{"id":"court_ctb_2492_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":2492,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2023-08-30","title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION | -------------------------------------------","summary_zh":"关于债务人再次提出中止破产案动议的通知 —— Ho Wan Kwok 破产案（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo），CTB 22-50073 ECF #2492（2023-08-30立案）。第11章破产受托人及 Genever 债务人向破产法院通报，债务人已于2024年1月4日在纽约南区刑事案中再次提交中止动议（ECF No. 218），并表示受托人将在2024年1月19日截止日前对该重新提出的中止动议提出反对。","summary_en":"Notice regarding debtor's renewed motion to stay bankruptcy cases — In re Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo / Guo Wengui), CTB 22-50073 ECF #2492 (filed 2023-08-30). The Chapter 11 Trustee and Genever Debtors inform the Bankruptcy Court that the debtor filed a renewed stay motion in the SDNY criminal case on January 4, 2024 (ECF No. 218) regarding privilege issues in the Bombardier adversary proceeding, and note that the Trustee intends to file an objection by the January 19, 2024 deadline.","body_en":"# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| ------------------------------------------------------ | x      |                         |\n|--------------------------------------------------------|--------|-------------------------|\n| In re:                                                 | :<br>: | Chapter 11              |\n| HO WAN KWOK et al.,                                    | :<br>: | Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |\n| Debtors.1                                              | :<br>: | Jointly Administered    |\n| ------------------------------------------------------ | :<br>x |                         |\n\n# **NOTICE OF CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE AND GENEVER DEBTORS REGARDING DEBTOR'S RENEWED MOTION IN CRIMINAL CASE FOR AN ORDER STAYING THESE CHAPTER 11 CASES AND RELATED ADVERSARY PROCEEDINGS**\n\nBy notice dated August 30, 2023 [Docket No. 2158], Luc A. Despins, as chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") for Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"), informed this Court and parties in interest that the Debtor had filed a motion (the \"Stay Motion\") in the criminal case [Case No. 1:23-cr-00118-AT] (the \"Criminal Case\") pending against him in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (the \"SDNY District Court\") seeking to stay the abovecaptioned chapter 11 cases and all related adversary proceedings.\n\nBy notice dated September 27, 2023, the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC (\"Genever\n\nBVI\"), and Genever Holdings Corporation (\"Genever US\" and, together with Genever BVI, the\n\n\"Genever Debtors\") provided an update to the Court and parties in interest, attaching the\n\nresponses to Stay Motion filed by (i) the United States Department of Justice, (ii) the Chapter 11\n\nTrustee and the Genever Debtors, and (iii) The Sherry-Netherland, Inc., as well as the joinder of\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\nthe official committee of unsecured creditors in the response filed by the Trustee and the Genever Debtors.\n\nBy notice dated December 21, 2023, the Trustee and the Genever Debtors provided a further update to the Court and parties in interest, attaching the order of the SDNY District Court denying the Stay Motion.\n\nThe Trustee and the Genever Debtors wish to provide a further update that, on January 4, 2024, the Debtor filed a renewed motion to stay these chapter 11 cases [Criminal Case ECF No. 218] (the \"Renewed Stay Motion\"). A copy of the Renewed Stay Motion (including the related memorandum of law and supporting declaration) is attached hereto as **Exhibit 1**.\n\nThe relief sought by the Debtor in the Renewed Motion is based, in part, on the Trustee's motion [ECF No. 2420] (the \"Privileges Motion\") for an order authorizing the Trustee to (a) use potentially privileged documents in the Trustee's adversary proceeding pending against Mei Guo [Adv. Proc. No. 23-5008] (the \"Bombardier Adversary Proceeding\") without waiving privilege or, alternatively, (b) to waive the Trustee's privilege on matters related to the Bombardier Global XRS aircraft and its sale proceeds.\n\nAs the Court knows, since the filing of the Privileges Motion, the Trustee has filed a motion for summary judgment in the Bombardier Adversary Proceeding [ECF No. 88 in Bombardier Adversary Proceeding] (the \"Summary Judgment Motion\"), which motion did **not** use or seek to use any privileged information. The Trustee expects that the Court will not rule on the Privileges Motion until after a ruling on the Summary Judgment Motion, and then only if the Court denies such motion. If the Summary Judgment Motion is granted, no trial will be necessary in the Bombardier Adversary Proceeding, thereby mooting the Privileges Motion. If the Summary Judgment Motion is not granted, then the Trustee will later decide as he prepares\n\nfor trial whether and to what extent he needs to use the potentially privileged documents that are the subject of the Privileges Motion.\n\nThe District Court entered an order on January 5, 2024 [Criminal Case ECF No. 221], providing that the United States and the Trustee have until January 19, 2024 to file their opposition to the Renewed Stay Motion, and the Trustee will avail himself of this opportunity to object to such motion.\n\nDated: January 8, 2024 New York, New York\n\n> By: */s/ G. Alexander Bongartz*  Avram E. Luft (admitted *pro hac vice*) G. Alexander Bongartz (admitted *pro hac vice*) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6079 aviluft@paulhastings.com alexbongartz@paulhastings.com\n\n*and*\n\nNicholas A. Bassett (admitted *pro hac vice*) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C., 20036 (202) 551-1902 nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n*and*\n\nDouglas S. Skalka (ct00616) Patrick R. Linsey (ct29437) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 781-2847 dskalka@npmlaw.com plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n*Counsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and Genever Holdings Corporation*\n\n# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| ------------------------------------------------------  | x           |                         |\n|---------------------------------------------------------|-------------|-------------------------|\n| In re:                                                  | :<br>:      | Chapter 11              |\n| HO WAN KWOK, et al.,1                                   | :<br>:      | Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |\n| Debtors.                                                | :<br>:<br>: | (Jointly Administered)  |\n| ------------------------------------------------------x |             |                         |\n\n# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nThe undersigned hereby certifies that on January 8, 2024, the foregoing Notice was electronically filed. Notice of this filing was sent by e-mail to all parties to the above-captioned chapter 11 case by operation of the Court's electronic filing (\"CM/ECF\") system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as indicated on the Notice of Electronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF system.\n\nDated: January 8, 2024 New York, New York\n\nBy: */s/ G. Alexander Bongartz*  G. Alexander Bongartz (admitted pro hac vice) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6079 alexbongartz@paulhastings.com\n\n*Counsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and Genever Holdings Corporation*\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and the Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\n# **Exhibit 1**\n\n# **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK**\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\n*Plaintiff,*\n\nv.\n\nHO WAN KWOK,\n\n*Defendant*.\n\nCase No. 1:23-CR-118-1 (AT)\n\n# **NOTICE OF RENEWED MOTION TO STAY BANKRUPTCY CASES AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION**\n\n### **ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED**\n\nDefendant Ho Wan Kwok, through counsel, respectfully (i) submits a renewed motion for an order and writ staying the bankruptcy cases captioned *In re Ho Wan Kwok, et al.*, Case No. 22- 50073(JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn.) (Jointly Administered), and all related cases (the \"Bankruptcy Cases\"), and (ii) moves the Court, pursuant to Local Criminal Rule 49.1, for reconsideration of the Court's order (Dkt. No. 204) denying Mr. Kwok's prior motion to stay the Bankruptcy Cases (Dkt. No. 131).\n\nDefendant moves upon the Declaration of Matthew S. Barkan, Esq., the exhibits annexed thereto, the accompanying Memorandum of Law, and all prior papers and proceedings had herein.\n\nDefendant respectfully requests oral argument on this motion.\n\nDated: January 4, 2023 New York, New York Respectfully submitted,\n\n![](_page_6_Picture_15.jpeg)\n\nSidhardha Kamaraju E. Scott Schirick Matthew S. Barkan Daniel J. Pohlman John M. Kilgard Clare P. Tilton PRYOR CASHMAN LLP 7 Times Square New York, NY 10036 (212) 421-4100\n\n[skamaraju@pryorcashman.com](mailto:skamaraju@pryorcashman.com)  sschirick@pryorcashman.com mbarkan@pryorcashman.com dpohlman@pryorcashman.com jkilgard@pryorcashman.com ctilton@pryorcashman.com\n\nSabrina P. Shroff 80 Broad Street, 19th Floor New York, NY 10004 (646) 763-1490\n\n*Attorneys for Defendant Ho Wan Kwok*\n\n# **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK**\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\n*Plaintiff,*\n\nv.\n\nHO WAN KWOK,\n\n**FILED PARTIALLY UNDER SEAL**\n\nCase No. 1:23-CR-118-1 (AT)\n\n*Defendant*.\n\n# **MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S RENEWED MOTION FOR A STAY AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION**\n\nSidhardha Kamaraju E. Scott Schirick Matthew S. Barkan Daniel J. Pohlman John M. Kilgard Clare P. Tilton PRYOR CASHMAN LLP 7 Times Square New York, NY 10036 (212) 421-4100 skamaraju@pryorcashman.com sschirick@pryorcashman.com mbarkan@pryorcashman.com dpohlman@pryorcashman.com jkilgard@pryorcashman.com ctilton@pryorcashman.com\n\nSabrina P. Shroff 80 Broad Street, 19th Floor New York, NY 10004 (646) 763-1490\n\n*Attorneys for Defendant Ho Wan Kwok*\n\n# **TABLE OF CONTENTS**\n\n| TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  ii                                                                                      |\n|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 1                                                                                       |\n| RELEVANT BACKGROUND 3                                                                                         |\n| I.<br>The Trustee's Attempts to Secure Victim Funds 4                                                         |\n| II. The Himalaya Exchange Funds Overlap and Dispute 5                                                         |\n| III. The Trustee's Active Efforts To Erode Mr. Kwok's Attorney-Client Privilege 7                             |\n| IV. The Court's Decision and Order Denying the Stay Motion 8                                                  |\n| V. The January 3, 2024 Superseding Indictment 8                                                               |\n| ARGUMENT 10                                                                                                   |\n| I.<br>Applicable Law 10                                                                                       |\n| II. Discussion 10                                                                                             |\n| A.<br>New Evidence Undermines The Court's Finding That There Was Only Limited<br>Overlap Between the Cases 10 |\n| (1)<br>The Overlap Of Determinations Regarding Customer Assets 11                                             |\n| (2)<br>The Overlap as to Mr. Kwok's Attorney-Client Privilege 16                                              |\n| CONCLUSION 18                                                                                                 |\n\n# **TABLE OF AUTHORITIES**\n\n### **Page(s)**\n\n# **Cases**\n\n| Corines v. Am. Physicians Ins. Tr.,<br>769 F. Supp. 2d 584 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)10                                            |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc.,<br>676 F.3d 83 (2d. Cir. 2012)8, 11                                       |\n| Schoolcraft v. City of New York,<br>298 F.R.D. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) 10                                                   |\n| Trustees of Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat. Pension Fund. v. Transworld Mech., Inc.,<br>886 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)16 |\n| United States v. Lisi,<br>No. 15-cr-457 (KPF), 2020 WL 1331955 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2020) 10                              |\n| United States v. Yalincak,<br>853 F.3d 629 (2d Cir. 2017)14                                                             |\n| Statutes and Rules                                                                                                      |\n| Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(b) 16                                                                                               |\n| Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g) 5                                                                                                |\n| Local Criminal Rule 49.1 1, 10                                                                                          |\n\nDefendant Ho Wan Kwok respectfully submits this memorandum of law in support of (i) his renewed motion to stay the bankruptcy proceedings captioned *In re Ho Wan Kwok, et al.*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn.) (Jointly Administered), and its related cases (collectively, the \"Bankruptcy Cases\"), and (ii) his motion, pursuant to Local Criminal Rule 49.1, for reconsideration of this Court's order (Dkt. No. 204, the \"Order\") denying his prior motion to stay the Bankruptcy Cases (Dkt No. 131, the \"Stay Motion\").\n\n#### **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\nIn its Order, the Court found that there was insufficient overlap between the Bankruptcy Cases and this case to support a stay. Since Mr. Kwok filed his original Stay Motion, however, significant developments in this case and the Bankruptcy Cases warrant the Court's revisiting of its Order and granting Mr. Kwok's request to stay the Bankruptcy Cases.\n\n*First*, just yesterday, over nine months after first charging Mr. Kwok and just three months before trial, the government filed a new superseding Indictment (the \"Indictment\") that transforms this purported \"fraud case,\" to borrow the government's tired mantra, into a purported racketeering case. Even setting aside the government's strained reading of the RICO statute, the fact is that the Indictment reveals that there is not a shred of daylight between the subject matter of this case and the Bankruptcy Cases. Indeed, the Indictment now alleges that Mr. Kwok's filing for bankruptcy protection itself was an act in furtherance of the government's purported schemes. Moreover, the alleged \"enterprise\" upon which the government relies is a constellation of corporate entities that include twelve entities against which the Trustee has commenced adversary proceedings to date, and numerous other entities which the Trustee has contended are Mr. Kwok's alter egos. While the overlap was clear before, the government has now removed any possible doubt about it.