{"id":"court_ctb_2346_2","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":2346,"sub_number":2,"doc_type":"UNKNOWN","filed_date":"2023-11-16","title":"| Case 22-50073 | Doc 2346-2 | Filed 11/16/23 | Entered 11/16/23 19:23:51 | Page 1 of |","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"| Case 22-50073 | Doc 2346-2 | Filed 11/16/23 | Entered 11/16/23 19:23:51 | Page 1 of |\n|---------------|------------|----------------|---------------------------|-----------|\n|---------------|------------|----------------|---------------------------|-----------|\n\n12\n\n# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\n| In re:
HO WAN KWOK, et al., | )
)
Chapter 11
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Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)
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(Jointly Administered)
) |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| Debtors.1 | )
Re: ECF Nos. 2338, 2340 |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
)
Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (JAM)
)
)
) |\n| v. | )
) |\n| HCHK TECHNOLOGIES, INC., HCHK PROPERTY
MANAGEMENT, INC., LEXINGTON PROPERTY AND )
STAFFING, INC., HOLY CITY HONG KONG
VENTURES, LTD., ANTHONY DIBATTISTA,
YVETTE WANG, and BRIAN W. HOFMEISTER,
ASSIGNEE FOR THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS, | )
)
)
)
)
) |\n| Defendants. | )
)
) |\n\n# **ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STAY PENDING APPEAL AND EX PARTE MOTION TO EXPEDITE HEARING ON MOTION TO STAY PENDING APPEAL**\n\n# **I. INTRODUCTION**\n\nBefore the Court are two motions related to the Order Granting Motion for Order\n\nRequiring Production of G-Club Documents entered in this adversary proceeding (the \"G-Club\n\n1 The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, the Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2346-2 Filed 11/16/23 Entered 11/16/23 19:23:51 Page 2 of 12\n\nDocuments Order\"). (ECF No. 179.)2 The two motions filed by G-Club Operations LLC (\"G-Club\") are: (i) the Motion to Stay Pending Appeal filed in the jointly administered Chapter 11 cases of Ho Wan Kwak (the \"Motion for Stay Pending Appeal\") (Main Case ECF No. 2338) and (ii) the *Ex Parte* Motion to Expedite Hearing and Limit Notice on the Motion for Stay Pending Appeal the \"Motion to Expedite\") (Main Case ECF No. 2340) in the Chapter 11 cases jointly administered under the caption *In re Kwok*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) (the \"Main Case\"). G-Club seeks a stay pending appeal of the G-Club Documents Order.\n\nIt is curious that G-Club filed a Notice of Appeal, a Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, and a Motion to Expedite in the Main Case, but only filed a Notice of Appeal in this adversary proceeding, the proceeding in which the G-Club Documents Order entered. G-Club is continuing to attempt to connect the production of documents to the Plaintiff by the Assignee, a Defendant in this adversary proceeding, pursuant to the settlement agreement approved in this adversary proceeding with the production of documents pursuant to a Rule 2004 examination subpoena served on G-Club in the Main Case. The G-Club Documents Order has nothing to do with the Rule 2004 subpoena served on G-Club in the Main Case. Instead, it squarely addresses the documents to be produced to the Plaintiff by the Assignee in this adversary proceeding. For the reasons stated below, the Court **DENIES** the Motion for Stay Pending Appeal and the Motion to Expedite.\n\n2 Capitalized terms undefined herein have the meaning ascribed to them in the G-Club Documents Order. References to the docket in this adversary proceeding will be styled \"ECF.\" References to the docket in the main case, *In re Kwok*, Case No. 22-50073, will be styled \"Main Case ECF.\"\n\n#### **II. BACKGROUND**\n\nThe Court notes from the outset that G-Club is not a Defendant in this adversary proceeding, yet it has argued in this adversary proceeding it has the right to challenge the settlement between the Plaintiff and the Assignee approved by this Court more than three months ago. Although G-Club was allowed to be heard on discrete issues regarding the settlement, the Court did not agree with G-Club's arguments and issued the G-Club Documents Order on November 13, 2023. The G-Club Documents Order requires G-Club, or the party in possession of the G-Club documents, to produce the documents to the Plaintiff by November 17, 2013. G-Club now asserts it must be granted a stay pending appeal so that it, or the party in possession of the documents, is not required to produce documents to be turned over pursuant to the settlement between the Plaintiff and the Assignee approved months ago.