{"id":"court_ctb_2432_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":2432,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"MOTION","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION In re : Chapter 11","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\nIn re : Chapter 11\n\nHO WAN KWOK, : Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n : Debtor. : \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_:\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_ :\n\n:\n\n# **THE INDIVIDUAL DEBTOR'S OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR ORDER AUTHORIZING (A) CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE TO USE POTENTIALLY PRIVILEGED DOCUMENTS IN BOMBARDIER ADVERSARY PROCEEDING ON A SEALED BASIS WITHOUT WAIVER OF PRIVILEGE OR, ALTERNATIVELY, (B) LIMITED WAIVER OF TRUSTEE PRIVILEGE AS TO SUBJECT MATTER OF BOMBARDIER AND BOMBARDIER PROCEEDS**\n\nThe individual debtor, Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Individual Debtor\"), by and through his undersigned counsel, Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C., respectfully submits his Objection to the Chapter 11 Trustee's (the \"Trustee\") Motion for Order Authorizing, (A) Chapter 11 Trustee to Use Potentially Privileged Documents in Bombardier Adversary Proceeding on a Sealed Basis Without Waiver of Privilege or, Alternatively, (B) Limited Waiver of Trustee Privilege as to Subject Matter of Bombardier and Bombardier Proceeds (the \"Privilege Waiver Motion\"), and in support thereof respectfully states:\n\n## **I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\n1. The Individual Debtor opposes the Privilege Waiver Motion to protect his rights in the criminal action pending against him in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York captioned *USA v. Kwok*, 1:23CR118 (the \"Criminal Action\"), and more particularly to prevent the United States Attorney's Office from obtaining and using against him attorney-client privileged communications that it would not be able to obtain absent the privilege waiver sought by the Trustee.\n\n2. The Trustee is fully aware that the Individual Debtor opposes the Trustee's waiver of privilege because the Individual Debtor is gravely concerned about the effects such a waiver would have in the pending Criminal Action. Indeed, the Trustee's counsel was told as much on multiple occasions while counsel engaged in discussions to try to arrive at a resolution of the present dispute, and the potential for the Trustee to waive attorney-client privilege is a primary focus of the Individual Debtor's Motion for an Order and Writ Staying Bankruptcy Cases which is pending in the Criminal Action. (*See* Criminal Action Doc. No. 131, at 23-25, filed in this case by the Trustee at Doc. No. 2158). Despite this knowledge, the Trustee still goes to great lengths to disparage the Individual Debtor and his motives for refusing to consent to a privilege waiver while he is incarcerated and fighting to regain his liberty.\n\n3. During the discussions between counsel regarding the Trustee's requested privilege waiver, the Individual Debtor's counsel invited the Trustee's counsel to provide authority permitting this Court to enter an enforceable order that would allow the Trustee, as the holder of the attorney-client privilege, to provide the documents at issue in this motion to the defendant's counsel in *Despins v. Guo*, Adv. Pro. No. 23-05008 (JAM) (the \"Whitecroft Adversary\"), as he would be required to do in order to affirmatively use them, and then affirmatively use those same documents to prove his claims in the Whitecroft Adversary, all without waiving any applicable privilege as to the documents.\n\n4. The Individual Debtor's counsel only asked the Trustee's counsel to provide such authority because the Trustee's counsel had suggested that a consensual order of the type now sought via the Privilege Waiver Motion could allow for the Trustee's affirmative use of attorneyclient privileged communications while preserving privilege, and the Individual Debtor's counsel wanted to satisfy themselves that what the Trustee's counsel was suggesting was possible. The\n\nTrustee's counsel never provided the requested authority, and the Individual Debtor's counsel has likewise been unable to locate any such authority because the voluntary disclosure of privileged information, which is what the Trustee as the privilege holder seeks to do, constitutes a privilege waiver.\n\n5. In the alternative, and again completely ignoring the Individual Debtor's stated legitimate concerns about the impact of a privilege waiver in the Criminal Case, the Trustee asks this Court to waive the attorney-client privilege, but fails to undertake the necessary analysis balancing the Trustee's needs for the documents at issue against the harm to the Individual Debtor of a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.\n\n6. The Trustee fails to conduct the requisite balancing test because he knows that the scales tip decidedly in favor of the Individual Debtor and the denial of the requested privilege waiver.\n\n7. The Trustee misleadingly identifies and attaches to the Privilege Waiver Motion a much broader set of documents then are truly at issue because some of the documents are duplicative of one another, and with others the Individual Debtor does not even contend there is any attorney-client or other privilege to protect. The Trustee also fails to articulate why the handful of documents at issue are vital to proving his claims in the Whitecroft Adversary and why he cannot do so without them in light of the information he has obtained in the Whitecroft Adversary from third-parties, and through the more than 220 2004 Examinations this Court has authorized, many of which have presumedly been conducted. Indeed, the information for which the Trustee seeks to waive the attorney-client privilege via the Privilege Waiver Motion was obtained via Rule 2004 Examinations, not as part of the discovery process in the Whitecroft Adversary. Surely the Trustee has obtained nonprivileged information as part of his investigation that could be used to\n\nsupport his claims in lieu of the documents at issue. The fact that the Truste may want to waive privilege rather than utilize other evidence should not be a sufficient reason to waive privilege. Indeed, under the present circumstance a privilege waiver should be permitted only as a last resort, not for convenience.