\n\n*Second*, just two days before the Court issued its Order, the Trustee took the extraordinary position before this Court that the Trustee should administer the hundreds of millions of dollars seized by the government in connection with the Himalaya Exchange (the \"Exchange\"), rather than allow the funds to be returned to customers of the Exchange who seek their return. The Trustee's request marks his latest attempt to siphon assets from this proceeding—which should go back to any alleged victims of the schemes charged in the Indictment in the event of a conviction into a bankruptcy proceeding that, based on its history, may largely fund his millions of dollars in fees and promises to put the funds of those alleged victims into the pocket of purported creditors who have no entitlement to those funds. With the government's imprimatur, the Trustee has sought control of millions of dollars that the government alleges to be the proceeds of fraud, including a \\$37 million loan from the Exchange to an entity controlled by one of Mr. Kwok's relatives (which is a basis of the count in the Indictment related to the Exchange); \\$38 million controlled by a company called HCHK (which is a basis of the counts in the Indictment related to the Farm Loans program); the Mahwah Facility (which is the basis of the counts in the Indictment related to G|CLUBS); and hundreds of millions of dollars in the Exchange's bank accounts (which is a basis of the count in the Indictment related to the Exchange).\n\nWhile the Trustee asserts (incorrectly) that he is entitled to control these assets, even if he were correct that these entities were Mr. Kwok's alter egos (which they decidedly are not), the Trustee would still not be entitled to take these funds because, as the government has reiterated, these funds came from *the alleged victims of the charged offenses, not from Mr. Kwok*. The Trustee's overreach demonstrates clearly the near total subject matter overlap between the Bankruptcy Cases and this proceeding—the Trustee claims as the very same money that Mr. Kwok is alleged to have stolen through the expansive scheme alleged in the Indictment, based on the\n\nTrustee's unfounded allegations that Mr. Kwok controls these entities, which tracks the government's theory in the Indictment.\n\n*Third*, the Court determined that Mr. Kwok's concerns about the Trustee's control over his privilege were theoretical and premature. Whether or not that was the case when Mr. Kwok originally filed his motion, the Trustee has now taken actions that make those concerns real and crystal clear. In particular, just recently, the Trustee took the position in the Bankruptcy Court that he can waive privilege over certain of Mr. Kwok's attorney-client communications in connection with an adversary proceeding he intends to pursue, thereby exposing those communications to public view, including by the government. Of course, the government has not explained its full case to Mr. Kwok or the Court, but given the substantial overlap between this proceeding and the Bankruptcy Cases, there is a significant risk that the government will thus gain access to privileged information that it would not otherwise be able to access. While the Court is correct that the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit parallel civil and criminal proceedings, the Trustee's control over Mr. Kwok's privilege creates a distinct Sixth Amendment issue that threatens the integrity of these proceedings.\n\nFor these reasons, Mr. Kwok respectfully moves for a stay of the Bankruptcy Cases and reconsideration of the Order.\n\n#### **RELEVANT BACKGROUND**\n\nThe Court is familiar with the relevant factual background described in Mr. Kwok's Stay Motion, which Mr. Kwok incorporates by reference. In addition, Mr. Kwok highlights the following material developments which occurred subsequent to his filing of the Motion.\n\n#### **I. The Trustee's Attempts to Secure Victim Funds**\n\nAs a prelude to the facts discussed below, prior to the filing of the Motion, the Trustee took repeated actions in the Bankruptcy Cases to secure various assets he contended were rightly property of the bankruptcy estate.\n\nPrior to the commencement of this criminal proceeding, one of Mr. Kwok's creditors, Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunities Fund (\"PAX\") and the Trustee jointly sought, and received, a preliminary injunction barring Mr. Kwok and numerous entities from specified activities. In the Bankruptcy Court's Memorandum of Decision granting that injunction, the Bankruptcy Court made sweeping findings (now repeatedly parroted by the Trustee) that Mr. Kwok is \"associated, affiliated, and/or connected to\" the Himalaya Farms, and the \"GSeries\" entities, which it concluded include the Himalaya Exchange, G|CLUBS, GFashion, Gettr, and GNews, among others. (Adv. Proc. No. 22-05032, Jan. 13, 2023, Dkt. No. 133 ¶ 3). The Bankruptcy Court further found that Mr. Kwok controls Saraca Media Group and its related entity, GTV. (*Id.*)\n\nFollowing the entry of this preliminary injunction, the Trustee commenced numerous actions to recover assets he (falsely) contended were held by alter egos of Mr. Kwok, including: HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited (Case No. 22-ap-05003 (summary judgment granted, Dkt No. 221)), the entity that owned the *Lady May* yacht, and which received a \\$37 million loan in connection with the *Lady May*, HCHK Technologies, Inc. and HCHK Property Management, Inc., which the Trustee asserted were \"affiliates of . . . GTV, GClubs, GFashion, and GMusic\" (Bankr. Dkt 1897, ¶ 4), and which held \\$38 million in cash; Taurus Fund LLC (Case No. 23-ap-05017), the entity that owns the property located at 675 Ramapo Valley Road, Mahwah, New Jersey 07430 (Bankr. Dkt. 1994); and against Mr. Kwok's family members, including his daughter (through which he seeks, among other items, ownership of the proceeds of the sale of the Bombardier Global XRS private jet (*see* Bankr. Dkt. 2421).\n\nAs a result of these proceedings, the Trustee seized \\$37 million from HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited (*See* Case No. 22-ap-05003 (Bankr. D. Conn., Dkt. No. 35, ¶¶ 79-81 (discussing \\$37 loan made in connection with the yacht), and also discussed in Indictment ¶ 19(g)), and \\$38 million from HCHK Property Management, Inc. and HCHK Technologies, Inc. (*See* Case No. 23-ap-05013, Dkt No. 1, ¶ 2; Dkt. No. 25 ¶ 5 (describing transfer of \\$38 million of funds to the Trustee).)\n\n#### **II. The Himalaya Exchange Funds Overlap and Dispute**\n\nOn December 6, 2023, more than 3,000 customers of the Himalaya Exchange—a cryptocurrency exchange that features heavily in the Indictment—filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) (the \"Customer Motion,\" Dkt No. 186) seeking the return of hundreds of millions of dollars in funds held in the Exchange's bank accounts (the \"Exchange Funds\") that were seized by the government in connection with this Indictment.\n\nThe next day, the government filed an opposition to the Customer Motion, in which it stated that \"the Government seized more than \\$600 million in proceeds of the charged crimes including the Exchange Funds in question—to preserve those funds for later disbursement and restitution to victims.\" (Dkt. No. 188 at 3.) The Trustee subsequently sought leave to file a response to the Customer Motion on December 8, 2023, alleging that by seeking assets held by the Exchange, that somehow implicated \"property of the Chapter 11 estate\" in Mr. Kwok's bankruptcy proceedings. (Dkt. No. 189 at 1.) The Court granted the Trustee leave to respond, and on December 19, 2023, the Trustee filed a response (the \"Trustee's Response\"). (Dkt. No. 202.)<sup>1</sup>\n\nIn his response to the Customer Motion, the Trustee contended that because he obtained a determination in the bankruptcy proceedings that the Exchange was purportedly under the sway of Mr. Kwok (a determination that is wrong) the Court should not grant the Customer Motion, and should instead allow the Trustee to obtain an order from the Bankruptcy Court permitting the Trustee to seize the Exchange Funds for the Chapter 11 estate. (*Id.* at 4-5.)\n\nIn support of his position that these assets be administered through the Bankruptcy Court, rather than this Court, the Trustee stresses that he \"owes duties to *all* of Mr. Kwok's legitimate creditors, not to any one creditor or group of creditors.\" (*Id.* at 4.) Further, the Trustee argues that \"property of a Chapter 11 estate consists of all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case *wherever located and by whomever held*,\" including, implicitly, property held by this Court. (*Id.* at 5 (cleaned up).)<sup>2</sup>\n\n<sup>1</sup> Upon reviewing the Trustee's response, Mr. Kwok's counsel began to draft a letter to the Court to bring the relevant issues with the Trustee's filing to the Court's attention. Just two days after the Trustee filed his response however, as Mr. Kwok's counsel was finalizing their letter, the Court issued its decision denying Mr. Kwok's Stay Motion.\n\n<sup>2</sup> Although not the subject of this Motion, the Trustee additionally spills considerable ink in his Response smearing Mr. Kwok with the spurious, irrelevant, and derogatory allegation that the Customer Motion is some machination of Mr. Kwok. The claim is categorically false—Mr. Kwok had nothing to do with the Customer Action, and is not directing anything with respect to it. As with the government's previous attempt to impugn members of the New Federal State of China (the \"NFSC\") who were using the Mahwah Facility for movement business (which was its intended purpose) (*see* Dkt. No. 148, at 2-4), the Trustee asserts this spurious claim without a shred of evidence. *First*, the Trustee claims summarily that Mr. Kwok has directed others to impede the bankruptcy proceedings. *Second*, the Trustee contends that one of Mr. Kwok's fellow movement members who was involved in recruiting customers to participate in the Customer Action once dined with Mr. Kwok, sailed on a yacht with him, and participated in a protest. Notwithstanding the Trustee's vociferous bluster, the Trustee utterly fails to provide any evidence in support of his claim showing that Mr. Kwok—who is detained in Brooklyn—somehow orchestrated the Customer Action. Instead, the Trustee merely shows that individuals who share Mr. Kwok's fervent belief in the NFSC and its pro-democracy mission have taken steps that they believe further\n\n#### **III. The Trustee's Active Efforts To Erode Mr. Kwok's Attorney-Client Privilege**\n\nAs outlined in the Stay Motion, one form of serious harm posed by the ongoing bankruptcy cases is the invasion of Mr. Kwok's attorney-client privilege, and the risk that the government will have access to information that it would not otherwise be able to view. (*See* Dkt No. 131 at 23- 24.) In opposing the Stay Motion, the Trustee previously portrayed Mr. Kwok's concerns as \"nonexistent issues\" (Dkt. No. 145 ¶ 3), claimed that Mr. Kwok's \"assertion that the Trustee has somehow infringed upon [Mr. Kwok]'s attorney-client privilege is completely unsupported\" (*id.* ¶ 50), and stated that \"'disputes' over the Trustee's ability to waive the privilege [are] meaningless\" (*id.* ¶ 55).\n\nUnfortunately, the risk Mr. Kwok highlighted in the Stay Motion is now at hand. On December 5, 2023, the Trustee filed of a motion seeking either (a) authority to use certain privileged materials, or (b) in the alternative, for the Bankruptcy Court to issue an order waiving such privilege (the \"Waiver Motion,\" Bankr. Dkt. No. 2421). The purpose of this filing was so that the Trustee could use these communications in connection with an adversary proceeding he had filed, including in support of a summary judgment motion the Trustee wished to file.<sup>3</sup> Thus, the communications would have been available to the public, including to the government.<sup>4</sup>\n\ntheir goals, namely, in this case, challenging the government's improper seizure of the Exchange Funds. Despite both the government's and the Trustee's attempts to malign these innocent bystanders, there is nothing improper about these customers seeking to recover funds that they believe were wrongfully taken from them.\n\n<sup>3</sup> As of the date of this Motion, the Waiver Motion remains under consideration, and the Trustee has moved for summary judgment without using any privileged documents. But, even if the Waiver Motion were denied, it demonstrates the Trustee's active attempts to invade Mr. Kwok's attorney-client privilege.\n\n<sup>4</sup> The Trustee filed the Waiver Motion under seal, and thus Mr. Kwok's criminal counsel cannot access the filing, and cannot submit it to the Court with this Motion. Mr. Kwok, however, objected to the Waiver Motion publicly before the Bankruptcy Court and is submitting a copy of his Motion as Exhibit A to the Declaration of Matthew S. Barkan, dated January 4, 2024.\n\n#### **IV. The Court's Decision and Order Denying the Stay Motion**\n\nOn August 30, 2023, Mr. Kwok filed the Stay Motion. Various parties responded to the Stay Motion on September 21, 2023, and the Stay Motion was fully submitted on October 5, 2023.\n\nOn December 21, 2023, this Court entered its order denying Mr. Kwok's Stay Motion. In its analysis of Mr. Kwok's Motion, the Court articulated the six-factor test set forth in *Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc.*, 676 F.3d 83, 97-98 (2d Cir. 2012), applied in determining whether to stay a parallel civil litigation, which factors include \"the extent to which the issues in the criminal case overlap with those presented in the civil case.\" (Order at 5.) The Court additionally noted that Cases substantially overlap when they \"arise from the same facts and involve nearly identical issues.\" (*Id.* at 7.)\n\nThe Court also found, however, that the \"Superseding Indictment . . . concerns alleged conduct by Kwok that is not at issue in the bankruptcy proceedings\" and that \"Kwok's intent and the materiality of his conduct, in addition to other key legal issues, are unique to the criminal proceeding.\" (*Id.* at 8.) As set forth below, the Court erred when it found that there was \"limited overlap\" between the bankruptcy and criminal proceedings (*id.* at 9), and when it held that \"determinations in the Bankruptcy Court\" would not be dispositive as to key issues pending in this criminal proceeding. (*Id.* at 8.)\n\n#### **V. The January 3, 2024 Superseding Indictment**\n\nOn January 3, 2024, the government filed the Indictment, charging Mr. Kwok with, among other offenses, a violation of the RICO Act. Significantly, the Indictment alleges that Mr. Kwok's bankruptcy filing \"was based on years-long efforts to obscure the funds used and controlled by [Mr. Kwok], which was a means and method\" of the alleged fraudulent enterprise. (*Id.* ¶ 20.) Thus, in other words, far from being distinct from the charged offenses, the Indictment now claims (falsely of course) that the Bankruptcy Cases themselves are part of the criminal conduct.\n\nMoreover, the Indictment newly alleges that a number of corporate entities comprised the purported RICO \"enterprise\" because they were, among other things, supposedly controlled by Mr. Kwok and used to perpetuate the alleged frauds, including through \"regularly mov[ing]\" funds between these entities and \"disguising the money movements as 'loans' or investments.'\" (Indictment ¶ 20.) Those entities include the entities for which the government alleges specific conduct, such as GTV Media Group, Inc., G Club Operations LLC, G Club International Limited, the Himalaya Exchange, and the Himalaya Alliance, and also includes twelve entities that are parties to adversary proceedings filed in the Bankruptcy Cases, including Taurus Fund LLC and Taurus Management, LLC (*Despins v. Taurus Fund, LLC, Taurus Management, LLC, et al.* Adv. Pro. No. 23-05017 (Bankr. D. Conn.)), HCHK Technologies, Inc., HCHK Property Management Inc., Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc., and Holy City Hong Kong Ventures Ltd., (*Despins v. HCHK Technologies, Inc. et al.* Adv. Pro. No. 23-05013 (Bankr. D. Conn.), Lamp Capital LLC, Infinity Treasury Management, Inc., Hudson Diamond NY LLC, Leading Shine NY Ltd. (*Despins v. Lamp Capital LLC, et al.