{"id":"court_ctb_2530_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":2530,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2024-01-08","title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION | -------------------------------------------","summary_zh":"债务人刑事案中止动议进展通知 —— Ho Wan Kwok 破产案（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo），CTB 22-50073 ECF #2530（2024-01-08立案）。受托人与 Genever 债务人向破产法院通报最新进展，附上其在纽约南区联邦地区法院刑事案中提交的反对中止破产程序答辩状。答辩状主张暂停破产将严重损害破产财产在 2024 年 2 月 15 日时效前追索数亿美元资产的权利。","summary_en":"Notice Regarding Debtor's Renewed Motion to Stay in Criminal Case — In re Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo / Guo Wengui), CTB 22-50073 ECF #2530 (filed 2024-01-08). The Trustee and Genever Debtors notified the Bankruptcy Court that they filed an opposition brief in the SDNY criminal case (1:23-cr-118, ECF #234) against Kwok's renewed stay motion. They argued that halting bankruptcy proceedings would severely prejudice the estate's ability to pursue hundreds of millions of dollars in claims before the February 15, 2024 deadline.","body_en":"# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| ------------------------------------------------------ | x      |                         |\n|--------------------------------------------------------|--------|-------------------------|\n| In re:                                                 | :<br>: | Chapter 11              |\n| HO WAN KWOK et al.,                                    | :<br>: | Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |\n| Debtors.1                                              | :<br>: | Jointly Administered    |\n| ------------------------------------------------------ | :<br>x |                         |\n\n# **NOTICE OF CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE AND GENEVER DEBTORS REGARDING UPDATE WITH RESPECT TO DEBTOR'S RENEWED MOTION IN CRIMINAL CASE FOR AN ORDER STAYING THESE CHAPTER 11 CASES AND RELATED ADVERSARY PROCEEDINGS**\n\nBy notice dated January 8, 2024 [Docket No. 2492], Luc A. Despins, as chapter 11\n\ntrustee (the \"Trustee\") for Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"), Genever Holdings LLC (\"Genever\n\nBVI\"), and Genever Holdings Corporation (\"Genever US\" and, together with Genever BVI, the\n\n\"Genever Debtors\") informed this Court and parties in interest that the Debtor had filed a\n\nrenewed motion (the \"Renewed Stay Motion\") in the criminal case [Case No. 1:23-cr-00118-AT]\n\n(the \"Criminal Case\") pending against him in the United States District Court for the Southern\n\nDistrict of New York (the \"SDNY District Court\") seeking to stay the above-captioned chapter\n\n11 cases and all related adversary proceedings.\n\nThe Trustee and the Genever Debtors wish to provide an update to the Court and parties\n\nin interest with respect to the Renewed Stay Motion. In particular, attached hereto as **Exhibit 1**\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\nis a copy of the *Response of Chapter 11 Trustee and Genever Debtors in Opposition to*\n\n*Defendant Ho Wan Kwok's Renewed Motion to Stay Bankruptcy Cases and Motion for*\n\n*Reconsideration*, dated January 19, 2024 [Criminal Case ECF No. 234].\n\nDated: January 26, 2024 New York, New York\n\nBy: */s/ G. Alexander Bongartz*\n\nAvram E. Luft (admitted *pro hac vice*) G. Alexander Bongartz (admitted *pro hac vice*) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6079 aviluft@paulhastings.com alexbongartz@paulhastings.com\n\n*and*\n\nNicholas A. Bassett (admitted *pro hac vice*) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C., 20036 (202) 551-1902 nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n*and*\n\nDouglas S. Skalka (ct00616) Patrick R. Linsey (ct29437) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 781-2847 dskalka@npmlaw.com plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n*Counsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and Genever Holdings Corporation*\n\n# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| ------------------------------------------------------  | x           |                         |\n|---------------------------------------------------------|-------------|-------------------------|\n| In re:                                                  | :<br>:      | Chapter 11              |\n| HO WAN KWOK, et al.,1                                   | :<br>:      | Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |\n| Debtors.                                                | :<br>:<br>: | (Jointly Administered)  |\n| ------------------------------------------------------x |             |                         |\n\n## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nThe undersigned hereby certifies that on January 26, 2024, the foregoing Notice was electronically filed. Notice of this filing was sent by e-mail to all parties to the above-captioned chapter 11 case by operation of the Court's electronic filing (\"CM/ECF\") system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as indicated on the Notice of Electronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF system.\n\nDated: January 26, 2024 New York, New York\n\nBy: */s/ G. Alexander Bongartz*  G. Alexander Bongartz (admitted pro hac vice) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6079 alexbongartz@paulhastings.com\n\n*Counsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and Genever Holdings Corporation*\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\n# **Exhibit 1**\n\n## **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK**\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\n\n-against-\n\nHO WAN KWOK,\n\nCase No. 1:23-CR-118-1 (AT)\n\nDefendant.