{"id":"court_ctb_2539_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":2539,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"TRANSCRIPT","filed_date":"2024-01-31","title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION In Re \\* Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) \\* HO WAN KW","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION In Re \\* Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) \\* HO WAN KWOK and GENEVER \\* HOLDINGS CORPORATION, \\* \\* Debtors. \\* LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 \\* Adv. Proc. No. 23-05023 TRUSTEE, \\* \\* Plaintiff, \\* v. \\* \\* Bridgeport, Connecticut LAMP CAPITAL LLC, et al., \\* January 23, 2024 \\* Defendants. \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HONORABLE JULIE A. MANNING UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE APPEARANCES: For the Chapter 11 Trustee: NICHOLAS A. BASSETT, ESQ. Paul Hastings LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166 Chapter 11 Trustee: LUC A. DESPINS, ESQ. Paul Hastings LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166 Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording, transcript produced by transcription service. **Fiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc. Shelton, CT 06484 (203)732-6461**\n\nAPPEARANCES: (Cont'd) For Lamp Capital and ROBERT J. GRAND, ESQ. Infinity Treasury ROBERT RUSH MILLER, ESQ. Management: Lax & Neville LLP 350 Fifth Avenue Suite 4640 New York, NY 10118 For the U.S. Trustee: HOLLEY L. CLAIBORN, ESQ. Office of U.S. Trustee The Giaimo Federal Building 150 Court Street, Room 302 New Haven, CT 06510 For Hudson Diamond NY, LLC, JAMES M. MORIARTY, ESQ. Hudson Diamond Holding, LLC AARON ROMNEY, ESQ. Leading Shine NY Ltd. and Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. Mei Guo: 10 Middle Street, 15th FL Bridgeport, CT 06604\n\n2\n\n| # 2475 | Interim Application for Compensation First Interim
Fee Application for Pallas Partners, LLP, Other
Professional, Fee: \\$318,591.60, Expenses: \\$4,953.04 |\n|--------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | |\n| #
4 | Pretrial Conference |\n| # 18 | Motion for Default Judgment by the Court Pursuant |\n| | To Fed R. Civ. P.55(b)(2) against Lamp Capital LLC |\n| | And Infinity Treasury Management, Inc. |\n| # 30 | Motion to Set Aside Default Filed by Aaron Romney |\n| # 42 | Motion to Set Aside Default Filed by Robert J. Grand |\n| | |\n\n3\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 4 of 111\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 4 (Proceedings commenced at 1:05 p.m.) THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Case No. 22-50073, Ho Wan Kwok, and Adversary No. 23-5023, Despins versus Lamp Capital, LLC, et al. THE COURT: All right. Good afternoon, everyone. If we could have appearances for the record, starting with the Chapter 11 Trustee, please. MR. DESPINS: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Luc Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee. MR. BASSETT: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Nick Bassett from Paul Hastings, counsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee. And Your Honor, I wanted to note that our co- counsel, Mr. Lindsey, was planning to be here, but unfortunately was in a car accident on the way to the courtroom. THE COURT: Oh. MR. BASSETT: He is okay. THE COURT: Well, that's good. I'm glad to hear that. MR. BASSETT: But due to that, unable to be here like he had planned to be. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. MS. CLAIBORN: Good afternoon. Holley Claiborn for the U.S. Trustee.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 5 of 111\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 5 THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. GRAND: Good afternoon. Robert Grand from Lax & Neville, for Lamp Capital and Infinity Treasury Management. THE COURT: Good afternoon. THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: I'm sorry. I didn't catch your last name? MR. GRAND: Grand, G-R-A-N-D. THE COURT: And Mr. Grand, we, in this courtroom, everything is audio. So if I can't hear you, I'm going to ask you to speak up because it's the only way we can keep a record in this case. All of our records are audio recordings. Okay? MR. GRAND: Yes. Thank you. THE COURT: Thank you. MR. MILLER: Your Honor, by video, Robert Miller, of Lax & Neville, for Lamp Capital and Infinity Treasury. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. MORIARTY: Good afternoon, Your Honor. MR. ROMNEY: Good afternoon. MR. MORIARTY: Sorry. Good afternoon, Your Honor. James Moriarty, from Zeisler & Zeisler, for Hudson Diamond New York, LLC, Hudson Diamond Holding, LLC, Leading Shine New York, Limited, and Mei Guo.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 6 of 111\n\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024
6 |\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | THE COURT:
Good afternoon. |\n| 2 | MR. ROMNEY:
Good afternoon, Your Honor.