* (Adv. Pro. No. 23-05023 (Bankr. D. Conn.)), Golden Spring (New York) LTD (*Despins v. Golden Spring (New York) Linted*, *et al.*, Adv. Pro. No. 23-05018 (Bankr. D. Conn.)), and Greenwich Land (*Despins v. Greenwich Land*, Adv. Pro. No. 23-05005 (Bankr. D. Conn.)) (Indictment ¶ 3(a).) and includes many others which the Trustee alleges are alter egos of Mr. Kwok, and whose assets thus properly belong to the Chapter 11 estate.\n\n#### **ARGUMENT**\n\n#### **I. Applicable Law**\n\nWith respect to Mr. Kwok's renewed motion for a stay, Mr. Kwok incorporates by reference the relevant legal standards set forth in the Stay Motion, (*see* Dkt. No. 131 at 14-17) and renews his motion based upon the material changes in circumstances discussed herein.\n\nAs for Mr. Kwok's motion for reconsideration, although not present in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Local Criminal Rule 49.1(d) permits a moving part to file a motion for reconsideration within fourteen days after the Court's determination of the original motion. A court should reconsider its conclusion where doing so is necessary due to an \"intervening change in controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.\" *Schoolcraft v. City of New York,* 298 F.R.D. 134, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (cleaned up). <sup>5</sup> \"[T]he decision to grant . . . a motion for reconsideration is within the sound discretion of the district court.\" *Corines v. Am. Physicians Ins. Tr.*, 769 F. Supp. 2d 584, 594 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).\n\n#### **II. Discussion**\n\n# **A. New Evidence Undermines The Court's Finding That There Was Only Limited Overlap Between the Cases**\n\nIn the analysis supporting its Order denying Mr. Kwok's Stay Motion, this Court recognized, under controlling case law, that the \"most important\" inquiry is whether there is an overlap of issues, (Order at 7), but found that there is only \"limited\" overlap between this criminal proceeding and the Bankruptcy Cases, (*id.* at 9). Contrary to this Court's finding, there is a near\n\n<sup>5</sup> The standards for reconsideration among the civil and criminal rules are largely the same, and courts in this District frequently cite to cases decided under both civil and criminal rules when considering motions for reconsideration. *See*, *e.g.*, *United States v. Lisi*, No. 15-cr-457 (KPF), 2020 WL 1331955, at \\*2 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2020).\n\nperfect identity of factual issues between the Bankruptcy Cases and this proceeding. Further, and more pressing, as illustrated through the new Indictment and recent filings, decisions in the Bankruptcy Cases run the risk of irrevocable prejudice to Mr. Kwok. The Bankruptcy Cases should be stayed as a result.\n\n#### **(1) The Overlap Of Determinations Regarding Customer Assets**\n\nAs an initial matter, the Court's decision suggests that the Court believed that it was relevant to its analysis that the Bankruptcy Cases had different burdens of proof and available remedies than this proceeding. (Order at 7-8 (noting that \"[b]ankruptcy is an equitable remedy\" and stating that determinations in the Bankruptcy Court \"are not dispositive in Kwok's criminal case, which requires a higher burden of proof.\").) Respectfully, if that interpretation of the Order is accurate, then that is an incorrect application of the law that would upset the foundation of the Court's decision—the law only requires an overlap in subject matter. *See Louis Vuitton*., 676 F.3d at 101. In fact, if it were the case that differing remedies and burdens negated a finding of overlap, then there could never be sufficient overlap between an SEC proceeding (which involves a preponderance standard and civil remedies) and a related criminal proceeding (which involves a beyond a reasonable doubt standard and criminal penalties). But as the Court is aware, stays of SEC proceedings in favor parallel criminal proceedings are routine in this Circuit—indeed, in this very case, the government successfully sought a stay of a parallel SEC case even though the SEC case involved a different burden of proof, fewer parties, and different remedies. (Motion at 25- 28.) Thus, to the extent the Court's decision was based on that legal conclusion, Mr. Kwok respectfully submits that that would be clear error warranting reconsideration.\n\nBut even when considering the overlap in factual issues only, the expanded scope of the new Indictment, coupled with the Trustee's attempts to claw the seized Exchange funds into the Bankruptcy Cases demonstrate the nearly perfect overlap (and conflict) between the Bankruptcy Cases and this proceeding.\n\n*First*, the new Indictment confirms that the very same factual issues that are at play in this case are also a critical part of the Bankruptcy Cases. In various filings, the Trustee has repeatedly litigated the issue of Mr. Kwok's purported control over entities at the heart of this case, including GTV, Saraca, G|CLUBS, and the Himalaya Exchange. *See supra* at 5-6, 9-10. That same issue forms the basis of the government's theory in this case—the Indictment repeatedly alleges that Mr. Kwok exercised control over these entities to cause them to inappropriately expend funds for his benefit. (Indictment ¶¶ 3, 5.) But in the new Indictment, the government has gone one step further, and has (ludicrously) alleged that Mr. Kwok's bankruptcy filing itself was a part of the racketeering activity giving rise to the RICO count. (*Id.* ¶ 20.) And the entities that comprised the RICO \"enterprise,\" according to the government, are some of the very same entities that the Trustee claims should be part of Mr. Kwok's estate because they are his alter egos. *See supra* at 9-10. Neither the Trustee or the government can run from the overlap when it is so transparent from the Indictment.\n\n*Second*, the Trustee's extraordinary attempt to lay claim to the customer funds in the Himalaya Exchange bank accounts further demonstrates the unresolvable conflict between this case and the Bankruptcy Cases. In particular, as the government has repeatedly asserted, the Exchange funds that are at issue in the Customer Action are funds that come from the customers (or users) of the Exchange—\n\n (*See* USAO\\_107396 ¶¶ 48-52, attached as Exhibit B to the Declaration of Matthew S. Barkan, submitted herewith). Moreover, the government noted that it\n\n\"seized more than \\$600 million in proceeds of the charged crimes—including the Exchange Funds in question—to preserve those funds for later disbursement and restitution to victims\" (Dkt. No. 188 at 3). Thus, a fact that the government, Mr. Kwok, and even the customers who filed the Customer Action can all agree on is that the funds seized by the government over which the Trustee now seeks control originated with the customers of the Exchange and not Mr. Kwok.<sup>6</sup>\n\nThe Trustee's response to the Customer Action, however, shows that these distinctions such as to whom the money actually belongs—matter little to a Trustee who is determined to rapaciously gobble up assets into the Chapter 11 estate, where they can be used to fund the legal fees caused by his repeated overreach.<sup>7</sup> While extraordinary, the Trustee's position is fairly straightforward (and utterly baseless)—specifically, because he convinced the Bankruptcy Court to conclude (wrongly) that the Exchange was an alter ego of Mr. Kwok, the Trustee argues that the Exchange's assets belong to the Chapter 11 estate. (Trustee Response at 3.) The Trustee's position shows the overlap between these two cases. As discussed above, the issue of Mr. Kwok's control over the Exchange and its assets is central both to the Trustee's efforts and the government's allegations in this prosecution. (*Compare* Dkt. 202 at 3 (wherein the Trustee contends that the Himalaya Exchange was a \"business vehicle\" for Mr. Kwok) with Indictment ¶¶ 5(c) (listing six bank accounts associated with the Exchange as subject to forfeiture).) But moreover, the assets that the Trustee seeks to claim for distribution to, among others, parties that\n\n<sup>6</sup> Mr. Kwok, of course, vehemently denies that he engaged in any fraud connected with the Exchange.\n\n<sup>7</sup> The Trustee's claim that he is marshalling assets for the \"legitimate creditors,\" of Mr. Kwok, coupled with his repeated use of scare quotes around the word \"customers\" when referring to the end-users of the Himalaya Exchange raises the serious specter that the Trustee may seek to disallow the Himalaya Exchanges customers' claims in bankruptcy. If that occurs, the purported victims (the users of the Himalaya Exchange) would receive nothing, and the Exchange Funds would flow exclusively to PAX and other creditors whom the Trustee deems \"legitimate,\" in addition to the Trustee himself in the form of his fees.\n\nwere not customers of the Exchange and payment of his legal fees are the very same assets that the government claims should be distributed to the alleged victims of the Himalaya Exchange criminal counts as restitution.\n\nThis is not a distinction without a difference for Mr. Kwok. Under the government's theory, as shown through the new Indictment, all of Mr. Kwok's commercial activities were part of a greater criminal enterprise, the purpose of which was to obtain money and property of victims and to conceal and launder the proceeds of the alleged fraud. (Indictment ¶ 7.) Under that theory, *all* proceeds from *all* of the alleged entities should be subject to forfeiture in this Court. But, under the Trustee's theory, these same assets should be funneled to the Bankruptcy Cases. The U.S. Attorney's Office has previously noted that such a scenario \"would risk detracting recovery to victims because funds otherwise available to return to victims by way of forfeiture would unnecessarily be used to pay the fees of a bankruptcy trustee.\" (Dkt. No. 50 at 1, *SEC v. Madoff, et al.*, No. 08 Civ. 10791 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2009).) And permitting the Trustee to divert these funds in this manner would affirmatively prejudice Mr. Kwok in the event of a conviction because it would increase his restitution obligations—any amounts paid to the Trustee's fees or to nonvictim creditors (like PAX) would not be credited as restitution in this proceeding. *See United States v. Yalincak*, 853 F.3d 629, 635 (2d Cir. 2017) (\"Amounts recovered by a bankruptcy trustee for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate, and consumed in the administration of the estate or distributed to non-victim creditors, plainly are not recovered by the victims of a crime; only amounts actually distributed to the victim creditors fit that description.\") (cleaned up).\n\n*Third*, while the Court pointed to the SEC action as an example of a case with sufficient overlap to warrant a stay (Order at 9), the fact is that the Trustee's actions show that the Bankruptcy Cases have significantly more overlap with this case than the SEC action. In particular, the SEC action focuses on the GTV Private Placement, *see SEC v. Kwok,* No. 23 Civ. 2200 (PGG) (S.D.N.Y.), Dkt. No. 1, ¶¶ 40-56, which is just one of the purported schemes alleged in the Indictment. But the Trustee's pursuits range into essentially every scheme alleged in the Indictment—while the Trustee trumpets that he has recovered \"more than \\$100 million in assets\" on behalf of the Chapter 11 estate, the overwhelming majority of what he has recovered and seeks to recover are funds belonging to alleged victims in this case. (Trustee Response at 2.) In particular, of that of that \\$100 million, (i) \\$38 million comes from the seizure of funds in the name of a company called HCHK, which, according to the government's theory, constitutes proceeds from the purported Farm Loans scheme, and (ii) \\$37 million comes from the seizure of a loan from the Himalaya Exchange that was used as a bond in connection with the Yacht, *see supra* at 4-5,<sup>8</sup> which the government alleges comes from the purported Himalaya Exchange scheme. (*See* Dkt. No. 19, at 9-11 (discussing the Farm Loan Program), at 18 (discussing transfer of \\$37 million).<sup>9</sup> Moreover, as the Court is aware, the Trustee is also seeking control over the Mahwah Facility, which is at heart of the alleged fraud involving G|CLUBS. Thus, in other words, the Trustee is\n\n<sup>8</sup> The Trustee falsely claims in his Response that Mr. Kwok admitted that the Yacht belonged to him in his recent renewed bail motion. Mr. Kwok, of course, did no such thing, as the very language that the Trustee cites demonstrates. Mr. Kwok merely stated is that he no longer has access to the Yacht that the government relied on in opposing Mr. Kwok's previous bail request. Plainly, having access to something and owning it are not the same thing.\n\n<sup>9</sup> In other words, approximately 75% of the funds that the Trustee claims he has recovered for the Chapter 11 estate constitute monies that the government alleges properly belong to victims of the alleged schemes at issue, and should be distributed to alleged victims as criminal restitution in this proceeding. The Trustee has expended nearly \\$25 million in fees in marshalling the assets of the Chapter 11 estate, meaning that (less purported victim monies) his efforts have yielded no tangible benefit for creditors. Thus, even the Court's conclusion that the creditors will be harmed if the stay is granted is largely only true if the Trustee is permitted to continue to peel off victim assets from this case to fund his potential recovery. And, to the extent the Court is concerned that Mr. Kwok's associates may have an opportunity to move assets, the fact is that the overwhelming bulk of the assets that the Trustee is targeting have already been seized by either him or the government, and thus cannot be dissipated.\n\nseeking and has sought to litigate the issue of Mr. Kwok's control and the ownership of victim funds associated with the alleged fraud schemes related to GTV, the Farm Loans, G|CLUBS, and the Himalaya Exchange, *i.e.*, all of the fraud schemes alleged in the Indictment. That is precisely the type of harm that a stay was intended to avoid. *See Trustees of Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat. Pension Fund. v. Transworld Mech., Inc.*, 886 F. Supp. 1134, 1138-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (stay can avoid parallel litigation that may \"impair a party's Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination, extend criminal discovery beyond the limits set forth in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(b), expose the defense's theory to the prosecution in advance of trial, or otherwise prejudice the criminal case\"). The new Indictment, coupled with Trustee's response to the Customer Action, and his absurd position therein, demonstrate the degree of overlap between the Bankruptcy Cases and this proceeding, and warrant staying the Bankruptcy Cases.\n\n#### **(2) The Overlap as to Mr. Kwok's Attorney-Client Privilege**\n\nIn his Stay Motion, Mr. Kwok argued that the Trustee's control over his privilege in the Bankruptcy Cases posed a significant threat to Mr. Kwok's ability to defend himself not only because the Trustee may directly give privileged information to the government, but also because the Trustee could waive privilege over protected communications and then use them in a public lawsuit to which the government would have access. In denying the motion, the Court concluded that Mr. Kwok's concerns were premature, that there was no evidence that the Trustee was engaged in such activity, and that the Privileges Order's carve-out for \"unrelated criminal conduct\" protected Mr. Kwok. (Order at 11.).