Club's Supplemental Notice to Modify the Revised Proposed Order Relating to Motion, Pursuant to Rule 9019, Re: Settlement with Assignee of HCHK Entities (ECF No. 2007, the \"Supplemental Notice\"). G Club incorporates both Notices herein.\n\n9. The Order also provided an August 11, 2023 deadline for the Trustee to \"file a brief in supp01i of the Trustee's argument that G-Club has waived any privilege and has no right to object to responsiveness.\" (Order~ 6(6)). On August 11, 2023, the Trustee filed the Memorandum in an Adversary Proceeding to which G Club is not a party, and he failed to file the Memorandum in the main case or otherwise serve G Club. *(See* G Club's Opposition to Trustee's Proposed Supplemental Order Regarding G Club Documents Pursuant to Order Approving Chapter 11 Trustee's Settlement With Assignee of HCHK Entities Under New York Court Assignment Proceedings, ECF No. 2233 at 2).\n\n10. When the August 11, 2023 deadline passed without (to G Club's knowledge) a filing from the Trustee on this issue, G Club assumed that the Trustee recognized that the procedure ordered by the Couti would allow it to review any and all non-privileged, responsive documents belonging to G Club in due course and declined to litigate the issue further in the interest of judicial\n\nefficiency and the preservation of the Chapter 11 estate's resources. *(See* Mem. ~ 3 (\"A key aspect of the Rule 9019 Settlement Agreement was to preserve the Chapter 11 estate's resources, including those that would be expended on contested discovery.\")).\n\n11. On September 19, 2023, the Court \"inquired about this issue during a hearing.\" *(See* ECF No. 2237). The Trustee's counsel \"represented it was his belief that the Trustee's counsel was trying to reach out to G-Club to determine the status of this issue.\" *Id.*\n\n12. Without having reached out or connected with G Club's counsel about these documents or his Memorandum before or after September 19, 2023, on September 26, 2023, the Trustee's counsel filed (in the same Adversary Proceeding only) a Proposed Supplemental Order compelling G Club to produce to the Trustee all documents produced to G Club by the Assignee. (Adv. Proc. ECF No. 130, Ex. A). This time, however, counsel for the Trustee emailed one of the three attorneys listed as counsel of record for G Club. The Trustee's September 26, 2023 email was the first, and to date, only, communication G Club has received from the Trustee since the Court's Order.\n\n13. That same day, G Club filed an objection to the Trustee's Proposed Supplemental Order, requesting seven days to respond to the Memorandum. (ECF. No. 2233) On September 28, 2023, the Court sustained the objection in part, giving G Club until 5:00 p.m. on September 29, 2023, to respond to the Memorandum. 3(ECF No. 2237).\n\n## **ARGUMENT**\n\n14. As G Club first stated in its Notice, shortly after the filing of the Rule 9019 Motion, \"[n]othing in the proposed settlement between the Trustee and HCHK Technologies, or in any\n\n3 The Trustee's tactics with respect to the Memorandum, filing it in an Adversary Proceeding to which G Club is not a party and never providing an unredacted copy of the Memorandum to G Club, and the Proposed Supplemental Order, filing it in the same Adversary Proceeding but sending just one of three G Club counsel ofrecord a copy of it by email, give the impression that the Trustee is engaging in, to use the Trustee's word, \"gamesmanship.\"\n\nproposed order, should waive G Club's rights.\" (ECF No. 1977 at **1).** The Trustee's arguments are unavailing for two simple reasons: First, G Club has not waived any privilege through the use of IT services. Indeed, the Trustee's misguided conception of waiver would implicate any business, including any law firm, that employs cloud-based solutions using a third-party for document management. Second, the Trustee's claim that he is entitled to non-responsive documents or documents from *HCHK* ignores that it is in receipt of nearly 125,000 responsive documents which G Club produced, with more to be produced shortly, along with a privilege log.\n\n## **I. G Club Has Not Waived Any Privilege**\n\n15. The Trustee's assertion that \"G-Club has waived any privilege to its documents\" provided to HCHK is based on a false premise and misstatement of the law. (Mem. **1** 26). The Trustee states that G Club has \"voluntarily disclosed the contents of those documents to three thirdparties,\" but nowhere in the Memorandum does the Trustee identify any document that was \"disclosed\" and any individual who actually saw the \"contents\" of a document. *Id.* That is because G Club did not disclose privileged documents to HCHK; HCHK was simply the administrator of a cloud-based enterprise system which is routinely utilized by corporations and law firms. G Club did not \"share its purportedly privileged information with\" HCHK; it simply contracted for the operation of a document management system with a third-party. *Id.* **127.** It cannot be that any person or entity who employs a similar system has waived the attorney-client privilege.\n\n16. Recently, the Comt of Chancery of Delaware held that having a third party \"provide hosting services did not result in a waiver.\" *Metro Storage Int'! LLC v. Herron,* 275 A.3d 810, 871 (Del. Ch. 2022). There, the court found that email storage by a third-patty resulted in an \"obligation to keep the informational confidential,\" and that \"[t]he situation is no different than when a lawyer contracts with a services provider to provide email services or to maintain\n\nconfidential documents in the cloud.\" *Id.* In a footnote, the Court cited a journal article and an American Bar Association publication, both of which approved of cloud storage; the former even cited Microsoft 365, the cloud-based solution at issue here, as one example that \"does not necessarily lead to privilege waiver.\" *Id.* at 871 n.35.\n\n17. In seeking G Club's privileged documents, the Trustee performs some sleight of hand, characterizing G Club as giving HCHK \"access to its documents,\" but then cites several cases that have nothing to do with *access.* The Trustee fails to point to a single case in which a third-party that provided a cloud-based solution broke privilege. They each involve a third-party who actually learned the substance of the privileged material and several of the Trustee's cases predate cloud-based technology. *See Strougo v. BEA Assocs.,* 199 F.R.D. 515,519 (S.D.N.Y. 200 l) (finding that the presence of nine non-directors and non-attorneys at in-person board meeting waived the potential privilege of board minutes); *Niceforo v. UBS Glob. Asset Mgmt. Americas, Inc.,* 20 F. Supp. 3d 428, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (finding that a physical notebook maintained by an employee at her employer's office, which her employer reviewed, was not privileged because she did not demonstrate the notebook contained attorney-client communications and she did not make \"a reasonable attempt to keep these statements confidential\"); *United States v. Mejia,* 655 F.3d 126, 132 (2d Cir.2011) (finding privilege did not cover a phone call made from prison to a family member where the defendant was aware that it was recorded by prison staff); *United States v. Ackert,* 169 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir.1999) (finding that oral communications between a party's lawyer and a third-party investment advisor regarding financial transaction were not covered by the party's privilege where the conversations were to improve the lawyer's understanding of the transaction); *Ampa Ltd. v. Kentfield Capital LLC,* No. 00 Civ. 0508 NRB AJP, 2000 WL 1156860, \\*1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2000) (finding board minutes\n\nwere not privileged where an outside accountant was present at the board meeting and not involved in the legal issue discussed); *In re Horowitz,* 482 F.2d 72, 82 (2d Cir. 1973) (finding privilege was waived where potentially privileged physical documents were comingled with non-privileged documents in file cabinets to which a third party had ready access and actively reviewed).\n\n18. The Trustee does not provide any support for the notion that use of a cloud-based solution for document management can waive privilege because there is none.\n\n19. With HCHK merely hosting G Club's data, HCHK could not have shared any of the contents with the Assignee. Indeed, pursuant to the Master Services Agreement, HCHK was obligated to maintain confidentiality. The Assignee certainly had no right or authority to access email domain accounts belonging to G Club and there are no allegations that any member of the Assignee's team did so. 4 Thus, there is no reason to assert any waiver that would have involved the Assignee.\n\n20. The Trustee also mistakenly argues that G Club failed to object to the assignee process by which the assets owned or controlled by HCHK would be sold to G News. (Mem **,r,r** 31, 32). As the Trustee well knows, he filed the Supplemental Emergency *Ex Parle* Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (\"TRO Motion\") on June 9, 2023, halting any action in the HCHK assignment proceedings. (Adv. Proc. ECF No. 14.) The Court granted the TRO Motion (Adv. Proc. ECF No. 18), prior to the June 12, 2023 deadline for patties to file objections and the June 13, 2023 hearing date set by the New York Supreme Court regarding the sale of HCHK's assets to G News. Therefore, G Club did not have a meaningful opportunity to object to either the assignment of HCHK's assets to the Assignee, nor\n\n4 And, even if members of the Assignee's team had accessed these accounts, the Assignee was not authorized by G Club to do so. To the contrary, G Club made sure that Assignee and the Trustee were aware the documents were not the Assignee's to access or review, in writing on July 5, 2023.\n\nto the proposed sale of the same assets to G News. Regardless, such sale never occurred so the Trustee's argument of waiver triggered by a proposed sale is simply meritless.\n\n## **II. The Trustee Has No Right to Review Non-Responsive Documents**\n\n21. Just as the Trustee is not entitled to review G Club's privileged documents, he is not entitled to review G Club documents that are not responsive to the Subpoena. In response to the Subpoena, G Club has produced almost 125,000 documents, and is planning on producing more soon, along with a privilege log. G Club anticipates finishing all its document review and a privilege log by mid-October 2023. To the extent that the Trustee wishes it had subpoenaed other documents, it may not use HCHK as a tool to obtain those documents; it must request them from GClub.\n\n22. The Trustee further improperly attempts to use the Subpoena served on *HCHK and not* G Club, to obtain G Club's property, stating that HCHK's productions \"have been woefully deficient.\" (Mem. **,r** 16). That, however, is irrelevant. The Trustee may not use HCHK's purported failure to produce a meaningful number of documents to force HCHK to produce documents that do not belong to HCHK. The Trustee theorizes that HCHK \"was a pass through for monies he was attaining through his 'business' activities that he used in part to fund his opulent lifestyle,\" and that the Trustee needs \"documents related to the services provided\" from HCHK. (Mem. **,r** 20). G Club does not object to HCHK's production of HCHK documents responsive to the Trustee's subpoena, nor could it. But G Club documents do not belong to HCHK. If the Trustee has issues with HCHK's alleged non-compliance, that is not G Club's issue, nor does it bear any relevance to the Trustee's requested modification of the Order.\n\n23. Accordingly, the Trustee's smear that \"entities like G Club\" are engaging m \"gamesmanship\" so that the Trustee will not have the \"ability to review\" documents is baseless.\n\n(Mem. ~ 21 ). G Club has complied with its discovery obligations and will continue to comply.\n\nThe Trustee should similarly comply with due process rights, including service obligations.\n\n**WHEREFORE,** for the reasons set forth above, G Club requests that the Court (i) deny\n\nthe Trustee's demand for HCHK's production of G Club's privileged and non-responsive\n\ndocuments and request to modify the Order and (ii) grant G Club such other relief as is just.\n\n# **G CLUB OPERATIONS LLC**\n\nBy: *Isl Kellianne Baranowsky*\n\nGREEN & SKLARZ LLC Jeffrey M. Sklarz (ct20938) Kellianne Baranowsky (ct26684) One Audobon St, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06511 Tel: 203-285-8545 jsklarz@gs-lawfirm.com kbaranowsky@gs-lawfirm.com\n\nPILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP Carolina A. Fornos *(pro hac vice)* 31 West 52nd Street New York, NY 10019 Tel: 212-858-1558 carolina.fornos@pillsburylaw.com\n\n*Attorneys.for G Club Operations LLC*\n\n\n\n# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI hereby certify that on the date set forth below, a copy of the foregoing was served by CM/ECF and/or mail on anyone unable to accept electronic filing. Notice of this filing will be sent by email to all parties by operation of the Court's electronic filing system. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF System.\n\nDate: September 29, 2023 *Isl* Kellianne Baranowsky\n\n# **IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\nIn re:\n\nHO WAN KWOK, *eta!.,*\n\nDebtors.\n\nChapter 11\n\nCase No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n(Jointly Administered)\n\n# **G CLUB OPERATIONS LLC'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF ITS EMERGENCY MOTION TO STAY PENDING APPEAL PURSUANT TO BANKRUPTCY RULE 8007**\n\nPursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8007(b), G Club Operations LLC (\"G Club Operations\") requests a stay (the \"Motion to Stay\") of the Bankruptcy Court's Order, dated November 13, 2023, granting the Chapter 11 Trustee's *Motion that G-Club Operations LLC Has Waived any Privilege and Has No Right to Object to Responsiveness. Despins et al v. HCHK Technologies, Inc. et al,* No. 23-05013 (Bankr. D. Conn. Jun. 8, 2023) (Dkt No. 179) (the \"Order\"). A copy of the Order is attached hereto as Exhibit A.\n\nPursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8007(b)(2), good cause exists for the United States District Court (the \"District Court\") to hear this Motion to Stay on an emergency basis and enter the requested stay because: (1) although G Club Operations has moved for a stay in the United States Bankruptcy Court (the \"Bankruptcy Court\"), the Bankruptcy Court has not yet ruled on the Motion to Stay, 1(2) the Bankruptcy Court's Order afforded G Club Operations only *four days* from entry of the Order to comply with the Order, despite Fed. **R.** Bankr. **P.** 8002(a)(l) providing a fourteen day appeal period, and (3) given the short time frame to address this matter, as set forth herein,\n\n1 A copy of the docketed Motion to Stay filed **in** the Bankruptcy Court and Motion to Expedite hearing are attached hereto as Exhibit B and are incorporated here by reference to the extent necessary to provide context to this request.