\n\n8. Lastly, the Trustee's half-hearted and indirect argument that because the Individual Debtor and Ms. Guo are represented by the same counsel the Individual Debtor's attorney-client privilege has somehow been waived as to Ms. Guo is unsupported, unsupportable, and must be rejected.\n\n#### **II. BACKGROUND**\n\n#### **A**. **The Privileges Order**\n\n9. On February 15, 2022 the Individual Debtor filed his voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, and on July 8, 2022, this Court entered its Order Granting Appointment Of Chapter 11 Trustee (Doc. No. 523), granting the appointment of the Trustee as Chapter 11 trustee in this case.\n\n10. On July 28, 2022, within weeks of his appointment, the Trustee filed the first three of what would become numerous motions to conduct Rule 2004 examinations. The first three motions included the motion to conduct a Rule 2004 examination of the Individual Debtor (Doc. No. 636) and motion to conduct Rule 2004 examinations of \"various legal and financial advisors to the [Individual] Debtor\" (the \"Professionals 2004 Motion\") (Doc. No. 637). The Professionals 2004 Motion sought leave to obtain documents and testimony from twelve different law firms or attorneys who had potentially provided legal services to the Individual Debtor (Doc. No. 637, at Exhibit B).\n\n11. On August 22, 2022, the Trustee filed his Motion . . . For Entry of Order (A)\n\nProviding That Control of Any Attorney-Client Privilege, Work Product Protection, and Other Privileges Related to Rule 2004 Subpoenaed Documents Passed to the Trustee Upon Appointment, [and] (B) Directing that [the Individual] Debtor and Other Examinees not Withhold Documents on Account of Such Privileges, . . . (the \"2004 Exam Privileges Motion\" (Doc. No. 777)). The Individual Debtor opposed the 2004 Exam Privileges Motion. The dispute was resolved on September 14, 2022 via the entry of a Consent Order Regarding Control of Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Protection Related to Rule 2004 Subpoenaed Documents and Information (the \"Privileges Order\" (Doc. No. 856)).\n\n12. The Privileges Order provides that the Trustee controls the Individual Debtor's attorney-client privilege and/or work-product protection with respect to specifically enumerated topics defined in the Privileges Order as the Investigation Topics, and further provides that with respect to the Investigation Topics:\n\nNeither the Debtor nor his counsel (based on instructions from the Debtor or any person acting on behalf of the Debtor), nor any other examinee, is entitled to withhold any of the documents and information requested in the attachments to the Rule 2004 subpoenas on the basis of any Trustee Privileges concerning the Investigation Topics.\n\n(Privileges Order, at ¶¶2-3). Thus, the intent of the Privileges Order was to allow the Trustee to conduct his investigation, and in particular via the use of Rule 2004, without concern that documents or information would be withheld on the basis of the Individual Debtor's attorneyclient privilege and/or on the basis of attorney work product.\n\n13. The Privileges Order reserves to the Individual Debtor the right to assert privilege over \"legal matters unrelated to the Investigation Topics, such as unrelated criminal allegations or the Debtor's asylum application . . .\". (Privileges Order, at ¶4).\n\n14. The Privileges Order does not permit the Trustee to waive the attorney-client privilege or work product protection:\n\n. . . provided, however, the Trustee shall not be entitled to waive any Trustee Privilege (for example, by disclosing privileged documents or information in open court or on any public docket or by sharing such documents or information with a third party) absent the Debtor's written consent or further order of the Court, . . .\n\n(Privileges Order, at ¶5).\n\n15. On the morning of March 15, 2023, a twelve count indictment was unsealed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York charging the Individual Debtor with various federal crimes. The Individual Debtor was arrested by federal law enforcement authorities on March 15, 2023. On March 29, 2023, a superseding indictment was filed in the Criminal Case. (Criminal Case, Doc. No. 19). The Individual Debtor remains in custody awaiting trial which is currently scheduled for April 2024. Thus, from the Individual Debtor's perspective, the world in which the Privileges Order entered bears no resemblance to the world today, and it is the state of the world today that drives the Individual Debtor's position vis-à-vis the Trustee's effort to waive attorney-client privilege.\n\n## **B. The Whitecroft Adversary**\n\n16. The Trustee Commenced the Whitecroft Adversary on May 16, 2023, seeking to recover, *inter alia*, the proceeds of a purported post-petition sale of alleged estate property, a Bombardier aircraft.[1](#page-5-0) Mei Guo (\"Ms. Guo\") is the only named defendant in the Whitecroft Adversary.\n\n17. On or about July 31, 2023, the Trustee served written discovery requests, interrogatories, requests for admission, and requests for the production of documents, on Ms. Guo in the Whitecroft Adversary (the \"Trustee Discovery). Ms. Guo responded to the Trustee Discovery on or about August 30, 2023, and invoked her Fifth Amendment rights against self-\n\n<span id=\"page-5-0\"></span><sup>1</sup> The Trustee seeks other relief in the Whitecroft Adversary but the documents at issue relate only to the Bombardier aircraft.\n\nincrimination in response to each request in the Trustee Discovery. The Trustee did not move to compel or otherwise seek leave of Court related to Ms. Guo's invocation of her Fifth Amendment Rights in response to the Trustee Discovery.\n\n18. Ms. Guo was deposed in the Whitecroft Adversary on November 1, 2023, and invoked her Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination in response to a number of the questions posed. The Trustee did not move to compel or otherwise seek leave of Court related to Ms. Guo's invocation of her Fifth Amendment Rights in response to questions posed to her during her deposition.\n\n19. Ms. Guo served discovery on the Trustee in the Whitecroft Adversary, including requests for the production of documents.