\n\n# **RESPONSE OF CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE AND GENEVER DEBTORS IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT HO WAN KWOK'S RENEWED MOTION TO STAY BANKRUPTCY CASES AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION**\n\nLuc A. Despins Adam J. Fee G. Alexander Bongartz PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6000 lucdespins@paulhastings.com adamfee@paulhastings.com alexbongartz@paulhastings.com\n\n *and*\n\nNicholas A. Bassett PAUL HASTINGS LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C., 20036 (202) 551-1902 nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n*Counsel for Luc A. Despins, as Chapter 11 Trustee, Genever Holdings Corporation, and Genever Holdings LLC*\n\n# **TABLE OF CONTENTS**\n\n# **Page**\n\n| PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  1                                                      |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| JURISDICTION  4                                                               |\n| ARGUMENT  5                                                                   |\n| I.<br>Himalaya Exchange Motion Is At Best Irrelevant To Second Stay Motion  6 |\n| II.<br>Superseding Indictment Provides No Basis For Reconsideration  7        |\n| III.<br>Privilege Waiver Motion Provides No Basis For Reconsideration  9      |\n| IV.<br>Trustee Would Suffer Immense Prejudice If Stay Granted  10             |\n| CONCLUSION  11                                                                |\n\n# **TABLE OF AUTHORITIES**\n\n### **Page(s)**\n\n### **Cases**\n\n| Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., |  |\n|-----------------------------------------------|--|\n| 676 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2012)5, 8                |  |\n\n## **Statutes**\n\n| § 108(a) 11 | 11 U.S.C. |\n|-------------|-----------|\n|             |           |\n| § 546(a) 11 |           |\n\nLuc A. Despins, in his capacity as the chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") appointed in the chapter 11 case of Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\" or \"Mr. Kwok\"), and Genever Holdings Corporation (\"Genever BVI\") and Genever Holdings LLC (\"Genever US\" and, together with Genever BVI, the \"Genever Debtors,\" and, collectively with the Trustee, the \"Respondents\")1 hereby file this response (the \"Response\") in opposition to (i) the Debtor's *Renewed Motion to Stay Bankruptcy Cases and Motion for Reconsideration* [ECF No. 218] (the \"Second Stay Motion\") and the related memorandum of law [ECF No. 219] (the \"Memorandum of Law\"). In support of this Response, the Respondents respectfully state as follows:\n\n### **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\n1. The Second Stay Motion is yet another maneuver in the Debtor's unrelenting effort to prevent the Trustee from completing his court-ordered investigation in the Debtor's Chapter 11 Case<sup>2</sup> to identify and recover valuable assets for creditors from the shell companies, relatives, and business associates with whom the Debtor has hidden his vast wealth. While couched as a motion for reconsideration—or a \"renewed\" stay motion purportedly based on new facts—the Second Stay Motion in reality simply rehashes the same failed arguments the Debtor made previously and which this Court rightfully rejected. To the extent the Court considers the Debtor's arguments anew (notwithstanding that they are appropriately addressed by the Bankruptcy Court, which the Debtor is desperate to avoid given his lack of success there), they should be rejected once more.\n\n2. The Debtor complains (again) of the Trustee's attempts to waive the privilege over certain documents the Trustee obtained in discovery, and he insists (again) that the criminal\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Debtor, Genever BVI, and Genever US are referred to, collectively, as the \"Debtors\".\n\n<sup>2</sup> Capitalized terms used but not defined in this Preliminary Statement have the meanings set forth in the remainder of the Response. Capitalized terms used but not defined in this Response have the meanings set forth in the Second Stay Motion.\n\nprosecution and the Chapter 11 Case involve identical issues based on the charges in the Superseding Indictment [ECF No. 215]. But none of these arguments is really new, and no developments warrant their reconsideration. In short, the Debtor utterly fails, as he did before, to show how he could be prejudiced by the ongoing Chapter 11 Case.\n\n3. The Trustee's only goal in the Chapter 11 Case, consistent with his statutory duties as a chapter 11 trustee, is to recover assets for the Debtor's creditors and then ensure that those assets are distributed fairly in accordance with the Bankruptcy Code. The Debtor should be supportive of—or, at the very least, agnostic to—the Trustee's efforts in this regard because the Debtor should want *more* assets in his estate, not less. The fact that the Debtor *opposes* the Trustee's efforts makes plain his desire to keep his assets hidden to benefit his associates.\n\n4. The timing of the Second Stay Motion is telling given that it comes on the eve of the two-year anniversary of the Debtor's chapter 11 filing. Pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code, this anniversary, which falls on February 15, 2024, marks the deadline for the Trustee to bring avoidance actions and certain other causes of action to recover additional assets for the estate. The Debtor is no-doubt desperate to stay the Bankruptcy Case to prevent the Trustee from meeting that deadline, thereby causing the estate to lose these valuable causes of action, which would allow the Debtor's assets to remain hidden in his shell companies throughout the world. Indeed, among the primary targets of such actions will be the Debtor's family members.