{"id":"court_ctb_2346_1","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":2346,"sub_number":1,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2023-11-16","title":"| Case 22-50073 | Doc 2346-1 | Filed 11/16/23 | Entered 11/16/23 19:23:51 | Page 1 of |","summary_zh":"法院裁定 —— Ho Wan Kwok 破产案（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo），CTB 22-50073 ECF #2346-1（2023-11-16立案）。破产法院裁定驳回 G-Club Operations LLC 就此前要求移交 G-Club 文件裁定所提出的上诉期间中止执行动议，并因该驳回而将紧急加急听证动议作为已失去实际意义予以驳回。","summary_en":"Court Order — In re Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo / Guo Wengui), CTB 22-50073 ECF #2346-1 (filed Nov 16, 2023). The Bankruptcy Court denies G-Club Operations LLC's motion to stay pending appeal regarding the order requiring turnover of G-Club documents, and denies as moot its motion for an expedited hearing.","body_en":"| Case 22-50073 | Doc 2346-1 | Filed 11/16/23 | Entered 11/16/23 19:23:51 | Page 1 of |\n|---------------|------------|----------------|---------------------------|-----------|\n|---------------|------------|----------------|---------------------------|-----------|\n\n12\n\n**UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\n)\n\n)\n\n) )\n\n)\n\n)\n\n)\n\n# Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) )\n\n) Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\nIn re: ) Chapter 11\n\nHO WAN KWOK, *et al.*, ) (Jointly Administered)\n\nDebtors.<sup>1</sup> ) Re: ECF Nos. 2338, 2340\n\nLUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ) Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (JAM) ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK, )\n\nHCHK TECHNOLOGIES, INC., HCHK PROPERTY ) MANAGEMENT, INC., LEXINGTON PROPERTY AND ) STAFFING, INC., HOLY CITY HONG KONG ) VENTURES, LTD., ANTHONY DIBATTISTA, ) YVETTE WANG, and BRIAN W. HOFMEISTER, ) ASSIGNEE FOR THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS, )\n\nDefendants. )\n\n## **ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STAY PENDING APPEAL AND EX PARTE MOTION TO EXPEDITE HEARING ON MOTION TO STAY PENDING APPEAL**\n\n# **I. INTRODUCTION**\n\nBefore the Court are two motions related to the Order Granting Motion for Order\n\nRequiring Production of G-Club Documents entered in this adversary proceeding (the \"G-Club\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, the Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2346-1 Filed 11/16/23 Entered 11/16/23 19:23:51 Page 2 of 12\n\nDocuments Order\"). (ECF No. 179.)2 The two motions filed by G-Club Operations LLC (\"G-Club\") are: (i) the Motion to Stay Pending Appeal filed in the jointly administered Chapter 11 cases of Ho Wan Kwak (the \"Motion for Stay Pending Appeal\") (Main Case ECF No. 2338) and (ii) the *Ex Parte* Motion to Expedite Hearing and Limit Notice on the Motion for Stay Pending Appeal the \"Motion to Expedite\") (Main Case ECF No. 2340) in the Chapter 11 cases jointly administered under the caption *In re Kwok*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) (the \"Main Case\"). G-Club seeks a stay pending appeal of the G-Club Documents Order.\n\nIt is curious that G-Club filed a Notice of Appeal, a Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, and a Motion to Expedite in the Main Case, but only filed a Notice of Appeal in this adversary proceeding, the proceeding in which the G-Club Documents Order entered. G-Club is continuing to attempt to connect the production of documents to the Plaintiff by the Assignee, a Defendant in this adversary proceeding, pursuant to the settlement agreement approved in this adversary proceeding with the production of documents pursuant to a Rule 2004 examination subpoena served on G-Club in the Main Case. The G-Club Documents Order has nothing to do with the Rule 2004 subpoena served on G-Club in the Main Case. Instead, it squarely addresses the documents to be produced to the Plaintiff by the Assignee in this adversary proceeding. For the reasons stated below, the Court **DENIES** the Motion for Stay Pending Appeal and the Motion to Expedite.\n\n<sup>2</sup> Capitalized terms undefined herein have the meaning ascribed to them in the G-Club Documents Order. References to the docket in this adversary proceeding will be styled \"ECF.\" References to the docket in the main case, *In re Kwok*, Case No. 22-50073, will be styled \"Main Case ECF.