\n\nDistrict Court intervention is necessary to protect G Club Operations rights of appeal and access to due process.\n\nAccordingly, G Club Operations requests that the District Court stay the Order until such time as the parties hereto can properly brief, and the District Court can properly consider, this matter. As set forth herein, without a stay G Club Operations' appeal will likely be mooted and its ability to protect privileged communications from disclosure effectively will be lost.\n\n## **INTRODUCTION**\n\nThe Order requires that G Club Operations and the Assignee of HCHK Technologies turn over to the Trustee privileged communications of G Club Operations, among other documents, by November 17, 2023 (less than the 14 days a party has to appeal an Order pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a)(l)) because HCHK Technologies acted as an internet administrator to G Club Operations, as well as other customers. Stated differently, according to the Order, retaining and utilizing a cloud computing vendor obliterates attorney client and work product privilege and allows the Trustee to access any document it wants, *even communications between* G *Club Operations and the undersigned counsel.*\n\nIn addition to its impact on G Club Operations, the effect of this ruling on clients and their legal counsel, indeed on anyone who exchanges legally confidential or protected communications utilizing cloud-based services administered by a third party, could be catastrophic, rendering it impossible to electronically store any protected documents or communications on the cloud without losing the key protection of privilege for such communications. The Order incorrectly applies the law to reach this result, and it creates a dangerous precedent that essentially holds that whenever a business or individual outsources its IT services to a provider which may also provide additional services, then that business or individual loses all rights to and in its documents,\n\nincluding the right to protect from disclosure attorney-client and work-product privileged communications. Respectfully, the Bankruptcy Court erred, and G Club Operations has filed a Notice of Appeal to the District Court challenging the Order. Exhibit C.\n\nAs explained herein, G Club Operations satisfies the requisite elements for a stay pending appeal because (1) failure to grant the stay and forcing G Club Operations to turn privileged communications, or HCHK to turn over G Club Operations' privileged communications, over to the Trustee before an appeal is heard will effectively deprive G Club Operations of the right to an effective appeal and irrevocably impacting its due process rights because once the privileged documents are produced, it is virtually impossible to un-ring that bell; (2) there is no harm to the Trustee as the Trustee has already received more than 140,000 documents from G Club Operations in connection with the Rule 2004 process, in addition to having issued far in excess of 200 Rule 2004 subpoenas; (3) the Order is against public policy as it implicates the privacy and constitutionally protected rights of every business and individual and every law firm that stores protected communications in the cloud; and (4) G Club Operations is likely to succeed on the merits because the Bankruptcy Court's reasoning is incorrect and, candidly, would impact how every law firm would transact business. Accordingly, a stay pending appeal should be granted so protected documents are not turned over before the issues on appeal are finally resolved.\n\nBecause the Order requires compliance by November 17, 2023, exigent circumstances exist to address this motion on an emergency basis. Further, G Club Operations respectfully requests that, to the extent practical, the District Comi rule on this motion no later than Friday, November 17, 2023 at 2 **PM,** so that G Club Operations may have the opportunity to seek further appropriate relief if necessary, given the truncated time frame imposed by the Bankruptcy Court.\n\n4862-7419-1761.v I\n\n# **RELEVANTPROCEDURALBACKGROUND2**\n\n1. On June 23, 2023, the Trustee filed a Motion, Pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019, Regarding Settlement with Assignee of HCHK Entities, Under New York Court Assignment Proceedings (Bankr. D. Conn. Adv. Proc. No. 22-50073, Dkt No. 1936) (the \"9019 Motion\"). The 9019 Motion included a Proposed Order that HCHK Technologies turn over to the Trustee all documents to which it may have had access. *(Id.,* Dkt. No. 2004) (the \"Revised Proposed Order\"). Specifically, Paragraph 6 of the Revised Proposed Order stated:\n\n**\"Corporate Records.** The Assignee shall immediately make available to the Trustee all non-privileged corporate records (including in electronic form) and other documents pertaining to the HCHK Entities in the possession of the Assignee. All such corporate records and other documents shall be considered documents designated as \"confidential\" and subject to the protective order entered in this Chapter 11 Case on October 6, 2022 [Main Case Docket No. 923].\"\n\n*Id.* at 3, if. 3\n\n2. On July 5, 2023, and agam on July 14, 2023 *(id.,* Dkt. Nos. 1977 and 2007\n\nrespectively), G Club Operations objected to Paragraph 6 of the Proposed Order and requested an\n\norderly process by which to preclude a wholesale turnover of confidential and privileged materials\n\nto the Trustee simply because it outsourced IT services.\n\n3. On July 28, 2023, the Bankruptcy Court ruled on the 9019 Motion, granting the\n\n9019 Motion but modifying Paragraph 6 of the Proposed Order to provide:\n\n**Corporate Records:** (a) The Assignee shall immediately secure and safeguard all corporate records (including in electronic form) and other documents pertaining to the HCHK Entities in the possession of the Assignee. Within ten (10) days from\n\n2 The Order arises from a Rule 9019 Motion relating to HCHK Technologies, Inc. (\"HCHK Technologies\"), HCHK Property Management, Inc. (\"HCHK Property\") and Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc. (\"HCHK Lexington\") (collectively, \"HCHK Entities\") via the alleged authority of an Assignee, with the subject matter of the Order resolving a final discrete issue - G Club's objection on due process grounds. The Order is a final order for purposes of appeal because it \"definitively dispose of [a] discrete disputes within the overarching bankruptcy case.\" *Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masomy, LLC,* 140 S. Ct. 582, 586 (2020) (citation omitted). The Comi has approved the Rule 9019 Motion.\n\n3The Rule 9019 was entered into between the Assignee of the HCHK Entities and the Trustee. Various issues related to that Rule 9019 Order are the subject of an appeal. *See* No. 23-05013, Dkt. Nos. 70, 80, and 98.\n\nthe date of the entry of this Order, the Assignee shall make available to the Trustee all non-privileged corporate records (including in electronic form) and other documents pertaining to the HCHK Entities in the possession of the Assignee, *except those that were at any point the property of G-Club Operation LLC (\"G-Club \").* All such corporate records and other documents shall be considered documents designated as \"confidential\" and subject to the protective order entered in this Chapter 11 Case on October 6, 2022 [Main Case Docket No. 923] (the \"Protective Order\"). Also within ten (10) days from the date of the entry of this Order, the Assignee shall make available to G-Club all corporate records (including in electronic form) and other documents pertaining to the HCHK Entities in the possession of the Assignee, *which were at any point the property ofG-Club. Upon receipt, G-Club shall immediately review such corporate records and other documents for privilege and responsiveness to the Trustee's Rule 2004 subpoena of G-Club and produce a privilege log and responsiveness log.* G-Club may designate materials it will produce to the Trustee as \"confidential\" or \"highly confidential\" in accordance with the Protective Order.\n\n*Id.,* 0kt. No. 2038 at 4, *,I* 6(a)) (emphasis added).\n\n4. The Bankruptcy Court also provided that \"[ o ]n or before August 11, 2023, the Trustee shall file a brief in support of the Trustee's argument that G-Club has waived any privilege and has no right to object to responsiveness. On or before August 18, 2023, G-Club shall file any response to the Trustee's brief.\" *Id.* at 5, *,I* 6(b ).\n\n5. On August 11, 2023, the Trustee filed a *Memorandum of Law in Support of Chapter 11 Trustee's Argument that G-Club Operations LLC has Waived any Privilege and has no Right to Object to Responsiveness as to G-Club Documents Turned Over from the Assignee of HCHK Technologies, Inc. to the Trustee Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 Settlement Agreement* (the \"Waiver Motion\"), which the Trustee filed in Adversary Proceeding No. 23-05013, ECF No. 86 (and not in No. 22-50073, as all other filings had previously been made). A copy of the Trustee's Waiver Motion is attached hereto as Exhibit D.\n\n6. G Club Operations opposed the Waiver Motion on September 29, 2023, filing its *Response to Trustee's Memorandum Challenging G Club's Privilege Assertions In Documents In HCHK's Possession and Opposition To The Trustee's Related Proposed Order.* (Bankr. D. Conn.\n\nCase No. 22-50073, Dkt. No. 2244) (the \"Response\").4 A copy of G Club Operations' Response is attached hereto as Exhibit E.\n\n7. On November 13, 2023, the Bankruptcy Court issued the Order granting the Trustee's Waiver Motion and ordering production by G Club Operations and the Assignee of HCHK Technologies by November 17, 2023, which is less than the time afforded G Club Operations to appeal the Order pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002. This Order is a final order of the Bankruptcy Court.\n\n# **A STAY OF THE ORDER PENDING APPEAL IS PROPER**\n\n8. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has established the\n\nfollowing four-part test for determining whether to grant a motion for stay pending appeal:\n\n( 1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.\n\n*In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig.,* 503 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).\n\nEach factor favors a stay in this case. A stay is '\"an exercise of judicial discretion,' and '[t]he\n\nparty requesting a stay bears the burden of showing that the circumstances justify an exercise of\n\nthat discretion.\"' *Uniformed Fire Officers Ass 'n v. de Blasio,* 973 F .3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2020)\n\n*(quotingNken v. Holder,* 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1760 (2009)).\n\n# **A. Absent a Stay, G Club Operations Will Be Irreparably Harmed by Deprivation of Appeal Rights and a Waiver of Privilege**\n\n9. Absent a stay, G Club Operations will suffer irreparable injury because one cannot\n\neffectively undo the wholesale turnover of privileged communications to the Trustee and, as a\n\n4 G Club filed on a different date for the reasons set forih in its *Opposition To Trustee's Proposed Supplemental Order Regarding G-Club Documents Pursuant To Order Approving Chapter I I Trustee's Settlement With Assignee of HCHK Entities Under New York Court Assignment Proceedings* (No. 22-50073, 0kt. No. 2233).\n\nresult, that turnover may render the appeal moot. Courts have found that irreparable injury exists when the denial of a stay creates the potential for a complete loss of a right for the moving party. *In re St. Johnsbury Trucking Co., Inc.,* 185 B.R. 687, 690 n. l (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding that if the government's appeal here is mooted, it will lose the ability to enforce some provisions ofCERCLA and the Internal Revenue Code; it is that threatened loss rather than the loss of the right to appeal *vel non* that gives rise to the Court's irreparable injury finding). \"[W]here the denial of a stay pending appeal risks mooting *any* appeal of *significant* claims of error, the irreparable harm requirement is satisfied.\" *In re BG!, Inc.,* 504 B.R. 754, 763 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, alterations added).\n\n10. That is precisely the issue here: G Club Operations' rights absent a stay will forever be lost as production of privileged information likely would moot any meaningful remedy if the Order is ove1iurned on appeal. The production deadline in the Order requires compliance by November 17, 2023. This production includes privileged communications between G Club Operations and its counsel. If G Club Operations, or HCHK, is forced to comply with the Order, G Club Operations will effectively forever lose its right to protect confidential communications with its attorneys. Once obtained, the Trustee and his advisors cannot unlearn the privileged communications they will see and review.\n\n11. To be clear, the Trustee would likely seek and obtain access to *every single email,* draft document, and other attorney-client communication between G Club Operations and its lawyers.\n\n## **B. A Stay Will Not Prejudice the Trustee**\n\n12. Unlike any other party in this bankruptcy matter, the Trustee has availed itself of the broad discovery afforded under Rule 2004. Indeed, the Trustee has already sought leave to file\n\n4862-7419-1761.vl\n\n255 Rule 2004 subpoenas. 5 , 6 With respect to G Club Operations specifically, the Trustee has served G Club Operations with a Rule 2004 Subpoena and G Club Operations has produced in excess of 140,000 documents. In addition, and in accordance with the Bankruptcy Court's Order on the Rule 9019 Motion, G Club Operations also produced a privilege log to the Trustee.\n\n13. Accordingly, the Trustee will not suffer any \"substantial injury\" by staying the Order to permit the appeal to proceed. Indeed, without a stay, compliance with the Order may render its appeal moot and will forever infringe G Club Operations' due process rights because once privileged communications are disclosed it is effectively impossible to return to the *status quo ante.*\n\n## **C. The Order Is Against Public Policy**\n\n14. The Order poses an immediate threat to the privacy and constitutionally-protected interests of customers who outsource their IT services. The Order is contrary to authority holding that utilization of \"hosting services did not result in a waiver.\" *See Metro Storage Int'! LLC v. Harron,* 275 A.3d 810, 871 (Del. Ch. 2022) (alterations added). There is no legal support for the proposition that simply using an outsourced, cloud-based data hosting service results in a waiver\n\n5 Unless stated otherwise references to \"Dkt. No. \\_\" refer to docket entries in the so-called \"main chapter 11 case,\" Case No. 22-50073.