\n\nUnfortunately, the Trustee's most recent Waiver Motion—which occurred after Mr. Kwok's stay motion was fully briefed, *see supra* at 7-8—belies the Court's conclusion. Through his filing of the Waiver Motion, the Trustee has taken affirmative steps to vitiate Mr. Kwok's\n\nattorney-client privilege in the Bankruptcy Cases. Specifically, the Trustee seeks authority to use, materials that are subject to Mr. Kwok's privilege in a public adversary proceeding. Thus, in other words, if the Trustee is successful, then those communications would become public and accessible to the government. And, given that the adversary proceeding that the Trustee is pursuing concerns the same private jet mentioned in the Indictment (¶ 17(f)(i)) that underscores that the Trustee's interpretation of the Privileges Order affords Mr. Kwok no protection under the \"unrelated criminal conduct\" carve-out. <sup>10</sup>\n\nThe fact is that this cycle will continue for as long as the Bankruptcy Cases continue. The Trustee has served subpoenas on more than twenty-five lawyers and law firms, meaning the Trustee will have access to a massive volume of privileged communications. And given the Trustee's position that every entity relevant to the Indictment is under Mr. Kwok's control, it is likely that the Trustee will wish to use—as the Waiver Motion evidences—at least some of those privileged communications as the basis of public actions, thus giving the government access to otherwise protected information that pertains to the very subject matter of the government's charges (*i.e.*, Mr. Kwok's purported ability to control, for example, G|CLUBS or the Himalaya Exchange). The Trustee's Waiver Motion thus undercuts the conclusion that Mr. Kwok's concerns about the Trustee's control over his privilege are theoretical or not ripe. <sup>11</sup>\n\n<sup>10</sup> Further, contrary to the Court's reasoning, in practice the \"unrelated criminal conduct\" carveout has proved ineffective law-firms and lawyers have produced materials to the Trustee without any opportunity for Mr. Kwok to assert privilege, and as a result, the Trustee (i) has had direct access to such materials and (ii) can seek relief from the Bankruptcy Court to use those materials in adversary proceedings. Moreover, in light of the January 3, 2024 Superseding Indictment and the RICO Act charge, it is unclear what conduct, if any, could be considered \"unrelated.\"\n\n<sup>11</sup> While this Court shared its belief that the Bankruptcy Court would be able to protect Mr. Kwok from an invasion of the privilege, the Bankruptcy Court has left the Waiver Motion pending and avoided addressing the Trustee's use of such materials, meaning that this is still a live issue that the Trustee can exploit in the future.\n\n#### **CONCLUSION**\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, the Court should reconsider its prior Order and grant Mr.\n\nKwok's request to stay the Bankruptcy Cases.\n\nDated: New York, New York January 4, 2024\n\nPRYOR CASHMAN LLP\n\nBy: \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\n\nSidhardha Kamaraju E. Scott Schirick Matthew S. Barkan Daniel J. Pohlman John M. Kilgard Clare P. Tilton\n\n7 Times Square New York, NY 10036 (212) 421-4100 skamaraju@pryorcashman.com sschirick@pryorcashman.com mbarkan@pryorcashman.com dpohlman@pryorcashman.com jkilgard@pryorcashman.com ctilton@pryorcashman.com\n\nSabrina P. Shroff 80 Broad Street, 19th Floor New York, NY 10004 (646) 763-1490\n\n*Attorneys for Defendant Ho Wan Kwok*\n\n# **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK**\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\n*Plaintiff,*\n\nv.\n\nHO WAN KWOK,\n\n*Defendant*.\n\n# **FILED PARTIALLY UNDER SEAL**\n\nCase No. 1:23-CR-118-1 (AT)\n\n**DECLARATION OF MATTHEW S. BARKAN ACCOMPANYING DEFENDANT'S RENEWED MOTION TO STAY BANKRUPTCY CASES AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION**\n\nI, MATTHEW S. BARKAN, hereby declare, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, as follows:\n\n1. I am a partner at the law firm Pryor Cashman LLP and counsel for Defendant Ho Wan Kwok in the above-captioned matter.\n\n2. I submit this declaration in support of Defendant's Renewed Motion to Stay Bankruptcy Cases and Motion for Reconsideration and to transmit to the Court true and correct copies of the following documents.\n\n3. A true and correct copy of the Individual Debtor's Objection to Motion for Order Authorizing (a) Chapter 11 Trustee to Use Potentially Privileged Documents in Bombardier Adversary Proceeding on a Sealed Basis Without Waiver of Privilege or, Alternatively, (b) Limited Waiver of Trustee Privilege as to Subject Matter of Bombardier and Bombardier Proceeds submitted by Mr. Kwok in the bankruptcy proceedings captioned *In re Ho Wan Kwok, et al.*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn.) (Jointly Administered), on December 13, 2023 is attached hereto as **Exhibit A**.\n\n4. A true and correct copy of an Affidavit in Support of Seizure Warrant produced by the government at USAO\\_00107385 is attached hereto as **Exhibit B**.\n\nI declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.\n\nExecuted on January 4, 2024.\n\nMatthew S. Barkan *Counsel for Defendant Ho Wan Kwok*\n\n# **Exhibit A**\n\n# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\nIn re : Chapter 11\n\nHO WAN KWOK, : Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n : Debtor. :\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_:\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_ :\n\n:\n\n# **THE INDIVIDUAL DEBTOR'S OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR ORDER AUTHORIZING (A) CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE TO USE POTENTIALLY PRIVILEGED DOCUMENTS IN BOMBARDIER ADVERSARY PROCEEDING ON A SEALED BASIS WITHOUT WAIVER OF PRIVILEGE OR, ALTERNATIVELY, (B) LIMITED WAIVER OF TRUSTEE PRIVILEGE AS TO SUBJECT MATTER OF BOMBARDIER AND BOMBARDIER PROCEEDS**\n\nThe individual debtor, Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Individual Debtor\"), by and through his undersigned counsel, Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C., respectfully submits his Objection to the Chapter 11 Trustee's (the \"Trustee\") Motion for Order Authorizing, (A) Chapter 11 Trustee to Use Potentially Privileged Documents in Bombardier Adversary Proceeding on a Sealed Basis Without Waiver of Privilege or, Alternatively, (B) Limited Waiver of Trustee Privilege as to Subject Matter of Bombardier and Bombardier Proceeds (the \"Privilege Waiver Motion\"), and in support thereof respectfully states:\n\n# **I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\n1. The Individual Debtor opposes the Privilege Waiver Motion to protect his rights in the criminal action pending against him in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York captioned *USA v. Kwok*, 1:23CR118 (the \"Criminal Action\"), and more particularly to prevent the United States Attorney's Office from obtaining and using against him attorney-client privileged communications that it would not be able to obtain absent the privilege waiver sought by the Trustee.\n\n2. The Trustee is fully aware that the Individual Debtor opposes the Trustee's waiver of privilege because the Individual Debtor is gravely concerned about the effects such a waiver would have in the pending Criminal Action. Indeed, the Trustee's counsel was told as much on multiple occasions while counsel engaged in discussions to try to arrive at a resolution of the present dispute, and the potential for the Trustee to waive attorney-client privilege is a primary focus of the Individual Debtor's Motion for an Order and Writ Staying Bankruptcy Cases which is pending in the Criminal Action. (*See* Criminal Action Doc. No. 131, at 23-25, filed in this case by the Trustee at Doc. No. 2158). Despite this knowledge, the Trustee still goes to great lengths to disparage the Individual Debtor and his motives for refusing to consent to a privilege waiver while he is incarcerated and fighting to regain his liberty.\n\n3. During the discussions between counsel regarding the Trustee's requested privilege waiver, the Individual Debtor's counsel invited the Trustee's counsel to provide authority permitting this Court to enter an enforceable order that would allow the Trustee, as the holder of the attorney-client privilege, to provide the documents at issue in this motion to the defendant's counsel in *Despins v. Guo*, Adv. Pro. No. 23-05008 (JAM) (the \"Whitecroft Adversary\"), as he would be required to do in order to affirmatively use them, and then affirmatively use those same documents to prove his claims in the Whitecroft Adversary, all without waiving any applicable privilege as to the documents.\n\n4. The Individual Debtor's counsel only asked the Trustee's counsel to provide such authority because the Trustee's counsel had suggested that a consensual order of the type now sought via the Privilege Waiver Motion could allow for the Trustee's affirmative use of attorneyclient privileged communications while preserving privilege, and the Individual Debtor's counsel wanted to satisfy themselves that what the Trustee's counsel was suggesting was possible. The\n\nTrustee's counsel never provided the requested authority, and the Individual Debtor's counsel has likewise been unable to locate any such authority because the voluntary disclosure of privileged information, which is what the Trustee as the privilege holder seeks to do, constitutes a privilege waiver.\n\n5. In the alternative, and again completely ignoring the Individual Debtor's stated legitimate concerns about the impact of a privilege waiver in the Criminal Case, the Trustee asks this Court to waive the attorney-client privilege, but fails to undertake the necessary analysis balancing the Trustee's needs for the documents at issue against the harm to the Individual Debtor of a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.\n\n6. The Trustee fails to conduct the requisite balancing test because he knows that the scales tip decidedly in favor of the Individual Debtor and the denial of the requested privilege waiver.\n\n7. The Trustee misleadingly identifies and attaches to the Privilege Waiver Motion a much broader set of documents then are truly at issue because some of the documents are duplicative of one another, and with others the Individual Debtor does not even contend there is any attorney-client or other privilege to protect. The Trustee also fails to articulate why the handful of documents at issue are vital to proving his claims in the Whitecroft Adversary and why he cannot do so without them in light of the information he has obtained in the Whitecroft Adversary from third-parties, and through the more than 220 2004 Examinations this Court has authorized, many of which have presumedly been conducted. Indeed, the information for which the Trustee seeks to waive the attorney-client privilege via the Privilege Waiver Motion was obtained via Rule 2004 Examinations, not as part of the discovery process in the Whitecroft Adversary. Surely the Trustee has obtained nonprivileged information as part of his investigation that could be used to\n\nsupport his claims in lieu of the documents at issue. The fact that the Truste may want to waive privilege rather than utilize other evidence should not be a sufficient reason to waive privilege. Indeed, under the present circumstance a privilege waiver should be permitted only as a last resort, not for convenience.\n\n8. Lastly, the Trustee's half-hearted and indirect argument that because the Individual Debtor and Ms. Guo are represented by the same counsel the Individual Debtor's attorney-client privilege has somehow been waived as to Ms. Guo is unsupported, unsupportable, and must be rejected.\n\n#### **II. BACKGROUND**\n\n#### **A**. **The Privileges Order**\n\n9. On February 15, 2022 the Individual Debtor filed his voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, and on July 8, 2022, this Court entered its Order Granting Appointment Of Chapter 11 Trustee (Doc. No. 523), granting the appointment of the Trustee as Chapter 11 trustee in this case.\n\n10. On July 28, 2022, within weeks of his appointment, the Trustee filed the first three of what would become numerous motions to conduct Rule 2004 examinations. The first three motions included the motion to conduct a Rule 2004 examination of the Individual Debtor (Doc. No. 636) and motion to conduct Rule 2004 examinations of \"various legal and financial advisors to the [Individual] Debtor\" (the \"Professionals 2004 Motion\") (Doc. No. 637). The Professionals 2004 Motion sought leave to obtain documents and testimony from twelve different law firms or attorneys who had potentially provided legal services to the Individual Debtor (Doc. No. 637, at Exhibit B).\n\n11. On August 22, 2022, the Trustee filed his Motion . . . For Entry of Order (A)\n\nProviding That Control of Any Attorney-Client Privilege, Work Product Protection, and Other Privileges Related to Rule 2004 Subpoenaed Documents Passed to the Trustee Upon Appointment, [and] (B) Directing that [the Individual] Debtor and Other Examinees not Withhold Documents on Account of Such Privileges, . . . (the \"2004 Exam Privileges Motion\" (Doc. No. 777)). The Individual Debtor opposed the 2004 Exam Privileges Motion. The dispute was resolved on September 14, 2022 via the entry of a Consent Order Regarding Control of Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Protection Related to Rule 2004 Subpoenaed Documents and Information (the \"Privileges Order\" (Doc. No. 856)).\n\n12. The Privileges Order provides that the Trustee controls the Individual Debtor's attorney-client privilege and/or work-product protection with respect to specifically enumerated topics defined in the Privileges Order as the Investigation Topics, and further provides that with respect to the Investigation Topics:\n\nNeither the Debtor nor his counsel (based on instructions from the Debtor or any person acting on behalf of the Debtor), nor any other examinee, is entitled to withhold any of the documents and information requested in the attachments to the Rule 2004 subpoenas on the basis of any Trustee Privileges concerning the Investigation Topics.\n\n(Privileges Order, at ¶¶2-3). Thus, the intent of the Privileges Order was to allow the Trustee to conduct his investigation, and in particular via the use of Rule 2004, without concern that documents or information would be withheld on the basis of the Individual Debtor's attorneyclient privilege and/or on the basis of attorney work product.\n\n13. The Privileges Order reserves to the Individual Debtor the right to assert privilege over \"legal matters unrelated to the Investigation Topics, such as unrelated criminal allegations or the Debtor's asylum application . . .\". (Privileges Order, at ¶4).\n\n14. The Privileges Order does not permit the Trustee to waive the attorney-client privilege or work product protection:\n\n. . . provided, however, the Trustee shall not be entitled to waive any Trustee Privilege (for example, by disclosing privileged documents or information in open court or on any public docket or by sharing such documents or information with a third party) absent the Debtor's written consent or further order of the Court, . . .\n\n(Privileges Order, at ¶5).\n\n15. On the morning of March 15, 2023, a twelve count indictment was unsealed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York charging the Individual Debtor with various federal crimes. The Individual Debtor was arrested by federal law enforcement authorities on March 15, 2023. On March 29, 2023, a superseding indictment was filed in the Criminal Case. (Criminal Case, Doc. No. 19). The Individual Debtor remains in custody awaiting trial which is currently scheduled for April 2024. Thus, from the Individual Debtor's perspective, the world in which the Privileges Order entered bears no resemblance to the world today, and it is the state of the world today that drives the Individual Debtor's position vis-à-vis the Trustee's effort to waive attorney-client privilege.\n\n#### **B. The Whitecroft Adversary**\n\n16. The Trustee Commenced the Whitecroft Adversary on May 16, 2023, seeking to recover, *inter alia*, the proceeds of a purported post-petition sale of alleged estate property, a Bombardier aircraft.[1](#page-46-0) Mei Guo (\"Ms. Guo\") is the only named defendant in the Whitecroft Adversary.