{"id":"court_ctb_2472_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":2472,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2023-08-30","title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION | -------------------------------------------","summary_zh":"关于债务人刑事案中止动议被驳回的进展通知 —— Ho Wan Kwok 破产案（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo），CTB 22-50073 ECF #2472（2023-08-30立案）。第11章破产受托人及 Genever 债务人向破产法院通报，纽约南区联邦地区法院已于2023年12月21日作出裁定（附附录1），正式驳回了郭文贵要求中止第11章破产案及相关对抗性诉讼程序的动议。","summary_en":"Notice regarding denial of debtor's criminal case stay motion — In re Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo / Guo Wengui), CTB 22-50073 ECF #2472 (filed 2023-08-30). The Chapter 11 Trustee and Genever Debtors notify the Bankruptcy Court that the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York entered an order on December 21, 2023 (ECF No. 200 in 23-cr-118) denying Ho Wan Kwok's motion to stay the Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings and related adversary proceedings.","body_en":"# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| ------------------------------------------------------ | x      |                         |\n|--------------------------------------------------------|--------|-------------------------|\n| In re:                                                 | :<br>: | Chapter 11              |\n| HO WAN KWOK et al.,                                    | :<br>: | Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |\n| Debtors.1                                              | :<br>: | Jointly Administered    |\n| ------------------------------------------------------ | :<br>x |                         |\n\n# **NOTICE OF CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE AND GENEVER DEBTORS REGARDING FURTHER UPDATE WITH RESPECT TO DEBTOR'S MOTION IN CRIMINAL CASE FOR AN ORDER STAYING THESE CHAPTER 11 CASES AND ASSOCIATED ADVERSARY PROCEEDINGS**\n\nBy notice dated August 30, 2023 [Docket No. 2158], Luc A. Despins, as chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") for Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"), informed this Court and parties in interest that the Debtor had filed a motion (the \"Stay Motion\") in the criminal case pending against him in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York [Case No. 1:23-cr-00118-AT] (the \"Criminal Case\") seeking to stay the above-captioned chapter 11 cases and all related adversary proceedings.\n\nBy notice dated September 27, 2023, the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC (\"Genever BVI\"), and Genever Holdings Corporation (\"Genever US\" and, together with Genever BVI, the \"Genever Debtors\") provided an update to the Court and parties in interest, attaching the responses to Stay Motion filed by (i) the United States Department of Justice, (ii) the Chapter 11\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\nTrustee and the Genever Debtors, and (iii) The Sherry-Netherland, Inc., as well as the joinder of the official committee of unsecured creditors in the response filed by the Trustee and the Genever Debtors.\n\nThe Trustee and the Genever Debtors wish to provide a further update the Court and parties in interest, namely that the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York has denied the Stay Motion. A copy of the order denying the Stay Motion is attached hereto as **Exhibit 1**.\n\nDated: December 21, 2023 New York, New York\n\nBy: */s/ G. Alexander Bongartz*\n\nAvram E. Luft (admitted *pro hac vice*) G. Alexander Bongartz (admitted *pro hac vice*) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6079 aviluft@paulhastings.com alexbongartz@paulhastings.com\n\n*and*\n\nNicholas A. Bassett (admitted *pro hac vice*) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C., 20036 (202) 551-1902 nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n*and*\n\nDouglas S. Skalka (ct00616) Patrick R. Linsey (ct29437) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 781-2847\n\ndskalka@npmlaw.com plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n*Counsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and Genever Holdings Corporation*\n\n# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| ------------------------------------------------------  | x           |                         |\n|---------------------------------------------------------|-------------|-------------------------|\n| In re:                                                  | :<br>:      | Chapter 11              |\n| HO WAN KWOK, et al.,1                                   | :<br>:      | Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |\n| Debtors.                                                | :<br>:<br>: | (Jointly Administered)  |\n| ------------------------------------------------------x |             |                         |\n\n## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nThe undersigned hereby certifies that on December 21, 2023, the foregoing Notice was electronically filed. Notice of this filing was sent by e-mail to all parties to the above-captioned chapter 11 case by operation of the Court's electronic filing (\"CM/ECF\") system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as indicated on the Notice of Electronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF system.\n\nDated: December 21, 2023 New York, New York\n\nBy: */s/ G. Alexander Bongartz*  G. Alexander Bongartz (admitted pro hac vice) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6079 alexbongartz@paulhastings.com\n\n*Counsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and Genever Holdings Corporation*\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and the Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\n# **Exhibit 1**\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\n-against-\n\nUSDC SDNY DOCUMENT ELECTRONICALLY FILED DOC #: \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_ DATE FILED: 12/21/2023\n\n# 23 Cr. 118-1 (AT)\n\nHO WAN KWOK, **ORDER**\n\nDefendant.\n\nANALISA TORRES, District Judge:\n\nDefendant, Ho Wan Kwok, seeks an order (1) staying several Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings involving him, ECF No. 129, and (2) directing the Government to produce its communications with the bankruptcy trustee and the Securities and Exchange Commission (\"SEC\"), ECF No. 141. For the reasons stated below, Kwok's motions are DENIED. 1\n\n## **BACKGROUND**\n\n### I. Bankruptcy Proceedings\n\nOn February 15, 2022, Kwok filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut. *In re Ho Wan Kwok*, Case No. 22-50073 (Bankr. D. Conn.), ECF No. 1.<sup>2</sup> On July 8, 2022, the Bankruptcy Court appointed Luc A. Despins as the bankruptcy trustee (the \"Trustee\"). Bankr. ECF No. 523. On October 14, 2022, the Bankruptcy Court consolidated the case with the Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings of two corporate affiliates controlled by Kwok, Genever Holdings Corporation and Genever Holdings LLC. Bankr. ECF No. 970.\n\n<sup>1</sup> On September 1 and October 5, 2023, Kwok's co-defendant, Yanping Wang, filed letters \"joining in\" Kwok's motions. *See* ECF Nos. 135, 153. The Court grants Wang's application to join in the motions to the extent that Kwok has moved for relief \"that would be applicable to [her] and to the extent that [she] would have standing to make such motions.\" *United States v. Nance*, 168 F. Supp. 3d 541, 554 (W.D.N.Y. 2016). Given that Wang adopts Kwok's arguments, her motions are also DENIED.\n\n<sup>2</sup> Citations to this Bankruptcy Court docket are styled Bankr. ECF No. #.\n\nOn March 29, 2023, a grand jury sitting in the Southern District of New York indicted Kwok on charges of (1) conspiracy to commit wire fraud, securities fraud, bank fraud, and money laundering; (2) wire fraud; (3) securities fraud; (4) international promotional money laundering; (5) international concealment money laundering; and (6) unlawful monetary transactions. 