\"\n\n#### **II. BACKGROUND**\n\nThe Court notes from the outset that G-Club is not a Defendant in this adversary proceeding, yet it has argued in this adversary proceeding it has the right to challenge the settlement between the Plaintiff and the Assignee approved by this Court more than three months ago. Although G-Club was allowed to be heard on discrete issues regarding the settlement, the Court did not agree with G-Club's arguments and issued the G-Club Documents Order on November 13, 2023. The G-Club Documents Order requires G-Club, or the party in possession of the G-Club documents, to produce the documents to the Plaintiff by November 17, 2013. G-Club now asserts it must be granted a stay pending appeal so that it, or the party in possession of the documents, is not required to produce documents to be turned over pursuant to the settlement between the Plaintiff and the Assignee approved months ago.\n\nThe arguments G-Club asserts in the Motion for Stay Pending appeal have been raised and argued no less than three times before this Court. On July 11, 2023 and July 18, 2023, hearings were held on the Plaintiff's Motion Regarding Settlement with Assignee of HCHK Entities under New York Court Assignment Proceedings (the \"Settlement Motion\") (Main Case ECF No. 1936; ECF No. 25) and a revised proposed order (the \"Revised Proposed Order\") regarding the Settlement Motion (Main Case ECF No. 2004; ECF No. 55), both filed by the Plaintiff, Mr. Luc A. Despins, in his capacity as Chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") for the estate of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok. G-Club filed objections to the Settlement Motion and the Revised Proposed Order. (Main Case ECF Nos. 1977, 2007.) On July 28, 2023, the Court entered the Order Approving Settlement, which granted the Settlement Motion, approved the settlement between the Trustee and the Assignee, and overruled all but one of the objections to the Settlement Motion raised by G-Club. (Main Case ECF No. 2038; ECF No. 70.)\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2346-1 Filed 11/16/23 Entered 11/16/23 19:23:51 Page 4 of 12\n\nParagraph 6 of the Order Approving Settlement allowed the parties to address G-Club's only remaining objection to the Settlement Motion (*see* Main Case ECF No. 2030, at 128:5– 48:8) by setting a briefing schedule whereby the Trustee and G-Club would contest whether G-Club had the right to review G-Club documents in the possession of the Assignee for responsiveness to the Rule 2004 subpoena served on G-Club and for privilege prior to the documents being produced to the Trustee. (Main Case ECF No. 2038 ¶ 6; ECF No. 70 ¶ 6.) On August 11, 2023, the Trustee timely filed a motion arguing that G-Club did not have any right to review the documents for either responsiveness or privilege. (ECF No. 87.) On September 29, 2023, after certain developments (*see* Main Case ECF No. 2237), G-Club filed a response to the Trustee's motion (Main Case ECF No. 2244), arguing that G-Club had rights to review the documents for both responsiveness and privilege.\n\nOn October 24, 2023, a hearing was held on the arguments raised by the Trustee in his motion. The Trustee and G-Club both appeared and argued their respective positions. On November 13, 2023, the Court entered the G-Club Documents Order, granting the Trustee his requested relief. (ECF No. 179.) The appeal by G-Club was then filed as well as the Motion for Stay Pending Appeal.\n\nThese matters are ripe for decision.\n\n#### **III. JURISDICTION**\n\nThe United States District Court for the District of Connecticut has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). This Court has authority to hear and determine this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) and the Order of Reference of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut dated September 21, 1984. The instant adversary\n\nproceeding in which the instant discovery dispute arises is a statutorily core proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (E), (O).\n\nVenue in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.\n\n## **IV. DISCUSSION3**\n\nA motion for stay pending appeal seeking relief under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8007 is considered under the same standard as a motion for stay pending appeal of a district court order. *In re Adelphia Commc'n Corp.*, 333 B.R. 649, 659 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); *Country Squire Assocs. of Carle Place, L.P. v. Rochester Cmty. Sav. Bank (In re Country Squire Assocs. of Carle Place, L.P.)*, 203 B.R. 182, 183 (2d B.A.P. 1996). A stay pending appeal is not a matter of right but rather left to judicial discretion and reviewed for abuse of discretion. *Unif. Fire Officers Ass'n v. de Blasio*, 973 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2020); *Andrews v. McCarron (In re Vincent Andrews Mgmt. Corp.)