{"id":"court_ctb_2346_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":2346,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"UNKNOWN","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT | In re:","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\n| In re:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | )<br>)<br>Chapter 11<br>)<br>Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|\n| HO WAN KWOK, et al.,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | )<br>(Jointly Administered)                          |\n| Debtors.1                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | )<br>)<br>Re: ECF Nos. 2338, 2340<br>)               |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE<br>ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,                                                                                                                                                                                  | )<br>)<br>Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (JAM)<br>)            |\n| Plaintiff,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | )<br>)<br>)                                          |\n| v.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | )<br>)                                               |\n| HCHK TECHNOLOGIES, INC., HCHK PROPERTY<br>MANAGEMENT, INC., LEXINGTON PROPERTY AND )<br>STAFFING, INC., HOLY CITY HONG KONG<br>VENTURES, LTD., ANTHONY DIBATTISTA,<br>YVETTE WANG, and BRIAN W. HOFMEISTER,<br>ASSIGNEE FOR THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS, | )<br>)<br>)<br>)<br>)<br>)                           |\n| Defendants.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           | )<br>)                                               |\n\n# **ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STAY PENDING APPEAL AND EX PARTE MOTION TO EXPEDITE HEARING ON MOTION TO STAY PENDING APPEAL**\n\n# **I. INTRODUCTION**\n\nBefore the Court are two motions related to the Order Granting Motion for Order\n\nRequiring Production of G-Club Documents entered in this adversary proceeding (the \"G-Club\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, the Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\nDocuments Order\"). (ECF No. 179.)2 The two motions filed by G-Club Operations LLC (\"G-Club\") are: (i) the Motion to Stay Pending Appeal filed in the jointly administered Chapter 11 cases of Ho Wan Kwak (the \"Motion for Stay Pending Appeal\") (Main Case ECF No. 2338) and (ii) the *Ex Parte* Motion to Expedite Hearing and Limit Notice on the Motion for Stay Pending Appeal the \"Motion to Expedite\") (Main Case ECF No. 2340) in the Chapter 11 cases jointly administered under the caption *In re Kwok*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) (the \"Main Case\"). G-Club seeks a stay pending appeal of the G-Club Documents Order.\n\nIt is curious that G-Club filed a Notice of Appeal, a Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, and a Motion to Expedite in the Main Case, but only filed a Notice of Appeal in this adversary proceeding, the proceeding in which the G-Club Documents Order entered. G-Club is continuing to attempt to connect the production of documents to the Plaintiff by the Assignee, a Defendant in this adversary proceeding, pursuant to the settlement agreement approved in this adversary proceeding with the production of documents pursuant to a Rule 2004 examination subpoena served on G-Club in the Main Case. The G-Club Documents Order has nothing to do with the Rule 2004 subpoena served on G-Club in the Main Case. Instead, it squarely addresses the documents to be produced to the Plaintiff by the Assignee in this adversary proceeding. For the reasons stated below, the Court **DENIES** the Motion for Stay Pending Appeal and the Motion to Expedite.\n\n<sup>2</sup> Capitalized terms undefined herein have the meaning ascribed to them in the G-Club Documents Order. References to the docket in this adversary proceeding will be styled \"ECF.\" References to the docket in the main case, *In re Kwok*, Case No. 22-50073, will be styled \"Main Case ECF.