\n\n5. The Debtor's ulterior motives are also exposed by his perplexing focus on—and apparent staunch defense of—the Himalaya Exchange Motion [ECF No. 186]. How and why the Debtor has an interest in the success of a motion by certain alleged customers of the Himalaya Exchange to recover their customer funds is a mystery—that is, of course, unless he is (despite his claims to the contrary) working in concert with such purported creditors and their counsel.\n\n6. To be clear, the Trustee's only goal in response to the Himalaya Exchange Motion is to prevent the alleged customer funds from being forever lost before the Trustee has the opportunity to seek appropriate relief in the Bankruptcy Court. The Trustee is not, as the Debtor claims, seeking to misappropriate the funds to pay his own fees or make distributions to select creditors. The fundamental purpose of bankruptcy law is to provide an orderly and fair process for gathering and distributing assets to a debtor's creditors. The Trustee is simply seeking to ensure the Bankruptcy Court has the opportunity to oversee this process, including with respect to the funds at issue in the Himalaya Exchange Motion, should they be found to be estate property.\n\n7. The Debtor's remaining arguments merely repackage his prior failed arguments, which he apparently believes deserve another shot based on intervening developments. They do not. The Debtor's recycled argument regarding the Trustee's attempt to obtain a privilege waiver is both meritless and premature. It is meritless because the Trustee seeks, if necessary, a very limited waiver of the attorney-client privilege he now controls over a small number of documents that may be relevant to the Trustee's prosecution of a claim to recover the sale proceeds of a jet purportedly owned by the Debtor's daughter. The argument is also premature because the motion to waive the privilege is not being prosecuted at this time and will only become relevant in the future if the Bankruptcy Court denies the Trustee's pending motion for summary judgment and the litigation heads to trial.\n\n8. The Debtor's arguments regarding the alleged overlap between the criminal and bankruptcy cases fail for the same reasons they did previously, including, as this Court noted, because the claims at issue in the Chapter 11 Case, and the standards of proof applicable to those claims, are different from the Government's criminal charges and their related burden of proof. More importantly, even if the underlying facts and issues were identical (they are not), the Debtor\n\nhas not articulated how he would be prejudiced by the Trustee continuing to prosecute his litigation in the Bankruptcy Court. Indeed, the Trustee's claims are not asserted against the Debtor but rather against other individuals and entities; the Debtor is not a party to the litigations at all.\n\n9. In any event, the Debtor's stated concerns regarding the alleged overlap in the two cases will soon be rendered moot. Given that the criminal trial is set to proceed in only a few short months, the Trustee has decided it would be most efficient for the chapter 11 estate to adjourn his pending adversary proceeding related to the Mahwah Mansion until after the criminal trial concludes. Similarly, the Trustee intends to ask the Bankruptcy Court to immediately stay the other complaints the Trustee intends to file by the above-mentioned February 15, 2024 deadline, which complaints may include civil RICO claims and other alter ego claims, until after the conclusion of the criminal trial. Because these claims will not be prosecuted, the Debtor's concerns about their overlap with the criminal trial simply no longer exist.3\n\n10. For all of these reasons, those set forth in the Trustee's First Stay Motion Response, and those set forth below, the Second Stay Motion should be denied.\n\n### **JURISDICTION**\n\n11. The Trustee continues to dispute that this Court has jurisdiction to consider the relief sought in the First and Second Stay Motions.4 This Court expressly declined to decide the jurisdictional issue in its prior decision given that the Debtor had failed to satisfy his burden on the merits. The Court correctly noted, however, that:\n\n<sup>3</sup> To be clear, the Trustee will not be seeking, and is not consenting to, a stay of the entire Chapter 11 Case, which is unprecedented, unwarranted, and would be severely prejudicial to the chapter 11 estate for all the reasons articulated in the Trustee's response [ECF No. 145] (the \"First Stay Motion Response\") to the Debtor's *Motion for an Order and Writ Staying Bankruptcy Cases or in the Alternative for Other Relief* [ECF No. 129] (the \"First Stay Motion\"). Although the Trustee intends to stay certain litigations until after the criminal trial for efficiency purposes, the Chapter 11 Case must remain active for the Trustee and the Bankruptcy Court to continue to oversee and protect the chapter 11 process and for the Trustee to otherwise continue his investigation as appropriate. 4\n\n*See* First Stay Motion Response at 11-15.\n\nBecause the power to stay proceedings arises from a court's authority to control its own docket, an application to stay a proceeding is more appropriately presented to the court presiding over the proceeding—here, the Bankruptcy Court. Indeed, in each of Kwok's cited cases, the initial application was made in the court where the stay was sought.\n\n*Order* [ECF No. 204] at 6 n. 6 (the \"Stay Denial Order\"). The Court ultimately concluded that, \"[e]ven if the Court has jurisdiction, it is doubtful that the Court should exercise it absent an extraordinary showing by Kwok.\" *Id*. (citing *United States v. LaRouche Campaign*, 682 F. Supp. 627, 628–29 (D. Mass. 1987)).