\n\n6Specifically: (i) the Trustee's First Supplemental Omnibus Motion (Dkt. No. 839) seeking twenty-five (25) subpoenas; (ii) the Trustee's Second Supplemental Omnibus Motion (Dkt. No. 1116) seeking fifty-three (53) subpoenas; (iii) the Trustee's Third Supplemental Omnibus Motion (Dkt. No. 1259) seeking nineteen (19) subpoenas; (iv) the Trustee's Fourth Supplemental Omnibus Motion (Dkt. No. 1592) seeking fifty-seven (57) subpoenas; (v) the Trustee's Fifth Supplemental Omnibus Motion (Dkt. No. 1789) seeking eight (8) subpoenas; (vi) the Trustee's Sixth Supplemental Omnibus Motion (Dkt. No. 2079) seeking twenty (20) subpoenas; (vii) the Trustee's Seventh Supplemental Omnibus Motion (Dkt. No. 2249) seeking six (6) subpoenas; (viii) the Trustee's Eighth Supplemental Omnibus Motion (Dkt. No. 2304) seeking eight (8) subpoenas; and (ix) the Trustee's Ninth Supplemental Omnibus Motion (Dkt. No. 2308) seeking twenty-nine (29) subpoenas. The latter two are presently subject to objections. *See, e.g., Objection of Shin Hsin Yu and Jie Zhang to Eighth Supplemental Omnibus Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee for Entry of Order Under Rule 2004* (Dkt. No. 2319); G *Club Operation LLC* 's *Limited Objection to Eighth Supplemental Omnibus Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee for En tty of Order Under Rule 2004* (Dkt No. 2320); *Objection of Shin !-!sin Yu, 1332156 B.* C. *LTD, GWGOPNZ Limited, and Jie Zhang to Ninth Supplemental Omnibus 1\\;Jotion of Chapter 11 Trustee for Enhy of Order Under Rule 2004* (Dkt No. 2326); G *Club Operations LLC* 's *Objection to Ninth Supplemental Omnibus 1'vlotion of Chapter 11 Trustee for Enfly of Order Under Rule 2004* (Dkt. No. 2331).\n\nof privilege or otherwise transfers the information maintained on the cloud to the administrator.\n\n15. Indeed, if entities that use cloud communications, which is virtually every individual and business in the world, have no attorney-client privilege, the attorney-client privilege will become a meaningless protection.\n\n# **D. G Club Operations Has A Substantial Possibility of Success on Appeal Because the Order Is Erroneous**\n\n16. As a preliminary matter, \"[t]he requisite showing of \"substantial possibility\" of success is \"inversely proportional to the amount of irreparable injury plaintiffl] will suffer absent the stay.\" *In re BG!, Inc.,* 504 B.R. at 764 (second alteration in original, citations omitted). As noted above, the harm to G Club Operations of an unstayed order forcing the turnover of its privileged documents is a change in circumstances that cannot be undone. As such, G Club Operations \"need not always show a \"probability of success' on the merits; instead, the movant need only present a substantial case on the merits when a serious legal question is involved and show that the balance of the equities weighs heavily in favor of granting the stay.\" *Id.* (citation omitted). As explained below, however, the Order reaches an erroneous legal conclusion, assummg waiver and improperly shifting the burden to G Club Operations to establish an exception when no waiver took place, which makes it likely G Club Operations will prevail on appeal.\n\n# • **The Order Conflates Documents \"Disclosed\" to HCHK** *with* **G Club Operations Documents on the Cloud for which HCHK Acted as IT Administrator**\n\n17. In addressing the issue of responsiveness and privilege, the Order conflates documents G Club Operations *disclosed* to HCHK that became property of HCHK *versus* G Club Operations' emails with a *gclub. com* domain name maintained on the cloud for which HCHK acted as IT manager and administrator and which belong only to G Club Operations, and never became\n\nHCHK's property. This extends to any other customer that HCHK has as a customer. As a result, the Order improperly relies on the Master Services Agreement between HCHK and G Club Operations as a basis to transfer gigabytes of cloud data to the Trustee that was never *disclosed* to HCHK.\n\n18. Illustrating this mistake is the Order's improper characterization of G Club Operations' position in No. 22-50073, Dkt. No. 2244, as a review process. The Order states \"that G-Club had rights to review the documents for both responsiveness and privilege.\" Order at 3. In other words, the Bankruptcy Court improperly framed the issue as G Club Operations' demand to review documents that HCHK was intending to produce to the Trustee as if G Club Operations had *disclosed* the documents on the cloud to HCHK in the first instance.\n\n19. That was not the issue raised by the Waiver Motion and challenged by G Club\n\nOperations. As G Club Operations argued in its filings:\n\n\"G Club contracted with HCHK for the administration of a cloud-based storage and email system for its communications (among other services). That system, Microsoft 365, is a cloud-based enterprise system which is routinely utilized by corporations and law firms. That HCHK was the system's administrator is not relevant to G Club's assetiion of privilege; the documents were maintained in \"the cloud,\" and the Trustee has made no assertions (nor can he) that a single individual other than G Club employees ever reviewed documents maintained on the cloud that hosted G Club domain names. Privileged documents stored in a cloud system administered by a third party simply do not lose their protected status.\"\n\nNo. 22-50073, Dkt. No. 2244, at 2-3, ~ 3.\n\n20. Thus, the issue is whether privileged documents lose their protected status merely as a result of outsourcing IT services when there is no factual contention that the IT service provider was given access to the privileged material.\n\n21. Underscoring this confusion is the Order's improper reliance on the Master Services Agreement (\"MSA\") between HCHK and G Club Operations. In quoting the MSA, the Bankruptcy Court erroneously stated: \"Under the terms of the Master Services Agreement (the\n\n\"MSA\") between HCHK Tech and G-Club, the Assignee may disclose G-Club's documents to a third party as required by law. (Mot. Ex. A, § 6.2.)\" Order at 6.\n\n22. Section 6.2, however, cannot be read without Section 6.1, which provides: \"Confidential Information\" means any information *disclosed* under this Agreement by either party *(\"Disclosing* Party\") to the other patty *(\"Receiving* Party\").\" MSA § 6.1 ( emphasis added). G Club Operations documents that are maintained \"in the cloud\" are not documents *disclosed* to HCHK.\n\n23. Indeed, there is a clear distinction between documents *sent* to HCHK or *shared* with HCHK (which should not be turned over to the Trustee without a review by G Club Operations for responsiveness and privilege) *versus* the gigabytes of data on the cloud that were not disclosed to HCHK and belong to G Club Operations and G Club Operations only and retain their privilege protections.\n\n24. As such, the MSA's provisions - which describe the patties in terms of \"Receiving Party\" and \"Disclosing Pmiy\" - do not inform the Bankruptcy Court's analysis of whether privileged material maintained \"in the cloud\" thereby lose their protected status.\n\n# • **The Order Improperly Assumed Waiver and Erroneously Shifted the Burden to G Club Operations to Establish an Exception to Waiver**\n\n25. With respect to privilege, the Order improperly assumed waiver based solely on the Trustee's conclusory assertion \"that G-Club has waived any privilege in the documents in the custody, control, and/or possession of the Assignee at the time of his settlement with the Trustee.\" Order at 7. \"Documents\" is not precisely defined, failing to account for the distinction explained above. And, thereafter, the Order improperly concludes that there must have been a waiver because **HCHK** provided \"a la carte consulting services\" and \"Section 6.2 of the MSA makes clear that **HCHK** Tech may use G-Club's documents in the course of providing the services listed on\n\nexhibit A to the agreement. *(Id.* Ex. A, § 6.2.)\" Order at 9. However, documents \"in the cloud\" are not documents to which HCHK had access or otherwise reviewed. In effect, the Bankruptcy Court assumed access and review and thus waiver, and then improperly shifted the burden to G Club to establish an exception to waiver when there was no waiver in the first instance because HCHK was not given access and the right to review G Club Operations' emails.\n\n26. As stated, the Bankruptcy Court based its burden shifting on the concept that G Club Operations' privilege had been waived merely as a result of HCHK's provision of data hosting in the cloud together with other services under the MSA. But, there is no legal suppoti for the proposition that the mere provision of \"a la carte consulting services\" separate and apmi from data hosting (particularly where there are no facts that could show that the host was authorized to review and access privileged material) results in waiver of privilege unless, of course, documents are actually exchanged, shared, disclosed, or otherwise reviewed by a party. Once again, the Order improperly conflates documents that would have been exchanged in the course of providing services (like communications between G Club Operations and HCHK) *versus* an outsourced IT storage service for cloud administration. The Order erroneously *assumes* waiver, and thus improperly shifted the burden to G Club Operation to demonstrate an exception to waiver under \"common interest\" or *Kovel.* 7 Order at 9-11.\n\n## **CONCLUSION**\n\n27. Under these circumstances, a stay pending appeal is proper to preserve the status\n\n7 The Bankruptcy Court's reference to *United States* v. *Kave/,* 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961) is unclear as *Kave!* stands for the proposition that in litigation a lawyer may hire an outside consultant who *works for the lawyer* and is subject to attorney-client privilege. Thus, for example, a lawyer may hire a CPA to assist with a tax case (as in *Kave!)* without having to turnover their communications in discovery. *Kave!* has no application outside the litigation context and there would be no way to *\"Kave!\"* an IT company generally. Here, HCHK was hired as an ordinary course IT provider, there was no law firm involved with retaining HCHK as there was no legal proceeding going on when G Club Operations hired them.\n\nquo and prevent the irreparable harm to G Club Operations of effectively losing its due process and privilege rights.\n\n# **RELIEF REQUESTED**\n\n28. G Club Operations respectfully requests that the District Court enter a stay pending\n\nappeal of the Order.\n\nDated: November 16, 2023\n\nBy: *Isl Jeffrey M Sklarz* GREEN & SKLARZ LLC Jeffrey M. Sklarz Kellianne Baranowsky One Audobon St, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06511 Tel: 203-285-8545 j sklarz@gs-lawfirm.com kbaranowsky@gs-lawfirm.com\n\n> PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP Carolina A. Pornos *(pro hac vice)* 31 West 52nd Street New York, NY 10019 Tel: 212-858-1558 caro Jina.fornos@pillsburylaw.com\n\n*Attorneys.for* G *Club Operations LLC*\n\n# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI hereby certify that on the date set forth below, a copy of the foregoing was served via\n\nCM/ECF. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF system.\n\nAdditionally, a copy of the foregoing has been filed on the docket of the Bankruptcy Comi\n\nas well as emailed as follows:\n\nCounsel for the Trustee A vi Luft aviluft@paulhastings.com Patrick Linsey plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\nCounsel for the Assignee, Brien W. Hofmeister Bonnie Mangan bonnie.mangan@manganlaw.com\n\nCounsel for HCHK Technologies, Inc; Holy City Hong Kong Ventures, LTD; Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc. John T. Shaban john@levinelevinelaw.com\n\nCounsel for HCHK Property Management, Inc. John T. Shaban john@levinelevinelaw.com Bonnie Mangan bonnie.mangan@manganlaw.com\n\nCounsel for Holy City Hong Kong Ventures, LTD. John T. Shaban john@levinelevinelaw.com\n\nDate: November 16, 2023.\n\n*Isl Jeffrey M Sklarz* Jeffrey M. Sklarz","body_zh":"康涅狄格联邦地区法院\n\n关于：\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等人，\n\n债务人。\n\n第11章\n\n案件编号：22-50073 (JAM)\n\n（合并管理）\n关于 G Club Operations LLC（G Club运营有限责任公司）依据《破产程序规则》第8007条向地区法院提交的待上诉期间暂停执行紧急动议的通知\n\n特此通知，G Club Operations LLC 已于 November 16, 2023，依据 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8007(b) 向康涅狄格联邦地区法院提交待上诉期间暂停执行紧急动议，请求暂停执行破产法院于 November 13, 2023 作出的命令，该命令准许第11章受托人提出的《主张 G-Club Operations LLC 已放弃任何特权且无权对相关性提出异议的动议》。Despins et al v. HCHK Technologies, Inc. et al, No. 23-05013 (Bankr. D. Conn. Jun. 8, 2023) (Dkt No. 179)。随附地区法院提交的全部文件副本。\n\n日期：November 16, 2023\n\n签署人：/s/ Jeffrey M. Sklarz\nGREEN & SKLARZ LLC\nJeffrey M. Sklarz\nKellianne Baranowsky\nOne Audubon St, 3rd Floor\nNew Haven, CT 06511\n电话：203-285-8545\njsklarz@gs-lawfirm.com\nkbaranowsky@gs-lawfirm.com\n\nPILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP\nCarolina A. Fornos（临时获准执业）\n31 West 52nd Street\nNew York, NY 10019\n电话：212-858-1558\ncarolina.fornos@pillsburylaw.com\n\nG Club Operations LLC 的代理律师\n送达证明\n\n本人特此证明，于下述日期，前述文件副本已通过 CM/ECF 送达。各方可通过法院的 CM/ECF 系统查阅本次提交文件。\n\n日期：November 16, 2023\n\n/s/ Jeffrey M. Sklarz\nJeffrey M. Sklarz\n\n康涅狄格联邦地区法院\n\n关于：\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等人，\n\n债务人。\n\n第11章\n\n案件编号：22-50073 (JAM)\n\n（合并管理）\nG CLUB OPERATIONS LLC 依据《破产程序规则》第8007条提出的待上诉期间暂停执行紧急动议\n\n依据《联邦破产程序规则》8007(b)，G Club Operations LLC（“G Club Operations”）请求暂停执行（“暂停执行动议”）破产法院于 November 13, 2023 作出的命令，该命令准许第11章受托人提出的《主张 G-Club Operations LLC 已放弃任何特权且无权对相关性提出异议的动议》。Despins et al v. HCHK Technologies, Inc. et al, No. 23-05013 (Bankr. D. Conn. Jun. 8, 2023) (Dkt No. 179)（“该命令”）。\n\n依据 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8007(b)(2) 及地方法规 7(a)，康涅狄格联邦地区法院（“地区法院”）有充分理由以紧急方式审理本暂停执行动议，理由如下：（1）尽管 G Club Operations 已向美国破产法院（“破产法院”）申请暂停执行，破产法院尚未对暂停执行动议作出裁定；（2）尽管 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a)(1) 规定十四日的上诉期间，破产法院的命令仅给予 G Club Operations 自该命令登记之日起四日以遵守该命令；以及（3）鉴于如本文所述处理此事的时间框架，地区法院的介入对于保护 G Club Operations 的上诉权和获得正当程序的权利是必要的。需要紧急救济，以确保履行该命令不会导致 G Club Operations 保护享有特权的通信免于披露的重要权利实际丧失。此外，如与本动议同时提交的法律备忘录中已充分论述的，如不暂停执行，G Club Operations 的上诉很可能失去实际意义。因此，G Club Operations 请求地区法院作出命令，暂停执行该命令，直至该上诉获得充分审理。\n\n日期：November 16, 2023\n\n签署人：/s/ Jeffrey M. Sklarz\nGREEN & SKLARZ LLC\nJeffrey M. Sklarz\nKellianne Baranowsky\nOne Audubon St, 3rd Floor\nNew Haven, CT 06511\n电话：203-285-8545\njsklarz@gs-lawfirm.com\nkbaranowsky@gs-lawfirm.com\n\nPILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP\nCarolina A. Fornos（临时获准执业）\n31 West 52nd Street\nNew York, NY 10019\n电话：212-858-1558\ncarolina.fornos@pillsburylaw.com\n\nG Club Operations LLC 的代理律师\n送达证明\n\n本人特此证明，于下述日期，前述文件副本已通过 CM/ECF 送达。各方可通过法院的 CM/ECF 系统查阅本次提交文件。\n\n此外，前述文件副本已提交至破产法院案卷，并已按如下方式通过电子邮件发送：\n\n受托人代理律师\nAvi Luft\naviluft@paulhastings.com\nPatrick Linsey\nplinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n受让人 Brien W. Hofmeister 的代理律师\nBonnie Mangan\nbonnie.mangan@manganlaw.com\n\nHCHK Technologies, Inc.、Holy City Hong Kong Ventures, LTD. 及 Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc. 的代理律师\nJohn T. Shaban\njohn@levinelevinelaw.com\n\nHCHK Property Management, Inc. 的代理律师\nJohn T. Shaban\njohn@levinelevinelaw.com\nBonnie Mangan\nbonnie.mangan@manganlaw.com\n\nHoly City Hong Kong Ventures, LTD. 的代理律师\nJohn T. Shaban\njohn@levinelevinelaw.com\n\n日期：November 16, 2023\n\n/s/ Jeffrey M. Sklarz\nJeffrey M. Sklarz\n\nJS 44（修订于 04/21）\n\nJS 44（修订于 04/21）民事案件封面表\n\n除地方法院规则另有规定外，JS 44 民事案件封面表及其中所载信息，既不替代亦不补充法律要求提交和送达的诉状或其他文件。