\n\n20. To date and based on the Bates stamps applied to documents by the Trustee, the Trustee has produced 8896 pages of documents to Ms. Guo in response to her requests for production, a subset of the more than 49,000 documents the Trustee's counsel represented that search terms run against document productions obtained by the Trustee pursuant to Rule 2004 had captured for further review by the Trustee's counsel in connection with Ms. Guo's discovery requests. (*See* October 9-12, 2023, email chain between, among others, the Trustee's counsel and the Individual Debtor's counsel, at October 9, 2023, 9:49 pm email. A copy of the email chain is attached hereto as Exhibit A).\n\n21. In connection with his search for documents responsive to Ms. Guo's requests for production the Trustee identified potentially privileged responsive documents and asked the Individual Debtor's counsel to consent to the production of those documents to Ms. Guo without undertaking any review. (*See generally id*).\n\n22. The Individual Debtor's counsel informed the Trustee's counsel that the Individual\n\nDebtor had not agreed to waive privilege and stated that the same process used to review privileged documents prior to production in *Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC, et al*. Adv. Pro. No. 5:23ap05005, should be used in the Whitecroft Adversary so that an informed decision regarding privilege could be made and any disputes could be limited. (*Id.*, at October 10, 2023, 4:40 pm email and responses thereto).[2](#page-7-0)\n\n23. The Trustee thereafter agreed to proceed in the same manner utilized in the Greenwich Land adversary proceeding and provided to the Individual Debtor's counsel 246 documents to review to determine the scope and substance of the waiver the Trustee was seeking, and to determine whether the Individual Debtor viewed each of the provided documents as privileged.[3](#page-7-1)\n\n24. Of the 246 documents provided for review, the Individual Debtor's counsel identified a total of 131 that the Individual Debtor viewed as privileged and objected to being produced, disclosed, or used for any purpose. The Individual Debtor further identified five (5) documents that included privileged information and his counsel returned to the Trustee redacted versions of those documents identifying those areas deemed to contain privileged information.[4](#page-7-2)\n\n<span id=\"page-7-0\"></span><sup>2</sup> In the Greenwich Land adversary proceeding the Trustee's counsel requested the Individual Debtor's consent to produce potentially privileged documents to the defendants. The Individual Debtor's counsel requested to review the documents before providing the Individual Debtor's position on the request for consent. The documents were provided to the Individual Debtor's counsel, reviewed, and the Individual Debtor identified the documents which he did not believe were subject to privilege, which could be immediately produced, and those that were subject to privilege and for which the Individual Debtor would not consent to production. The process utilized in the Greenwich Land adversary appeared to work well and did not result in any dispute presented to the Court. Thus, the Individual Debtor's counsel requested that the same process be used in the Whitecroft Adversary.\n\n<span id=\"page-7-1\"></span><sup>3</sup> It appears that the Trustee is treating every document obtained from a law firm or lawyer that may have previously represented the Individual Debtor as privileged. Thus, part of the Individual Debtor's Counsel's review included analyzing whether a document was even subject to attorneyclient privilege.\n\n<span id=\"page-7-2\"></span><sup>4</sup> One of the documents the Individual Debtor's counsel returned to the Trustee in redacted form is included as an Exhibit to the Privilege Waiver Motion, Exhibit J, without the redaction which\n\n25. The individual Debtor did not consider the other 101 documents privileged and did not object to their production, disclosure, or use. To the best of counsel's knowledge as of the filing of this Objection the Trustee's counsel has neither produced the documents identified as non-privileged to Ms. Guo's counsel nor provided a privilege log of the documents that the Individual Debtor identified as privileged but which the Trustee does not seek to affirmatively use and are therefore not at issue in the Privilege Waiver Motion.\n\n26. Of the 136 documents that the Individual Debtor identified as privileged and to which he would not consent to a waiver only six (6) appear to be at issue as the remining 10, the Privilege Waiver Motion attaches 16 exhibits, do not appear to have been provide to the Individual Debtor's counsel for review based on the lack of the Bates stamp prefix \"MGAP\" which was affixed to the documents provided for review\n\n## **C. The Documents at Issue**\n\n27. The Privilege Waiver Motion includes as Exhibits A-P the documents for which the Trustee seeks to waive privilege. The Individual Debtor does not contend that the following documents are subject to attorney-client privilege: Exhibits C, G, O, and P (Exhibit G, O, and P do not include the MGAP Bates prefix, and the Individual Debtor has not located Exhibit C in the documents provided by the Trustee's counsel for review).\n\n28. The Individual Debtor does not contend that the following portions of Exhibits attached to the Privilege Waiver Motion are privileged:\n\n> • Exhibit F, all pages save for pages 137-140 (the Individual Debtor does contend that pages 137-140 contain privileged information);\n\ngives the impression that the Individual Debtor is asserting that communications between nonlawyers are privileged, he is not.\n\n- Exhibit J, all pages save for the first email in the chain at Bates stamp MGAP06178 from Ms. Wong to Mr. Shulman, and others, the email at Bates Stamp MGAP06198 from Mr. Shulman to Ms. Wong and others, and the email at Bates stamped pages MGAP06201-6203 between Ms. Wong and Messrs. Shulman and Barnett.\n- Exhibit M, the email at Bates stamp WC-KWOK-BANKR 0004783 is claimed as privileged, while the email at Bates stamp WC-KWOK-BANKR 0004784-85 is not claimed as privileged.\n\n29. Certain of the documents attached as Exhibits to the Privilege Waiver Motion are duplicative of one another. Exhibit B consists of an email chain containing three emails, Exhibit D is one of the emails contained in the Exhibit B chain and Exhibit E consists of two of the emails contained in the Exhibit B chain. Thus, Exhibits B, D and E are effectively one document. Likewise, Exhibit I is an email chain consisting of four emails, three of which are included within the documents that constitute Exhibit H.