\n\nThe arguments G-Club asserts in the Motion for Stay Pending appeal have been raised and argued no less than three times before this Court. On July 11, 2023 and July 18, 2023, hearings were held on the Plaintiff's Motion Regarding Settlement with Assignee of HCHK Entities under New York Court Assignment Proceedings (the \"Settlement Motion\") (Main Case ECF No. 1936; ECF No. 25) and a revised proposed order (the \"Revised Proposed Order\") regarding the Settlement Motion (Main Case ECF No. 2004; ECF No. 55), both filed by the Plaintiff, Mr. Luc A. Despins, in his capacity as Chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") for the estate of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok. G-Club filed objections to the Settlement Motion and the Revised Proposed Order. (Main Case ECF Nos. 1977, 2007.) On July 28, 2023, the Court entered the Order Approving Settlement, which granted the Settlement Motion, approved the settlement between the Trustee and the Assignee, and overruled all but one of the objections to the Settlement Motion raised by G-Club. (Main Case ECF No. 2038; ECF No. 70.)\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2346-2 Filed 11/16/23 Entered 11/16/23 19:23:51 Page 4 of 12\n\nParagraph 6 of the Order Approving Settlement allowed the parties to address G-Club's only remaining objection to the Settlement Motion (*see* Main Case ECF No. 2030, at 128:5– 48:8) by setting a briefing schedule whereby the Trustee and G-Club would contest whether G-Club had the right to review G-Club documents in the possession of the Assignee for responsiveness to the Rule 2004 subpoena served on G-Club and for privilege prior to the documents being produced to the Trustee. (Main Case ECF No. 2038 ¶ 6; ECF No. 70 ¶ 6.) On August 11, 2023, the Trustee timely filed a motion arguing that G-Club did not have any right to review the documents for either responsiveness or privilege. (ECF No. 87.) On September 29, 2023, after certain developments (*see* Main Case ECF No. 2237), G-Club filed a response to the Trustee's motion (Main Case ECF No. 2244), arguing that G-Club had rights to review the documents for both responsiveness and privilege.\n\nOn October 24, 2023, a hearing was held on the arguments raised by the Trustee in his motion. The Trustee and G-Club both appeared and argued their respective positions. On November 13, 2023, the Court entered the G-Club Documents Order, granting the Trustee his requested relief. (ECF No. 179.) The appeal by G-Club was then filed as well as the Motion for Stay Pending Appeal.\n\nThese matters are ripe for decision.\n\n#### **III. JURISDICTION**\n\nThe United States District Court for the District of Connecticut has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). This Court has authority to hear and determine this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) and the Order of Reference of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut dated September 21, 1984. The instant adversary\n\nproceeding in which the instant discovery dispute arises is a statutorily core proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (E), (O).\n\nVenue in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.\n\n# **IV. DISCUSSION3**\n\nA motion for stay pending appeal seeking relief under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8007 is considered under the same standard as a motion for stay pending appeal of a district court order. *In re Adelphia Commc'n Corp.*, 333 B.R. 649, 659 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); *Country Squire Assocs. of Carle Place, L.P. v. Rochester Cmty. Sav. Bank (In re Country Squire Assocs. of Carle Place, L.P.)*, 203 B.R. 182, 183 (2d B.A.P. 1996). A stay pending appeal is not a matter of right but rather left to judicial discretion and reviewed for abuse of discretion. *Unif. Fire Officers Ass'n v. de Blasio*, 973 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2020); *Andrews v. McCarron (In re Vincent Andrews Mgmt. Corp.)*, 414 B.R. 1, 4 (D. Conn. 2009); *Green Point Bank v. Treston*, 188 B.R. 9, 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); *Youssef v. Sally Mae Inc. (In re Homaidan)*, 646 B.R. 550, 575 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2022).\n\nThere are four elements that the movant must establish for a stay pending appeal to issue, namely, \"the likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable injury if a stay is denied, substantial injury to the party opposing a stay if one is issued, and the public interest.