\"\n\n#### **II. BACKGROUND**\n\nThe Court notes from the outset that G-Club is not a Defendant in this adversary proceeding, yet it has argued in this adversary proceeding it has the right to challenge the settlement between the Plaintiff and the Assignee approved by this Court more than three months ago. Although G-Club was allowed to be heard on discrete issues regarding the settlement, the Court did not agree with G-Club's arguments and issued the G-Club Documents Order on November 13, 2023. The G-Club Documents Order requires G-Club, or the party in possession of the G-Club documents, to produce the documents to the Plaintiff by November 17, 2013. G-Club now asserts it must be granted a stay pending appeal so that it, or the party in possession of the documents, is not required to produce documents to be turned over pursuant to the settlement between the Plaintiff and the Assignee approved months ago.\n\nThe arguments G-Club asserts in the Motion for Stay Pending appeal have been raised and argued no less than three times before this Court. On July 11, 2023 and July 18, 2023, hearings were held on the Plaintiff's Motion Regarding Settlement with Assignee of HCHK Entities under New York Court Assignment Proceedings (the \"Settlement Motion\") (Main Case ECF No. 1936; ECF No. 25) and a revised proposed order (the \"Revised Proposed Order\") regarding the Settlement Motion (Main Case ECF No. 2004; ECF No. 55), both filed by the Plaintiff, Mr. Luc A. Despins, in his capacity as Chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") for the estate of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok. G-Club filed objections to the Settlement Motion and the Revised Proposed Order. (Main Case ECF Nos. 1977, 2007.) On July 28, 2023, the Court entered the Order Approving Settlement, which granted the Settlement Motion, approved the settlement between the Trustee and the Assignee, and overruled all but one of the objections to the Settlement Motion raised by G-Club. (Main Case ECF No. 2038; ECF No. 70.)\n\n3\n\nParagraph 6 of the Order Approving Settlement allowed the parties to address G-Club's only remaining objection to the Settlement Motion (*see* Main Case ECF No. 2030, at 128:5– 48:8) by setting a briefing schedule whereby the Trustee and G-Club would contest whether G-Club had the right to review G-Club documents in the possession of the Assignee for responsiveness to the Rule 2004 subpoena served on G-Club and for privilege prior to the documents being produced to the Trustee. (Main Case ECF No. 2038 ¶ 6; ECF No. 70 ¶ 6.) On August 11, 2023, the Trustee timely filed a motion arguing that G-Club did not have any right to review the documents for either responsiveness or privilege. (ECF No. 87.) On September 29, 2023, after certain developments (*see* Main Case ECF No. 2237), G-Club filed a response to the Trustee's motion (Main Case ECF No. 2244), arguing that G-Club had rights to review the documents for both responsiveness and privilege.\n\nOn October 24, 2023, a hearing was held on the arguments raised by the Trustee in his motion. The Trustee and G-Club both appeared and argued their respective positions. On November 13, 2023, the Court entered the G-Club Documents Order, granting the Trustee his requested relief. (ECF No. 179.) The appeal by G-Club was then filed as well as the Motion for Stay Pending Appeal.\n\nThese matters are ripe for decision.\n\n#### **III. JURISDICTION**\n\nThe United States District Court for the District of Connecticut has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). This Court has authority to hear and determine this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) and the Order of Reference of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut dated September 21, 1984. The instant adversary\n\n4\n\nproceeding in which the instant discovery dispute arises is a statutorily core proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (E), (O).\n\nVenue in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.\n\n## **IV. DISCUSSION3**\n\nA motion for stay pending appeal seeking relief under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8007 is considered under the same standard as a motion for stay pending appeal of a district court order. *In re Adelphia Commc'n Corp.*, 333 B.R. 649, 659 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); *Country Squire Assocs. of Carle Place, L.P. v. Rochester Cmty. Sav. Bank (In re Country Squire Assocs. of Carle Place, L.P.)*, 203 B.R. 182, 183 (2d B.A.P. 1996). A stay pending appeal is not a matter of right but rather left to judicial discretion and reviewed for abuse of discretion. *Unif. Fire Officers Ass'n v. de Blasio*, 973 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2020); *Andrews v. McCarron (In re Vincent Andrews Mgmt. Corp.)