[5](#page-9-0)\n\n30. Based on the foregoing there is a very limited set of unique documents at issue on the Privilege Waiver Motion: Exhibits A, B (which includes D and E), F (pages 137-140 of the transcript only), H, I (only the first email in the chain is unique), J (only pages Bates stamped MGAP06178, MGAP06198, and MGAP 6201-6203 are at issue), K, L, M (only the email at WC-KWOK-BANKR 0004783 is at issue), and Exhibit N.\n\n## **III. ARGUMENT**\n\n# **A. The Trustee Provides No Authority That the Order He Seeks Will be Enforceable and not Simply Result in a Privilege Waiver**\n\n31. The Trustee asks this Court to enter an order permitting the Trustee, as the privilege\n\n<span id=\"page-9-0\"></span><sup>5</sup> Exhibit H is a composite exhibit that appears to be the entire contents of a law firm's file on a particular subject.\n\nholder, to affirmatively utilize the documents at issue in the Privilege Waiver Motion to prove his claims in the Whitecroft Adversary, and to disclose them to Ms. Guo, the defendant in that adversary proceeding as he would have to do to utilize them, all without waiving privilege as to those documents.\n\n32. The Trustee cites no authority that such an order would be enforceable and would preclude a third-party from obtaining the documents at issue because no such authority appears to exist. Indeed, the Trustee's affirmative use of the documents would constitute a privilege waiver regardless of the entry of the requested order.\n\n33. The Trustee requested that the Individual Debtor agree to such an order and he refused to do so absent authority that the order would be enforceable against third-parties; the Trustee has not provided any such authority, either to the Individual Debtor or the Court in the Privilege Waiver Motion, and the Individual Debtor has not located any such authority.\n\n34. The authority located by the Individual Debtor is to the contrary: the affirmative use of privileged information by the privilege holder, in this case the Trustee, constitutes a privilege waiver, and not just in the particular action in which the privileged materials are utilized. *Chevron Corp. v. Salazar*, 275 F.R.D. 437, 445-46 (S.D.N.Y., 2011) (\"Where a party voluntarily discloses privileged documents to an adversary in one proceeding, it cannot withhold the same documents on the basis of privilege in a subsequent proceeding, even if the subsequent proceeding involves a different adversary.\") (citing cases). *See also In re Parmalat Sec. Litig.*, No. 04 MD 1653 (LAK) (HBP), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88629, \\*28 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 1, 2006) (noting that \"voluntary or even inadvertent disclosure [of privileged communications] may result [in] a waiver of privilege\" whereas compelled disclosure does not result in a waiver) (citations omitted); *Scott v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc.*, 94 F. Supp. 3d 585, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (\"with some exceptions,\n\nthe attorney-client privilege is automatically waived when a privileged communication is disclosed to a third party or litigation adversary.\") (citing cases); *Speedfit LLC v. Woodway USA Inc.*, Case No. CV 17-768, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56559, \\*13 (E.D.N.Y., March 28, 2019) (noting that the attorney-client privilege is not absolute and may be waived).\n\n35. The intentional waiver of the attorney-client privilege by the Trustee of a handful of documents on a particular subject also creates the risk of a broader subject matter waiver. *Speedfit LLC*, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56559, at \\*13 (\"Subject matter waiver is a type of implied waiver 'which allows the attacking party to reach all privileged conversations regarding a particular subject once one privileged conversation on that topic disclosed,' and is grounded in 'fairness considerations at work in the context of litigations.'\") (*quoting Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co.* 193 F.R.D. 73, 84 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)*. See also*, Fed. R. Evid. 502(a) (\"When the disclosure is made in a federal proceeding or to a federal office or agency and waives the attorney-client privilege or work-product protection, the waiver extends to an undisclosed communication or information in a federal or state proceeding only if: (1) the waiver is intentional; (2) the disclosed and undisclosed communications or information concern the same subject matter; and (3) they ought in fairness to be considered together.\").\n\n36. Because the Individual Debtor has grave concerns about the enforceability of the Order requested by the Trustee, and the concomitant ability of prosecutors to obtain at least the documents used by the Trustee that are otherwise privileged, and potentially much more if there is subsequently deemed to be a subject matter waiver, the Individual Debtor Objects to the entry of the Order requested by the Trustee.\n\n#### **B. The Trustee Should not be Permitted to Waive Privilege**\n\n37. In the alternative to the requested Order permitting him to affirmatively use\n\ndocuments without waiving privilege, the Trustee asks the Court to enter an order permitting him to waive privilege as to the handful of documents at issue.\n\n38. The Trustee cites several cases where a bankruptcy trustee was permitted to waive a debtor's attorney-client privilege, but the Trustee performs no analysis under the prevailing balancing test. That analysis leads to the inescapable conclusion that privilege should not be waived.\n\n39. The majority of courts that have addressed the issue of a bankruptcy trustee's authority to waive a debtor's pre-petition attorney-client privilege have utilized a balancing test. *See Moore v. Eason (In re Bazemore)*, 216 B.R. 1020, 1023-24 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1998) (\"The filing of bankruptcy by an individual debtor requires a determination as to whether anyone else controls the privilege. The inquiry requires balancing the interests of a full and frank discussion in the attorney-client relationship and the harm to the debtor upon a disclosure with the trustee's duty to maximize the value of the debtor's estate and represent the interests of the estate\"). *See also*, *Ramette v. Bame (In re Bame)* 251 B.R. 367, 377 (D. Minn. 2000) (finding, based on the weight of authority, the balancing approach to be the applicable test in determining whether a bankruptcy trustee may waive a debtor's prepetition privilege); *Whatley v. Meyer Wilson Co., LPA (In re Chandar)*, Case No. 11-37360-B-7, Adv. No. 17-2057, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 3903, at \\*2-3 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2017) (collecting cases); *In re Still*, 444 B.R. 520, 522 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2010) (\"The trend of the cases is toward a balancing approach.