\" *Mohammed v. Reno*, 309 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2002); *Hirschfeld v. Board of Elections*, 984 F.2d 35, 39 (2d Cir. 1993). A party seeking a stay pending appeal carries the burden on all elements and it is a \"heavy burden.\" *Adelphia*, 333 B.R. at 659; *see Barretta v. Wells Fargo, N.A. (In re Barretta)*, 560 B.R. 630, 632 (D. Conn. 2016); *In re 473 W. End Realty Corp.*, 507 B.R. 496, 501–02\n\n3 The following constitutes the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Court pursuant to Rule 7052 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, made applicable by Rule 7001 in adversary proceedings.\n\n(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014). The first two elements are the \"most critical.\" *Nken v. Holder*, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009).\n\nAs is true with regard to the preliminary injunction standard followed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the movant's burden on the first element – likelihood of success on the merits – varies depending on the strength or weakness of the movant's argument on the other elements under the specific facts and circumstances of the case. *Reno*, 309 F.3d at 100–01; *see Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd.*, 598 F.3d 30, 35–38 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding *Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc.*, 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979) remains the law of the Second Circuit). Therefore, the Court will first consider the second, third, and fourth elements of a stay pending appeal before turning to an analysis of the likelihood of success on the merits.\n\n#### **A. Irreparable Harm**\n\nG-Club argues that, absent a stay pending appeal, it will forever lose its rights regarding privileged documents in complying with the G-Club Documents Order because the Trustee will have the allegedly privileged documents and be unable to remove their contents from his mind.\n\nThe Court disagrees. G-Club provides no case law supporting the proposition that there is irreparable harm if privileged material is produced to another party under Court order. It is unsurprising that G-Club has not – the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure address this situation. If G-Club prevails on appeal, Rule 26(b)(5)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as made applicable in this adversary proceeding by Rule 7026 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy, provides a procedure for the return of privileged materials produced in discovery. The Trustee would not, then, be able to use the documents as evidence. Absent a conflict of interest, the general rule is that lawyers can represent a series of clients despite coming into each new\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2346-2 Filed 11/16/23 Entered 11/16/23 19:23:51 Page 7 of 12\n\narrangement with privileged information in their head – from previous clients and previous adversaries. *But see, generally*, *In re Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams.*, 605 F.3d 1373 (F. Cir. 2010) (discussing caselaw about where lawyers are involved in *competitive* decision making after obtaining competitor's competitive information). Lawyers are expected to and believed capable of abiding by procedural rules and protective orders.\n\nNotably, G-Club makes no argument regarding irreparable harm as to non-privileged documents that are allegedly non-responsive to the Rule 2004 subpoena served on it in Mr. Kwok's Chapter 11 case. The Court concludes that G-Club has conceded that it would not be irreparably harmed by being required to produce documents notwithstanding any determination that they were non-responsive to the Rule 2004 subpoena served on G-Club.\n\nFor all of the above reasons, G-Club has not established irreparable harm absent a stay pending appeal.\n\n#### **B. Substantial Injury to the Estate**\n\nG-Club asserts that the Trustee will suffer no injury because he has conducted Rule 2004 exams, including of G-Club.\n\nG Club's argument is unpersuasive for several reasons. First, regardless of whether the Trustee has already received documents from various parties, the Trustee may need the documents presently sought. Second, the settlement between the Trustee and Assignee related to Rule 26 discovery in this adversary proceeding and/or the Rule 2004 subpoena served on the HCHK Entities – not the Rule 2004 exam served on G-Club. Third, Rule 2004 exams exist in pertinent part as a way for bankruptcy trustees – who are not the debtor – to explore the debtor's assets, liabilities, and financial affairs. There is nothing nefarious about proper use of Rule 2004. Fourth, in the Main Case, parties have repeatedly been held in contempt for discovery abuses.