3 Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 19. Kwok and two co-defendants are charged with defrauding thousands of victims out of over \\$1 billion through a series of fraudulent businesses and investment opportunities; misappropriating victims' funds by laundering those funds through approximately 500 bank accounts associated with at least eighty entities or individuals in several countries; and improperly using those funds to enrich themselves. Superseding Indictment ¶¶ 1–3. Kwok allegedly used the fraud proceeds to purchase extravagant goods and assets for himself and his family, including homes and vehicles. *Id*.\n\nOne purchase at issue is real property located at 675 Ramapo Valley Road, Mahwah, New Jersey (the \"Mahwah Property\"). On March 15, 2023, the day that Kwok's original indictment became public, Federal Bureau of Investigation (\"FBI\") agents executed a search warrant at the Mahwah Property, \"meticulously document[ing] the premises and its contents\" and \"seiz[ing] voluminous physical evidence.\" Gov't Compel Opp. at 2, ECF No. 160. The Superseding Indictment identifies the Mahwah Property as property subject to forfeiture. *See*  Superseding Indictment ¶ 55(v).\n\nAround June 28, 2023, the Trustee \"advised the Government that he had concluded that the Mahwah [Property] is part of Kwok's [bankruptcy] estate.\" Gov't Compel Opp. at 3. Faced with potentially conflicting claims to the Mahwah Property—between bankruptcy creditors on\n\n<sup>3</sup> Kwok was originally indicted on March 6, 2023, ECF No. 1 at 38, and the indictment was unsealed on March 15, 2023, ECF No. 3. The Superseding Indictment added charges against Defendant Yanping Wang.\n\nthe one hand and fraud victims on the other—the Government and Trustee conferred and executed a settlement agreement (the \"Mahwah Settlement\"). *See* Bankr. ECF No. 2083 at ¶¶ 12, 14. Under the Mahwah Settlement, the Trustee is permitted to \"obtain control of and/or sell\" the Mahwah Property while the criminal case is pending, and the Government agrees not to oppose the Trustee's efforts to do so. 4 *Id.* at ¶ 14(a). The Government also provided the Trustee with twelve photographs taken during the FBI's search to \"illustrat[e] that Kwok used the Mahwah [Property] as a *personal* residence.\" Gov't Compel Opp. at 3 (emphasis in original).\n\nOn July 11, 2023, the Trustee initiated an adversary proceeding seeking to limit public access to the Mahwah Property. *Despins v. Taurus Fund LLC et al.*, Adv. Proc. No. 23-05017 (Bankr. D. Conn.), ECF No. 1. Kwok objected, arguing that he \"considers the Mahwah [Property] and its contents to be important evidence\" in his criminal case. Kwok Stay Mem. at 12, ECF No. 131. On August 31, 2023, the Bankruptcy Court entered a preliminary injunction (the \"Access Order\") restricting access to the Mahwah Property to certain security personnel, the Trustee, the Government, the FBI, other law enforcement, and others expressly authorized by the Trustee, this Court, or the Bankruptcy Court. *Despins*, Adv. Proc. No. 23-05017, ECF No. 58.\n\nThe Bankruptcy Court also authorized subpoenas permitting the Trustee to examine Kwok pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2004 and requiring him to produce documents in his possession. *See* Bankr. ECF Nos. 636, 757, 1046. On September 14, 2022, the Bankruptcy Court entered a consent order (the \"Privileges Order\"), \"confirming that the Trustee owns and controls the attorney-client privilege, work product protection and other privileges on issues related to the Debtor's assets and financial affairs and the administration of his estate.\"\n\n<sup>4</sup> The Trustee has requested the Bankruptcy Court's approval of the Mahwah Settlement; that motion is pending. *See* Bankr. ECF No. 2083.\n\nBankr. ECF No. 856 at 1. The Privileges Order bars Kwok from withholding documents requested in the subpoenas based on any privileges now held by the Trustee. *Id.* at 3. Then, on January 20, 2023, the Bankruptcy Court issued an order (the \"Subpoena Order\") compelling compliance with the subpoenas. Bankr. ECF No. 1353. Kwok invoked his right against selfincrimination under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Bankr. ECF Nos. 1444, 1650, and cross-moved to stay the Subpoena Order pending resolution of his criminal case, Bankr. ECF No. 1649. \"Given the serious nature of the issues involved, the [Bankruptcy] Court waited\" before ruling on the cross-motions, allowing Kwok time to review discovery in the criminal case. Bankr. ECF No. 2035 at 6. On July 26, 2023, the Bankruptcy Court issued an order (the \"Contempt Order\") denying Kwok's stay request and holding him in contempt for failing to comply with the Subpoena Order. *Id.* at 41.\n\n#### II. SEC Proceeding\n\nSeparately, on March 29, 2023—the same day that Kwok's indictment was unsealed the SEC charged him with violating the antifraud provisions of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. *See SEC v. Kwok*, No. 23 Civ. 2200 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 15, 2023), ECF No. 1 (the \"SEC Action\"). The SEC alleges that \"[s]ince in or about April 2020, [Kwok] has conducted fraudulent securities offerings . . . that have collectively raised at least hundreds of millions of dollars from investors in the United States and around the world.\" *Id.* ¶ 1. Specifically, it charges that Kwok \"pitched three unregistered securities offerings to investors as a means of obtaining shares in GTV Media Group, Inc. (\"GTV\"), a media company that Kwok founded, and a fourth offering as a means [of] obtain[ing] a crypto asset security called 'H-Coin' that he falsely claimed was backed by gold reserves.\" *Id.* ¶ 2. On April 28, 2023, the Honorable Paul\n\nG. Gardephe stayed the SEC Action pending the resolution of the criminal matter. *See* SEC Action, ECF No. 44.\n\n### **ANALYSIS**\n\nBefore the Court are two related motions. First, Kwok seeks an order staying the bankruptcy proceedings during the pendency of his criminal case, arguing that \"the Trustee is interfering with [] Kwok's rights as a criminal defendant and the sanctity of these proceedings.\" Kwok Stay Mem. at 2. Second, he seeks an order directing the Government to produce its communications with the Trustee and the SEC.\n\n### I. Motion to Stay Bankruptcy Cases\n\nKwok argues that, \"pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, and . . . the Court's inherent supervisory authority,\" the bankruptcy cases should be stayed. Kwok Stay Mem. at 1.\n\n- A. Bankruptcy Stay\n\t- 1. Legal Standard\n\nTo invoke the \"extraordinary remedy\" of staying a civil case pending the conclusion of a related criminal proceeding, a defendant bears the burden of demonstrating \"undue prejudice\" or \"interference with his constitutional rights.\" *Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc.*, 676 F.3d 83, 97–98 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Courts in this Circuit consider the following six factors in making that determination:\n\n1) the extent to which the issues in the criminal case overlap with those presented in the civil case; 2) the status of the case, including whether the defendants have been indicted; 3) the private interests of the plaintiffs in proceeding expeditiously weighed against the prejudice to plaintiffs caused by the delay; 4) the private interests of and burden on the defendants; 5) the interests of the courts; and 6) the public interest.\n\n*Citibank, N.A. v. Super Sayin' Publ'g, LLC*, 86 F. Supp. 3d 244, 246–47 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (citation omitted). These factors \"are not mechanical devices for churning out correct results.\" *Louis Vuitton*, 676 F.3d at 99. Rather, they are a \"rough guide\" for the \"district court's studied judgment as to whether the civil action should be stayed based on the particular facts before it and the extent to which such a stay would work a hardship, inequity, or injustice to a party, the public or the court.\" *Id.*\n\n\"[T]he Constitution rarely, if ever, *requires* such a stay.\" *Id.