本表经美国司法会议于 September 1974 批准，供法院书记员用于建立民事案卷记录之目的。（请参阅本表下一页的说明。）\n\nI. (a) 原告 被告\nG Club Operations, LLC——上诉人／动议人 Luc A. Despins——第11章受托人——被上诉人／被申请人\n\n(b) 第一列原告居住县 San Juan PR 第一列被告居住县 New York NY\n（美国原告案件除外） 注：（仅适用于美国原告案件）\n在土地征收案件中，使用所涉土地地块所在地。\n\n(c) 律师（律师事务所名称、地址及电话号码） 律师（如已知）\n3rd Fl., New Haven, CT 06511 (203) 285-8545\nJeffrey M. Sklarz, Green & Sklarz LLC, 1 Audubon Street, Patrick R. Linsey, Neubert Pepe & Monteith PC, 195 Church St, New Haven, CT 06510, (203) 821-2000\n\nII. 管辖权依据（仅在一个方框内标注“X”） III. 主要当事人国籍（在原告栏内标注“X”）\n□ 1 美国政府\n原告 ☒ 3 联邦问题\n（美国政府不是当事人） （仅适用于多元国籍管辖案件）\n本州公民 原告\n□ 1 被告\n□ 1 于本州注册成立或主要营业地位于本州 以及在被告栏内标注一个方框） 原告\n□ 4 被告\n□ 4\n\n□ 2 美国政府\n被告 □ 4 多元国籍管辖 （在第III项注明当事人国籍） 他州公民 □ 2 □ 2 于他州注册成立且主要营业地位于他州 □ 5 □ 5\n\n外国国家公民或臣民 □ 3 □ 3 外国国家 □ 6 □ 6\n\nIV. 案件性质（仅在一个方框内标注“X”） 点击此处查看案件性质代码说明\n\n合同\n\n□ 110 保险 人身伤害 侵权\n\n人身伤害 没收／处罚\n\n□ 625 与毒品有关的财产扣押 破产\n\n☒ 422 依据 28 USC 158 的上诉 其他法令\n\n□ 120 海事\n\n□ 130 Miller Act □ 310 航空器 □ 315 航空器产品责任 □ 365 人身伤害——产品责任 依 21 USC 881 □ 690 其他 □ 423 撤回\n\n☒ 28 USC 157 □ 375 虚假申报法\n3729(a) □ 376 Qui Tam（31 USC）\n\n□ 140 可转让票据 □ 367 医疗保健／制药\n人身伤害 知识产权 □ 400 州重新划分选区\n\n□ 150 追偿多付款项及判决执行 □ 320 攻击、诽谤及中伤 产品责任 财产权利 □ 410 反垄断\n\n□ 430 银行与银行业\n\n☒ 151 Medicare Act □ 330 联邦雇主责任 □ 368 石棉人身伤害 □ 820 著作权\n\n☒ 830 专利 □ 450 商业\n\n□ 152 追偿违约学生贷款 责任 伤害产品 □ 835 专利——简化新药申请 □ 460 递解出境\n\n（不包括退伍军人） □ 340 海事 责任 □ 470 受影响及腐败组织法\n\n□ 153 追偿退伍军人福利多付款项 □ 345 海事产品责任\n\n动产 劳动 □ 840 商标 □ 480 消费者信贷 腐败组织\n\n□ 160 股东诉讼 ☒ 350 机动车 ☒ 370 其他欺诈 □ 710 公平劳动标准法 □ 880 2016年《保护商业秘密法》 （15 USC 1681 或 1692）\n\n□ 190 其他合同 □ 355 机动车产品责任 □ 371 真实借贷法\n\n□ 380 其他人身 □ 720 劳资关系 社会保障 □ 485 电话消费者保护法\n\n☒ 195 合同产品责任 □ 360 其他人身 财产损害 □ 861 HIA (1395ff) □ 490 有线／卫星电视\n\n□ 196 特许经营 伤害 □ 385 财产损害 □ 740 铁路劳动法\n\n□ 362 人身伤害——产品责任 □ 751 家庭与医疗休假法 □ 862 黑肺病 (923)\n\n□ 863 DIWC/DIWW (405(g)) □ 850 证券／商品／交易所\n\n不动产\n\n医疗过失 民权 囚犯申请 □ 790 其他劳动诉讼 □ 865 RSI (405(g)) □ 864 SSID Title XVI □ 890 其他法定诉讼\n\n□ 891 农业法\n\n□ 210 土地征收 □ 440 其他民权\n\n人身保护令： □ 791 雇员退休收入保障法 □ 893 环境事项\n\n□ 220 止赎 □ 441 投票\n\n□ 442 就业 □ 463 外国被拘留人\n\n□ 510 撤销判决动议 联邦税收法\n\n□ 870 税收（美国为原告 □ 895 信息自由法\n\n§ 230 租赁及驱逐\n\n□ 240 土地侵占 □ 443 住房／住宿 判决 或被告）\n\n□ 871 IRS 第三方 □ 896 仲裁\n\n□ 245 侵权产品责任\n\n□ 290 所有其他不动产 □ 445 残障美国人法—— □ 530 一般 □ 535 死刑 移民 26 USC 7609 □ 899 行政程序法／审查或上诉机构决定\n\n就业\n\n□ 446 残障美国人法——\n\n其他：\n\n□ 540 强制令及其他 □ 462 入籍申请 □ 950 州法合宪性\n\n其他\n\n□ 550 民权 □ 465 其他移民诉讼\n\n□ 448 教育 □ 555 监狱条件\n\n□ 560 民事被拘留人——\n\n羁押条件\n\nV. 起因（仅在一个方框内标注“X”）\n\n☒ 1 原始程序 □ 2 自州法院移送 □ 3 发回自上诉法院 □ 4 恢复或重新开启 □ 5 自另一地区移送（请注明） □ 6 多区诉讼——移送 □ 8 多区诉讼——直接提交\n\n请注明您据以提起诉讼的美国民事法令（除非为多元国籍管辖，不要引用管辖权法令）：\n28 U.S.C. 158 - 破产上诉；Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8007(b) - 请求暂停执行美国破产法院命令的动议\n\nVI. 诉因 诉因简述：请求暂停执行美国破产法院命令的紧急动议（Manning, USBJ）\n\nVII. 诉状中的请求：\n依据 Rule 23, Fed. R. Civ. P. □ 如属集体诉讼，请勾选 NA 请求金额 $ 仅在诉状中提出请求时勾选“是”：\n陪审团审判请求： 是 ☒ 否\n\nVIII. 关联案件\n如有 （见说明）： 法官 _______________ 案卷编号 __________\n\n日期 登记在案律师签名\nNov 16, 2023 /s/ Jeffrey M. Sklarz (ct20938)\n\n仅供办公室使用\n收据编号 金额 申请 IFP 法官 治安法官\n\n附件 A\n\n康涅狄格联邦破产法院\n\n关于： )\n)\n第11章\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等人， )\n)\n案件编号：22-50073 (JAM)\n\n债务人。\n____________________ )\n（合并管理）\n)\n)\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 财产的第11章受托人，\n原告， )\n)\n对抗程序编号：23-05013 (JAM)\n)\n)\n关于：ECF No. 86\n)\n诉 )\n)\nHCHK TECHNOLOGIES, INC.、HCHK PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC.、LEXINGTON PROPERTY AND STAFFING, INC.、HOLY CITY HONG KONG VENTURES, LTD.、ANTHONY DIBATTISTA、YVETTE WANG 及 BRIAN W. HOFMEISTER，作为为债权人利益而设的受让人， )\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n被告。\n____________________ )\n)\n)\n\n准许要求交付 G-CLUB 文件之动议的命令\n\nI. 引言\n\n本院面前的是支持第11章受托人下列主张的法律备忘录：G-Club Operations LLC 已放弃任何特权且无权对相关性提出异议。\n\n1本第11章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（亦称 Guo Wengui、Miles Guo 和 Miles Kwok，以及众多其他别名）（税务识别号码后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（Genever Holdings有限责任公司）（税务识别号码后四位：8202）以及 Genever Holdings Corporation（Genever Holdings股份有限公司）。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 及 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为 Paul Hastings LLP，200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166，转交 Luc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯），其作为 Ho Wan Kwok 遗产的受托人（仅为通知和通信之目的）。\n\n相关性（以下简称“本动议”）（ECF No. 86）2，由 Luc A. Despins 先生以 Ho Wan Kwok 先生遗产第11章受托人（以下简称“受托人”）的身份，根据《批准第11章受托人与 HCHK Entities（HCHK实体）受让人和解的命令》（以下简称“批准和解命令”）（ECF No. 70）主文第6(b)段提出。基于下述理由，准许本动议所请求的救济，并命令 G-Club Operations LLC（G-Club运营有限责任公司，以下简称“G-Club”）及/或 Brian Hofmeister（布赖恩·霍夫迈斯特）先生以 HCHK Technologies, Inc.（HCHK技术公司，以下简称“HCHK Tech”）、HCHK Property Management, Inc.（HCHK物业管理公司）及 Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc.（莱克星顿物业与人事公司）（合称“HCHK Entities”）债权人利益受让人（以下简称“受让人”）的身份，提交由受让人持有或曾由其持有（视具体情况而定）的文件；该等文件系受让人根据批准和解命令提供给 G-Club 的文件。\n\nII. 背景\n\n于 July 11, 2023 和 July 18, 2023，分别就受托人提出的《关于在纽约州法院转让程序中与 HCHK Entities 受让人和解的动议》（以下简称“和解动议”）（主案 ECF No. 1936；ECF No. 25）以及关于和解动议的经修订拟议命令（以下简称“经修订拟议命令”）（主案 ECF No. 2004；ECF No. 55）举行了听证。G-Club 对和解动议和经修订拟议命令提出异议。（主案 ECF Nos. 1977, 2007。）于 July 28, 2023，本院作出批准和解命令，准许和解动议并批准受托人与受让人之间的和解。（主案 ECF No. 2038；ECF No. 70。）\n\n2本对抗程序案卷的引用将标示为“ECF”。对主案 In re Kwok, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) 案卷的引用将标示为“主案 ECF”。\n\n批准和解命令第6段通过设定书面陈述时间表，处理 G-Club 对和解动议仅存的异议（见主案 ECF No. 2030，第128:5-148:8页）；根据该时间表，受托人与 G-Club 将就 G-Club 是否有权在文件提交给受托人之前，审阅受让人持有的 G-Club 文件，以核查其是否与向 G-Club 送达的 Rule 2004 传票相关及是否受特权保护，进行争讼。（主案 ECF No. 2038 ¶ 6；ECF No. 70 ¶ 6。）于 August 11, 2023，受托人及时提交本动议，主张 G-Club 无权就相关性或特权审阅该等文件。（ECF No. 87。）于 September 29, 2023，在发生某些进展后（见主案 ECF No. 2237），G-Club 对受托人的备忘录提交答复（主案 ECF No. 2244），主张 G-Club 有权就相关性和特权两方面审阅该等文件。\n\n于 October 24, 2023，就受托人在本动议中提出的论点举行了听证。受托人和 G-Club 均出庭并就各自立场进行了辩论。听证结束时，本院将该事项留待裁决。\n\n受托人与 G-Club 之间的争议现已适于作出裁决。\n\nIII. 管辖权\n\nUnited States District Court for the District of Connecticut（美国康涅狄格联邦地区法院）根据 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) 对本事项具有管辖权。本院根据 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) 及 United States District Court for the District of Connecticut 于 September 21, 1984 作出的移送命令，有权审理和裁决本事项。发生本发现争议的本对抗程序是法定核心程序。28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (E), (O)。\n\n根据 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409，本地区为适当审理地。\n\nIV. 讨论3\n\n首先，受托人与 G-Club 对批准和解命令的条款以及本动议是否寻求免除该命令的救济存在争议。受托人主张，批准和解命令规定各方应就本动议提出的问题进行诉讼。G-Club 主张，该命令已就该等问题作出了有利于 G-Club 的裁决。受托人显然是正确的。尽管批准和解命令主文第6(a)段规定，受让人应允许 G-Club 查阅其持有的 G-Club 文件，并给予 G-Club 在将文件提交给受托人之前核查其是否与向 G-Club 送达的 Rule 2004 传票相关及是否受特权保护的机会，但主文第6(b)段规定，受托人与 G-Club 应就 G-Club 是否有权在 G-Club 及/或受让人将文件提交给受托人之前，就相关性及/或特权核查该等文件提交书面陈述。实质上，批准和解命令保留了相关问题，同时设立了一项机制，使发现程序得以在就目前提交本院的问题作出裁决前继续进行。\n\n本院此前并未就该等问题作出有利于 G-Club 的裁决，并将在下文审议双方关于相关性及特权的论点。\n\nA. 相关性\n\n受托人主张，G-Club 不得以该等文件与在 Kwok 先生第11章案件中向 G-Club 送达的 Rule 2004 传票不相关为由，反对受让人根据批准和解命令提交 HCHK Entities 的文件。受托人认为，与 G-Club 传票无关的是，该受让人与受托人达成的和解涉及受托人原本将在本对抗程序中寻求的发现，以及在 Kwok 先生第11章案件中向 HCHK Tech 送达的 Rule 2004 传票。\n\n3以下内容构成本院根据 Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 第7052条作出的事实认定和法律结论，该规则通过第7001条适用于对抗程序。\n\nG-Club 答复称，受托人不能通过从 HCHK Tech 进行发现获取 G-Club 的财产。因此，G-Club 主张，受托人只能根据向其送达的 Rule 2004 传票从 G-Club 获取文件，但须由 G-Club 进行相关性审阅。\n\n本院同意受托人的意见。第一，本争议与 G-Club 是否遵守向其送达的 Rule 2004 传票的争议相互独立且有所区别。HCHK Entities 在转让契据中授予受让人与受托人和解的权限。（见，例如，起诉状证据附件13，Brian Hofmeister 宣誓书和申请书证据附件B，第4节。）受让人确已如此行事：批准和解命令批准的是受托人与受让人之间关于本对抗程序及其中相关发现的和解，而不是受托人与 G-Club 之间关于 Kwok 先生第11章案件中发现的和解。\n\n在本对抗程序中，受托人主张，HCHK Entities 是 Kwok 先生的另一个自我，及/或 Kwok 先生对 HCHK Entities 及/或其资产享有受益所有权。受托人还主张，Kwok 先生经营着由实体、亲属和忠实追随者组成的错综复杂网络，以向其债权人隐匿资产。据称，G-Club 是该等实体之一。若非与受让人达成和解，受托人本会就 HCHK Entities 与 G-Club 的关联向 HCHK Entities 寻求发现。事实上，受托人曾通过送达 Rule 2004 传票，在诉前寻求该等发现。受让人与受托人之间的和解旨在解决受托人与 HCHK Entities 之间的发现问题。向 G-Club 送达的 Rule 2004 传票是一个独立问题，不能构成 G-Club 反对受让人依照和解向受托人提交 G-Club 文件的依据。\n\n第二，受让人凭借 HCHK Tech 转让给他的权力和权利，可以披露 G-Club 文件。（起诉状证据附件13，Brian Hofmeister 宣誓书和申请书证据附件B，第1、4节。）根据 HCHK Tech 与 G-Club 之间的《主服务协议》（以下简称“MSA”）条款，受让人可以在法律要求的情况下向第三方披露 G-Club 的文件。（动议证据附件A，第6.2节。）\n\n然而，在作出该等披露之前，受让人必须通知 G-Club，以给予 G-Club 寻求保护令或其他适当救济的机会。受让人已履行其在 MSA 项下的义务。G-Club 获得了和解动议的通知；该动议根据 D. Conn. L. Bankr. R. 9019-1(a)(2) 在 Kwok 先生第11章案件中提交——G-Club 在该案中通过电子通知以及向出庭律师送达而获得通知——并且亦在本对抗程序中提交。事实上，G-Club 最初以保密性为由——符合 MSA 的规定——以及以相关性和特权为由提出异议。然而，在最终听证中，G-Club 放弃了其保密性异议，因为根据经修订拟议命令，受让人将在 Kwok 先生第11章案件中作出的保护令下，将所提交文件标记为“confidential”。（主案 ECF No. 923。）（主案 ECF No. 2030，听证记录第128:5-148:8页。）如放弃该异议所表明，和解以 MSA 所设想的方式保护了 G-Club。\n\n基于上述全部理由，本院认定，受让人可以提交 G-Club 的文件，而该等文件无须由 G-Club 就其与在 Kwok 先生第11章案件中向 G-Club 送达的 Rule 2004 传票的相关性进行审阅。因此，G-Club 必须向受托人移交受让人根据批准和解命令主文第6(a)段向其提交的文件，不论任何文件是否与向其送达的 Rule 2004 传票相关。\n\nB. 特权\n\n受托人主张，G-Club 已放弃在其与受让人达成和解时由受让人保管、控制及/或占有的文件中的任何特权。受托人声称，G-Club 在以下情形中放弃了该等文件中的任何及所有特权：第一，G-Club 与 HCHK Tech 签订 MSA，受托人认为，HCHK Tech 在该协议中同意提供超出仅托管 G-Club 文件范围的服务，并获得对该等文件的访问权；第二，G-Club 未对据称将 HCHK Tech 实质上全部财产（包括 G-Club 文件）转让给受让人提出异议；第三，G-Club 未对受让人出售 HCHK Tech 资产给 G-News Operations, LLC（G-News运营有限责任公司，以下简称“G-News”）的动议提出异议。\n\nG-Club 答复称，目前的事实和情况不足以支持 G-Club 已放弃任何特权的结论。具体而言，G-Club 主张，尽管 MSA 有相关条款，HCHK Tech 仅托管 G-Club 文件，并未访问该等文件；且在本院作出有关推进转让程序的临时限制令时，G-Club 对将 HCHK Tech 资产转让给受让人以及拟议出售给 G-News 提出异议的期限尚未届满。G-Club 将 HCHK Tech 向 G-Club 提供的服务类比为 Microsoft Corporation（微软公司，以下简称“Microsoft”）向众多个人和实体提供云存储及基于云的办公软件，并警告称，不利裁决将产生与既定法律相悖的深远影响。\n\n本院同意受托人的意见。\n\n“与所有特权一样，主张律师—委托人特权的人负有证明其所有必要要件的责任。”In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 82 (2d Cir. 1973)（引用 United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 923 (2d Cir. 1961)）。“主张该特权的一方……负有证明责任”，即受保护的通信属于“（1）委托人与其律师之间的通信；（2）意图并且事实上保持保密的通信；（3）为获取或提供法律意见而进行的通信。”United States v. Mejia, 655 F.3d 126, 132 (2d Cir. 2011)；参见 Strougo v. BEA Assocs., 199 F.R.D. 515, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)（引用 United States v. Constr. Prod. Rsch., Inc., 73 F.3d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1996)）。“寻求律师—委托人特权保护的一方必须积极采取行动保护其通信。”Niceforo v. UBS Glob. Asset Agmt. Ams., Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 428, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)。采取“可预见地将导致”特权通信披露的行动，将导致放弃律师—委托人特权，Niceforo, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 437；参见 Horowitz, 482 F.2d at 82，除非该等披露“对于特权旨在允许的委托人与律师之间进行有效磋商而言是‘必要的，或者至少是高度有用的’”，Strougo, 199 F.R.D. at 522（引用援引 Kovel, 296 F.2d at 922 的案例）。然而，“这种扩展［依据 Kovel］始终是有限的，并且‘为此目的，该特权保护的是委托人与律师之间的通信，而非对律师向委托人提供法律意见具有重要性的通信。’”Mejia, 655 F.3d at 132（引用 United States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir. 1999)）；参见 Horowitz, 482 F.2d at 80-82（区分 Kovel）。\n\n“共同利益”原则规定了一项放弃特权的例外：多方由同一律师代理并且“为实现共同目标……协同工作”，或者由不同律师代理但参与“共同法律事务”，以至于“［共同］利益的性质必须是相同而非相似，并且必须是法律利益，而非仅为商业利益。”Strougo, 199 F.R.D. at 520（省略内部引注）。然而，律师—委托人特权“应在与其原则逻辑相一致的最狭窄可能限度内受到严格限制。”Horowitz, 482 F.2d at 81；参见 Mejia, 655 F.3d at 132。\n\n在本案中，Brian Hofmeister（布莱恩·霍夫迈斯特）的宣誓书及请愿书同样载明，HCHK Tech（HCHK Tech）在技术、产品开发、工程、人力资源、招聘、法律、财务及研发等领域提供“按需咨询服务”。（Complaint Ex. 13, Affidavit and Petition of Brian Hofmeister ¶ 4。）根据 MSA 的条款，G-Club（G-Club）是该等广泛服务的使用者。（Id. Ex. 13, Affidavit and Petition of Brian Hofmeister ¶ 5。）HCHK Tech 作为独立承包商提供该等服务。（Mot. Ex. A, § 10.1。）MSA 第 1.1 条规定，HCHK Tech 将向 G-Club 提供的服务列于 MSA 的附件中。（Id. Ex. A, § 1.1。）MSA 附件 A 除信息技术支持服务外，还列出五类服务；信息技术支持服务是 G-Club 在其论证中承认的唯一服务类别。（Id. Ex. A, Ex. A。）其他服务类别包括但不限于法律服务、人力资源服务、财务服务及工程／开发服务。（Id. Ex. A, Ex. A。）MSA 第 6.2 条明确规定，HCHK Tech 可在提供协议附件 A 所列服务的过程中使用 G-Club 的文件。（Id. Ex. A, § 6.2。）尽管 G-Club 作出相反主张，HCHK Tech 与 G-Club 的关系并不同于 Microsoft（微软）与其云服务和基于云的办公软件普通消费者之间的关系。\n\n因此，G-Club 援引的 Metro Storage International v. Harron, 275 A.2d 810, 868-72 (Del. Ch. 2022)，对本案事实并无说服力。在该案中，就相关部分而言，\n\n被告雇员主张，公司原告关于其违反原告经营协议中保密条款的论点，除其他外，是以原告与一家非当事人公司共享文件从而放弃保密性为依据。Harron, 275 A.2d at 822-24, 868, 870-71。在 Harron 一案中，该非当事人公司除提供信息技术服务外，还提供物业管理及相关服务，并将原告的所有电子文件存储于其服务器上。Id. at 870-71。Delaware Court of Chancery（特拉华州衡平法院）将该等技术服务等同于例如 g-mail 或 Microsoft 365 的服务，Id. at 871 n. 35，并认定该非当事人方是受约束须维持文件保密性的原告代理人，因此，与该非当事人方共享文件并不构成对保密性的放弃，Id. at 871。\n\n然而，如上所述，与 Harron 一案不同，在本案中，HCHK Tech 根据 MSA 在多个领域提供“按需”服务，其中包括要求其查阅文件内容的领域。（Mot. Ex. A, Ex. A。）尽管 MSA 有此规定，G-Club 主张 HCHK Tech 仅是 G-Club 域名的信息技术管理员，且无权访问该等文件。（ECF 168, Hr'g Tr. at 34:10-37:13。）G-Club 未提供任何支持该主张并与 MSA 相矛盾的证据。G-Club 还主张，受托人未能证明 HCHK Tech 访问了 G-Club 的文件。（Id.）提出这些论点时，G-Club 试图规避其举证责任。Mejia, 655 F.3d at 132；Horowitz, 482 F.2d at 82；Kovel, 296 F.2d at 923；Strougo, 199 F.R.D. at 519。本院拒绝随 G-Club 陷入错误。\n\n证明 HCHK 访问文件的责任并不在受托人一方。事实上，第二巡回上诉法院在 Horowitz 一案中认定，一方当事人在“将其本人及律师之间的通信与所有其他记录同等对待，\n\n允许作为独立承包商而非雇员的 Horowitz 随意查阅其希望查阅的内容”时，即已放弃律师—委托人特权，482 F.2d at 82，尽管该法院指出“关于 Horowitz 使用载有 Kasser 夫妇与律师之间通信的档案的记录很少”，Id. at 80，并承认 Horowitz 作出了相矛盾的证词。前者而非后者构成 Horowitz 一案裁决的依据。Id. at 82。\n\nG-Club 并未试图使其向 HCHK Tech 披露特权文件的行为符合放弃特权的例外。G-Club 并未主张，向 HCHK Tech 披露对于其与律师磋商而言是必要的或高度有用的。同样，G-Club 并未主张 HCHK Tech 与 G-Club 具有共同法律利益，无论是在共同代理中，还是作为共同法律事务的一部分。\n\n因此，本院认定，G-Club 通过向 HCHK Tech 披露其通信，已放弃律师—委托人特权。此外，尽管在本对抗程序中发出临时限制令之前，G-Club 对让与程序及／或通过该等让与程序拟向 G-News 出售包括 HCHK Tech 在内的资产提出异议的期限尚未届满，但受托人正确指出，G-Club 未能证明其有意反对该让与或该出售。这进一步证明，G-Club 一直以“可预见地将导致”特权通信披露的方式处理其通信。Niceforo, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 437；参见 Horowitz, 482 F.2d at 82。\n\n基于上述全部理由，本院认定，G-Club 未能履行其证明律师—委托人特权适用的举证责任。受让人可以提交 G-Club 的文件，而该等文件无需接受 G-Club 的特权审查。因此，G-Club 必须向受托人移交受让人依照《批准和解裁定》第 6a 判决性段落向其提交的文件，无论任何文件是否享有特权。\n\nV. 结论及命令\n\n因此，基于上述理由，现命令如下：\n\n命令：动议中请求的救济予以准许。于 2023 年 11 月 17 日或之前，G-Club 应依照《批准和解裁定》第 6(a) 段，向受托人提供受让人向 G-Club 提供的全部文件；并进一步\n\n命令：于 2023 年 11 月 17 日或之前，受让人应依照《批准和解裁定》第 6(a) 段，向受托人提供受让人所保留的、由受让人向 G-Club 提供的文件的全部副本；并进一步\n\n命令：依照本命令向受托人提交的全部文件，应被视为指定为“保密”的文件，并受共同管理、案名为 In re Kwok, Case 22-50073 (JAM) 的案件中以 ECF No. 923 登记的保护令约束；并进一步\n\n命令：于 2023 年 11 月 14 日或之前，受托人应向 G-Club 和受让人送达本裁定。于 2023 年 11 月 15 日或之前，受托人应提交送达证明，以证明已遵守本裁定。\n\n2023 年 11 月 13 日，于康涅狄格州布里奇波特签署。\n\n附件 B\n\n康涅狄格州美国破产法院\n\n关于：\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，\n\n债务人。\n\n第 11 章\n\n案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n\n（合并管理）\n\nG CLUB OPERATIONS LLC（G Club Operations 有限责任公司）根据《破产程序规则》8007 条提出的待上诉期间中止动议\n\n根据《联邦破产程序规则》8007(a)(1)(A)，G Club Operations LLC（“G Club Operations”）请求中止本院于 2023 年 11 月 13 日作出的裁定；该裁定准许第 11 章受托人提出的《请求认定 G-Club Operations LLC 已放弃任何特权且无权对相关性提出异议的动议》。Despins et al v. HCHK Technologies, Inc. et al, No. 23-05013 (Bankr. D. Conn. Jun. 8, 2023) (Dkt No. 179)（以下简称“该裁定”）。该可上诉的终局裁定要求 G Club Operations 及 HCHK Technologies（HCHK Technologies）的受让人，于 2023 年 11 月 17 日前向受托人移交包括 G Club Operations 特权通信在内的文件（该期限少于当事人对裁定提出上诉所享有的 14 天期限），理由是 HCHK Technologies 曾作为 G Club Operations 及其他客户的互联网管理员。该裁定存在错误，并造成了危险的先例；该先例实质上认定，当企业或个人将其 IT 服务外包给也可能提供其他附加服务的供应商时，该企业或个人即丧失其文件的一切权利和权益，包括保护律师—委托人特权通信和工作成果特权通信免于披露的权利。谨此，本院作出该裁定有误，G Club Operations 已向地区法院提交上诉通知，对该裁定提出异议。\n\n如下文所述，G Club Operations 满足待上诉期间中止所需的要件。\n\n上诉，原因在于：(1) 未准予中止执行并迫使 G Club Operations（G Club运营公司）在上诉审理前向受托人交出受特权保护的通讯，将因使上诉失去实际意义并不可逆转地影响其正当程序权利，而实际上剥夺 G Club Operations 的上诉权；(2) 受托人不会受到任何损害，因为除已发出远超过 200 份 Rule 2004 传票外，受托人已在 Rule 2004 程序中从 G Club Operations 收到超过 140,000 份文件；(3) 该裁决违反公共政策，因为其涉及数百万客户的隐私权及受宪法保护的权利；以及 (4) G Club Operations 很可能在实体问题上胜诉，因为本院的推理不正确。因此，应准予上诉期间中止执行，以便在上诉所涉问题得到最终解决前，不交出受保护文件。\n\n由于该命令要求于 November 17, 2023 前履行，存在紧急情形，应以紧急动议方式审理本动议。此外，G Club Operations 谨请求本院在切实可行的范围内，最迟于 Thursday, November 16, 2023 对本动议作出裁决，以便 G Club Operations 如有必要可寻求地区法院的进一步适当救济。如未作出裁决，G Club Operations 拟于 Friday, November 15, 2023 向地区法院提交中止执行动议。\n\n相关程序背景1\n\n1. 于 June 23, 2023，受托人根据 Bankruptcy Rule 9019 提交了关于与纽约法院转让程序下 HCHK Entities（HCHK实体）受让人达成和解的动议（No. 22-50073, Dkt. No. 1936）（以下简称“9019动议”）。