\n\n17. On or about July 31, 2023, the Trustee served written discovery requests, interrogatories, requests for admission, and requests for the production of documents, on Ms. Guo in the Whitecroft Adversary (the \"Trustee Discovery). Ms. Guo responded to the Trustee Discovery on or about August 30, 2023, and invoked her Fifth Amendment rights against self-\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Trustee seeks other relief in the Whitecroft Adversary but the documents at issue relate only to the Bombardier aircraft.\n\nincrimination in response to each request in the Trustee Discovery. The Trustee did not move to compel or otherwise seek leave of Court related to Ms. Guo's invocation of her Fifth Amendment Rights in response to the Trustee Discovery.\n\n18. Ms. Guo was deposed in the Whitecroft Adversary on November 1, 2023, and invoked her Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination in response to a number of the questions posed. The Trustee did not move to compel or otherwise seek leave of Court related to Ms. Guo's invocation of her Fifth Amendment Rights in response to questions posed to her during her deposition.\n\n19. Ms. Guo served discovery on the Trustee in the Whitecroft Adversary, including requests for the production of documents.\n\n20. To date and based on the Bates stamps applied to documents by the Trustee, the Trustee has produced 8896 pages of documents to Ms. Guo in response to her requests for production, a subset of the more than 49,000 documents the Trustee's counsel represented that search terms run against document productions obtained by the Trustee pursuant to Rule 2004 had captured for further review by the Trustee's counsel in connection with Ms. Guo's discovery requests. (*See* October 9-12, 2023, email chain between, among others, the Trustee's counsel and the Individual Debtor's counsel, at October 9, 2023, 9:49 pm email. A copy of the email chain is attached hereto as Exhibit A).\n\n21. In connection with his search for documents responsive to Ms. Guo's requests for production the Trustee identified potentially privileged responsive documents and asked the Individual Debtor's counsel to consent to the production of those documents to Ms. Guo without undertaking any review. (*See generally id*).\n\n22. The Individual Debtor's counsel informed the Trustee's counsel that the Individual\n\nDebtor had not agreed to waive privilege and stated that the same process used to review privileged documents prior to production in *Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC, et al*. Adv. Pro. No. 5:23ap05005, should be used in the Whitecroft Adversary so that an informed decision regarding privilege could be made and any disputes could be limited. (*Id.*, at October 10, 2023, 4:40 pm email and responses thereto).[2](#page-46-0)\n\n23. The Trustee thereafter agreed to proceed in the same manner utilized in the Greenwich Land adversary proceeding and provided to the Individual Debtor's counsel 246 documents to review to determine the scope and substance of the waiver the Trustee was seeking, and to determine whether the Individual Debtor viewed each of the provided documents as privileged.[3](#page-46-0)\n\n24. Of the 246 documents provided for review, the Individual Debtor's counsel identified a total of 131 that the Individual Debtor viewed as privileged and objected to being produced, disclosed, or used for any purpose. The Individual Debtor further identified five (5) documents that included privileged information and his counsel returned to the Trustee redacted versions of those documents identifying those areas deemed to contain privileged information.[4](#page-46-0)\n\n<sup>2</sup> In the Greenwich Land adversary proceeding the Trustee's counsel requested the Individual Debtor's consent to produce potentially privileged documents to the defendants. The Individual Debtor's counsel requested to review the documents before providing the Individual Debtor's position on the request for consent. The documents were provided to the Individual Debtor's counsel, reviewed, and the Individual Debtor identified the documents which he did not believe were subject to privilege, which could be immediately produced, and those that were subject to privilege and for which the Individual Debtor would not consent to production. The process utilized in the Greenwich Land adversary appeared to work well and did not result in any dispute presented to the Court. Thus, the Individual Debtor's counsel requested that the same process be used in the Whitecroft Adversary.\n\n<sup>3</sup> It appears that the Trustee is treating every document obtained from a law firm or lawyer that may have previously represented the Individual Debtor as privileged. Thus, part of the Individual Debtor's Counsel's review included analyzing whether a document was even subject to attorneyclient privilege.\n\n<sup>4</sup> One of the documents the Individual Debtor's counsel returned to the Trustee in redacted form is included as an Exhibit to the Privilege Waiver Motion, Exhibit J, without the redaction which\n\n25. The individual Debtor did not consider the other 101 documents privileged and did not object to their production, disclosure, or use. To the best of counsel's knowledge as of the filing of this Objection the Trustee's counsel has neither produced the documents identified as non-privileged to Ms. Guo's counsel nor provided a privilege log of the documents that the Individual Debtor identified as privileged but which the Trustee does not seek to affirmatively use and are therefore not at issue in the Privilege Waiver Motion.\n\n26. Of the 136 documents that the Individual Debtor identified as privileged and to which he would not consent to a waiver only six (6) appear to be at issue as the remining 10, the Privilege Waiver Motion attaches 16 exhibits, do not appear to have been provide to the Individual Debtor's counsel for review based on the lack of the Bates stamp prefix \"MGAP\" which was affixed to the documents provided for review\n\n#### **C. The Documents at Issue**\n\n27. The Privilege Waiver Motion includes as Exhibits A-P the documents for which the Trustee seeks to waive privilege. The Individual Debtor does not contend that the following documents are subject to attorney-client privilege: Exhibits C, G, O, and P (Exhibit G, O, and P do not include the MGAP Bates prefix, and the Individual Debtor has not located Exhibit C in the documents provided by the Trustee's counsel for review).\n\n28. The Individual Debtor does not contend that the following portions of Exhibits attached to the Privilege Waiver Motion are privileged:\n\n> • Exhibit F, all pages save for pages 137-140 (the Individual Debtor does contend that pages 137-140 contain privileged information);\n\ngives the impression that the Individual Debtor is asserting that communications between nonlawyers are privileged, he is not.\n\n- Exhibit J, all pages save for the first email in the chain at Bates stamp MGAP06178 from Ms. Wong to Mr. Shulman, and others, the email at Bates Stamp MGAP06198 from Mr. Shulman to Ms. Wong and others, and the email at Bates stamped pages MGAP06201-6203 between Ms. Wong and Messrs. Shulman and Barnett.\n- Exhibit M, the email at Bates stamp WC-KWOK-BANKR 0004783 is claimed as privileged, while the email at Bates stamp WC-KWOK-BANKR 0004784-85 is not claimed as privileged.\n\n29. Certain of the documents attached as Exhibits to the Privilege Waiver Motion are duplicative of one another. Exhibit B consists of an email chain containing three emails, Exhibit D is one of the emails contained in the Exhibit B chain and Exhibit E consists of two of the emails contained in the Exhibit B chain. Thus, Exhibits B, D and E are effectively one document. Likewise, Exhibit I is an email chain consisting of four emails, three of which are included within the documents that constitute Exhibit H.[5](#page-46-0)\n\n30. Based on the foregoing there is a very limited set of unique documents at issue on the Privilege Waiver Motion: Exhibits A, B (which includes D and E), F (pages 137-140 of the transcript only), H, I (only the first email in the chain is unique), J (only pages Bates stamped MGAP06178, MGAP06198, and MGAP 6201-6203 are at issue), K, L, M (only the email at WC-KWOK-BANKR 0004783 is at issue), and Exhibit N.\n\n# **III. ARGUMENT**\n\n# **A. The Trustee Provides No Authority That the Order He Seeks Will be Enforceable and not Simply Result in a Privilege Waiver**\n\n31. The Trustee asks this Court to enter an order permitting the Trustee, as the privilege\n\n<sup>5</sup> Exhibit H is a composite exhibit that appears to be the entire contents of a law firm's file on a particular subject.\n\nholder, to affirmatively utilize the documents at issue in the Privilege Waiver Motion to prove his claims in the Whitecroft Adversary, and to disclose them to Ms. Guo, the defendant in that adversary proceeding as he would have to do to utilize them, all without waiving privilege as to those documents.\n\n32. The Trustee cites no authority that such an order would be enforceable and would preclude a third-party from obtaining the documents at issue because no such authority appears to exist. Indeed, the Trustee's affirmative use of the documents would constitute a privilege waiver regardless of the entry of the requested order.\n\n33. The Trustee requested that the Individual Debtor agree to such an order and he refused to do so absent authority that the order would be enforceable against third-parties; the Trustee has not provided any such authority, either to the Individual Debtor or the Court in the Privilege Waiver Motion, and the Individual Debtor has not located any such authority.\n\n34. The authority located by the Individual Debtor is to the contrary: the affirmative use of privileged information by the privilege holder, in this case the Trustee, constitutes a privilege waiver, and not just in the particular action in which the privileged materials are utilized. *Chevron Corp. v. Salazar*, 275 F.R.D. 437, 445-46 (S.D.N.Y., 2011) (\"Where a party voluntarily discloses privileged documents to an adversary in one proceeding, it cannot withhold the same documents on the basis of privilege in a subsequent proceeding, even if the subsequent proceeding involves a different adversary.\") (citing cases). *See also In re Parmalat Sec. Litig.*, No. 04 MD 1653 (LAK) (HBP), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88629, \\*28 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 1, 2006) (noting that \"voluntary or even inadvertent disclosure [of privileged communications] may result [in] a waiver of privilege\" whereas compelled disclosure does not result in a waiver) (citations omitted); *Scott v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc.*, 94 F. Supp. 3d 585, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (\"with some exceptions,\n\nthe attorney-client privilege is automatically waived when a privileged communication is disclosed to a third party or litigation adversary.\") (citing cases); *Speedfit LLC v. Woodway USA Inc.*, Case No. CV 17-768, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56559, \\*13 (E.D.N.Y., March 28, 2019) (noting that the attorney-client privilege is not absolute and may be waived).\n\n35. The intentional waiver of the attorney-client privilege by the Trustee of a handful of documents on a particular subject also creates the risk of a broader subject matter waiver. *Speedfit LLC*, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56559, at \\*13 (\"Subject matter waiver is a type of implied waiver 'which allows the attacking party to reach all privileged conversations regarding a particular subject once one privileged conversation on that topic disclosed,' and is grounded in 'fairness considerations at work in the context of litigations.'\") (*quoting Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co.* 193 F.R.D. 73, 84 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)*. See also*, Fed. R. Evid. 502(a) (\"When the disclosure is made in a federal proceeding or to a federal office or agency and waives the attorney-client privilege or work-product protection, the waiver extends to an undisclosed communication or information in a federal or state proceeding only if: (1) the waiver is intentional; (2) the disclosed and undisclosed communications or information concern the same subject matter; and (3) they ought in fairness to be considered together.\").\n\n36. Because the Individual Debtor has grave concerns about the enforceability of the Order requested by the Trustee, and the concomitant ability of prosecutors to obtain at least the documents used by the Trustee that are otherwise privileged, and potentially much more if there is subsequently deemed to be a subject matter waiver, the Individual Debtor Objects to the entry of the Order requested by the Trustee.\n\n#### **B. The Trustee Should not be Permitted to Waive Privilege**\n\n37. In the alternative to the requested Order permitting him to affirmatively use\n\ndocuments without waiving privilege, the Trustee asks the Court to enter an order permitting him to waive privilege as to the handful of documents at issue.\n\n38. The Trustee cites several cases where a bankruptcy trustee was permitted to waive a debtor's attorney-client privilege, but the Trustee performs no analysis under the prevailing balancing test. That analysis leads to the inescapable conclusion that privilege should not be waived.\n\n39. The majority of courts that have addressed the issue of a bankruptcy trustee's authority to waive a debtor's pre-petition attorney-client privilege have utilized a balancing test. *See Moore v. Eason (In re Bazemore)*, 216 B.R. 1020, 1023-24 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1998) (\"The filing of bankruptcy by an individual debtor requires a determination as to whether anyone else controls the privilege. The inquiry requires balancing the interests of a full and frank discussion in the attorney-client relationship and the harm to the debtor upon a disclosure with the trustee's duty to maximize the value of the debtor's estate and represent the interests of the estate\"). *See also*, *Ramette v. Bame (In re Bame)* 251 B.R. 367, 377 (D. Minn. 2000) (finding, based on the weight of authority, the balancing approach to be the applicable test in determining whether a bankruptcy trustee may waive a debtor's prepetition privilege); *Whatley v. Meyer Wilson Co., LPA (In re Chandar)*, Case No. 11-37360-B-7, Adv. No. 17-2057, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 3903, at \\*2-3 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2017) (collecting cases); *In re Still*, 444 B.R. 520, 522 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2010) (\"The trend of the cases is toward a balancing approach.\").\n\n40. In applying the balancing test courts determine whether \"on balance the trustee's duties to maximize the value of the estate outweigh the policies underlying the attorney-client privilege and the harm to the debtor of disclosure.\" *Ramette (In re Bame)* 215 B.R. 367, at 377 (citations omitted). *See also*, *Degirolamo v. Daily & Haskins (In re Wittmer)*, Case No. 08-61618,\n\n2011 Bankr. LEXIS 4727, at \\*7 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio, Nov. 30, 2011) (\"This [balancing] approach blends the argument that a trustee cannot waive the attorney-client privilege because of the potential for personal harm to the debtor and impediment of the attorney-client communication with the argument that a trustee can waive the attorney-client privilege if there is no adverse effect on the debtor.\") (*citing In re Miller* 247 B.R. 704, 710 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2000)).