\n\n12. The Trustee respectfully submits that only the Bankruptcy Court has jurisdiction over the Second Stay Motion, and, therefore, the Court should decline to consider it. In any event, even if this Court does have jurisdiction over the Second Stay Motion, the Debtor has certainly not made the \"extraordinary showing\" necessary for this Court to exercise that jurisdiction.\n\n### **ARGUMENT**\n\n13. As the Court previously recognized, staying a civil case pending the conclusion of a related criminal proceeding is an \"extraordinary remedy\" for which a defendant bears the burden of demonstrating \"undue prejudice\" or \"interference with his constitutional rights.\" Stay Denial Order at 5 (quoting *Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc.*, 676 F.3d 83, 97–98 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). The Court correctly identified several factors courts in the Second Circuit will consider in ruling on a stay request, including the extent the issues in the two cases overlap and the extent of prejudice to parties in the civil case. *Id*. These enumerated factors, however, are only a \"rough guide\" for what is ultimately a fact-based analysis focused on whether the requested stay \"would work a hardship, inequity, or injustice to a party, the public or the court.\" *Id*. at 6 (quoting *Louis Vuitton*, 676 F.3d at 99).\n\n14. The Court appropriately determined in response to the First Stay Motion that the Debtor failed to carry his high burden of demonstrating that the continuation of the Chapter 11 Case would somehow unduly prejudice the Debtor or interfere with his constitutional rights. The Debtor has provided no basis for the Court to reconsider that decision.\n\n#### **I. Himalaya Exchange Motion Is At Best Irrelevant To Second Stay Motion**\n\n15. The first of the Debtor's arguments centers around the *Motion for Return of Property* [ECF No. 186] (the \"Himalaya Exchange Motion\") filed by certain purported customers of the Himalaya Exchange and the Trustee's response thereto [ECF No. 202]. Candidly, the Trustee struggles to even understand this argument. If anything, the circumstances surrounding the Himalaya Exchange Motion support the Trustee's position, not the Debtor's.\n\n16. The Himalaya Exchange Motion involves a request by the purported investors in the Himalaya Exchange to immediately recover certain funds that have been seized by the Government in this case. The Debtor insists he does not control and has no interest in the Himalaya Exchange. Oddly, however, he makes the Himalaya Exchange Motion a focal point of the Second Stay Motion, contending that the Trustee's response thereto is an \"overreach\" and \"utterly baseless\" because \"the funds seized by the government over which the Trustee now seeks control originated with the customers of the Exchange and not Mr. Kwok.\" Second Stay Mot. at 13. Of course, the Debtor does not explain why he has any legitimate interest—economic or otherwise in supporting the Himalaya Exchange Motion and seeing that the alleged customers receive their funds. What the Debtor's support for the Himalaya Exchange Motion really shows is that his goal is not to avoid prejudice to his criminal rights but rather to protect his own interests and those of his associates, his followers, and the entities he controls. So far, the Debtor has been resoundingly unsuccessful in achieving this goal in the Bankruptcy Court, so now he is coming to this Court.\n\n17. The Debtor suggests that the Government's seizure of the Himalaya Exchange funds and the Trustee's claim to those same funds is an example of overlap between the two cases that somehow supports his stay request. But the Debtor tellingly identifies no prejudice whatsoever from this alleged overlap. To the extent the Debtor complains about the effect that the Trustee's eventual recovery of the funds may have on his restitution obligations, that argument is premature because (i) the Debtor's restitution obligations will only arise following a conviction, if any, and thus they have no bearing on his right to a fair trial, and (ii) in any event, the Trustee is not asking for the funds to be turned over to the estate at this time but rather only seeking to preserve his rights by ensuring that the funds are not released to the alleged customers\n\n18. Moreover, by pointing to his restitution obligations, the Debtor is tellingly ignoring that he purportedly has no assets other than those he identified in his Chapter 11 Case (a mere \\$3500 to his name) and is again showing his hand. If the Debtor is convicted, he should be agnostic about whether the Himalaya Exchange funds are used to pay either his creditors or the victims of his fraud because he will have obligations to both groups. That he is advocating for one outcome over another—i.e., trying to keep the funds from creditors who already hold claims vs. victims who will only be entitled to restitution if he is convicted—exposes his true motivation: to keep his assets hidden and to protect his family members and close associates.\n\n#### **II. Superseding Indictment Provides No Basis for Reconsideration**\n\n19. As the Court recognized in its Stay Denial Order, the \"focus\" of the Chapter 11 Case, unlike this criminal case, \"is to identify properties to compensate Kwok's creditors—not questions of criminal liability.\" Stay Denial Order at 7. Accordingly, the Trustee is focused on gathering assets, including companies that are the Debtor's alter egos, and ensuring a ratable distribution to creditors. *Id*. These objectives are as true today as they were when the Court issued\n\nthe Stay Denial Order, and they continue to show a critical distinction between the Chapter 11 Case and this case. In other words, nothing has changed, so reconsideration is inappropriate.