\").\n\n40. In applying the balancing test courts determine whether \"on balance the trustee's duties to maximize the value of the estate outweigh the policies underlying the attorney-client privilege and the harm to the debtor of disclosure.\" *Ramette (In re Bame)* 215 B.R. 367, at 377 (citations omitted). *See also*, *Degirolamo v. Daily & Haskins (In re Wittmer)*, Case No. 08-61618,\n\n2011 Bankr. LEXIS 4727, at \\*7 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio, Nov. 30, 2011) (\"This [balancing] approach blends the argument that a trustee cannot waive the attorney-client privilege because of the potential for personal harm to the debtor and impediment of the attorney-client communication with the argument that a trustee can waive the attorney-client privilege if there is no adverse effect on the debtor.\") (*citing In re Miller* 247 B.R. 704, 710 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2000)).\n\n41. In this case the adverse effect of a privilege waiver to the Individual Debtor is substantial because he has been charged in a superseding indictment with multiple violations of federal criminal law, and the allegations of the superseding indictment mirror certain of the allegations of the Whitecroft Adversary complaint. (Compare Whitecroft Adversary complaint, at ¶¶13-19 accusing the Individual Debtor of using numerous shell companies to keep assets from creditors, with superseding indictment at ¶¶1-3, including at ¶3 (\"To conceal the illegal source of the funds [the Individual Debtor and his alleged co-defendants] transferred, and directed the transfer of, money into and through more than approximately 500 accounts held in the names of at least 80 different entities or individuals, . . .\"). Certain of the documents for which the Trustee seeks to waive privilege, Exhibits A, B (and D and E as subsets of B), and F, relate to purported contemplated asset transfers during the time period at issue within the superseding indictment, *i.e.*, \"[f]rom at least in or about 2018 through at least in or about March 2023\". (Superseding indictment, at ¶1).\n\n42. Based on a review of the docket of the Criminal Case the prosecutors in that case have not sought leave to obtain any of the Individual Debtor's privileged communications. Of course, if the Trustee waives the privilege the prosecutor's would be entitled to obtain all of the documents to which the waiver applies, including any subsequent subject matter waiver that the Court may find. The potential for criminal liability is a factor that courts look to when conducting the balancing test to determine whether privilege should be waived, and the potential for prosecutors to obtain access to documents that they would not otherwise be able to access should weigh even more heavily in refusing to permit waiver. *See Ramette (In re Bame)* 215 B.R. 367, at 377 (\"As to other questions, however, especially those going to activities giving rise to potential criminal prosecution, the balance would probably tip in favor of sustaining assertion of the privilege, in which case the trustee would have the opportunity to raise the crime-fraud exception to the privilege.\").\n\n43. On the other side of the scale, the Trustee has not identified any harm that would befall the estate if the Court refuses to permit the requested privilege waiver. Indeed, the only stated reason for seeking the privilege waiver is to use a handful of documents affirmatively in the Whitecroft Adversary, but as the Trustee states in the Privilege Waiver Motion he likely does not even need these few documents to prevail because Ms. Guo has not defended against the Trustee's allegations. (Privilege Waiver Motion, at ¶48 (\"Thus, Ms. Guo has failed to substantiate any basis to oppose the Trustee's claims in the Bombardier Adversary Proceeding\").\n\n44. The Privilege Waiver Motion also ignores the non-privileged information that the Trustee relies upon in support of his complaint, all as referenced therein and attached as exhibits thereto[6](#page-14-0) , as well as the substantive deposition testimony of Ms. Guo secured in January 2023, which was reaffirmed during her November 1, 2023 deposition in the Whitecroft Adversary, the substantial non-privileged information that the Trustee has obtained in connection with his sweeping investigation, and publicly available information such as that referenced at paragraph 20\n\n<span id=\"page-14-0\"></span><sup>6</sup> The Trustee attached one or more of the documents at issue in the Privilege Waiver Motion as an exhibit to the Whitecroft Adversary complaint without asking the Individual Debtor's counsel for consent or seeking leave of Court. Obviously, the Trustee's unilateral use of documents in violation of the Privileges Order does not constitute a waiver of the Individual Debtor's right to demand compliance with that order.\n\nof the Privilege Waiver Motion.\n\n45. As previously noted, in response to Ms. Guo's requests for production in the Whitecroft Adversary, many of which requests sought information concerning the Trustee's allegations regarding ownership of the Bombardier aircraft, the Trustee produced nearly 9,000 pages of documents. Moreover, the Trustee continues to seek information in support of his claims, having received documents in response to a subpoena from JetLaw, LLC within the last week, and thereafter issuing two additional subpoenas for documents and depositions. In addition, the Trustee will certainly seek adverse inferences against Ms. Guo based on her invocation of her Fifth Amendment rights and the Individual Debtor's invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights during a March 2, 2023 deposition at which he was questioned regarding matters at issue in the Whitecroft Adversary even though it had yet to be filed and the deposition related to the claim and counterclaims asserted in *HK International Funds Investments (USA) Ltd. v. Despins*, Adv. Pro. No. 22-05003. (*See* Whitecroft Complaint, at ¶¶26, 29, 42, 44(a)-(f), 49, 64, and 72).