*, 414 B.R. 1, 4 (D. Conn. 2009); *Green Point Bank v. Treston*, 188 B.R. 9, 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); *Youssef v. Sally Mae Inc. (In re Homaidan)*, 646 B.R. 550, 575 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2022).\n\nThere are four elements that the movant must establish for a stay pending appeal to issue, namely, \"the likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable injury if a stay is denied, substantial injury to the party opposing a stay if one is issued, and the public interest.\" *Mohammed v. Reno*, 309 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2002); *Hirschfeld v. Board of Elections*, 984 F.2d 35, 39 (2d Cir. 1993). A party seeking a stay pending appeal carries the burden on all elements and it is a \"heavy burden.\" *Adelphia*, 333 B.R. at 659; *see Barretta v. Wells Fargo, N.A. (In re Barretta)*, 560 B.R. 630, 632 (D. Conn. 2016); *In re 473 W. End Realty Corp.*, 507 B.R. 496, 501–02\n\n<sup>3</sup> The following constitutes the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Court pursuant to Rule 7052 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, made applicable by Rule 7001 in adversary proceedings.\n\n(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014). The first two elements are the \"most critical.\" *Nken v. Holder*, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009).\n\nAs is true with regard to the preliminary injunction standard followed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the movant's burden on the first element – likelihood of success on the merits – varies depending on the strength or weakness of the movant's argument on the other elements under the specific facts and circumstances of the case. *Reno*, 309 F.3d at 100–01; *see Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd.*, 598 F.3d 30, 35–38 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding *Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc.*, 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979) remains the law of the Second Circuit). Therefore, the Court will first consider the second, third, and fourth elements of a stay pending appeal before turning to an analysis of the likelihood of success on the merits.\n\n#### **A. Irreparable Harm**\n\nG-Club argues that, absent a stay pending appeal, it will forever lose its rights regarding privileged documents in complying with the G-Club Documents Order because the Trustee will have the allegedly privileged documents and be unable to remove their contents from his mind.\n\nThe Court disagrees. G-Club provides no case law supporting the proposition that there is irreparable harm if privileged material is produced to another party under Court order. It is unsurprising that G-Club has not – the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure address this situation. If G-Club prevails on appeal, Rule 26(b)(5)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as made applicable in this adversary proceeding by Rule 7026 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy, provides a procedure for the return of privileged materials produced in discovery. The Trustee would not, then, be able to use the documents as evidence. Absent a conflict of interest, the general rule is that lawyers can represent a series of clients despite coming into each new\n\narrangement with privileged information in their head – from previous clients and previous adversaries. *But see, generally*, *In re Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams.*, 605 F.3d 1373 (F. Cir. 2010) (discussing caselaw about where lawyers are involved in *competitive* decision making after obtaining competitor's competitive information). Lawyers are expected to and believed capable of abiding by procedural rules and protective orders.\n\nNotably, G-Club makes no argument regarding irreparable harm as to non-privileged documents that are allegedly non-responsive to the Rule 2004 subpoena served on it in Mr. Kwok's Chapter 11 case. The Court concludes that G-Club has conceded that it would not be irreparably harmed by being required to produce documents notwithstanding any determination that they were non-responsive to the Rule 2004 subpoena served on G-Club.\n\nFor all of the above reasons, G-Club has not established irreparable harm absent a stay pending appeal.\n\n#### **B. Substantial Injury to the Estate**\n\nG-Club asserts that the Trustee will suffer no injury because he has conducted Rule 2004 exams, including of G-Club.