\n\n20. The Debtor contends that, because the Superseding Indictment alleges that certain entities were part of his criminal enterprise, an inextricable link now exists between the criminal case and the Trustee's efforts to demonstrate that these and certain other entities are the Debtor's alter egos and/or that the Debtor is the equitable owner of such entities. This argument, however, ignores that the Trustee is not seeking to impose criminal liability on the Debtor, but rather to assert civil claims against other individuals and entities to recover assets for creditors. Indeed, the Debtor is not even a party to the Trustee's adversary proceedings. It is therefore unsurprising that the Debtor cannot explain how he would actually be prejudiced by the Trustee's continued pursuit of his adversary proceedings, which is the critical showing the Debtor must make to obtain his requested stay. *See Louis Vuitton*, 676 F.3d at 99.\n\n21. Even if the Debtor's concerns regarding allegedly overlapping issues had merit (which they do not), they will soon be rendered moot. The Debtor has long complained in particular about prejudice allegedly created by the Trustee's litigation to obtain ownership of the Debtor's mansion in Mahwah, New Jersey.5 Based on the current posture of such litigation, however, and the fact that the criminal trial is set to begin shortly, the Trustee has decided it would be most efficient to stay the remainder of the Mahwah mansion litigation until the criminal trial has concluded. He has already conferred with opposing counsel concerning such a stay and intends to move the Bankruptcy Court in the coming days. The Trustee also intends to ask the Bankruptcy Court to immediately stay the additional alter ego actions, as well as an anticipated civil RICO complaint, that he anticipates filing no later than the February 15, 2024 statute of limitations\n\n<sup>5</sup> *See generally Despins v. Taurus Fund LLC, et al.,* Adv. Proc. No. 23-5017 (Bankr. D. Conn.) (the \"Mahwah Mansion Litigation\").\n\ndeadline. Because these litigations will not be moving forward after their filing, the Debtor's complaints about their overlap with this case no longer exist.\n\n### **III. Privilege Waiver Motion Provides No Basis for Reconsideration**\n\n22. The Debtor also repeats the argument this Court already rejected that a stay is necessary to prevent the Trustee from waiving the attorney-client privilege formerly held by the Debtor over certain documents and communications. The Debtor argues that circumstances have changed because, since entry of the Stay Denial Order, the Trustee has filed a motion asking the Bankruptcy Court to order such a privilege waiver. This argument, however, severely mischaracterizes the limited nature of the relief the Trustee seeks and fails to explain that the Trustee's motion may never even be considered by the Bankruptcy Court.\n\n23. The motion at issue relates to an adversary proceeding the Trustee commenced against the Debtor's daughter, which involves a shell company nominally owned by her that held title to the Debtor's Bombardier private jet.6 During discovery, the Trustee properly obtained access to certain arguably privileged documents in the files of the Debtor's former counsel, which the Trustee believes are relevant to his claims. When the Debtor refused to consent to the Trustee's use of the documents in the adversary proceeding, the Trustee filed a motion asking the Bankruptcy Court to either (i) authorize the use of the documents *under seal, without effecting a privilege waiver*, or, alternatively (ii) permit the Trustee to effect a limited waiver of the privilege only with respect to matters related to the private jet (and its subsequent sale proceeds). In other words, the scope of the motion is extremely narrow and specifically asks that a waiver *not* occur.\n\n24. The Debtor knows well the details of the Trustee's motion because he appeared in the Bankruptcy Court through counsel to vigorously oppose it (no doubt for the purpose of\n\n*See generally Despins v. Mei Guo,* Adv. Proc. No. 23-5008 (Bankr. D. Conn.).\n\nassisting his daughter's defense in the litigation). Although the motion has not yet been ruled upon, the Debtor unquestionably received due process by appearing and contesting the motion in the one court that has jurisdiction to consider it: the Bankruptcy Court.\n\n25. In any event, the Debtor's stated concern about the waiver sought by the motion is premature. On December 28, 2023, the Trustee filed a motion for summary judgment in the adversary proceeding at issue and, in doing so, specifically noted that he was *not* relying on any of the arguably privileged documents in support of such motion. Rather, the Trustee has informed the Court that he will only pursue his motion to use the documents if the Court denies summary judgment and the Trustee determines it is necessary to later use the documents for trial. Accordingly, the Debtor's argument regarding privilege waiver is—like his other arguments—a false alarm that in no way supports his extraordinary stay request.\n\n### **IV. Trustee Would Suffer Immense Prejudice If Stay Granted**\n\n26. As discussed in the Trustee's First Stay Motion Response, a global stay of the Chapter 11 Case would be extraordinarily prejudicial to the chapter 11 estate and to the creditors of the Debtor who have already been waiting years to obtain recoveries on their claims.\n\n27. As noted above, the Trustee has decided for his own reasons to voluntarily stay certain litigation until the conclusion of the criminal trial. The Chapter 11 Case in general, however, must continue unabated. Among other things, it is critical for the automatic stay to remain in place to protect the Debtor's assets throughout the world and for the Trustee to be able to take actions necessary to safeguard those assets, including by enforcing existing orders of the Bankruptcy Court. The Trustee must also be allowed to continue to make progress in other litigations he is not staying at this time, such as the aforementioned litigation related to the recovery of the sale proceeds of the Bombardier jet.