9019动议包括一份裁定草案，要求 HCHK Technologies, Inc.（HCHK科技公司）向受托人交出其可能有权查阅的全部文件。（同上，Dkt. No. 2004）（以下简称“经修订裁定草案”）。具体而言，经修订裁定草案第6段规定：\n\n“公司记录。受让人应立即向受托人提供其占有的、与 HCHK Entities 有关的所有非特权公司记录（包括电子形式）及其他文件。所有该等公司记录及其他文件均应视为被指定为‘保密’的文件，并受本 Chapter 11 案件中于 October 6, 2022 作出的保护令约束 [Main Case Docket No. 923]。”\n\n同上，第3页，第2段。\n\n1 该命令源于一项涉及 HCHK Technologies, HCHK Property Management, Inc.（HCHK物业管理公司）及 Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc.（列克星敦物业与人事公司）（合称“HCHK Entities”）的 Rule 9019 动议，该动议系通过一名受让人所称的授权提出；该命令所解决的事项为一项最终且独立的问题——G Club 基于正当程序理由提出的异议。就上诉而言，该命令属于终局命令，因为其“最终处置了总体破产案件中的一项独立争议”。Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 582, 586 (2020)（引文略）。本院已批准 9019动议。\n\n2. 于 July 5, 2023 以及再次于 July 14, 2023（同上，分别为 Dkt. Nos. 1977 和 2007），G Club Operations 对裁定草案第6段提出异议，并请求建立有序程序，以避免仅因其外包 IT 服务而向受托人全面交出保密和受特权保护的材料。\n\n3. 于 July 28, 2023，本院就 9019动议作出裁决，准予 9019动议，但对裁定草案第6段作出如下修改：\n\n公司记录：(a) 受让人应立即保全并妥善保护其占有的、与 HCHK Entities 有关的所有公司记录（包括电子形式）及其他文件。自本命令登记之日起十 (10) 日内，受让人应向受托人提供其占有的、与 HCHK Entities 有关的所有非特权公司记录（包括电子形式）及其他文件，但任何时候属于 G-Club Operation LLC（G-Club运营有限责任公司）（“G-Club”）财产的文件除外。所有该等公司记录及其他文件均应视为被指定为“保密”的文件，并受本 Chapter 11 案件中于 October 6, 2022 作出的保护令 [Main Case Docket No. 923]（以下简称“保护令”）约束。同样在本命令登记之日起十 (10) 日内，受让人应向 G-Club 提供其占有的、与 HCHK Entities 有关且任何时候属于 G-Club 财产的所有公司记录（包括电子形式）及其他文件。收到后，G-Club 应立即审查该等公司记录及其他文件，以确定其是否受特权保护以及是否对受托人向 G-Club 发出的 Rule 2004 传票具有响应性，并提交特权清单和响应性清单。G-Club 可根据保护令，将其将向受托人提供的材料指定为“保密”或“高度保密”。\n\n同上，Dkt. No. 2038，第4页，第6(a)段（着重号系后加）。\n\n2 该 Rule 9019 由 HCHK Entities 的受让人与受托人达成。与该 Rule 9019 命令有关的各种问题现为上诉事项。见 No. 23-05013, Dkt. Nos. 70, 80, and 98。\n\n4. 本院还规定：“于 August 11, 2023 当日或之前，受托人应提交书状，以支持受托人关于 G-Club 已放弃任何特权且无权对响应性提出异议的论点。于 August 18, 2023 当日或之前，G-Club 应就受托人的书状提交任何答复。”同上，第5页，第6(b)段。\n\n5. 于 August 11, 2023，受托人在 Adversary Proceeding No. 23-05013, ECF No. 86 提交了《支持第11章受托人关于 G-Club Operations LLC 已放弃任何特权且无权就根据 Bankruptcy Rule 9019 和解协议由 HCHK Technologies, Inc. 的受让人向受托人交付的 G-Club 文件提出响应性异议之论点的法律备忘录》（以下简称“特权放弃动议”），而非在 No. 22-50073 提交该动议（此前所有文件均在该案中提交）。\n\n6. G Club Operations 于 September 29, 2023 对特权放弃动议提出反对，提交了其《关于受托人质疑 G Club 对 HCHK 占有文件中所主张特权之备忘录的答复，以及对受托人相关裁定草案的反对意见》。（No. 22-50073, Dkt. No. 2244）。3\n\n7. 于 November 13, 2023，本院作出命令，准予受托人的特权放弃动议，并命令 G Club Operations 及 HCHK Technologies 的受让人于 November 17, 2023 前完成文件提交；该期限短于 G Club Operations 根据 Bankruptcy Rule 8002 对该命令提出上诉的期限。本命令为终局命令。\n\n3 G Club 因其《反对受托人根据批准第11章受托人与纽约法院转让程序下 HCHK Entities 受让人和解的命令而提出的、关于 G-Club 文件的补充裁定草案》所述理由，于不同日期提交文件。（No. 22-50073, Dkt. No. 2233）。\n\n上诉期间中止执行该命令适当\n\n8. United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit（美国联邦第二巡回上诉法院）确立了下列四部分标准，以确定是否准予上诉期间中止执行动议：\n\n(1) 申请中止执行的一方是否已充分证明其很可能在实体问题上胜诉；(2) 如不予中止执行，申请人是否将遭受不可弥补的损害；(3) 签发中止执行令是否将对该程序中具有利害关系的其他当事人造成重大损害；以及 (4) 公共利益所在。\n\nIn re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 503 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2007)（引文略）。本案中，每项因素均支持中止执行。中止执行是“‘司法裁量权的行使’”，且“‘请求中止执行的一方负有证明情况足以使该裁量权得以行使的责任。’”Uniformed Fire Officers Ass’n v. de Blasio, 973 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2020)（引自 Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1760 (2009)）。\n\nA. 如不予中止执行，G Club Operations 将因被剥夺上诉权及特权放弃而遭受不可弥补的损害\n\n9. 如不予中止执行，G Club Operations 将遭受不可弥补的损害，因为无法有效撤销向受托人全面交出受特权保护通讯的行为，且因此该交付可能使上诉失去实际意义。法院已认定，当拒绝中止执行可能导致动议方完全丧失一项权利时，即存在不可弥补的损害。In re St. Johnsbury Trucking Co., Inc., 185 B.R. 687, 690 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)（认定若政府在本案中的上诉失去实际意义，其将失去执行 CERCLA 及 Internal Revenue Code 某些规定的能力；构成法院认定不可弥补损害基础的是该受威胁的丧失，而非无论是否存在上诉权的丧失）。“在拒绝上诉期间中止执行可能使对重大错误主张的任何上诉失去实际意义的情况下，不可弥补损害要件即获满足。”In re BGI, Inc., 504 B.R. 754, 763 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)（内部引号及引文略，改动系后加）。\n\n10. 这正是本案的问题；如不予中止执行，G Club Operations 的权利将永久丧失，因为交付受特权保护的信息很可能会使该命令在上诉中被推翻时的任何有意义救济失去实际意义。该命令规定的交付期限要求于 November 17, 2023 前履行。该交付包括 G Club Operations 与其律师之间的受特权保护通讯。如 G Club Operations 或 HCHK 被迫遵守该命令，G Club Operations 将实际上永久失去保护其与律师之间保密通讯的权利。受托人及其顾问一旦取得，便无法忘却其将阅览和审查的受特权保护通讯。\n\nB. 中止执行不会损害受托人\n\n11. 与本破产事项中的任何其他当事人不同，受托人利用了 Rule 2004 赋予的广泛证据开示。事实上，受托人已申请许可提交 255 份 Rule 2004 传票。4 就 G Club Operations 而言，受托人已向 G Club Operations 送达 Rule 2004 传票，且 G Club Operations 已提供超过 140,000 份文件。此外，根据本院就 9019动议作出的命令，G Club Operations 还向受托人提供了特权清单。\n\n12. 因此，准许 G 不会使受托人遭受任何“重大损害”。\n\n4具体而言：(i) 受托人第一份补充综合动议（Dkt. No. 839），请求发出二十五（25）份传票；(ii) 受托人第二份补充综合动议（Dkt. No. 1116），请求发出五十三（53）份传票；(iii) 受托人第三份补充综合动议（Dkt. No. 1259），请求发出十九（19）份传票；(iv) 受托人第四份补充综合动议（Dkt. No. 1592），请求发出五十七（57）份传票；(v) 受托人第五份补充综合动议（Dkt. No. 1789），请求发出八（8）份传票；(vi) 受托人第六份补充综合动议（Dkt. No. 2079），请求发出二十（20）份传票；(vii) 受托人第七份补充综合动议（Dkt. No. 2249），请求发出六（6）份传票；(viii) 受托人第八份补充综合动议（Dkt. No. 2304），请求发出八（8）份传票；以及 (ix) 受托人第九份补充综合动议（Dkt. No. 2308），请求发出二十九（29）份传票。后两项目前正受异议约束。参见，例如，Shin Hsin Yu（俞欣欣）和 Jie Zhang（张杰）就第11章受托人依据 Rule 2004 请求作出命令的第八份补充综合动议提出的异议（Dkt. No. 2319）；G Club Operation LLC（G Club运营有限责任公司）就第11章受托人依据 Rule 2004 请求作出命令的第八份补充综合动议提出的有限异议（Dkt. No. 2320）；Shin Hsin Yu、1332156 B.C LTD、GWGOPNZ Limited 及 Jie Zhang 就第11章受托人依据 Rule 2004 请求作出命令的第九份补充综合动议提出的异议（Dkt. No. 2326）；G Club Operations LLC 就第11章受托人依据 Rule 2004 请求作出命令的第九份补充综合动议提出的异议（Dkt. No. 2331）。\n\nG Club Operations 对该命令提起上诉的权利；一旦该命令得到遵从，任何上诉将失去意义，并将永久侵害 G Club Operations 的正当程序权利。\n\nC. 该命令违反公共政策\n\n13. 该命令对将其信息技术服务外包的客户之隐私及受宪法保护的利益构成即时威胁。该命令违反了认定使用“托管服务并不导致放弃”的权威判例。参见 Metro Storage Int'l LLC（国际地铁仓储有限责任公司） v. Harron（哈伦）, 275 A.3d 810, 871 (Del. Ch. 2022)（增补内容）。没有法律依据支持如下主张：仅仅使用外包的、基于云端的数据托管服务，即导致特权被放弃，或以其他方式将云端存储的信息转移给管理人。\n\nD. G Club Operations 在上诉中具有实质性胜诉可能性，因为该命令存在错误\n\n14. 作为初步事项，“在未获中止执行的情况下原告将遭受的不可弥补损害金额，与成功的‘实质性可能性’所需证明程度成反比。”In re BGI, Inc., 504 B.R. at 764（原文第二处修改，省略引文）。如上所述，一项未经中止执行、强制移交 G Club Operations 享有特权之文件的命令，对 G Club Operations 造成的损害属于无法撤销的情势变化。因此，G Club Operations“并非始终需要证明其在实体问题上具有‘胜诉可能性’；相反，当涉及严肃法律问题时，动议方仅需在实体问题上提出实质性案件，并证明衡平利益的权衡强烈支持准予中止执行。”同上（省略引文）。然而，如下所述，该命令作出了错误的法律结论，假定存在放弃，并在根本未发生放弃的情况下，不当地将证明例外情形的责任转移给 G Club Operations，因此 G Club Operations 很可能在上诉中胜诉。\n\n该命令将向 HCHK 披露的文件与由 HCHK 作为 IT 管理人管理、存储于云端的 G Club Operations 文件混为一谈\n\n15. 在处理相关性和特权问题时，该命令将 G Club Operations 向 HCHK 披露、因而成为 HCHK 财产的文件，与由 HCHK 担任 IT 经理和管理人、存储于云端且仅属于 G Club Operations、使用 gclub.com 域名并且从未成为 HCHK 财产的 G Club Operations 电子邮件混为一谈。这同样适用于 HCHK 的任何其他客户。因此，该命令不当地依赖 HCHK 与 G Club Operations 之间的《主服务协议》，作为向受托人移交从未向 HCHK 披露的数千兆字节云端数据的依据。\n\n16. 该命令对 G Club Operations 在 No. 22-50073, Dkt. No. 2244 中立场的不当描述为审查程序，说明了这一错误。该命令称，“G-Club 有权就相关性和特权两方面审查文件。”命令第3页。换言之，法院不当地将争议界定为：G Club Operations 要求审查 HCHK 拟向受托人提交的文件，仿佛 G Club Operations 最初已将云端文件披露给 HCHK。\n\n17. 这并非放弃动议所提出、并由 G Club Operations 提出异议的问题。正如 G Club Operations 在其提交文件中所主张：\n\n“G Club 与 HCHK 签订合同，由其管理用于 G Club 通讯的基于云端的存储及电子邮件系统（以及其他服务）。该系统 Microsoft 365 是一个基于云端的企业系统，企业和律师事务所经常使用。HCHK 作为该系统的管理人，与 G Club 主张特权无关；有关文件存储于‘云端’，而受托人从未主张（且其也无法主张），除 G Club 雇员外，任何个人曾审查过存储于托管 G Club 域名的云端之文件。存储于由第三方管理的云端系统中的特权文件，并不会仅因此失去其受保护地位。”\nNo. 22-50073, Dkt. No. 2244, at 2-3, 13.\n\n18. 因此，问题在于：在没有事实主张称 IT 服务提供商曾接触特权材料的情况下，仅因外包 IT 服务，特权文件是否会失去其受保护地位。\n\n19. 进一步凸显这一混淆的是，该命令不当地依赖 HCHK 与 G Club Operations 之间的《主服务协议》（“MSA”）。在引用 MSA 时，法院错误地称：“根据 HCHK Tech（HCHK科技）与 G-Club 之间《主服务协议》（‘MSA’）的条款，受让人可在法律要求时向第三方披露 G-Club 的文件。（动议附件 A，§ 6.2。）”命令第6页。\n\n20. 然而，不能脱离第 6.1 条解读第 6.2 条；第 6.1 条规定：“‘保密信息’是指任一方（‘披露方’）根据本协议向另一方（‘接收方’）披露的任何信息。”MSA § 6.1（强调系后加）。存储于“云端”的 G Club Operations 文件并非向 HCHK 披露的文件。\n\n21. 事实上，发送给 HCHK 或与 HCHK 共享的文件（未经 G Club Operations 对相关性及特权进行审查，不应移交给受托人）与未向 HCHK 披露、属于且仅属于 G Club Operations 的数千兆字节云端数据之间，存在明确区别。\n\n22. 因此，MSA 的条款——其以“接收方”和“披露方”描述双方——并不能指导法院分析存储于“云端”的特权材料是否因此失去其受保护地位。\n\n该命令不当地假定存在放弃，并错误地将证明放弃例外的责任转移给 G Club Operations\n\n23. 关于特权，该命令仅依据受托人武断地声称“G-Club 已放弃其对受让人在与受托人和解时保管、控制和／或占有之文件所享有的任何特权”，便不当地假定存在放弃。命令第7页。“文件”并未被精确定义，未能顾及上述区别。此后，该命令不当地得出结论，认为必定存在放弃，因为 HCHK 提供“按项选择的咨询服务”，且“MSA 第 6.2 条明确规定，HCHK Tech 可在提供协议附件 A 所列服务的过程中使用 G-Club 的文件。（同上，附件 A，§ 6.2。）”命令第9页。然而，“云端”中的文件并非 HCHK 曾接触或以其他方式审查的文件。实际上，法院假定存在接触、审查和放弃，继而在起初根本不存在放弃的情况下，不当地将证明放弃例外的责任转移给 G Club。\n\n24. 如前所述，法院基于如下观念实施了实质上的责任转移：仅因 HCHK 根据 MSA 在云端提供数据托管及其他服务，G Club Operations 的特权即已被放弃。但是，没有法律依据支持如下主张：单纯提供与数据托管相分离的“按项选择的咨询服务”（尤其在不存在任何能够表明托管方实际接触特权材料之事实的情况下）会导致特权放弃——除非文件事实上已由一方交换、共享、披露或以其他方式审查。该命令再次不当地将服务提供过程中可能交换的文件（如 G Club Operations 与 HCHK 之间的通讯）与云端管理的外包 IT 服务混为一谈。该命令错误地假定存在放弃，因而不当地将责任转移给 G Club Operation，要求其根据“共同利益”或 Kovel 证明存在放弃例外。命令第9-11页。\n\n结论\n\n25. 在此情形下，为维持现状并防止 G Club Operations 因实际上丧失其正当程序及特权权利而遭受不可弥补的损害，在上诉期间中止执行是适当的。\n\n请求的救济\n\n26. G Club Operations 恭请法院作出命令，在该命令上诉期间中止执行。\n\n日期：November 15, 2023\n\n签署人：/s/ Jeffrey M. Sklarz\nGREEN & SKLARZ LLC\nJeffrey M. Sklarz（杰弗里·M·斯克拉兹）\nKellianne Baranowsky（凯莉安娜·巴拉诺夫斯基）\nOne Audobon St, 3rd Floor\nNew Haven, CT 06511\n电话：203-285-8545\njsklarz@gs-lawfirm.com\nkbaranowsky@gs-lawfirm.com\n\nPILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP\nCarolina A. Fornos（卡罗琳娜·A·福诺斯）（pro hac vice）\n31 West 52nd Street\nNew York, NY 10019\n电话：212-858-1558\ncarolina.fornos@pillsburylaw.com\n\nG Club Operations LLC 的代理律师\n\n送达证明\n\n本人特此证明，于下述日期，通过 CM/ECF 送达上述文件副本。当事人可通过法院的 CM/ECF 系统查阅本次提交。\n\n日期：November 15, 2023。\n\n/s/ Jeffrey M. Sklarz\nJeffrey M. Sklarz（杰弗里·M·斯克拉兹）\n\n美国康涅狄格地区联邦破产法院\n\n关于：\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，\n\n债务人。\n\n第11章\n\n案号 No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n（合并管理）\n\nG. CLUB OPERATIONS, LLC 提交的关于加速审理并限制就上诉期间中止执行动议进行通知的单方动议\n\n根据 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(c)(1) 和 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8007，G Club Operations, LLC（“G Club Operations”）谨此请求法院加速审理 G Club Operations, LLC 同时提交的上诉期间紧急中止执行动议（“中止执行动议”）。G Club Operations 请求在 Thursday, November 16, 2023 召开听证会（任何时间均可，可现场举行或通过 Zoom.gov 进行），因为法院已将 Friday, November 17, 2023（即作出 November 13, 2023 关于准予请求命令要求提交 G-Club 文件之动议的命令后第 4 日；该命令仅在对抗程序 Adv. Proc. 23-5013 中提交，以下简称“裁决”）定为遵从该裁决的截止日期。\n\n1．本案背景为法院所熟知，并已在中止执行动议中概述。\n\n2．Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(c)(1) 规定，法院可在有理由证明的情况下缩短动议的通知期间。\n\n1 G Club Operations, LLC（G Club运营有限责任公司）并非 Adv. Proc. 23-5013（“HCHK AP”）的当事人，亦从未在该案中被送达，且没有律师在该案中提交出庭代理声明。该裁定涉及 G Club 对根据 Fed. R. Civ. P. 9019 作出的一项命令中若干内容提出的异议；该命令（主案 ECF No. 2038）批准了受托人与 HCHK 就 HCHK AP 达成的和解的若干方面。参见主案 ECF Nos. 2270, 2242, 2237, 2233, 2077, 2038, 1977)。主案和 HCHK AP 均已提交上诉通知。\n\n3. 由于法院确定的履行日期为 November 17, 2023，即法院作出其裁定后 4 天，因此，暂缓执行动议需要立即审议。\n\n4. 如暂缓执行动议中所详述，G Club Operations 满足上诉期间暂缓执行所需的要件，原因是：(1) 如不批准暂缓执行，并迫使 G Club Operations 在上诉审理前将享有特权保护的通信交给受托人，将因使上诉失去意义并不可逆转地影响其正当程序权利，而实际上剥夺 G Club Operations 的上诉权；(2) 不会对受托人造成损害，因为除已发出远超过 200 份 Rule 2004 传票外，受托人已经在 Rule 2004 程序中从 G Club Operations 收到超过 140,000 份文件；(3) 该裁定违背公共政策，因为其涉及数百万客户的隐私权及受宪法保护的权利；以及 (4) G Club Operations 很可能在实体问题上胜诉，因为法院的推理在事实和法律上均属错误。因此，应批准上诉期间暂缓执行，以使受保护文件不会在上诉争议获得最终解决之前被交出。\n\n5. 由于该命令要求于 November 17, 2023 前履行，故存在紧急情形，应以紧急动议方式处理本动议。进一步地，G Club Operations 恭请法院在可行范围内不迟于 Thursday, November 16, 2023 对本动议作出裁定，以便 G Club Operations 如有必要可有机会向地区法院寻求进一步适当救济。如未获裁定，G Club Operations 拟于 Friday, November 15, 2023 向地区法院提交暂缓执行动议。\n\n6. 因此，存在理由使法院批准本加速审理动议，并就暂缓执行动议安排加速听证。\n\n据此，G Club Operations 恭请法院将暂缓执行动议的听证加速至 Thursday, November 16, 2023，并给予法院认为公正、适当及必要的其他和进一步救济。\n\n日期：November 15, 2023\n\nG CLUB OPERATIONS, LLC\n\n签字人：/s/ Jeffrey M. Sklarz\nGREEN & SKLARZ LLC（格林与斯克拉兹律师事务所）\nJeffrey M. Sklarz\nKellianne Baranowsky\nOne Audobon St, 3rd Floor\nNew Haven, CT 06511\n电话：203-285-8545\njsklarz@gs-lawfirm.com\nkbaranowsky@gs-lawfirm.com\n\nPILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP（博钦律师事务所）\nCarolina A. Fornos（pro hac vice）\n31 West 52nd Street\nNew York, NY 10019\n电话：212-858-1558\ncarolina.fornos@pillsburylaw.com\n\nG Club Operations LLC 的代理律师\n\n送达证明\n\n本人特此证明，于下列日期，上述文件副本已通过 CM/ECF 送达。当事人可通过法院的 CM/ECF 系统查阅本次提交的文件。\n\n日期：November 15, 2023.\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz\n/s/ Jeffrey M. Sklarz\n\n美利坚合众国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院\n\n关于：\n\n第 11 章\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n\n债务人。（合并管理）\n\n批准 G. CLUB OPERATIONS, LLC 提交的加速听证并限制关于上诉期间暂缓执行动议之通知的单方动议的命令\n\n根据 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(c)(l) 和 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8007，G Club Operations, LLC（“G Club Operations”）请求法院加速审理 G Club Operations, LLC 的上诉期间紧急暂缓执行动议（“暂缓执行动议”）。法院认为应批准该加速审理动议所请求的救济，现命令如下：\n\n兹命令，就暂缓执行动议的听证将于 November 16, 2023 上午/下午 __:__，通过 Zoom 平台/在美利坚合众国康涅狄格州布里奇波特联邦破产法院现场举行。\n\n兹命令，本命令及加速审理动议必须于 November __, 2023 上午/下午 __:__ 或之前，向所有有权获得通知的当事人送达；并进一步命令：\n\n兹命令，证明已遵守批准加速审理动议命令规定的送达证明，必须于 November __, 2023 上午/下午 __:__ 或之前提交。\n\n附件 C\n\n美利坚合众国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院\n\n关于：\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，\n\n债务人。1\n\n第 11 章\n\n案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n\n（合并管理）\n\nNovember 15, 2023\n\n上诉通知\n\n请注意，根据 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8001 et seq.，G Club Operations, LLC（“G Club Operations”）特此就破产法院于 November 13, 2023 作出的批准要求提交 G-Club 文件动议的命令（仅提交于 Adv. Proc. 23-5013，即“该裁定”）2 提交上诉通知。该裁定准许第 11 章受托人 Luc A. Despins（“受托人”）查阅由 HCHK Technologies, Inc.（“HCHK”）以电子方式存储的所有 G Club Operations 文件，此举进一步依据受托人支持“第 11 章受托人关于 G-Club Operations LLC 已放弃任何特权且无权对相关性提出异议的主张”的法律备忘录（“该动议”）（仅提交于 Adv. Proc. 23-5013，ECF No. 86）。该裁定副本随附于本通知，作为附件 A。\n\n1 本第 11 章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（税务识别号码后四位：9595）（“债务人”）、Genever Holdings LLC（税务识别号码后四位：8202）及 Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 及 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为 Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166，c/o Luc A. Despins，作为 Ho Wan Kwok 财产的受托人（仅用于通知和通信目的）。\n\n2 G Club Operations 并非 Adv. Proc. 23-5013（“HCHK AP”）的当事人，亦从未在该案中被送达，且没有律师在该案中提交出庭代理声明。该裁定涉及 G Club 对根据 Fed. R. Civ. P. 9019 作出的一项命令中若干内容提出的异议；该命令（主案 ECF No. 2038）批准了受托人与 HCHK 就 HCHK AP 达成的和解的若干方面。参见主案 ECF Nos. 2270, 2242, 2237, 2233, 2077, 2038, 1977)。然而，被上诉的该裁定仅在对抗程序中作出，因此，本上诉通知亦在该对抗程序中提交。{00340394.2 }\n\n法院被上诉命令所涉全部当事人的名称，以及其各自律师的名称、地址和电话号码如下：\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz\nKellianne T. Baranowsky\nGreen & Sklarz LLC\nOne Audubon Street, 3rd Floor\nNew Haven, CT 06511\n(203) 285-8545\n传真：(203) 823-4546\njsklarz@gs-lawfirm.com\nkbaranowsky@gs-lawfirm.com\n代理 G Club Operations LLC\n\n53 Calle Palmeras, Suite 1401\nPuerta De Tierra\nSan Juan, Puerto Rico 00901\n\n利害关系人及上诉人\n\n以及\n\nCarolina A. Fornos（pro hac vice）\nPILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP\n31 West 52nd Street\nNew York, NY 10019\n电话：212-858-1558\ncarolina.fornos@pillsburylaw.com\n\nDouglas S. Skalka（ct00616）\nPatrick R. Linsey（ct29437）\nNEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C.（纽伯特、佩佩与蒙蒂斯律师事务所）\n195 Church Street, 13th Floor\nNew Haven, Connecticut 06510\n(203) 781-2847\ndskalka@npmlaw.com\nplinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n以及\n\nNicholas A. Bassett（pro hac vice）\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP（普衡律师事务所）\n2050 M Street NW\nWashington, D.C., 20036\n(202) 551-1902\nnicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n以及\n\n代理第 11 章受托人 Luc A. Despins\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, New York 10166\n\n第 11 章受托人及被上诉人\n\nAvram E. Luft（pro hac vice）\nDouglass Barron（pro hac vice）\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, New York 10166\n(212) 318-6079\naviluft@paulhastings.com\n\n第 11 章受托人的律师\n\n利害关系人 G CLUB OPERATIONS LLC\n\n签字人：/s/ Jeffrey M. Sklarz\nJeffrey M. Sklarz（ct20938）\nGreen & Sklarz LLC\n700 State St, Suite 100\nNew Haven, CT 06511\n(203) 285-8545\n传真：(203) 823-4546\njsklarz@gs-lawfirm.com\n\n送达证明\n\n本人特此证明，于下列日期，上述文件副本已通过 CM/ECF 和/或邮寄方式向任何无法接受电子提交的人送达。