{"id":"court_ctb_2509_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":2509,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"MOTION","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION | -------------------------------------------","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| ------------------------------------------------------<br>x |             |                         |  |  |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|-------------------------|--|--|\n| In re:                                                      | :<br>:      | Chapter 11              |  |  |\n| HO WAN KWOK, et al.,1                                       | :<br>:      | Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |  |  |\n| Debtors.                                                    | :<br>:<br>: | (Jointly Administered)  |  |  |\n| ------------------------------------------------------x     |             |                         |  |  |\n\n# **MOTION FOR ENTRY OF ORDER EXTENDING DEADLINE FOR TRUSTEE TO FILE AVOIDANCE ACTIONS UNDER BANKRUPTCY CODE SECTIONS 108, 546(a), AND 549**\n\nLuc A. Despins, in his capacity as the chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") appointed in the chapter 11 case of Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"), by and through his undersigned counsel, hereby files this motion (the \"Motion\"), pursuant to section 105(a) of title 11 of the United States Code (the \"Bankruptcy Code\") and Rule 9006 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the \"Bankruptcy Rules\"), for an order, substantially in the form of the proposed order attached as **Exhibit 1** hereto (the \"Proposed Order\"), extending the deadlines set forth in sections 108, 546(a), and 549 of the Bankruptcy Code for the Trustee to commence certain causes of action. In support of the Motion, the Trustee respectfully states as follows:\n\n# **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\n1. Since his appointment in July 2022, the Trustee has been diligently pursuing a\n\nwide-ranging investigation into the Debtor's complex financial affairs and, where, appropriate\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\nhas pursued litigation to, among other things, recover assets of the estate and avoid fraudulent transfers. The Trustee has made significant progress in his investigation and, in addition to the actions he has already commenced, will be filing numerous complaints prior to the current deadline. However, for various reasons described herein, the Trustee has not yet finished identifying all potential causes of action (and the potential defendants to such causes of action) to obtain value for the Debtor's creditors, including potential additional defendants and potential additional claims against defendants that the Trustee has already identified and against whom the Trustee will be bringing claims prior to the current deadline. By this Motion, the Trustee seeks an order equitably tolling the statute of limitations as to such causes of action so that the Trustee may pursue them after the February 15, 2024 deadline for doing so.\n\n2. The Court may equitably toll a statute of limitations where the movant shows (i) extraordinary circumstances and (ii) that he exercised reasonable diligence to commence litigation before the expiration of the limitations period. The factual record of this Chapter 11 Case easily satisfies these standards and unequivocally justifies an extension of the limitations periods.2 Further, pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b), the Bankruptcy Court may extend a time period—including statutes of limitations—for \"cause shown.\"\n\n3. Bankruptcy courts frequently deal with the aftermath of large-scale fraud and other illegal conduct. Such cases, on their own, create enormous logistical and investigative difficulties, and this case is no different. However, the difficulties in this case go beyond the significant challenge of wading through the aftermath of such conduct. This case presents the additional extraordinary circumstance of ongoing and repeated efforts to impede, obstruct, and delay the Trustee's investigation. These efforts started with the very filing of the Debtor's\n\n<sup>2</sup> As discussed below, equitable tolling and Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) each, on their own, provide legal support for the relief requested herein.\n\npetition and supporting papers, led to the appointment of the Trustee, and have continued unabated since then—even in the face of multiple Court orders, sanctions, and contempt rulings.\n\n4. Furthermore, the Trustee has diligently continued his investigation, notwithstanding the obstacles placed in his way at every turn. In fact, as detailed below, the Trustee has succeeded at nearly every turn. But those successes take time in the normal course, and have taken even longer because of the obstacles the Trustee has been forced to deal with.\n\n5. Moreover, because of the convoluted \"shell game\" the Debtor put in place, and continues to employ, each of the Trustee's successes does not bring his investigation to a close. Just the opposite, each success reveals more stones for the Trustee to turn over, and more assets hidden and/or transferred. This is not hyperbole: so far, the Trustee and his professionals have, through this process, identified more than 339 Kwok-related bank accounts, approximately 83,820 transactions in and out of these accounts, and over \\$3.2 billion transiting through these accounts. In short, and as explained below, the diligence prong requires the Trustee demonstrate that he has not \"slept on his rights.\" This prong is, also, easily satisfied by any clear-eyed evaluation of the record.\n\n6. Because the facts so strongly and obviously favor granting the requested relief, the real issue for the Court is to ensure that it has the authority to grant that relief. As indicated above, the Trustee brings this Motion under both bankruptcy law (specifically, Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) and section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code) and non-bankruptcy law (specifically, the doctrine of equitable tolling). Both supply the required authority.\n\n7. Equitable Tolling. Bankruptcy courts in multiple jurisdictions have relied on equitable tolling to extend limitations periods even before the period has run. The Trustee submits that the Court should follow the guidance of these courts. While the Trustee recognizes\n\nthat other courts have declined to do so on notice and/or procedural grounds, these courts are concerned that potential defendants should have their day in court and an opportunity to challenge the application of equitable tolling to them. But those concerns are not applicable here, as the Trustee has already filed a motion proposing a large-scale, multi-prong, notice program to address these concerns (the \"Notice Motion\").3\n\n8. Bankruptcy law. Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) is clear: bankruptcy courts can enlarge a \"specified period\" for \"cause shown.\" The Trustee recognizes that some courts have held this does not apply to the limitations period to bring claims under chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code. But, as addressed in detail below, multiple courts in multiple jurisdictions have disagreed, holding that Rule 9006(b) *does* supply the required authority.\n\n9. The relief requested in this Motion is vital. Absent an extension, the Trustee will be forced to litigate the limitations period on a one-off basis in a free-standing adversary proceeding with any potential defendant who raises the issue. This is not just difficult; it is likely impossible—the Trustee has already identified over 83,000 transfers. Moreover, the cost, both in time and dollars, would be astronomical, and would directly harm creditors. Finally, the uncertainty would put the Trustee—who has to defend all of his actions and has already had to defend a motion seeking his removal as well as other scurrilous accusations—in an untenable position moving forward.\n\n10. The Trustee's proposal solves these problems. At the same time, and especially in conjunction with the Notice Motion, it preserves the rights of all potential defendants. It simply channels everything into one forum.\n\n<sup>3</sup> *See* ECF No. 2494.\n\n#### **BACKGROUND**\n\n11. On June 15, 2022, the Bankruptcy Court entered a memorandum of decision and order [ECF No. 465] directing the United States Trustee to appoint a chapter 11 trustee. On July 8, 2022, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order [ECF No. 523] appointing the Trustee.\n\n12. The Debtor's bankruptcy schedules, filed in March 2022, claimed only \\$3,850 in assets compared to hundreds of millions of dollars of liabilities.4 The Debtor asserted in the Bankruptcy Court that he was essentially penniless, and that his luxurious homes, the Lady May yacht, and his other publicly flaunted trappings of wealth did not belong to him, but to companies purportedly owned by his family members.5 As several courts have now observed, the Debtor was able to maintain his opulent lifestyle while professing to own virtually no assets by constructing a vast maze of shell companies in which he hid his wealth in the names of family members and close associates.\n\n13. Since his appointment, the Trustee has been working diligently to identify and recover for the benefit of the estate the assets the Debtor has hidden. To that end, in accordance with the Bankruptcy Court's directive, the Trustee has launched a complex and thorough investigation and litigation process, focusing on the Debtor's \"shell game\"—*i.e.*, his use of alter ego companies to hide his assets from creditors. Broadly speaking, the process has included (a) discovery pursuant to Rule 2004 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the \"Bankruptcy Rules\") and (b) litigation to establish that certain entities are alter egos of the Debtor and/or recover specific property and assets. The Trustee has filed thirteen Rule 2004 motions, issued Rule 2004 subpoenas to over 250 parties, and reviewed hundreds of thousands of documents produced in discovery, and continues to take all reasonable steps to obtain additional records.\n\n<sup>4</sup> *See* Schedules of Assets & Liabilities, at 1 [ECF No. 78].\n\n<sup>5</sup> *See Declaration of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok in Support of the Chapter 11 Case and Certain Motions* [ECF No. 107].