\n\n28. Most importantly, the Trustee *must be permitted to commence additional litigations by February 15, 2024*, which is the deadline established by sections 108(a) and 546(a) of the Bankruptcy Code for the Trustee to commence avoidance actions and certain other types of claims against third parties to recover assets for the estate. The Trustee is presently in the process of preparing dozens of avoidance actions, as well as an omnibus alter ego/equitable ownership action and a civil RICO complaint, each involving numerous Debtor associates and shell companies, to file by the February 15 deadline.7 For efficiency purposes, the Trustee intends to seek a stay of the alter ego/equitable ownership and civil RICO actions immediately upon their filing until at least the conclusion of the criminal trial, and thus such actions will not overlap with the criminal case in any way.\n\n29. Were the Trustee to miss the February 15 deadline, the result for the chapter 11 estate would be devastating, as the estate would risk losing the opportunity to ever pursue and recover significant additional value—potentially in the hundreds of millions of dollars—for the benefit of the Debtor's creditors. This manifestly unjust outcome is exactly what the Debtor wants because it would protect the \"shell game\" he has been playing for years and allow him to protect his family members and associates and keep his massive wealth forever hidden from his creditors. It should not be permitted.\n\n#### **CONCLUSION**\n\n30. For all of the foregoing reasons, the Trustee respectfully requests that the Second Stay Motion be denied because the Debtor has fallen far short of meeting his heavy burden to justify the extraordinary relief he seeks. Indeed, the Debtor has demonstrated virtually no\n\n<sup>7</sup> The Trustee has filed a motion asking the Bankruptcy Court to toll the two-year limitations period; however, there is no guarantee that such motion will be granted or that any order granting the motion will not be challenged by future defendants. The only way for the Trustee to preserve his causes of action with absolute certainty is to commence litigation on or before the two-year deadline.\n\nprejudice at all from the continuation of the Chapter 11 Case, while the chapter 11 estate, by contrast, stands to be harmed significantly by the requested stay.8\n\n[*Remainder of Page Intentionally Left Blank.*]\n\n<sup>8</sup> Finally, the stay request is even weaker as it pertains to the two Genever Debtors, whose chapter 11 cases are not overseen by the Trustee. These Debtors were holding companies for the Debtor's palatial apartment at the Sherry Netherland hotel, which the Trustee now owns and controls pursuant to a judgment of the Bankruptcy Court. The Debtor does not even mention the Genever Debtors in his Second Stay Motion.\n\nDated: January 19, 2024 Washington, D.C.\n\nBy: */s/ Nicholas A. Bassett*\n\nNicholas A. Bassett PAUL HASTINGS LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C., 20036 (202) 551-1902 nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n *and*\n\nLuc A. Despins Adam J. Fee G. Alexander Bongartz PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6000 lucdespins@paulhastings.com adamfee@paulhastings.com alexbongartz@paulhastings.com\n\n*Counsel for Luc A. Despins, as Chapter 11 Trustee, Genever Holdings Corporation, and Genever Holdings LLC*","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院布里奇波特分部\n\n------------------------------------------------------　x\n\n关于：　:\n:　第11章\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，　:\n:　案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。1　:\n:　合并管理\n\nx\n\n第11章受托人与 GENEVER 债务人就债务人在刑事案件中提出请求裁定中止本第11章案件及相关对抗程序的续展动议之更新通知\n\n根据日期为 January 8, 2024 的通知[Docket No. 2492]，Luc A. Despins 作为 Ho Wan Kwok（以下简称“债务人”）、Genever Holdings LLC（“Genever BVI”）及 Genever Holdings Corporation（“Genever US”，与 Genever BVI 合称“Genever 债务人”）的第11章受托人（以下简称“受托人”），已通知本院及利害关系方，债务人已在针对其进行的、正在 United States District Court for the Southern District of New York（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院，以下简称“SDNY 地区法院”）审理的刑事案件[Case No. 1:23-cr-00118-AT]（以下简称“刑事案件”）中提交一项续展动议（以下简称“续展中止动议”），请求中止上述第11章案件及所有相关对抗程序。\n\n受托人与 Genever 债务人希望就续展中止动议向本院及利害关系方提供更新。具体而言，随附本通知作为附件1的是日期为 January 19, 2024 的《第11章受托人与 Genever 债务人反对被告 Ho Wan Kwok 提出的中止破产案件及复议续展动议的答复》副本[Criminal Case ECF No. 234]。\n\n1 本第11章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（亦称 Guo Wengui、Miles Guo 和 Miles Kwok，以及众多其他别名）（税务识别号码后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（税务识别号码后四位：8202）及 Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 及 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为 Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166，转交 Luc A. Despins，作为 Ho Wan Kwok 财产的受托人（仅限于通知和通信之目的）。\n\n日期：January 26, 2024　New York, New York\n\n签署人：/s/ G. Alexander Bongartz\n\nAvram E. Luft（获准 pro hac vice 出庭）\nG. Alexander Bongartz（获准 pro hac vice 出庭）\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, New York 10166\n(212) 318-6079\naviluft@paulhastings.com\nalexbongartz@paulhastings.com\n\n及\n\nNicholas A. Bassett（获准 pro hac vice 出庭）\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP\n2050 M Street NW\nWashington, D.C., 20036\n(202) 551-1902\nnicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n及\n\nDouglas S. Skalka (ct00616)\nPatrick R. Linsey (ct29437)\nNEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C.