\n\n### Case 22-50073 Doc 2346-2 Filed 11/16/23 Entered 11/16/23 19:23:51 Page 8 of 12\n\n(Main Case ECF No. 1537, 1709, 1892, 2009, 2035, 2093.) The Trustee's need to seek numerous Rule 2004 exams has occurred in this context.\n\nThere is substantial injury to the estate if the G-Club documents are not produced. The Court has given G-Club ample time to make its arguments: there have been three hearings and G-Club has filed three briefs. In all that time, G-Club did not provide any evidence or legal authority to support its arguments. The failure of G-Club to support its arguments is not the Trustee's problem; it is G-Club's problem. Moreover, the Trustee settled various issues with the Assignee, which included the production of documents from the Assignee. But for G-Club's unsupported arguments, the G-Club documents in the possession, custody, and/or control of the Assignee would have already been produced to the Trustee. The estate should not bear the expense of continued, frivolous litigation on these matters.\n\nFor all these reasons, G-Club has not established a lack of substantial injury to the estate. If the Court were to grant G-Club a stay pending appeal under these circumstances, G-Club would be required to post a bond pursuant to Rule 8007(d).\n\n#### **C. Public Interest**\n\nG-Club argues that the public interest supports a stay pending appeal because the G-Club Document Order threatens the constitutional rights of ordinary consumers.\n\nThe Court disagrees. First, it is unclear what constitutional right is at risk. Despite being heard on numerous occasions, G-Club has failed to identity any specific constitutional right that may be at risk. Second, the G-Club Documents Order is premised on the facts and circumstances before the Court. It is possible that, unlike G-Club, other parties could produce evidence to establish that the \"cloud\" containing their information was secure, confidential, and private and not shared with the service provider who is offering such intimate services as human relations\n\nand legal services. G-Club's argument fails because of *its* inability to establish privilege. That failure is unique to it and not generally applicable to the public. The G-Club Document Order is narrow and does not impact the general consumer of cloud services.\n\nTherefore, G-Club fails to establish that the public interest supports a stay pending appeal.\n\n#### **D. Likelihood of Success on the Merits**\n\nTurning to its likelihood of success on the merits, because G-Club has failed to establish the other elements, its burden is heavy. *Reno*, 309 F.3d at 100–01. In this connection, as noted above G-Club makes no argument that it would be irreparably harmed by producing the potentially non-responsive documents.G-Club makes separate but related arguments regarding privilege and responsiveness.\n\n#### *Privilege*\n\nRegarding privilege, G-Club argues that the G-Club Document Order erroneously assumes waiver and improperly places the burden on G-Club. Therefore, it asserts, G-Club is likely to succeed on appeal as it relates to privilege.\n\nThe Court disagrees. Under the law of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, G-Club – not the Trustee – has the burden of establishing that the G-Club documents were in fact kept confidential between G-Club and its counsel. \"[A]s with all privileges, the person claiming the attorney client privilege has the burden of establishing all essential elements.\" *In re Horowitz*, 482 F.2d 72, 82 (2d Cir. 1973) (citing *United States v. Kovel*, 296 F.2d 918, 923 (2d Cir. 1961)). \"The party asserting the privilege . . . bears the burden of establishing\" that the communications to be protected are \"communications (1) between a client and his or her attorney *(2) that are intended to be, and in fact were, kept confidential* (3) for the\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2346-2 Filed 11/16/23 Entered 11/16/23 19:23:51 Page 10 of 12\n\npurpose of obtaining or providing legal advice.\" *United States v. Mejia*, 655 F.3d 126, 132 (2d Cir. 2011) (emphasis added); *see Strougo v. BEA Assocs.*, 199 F.R.D. 515, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing *United States v. Constr. Prod. Rsch., Inc.