\n\n14. As the Court is well aware, the Debtor, his family members, and his associates have sought to obstruct the Trustee's efforts at every turn. Among other things:\n\n15. Flouting his statutory obligation to turn over his books and records,6 the Debtor claimed, essentially, that he had no business records, producing only forty-six documents in response to Rule 2004 discovery. The Debtor refused to produce documents related to assets he contended belonged to his family members or other persons and entities, (ii) collect and produce documents in the possession of his counsel and advisors, or (iii) sufficiently describe the efforts by which he searched for responsive documents. The Debtor's refusal to cooperate led the Trustee to seek and obtain (over the Debtor's objection) an order compelling production of documents responsive to the Trustee's requests and an explanation of the Debtor's efforts to search for such documents. [ECF No. 1353]. Instead of complying with the order to compel production, the Debtor asserted that he had no obligation to do so under the Fifth Amendment and \"act of production doctrine,\" requiring the Trustee to seek and obtain (again, over the Debtor's fierce opposition), and order holding the Debtor in contempt. [ECF No. 2035].\n\n16. Shortly after the Trustee's appointment, the Debtor sought to vacate the order appointing the Trustee, which motion the Bankruptcy Court denied on August 2, 2022 [ECF No. 667]. Later, in December 2022, the Debtor renewed his attempt to remove the Trustee, but this motion was withdrawn following vigorous opposition from various parties in interest. [ECF Nos. 1274, 1635].\n\n17. The Debtor unsuccessfully opposed the Trustee's motion to confirm that, upon his appointment, the Trustee holds all economic and corporate governance rights with respect to\n\n<sup>6</sup> *See* 11 U.S.C § 521(a)(4) (the debtor \"shall,\" where there is a trustee, \"surrender to the trustee all property of the estate and any recorded information, including books, documents, records, and papers, relating to property of the estate\").\n\nentities owned and/or controlled by the Debtor, including Genever Holdings Corporation and Genever US LLC [ECF No. 643].\n\n18. Despite the Debtor's statutory obligation to cooperate with the Trustee and surrender to the Trustee all property of the estate and any information relating to property of the estate, the Debtor and numerous of his family members, business associates, and affiliated companies have refused, at every turn, to cooperate with the Trustee's discovery efforts and surrender property of the estate to the Trustee, resulting in no less than seven (7) orders holding them in contempt of court [ECF Nos. 1372, 1537, 1709, 1892, 2009, 2035, and 2093].\n\n19. The Defendant's tactics have not been limited to the courtroom. From the outset of the Trustee's appointment, the Defendant has attempted to discredit the Trustee and his counsel (Paul Hastings LLP), with all means available to him. Perhaps most egregiously, beginning in mid-November 2022, the Defendant instigated an extensive social media intimidation campaign directed at the Trustee, his family, and his counsel, as well as one of the largest unsecured creditor in the chapter 11 cases (namely, Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. (\"PAX\")), the chief executive of PAX's parent company, his family, and PAX's counsel, including by disclosing home address information online and issuing threats against them personally. As a result, starting on November 20, 2022, a group of individuals aligned with the Defendant began picketing at the residence of the Trustee as well as the residencies of members of the Trustee's family, including his former spouse, and subsequently at the offices of counsel to the Trustee and counsel to PAX (O'Melveny & Myers LLP). Following several days of evidentiary hearings on these matters, the Bankruptcy Court issued a preliminary injunction to curtail this improper interference with the administration of the Bankruptcy Cases.\n\n20. Other efforts to harass the Trustee and his counsel included a lawsuit filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York by various individuals affiliated with various of the Defendants' organizations, alleging that the Trustee and his counsel violated the Foreign Agents Registration Act (\"FARA\") by failing to register as agents of the People's Republic of China or the Chinese Communist Party. In the District Court, Judge Caproni dismissed this lawsuit and imposed Rule 11 sanctions on the plaintiffs and their counsel because this meritless lawsuit was filed in bad faith and to harass the Trustee and his counsel.\n\n21. On March 15, 2023, the Debtor was arrested in connection with multiple charges of securities fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering.7 The related criminal indictment filed by the Unites States Attorney against the Debtor alleged that the Debtor was \"the leader of, and directed\"8 a scheme in which, among other things, the Debtor and his co-defendant William Je transferred money \"into and through more than approximately 500 accounts held in the names of at least 80 different entities or individuals.\"9 Also on March 15, 2023, the Securities and Exchange Commission initiated a lawsuit against the Debtor by filing a complaint alleging multiple securities law violations against the Debtor based on similar conduct as that described in the criminal indictment, which lawsuit was stayed. More recently, on January 3, 2024, the United States Attorney filed a superseding indictment against the Debtor alleging multiple criminal RICO allegations. The superseding indictment alleged, among other things, that the Debtor directed the \"Kwok Enterprise,\" made up of \"dozens of interrelated entities,\" as part of a\n\n<sup>7</sup> *See* Crim. Indictment, *United States v. Kwok*, No. 1:23-cr-00118-AT (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2023). (A related criminal complaint was also filed separately against the Debtor's employee, Yvette Wang, based on her participation in the Debtor's criminal scheme. Wang has been charged with wire fraud, securities fraud, conspiracy to commit wire fraud and securities fraud, and the making of an unlawful transaction.) 8\n\nCrim. Indictment ¶ 6.\n\n<sup>9</sup> *Id.* ¶ 3.\n\ncriminal scheme that was continually adapted to \"evade the enforcement of investor-protection, anti-money laundering, and bankruptcy laws in the United States.\"10\n\n22. Notably, in its April 20, 2023 order denying the Debtor's request for release on bail, the District Court for the Southern District of New York (the \"Criminal Court\") highlighted the Debtor's \"history of obstructive behavior in prior cases,\"11 identifying conduct related to these chapter 11 cases such as, among other things, the Debtor misstating his assets12; posting false and harassing material on social media; encouraging others via social media to protest the bankruptcy trustee, his family, and his counsel and also file claims in his bankruptcy to drive up the trustee's attorney's fees13; and publicly publishing confidential settlement documents on the internet.14 The Debtor in a more recent renewed motion for release on bail filed represented to the Criminal Court that he \"apologizes for his past behavior and the upset he caused others.\"15\n\n23. The Debtor has attempted to use the Criminal Court as a forum in which to further seek to delay and obstruct the Trustee's efforts in these chapter 11 cases. On August 30, 2023, the Debtor filed a motion (joined by Yvette Wang) in his criminal case seeking to stay these chapter 11 cases, pending resolution of his criminal trial, which motion was denied on December 21, 2023 [Crim. Ct. ECF No. 204]. Subsequently, on January 4, 2024, the Debtor filed yet another motion in his criminal case reiterating his request that these chapter 11 cases be stayed [Crim. Ct. ECF No. 218].\n\n24. Despite all of the efforts of the Debtor and his associates to obstruct and delay the Trustee, the Trustee has succeeded in recovering tens of millions of dollars for the estate through\n\n<sup>10</sup> *See* Jan. 3, 2024 Superseding Indictment ¶¶ 1, 6, *United States v. Kwok*, No. 1:23-cr-00118-AT (S.D.N.Y.) [Crim. Ct. ECF No. 215]. 11 Order, at 11 [Crim. Ct. ECF No. 51].\n\n<sup>12</sup>*Id.* at 8 and 10. 13 *Id.* at 9. 14 *Id.* 15 Mem. in Supp. of Renewed Mot. for Pretrial Release of Ho Wan Kwok, at 10 [Crim. Ct. ECF 178].\n\nadversary proceedings with respect to identified assets such as the Lady May yacht,16 the Sherry Netherland apartment,17 and identified bank accounts such as the accounts of the HCHK entities18 and the U.S. Bank escrow account.19 The Trustee has also initiated actions to recover, among other things, the Debtor's \\$26.5 million mansion in Mahwah, New Jersey.20 The Debtor's family members and acolytes have fiercely opposed the Trustee's efforts in these adversary proceedings. To give just one example, certain of the Debtor's followers, claiming to be creditors of the HCHK entities, sought to intervene to oppose the Trustee's alter ego claims against those entities. Though the intervention motion was denied by the Court in its recent decision issued on January 5, 2024, the intervention motion caused months of delay and necessitated an evidentiary hearing at which, among other things, one of the Debtor's followers \"brazenly and repeatedly refused to answer questions on cross examination despite the Court ordering her to do so,\" while another \"admit[ted] he forged a document to advance th[e] litigation.\"21\n\n25. Given the lack of funding to hire a forensic accountant until the sale of the Lady May, the Trustee and his counsel (which could until then only look to future-recovered assets for compensation) focused their initial asset recovery efforts on identified assets. As such, the necessary step of conducting a forensic accounting of the hundreds of accounts used by Kwok-\n\n<sup>16</sup> Recovered by the Trustee in connection with adversary proceeding 22-05003, *HK International Funds*\n\n*Investments (USA) Limited v. Despins*, and sold pursuant to the Court's order of June 27, 2023. [ECF No. 1953]. 17 Recovered by the Trustee in connection with adversary proceeding 22-05027, *Despins v. Bravo Luck Limited*. 18 These entities, HCHK Technologies, Inc., HCHK Property Management, Inc., and Lexington Property, Inc., are the subject of adversary proceeding 23-05013, *Despins v. HCHK Technologies, Inc., et al.*, in which the Trustee has sought an alter ego judgment. While the Trustee's adversary proceeding seeking the funds of the HCHK entities is not yet complete, those funds are in the Trustee's possession and safe from dissipation pending a final ruling, which the Trustee believes will be in his favor. 