* at 98 (emphasis in original). <sup>5</sup> That said, \"the power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.\" *Id.* at 96 (quoting *Landis v. N. Am. Co.*, 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)).\n\n### 2. Analysis\n\nAs an initial matter, the parties dispute whether the Court has jurisdiction to stay bankruptcy proceedings pending in another district court. 6 *See* Trustee Stay Opp. at 11–13; Def. Stay Reply at 3–9. The Court shall not reach the jurisdictional question because Kwok has failed to make the necessary showing of prejudice to justify this extraordinary remedy.\n\n<sup>5</sup> For a defendant facing parallel civil and criminal proceedings, the Constitution does not afford him an \"absolute right not to be forced\" to choose between \"being prejudiced in the civil litigation, if the defendant asserts his or her Fifth Amendment privilege, or from being prejudiced in the criminal litigation if he or she waives that privilege in the civil litigation.\" *Louis Vuitton*, 676 F.3d at 97–98 (citation omitted).\n\n<sup>6</sup> Even if the Court has jurisdiction, it is doubtful that the Court should exercise it absent an extraordinary showing by Kwok. *See United States v. LaRouche Campaign*, 682 F. Supp. 627, 628–29 (D. Mass. 1987). Because the power to stay proceedings arises from a court's authority to control its own docket, an application to stay a proceeding is more appropriately presented to the court presiding over the proceeding—here, the Bankruptcy Court. Indeed, in each of Kwok's cited cases, the initial application was made in the court where the stay was sought. *See*  Kwok Stay Mem. at 14–16 (citing cases); *see also* SEC Action, ECF No. 42. Kwok admits that \"any one of these issues may be redressable in the Bankruptcy Court.\" Kwok Stay Mem. at 4. The Bankruptcy Court has carefully weighed complicated issues in this case so far, and the Court has no reason to doubt that it would not do the same here.\n\nAlthough a stay is \"most appropriate when a party to the civil case has already been indicted,\" *Trs. of Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat'l Pension Fund v. Transworld Mech., Inc.*, 886 F. Supp. 1134, 1139 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), \"[t]he most important factor at the threshold is the first factor: the degree to which the civil issues overlap with the criminal issues.\" *In re 650 Fifth Ave.*, No. 08 Civ. 10934, 2011 WL 3586169, at \\*3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Cases substantially overlap when they \"arise from the same facts and involve nearly identical issues.\" *Capak v. Epps*, No. 18 Civ. 4325, 2018 WL 6726553, at \\*3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2018) (citation omitted); *see SEC v. McGinnis*, 161 F. Supp. 3d 318, 323 (D. Vt. 2016) (examining the \"facts and circumstances . . . , the laws allegedly violated, and the evidence to be presented to a finder of fact\"). The Court finds that there is insufficient overlap between the bankruptcy and criminal cases.\n\nKwok initiated the bankruptcy proceedings more than a year before his criminal indictment, and their focus is to identify properties to compensate Kwok's creditors—not questions of criminal liability. \"Bankruptcy is an equitable remedy\" intended to \"facilitate rehabilitation or reorganization of [the debtor's] finances and to promote a 'fresh start' through the orderly disposition of assets to satisfy his creditors.\" *In re 9281 Shore Rd. Owners Corp.*, 187 B.R. 837, 848 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (quoting *Little Creek Dev. Co. v. Commonwealth Mortg. Corp.*, 779 F.2d 1068, 1071 (5th Cir. 1986)). Historically, a \"prime purpose[]\" of bankruptcy has been to ensure \"a ratable distribution among creditors of a bankrupt's assets; [and] to protect the creditors from one another.\" *Young v. Higbee Co.,* 324 U.S. 204, 210 (1945). In service of this objective, the Trustee is focused is on \"demonstrating that certain companies nominally owned by [Kwok]'s family members or business associates are, in reality, alter egos of [Kwok].\" Trustee Stay Opp. at 19.\n\nThe Superseding Indictment, by contrast, concerns alleged conduct by Kwok that is not at issue in the bankruptcy proceedings. Superseding Indictment ¶¶ 1, 13–23, 47–54 (alleging multiple fraudulent schemes and money laundering over the course of approximately five years from \"about 2018 through at least in or about March 2023\"). The Government must prove each element of the alleged offenses. For example, for the wire fraud counts under 18 U.S.C. § 1343, the Government must prove the existence of \"(i) a scheme to defraud (ii) to get money or property, (iii) furthered by the use of interstate wires.\" *United States v. Pierce*, 224 F.3d 158, 165 (2d Cir. 2000). To establish the first element, a scheme to defraud, \"the Government must prove (i) the existence of a scheme to defraud, (ii) the requisite scienter (or fraudulent intent) on the part of the defendant, and (iii) the materiality of the misrepresentations.\" *Id.* (citations omitted) (cleaned up). Kwok's intent and the materiality of his conduct, in addition to other key legal issues, are unique to the criminal proceeding. *See, e.g.*, Superseding Indictment ¶¶ 26–52 (counts requiring knowing intent or an intent to defraud); *see also United States v. Simon*, 373 F.2d 649, 653–54 (2d Cir. 1967) (holding that distinct legal issues weigh against a finding of overlap). 7\n\nKwok argues that the overlap is \"obvious and plain\" because the \"Trustee and the [G]overnment both assert . . . that certain property owned by others is, in reality, controlled by\" Kwok. Kwok Stay Reply at 10–11, ECF No. 152. But, even if there may be limited overlap between the bankruptcy and criminal proceedings, determinations in the Bankruptcy Court such as the ultimate owner of the Mahwah Property—are not dispositive in Kwok's criminal case, which requires a higher burden of proof. *See, e.g., In re Ngan Gung Rest., Inc.*, 195 B.R.\n\n<sup>7</sup> Although the Supreme Court later granted the parties' joint motion to vacate and remanded the case to be dismissed as moot, *Simon v. Wharton,* 389 U.S. 425 (1967) (per curiam), the Circuit's reasoning in *Simon* is relevant and persuasive.\n\n593, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting bankruptcy court's finding of debtor in contempt by \"clear and convincing evidence\" and not \"'beyond a reasonable doubt,' which would be required for a finding of criminal liability\"); *In re Dreier LLP*, 452 B.R. 391, 436 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that the \"[t]rustee bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence on all elements of a claim for constructive fraudulent transfer\" (quotation marks and citation omitted)). Moreover, Kwok identifies overlap in only a portion of the subject matter, which is insufficient. *See In re Bolin & Co., LLC*, No. 08 Civ. 1793, 2012 WL 3730410, at \\*2 (D. Conn. June 27, 2012) (denying a stay because \"the overlap is not complete\").\n\nKwok also points to the stay in the SEC Action as a justification for staying the bankruptcy proceedings. Kwok Stay Reply at 11–12. This argument is unavailing. Unlike the bankruptcy proceedings, the conduct alleged in the SEC's case against Kwok closely parallels the acts alleged in his criminal case. *See* ECF No. 130-7 (motion to stay SEC proceedings). Both involve the \"unregistered offering of common stock\" in GTV, \"false and misleading statements to investors\" regarding GTV's value, and Kwok's alleged efforts \"to solicit, launder, and misappropriate victim funds\" from April 2020 through March 2023. *Id.* at 2–3. The bankruptcy proceedings will not decide these issues. Therefore, the limited overlap between the bankruptcy and criminal proceedings weighs against a stay.\n\nThe Court must also consider the parties' interests and the potential prejudice of allowing the cases to proceed in tandem. At play are the Trustee's interest in proceeding expeditiously, the potential prejudice caused by a delay in the bankruptcy proceedings, the private interests of and burden on Kwok, and the interests of the judiciary and the public. *See Citibank, N.A.*, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 246–47.\n\nRegarding the Trustee's interest and the potential prejudice which may be caused by a stay, halting the bankruptcy proceedings would delay \"the resolution of thousands of claims and any distribution from [Kwok and the related entities'] assets.\" Trustee Stay Opp. at 19, ECF No. 145. Creditors might lose their only forum to resolve their claims, and the Trustee would be forced to pause his investigation into possible estate assets. *Id.* at 19–21. The Court has determined that Kwok's associates have already \"undertaken efforts to move or take control of potential estate assets.\" *Id.* at 20 (citing ECF No. 110). A stay could open the door to further asset transfers, dissipating the estate and reducing the possibility that creditors will be made whole.\n\nAs for Kwok's interests, he argues that three aspects of the bankruptcy proceedings intrude on his rights and compel a stay. First, Kwok contends that the Contempt Order threatens his Fifth Amendment rights. Kwok Stay Mem. at 18–19. Specifically, he argues that producing to the Trustee documents which Kwok received from the Government would \"implicitly authenticate the documents produced, and [that] such production could be 'a link in the chain of evidence' used to prosecute him.\" *Id.* at 18. This concern is now moot as the Trustee no longer seeks these documents. Trustee Stay Opp. at 23.\n\nKwok next argues that the bankruptcy proceedings threaten the status of the Mahwah Property and, in doing so, infringe on his rights under *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). He maintains that \"[a]bsent this Court's intervention to preserve the Mahwah [Property] and defense counsel's access to it, the 'fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice\" is put at risk.'\" Kwok Stay Mem. at 21 (quoting *United States v. Valenzuela–Bernal*, 458 U.S. 858, 872 (1982)). This concern is premature. The sale of the Mahwah Property is not imminent. And, pursuant to the Access Order, Kwok's counsel may access the Mahwah Property.\n\nFinally, Kwok argues that the Privileges Order gives the Government \"access to information that it would not otherwise be able to view,\" and allows his attorney-client privilege to \"be used as a sword against him.\" Kwok Stay Mem. at 23. The Court disagrees. A trustee, as is the case here, is vested with control over a debtor's attorney-client privilege. *Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub*, 471 U.S. 343, 354 (1985). Kwok speculates that the Trustee will indiscriminately seek to waive his privilege. *See* Kwok Stay Mem. at 24 (\"[T]he Trustee has no qualms about reporting [privileged] information directly to law enforcement, including the prosecutor's office handling this matter, and there would be nothing to stop him from sharing Mr. Kwok's privileged communications with the [G]overnment here once he is authorized to waive Mr. Kwok's privilege.\"). But, Kwok cites no evidence to support this claim. Indeed, pursuant to the Privileges Order, Kwok and the Trustee agreed that the Trustee would not waive the attorney-client privilege without Kwok's consent or an order of the Bankruptcy Court. *See* Privileges Order ¶ 8. The Privileges Order also preserves Kwok's ability to assert privileges regarding \"unrelated criminal allegations.\" *Id.* ¶ 4. Moreover, the Government represents that it \"has neither solicited nor received Kwok's potentially privileged information or records from the Trustee[,] does not presently intend to do so, and will not do so absent agreement from Kwok's counsel (or the appropriate holder) or an order of this Court finding that such materials are not privileged and/or subject to the crime-fraud exception.\" Gov't Stay Ltr. at 2. As such, Kwok's concern is without merit and premature.\n\nWeighing these factors, as well as the judiciary's interest in maintaining a wellfunctioning and efficient court system, the Court concludes that Kwok has not satisfied his burden of showing \"undue prejudice\" or \"interference with his constitutional rights.\" *Louis*  *Vuitton*, 676 F.3d at 97–98. Accordingly, his motion to stay the bankruptcy proceedings is DENIED.\n\nB. Alternative Relief\n\nIn the alternative, Kwok seeks an order (1) modifying the Protective Order, ECF No. 63, to allow for production to the Trustee of discovery provided by the Government in his criminal case; (2) directing that his defense team be permitted access to the Mahwah Property, and forbidding the sale of the property; and (3) prohibiting the Government from soliciting or receiving privileged materials from the Trustee. Kwok Stay Mem. at 1.\n\n1. Modification of the Protective Order\n\nKwok's request to modify the Protective Order to allow for production to the Trustee of discovery provided by the Government in his criminal case, *see* Kwok Stay Mem. at 28, is now moot because the Trustee no longer seeks the documents provided by the Government to Kwok, and will seek to modify the Contempt Order accordingly, Trustee Stay Opp. at 23.\n\n2. Order Preserving Status Quo of the Mahwah Facility\n\nThe Court denies Kwok's request for an order \"preserving the status quo of the Mahwah [Property,] . . . guaranteeing access to the property by Mr. Kwok's legal team[,] . . . [and] expressly disallowing the Trustee from moving, altering, or modifying the Mahwah [Property] or its contents.\" Kwok Stay Mem. at 29. Kwok's spoliation concern rests on mere suspicion. The sale of the property is not imminent, Kwok's legal team has access to the Mahwah Property pursuant to the Access Order, and the Government has produced \"thousands of photographs, as well as videos\" of the property. Gov't Stay Ltr. at 5. Further, Kwok does not sufficiently explain how changes to the Mahwah Property today would bear on evidence of its nature and use between 2018 and 2023, the time period at issue in the Superseding Indictment. As such, the Court is not persuaded that the requested relief is warranted.\n\n3. Order Preventing Communication Between the Government and Trustee\n\nKwok's claim that the Trustee has shared privileged information with the Government, thereby necessitating an order preventing communication between the Government and the Trustee, is unsubstantiated. Kwok Stay Mem. at 29. Both the Government and the Trustee deny any improper disclosure of Kwok's privileged information. Gov't Stay Ltr. at 2; Trustee Stay Opp. at 25. The request is, therefore, denied. The Court further notes that the Bankruptcy Court is capable of ensuring compliance with the Privileges Order and adjudicating Kwok's privilege concerns.\n\nAccordingly, Kwok's requests for alternative relief are also DENIED.\n\n#### II. Motion to Compel Discovery\n\n#### A. Legal Standard\n\nKwok also moves to compel the production of material pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.<sup>8</sup> Under Rule 16, the Government must produce, upon defense request, items \"within the [its] possession, custody, or control\" that are \"material to preparing the defense.\" Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E). An item is \"material to preparing the defense\" under Rule 16 \"if it could be used to counter the [G]overnment's case or to bolster a defense.\" *United*\n\n<sup>8</sup> Kwok also suggests, in passing, that he may be entitled to additional materials under *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). *See, e.g.*, Kwok Compel Mem. at 14, 18 n.8. Under *Brady*, the Government must disclose to a criminal defendant any material exculpatory information \"in time for its effective use at trial.\" *United States v. Coppa*, 267 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 2001). \"*Brady*, however, establishes no general right of pretrial discovery and gives rise to no pretrial remedies.