*, 414 B.R. 1, 4 (D. Conn. 2009); *Green Point Bank v. Treston*, 188 B.R. 9, 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); *Youssef v. Sally Mae Inc. (In re Homaidan)*, 646 B.R. 550, 575 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2022).\n\nThere are four elements that the movant must establish for a stay pending appeal to issue, namely, \"the likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable injury if a stay is denied, substantial injury to the party opposing a stay if one is issued, and the public interest.\" *Mohammed v. Reno*, 309 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2002); *Hirschfeld v. Board of Elections*, 984 F.2d 35, 39 (2d Cir. 1993). A party seeking a stay pending appeal carries the burden on all elements and it is a \"heavy burden.\" *Adelphia*, 333 B.R. at 659; *see Barretta v. Wells Fargo, N.A. (In re Barretta)*, 560 B.R. 630, 632 (D. Conn. 2016); *In re 473 W. End Realty Corp.*, 507 B.R. 496, 501–02\n\n<sup>3</sup> The following constitutes the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Court pursuant to Rule 7052 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, made applicable by Rule 7001 in adversary proceedings.\n\n(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014). The first two elements are the \"most critical.\" *Nken v. Holder*, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009).\n\nAs is true with regard to the preliminary injunction standard followed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the movant's burden on the first element – likelihood of success on the merits – varies depending on the strength or weakness of the movant's argument on the other elements under the specific facts and circumstances of the case. *Reno*, 309 F.3d at 100–01; *see Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd.*, 598 F.3d 30, 35–38 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding *Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc.*, 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979) remains the law of the Second Circuit). Therefore, the Court will first consider the second, third, and fourth elements of a stay pending appeal before turning to an analysis of the likelihood of success on the merits.\n\n#### **A. Irreparable Harm**\n\nG-Club argues that, absent a stay pending appeal, it will forever lose its rights regarding privileged documents in complying with the G-Club Documents Order because the Trustee will have the allegedly privileged documents and be unable to remove their contents from his mind.\n\nThe Court disagrees. G-Club provides no case law supporting the proposition that there is irreparable harm if privileged material is produced to another party under Court order. It is unsurprising that G-Club has not – the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure address this situation. If G-Club prevails on appeal, Rule 26(b)(5)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as made applicable in this adversary proceeding by Rule 7026 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy, provides a procedure for the return of privileged materials produced in discovery. The Trustee would not, then, be able to use the documents as evidence. Absent a conflict of interest, the general rule is that lawyers can represent a series of clients despite coming into each new\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2346-1 Filed 11/16/23 Entered 11/16/23 19:23:51 Page 7 of 12\n\narrangement with privileged information in their head – from previous clients and previous adversaries. *But see, generally*, *In re Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams.*, 605 F.3d 1373 (F. Cir. 2010) (discussing caselaw about where lawyers are involved in *competitive* decision making after obtaining competitor's competitive information). Lawyers are expected to and believed capable of abiding by procedural rules and protective orders.\n\nNotably, G-Club makes no argument regarding irreparable harm as to non-privileged documents that are allegedly non-responsive to the Rule 2004 subpoena served on it in Mr. Kwok's Chapter 11 case. The Court concludes that G-Club has conceded that it would not be irreparably harmed by being required to produce documents notwithstanding any determination that they were non-responsive to the Rule 2004 subpoena served on G-Club.\n\nFor all of the above reasons, G-Club has not established irreparable harm absent a stay pending appeal.\n\n#### **B. Substantial Injury to the Estate**\n\nG-Club asserts that the Trustee will suffer no injury because he has conducted Rule 2004 exams, including of G-Club.