19 Recovered by the Trustee in connection with adversary proceeding 22-05003, *HK International Funds*\n\n*Investments (USA) Limited v. Despins*, and adversary proceeding 23-05012, *U.S Bank National Association v. HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, et al.*\n\n<sup>20</sup> The Mahwah mansion is the subject of adversary proceeding 23-05017, *Despins v. Taurus Fund LLC, et al*.. 21 Mem. of Decision & Order, at 28 [Adv. Proc. No. 23-05013, ECF No. 239].\n\nrelated entities did not commence in earnest until the Trustee retained Kroll, LLC (\"Kroll\") as the Trustee's forensic investigator in August 2023, pursuant to the Court's order entered on September 29, 2023 [ECF No. 2241].\n\n26. Since its retention, Kroll has been hard at work assisting the Trustee to lay the foundation for, among other things, the prosecution of avoidance actions arising out of the thousands of transfers made, effectively by the Debtor, using numerous Kwok-related entities. Thus far, Kroll has identified more than 339 Kwok-related bank accounts, approximately 83,820 transactions in and out of these accounts, and over \\$3.2 billion transiting through these accounts. These numbers grow literally every day as Kroll's analysis progresses.\n\n#### **RELIEF SOUGHT**\n\n27. The Trustee requests entry of the Proposed Order extending the statute of limitations in sections 108, 546, and 549 of the Bankruptcy Code, which will allow the Trustee to continue his investigation and bring additional actions under chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code.\n\n#### **BASIS FOR RELIEF**\n\n### **I. Court Has Authority to Grant Requested Relief**\n\n28. Bankruptcy courts frequently grant the relief requested herein under nonbankruptcy law (specifically, the doctrine of equitable tolling) and/or bankruptcy law (specifically, Rule 9006).\n\n# A. Equitable Tolling Applies to Bankruptcy Code Statutes of Limitations and Can be Applied Prospectively\n\n29. Courts have confirmed that the non-bankruptcy law doctrine of equitable tolling authorizes the extension of a statute of limitations, including the time period set forth in section 546(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. *See Fam. Golf Ctrs., Inc. v. Acushnet Co. (In re Randall's*\n\n*Island Fam. Golf Ctrs., Inc.)*, 288 B.R. 701, 706 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (\"It is well-settled that equitable tolling may be applied, in appropriate circumstances, to toll the statute of limitations imposed under 11 U.S.C. § 546(a).\"); *Fogel v. Shabat (In re Draiman)*, 714 F.3d 462, 466 (7th Cir. 2013) (\"Furthermore, the statute of limitations in 11 U.S.C. § 546(a) is subject to equitable tolling.\"). Any inconsistency in the caselaw, instead, arises when equitable toiling is requested prior to the expiration of the limitations period.\n\n30. As an initial matter, many courts have granted this relief prospectively. *See, e.g.*, *In re Farwest Pump Co.*, No. 4:17-BK-11112-BMW, 2020 WL 257784, at \\*3 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Jan. 15, 2020) (granting motion to equitably toll statute of limitations that was filed prior to expiration); *Marsh v. Levy (In re Martin Levy of Berlin D.M.D., P.C*.), 416 B.R. 1, 8 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009) (order that granted motion to extend section 546(a) before it expired was proper); *In re Dwek,* No. 07- 11757 (KCF) (Bankr. D.N.J. Feb. 2, 2009) [ECF No. 3790] (prospectively granting motion to extend limitations periods); *In re Rockport Dev., Inc*., No. 20-11339-SC (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2022) [ECF No. 822] (same); *In re Visiting Nurse Ass'n of Inland Counties*, No. 18-16908-MH (Bankr C.D. Cal. July 30, 2020) [ECF No. 683] (same); *In re Builders Holding Co.*, No. 16-06643-EAG7 (Bankr. D.P.R. April 25, 2019) [ECF No. 501] (same).22\n\n31. Other courts, however, have held that courts should not grant requests for prospective equitable tolling. For example, the court in *Walnut Hill* held that it was \"wholly premature\" to grant an equitable tolling motion where the limitations period had not yet expired. *In re Walnut Hill, Inc.*, No. 16–20960 (JJT), 2018 WL 2672242, at \\* 2 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 1, 2018). And *In re Randolph Hospital, Inc.* denied, without prejudice, a motion to equitably toll\n\n<sup>22</sup> Copies of the orders entered in *In re Dwek, In re Rockport Dev*., *In re Visiting Nurse Assoc. of Inland Counties*, and *In re Builders Holding Co. Corp*. are attached as **Exhibits 2-5** hereto.\n\nthe limitations period, to be renewed after the trustee \"initiates actions against identifiable and *properly noticed defendants*.\" *In re Randolph Hosp., Inc.*, No. 20-10247, 2022 WL 19298765, at \\*1 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2022) (emphasis added). For the reasons discussed below, this concern should not prevent the Court from granting the instant Motion under the circumstances present here.\n\n32. Courts that have declined to rely on equitable tolling to prospectively toll a statute of limitations make clear that the primary concern with prospective equitable tolling is notice: parties who may ultimately be defendants should have an opportunity to argue that equitable tolling is not appropriate under a given set of circumstances, and a court should not preemptively take away that opportunity.\n\n33. The flip side of this focus on notice is that courts have held that, where notice *is* received, it is incumbent on the potential defendant to object. *See In re Martin Levy of Berlin*, 416 B.R. at 8 (\"Defendants can not avoid trustees who seek information, ignore a trustee request to extend the statute of limitations, wait for the limitations period to pass and then, months later after a complaint is filed, claim that the trustee is out of luck. Given the circumstances, the Trustee showed more than sufficient cause for the Court to extend the deadline, even had the defendants objected. Their failure to respond provides that much more justification for the extension. Accordingly, this Court finds and rules that because the defendants waived their rights by their inaction, the § 546(a) deadline was properly extended, and the Trustee timely filed the Complaint.\").\n\n34. This is precisely why this Motion, under these circumstances, could, and should, be granted. The Trustee has identified hundreds of parties that may ultimately be sued. The Trustee will, with great effort and at significant expense, serve those parties with notice of the\n\ninstant Tolling Motion, all in accordance with the Notice Motion (which itself was served on as many potential defendants as possible). And if the Court grants the Notice Motion, the Court will have determined that this notice was sufficient. In short, the parties impacted by this tolling request *will* get notice—actual, constructive, or both.\n\n### B. Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) Also Supplies Authority to Extend Limitations Period\n\n35. As one court has explained, \"Rule 9006(b) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure gives the Court authority 'for cause' ... 'at any time in its discretion' to order the time within which an act is specified to take place enlarged. This includes the period of time for commencing avoidance actions under 11 U.S.C. § 546(a).\" *Frentz v. Stites & Harbison (In re ThermoView Indus., Inc.)*, 381 B.R. 225, 227 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2008) (internal references omitted). Multiple other courts, in multiple jurisdictions, agree.23 *See, e.g.*, *In re Campbellton-Graceville Hosp. Corp.*, 616 B.R. 177, 182 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2019) (\"Bankruptcy Courts have authority to enlarge the two-year statute of limitations period under Section 546 for cause, pursuant to Rule 9006(b).\"); *see also In re D & L Energy, Inc.*, No. 13-40813 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Mar. 25, 2015) [ECF No. 1377] (finding court has authority under Rule 9006(b) to extend limitations period in section 546); *In re Network Services Sols., LLC*, No. 17-50309-gwz (Bankr. D. Nev. Mar. 6, 2019) [ECF No. 503] (granting motion to enlarge time to commence actions under sections 108 and 546 of the Bankruptcy Code pursuant to Rule 9006); *In re Farm-Rite, Inc*., No. 20-19379-JNP (Bankr. D.N.J. Aug. 3, 2022) [ECF No. 551] (granting motion to extend deadline in section 546 of the Bankruptcy Code under Rule 9006(b)); *In re Anton & Chia, LLP*,\n\n<sup>23</sup> To be clear, these two approaches—extension based on Rule 9006 and extension based on equitable tolling are not exclusive. They can exist in the same case, and basis to extend the limitations period can exist under either, or both. For example, in *International Administrative Services*, the court held that Rule 9006(b) granted authority to extend the deadline, but also decided to \"reach the question of whether the trustee demonstrated an equitable basis for extending the limitations period.\" *IBT Int'l, Inc. v. Northern (In re Int'l Admin. Servs., Inc.)*, 408 F.3d 689, 700 (11th Cir. 2005).\n\nNo. 18-12565-TA (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2020) [ECF No. 136] (same); *In re Uplift RX, LLC*, No. 17-32186 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2019) [ECF No. 1005] (same).24\n\n36. The Trustee recognizes that, notwithstanding the caselaw cited above, some courts have held that Rule 9006(b) does not authorize the extension of statutory limitations period. *See, e.g.*, *In re Walnut Hill, Inc.*, 2018 WL 2672242, at \\*2.\n\n37. The Trustee submits, however, that the Court should adopt the analysis endorsed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. In *International Administrative Services*, the defendants pointed \"to Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) which does not specifically provide for enlargement of time period created by statute.\" *In re Int'l Admin. Servs., Inc.*, 408 F.3d at 699. The court, though, found \"no merit in this argument.\" *Id*. The court pointed out that the definition and commencement of an adversary proceeding are also governed by Bankruptcy Rules 7001 and 7003, respectively, and held that Rule 9006 does grant bankruptcy courts discretion to enlarge statutory time periods, *even though* the rule does not \"explicitly encompass statutory timeframes.\" *Id*.