本次提交的通知将依照法院电子提交系统的运行，通过电子邮件发送给所有当事人，或按照电子提交通知中所示，通过邮寄方式发送给任何无法接受电子提交的人。当事人可通过法院的 CM/ECF 系统查阅本次提交的文件。\n\n日期：November 15, 2017\n/s/ Jeffrey M. Sklarz\n\n{00340394.2 }\n\n附件 A\n\n{00340394.2 }\n\n美利坚合众国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院\n\n关于：\n\n第 11 章\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，\n\n债务人。\n\n案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n\n（合并管理）\n\nLUC A. DESPINS（Luc A. Despins），作为 HO WAN KWOK 财产的第 11 章受托人，\n\n原告，\n\n对抗程序案号：23-05013 (JAM)\n\n关于：ECF No. 86\n\n诉\n\nHCHK TECHNOLOGIES, INC.、HCHK PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC.、LEXINGTON PROPERTY AND STAFFING, INC.、HOLY CITY HONG KONG VENTURES, LTD.、ANTHONY DIBATTISTA、YVETTE WANG 及 BRIAN W. HOFMEISTER，债权人利益受让人，\n\n被告。\n\n批准要求提交 G-CLUB 文件动议的命令\n\n一、引言\n\n法院面前现有 Luc A. Despins 先生以 Ho Wan Kwok 先生财产的第 11 章受托人（“受托人”）身份，根据批准第 11 章受托人与 HCHK 实体受让人和解命令（“批准和解命令”）（ECF No. 70）判令第 6(b)段提交的、支持“第 11 章受托人关于 G-Club Operations LLC 已放弃任何特权且无权对相关性提出异议的主张”的法律备忘录（“该动议”）（ECF No. 86）2。基于下述理由，批准该动议所请求的救济，并命令 G-Club Operations LLC（“G-Club”）和/或 Brian Hofmeister 先生以 HCHK Technologies, Inc.（“HCHK Tech”）、HCHK Property Management, Inc. 及 Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc.（合称“HCHK 实体”）债权人利益受让人（“受让人”）的身份，提交由受让人持有的文件，视具体情况而定，该等文件此前由受让人依照批准和解命令提供给 G-Club。\n\n二、背景\n\n于 July 11, 2023 和 July 18, 2023，法院分别就受托人提交的关于依据纽约州法院让与程序与 HCHK 实体受让人达成和解的动议（“和解动议”）（主案 ECF No. 1936；ECF No. 25）以及关于和解动议的经修订拟议命令（“经修订拟议命令”）（主案 ECF No. 2004；ECF No. 55）举行听证。G-Club 对和解动议及经修订拟议命令提出异议。（主案 ECF Nos. 1977, 2007。）于 July 28, 2023，法院作出批准和解命令，批准和解动议及受托人与受让人之间的和解。（主案 ECF No. 2038；ECF No. 70。）\n\n2 本对抗程序案卷的引用将标示为“ECF”。对主案 In re Kwok, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)（郭文贵案）的案卷引用将标示为“Main Case ECF”。\n\n《批准和解命令》第6段通过设定书面陈述日程，处理了G-Club（G俱乐部）对《和解动议》提出的唯一剩余异议（见Main Case ECF No. 2030, at 128:5-48:8）；根据该日程，受托人与G-Club将就G-Club是否有权在文件交付受托人之前，审阅受让人持有的G-Club文件，以确定其是否对向G-Club送达的Rule 2004传票具有相关性，以及是否享有特权，进行争讼。(Main Case ECF No. 2038 ¶ 6; ECF No. 70 ¶ 6.) 2023年8月11日，受托人及时提交《动议》，主张G-Club无权为相关性或特权之目的审阅该等文件。(ECF No. 87.) 2023年9月29日，在某些事态发展之后（见Main Case ECF No. 2237），G-Club对受托人的备忘录提交答复(Main Case ECF No. 2244)，主张G-Club有权为相关性及特权两方面审阅该等文件。\n\n2023年10月24日，就受托人在《动议》中提出的论点举行了听证。受托人与G-Club均出庭并陈述各自立场。听证结束时，本院将该事项留待审议。\n\n受托人与G-Club之间的争议已具备裁决条件。\n\nIII. 管辖权\n\nUnited States District Court for the District of Connecticut（美国康涅狄格联邦地区法院）依据28 U.S.C. § 1334(b)对本事项具有管辖权。本院依据28 U.S.C. § 157(a)及United States District Court for the District of Connecticut于1984年9月21日作出的移送命令，有权审理并裁定本事项。本对抗程序，即本发现程序争议发生所在的程序，属于法定核心程序。28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (E), (0).\n\n依据28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409，本地区为适格审判地。\n\nIV. 讨论3\n\n首先，受托人与G-Club就《批准和解命令》的条款以及《动议》是否寻求免除该命令的救济存在争议。受托人主张，《批准和解命令》规定当事人就《动议》提出的问题进行诉讼。G-Club主张，该命令已对相关问题作出有利于G-Club的裁定。受托人显然正确。尽管《批准和解命令》的判令第6(a)款规定，受让人应允许G-Club查阅其持有的G-Club文件，并且G-Club获得机会，在将文件交付受托人之前核查其对向G-Club送达的Rule 2004传票是否具有相关性及是否享有特权，但判令第6(b)款规定，受托人与G-Club应就G-Club在G-Club和/或受让人向受托人交付文件之前，是否有权核查文件的相关性和/或特权问题提交书面陈述。实质上，《批准和解命令》保留了相关问题，同时提供了一种机制，以便在本院目前待决问题作出裁定之前继续进行发现程序。\n\n本院此前并未作出有利于G-Club的相关问题裁定，并将在下文审议当事人就相关性和特权提出的论点。\n\nA. 相关性\n\n受托人主张，G-Club不得以该等文件对在郭文贵Chapter 11案件中向G-Club送达的Rule 2004传票不具相关性为由，反对受让人依据《批准和解命令》交付HCHK Entities（HCHK实体）的文件。受托人主张，与G-Club传票无关，该\n\n3 下文构成本院依据Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure第7052条作出的事实认定和法律结论；该条通过第7001条适用于对抗程序。\n\n与受让人达成的和解涉及受托人原本将在本对抗程序中寻求的发现，以及在郭文贵Chapter 11案件中向HCHK Tech（HCHK科技）送达的Rule 2004传票。\n\nG-Club答复称，受托人不得通过向HCHK Tech进行发现来取得G-Club的财产。因此，G-Club主张，受托人只能依据向其送达的Rule 2004传票从G-Club取得文件，但须由G-Club进行相关性审阅。\n\n本院同意受托人的意见。第一，本争议与关于G-Club遵守向其送达的Rule 2004传票的争议相互独立且截然不同。HCHK Entities在转让契约中授予受让人与受托人和解的权限。(See, e.g., Complaint Ex. 13, Affidavit and Petition of Brian Hofmeister Ex. B, § 4.) 受让人已如此行事：《批准和解命令》批准了受托人与受让人就本对抗程序以及其中相关发现程序达成的和解，而非受托人与G-Club就郭文贵Chapter 11案件中的发现程序达成的和解。\n\n在本对抗程序中，受托人主张HCHK Entities是郭文贵的另我，和/或郭文贵实益拥有HCHK Entities和/或其资产。受托人另行主张，郭文贵经营由实体、亲属和忠实追随者组成的错综复杂网络，以向其债权人隐匿资产。据称，G-Club即为其中一个实体。若非与受让人达成和解，受托人本会就HCHK Entities与G-Club之间的关联向其寻求发现。事实上，受托人在诉讼前已通过送达Rule 2004传票寻求该等发现。受让人与受托人之间的和解旨在解决受托人与HCHK Entities之间的发现问题。向G-Club送达的Rule 2004传票是一个独立问题，不能构成G-Club反对受让人依据该和解向受托人交付G-Club文件的依据。\n\n第二，受让人凭借HCHK Tech向其转让的权力和权利，可以披露G-Club文件。(Complaint Ex. 13, Affidavit and Petition of Brian Hofmeister Ex. B, §§ 1, 4.) 根据HCHK Tech与G-Club之间《主服务协议》（“MSA”）的条款，受让人可以在法律要求时向第三方披露G-Club文件。(Mot. Ex. A, § 6.2.)\n\n然而，在作出该等披露之前，受让人必须通知G-Club，以使G-Club有机会申请保护令或其他适当救济。受让人已履行其在MSA项下的义务。G-Club已收到《和解动议》的通知；该动议依据D. Conn. L. Bankr. R. 9019- 1 (a)(2)在郭文贵Chapter 11案件中提交——在该案件中，G-Club通过电子通知及向其出庭律师送达而收到通知——并且亦在本对抗程序中提交。事实上，G-Club最初依据MSA的规定，以保密为由提出异议——并同时以相关性和特权为由提出异议。然而，在最终听证中，G-Club放弃了其保密异议，因为根据《经修订的拟议命令》，受让人将根据郭文贵Chapter 11案件中作出的保护令，将已交付文件标示为“confidential”（保密）。(Main Case ECF No. 923). (Main Case ECF No. 2030, Hr'g Tr. at 128:5-48:8.) 如放弃该异议所示，该和解以MSA所设想的方式保护了G-Club。\n\n基于上述全部理由，本院认定，受让人可以交付G-Club文件，而该等文件无需由G-Club审阅其对在郭文贵Chapter 11案件中向G-Club送达的Rule 2004传票是否具有相关性。因此，G-Club必须向受托人移交受让人依据《批准和解命令》判令第6a款向其交付的文件，而不考虑任何文件是否对向其送达的Rule 2004传票具有相关性。\n\nB. 特权\n\n受托人主张，G-Club已放弃受让人在其与受托人达成和解时保管、控制和/或占有的文件所享有的任何特权。受托人断言，G-Club在以下情形中放弃了文件中的任何及全部特权：第一，G-Club与HCHK Tech订立MSA；受托人主张，HCHK Tech在该协议中同意提供超出仅托管G-Club文件范围的服务，并获准访问该等文件；第二，G-Club未对据称将HCHK Tech实质上全部财产（包括G-Club文件）转让给受让人提出异议；以及第三，G-Club未对受让人出售HCHK Tech资产给G-News Operations, LLC（“G-News”）的动议提出异议。\n\nG-Club答复称，目前的事实和情形不支持G-Club已放弃任何特权这一结论。具体而言，G-Club主张，尽管MSA有相关条款，HCHK Tech仅托管G-Club文件，并未访问这些文件；并且，在本院就推进转让程序作出临时限制令时，G-Club对将HCHK Tech资产转让给受让人以及拟议出售给G-News提出异议的期限尚未届满。G-Club将HCHK Tech向G-Club提供的服务类比于Microsoft Corporation（“Microsoft”）向大量个人和实体提供云存储和基于云的办公软件，并警告称，不利裁定将产生与既定法律相悖的深远影响。\n\n本院同意受托人的意见。\n\n“[A]s with all privileges, the person claiming the attorney client privilege has the burden of establishing all essential elements.” In re Horowitz, 482 F .2d 72, 82 (2d Cir. 1973) ( citing United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 923 (2d Cir. 1961 )). “主张特权的一方……负有举证责任，证明”拟受保护的通讯属于“通讯（1）发生于客户与其律师之间；（2）意图保密且事实上已保密；以及（3）旨在获得或提供法律意见。” United States v. Mejia, 655 F.3d 126, 132 (2d Cir. 2011); see Strougo v. BEA Assocs., 199 F.R.D. 515, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ( citing United States v. Constr. Prod. Rsch., Inc., 73 F .3d 464,473 (2d Cir. 1996)). “寻求律师—客户特权保护的一方必须积极采取行动保护其通讯。” Nice.faro v. UBS Glob. Asset Agmt. Ams., Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 428,437 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 采取“‘可预见地将导致’特权通讯披露”的行动，将导致放弃律师—客户特权，Nice.fora, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 437; see Horowitz, 482 F.2d at 82，除非该等披露“‘对于特权旨在允许的客户与律师之间的有效咨询是必要的，或者至少是高度有用的’”，Strougo, 199 F.R.D. at 522 (citing case quoting Kovel, 296 F.2d at 922). 尽管如此，“[Kovel项下的]这一延伸始终受到限制，而且‘[t]o that end, the privilege protects communications between a client and an attorney, not communications that prove impotiant to an attorney’s legal advice to a client.’” Mejia, 655 F.3d at 132 (citing United States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir. 1999)); see Horowitz, 482 F.2d at 80-82 ( distinguishing Kovel).\n\n“共同利益原则”在多方当事人由同一律师代理并“为共同目标……协作”，或者由不同律师代理但从事“共同法律事业”且“[共同]利益的性质必须相同，而非相似，并且必须是法律利益，而非仅仅是商业利益”的情况下，构成对特权放弃的例外。Strougo, 199 F.R.D. at 520（省略内部引文）。然而，律师—当事人特权“应当在与其原则逻辑相一致的最狭窄可能限度内严格限定。”Horowitz, 482 F.2d at 81；参见 Mejia, 655 F.3d at 132。\n\n在本案中，Brian Hofmeister（布莱恩·霍夫迈斯特）的宣誓书及请愿书同样称，HCHK Tech 提供“涵盖技术、产品开发、工程、人力资源、招聘、法律、财务及研发的按需咨询服务。”（Complaint Ex. 13, Affidavit and Petition of Brian Hofmeister ¶ 4。）G-Club 根据 MSA 的条款接受这些广泛服务。（Id. Ex. 13, Affidavit and Petition of Brian Hofmeister ¶ 5。）HCHK Tech 作为独立承包商提供该等服务。（Mot. Ex. A, § 10.1。）MSA 第1.1条规定，HCHK Tech 将向 G-Club 提供的服务列于 MSA 的一份附件中。（Id. Ex. A, § 1.1。）MSA 附件A除信息技术支持服务外，还列出五类服务；信息技术支持服务是 G-Club 在其论证中承认的唯一服务类别。（Id. Ex. A, Ex. A。）其他服务类别包括但不限于法律服务、人力资源服务、财务服务及工程/开发服务。（Id. Ex. A, Ex. A。）MSA 第6.2条明确规定，HCHK Tech 可以在提供协议附件A所列服务的过程中使用 G-Club 的文件。（Id. Ex. A, § 6.2。）尽管 G-Club 作出相反主张，HCHK Tech 与 G-Club 的关系并不同于 Microsoft（微软）与其云服务及基于云的办公软件普通消费者之间的关系。\n\n因此，G-Club 援引的 Metro Storage International v. Harron, 275 A.2d 810, 868-72 (Del. Ch. 2022)，对本案事实不具说服力。在该案中，就与本案相关的部分而言，被告雇员针对公司原告关于其违反原告运营协议中保密条款的主张提出辩称，其中包括主张原告因与一家非当事人公司共享其文件而放弃了保密性。Harron, 275 A.2d at 822-24, 868, 870-71。在 Harron 案中，该非当事人公司提供物业管理及相关服务以及信息技术服务，并将原告的所有电子文件存储于其服务器上。Id. at 870-71。Delaware Court of Chancery（特拉华州衡平法院）将这些技术服务等同于例如 g-mail 或 Microsoft 365 的服务，Id. at 871 n. 35，并认定该非当事人为原告的代理人，负有维护文件保密性的义务，因此，与该非当事人共享文件并不构成对保密性的放弃，Id. at 871。\n\n然而，如上所述，与 Harron 案不同，在本案中，HCHK Tech 根据 MSA 在多个领域提供“按需”服务，其中包括要求其接触文件内容的领域。（Mot. Ex. A, Ex. A。）尽管有 MSA 的条款，G-Club 主张 HCHK Tech 仅是 G-Club 域名的信息技术管理人，且无权接触该等文件。（ECF 168, Hr'g Tr. at 34:10-37:13。）G-Club 没有提供任何支持该主张并与 MSA 相矛盾的证据。G-Club 还主张，受托人未能证明 HCHK Tech 接触过 G-Club 的文件。（Id.）提出这些论点时，G-Club 试图逃避其举证责任。Mejia, 655 F.3d at 132；Horowitz, 482 F.2d at 82；Kovel, 296 F.2d at 923；Strougo, 199 F.R.D. at 519。本院拒绝随 G-Club 一同犯错。\n\n举证责任不在受托人，受托人无需证明 HCHK 接触过文件。事实上，第二巡回法院在 Horowitz 案中认定，一方当事人放弃了律师—当事人特权，因为他“将其与律师之间的通信与所有其他记录同等对待，Horowitz 是独立承包商而非雇员，可以自由查看其所愿查看的任何内容”，482 F.2d at 82，尽管该法院指出“有关 Horowitz 使用包含 Kasser 家族与律师通信文件的记录很少”，id. at 80，并承认 Horowitz 作出了相互矛盾的证词。前者而非后者构成 Horowitz 案裁判的基础。Id. at 82。\n\nG-Club 并未试图将其向 HCHK Tech 披露特权文件的行为纳入放弃特权的例外情形。G-Club 未主张，向 HCHK Tech 披露对于其与律师的协商而言是必要的或极为有用的。同样，G-Club 也未主张 HCHK Tech 与 G-Club 具有共同的法律利益，无论是在共同代理中，还是作为共同法律事业的一部分。\n\n因此，本院认定，G-Club 通过向 HCHK Tech 披露其通信，放弃了律师—当事人特权。此外，尽管在本对抗程序中临时限制令发布前，G-Club 对让与程序和/或通过该等让与程序拟将包括 HCHK Tech 在内的资产出售给 G-News 提出异议的期限尚未届满，但受托人正确指出，G-Club 未能证明其有意反对该让与或出售中的任何一项。这进一步表明，G-Club 一直以“可预见地导致”特权通信披露的方式处理其通信。Niceforo, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 437；参见 Horowitz, 482 F.2d at 82。\n\n基于上述所有理由，本院认定 G-Club 未能履行其举证责任，以证明律师—当事人特权适用。受让人可以提供 G-Club 的文件，而该等文件无需由 G-Club 进行特权审查。因此，G-Club 必须向受托人移交受让人根据和解批准裁定主文第6a段向其提供的文件，而不论任何文件是否享有特权。\n\nV. 结论及命令\n\n因此，基于上述理由，现命令如下：\n\n命令：动议所请求的救济获准。于2023年11月17日或之前，G-Club 应向受托人提供受让人根据和解批准裁定第6(a)段向 G-Club 提供的所有文件；并进一步\n\n命令：于2023年11月17日或之前，受让人应向受托人提供受让人留存的、受让人根据和解批准裁定第6(a)段向 G-Club 提供的所有文件副本；并进一步\n\n命令：根据本命令向受托人提供的所有文件均应视为被指定为“保密”的文件，并受在联合管理案件 In re Kwok, Case 22-50073 (JAM) 中以 ECF No. 923 登记的保护令约束；并进一步\n\n命令：于2023年11月14日或之前，受托人应向 G-Club 和受让人送达本裁定。于2023年11月15日或之前，受托人应提交送达证明，以证明其遵守本裁定。\n\n2023年11月13日，于康涅狄格州布里奇波特签署。\n\n附件D\n\n美国破产法院\n康涅狄格地区\n布里奇波特分庭\n\n关于： 第11章\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等， 案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。 （联合管理）\n\nLUC A. DESPINS（卢克·A·德斯平斯），第11章\n受托人，\n原告，\n诉 对抗程序案号 23-05013 (JAM)\nHCHK TECHNOLOGIES, INC.（HCHK科技公司），\nHCHK PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC.（HCHK物业管理公司），\nLEXINGTON PROPERTY AND STAFFING, INC.（莱克星顿物业与人事公司）：\nHOLY CITY HONG KONG VENTURES, LTD.（香港圣城创投有限公司），\nANTHONY DIBATTISTA（安东尼·迪巴蒂斯塔），YVETTE WANG（王雁），\n以及 BRIAN HOFMEISTER（布莱恩·霍夫迈斯特）（以其作为\n受让人的身份），\n被告。\n\n支持第11章受托人关于 G-CLUB OPERATIONS LLC（G-CLUB运营有限责任公司）已放弃任何特权，且无权就根据破产规则第9019条和解协议由 HCHK TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 受让人向受托人移交的 G-CLUB 文件提出相关性异议之论点的法律备忘录\n\n本第11章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（亦称 Guo Wengui、Miles Guo 和 Miles Kwok，以及众多其他别名）（税务识别号码后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（Genever控股有限责任公司）（税务识别号码后四位：8202）及 Genever Holdings Corporation（Genever控股公司）。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 和 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为 Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166，c/o Luc A. Despins，作为 Ho Wan Kwok 财产的受托人（仅用于通知和通信目的）。\n\nLuc A. Despins 以其作为 Ho Wan Kwok（“债务人”或“Kwok”）第11章案件（“第11章案件”）中指定的第11章受托人（“受托人”）身份，提交本法律备忘录（“备忘录”），以支持受托人的论点：不应允许 G-Club Operations LLC（“G-Club”）基于其主张其声称属于 G-Club 财产的文件享有特权或与向 G-Club 送达的规则2004传票无关，而阻止作为受托人规则9019和解协议一部分的 HCHK Technologies, Inc.（“HCHK Technologies”）公司记录由 HCHK Entities2 的受让人移交给受托人。为支持本备忘录，受托人陈述如下：\n\n初步陈述\n\n1. G-Club 试图阻止根据规则9019和解协议移交 HCHK Technologies 公司文件的部分内容，理由是该等文件与向 G-Club 送达的规则2004传票无关，且 G-Club 对其中一部分文件享有特权。两项论点均无依据。\n\n2. 首先，无论争议文件是否与受托人向 G-Club 送达的规则2004传票相关，毫无疑问，该等文件与受托人向 HCHK Technologies 送达的规则2004传票相关。向 HCHK Technologies 提出的规则2004请求明确寻求与 Kwok 关联实体、债务人、其家人、其代理人（包括 HCHK Technologies 的99.999%所有人 Yvette Wang）以及与该等实体和个人有关的任何资产、资金或商业交易相关的文件。这些请求显然涵盖与 G-Club 有关的文件，受托人已主张 G-Club 为债务人控制的实体。尽管如此——且现已知 HCHK Technologies 拥有数万份相关文件——其前任律师总共提供的文件不足150份，且仅有一份与 G-Club 有关的文件。必须提供 HCHK Technologies 所有与 G-Club 有关的额外文件。\n\n3. 要求HCHK Technologies提供这些文件也有助于提升司法效率。《破产程序规则》第9019条和解协议的一个关键方面，是保留第11章破产财产的资源，包括原本将用于有争议证据开示的资源。如果受托人无法根据和解协议取得HCHK Technologies的文件，他将需要就其替身实体及衡平法所有权主张的诉讼，对HCHK Technologies进行负担沉重且成本高昂的正式证据开示，包括取得与债务人通过其拥有及控制的实体转移资金有关的文件。此类文件显然将包括与G-Club有关的文件：本院已认定该实体受债务人控制，且政府在针对债务人（及其共谋者Yvette Wang（王雁）和William Je）的刑事起诉书中指称，该实体是其欺诈性资金转移的支柱。鉴于无需承担证据开示附带成本而取得这些文件的必要性，各方同意，最有效率的做法是仅允许受托人查阅HCHK Technologies的公司记录。\n\n4. 基于这些理由，G-Club不能以该等文件可能与送达给G-Club的第2004条传票无关为由，阻止向受托人披露HCHK Technologies的文件。\n\n5. 第二，没有任何特权阻止披露该等文件。G-Club就HCHK Technologies持有的文件可能享有的任何特权，首先在其为G-Club外包给HCHK Technologies的众多服务而自由地向HCHK Technologies共享该等文件时即已放弃；其后，在该等文件被提供给受让人并继而提供给G-News时，再次被放弃。\n\nG-Club已将其声称受特权保护的文件自由地与三名第三方共享，现不能主张该等文件受特权保护，以阻止受托人取得该等文件。\n\n事实背景\n\n6. 本院十分熟悉与Brian Hofmeister（“受让人”）在纽约州法院启动的HCHK实体的3项转让程序、受让人为寻求作出命令以授权并批准其与G-News Operations, LLC（“G-News”）订立《临时管理协议》（“IMA”）而提交的经核实申请（“申请”）、受托人针对HCHK实体及受让人提起的对抗程序（“对抗程序”）[Adv. Proc. 23-05013, Docket No. 1]、受让人随后与受托人达成的和解协议（“第9019条和解协议”）、G-Club的异议以及由此产生的听证会有关的基础事实。因此，为节约司法资源，受托人仅在此强调与本备忘录所涉争议直接相关的事实。\n\n7. 2022年12月7日，受托人向HCHK Technologies送达了第2004条传票。4 根据该传票，受托人于2023年3月10日前后收到HCHK Technologies提供的文件，共计148份文件。其中仅有一份文件，即一份Excel电子表格，顺带提及G-Club。\n\n8. 在受托人针对该等转让程序采取行动之后，并在本院作出准予临时限制令的命令之后，受托人与受让人进行了诚信讨论，最终达成第9019条和解协议；该协议旨在：（1）在临时基础上并等待对抗程序结果，将目前存放在受让人控制账户中的HCHK实体逾$38 million现金转入受托人控制的账户；以及（2）规定解决与对抗程序有关的其他未决问题，包括规定受让人向受托人移交所有与HCHK实体有关的非特权公司记录及其他文件。该规定对第9019条和解协议至关重要，因为它使双方均可避免受托人需要向HCHK实体进行证据开示所产生的成本，同时确保受托人能够取得HCHK实体所持有的一切文件，而该等文件与受托人关于HCHK实体系债务人的替身实体并由债务人享有衡平法所有权的主张相关。\n\n“HCHK实体”被定义为HCHK Technologies、HCHK Property Management, Inc.（“HCHK Property”）以及Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc.（“Lexington Property”）。\n\n送达宣誓书作为附件C附于本文件之后。送达给HCHK Technologies的传票及文件请求作为附件D附于本文件之后。\n\n9. 2023年7月5日，G-Club提交了《G-Club Operations LLC关于：根据《破产程序规则》第9019条就纽约法院转让程序下与HCHK实体受让人达成和解之动议的通知》[Main Case Docket No. 1977]（“G-Club通知”）。G-Club通知告知本院，HCHK Technologies根据G-Club与HCHK Technologies之间的一份《主服务协议》5，“管理及维护G Club的电子邮件及其他应用程序”，因此持有G-Club的机密信息和文件。6 G-Club通知还请求HCHK Technologies在根据第9019条和解协议向受托人移交之前，将G-Club的全部机密信息和文件返还给G-Club，以使G-Club能够审阅并根据受托人送达给G-Club的第2004条传票向受托人提供相应信息。7\n\nG-Club与HCHK Technologies之间《主服务协议》的副本作为附件A附于本文件之后。\n\n见G-Club通知第4段。\n\n10. 2023年7月7日，受托人提交了《第11章受托人综合答复：（I）支持根据《破产程序规则》第9019条就纽约法院转让程序下与HCHK实体受让人达成和解之动议；以及（II）答复异议》[Adv. Proc. 23-05013, Docket No. 45]。\n\n11. 就G-Club通知及第9019条和解协议，于2023年7月11日及2023年7月18日举行了听证会。在2023年7月18日的听证会上，8G-Club的律师主张，G-Club主要关切的是特权信息，而非机密信息；机密信息推定应受主案中已作出的保护令约束[Main Case Docket No. 923]。9\n\n12. 2023年7月28日，本院作出《根据《破产程序规则》第9019条批准第11章受托人与纽约法院转让程序下HCHK实体受让人达成和解的命令》[Adv. Proc. 23-05013, Docket No. 70]（“第9019条和解命令”）。除其他事项外，第9019条和解命令规定如下：\n\n自本命令作出之日起十（10）日内，受让人应向受托人提供受让人持有的与HCHK实体有关的全部非特权公司记录（包括电子形式的记录）及其他文件，但任何时点曾属于[G-Club]财产的文件除外……同样，自本命令作出之日起十（10）日内，受让人应向G-Club提供受让人持有的、任何时点曾属于G-Club财产的与HCHK实体有关的全部公司记录（包括电子形式的记录）及其他文件。收到后，G-Club应立即审查该等公司记录及其他文件，以确定其是否受特权保护以及是否对受托人向G-Club送达的第2004条传票具有相关性，并提交特权日志及相关性日志。G-Club可依照保护令，将其将向受托人提供的材料指定为“机密”或“高度机密”。10\n\n13. 第9019条和解命令还命令受托人于2023年8月11日或之前提交法律备忘录，以支持其主张：G-Club已放弃任何特权，且无权反对受让人根据第9019条和解命令移交HCHK Technologies与G-Club有关的文件是否具有相关性。