\n\n46. Based on the (i) massive volume of non-privileged information the Trustee has accrued, (ii) lack of any showing that the inability to use the handful of documents the Trustee seeks to use via the Privilege Waiver Motion will negate his ability to successfully prove his claims, and (iii) harm that will befall the Individual Debtor if privilege is waived, the Privilege Waiver Motion should be denied.\n\n## **C. Ms. Guo's Counsel's Knowledge of Certain Facts Does not Constitute a Privilege Waiver**\n\n47. The fact that Ms. Guo and the Individual Debtor are represented by the same counsel does not work a waiver of the Individual Debtor's attorney-client privilege or vice-versa simply because counsel has knowledge of privileged information and the Trustee cites no authority for his implied position that it does—the fact that the Trustee does not come right out and say that\n\nhe is arguing that Zeisler & Zeisler's representation of the Individual Debtor in the main bankruptcy case and Ms. Guo in the Whitecroft Adversary results in a waiver of the Individual Debtor's attorney-client privilege speaks volumes about the Trustee's own view of his argument.\n\n48. The cases cited by the Trustee do not support his implied waiver argument, and are utterly inapposite. *Helmedach v. Comm'r of Corr.,* 329 Conn. 726, 737 (2018) addresses the issue of notifying a criminal defendant client of a plea offer and whether the failure to do so in a timely manner constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. *Uchechukwu Egbujo v. Jackson Lewis, P.C.*, 2022 U.S. Dist LEXIS 177041, 2022 WL 4585688, \\*7 (D. Conn., Sept. 29, 2022) involves a defamation claim and whether a law firm's publication to its own client of the findings of its investigation conducted on behalf of the client constitutes publication to a third-party for purposes of satisfying the publication element of a defamation claim, it does not. Lastly, *Rai v. WB Imico Lexington Fee, LLC*, 802 F.3d 353 (2015) involves an interpretation of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, and whether providing a required document to counsel satisfies the act's disclosure provisions, it does.\n\n49. The Trustee also contends that the Individual Debtor and Ms. Guo are seeking to use the attorney-client privilege as a sword and a shield. The sword and shield problem arises where one party seeks to use its privileged communications affirmatively without disclosing them. *Sims v. Blot*, 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (\"In other words, a party cannot partially disclose privileged communications or affirmatively rely on privileged communications to support its claim or defense and then shield the underlying communications from scrutiny by the opposing party.\") (citations omitted). As between the Trustee, the Individual Debtor, and Ms. Guo the only party that is seeking to affirmatively use privileged information is the Trustee. Thus, the only one who could even potentially have a sword and shield problem is the Trustee (the Individual Debtor is not a party to the Whitecroft Adversary and is not seeking to use privileged communications for any purpose, he is simply seeking to have privileged communications remain privileged; Ms. Guo is not seeking to use privileged communications for any purpose and could not because she has no right or ability to use them).\n\nWHEREFORE, for all of the foregoing reasons the Privilege Waiver Motion should be denied.\n\nDated at Bridgeport, Connecticut on this 13th day of December, 2023.\n\n# **THE DEBTOR, HO WAN KWOK**\n\n */s/ James M. Moriarty*\n\nEric Henzy (ct12849) James M. Moriarty 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604 Telephone: (203) 368-4234 Facsimile: (203) 368-5487 Email: [ehenzy@zeislaw.com](mailto:ehenzy@zeislaw.com) [Jmoriarty@zeislaw.com](mailto:Jmoriarty@zeislaw.com)\n\n# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n : Debtor. : \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_:\n\n:\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_ :\n\nIn re : Chapter 11\n\nHO WAN KWOK, : Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI hereby certify that on this 13th day of December, 2023, a copy of foregoing was filed electronically. Notice of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties by operation of the Court's electronic filing system. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF System.\n\n> */s/ James M. Moriarty*  James M. Moriarty (ct21876)","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格联邦破产法院布里奇波特分部\n\n关于：第 11 章\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）：案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n\n：债务人。：\n\n：\n\n个人债务人对请求裁定授权：(A) 第 11 章受托人在不放弃特权的情况下，以密封方式在 Bombardier 对抗程序中使用可能受特权保护的文件；或备选地，(B) 就 Bombardier 及 Bombardier 收益事项有限放弃受托人特权之动议的异议\n\n个人债务人 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（以下简称“个人债务人”）通过其下列签署的律师 Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.，谨此提交其对第 11 章受托人（以下简称“受托人”）《请求裁定授权：(A) 第 11 章受托人在不放弃特权的情况下，以密封方式在 Bombardier 对抗程序中使用可能受特权保护的文件；或备选地，(B) 就 Bombardier 及 Bombardier 收益事项有限放弃受托人特权之动议》（以下简称“特权放弃动议”）的异议，并谨此陈述如下：\n\n一、初步陈述\n\n1. 个人债务人反对特权放弃动议，以保护其在 United States District Court for the Southern District of New York（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）待决的、案名为 USA v. Kwok, 1:23CR118（以下简称“刑事案件”）的刑事诉讼中的权利；更具体而言，是为防止 United States Attorney's Office（美国联邦检察官办公室）取得并用于对抗他的律师—当事人特权通讯，而若无受托人所寻求的特权放弃，该办公室本无法取得该等通讯。\n\n2. 受托人完全知悉，个人债务人反对受托人放弃特权，因为个人债务人严重担忧该等放弃会对待决刑事案件产生影响。事实上，在律师为寻求解决当前争议而进行讨论期间，受托人的律师多次被告知此事；而受托人可能放弃律师—当事人特权，亦是个人债务人在刑事案件中待决的《请求裁定及暂停破产案件令状动议》的主要焦点。（见刑事案件文件编号 131，第 23-25 页，该文件由受托人作为文件编号 2158 提交于本案。）尽管知悉上述情况，受托人仍竭力贬损个人债务人及其在被羁押并为重获自由而抗争期间拒绝同意放弃特权的动机。\n\n3. 在律师就受托人所请求的特权放弃进行讨论期间，个人债务人的律师邀请受托人的律师提供依据，证明本院可作出一项可执行的裁定，允许受托人作为律师—当事人特权的持有人，将本动议所涉文件提供给 Despins v. Guo, Adv. Pro. No. 23-05008 (JAM)（以下简称“Whitecroft 对抗程序”）中被告的律师——这是其为积极使用该等文件所必须采取的行为——并继而积极使用同一等文件证明其在 Whitecroft 对抗程序中的请求，同时不放弃与该等文件有关的任何适用特权。\n\n4. 个人债务人的律师之所以仅要求受托人的律师提供该等依据，是因为受托人的律师曾提出，如今通过特权放弃动议所寻求类型的合意裁定，可以允许受托人积极使用受律师—当事人特权保护的通讯，同时保留特权；个人债务人的律师希望确认受托人的律师所提议之事确有可能。受托人的律师从未提供所请求的依据，个人债务人的律师同样未能找到任何该等依据，因为自愿披露享有特权的信息——即作为特权持有人的受托人所寻求进行的行为——构成特权放弃。\n\n5. 备选地，受托人再次完全无视个人债务人就特权放弃对刑事案件影响所陈述的正当担忧，请求本院放弃律师—当事人特权，但未进行必要的分析，以权衡受托人对所涉文件的需求与放弃律师—当事人特权对个人债务人造成的损害。\n\n6. 受托人未进行必要的权衡测试，因为其知道天平显然倾向于个人债务人以及驳回所请求的特权放弃。\n\n7. 