\" *United States v. Kelly*, 91 F. Supp. 2d 580, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing *Weatherford v. Bursey*, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977)); *see also United States v. Louis*, No. 04 Cr. 203, 2005 WL 180885, at \\*2 & n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2005) (explaining that Rule 16 is \"the sole authorized vehicle under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for pre-trial discovery in criminal cases\"). At this stage, therefore, the Court analyzes only whether Kwok's discovery requests meet the Rule 16 standard.\n\n*States v. Stevens*, 985 F.2d 1175, 1180 (2d Cir. 1993). \"A defendant bears the burden to make a prima facie showing that information sought is material.\" *United States v. Alexandre*, No. 22 Cr. 326, 2023 WL 416405, at \\*9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2023) (quotation marks and citation omitted).\n\nPursuant to Rule 16, the Government may be obligated to disclose \"materials relevant to the coordination\" between the prosecution and another investigating agency. *Alexandre*, 2023 WL 416405, at \\*10. This is so because, although \"[i]t is well established that the Government may conduct simultaneous criminal and civil investigations of the same targets and subject matters,\" \"it is equally well established that there are some due process limitations on the coordination\" of such investigations. *United States v. Rhodes*, No. 18 Cr. 887, 2019 WL 3162221, at \\*3 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2019). Courts in this Circuit have held that a defendant seeking coordination-related discovery must make a \"substantial preliminary showing of bad faith.\" *Id.* at \\*4 (citing *United States v. Gel Spice Co.*, 773 F.2d 427, 432 (2d Cir. 1985)); *accord Alexandre*, 2023 WL 416405, at \\*10.\n\nKwok—citing *United States v. Martoma*, 990 F. Supp. 2d 458, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) argues that \"no substantial preliminary showing of bad faith is needed.\" Kwok Compel Reply at 11, ECF No. 163. But, *Martoma* contemplates a factual scenario where the prosecution and another agency engaged in a \"joint investigation,\" which would obligate the Government to search for and produce *Brady* materials contained in another agency's files. 990 F. Supp. 2d at 460. In the case of a joint investigation, a preliminary showing of bad faith is not required. Kwok, however, expressly denies that he is asking for this Court to label the Government's coordination with the Trustee or SEC a joint investigation. *See* Kwok Compel Reply at 1 (labeling the joint-investigation inquiry a \"red herring\"); *see also id.* at 15. Instead, he seeks \"additional discovery in service of making such a showing\"—a request which, under *Gel Spice*,\n\nis subject to a bad-faith requirement. *Rhodes*, 2019 WL 3162221, at \\*3; *see id.* (citing *Gel Spice*, 773 F.2d at 434).\n\nB. Communications Between the Government and Bankruptcy Trustee\n\nKwok seeks to compel disclosure of \"all communications and documents exchanged between the [G]overnment and [] the Trustee and his agents.\" Kwok Compel Mem. at 13, ECF No. 143.\n\nFirst, Kwok contends that the Mahwah Settlement \"threatens [his] right to present a defense and to obtain exculpatory evidence.\" *Id.* at 16. He argues that by entering into the Mahwah Settlement, which permits the Trustee to \"dispose of the Mahwah [Property] before trial,\" the Government is greenlighting the spoliation of evidence contained in the property. *Id.*  at 17. But, as discussed above, Kwok's spoliation concerns are premature and unfounded. The Government represents that there is no imminent sale of the Mahwah Property, Gov't Stay Ltr. at 5, and that it has exhaustively documented the Property's contents and produced that information to Kwok, Gov't Compel Mem. at 19–20. Further, the Bankruptcy Court will not determine whether the Mahwah Property is property of the estate until the completion of the Trustee's adversary proceeding—and even then, any proposed sale will be subject to the Bankruptcy Court's review. *See* Bankr. ECF No. 2083 at 20. Any alleged spoliation of evidence is hypothetical and, therefore, insufficient to demonstrate bad faith.\n\nSecond, Kwok complains that the Trustee \"has possession of and is seeking additional material that is subject to Mr. Kwok's privileges,\" and has shared privileged information with the Government. Kwok Compel Mem. at 18. But, Kwok offers no evidence to substantiate his allegations, and the Government states that it \"has neither solicited nor received Kwok's potentially privileged information or records from the Trustee.\" Gov't Stay Ltr. At 2. Without\n\nany reason to doubt \"the accuracy of the Government's representations, the Court accepts those representations as sufficient\" and declines to infer bad faith. *United States v. Middendorf*, No. 18 Cr. 36, 2018 WL 3956494, at \\*5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2018).\n\nThird, Kwok argues that he needs access to the Government's communications with the Trustee to (1) \"fully investigate whether the Trustee is acting as a *de facto* member of the prosecution team,\" and (2) potentially, bring a joint-investigation motion. Kwok Compel Mem. at 19. Kwok does not (and cannot) argue, however, that the potential usefulness of the information fulfills the bad-faith requirement. Nor will the Court infer bad faith based on Kwok's unfounded allegations that the Trustee is sharing privileged information with the Government. *See* Kwok Compel Mem. at 2–3; *supra* at 10–11.\n\nThe Court finds that Kwok has failed to make \"a substantial preliminary showing of bad faith\" or improper coordination between the Government and the Trustee. His request for the Government's communications with the Trustee is, therefore, DENIED.\n\n#### C. Communications Between the Government and SEC\n\nKwok also moves to compel the Government to produce \"its communications with the SEC concerning the subject matter of the Indictment.\"<sup>9</sup> Kwok Compel Mem. at 22. He contends that the communications will \"reveal other examples of cooperation\" and \"further demonstrat[e] that the SEC and the [G]overnment have engaged in a joint investigation here and what information was shared between them as part of their joint investigation.\" *Id.* Again, Kwok fails to establish bad faith entitling him to this discovery.\n\n<sup>9</sup> In his opening brief, Kwok at times appears to suggest that the Government and SEC engaged in a joint investigation, entitling him to *Brady* and Rule 16 discovery from the SEC's records. *See, e.g.*, Kwok Compel Mem. at 20–21. Because Kwok expressly disclaims that argument in his reply, the Court does not consider whether the coordination between the agencies amounts to a joint investigation. *See* Kwok Compel Reply at 2–3.\n\n\"[T]here is no general rule preventing the SEC's sharing of evidence acquired through civil discovery with criminal prosecutors.\" *United States v. Fiore*, 381 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2004). Although Kwok notes that the SEC has shared information and analysis with the Government, *see* Kwok Compel Mem. at 20–21, \"the fact that . . . there was coordination and sharing . . . is, in itself, unexceptional and unproblematic.\" *Rhodes*, 2019 WL 3162221, at \\*3. Whether Kwok is entitled to further information about the agencies' coordination, therefore, turns on whether he has made a substantial preliminary showing of bad faith—for example, that the SEC \"hid[] the possibility of a criminal investigation from him\" or \"conducted the civil investigation 'solely' to assist the criminal one.\" *Id.* at \\*4 (citing *United States v. Kordel*, 397 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1970)).\n\nBeyond pointing out instances of cooperation between the SEC and the Government, however, Kwok adduces no evidence that the agencies acted in bad faith. He does not contend that the SEC hid from him the possibility of a parallel criminal investigation. Nor does he argue that the SEC conducted its investigation solely to assist the criminal prosecution.