\n\n38. Furthermore, the position advanced by the *Walnut Hill* court suffers from a logical deficiency. In *Walnut Hill*, the court framed the issue as a \"yes or no\" inquiry: Can a rule override a statute? Yet even that court acknowledged that Rule 9006(a) does apply to statutes because that specific subsection of Rule 9006 says that it applies to \"any statute.\"25 Admittedly, this \"any statute\" language is missing from Rule 9006(b). But this exercise demonstrates that the correct question is not whether Rule 9006(b) *can* be used to extend a statutory timeframe, as\n\n<sup>24</sup> Copies of the orders entered in *In re D & L Energy*, *In re Network Services Solutions, LLC*, *In re Farm-Rite, Inc*., *In re Anton & Chia, LLP*, and *In re Uplift RX, LLC* are attached as **Exhibits 6-10** hereto. 25 The relevant language, in full, of subsection (a) of Rule 9006 provides that \"[t]he following rules apply in\n\ncomputing any time period specified in these rules, in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in any local rule or court order, or in any statute that does not specify a method of computing time.\" Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(a).\n\n*Walnut Hill* suggests. In other words, *Walnut Hill* got the wrong answer because it asked the wrong question.\n\n39. Instead, the correct inquiry is whether Rule 9006(b) *does* grant the Bankruptcy Court such authority. This converts the question from an absolute \"yes or no\" inquiry to a question of interpretation: what is the best way to read, understand, and apply Rule 9006(b), and whether Rule 9006(b) should extend to section 546(a) (and, equally, other limitations periods governing avoidance actions). And, in this regard, the Trustee submits that the better answer is the one given by the Eleventh Circuit and numerous other bankruptcy courts across multiple jurisdictions: even though it \"does not explicitly encompass statutory timeframes,\" to hold that Rule 9006(b) does not apply to the 546(a) deadline would lead to \"absurd results.\" *In re Int'l Admin. Servs., Inc.*, 408 F.3d at 699.26\n\n40. Indeed, no case better illustrates the \"absurdity\" the Eleventh Circuit was concerned about than the present case. The Court is well aware of the complex nature of these chapter 11 cases, and the unending efforts of the Debtor and his associates to hinder the Trustee's investigation. The Debtor should not be able to simply \"run out the clock\" for only two years and, in doing so, escape liability and effectively put an end to his bankruptcy case, thwarting not just his creditors and the Trustee, but Congress' intent. Nor is it a practical solution to address this on an *ex post facto* basis after the limitations period has run. The complexity of this case, and the sheer volume of information and parties is such that this would border on the impossible—and would, certainly, impose such a burden and expense on the\n\n<sup>26</sup> The *Walnut Hill* court also observed (correctly) that the Bankruptcy Rules cannot \"abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.\" 2018 WL 2672242, at \\*2. But the limitations period in section 546(a) is a statute of limitations not a \"substantive right.\" *See Collins v. J & N Rest. Assocs., Inc. (In re Mendolia)*, No. 12-60219, 2015 WL 475966, at \\*8 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2015) (\"The statute of limitations, however, by its very nature is procedural and does not confer or enlarge a substantive right.\"); *Moglia v. Inland Plywood Co. (In re Outboard Marine Corp*.), 299 B.R. 488, 500 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2003) (finding section 546(a) is a statute of limitations); *Pryor v. Barbara (In re Rodriguez)*, 283 B.R. 112 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2001) (same).\n\nTrustee as to directly impact creditors ultimate recovery. *See In re ThermoView Indus., Inc.*, 381 B.R. at 227 (granting extension motion under Rule 9006(b) in \"an exceedingly complex case in which the Trustee has pursued and filed nearly 400 adversary proceedings\"). As noted above, the correct inquiry is not if Rule 9006 can give the Court the necessary authority, but rather whether it does. It cannot be the case that Congress intended bankruptcy courts to be without recourse in cases such as this—and any other reading of Rule 9006(b) would lead to perverse and inequitable outcomes. *See In re Fundamental Long Term Care, Inc.*, 501 B.R. 784, 791 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2013) (\"If the Court does not enlarge the period for bringing avoidance actions, it will, in effect, be rewarding the targets' opposition (even if justified) during the discovery process. And it would create a perverse incentive for targets of avoidance actions (in this case and others) to oppose discovery.\").27\n\n41. Moreover, there is statutory authority to extend the limitations period set out in the Bankruptcy Code. Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code (which is, of course, a statute), grants bankruptcy courts the authority to \"issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary to carry out the provisions of this title.\" And courts have specifically relied on section 105(a) to extend limitations periods set out in the Bankruptcy Code. *See Morgan v. United States (In re Morgan)*, 182 F.3d 775, 779 (11th Cir. 1999) (section 105(a) may be used to toll three-year period in section 507(a)(8)(A)(i)); *United States v. Richards (In re Richards)*, 994 F.2d 763, 765 (10th Cir. 1993) (\"11 U.S.C. § 105(a) is broad enough to permit the Bankruptcy Court's order to suspend the 240–day assessment period in 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7)(A)(ii) for the time Richards was in his first bankruptcy.\").\n\n<sup>27</sup> If this result would be inequitable even where the discovery opposition may have been \"justified,\" that concern is exponentially heightened here, where there is no such justification.\n\n42. While the Trustee recognizes section 105(a) cannot be used to take an action the Bankruptcy Code prohibits, *see Law v. Siegel*, 571 U.S. 415, 421 (2014), extending the limitations period pursuant to section 105(a) would not violate this principle. Tolling the statute of limitations in sections 108, 546 and 549 is not prohibited by these sections or any other section of the Bankruptcy Code. In fact, equitable tolling is a remedy read *into* every federal statute of limitations, including sections 108, 546, and 549. *See Young v. United States*, 535 U.S. 43, 50 (2002) (\"It is hornbook law that limitations periods are customarily subject to equitable tolling . . . Congress must be presumed to draft limitations periods in light of this background principle. *That is doubly true when it is enacting limitations periods to be applied by bankruptcy courts, which are courts of equity and apply the principles and rules of equity jurisprudence*.\") (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and references omitted) .\n\n43. Accordingly, and especially when taken together, section 105(a) and Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) are best understood as granting the authority to extend the limitations period in 546(a).\n\n#### **II. Court Should Grant Requested Relief**\n\n44. Having established that the Court has authority to grant the requested relief, application of the applicable standards demonstrates that such relief is proper and necessary here.\n\nA. Equitable Tolling Standard\n\n45. A trustee may equitably toll the statute of limitations \"if despite all due diligence he is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of his claim.\" *Donely ex rel. Valdez v. United States*, 518 F.3d 173, 182 (2d Cir. 2008). Equitable tolling must be decided on a case-by-case basis and is not limited to a particular set of facts. *See Young*, 535 U.S. at 48-50.\n\n46. While fraudulent concealment is certainly a basis for equitable tolling, \"equitable tolling is often confused with fraudulent concealment,\" *Valdez*, 518 F.3d at 182-83, and\n\n\"equitable tolling is not limited to situations involving . . . the adversary's misconduct.\" *In re Randall's Island Fam. Golf Cts.*, 288 B.R. at 705-06 (internal references omitted). In other words, equitable tolling does not require any particular misconduct by the defendant. *See Heyman v. Dec (In re Dec)*, 272 B.R. 218, 225 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2001) (\"The statute of limitations under Code § 546(a) may also be tolled where the fraud goes undiscovered even though the defendant does nothing to conceal it.\").\n\n47. \"To obtain the benefit of the doctrine, the Trustee bears the burden of establishing that []he (1) has acted with reasonable diligence during the time period she seeks to have tolled, and (2) has proved that the circumstances are so extraordinary that the doctrine should apply.\" *In re Anderson*, 623 B.R. 199, 217 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2020); *see also Castilloex rel. A.Q.C. v. United States*, 656 F.3d 135, 144 (2d Cir. 2011).\n\n# B. Equitable Tolling Is Warranted In This Case28\n\n48. The entirety of the factual record easily demonstrates that (i) extraordinary circumstances prevented the Trustee from bringing the Avoidance Actions and (ii) the Trustee acted diligently in pursuing his rights.\n\n### *a. Extraordinary Circumstances*\n\n49. \"An extraordinary circumstance … derives from some external obstacle to timely filing beyond the plaintiff's control, not from self-inflicted delay.\" *Schmidt v. Twosons Corp. (In re Black Elk Energy Offshore Operations, LLC)*, No. 15-34287, 2022 WL 1589190, at \\*11 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 19, 2022) (as modified) (internal quotation marks and references omitted). This has particular application to bankruptcy cases, where the debtor's conduct can\n\n<sup>28</sup> To the extent the Court agrees that Rule 9006(b) and/or section 105(a) provide authority for the relief requested herein, the Trustee submits that the same reasons that justify equitable tolling also constitute \"cause\" under Rule 9006(b).\n\njustify tolling against non-debtors. *Kearns Motor Co. v. Cimino (In re Dreiling)*, 233 B.R. 848, 878 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1999) (\"a debtor's fraudulent concealment may be imputed to other defendants for purposes of equitable tolling\"); *In re Dec*, 272 B.R. at 227 (\"A bankruptcy case presents a rather different slant on equitable tolling. In the typical situation, it is the debtor's conduct rather than the defendant's conduct which invokes equitable tolling.