\n\nG Club's argument is unpersuasive for several reasons. First, regardless of whether the Trustee has already received documents from various parties, the Trustee may need the documents presently sought. Second, the settlement between the Trustee and Assignee related to Rule 26 discovery in this adversary proceeding and/or the Rule 2004 subpoena served on the HCHK Entities – not the Rule 2004 exam served on G-Club. Third, Rule 2004 exams exist in pertinent part as a way for bankruptcy trustees – who are not the debtor – to explore the debtor's assets, liabilities, and financial affairs. There is nothing nefarious about proper use of Rule 2004. Fourth, in the Main Case, parties have repeatedly been held in contempt for discovery abuses.\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2346-1 Filed 11/16/23 Entered 11/16/23 19:23:51 Page 8 of 12\n\n(Main Case ECF No. 1537, 1709, 1892, 2009, 2035, 2093.) The Trustee's need to seek numerous Rule 2004 exams has occurred in this context.\n\nThere is substantial injury to the estate if the G-Club documents are not produced. The Court has given G-Club ample time to make its arguments: there have been three hearings and G-Club has filed three briefs. In all that time, G-Club did not provide any evidence or legal authority to support its arguments. The failure of G-Club to support its arguments is not the Trustee's problem; it is G-Club's problem. Moreover, the Trustee settled various issues with the Assignee, which included the production of documents from the Assignee. But for G-Club's unsupported arguments, the G-Club documents in the possession, custody, and/or control of the Assignee would have already been produced to the Trustee. The estate should not bear the expense of continued, frivolous litigation on these matters.\n\nFor all these reasons, G-Club has not established a lack of substantial injury to the estate. If the Court were to grant G-Club a stay pending appeal under these circumstances, G-Club would be required to post a bond pursuant to Rule 8007(d).\n\n#### **C. Public Interest**\n\nG-Club argues that the public interest supports a stay pending appeal because the G-Club Document Order threatens the constitutional rights of ordinary consumers.\n\nThe Court disagrees. First, it is unclear what constitutional right is at risk. Despite being heard on numerous occasions, G-Club has failed to identity any specific constitutional right that may be at risk. Second, the G-Club Documents Order is premised on the facts and circumstances before the Court. It is possible that, unlike G-Club, other parties could produce evidence to establish that the \"cloud\" containing their information was secure, confidential, and private and not shared with the service provider who is offering such intimate services as human relations\n\nand legal services. G-Club's argument fails because of *its* inability to establish privilege. That failure is unique to it and not generally applicable to the public. The G-Club Document Order is narrow and does not impact the general consumer of cloud services.\n\nTherefore, G-Club fails to establish that the public interest supports a stay pending appeal.\n\n#### **D. Likelihood of Success on the Merits**\n\nTurning to its likelihood of success on the merits, because G-Club has failed to establish the other elements, its burden is heavy. *Reno*, 309 F.3d at 100–01. In this connection, as noted above G-Club makes no argument that it would be irreparably harmed by producing the potentially non-responsive documents.G-Club makes separate but related arguments regarding privilege and responsiveness.\n\n#### *Privilege*\n\nRegarding privilege, G-Club argues that the G-Club Document Order erroneously assumes waiver and improperly places the burden on G-Club. Therefore, it asserts, G-Club is likely to succeed on appeal as it relates to privilege.\n\nThe Court disagrees. Under the law of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, G-Club – not the Trustee – has the burden of establishing that the G-Club documents were in fact kept confidential between G-Club and its counsel. \"[A]s with all privileges, the person claiming the attorney client privilege has the burden of establishing all essential elements.\" *In re Horowitz*, 482 F.2d 72, 82 (2d Cir. 1973) (citing *United States v. Kovel*, 296 F.2d 918, 923 (2d Cir. 1961)). \"The party asserting the privilege . . . bears the burden of establishing\" that the communications to be protected are \"communications (1) between a client and his or her attorney *(2) that are intended to be, and in fact were, kept confidential* (3) for the\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2346-1 Filed 11/16/23 Entered 11/16/23 19:23:51 Page 10 of 12\n\npurpose of obtaining or providing legal advice.