\n\nAs in *Rhodes* and *Alexandre*, the record reveals no improper coordination between the Government and the SEC. AUSA Juliana N. Murray affirms under penalty of perjury that \"the Government played no role in the SEC's charging decisions or the developments of the SEC's litigation strategy.\" Murray Aff. ¶ 2, ECF No. 160-1; *see Rhodes*, 2019 WL 3162221, at \\*5; *Alexandre*, 2023 WL 416405, at \\*11. \"By itself, that unambiguous statement refutes any suggestion that the SEC issued the subpoena, or gathered documents pursuant to it, solely (or even partly) to further the criminal investigation.\" *Rhodes*, WL 3162221, at \\*5. In *Rhodes*, moreover, the court was troubled by the SEC's decision not to charge the defendant despite a lengthy investigation. *Id.* (\"[T]here is one mystery that remains unsolved—namely, why the\n\nSEC, despite its extensive investigation of, and settlement discussions with, Rhodes, has not brought civil fraud charges against him.\"). Here, by contrast, the SEC initiated a civil action against Kwok—and although that case is stayed, \"there is no indication that the [SEC] does not intend to resume prosecuting its case immediately following the completion of these criminal proceedings.\" *Alexandre*, 2023 WL 416405, at \\*11.\n\nAccordingly, because Kwok has failed to make a substantial preliminary showing of bad faith, his request for production of communications between the Government and the SEC is DENIED.\n\n### **CONCLUSION**\n\nFor the reasons stated above, Kwok's motions are DENIED. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the motions at ECF Nos. 129 and 141.\n\nSO ORDERED.\n\nDated: December 21, 2023 New York, New York","body_zh":"美国破产法院 康涅狄格联邦地区 布里奇波特分院\n\n------------------------------------------------------　x\n\n关于：　:\n:　第11章\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，　:\n:　案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。1　:\n:　合并管理\n\nx\n\n第11章受托人及 Genever 债务人就债务人在刑事案件中提出请求裁定中止本第11章案件及相关对抗程序之动议的进一步更新通知\n\n根据日期为 August 30, 2023 的通知 [Docket No. 2158]，Luc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯）作为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（“债务人”）的第11章受托人（“受托人”），告知本院及利害关系方，债务人已在 United States District Court for the Southern District of New York（纽约南区联邦地区法院）对其审理中的刑事案件 [Case No. 1:23-cr-00118-AT]（“刑事案件”）中提出一项动议（“中止动议”），请求中止上述第11章案件及所有相关对抗程序。\n\n根据日期为 September 27, 2023 的通知，受托人、Genever Holdings LLC（“Genever BVI”）及 Genever Holdings Corporation（“Genever US”，并与 Genever BVI 合称“Genever 债务人”）向本院及利害关系方提供了更新，并附上由下列主体就中止动议提交的答复：(i) United States Department of Justice（美国司法部），(ii) 第11章受托人及 Genever 债务人，以及 (iii) The Sherry-Netherland, Inc.（谢里-内瑟兰公司）；该通知还附上无担保债权人正式委员会加入受托人及 Genever 债务人所提交答复的声明。\n\n1 本第11章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（亦称 Guo Wengui、Miles Guo 和 Miles Kwok，以及众多其他别名）（税务识别号码后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（税务识别号码后四位：8202）及 Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 和 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为 Paul Hastings LLP（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所），200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166，c/o Luc A. Despins，作为 Ho Wan Kwok 遗产的受托人（仅为通知及通信之目的）。\n\n受托人及 Genever 债务人希望向本院及利害关系方提供进一步更新，即纽约南区联邦地区法院已驳回中止动议。随附驳回中止动议的命令副本，作为附件1。\n\n日期：December 21, 2023 New York, New York\n\n签字：/s/ G. Alexander Bongartz\n\nAvram E. Luft（阿夫拉姆·E·卢夫特）（获准临时出庭）\nG. Alexander Bongartz（G. 亚历山大·邦加茨）（获准临时出庭）\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, New York 10166\n(212) 318-6079\naviluft@paulhastings.com\nalexbongartz@paulhastings.com\n\n以及\n\nNicholas A. Bassett（尼古拉斯·A·巴塞特）（获准临时出庭）\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP\n2050 M Street NW\nWashington, D.C., 20036\n(202) 551-1902\nnicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n以及\n\nDouglas S. Skalka（道格拉斯·S·斯卡尔卡）（ct00616）\nPatrick R. Linsey（帕特里克·R·林赛）（ct29437）\nNEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C.\n195 Church Street, 13th Floor\nNew Haven, Connecticut 06510\n(203) 781-2847\n\ndskalka@npmlaw.com\nplinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n第11章受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 及 Genever Holdings Corporation 的代理律师\n\n美国破产法院 康涅狄格联邦地区 布里奇波特分院\n\n------------------------------------------------------　x\n\n关于：　:\n:　第11章\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，1　:\n:　案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。　:\n:\n:　（合并管理）\n\n送达证明\n\n下列签署人特此证明，于 December 21, 2023，前述通知已以电子方式提交。通过法院电子提交（“CM/ECF”）系统的运行，已向上述第11章案件的所有当事方以电子邮件发送本次提交的通知；对于不能接受电子提交者，则依电子提交通知中所示通过邮件发送。各方可通过法院的 CM/ECF 系统查阅本次提交。\n\n日期：December 21, 2023 New York, New York\n\n签字：/s/ G. Alexander Bongartz\nG. Alexander Bongartz（G. 亚历山大·邦加茨）（获准临时出庭）\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, New York 10166\n(212) 318-6079\nalexbongartz@paulhastings.com\n\n第11章受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 及 Genever Holdings Corporation 的代理律师\n\n1 本第11章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（亦称 Guo Wengui、Miles Guo 和 Miles Kwok，以及众多其他别名）（税务识别号码后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（税务识别号码后四位：8202）及 Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 和 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为 Paul Hastings LLP，200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166，c/o Luc A. Despins，作为 Ho Wan Kwok 遗产的受托人（仅为通知及通信之目的）。\n\n附件1\n\n美国联邦地区法院 纽约南区\n\n美利坚合众国，\n\n-诉-\n\nUSDC SDNY 文件\n电子提交\n文件编号：____________________\n提交日期：12/21/2023\n23 Cr. 118-1 (AT)\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），　　　　　　　　　　　命令\n\n被告。\n\nANALISA TORRES（阿纳莉萨·托雷斯），地区法官：\n\n被告 Ho Wan Kwok 请求作出命令：(1) 中止涉及其本人的数个第11章破产程序，ECF No. 129；以及 (2) 指示政府交出其与破产受托人及 Securities and Exchange Commission（证券交易委员会）（“SEC”）之间的通信，ECF No. 141。基于以下理由，Kwok 的动议予以驳回。1\n\n背景\n\n一、破产程序\n\n于 February 15, 2022，Kwok 向 Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut（康涅狄格联邦地区破产法院）申请第11章破产。In re Ho Wan Kwok, Case No. 22-50073 (Bankr. D. Conn.), ECF No. 1。2 于 July 8, 2022，破产法院指定 Luc A. Despins 为破产受托人（“受托人”）。Bankr. ECF No. 523。于 October 14, 2022，破产法院将该案件与由 Kwok 控制的两家关联公司 Genever Holdings Corporation 和 Genever Holdings LLC 的第11章破产程序合并。Bankr. ECF No. 970。\n\n1 于 September 1 和 October 5, 2023，Kwok 的共同被告 Yanping Wang（王艳萍）提交信函，“加入”Kwok 的动议。见 ECF Nos. 135, 153。本院准许 Wang 加入该等动议的申请，但仅限于 Kwok 所请求的“可适用于[其]的救济，以及[其]具有提出该等动议资格的范围内”。United States v. Nance, 168 F. Supp. 3d 541, 554 (W.D.N.Y. 2016)。鉴于 Wang 采纳 Kwok 的论点，其动议亦予驳回。\n\n2 对本破产法院案卷的引注格式为 Bankr. ECF No. #。\n\n于 March 29, 2023，纽约南区大陪审团以以下罪名起诉 Kwok：(1) 共谋实施电信诈骗、证券诈骗、银行诈骗和洗钱；(2) 电信诈骗；(3) 证券诈骗；(4) 国际促成型洗钱；(5) 国际隐匿型洗钱；以及 (6) 非法货币交易。3 Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 19。Kwok 及两名共同被告被控通过一系列欺诈性企业和投资机会，诈骗数千名受害人逾 $1 billion；通过与多个国家至少八十个实体或个人有关联的大约 500 个银行账户洗白该等资金，从而侵吞受害人的资金；并不当使用该等资金使其自身获利。Superseding Indictment ¶¶ 1–3。据称，Kwok 使用诈骗所得为其本人及家人购买奢侈物品和资产，包括住宅及车辆。Id.\n\n涉案的一项购买为位于 675 Ramapo Valley Road, Mahwah, New Jersey 的不动产（“Mahwah 房产”）。于 March 15, 2023，即 Kwok 的原始起诉书公开之日，Federal Bureau of Investigation（联邦调查局）（“FBI”）特工在 Mahwah 房产执行搜查令，“细致记录该处所及其内容物”并“扣押大量实物证据”。Gov't Compel Opp. at 2, ECF No. 160。修正起诉书将 Mahwah 房产列为应予没收的财产。见 Superseding Indictment ¶ 55(v)。\n\n约于 June 28, 2023，受托人“告知政府，其已认定 Mahwah [房产] 属于 Kwok 的[破产]财产”。Gov't Compel Opp. at 3。面对 Mahwah 房产上可能相互冲突的主张——一方为破产债权人，另一方为诈骗受害人——政府与受托人进行了协商，并签署了一项和解协议（“Mahwah 和解协议”）。见 Bankr. ECF No. 2083 at ¶¶ 12, 14。根据 Mahwah 和解协议，受托人在刑事案件审理期间获准“取得控制权及/或出售”Mahwah 房产，且政府同意不反对受托人为此所作的努力。4 Id. at ¶ 14(a)。政府还向受托人提供了在 FBI 搜查期间拍摄的十二张照片，以“说明 Kwok 将 Mahwah [房产] 用作个人住所”。Gov't Compel Opp. at 3（原文强调）。\n\n于 July 11, 2023，受托人提起对抗程序，请求限制公众进入 Mahwah 房产。Despins v. Taurus Fund LLC et al., Adv. Proc. No. 23-05017 (Bankr. D. Conn.), ECF No. 1。Kwok 提出异议，主张其“认为 Mahwah [房产] 及其内容物是其刑事案件中的重要证据”。Kwok Stay Mem. at 12, ECF No. 131。于 August 31, 2023，破产法院发布初步禁令（“访问命令”），将进入 Mahwah 房产的权限限制于特定安保人员、受托人、政府、FBI、其他执法部门，以及受托人、本院或破产法院明确授权的其他人员。Despins, Adv. Proc. No. 23-05017, ECF No. 58。\n\n破产法院还授权发出传票，允许受托人根据 Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2004（联邦破产程序规则第2004条）对 Kwok 进行审查，并要求其提交由其占有的文件。