*, 73 F.3d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1996)). \"A party seeking the protections of the attorney-client privilege must affirmatively act to protect her communications.\" *Niceforo v. UBS Glob. Asset Agmt. Ams., Inc.*, 20 F. Supp. 3d 428, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). Undertaking actions that \"'will predictably lead to the disclosure' of privileged communications\" results in waiver of the attorney-client privilege. *Niceforo*, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 437; *see Horowitz*, 482 F.2d at 82. G-Club did not submit any authority that the burden is on the Trustee as opposed to the clear line of authority that establishes the burden is on G-Club.\n\nIn addition, G-Club did not even attempt to make the required showing regarding *any of the elements*, let alone regarding whether the communications were kept confidential. Rather, much as in the Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, G-Club attempts to draw an analogy to cloud services provided by, *e.g.*, Microsoft Corporation, without providing the Court any basis to sustain the analogy. Faced with the terms of the Master Services Agreement (\"MSA\"), counsel to G-Club acknowledged in oral argument that the MSA was relevant but beseeched the Court to adopt its analogy upon no evidence. (ECF 168, Hr'g Tr. at 34:10–37:13.) While G-Club argues the Court shifted the burden, in fact *G-Club petitioned the Court to shift the burden*. It is repeating that request in the Motion for Stay Pending Appeal. This request is contrary to binding Second Circuit precedent. Hence, G-Club has no likelihood of success on the merits regarding privilege.\n\n#### *Responsiveness*\n\nRegarding responsiveness, G-Club argues that the Court assumed disclosure and misapplied the MSA regarding the documents.\n\nThe Court disagrees. The G-Club Documents Order is based on the record before the\n\nCourt. There is, again, nothing in the record supporting G-Club's position and indeed, in\n\nargument before this Court, *G-Club also referred to the confidentiality paragraphs of the MSA in*\n\n# *support of their argument*:\n\nThe Court is correct, Your Honor. And my apologies. The trustee's presentation focused on far beyond what the master services agreement allegedly provided. The issue of confidentiality was maintained by the master services agreement. The master services agreement did specifically say that HCHK would provide IT services and all information was to be maintained confidential*.*\n\n(ECF 168, Hr'g Tr. at 34:10–35:2.) To now say that the Court was \"confused\" in applying those paragraphs is contrary to G-Club's own prior stated positions. Indeed, counsel presented the situation to the Court markedly differently than the Motion for Stay Pending Appeal contends,\n\nstating the issue as:\n\nWhat I'm referring to and the reason that I just want to make sure that we all understand, whatever the MSA and confidentiality restrictions apply to HCHK, the fact of the matter is they were an IT manager for our domain name. There is absolutely no evidence in the record that HCHK logged on and searched all of these emails and reviewed these emails or had the authority to simply cart blanche review these emails. That's just not in evidence.\n\n(*Id.*, Hr'g Tr. at 35:3–10.) Whereas G-Club now contends HCHK Tech had no opportunity to\n\naccess the files, it previously stated to the Court that HCHK Tech *did* have access but the Trustee\n\nhad to prove HCHK Tech utilized that access.\n\nThe problems with G-Club's arguments during the hearing are that (i), as noted above, it\n\nis G-Club's burden to establish that G-Club did not put its documents in a position where HCHK\n\nTech *could* (regardless of whether it *did*) go through all of those documents where HCHK Tech\n\nwas, as established by the MSA, much more than an information technology manager for G-\n\nClub's domain name; and (ii) it is undisputed that HCHK Tech did indeed have possession,\n\ncustody, and/or control of the documents – that is the whole reason the present litigation exists.\n\nHence, G-Club now seeks to retreat from that argument, attribute it to the Court's \"confusion,\" and ignore its own prior statements on the record in this case in order to have a *fourth argument* and file a *fourth brief*. This is not a recipe for success on appeal.