\" *United States v. Mejia*, 655 F.3d 126, 132 (2d Cir. 2011) (emphasis added); *see Strougo v. BEA Assocs.*, 199 F.R.D. 515, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing *United States v. Constr. Prod. Rsch., Inc.*, 73 F.3d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1996)). \"A party seeking the protections of the attorney-client privilege must affirmatively act to protect her communications.\" *Niceforo v. UBS Glob. Asset Agmt. Ams., Inc.*, 20 F. Supp. 3d 428, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). Undertaking actions that \"'will predictably lead to the disclosure' of privileged communications\" results in waiver of the attorney-client privilege. *Niceforo*, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 437; *see Horowitz*, 482 F.2d at 82. G-Club did not submit any authority that the burden is on the Trustee as opposed to the clear line of authority that establishes the burden is on G-Club.\n\nIn addition, G-Club did not even attempt to make the required showing regarding *any of the elements*, let alone regarding whether the communications were kept confidential. Rather, much as in the Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, G-Club attempts to draw an analogy to cloud services provided by, *e.g.*, Microsoft Corporation, without providing the Court any basis to sustain the analogy. Faced with the terms of the Master Services Agreement (\"MSA\"), counsel to G-Club acknowledged in oral argument that the MSA was relevant but beseeched the Court to adopt its analogy upon no evidence. (ECF 168, Hr'g Tr. at 34:10–37:13.) While G-Club argues the Court shifted the burden, in fact *G-Club petitioned the Court to shift the burden*. It is repeating that request in the Motion for Stay Pending Appeal. This request is contrary to binding Second Circuit precedent. Hence, G-Club has no likelihood of success on the merits regarding privilege.\n\n#### *Responsiveness*\n\nRegarding responsiveness, G-Club argues that the Court assumed disclosure and misapplied the MSA regarding the documents.\n\nThe Court disagrees. The G-Club Documents Order is based on the record before the\n\nCourt. There is, again, nothing in the record supporting G-Club's position and indeed, in\n\nargument before this Court, *G-Club also referred to the confidentiality paragraphs of the MSA in*\n\n## *support of their argument*:\n\nThe Court is correct, Your Honor. And my apologies. The trustee's presentation focused on far beyond what the master services agreement allegedly provided. The issue of confidentiality was maintained by the master services agreement. The master services agreement did specifically say that HCHK would provide IT services and all information was to be maintained confidential*.*\n\n(ECF 168, Hr'g Tr. at 34:10–35:2.) To now say that the Court was \"confused\" in applying those paragraphs is contrary to G-Club's own prior stated positions. Indeed, counsel presented the situation to the Court markedly differently than the Motion for Stay Pending Appeal contends,\n\nstating the issue as:\n\nWhat I'm referring to and the reason that I just want to make sure that we all understand, whatever the MSA and confidentiality restrictions apply to HCHK, the fact of the matter is they were an IT manager for our domain name. There is absolutely no evidence in the record that HCHK logged on and searched all of these emails and reviewed these emails or had the authority to simply cart blanche review these emails. That's just not in evidence.\n\n(*Id.*, Hr'g Tr. at 35:3–10.) Whereas G-Club now contends HCHK Tech had no opportunity to\n\naccess the files, it previously stated to the Court that HCHK Tech *did* have access but the Trustee\n\nhad to prove HCHK Tech utilized that access.\n\nThe problems with G-Club's arguments during the hearing are that (i), as noted above, it\n\nis G-Club's burden to establish that G-Club did not put its documents in a position where HCHK\n\nTech *could* (regardless of whether it *did*) go through all of those documents where HCHK Tech\n\nwas, as established by the MSA, much more than an information technology manager for G-\n\nClub's domain name; and (ii) it is undisputed that HCHK Tech did indeed have possession,\n\ncustody, and/or control of the documents – that is the whole reason the present litigation exists.\n\nHence, G-Club now seeks to retreat from that argument, attribute it to the Court's \"confusion,\" and ignore its own prior statements on the record in this case in order to have a *fourth argument* and file a *fourth brief*. This is not a recipe for success on appeal.