见 Bankr. ECF Nos. 636, 757, 1046。于 September 14, 2022，破产法院作出同意命令（“特权命令”），“确认受托人拥有并控制与债务人资产和财务事务以及其遗产管理有关问题上的律师—当事人特权、工作成果保护及其他特权。” Bankr. ECF No. 856 at 1。特权命令禁止 Kwok 基于目前由受托人持有的任何特权，拒绝提交传票所要求的文件。Id. at 3。其后，于 January 20, 2023，破产法院作出命令（“传票命令”），强制遵守传票。Bankr. ECF No. 1353。Kwok 援引美国宪法第五修正案规定的反对自证其罪权利，Bankr. ECF Nos. 1444, 1650，并提出交叉动议，请求在其刑事案件解决前中止传票命令，Bankr. ECF No. 1649。“鉴于所涉问题的严重性质，[破产]法院在作出裁决前予以等待”，以给予 Kwok 时间审阅刑事案件中的证据开示材料。Bankr. ECF No. 2035 at 6。于 July 26, 2023，破产法院作出命令（“藐视法庭命令”），驳回 Kwok 的中止请求，并因其未遵守传票命令而认定其藐视法庭。Id. at 41。\n\n二、SEC 程序\n\n此外，2023年3月29日——即 Kwok（郭文贵）的起诉书被解封的同一天——美国证券交易委员会（SEC）指控其违反《1933年证券法》第17(a)条、《1934年证券交易法》第10(b)条及其项下 Rule 10b-5 的反欺诈规定。见 SEC v. Kwok, No. 23 Civ. 2200 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 15, 2023), ECF No. 1（“SEC Action”）。SEC 指称，“[s]ince in or about April 2020, [Kwok] has conducted fraudulent securities offerings . . . that have collectively raised at least hundreds of millions of dollars from investors in the United States and around the world。”Id. ¶ 1。具体而言，其指控 Kwok“向投资者推介了三项未经注册的证券发行，以此作为取得其创办的媒体公司 GTV Media Group, Inc.（GTV）股份的手段；并推介了第四项发行，以此作为取得一种名为‘H-Coin’的加密资产证券的手段，而其虚假声称该证券有黄金储备支持。”Id. ¶ 2。2023年4月28日，尊敬的 Paul G. Gardephe 法官在刑事案件审结前中止了 SEC Action。见 SEC Action, ECF No. 44。\n\n分析\n\n本院面前有两项相关动议。第一，Kwok 寻求一项裁定，在其刑事案件审理期间中止破产程序，理由是“the Trustee is interfering with [] Kwok's rights as a criminal defendant and the sanctity of these proceedings。”Kwok Stay Mem. at 2。第二，其寻求一项裁定，指示政府提交其与受托人及 SEC 之间的通信。\n\nI. 中止破产案件的动议\n\nKwok 主张，“pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, and . . . the Court's inherent supervisory authority”，应中止破产案件。Kwok Stay Mem. at 1。\n\nA. 破产程序中止\n\n1. 法律标准\n\n为援引在相关刑事程序结束前中止民事案件这一“非常救济”，被告负有证明存在“不当损害”或“干扰其宪法权利”的责任。Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 97–98 (2d Cir. 2012)（省略内部引号和引文）。本巡回区法院在作出该判断时考虑以下六项因素：\n\n1）刑事案件中的争点与民事案件中提出的争点重叠的程度；2）案件的状态，包括被告是否已被起诉；3）原告迅速推进案件的私人利益，与延误对原告造成的损害之间的权衡；4）被告的私人利益及其负担；5）法院的利益；以及 6）公共利益。\n\nCitibank, N.A. v. Super Sayin' Publ'g, LLC, 86 F. Supp. 3d 244, 246–47 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)（省略引文）。这些因素“并非用于机械地产生正确结果的工具”。Louis Vuitton, 676 F.3d at 99。相反，它们是对“地区法院经过审慎研究后，就应否基于其面前的具体事实中止民事诉讼，以及此类中止将在何种程度上给一方当事人、公众或法院造成困难、不公平或不正义所作判断”的“粗略指引”。Id.\n\n“[T]he Constitution rarely, if ever, requires such a stay。”Id. at 98（原文强调）。5 尽管如此，“中止程序的权力附随于每一法院固有的权力，即为自身、律师和诉讼当事人节省时间和精力而控制其案卷上案件处置的权力。”Id. at 96（引自 Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)）。\n\n2. 分析\n\n首先，各方就本院是否有管辖权中止在另一地区法院待决的破产程序存在争议。6 见 Trustee Stay Opp. at 11–13; Def. Stay Reply at 3–9。本院不对管辖权问题作出裁决，因为 Kwok 未能作出证明存在损害的必要举示，以证明采取这一非常救济具有正当性。\n\n5 对于同时面临民事和刑事程序的被告，宪法并未赋予其“绝对权利，使其不被迫”在以下两者之间作出选择：“如果被告主张其第五修正案特权，则在民事诉讼中受到损害；或者，如果其在民事诉讼中放弃该特权，则在刑事诉讼中受到损害。”Louis Vuitton, 676 F.3d at 97–98（省略引文）。\n\n6 即使本院具有管辖权，如无 Kwok 作出的非常举示，本院是否应行使该管辖权亦属可疑。见 United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 682 F. Supp. 627, 628–29 (D. Mass. 1987)。由于中止程序的权力源于法院控制其自身案卷的权力，中止程序的申请更适宜向主持该程序的法院提出——本案中即破产法院。事实上，在 Kwok 所援引的每个案件中，最初申请均向寻求中止所在地的法院提出。见 Kwok Stay Mem. at 14–16（引用案件）；另见 SEC Action, ECF No. 42。Kwok 承认，“any one of these issues may be redressable in the Bankruptcy Court。”Kwok Stay Mem. at 4。迄今为止，破产法院已审慎权衡本案中的复杂争点，本院没有理由怀疑其不会在此处作出同样处理。\n\n尽管当民事案件的一方当事人已被起诉时，中止“最为适当”，Trs. of Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat'l Pension Fund v. Transworld Mech., Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1134, 1139 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)，“在门槛上最重要的因素是第一项因素：民事争点与刑事争点重叠的程度”。In re 650 Fifth Ave., No. 08 Civ. 10934, 2011 WL 3586169, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2011)（省略引号和引文）。当案件“源于相同事实并涉及几乎相同的争点”时，案件即构成实质性重叠。Capak v. Epps, No. 18 Civ. 4325, 2018 WL 6726553, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2018)（省略引文）；另见 SEC v. McGinnis, 161 F. Supp. 3d 318, 323 (D. Vt. 2016)（审查“facts and circumstances . . . , the laws allegedly violated, and the evidence to be presented to a finder of fact”）。本院认定，破产案件与刑事案件之间的重叠不足。\n\nKwok 在其刑事起诉书提出一年多前启动破产程序，其重点在于识别用于补偿 Kwok 债权人的财产，而非刑事责任问题。“破产是一种衡平救济”，旨在“促进[债务人]财务的恢复或重组，并通过有序处分资产以清偿其债权人，从而促进‘重新开始’。”In re 9281 Shore Rd. Owners Corp., 187 B.R. 837, 848 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)（引自 Little Creek Dev. Co. v. Commonwealth Mortg. Corp., 779 F.2d 1068, 1071 (5th Cir. 1986)）。从历史上看，破产的“一项主要目的”是确保“在债权人之间按比例分配破产人的资产；[并且]保护债权人彼此不受损害。”Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204, 210 (1945)。为实现该目标，受托人专注于“证明名义上由[Kwok]的家庭成员或商业伙伴拥有的某些公司，实际上是[Kwok]的另一个自我”。Trustee Stay Opp. at 19。\n\n相较之下，修正起诉书涉及 Kwok 被指控实施、但并非破产程序争点的行为。Superseding Indictment ¶¶ 1, 13–23, 47–54（指控自“about 2018 through at least in or about March 2023”约五年期间的多项欺诈计划及洗钱行为）。政府必须证明被指控罪行的每一项要件。例如，对于依据 18 U.S.C. § 1343 提出的电信欺诈罪名项，政府必须证明“(i) a scheme to defraud (ii) to get money or property, (iii) furthered by the use of interstate wires”的存在。United States v. Pierce, 224 F.3d 158, 165 (2d Cir. 2000)。为证明第一项要件，即欺诈计划，“政府必须证明（i）存在欺诈计划，（ii）被告具有必要的主观明知要素（或欺诈意图），以及（iii）虚假陈述具有重大性。”Id.（省略引文）（清理后）。除其他关键法律问题外，Kwok 的意图及其行为的重大性均为刑事程序所特有。见，例如，Superseding Indictment ¶¶ 26–52（要求具有明知意图或欺诈意图的罪名项）；另见 United States v. Simon, 373 F.2d 649, 653–54 (2d Cir. 1967)（认为不同的法律争点不利于作出存在重叠的认定）。7\n\nKwok 主张，重叠“obvious and plain”，因为“Trustee and the [G]overnment both assert . . . that certain property owned by others is, in reality, controlled by” Kwok。Kwok Stay Reply at 10–11, ECF No. 152。然而，即使破产程序与刑事程序之间可能存在有限重叠，破产法院所作的诸如 Mahwah Property 的最终所有人之类的认定，对于 Kwok 的刑事案件并无决定性作用；该刑事案件要求更高的证明标准。见，例如，In re Ngan Gung Rest., Inc., 195 B.R. 593, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)（指出破产法院以“clear and convincing evidence”而非认定刑事责任所需的“‘beyond a reasonable doubt’”标准，认定债务人藐视法庭）；In re Dreier LLP, 452 B.R. 391, 436 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011)（认为“[t]rustee bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence on all elements of a claim for constructive fraudulent transfer”）（省略引号和引文）。此外，Kwok 仅指出部分事项存在重叠，这并不足够。见 In re Bolin & Co., LLC, No. 08 Civ. 1793, 2012 WL 3730410, at *2 (D. Conn. June 27, 2012)（因“the overlap is not complete”而驳回中止申请）。\n\nKwok 还援引 SEC Action 中的中止，作为中止破产程序的理由。Kwok Stay Reply at 11–12。该论点不能成立。与破产程序不同，SEC 在针对 Kwok 的案件中所指控的行为，与其刑事案件中被指控的行为密切平行。见 ECF No. 130-7（中止 SEC 程序的动议）。二者均涉及 GTV 中普通股的“unregistered offering”、就 GTV 价值向投资者作出的“false and misleading statements”，以及 Kwok 被指控自 April 2020 至 March 2023 为“to solicit, launder, and misappropriate victim funds”所作的努力。Id. at 2–3。破产程序不会裁决这些问题。因此，破产程序与刑事程序之间的有限重叠不利于中止。\n\n本院还必须考虑各方利益，以及允许案件并行推进可能造成的损害。需要考虑的包括受托人迅速推进程序的利益、延误破产程序可能造成的损害、Kwok 的私人利益及其负担，以及司法机关和公众的利益。见 Citibank, N.A., 86 F. Supp. 3d at 246–47。\n\n关于受托人的利益以及中止可能造成的潜在不利影响，暂停破产程序将延迟“对数千项请求的解决，以及从[Kwok（郭文贵）及相关实体]资产中进行的任何分配。” Trustee Stay Opp. at 19, ECF No. 145。债权人可能失去解决其请求的唯一平台，且受托人将被迫暂停其对可能构成破产财产的资产所进行的调查。Id. at 19–21。法院已认定，Kwok的关联人士已“采取行动转移或取得对可能构成破产财产的资产的控制权。” Id. at 20（引用 ECF No. 110）。中止可能为进一步的资产转移打开方便之门，耗散破产财产，并降低债权人获得完全清偿的可能性。\n\n至于Kwok的利益，他主张破产程序的三个方面侵犯其权利，因而有必要中止程序。首先，Kwok主张，Contempt Order（藐视法庭裁定）威胁其《美国宪法第五修正案》权利。Kwok Stay Mem. at 18–19。具体而言，他主张，向受托人提交Kwok从政府获得的文件将“默示地认证所提交的文件，且该等提交可能成为用于起诉他的‘证据链中的一环’。” Id. at 18。由于受托人已不再寻求这些文件，该担忧现已无实际意义。Trustee Stay Opp. at 23。\n\nKwok继而主张，破产程序威胁Mahwah Property（马瓦房产）的现状，并由此侵犯其根据 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) 享有的权利。他坚持认为，“‘如无法院介入以保全Mahwah [Property]并保障辩护律师对其的访问，则“司法概念本身所必不可少的基本公正”将受到威胁。’” Kwok Stay Mem. at 21（引用 United States v. Valenzuela–Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 872 (1982)）。该担忧为时过早。Mahwah Property的出售并不迫在眉睫。并且，根据 Access Order（访问命令），Kwok的律师可以进入Mahwah Property。\n\n最后，Kwok主张，Privileges Order（特权裁定）使政府“能够获取其原本无法查看的信息”，并允许其律师—当事人特权“被用作对付他的武器”。Kwok Stay Mem. at 23。法院不同意。与本案情形相同，受托人被赋予对债务人律师—当事人特权的控制权。Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 354 (1985)。Kwok推测受托人将不加区分地寻求放弃其特权。见 Kwok Stay Mem. at 24（“[T]he Trustee has no qualms about reporting [privileged] information directly to law enforcement, including the prosecutor's office handling this matter, and there would be nothing to stop him from sharing Mr. Kwok's privileged communications with the [G]overnment here once he is authorized to waive Mr. Kwok's privilege.”）。但是，Kwok没有援引任何证据支持该主张。