受托人在特权放弃动议中误导性地列明并附上了一组远比实际争议范围更广的文件，因为其中一些文件彼此重复，而对于另一些文件，个人债务人甚至并不主张存在任何应予保护的律师—当事人特权或其他特权。受托人亦未说明，为何所涉的少数文件对于证明其在 Whitecroft 对抗程序中的请求至关重要，以及鉴于其已从第三方并通过本院授权的逾 220 次 2004 审查中获得的信息——其中许多推定已经进行——其为何无法在没有该等文件的情况下做到这一点。事实上，受托人通过特权放弃动议寻求放弃律师—当事人特权所针对的信息，是通过 Rule 2004 审查取得的，而非作为 Whitecroft 对抗程序中证据开示程序的一部分取得的。受托人在其调查过程中必定已取得可用于支持其请求的非特权信息，以替代所涉文件。受托人可能希望放弃特权而非使用其他证据这一事实，不应构成放弃特权的充分理由。事实上，在当前情况下，只有作为最后手段而非为便利起见，才应准许放弃特权。\n\n8. 最后，受托人提出的半心半意且间接的论点，即因个人债务人与 Guo 女士由同一律师代理，个人债务人的律师—当事人特权便以某种方式就 Guo 女士而言已被放弃，该论点毫无依据、无法成立，必须予以驳回。\n\n二、背景\n\nA. 特权命令\n\n9. 2022年2月15日，个人债务人根据《破产法》第 11 章自愿提交破产救济申请；2022年7月8日，本院作出《准许指定第 11 章受托人的命令》（文件编号 523），准许指定受托人为本案第 11 章受托人。\n\n10. 2022年7月28日，即其获指定后数周内，受托人提交了后来众多请求进行 Rule 2004 审查的动议中的最初三项。最初三项动议包括请求对个人债务人进行 Rule 2004 审查的动议（文件编号 636），以及请求对“[个人]债务人的各类法律和财务顾问”进行 Rule 2004 审查的动议（以下简称“专业人士 2004 动议”）（文件编号 637）。专业人士 2004 动议请求许可向十二家不同的律师事务所或律师取得文件及证言，该等律师事务所或律师可能曾向个人债务人提供法律服务（文件编号 637，附件 B）。\n\n11. 2022年8月22日，受托人提交了其《……请求作出命令的动议，该命令：(A) 规定与根据 Rule 2004 传票取得的文件相关的任何律师—当事人特权、工作成果保护及其他特权的控制权，自指定之时起转由受托人行使；[以及] (B) 指示[个人]债务人及其他被审查人不得基于该等特权扣留文件，……》（以下简称“2004 审查特权动议”（文件编号 777））。个人债务人反对 2004 审查特权动议。该争议于 2022年9月14日通过作出《有关与根据 Rule 2004 传票取得的文件和信息相关的律师—当事人特权及工作成果保护控制权的合意命令》（以下简称“特权命令”（文件编号 856））而获解决。\n\n12. 特权命令规定，对于特权命令中明确定义为“调查事项”的列举事项，受托人控制个人债务人的律师—当事人特权和/或工作成果保护；并进一步规定，就调查事项而言：\n\n债务人及其律师（基于债务人或代表债务人行事的任何人的指示），以及任何其他被审查人，均无权以涉及调查事项的任何受托人特权为由，扣留 Rule 2004 传票附件中所请求的任何文件和信息。\n\n（特权命令，第 ¶¶2-3 段。）因此，特权命令旨在允许受托人进行其调查，尤其是通过使用 Rule 2004 进行调查，而无需担忧文件或信息会基于个人债务人的律师—当事人特权和/或律师工作成果而被扣留。\n\n13. 特权命令保留个人债务人就“与调查事项无关的法律事项，例如无关的刑事指控或债务人的庇护申请……”主张特权的权利。（特权命令，第 ¶4 段。）\n\n14. 特权命令并不允许受托人放弃律师—当事人特权或工作成果保护：\n\n……但条件是，未经债务人的书面同意或法院进一步命令，受托人无权放弃任何受托人特权（例如，通过在公开法庭或任何公开案卷中披露享有特权的文件或信息，或与第三方分享该等文件或信息），……\n\n（特权命令，第 ¶5 段。）\n\n15. 2023年3月15日上午，一份包含十二项罪名的起诉书在 United States District Court for the Southern District of New York（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）解封，指控个人债务人犯有多项联邦罪行。个人债务人于 2023年3月15日被联邦执法机关逮捕。2023年3月29日，经替代起诉书在刑事案件中提交。（刑事案件，文件编号 19。）个人债务人仍被羁押候审，目前审判定于 2024年4月进行。因此，从个人债务人的角度看，特权命令作出时的世界与今日的世界毫无相似之处，而今日的情势正是决定个人债务人就受托人试图放弃律师—当事人特权所持立场的因素。\n\nB. Whitecroft 对抗程序\n\n16. 受托人于 2023年5月16日提起 Whitecroft 对抗程序，寻求追回包括一架据称于申请后出售的所谓破产财产 Bombardier 飞机的收益在内的财产。[1] Mei Guo（郭梅，以下简称“Guo 女士”）是 Whitecroft 对抗程序中唯一列名的被告。\n\n17. 约于 2023年7月31日，受托人在 Whitecroft 对抗程序中向 Guo 女士送达书面证据开示请求、书面质询、承认请求及文件出示请求（以下简称“受托人证据开示请求”）。Guo 女士约于 2023年8月30日对受托人证据开示请求作出答复，并针对受托人证据开示请求中的每一项请求援引其《宪法第五修正案》反自证其罪权利。受托人未就 Guo 女士针对受托人证据开示请求援引其《宪法第五修正案》权利提出强制动议，亦未以其他方式寻求法院许可。\n\n1 受托人在 Whitecroft 对抗程序中寻求其他救济，但所涉文件仅与 Bombardier 飞机有关。\n\n18. Guo 女士（郭女士）于 2023年11月1日在 Whitecroft Adversary（Whitecroft 对抗性程序）中接受了宣誓证言，并就向其提出的若干问题援引了其根据《第五修正案》享有的反对自证其罪权利。受托人未就 Guo 女士在宣誓证言中针对向其提出的问题援引其《第五修正案》权利提出强制披露动议，亦未以其他方式向本院寻求许可。\n\n19. Guo 女士在 Whitecroft 对抗性程序中向受托人送达了证据开示请求，包括文件出示请求。\n\n20. 截至目前，根据受托人加盖于文件上的 Bates 编号戳记，受托人已就 Guo 女士的文件出示请求向其出示了 8896 页文件；该等文件是逾 49,000 份文件中的一部分。受托人的律师称，就受托人依据 Rule 2004 取得的文件进行检索所使用的检索词，已筛选出该等逾 49,000 份文件，以供受托人的律师结合 Guo 女士的证据开示请求进一步审查。（参见 2023年10月9日至12日期间受托人律师、个别债务人律师及其他人士之间的电子邮件链，见 2023年10月9日晚上 9:49 的电子邮件。该电子邮件链副本作为附件 A 随附于此。）\n\n21. 受托人在检索响应 Guo 女士文件出示请求的文件时，识别出可能受特权保护的响应性文件，并请求个别债务人的律师同意在不进行任何审查的情况下向 Guo 女士出示该等文件。（概见同上。）\n\n22. 个别债务人的律师告知受托人的律师，个别债务人并未同意放弃特权，并表示应在 Whitecroft 对抗性程序中采用 Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC（格林尼治地产有限责任公司）, et al. Adv. Pro. No. 5:23ap05005 中在出示前审查受特权保护文件时所使用的相同程序，以便能够就特权作出知情决定，并限制任何争议。（同上，见 2023年10月10日下午 4:40 的电子邮件及其回复。）[2]\n\n23. 此后，受托人同意以 Greenwich Land 对抗性程序中所采用的相同方式进行，并向个别债务人的律师提供了 246 份文件，以审查并确定受托人所寻求的放弃范围和内容，以及确定个别债务人是否认为所提供的每份文件均受特权保护。[3]\n\n24. 在提供审查的 246 份文件中，个别债务人的律师共识别出 131 份个别债务人认为受特权保护的文件，并反对为任何目的出示、披露或使用该等文件。个别债务人还识别出五（5）份包含受特权保护信息的文件，其律师向受托人返还了该等文件的删节版本，并标明了被认定为包含受特权保护信息的部分。[4]\n\n2 在 Greenwich Land 对抗性程序中，受托人的律师请求个别债务人同意向被告出示可能受特权保护的文件。个别债务人的律师请求在就该同意请求提供个别债务人的立场前审查该等文件。文件被提供给个别债务人的律师并经审查后，个别债务人识别出其认为不受特权保护、可立即出示的文件，以及受特权保护且个别债务人不同意出示的文件。在 Greenwich Land 对抗性程序中采用的程序似乎运作良好，且未导致任何提交本院的争议。因此，个别债务人的律师请求在 Whitecroft 对抗性程序中采用相同程序。\n\n3 受托人似乎将从可能曾代理个别债务人的律师事务所或律师处取得的每份文件均视为受特权保护。因此，个别债务人律师审查的一部分包括分析某份文件是否实际受律师—当事人特权保护。\n\n4 个别债务人的律师以删节形式返还给受托人的文件之一，作为 Privilege Waiver Motion（特权放弃动议）的附件 J 被收录，但未作删节，因而给人以个别债务人主张非律师之间的通信受特权保护的印象；其并未作出该等主张。\n\n25. 个别债务人并未认为其余 101 份文件受特权保护，且不反对出示、披露或使用该等文件。截至提交本异议之日，据律师所知，受托人的律师既未向 Guo 女士的律师出示被认定为不受特权保护的文件，也未就个别债务人认定为受特权保护、但受托人并不寻求积极使用且因此不属于 Privilege Waiver Motion 争议范围的文件提供特权清单。\n\n26. 在个别债务人认定为受特权保护且其不同意放弃特权的 136 份文件中，似乎只有六（6）份属于争议范围，因为 Privilege Waiver Motion 附有 16 份附件，其余 10 份似乎并未提供给个别债务人的律师审查；此结论基于该等文件未带有加盖于供审查文件上的 “MGAP” Bates 编号前缀。\n\nC. 争议文件\n\n27. Privilege Waiver Motion 将受托人寻求放弃特权的文件作为附件 A-P 附上。个别债务人并不主张下列文件受律师—当事人特权保护：附件 C、G、O 和 P（附件 G、O 和 P 不含 MGAP Bates 编号前缀，且个别债务人未能在受托人律师提供供审查的文件中找到附件 C）。\n\n28. 个别债务人并不主张附于 Privilege Waiver Motion 的附件中以下部分受特权保护：\n\n附件 F，除第 137-140 页外的全部页面（个别债务人确实主张第 137-140 页包含受特权保护的信息）；\n\n附件 J，除邮件链中 Bates 编号为 MGAP06178 的 Wong 女士（王女士）致 Shulman 先生（舒尔曼先生）及其他人士的第一封电子邮件、Bates 编号为 MGAP06198 的 Shulman 先生致 Wong 女士及其他人士的电子邮件，以及 Bates 编号页 MGAP06201-6203 上 Wong 女士与 Shulman 先生及 Barnett 先生（巴尼特先生）之间的电子邮件外的全部页面。\n\n附件 M，Bates 编号为 WC-KWOK-BANKR 0004783 的电子邮件被主张受特权保护，而 Bates 编号为 WC-KWOK-BANKR 0004784-85 的电子邮件未被主张受特权保护。\n\n29. 作为 Privilege Waiver Motion 附件附上的某些文件彼此重复。附件 B 由包含三封电子邮件的邮件链构成，附件 D 是附件 B 邮件链中所含的一封电子邮件，附件 E 由附件 B 邮件链中所含的两封电子邮件构成。因此，附件 B、D 和 E 实质上构成一份文件。同样，附件 I 是由四封电子邮件构成的邮件链，其中三封包含在构成附件 H 的文件中。[5]\n\n30. 根据上述情况，Privilege Waiver Motion 中争议范围内的独特文件极为有限：附件 A、B（包括 D 和 E）、F（仅为笔录第 137-140 页）、H、I（仅邮件链中的第一封电子邮件具有独特性）、J（仅 Bates 编号为 MGAP06178、MGAP06198 和 MGAP 6201-6203 的页面属于争议范围）、K、L、M（仅 WC-KWOK-BANKR 0004783 的电子邮件属于争议范围）以及附件 N。\n\nIII. 论证\n\nA. 受托人未提供任何依据证明其所寻求的命令将可执行，而非仅仅导致特权放弃\n\n31. 受托人请求本院作出命令，允许受托人作为特权持有人，积极使用 Privilege Waiver Motion 中争议文件，以证明其在 Whitecroft 对抗性程序中的请求，并向该对抗性程序中的被告 Guo 女士披露该等文件，如同其为使用该等文件所必须进行的披露，而不放弃该等文件的特权。\n\n5 附件 H 是一份综合附件，似乎是某律师事务所就某一特定主题所持全部档案内容。\n\n32. 受托人未援引任何依据表明该等命令具有可执行性，且将阻止第三方取得争议文件，因为似乎不存在该等依据。事实上，无论是否作出所请求的命令，受托人对该等文件的积极使用均构成特权放弃。\n\n33. 受托人曾请求个别债务人同意作出该等命令，而个别债务人在未获得证明该命令可对第三方执行的依据前拒绝同意；受托人既未向个别债务人提供任何该等依据，也未在 Privilege Waiver Motion 中向本院提供任何该等依据，且个别债务人未找到任何该等依据。\n\n34. 个别债务人所找到的依据恰恰相反：特权持有人在本案中即受托人对受特权保护信息的积极使用，构成特权放弃，且不仅限于使用受特权保护材料的特定诉讼。Chevron Corp. v. Salazar, 275 F.R.D. 437, 445-46 (S.D.N.Y., 2011)（“一方当事人在一项程序中自愿向对方披露受特权保护的文件后，即使后续程序涉及不同的对方当事人，其亦不得在后续程序中以特权为由拒绝提供相同文件。”）（援引案例）。另见 In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., No. 04 MD 1653 (LAK) (HBP), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88629, \\*28 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 1, 2006)（指出，“自愿甚至非故意披露[受特权保护的通信]可能导致特权放弃”，而被强制披露不会导致特权放弃）（省略引文）；Scott v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 3d 585, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)（“除少数例外情形外，当受特权保护的通信被披露给第三方或诉讼对方时，律师—当事人特权即自动放弃。”）