\n\n#### *Responsiveness and Privilege*\n\nFinally, G-Club seeks to appeal a discovery order. There has been no finding of contempt. Sanctions have not entered. This appears to be an interlocutory appeal. *See Pawlak v. U.S. Dep't of Educ. (In re Pawlak)*, 520 B.R. 177 (D. Md. 2014) (denying interlocutory appeal of discovery order); *Speer v. Tow (In re Royce Homes LP)*, 466 B.R. 81 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (same); *Kaiser Grp. Int'l, Inc. v. Ostrava (In re Kaiser Grp. Int'l, Inc.)*, 400 B.R. 140 (D. Del. 2009) (same); *see also Shimer ex rel. Fugazy Express, Inc. v. Fugazy (In re Fugazy Express, Inc.)*, 982 F.2d 755–56 (2d Cir. 1992) (collecting cases on interlocutory appeal, including regarding contempt before sanctions enter). Filing an interlocutory appeal decreases the likelihood of success on appeal.\n\nFor all of these reasons, G-Club has not established a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits regarding either privilege or responsiveness.\n\n## **V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER**\n\nFor all the above stated reasons, and pursuant to Rule 8007, it is hereby\n\n**ORDERED:** The Motion for Stay Pending Appeal is **DENIED**; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** The Motion to Expedite is **DENIED** as moot due to the denial of the Motion for Stay Pending Appeal.\n\nDated at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 16th day of November, 2023.","body_zh":"Case 22-50073 Doc 2346-2 Filed 11/16/23 Entered 11/16/23 19:23:51 Page 1 of\n\nUNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT（美国康涅狄格区破产法院）\n\n关于：\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，\n第11章\n主案案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n（合并审理）\n\n债务人。1\n涉及：ECF Nos. 2338, 2340\nLUC A. DESPINS（卢克·A·德斯平斯），HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第11章托管人，\n原告，\n对抗诉讼案号：23-05013 (JAM)\n\n诉\n\nHCHK TECHNOLOGIES, INC.、HCHK PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC.、LEXINGTON PROPERTY AND STAFFING, INC.、HOLY CITY HONG KONG VENTURES, LTD.、ANTHONY DIBATTISTA、YVETTE WANG（王雁平）以及 BRIAN W. HOFMEISTER（为债权人利益受让人），\n被告。\n\n关于驳回上诉期间中止动议及关于上诉期间中止动议加快听证单方动议的裁定\nI. 引言\n\n本法院正在审理与本对抗诉讼中作出的《关于批准要求提供 G-Club 文件的动议的裁定》（以下简称“《G-Club 文件裁定》”）相关的两项动议。（ECF No. 179。）2 由 G-Club Operations LLC（以下简称“G-Club”）提起的这两项动议分别为：(i) 在郭文贵合并审理的第11章案件中提起的《上诉期间中止动议》（以下简称“《上诉期间中止动议》”）（主案 ECF No. 2338）；以及 (ii) 在题为 In re Kwok（《关于郭案》）、案号为 22-50073 (JAM) 的合并审理第11章案件（以下简称“主案”）中提起的《关于上诉期间中止动议加快听证并限制通知的单方动议》（以下简称“《加快审理动议》”）（主案 ECF No. 2340）。G-Club 请求在上诉期间中止执行《G-Club 文件裁定》。\n\n1 这些第11章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（亦称郭文贵、Miles Guo、Miles Kwok 以及其他多个化名）（纳税人识别号后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（纳税人识别号后四位：8202）及 Genever Holdings Corporation。托管人、Genever Holdings LLC、Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为 Paul Hastings LLP（普衡律师事务所）, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 转交 Ho Wan Kwok 破产财产托管人 Luc A. Despins（仅用于通知与联络目的）。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2346-2 Filed 11/16/23 Entered 11/16/23 19:23:51 Page 2 of 12\n\n耐人寻味的是，G-Club 在主案中提交了《上诉通知》、《上诉期间中止动议》和《加快审理动议》，却仅在本对抗诉讼（即作出《G-Club 文件裁定》的诉讼程序）中提交了《上诉通知》。G-Club 一直试图将受让人（本对抗诉讼中的被告）依据本对抗诉讼中批准的和解协议向原告提供文件一事，与依据主案中向 G-Club 送达的 Rule 2004 调查传票提供文件一事相联系。《G-Club 文件裁定》与在主案中向 G-Club 送达的 Rule 2004 传票毫无关系。相反，它明确针对的是受让人在本对抗诉讼中应向原告提供的文件。基于下述理由，本法院驳回《上诉期间中止动议》和《加快审理动议》。\n\n2 本文未予定义的首字母大写术语具有《G-Club 文件裁定》中赋予它们的含义。对本对抗诉讼案卷的引用将表述为“ECF”。对主案 In re Kwok, Case No. 22-50073 案卷的引用将表述为“主案 ECF”。\nII. 背景\n\n本法院首先指出，G-Club 并非本对抗诉讼中的被告，但其在本对抗诉讼中主张，其有权对本法院三个多月前批准的原告与受让人之间的和解提出质疑。尽管 G-Club 获准就与和解相关的个别问题陈述意见，但本法院并未采纳 G-Club 的主张，并于 2023年11月13日 作出了《G-Club 文件裁定》。《G-Club 文件裁定》要求 G-Club 或持有 G-Club 文件的当事方在 2023年11月17日 之前向原告提供这些文件。G-Club 现声称必须给予其上诉期间中止，以便其或持有该等文件的当事方无需移交依据数月前批准的原告与受让人和解协议所应提供的文件。\n\nG-Club 在《上诉期间中止动议》中提出的主张，已在本法院前提出并辩论了不下三次。2023年7月11日 和 2023年7月18日，法院就原告提出的《关于根据纽约州法院转让程序与 HCHK 实体受让人达成和解的动议》（以下简称“《和解动议》”）（主案 ECF No. 1936；ECF No. 25）以及关于《和解动议》的修改后拟议裁定（以下简称“《修改后拟议裁定》”）（主案 ECF No. 2004；ECF No. 55）举行了听证会，这两份文件均由原告 Luc A. Despins 先生以 Ho Wan Kwok 先生破产财产的第11章托管人（以下简称“托管人”）身份提交。G-Club 对《和解动议》及《修改后拟议裁定》提出了异议。（主案 ECF Nos. 1977, 2007。）2023年7月28日，本法院作出了《批准和解裁定》，批准了《和解动议》，核准了托管人与受让人之间的和解，并驳回了 G-Club 对《和解动议》提出的大部分异议，仅保留一项。（主案 ECF No. 2038；ECF No. 70。）\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2346-2 Filed 11/16/23 Entered 11/16/23 19:23:51 Page 4 of 12\n\n《批准和解裁定》第 6 款允许各方就 G-Club 对《和解动议》唯一剩余的异议进行处理（见主案 ECF No. 2030，第 128:5–148:8 行），方法是设定一个简要陈述日程表，由托管人和 G-Club 辩论 G-Club 是否有权在向托管人提供文件之前，审查受让人所持有的 G-Club 文件是否符合向 G-Club 送达的 Rule 2004 传票的要求以及是否享有特权。（主案 ECF No. 2038 ¶ 6；ECF No. 70 ¶ 6。）2023年8月11日，托管人及时提交了一项动议，主张 G-Club 无论对相关性审查还是特权审查均无任何权利。（ECF No. 87。）2023年9月29日，在出现某些进展之后（见主案 ECF No. 2237），G-Club 对托管人的动议提交了答复（主案 ECF No. 2244），主张 G-Club 拥有对文件进行相关性和特权审查的权利。