\n\n41. In this case the adverse effect of a privilege waiver to the Individual Debtor is substantial because he has been charged in a superseding indictment with multiple violations of federal criminal law, and the allegations of the superseding indictment mirror certain of the allegations of the Whitecroft Adversary complaint. (Compare Whitecroft Adversary complaint, at ¶¶13-19 accusing the Individual Debtor of using numerous shell companies to keep assets from creditors, with superseding indictment at ¶¶1-3, including at ¶3 (\"To conceal the illegal source of the funds [the Individual Debtor and his alleged co-defendants] transferred, and directed the transfer of, money into and through more than approximately 500 accounts held in the names of at least 80 different entities or individuals, . . .\"). Certain of the documents for which the Trustee seeks to waive privilege, Exhibits A, B (and D and E as subsets of B), and F, relate to purported contemplated asset transfers during the time period at issue within the superseding indictment, *i.e.*, \"[f]rom at least in or about 2018 through at least in or about March 2023\". (Superseding indictment, at ¶1).\n\n42. Based on a review of the docket of the Criminal Case the prosecutors in that case have not sought leave to obtain any of the Individual Debtor's privileged communications. Of course, if the Trustee waives the privilege the prosecutor's would be entitled to obtain all of the documents to which the waiver applies, including any subsequent subject matter waiver that the Court may find. The potential for criminal liability is a factor that courts look to when conducting\n\nthe balancing test to determine whether privilege should be waived, and the potential for prosecutors to obtain access to documents that they would not otherwise be able to access should weigh even more heavily in refusing to permit waiver. *See Ramette (In re Bame)* 215 B.R. 367, at 377 (\"As to other questions, however, especially those going to activities giving rise to potential criminal prosecution, the balance would probably tip in favor of sustaining assertion of the privilege, in which case the trustee would have the opportunity to raise the crime-fraud exception to the privilege.\").\n\n43. On the other side of the scale, the Trustee has not identified any harm that would befall the estate if the Court refuses to permit the requested privilege waiver. Indeed, the only stated reason for seeking the privilege waiver is to use a handful of documents affirmatively in the Whitecroft Adversary, but as the Trustee states in the Privilege Waiver Motion he likely does not even need these few documents to prevail because Ms. Guo has not defended against the Trustee's allegations. (Privilege Waiver Motion, at ¶48 (\"Thus, Ms. Guo has failed to substantiate any basis to oppose the Trustee's claims in the Bombardier Adversary Proceeding\").\n\n44. The Privilege Waiver Motion also ignores the non-privileged information that the Trustee relies upon in support of his complaint, all as referenced therein and attached as exhibits thereto[6](#page-46-0) , as well as the substantive deposition testimony of Ms. Guo secured in January 2023, which was reaffirmed during her November 1, 2023 deposition in the Whitecroft Adversary, the substantial non-privileged information that the Trustee has obtained in connection with his sweeping investigation, and publicly available information such as that referenced at paragraph 20\n\n<span id=\"page-46-0\"></span><sup>6</sup> The Trustee attached one or more of the documents at issue in the Privilege Waiver Motion as an exhibit to the Whitecroft Adversary complaint without asking the Individual Debtor's counsel for consent or seeking leave of Court. Obviously, the Trustee's unilateral use of documents in violation of the Privileges Order does not constitute a waiver of the Individual Debtor's right to demand compliance with that order.\n\nof the Privilege Waiver Motion.\n\n45. As previously noted, in response to Ms. Guo's requests for production in the Whitecroft Adversary, many of which requests sought information concerning the Trustee's allegations regarding ownership of the Bombardier aircraft, the Trustee produced nearly 9,000 pages of documents. Moreover, the Trustee continues to seek information in support of his claims, having received documents in response to a subpoena from JetLaw, LLC within the last week, and thereafter issuing two additional subpoenas for documents and depositions. In addition, the Trustee will certainly seek adverse inferences against Ms. Guo based on her invocation of her Fifth Amendment rights and the Individual Debtor's invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights during a March 2, 2023 deposition at which he was questioned regarding matters at issue in the Whitecroft Adversary even though it had yet to be filed and the deposition related to the claim and counterclaims asserted in *HK International Funds Investments (USA) Ltd. v. Despins*, Adv. Pro. No. 22-05003. (*See* Whitecroft Complaint, at ¶¶26, 29, 42, 44(a)-(f), 49, 64, and 72).\n\n46. Based on the (i) massive volume of non-privileged information the Trustee has accrued, (ii) lack of any showing that the inability to use the handful of documents the Trustee seeks to use via the Privilege Waiver Motion will negate his ability to successfully prove his claims, and (iii) harm that will befall the Individual Debtor if privilege is waived, the Privilege Waiver Motion should be denied.\n\n# **C. Ms. Guo's Counsel's Knowledge of Certain Facts Does not Constitute a Privilege Waiver**\n\n47. The fact that Ms. Guo and the Individual Debtor are represented by the same counsel does not work a waiver of the Individual Debtor's attorney-client privilege or vice-versa simply because counsel has knowledge of privileged information and the Trustee cites no authority for his implied position that it does—the fact that the Trustee does not come right out and say that\n\nhe is arguing that Zeisler & Zeisler's representation of the Individual Debtor in the main bankruptcy case and Ms. Guo in the Whitecroft Adversary results in a waiver of the Individual Debtor's attorney-client privilege speaks volumes about the Trustee's own view of his argument.\n\n48. The cases cited by the Trustee do not support his implied waiver argument, and are utterly inapposite. *Helmedach v. Comm'r of Corr.,* 329 Conn. 726, 737 (2018) addresses the issue of notifying a criminal defendant client of a plea offer and whether the failure to do so in a timely manner constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. *Uchechukwu Egbujo v. Jackson Lewis, P.C.*, 2022 U.S. Dist LEXIS 177041, 2022 WL 4585688, \\*7 (D. Conn., Sept. 29, 2022) involves a defamation claim and whether a law firm's publication to its own client of the findings of its investigation conducted on behalf of the client constitutes publication to a third-party for purposes of satisfying the publication element of a defamation claim, it does not. Lastly, *Rai v. WB Imico Lexington Fee, LLC*, 802 F.3d 353 (2015) involves an interpretation of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, and whether providing a required document to counsel satisfies the act's disclosure provisions, it does.\n\n49. The Trustee also contends that the Individual Debtor and Ms. Guo are seeking to use the attorney-client privilege as a sword and a shield. The sword and shield problem arises where one party seeks to use its privileged communications affirmatively without disclosing them. *Sims v. Blot*, 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (\"In other words, a party cannot partially disclose privileged communications or affirmatively rely on privileged communications to support its claim or defense and then shield the underlying communications from scrutiny by the opposing party.\") (citations omitted). As between the Trustee, the Individual Debtor, and Ms. Guo the only party that is seeking to affirmatively use privileged information is the Trustee. Thus, the only one who could even potentially have a sword and shield problem is the Trustee (the Individual Debtor is not a party to the Whitecroft Adversary and is not seeking to use privileged communications for any purpose, he is simply seeking to have privileged communications remain privileged; Ms. Guo is not seeking to use privileged communications for any purpose and could not because she has no right or ability to use them).\n\nWHEREFORE, for all of the foregoing reasons the Privilege Waiver Motion should be denied.\n\nDated at Bridgeport, Connecticut on this 13th day of December, 2023.\n\n# **THE DEBTOR, HO WAN KWOK**\n\n */s/ James M. Moriarty*\n\nEric Henzy (ct12849) James M. Moriarty 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604 Telephone: (203) 368-4234 Facsimile: (203) 368-5487 Email: [ehenzy@zeislaw.com](mailto:ehenzy@zeislaw.com) [Jmoriarty@zeislaw.com](mailto:Jmoriarty@zeislaw.com)\n\n# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n : Debtor. : \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_:\n\n:\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_ :\n\nIn re : Chapter 11\n\nHO WAN KWOK, : Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI hereby certify that on this 13th day of December, 2023, a copy of foregoing was filed electronically. Notice of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties by operation of the Court's electronic filing system. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF System.\n\n> */s/ James M. Moriarty*  James M. Moriarty (ct21876)\n\n# **Exhibit B Filed Under Seal**","body_zh":"美国破产法院康涅狄格州联邦地区布里奇波特分院\n\n------------------------------------------------------　x\n\n关于：　:\n:　Chapter 11\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）等，　:\n:　Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。1　:\n:　联合管理\n\nx\n第11章受托人及 Genever 债务人就债务人在刑事案件中再次提出请求裁定中止本第11章案件及相关对抗程序之动议的通知\n\n根据日期为 August 30, 2023 的通知 [Docket No. 2158]，Luc A. Despins（吕克·A·德斯平斯）作为 Ho Wan Kwok（下称“债务人”）的第11章受托人（下称“受托人”），告知本院及利害关系方，债务人已在美国纽约南区联邦地区法院（下称“SDNY地区法院”）针对其正在审理的刑事案件 [Case No. 1:23-cr-00118-AT]（下称“刑事案件”）中提出一项动议（下称“中止动议”），请求中止上述第11章案件及所有相关对抗程序。\n\n根据日期为 September 27, 2023 的通知，受托人、Genever Holdings LLC（Genever控股有限责任公司，下称“Genever BVI”）以及 Genever Holdings Corporation（Genever控股公司，下称“Genever US”，并与 Genever BVI 合称“Genever债务人”）向本院及利害关系方提供了最新情况，并附上了以下各方就中止动议提交的答复：（i）美国司法部，（ii）第11章受托人及 Genever 债务人，以及（iii）The Sherry-Netherland, Inc.（谢里-内德兰公司）；以及无担保债权人正式委员会对受托人及 Genever 债务人所提交答复的加入。\n\n1 本第11章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（亦称 Guo Wengui、Miles Guo 和 Miles Kwok，以及众多其他别名）（税务识别号码后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（税务识别号码后四位：8202）及 Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 及 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为 Paul Hastings LLP，200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166，转交 Luc A. Despins，作为 Ho Wan Kwok 财产的受托人（仅为通知和通信之目的）。\n\n根据日期为 December 21, 2023 的通知，受托人及 Genever 债务人向本院及利害关系方进一步提供了最新情况，并附上 SDNY地区法院驳回中止动议的裁定。\n\n受托人及 Genever 债务人希望进一步提供最新情况：于 January 4, 2024，债务人提交了一项再次请求中止本第11章案件的动议 [Criminal Case ECF No. 218]（下称“再次中止动议”）。再次中止动议（包括相关法律备忘录及支持性声明）的副本作为附件1附后。\n\n债务人在再次动议中请求的救济，部分基于受托人提出的动议 [ECF No. 2420]（下称“特权动议”），该动议请求裁定授权受托人：（a）在受托人针对 Mei Guo（郭美）正在进行的对抗程序 [Adv. Proc. No. 23-5008]（下称“庞巴迪对抗程序”）中使用可能受特权保护的文件，而不放弃特权；或作为替代方案，（b）放弃受托人就与 Bombardier Global XRS 飞机及其出售所得款项有关事项享有的特权。\n\n如本院所知，自提交特权动议以来，受托人已在庞巴迪对抗程序中提交简易判决动议 [ECF No. 88 in Bombardier Adversary Proceeding]（下称“简易判决动议”），该动议未使用亦未寻求使用任何享有特权的信息。受托人预计，本院将在就简易判决动议作出裁定后，且仅在本院驳回该动议的情况下，才会就特权动议作出裁定。如准予简易判决动议，则庞巴迪对抗程序将无需审判，从而使特权动议失去意义。如不准予简易判决动议，则受托人将在其为审判作准备时，于较后决定其是否及在何种程度上需要使用特权动议所涉可能受特权保护的文件。\n\n地区法院于 January 5, 2024 作出一项裁定 [Criminal Case ECF No. 221]，规定美国政府及受托人须于 January 19, 2024 前提交其对再次中止动议的反对意见，受托人将利用该机会反对该动议。\n\n日期：January 8, 2024　纽约州纽约市\n\n> 签署人：/s/ G. Alexander Bongartz　Avram E. Luft（获准临时出庭）　G. Alexander Bongartz（获准临时出庭）　PAUL HASTINGS LLP　200 Park Avenue　New York, New York 10166　(212) 318-6079　aviluft@paulhastings.com　alexbongartz@paulhastings.com\n\n以及\n\nNicholas A. Bassett（获准临时出庭）　PAUL HASTINGS LLP　2050 M Street NW　Washington, D.C., 20036　(202) 551-1902　nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n以及\n\nDouglas S. Skalka（ct00616）　Patrick R. Linsey（ct29437）　NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C.　195 Church Street, 13th Floor　New Haven, Connecticut 06510　(203) 781-2847　dskalka@npmlaw.com　plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n第11章受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 及 Genever Holdings Corporation 的律师\n\n美国破产法院康涅狄格州联邦地区布里奇波特分院\n\n------------------------------------------------------　x\n\n关于：　:\n:　Chapter 11\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）等，1　:\n:　Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。　:\n:\n:　（联合管理）\n\n送达证明\n\n下列签署人特此证明，于 January 8, 2024，上述通知已以电子方式提交。该提交的通知已通过本院电子提交（“CM/ECF”）系统的操作，以电子邮件发送给上述第11章案件的所有当事方；或者，如电子提交通知所示，已通过邮寄发送给任何无法接受电子提交的人士。各方可通过本院 CM/ECF 系统查阅该提交文件。\n\n日期：January 8, 2024　纽约州纽约市\n\n签署人：/s/ G. Alexander Bongartz　G. Alexander Bongartz（获准临时出庭）　PAUL HASTINGS LLP　200 Park Avenue　New York, New York 10166　(212) 318-6079　alexbongartz@paulhastings.com\n\n第11章受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 及 Genever Holdings Corporation 的律师\n\n1 本第11章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（亦称 Guo Wengui、Miles Guo 和 Miles Kwok，以及众多其他别名）（税务识别号码后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（税务识别号码后四位：8202）及 Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 及 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为 Paul Hastings LLP，200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166，转交 Luc A. Despins，作为 Ho Wan Kwok 财产的受托人（仅为通知和通信之目的）。\n\n附件1\n\n美国纽约南区联邦地区法院\n\n美利坚合众国，\n\n原告，\n\n诉\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵），\n\n被告。\n\nCase No. 1:23-CR-118-1 (AT)\n\n再次请求中止破产案件的动议通知及请求复议的动议\n\n请求口头辩论\n\n被告 Ho Wan Kwok 通过其律师，谨此（i）提交一项再次动议，请求作出裁定及令状，以中止题为 In re Ho Wan Kwok, et al., Case No. 22-50073(JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn.) (Jointly Administered) 的破产案件及所有相关案件（下称“破产案件”）；以及（ii）根据 Local Criminal Rule 49.1，请求本院复议本院驳回 Kwok 先生先前中止破产案件动议（Dkt. No. 131）的裁定（Dkt. No. 204）。\n\n被告依据 Matthew S. Barkan, Esq.（马修·S·巴坎律师）的声明、其所附证据、随附的法律备忘录，以及此前在本案中进行的所有文书提交及程序提出本动议。\n\n被告谨请求就本动议进行口头辩论。\n\n日期：January 4, 2023　纽约州纽约市　谨此提交，\n\nSidhardha Kamaraju　E. Scott Schirick　Matthew S. Barkan　Daniel J. Pohlman　John M. Kilgard　Clare P. Tilton　PRYOR CASHMAN LLP　7 Times Square　New York, NY 10036　(212) 421-4100\n\n[skamaraju@pryorcashman.com]　sschirick@pryorcashman.com　mbarkan@pryorcashman.com　dpohlman@pryorcashman.com　jkilgard@pryorcashman.com　ctilton@pryorcashman.com\n\nSabrina P. Shroff　80 Broad Street, 19th Floor　New York, NY 10004　(646) 763-1490\n\n被告 Ho Wan Kwok 的律师\n\n美国纽约南区联邦地区法院\n\n美利坚合众国，\n\n原告，\n\n诉\n\nHo Wan Kwok，\n\n部分密封提交\n\nCase No. 1:23-CR-118-1 (AT)\n\n被告。\n\n支持被告再次提出中止动议及复议动议的法律备忘录\n\nSidhardha Kamaraju　E. Scott Schirick　Matthew S. Barkan　Daniel J. Pohlman　John M. Kilgard　Clare P. Tilton　PRYOR CASHMAN LLP　7 Times Square　New York, NY 10036　(212) 421-4100　skamaraju@pryorcashman.com　sschirick@pryorcashman.com　mbarkan@pryorcashman.com　dpohlman@pryorcashman.com　jkilgard@pryorcashman.com　ctilton@pryorcashman.com\n\nSabrina P. Shroff　80 Broad Street, 19th Floor　New York, NY 10004　(646) 763-1490\n\n被告 Ho Wan Kwok 的律师\n\n目录\n\n引用权威资料表　ii\n\n初步陈述　1\n相关背景　3\nI.\n受托人为取得受害人资金所作的尝试　4\nII. Himalaya Exchange 资金的重叠及争议　5\nIII. 受托人积极努力削弱 Kwok 先生的律师—客户特权　7\nIV. 本院驳回中止动议的决定及裁定　8\nV. January 3, 2024 的替代起诉书　8\n论证　10\nI.\n适用法律　10\nII. 讨论　10\nA.\n新证据削弱本院关于案件之间仅存在有限重叠的认定　10\n(1)\n关于客户资产认定的重叠　11\n(2)\n关于 Kwok 先生律师—客户特权的重叠　16\n结论　18\n\n引用权威资料表\n\n页码\n\n案例\n\nCorines v. Am. Physicians Ins. Tr.,\n769 F. Supp. 2d 584 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)10\n\nLouis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc.,\n676 F.3d 83 (2d. Cir. 2012)8, 11\n\nSchoolcraft v. City of New York,\n298 F.R.D. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) 10\n\nTrustees of Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat. Pension Fund. v. Transworld Mech., Inc.,\n886 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)16\n\nUnited States v. Lisi,\nNo. 15-cr-457 (KPF), 2020 WL 1331955 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2020) 10\n\nUnited States v. Yalincak,\n853 F.3d 629 (2d Cir. 2017)14\n\n法律及规则\n\nFed. R. Crim. P. 16(b)　16\n\nFed. R. Crim. P. 41(g)　5\n\nLocal Criminal Rule 49.1　1, 10\n\n被告 Ho Wan Kwok 谨此提交本法律备忘录，以支持：（i）其再次提出的动议，请求中止题为 In re Ho Wan Kwok, et al., Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn.) (Jointly Administered) 的破产程序及其相关案件（合称“破产案件”）；以及（ii）其根据 Local Criminal Rule 49.1 提出的复议动议，请求复议本院驳回其先前中止破产案件动议（Dkt No. 131，下称“中止动议”）的裁定（Dkt. No. 204，下称“该裁定”）。