\n195 Church Street, 13th Floor\nNew Haven, Connecticut 06510\n(203) 781-2847\ndskalka@npmlaw.com\nplinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n第11章受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 及 Genever Holdings Corporation 的律师\n\n美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院布里奇波特分部\n\n------------------------------------------------------　x\n\n关于：　:\n:　第11章\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，1　:\n:　案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。　:\n:\n:　（合并管理）\n\n送达证明\n\n下列签署人特此证明，于 January 26, 2024，前述通知已以电子方式提交。根据法院电子提交（“CM/ECF”）系统的运行，或依照电子提交通知中所示向无法接受电子提交的任何人士以邮件方式，已通过电子邮件向上述第11章案件的所有当事人发送本次提交的通知。当事人可通过法院的 CM/ECF 系统查阅本次提交。\n\n日期：January 26, 2024　New York, New York\n\n签署人：/s/ G. Alexander Bongartz\nG. Alexander Bongartz（获准 pro hac vice 出庭）\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, New York 10166\n(212) 318-6079\nalexbongartz@paulhastings.com\n\n第11章受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 及 Genever Holdings Corporation 的律师\n\n1 本第11章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（亦称 Guo Wengui、Miles Guo 和 Miles Kwok，以及众多其他别名）（税务识别号码后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（税务识别号码后四位：8202）及 Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 及 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为 Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166，转交 Luc A. Despins，作为 Ho Wan Kwok 财产的受托人（仅限于通知和通信之目的）。\n\n附件1\n\n美国纽约南区联邦地区法院\n\n美利坚合众国\n\n-诉-\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），\n\n案号：1:23-CR-118-1 (AT)\n\n被告。\n\n第11章受托人与 GENEVER 债务人反对被告 HO WAN KWOK 提出的中止破产案件及复议续展动议的答复\n\nLuc A. Despins\nAdam J. Fee\nG. Alexander Bongartz\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, New York 10166\n(212) 318-6000\nlucdespins@paulhastings.com\nadamfee@paulhastings.com\nalexbongartz@paulhastings.com\n\n及\n\nNicholas A. Bassett\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP\n2050 M Street NW\nWashington, D.C., 20036\n(202) 551-1902\nnicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\nLuc A. Despins（作为第11章受托人）、Genever Holdings Corporation 及 Genever Holdings LLC 的律师\n\n目录\n页码\n\n初步陈述　1\n\n管辖权　4\n\n论证　5\n\nI.\nHimalaya Exchange 动议至多与第二次中止动议无关　6\n\nII.\n替代起诉书并未提供复议依据　7\n\nIII.\n特权放弃动议并未提供复议依据　9\n\nIV.\n如准许中止，受托人将遭受巨大不利影响　10\n\n结论　11\n\n引证目录\n页码\n案件\n\nLouis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc.,\n\n676 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2012)　5, 8\n\n法规\n\n11 U.S.C. § 108(a)　11\n\n11 U.S.C. § 546(a)　11\n\nLuc A. Despins，以其作为在 Ho Wan Kwok（以下简称“债务人”或“Kwok 先生”）第11章案件中获任命的第11章受托人（以下简称“受托人”）的身份，与 Genever Holdings Corporation（“Genever BVI”）及 Genever Holdings LLC（“Genever US”，与 Genever BVI 合称“Genever 债务人”，并与受托人合称“答复方”）1，特此提交本答复（以下简称“答复”），反对：(i) 债务人提出的《中止破产案件及复议续展动议》[ECF No. 218]（以下简称“第二次中止动议”）及相关法律备忘录[ECF No. 219]（以下简称“法律备忘录”）。为支持本答复，答复方谨陈述如下：\n\n初步陈述\n\n1. 第二次中止动议是债务人为阻止受托人完成其经法院命令进行的、旨在从债务人借以隐匿其巨额财富的空壳公司、亲属及商业伙伴处识别并为债权人追回有价值资产的债务人第11章案件2调查，而持续不懈采取的又一手段。尽管其被表述为复议动议——或一项据称基于新事实的“续展”中止动议——第二次中止动议实际上只是重述债务人先前提出且本院已正当地驳回的同一失败论点。即使本院重新审议债务人的论点（尽管这些论点本应由破产法院处理，而债务人鉴于其在该法院未获成功，急于避免该法院处理），也应再次予以驳回。\n\n2. 债务人再次抱怨受托人试图放弃受托人在证据开示中获得的某些文件的特权，并再次坚称，基于替代起诉书[ECF No. 215]中的指控，刑事\n\n1 债务人、Genever BVI 及 Genever US 合称为“债务人”。\n\n2 本初步陈述中使用但未定义的大写术语，具有本答复其余部分所载的含义。本答复中使用但未定义的大写术语，具有第二次中止动议所载的含义。\n\n诉讼与第11章案件涉及相同问题。但这些论点均非真正的新论点，也没有任何进展足以支持对其进行复议。简而言之，债务人与先前一样，完全未能表明正在进行的第11章案件会如何使其受到不利影响。\n\n3. 受托人在第11章案件中的唯一目标，是依照其作为第11章受托人的法定职责，为债务人的债权人追回资产，并随后确保这些资产依照《破产法典》得到公平分配。债务人应当支持——或者至少不应对——受托人在此方面的努力，因为债务人应当希望其财产中有更多而非更少的资产。债务人反对受托人的努力这一事实，清楚表明其希望继续隐匿其资产，以使其关联人士受益。\n\n4. 鉴于第二次中止动议是在债务人提交第11章申请满两周年前夕提出，其时间点颇具说明意义。根据《破产法典》，该周年日，即 February 15, 2024，是受托人提起撤销诉讼及某些其他诉讼请求以为财产追回额外资产的截止日期。债务人无疑急于中止破产案件，以阻止受托人赶上该截止日期，从而导致财产失去这些有价值的诉讼请求；这些诉讼请求本可使债务人的资产继续隐藏于其遍布世界各地的空壳公司中。事实上，此类诉讼的主要目标之一将是债务人的家庭成员。\n\n5. 债务人的隐秘动机还因其令人费解地聚焦于——并似乎坚决为之辩护的——Himalaya Exchange 动议[ECF No. 186]而暴露无遗。债务人为何以及如何对某些据称为 Himalaya Exchange 客户的人士提出的、要求追回其客户资金的动议成功具有利益关系，是一个谜——当然，除非其（尽管其作出相反主张）正与此类所谓债权人及其律师协同行动。\n\n6. 为明确起见，受托人就 Himalaya Exchange 动议所追求的唯一目标，是防止在受托人有机会向破产法院寻求适当救济之前，据称的客户资金永久丧失。受托人并非如债务人所称，试图挪用该等资金以支付其自身费用或向特定债权人作出分配。破产法的根本目的，是提供一个有序且公平的程序，以归集资产并将其分配给债务人的债权人。受托人仅寻求确保破产法院有机会监督该程序，包括就 Himalaya Exchange 动议所涉资金而言，如该等资金被认定为财产资产。\n\n7. 债务人的其余论点仅是对其先前失败论点的重新包装；其显然认为，基于介入性进展，这些论点值得再获一次机会。事实并非如此。债务人就受托人试图取得特权放弃所提出的重复论点，既无依据亦为时过早。其无依据，是因为受托人如有必要，仅寻求放弃其目前控制的、少量可能与受托人主张追回一架据称由债务人女儿拥有的喷气式飞机出售收益之请求有关的文件所享有的律师—委托人特权。该论点亦为时过早，因为特权放弃动议目前并未被推进，且仅在破产法院驳回受托人待决的简易判决动议且诉讼进入审判时，才会在未来变得相关。\n\n8. 债务人关于刑事案件与破产案件之间所谓重叠的论点，基于其先前未获支持的相同理由而不能成立，包括如本院所指出的，因第11章案件中所涉请求及适用于该等请求的证明标准，与政府提出的刑事指控及其相关证明责任不同。更为重要的是，即使基础事实和争点相同（事实并非如此），债务人亦未说明若受托人继续在破产法院提起诉讼，其将如何受到不利影响。事实上，受托人的请求并非针对债务人提出，而是针对其他个人和实体提出；债务人根本不是该等诉讼的当事人。\n\n9. 无论如何，债务人对于两案所谓重叠所表示的担忧很快将变得毫无实际意义。鉴于刑事审判将在仅数月后进行，受托人已决定，为提高第11章破产财产的效率，暂缓其与Mahwah Mansion（马瓦庄园）有关的未决对抗程序，直至刑事审判结束。同样，受托人拟请求破产法院立即中止其拟于上述February 15, 2024截止日期前提起的其他诉状；该等诉状可能包括民事RICO请求及其他另我请求，直至刑事审判结束。由于这些请求将不会被继续追诉，债务人对其与刑事审判重叠的担忧已不复存在。3\n\n10. 基于上述所有理由、受托人对第一次中止动议的答复中所述理由，以及下文所述理由，第二次中止动议应予驳回。\n\n管辖权\n\n11. 受托人继续对本院是否有管辖权审理第一次和第二次中止动议所寻求的救济提出异议。4 鉴于债务人未能在实体问题上履行其举证责任，本院在先前裁决中明确拒绝裁定管辖权问题。然而，本院正确指出：\n\n3 为明确起见，受托人不会寻求、亦不同意中止整个第11章案件；该等中止前所未有、毫无依据，并且基于受托人就债务人关于作出中止破产案件的命令和令状，或备选地给予其他救济的动议 [ECF No. 129]（“第一次中止动议”）所提交的答复 [ECF No. 145]（“第一次中止动议答复”）中阐述的全部理由，将严重损害第11章破产财产。尽管受托人拟为提高效率而在刑事审判结束前中止某些诉讼，第11章案件必须保持进行，以便受托人和破产法院继续监督并保护第11章程序，并使受托人得以在适当情况下继续其调查。4\n\n参见第一次中止动议答复，第11–15页。\n\n由于中止程序的权力源自法院控制其自身案件日程的权限，中止程序的申请更适合向主持该程序的法院提出——在此即破产法院。事实上，在Kwok（郭文贵）援引的每个案件中，最初申请均向请求中止的法院提出。\n\n命令 [ECF No. 204] 第6页注6（“驳回中止命令”）。本院最终认定：“即使本院具有管辖权，如Kwok未作出非常情形的证明，本院是否应行使该管辖权亦存疑。”同上（援引 United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 682 F. Supp. 627, 628–29 (D. Mass. 1987)）。\n\n12. 受托人谨陈，仅破产法院对第二次中止动议具有管辖权，因此，本院应拒绝审理该动议。无论如何，即使本院对第二次中止动议确有管辖权，债务人也显然未作出本院行使该管辖权所必需的“非常情形”证明。\n\n论证\n\n13. 如本院先前所确认，在相关刑事程序结束前中止民事案件，属于“非常救济”；被告负有证明“过度不利影响”或“干扰其宪法权利”的责任。驳回中止命令，第5页（引自 Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 97–98 (2d Cir. 2012)（省略内部引号及引文））。本院正确识别了第二巡回区法院在裁定中止请求时将考虑的若干因素，包括两案争点重叠的程度，以及对民事案件当事人的不利影响程度。