\n\n2023年10月24日，法院就托管人在其动议中提出的主张举行了听证会。托管人和 G-Club 均出庭并陈述了各自的立场。2023年11月13日，本法院作出了《G-Club 文件裁定》，准许了托管人所请求的救济。（ECF No. 179。）随后 G-Club 提起了上诉，并提交了《上诉期间中止动议》。\n\n这些事项已成熟，可作出裁决。\nIII. 管辖权\n\n依据 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b)，United States District Court for the District of Connecticut（美国康涅狄格区联邦地方法院）对本案具有管辖权。依据 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) 及美国康涅狄格区联邦地方法院 1984年9月21日 的《移送命令》，本法院有权审理并裁判本案。产生本案证据开示争议的本案对抗诉讼属于法定核心程序。28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (E), (O)。\n\n依据 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 和 1409，本审区的管辖地适格。\nIV. 讨论3\n\n根据 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8007 请求救济的上诉期间中止动议，其审理标准与对地方法院裁定提起上诉期间的中止动议相同。In re Adelphia Commc'n Corp., 333 B.R. 649, 659 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)；Country Squire Assocs. of Carle Place, L.P. v. Rochester Cmty. Sav. Bank (In re Country Squire Assocs. of Carle Place, L.P.), 203 B.R. 182, 183 (2d B.A.P. 1996)。上诉期间中止并非法定当然权利，而是属于司法裁量权范畴，按滥用裁量权标准予以审查。Unif. Fire Officers Ass'n v. de Blasio, 973 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2020)；Andrews v. McCarron (In re Vincent Andrews Mgmt. Corp.), 414 B.R. 1, 4 (D. Conn. 2009)；Green Point Bank v. Treston, 188 B.R. 9, 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)；Youssef v. Sally Mae Inc. (In re Homaidan), 646 B.R. 550, 575 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2022)。\n\n动议方若要获得上诉期间中止，必须证明四项要件，即：“实体胜诉的可能性、若拒绝中止将造成不可弥补的损害、若发布中止将对反对中止的一方造成实质性损害，以及公共利益。”Mohammed v. Reno, 309 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2002)；Hirschfeld v. Board of Elections, 984 F.2d 35, 39 (2d Cir. 1993)。寻求上诉期间中止的一方对所有要件均承担举证责任，且这是一项“沉重的负担”。Adelphia, 333 B.R. at 659；见 Barretta v. Wells Fargo, N.A. (In re Barretta), 560 B.R. 630, 632 (D. Conn. 2016)；In re 473 W. End Realty Corp., 507 B.R. 496, 501–02\n\n3 以下内容构成根据《联邦破产诉讼程序规则》第 7052 条（通过对抗诉讼中的第 7001 条适用）作出的本法院事实认定和法律结论。\n\n(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014)。前两项要件是“最关键的”。Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009)。\n\n与 United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit（美国第二巡回上诉法院）所遵循的初步禁令标准相同，动议方对第一项要件（实体胜诉可能性）的举证责任，取决于根据该案的具体事实和情况动议方在其他要件上主张的强弱。Reno, 309 F.3d at 100–01；见 Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 35–38 (2d Cir. 2010)（判定 Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979) 仍为第二巡回法院之先例法）。因此，本法院在转向分析实体胜诉可能性之前，将首先审议上诉期间中止的第二、第三和第四项要件。\nA. 不可弥补的损害\n\nG-Club 主张，如果不上诉期间中止执行，其在履行《G-Club 文件裁定》时将永远失去关于特权文件的权利，因为托管人将获得据称享有特权的文件，且无法从其脑海中消除这些内容。\n\n本法院不予认同。G-Club 未提供任何判例法支持依据法院命令向另一方提供特权材料即构成不可弥补损害这一主张。G-Club 拿不出来并不令人意外——《联邦民事诉讼程序规则》对此类情况已有规定。如果 G-Club 在上诉中胜诉，《联邦民事诉讼程序规则》第 26(b)(5)(B) 条（通过《联邦破产诉讼程序规则》第 7026 条适用于本对抗诉讼）规定了返还在证据开示中提供的特权材料的程序。届时，托管人将无法将这些文件用作证据。在不存在利益冲突的情况下，一般规则是律师可以代理一系列客户，即使他们在进入每一项新的代理关系时脑海中都带有特权信息——这些信息来自先前的客户和先前的对手。但一般性对比见 In re Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams., 605 F.3d 1373 (F. Cir. 2010)（讨论关于律师在获得竞争对手的竞争性信息后参与竞争性决策的相关判例法）。律师被期望且被认为有能力遵守程序规则和保护令。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2346-2 Filed 11/16/23 Entered 11/16/23 19:23:51 Page 7 of 12\n\n值得注意的是，G-Club对于据称与其在Kwok先生（郭文贵先生）的第11章破产案中所收到的第2004条传票不相关的非特权文件，未就不可弥补的损害提出任何论辩。本法院认定，G-Club已承认，即使认定相关文件与其所收到的第2004条传票不相关，被要求出示这些文件也不会对其造成不可弥补的损害。\n\n基于上述所有理由，G-Club未能证明在未获得上诉期间中止执行的情况下会遭受不可弥补的损害。\nB. 对破产财团的实质性损害\n\nG-Club坚称受托人不会遭受任何损害，因为其已经进行了包括针对G-Club在内的第2004条调查。\n\nG-Club的论辩缺乏说服力，原因有几点。第一，无论受托人是否已经从各方处获得了文件，受托人都可能需要目前所寻求的文件。第二，受托人与受让人之间达成的和解涉及的是本对抗性程序中的第26条开示程序及/或送达给HCHK Entities（HCHK实体）的第2004条传票——而非送达给G-Club的第2004条调查。第三，第2004条调查在相关部分的存在，是作为破产受托人（其并非债务人）调查债务人资产、负债和财务状况的一种途径。正当使用第2004条并不存在任何恶意。第四，在主案中，各方因滥用证据开示程序已多次被判定构成蔑视法庭。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2346-2 Filed 11/16/23 Entered 11/16/23 19:23:51 Page 8 of 12\n\n（主案 ECF No. 1537, 1709, 1892, 2009, 2035, 2093。）受托人需要寻求多次第2004条调查正是在此背景下发生的。\n\n如果不交出G-Club的文件，将对破产财团造成实质性损害。本法院已给予G-Club充分的时间提出其论辩：已经举行了三次听证会，G-Club也提交了三份诉状。在所有这些时间里，G-Club均未提供任何证据或法律依据来支持其论点。G-Club未能支持其论点不是受托人的问题，而是G-Club自身的问题。此外，受托人已就各种问题与受让人达成和解，其中包括受让人出示文件。若非G-Club缺乏支持依据的论点，由受让人占有、保管及/或控制的G-Club文件本应早已出示给受托人。破产财团不应承担在这些事项上继续进行无理诉讼的费用。\n\n基于所有这些理由，G-Club未能证明破产财团不存在实质性损害。如果本法院在这些情况下准许G-Club在上诉期间中止执行，G-Club将根据第8007(d)条被要求提供保证金。\nC. 公共利益\n\nG-Club主张公共利益支持上诉期间中止执行，因为《G-Club文件裁定》威胁到了普通消费者的宪法权利。\n\n本法院不予认同。首先，目前尚不清楚何种宪法权利面临风险。尽管已经历了多次陈词机会，G-Club仍未能指出可能面临风险的任何具体宪法权利。其次，《G-Club文件裁定》是基于本法院面前的事实和具体情况作出的。与G-Club不同的是，其他当事方有可能能够出示证据证明包含其信息的“云端”是安全、保密且私密的，并且未与提供诸如人力资源和法律服务等如此紧密服务的服务提供商共享。\n\nG-Club的论点之所以不成立，是因为其无法确立特权。该失败是其个案特有的，并不普遍适用于公众。《G-Club文件裁定》范围狭窄，不会对云服务的普通消费者造成影响。\n\n因此，G-Club未能证明公共利益支持上诉期间中止执行。\nD. 