\n\nG Club's argument is unpersuasive for several reasons. First, regardless of whether the Trustee has already received documents from various parties, the Trustee may need the documents presently sought. Second, the settlement between the Trustee and Assignee related to Rule 26 discovery in this adversary proceeding and/or the Rule 2004 subpoena served on the HCHK Entities – not the Rule 2004 exam served on G-Club. Third, Rule 2004 exams exist in pertinent part as a way for bankruptcy trustees – who are not the debtor – to explore the debtor's assets, liabilities, and financial affairs. There is nothing nefarious about proper use of Rule 2004. Fourth, in the Main Case, parties have repeatedly been held in contempt for discovery abuses.\n\n7\n\n(Main Case ECF No. 1537, 1709, 1892, 2009, 2035, 2093.) The Trustee's need to seek numerous Rule 2004 exams has occurred in this context.\n\nThere is substantial injury to the estate if the G-Club documents are not produced. The Court has given G-Club ample time to make its arguments: there have been three hearings and G-Club has filed three briefs. In all that time, G-Club did not provide any evidence or legal authority to support its arguments. The failure of G-Club to support its arguments is not the Trustee's problem; it is G-Club's problem. Moreover, the Trustee settled various issues with the Assignee, which included the production of documents from the Assignee. But for G-Club's unsupported arguments, the G-Club documents in the possession, custody, and/or control of the Assignee would have already been produced to the Trustee. The estate should not bear the expense of continued, frivolous litigation on these matters.\n\nFor all these reasons, G-Club has not established a lack of substantial injury to the estate. If the Court were to grant G-Club a stay pending appeal under these circumstances, G-Club would be required to post a bond pursuant to Rule 8007(d).\n\n#### **C. Public Interest**\n\nG-Club argues that the public interest supports a stay pending appeal because the G-Club Document Order threatens the constitutional rights of ordinary consumers.\n\nThe Court disagrees. First, it is unclear what constitutional right is at risk. Despite being heard on numerous occasions, G-Club has failed to identity any specific constitutional right that may be at risk. Second, the G-Club Documents Order is premised on the facts and circumstances before the Court. It is possible that, unlike G-Club, other parties could produce evidence to establish that the \"cloud\" containing their information was secure, confidential, and private and not shared with the service provider who is offering such intimate services as human relations\n\nand legal services. G-Club's argument fails because of *its* inability to establish privilege. That failure is unique to it and not generally applicable to the public. The G-Club Document Order is narrow and does not impact the general consumer of cloud services.\n\nTherefore, G-Club fails to establish that the public interest supports a stay pending appeal.\n\n#### **D. Likelihood of Success on the Merits**\n\nTurning to its likelihood of success on the merits, because G-Club has failed to establish the other elements, its burden is heavy. *Reno*, 309 F.3d at 100–01. In this connection, as noted above G-Club makes no argument that it would be irreparably harmed by producing the potentially non-responsive documents.G-Club makes separate but related arguments regarding privilege and responsiveness.\n\n#### *Privilege*\n\nRegarding privilege, G-Club argues that the G-Club Document Order erroneously assumes waiver and improperly places the burden on G-Club. Therefore, it asserts, G-Club is likely to succeed on appeal as it relates to privilege.\n\nThe Court disagrees. Under the law of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, G-Club – not the Trustee – has the burden of establishing that the G-Club documents were in fact kept confidential between G-Club and its counsel. \"[A]s with all privileges, the person claiming the attorney client privilege has the burden of establishing all essential elements.\" *In re Horowitz*, 482 F.2d 72, 82 (2d Cir. 1973) (citing *United States v. Kovel*, 296 F.2d 918, 923 (2d Cir. 1961)). \"The party asserting the privilege . . . bears the burden of establishing\" that the communications to be protected are \"communications (1) between a client and his or her attorney *(2) that are intended to be, and in fact were, kept confidential* (3) for the\n\npurpose of obtaining or providing legal advice.