11\n\n救济依据\n\n一、G-Club无权对HCHK Technologies持有文件的相关性提出异议\n\n14. G-Club主张，其可基于HCHK Technologies档案中的文件可能与送达给G-Club的第2004条传票无关，阻止HCHK Technologies向受托人提供该等文件。12 该主张不能成立，因为受托人审阅HCHK Technologies文件的权利，并不取决于何者与G-Club的传票有关。相反，问题在于HCHK Technologies持有并控制的文件，包括源自G Club的文件，是否与受托人向HCHK Technologies送达的第2004条传票有关，或是否与受托人针对HCHK Technologies提起的对抗程序有关。G-Club不能利用其自身的第2004条传票，阻止受托人从其他当事人取得有效的第2004条证据开示，或阻止受托人在本对抗程序中寻求额外证据开示。13\n\n10 见第9019条和解命令第6段。\n\n11 见同上。\n\n12 第9019条和解命令要求受让人向G-Club返还所有属于或在任何时点曾属于G-Club财产的文件。诚然，HCHK Technologies独立制作、仅因提及G-Club而与G-Club有关的工作成果，如无其他情形，并非G-Club的财产。\n\nHCHK Technologies。G-Club不能利用其自身的第2004条传票，阻止受托人从其他当事人取得有效的第2004条证据开示，或阻止受托人在本对抗程序中寻求额外证据开示。13\n\na. HCHK Technologies的文件，包括其持有的任何源自G-Club的文件，与HCHK Technologies自身的第2004条传票有关且具备响应性\n\n15. 如上所述，受托人作为其第2004条调查的一部分，向HCHK Technologies送达了其自身的第2004条传票。附于该传票的文件请求将G-Club列入受托人对“关联实体”的定义之中，14且多项具体请求要求提供关于“关联实体”的文件。15\n\n16. 尽管如此，HCHK Technologies向受托人提供的文件严重不足。受托人仅收到148份文件，其中不包括与G-Club有关的文件，尽管该等文件显然对HCHK Technologies的传票具有响应性。\n\n17. 正如在HCHK Technologies完全遵从一份有效传票的过程中，G-Club不能要求从HCHK Technologies删除其文件一样，G-Club现亦不应能够阻止HCHK Technologies针对其自身的第2004条传票移交其持有的具有响应性的文件，即使该等文件源自G-Club。\n\nb. 以移交HCHK Technologies的文件代替证据开示，包括其持有的任何源自G-Club的文件，是第9019条和解协议的关键方面\n\n13 在受托人误解了 G-Club（G俱乐部）的动机，且 G-Club 仅寻求审查 HCHK Technologies（HCHK科技）持有的、其声称属于其财产且对其 Rule 2004 Subpoena（第2004条传票）具有回应性的文件，而不妨碍受托人审查 HCHK Technologies 的所有公司记录——因为该等记录对本对抗程序和 HCHK Technologies 的 Rule 2004 Subpoena 具有回应性——的范围内，尽管认为此举重复，受托人不会反对。\n\n14 见附件 D，第 9 页。\n\n15 见附件 D，请求提供文件第 1、3、5、6、10、11 和 18 项。\n\n18. 将 HCHK Technologies 的公司记录移交给受托人的协议，旨在避免双方承担过度且不必要的证据开示费用。这绝不意味着与本对抗程序有关且可从 HCHK Technologies 获取的文件不再需要提交。鉴于受托人针对 HCHK Technologies 提起的对抗程序，如未达成和解协议，受托人本将寻求与其在该对抗程序中主张相关的证据开示，包括涉及 G-Club 的文件；该等文件显然与将 HCHK Technologies 与债务人联系起来有关。\n\n19. 本院在其部分准许初步禁令动议的更正裁决备忘录（“初步禁令裁决”）[Adv. P. No. 22-05032, ECF No. 133]中认定，债务人是 G-Series（G系列）的领导者，而 G-Series 被界定为包括 G-Club。16 同样，美国检察官办公室在对债务人提出的刑事起诉书中主张，G-Club 是债务人为使自己获利而实施的大规模欺诈计划的四大支柱中所使用的实体之一（代价由其债权人和受害人承担）。17 因此，HCHK Technologies 持有的与 G-Club 有关的文件，对本案具有回应性，并构成有力的证据开示材料。\n\n20. HCHK Technologies 的全部业务表面上是向受托人认为均与债务人存在紧密联系的公司提供商业服务。受托人认为，HCHK Technologies 的文件将表明，其实际上不仅是债务人企业的运营枢纽，而且还是其通过“商业”活动获得并部分用于资助其奢靡生活方式的款项的通道，包括在本破产程序进行期间。获取与所提供服务以及向哪些实体提供该等服务有关的文件，包括与 G-Club 有关的文件，正是受托人针对 HCHK Technologies 提起的对抗程序的核心。G-Club 不得以该等文件是否同时对 G-Club 的传票具有回应性为由，阻止移交该等文件。\n\n16 见初步禁令裁决，第 10-11 页。\n\n17 见 USA v. Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵） and Kin Ming Je（简明杰）, Sealed Indictment（密封起诉书）, United States District Court Southern District of New York（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）, 1:23-cr-00118-AT (March 6, 2023) at ¶¶ 12; 14-15。\n\n21. 最后，受托人刚刚收到 Gettr（盖特尔）律师的来信；与 G-Club 一样，受托人主张 Gettr 是另一家由债务人控制的实体。该信要求 HCHK Technologies 在受托人能够审查其文件之前返还其全部文件。这很可能并非巧合。看来，类似 G-Club 和 Gettr 的实体所采取的新策略是要求返还其文件，其目的在于：如果 HCHK Technologies 的所有“客户”均在受托人能够审查其文件之前要求返还其文件，则将不再剩下任何文件。本院应当看穿这种策略性操作，并命令提交全部文件。\n\nII. G-Club 已就 HCHK Technologies 持有的其文件放弃任何特权18\n\n22. “主张律师—当事人特权的一方负有证明以下事项的责任：‘(1) 当事人与律师之间的通信，该通信 (2) 旨在且事实上保持保密，以及 (3) 为获得或提供法律意见而作出。’” Strougo v. BEA Assocs., 199 F.R.D. 515, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)（引文略）。“该特权‘不仅旨在保护向能够据此采取行动的人提供专业意见，也旨在保护向律师提供信息，以使律师能够提出可靠且知情的意见。’” Id.（引文略）。律师—当事人特权同时适用于个人和公司实体。见 id.\n\n23. 共同利益原则保护原本会导致放弃律师—当事人特权的某些通信，并且“通常适用于多名人士由同一方代理的情形[。]” Id. at 520。共同利益原则也可适用于由不同律师代理、但从事共同法律事务的当事人。见 id.\n\n关键考量在于，该利益的性质必须相同而非相似，且必须是法律利益而非仅仅是商业利益。第三方的商业利益与法律利益可能存在重叠这一事实，并不否定法律利益在确立共同利益方面的效力。\n\nNorth River Ins. Co. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 1995 WL 5792, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 1995)（内部引文略）。“重要的并非当事人在理论上是否具有相似利益，而是其是否表明为实现共同法律目标而进行了实际合作。” Id. at *4.\n\n24. “寻求律师—当事人特权保护的一方必须积极采取行动保护其通信。” Niceforo v. UBS Glob. Asset Mgmt. Americas, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 428, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)（引文略）（即使雇员保存在其办公桌内的笔记本内容享有特权，雇员在离职后逾 15 个月才尝试要求返还该笔记本，尽管其有数次机会这样做，亦已放弃任何特权主张）。\n\n25. “除非向非当事人披露文件所载信息对于律师—当事人之间的有效咨询——即该特权旨在允许的咨询——‘属必要，或至少极为有用’，否则自愿向非当事人披露该等信息即放弃律师—当事人特权。” Strougo, 199 F.R.D. at 522（引文略）。另见 United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir.1961)（向其意见对于诉讼准备属必要的外部会计师披露信息，并未放弃特权）。然而，Kovel 原则“一向受到严格限制，并且‘为此目的，特权保护的是当事人与律师之间的通信，而不是对律师向当事人提供法律意见具有重要意义的通信。’” United States v. Mejia, 655 F.3d 126, 132 (2d Cir. 2011)（引文略）。另见 United States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir.1999)（第三方参与必须是为“增进对律师与当事人之间通信的理解”所必需）；Ampa Ltd. v. Kentfield Capital LLC, No. 00 Civ. 0508 NRB AJP, 2000 WL 1156860, *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2000)（外部会计师在场且未参与所讨论的法律问题时，董事会会议记录不享有特权）。\n\n26. 在本案中，G-Club 已就 HCHK Technologies 持有的其文件放弃任何特权，因为 G-Club 自愿向三名第三方披露了该等文件的内容。G-Club 在已经放弃特权且此前完全未顾及维护该特权的情况下，不应当现在又能够主张特权以阻止受托人取得其文件。\n\na. G-Club 放弃了其向 HCHK Technologies 提供的文件的任何特权\n\n27. G-Club 在其自愿允许第三方 HCHK Technologies 接触其据称享有特权的文件时，即已放弃对相关文件的特权。其既已选择与 HCHK Technologies 分享其据称享有特权的信息，从而放弃任何律师—当事人特权，现不得再寻求将该等文件重新视为享有特权，并期望据此阻止向受托人披露。\n\n28. G-Club 告知本院，HCHK Technologies 仅提供“包括云计算服务、数据托管和电子邮件托管在内的 IT 服务”19，并且“管理和运营 G Club 的电子邮件及其他应用程序”。20\n\n19 附件 B，第 128:10-11 页。\n\n20 G-Club Notice，第 4 段。\n\n29. G-Club 不得允许 HCHK Technologies 接触其文件，同时仍保留对该等文件的特权。见 Ackert, 169 F.3d at 139 (2d Cir.1999)（第三方参与必须是为“增进对律师与当事人之间通信的理解”所必需）；Ampa Ltd., 2000 WL at *1（外部会计师在场且未参与所讨论的法律问题时，董事会会议记录不享有特权）。另见 In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 82 (2d Cir. 1973)（文件与其他日常文件不加区别地混放，且未对可能享有特权的记录采取特别保护措施，并允许作为独立承包商的会计师自由审查全部记录时，特权即被放弃）。\n\nb. 指定受让人导致放弃任何剩余特权\n\n30. 即使 G-Club 主张（错误地）特权此前尚未被放弃，HCHK Technologies 将其全部资产（包括 G-Club 的文件）转让给受让人——另一名可自由接触所有 G-Club 文件的第三方——时，该特权也已被放弃。\n\n31. G-Club 未反对将其文件转让给受让人，而受让人持有并可自由接触 G-Club 文件，支持作出独立的放弃认定。即使 G-Club 主张，鉴于两实体与债务人的关系，G-Club 与 HCHK Technologies 具有共同利益，因此 HCHK Technologies 并非足以导致放弃的真正第三方，任何共同利益亦会在独立受让人接管 HCHK Entities（HCHK实体）时终止。24\n\nc. G-Club 未反对将 HCHK Technologies 的资产出售给 G-News\n\n32. 根据申请书和 IM 协议，G-News（G新闻）这一又一第三方拟收购 HCHK Technologies 的几乎全部资产（包括 G-Club 的公司记录），并取得 HCHK Technologies 的运营控制权。作为该协议的一部分，G-News 获得了 HCHK Technologies 在过渡期间的运营控制权，使所有 G-Club 文件均暴露于 G-News。G-Club 在此之前未保全并追回其文件；若其确实担心保护其据称享有特权的文件免受第三方接触，其本应这样做。不应允许 G-Club 选择性地主张其所称特权。见 Niceforo, 20 F. Supp. at 437（“寻求律师—当事人特权保护的一方必须积极采取行动保护其通信。”）。\n\n[本页其余部分有意留白]\n\n24 受托人指出，该论点亦不能成立，因为这并非针对法律问题的共同利益，而主张共同利益特权须具备此项条件。\n\n鉴于上述理由，受托人谨请求作出命令，认定 G-Club Operations LLC（G-Club运营有限责任公司）已放弃任何特权，并且无权就根据 Bankruptcy Rule 9019 Settlement Agreement（《破产规则》第 9019 条和解协议）由 HCHK Technologies, Inc.（HCHK科技公司）的受让人向受托人移交的 G-Club 文件之回应性提出异议，并给予其他公正和适当的救济。\n\n日期：August 11, 2023\nNew Haven, Connecticut\nLUC A. DESPINS（卢克·A·德斯平斯），CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE（第11章受托人）\n\n代理人：/s/ Avram E. Luft\n\nAvram E. Luft（阿夫拉姆·E·卢夫特）（获准 pro hac vice）\nDouglass Barron（道格拉斯·巴伦）（获准 pro hac vice）\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP（普衡律师事务所）\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, New York 10166\n(212) 318-6079\naviluft@paulhastings.com\ndouglassbarron@paulhastings.com\n\n及\n\nNicholas A. Bassett（尼古拉斯·A·巴塞特）（获准 pro hac vice）\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP（普衡律师事务所）\n2050 M Street NW\nWashington, D.C., 20036\n(202) 551-1902\nnicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n及\n\nPatrick R. Linsey（帕特里克·R·林西）（ct29437）\nNEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C.（纽伯特、佩佩及蒙蒂思专业公司）\n195 Church Street, 13th Floor\nNew Haven, Connecticut 06510\n(203) 781-2847\nplinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n第11章受托人代理律师\n\n美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院\n康涅狄格区\n布里奇波特分院\n\n关于： 第11章\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等人，1 案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。 （联合管理）\n\nLUC A. DESPINS（卢克·A·德斯平斯），第11章\n受托人，\n原告，\n诉\nHCHK TECHNOLOGIES, INC.（HCHK科技公司），\nHCHK PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC.（HCHK物业管理公司）， 对抗性程序案号：23-05013 (JAM)\nLEXINGTON PROPERTY AND STAFFING, INC.（列克星敦物业及人事公司）：\nHOLY CITY HONG KONG VENTURES, LTD.（圣城香港创投有限公司），\nANTHONY DIBATTISTA（安东尼·迪巴蒂斯塔）、YVETTE WANG（王悦），\n以及 BRIAN HOFMEISTER（布赖恩·霍夫迈斯特）（以其\n受让人身份），\n被告。\n\n送达证明\n\n下列签署人特此证明，于 August 11, 2023，前述《支持第11章受托人主张 G-Club Operations LLC 已放弃任何\n\n特权，且无权就已移交的 G-Club 文件的相关性提出异议的法律备忘录》\n\n本第11章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（亦称 Guo Wengui、Miles Guo 和 Miles Kwok，以及众多其他别名）（税务识别号后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（吉尼弗控股有限责任公司）（税务识别号后四位：8202）及 Genever Holdings Corporation（吉尼弗控股公司）。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 和 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为：Paul Hastings LLP（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所），200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166，c/o Luc A. Despins，作为 Ho Wan Kwok 遗产的受托人（仅用于通知和通信）。\n\n根据《破产规则》9019 和解协议，由 HCHK Technologies, Inc. 的受让人向受托人移交》已通过电子方式提交。该提交的通知已通过法院电子提交（“CM/ECF”）系统，以电子邮件发送给上述第11章案件的所有当事人；或如《电子提交通知》所示，以邮寄方式发送给任何不能接受电子提交的人。2当事人可通过法院的 CM/ECF 系统查阅该提交文件。\n\n日期：August 11, 2023\nNew Haven, Connecticut\nLUC A. DESPINS，第11章受托人\n\n签字人：/s/ Avram E. Luft\n\nAvram E. Luft（阿夫拉姆·E·卢夫特）（获准 pro hac vice）\nDouglass Barron（道格拉斯·巴伦）（获准 pro hac vice）\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所）\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, New York 10166\n(212) 318-6079\naviluft@paulhastings.com\ndouglassbarron@paulhastings.com\n\n以及\n\nNicholas A. Bassett（尼古拉斯·A·巴塞特）（获准 pro hac vice）\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所）\n2050 M Street NW\nWashington, D.C., 20036\n(202) 551-1902\nnicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n以及\n\nPatrick R. Linsey（帕特里克·R·林西）（ct29437）\nNEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C.（纽伯特、佩佩及蒙蒂思专业公司）\n195 Church Street, 13th Floor\nNew Haven, Connecticut 06510\n(203) 781-2847\nplinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n如前述文件在正常营业时间以外提交，则对无法或无资格接受电子通知的收件人，以邮寄方式送达于下一个营业日完成。\n\n第11章受托人代理律师\n附件 E\n美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院\n\n关于：\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等人，\n\n债务人。1\n\n第11章\n\n案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n\n（联合管理）\n\nSeptember 29, 2023\nG CLUB OPERATIONS LLC 对受托人质疑 HCHK 持有文件中 G CLUB 特权主张的备忘录的答复，以及对受托人相关拟议裁定的反对\n\nG Club Operations LLC（G Club）反对第11章受托人的《支持第11章受托人主张 G-Club Operations LLC 已放弃任何特权，且无权就根据《破产规则》9019 和解协议由 HCHK Technologies, Inc. 的受让人向受托人移交的 G-Club 文件的相关性提出异议的法律备忘录》（对抗性程序 23-05013，ECF No. 86）2（“备忘录”或“Mem.”）。基于下文所述理由，法院适当地审议了相关论点，并适当地作出了\n\n保护 G Club 正当程序权利且不损害受托人的裁定。\n初步陈述\n\n1. 在其 July 28, 2023《根据《破产规则》9019 批准第11章受托人与纽约法院转让程序下 HCHK 实体受让人和解的裁定》（ECF No. 2038，即“裁定”）中，法院命令受让人向 G-Club “提供所有公司记录（包括电子形式）以及其他文件”，该等文件\n\n1. 本第11章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（税务识别号后四位：9595）（“债务人”）、Genever Holdings LLC（税务识别号后四位：8202）及 Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 和 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为：Paul Hastings LLP，200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166，c/o Luc A. Despins，作为 Ho Wan Kwok 遗产的受托人（仅用于通知和通信）。\n\n2. G Club 在本文中将对抗性程序 23-05013 称为“对抗性程序”或“Adv. Proc.”。\n\n“在任何时候均为 G Club 的财产。”（裁定第 6(a) 段）。G Club 应当“审查该等公司记录及其他文件，以确定是否享有特权以及是否对受托人向 G-Club 发出的《规则》2004 传票具有相关性，并出具特权清单和相关性清单。”同上。因此，法院的裁定在 G Club 的权利与第11章受托人的要求之间取得平衡。裁定规定的程序已经足够，并且仅能防止第11章受托人（“受托人”）审阅享有特权的文件，或者受托人从一开始便无权审阅的无关文件。\n\n2. 然而，受托人指控 G Club “玩弄程序”，声称其“目标”是要求其供应商 HCHK Technologies（“HCHK”）返还“[其]文件”，以使“不会剩下任何文件”。（Mem. 第 21 段）。迄今为止，G Club 已向受托人出示 124,876 份文件，且 G Club 正在完成审查，以便出示另外 10,000 份文件及一份特权清单。因此，事实与受托人关于 G Club 的目标是阻止受托人审阅 G Club 文件的主张相矛盾。相反，受托人试图通过与另一实体 HCHK 达成和解协议以取得 G Club 财产，乃是试图剥夺 G Club 确定哪些文件具有相关性且不享有特权的权利，并规避进行文件审查和出示的适当且有序程序。\n\n3. 与受托人的主张相反，该等主张在事实和法律上均缺乏依据，G Club 并未放弃任何权利。G Club 与 HCHK 签约，由其管理用于 G Club 通信的云端存储及电子邮件系统（以及其他服务）。该系统 Microsoft 365 是一套云端企业系统，公司和律师事务所经常使用该系统。HCHK 作为该系统管理员，与 G Club 的特权主张无关；该等文件保存在“云端”，而受托人并未主张（也不可能主张）\n\n除 G Club 员工外，曾有任何个人审阅存储于托管 G Club 域名的云端中的文件。存储于由第三方管理的云端系统中的享有特权文件，并不因此失去其受保护地位。\n\n4. 受托人还错误地声称，HCHK 必须出示与受托人传票（“传票”）无关的 G Club 文件（Mem. 第 2 段），但受托人不能规避其自身传票的限制。G Club 有权像任何其他当事人一样，在适当时候对其自身文件进行审查。受托人无权获取现存的任何及所有文件，继而自行确定哪些文件与其自身传票有关，或构成 G Club 与其律师之间享有特权的通信。\n\n5. 受托人认识到其论点的弱点，转而主张 HCHK 持有的 G Club 文件实际上可能与受托人向 HCHK 发出的传票有关，并抱怨 HCHK 已移交不足 150 份文件。（Mem. 第 14、16 段）。值得注意的是，尽管该备忘录三次提及 HCHK 截至目前的出示规模（Mem. 第 2、7、16 段），但一次也未提及 G Club 的出示规模，因为 G Club 已履行并持续履行其证据开示义务。\n\n6. 如受托人对 HCHK 的文件出示存在异议，该争议应发生于受托人与 HCHK 之间；不应将 G Club 的文件卷入该争议。受托人没有依据要求 HCHK 以任何文件补充其自身出示，更遑论属于 G Club 的享有特权和无关文件。\n相关程序经过\n\n7. 在其裁定中，法院通过允许 G Club 查阅其文件，适当地保护了 G Club 与《规则》9019 和解有关的正当程序权利。具体而言，裁定规定：\n\n受让人应向 G-Club 提供受让人持有的、与 HCHK 实体有关的所有公司记录（包括电子形式）及其他文件，且该等文件在任何时候均为 G-Club 的财产。收到后，G-Club 应立即审查该等公司记录及其他文件，以确定是否享有特权以及是否对受托人向 G-Club 发出的《规则》2004 传票具有相关性，并出具特权清单和相关性清单。G-Club 可根据保护令，将其将向受托人出示的材料指定为“保密”或“高度保密”。（裁定第 6(a) 段）。\n\n8. 如法院所规定，该程序确保 G Club 能够查阅其信息，并进行任何当事人在出示文件前都会进行的审查。该裁定是在法院审议 G Club 就《规则》9019 动议提交的文件和提出的论点后作出的，其中包括 G Club 关于 9019 动议及拟议裁定的立场通知（ECF No. 1977，即“通知”）以及 G Club 关于修改与根据《规则》9019 提出的、有关与 HCHK 实体受让人和解之动议相关的修订拟议裁定的补充通知（ECF No. 2007，即“补充通知”）。G Club 在此援引两份通知。\n\n9. 该裁定还规定，受托人须在 August 11, 2023 前“提交支持受托人主张 G-Club 已放弃任何特权且无权就相关性提出异议的书面陈述。”（裁定第 6(b) 段）。于 August 11, 2023，受托人在一项 G Club 并非当事人的对抗性程序中提交了该备忘录，且其未在主案中提交该备忘录，亦未以其他方式向 G Club 送达该备忘录。（见 G Club 对受托人关于根据批准第11章受托人与纽约法院转让程序下 HCHK 实体受让人和解之裁定处理 G Club 文件的拟议补充裁定的反对意见，ECF No. 2233，第 2 页）。\n\n10. 当 August 11, 2023 的期限届满而受托人未就该问题提交文件（据 G Club 所知）时，G Club 认为，受托人承认法院命令的程序将允许其在适当时候审查属于 G Club 的任何及所有不享有特权且具有相关性的文件，并为了司法效率及保存第11章遗产资源而决定不再进一步就该问题进行诉讼。（见 Mem. 第 3 段（“《规则》9019 和解协议的一个关键方面是保存第11章遗产的资源，包括原本将用于有争议证据开示的资源。”））。\n\n11. 于 September 19, 2023，法院“在一次听证期间询问了该问题。”（见 ECF No. 2237）。受托人的律师“陈述，其认为受托人的律师正试图联系 G-Club，以确定该问题的状态。”同上。\n\n12. 在2023年9月19日之前或之后均未就这些文件或其备忘录与G Club的律师联系或沟通的情况下，受托人的律师于2023年9月26日提交了一项拟议补充命令，仅在同一对抗程序中，要求G Club向受托人提交受让人向G Club提供的所有文件。（对抗程序 ECF No. 130，Ex. A）。然而，这一次，受托人的律师通过电子邮件联系了列为G Club登记代理律师的三名律师中的一人。受托人2023年9月26日的电子邮件，是自本院作出命令以来G Club从受托人处收到的首次通信，且截至目前仍是唯一一次通信。\n\n13. 同日，G Club对受托人的拟议补充命令提出异议，请求给予七天时间对该备忘录作出回应。（ECF No. 2233）2023年9月28日，本院部分支持该异议，给予G Club至2023年9月29日下午5:00对该备忘录作出回应的期限。3（ECF No. 2237）。\n\n论证\n\n14. 如G Club首先在其通知中所述，在依《规则》9019提出动议后不久，“受托人与HCHK Technologies（HCHK科技公司）之间拟议和解中的任何内容，或任何\n\n3 受托人就该备忘录所采取的策略——在G Club并非当事方的对抗程序中提交该备忘录，且从未向G Club提供未删节版备忘录——以及就拟议补充命令所采取的策略——在同一对抗程序中提交该命令，但仅通过电子邮件向G Club三名登记代理律师中的一人发送其副本——使人产生这样的印象：受托人正在从事，用受托人自己的话说，“策略性操作”。\n\n拟议命令中的任何内容，均不应放弃G Club的权利。”（ECF No. 1977 at 1）。受托人的论点不能成立，原因有二：第一，G Club并未因使用信息技术服务而放弃任何特权。事实上，受托人对放弃的错误理解，将涉及任何使用第三方提供的基于云端的文档管理解决方案的企业，包括任何律师事务所。第二，受托人声称其有权取得不具回应性的文件或HCHK的文件，忽视了其已收到G Club提交的近125,000份具回应性的文件，并且还将很快收到更多文件以及一份特权日志。\n\n一、G Club未放弃任何特权\n\n15. 受托人声称G Club已放弃其向HCHK提供的文件所享有的任何特权，这一主张建立在错误前提及对法律的错误陈述之上。（Mem. ¶ 26）。受托人称G Club“自愿向三名第三方披露了这些文件的内容”，但在该备忘录中，受托人没有指出任何被“披露”的文件，或任何实际看到某份文件“内容”的个人。Id. 这是因为G Club未向HCHK披露特权文件；HCHK仅仅是一个基于云端的企业系统的管理者，而该系统通常由公司和律师事务所使用。G Club并未与HCHK“分享其所谓的特权信息”；其仅与第三方签订合同，由其运营文档管理系统。Id. ¶ 27。任何采用类似系统的个人或实体均不可能因此放弃律师—当事人特权。\n\n16. 近期，Delaware Court of Chancery（特拉华州衡平法院）裁定，由第三方“提供托管服务并不导致特权放弃。”Metro Storage Int'! LLC v. Herron, 275 A.3d 810, 871 (Del. Ch. 2022)。在该案中，法院认定，第三方存储电子邮件导致其负有“对信息保密的义务”，且“该情形与律师聘请服务提供商提供电子邮件服务或在云端保存机密文件时并无不同。”Id. 在脚注中，本院引用了一篇期刊文章和一份American Bar Association（美国律师协会）出版物，两者均认可云端存储；前者甚至将本案所涉的基于云端的解决方案Microsoft 365列为一个“并不必然导致特权放弃”的例子。Id. at 871 n.35.\n\n17. 受托人在寻求G Club的特权文件时，施展了一些障眼法，将G Club描述为给予HCHK“访问其文件”的权限，却随后引用若干与访问毫无关系的案件。受托人未能指出任何一个提供基于云端解决方案的第三方破坏特权的案件。这些案件均涉及实际知悉特权材料实质内容的第三方，且受托人引用的若干案件早于云端技术。