实体胜诉盖然性\n\n谈及其在实体问题上的胜诉盖然性，由于G-Club未能确立其他要素，其承担的举证责任极为繁重。见 Reno, 309 F.3d at 100–01。就此而言，如上所述，G-Club并未主张出示可能不相关的文档会对其造成不可弥补的损害。G-Club就特权和相关性分别提出了独立但相互关联的论辩。\n特权\n\n关于特权，G-Club主张《G-Club文件裁定》错误地推定存在弃权，并不当地将举证责任强加于G-Club。因此其坚称，就特权问题而言，G-Club在上诉中很有可能胜诉。\n\n本法院不予认同。根据United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit（美国联邦第二巡回上诉法院）的法律，应由G-Club而非受托人承担举证责任，证明G-Club与其律师之间的G-Club文件实际上保持了保密性。“正如所有特权一样，主张律师-当事人特权的人承担证明所有基本要素的责任。”In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 82 (2d Cir. 1973) (citing United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 923 (2d Cir. 1961))。“主张特权的当事方……承担举证责任”，以证明受保护的通信属于“（1）当事人与其律师之间的通信，（2）旨在且实际上保持了保密性，（3）出于获得或提供法律意见之目的”。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2346-2 Filed 11/16/23 Entered 11/16/23 19:23:51 Page 10 of 12\n\nUnited States v. Mejia, 655 F.3d 126, 132 (2d Cir. 2011)（强调为原文所加）；参见 Strougo v. BEA Assocs., 199 F.R.D. 515, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing United States v. Constr. Prod. Rsch., Inc., 73 F.3d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1996))。“寻求律师-当事人特权保护的当事方必须采取积极行动保护其通信。”Niceforo v. UBS Glob. Asset Agmt. Ams., Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 428, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)。采取“‘预计将导致’特权通信‘披露’”的行为会导致放弃律师-当事人特权。Niceforo, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 437；参见 Horowitz, 482 F.2d at 82。G-Club没有提交任何表明举证责任由受托人承担的法律依据，以抗衡确立举证责任由G-Club承担的明确判例规则。\n\n此外，G-Club甚至没有尝试就任何要素做出所需的证明，更不用说就通信是否保持了保密性做出证明。相反，正如在《上诉期间中止执行动议》中一样，G-Club试图类比例如Microsoft Corporation（微软公司）所提供的云服务，却未向法院提供任何支持该类比的依据。面对《主服务协议》（Master Services Agreement，“MSA”）的条款，G-Club的代理律师在口头辩论中承认MSA是相关的，但在没有任何证据的情况下恳请法院采纳其类比。（ECF 168, Hr'g Tr. at 34:10–37:13。）虽然G-Club辩称法院转移了举证责任，但事实上是G-Club请求法院转移举证责任。它在《上诉期间中止执行动议》中再次提出了这一请求。该请求违背了具有约束力的第二巡回法院判例。因此，在特权问题上，G-Club在实体上没有任何胜诉的盖然性。\n相关性\n\n关于相关性，G-Club辩称法院推定了披露，并在涉案文件上错误适用了MSA。\n\n本法院不予认同。《G-Club文件裁定》是基于本法院面前的记录作出的。\n\n记录中同样没有任何内容支持G-Club的主张，事实上，在向本法院陈词时，G-Club也提到了MSA的保密条款以支持其论点：\n\n法官阁下，法庭说得对。我也表示歉意。受托人的陈述重点远远超出了主服务协议据称所规定的范围。保密问题是由主服务协议维持的。主服务协议确实明确规定HCHK将提供IT服务，且所有信息均应予以保密。\n\n（ECF 168, Hr'g Tr. at 34:10–35:2。）现在声称法院在适用这些条款时感到“困惑”，这与G-Club自身先前表明的立场相违背。事实上，代理律师向法院陈述的情况与《上诉期间中止执行动议》中所主张的存在显著差异，将问题陈述为：\n\n我所指的是，并且我只是想确保我们所有人都理解的原因在于，无论适用于HCHK的MSA和保密限制是什么，事实是他们是我们域名的IT管理员。记录中绝对没有任何证据表明HCHK登录并检索了所有这些电子邮件并审查了这些电子邮件，或者拥有全权审查这些电子邮件的授权。这根本没有证据支持。\n\n（Id., Hr'g Tr. at 35:3–10。）虽然G-Club现在主张HCHK Tech（HCHK科技）没有机会访问这些文件，但它此前曾向法院陈述HCHK Tech确实拥有访问权限，但受托人必须证明HCHK Tech利用了该访问权限。\n\nG-Club在听证会上的论据存在的问题在于：(i) 如上所述，G-Club有责任证明其并未将文件置于HCHK Tech可以（无论其是否实际做了）审查所有这些文件的境地，而正如MSA所确立的那样，HCHK Tech不仅仅是G-Club域名的信息技术管理员；以及 (ii) 毫无争议的是，HCHK Tech确实占有、保管及/或控制了这些文件——这正是目前诉讼存在的全部原因。\n\n因此，G-Club现在试图从该论辩中后退，将其归咎于法院的“困惑”，并无视其自身在本案记录中先前的陈述，以便提出第四种论点并提交第四份诉状。这绝非上诉获胜之道。\n相关性与特权\n\n最后，G-Club试图对一项证据开示命令提起上诉。目前尚未有蔑视法庭的裁决。制裁也尚未作出。这似乎是一项中间上诉。参见 Pawlak v. U.S. Dep't of Educ. (In re Pawlak), 520 B.R. 177 (D. Md. 2014)（驳回对证据开示命令的中间上诉）；Speer v. Tow (In re Royce Homes LP), 466 B.R. 81 (S.D. Tex. 2012)（同上）；Kaiser Grp. Int'l, Inc. v. Ostrava (In re Kaiser Grp. Int'l, Inc.), 400 B.R. 140 (D. Del. 2009)（同上）；亦参见 Shimer ex rel. Fugazy Express, Inc. v. Fugazy (In re Fugazy Express, Inc.), 982 F.2d 755–56 (2d Cir. 1992)（汇集关于中间上诉的案例，包括关于在实施制裁前针对蔑视法庭的中间上诉）。提起中间上诉会降低上诉胜诉的盖然性。\n\n基于所有这些理由，G-Club无论在特权还是相关性方面，均未能确立足够的实体胜诉盖然性。\nV. 结论与裁定\n\n基于上述所有理由，并根据第8007条，特此\n\n裁定：《上诉期间中止执行动议》予以驳回；并进一步\n\n裁定：鉴于《上诉期间中止执行动议》被驳回，《加急动议》因失去实际意义而予以驳回。\n\n2023年11月16日订于康涅狄格州布里奇波特（Bridgeport, Connecticut）。","key_entities":["HCHK","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Despins","Je","Guo","Miles Guo","Paul Hastings"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":25,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":55,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":70,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":87,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":168,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":179,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1537,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1936,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2004,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2030,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2038,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2237,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2244,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2338,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2340,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":3741,"status":"published","published_at":"2023-11-16 00:00:00","created_at":"2023-11-16","updated_at":"2026-08-23 13:52:44"}