\" *United States v. Mejia*, 655 F.3d 126, 132 (2d Cir. 2011) (emphasis added); *see Strougo v. BEA Assocs.*, 199 F.R.D. 515, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing *United States v. Constr. Prod. Rsch., Inc.*, 73 F.3d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1996)). \"A party seeking the protections of the attorney-client privilege must affirmatively act to protect her communications.\" *Niceforo v. UBS Glob. Asset Agmt. Ams., Inc.*, 20 F. Supp. 3d 428, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). Undertaking actions that \"'will predictably lead to the disclosure' of privileged communications\" results in waiver of the attorney-client privilege. *Niceforo*, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 437; *see Horowitz*, 482 F.2d at 82. G-Club did not submit any authority that the burden is on the Trustee as opposed to the clear line of authority that establishes the burden is on G-Club.\n\nIn addition, G-Club did not even attempt to make the required showing regarding *any of the elements*, let alone regarding whether the communications were kept confidential. Rather, much as in the Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, G-Club attempts to draw an analogy to cloud services provided by, *e.g.*, Microsoft Corporation, without providing the Court any basis to sustain the analogy. Faced with the terms of the Master Services Agreement (\"MSA\"), counsel to G-Club acknowledged in oral argument that the MSA was relevant but beseeched the Court to adopt its analogy upon no evidence. (ECF 168, Hr'g Tr. at 34:10–37:13.) While G-Club argues the Court shifted the burden, in fact *G-Club petitioned the Court to shift the burden*. It is repeating that request in the Motion for Stay Pending Appeal. This request is contrary to binding Second Circuit precedent. Hence, G-Club has no likelihood of success on the merits regarding privilege.\n\n#### *Responsiveness*\n\nRegarding responsiveness, G-Club argues that the Court assumed disclosure and misapplied the MSA regarding the documents.\n\nThe Court disagrees. The G-Club Documents Order is based on the record before the\n\nCourt. There is, again, nothing in the record supporting G-Club's position and indeed, in\n\nargument before this Court, *G-Club also referred to the confidentiality paragraphs of the MSA in*\n\n#### *support of their argument*:\n\nThe Court is correct, Your Honor. And my apologies. The trustee's presentation focused on far beyond what the master services agreement allegedly provided. The issue of confidentiality was maintained by the master services agreement. The master services agreement did specifically say that HCHK would provide IT services and all information was to be maintained confidential*.*\n\n(ECF 168, Hr'g Tr. at 34:10–35:2.) To now say that the Court was \"confused\" in applying those paragraphs is contrary to G-Club's own prior stated positions. Indeed, counsel presented the situation to the Court markedly differently than the Motion for Stay Pending Appeal contends, stating the issue as:\n\nWhat I'm referring to and the reason that I just want to make sure that we all understand, whatever the MSA and confidentiality restrictions apply to HCHK, the fact of the matter is they were an IT manager for our domain name. There is absolutely no evidence in the record that HCHK logged on and searched all of these emails and reviewed these emails or had the authority to simply cart blanche review these emails. That's just not in evidence.\n\n(*Id.*, Hr'g Tr. at 35:3–10.) Whereas G-Club now contends HCHK Tech had no opportunity to access the files, it previously stated to the Court that HCHK Tech *did* have access but the Trustee had to prove HCHK Tech utilized that access.\n\nThe problems with G-Club's arguments during the hearing are that (i), as noted above, it\n\nis G-Club's burden to establish that G-Club did not put its documents in a position where HCHK\n\nTech *could* (regardless of whether it *did*) go through all of those documents where HCHK Tech\n\nwas, as established by the MSA, much more than an information technology manager for G-\n\nClub's domain name; and (ii) it is undisputed that HCHK Tech did indeed have possession,\n\ncustody, and/or control of the documents – that is the whole reason the present litigation exists.\n\nHence, G-Club now seeks to retreat from that argument, attribute it to the Court's \"confusion,\" and ignore its own prior statements on the record in this case in order to have a *fourth argument* and file a *fourth brief*. This is not a recipe for success on appeal.