\"); *Olsen v. Zerbetz (In re Olsen)*, 36 F.3d 71, 73 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding debtor's sale of estate property to family without notifying the court or parties in interest was basis for equitable tolling of fraudulent transfer because \"because the trustee remained in the dark without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part\") (internal quotation marks and references omitted).\n\n50. Accordingly, courts consistently find extraordinary circumstances when a plaintiff is unable to make progress on discovery, especially in light of the debtor's obstruction:\n\n- *In re Int'l Admin. Servs. Inc*., 408 F.3d 689, 702 (11th Cir. 2005) (tolling statute of limitations based, in part, on debtor and defendant's attempts to interfere with trustee's investigation into asset diversion plan by hiding their activities and violating discovery requests).\n- *Bender v. Mann (In re Bender)*, No. 02-00773-RTB, 2010 WL 6467681, at \\*9-10 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2010), aff'd, 480 F. App'x 445 (9th Cir. 2012) (affirming lower court decision for equitable tolling where the debtor's obstruction \"stood in the way\" of the trustee's filing of an avoidance action and noting the \"case law is replete with examples where courts have allowed equitable tolling in response to obstructive behavior by a party\").\n- *Freeland v. CPA Warehouse (In re Livemercial Aviation Holding, LLC)*, 508 B.R. 58, 71(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2014) (\"The Trustee's inability, despite due diligence, to obtain information/documentation highly material to the core of this case—for whatever reason caused Mathis' inability or failure to promptly produce or provide it—amply supports the application of the doctrine of equitable tolling to this case in order to extend the limitation period of 11 U.S.C. § 546(a)(1)(A)\").\n- *Ochs Charitable Remainder Trust v. Ochs (In re Ochs)*, 608 B.R. 252, 261–62 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2019) (finding that the extraordinary circumstances include, among others, the \"[Defendant's] obstruction of legitimate discovery, requiring the Court to intervene twice in the bankruptcy discovery disputes and rule against the Defendant both times; . . . his failure to provide a complete document production, requiring the Plaintiffs to direct\n\ndiscovery to several third-party financial institutions to obtain documents in 2019; and . . . when finally deposed after multiple delays, his vague and indefinite answers to questions under oath.\").\n\n *In re Farwest Pump Co*., No. 4:17-BK-11112-BMW, 2020 WL 257784, at \\*3 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Jan. 15, 2020) (\"It is also clear that the Committee is faced with extraordinary circumstances in this case, which circumstances were caused and have been perpetuated by the Vaughts, one and/or both of whom own and manage the Debtor [and related entities]. . . [including because] [t]he Vaughts have refused to disclose financial documents about their entities.\").\n\n51. Moreover, the Trustee need not prove that any (let alone all) potential defendant engaged or participated in blocking the Trustee's discovery. That \"some targets may not be responsible for impeding or delaying the Trustee's investigation is not a basis, by itself, for refusing to enlarge the two-year limitations period for bringing avoidance actions.\" *In re Fundamental Long Term Care, Inc*., 501 B.R. 784, 791 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Nov. 13, 2013). \"If the Trustee has been impeded from discovering potential avoidance actions, then the deadline ought to be enlarged as to all claims—not on a party-by-party basis.\" *Id.*\n\n52. Here, it has been amply demonstrated that the Debtor and his associates have, and continue to, actively interfered with the Trustee's discovery efforts, including from the very commencement of the case. *See In re Bender,* 2010 WL 6467681, at \\*8 (\"There is nothing in the case law that would prevent the bankruptcy court from concluding that [debtor's] misconduct, as it found, in 'going to great lengths to conceal real property in Hawaii from his Arizona chapter 7 trustee' does not constitute an extraordinary circumstance that \"stood in the way\" and delayed timely compliance with the statute of limitations by Trustee.\").\n\n#### i. Pending Criminal Case Is Also an Extraordinary Circumstance\n\n53. Extraordinary circumstances are also found in external events, such as \"the pendency of other legal proceedings which prevent enforcement of the subject claim.\" *Collins v. Decker (In re Decker)*, No. 06-60886, 2011 WL 2174349, at \\*5 n. 5 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. June 1,\n\n2011) (citation omitted); *Jobin v. Boryla (In re M & L Bus. Machine Co*.*)*, 75 F.3d 586, 591 (10th Cir.1996) (stating trustee's allegation that extraordinary circumstances were present where she was unable to obtain key records which had been seized by the Justice Department in connection with criminal charges filed against debtor's principals may be basis for equitable tolling); Hr'g Tr. at 9:10-17, *In re Dwek,* No. 07- 11757 (KCF) (Bankr. D.N.J. Feb. 2, 2009) [ECF No. 3916] (\"[E]quitable tolling of the Statute of Limitations is appropriate here given the recent activities by the U.S. Attorney and the FBI in conducting their investigations. That has involved a lengthy delay of continued 2004 deposition of the Debtor, and that's beyond the control of the Trustee.\").29\n\n54. As the Court is well aware, the Debtor is a defendant in a wide-ranging criminal case brought after the petition date. The pendency of this criminal case has required the Trustee to navigate a number of issues that have complicated his investigation. For example, as the Court is aware, the Trustee originally sought discovery of the documents produced to the debtor by the government in the criminal case, which request was opposed by the Debtor and ultimately led or contributed to motion practice in both this Court and the court overseeing the criminal case, including a motion by the Debtor to stay this chapter 11 case in its entirety. As a result of this motion practice, the Trustee eventually agreed to not pursue at this time his request to obtain from the Debtor documents produced by the government to the Debtor in the criminal case. The Trustee now expects he will gain access to at least some of these documents to the extent they are disclosed in open court as part of the trial in the criminal case, which is presently scheduled to begin in May 2024. The impending criminal trial has also led to complications in the Trustee's ability to obtain critical deposition testimony from certain individuals who are likely to\n\n<sup>29</sup> *In re Dwek*, No. 07- 11757 (KCF) (Bankr. D.N.J. Feb. 2, 2009) [ECF No. 3916], attached hereto as **Exhibit 11**.\n\nbe witnesses or otherwise involved in the criminal case. Thus, the criminal case presents an extraordinary circumstance that has delayed the Trustee's investigation in ways beyond his control.\n\n#### b. Trustee Acted Diligently\n\n55. The Supreme Court has cautioned that \"[t]he diligence required for equitable tolling purposes is *reasonable diligence*, not maximum feasible diligence.\" *Holland v. Florida*, 560 U.S. 631, 653 (2010) (as modified) (internal quotation marks and references omitted) (emphasis added). Consistent with this, and especially relevant to the bankruptcy context, courts have explained that \"what constitutes due diligence is limited by the circumstances of the case, and specifically by economic exigencies.\" *In re Dreiling*, 233 B.R. at 878.\n\n56. A trustee has been sufficiently diligent where he \"work[s] long and hard to discover all the intricacies\" of a debtor's assets and financial affairs. *In re Int'l Admin. Servs., Inc.*, 408 F.3d at 708; *see also In re Couchell*, No. 19 B 7328, 2020 WL 6438511, at \\*3 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2020) (diligence requirement satisfied where movant \"attended [debtor's] § 341 meeting, filed a proof of claim, issued 2004 subpoenas, conducted examinations and compelled production of documents\"); *In re Farwest Pump Co.*, No. 4:17-BK-11112-BMW, 2020 WL 257784, at \\*3 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Jan. 15, 2020) (\"In this case it is clear that the Committee has diligently pursued its rights by, among other things, filing the Motion for Standing, requesting an expedited hearing on the Motion for Standing . . . and applying for Rule 2004 examinations with respect to Reliant, Vaught Equipment, and the Vaughts.\"); *Tese-Milner v. Kim (In re Level 8 Apparel, LLC)*, No. 16-13164 (JLG), 2021 WL 1977161, at \\*7 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2021) (finding trustee demonstrated diligence when she sought information related to the debtor's accounts by obtaining documents from debtor and serving Rule 2004 discovery requests).\n\n57. \"To act diligently is to demonstrate to the Court that one has not slept on his rights.\" *In re Ramsoomair*, No. 21-11215 (DSJ), 2022 WL 828307, at \\*6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2022) (internal quotation marks and references omitted). For all the reasons detailed above, there can be no dispute that the Trustee has acted diligently and has not slept on his rights.\n\n[*Remainder of page intentionally left blank.*]\n\nWHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the Trustee respectfully requests that the Court\n\nenter the Proposed Order granting the relief requested herein and grant any other relief as the\n\nCourt considers proper.\n\nDated: January 18, 2024 LUC A. DESPINS,\n\nNew Haven, Connecticut CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE\n\nBy: */s/ Douglass Barron*\n\nAvram E. Luft (admitted *pro hac vice*) Douglass Barron (admitted *pro hac vice*) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6079 aviluft@paulhastings.com douglassbarron@paulhastings.com\n\n*and*\n\nNicholas A. Bassett (admitted *pro hac vice*) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C., 20036 (202) 551-1902 nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n *and*\n\nPatrick R. Linsey (ct29437) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 781-2847 plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n*Counsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee*\n\n# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| ------------------------------------------------------<br>x |             |                         |  |  |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|-------------------------|--|--|\n| In re:                                                      | :<br>:      | Chapter 11              |  |  |\n| HO WAN KWOK, et al.,1                                       | :<br>:      | Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |  |  |\n| Debtors.                                                    | :<br>:<br>: | (Jointly Administered)  |  |  |\n| ------------------------------------------------------x     |             |                         |  |  |\n\n### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nThe undersigned hereby certifies that on January 18, 2024, the foregoing Motion, and all declarations, exhibits and attachments thereto, was electronically filed. Notice of this filing was sent by e-mail to all parties to the above-captioned chapter 11 case by operation of the Court's electronic filing (\"CM/ECF\") system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as indicated on the Notice of Electronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF system.\n\nDated: January 18, 2024 New Haven, Connecticut\n\nBy: */s/ Douglass Barron*\n\nDouglass Barron (admitted *pro hac vice*) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6000 douglassbarron@paulhastings.com\n\n *Counsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee*\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\n# **Exhibit 1**\n\n**Proposed Order**\n\n# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| ------------------------------------------------------  | x                                     |  |\n|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|\n| In re:                                                  | :<br>:<br>Chapter 11                  |  |\n| HO WAN KWOK, et al.,30                                  | :<br>:<br>Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)     |  |\n| Debtors.                                                | :<br>:<br>(Jointly Administered)<br>: |  |\n| ------------------------------------------------------x |                                       |  |\n\n### **[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ENTRY OF ORDER EXTENDING DEADLINE FOR TRUSTEE TO FILE AVOIDANCE ACTIONS UNDER BANKRUPTCY CODE SECTIONS 108, 546(a), AND 549**\n\nUPON CONSIDERATION OF the Chapter 11 Trustee's *Motion for Entry of Order*\n\n*Extending Deadline for Trustee to File Avoidance Actions Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 108,*\n\n*546(a), and 549* (the \"Motion\"), and good cause having been shown, and the Court having\n\nconsidered any and all objections and other responses to the Motion, and the Court finding that\n\n(i) there is good cause for the relief requested, (ii) there are extraordinary circumstances\n\njustifying the relief requested, (iii) the Trustee has acted diligently, and (iv) the Motion has been\n\nserved in accordance with the Court's prior Order granting the Notice Motion, and such notice is\n\nproper and sufficient under the circumstances and no other notice is required, and the relief\n\nprovided herein being narrowly tailored to serve the foregoing purposes, it is by the Court,\n\nhereby\n\nORDERED, that the Motion is granted as set forth herein; and it is further\n\n<sup>30</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\nORDERED, that the time limitations set forth in 11 U.S.C. 108, 546, and 549 for the Trustee to commence avoidance actions and other actions on behalf of the estate, as well as for amending any pending complaints, are extended through and including August 15, 2024, which date may be further extended; and it is further\n\nORDERED, that any party that has received notice, whether actual or constructive, of the Motion and did not object to the Motion has waived its right to assert a limitations period defense if ultimately named in an action that is timely brought under the terms of this Order; and it is further\n\nORDERED, that the terms and conditions of this Order shall be immediately effective and enforceable upon its entry; and it is further\n\nORDERED, that the Trustee is authorized to take all actions necessary to effectuate the relief granted herein; and it is further\n\nORDERED, that the Court shall retain jurisdiction with respect to all matters arising from or related to the interpretation or implementation of this Order.\n\nDated: \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_, 2024\n\nJulie A. Manning, United States Bankruptcy Judge\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院\n布里奇波特分院\n\nx\n\n关于：　：\n：　第11章\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等人，1　：\n：　案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。　：\n：\n：　（合并管理）\n\n请求作出命令以延长受托人根据《破产法典》第108、546(a)及549条提起撤销诉讼期限的动议\n\nLuc A. Despins，以获任命处理 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（“债务人”）第11章案件的第11章受托人（“受托人”）身份，经由其下方签署的律师，特此根据《美国法典》第11编第105(a)条（“破产法典”）及《联邦破产程序规则》第9006条（“破产规则”）提交本动议（“本动议”），请求作出一项命令，其形式实质上如随附于本动议的附件1所载拟议命令（“拟议命令”），延长《破产法典》第108、546(a)及549条规定的受托人提起特定诉因的期限。为支持本动议，受托人谨陈述如下：\n\n初步陈述\n\n1. 自其于2022年7月获任命以来，受托人一直勤勉地对债务人复杂的财务事务进行广泛调查，并在适当情况下提起诉讼，以实现包括追回破产财产资产及撤销欺诈性转让在内的目的。\n\n1 本第11章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（亦称 Guo Wengui、Miles Guo 和 Miles Kwok，以及众多其他别名）（税务识别号码后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（税务识别号码后四位：8202）及 Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 及 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为：Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166，收件人为 Luc A. Despins，作为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）破产财产的受托人（仅为通知及通信之目的）。\n\n受托人在其调查中已取得重大进展，且除其已提起的诉讼外，还将在现行期限届满前提交多份诉状。然而，基于本文所述的各种原因，受托人尚未完成识别为债务人债权人获取价值的所有潜在诉因（及该等诉因的潜在被告），包括受托人已识别、且将于现行期限届满前对其提出请求的被告所涉潜在额外被告及潜在额外请求。受托人通过本动议请求作出一项命令，对该等诉因的法定时效予以衡平中止，以便受托人可在2024年2月15日的相关期限届满后追诉该等诉因。\n\n2. 当动议提出人证明：(i) 存在非同寻常情形，且 (ii) 其在时效期间届满前已行使合理勤勉提起诉讼时，法院可对法定时效予以衡平中止。本第11章案件的事实记录显然符合该等标准，并毫无疑问地证明延长时效期间具有正当性。2 此外，根据《破产规则》第9006(b)条，破产法院可在“有正当理由显示”时延长期限——包括法定时效。\n\n3. 破产法院经常处理大规模欺诈及其他非法行为的后果。该等案件本身即造成巨大的后勤及调查困难，本案亦不例外。然而，本案的困难超出了应对该等行为后果这一重大挑战。本案还存在一项额外的非同寻常情形，即持续且反复地试图妨碍、阻挠及拖延受托人的调查。这些努力始于债务人提交破产申请及支持性文件之时，导致受托人获任命，并自此持续不断——即使面对法院作出的多项命令、制裁及藐视法庭裁定亦然。\n\n2 如下文所述，衡平中止及《破产规则》第9006(b)条均各自独立地为本文所请求的救济提供法律依据。\n\n4. 此外，尽管在每一步均面临障碍，受托人仍勤勉地持续进行调查。事实上，如下文详述，受托人几乎在每一步都取得了成功。但在正常情况下，这些成功本就需要时间；又因受托人被迫应对的障碍，所需时间更长。\n\n5. 此外，由于债务人建立并持续运用的错综复杂的“空壳公司把戏”，受托人的每一次成功都不会使其调查终结。恰恰相反，每一次成功都会揭示更多有待受托人深入调查的线索，以及更多被隐藏和／或转移的资产。这并非夸张：迄今为止，受托人及其专业人士通过该程序已识别出超过339个与 Kwok（郭文贵）相关的银行账户、这些账户中约83,820笔流入及流出交易，以及经由这些账户流转的逾 \\$3.2 billion。简言之，如下文所述，勤勉要件要求受托人证明其未“怠于行使其权利”。任何对记录进行清醒的评估，均可轻易满足该要件。\n\n6. 由于事实如此强烈且显而易见地支持准予所请求的救济，法院真正需要解决的问题是确保其有权准予该救济。如上所述，受托人依据破产法（具体而言，《破产规则》第9006(b)条及《破产法典》第105(a)条）及非破产法（具体而言，衡平中止原则）提出本动议。两者均提供所需授权。\n\n7. 衡平中止。多个司法辖区的破产法院均依赖衡平中止，在时效期间届满之前即延长时效期间。受托人主张，法院应遵循这些法院的指引。尽管受托人承认其他法院曾基于通知和／或程序理由拒绝这样做，但这些法院担心潜在被告应有其出庭之日，并有机会对衡平中止适用于其自身提出质疑。然而，这些担忧在本案中并不适用，因为受托人已提交一项动议，提议实施大规模、多层面的通知方案，以解决这些担忧（“通知动议”）。3\n\n8. 破产法。《破产规则》第9006(b)条明确规定：破产法院可在“有正当理由显示”时延长“指定期间”。受托人承认，一些法院认为该规定不适用于提出《破产法典》第5章项下请求的时效期间。但是，如下文详细讨论，多个司法辖区的多家法院持不同意见，认定第9006(b)条确实提供所需授权。\n\n9. 本动议所请求的救济至关重要。如不予延长，受托人将被迫就时效期间问题，针对每一名提出该问题的潜在被告，在独立的对抗程序中逐案进行诉讼。这不仅困难；而且很可能无法做到——受托人已识别出超过83,000笔转让。此外，无论在时间还是金钱上的成本都将极其巨大，并将直接损害债权人。最后，不确定性将使受托人——其必须为自身所有行为辩护，且已不得不应对一项要求将其免职的动议以及其他恶意指控——在未来处于无法维持的境地。\n\n10. 受托人的提议解决了这些问题。同时，特别是结合通知动议，该提议保留了所有潜在被告的权利。它仅仅是将一切事项集中至一个审理平台。\n\n3 见 ECF No. 2494。\n\n背景\n\n11. 2022年6月15日，破产法院作出一份决定备忘录及命令 [ECF No. 465]，指示 United States Trustee（美国受托人）任命一名第11章受托人。2022年7月8日，破产法院作出一项命令 [ECF No. 523]，任命受托人。\n\n12. 债务人于2022年3月提交的破产财产清单声称，其资产仅为 \\$3,850，而负债则高达数亿美元。4 债务人在破产法院主张，其实质上身无分文，其豪华住宅、Lady May 游艇及其其他公开炫耀的财富标志并不属于其本人，而是属于据称由其家庭成员拥有的公司。5 正如数个法院现已观察到的，债务人通过构建庞大的空壳公司迷宫，将其财富隐藏在家庭成员及密切关联人的名下，从而得以在声称几乎不拥有任何资产的同时维持其奢华生活方式。\n\n13. 自获任命以来，受托人一直勤勉地努力识别并为破产财产利益追回债务人所隐藏的资产。为此，根据破产法院的指示，受托人已启动一项复杂而全面的调查及诉讼程序，重点关注债务人的“空壳公司把戏”——即其利用替身公司向债权人隐藏资产。概而言之，该程序包括：(a) 根据《联邦破产程序规则》（“破产规则”）第2004条进行的证据开示，以及 (b) 为确立某些实体为债务人的替身实体和／或追回特定财产及资产而进行的诉讼。受托人已提交十三项第2004条动议，向逾250方发出第2004条传票，并审查在证据开示中提交的数十万份文件，且持续采取一切合理措施以获取额外记录。\n\n4 见资产与负债清单，第1页 [ECF No. 78]。\n\n5 见 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）先生支持第11章案件及若干动议的声明 [ECF No. 107]。\n\n14. 如法院所充分知悉，债务人、其家庭成员及其关联人一直试图在每一步阻挠受托人的工作。其中包括：\n\n15. 债务人蔑视其移交账簿及记录的法定义务，6 实质上声称其没有任何业务记录，仅就第2004条证据开示提交四十六份文件。债务人拒绝：(i) 提交与其主张属于其家庭成员或其他个人及实体的资产有关的文件；(ii) 收集并提交由其律师及顾问持有的文件；或 (iii) 充分说明其搜寻回应性文件所作努力。债务人拒绝合作，导致受托人请求并获得一项命令（不顾债务人的反对），强制其提交回应受托人请求的文件，并说明债务人搜寻该等文件所作的努力。[ECF No. 1353]。债务人未遵守强制提交命令，反而主张其根据《第五修正案》及“提交行为原则”没有义务这样做，致使受托人请求并获得（再次不顾债务人的强烈反对）一项认定债务人藐视法庭的命令。[ECF No. 2035]。\n\n16. 在受托人获任命后不久，债务人即寻求撤销任命受托人的命令，破产法院于2022年8月2日驳回该动议 [ECF No. 667]。此后，于2022年12月，债务人再次试图将受托人免职，但在各方利害关系人强烈反对后，该动议被撤回。[ECF Nos. 1274, 1635]。\n\n17. 债务人未成功反对受托人所提动议，该动议请求确认受托人获任命后，就以下事项受托人持有全部经济权利及公司治理权利：\n\n6 见 11 U.S.C § 521(a)(4)（债务人在有受托人的情况下“应”“向受托人交出破产财产的所有财产及任何记录信息，包括与破产财产有关的账簿、文件、记录及文书”）。\n\n债务人拥有及/或控制的实体，包括 Genever Holdings Corporation（Genever控股公司）和 Genever US LLC（Genever美国有限责任公司）[ECF No. 643]。\n\n18. 尽管债务人负有法定义务，应与受托人合作，并向受托人交出所有破产财产及与破产财产相关的任何信息，债务人及其众多家庭成员、商业伙伴和关联公司却一再拒绝配合受托人的证据开示工作，并拒绝向受托人交出破产财产，致使至少七（7）项命令认定其藐视法庭[ECF Nos. 1372, 1537, 1709, 1892, 2009, 2035, and 2093]。\n\n19. 被告的策略并不限于法庭之内。自受托人获任命之初起，被告便试图动用其一切可用手段，诋毁受托人及其律师（Paul Hastings LLP（普衡律师事务所））。尤其恶劣的是，自2022年11月中旬起，被告煽动了一场大规模社交媒体恐吓活动，针对受托人、其家人及其律师，以及第11章案件中最大的无担保债权人之一（即 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（太盟亚洲机会基金，简称“PAX”））、PAX母公司的首席执行官、其家人及PAX的律师，包括在网上披露其住宅地址信息并对其本人发出威胁。因此，自2022年11月20日起，一群与被告立场一致的个人开始在受托人的住所及受托人家庭成员的住所（包括其前配偶的住所）外举行抗议活动，随后又在受托人律师及PAX律师 O'Melveny & Myers LLP（欧麦律师事务所）的办公场所外举行抗议活动。在就这些事项举行数日证据听证后，破产法院发布初步禁令，以遏制这种对破产案件管理的不当干预。\n\n20. 对受托人及其律师进行骚扰的其他行为包括：与各被告组织有关联的多名个人在 United States District Court for the Southern District of New York（纽约南区联邦地区法院）提起诉讼，主张受托人及其律师因未登记为中华人民共和国或中国共产党的代理人而违反《外国代理人登记法》（“FARA”）。在地区法院，Caproni法官驳回了该诉讼，并对原告及其律师施加《规则》第11条制裁，因为该无依据的诉讼系出于恶意提起，旨在骚扰受托人及其律师。\n\n21. 2023年3月15日，债务人因多项证券欺诈、电信欺诈及洗钱指控被逮捕。7 United States Attorney（美国联邦检察官）针对债务人提交的相关刑事起诉书指称，债务人是某项计划“领导者，并指挥”8该计划；其中包括债务人与其共同被告 William Je 将资金“转入并经由以至少80个不同实体或个人名义持有的大约500多个账户”。9 同样在2023年3月15日，Securities and Exchange Commission（美国证券交易委员会）提交起诉状，对债务人提起诉讼，指控其基于与刑事起诉书所述相似的行为违反多项证券法律；该诉讼已被中止。最近，2024年1月3日，美国联邦检察官针对债务人提交了替代起诉书，指控多项刑事RICO罪名。替代起诉书尤其指称，债务人指挥由“数十个相互关联的实体”组成的“Kwok Enterprise（郭氏企业）”，作为一项持续调整以“规避美国投资者保护、反洗钱和破产法律执行”的犯罪计划的一部分。10\n\n7 参见 Crim. Indictment, United States v. Kwok, No. 1:23-cr-00118-AT (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2023). （另有一份相关刑事起诉状单独针对债务人的雇员 Yvette Wang 提出，依据是其参与债务人的犯罪计划。Wang被控电信欺诈、证券欺诈、共谋实施电信欺诈和证券欺诈，以及进行非法交易。）\n\n8 Crim. Indictment ¶ 6.\n\n9 同上 ¶ 3.\n\n22. 值得注意的是，在其于2023年4月20日作出的驳回债务人保释释放请求的命令中，纽约南区联邦地区法院（“刑事法院”）强调了债务人“在先前案件中妨碍程序行为的历史”，11并指出与这些第11章案件有关的行为，包括债务人虚报其资产12；在社交媒体上发布虚假和骚扰性材料；通过社交媒体鼓励他人抗议破产受托人、其家人及其律师，并在其破产案中提出债权申报以推高受托人的律师费13；以及在互联网上公开发布保密和解文件。14 债务人在其最近提交的再次保释释放动议中向刑事法院陈述，他“为其过去的行为以及其给他人造成的困扰道歉。”15\n\n23. 债务人试图将刑事法院作为一个平台，进一步寻求拖延和阻挠受托人在这些第11章案件中的工作。