事实上，根据Privileges Order，Kwok与受托人同意，未经Kwok同意或破产法院命令，受托人不会放弃律师—当事人特权。见 Privileges Order ¶ 8。Privileges Order还保留Kwok就“无关的刑事指控”主张特权的能力。Id. ¶ 4。此外，政府表示，其“既未向受托人索取，也未从受托人处收到Kwok可能受特权保护的信息或记录[,]目前并无意这样做，并且除非获得Kwok律师（或适当权利持有人）的同意，或本法院作出命令认定该等材料不受特权保护和/或适用犯罪—欺诈例外，否则不会这样做。” Gov't Stay Ltr. at 2。因此，Kwok的担忧毫无根据且为时过早。\n\n权衡这些因素，以及司法机构对于维持运作良好且高效的法院系统的利益，法院认定Kwok未能承担其举证责任，证明存在“不当不利影响”或“对其宪法权利的干扰”。Louis Vuitton, 676 F.3d at 97–98。据此，其要求中止破产程序的动议予以驳回。\n\nB. 备选救济\n\n作为备选，Kwok请求作出命令：（1）修改 Protective Order（保护令）, ECF No. 63，以允许将政府在其刑事案件中提供的证据开示材料交付给受托人；（2）指令允许其辩护团队进入Mahwah Property，并禁止出售该房产；以及（3）禁止政府向受托人索取或接收特权材料。Kwok Stay Mem. at 1。\n\n1. 修改保护令\n\nKwok要求修改Protective Order，以允许将政府在其刑事案件中提供的证据开示材料交付给受托人，见 Kwok Stay Mem. at 28，现已无实际意义，因为受托人不再寻求政府提供给Kwok的文件，并将相应地寻求修改Contempt Order。Trustee Stay Opp. at 23。\n\n2. 维持Mahwah设施现状的命令\n\n法院驳回Kwok要求作出命令的请求，该命令旨在“维持Mahwah [Property]的现状，[……]保证Kwok先生的法律团队能够进入该房产，[……][并且]明确禁止受托人移动、变更或改造Mahwah [Property]或其内容物。” Kwok Stay Mem. at 29。Kwok关于证据毁损的担忧仅基于猜测。该房产的出售并不迫在眉睫，Kwok的法律团队依据Access Order可以进入Mahwah Property，并且政府已提交该房产“数千张照片以及视频”。Gov't Stay Ltr. at 5。此外，Kwok并未充分说明，当下对Mahwah Property作出的变更将如何影响其在2018年至2023年间的性质及用途的证据；该期间是 Superseding Indictment（修正起诉书）所涉期间。因此，法院不认为所请求的救济具有正当依据。\n\n3. 防止政府与受托人之间沟通的命令\n\nKwok主张受托人已与政府分享特权信息，因而有必要作出命令防止政府与受托人之间沟通；该主张未经证实。Kwok Stay Mem. at 29。政府和受托人均否认曾不当披露Kwok的特权信息。Gov't Stay Ltr. at 2；Trustee Stay Opp. at 25。因此，该请求予以驳回。法院进一步指出，破产法院能够确保遵守Privileges Order，并裁决Kwok对特权的关切。\n\n据此，Kwok提出的备选救济请求亦予以驳回。\n\nII. 强制证据开示动议\n\nA. 法律标准\n\nKwok还依据《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第16条请求强制提交材料。8 根据第16条，政府必须应辩方请求提交“在[其]占有、保管或控制之下”且“对准备辩护具有重要性”的物品。Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E)。根据第16条，如某一物品“可用于反驳政府的案件或加强一项辩护”，则该物品“对准备辩护具有重要性”。United States v. Stevens, 985 F.2d 1175, 1180 (2d Cir. 1993)。“被告负有初步证明所寻求信息具有重要性的举证责任。” United States v. Alexandre, No. 22 Cr. 326, 2023 WL 416405, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2023)（省略引号及引文）。\n\n8 Kwok还顺带表示，其可能有权依据 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) 获得额外材料。见，例如，Kwok Compel Mem. at 14, 18 n.8。根据 Brady，政府必须向刑事被告披露任何对其有利且具有重要性的免责信息，并应“及时披露，以便其在审判中得到有效使用”。United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 2001)。“然而，Brady并未确立一般性的审前证据开示权利，也未产生任何审前救济。” United States v. Kelly, 91 F. Supp. 2d 580, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)（引用 Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977)）；另见 United States v. Louis, No. 04 Cr. 203, 2005 WL 180885, at *2 & n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2005)（说明第16条是“《联邦刑事诉讼规则》授权刑事案件审前证据开示的唯一途径”）。因此，在此阶段，法院仅分析Kwok的证据开示请求是否符合第16条标准。\n\n根据第16条，政府可能有义务披露“与协调有关的材料”，该协调发生在检方与另一调查机构之间。Alexandre, 2023 WL 416405, at *10。之所以如此，是因为尽管“政府可以对相同目标及相同事项同时开展刑事和民事调查，这一点早已确立”，但“同样早已确立的是，对该等调查之间的协调存在若干正当程序限制”。United States v. Rhodes, No. 18 Cr. 887, 2019 WL 3162221, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2019)。本巡回区法院认为，寻求与协调有关的证据开示的被告必须“作出恶意的实质性初步证明”。Id. at *4（引用 United States v. Gel Spice Co., 773 F.2d 427, 432 (2d Cir. 1985)）；同见 Alexandre, 2023 WL 416405, at *10。\n\nKwok援引 United States v. Martoma, 990 F. Supp. 2d 458, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)，主张“无需作出恶意的实质性初步证明”。Kwok Compel Reply at 11, ECF No. 163。但是，Martoma设想的是检方与另一机构进行“联合调查”的事实情形；在此情形下，政府有义务检索并提交另一机构档案中包含的Brady材料。990 F. Supp. 2d at 460。在联合调查的情况下，无需作出恶意的初步证明。然而，Kwok明确否认其请求本法院将政府与受托人或 SEC（美国证券交易委员会）的协调定性为联合调查。见 Kwok Compel Reply at 1（将联合调查问题称为“red herring”）；另见 id. at 15。相反，他寻求“为作出该等证明而进行的额外证据开示”——根据Gel Spice，该请求受恶意要求的约束。Rhodes, 2019 WL 3162221, at *3；见 id.（引用 Gel Spice, 773 F.2d at 434）。\n\nB. 政府与破产受托人之间的沟通\n\nKwok寻求强制披露“政府与受托人及其代理人之间交换的所有通信和文件”。Kwok Compel Mem. at 13, ECF No. 143。\n\n首先，Kwok主张，Mahwah Settlement（马瓦和解协议）“威胁[其]提出辩护及获得免责证据的权利”。Id. at 16。他主张，政府通过达成Mahwah Settlement——该和解协议允许受托人在审判前“处置Mahwah [Property]”——实际上批准了对该房产内证据的毁损。Id. at 17。但是，如上所述，Kwok对证据毁损的担忧为时过早且毫无根据。政府表示，Mahwah Property不存在即将出售的情形，Gov't Stay Ltr. at 5，并且其已全面记录该房产的内容物并向Kwok提交该等信息，Gov't Compel Mem. at 19–20。此外，破产法院在受托人的对抗程序完成之前不会确定Mahwah Property是否属于破产财产——即便届时，任何拟议出售亦须经破产法院审查。见 Bankr. ECF No. 2083 at 20。任何所谓的证据毁损均属假设，因而不足以证明恶意。\n\n第二，Kwok（郭文贵）抱怨称，受托人“持有并正在寻求取得受Kwok先生特权保护的额外材料”，且已与政府分享了享有特权的信息。Kwok Compel Mem. at 18. 但Kwok未提供任何证据证实其指控，政府称其“既未向受托人索取，也未从受托人处收到Kwok可能享有特权的信息或记录。”Gov't Stay Ltr. At 2. 在没有任何理由怀疑“政府陈述的准确性”的情况下，本院接受该等陈述为充分，并拒绝推定存在恶意。United States v. Middendorf, No. 18 Cr. 36, 2018 WL 3956494, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2018).\n\n第三，Kwok主张，他需要查阅政府与受托人之间的通信，以便：(1)“全面调查受托人是否作为事实上的控方团队成员行事”；以及(2)可能提出联合调查动议。Kwok Compel Mem. at 19. 然而，Kwok并未（也无法）主张该等信息的潜在有用性满足恶意要件。本院也不会基于Kwok毫无根据地指称受托人与政府分享享有特权的信息而推定存在恶意。见Kwok Compel Mem. at 2–3；上文第10–11页。\n\n本院认定，Kwok未能作出“恶意的实质性初步证明”，亦未能证明政府与受托人之间存在不当协调。因此，其要求提供政府与受托人之间通信的请求予以驳回。\nC. 政府与SEC（美国证券交易委员会）之间的通信\n\nKwok还提出强制动议，要求政府提供“其与SEC就起诉书事项进行的通信”。9 Kwok Compel Mem. at 22. 他主张，该等通信将“揭示其他合作实例”，并“进一步表明SEC与[G]overnment在本案中进行了联合调查，以及作为其联合调查的一部分双方共享了何种信息。”Id. 再次，Kwok未能证明其有权获得该项证据开示所需的恶意。\n\n9 在其开篇书状中，Kwok有时似乎主张政府与SEC进行了联合调查，因此他有权从SEC的记录中获得Brady和Rule 16证据开示。见，例如，Kwok Compel Mem. at 20–21。由于Kwok在其答复中明确放弃该主张，本院不考虑两机构之间的协调是否构成联合调查。见Kwok Compel Reply at 2–3。\n\n“并无一般规则禁止SEC与刑事检察官分享通过民事证据开示取得的证据。”United States v. Fiore, 381 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2004). 虽然Kwok指出SEC已与政府分享信息和分析，见Kwok Compel Mem. at 20–21，但“存在协调和分享这一事实本身，并不异常，也不存在问题。”Rhodes, 2019 WL 3162221, at *3. 因此，Kwok是否有权获得关于两机构协调的进一步信息，取决于他是否已作出恶意的实质性初步证明——例如，SEC是否“向其隐瞒了可能存在刑事调查”或者“仅仅为了协助刑事调查而开展民事调查。”Id. at *4 (citing United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1970)).\n\n然而，除指出SEC与政府之间的合作实例外，Kwok未提出任何证据证明两机构存在恶意。他并未主张SEC向其隐瞒了平行刑事调查的可能性。他也未主张SEC仅为协助刑事起诉而进行调查。\n\n如同Rhodes和Alexandre案，本案记录未显示政府与SEC之间存在不当协调。助理美国联邦检察官Juliana N. Murray（朱莉安娜·N·默里）在伪证处罚下宣誓称，“政府未参与SEC的指控决定或SEC诉讼策略的制定。”Murray Aff. ¶ 2, ECF No. 160-1; see Rhodes, 2019 WL 3162221, at *5; Alexandre, 2023 WL 416405, at *11. “仅凭该明确陈述，即可驳斥任何关于SEC发出传票或据此收集文件，仅为（甚至部分为）推进刑事调查的说法。”Rhodes, WL 3162221, at *5. 此外，在Rhodes案中，尽管经过长期调查，SEC仍决定不对被告提出指控，这一点令法院感到困扰。Id. (“[T]here is one mystery that remains unsolved—namely, why the SEC, despite its extensive investigation of, and settlement discussions with, Rhodes, has not brought civil fraud charges against him.\"). 与此相反，在本案中，SEC已对Kwok提起民事诉讼——尽管该案已中止，“但没有迹象表明[SEC]无意在本刑事程序完成后立即恢复对其案件的追诉。”Alexandre, 2023 WL 416405, at *11.\n\n因此，由于Kwok未能作出恶意的实质性初步证明，其要求提供政府与SEC之间通信的请求予以驳回。\n结论\n\n基于上述理由，Kwok的各项动议均予以驳回。书记官受命终止ECF Nos. 129 and 141项下的动议。\n\n特此命令。\n\n日期：December 21, 2023 New York, New York","key_entities":["Kwok","Je","Ho Wan Kwok","Despins","Brady","Guo","Paul Hastings","GTV","Miles Guo","Yanping Wang","Murray","Torres","Analisa Torres","forfeiture"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":1,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":19,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":42,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":44,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":58,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":63,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":110,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":129,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":130,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":131,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":141,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":143,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":145,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":152,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":160,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":163,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":204,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":523,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":856,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":970,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1353,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1649,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2035,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2083,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":6398,"status":"published","published_at":"2023-08-30 00:00:00","created_at":"2023-08-30","updated_at":"2026-08-23 19:34:43"}