同上。然则，该等列举因素仅是对最终基于事实的分析的“粗略指引”；该分析的重点在于所请求的中止是否“会给一方当事人、公众或法院造成困难、不公平或不正义”。同上，第6页（引自 Louis Vuitton, 676 F.3d 第99页）。\n\n14. 本院在回应第一次中止动议时适当认定，债务人未能履行其较高的举证责任，以证明第11章案件的继续进行会以某种方式对债务人造成过度不利影响，或干扰其宪法权利。债务人未提供任何依据使本院重新考虑该决定。\n\nI. Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）动议至多与第二次中止动议无关\n\n15. 债务人的第一项论点围绕某些所谓Himalaya Exchange客户提出的返还财产动议 [ECF No. 186]（“Himalaya Exchange动议”），以及受托人对此提交的答复 [ECF No. 202]。坦率而言，受托人甚至难以理解这一论点。即使有任何关系，围绕Himalaya Exchange动议的情形也支持受托人的立场，而非债务人的立场。\n\n16. Himalaya Exchange动议涉及所谓Himalaya Exchange投资者请求立即收回政府在本案中扣押的某些资金。债务人坚持称其并不控制Himalaya Exchange，且对其不享有任何权益。然而，奇怪的是，他将Himalaya Exchange动议作为第二次中止动议的焦点，主张受托人对该动议的答复构成“越权”且“毫无根据”，因为“受托人现寻求控制的、由政府扣押的资金来源于交易所客户，而非Kwok先生。”第二次中止动议，第13页。当然，债务人并未解释，为何其对支持Himalaya Exchange动议并确保所谓客户获得其资金具有任何正当利益——无论是经济利益还是其他利益。债务人对Himalaya Exchange动议的支持实际表明，其目标并非避免对其刑事权利造成不利影响，而是保护其自身利益以及其同伙、追随者和其控制实体的利益。迄今为止，债务人在破产法院实现该目标已遭彻底挫败，因此其现在来到本院。\n\n17. 债务人暗示，政府扣押Himalaya Exchange资金以及受托人对同一资金提出请求，是两案之间重叠的一个例子，且以某种方式支持其提出的中止请求。但值得注意的是，债务人完全未指出该所谓重叠造成任何不利影响。就债务人抱怨受托人最终收回该等资金可能对其赔偿义务产生影响而言，该论点尚不成熟，因为：(i) 债务人的赔偿义务仅会在其被定罪后产生，如有任何定罪，因此与其获得公正审判的权利无关；并且 (ii) 无论如何，受托人目前并未请求将该等资金移交给破产财产，而仅寻求通过确保该等资金不被发还给所谓客户来保全其权利\n\n18. 此外，债务人援引其赔偿义务时，刻意忽略了其声称除其在第11章案件中列明的资产外别无其他资产（其名下仅有$3500），并再次暴露了其意图。若债务人被定罪，其本应对Himalaya Exchange资金是用于偿付其债权人还是其欺诈受害人不持立场，因为其对两类群体均负有义务。他主张一种结果而非另一种结果——即，试图阻止资金流向已持有债权请求的债权人，而流向仅在其被定罪后才有权获得赔偿的受害人——揭示了其真实动机：隐藏其资产并保护其家庭成员及密切同伙。\n\nII. 替代起诉书未提供重新考虑的依据\n\n19. 如本院在其驳回中止命令中所确认，第11章案件的“重点”与本刑事案件不同，“在于确认用于补偿Kwok债权人的财产——而非刑事责任问题。”驳回中止命令，第7页。因此，受托人着眼于归集资产，包括作为债务人另我的公司，并确保向债权人按比例分配。同上。这些目标在本院作出驳回中止命令时如此，今天依然如此，且继续显示第11章案件与本案之间的关键区别。换言之，情况没有变化，因此重新考虑并不适当。\n\n20. 债务人主张，由于替代起诉书指控某些实体属于其犯罪企业的一部分，现已在刑事案件与受托人为证明这些及其他某些实体系债务人的另我和／或债务人系该等实体衡平所有人所作努力之间形成不可分割的联系。然而，该论点忽视了受托人并非寻求对债务人追究刑事责任，而是对其他个人和实体主张民事请求，以为债权人收回资产。事实上，债务人甚至不是受托人对抗程序的当事人。因此，债务人无法解释其将如何因受托人继续推进其对抗程序而实际受到不利影响，并不令人意外；而这是债务人为获得其所请求中止必须作出的关键证明。参见 Louis Vuitton, 676 F.3d 第99页。\n\n21. 即使债务人对于所谓重叠争点的担忧有理（事实并非如此），其也将很快变得毫无实际意义。债务人长期以来尤其抱怨，受托人为取得债务人在New Jersey（新泽西州）Mahwah的宅邸所有权而进行的诉讼，据称造成不利影响。5 然而，基于该诉讼的当前状态，以及刑事审判即将开始这一事实，受托人已决定，最有效率的做法是中止Mahwah宅邸诉讼的其余部分，直至刑事审判结束。他已就该等中止与对方律师进行协商，并拟在未来数日向破产法院提出动议。受托人还拟请求破产法院立即中止其预计最迟于February 15, 2024诉讼时效截止日期前提交的额外另我诉讼，以及一份预期的民事RICO诉状。由于这些诉讼在提交后将不会继续推进，债务人对于其与本案重叠的抱怨已不复存在。\n\nIII. 特权放弃动议未提供重新考虑的依据\n\n22. 债务人还重复提出了本院已经驳回的论点，即为防止受托人放弃债务人此前就某些文件和通信所享有的律师—当事人保密特权，有必要中止程序。债务人主张，情况已经发生变化，因为自作出中止驳回裁定以来，受托人已提出动议，请求破产法院命令放弃该等特权。然而，该论点严重歪曲了受托人所寻求救济的有限性质，且未说明受托人的动议甚至可能永远不会由破产法院审议。\n\n23. 所涉动议与受托人对债务人的女儿提起的一项对抗程序有关，该程序涉及一家由其女儿名义持有的空壳公司，该公司持有债务人的 Bombardier（庞巴迪）私人飞机的所有权。6 在证据开示期间，受托人适当地获得了查阅债务人前任律师档案中某些可能受特权保护文件的权限，受托人认为该等文件与其诉求有关。当债务人拒绝同意受托人在该对抗程序中使用该等文件时，受托人提出动议，请求破产法院或者：(i) 授权在密封状态下使用该等文件，而不导致放弃特权；或者，作为备选，(ii) 允许受托人仅就与该私人飞机（及其后续出售所得款项）有关的事项有限放弃特权。换言之，该动议的范围极为狭窄，并明确请求不发生特权放弃。\n\n24. 债务人十分了解受托人动议的细节，因为他已通过律师在破产法院出庭，积极反对该动议（毫无疑问，是为了协助其女儿在该诉讼中的抗辩）。\n\n一般参见 Despins v. Mei Guo, Adv. Proc. No. 23-5008 (Bankr. D. Conn.)。\n\n尽管该动议尚未得到裁决，债务人已通过在唯一有权审议该动议的法院——破产法院——出庭并对该动议提出争议，而毫无疑问地获得了正当程序。\n\n25. 无论如何，债务人对该动议所寻求特权放弃的担忧尚不成熟。On December 28, 2023，受托人在所涉对抗程序中提出简易判决动议，并在提出该动议时明确指出，其并未依赖任何可能受特权保护的文件来支持该动议。相反，受托人已告知本院，只有在本院驳回简易判决动议且受托人认定日后为审判而使用该等文件属必要时，才会继续推进其使用该等文件的动议。因此，债务人有关特权放弃的论点——与其其他论点一样——是虚惊一场，丝毫不能支持其非常规的中止请求。\n\nIV. 如准予中止，受托人将遭受巨大损害\n\n26. 如受托人对第一项中止动议的答复中所述，对第11章案件的全面中止将对第11章财产以及已等待多年以获得其债权回收的债务人债权人造成极大损害。\n\n27. 如上所述，受托人出于其自身理由，已决定自愿中止某些诉讼，直至刑事审判结束。然而，第11章案件总体上必须不受阻碍地继续进行。其中，至关重要的是，自动中止必须继续有效，以保护债务人在世界各地的资产，并使受托人能够采取必要行动保障该等资产，包括执行破产法院现有的裁定。还必须允许受托人继续推进其目前并未中止的其他诉讼，例如前述与追收 Bombardier 飞机出售所得款项有关的诉讼。\n\n28. 最重要的是，必须允许受托人在 February 15, 2024 之前提起额外诉讼；该日期是《破产法》第108(a)条和第546(a)条为受托人提起撤销诉讼及针对第三方的某些其他类型诉求、以为财产追回资产所规定的截止日期。受托人目前正在准备数十项撤销诉讼，以及一项综合性的另我/衡平所有权诉讼和一份民事 RICO 起诉状，各自涉及众多债务人的关联人士和空壳公司，以便在 February 15 截止日期前提交。7 为提高效率，受托人拟在另我/衡平所有权诉讼和民事 RICO 诉讼提交后立即请求中止该等诉讼，至少直至刑事审判结束，因此该等诉讼不会以任何方式与刑事案件重叠。\n\n29. 若受托人错过 February 15 截止日期，第11章财产的后果将是毁灭性的，因为该财产将面临失去追究并收回重大额外价值——可能高达数亿美元——以惠及债务人债权人的机会。该显失公正的结果正是债务人所希望的，因为这将保护其多年来一直在进行的“空壳把戏”，并使其能够保护其家庭成员和关联人士，且永远对其债权人隐匿其巨额财富。不应允许发生这种情况。\n\n结论\n\n30. 基于上述全部理由，受托人谨请求驳回第二项中止动议，因为债务人远未达到证明其所寻求非常规救济具有正当理由的沉重举证责任。事实上，债务人几乎未能证明第11章案件继续进行会给其造成任何损害；相反，第11章财产将因所请求的中止而遭受重大损害。8\n\n7 受托人已提出动议，请求破产法院中止计算两年的时效期间；然而，无法保证该动议将获准，也无法保证任何准许该动议的裁定不会受到未来被告的质疑。受托人以绝对确定性保全其诉因的唯一方式，是在两年期限届满之日或之前提起诉讼。\n\n[本页其余部分故意留白。]\n\n8 最后，就两家 Genever（杰尼弗）债务人而言，中止请求更为薄弱，因为其第11章案件并非由受托人监督。该等债务人是债务人在 Sherry Netherland（雪莉内瑟兰）酒店豪华公寓的控股公司；受托人现已依据破产法院的一项判决书拥有并控制该公寓。债务人在其第二项中止动议中甚至没有提及 Genever 债务人。\n\n日期：January 19, 2024 Washington, D.C.\n\n签署人：/s/ Nicholas A. Bassett\n\nNicholas A. Bassett\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP（普衡律师事务所）\n2050 M Street NW\nWashington, D.C., 20036\n(202) 551-1902\nnicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n以及\n\nLuc A. Despins\nAdam J. Fee\nG. Alexander Bongartz\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, New York 10166\n(212) 318-6000\nlucdespins@paulhastings.com\nadamfee@paulhastings.com\nalexbongartz@paulhastings.com\n\nLuc A. Despins 作为第11章受托人、Genever Holdings Corporation（杰尼弗控股公司）及 Genever Holdings LLC（杰尼弗控股有限责任公司）的律师","key_entities":["Kwok","Himalaya","Himalaya Exchange","Despins","Ho Wan Kwok","Je","Paul Hastings","Guo","RICO","Miles Guo","CIPA"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":129,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":145,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":186,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":202,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":204,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":215,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":218,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":219,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":234,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":4925,"status":"published","published_at":"2024-01-08 00:00:00","created_at":"2024-01-08","updated_at":"2026-08-23 18:46:09"}