See Strougo v. BEA Assocs., 199 F.R.D. 515,519 (S.D.N.Y. 200 l)（认定九名非董事且非律师人员出席现场董事会会议，放弃了董事会会议记录可能享有的特权）；Niceforo v. UBS Glob. Asset Mgmt. Americas, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 428, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)（认定一名雇员在其雇主办公室保管、并由其雇主查阅的实体笔记本不享有特权，因为她未证明该笔记本包含律师—当事人通信，且未“作出合理尝试以对这些陈述保密”）；United States v. Mejia, 655 F.3d 126, 132 (2d Cir.2011)（认定特权不涵盖被告明知监狱工作人员会录音的情况下，从监狱向家属拨打的电话）；United States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir.1999)（认定一方律师与第三方投资顾问就金融交易进行的口头通信不受该方特权保护，因为该等谈话旨在加深律师对交易的理解）；Ampa Ltd. v. Kentfield Capital LLC, No. 00 Civ. 0508 NRB AJP, 2000 WL 1156860, \\*1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2000)（认定董事会会议记录不享有特权，因为一名外部会计师出席了董事会会议，但未参与所讨论的法律问题）；In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 82 (2d Cir. 1973)（认定可能享有特权的实体文件与非特权文件混放在第三方可随时访问并实际查阅的文件柜中，因而特权已被放弃）。\n\n18. 受托人没有为使用基于云端的文档管理解决方案能够放弃特权这一观点提供任何支持，因为不存在此类支持。\n\n19. 由于HCHK仅托管G Club的数据，HCHK不可能与受让人分享任何内容。事实上，根据《主服务协议》，HCHK负有保密义务。受让人当然无权或无授权访问属于G Club的电子邮件域名账户，且没有指控称受让人团队的任何成员曾如此做。4 因此，没有理由主张任何会涉及受让人的特权放弃。\n\n20. 受托人还错误地辩称，G Club未对HCHK拥有或控制的资产将出售给G News的受让人程序提出异议。（Mem. ¶¶ 31, 32）。如受托人所明知，其于2023年6月9日提交了第11章受托人关于临时限制令和初步禁令的补充紧急单方动议（“TRO动议”），停止HCHK受让程序中的任何行动。（对抗程序 ECF No. 14。）本院批准了TRO动议（对抗程序 ECF No. 18），该批准发生在当事方提出异议的2023年6月12日期限之前，亦发生在New York Supreme Court（纽约州最高法院）就将HCHK资产出售给G News所定2023年6月13日听证日期之前。因此，G Club没有实质机会对将HCHK资产转让给受让人提出异议，也没有实质机会对将同一资产拟议出售给G News提出异议。无论如何，该出售从未发生，因此受托人关于拟议出售触发特权放弃的论点毫无根据。\n\n二、受托人无权审查不具回应性的文件\n\n21. 正如受托人无权审查G Club的特权文件一样，其亦无权审查对传票不具回应性的G Club文件。为回应该传票，G Club已提交近125,000份文件，并计划很快连同一份特权日志提交更多文件。G Club预计将在2023年10月中旬前完成其全部文件审查及特权日志。若受托人希望其曾传唤其他文件，其不得将HCHK作为取得该等文件的工具；其必须向G Club请求该等文件。\n\n22. 受托人进一步不当试图利用向HCHK而非G Club送达的传票取得G Club的财产，称HCHK的提交“严重不足”。（Mem. ¶ 16）。然而，这并不相关。受托人不得利用HCHK据称未提交大量文件，迫使HCHK提交不属于HCHK的文件。受托人提出理论称，HCHK“是其通过其‘商业’活动获得的资金的过手渠道，而其部分使用该等资金资助其奢侈生活方式”，并且受托人需要从HCHK取得“与所提供服务有关的文件”。（Mem. ¶ 20）。G Club不反对HCHK提交对受托人传票具回应性的HCHK文件，且其亦不能反对。但G Club文件不属于HCHK。如果受托人对HCHK据称的不遵从存在问题，那不是G Club的问题，也与受托人请求修改本命令无关。\n\n23. 因此，受托人称“诸如G Club之类的实体”正在从事“策略性操作”，以使受托人无法“审查”文件的诋毁毫无根据。（Mem. ¶ 21）。G Club已履行其证据开示义务，并将继续履行。\n\n受托人同样应遵守正当程序权利，包括送达义务。\n\n因此，基于上述理由，G Club请求本院：(i) 驳回受托人要求HCHK提交G Club特权及不具回应性文件的请求，以及修改本命令的请求；及(ii) 给予G Club其他公正的救济。\n\nG CLUB OPERATIONS LLC（G Club运营有限责任公司）\n\n签署人：/s/ Kellianne Baranowsky（凯莉安娜·巴拉诺夫斯基）\n\nGREEN & SKLARZ LLC（格林与斯克拉兹有限责任公司） Jeffrey M. Sklarz（杰弗里·M·斯克拉兹）（ct20938） Kellianne Baranowsky（凯莉安娜·巴拉诺夫斯基）（ct26684） One Audobon St, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06511 Tel: 203-285-8545 jsklarz@gs-lawfirm.com kbaranowsky@gs-lawfirm.com\n\nPILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP（皮尔斯伯里·温思罗普·肖·皮特曼律师事务所） Carolina A. Fornos（卡罗莱纳·A·福尔诺斯）（pro hac vice） 31 West 52nd Street New York, NY 10019 Tel: 212-858-1558 carolina.fornos@pillsburylaw.com\n\nG Club Operations LLC的代理律师\n\n送达证明\n\n本人特此证明，于下列日期，已通过CM/ECF及/或邮寄方式向任何无法接受电子提交的人送达上述文件副本。本次提交的通知将通过本院电子提交系统的运作以电子邮件发送给所有当事方。当事方可通过本院CM/ECF系统查阅本次提交。\n\n日期：September 29, 2023 /s/ Kellianne Baranowsky（凯莉安娜·巴拉诺夫斯基）\n\n美利坚合众国康涅狄格州联邦地区法院\n\n关于：\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，\n\n债务人。\n\n第11章\n\n案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n\n（合并管理）\n\nG CLUB OPERATIONS LLC依据破产规则8007支持其在上诉期间暂缓执行紧急动议的法律备忘录\n\n根据《联邦破产程序规则》8007(b)，G Club Operations LLC（G Club Operations有限责任公司）（“G Club Operations”）请求暂缓执行（“暂缓动议”）破产法院于2023年11月13日作出的命令；该命令准许第11章受托人提出的《G-Club Operations LLC已放弃任何特权且无权对相关性提出异议的动议》。Despins et al v. HCHK Technologies, Inc.（HCHK Technologies公司）et al, No. 23-05013 (Bankr. D. Conn. Jun. 8, 2023) (Dkt No. 179)（“命令”）。该命令副本作为附件A随附于此。\n\n根据Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8007(b)(2)，美国联邦地区法院（“地区法院”）有充分理由以紧急方式审理本暂缓动议并作出所请求的暂缓，因为：(1) 尽管G Club Operations已向美国破产法院（“破产法院”）提出暂缓请求，破产法院尚未就暂缓动议作出裁决；(2) 尽管Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a)(1)规定了十四日的上诉期限，破产法院的命令仅给予G Club Operations自该命令作出之日起四日以遵守该命令；以及(3) 鉴于处理本事项的时间框架较短，如本文所述，\n\n1 破产法院已登记的暂缓动议副本及加快审理动议作为附件B随附于此，并在为本请求提供背景所必需的范围内通过引用并入本文。\n\n地区法院的介入对于保护G Club Operations的上诉权及获得正当程序的权利是必要的。\n\n因此，G Club Operations请求地区法院暂缓执行该命令，直至本案当事人能够适当提交书面陈述且地区法院能够适当审议本事项之时。如本文所述，如不予暂缓，G Club Operations的上诉很可能将失去意义，其保护享有特权的通信免于披露的能力将实际上丧失。\n\n引言\n\n该命令要求G Club Operations及HCHK Technologies的受让人于2023年11月17日前向受托人移交G Club Operations享有特权的通信以及其他文件（少于当事人根据Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a)(1)就命令提出上诉所享有的14日），理由是HCHK Technologies曾作为G Club Operations及其他客户的互联网管理员。换言之，根据该命令，保留并使用云计算供应商将消灭律师—当事人特权及工作成果特权，并允许受托人获取其所欲获取的任何文件，甚至包括G Club Operations与下列署名律师之间的通信。\n\n除对G Club Operations造成的影响外，该裁决对客户及其法律顾问，乃至对任何使用由第三方管理的云端服务交换受法律保密或保护的通信之人的影响，可能是灾难性的；其将使得任何受保护的文件或通信均无法在云端以电子方式存储，而不丧失该等通信所享有的特权这一关键保护。该命令错误适用法律以得出该结果，并造成危险先例，实质上认定：只要企业或个人将其IT服务外包给亦可能提供额外服务的供应商，该企业或个人即丧失对其文件的一切权利及权益，\n\n包括保护享有律师—当事人特权及工作成果特权的通信免于披露的权利。谨此，破产法院存在错误，且G Club Operations已向地区法院提交上诉通知，对该命令提出异议。附件C。\n\n如本文所述，G Club Operations满足上诉期间暂缓执行所需的要件，因为：(1) 如不准予暂缓并迫使G Club Operations在上诉审理前向受托人移交享有特权的通信，或迫使HCHK向受托人移交G Club Operations享有特权的通信，将实际上剥夺G Club Operations获得有效上诉的权利，并不可逆转地影响其正当程序权利，因为一旦特权文件被提交，实际上不可能消除其后果；(2) 受托人不会受到损害，因为除已发出远超过200份Rule 2004传票外，受托人已在Rule 2004程序中从G Club Operations收到超过140,000份文件；(3) 该命令违反公共政策，因为其涉及每一家在云端存储受保护通信的企业、个人及律师事务所的隐私权和受宪法保护的权利；以及(4) G Club Operations很可能在实体问题上胜诉，因为破产法院的推理不正确，而且坦率地说，将影响每一家律师事务所开展业务的方式。因此，应准予上诉期间暂缓执行，以免在上诉问题获得最终解决前移交受保护文件。\n\n由于该命令要求于2023年11月17日前遵守，存在以紧急方式处理本动议的紧急情形。此外，G Club Operations谨请求，在实际可行的范围内，地区法院至迟于2023年11月17日星期五下午2时就本动议作出裁决，以便鉴于破产法院施加的缩短时间框架，如有必要，G Club Operations有机会寻求进一步适当的救济。\n\n4862-7419-1761.v I\n\n相关程序背景2\n\n1. 2023年6月23日，受托人根据Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019，就与纽约法院让与程序下HCHK实体受让人的和解，提交了动议（Bankr. D. Conn. Adv. Proc. No. 22-50073, Dkt No. 1936）（“9019动议”）。9019动议包括一项拟议命令，要求HCHK Technologies向受托人移交其可能有权查阅的所有文件。(Id., Dkt. No. 2004)（“修订后的拟议命令”）。具体而言，修订后的拟议命令第6段规定：\n\n“公司记录。受让人应立即向受托人提供其所持有的、与HCHK实体有关的所有不享有特权的公司记录（包括电子形式）及其他文件。所有该等公司记录及其他文件均应视为被指定为‘保密’的文件，并受本第11章案件中于2022年10月6日作出的保护令[主案卷宗编号923]约束。”\n\nId. at 3, ¶ 3\n\n2. 2023年7月5日，以及2023年7月14日再次（分别见id., Dkt. Nos. 1977 and 2007），G Club Operations对拟议命令第6段提出异议，并请求建立有序程序，以避免仅因其将IT服务外包即向受托人全面移交保密及享有特权的材料。\n\n3. 2023年7月28日，破产法院就9019动议作出裁决，准许该9019动议，但修改拟议命令第6段如下：\n\n公司记录：(a) 受让人应立即取得并保管其所持有的、与HCHK实体有关的所有公司记录（包括电子形式）及其他文件。自本命令作出之日起十(10)日内，受让人应向受托人提供其所持有的、与HCHK实体有关的所有不享有特权的公司记录（包括电子形式）及其他文件，但在任何时点曾为G-Club Operation LLC（“G-Club”）财产的文件除外。所有该等公司记录及其他文件均应视为被指定为“保密”的文件，并受本第11章案件中于2022年10月6日作出的保护令[主案卷宗编号923]（“保护令”）约束。同样在本命令作出之日起十(10)日内，受让人应向G-Club提供其所持有的、与HCHK实体有关的所有公司记录（包括电子形式）及其他文件，该等文件在任何时点曾为G-Club的财产。G-Club收到后，应立即审查该等公司记录及其他文件，以确定其是否享有特权以及是否对受托人向G-Club发出的Rule 2004传票具有相关性，并提交特权日志及相关性日志。G-Club可根据保护令，将其将向受托人提交的材料指定为“保密”或“高度保密”。\n\nId., Dkt. No. 2038 at 4, ¶ 6(a))（强调部分为原文所加）。\n\n4. 破产法院还规定：“[于]2023年8月11日或之前，受托人应提交书面陈述，以支持受托人关于G-Club已放弃任何特权且无权对相关性提出异议的主张。于2023年8月18日或之前，G-Club应提交对受托人书面陈述的任何回应。”Id. at 5, ¶ 6(b)。\n\n5. 2023年8月11日，受托人在对抗程序No. 23-05013, ECF No. 86中提交了《支持第11章受托人关于G-Club Operations LLC已放弃任何特权且无权对HCHK Technologies, Inc.受让人根据破产规则9019和解协议向受托人移交的G-Club文件之相关性提出异议的法律备忘录》（“特权放弃动议”）（而非提交于No. 22-50073；此前所有其他文件均提交于该案）。受托人的特权放弃动议副本作为附件D随附于此。\n\n6. G Club Operations于2023年9月29日反对特权放弃动议，提交了《对受托人关于HCHK持有文件中G Club特权主张的备忘录的答复，以及对受托人相关拟议命令的反对意见》。(Bankr. D. Conn. Case No. 22-50073, Dkt. No. 2244)（“答复”）。4 G Club Operations的答复副本作为附件E随附于此。\n\n7. 2023年11月13日，破产法院作出该命令，准许受托人的特权放弃动议，并命令G Club Operations及HCHK Technologies受让人于2023年11月17日前提交文件；该期限短于G Club Operations根据Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002就该命令提出上诉所获准的期限。该命令是破产法院的终局命令。\n\n上诉期间暂缓执行该命令是适当的\n\n8. 美国联邦第二巡回上诉法院已确立如下四部分标准，以确定是否准许上诉期间暂缓执行动议：\n\n(1) 申请暂缓者是否有力证明其很可能在实体问题上胜诉；(2) 如不予暂缓，申请人是否将遭受不可弥补的损害；(3) 作出暂缓是否将对程序中其他利益相关方造成重大损害；以及(4) 公共利益何在。\n\nIn re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 503 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).\n\n本案中的每项因素均支持暂缓。暂缓是“‘司法裁量权的行使’，且‘[请\n\n求暂缓的一方负有证明情形足以正当化行使该裁量权的责任。\n\n“该自由裁量权。” Uniformed Fire Officers Ass’n v. de Blasio, 973 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2020)\n\n（引自 Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1760 (2009)）。\n\nA. 如不予中止，G Club Operations（G Club运营公司）将因丧失上诉权及放弃特权而遭受不可弥补的损害\n\n9. 如不予中止，G Club Operations 将遭受不可弥补的损害，因为无法有效撤销向受托人全面移交享有特权的通信，而因此，该移交可能使上诉失去实际意义。4 法院认定，如驳回中止请求可能导致动议方完全丧失一项权利，即存在不可弥补的损害。In re St. Johnsbury Trucking Co., Inc., 185 B.R. 687, 690 n. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)（认定，若政府在本案中的上诉失去实际意义，其将丧失执行 CERCLA 和《国内税收法典》若干条款的能力；正是该等可能丧失的能力，而非是否丧失上诉权本身，构成法院认定存在不可弥补损害的依据）。“在上诉待决期间拒绝中止，致使针对重大错误主张的任何上诉可能失去实际意义的，不可弥补损害的要件即获满足。”In re BGI, Inc., 504 B.R. 754, 763 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)（省略内部引号及引文，增补修改）。\n\n4 出于其《关于反对受托人根据批准第 11 章受托人与纽约法院转让程序中 HCHK Entities 受让人达成和解的裁定，就 G-Club 文件提出的拟议补充裁定的反对意见》（No. 22-50073, Dkt. No. 2233）中所述理由，G Club 于不同日期提交了文件。\n\n10. 这正是本案所涉问题：如不予中止，G Club Operations 的权利将永久丧失，因为如该裁定在上诉中被推翻，披露享有特权的信息很可能会使任何有意义的救济失去实际意义。该裁定规定的提交期限要求于 November 17, 2023 前履行。该等提交包括 G Club Operations 与其律师之间享有特权的通信。如 G Club Operations 或 HCHK 被迫遵守该裁定，G Club Operations 将实际上永久丧失保护其与律师之间保密通信的权利。一旦取得该等通信，受托人及其顾问无法忘却其将看到并审阅的享有特权的通信。\n\n11. 明确而言，受托人很可能会寻求并取得 G Club Operations 与其律师之间每一封电子邮件、每份文件草稿及其他律师—当事人通信的访问权。\n\nB. 中止不会损害受托人\n\n12. 与本破产事项中的任何其他当事人不同，受托人已利用 Rule 2004 所赋予的广泛证据开示。事实上，受托人已经申请许可提交 255 份 Rule 2004 传票。5，6 就 G Club Operations 而言，受托人已向 G Club Operations 送达 Rule 2004 传票，而 G Club Operations 已提交超过 140,000 份文件。此外，根据破产法院就 Rule 9019 动议作出的裁定，G Club Operations 还向受托人提交了一份特权日志。\n\n4862-7419-1761.v1\n\n5 除非另有说明，对“Dkt. No. __”的提及均指所谓“主第 11 章案件”Case No. 22-50073 中的案卷记录。\n\n6 具体而言：（i）受托人第一份补充综合动议（Dkt. No. 839），寻求二十五（25）份传票；（ii）受托人第二份补充综合动议（Dkt. No. 1116），寻求五十三（53）份传票；（iii）受托人第三份补充综合动议（Dkt. No. 1259），寻求十九（19）份传票；（iv）受托人第四份补充综合动议（Dkt. No. 1592），寻求五十七（57）份传票；（v）受托人第五份补充综合动议（Dkt. No. 1789），寻求八（8）份传票；（vi）受托人第六份补充综合动议（Dkt. No. 2079），寻求二十（20）份传票；（vii）受托人第七份补充综合动议（Dkt. No. 2249），寻求六（6）份传票；（viii）受托人第八份补充综合动议（Dkt. No. 2304），寻求八（8）份传票；以及（ix）受托人第九份补充综合动议（Dkt. No. 2308），寻求二十九（29）份传票。后两项目前均遭到异议。参见，例如，Shin Hsin Yu（俞新欣）和 Jie Zhang（张洁）对第 11 章受托人根据 Rule 2004 请求作出裁定的第八份补充综合动议提出的异议（Dkt. No. 2319）；G Club Operations LLC 对第 11 章受托人根据 Rule 2004 请求作出裁定的第八份补充综合动议提出的有限异议（Dkt. No. 2320）；Shin Hsin Yu、1332156 B. C. LTD、GWGOPNZ Limited 和 Jie Zhang 对第 11 章受托人根据 Rule 2004 请求作出裁定的第九份补充综合动议提出的异议（Dkt. No. 2326）；G Club Operations LLC 对第 11 章受托人根据 Rule 2004 请求作出裁定的第九份补充综合动议提出的异议（Dkt. No. 2331）。\n\n13. 因此，为使上诉得以进行而中止该裁定，不会使受托人遭受任何“重大损害”。事实上，如不予中止，遵守该裁定可能使其上诉失去实际意义，并将永久侵害 G Club Operations 的正当程序权利，因为一旦享有特权的通信被披露，实际上不可能恢复至原状。\n\nC. 该裁定违反公共政策\n\n14. 该裁定对外包其 IT 服务的客户的隐私及受宪法保护的利益构成直接威胁。该裁定与认定使用“托管服务并不导致放弃”的判例相悖。参见 Metro Storage Int’l LLC v. Harron, 275 A.3d 810, 871 (Del. Ch. 2022)（增补修改）。没有任何法律依据支持如下主张：仅仅使用外包的、基于云的数据托管服务，即导致放弃特权，或以其他方式将存储于云端的信息转移给管理人。\n\n15. 事实上，如使用云端通信的实体——几乎世界上的每一个个人和企业——均不享有律师—当事人特权，则律师—当事人特权将成为毫无意义的保护。\n\nD. G Club Operations 在上诉中具有较大胜诉可能性，因为该裁定有误\n\n16. 初步而言，“对胜诉具有‘较大可能性’的必要证明，与原告如不获中止将遭受的不可弥补损害程度成反比。”In re BGI, Inc., 504 B.R. at 764（原文第二处修改，引文略）。如上所述，一项未经中止、强制移交 G Club Operations 享有特权文件的裁定对其造成的损害，是无法撤销的情势改变。因此，当涉及严肃法律问题且衡平利益明显有利于准予中止时，G Club Operations“不必始终证明实体上‘胜诉的可能性’；相反，动议方仅须在实体上提出具有较大基础的案件。”Id.（引文略）。然而，如下所述，该裁定作出了错误的法律结论，在并未发生放弃的情况下假定存在放弃，并不当地将证明例外情形的举证责任转移给 G Club Operations，这使得 G Club Operations 很可能在上诉中胜诉。\n\n• 该裁定将“披露”给 HCHK 的文件，与存储于云端、由 HCHK 担任 IT 管理人、属于 G Club Operations 的文件混为一谈\n\n17. 在处理相关性及特权问题时，该裁定将 G Club Operations 向 HCHK 披露、因而成为 HCHK 财产的文件，与 G Club Operations 使用 gclub.com 域名的电子邮件混为一谈；后者存储于云端，由 HCHK 担任 IT 管理人和管理员，仅属于 G Club Operations，且从未成为 HCHK 的财产。该情形同样适用于 HCHK 的任何其他客户。因此，该裁定不当地依赖 HCHK 与 G Club Operations 之间的主服务协议，作为将从未向 HCHK 披露的数 GB 云端数据转交受托人的依据。\n\n18. 该错误可见于该裁定对 G Club Operations 在 No. 22-50073, Dkt. No. 2244 中立场的不当定性，即将其定性为审查程序。该裁定称，“G-Club 有权就文件的相关性和特权进行审查。”Order at 3。换言之，破产法院不当地将问题界定为：G Club Operations 要求审查 HCHK 拟向受托人提交的文件，仿佛 G Club Operations 最初已将云端文件披露给 HCHK。\n\n19. 这并非放弃动议所提出且 G Club Operations 所质疑的问题。如 G Club Operations 在其提交文件中所主张：\n\n“G Club 与 HCHK 签订合同，由其管理用于 G Club 通信的基于云端的存储和电子邮件系统（以及其他服务）。该系统 Microsoft 365 是企业通常使用的基于云端的系统，公司和律师事务所均经常使用该系统。HCHK 是该系统的管理员，与 G Club 主张特权无关；文件保存在‘云端’，受托人并未主张（且不能主张）除 G Club 员工外有任何个人曾审阅存储于承载 G Club 域名的云端的文件。存储于由第三方管理的云端系统中的享有特权文件，并不会因此丧失其受保护地位。”\n\nNo. 22-50073, Dkt. No. 2244, at 2-3, ¶ 3.\n\n20. 因此，问题在于：在没有事实主张称 IT 服务提供商获准接触享有特权材料的情况下，享有特权的文件是否仅因外包 IT 服务而丧失其受保护地位。\n\n21. 进一步凸显该混淆的是，该裁定不当地依赖 HCHK 与 G Club Operations 之间的主服务协议（“MSA”）。在引用 MSA 时，破产法院错误地称：“根据 HCHK Tech 与 G-Club 之间主服务协议（‘MSA’）的条款，受让人可在法律要求的情况下向第三方披露 G-Club 的文件。（Mot. Ex. A, § 6.2。）”Order at 6。\n\n22. 然而，第 6.2 条不能脱离第 6.1 条解读；第 6.1 条规定：“‘保密信息’系指任一方（‘披露方’）根据本协议向另一方（‘接收方’）披露的任何信息。”MSA § 6.1（着重强调）。存储于“云端”的 G Club Operations 文件并非向 HCHK 披露的文件。\n\n23. 事实上，发送给 HCHK 或与 HCHK 共享的文件（在 G Club Operations 对其相关性和特权进行审查之前，不应移交受托人）与云端数 GB 的数据之间存在明确区别；后者从未向 HCHK 披露，仅属于 G Club Operations，并保留其特权保护。\n\n24. 因此，MSA 的条款——其以“接收方”和“披露方”描述当事人——并不能为破产法院分析存储于“云端”的享有特权材料是否因此丧失其受保护地位提供依据。\n\n• 该裁定不当地假定存在放弃，并错误地将证明放弃例外情形的举证责任转移给 G Club Operations\n\n25. 就特权而言，该裁定仅基于受托人如下结论性主张而不当地假定存在放弃：“G-Club 已放弃其对受让人在其与受托人和解时保管、控制和／或占有的文件所享有的任何特权。”Order at 7。“文件”一词未被精确定义，未考虑上述区别。其后，该裁定不当地得出结论，认为必然存在放弃，因为 HCHK 提供了“按需咨询服务”，且“MSA 第 6.2 条明确规定，HCHK Tech 可以在提供所列服务的过程中使用 G-Club 的文件”。\n\n协议附件 A。（同上，附件 A，§ 6.2。）裁定第 9 页。然而，“云端”文件并非 HCHK（HCHK）曾有权访问或以其他方式审阅的文件。实际上，破产法院假定存在访问和审阅，因而假定存在放弃，继而不当地将举证责任转移给 G Club Operations（G Club 运营公司），要求其证明存在放弃的例外；但由于 HCHK 未获准访问及审阅 G Club Operations 电子邮件的权利，起初并不存在放弃。\n\n26. 如前所述，破产法院基于如下观念进行举证责任转移：G Club Operations 的特权仅仅因 HCHK 根据 MSA（主服务协议）在云端提供数据托管及其他服务而被放弃。但是，并无法律依据支持以下主张：仅仅提供与数据托管相分离的“点菜式咨询服务”（尤其是在不存在任何可证明托管方获授权审阅和访问特权材料的事实时）即导致特权放弃，除非文件实际上由一方交换、共享、披露或以其他方式审阅。裁定再次不当地混淆了在提供服务过程中本应交换的文件（例如 G Club Operations 与 HCHK 之间的通信）与为云端管理而外包的 IT 存储服务。裁定错误地假定存在放弃，因而不当地将举证责任转移给 G Club Operation，要求其根据“共同利益”或 Kovel 证明存在不构成放弃的例外。7 裁定第 9-11 页。\n\n结论\n\n27. 在此情况下，为维持现状并防止 G Club Operations 因实际上丧失其正当程序及特权权利而遭受不可弥补的损害，准许上诉期间中止执行是适当的。\n\n7 破产法院援引 United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961)（United States v. Kovel，美国诉 Kovel 案）尚不明确，因为 Kovel 案确立的主张是：在诉讼中，律师可以聘请一名为该律师工作并受律师—当事人特权保护的外部顾问。因此，例如，律师可聘请一名 CPA（注册会计师）协助处理税务案件（如 Kovel 案中所示），而无需在证据开示中交出其通信。Kovel 案不适用于诉讼情境之外，且通常不存在将 IT 公司“适用 Kovel”的方式。本案中，HCHK 是作为日常 IT 服务提供商受聘；G Club Operations 聘请其时不存在任何法律程序，因此没有律师事务所参与聘请 HCHK。\n\n所请求的救济\n\n28. G Club Operations 恭请地区法院在对该裁定上诉期间作出中止执行命令。\n\n日期：November 16, 2023\n\n签名：Jeffrey M. Sklarz（杰弗里·M·斯克拉兹）\nGREEN & SKLARZ LLC（格林与斯克拉兹有限责任公司）\nJeffrey M. Sklarz\nKellianne Baranowsky（凯莉安娜·巴拉诺夫斯基）\nOne Audobon St, 3rd Floor\nNew Haven, CT 06511\n电话：203-285-8545\njsklarz@gs-lawfirm.com\nkbaranowsky@gs-lawfirm.com\n\nPILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP（皮尔斯伯里·温思罗普·肖·皮特曼律师事务所）\nCarolina A. Fornos（卡罗莱纳·A·福诺斯）（pro hac vice）\n31 West 52nd Street\nNew York, NY 10019\n电话：212-858-1558\ncarolina.fornos@pillsburylaw.com\n\nG Club Operations LLC 的代理律师\n\n送达证明\n\n本人特此证明，于下列日期，前述文件副本已通过 CM/ECF 送达。各方可通过法院的 CM/ECF 系统查阅该提交文件。\n\n此外，前述文件副本已提交至破产法院的案卷，并已按如下方式通过电子邮件发送：\n\n受托人代理律师\nAvi Luft（阿维·卢夫特） aviluft@paulhastings.com\nPatrick Linsey（帕特里克·林赛） plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n受让人 Brien W. Hofmeister（布莱恩·W·霍夫迈斯特）的代理律师\nBonnie Mangan（邦妮·曼根） bonnie.mangan@manganlaw.com\n\nHCHK Technologies, Inc.（HCHK 科技公司）；Holy City Hong Kong Ventures, LTD（香港圣城创投有限公司）；Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc.（列克星敦物业及人力配置公司）的代理律师\nJohn T. Shaban（约翰·T·沙班） john@levinelevinelaw.com\n\nHCHK Property Management, Inc.（HCHK 物业管理公司）的代理律师\nJohn T. Shaban john@levinelevinelaw.com\nBonnie Mangan bonnie.mangan@manganlaw.com\n\nHoly City Hong Kong Ventures, LTD 的代理律师\nJohn T. Shaban john@levinelevinelaw.com\n\n日期：November 16, 2023.\n\n签名：Jeffrey M. 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