\n\n## *Responsiveness and Privilege*\n\nFinally, G-Club seeks to appeal a discovery order. There has been no finding of contempt. Sanctions have not entered. This appears to be an interlocutory appeal. *See Pawlak v. U.S. Dep't of Educ. (In re Pawlak)*, 520 B.R. 177 (D. Md. 2014) (denying interlocutory appeal of discovery order); *Speer v. Tow (In re Royce Homes LP)*, 466 B.R. 81 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (same); *Kaiser Grp. Int'l, Inc. v. Ostrava (In re Kaiser Grp. Int'l, Inc.)*, 400 B.R. 140 (D. Del. 2009) (same); *see also Shimer ex rel. Fugazy Express, Inc. v. Fugazy (In re Fugazy Express, Inc.)*, 982 F.2d 755–56 (2d Cir. 1992) (collecting cases on interlocutory appeal, including regarding contempt before sanctions enter). Filing an interlocutory appeal decreases the likelihood of success on appeal.\n\nFor all of these reasons, G-Club has not established a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits regarding either privilege or responsiveness.\n\n## **V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER**\n\nFor all the above stated reasons, and pursuant to Rule 8007, it is hereby\n\n**ORDERED:** The Motion for Stay Pending Appeal is **DENIED**; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** The Motion to Expedite is **DENIED** as moot due to the denial of the Motion for Stay Pending Appeal.\n\nDated at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 16th day of November, 2023.","body_zh":"案件编号 22-50073 文件 2346-1 归档于 11/16/23 录入于 11/16/23 19:23:51 第 1 页，共\nUNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT（美国康涅狄格区破产法院）\n\n关于：\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等人，\n债务人。1\n案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)\n第 11 章\n（合并审理）\n涉及：ECF 编号 2338、2340\n\nLUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK（Luc A. Despins，作为郭文贵破产财产的第 11 章受托人），\n原告，\n对抗诉讼编号 23-05013 (JAM)\nv.\nHCHK TECHNOLOGIES, INC.、HCHK PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC.、LEXINGTON PROPERTY AND STAFFING, INC.、HOLY CITY HONG KONG VENTURES, LTD.、ANTHONY DIBATTISTA、YVETTE WANG（王雁平），以及 BRIAN W. HOFMEISTER, ASSIGNEE FOR THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS（Brian W. Hofmeister，作为全体债权人利益的受让人），\n被告。\n\n驳回上诉期间中止执行动议及驳回关于上诉期间中止执行动议的单方加快听证动议的裁定\n\nI. 引言\n\n本法院现审理两项与在本对抗诉讼中作出的《准予要求提供 G-Club 文件裁定的动议的裁定》（以下简称“《G-Club 文件裁定》”）相关的动议。（ECF 编号 179。）2 由 G-Club Operations LLC（以下简称“G-Club”）提交的两项动议为：(i) 在合并审理的 Ho Wan Kwak（郭文贵）第 11 章案件中提交的《上诉期间中止执行动议》（以下简称“《上诉期间中止执行动议》”）（主案 ECF 编号 2338），以及 (ii) 在以 In re Kwok 为案由合并审理的第 11 章案件（案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)）（以下简称“主案”）中提交的《关于上诉期间中止执行动议的单方加快听证及限制通知动议》（以下简称“《加快审理动议》”）（主案 ECF 编号 2340）。G-Club 申请在上诉期间中止执行《G-Club 文件裁定》。\n\n1 这些第 11 章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵，亦称为郭文贵、Miles Guo 和 Miles Kwok，以及其他众多化名）（纳税人识别号后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（纳税人识别号后四位：8202）和 Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 和 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为：Paul Hastings LLP（普衡律师事务所）, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 转交 Luc A. Despins，作为郭文贵破产财产受托人（仅用于通知与通讯目的）。\n案件编号 22-50073 文件 2346-1 归档于 11/16/23 录入于 11/16/23 19:23:51 第 2 页，共 12 页\n\n令人不解的是，G-Club 在主案中提交了《上诉通知书》、《上诉期间中止执行动议》和《加快审理动议》，但在此对抗诉讼（即作出《G-Club 文件裁定》的诉讼程序）中仅提交了《上诉通知书》。G-Club 一直试图将被告受让人（作为本对抗诉讼中的被告）根据本对抗诉讼中批准的和解协议向原告提供文件，与根据在主案中向 G-Club 送达的《破产程序规则》第 2004 条调查传票提供文件联系起来。《G-Club 文件裁定》与在主案中向 G-Club 送达的第 2004 条传票毫无关系。相反，它直接针对的是在本对抗诉讼中应由受让人向原告提供移交的文件。基于下文所述的理由，本法院驳回《上诉期间中止执行动议》和《加快审理动议》。\n\n2 本文未定义的词首字母大写术语具有《G-Club 文件裁定》中赋予它们的含义。对本对抗诉讼案卷目录的引用将表述为“ECF”。对主案（In re Kwok，案件编号 22-50073）案卷目录的引用将表述为“主案 ECF”。\n\nII. 背景\n\n本法院首先指出，G-Club 并非本对抗诉讼的被告，但它在本对抗诉讼中主张其有权质疑本法院在三个多月前批准的原告与受让人之间的和解协议。尽管 G-Club 获准就和解协议的具体个别问题陈述意见，但本法院不同意 G-Club 的主张，并于 2023 年 11 月 13 日作出了《G-Club 文件裁定》。《G-Club 文件裁定》要求 G-Club 或持有 G-Club 文件的当事方于 2023 年 11 月 17 日前向原告提供这些文件。G-Club 现主张必须准予其在上诉期间中止执行，以使其或持有文件的当事方无需根据数月前批准的原告与受让人之间的和解协议移交提供文件。\n\nG-Club 在《上诉期间中止执行动议》中提出的论据，已在本法院前提出并辩论了不下三次。2023 年 7 月 11 日和 2023 年 7 月 18 日，就原告 Luc A. Despins 先生以其作为 Mr. Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵先生）破产财产的第 11 章受托人（以下简称“受托人”）身份提交的《关于根据纽约州法院转让程序与 HCHK 实体受让人和解的动议》（以下简称“《和解动议》”）（主案 ECF 编号 1936；ECF 编号 25）以及关于该《和解动议》的修改后拟议裁定（以下简称“《修改后拟议裁定》”）（主案 ECF 编号 2004；ECF 编号 55）举行了听证会。G-Club 对《和解动议》和《修改后拟议裁定》提出了异议。（主案 ECF 编号 1977、2007。）2023 年 7 月 28 日，本法院作出了《批准和解裁定》，准予了《和解动议》，批准了受托人与受让人之间的和解，并驳回了 G-Club 对《和解动议》提出的大部分异议，仅保留了一项。（主案 ECF 编号 2038；ECF 编号 70。）\n案件编号 22-50073 文件 2346-1 归档于 11/16/23 录入于 11/16/23 19:23:51 第 4 页，共 12 页\n\n《批准和解裁定》第 6 段通过设定简要陈述日程，允许各当事方解决 G-Club 对《和解动议》提出的唯一遗留异议（见主案 ECF 编号 2030，第 128:5–148:8 行），据此，受托人和 G-Club 将就 G-Club 是否有权在将受让人持有的 G-Club 文件提供给受托人之前，审查这些文件是否符合向 G-Club 送达的第 2004 条传票的要求以及是否享有特权提出抗辩。（主案 ECF 编号 2038 第 6 段；ECF 编号 70 第 6 段。）2023 年 8 月 11 日，受托人及时提交了一项动议，主张 G-Club 无论对相关性还是特权均无权审查这些文件。