2023年8月30日，债务人在其刑事案件中提交动议（Yvette Wang共同加入该动议），请求在其刑事审判裁决之前中止这些第11章案件；该动议于2023年12月21日被驳回[Crim. Ct. ECF No. 204]。随后，2024年1月4日，债务人在其刑事案件中又提交一项动议，重申其请求中止这些第11章案件[Crim. Ct. ECF No. 218]。\n\n24. 尽管债务人及其同伙竭力阻挠和拖延受托人，受托人仍已通过与已识别资产有关的对抗程序，为破产财产追回数千万美元，包括 Lady May（“Lady May”号游艇），16 Sherry Netherland（雪莉荷兰公寓），17以及已识别的银行账户，例如HCHK实体的账户18和 U.S. Bank（美国银行）托管账户。19 受托人还提起诉讼，以追回包括债务人在 New Jersey（新泽西州）Mahwah（马瓦）的$26.5 million豪宅在内的财产。20 债务人的家庭成员和追随者强烈反对受托人在这些对抗程序中的工作。仅举一例，债务人的某些追随者声称自己是HCHK实体的债权人，并寻求介入以反对受托人针对这些实体提出的另我主张。尽管法院在其于2024年1月5日发布的近期裁决中驳回了该介入动议，但该介入动议造成数月延误，并导致必须举行证据听证；在该听证中，债务人的一名追随者“尽管法院命令其作答，却公然且反复拒绝在交叉询问中回答问题”，而另一人则“承认其伪造文件以推进该诉讼”。21\n\n10 参见 Jan. 3, 2024 Superseding Indictment ¶¶ 1, 6, United States v. Kwok, No. 1:23-cr-00118-AT (S.D.N.Y.) [Crim. Ct. ECF No. 215].\n\n11 Order, at 11 [Crim. Ct. ECF No. 51].\n\n12 同上 at 8 and 10.\n\n13 同上 at 9.\n\n14 同上。\n\n15 Mem. in Supp. of Renewed Mot. for Pretrial Release of Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）, at 10 [Crim. Ct. ECF 178].\n\n25. 鉴于在出售Lady May之前缺乏聘请法务会计师的资金，受托人及其律师（在此之前只能从未来追回的资产中寻求报酬）将其初步资产追回工作集中于已识别资产。因此，对Kwok相关实体使用的数百个账户进行法务会计审查这一必要步骤，直到受托人根据法院于2023年9月29日作出的命令，于2023年8月聘请 Kroll, LLC（克罗尔，简称“Kroll”）担任受托人的法务调查员后，才真正开始进行[ECF No. 2241]。\n\n16. 受托人于对抗程序22-05003，HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited v. Despins中追回，并依据法院2023年6月27日的命令出售。[ECF No. 1953]。\n\n17. 受托人于对抗程序22-05027，Despins v. Bravo Luck Limited中追回。\n\n18. 这些实体，即 HCHK Technologies, Inc.、HCHK Property Management, Inc. 和 Lexington Property, Inc.，是对抗程序23-05013，Despins v. HCHK Technologies, Inc., et al.的标的；在该程序中，受托人寻求作出另我判决。尽管受托人寻求取得HCHK实体资金的对抗程序尚未完成，但这些资金现由受托人持有，在最终裁决作出前不会被耗散；受托人相信该裁决将对其有利。\n\n19. 受托人于对抗程序22-05003，HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited v. Despins，以及对抗程序23-05012，U.S Bank National Association v. HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, et al.中追回。\n\n20. Mahwah豪宅是对抗程序23-05017，Despins v. Taurus Fund LLC, et al.的标的。\n\n21. Mem. of Decision & Order, at 28 [Adv. Proc. No. 23-05013, ECF No. 239].\n\n26. 自获聘以来，Kroll一直努力协助受托人为包括提起撤销诉讼在内的工作奠定基础；该等诉讼源于债务人实际上利用众多Kwok相关实体进行的数千笔转账。截至目前，Kroll已识别出超过339个Kwok相关银行账户、约83,820笔进出这些账户的交易，以及经由这些账户流转的逾$3.2 billion。随着Kroll的分析进展，这些数字确实每天都在增长。\n\n请求的救济\n\n27. 受托人请求作出拟议命令，延长《破产法典》第108、546和549条规定的时效期限，这将使受托人能够继续其调查，并根据《破产法典》第5章提起额外诉讼。\n\n救济依据\n\nI. 法院有权授予所请求的救济\n\n28. 破产法院经常依据非破产法（具体而言，即衡平停止时效原则）及/或破产法（具体而言，即规则9006）授予本案请求的救济。\n\nA. 衡平停止时效适用于《破产法典》时效期限，并可予以前瞻性适用\n\n29. 法院已确认，非破产法中的衡平停止时效原则授权延长时效期限，包括《破产法典》第546(a)条规定的期限。参见 Fam. Golf Ctrs., Inc. v. Acushnet Co. (In re Randall's Island Fam. Golf Ctrs., Inc.), 288 B.R. 701, 706 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003)（“在适当情形下，可适用衡平停止时效，以停止11 U.S.C. § 546(a)规定的时效期限，这一点已得到充分确认。”）；Fogel v. Shabat (In re Draiman), 714 F.3d 462, 466 (7th Cir. 2013)（“此外，11 U.S.C. § 546(a)中的时效期限受衡平停止时效约束。”）。相反，判例法中的任何不一致之处，均产生于在时效期限届满之前请求适用衡平停止时效的情形。\n\n30. 首先，许多法院已前瞻性地准予此项救济。参见，例如，In re Farwest Pump Co.（法威斯特泵业公司案）, No. 4:17-BK-11112-BMW, 2020 WL 257784, at \\*3 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Jan. 15, 2020)（准予在时效届满前提出的衡平中止诉讼时效动议）；Marsh v. Levy（In re Martin Levy of Berlin D.M.D., P.C.（柏林马丁·利维牙科专业公司案））, 416 B.R. 1, 8 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009)（在 section 546(a) 届满前准予延长期限动议的命令适当）；In re Dwek（德韦克案）, No. 07- 11757 (KCF) (Bankr. D.N.J. Feb. 2, 2009) [ECF No. 3790]（前瞻性地准予延长时效期间的动议）；In re Rockport Dev., Inc.（罗克波特开发公司案）, No. 20-11339-SC (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2022) [ECF No. 822]（同上）；In re Visiting Nurse Ass'n of Inland Counties（内陆各县巡回护士协会案）, No. 18-16908-MH (Bankr C.D. Cal. July 30, 2020) [ECF No. 683]（同上）；In re Builders Holding Co.（建筑商控股公司案）, No. 16-06643-EAG7 (Bankr. D.P.R. April 25, 2019) [ECF No. 501]（同上）。22\n\n31. 然而，其他法院认为，法院不应准予前瞻性衡平中止的请求。例如，Walnut Hill案法院认为，在时效期间尚未届满的情况下准予衡平中止动议“完全为时过早”。In re Walnut Hill, Inc.（沃尔纳特山公司案）, No. 16–20960 (JJT), 2018 WL 2672242, at \\* 2 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 1, 2018)。而 In re Randolph Hospital, Inc.（伦道夫医院公司案）驳回了一项衡平中止时效期间的动议，但不妨碍再次提出；该动议可在受托人“针对可识别且已得到适当通知的被告提起诉讼”后再次提出。In re Randolph Hosp., Inc., No. 20-10247, 2022 WL 19298765, at \\*1 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2022)（着重号为后加）。基于下文所述理由，在本案现有情形下，该项顾虑不应妨碍本院准予本动议。\n\n22 作为本文件附件 2-5 附上的是在 In re Dwek、In re Rockport Dev.、In re Visiting Nurse Assoc. of Inland Counties 及 In re Builders Holding Co. Corp. 中作出的命令副本。\n\n32. 拒绝依赖衡平中止而前瞻性中止诉讼时效的法院明确指出，前瞻性衡平中止的主要顾虑在于通知：可能最终成为被告的当事人应有机会主张，在特定情形下衡平中止并不适当；法院不应预先剥夺该机会。\n\n33. 对通知的这一侧重所产生的另一面是，法院认为，在收到通知后，潜在被告有责任提出异议。参见 In re Martin Levy of Berlin, 416 B.R. at 8（“被告不能回避寻求信息的受托人，无视受托人延长诉讼时效的请求，等待时效期间经过，然后在数月后起诉书被提交时主张受托人无计可施。鉴于该等情形，即使被告提出异议，受托人也已表明本院延长期限的理由绰绰有余。其未作答复为延期提供了更多正当理由。因此，本院认定并裁定，由于被告因其不作为而放弃其权利，§ 546(a) 期限得到了适当延长，且受托人及时提交了起诉书。”）。\n\n34. 正因如此，在该等情形下，本动议可以且应当获准。受托人已识别出数百名可能最终被起诉的当事人。受托人将付出巨大努力并承担重大费用，依照 Notice Motion（通知动议）的规定，向该等当事人送达本时效中止动议的通知（该通知动议本身已向尽可能多的潜在被告送达）。如本院准予通知动议，本院即已认定该通知充分。简言之，受此时效中止请求影响的当事人将获得通知——实际通知、推定通知，或两者兼有。\n\nB. Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)（《联邦破产程序规则》第 9006(b) 条）亦提供延长时效期间的授权\n\n35. 如一法院所解释：“《联邦破产程序规则》第 9006(b) 条赋予本院‘基于事由’……‘在任何时候依其酌情决定’下令延长规定行为须在何时完成的期限的授权。这包括根据 11 U.S.C. § 546(a) 提起撤销诉讼的期限。”Frentz v. Stites & Harbison（In re ThermoView Indus., Inc.（赛默维尤工业公司案））, 381 B.R. 225, 227 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2008)（省略内部引文）。多个辖区的多个其他法院亦持相同意见。23 参见，例如，In re Campbellton-Graceville Hosp. Corp.（坎贝尔顿—格雷斯维尔医院公司案）, 616 B.R. 177, 182 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2019)（“破产法院有权依据 Rule 9006(b)，基于事由延长 Section 546 规定的两年诉讼时效期间。”）；另见 In re D & L Energy, Inc.（D & L 能源公司案）, No. 13-40813 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Mar. 25, 2015) [ECF No. 1377]（认定法院有权依据 Rule 9006(b) 延长 section 546 中的时效期间）；In re Network Services Sols., LLC（网络服务解决方案有限责任公司案）, No. 17-50309-gwz (Bankr. D. Nev. Mar. 6, 2019) [ECF No. 503]（依据 Rule 9006 准予延长根据《破产法》sections 108 and 546 提起诉讼期限的动议）；In re Farm-Rite, Inc.（农场礼仪公司案）, No. 20-19379-JNP (Bankr. D.N.J. Aug. 3, 2022) [ECF No. 551]（依据 Rule 9006(b) 准予延长《破产法》section 546 期限的动议）；In re Anton & Chia, LLP（安东及奇亚有限责任合伙企业案）, No. 18-12565-TA (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2020) [ECF No. 136]（同上）；In re Uplift RX, LLC（Uplift RX 有限责任公司案）, No. 17-32186 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2019) [ECF No. 1005]（同上）。24\n\n23 为明确起见，这两种方法——基于 Rule 9006 的延期和基于衡平中止的延期——并非相互排斥。它们可以存在于同一案件中，并且可依据其中任一项或两者延长时效期间。例如，在 International Administrative Services（国际行政服务公司案）中，法院认定 Rule 9006(b) 授予延长期限的授权，但也决定“处理受托人是否证明存在延长时效期间的衡平依据这一问题。”IBT Int'l, Inc. v. Northern（In re Int'l Admin. Servs., Inc.）, 408 F.3d 689, 700 (11th Cir. 2005)。\n\n24 作为本文件附件 6-10 附上的是在 In re D & L Energy、In re Network Services Solutions, LLC、In re Farm-Rite, Inc.、In re Anton & Chia, LLP 及 In re Uplift RX, LLC 中作出的命令副本。\n\n36. 受托人承认，尽管存在上文援引的判例法，仍有一些法院认为 Rule 9006(b) 并未授权延长法定时效期间。参见，例如，In re Walnut Hill, Inc., 2018 WL 2672242, at \\*2。\n\n37. 然而，受托人主张，本院应采纳第十一巡回上诉法院（Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals）认可的分析。在 International Administrative Services 一案中，被告援引“未具体规定延长法定期间的 Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)”。In re Int'l Admin. Servs., Inc., 408 F.3d at 699。然而，法院认定“该论点毫无依据”。Id. 法院指出，对抗程序的定义和启动也分别受 Bankruptcy Rules 7001 and 7003 规制，并裁定 Rule 9006 确实赋予破产法院酌情延长法定期间的权力，即使该规则并未“明确涵盖法定时限”。Id.\n\n38. 此外，Walnut Hill案法院提出的立场存在逻辑缺陷。在 Walnut Hill 一案中，法院将问题界定为一个“是或否”的问题：一项规则能否凌驾于一项法规之上？然而，即使该法院也承认，Rule 9006(a) 确实适用于法规，因为 Rule 9006 的该特定款项规定其适用于“任何法规”。25 诚然，Rule 9006(b) 中没有这一“任何法规”的表述。但这一分析表明，正确的问题并非如 Walnut Hill 所认为的，Rule 9006(b) 是否可以被用来延长法定时限。换言之，Walnut Hill 因其提出了错误的问题而得出了错误的答案。\n\n25 Rule 9006(a) subsection (a) 的相关完整表述规定：“[t]he following rules apply in computing any time period specified in these rules, in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in any local rule or court order, or in any statute that does not specify a method of computing time.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(a).\n\n39. 相反，正确的探究应是 Rule 9006(b) 是否确实赋予破产法院该等权力。这将问题从绝对的“是或否”问题转变为解释问题：如何以最佳方式解读、理解和适用 Rule 9006(b)，以及 Rule 9006(b) 是否应延及 section 546(a)（以及同样地，规制撤销诉讼的其他时效期间）。就此而言，受托人主张，较佳答案是第十一巡回上诉法院和多个辖区的众多其他破产法院所给出的答案：尽管其“并未明确涵盖法定时限”，认定 Rule 9006(b) 不适用于 546(a) 期限将导致“荒谬的结果”。In re Int'l Admin. Servs., Inc., 408 F.3d at 699.26\n\n40. 的确，没有任何案件比本案更能说明第十一巡回上诉法院所担忧的“荒谬性”。本院充分知悉这些第 11 章案件的复杂性质，以及债务人及其同伙为阻碍受托人调查所作出的不懈努力。债务人不应能够仅仅“拖延时间”两年，并借此逃避责任，且实际上终结其破产案件，从而挫败的不仅是其债权人和受托人，还有国会的意图。在时效期间届满后以事后方式处理该问题，也并非切实可行的解决方案。本案的复杂性，以及信息和当事人数量之巨，使得这将近乎不可能——并且必然会给受托人施加如此巨大的负担和费用，以至于直接影响债权人的最终受偿。参见 In re ThermoView Indus., Inc., 381 B.R. at 227（在“一起极其复杂的案件中”依据 Rule 9006(b) 准予延长动议；该案中受托人已追查并提交近 400 件对抗程序）。如上所述，正确的问题并非 Rule 9006 能否赋予本院必要权力，而是其是否确实赋予该权力。国会不可能意图使破产法院在此类案件中无从救济——对 Rule 9006(b) 的任何其他解读均将导致有悖常理且不公平的结果。参见 In re Fundamental Long Term Care, Inc.（基础长期护理公司案）, 501 B.R. 784, 791 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2013)（“如果本院不延长提起撤销诉讼的期间，实际上将是在奖励诉讼目标在证据开示程序中所作的反对（即使该反对有正当理由）。而且，这将为撤销诉讼的目标当事人（本案及其他案件中）反对证据开示制造有悖常理的激励。”）。27\n\n41. 此外，存在延长《Bankruptcy Code（破产法典）》所规定时效期间的法定授权。《破产法典》第 105(a) 条（当然，该条为成文法）赋予破产法院发布“为实施本标题规定所必需的任何裁定、程序或判决书”的权力。法院已具体援引第 105(a) 条延长《破产法典》规定的时效期间。参见 Morgan（摩根）诉 United States（美国）案（In re Morgan（摩根案）），182 F.3d 775, 779 (11th Cir. 1999)（第 105(a) 条可用于中止第 507(a)(8)(A)(i) 条规定的三年期间）；United States（美国）诉 Richards（理查兹）案（In re Richards（理查兹案）），994 F.2d 763, 765 (10th Cir. 1993)（“11 U.S.C. § 105(a) 的范围足以允许破产法院的命令，在 Richards 第一次破产期间，中止 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7)(A)(ii) 规定的 240–day 评估期间。”）。\n\n27 即使在对证据开示提出异议可能具有“正当理由”的情况下，该结果仍会不公平；而在本案中不存在任何此类正当理由，该项关切便成倍加剧。\n\n42. 尽管受托人承认，第 105(a) 条不得被用于采取《破产法典》所禁止的行动，参见 Law（劳）诉 Siegel（西格尔）案，571 U.S. 415, 421 (2014)，但根据第 105(a) 条延长时效期间并不违反该原则。第 108、546 和 549 条均未禁止中止时效，且《破产法典》的任何其他条款亦未禁止。事实上，衡平法中止是被纳入每一部联邦时效法规的救济，包括第 108、546 和 549 条。参见 Young（杨）诉 United States（美国）案，535 U.S. 43, 50 (2002)（“法律常识认为，时效期间通常受衡平法中止约束……必须推定，国会是在此背景原则下制定时效期间的。在国会制定由破产法院适用的时效期间时，这一点尤为如此，因为破产法院属于衡平法院，并适用衡平法理的原则和规则。”）（着重号为后加）（内部引号及引文略去）。\n\n43. 因此，特别是结合起来理解时，第 105(a) 条和 Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)（破产程序规则第 9006(b) 条）最适宜被理解为授予延长第 546(a) 条时效期间的权力。\n\nII. 法院应准予所请求的救济\n\n44. 既已确定法院有权准予所请求的救济，适用相关标准表明，该等救济在本案中适当且必要。\n\nA. 衡平法中止标准\n\n45. 如受托人“尽到一切应有的勤勉后，仍无法获得与其请求权是否存在有关的重要信息”，则其可以衡平地中止时效。Donely（多内利）以 Valdez（巴尔德斯）名义诉 United States（美国）案，518 F.3d 173, 182 (2d Cir. 2008)。衡平法中止必须逐案决定，且不限于特定的一组事实。参见 Young，535 U.S. at 48-50。\n\n46. 虽然欺诈性隐瞒当然可以构成衡平法中止的依据，但“衡平法中止经常与欺诈性隐瞒相混淆”，Valdez，518 F.3d at 182-83，并且\n\n“衡平法中止并不限于涉及……对方当事人不当行为的情形。”In re Randall's Island Fam. Golf Cts.（Randall's Island 家庭高尔夫球场案），288 B.R. at 705-06（内部引文略去）。换言之，衡平法中止不要求被告实施任何特定不当行为。参见 Heyman（海曼）诉 Dec（德克）案（In re Dec（德克案）），272 B.R. 218, 225 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2001)（“即使被告未采取任何隐瞒行为，在欺诈未被发现的情况下，Code § 546(a) 规定的时效也可被中止。”）。