\n\n#### *Responsiveness and Privilege*\n\nFinally, G-Club seeks to appeal a discovery order. There has been no finding of contempt. Sanctions have not entered. This appears to be an interlocutory appeal. *See Pawlak v. U.S. Dep't of Educ. (In re Pawlak)*, 520 B.R. 177 (D. Md. 2014) (denying interlocutory appeal of discovery order); *Speer v. Tow (In re Royce Homes LP)*, 466 B.R. 81 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (same); *Kaiser Grp. Int'l, Inc. v. Ostrava (In re Kaiser Grp. Int'l, Inc.)*, 400 B.R. 140 (D. Del. 2009) (same); *see also Shimer ex rel. Fugazy Express, Inc. v. Fugazy (In re Fugazy Express, Inc.)*, 982 F.2d 755–56 (2d Cir. 1992) (collecting cases on interlocutory appeal, including regarding contempt before sanctions enter). Filing an interlocutory appeal decreases the likelihood of success on appeal.\n\nFor all of these reasons, G-Club has not established a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits regarding either privilege or responsiveness.\n\n### **V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER**\n\nFor all the above stated reasons, and pursuant to Rule 8007, it is hereby\n\n**ORDERED:** The Motion for Stay Pending Appeal is **DENIED**; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** The Motion to Expedite is **DENIED** as moot due to the denial of the Motion for Stay Pending Appeal.\n\nDated at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 16th day of November, 2023.","body_zh":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT（美国康涅狄格区破产法院）\n\n关于： )\n)\n第11章\n)\n案件编号：22-50073 (JAM)\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等人， )\n（合并审理）\n债务人。1 )\n)\n涉及：ECF编号 2338、2340\n)\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第11章受托人， )\n)\n对抗性诉讼编号：23-05013 (JAM)\n)\n原告， )\n)\n)\n诉 )\n)\nHCHK TECHNOLOGIES, INC.、HCHK PROPERTY\nMANAGEMENT, INC.、LEXINGTON PROPERTY AND )\nSTAFFING, INC.、HOLY CITY HONG KONG\nVENTURES, LTD.、ANTHONY DIBATTISTA、\nYVETTE WANG（王雁平）以及 BRIAN W. HOFMEISTER，\n作为债权人利益受让人， )\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n被告。 )\n)\n驳回上诉期间中止执行动议及驳回关于加快审理上诉期间中止执行动议的单方动议的裁定\n\nI. 引言\n\n本法院现收到两项动议，均与在本对抗性诉讼中作出的《关于准许要求移交 G-Club 文件的动议的裁定》（以下简称《G-Club 文件裁定》）相关。（ECF编号 179。）2 由 G-Club Operations LLC（以下简称「G-Club」）提起的这两项动议分别为：(i) 在合并审理的 Ho Wan Kwok 第11章案件中提起的《上诉期间中止执行动议》（主案 ECF编号 2338），以及 (ii) 在以 In re Kwok 为标题合并审理的第11章案件（案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)）（以下简称「主案」）中提起的《关于加快审理上诉期间中止执行动议并限制通知范围的单方动议》（以下简称「加快动议」）（主案 ECF编号 2340）。G-Club 申请在上诉期间中止执行《G-Club 文件裁定》。\n\n1 本第11章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（亦称为郭文贵、Miles Guo 和 Miles Kwok，以及其他众多化名）（纳税人识别号后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（纳税人识别号后四位：8202）和 Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 及 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为 Paul Hastings LLP（普衡律师事务所）, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 转交 Luc A. Despins（作为 Ho Wan Kwok 破产财产受托人）（仅用于接收通知和联络之目的）。\n\n2 本文未定义的词首大写术语具有《G-Club 文件裁定》中赋予它们的含义。对本对抗性诉讼案卷目录的引用将标为「ECF」。对主案 In re Kwok（案件编号 22-50073）案卷目录的引用将标为「主案 ECF」。\n\n令人费解的是，G-Club 在主案中提交了《上诉通知书》、《上诉期间中止执行动议》和《加快动议》，却仅在本对抗性诉讼中提交了《上诉通知书》，而《G-Club 文件裁定》恰恰是在本诉讼中作出的。G-Club 企图继续将本对抗性诉讼中作为被告的受让人根据本诉讼批准的和解协议向原告移交文件一事，与在主案中向 G-Club 送达的根据第2004条规则进行质询的传票项下移交文件一事联系起来。《G-Club 文件裁定》与主案中向 G-Club 送达的第2004条规则传票毫无关系。相反，它直接针对的是本对抗性诉讼中受让人应当向原告移交的文件。基于下述理由，本法院驳回《上诉期间中止执行动议》和《加快动议》。\n\nII. 背景\n\n本法院从一开始便注意到，G-Club 并非本对抗性诉讼的被告，但其却在本诉讼中主张其有权质疑本法院于三个多月前批准的原告与受让人之间的和解。尽管本法院允许 G-Club 就和解相关的个别争议发表意见，但本法院并未采纳 G-Club 的主张，并于2023年11月13日作出了《G-Club 文件裁定》。《G-Club 文件裁定》要求 G-Club 或持有 G-Club 文件的当事方在2023年11月17日前向原告移交这些文件。G-Club 现主张必须准予其在上诉期间中止执行，以便其或持有该文件的当事方无需根据数月前批准的原告与受让人之间的和解移交相关文件。\n\nG-Club 在《上诉期间中止执行动议》中提出的主张，此前已向本法院提出并辩论了不下三次。2023年7月11日和2023年7月18日，法院就原告提出的《关于依据纽约州法院转让程序与 HCHK 实体受让人和解的动议》（以下简称《和解动议》）（主案 ECF编号 1936；ECF编号 25）以及关于该和解动议的修改后拟议裁定（以下简称《修改后拟议裁定》）（主案 ECF编号 2004；ECF编号 55）举行了听证，上述动议和拟议裁定均由原告 Luc A. Despins 先生以 Ho Wan Kwok 先生破产财产的第11章受托人（以下简称「受托人」）身份提交。G-Club 对《和解动议》和《修改后拟议裁定》提出了异议。（主案 ECF编号 1977、2007。）2023年7月28日，本法院签署并录入了《批准和解裁定》，准许了《和解动议》，批准了受托人与受让人之间的和解，并驳回了 G-Club 对《和解动议》提出的除一项之外的所有异议。（主案 ECF编号 2038；ECF编号 70。）\n\n《批准和解裁定》第6段通过设定书面答辩日程，允许各方就 G-Club 对《和解动议》仅存的一项异议进行处理（参见主案 ECF编号 2030，第128:5–148:8行），使受托人与 G-Club 能够针对以下问题进行辩论：在将受让人持有的 G-Club 文件移交给受托人之前，G-Club 是否有权审查这些文件以确定其是否符合向 G-Club 送达的第2004条规则传票的要求，以及是否享有保密特权。（主案 ECF编号 2038 第6段；ECF编号 70 第6段。）2023年8月11日，受托人及时提交了一项动议，主张 G-Club 无权基于相关性或保密特权审查这些文件。（ECF编号 87。）2023年9月29日，在出现某些进展后（参见主案 ECF编号 2237），G-Club 对受托人的动议提交了答复（主案 ECF编号 2244），主张 G-Club 有权基于相关性和保密特权对文件进行审查。