（ECF 编号 87。）2023 年 9 月 29 日，在发生某些进展之后（见主案 ECF 编号 2237），G-Club 对受托人的动议提交了答辩（主案 ECF 编号 2244），主张 G-Club 有权对这些文件进行相关性和特权审查。\n\n2023 年 10 月 24 日，就受托人在其动议中提出的论点举行了听证会。受托人和 G-Club 均出席并就各自的立场进行了辩论。2023 年 11 月 13 日，本法院作出了《G-Club 文件裁定》，准予了受托人所请求的救济。（ECF 编号 179。）随后 G-Club 提起了上诉，并提交了《上诉期间中止执行动议》。\n\n这些事项已具备裁决条件。\n\nIII. 管辖权\n\nUnited States District Court for the District of Connecticut（美国康涅狄格区联邦地区法院）依据 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) 对本案拥有管辖权。本法院依据 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) 及美国康涅狄格区联邦地区法院于 1984 年 9 月 21 日签署的《移交案件命令》有权审理并裁决本案。产生本案证据开示争议的本对抗诉讼属于法定核心程序。28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A)、(E)、(O)。\n\n依据 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 和 1409，本司法管辖区的审判地适格。\n\nIV. 讨论 3\n\n根据 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8007（《联邦破产诉讼程序规则》第 8007 条）寻求救济的上诉期间中止执行动议，其审查标准与地区法院裁定的上诉期间中止执行动议相同。见 In re Adelphia Commc'n Corp., 333 B.R. 649, 659 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)；Country Squire Assocs. of Carle Place, L.P. v. Rochester Cmty. Sav. Bank (In re Country Squire Assocs. of Carle Place, L.P.), 203 B.R. 182, 183 (2d B.A.P. 1996)。上诉期间中止执行并非一项法定权利，而是属于司法自由裁量权的范围，并按滥用自由裁量权标准进行审查。见 Unif. Fire Officers Ass'n v. de Blasio, 973 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2020)；Andrews v. McCarron (In re Vincent Andrews Mgmt. Corp.), 414 B.R. 1, 4 (D. Conn. 2009)；Green Point Bank v. Treston, 188 B.R. 9, 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)；Youssef v. Sally Mae Inc. (In re Homaidan), 646 B.R. 550, 575 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2022)。\n\n动议方若要获得上诉期间中止执行，必须证明四项要素，即“实体胜诉的可能性、若拒绝中止将造成不可挽回的损害、若签发中止将对反对中止的一方造成重大损害，以及公共利益。”见 Mohammed v. Reno, 309 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2002)；Hirschfeld v. Board of Elections, 984 F.2d 35, 39 (2d Cir. 1993)。申请上诉期间中止执行的一方对所有要素承担举证责任，且这是一项“沉重的举证责任”。见 Adelphia, 333 B.R. at 659；另见 Barretta v. Wells Fargo, N.A. (In re Barretta), 560 B.R. 630, 632 (D. Conn. 2016)；In re 473 W. End Realty Corp., 507 B.R. 496, 501–02\n\n3 以下内容构成根据《联邦破产诉讼程序规则》第 7052 条（通过对抗诉讼中的第 7001 条适用）由本法院作出的事实认定和法律结论。\n\n(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014)。前两项要素是“最关键的”。见 Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009)。\n\n与 United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit（美国联邦第二巡回上诉法院）所遵循的初步禁令标准一样，动议方对第一项要素——实体胜诉可能性——的举证责任，取决于在本案特定事实和情况下动议方在其他要素上论点的强弱。见 Reno, 309 F.3d at 100–01；另见 Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 35–38 (2d Cir. 2010)（认定 Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979) 仍是第二巡回区的判例法）。因此，本法院将先考虑上诉期间中止执行的第二、第三和第四项要素，然后再转向对实体胜诉可能性的分析。\n\nA. 不可挽回的损害\n\nG-Club 主张，若不在上诉期间中止执行，其在执行《G-Club 文件裁定》时将永久丧失关于特权文件的权利，因为受托人将获得涉嫌享有特权的文件，并且无法从其脑海中消除这些内容。\n\n本法院不予认同。G-Club 未提供任何判例法来支持“依法院裁定将特权材料提供给另一方当事人即构成不可挽回的损害”这一命题。G-Club 未能提供并不令人意外——《联邦民事诉讼程序规则》对该情况作出了规定。若 G-Club 在上诉中胜诉，《联邦民事诉讼程序规则》第 26(b)(5)(B) 条（通过《联邦破产诉讼程序规则》第 7026 条在对抗诉讼中适用）规定了返还在证据开示中提供的特权材料的程序。届时，受托人将无法把这些文件用作证据。在不存在利益冲突的情况下，一般规则是，尽管律师在接手每项新委任时脑海中已带有来自先前客户和先前对手的特权信息，但他们仍可以代理一系列客户。\n案件编号 22-50073 文件 2346-1 归档于 11/16/23 录入于 11/16/23 19:23:51 第 7 页，共 12 页\n\n但总的来说，另见 In re Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams., 605 F.3d 1373 (F. Cir. 2010)（讨论了关于律师在获取竞争对手的竞争性信息后参与竞争性决策的判例法）。律师应当并且被认为有能力遵守诉讼程序规则和保护令。\n\n值得注意的是，G-Club对于据称与其在Kwok先生（郭文贵）破产法第11章案件中送达的Rule 2004传票无响应性的非特权文件，并未提出任何不可弥补损害的论主张。本法院认定，G-Club已承认，尽管有任何认定认为这些文件对向G-Club送达的Rule 2004传票无响应性，但被要求提供这些文件并不会对其造成不可弥补的损害。\n\n基于上述所有理由，在没有上诉期间暂缓执行的情况下，G-Club未能确立存在不可弥补的损害。\nB. 对破产财产的重大损害\n\nG-Club坚称受托人（Trustee）不会遭受任何损害，因为受托人已经进行了Rule 2004调查程序，包括对G-Club的调查。\n\nG-Club的论点因若干原因而缺乏说服力。第一，无论受托人是否已经从各方处收到文件，受托人都可能需要目前所寻求的文件。第二，受托人与受让人（Assignee）之间的和解涉及本对抗性程序中的Rule 26证据开示和/或送达给HCHK Entities（HCHK实体）的Rule 2004传票——而非送达给G-Club的Rule 2004调查。第三，Rule 2004调查程序在相关部分的存在目的，是作为破产受托人——其并非债务人——探查债务人的资产、负债和财务事务的一种方式。正当使用Rule 2004并无任何不当之处。第四，在主案中，各方因滥用证据开示程序已屡次被裁定藐视法庭。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2346-1 Filed 11/16/23 Entered 11/16/23 19:23:51 Page 8 of 12\n\n（主案 ECF No. 1537, 1709, 1892, 2009, 2035, 2093。）受托人寻求大量Rule 2004调查的需求正是在这一背景下发生的。\n\n如果不提供G-Club文件，破产财产将遭受重大损害。本法院已给予G-Club充足的时间来阐明其论点：已举行了三次听证会，G-Club也提交了三份诉状。在所有这些时间里，G-Club均未提供任何证据或法律依据来支持其论点。G-Club未能支持其论点并非受托人的问题，而是G-Club自身的问题。此外，受托人与受让人解决了多项争议，其中就包括由受让人提供文件。若非G-Club提出毫无依据的论点，由受让人占有、保管和/或控制的G-Club文件本应早已向受托人提供。破产财产不应承担就这些事项继续进行无意义诉讼的费用。\n\n基于所有这些理由，G-Club未能证明破产财产缺乏重大损害。如果本法院在此种情形下批准G-Club在上诉期间暂缓执行，G-Club将须根据Rule 8007(d)提供担保金。\nC. 公共利益\n\nG-Club辩称公共利益支持在上诉期间暂缓执行，因为G-Club文件裁定威胁到了普通消费者的宪法权利。\n\n本法院不予认同。第一，目前尚不清楚究竟何种宪法权利面临风险。尽管获得了多次陈述意见的机会，G-Club仍未能指出可能面临风险的任何具体宪法权利。第二，G-Club文件裁定是基于本法院面前的事实和具体情况作出的。与G-Club不同，其他当事人完全有可能提供证据证明包含其信息的“云端”是安全、保密且私密的，并且未与提供人力资源\n\n及法律服务等如此私密服务的服务提供商共享。G-Club的论点之所以不能成立，是因为其无法确立特权。