\n\n47. “为获得该原则的利益，受托人负有举证责任，证明其（1）在其寻求中止的期间内已采取合理勤勉措施，且（2）已证明情形极其特殊，以致该原则应予适用。”In re Anderson（安德森案），623 B.R. 199, 217 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2020)；另参见 Castillo（卡斯蒂略）以 A.Q.C. 名义诉 United States（美国）案，656 F.3d 135, 144 (2d Cir. 2011)。\n\nB. 本案具备适用衡平法中止的条件28\n\n48. 全部事实记录明确表明：（i）特殊情形阻碍受托人提起撤销诉讼；以及（ii）受托人在追索其权利时已勤勉行事。\n\na. 特殊情形\n\n49. “特殊情形……源于原告控制范围之外、妨碍及时提交的某种外部障碍，而非自我造成的拖延。”Schmidt（施密特）诉 Twosons Corp.（图森斯公司）案（In re Black Elk Energy Offshore Operations, LLC（黑麋鹿能源海上运营有限责任公司案）），No. 15-34287, 2022 WL 1589190, at *11 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 19, 2022)（经修改）（内部引号及引文略去）。这对于破产案件尤其适用，在破产案件中，债务人的行为可以\n\n28 在法院同意 Rule 9006(b) 和/或第 105(a) 条为本申请所请求的救济提供授权的范围内，受托人主张，支持衡平法中止的相同理由亦构成 Rule 9006(b) 所称的“理由”。\n\n证明对非债务人中止时效具有正当性。Kearns Motor Co.（卡恩斯汽车公司）诉 Cimino（西米诺）案（In re Dreiling（德赖林案）），233 B.R. 848, 878 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1999)（“为衡平法中止之目的，债务人的欺诈性隐瞒可归责于其他被告”）；In re Dec（德克案），272 B.R. at 227（“破产案件赋予衡平法中止一种颇为不同的视角。在典型情形中，援引衡平法中止的是债务人的行为，而非被告的行为。”）；Olsen（奥尔森）诉 Zerbetz（泽尔贝茨）案（In re Olsen（奥尔森案）），36 F.3d 71, 73 (9th Cir. 1994)（认定债务人将遗产财产出售给家人而未通知法院或利害关系人，构成对欺诈性转让适用衡平法中止的依据，因为“受托人在不具有任何过错、缺乏勤勉或注意义务违反的情况下仍被蒙在鼓里”）（内部引号及引文略去）。\n\n50. 因此，法院一贯认定，当原告无法在证据开示中取得进展时，特别是在债务人妨碍的情况下，存在特殊情形：\n\n• In re Int'l Admin. Servs. Inc.（国际行政服务公司案），408 F.3d 689, 702 (11th Cir. 2005)（部分基于债务人和被告试图通过隐瞒其活动及违反证据开示请求，干扰受托人对资产转移计划的调查，而中止时效）。\n\n• Bender（本德）诉 Mann（曼恩）案（In re Bender（本德案）），No. 02-00773-RTB, 2010 WL 6467681, at *9-10 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2010), aff'd, 480 F. App'x 445 (9th Cir. 2012)（确认下级法院适用衡平法中止的判决，债务人的妨碍“阻碍”了受托人提起撤销诉讼，并指出“判例法中充满了法院因一方当事人的妨碍行为而允许适用衡平法中止的例子”）。\n\n• Freeland（弗里兰）诉 CPA Warehouse（注册会计师仓库）案（In re Livemercial Aviation Holding, LLC（利弗默夏尔航空控股有限责任公司案）），508 B.R. 58, 71(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2014)（“无论何种原因导致 Mathis（马西斯）无法或未能及时出示或提供该等信息/文件，受托人尽到应有勤勉后仍无法获得对本案核心具有高度重要性的该等信息/文件，足以支持本案适用衡平法中止原则，以延长 11 U.S.C. § 546(a)(1)(A) 的时效期间。”）。\n\n• Ochs Charitable Remainder Trust（奥克斯慈善剩余信托）诉 Ochs（奥克斯）案（In re Ochs（奥克斯案）），608 B.R. 252, 261–62 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2019)（认定特殊情形包括但不限于：“[被告]妨碍合法证据开示，致使法院两次介入破产证据开示争议，且两次均作出不利于被告的裁决；……其未能提供完整的文件出示，致使原告不得不在 2019 年向数家第三方金融机构进行证据开示以取得文件；以及……在多次拖延后终于接受宣誓证言时，其对问题作出的回答含糊且不确定。”）。\n\n• In re Farwest Pump Co.（远西泵业公司案），No. 4:17-BK-11112-BMW, 2020 WL 257784, at *3 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Jan. 15, 2020)（“同样明确的是，本案委员会面临特殊情形，该等情形由 Vaughts（沃特夫妇）造成并持续存在，二者中的一人和/或二人拥有并管理债务人[及关联实体]……[其中包括]沃特夫妇拒绝披露其实体的财务文件。”）。\n\n51. 此外，受托人无需证明任何一名（更不必说全部）潜在被告参与或协助阻碍受托人的证据开示。“某些对象可能不对妨碍或延误受托人的调查负责，这一事实本身并不是拒绝延长提起撤销诉讼的两年时效期间的理由。”In re Fundamental Long Term Care, Inc.（基本长期护理公司案），501 B.R. 784, 791 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Nov. 13, 2013)。“如受托人受到阻碍而无法发现潜在撤销诉讼，则截止期限应就所有请求权予以延长——而非逐一当事人地延长。”同上。\n\n52. 在本案中，已充分证明，债务人及其关联人士自案件一开始即一直并持续积极干扰受托人的证据开示工作。参见 In re Bender（本德案），2010 WL 6467681, at *8（“判例法中没有任何内容会阻止破产法院认定，[债务人]经认定的‘竭尽全力向其亚利桑那州第 7 章受托人隐瞒夏威夷不动产’的不当行为，不构成‘阻碍’并延迟受托人及时遵守时效法规的特殊情形。”）。\n\ni. 待决刑事案件亦构成特殊情形\n\n53. 外部事件亦可构成特殊情形，例如“妨碍执行相关请求权的其他法律程序尚在进行中”。Collins（柯林斯）诉 Decker（德克尔）案（In re Decker（德克尔案）），No. 06-60886, 2011 WL 2174349, at *5 n. 5 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. June 1, 2011)（引文略去）；Jobin（乔宾）诉 Boryla（博里拉）案（In re M & L Bus. Machine Co.（M & L 商务机器公司案）），75 F.3d 586, 591 (10th Cir.1996)（指出，受托人所称存在特殊情形，即其无法取得因针对债务人主要负责人的刑事指控而被司法部扣押的关键记录，可能构成适用衡平法中止的依据）；Hr'g Tr. at 9:10-17, In re Dwek（德韦克案），No. 07- 11757 (KCF) (Bankr. D.N.J. Feb. 2, 2009) [ECF No. 3916]（“鉴于美国检察官和 FBI 近期开展调查活动，此处适宜对时效适用衡平法中止。这导致对债务人持续进行的 2004 证言发生长期延误，且这超出受托人的控制范围。”）。29\n\n54. 如法院所充分知悉，债务人是在申请提交日之后提起的一宗范围广泛的刑事案件中的被告。该刑事案件的待决状态要求受托人处理若干使其调查复杂化的问题。例如，如法院所知，受托人最初寻求开示政府在刑事案件中向债务人提供的文件；该请求遭到债务人反对，并最终导致或促成在本院及监督该刑事案件的法院中进行动议程序，其中包括债务人提出的请求全面中止本第 11 章案件的动议。由于该等动议程序，受托人最终同意，目前不再追求其要求从债务人处取得政府在刑事案件中向债务人提供的文件。受托人现预计，在该刑事案件目前定于 May 2024 开始的审判中，只要该等文件在公开法庭上披露，其将能够取得至少部分该等文件。即将举行的刑事审判亦使受托人从某些很可能会\n\n29 In re Dwek, No. 07- 11757 (KCF) (Bankr. D.N.J. Feb. 2, 2009) [ECF No. 3916]，作为证据11随附于本文件。\n\n成为证人或以其他方式参与该刑事案件。因此，该刑事案件构成一种特殊情形，致使受托人的调查因其无法控制的原因而被延误。\n\nb. 受托人已勤勉行事\n\n55. 最高法院已告诫：“为衡平中止时效目的所要求的勤勉，是合理的勤勉，而非最大可行程度的勤勉。”Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 653 (2010)（经修订）（省略内部引文标记及引证）（强调系后加）。与此一致，且尤其与破产情境相关的是，各法院已说明，“何为适当勤勉受案件情形限制，尤其受经济紧迫状况限制。”In re Dreiling, 233 B.R. at 878。\n\n56. 当受托人为查明债务人资产和财务事务的所有复杂细节而“长期且努力地工作”时，即已具备足够的勤勉。In re Int'l Admin. Servs., Inc., 408 F.3d at 708；另见 In re Couchell, No. 19 B 7328, 2020 WL 6438511, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2020)（动议人“参加了[债务人]的§ 341会议，提交了债权申报，发出了2004规则传票，进行了审查并强制提交文件”，因而满足勤勉要求）；In re Farwest Pump Co., No. 4:17-BK-11112-BMW, 2020 WL 257784, at *3 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Jan. 15, 2020)（“在本案中，显然委员会已通过包括但不限于提交地位动议、请求就地位动议举行加速听证……以及申请就Reliant、Vaught Equipment和Vaughts进行2004规则审查等方式，勤勉追求其权利。”）；Tese-Milner v. Kim (In re Level 8 Apparel, LLC), No. 16-13164 (JLG), 2021 WL 1977161, at *7 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2021)（认定受托人在从债务人取得文件并送达2004规则证据开示请求以寻求与债务人账户有关的信息时，已表现出勤勉）。\n\n57. “勤勉行事，即向法院表明某人并未怠于行使其权利。”In re Ramsoomair, No. 21-11215 (DSJ), 2022 WL 828307, at *6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2022)（省略内部引文标记及引证）。基于上述详述的全部理由，毫无争议，受托人已勤勉行事，并未怠于行使其权利。\n\n[本页其余部分特意留白。]\n\n因此，基于前述理由，受托人谨请法院\n\n作出拟议命令，准许本文件所请求的救济，并给予法院认为适当的任何其他救济。\n\n日期：January 18, 2024　LUC A. DESPINS（吕西安·A·德斯潘），\n\nNew Haven, Connecticut　第11章受托人\n\n签署：/s/ Douglass Barron\n\nAvram E. Luft（艾弗拉姆·E·卢夫特）（获准pro hac vice出庭）　Douglass Barron（道格拉斯·巴伦）（获准pro hac vice出庭）　PAUL HASTINGS LLP（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所）　200 Park Avenue　New York, New York 10166　(212) 318-6079　aviluft@paulhastings.com　douglassbarron@paulhastings.com\n\n以及\n\nNicholas A. Bassett（尼古拉斯·A·巴塞特）（获准pro hac vice出庭）　PAUL HASTINGS LLP（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所）　2050 M Street NW　Washington, D.C., 20036　(202) 551-1902　nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n以及\n\nPatrick R. Linsey（帕特里克·R·林赛）（ct29437）　NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C.（纽伯特、佩佩及蒙蒂斯律师事务所）　195 Church Street, 13th Floor　New Haven, Connecticut 06510　(203) 781-2847　plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n第11章受托人代理律师\n\nUNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION（美国破产法院康涅狄格联邦地区布里奇波特分院）\n\nx\n\n关于：　：\n：　第11章\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等人，1　：\n：　案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。　：\n：\n：　（合并管理）\n\n送达证明\n\n下列签署人特此证明，于January 18, 2024，前述动议及其所有声明、证据和附件已通过电子方式提交。本次提交的通知已通过法院电子提交（“CM/ECF”）系统的运行，以电子邮件发送给上述标题第11章案件的所有当事人；或按照电子提交通知所示，通过邮寄发送给无法接受电子提交的任何人。当事人可通过法院的CM/ECF系统查阅本次提交。\n\n日期：January 18, 2024　New Haven, Connecticut\n\n签署：/s/ Douglass Barron\n\nDouglass Barron（道格拉斯·巴伦）（获准pro hac vice出庭）　PAUL HASTINGS LLP（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所）　200 Park Avenue　New York, New York 10166　(212) 318-6000　douglassbarron@paulhastings.com\n\n第11章受托人代理律师\n\n1 本第11章案件中的债务人为Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（亦称Guo Wengui、Miles Guo及Miles Kwok，以及众多其他别名）（税务识别号码后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（税务识别号码后四位：8202）及Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC及Genever Holdings Corporation的邮寄地址为Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166，收件人为作为Ho Wan Kwok遗产受托人的Luc A. Despins（仅为通知和通信之目的）。\n\n证据1\n\n拟议命令\n\nUNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION（美国破产法院康涅狄格联邦地区布里奇波特分院）\n\n------------------------------------------------------　x\n\n关于：　：\n：\n第11章\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等人，30　：\n：\n案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。　：\n：\n（合并管理）\n\n[拟议]准许关于延长受托人根据《破产法》第108、546(a)及549条提起撤销之诉期限之动议的命令\n\n经审议第11章受托人关于作出命令\n\n延长受托人根据《破产法》第108、\n\n546(a)及549条提起撤销之诉期限的动议（“动议”），并已证明存在正当理由，且法院已\n\n审议针对该动议提出的任何及所有异议和其他答复，且法院认定：\n\n(i) 存在授予所请求救济的正当理由，(ii) 存在证明所请求救济正当的特殊情形，\n\n(iii) 受托人已勤勉行事，以及(iv) 该动议已按照法院先前准许通知动议的命令完成送达，且该等通知在当时情形下适当且充分，无需其他通知，并且本命令所\n\n提供的救济经过严格限定，以实现前述目的，故法院特此\n\n命令：兹准许该动议，具体如下；并进一步\n\n30 本第11章案件中的债务人为Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（亦称Guo Wengui、Miles Guo及Miles Kwok，以及众多其他别名）（税务识别号码后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（税务识别号码后四位：8202）及Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC及Genever Holdings Corporation的邮寄地址为Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166，收件人为作为Ho Wan Kwok遗产受托人的Luc A. Despins（仅为通知和通信之目的）。\n\n命令：11 U.S.C. 108、546及549规定的受托人代表遗产提起撤销之诉及其他诉讼，以及修订任何待决起诉状的期限，延长至并包括August 15, 2024；该日期可进一步延长；并进一步\n\n命令：任何已实际或推定收到该动议通知、且未对该动议提出异议的当事人，如最终被列为根据本命令条款及时提起的诉讼中的被告，均放弃主张时效期间抗辩的权利；并进一步\n\n命令：本命令的条款和条件自录入之时起立即生效并可执行；并进一步\n\n命令：授权受托人采取实施本文件所授予救济所必需的一切行动；并进一步\n\n命令：法院保留对因解释或实施本命令而产生或与之相关的一切事项的管辖权。\n\n日期：\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_, 2024\n\nJulie A. Manning（朱莉·A·曼宁），美国破产法官\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_","key_entities":["Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Despins","Paul Hastings","Guo","HCHK","Miles Guo","CIPA","Je","William Je","Chinese Communist Party","RICO"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":51,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":78,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":107,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":136,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":178,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":204,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":215,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":218,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":239,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":465,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":501,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":503,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":523,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":551,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":643,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":667,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":683,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":822,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1005,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1353,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1377,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1953,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2035,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2241,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2494,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3790,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3916,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":8783,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 20:45:51"}