\n\n2023年10月24日，法院就受托人在其动议中提出的主张举行了听证。受托人与 G-Club 均出庭并陈述了各自的立场。2023年11月13日，本法院作出了《G-Club 文件裁定》，准许了受托人所请求的救济。（ECF编号 179。）随后，G-Club 提起了上诉并提交了《上诉期间中止执行动议》。\n\n上述事项现已成熟，可予裁决。\n\nIII. 管辖权\n\n依据 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b)，United States District Court for the District of Connecticut（美国康涅狄格区联邦地区法院）对本案具有管辖权。依据 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) 以及康涅狄格区联邦地区法院于1984年9月21日作出的《案件移交令》，本法院有权审理并裁决本案。产生本案证据开示争议的本对抗性诉讼属于法定核心程序。28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (E), (O)。\n\n依据 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 和 1409，本审区的管辖地（审判地）符合规定。\n\nIV. 讨论3\n\n依据《联邦破产诉讼规则》第8007条申请救济的上诉期间中止执行动议，适用的审查标准与对地区法院裁定提起上诉期间申请中止执行动议的标准相同。In re Adelphia Commc'n Corp., 333 B.R. 649, 659 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)；Country Squire Assocs. of Carle Place, L.P. v. Rochester Cmty. Sav. Bank (In re Country Squire Assocs. of Carle Place, L.P.), 203 B.R. 182, 183 (2d B.A.P. 1996)。上诉期间中止执行并非法定当然权利，而是属于司法裁量范围，并按滥用裁量权标准进行复审。Unif. Fire Officers Ass'n v. de Blasio, 973 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2020)；Andrews v. McCarron (In re Vincent Andrews Mgmt. Corp.), 414 B.R. 1, 4 (D. Conn. 2009)；Green Point Bank v. Treston, 188 B.R. 9, 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)；Youssef v. Sally Mae Inc. (In re Homaidan), 646 B.R. 550, 575 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2022)。\n\n3 以下内容构成法院依据通过第7001条规则适用于对抗性诉讼的《联邦破产诉讼规则》第7052条作出的事实认定和法律结论。\n\n动议提出方必须证明四个要件方可获准在上诉期间中止执行，即：「在实体审理中胜诉的可能性、若拒绝中止将造成难以弥补的损害、若准予中止将对反对中止的一方造成重大损害，以及公共利益。」Mohammed v. Reno, 309 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2002)；Hirschfeld v. Board of Elections, 984 F.2d 35, 39 (2d Cir. 1993)。申请在上诉期间中止执行的一方对所有要件承担举证责任，且这是一项「沉重的负担」。Adelphia, 333 B.R. at 659；参见 Barretta v. Wells Fargo, N.A. (In re Barretta), 560 B.R. 630, 632 (D. Conn. 2016)；In re 473 W. End Realty Corp., 507 B.R. 496, 501–02 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014)。前两个要件是「最为关键的」。Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009)。\n\n与 United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit（美国第二巡回联邦上诉法院）所遵循的初步禁令标准一致，动议方对第一要件（在实体审理中胜诉的可能性）所承担的举证负担，会根据该案具体事实和情况下动议方在其他要件上的论证强弱而有所不同。Reno, 309 F.3d at 100–01；参见 Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 35–38 (2d Cir. 2010)（判定 Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979) 仍为第二巡回法院之判例法）。因此，法院将在转向分析胜诉可能性之前，首先审查上诉期间中止执行的第二、第三和第四个要件。\n\nA. 难以弥补的损害\n\nG-Club 主张，若不在上诉期间中止执行，其在遵守《G-Club 文件裁定》的过程中将永久丧失关于享有保密特权文件的权利，因为受托人将掌握这些据称享有特权的文件，并且无法从脑海中抹去其内容。\n\n本法院对此不予认同。G-Club 未提供任何判例支持「依据法院裁定向另一方移交特权材料即构成难以弥补的损害」这一主张。G-Club 未能提供判例不足为奇——《联邦民事诉讼规则》对此类情况已有规定。若 G-Club 在上诉中胜诉，通过《联邦破产诉讼规则》第7026条适用于本对抗性诉讼的《联邦民事诉讼规则》第26(b)(5)(B)条，提供了返还在证据开示中移交的特权材料的程序。届时，受托人将无法使用这些文件作为证据。在不存在利益冲突的情况下，一般规则是，律师可以代表一系列客户，尽管在进入每一项新的代理关系时，其脑海中已带有来自先前客户和先前对手的特权信息。但一般亦可参见 In re Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams., 605 F.3d 1373 (F. Cir. 2010)（讨论关于律师在获取竞争对手的竞争信息后参与竞争性决策的判例法）。人们期望并且相信律师有能力遵守程序规则和保护令。\n\n值得注意的是，对于据称不符合在郭先生第11章案件中向其送达的第2004条规则传票要求的非特权文件，G-Club 未就难以弥补的损害提出任何主张。本法院认定，G-Club 已承认，即便确定这些文件不符合向 G-Club 送达的第2004条规则传票的要求，被要求移交这些文件也不会对其造成难以弥补的损害。\n\n基于上述所有理由，G-Club 未能证明在未获得上诉期间中止执行的情况下会遭受难以弥补的损害。\n\nB. 对破产财产的重大损害\n\nG-Club 声称，受托人不会遭受任何损害，因为其已经进行了包括针对 G-Club 在内的第2004条规则质询。\n\nG-Club（G俱乐部）的主张因若干原因而缺乏说服力。第一，无论受托人（Trustee）是否已经从各方处收到文件，受托人可能仍需要目前所寻求的文件。第二，受托人与受让人（Assignee）之间的和解涉及本对抗性程序中的第 26 条（Rule 26）证据开示，和/或向 HCHK 实体（HCHK Entities）送达的第 2004 条（Rule 2004）传票——而非向 G-Club 送达的第 2004 条质询。第三，第 2004 条质询的相关存在意义在于，作为破产受托人——其并非债务人——探查债务人资产、负债及财务状况的一种途径。合规使用第 2004 条并无任何不当之处。第四，在主案（Main Case）中，当事方因滥用证据开示程序已多次被裁定藐视法庭。\n(Main Case ECF No. 1537, 1709, 1892, 2009, 2035, 2093.) 受托人寻求多次第 2004 条质询的必要性正是在此背景下产生的。\n\n如果不移交 G-Club 文件，破产财产（estate）将遭受重大损害。本法院已给予 G-Club 充足的时间陈述其主张：已举行了三次听证会，G-Club 也提交了三份诉状。在此期间，G-Club 未能提供任何证据或法律依据来支持其主张。G-Club 未能为其主张提供支持，这不是受托人的问题，而是 G-Club 自身的问题。此外，受托人已与受让人就各项争议达成和解，其中包括受让人移交文件。若非 G-Club 提出无依据的主张，受让人占有、保管和/或控制的 G-Club 文件本应已经移交给受托人。破产财产不应承担就这些事项继续进行无理缠诉的费用。\n\n基于所有这些理由，G-Club 未能确立破产财产不会遭受重大损害。如果本法院在这些情况下准予 G-Club 上诉期间中止执行，依据第 8007(d) 条（Rule 8007(d)），G-Club 将被要求提供保证书。\n\nC. 公共利益\n\nG-Club 主张，公共利益支持上诉期间中止执行，因为 G-Club 文件命令（G-Club Document Order）威胁到了普通消费者的宪法权利。\n\n本法院不予认同。第一，目前尚不清楚哪项宪法权利面临风险。尽管获得了多次陈述意见的机会，G-Club 仍未能指出可能面临风险的任何具体宪法权利。第二，G-Club 文件命令是以本法院面前的事实和情况为前提的。与其他当事方不同的是，其他当事方有可能提供证据证明包含其信息的“云端”是安全、保密且私密的，并未与提供人事关系及法律服务等如此私密服务的服务提供商共享。G-Club 的主张不成立，是因为其无法确立特权的存在。该等不能证明的情况仅为其自身特有，并不普遍适用于公众。G-Club 文件命令范围狭窄，并不影响云服务的普通消费者。\n\n因此，G-Club 未能确立公共利益支持上诉期间中止执行。\n\nD. 实体胜诉的可能性\n\n转到其在实体胜诉的可能性，由于 G-Club 未能确立其他要件，其举证责任十分沉重。见 Reno, 309 F.3d at 100–01。