\n\n初步陈述\n\n本院在该裁定中认定，破产案件与本案之间不存在足以支持中止的充分重叠。然而，自 Kwok 先生提交其原中止动议以来，本案及破产案件中的重大进展使本院有必要重新审视其裁定，并准予 Kwok 先生中止破产案件的请求。\n\n首先，就在昨天，即政府首次对Kwok先生提出指控九个多月后、审判前三个月，政府提交了一份新的替代起诉书（the “Indictment”），将这起所谓的“欺诈案件”——借用政府陈词滥调般的说法——变成了一起所谓的敲诈勒索案件。即使撇开政府对RICO法规的牵强解读不谈，事实上，起诉书表明，本案的标的与破产案件之间没有丝毫差别。事实上，起诉书现指称，Kwok先生申请破产保护本身就是推进政府所谓计划的行为。此外，政府所依赖的所谓“企业”是一系列公司实体，其中包括受托人迄今已对其提起对立程序的十二个实体，以及受托人主张为Kwok先生另一个自我的众多其他实体。此前两者之间的重叠已很明显，而政府如今已消除了对此的一切可能疑问。\n\n其次，就在法院作出其命令前两天，受托人在本院采取了不同寻常的立场，即受托人应管理政府就Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所，以下简称“交易所”）扣押的数亿美元，而非允许该等资金返还给寻求返还的交易所客户。受托人的请求是其最新一次试图将本案程序中的资产——如被判有罪，本应返还给起诉书所指控计划的任何所谓受害人的资产——转移至破产程序；根据该破产程序的历史，该程序可能在很大程度上为其数百万美元的费用提供资金，并承诺将那些所谓受害人的资金置入对该等资金无权享有权利的所谓债权人的口袋。在政府认可下，受托人寻求控制政府指称为欺诈所得的数百万美元，其中包括交易所向由Kwok先生一名亲属控制的实体提供的一笔$37 million贷款（该贷款构成起诉书中与交易所相关罪名项的依据）；由一家名为HCHK的公司控制的$38 million（构成起诉书中与Farm Loans计划相关罪名项的依据）；Mahwah Facility（马瓦设施，构成起诉书中与G|CLUBS相关罪名项的依据）；以及交易所银行账户中的数亿美元（构成起诉书中与交易所相关罪名项的依据）。\n\n尽管受托人主张（但此主张不正确）其有权控制这些资产，即使其关于这些实体为Kwok先生另一个自我的主张正确（而该主张显然并不正确），受托人仍无权取得这些资金，因为正如政府重申的，这些资金来自被指控罪行的所谓受害人，而非Kwok先生。受托人的越权行为清楚表明破产案件与本案程序之间的标的几乎完全重叠——受托人将Kwok先生被指称通过起诉书所述广泛计划窃取的同一笔资金据为己有，其依据是受托人毫无根据地指称Kwok先生控制这些实体，而这与政府在起诉书中的理论一致。\n\n第三，法院认定，Kwok先生对受托人控制其特权的担忧具有理论性且为时尚早。无论Kwok先生最初提出其动议时是否如此，受托人现已采取行动，使该等担忧变得真实且清晰无疑。特别是，受托人最近在破产法院采取立场称，其可就其拟提起的对立程序中Kwok先生某些律师—当事人通信放弃特权，从而使该等通信暴露于公众视野，包括政府的视野。当然，政府尚未向Kwok先生或法院说明其完整案件，但鉴于本案程序与破产案件之间存在实质性重叠，政府因而极有可能获得其原本无法获得的受特权保护的信息。尽管法院认为第五修正案并不禁止平行的民事和刑事程序是正确的，但受托人对Kwok先生特权的控制造成了一个独立的第六修正案问题，威胁到这些程序的完整性。\n\n基于上述理由，Kwok先生谨此请求中止破产案件并重新考虑该命令。\n\n相关背景\n\n法院熟悉Kwok先生中止动议中所述的相关事实背景，Kwok先生将其援引并入本文。此外，Kwok先生强调以下在其提交该动议后发生的重大进展。\n\n一、受托人确保受害人资金的尝试\n\n作为下文所述事实的前言，在提交该动议之前，受托人在破产案件中反复采取行动，以确保其主张应当属于破产财产的各类资产。\n\n在本刑事程序开始之前，Kwok先生的一名债权人Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunities Fund（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金，以下简称“PAX”）与受托人共同请求并获得了一项初步禁令，禁止Kwok先生及众多实体从事特定活动。在破产法院准予该禁令的裁决备忘录中，破产法院作出广泛认定（现被受托人反复照搬），即Kwok先生“与Himalaya Farms（喜马拉雅农场）和‘GSeries’实体有关联、隶属和/或存在联系”，并认定后者包括Himalaya Exchange、G|CLUBS、GFashion、Gettr和GNews等。 (Adv. Proc. No. 22-05032, Jan. 13, 2023, Dkt. No. 133 ¶ 3)。破产法院还认定，Kwok先生控制Saraca Media Group（萨拉卡媒体集团）及其关联实体GTV。 (Id.)\n\n在该初步禁令作出后，受托人提起了多项诉讼，以追回其（错误地）主张由Kwok先生的另一个自我持有的资产，其中包括：HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited（美国香港国际基金投资有限公司）(Case No. 22-ap-05003 (summary judgment granted, Dkt No. 221))；拥有Lady May游艇并就Lady May收到一笔$37 million贷款的实体；HCHK Technologies, Inc.和HCHK Property Management, Inc.，受托人主张其为“……GTV、GClubs、GFashion和GMusic的关联方”(Bankr. Dkt 1897, ¶ 4)，且持有$38 million现金；Taurus Fund LLC（塔罗斯基金有限责任公司）(Case No. 23-ap-05017)，即拥有位于675 Ramapo Valley Road, Mahwah, New Jersey 07430的不动产的实体(Bankr. Dkt. 1994)；以及针对Kwok先生的家庭成员，包括其女儿（受托人通过该程序寻求取得Bombardier Global XRS私人飞机出售所得的所有权等事项(see Bankr. Dkt. 2421)）。\n\n由于这些程序，受托人从HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited扣押了$37 million（See Case No. 22-ap-05003 (Bankr. D. Conn., Dkt. No. 35, ¶¶ 79-81 (discussing $37 loan made in connection with the yacht), and also discussed in Indictment ¶ 19(g))），并从HCHK Property Management, Inc.和HCHK Technologies, Inc.扣押了$38 million。（See Case No. 23-ap-05013, Dkt No. 1, ¶ 2; Dkt. No. 25 ¶ 5 (describing transfer of $38 million of funds to the Trustee).）\n\n二、Himalaya Exchange资金的重叠与争议\n\n2023年12月6日，超过3,000名Himalaya Exchange客户——该加密货币交易所在起诉书中占据重要位置——根据Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g)提交动议（以下简称“客户动议”，Dkt No. 186），请求返还政府就本起诉书扣押的、存放于交易所银行账户中的数亿美元资金（以下简称“交易所资金”）。\n\n次日，政府提交了对客户动议的反对意见，其中称：“政府扣押了超过$600 million的被指控犯罪所得，包括涉案交易所资金——以保全该等资金，供日后向受害人分配及赔偿。” (Dkt. No. 188 at 3.) 随后，受托人于2023年12月8日请求准许对客户动议作出答复，主张客户寻求交易所持有的资产不知何故涉及Kwok先生破产程序中的“Chapter 11破产财产”。 (Dkt. No. 189 at 1.) 法院准许受托人作出答复，受托人于2023年12月19日提交答复（以下简称“受托人答复”）。 (Dkt. No. 202.)1\n\n受托人在其对客户动议的答复中主张，由于其已在破产程序中取得一项认定，即交易所据称受Kwok先生支配（该认定错误），法院不应准许客户动议，而应允许受托人取得破产法院的命令，准许受托人为Chapter 11破产财产扣押交易所资金。 (Id. at 4-5.)\n\n为支持其关于应通过破产法院而非本院管理这些资产的立场，受托人强调，其“对Kwok先生的所有合法债权人负有义务，而非对任何单一债权人或债权人群体负有义务”。 (Id. at 4.) 此外，受托人主张，“Chapter 11破产财产由案件开始时债务人对财产享有的所有法定或衡平权益构成，无论其位于何处、由何人持有”，其中隐含包括由本院持有的财产。 (Id. at 5 (cleaned up).)2\n\n1 在审阅受托人的答复后，Kwok先生的律师开始起草致法院的信函，以使法院注意到受托人提交文件所涉的相关问题。然而，就在受托人提交答复两天后，当Kwok先生的律师即将完成其信函时，法院作出决定，驳回Kwok先生的中止动议。\n\n2 尽管并非本动议的标的，受托人还在其答复中大肆诋毁Kwok先生，提出客户动议是Kwok先生某种策划的虚假、无关且贬损性指控。该主张绝对虚假——Kwok先生与客户诉讼毫无关系，也未就此指挥任何事项。如同政府此前试图贬损使用Mahwah Facility开展运动事务（这正是其预定用途）的New Federal State of China（新中国联邦，以下简称“NFSC”）成员的做法(see Dkt. No. 148, at 2-4)，受托人在毫无证据的情况下提出该虚假主张。首先，受托人概括地声称Kwok先生曾指使他人妨碍破产程序。其次，受托人主张，一名参与招募客户参加客户诉讼的Kwok先生运动同伴曾与Kwok先生共进晚餐、与其一同乘游艇航行并参加抗议活动。尽管受托人大声恫吓，其完全未能提供任何支持其主张的证据，证明被羁押于Brooklyn（布鲁克林）的Kwok先生以某种方式策划了客户诉讼。相反，受托人仅表明，与Kwok先生一样坚定信仰NFSC及其民主使命的个人，已采取了他们认为会进一步\n\n三、受托人积极削弱Kwok先生律师—当事人特权的努力\n\n如暂停动议所述，持续进行的破产案件所造成的一种严重损害是对郭文贵先生律师—当事人保密特权的侵犯，以及政府将获得其原本无权查看的信息的风险。（见 Dkt No. 131 at 23- 24。）在反对暂停动议时，受托人此前将郭先生的担忧描述为“不存在的问题”（Dkt. No. 145 ¶ 3），声称郭先生“关于受托人以某种方式侵犯了[郭先生]律师—当事人保密特权的主张完全没有依据”（id. ¶ 50），并表示“关于受托人放弃该保密特权之能力的‘争议’毫无意义”（id. ¶ 55）。\n\n遗憾的是，郭先生在暂停动议中强调的风险现已迫在眉睫。2023年12月5日，受托人提交了一项动议，请求：(a) 获准使用某些享有保密特权的材料；或者，(b) 作为替代方案，请求破产法院发布一项命令，放弃该等保密特权（“放弃动议”，Bankr. Dkt. No. 2421）。提交该文件的目的，是使受托人能够在其已提起的对抗程序中使用这些通信内容，包括用于支持受托人拟提交的简易判决动议。3 因此，该等通信内容本将可供公众查阅，包括政府。4\n\n实现其目标，即在本案中质疑政府对交易所资金的不当扣押。尽管政府和受托人均试图诋毁这些无辜的旁观者，但这些客户寻求追回其认为被不当取走的资金，并无任何不当之处。\n\n3 截至本动议之日，放弃动议仍在审理中，且受托人已在未使用任何享有保密特权的文件的情况下申请简易判决。但是，即使放弃动议被驳回，该动议仍表明受托人正积极试图侵犯郭先生的律师—当事人保密特权。\n\n4 受托人以密封方式提交了放弃动议，因此郭先生的刑事辩护律师无法查阅该文件，也无法将其随本动议提交给本院。然而，郭先生此前已在破产法院公开反对放弃动议，并将其动议副本作为 Matthew S. Barkan（马修·S·巴坎）于2024年1月4日作出的声明之附件A提交。\nIV. 本院驳回暂停动议的裁定及命令\n\n2023年8月30日，郭先生提交了暂停动议。各方于2023年9月21日对暂停动议作出回应，暂停动议于2023年10月5日完成提交。\n\n2023年12月21日，本院作出命令，驳回郭先生的暂停动议。在分析郭先生的动议时，本院阐明了 Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A.（路易威登马利蒂埃股份公司）v. LY USA, Inc.（LY美国公司）, 676 F.3d 83, 97-98 (2d Cir. 2012) 所确立的六因素检验，该检验适用于决定是否暂停平行民事诉讼，其中包括“刑事案件中的争点与民事案件中所提出争点的重叠程度”。（Order at 5。）本院还指出，当案件“源于相同事实并涉及几乎相同的问题”时，案件之间存在实质性重叠。（Id. at 7。）\n\n然而，本院还认定，“替代起诉书……涉及郭文贵被指控的、并非破产程序争点的行为”，并且“郭文贵的意图及其行为的重要性，连同其他关键法律问题，均为刑事程序所特有”。（Id. at 8。）如下所述，本院认定破产程序与刑事程序之间仅存在“有限重叠”（id. at 9），以及认定“破产法院中的裁决”不会对本刑事程序中待决的关键问题具有决定性作用（Id. at 8），均属错误。\nV. 2024年1月3日的替代起诉书\n\n2024年1月3日，政府提交了起诉书，指控郭先生犯有包括违反 RICO Act 在内的罪行。重要的是，起诉书指称，郭先生的破产申请“基于多年来隐匿由[郭先生]使用和控制的资金的努力，该申请是所指控欺诈企业的一种手段和方法”。（Id. ¶ 20。）因此，换言之，起诉书现在主张（当然是错误地），破产案件本身构成犯罪行为的一部分，而非与被指控罪行相互独立。\n\n此外，起诉书新近指称，多家法人实体构成所谓的 RICO“企业”，因为该等实体除其他事项外，据称由郭先生控制，并被用于延续所指控的欺诈行为，包括通过在这些实体之间“经常性转移”资金，并将资金流动“伪装成‘贷款’或投资”。（Indictment ¶ 20。）这些实体包括政府指称实施了具体行为的实体，例如 GTV Media Group, Inc.（GTV媒体集团公司）、G Club Operations LLC、G Club International Limited、Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）和 Himalaya Alliance（喜马拉雅联盟）；还包括十二家作为破产案件中已提起的对抗程序当事方的实体，其中包括 Taurus Fund LLC 和 Taurus Management, LLC（Despins v. Taurus Fund, LLC, Taurus Management, LLC, et al. Adv. Pro. No. 23-05017 (Bankr. D. Conn.)）、HCHK Technologies, Inc.、HCHK Property Management Inc.、Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc. 和 Holy City Hong Kong Ventures Ltd.（Despins v. HCHK Technologies, Inc. et al. Adv. Pro. No. 23-05013 (Bankr. D. Conn.)）、Lamp Capital LLC、Infinity Treasury Management, Inc.、Hudson Diamond NY LLC、Leading Shine NY Ltd.（Despins v. Lamp Capital LLC, et al. (Adv. Pro. No. 23-05023 (Bankr. D. Conn.)）、Golden Spring (New York) LTD（Despins v. Golden Spring (New York) Linted, et al., Adv. Pro. No. 23-05018 (Bankr. D. Conn.)），以及 Greenwich Land（Despins v. Greenwich Land, Adv. Pro. No. 23-05005 (Bankr. D. Conn.)）（Indictment ¶ 3(a).）；还包括许多其他实体，受托人主张该等实体是郭先生的另我，因而其资产应适当归属于 Chapter 11 破产财产。\n论证\nI. 适用法律\n\n关于郭先生重新提出的暂停动议，郭先生通过援引方式并入暂停动议中所述的相关法律标准，（见 Dkt. No. 131 at 14-17），并基于本文所讨论的重大情势变化重新提出其动议。\n\n至于郭先生的复议动议，尽管《联邦刑事诉讼规则》中并无此规定，但 Local Criminal Rule 49.1(d) 允许动议方在本院就原动议作出裁定后的十四日内提交复议动议。若因“控制性法律的介入性变化、新证据的可获得性，或纠正明显错误或防止明显不公正的需要”而有必要，法院应重新考虑其结论。Schoolcraft v. City of New York（纽约市）, 298 F.R.D. 134, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (cleaned up). 5 “是否准许……复议动议，属于地区法院的合理酌处权范围。”Corines v. Am. Physicians Ins. Tr., 769 F. Supp. 2d 584, 594 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)。\nII. 讨论\nA. 新证据削弱了本院关于案件之间仅存在有限重叠的认定\n\n在支持其驳回郭先生暂停动议之命令的分析中，本院依据控制性判例法确认，“最重要”的审查事项是争点是否重叠，（Order at 7），但认定本刑事程序与破产案件之间仅存在“有限”重叠，（id. at 9）。与本院的认定相反，破产案件与本程序之间的事实争点几乎完全一致。此外，更为紧迫的是，如新的起诉书和近期提交的文件所示，破产案件中的裁决可能对郭先生造成不可逆转的损害。因此，应暂停破产案件。\n(1) 关于客户资产的裁决之重叠\n\n首先，本院的裁定表明，本院似乎认为，破产案件与本程序具有不同的举证责任和可获得的救济，对其分析具有相关性。（Order at 7-8（指出“[b]ankruptcy is an equitable remedy”，并表示破产法院的裁决“对郭文贵的刑事案件不具有决定性作用，该案件要求更高的举证责任”。）。）谨此陈述，若该裁定的此种理解准确，则这属于对法律的错误适用，并将动摇本院裁定的基础——法律仅要求标的事项存在重叠。见 Louis Vuitton., 676 F.3d at 101。事实上，若不同的救济和举证责任足以否定重叠的认定，则 SEC 程序（涉及优势证据标准和民事救济）与相关刑事程序（涉及排除合理怀疑标准和刑事处罚）之间，永远不可能存在充分重叠。但是，如本院所知，本巡回区内为优先进行平行刑事程序而暂停 SEC 程序是惯常做法——事实上，在本案中，尽管 SEC 案件涉及不同的举证责任、较少的当事方和不同的救济，政府仍成功申请暂停一宗平行 SEC 案件。（Motion at 25- 28。）因此，如本院的裁定基于该法律结论，郭先生谨此主张，这将构成足以进行复议的明显错误。\n\n但是，即使仅考虑事实争点的重叠，新的起诉书扩大后的范围，加之受托人试图将被扣押的交易所资金追回至破产案件中，均表明破产案件与本程序之间几乎完全重叠（且存在冲突）。\n\n第一，新的起诉书确认，本案所涉的完全相同的事实争点也是破产案件的关键组成部分。在多份文件中，受托人反复就郭先生对本案核心实体的所谓控制权进行诉讼，包括 GTV、Saraca、G|CLUBS 和 Himalaya Exchange。见 supra at 5-6, 9-10。同一问题构成政府在本案中理论的基础——起诉书反复指称，郭先生对这些实体行使控制，以使其为其利益而不当支出资金。（Indictment ¶¶ 3, 5。）但是，在新的起诉书中，政府又进一步（荒谬地）指称，郭先生的破产申请本身是构成 RICO 罪名项之敲诈活动的一部分。（Id. ¶ 20。）而据政府所称，构成 RICO“企业”的实体，正是受托人主张应因其为郭先生的另我而成为郭先生破产财产一部分的一些实体。见 supra at 9-10。当起诉书已如此清楚地显示重叠时，受托人和政府均无法回避这种重叠。\n\n第二，受托人非同寻常地试图主张对 Himalaya Exchange 银行账户中客户资金的权利，进一步表明本案与破产案件之间存在无法化解的冲突。具体而言，正如政府反复主张的，客户诉讼中所涉的交易所资金，来自交易所的客户（或用户）——\n\n（见 USAO\\_107396 ¶¶ 48-52，作为随附提交的 Matthew S. Barkan 声明之附件B）。此外，政府指出其\n\n“扣押了逾 $600 million 的所控犯罪收益——包括争议中的交易所资金——以保全该等资金，供日后向受害人发放及作出赔偿”（Dkt. No. 188 at 3）。因此，政府、郭先生以及甚至提起客户诉讼的客户均可同意的一项事实是：政府扣押、而受托人现寻求控制的资金，来源于交易所客户，而非郭先生。6\n\n然而，受托人对客户诉讼的答复表明，对于一名决意贪婪地将资产攫入第11章破产财产、以用于支付因其屡次越权而产生的律师费的受托人而言，诸如款项实际属于何人之类的区别无关紧要。7 虽然不同寻常，受托人的立场相当直接（且全无根据）——具体而言，由于其说服破产法院得出结论（错误地认为）交易所是郭先生的替身实体，受托人主张交易所的资产属于第11章破产财产。(Trustee Response at 3.) 受托人的立场显示了这两案之间的重叠。如上所述，郭先生对交易所及其资产的控制问题，既是受托人努力的核心，也是政府在本次刑事追诉中指控的核心。(Compare Dkt. 202 at 3 (wherein the Trustee contends that the Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所） was a \"business vehicle\" for Mr. Kwok) with Indictment ¶¶ 5(c) (listing six bank accounts associated with the Exchange as subject to forfeiture).) 此外，受托人寻求主张并向包括并非交易所客户的当事人在内的人员分配、以及用于支付其律师费的资产，正是政府主张应作为赔偿分配给喜马拉雅交易所相关刑事罪名项之所谓受害人的同一批资产。\n\n6 当然，郭先生强烈否认其从事过任何与交易所有关的欺诈行为。\n\n7 受托人声称其正在为郭先生的“正当债权人”归集资产，同时在提及喜马拉雅交易所的终端用户时反复对“客户”一词加上引号，这引发了一个严重的可能性：受托人可能寻求在破产程序中不予认可喜马拉雅交易所客户的债权请求。若发生该情况，据称的受害人（喜马拉雅交易所的用户）将一无所获，而交易所资金将仅流向 PAX 及受托人认定为“正当”的其他债权人，此外还将以其费用的形式流向受托人本人。\n\n这对郭先生而言并非无实质差异。根据政府的理论，如新起诉书所示，郭先生的所有商业活动均是一个更大犯罪企业的一部分，其目的在于获取受害人的金钱和财产，并隐匿及洗白所称欺诈所得。(Indictment ¶ 7.) 根据该理论，所有所称实体的一切收益均应在本院受到没收。但根据受托人的理论，这些同一资产应被导入破产案件。美国检察官办公室此前指出，此种情形“可能会减少受害人的追偿，因为原本可通过没收返还给受害人的资金，将被不必要地用于支付破产受托人的费用”。(Dkt. No. 50 at 1, SEC v. Madoff, et al., No. 08 Civ. 10791 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2009).) 若允许受托人以此方式转移这些资金，则一旦郭先生被定罪，便会对其造成实际不利影响，因为这将增加其赔偿义务——支付给受托人费用或非受害人债权人（如 PAX）的任何款项，均不得在本程序中抵作赔偿。See United States v. Yalincak, 853 F.3d 629, 635 (2d Cir. 2017) (“破产受托人为破产财产利益所回收、并在破产财产管理中耗用或分配给非受害人债权人的款项，显然并非由犯罪受害人所回收；只有实际分配给受害人债权人的款项才符合该描述。”) (cleaned up).\n\n第三，尽管本院将 SEC 诉讼作为与本案具有足够重叠、从而有必要中止的案件示例 (Order at 9)，但事实上，受托人的行为表明，破产案件与本案之间的重叠程度远高于 SEC 诉讼。具体而言，SEC 诉讼聚焦于 GTV Private Placement（GTV 私募配售），see SEC v. Kwok, No. 23 Civ. 2200 (PGG) (S.D.N.Y.), Dkt. No. 1, ¶¶ 40-56，而这只是起诉书所指控的据称计划之一。但受托人的追索几乎涉及起诉书所指控的每一项计划——受托人夸耀其已代表第11章破产财产“回收逾 $100 million 的资产”，但其已回收及寻求回收的绝大多数资产，均属于本案所称受害人的资金。(Trustee Response at 2.) 具体而言，在该 $100 million 中，(i) $38 million 来自对一家名为 HCHK 的公司名下资金的扣押；根据政府的理论，该等资金构成所称农场贷款计划的收益；及 (ii) $37 million 来自对喜马拉雅交易所一笔贷款的扣押，该笔贷款曾被用作与游艇有关的保证金，see supra at 4-5,8 政府主张该款项源自所称喜马拉雅交易所计划。(See Dkt. No. 19, at 9-11 (discussing the Farm Loan Program), at 18 (discussing transfer of $37 million).9 此外，如本院所知，受托人还在寻求控制 Mahwah Facility（马瓦设施），该设施处于涉及 G|CLUBS 的所称欺诈的核心。因此，换言之，受托人一直寻求并已寻求通过诉讼解决郭先生的控制权问题，以及与 GTV、农场贷款、G|CLUBS 和喜马拉雅交易所相关的所称欺诈计划所涉受害人资金的所有权问题，即起诉书所指控的全部欺诈计划。这正是中止本应避免的损害类型。See Trustees of Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat. Pension Fund. v. Transworld Mech., Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1134, 1138-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)（中止可避免平行诉讼，该等诉讼可能“损害一方当事人免于自证其罪的《第五修正案》特权，将刑事证据开示扩大至 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(b) 规定的限度之外，在审判前将辩方理论暴露给控方，或以其他方式损害刑事案件”）。新起诉书，加之受托人对客户诉讼的答复及其在其中荒谬的立场，表明破产案件与本程序之间存在高度重叠，并证明应中止破产案件。\n\n8 受托人在其答复中错误地声称，郭先生在其近期重新提出的保释动议中承认游艇属于其本人。郭先生当然并未作出任何此类承认，正如受托人所援引的文字本身所表明的那样。郭先生仅陈述，其已无法再使用政府在反对郭先生先前保释请求时所依据的游艇。显然，能够使用某物与拥有该物并非同一回事。\n\n9 换言之，受托人声称其为第11章破产财产回收的资金中，约 75% 构成政府主张依法属于涉案所称计划受害人的款项，并应在本程序中作为刑事赔偿分配给所称受害人。受托人为归集第11章破产财产的资产已支出近 $25 million 的费用，这意味着，扣除据称属于受害人的款项后，其努力未给债权人带来任何有形利益。因此，即使本院认为若准许中止，债权人将受到损害的结论，也基本上只有在允许受托人继续从本案中剥离受害人资产以资助其潜在回收的情况下才成立。而且，如本院担心郭先生的关联人士可能有机会转移资产，事实上，受托人所针对的绝大部分资产已被其本人或政府扣押，因而无法被耗散。\n\n(2) 关于郭先生律师—委托人保密特权的重叠\n\n郭先生在其中止动议中主张，受托人在破产案件中对其保密特权的控制，对郭先生自我辩护的能力构成重大威胁，不仅因为受托人可能直接向政府提供享有特权的信息，也因为受托人可能放弃受保护通信的特权，然后在政府可接触的公开诉讼中使用该等通信。在驳回该动议时，本院认定，郭先生的担忧为时尚早，没有证据表明受托人正在从事此类活动，而且 Privileges Order（保密特权裁定）中针对“无关犯罪行为”的例外条款保护了郭先生。(Order at 11.).\n\n遗憾的是，受托人最近提出的 Waiver Motion（豁免动议）——该动议发生于郭先生的中止动议已完成全部书面陈述之后，see supra at 7-8——与本院的结论相矛盾。受托人通过提交豁免动议，已采取积极步骤使郭先生在破产案件中的律师—委托人保密特权失效。具体而言，受托人寻求获得授权，在公开对抗程序中使用受郭先生特权保护的材料。因此，换言之，若受托人成功，该等通信将公开并可由政府获取。并且，鉴于受托人正在推进的对抗程序涉及起诉书 (¶ 17(f)(i)) 中提及的同一架私人飞机，这表明受托人对保密特权裁定的解释，并未在“无关犯罪行为”例外条款下给予郭先生任何保护。10\n\n事实上，只要破产案件继续进行，这一循环就会持续。受托人已向二十五名以上律师及律师事务所送达传票，这意味着受托人将可获取大量享有特权的通信。鉴于受托人的立场是，与起诉书相关的每个实体均受郭先生控制，受托人很可能会希望——正如豁免动议所证明的——将至少部分该等享有特权的通信用作公开诉讼的依据，从而使政府得以获取原本受保护、且涉及政府指控事项本身的信息（即，例如郭先生据称控制 G|CLUBS 或喜马拉雅交易所的能力）。因此，受托人的豁免动议削弱了如下结论：郭先生对于受托人控制其特权的担忧只是理论性的或尚未成熟。11\n\n10 此外，与本院的推理相反，在实践中，“无关犯罪行为”例外条款已被证明毫无成效——律师事务所和律师已向受托人提交材料，而郭先生没有任何机会主张特权，因此，受托人 (i) 已可直接获取该等材料，且 (ii) 可向破产法院寻求救济，以在对抗程序中使用该等材料。此外，鉴于 2024年1月3日 的替代起诉书及 RICO Act 指控，尚不清楚何种行为（如有）可被视为“无关”。\n\n11 尽管本院表示相信破产法院能够保护郭先生免受对其特权的侵犯，但破产法院一直未对豁免动议作出裁决，并避免处理受托人对该等材料的使用问题，这意味着该问题仍然存在，受托人可在未来加以利用。\n\n结论\n\n基于上述理由，本院应重新考虑其先前裁定，并准许郭先生提出的中止破产案件的请求。\n\n日期：New York, New York，January 4, 2024\n\nPRYOR CASHMAN LLP（普赖尔·卡什曼律师事务所）\n\n签署人：________________________________________\n\nSidhardha Kamaraju（西达尔达·卡马拉朱） E. Scott Schirick（E. 斯科特·希里克） Matthew S. Barkan（马修·S·巴坎） Daniel J. Pohlman（丹尼尔·J·波尔曼） John M. Kilgard（约翰·M·基尔加德） Clare P. Tilton（克莱尔·P·蒂尔顿）\n\n7 Times Square New York, NY 10036 (212) 421-4100 skamaraju@pryorcashman.com sschirick@pryorcashman.com mbarkan@pryorcashman.com dpohlman@pryorcashman.com jkilgard@pryorcashman.com ctilton@pryorcashman.com\n\nSabrina P. Shroff（萨布丽娜·P·施罗夫） 80 Broad Street, 19th Floor New York, NY 10004 (646) 763-1490\n\n被告 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）之代理律师\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT（美国联邦地区法院） SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（纽约南区）\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA（美利坚合众国），\n\n原告，\n\n诉\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），\n\n被告。\n部分密封提交\n\nCase No. 1:23-CR-118-1 (AT)\n\n马修·S·巴坎就被告重新提出的中止破产案件动议及复议动议所作声明\n\n本人，MATTHEW S. BARKAN（马修·S·巴坎），现依照 28 U.S.C. § 1746 声明如下：\n\n1. 本人系 Pryor Cashman LLP 的合伙人，并担任上述标题案件中被告 Ho Wan Kwok 的代理律师。\n\n2. 本人提交本声明，以支持被告重新提出的中止破产案件动议及复议动议，并向本院提交下列文件的真实、准确副本。\n\n3. 随附于本声明并作为附件 A 的，是 Kwok 先生于 December 13, 2023 在题为 In re Ho Wan Kwok, et al., Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn.) (Jointly Administered) 的破产程序中提交的《个人债务人对请求作出命令以授权：(a) Chapter 11 受托人在 Bombardier 对抗程序中以密封方式使用可能受特权保护的文件而不放弃特权；或备选地，(b) 就 Bombardier 及 Bombardier 收益的事项有限放弃受托人特权之动议的异议》的真实、准确副本。\n\n4. 随附于本声明并作为附件 B 的，是政府在 USAO_00107385 提供的《支持扣押令状的宣誓书》的真实、准确副本。\n\n本人在伪证罪处罚的约束下声明，上述内容真实、准确。\n\n签署于 January 4, 2024。\n\nMatthew S. Barkan 被告 Ho Wan Kwok 的代理律师\n附件 A\nUNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT（美国破产法院） DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT（康涅狄格州地区） BRIDGEPORT DIVISION（布里奇波特分部）\n\n关于：第 11 章\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）：Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n：债务人。