（援引案例）；Speedfit LLC v. Woodway USA Inc., Case No. CV 17-768, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56559, \\*13 (E.D.N.Y., March 28, 2019)（指出律师—当事人特权并非绝对，且可以被放弃）。\n\n35. 受托人就某一特定主题有意放弃少数文件的律师—当事人特权，也产生更广泛主题事项放弃的风险。Speedfit LLC, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56559, at \\*13（“主题事项放弃是一种默示放弃，‘一旦披露了有关该主题的一次受特权保护的通信，其允许攻击方接触与特定主题有关的所有受特权保护的谈话’，并以‘诉讼背景下发挥作用的公平考量’为基础。”）（引自 Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co. 193 F.R.D. 73, 84 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)。另见 Fed. R. Evid. 502(a)（“当披露发生于联邦程序中或向联邦官员或机构作出，并放弃律师—当事人特权或工作成果保护时，放弃仅在符合以下条件时才延及联邦或州程序中未披露的通信或信息：(1) 放弃是有意的；(2) 已披露与未披露的通信或信息涉及同一主题事项；以及 (3) 基于公平原则，应一并加以考虑。”）。\n\n36. 因个别债务人对受托人请求的命令是否可执行，以及检察官能否取得至少受托人所使用、原本受特权保护的文件，且如随后被认定存在主题事项放弃时可能取得更多文件，存有严重关切，个别债务人反对作出受托人所请求的命令。\n\nB. 不应允许受托人放弃特权\n\n37. 作为允许其在不放弃特权的情况下积极使用文件之所请求命令的替代方案，受托人请求本院作出命令，允许其就争议范围内的少数文件放弃特权。\n\n38. 受托人援引了若干破产受托人获准放弃债务人律师—当事人特权的案件，但受托人并未依照现行的利益衡量标准进行任何分析。该分析必然导致以下结论：不应放弃特权。\n\n39. 审理过破产受托人是否有权放弃债务人在提交破产申请前享有的律师—当事人特权这一问题的大多数法院，均采用利益衡量标准。参见 Moore v. Eason (In re Bazemore), 216 B.R. 1020, 1023-24 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1998)（“个人债务人提交破产申请，要求确定是否由其他人控制该特权。该审查要求在律师—当事人关系中进行全面坦诚讨论的利益、披露对债务人造成的损害，与受托人最大化债务人财产价值并代表该财产利益的职责之间进行衡量。”）。另见 Ramette v. Bame (In re Bame) 251 B.R. 367, 377 (D. Minn. 2000)（根据权威观点的主流，认定利益衡量方法是确定破产受托人是否可以放弃债务人申请破产前特权时适用的标准）；Whatley v. Meyer Wilson Co., LPA（Meyer Wilson Co., LPA 律师事务所）(In re Chandar), Case No. 11-37360-B-7, Adv. No. 17-2057, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 3903, at \\*2-3 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2017)（汇集案件）；In re Still, 444 B.R. 520, 522 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2010)（“案件的趋势是采用利益衡量方法。”）。\n\n40. 在适用利益衡量标准时，法院确定“总体而言，受托人最大化财产价值的职责是否超过律师—当事人特权所依据的政策以及披露对债务人造成的损害。”Ramette (In re Bame) 215 B.R. 367, at 377（引文略）。另见 Degirolamo v. Daily & Haskins (In re Wittmer), Case No. 08-61618,\n\n2011 Bankr. LEXIS 4727, at \\*7 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio, Nov. 30, 2011)（“该[利益衡量]方法将以下主张结合起来：受托人因可能对债务人造成个人损害并妨碍律师—当事人沟通而不能放弃律师—当事人特权；以及，如果不会对债务人造成不利影响，受托人可以放弃律师—当事人特权。”）（引用 In re Miller 247 B.R. 704, 710 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2000)）。\n\n41. 在本案中，放弃特权将对个人债务人产生重大不利影响，因为他已在一份替代起诉书中被指控多项违反联邦刑法的行为，而该替代起诉书中的指控与 Whitecroft 对抗程序（Whitecroft Adversary）起诉状中的某些指控相对应。（比较 Whitecroft 对抗程序起诉状第 ¶¶13-19 段，其中指控个人债务人利用众多空壳公司向债权人隐匿资产；与替代起诉书第 ¶¶1-3 段，其中包括第 ¶3 段：“为掩盖[个人债务人及其被指称的共同被告]转移并指示转移资金的非法来源，[个人债务人及其被指称的共同被告]将资金转入并经由以至少80个不同实体或个人名义持有的约500多个账户，……。”）。受托人寻求放弃特权的部分文件，即证据附件 A、B（以及作为 B 子集的 D 和 E）和 F，涉及替代起诉书所涉期间内据称拟议进行的资产转移，即“[f]rom at least in or about 2018 through at least in or about March 2023”。（替代起诉书，第 ¶1 段）。\n\n42. 根据对刑事案件（Criminal Case）案卷的审查，该案检察官并未请求许可获取个人债务人的任何特权通信。当然，若受托人放弃该特权，检察官将有权获取该项放弃所适用的所有文件，包括法院可能认定的任何后续事项范围放弃。潜在的刑事责任是法院在进行利益衡量测试以确定是否应放弃特权时考量的因素，而检察官可能获得其原本无法获得的文件，更应当成为拒绝准许放弃的理由。参见 Ramette (In re Bame) 215 B.R. 367, at 377（“然而，就其他问题而言，尤其是涉及可能引发刑事追诉的活动的问题，利益衡量很可能会倾向于维持特权主张，在此情形下，受托人将有机会提出该特权的犯罪—欺诈例外。”）。\n\n43. 在衡量的另一端，受托人并未指出，若法院拒绝准许所请求的特权放弃，财产将遭受任何损害。事实上，寻求特权放弃的唯一明示理由，是在 Whitecroft 对抗程序中主动使用少数几份文件；但正如受托人在特权放弃动议（Privilege Waiver Motion）中所述，他很可能甚至无需这些少数文件即可胜诉，因为 Guo 女士（郭文贵女士）并未对受托人的指控提出抗辩。（特权放弃动议，第 ¶48 段（“因此，Guo 女士未能证实任何反对受托人在 Bombardier 对抗程序（Bombardier Adversary Proceeding）中主张的依据。”）\n\n44. 特权放弃动议还忽略了受托人为支持其起诉状所依赖的非特权信息，所有该等信息均在其中被提及并作为其附件附上[6]，以及受托人在 2023年1月取得的 Guo 女士的实质性证言，该证言在她于 2023年11月1日在 Whitecroft 对抗程序中的证言期间得到重申；还忽略了受托人在其广泛调查中取得的大量非特权信息，以及特权放弃动议第20段所提及的公开可得信息。\n\n6 受托人未经个人债务人律师同意或请求法院许可，便将特权放弃动议中所涉一份或多份文件作为附件附于 Whitecroft 对抗程序起诉状。显然，受托人单方面使用违反特权命令（Privileges Order）的文件，并不构成个人债务人放弃要求遵守该命令的权利。\n\n45. 如先前所述，为回应 Guo 女士在 Whitecroft 对抗程序中提出的文件出示请求——其中许多请求寻求与受托人关于 Bombardier 飞机所有权的指控有关的信息——受托人出示了近 9,000 页文件。此外，受托人持续寻求支持其主张的信息，其在过去一周内已收到针对 JetLaw, LLC（JetLaw, LLC 有限责任公司）传票所作回应的文件，随后又发出了两份额外传票，要求提供文件和证言。此外，受托人必将基于 Guo 女士援引其第五修正案权利，以及个人债务人在 2023年3月2日的证言期间援引其第五修正案权利，而请求对 Guo 女士作出不利推定；在该次证言中，个人债务人就 Whitecroft 对抗程序所涉事项接受询问，尽管该对抗程序尚未提起，且该证言涉及 HK International Funds Investments (USA) Ltd. v. Despins, Adv. Pro. No. 22-05003 中提出的请求和反请求。（见 Whitecroft 起诉状，第 ¶¶26、29、42、44(a)-(f)、49、64 和 72 段）。\n\n46. 基于：(i) 受托人已积累的大量非特权信息；(ii) 未有任何证明表明，无法使用受托人试图通过特权放弃动议使用的少数文件，将排除其成功证明其主张的能力；以及 (iii) 若放弃特权将对个人债务人造成的损害，特权放弃动议应予驳回。\n\nC. Guo 女士律师对某些事实的知悉不构成特权放弃\n\n47. Guo 女士和个人债务人由同一律师代理这一事实，并不当然构成个人债务人放弃其律师—当事人特权，反之亦然；仅仅因为律师知悉特权信息并不产生该等放弃，且受托人没有援引任何权威支持其隐含主张，即其确实产生放弃——受托人没有直接声称其主张 Zeisler & Zeisler（Zeisler & Zeisler 律师事务所）在主破产案件中代理个人债务人、并在 Whitecroft 对抗程序中代理 Guo 女士，导致个人债务人放弃其律师—当事人特权，这充分说明受托人自身对其论点的看法。\n\n48. 受托人援引的案件并不支持其隐含放弃论点，且完全不适用。Helmedach v. Comm'r of Corr., 329 Conn. 726, 737 (2018) 涉及向刑事被告当事人通知认罪答辩提议的问题，以及未及时通知是否构成律师无效辩护。Uchechukwu Egbujo v. Jackson Lewis, P.C., 2022 U.S. Dist LEXIS 177041, 2022 WL 4585688, \\*7 (D. Conn., Sept. 29, 2022) 涉及诽谤请求，以及律师事务所向其自身当事人发布其代表该当事人进行调查所得结论，是否构成为满足诽谤请求中发布要件而向第三方发布；并不构成。最后，Rai v. WB Imico Lexington Fee, LLC, 802 F.3d 353 (2015) 涉及对《州际土地销售全面披露法》（Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act）的解释，以及向律师提供所需文件是否满足该法的披露规定；满足。\n\n49. 受托人还主张，个人债务人和 Guo 女士试图将律师—当事人特权作为剑与盾。当一方试图在不披露其特权通信的情况下主动使用该等通信时，就会产生剑与盾问题。Sims v. Blot, 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir. 2008)（“换言之，一方不得部分披露特权通信，或主动依赖特权通信以支持其请求或抗辩，然后又使对方当事人无法审查该等基础通信。”）（引文略）。在受托人、个人债务人和 Guo 女士之间，唯一试图主动使用特权信息的一方是受托人。因此，唯一甚至可能存在剑与盾问题的人是受托人（个人债务人并非 Whitecroft 对抗程序的当事人，且并未试图为任何目的使用特权通信；他仅仅寻求使特权通信继续享有特权；Guo 女士并未试图为任何目的使用特权通信，且也不能这样做，因为她没有使用该等通信的权利或能力）。\n\n鉴此，基于上述全部理由，特权放弃动议应予驳回。\n\n于 2023年12月13日订立于 Connecticut（康涅狄格州）Bridgeport（布里奇波特）。\n债务人，HO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）\n\n /s/ James M. Moriarty\n\nEric Henzy (ct12849) James M. Moriarty 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604 电话：(203) 368-4234 传真：(203) 368-5487 电子邮件：[ehenzy@zeislaw.com] [Jmoriarty@zeislaw.com]\n美国破产法院 Connecticut 地区 Bridgeport 分庭\n\n：债务人。：\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_:\n\n:\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_ :\n\n关于：第11章\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）：Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n送达证明\n\n本人特此证明，于 2023年12月13日，上述文件副本已通过电子方式提交。法院电子提交系统将通过电子邮件向所有当事人发送本次提交的通知。当事人可通过法院的 CM/ECF 系统查阅本次提交。\n\n> /s/ James M. Moriarty  James M. Moriarty (ct21876)","key_entities":["Guo","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Despins"],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":5592,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 19:02:47"}