在此方面，如上所述，G-Club 并未主张移交潜在的无关联文件会使其遭受不可弥补的损害。G-Club 就特权和关联性分别提出了但彼此相关的论点。\n\n特权\n\n关于特权，G-Club 主张，G-Club 文件命令错误地推定放弃了特权，并不当地将举证责任强加于 G-Club。因此，它声称，G-Club 在与特权相关的上诉中很有可能胜诉。\n\n本法院不予认同。根据美国联邦第二巡回上诉法院（United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit）的法律，应由 G-Club——而非受托人——承担举证责任，证明 G-Club 文件在 G-Club 与其律师之间事实上保持了保密性。“正如所有特权一样，主张律师-当事人保密特权的人有责任证明所有基本要件。”In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 82 (2d Cir. 1973) (citing United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 923 (2d Cir. 1961))。“主张该特权的当事方……负有举证责任”，证明受保护的沟通是“(1) 客户与其律师之间的沟通，(2) 意在且事实上保持了保密性，(3) 目的是为了获取或提供法律意见”。United States v. Mejia, 655 F.3d 126, 132 (2d Cir. 2011)（强调为后加）；见 Strougo v. BEA Assocs., 199 F.R.D. 515, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing United States v. Constr. Prod. Rsch., Inc., 73 F.3d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1996))。“寻求律师-当事人保密特权保护的当事方必须采取积极行动保护其沟通。”Niceforo v. UBS Glob. Asset Agmt. Ams., Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 428, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)。采取“‘可预见地会导致披露’受特权保护之沟通”的行为，会导致放弃律师-当事人保密特权。Niceforo, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 437; 见 Horowitz, 482 F.2d at 82。G-Club 未能提交任何支持举证责任在受托人一方的权威判例，而明确的判例先例确立了举证责任在 G-Club 一方。\n\n此外，G-Club 甚至根本没有试图就任何要件作出必要的举证，更不用说就沟通是否保持保密作出举证了。相反，正如在《上诉期间中止执行动议》（Motion for Stay Pending Appeal）中一样，G-Club 试图类比 Microsoft Corporation（微软公司）等提供的云服务，却未向本法院提供任何支持该类比的依据。面对《主服务协议》（Master Services Agreement，简称“MSA”）的条款，G-Club 的律师在口头辩论中承认 MSA 具有相关性，但恳请本法院在没有任何证据的情况下采纳其类比。(ECF 168, Hr'g Tr. at 34:10–37:13.) 虽然 G-Club 主张本法院转移了举证责任，但事实上是 G-Club 请求本法院转移举证责任。它在《上诉期间中止执行动议》中再次提出了这一请求。该请求违背了具有约束力的第二巡回法院先例。因此，G-Club 就特权方面在实体上没有胜诉的可能性。\n\n关联性\n\n关于关联性，G-Club 主张本法院推定已构成披露，并在涉及这些文件时错误适用了 MSA。\n\n本法院不予认同。G-Club 文件命令是基于本法院面前的记录作出的。再次强调，记录中没有任何内容支持 G-Club 的立场，事实上，在本法院面前的辩论中，G-Club 也援引了 MSA 的保密条款来支持其论点：\n\n法官阁下，法庭是正确的。我表示歉意。受托人的陈述重点远远超出了主服务协议所规定的范围。保密性问题是由主服务协议维持的。主服务协议确实明确规定 HCHK 将提供 IT 服务，并且所有信息都应保持保密。\n\n(ECF 168, Hr'g Tr. at 34:10–35:2.) 现在改称法院在适用这些条款时存在“混淆”，这与 G-Club 自身先前声明的立场相悖。事实上，律师向本法院陈述情况的方式与《上诉期间中止执行动议》所主张的明显不同，其将争议问题表述为：\n\n我所指的是，以及我只是想确保我们大家都理解的原因在于，无论 MSA 和保密限制如何适用于 HCHK，事实是他们是我们域名的 IT 管理员。记录中绝对没有任何证据表明 HCHK 登录并搜索了所有这些电子邮件并审阅了这些电子邮件，或者拥有全权审阅这些电子邮件的权力。这根本没有证据支持。\n\n(Id., Hr'g Tr. at 35:3–10.) 尽管 G-Club 目前主张 HCHK Tech（HCHK科技）没有机会访问这些文件，但其此前曾向本法院陈述称 HCHK Tech 确实拥有访问权限，但受托人必须证明 HCHK Tech 利用了该访问权限。\n\nG-Club 在听证会期间的主张所存在的问题在于：(i) 如上所述，应由 G-Club 承担举证责任，证明 G-Club 未将其文件置于 HCHK Tech 可以（无论其是否实际进行了）查阅所有这些文件的境地，而正如 MSA 所确立的，HCHK Tech 的角色远不止是 G-Club 域名的信息技术管理员；以及 (ii) 无可争议的是，HCHK Tech 确实占有、保管和/或控制了这些文件——这正是本诉讼存在的全部原因。因此，G-Club 现在试图推翻该论点，将其归咎于法院的“混淆”，并无视其自身在本案记录中先前的陈述，以便进行第四次辩论并提交第四份诉状。这不是上诉获胜之道。\n\n关联性与特权\n\n最后，G-Club 试图就一项证据开示命令提起上诉。目前尚未作出藐视法庭的认定。亦未下达制裁裁决。这似乎属于中间上诉。见 Pawlak v. U.S. Dep't of Educ. (In re Pawlak), 520 B.R. 177 (D. Md. 2014)（驳回对证据开示命令的中间上诉）；Speer v. Tow (In re Royce Homes LP), 466 B.R. 81 (S.D. Tex. 2012)（同上）；Kaiser Grp. Int'l, Inc. v. Ostrava (In re Kaiser Grp. Int'l, Inc.), 400 B.R. 140 (D. Del. 2009)（同上）；亦见 Shimer ex rel. Fugazy Express, Inc. v. Fugazy (In re Fugazy Express, Inc.), 982 F.2d 755–56 (2d Cir. 1992)（汇编有关中间上诉的先例，包括在下达制裁裁决前涉及藐视法庭的情形）。提起中间上诉会降低上诉成功的可能性。\n\n基于所有这些理由，G-Club 无论就特权还是关联性而言，均未确立在实体上有充分的胜诉可能性。\n\n五、结论与命令\n\n基于上述所有理由，并依据第 8007 条（Rule 8007），特此\n\n命令：《上诉期间中止执行动议》予以驳回；并进一步\n\n命令：鉴于《上诉期间中止执行动议》已被驳回，《加急动议》（Motion to Expedite）作为已无实际意义予以驳回。\n\n日期：2023年11月16日于康涅狄格州布里奇波特（Bridgeport, Connecticut）。","key_entities":["HCHK","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Despins","Je","Guo","Miles Guo","Paul Hastings"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":25,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":55,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":70,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":87,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":168,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":179,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1537,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1936,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2004,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2030,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2038,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2237,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2244,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2338,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2340,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":3663,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 13:51:27"}