该失败是其自身特有的，并不普遍适用于公众。G-Club文件裁定适用范围狭窄，不会对云服务的普通消费者造成影响。\n\n因此，G-Club未能证明公共利益支持在上诉期间暂缓执行。\nD. 胜诉实体可能性的合理预期\n\n谈及其在实体问题上的胜诉可能性，由于G-Club未能确立其他要素，其承担的举证责任极为沉重。见Reno, 309 F.3d at 100–01。就此而言，如上所述，G-Club并未主张提供可能无响应性的文件会对其造成不可弥补的损害。G-Club就特权和响应性提出了各自独立但相互关联的论点。\n特权\n\n关于特权，G-Club主张G-Club文件裁定错误地假定了放弃特权，并不当地将举证责任强加于G-Club。因此，其坚称在涉及特权的上诉中G-Club很有可能胜诉。\n\n本法院不予认同。根据United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit（美国联邦第二巡回上诉法院）的法律，应由G-Club——而非受托人——承担证明G-Club与其法律顾问之间的G-Club文件实际上保持了保密性的举证责任。“正如所有特权一样，主张律师-当事人保密特权的人负有确立所有基本要素的举证责任。”In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 82 (2d Cir. 1973)（援引United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 923 (2d Cir. 1961)）。“主张该特权的当事人……承担举证责任证明”拟受保护的通信为“（1）客户与其律师之间的通信，（2）旨在且实际上保持了保密性，（3）用于\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2346-1 Filed 11/16/23 Entered 11/16/23 19:23:51 Page 10 of 12\n\n获取或提供法律意见之目的。”United States v. Mejia, 655 F.3d 126, 132 (2d Cir. 2011)（强调为原文所加）；参见Strougo v. BEA Assocs., 199 F.R.D. 515, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)（援引United States v. Constr. Prod. Rsch., Inc., 73 F.3d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1996)）。“寻求律师-当事人保密特权保护的当事人必须积极采取作为以保护其通信。”Niceforo v. UBS Glob. Asset Agmt. Ams., Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 428, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)。采取“‘预计会导致’特权通信‘被披露’的作为”会导致律师-当事人保密特权的放弃。Niceforo, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 437；参见Horowitz, 482 F.2d at 82。确立举证责任在G-Club一方法律渊源十分明确，而G-Club未提交任何支持责任在受托人一方的法律依据。\n\n此外，G-Club甚至根本没有试图就任何要素作出必要的举证，更不用说就通信是否保持了保密性进行举证。相反，正如在上诉期间暂缓执行动议中一样，G-Club试图将其类比为例如Microsoft Corporation（微软公司）所提供的云服务，但却未向量法院提供任何支持该类比的依据。面对主服务协议（Master Services Agreement，“MSA”）的条款，G-Club的法律顾问在口头答辩中承认MSA具有相关性，但却在没有任何证据的情况下恳请法院采纳其类比。（ECF 168，听证会笔录第34:10–37:13页。）虽然G-Club主张法院转移了举证责任，但事实上是G-Club请求法院转移举证责任。它正在上诉期间暂缓执行动议中重复该请求。该请求违背了第二巡回法院具有约束力的先例。因此，在特权问题上，G-Club没有任何实体胜诉的可能性。\n响应性\n\n关于响应性，G-Club主张法院假定了已披露，并在文件方面错误适用了MSA。\n\n本法院不予认同。G-Club文件裁定是基于本\n\n法院面前的记录作出的。记录中再次没有任何支持G-Club立场的内容，事实上，在本法院面前的辩论中，\n\nG-Club同样提到了MSA的保密条款以支持其论点：\n\n法官阁下，法庭是对的。我表示歉意。受托人的陈述重点远远超出了主服务协议据称所规定的范围。保密问题是由主服务协议维持的。主服务协议确实明确规定HCHK将提供IT服务，且所有信息均应保持保密。\n\n（ECF 168，听证会笔录第34:10–35:2页。）现在说法院在适用这些条款时存在“困惑”，这与G-Club自身先前陈述的立场相悖。事实上，法律顾问向法院陈述的情况与在上诉期间暂缓执行动议中坚称的内容明显不同，\n\n其将问题陈述为：\n\n我所指的是，并且我只是想确保我们大家都明白的原因是，无论MSA和保密限制对HCHK如何适用，事实是他们是我们域名的IT管理员。记录中绝无任何证据表明HCHK登录并搜索了所有这些电子邮件并审阅了这些电子邮件，或者拥有全权审阅这些电子邮件的权力。这根本没有证据支持。\n\n（同上，听证会笔录第35:3–10页。）尽管G-Club现在坚称HCHK Tech没有机会\n\n接触这些文件，但它此前曾向法院陈述HCHK Tech确实有接触权限，只是受托人\n\n必须证明HCHK Tech实际利用了该权限。\n\nG-Club在听证会期间论点的问题在于：(i) 如上所述，\n\nG-Club负有举证责任证明G-Club没有将其文件置于HCHK Tech能够（无论其是否实际进行了）查阅所有这些文件的处境，而正如MSA所确立的，HCHK Tech绝不仅是G-Club域名的信息技术管理员；并且 (ii) 无可争议的是，HCHK Tech确实占有、\n\n保管和/或控制了这些文件——这正是目前诉讼存在的全部原因。\n\n因此，G-Club现在试图推翻该论点，将其归咎于法院的“困惑”，并无视其自身在本案记录中的先前陈述，以便提出第四种论点并提交第四份诉状。这绝非上诉成功的途径。\n响应性与特权\n\n最后，G-Club试图对一项证据开示裁定提起上诉。目前尚未作出藐视法庭的认定。制裁措施也尚未进入生效执行程序。这似乎属于中间上诉。参见Pawlak v. U.S. Dep't of Educ. (In re Pawlak), 520 B.R. 177 (D. Md. 2014)（驳回对证据开示裁定的中间上诉）；Speer v. Tow (In re Royce Homes LP), 466 B.R. 81 (S.D. Tex. 2012)（同上）；Kaiser Grp. Int'l, Inc. v. Ostrava (In re Kaiser Grp. Int'l, Inc.), 400 B.R. 140 (D. Del. 2009)（同上）；亦见Shimer ex rel. Fugazy Express, Inc. v. Fugazy (In re Fugazy Express, Inc.), 982 F.2d 755–56 (2d Cir. 1992)（汇集关于中间上诉的先例，包括关于制裁生效前藐视法庭的案件）。提起中间上诉会降低上诉成功的可能性。\n\n基于所有这些理由，G-Club未能在特权或响应性方面确立充分的实体胜诉可能性。\nV. 结论与裁定\n\n基于上述所有理由，并依据Rule 8007，特此\n\n裁定：上诉期间暂缓执行动议予以驳回；并进一步\n\n裁定：鉴于上诉期间暂缓执行动议已被驳回，加急动议因失去实际意义而予以驳回。\n\n2023年11月16日签署于康涅狄格州布里奇波特。","key_entities":["HCHK","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Despins","Je","Guo","Miles Guo","Paul Hastings"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":25,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":55,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":70,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":87,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":168,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":179,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1537,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1936,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2004,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2030,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2038,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2237,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2244,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2338,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2340,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":3752,"status":"published","published_at":"2023-11-16 00:00:00","created_at":"2023-11-16","updated_at":"2026-08-23 13:45:46"}