：\n\n________________________________________________________：\n\n________________________________________________________ ：\n\n：\n个人债务人对请求作出命令以授权：(A) Chapter 11 受托人在 Bombardier 对抗程序中以密封方式使用可能受特权保护的文件而不放弃特权；或备选地，(B) 就 Bombardier 及 Bombardier 收益的事项有限放弃受托人特权之动议的异议\n\n个人债务人 Ho Wan Kwok（“个人债务人”），经由其下列签署的代理律师 Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（泽斯勒与泽斯勒律师事务所），谨对 Chapter 11 受托人（“受托人”）提出的《请求作出命令以授权：(A) Chapter 11 受托人在 Bombardier 对抗程序中以密封方式使用可能受特权保护的文件而不放弃特权；或备选地，(B) 就 Bombardier 及 Bombardier 收益的事项有限放弃受托人特权之动议》（“特权放弃动议”）提出异议，并谨陈述支持理由如下：\nI. 初步陈述\n\n1. 个人债务人反对特权放弃动议，以保护其在 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（纽约南区美国联邦地区法院）审理的、题为 USA v. Kwok, 1:23CR118（“刑事案件”）的针对其提起的刑事诉讼中的权利，特别是为了防止 United States Attorney's Office（美国联邦检察官办公室）取得并对其使用律师—客户特权通信；若无受托人所寻求的特权放弃，该办公室将无法取得该等通信。\n\n2. 受托人完全知悉，个人债务人反对受托人放弃特权，因为个人债务人严重担忧此种放弃将在待决刑事案件中造成的影响。事实上，在律师为努力解决当前争议而进行讨论期间，受托人的律师曾多次获悉此事；而受托人可能放弃律师—客户特权，也是个人债务人在刑事案件中待决的《请求作出中止破产案件命令及令状之动议》的主要焦点。（见刑事案件文件编号 131，第 23-25 页；受托人已作为本案文件编号 2158 提交。）尽管知悉上述情况，受托人仍竭力贬损个人债务人及其在被监禁并争取重获自由期间拒绝同意放弃特权的动机。\n\n3. 在律师就受托人所请求的特权放弃进行讨论期间，个人债务人的律师邀请受托人的律师提供授权依据，证明本院可作出一项可执行的命令，允许受托人作为律师—客户特权持有人，将本动议所涉文件提供给 Despins v. Guo, Adv. Pro. No. 23-05008 (JAM)（“Whitecroft 对抗程序”）中被告方的律师——为积极使用该等文件，受托人本须如此办理——并随后积极使用该等文件证明其在 Whitecroft 对抗程序中的请求，同时不放弃与该等文件有关的任何适用特权。\n\n4. 个人债务人的律师之所以仅要求受托人的律师提供该等授权依据，是因为受托人的律师曾表示，经双方同意而作出的、现通过特权放弃动议寻求的此类命令，可以允许受托人在保留特权的同时积极使用律师—客户特权通信；个人债务人的律师希望确认受托人的律师所述事项是否可行。受托人的律师从未提供所请求的授权依据，个人债务人的律师同样未能找到任何此类授权依据，因为自愿披露特权信息——即作为特权持有人的受托人所寻求实施的行为——构成特权放弃。\n\n5. 作为备选方案，且再次完全无视个人债务人已陈述的关于特权放弃在刑事案件中影响的正当担忧，受托人请求本院放弃律师—客户特权，但未进行必要分析，以权衡受托人对所涉文件的需求与放弃律师—客户特权对个人债务人造成的损害。\n\n6. 受托人未进行所要求的利益衡量测试，是因为其知道衡量结果明确有利于个人债务人，并有利于驳回所请求的特权放弃。\n\n7. 受托人在特权放弃动议中误导性地列明并附上了一组远比实际争议范围更广的文件，因为其中一些文件相互重复，而对于另一些文件，个人债务人甚至并不主张存在任何应予保护的律师—客户特权或其他特权。受托人亦未说明，为何所涉少数文件对于其在 Whitecroft 对抗程序中证明其请求至关重要，以及鉴于其已从第三方、并通过本院授权的 220 多次 Rule 2004 Examinations 中获得的信息——其中许多推定已经进行——为何其无法在没有该等文件的情况下加以证明。事实上，受托人通过特权放弃动议寻求放弃律师—客户特权的信息，是通过 Rule 2004 Examinations 获得的，而非作为 Whitecroft 对抗程序中证据开示程序的一部分获得。受托人当然已在其调查中获得可用于支持其请求的非特权信息，以替代所涉文件。受托人可能希望放弃特权而非利用其他证据这一事实，不应构成放弃特权的充分理由。事实上，在当前情形下，仅应将特权放弃作为最后手段予以允许，而非为图方便。\n\n8. 最后，受托人所作的半心半意且间接的主张，即因个人债务人与 Guo 女士由同一律师代理，个人债务人的律师—客户特权即以某种方式就 Guo 女士而言已被放弃，该主张缺乏支持、不能成立，必须予以驳回。\nII. 背景\nA. 特权命令\n\n9. 于 February 15, 2022，个人债务人根据 Bankruptcy Code（破产法）第 11 章提交了自愿救济申请；于 July 8, 2022，本院作出《准予指定 Chapter 11 受托人的命令》（Doc. No. 523），准予指定受托人担任本案的 Chapter 11 受托人。\n\n10. 于 July 28, 2022，即在其获任命后数周内，受托人提交了后来众多进行 Rule 2004 审查之动议中的前三项。前三项动议包括对个人债务人进行 Rule 2004 审查的动议（Doc. No. 636），以及对“[个人]债务人的各类法律及财务顾问”进行 Rule 2004 审查的动议（“专业人士 2004 动议”）（Doc. No. 637）。专业人士 2004 动议请求准许从十二家可能曾向个人债务人提供法律服务的不同律师事务所或律师处取得文件及证言（Doc. No. 637，附件 B）。\n\n11. 于 August 22, 2022，受托人提交其《……请求作出命令，(A) 规定与 Rule 2004 传票调取的文件有关的任何律师—客户特权、工作成果保护及其他特权的控制权，于受托人获任命时转归受托人；以及 (B) 指示[个人]债务人及其他受审查人不得以该等特权为由扣留文件，……之动议》（“2004 审查特权动议”（Doc. No. 777））。个人债务人反对 2004 审查特权动议。该争议于 September 14, 2022 通过作出《有关与 Rule 2004 传票调取的文件及信息相关的律师—客户特权和工作成果保护控制权之同意命令》（“特权命令”（Doc. No. 856））而得以解决。\n\n12. 特权命令规定，受托人控制个人债务人就特权命令中明确定义为调查主题的特定列举事项所享有的律师—客户特权及/或工作成果保护，并进一步规定，就调查主题而言：\n\n债务人及其律师（依据债务人或代表债务人行事的任何人士的指示），以及任何其他受审查人，均无权以有关调查主题的任何受托人特权为由，扣留 Rule 2004 传票附件中所请求的任何文件和信息。\n\n（特权命令，第 ¶¶2-3 段）。因此，特权命令旨在允许受托人开展其调查，特别是通过使用 Rule 2004 开展调查，而无需担心文件或信息会基于个人债务人的律师—客户特权及/或律师工作成果而被扣留。\n\n13. 特权命令保留个人债务人就“与调查主题无关的法律事项，例如无关的刑事指控或债务人的庇护申请……”，主张特权的权利。（特权命令，第 ¶4 段）。\n\n14. 特权命令不允许受托人放弃律师—客户特权或工作成果保护：\n\n……但受托人无权在未经债务人书面同意或法院进一步命令的情况下放弃任何受托人特权（例如，通过在公开法庭或任何公开案卷中披露享有特权的文件或信息，或与第三方分享该等文件或信息）……\n\n（《特权裁定》，第 ¶5 段）。\n\n15. 2023年3月15日上午，纽约南区美国联邦地区法院（United States District Court for the Southern District of New York）解封了一份包含十二项罪名的起诉书，指控个人债务人犯有多项联邦罪行。个人债务人于2023年3月15日被联邦执法机关逮捕。2023年3月29日，刑事案件中提交了一份替代起诉书。（刑事案件，文件编号19）。个人债务人目前仍被羁押候审，审判现定于2024年4月举行。因此，就个人债务人而言，作出《特权裁定》时所处的世界与今日的世界毫无相似之处，而正是今日的现实状况决定了个人债务人对受托人试图放弃律师—当事人保密特权一事的立场。\n\nB. Whitecroft 对抗诉讼（Whitecroft Adversary）\n\n16. 受托人于2023年5月16日提起 Whitecroft 对抗诉讼，寻求追回包括据称在破产申请提交后出售的被指为破产财产的一架庞巴迪（Bombardier）飞机的所得款项在内的救济。[1] Mei Guo（郭梅，以下简称“Guo 女士”）是 Whitecroft 对抗诉讼中唯一具名被告。\n\n17. 2023年7月31日左右，受托人在 Whitecroft 对抗诉讼中向 Guo 女士送达了书面证据开示请求、书面质询、承认请求以及文件出示请求（以下简称“受托人证据开示”）。Guo 女士于2023年8月30日左右对受托人证据开示作出答复，并针对受托人证据开示中的每一项请求援引其《第五修正案》反对自证其罪的权利。受托人未就 Guo 女士在答复受托人证据开示时援引其《第五修正案》权利提出强制执行动议，亦未以其他方式寻求法院许可。\n\n1. 受托人在 Whitecroft 对抗诉讼中寻求其他救济，但所涉文件仅与该架庞巴迪飞机有关。\n\n18. Guo 女士于2023年11月1日在 Whitecroft 对抗诉讼中接受证言录取，并针对向其提出的若干问题援引其《第五修正案》反对自证其罪的权利。受托人未就 Guo 女士在证言录取期间针对向其提出的问题援引其《第五修正案》权利提出强制执行动议，亦未以其他方式寻求法院许可。\n\n19. Guo 女士在 Whitecroft 对抗诉讼中向受托人送达了证据开示请求，其中包括文件出示请求。\n\n20. 截至目前，根据受托人对文件加盖的 Bates 编号，受托人已就 Guo 女士的出示请求向其出示了8896页文件；该等文件是受托人律师陈述称，就依据 Rule 2004 由受托人取得的文件进行检索词搜索后，为与 Guo 女士的证据开示请求相关而由受托人律师进一步审查所筛出的逾49,000份文件中的一部分。（见2023年10月9日至12日期间受托人律师、个人债务人律师等人之间的电子邮件往来，其中包括2023年10月9日晚上9:49的电子邮件。该电子邮件往来副本作为证据A随附于此）。\n\n21. 受托人为查找回应 Guo 女士文件出示请求的文件，识别出可能享有特权的回应性文件，并要求个人债务人的律师同意在不进行任何审查的情况下向 Guo 女士出示该等文件。（总体见同前）。\n\n22. 个人债务人的律师告知受托人律师，个人债务人并未同意放弃特权，并表示，应当在 Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC, et al.（Despins 诉 Greenwich Land, LLC 等案）对抗诉讼案号 Adv. Pro. No. 5:23ap05005 中用于在出示前审查享有特权文件的同一程序，适用于 Whitecroft 对抗诉讼，以便能够就特权作出知情决定并限制任何争议。（同前，2023年10月10日下午4:40的电子邮件及其回复）。[2]\n\n23. 此后，受托人同意按照 Greenwich Land 对抗诉讼中采用的同一方式进行，并向个人债务人的律师提供246份文件，以审查并确定受托人所寻求放弃的范围和内容，以及确定个人债务人是否认为所提供的每一份文件享有特权。[3]\n\n24. 在提供审查的246份文件中，个人债务人的律师共识别出131份个人债务人认为享有特权且反对被出示、披露或用于任何目的的文件。个人债务人另识别出五（5）份包含享有特权信息的文件，其律师向受托人返还了该等文件的经删节版本，并标明被认为包含享有特权信息的部分。[4]\n\n2. 在 Greenwich Land 对抗诉讼中，受托人律师请求个人债务人同意向被告出示可能享有特权的文件。个人债务人的律师请求在就同意请求表明个人债务人的立场之前审查该等文件。文件被提供给个人债务人的律师，经审查后，个人债务人识别出其认为不受特权保护、可立即出示的文件，以及受特权保护且个人债务人不会同意出示的文件。Greenwich Land 对抗诉讼中采用的程序似乎运作良好，且未导致任何提交法院的争议。因此，个人债务人的律师请求在 Whitecroft 对抗诉讼中采用同一程序。\n\n3. 受托人似乎将从可能此前曾代表个人债务人的律师事务所或律师处取得的每一份文件均视为享有特权。因此，个人债务人律师的审查还包括分析一份文件是否确实受律师—当事人保密特权保护。\n\n4. 个人债务人的律师以经删节形式返还给受托人的文件之一，作为《特权放弃动议》的证据J附上，但未作删节，由此造成个人债务人主张非律师之间的通信享有特权的印象；其并未作出该等主张。\n\n25. 个人债务人未认为其余101份文件享有特权，且未反对其出示、披露或使用。据律师在提交本异议时所知，受托人律师既未向 Guo 女士的律师出示被认定为不享有特权的文件，也未提供个人债务人认定为享有特权、但受托人并不寻求积极使用、因而不属于《特权放弃动议》争议范围的文件的特权日志。\n\n26. 在个人债务人认定为享有特权且其不会同意放弃特权的136份文件中，似乎仅有六（6）份属于争议范围，因为其余10份文件——《特权放弃动议》附有16份证据——根据用于审查的文件所附 Bates 编号前缀“MGAP”的缺失，似乎未被提供给个人债务人的律师审查。\n\nC. 争议文件\n\n27. 《特权放弃动议》将受托人寻求放弃特权的文件作为证据A至P附上。个人债务人不主张下列文件受律师—当事人保密特权保护：证据C、G、O及P（证据G、O及P不含 MGAP Bates 编号前缀，且个人债务人未在受托人律师提供供审查的文件中找到证据C）。\n\n28. 个人债务人不主张作为《特权放弃动议》证据附上的下列部分享有特权：\n\n证据F，除第137至140页外的所有页面（个人债务人主张第137至140页包含享有特权的信息）；\n\n证据J，除 Bates 编号 MGAP06178 中 Wong 女士（Ms. Wong）发送给 Shulman 先生（Mr. Shulman）及其他人的电子邮件链中的第一封电子邮件、Bates 编号 MGAP06198 中 Shulman 先生发送给 Wong 女士及其他人的电子邮件，以及 Bates 编号页面 MGAP06201-6203 中 Wong 女士与 Shulman 先生和 Barnett 先生（Mr. Barnett）之间的电子邮件外的所有页面。\n\n证据M，Bates 编号 WC-KWOK-BANKR 0004783 的电子邮件被主张享有特权，而 Bates 编号 WC-KWOK-BANKR 0004784-85 的电子邮件未被主张享有特权。\n\n29. 作为《特权放弃动议》证据附上的某些文件彼此重复。证据B由包含三封电子邮件的电子邮件链构成，证据D是证据B电子邮件链中包含的一封电子邮件，证据E由证据B电子邮件链中包含的两封电子邮件构成。因此，证据B、D及E实际构成一份文件。同样，证据I是由四封电子邮件构成的电子邮件链，其中三封包含在构成证据H的文件内。[5]\n\n30. 基于上述情况，《特权放弃动议》中实际属于争议范围的独特文件数量极为有限：证据A、B（包括D和E）、F（仅证言记录第137至140页）、H、I（仅电子邮件链中的第一封电子邮件具有独特性）、J（仅 Bates 编号为 MGAP06178、MGAP06198 及 MGAP 6201-6203 的页面属于争议范围）、K、L、M（仅 WC-KWOK-BANKR 0004783 的电子邮件属于争议范围）以及证据N。\n\nIII. 论证\n\nA. 受托人未提供任何依据证明其所寻求的命令可执行，而不会仅导致特权放弃\n\n31. 受托人请求本院作出命令，允许受托人作为特权持有人，积极使用《特权放弃动议》中争议文件以证明其在 Whitecroft 对抗诉讼中的主张，并向该对抗诉讼中的被告 Guo 女士披露该等文件——如其欲使用该等文件即必须如此——且不放弃与该等文件相关的特权。\n\n5. 证据H是一份合并证据，似乎是某律师事务所就某一特定事项所持全部档案内容。\n\n32. 受托人未援引任何依据证明该等命令可执行，且可阻止第三方取得争议文件，因为似乎不存在此类依据。事实上，无论是否作出所请求的命令，受托人积极使用该等文件均将构成特权放弃。\n\n33. 受托人曾请求个人债务人同意该等命令，但个人债务人在缺乏证明该命令可对第三方执行的依据时拒绝同意；受托人既未向个人债务人提供任何此类依据，也未在《特权放弃动议》中向法院提供任何此类依据，且个人债务人未找到任何此类依据。\n\n34. 个人债务人所援引的判例权威恰恰相反：特权持有人（本案中为受托人）主动使用受特权保护的信息，即构成对特权的放弃，而不仅限于使用该等受特权保护材料的特定诉讼。Chevron Corp.（雪佛龙公司） v. Salazar（萨拉查）, 275 F.R.D. 437, 445-46 (S.D.N.Y.（纽约南区）, 2011)（“一方当事人在某一程序中自愿向对方当事人披露受特权保护的文件后，即不得在后续程序中以特权为由扣留相同文件，即使后续程序涉及不同的对方当事人。”）（援引案例）。另见 In re Parmalat Sec. Litig.（帕玛拉特证券诉讼）, No. 04 MD 1653 (LAK) (HBP), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88629, \\*28 (S.D.N.Y.（纽约南区）, Dec. 1, 2006)（指出“自愿甚至无意披露[受特权保护的通信]均可能导致特权被放弃”，而被强制披露并不导致放弃）（引文略）；Scott（斯科特） v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc.（奇波雷墨西哥烧烤公司）, 94 F. Supp. 3d 585, 598 (S.D.N.Y.（纽约南区） 2015)（“除少数例外情形外，当受特权保护的通信被披露给第三方或诉讼对方当事人时，律师—当事人特权即自动被放弃。”）（援引案例）；Speedfit LLC（斯必德菲特有限责任公司） v. Woodway USA Inc.（伍德韦美国公司）, Case No. CV 17-768, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56559, \\*13 (E.D.N.Y.（纽约东区）, March 28, 2019)（指出律师—当事人特权并非绝对，且可能被放弃）。\n\n35. 受托人就某一特定事项的少量文件故意放弃律师—当事人特权，也会产生更广泛的事项范围放弃风险。Speedfit LLC, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56559, at \\*13（“事项范围放弃是一种默示放弃，‘一旦某一特权通信被披露，即允许攻击方取得与该特定事项有关的所有受特权保护的通信’，其基础是‘在诉讼背景下发挥作用的公平考量。’”）（引自 Falise（法利斯） v. Am. Tobacco Co.（美国烟草公司） 193 F.R.D. 73, 84 (E.D.N.Y.（纽约东区） 2000)）。另见 Fed. R. Evid. 502(a)（“当披露在联邦程序中作出，或者向联邦机关或机构作出，并且该披露放弃了律师—当事人特权或工作成果保护时，该放弃仅在下列情形下延及联邦或州程序中未披露的通信或信息：(1) 放弃是故意的；(2) 已披露和未披露的通信或信息涉及相同事项；以及 (3) 基于公平原则，应将其一并考虑。”）。\n\n36. 鉴于个人债务人对受托人所请求命令的可执行性，以及检察官随之取得至少受托人所使用、原本受特权保护的文件的能力，且如随后被认定存在事项范围放弃，检察官还可能取得更多文件，均存在严重关切，个人债务人反对法院作出受托人所请求的命令。\n\nB. 不应允许受托人放弃特权\n\n37. 作为允许其在不放弃特权的情况下主动使用文件的所请求命令之替代，受托人请求法院作出命令，允许其就争议中的少量文件放弃特权。\n\n38. 受托人援引了数个破产受托人获准放弃债务人律师—当事人特权的案件，但受托人未根据通行的利益衡量标准作出任何分析。该分析必然得出特权不应被放弃的结论。\n\n39. 处理过破产受托人是否有权放弃债务人在破产申请前享有的律师—当事人特权这一问题的大多数法院，均采用利益衡量标准。见 Moore（摩尔） v. Eason（伊森） (In re Bazemore（贝兹莫尔案）), 216 B.R. 1020, 1023-24 (Bankr. S.D. Ga.（佐治亚州南区破产法院） 1998)（“个人债务人提出破产申请，要求确定是否由其他人控制该特权。该审查要求权衡律师—当事人关系中充分坦诚讨论的利益以及披露对债务人造成的损害，与受托人最大化债务人财产价值及代表财产利益的职责。”）。另见 Ramette（拉梅特） v. Bame（贝姆） (In re Bame（贝姆案）) 251 B.R. 367, 377 (D. Minn.（明尼苏达区） 2000)（根据权威观点的主流，认定利益衡量方法是确定破产受托人是否可以放弃债务人破产申请前特权的适用标准）；Whatley（沃特利） v. Meyer Wilson Co., LPA（迈耶·威尔逊律师事务所） (In re Chandar（钱达尔案）), Case No. 11-37360-B-7, Adv. No. 17-2057, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 3903, at \\*2-3 (Bankr. E.D. Cal.（加利福尼亚州东区破产法院） Nov. 13, 2017)（汇集案例）；In re Still（斯蒂尔案）, 444 B.R. 520, 522 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.（宾夕法尼亚州东区破产法院） 2010)（“案件的发展趋势是采用利益衡量方法。”）。\n\n40. 在适用利益衡量标准时，法院确定“总体而言，受托人最大化财产价值的职责是否超过律师—当事人特权所依据的政策，以及披露对债务人造成的损害。”Ramette (In re Bame) 215 B.R. 367, at 377（引文略）。另见 Degirolamo（德吉罗拉莫） v. Daily & Haskins（戴利及哈斯金斯） (In re Wittmer（威特默案）), Case No. 08-61618, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 4727, at \\*7 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio（俄亥俄州北区破产法院）, Nov. 30, 2011)（“该[利益衡量]方法结合了如下论点：由于可能对债务人造成个人损害并妨碍律师—当事人沟通，受托人不能放弃律师—当事人特权；以及如下论点：如对债务人没有不利影响，受托人可以放弃律师—当事人特权。”）（援引 In re Miller（米勒案） 247 B.R. 704, 710 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio（俄亥俄州北区破产法院） 2000)）。\n\n41. 在本案中，放弃特权将对个人债务人造成重大不利影响，因为其已在一份替代起诉书中被指控多项违反联邦刑法的罪名，且该替代起诉书中的指控与 Whitecroft Adversary（Whitecroft 对抗程序）起诉状中的某些指控相对应。（比较 Whitecroft Adversary 起诉状第¶¶13-19段，其指控个人债务人利用众多空壳公司向债权人隐匿资产；与替代起诉书第¶¶1-3段，其中包括第¶3段：“为隐瞒[个人债务人及其被指称共同被告]所转移及指示转移的资金的非法来源，该等人员将资金转入并经由以至少80个不同实体或个人名义持有的约500多个账户，. . .”）。受托人寻求放弃特权的某些文件，即附件A、B（以及作为B子集的D和E）和F，涉及替代起诉书所涉期间内据称拟议的资产转移，即“[自]至少约2018年起至至少约March 2023止”。（替代起诉书，第¶1段）。\n\n42. 根据对刑事案件案卷的审阅，该案检察官尚未申请许可取得个人债务人的任何受特权保护的通信。当然，如受托人放弃特权，检察官将有权取得该放弃所适用的全部文件，包括法院可能认定的任何后续事项范围放弃。潜在刑事责任是法院在进行利益衡量标准以确定是否应放弃特权时所考量的因素，而检察官可能取得其原本无法取得的文件，这一可能性更应有力支持拒绝允许放弃。见 Ramette (In re Bame) 215 B.R. 367, at 377（“然而，至于其他问题，尤其是涉及可能导致刑事起诉的活动的问题，利益衡量可能会倾向于维持特权主张，在此情况下，受托人将有机会提出特权的犯罪—欺诈例外。”）。\n\n43. 在利益衡量的另一端，如法院拒绝允许所请求的特权放弃，受托人并未指出财产将遭受任何损害。事实上，寻求放弃特权的唯一明示理由，是在 Whitecroft Adversary 中主动使用少量文件；但正如受托人在 Privilege Waiver Motion（特权放弃动议）中所述，其很可能甚至无需这些少量文件即可胜诉，因为 Guo 女士未对受托人的指控作出抗辩。（Privilege Waiver Motion，第¶48段（“因此，Guo 女士未能证实任何反对受托人在 Bombardier Adversary Proceeding（庞巴迪对抗程序）中主张的依据。”）\n\n44. Privilege Waiver Motion 还忽略了受托人为支持其起诉状所依赖的非特权信息，均如其中所述并作为其附件所附[6]，以及于 January 2023 取得的 Guo 女士的实质性宣誓证言；该证言在其于 November 1, 2023 在 Whitecroft Adversary 中进行的宣誓作证期间得到再次确认；还忽略了受托人在其广泛调查中取得的大量非特权信息，以及诸如 Privilege Waiver Motion 第20段所提及的公开可获得信息。\n\n6 受托人在未征得个人债务人律师同意或未请求法院许可的情况下，将 Privilege Waiver Motion 中争议文件中的一份或多份作为附件附于 Whitecroft Adversary 起诉状。显然，受托人单方面使用违反 Privileges Order（特权命令）的文件，并不构成对个人债务人要求遵守该命令之权利的放弃。\n\n45. 如前所述，针对 Guo 女士在 Whitecroft Adversary 中提出的文件提供请求，其中许多请求寻求有关受托人关于 Bombardier 飞机所有权之指控的信息，受托人已提供近9,000页文件。此外，受托人仍在寻求支持其主张的信息；其在过去一周内已收到 JetLaw, LLC（捷特劳有限责任公司）回应传票所提供的文件，随后又发出了两份额外传票，要求提供文件及进行宣誓作证。此外，受托人必将基于 Guo 女士援引其第五修正案权利，以及个人债务人在 March 2, 2023 的宣誓作证中援引其第五修正案权利，而对 Guo 女士作出不利推定；在该次作证中，个人债务人就 Whitecroft Adversary 所涉事项接受询问，尽管该程序当时尚未提起，且该次作证涉及 HK International Funds Investments (USA) Ltd.（HK国际基金投资（美国）有限公司） v. Despins（德斯平斯）, Adv. Pro. No. 22-05003 中提出的请求和反请求。（见 Whitecroft Complaint（Whitecroft 起诉状），第¶¶26、29、42、44(a)-(f)、49、64及72段）。\n\n46. 基于：(i) 受托人已积累的大量非特权信息；(ii) 未能证明无法使用受托人寻求通过 Privilege Waiver Motion 使用的少量文件，将否定其成功证明其主张的能力；以及 (iii) 如放弃特权将对个人债务人造成的损害，Privilege Waiver Motion 应予驳回。\n\nC. Guo 女士律师对某些事实的知悉不构成特权放弃\n\n47. Guo 女士与个人债务人由同一律师代理这一事实，并不因该律师知悉受特权保护的信息而当然构成对个人债务人律师—当事人特权的放弃，反之亦然；受托人也未援引任何权威支持其默示立场，即该事实确会构成放弃——受托人并未直言其主张 Zeisler & Zeisler（泽斯勒与泽斯勒律师事务所）在主破产案件中代理个人债务人以及在 Whitecroft Adversary 中代理 Guo 女士，导致个人债务人的律师—当事人特权被放弃，这一点充分说明受托人自身对其论点的看法。\n\n48. 受托人所援引的案件并不支持其默示放弃主张，且与本案完全不相干。Helmedach v. Comm'r of Corr., 329 Conn. 726, 737 (2018) 涉及向作为刑事被告人的客户通知认罪答辩提议的问题，以及未及时通知是否构成无效律师协助。Uchechukwu Egbujo（乌切丘库·埃布乔）v. Jackson Lewis, P.C.（杰克逊·刘易斯律师事务所）, 2022 U.S. Dist LEXIS 177041, 2022 WL 4585688, *7 (D. Conn., Sept. 29, 2022) 涉及诽谤主张，以及律师事务所向其自身客户公布其代表该客户进行调查所得结论，是否构成为满足诽谤主张中公布要件而向第三方公布；并不构成。最后，Rai（赖伊）v. WB Imico Lexington Fee, LLC（WB Imico Lexington Fee 有限责任公司）, 802 F.3d 353 (2015) 涉及对《州际土地销售完全披露法》的解释，以及向律师提供一份必需文件是否满足该法的披露规定；满足。\n\n49. 受托人还主张，个别债务人和 Guo 女士（郭女士）正试图将律师—客户特权作为进攻之剑和防御之盾。在一方寻求积极使用其受特权保护的通信而不披露该等通信时，即会产生进攻之剑和防御之盾的问题。Sims v. Blot, 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir. 2008)（“换言之，一方不得部分披露受特权保护的通信，或积极依赖受特权保护的通信以支持其主张或抗辩，然后又以特权为由阻止对方当事人审查相关通信。”）（引文略）。在受托人、个别债务人和 Guo 女士之间，唯一寻求积极使用特权信息的一方是受托人。因此，唯一可能存在进攻之剑和防御之盾问题的一方是受托人（个别债务人并非 Whitecroft 对抗程序的一方，且并未寻求为任何目的使用受特权保护的通信；其仅寻求使受特权保护的通信继续受特权保护。Guo 女士并未寻求为任何目的使用受特权保护的通信，且也不能如此，因为她没有使用该等通信的权利或能力）。\n\n因此，基于前述全部理由，应驳回特权放弃动议。\n\n日期：2023 年 12 月 13 日，康涅狄格州布里奇波特。\n债务人，HO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）\n\n/s/ James M. Moriarty\n\nEric Henzy（埃里克·亨齐，ct12849） James M. Moriarty（詹姆斯·M·莫里亚蒂） 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604 电话：(203) 368-4234 传真：(203) 368-5487 电子邮箱：[ehenzy@zeislaw.com] [Jmoriarty@zeislaw.com]\n\nUNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION（美国康涅狄格联邦破产法院布里奇波特分部）\n\n：债务人。\n\n：\n\n：\n\nIn re（关于）：第 11 章\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），：Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n送达证明\n\n本人特此证明，于 2023 年 12 月 13 日，前述文件副本已以电子方式提交。本次提交的通知将依照法院电子提交系统的操作，通过电子邮件发送给所有当事人。当事人可通过法院的 CM/ECF System 查阅本次提交文件。\n\n/s/ James M. Moriarty  James M. Moriarty（詹姆斯·M·莫里亚蒂，ct21876）\n\n附件 B  密封提交","key_entities":["Kwok","Je","Guo","Ho Wan Kwok","Himalaya","Himalaya Exchange","Despins","HCHK","Kamaraju","GTV","RICO","Paul Hastings","Farm Loan","Pryor Cashman","Shroff","forfeiture","Miles Guo","Saraca","CIPA","GETTR","Himalaya Alliance"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":1,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":19,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":25,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":35,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":50,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":88,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":131,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":133,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":145,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":148,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":186,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":188,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":189,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":202,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":204,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":218,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":219,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":220,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":221,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1897,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1994,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2420,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2421,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2432,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":13425,"status":"published","published_at":"2023-08-30 00:00:00","created_at":"2023-08-30","updated_at":"2026-08-23 21:37:02"}