Aaron |\n| 3 | Romney, Zeisler & Zeisler, for the same parties. |\n| 4 | THE COURT:
Good afternoon. |\n| 5 | Mr. Moriarty, Mr. Romney, is anyone from Mr. |\n| 6 | Vartan's office going to be here today? |\n| 7 | MR. ROMNEY:
No, Your Honor. |\n| 8 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Then I just wanted to note for |\n| 9 | the record that Mr. Vartan and Ms. Wernick filed notices of |\n| 10 | appearance on behalf of Holdings and Ms. Guo, but not on |\n| 11 | behalf of New York, Hudson Diamond New York, even though |\n| 12 | they filed -- they signed a pleading recently, I think it |\n| 13 | was the response, where they filed -- it was signed on |\n| 14 | behalf of all three parties, all three defendants, Hudson |\n| 15 | Diamond Holdings, Hudson Diamond New York, and Ms. Guo, so |\n| 16 | we need that to be remedied.
Okay? |\n| 17 | MR. ROMNEY:
Understood, Your Honor. |\n| 18 | THE COURT:
All right. |\n| 19 | MR. ROMNEY:
We'll get their appearances in I |\n| 20 | imagine by the end of the day.
Thank you. |\n| 21 | THE COURT:
That's fine.
I just want to make |\n| 22 | sure, because the notices of appearance only appear -- they |\n| 23 | only reflect an appearance on behalf of Holdings and Ms. |\n| 24 | Guo, where the subsequently filed pleading is signed by Mr. |\n| 25 | Vartan on behalf of all three of the defendants. |\n| | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 7 of 111\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 7 MR. ROMNEY: Understood, Your Honor. I believe, just the background of that, was that their pro hac applications for Holdings and Ms. Guo had been granted prior, whereas, the pro hac application for New York was just granted yesterday. THE COURT: Well, maybe. Okay. Maybe that's the reason then. Okay. Fine. Thank you. Just when you -- we just want to make that -- we want to have that remedied so that the record is accurate. MR. ROMNEY: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. All right, then, on the calendar today, in the matter, are -- is the interim application for compensation. And then the originally scheduled pretrial conference, which is always scheduled by the Court Clerk's Office when a summons is issued in connection with an adversary proceeding. And obviously we then have motions to address in the adversary proceeding. So Mr. Bassett, are we proceeding with the application for compensation first? MR. DESPINS: Yes, Your Honor. I'll handle that. THE COURT: Oh, okay. Sorry. Okay. Go ahead, Trustee Despins. MR. DESPINS: Okay. Your Honor, this is the application, docket No. 2475, of Pallas Partners, that was\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 8 of 111\n\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024
8 |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | filed on December 27th.
And the relief sought in that |\n| 2 | application of compensation, the amount of 318,591.
But |\n| 3 | that was for practically a one-year period from January to |\n| 4 | November, end of November.
And also reimbursement of |\n| 5 | expense of 4,952.80. |\n| 6 | Now, the U.S. Trustee had some comments on the |\n| 7 | application and she actually negotiated a reduction of the |\n| 8 | fees for Pallas from 318,591 to 305,791, a reduction of |\n| 9 | 12,800, and a reduction of expenses of 4,927, because those |\n| 10 | expenses were the expenses of the barrister and that he will |\n| 11 | seek reimbursements for his fees separately. |\n| 12 | And, Your Honor, you never deal with that firm, |\n| 13 | Pallas, so I think it's worth spending just two minutes on |\n| 14 | it, you know -- they're our U.K. counsel in the UBS |\n| 15 | litigation. |\n| 16 | And over the last year, you know, they've assisted |\n| 17 | us in trying, you know, trying to get attorney-client |\n| 18 | privileged reports from the law firm that represented Mr. |\n| 19 | Kwok and the other -- the other plaintiffs in that |\n| 20 | litigation against to UBS. |\n| 21 | They've also assisted us recently in filing a |\n| 22 | motion to seek a stay of that litigation. |\n| 23 | Because the point that we're making is that it |\n| 24 | makes no sense to go forward with that litigation in a |\n| 25 | situation where there's a disagreement as to who controls |\n| | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 9 of 111\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 9 that litigation, in the sense that our view, based on your decision, is that the Trustee owns Ace Decade and Dawn State. But there's a law firm in the U.K. appearing on behalf of Ace Decade. They won't say who's -- who they're taking instructions from, but they say they represent Ace Decade and they're opposing us. So we filed this motion for a stay in the U.K. courts basically saying we need to resolve this issue once and for all as to who owns Ace Decade, and also to avoid the transfer that Yvette Wang did of the shares of Ace Decade back in January of 2023. You may recall that. So we filed an adversary proceeding before Your Honor seeking that relief that will take its own course. You know, I don't know if Ms. Wang will default or not, but -- so the defendants are Ace Decade, Ms. Wang, and also a gentleman that is now the holder of the stock of Ace Decade who is located in Switzerland. So that's what's happening. That's the worst that they've enjoined for us in the U.K. And unless Your Honor has questions, we would ask the Court to approve the application as modified per the U.S. Trustee discussions. THE COURT: I do not have any questions at the moment. Thank you. Ms. Claiborn?\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 10 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 10 MS. CLAIBORN: Your Honor, just to add to the record, the statement that I filed that confirms the presentation Trustee Despins just gave is at ECF 2502. And to put a finer point on the heart of it that deals with expenses, the barrister, Paul Wright, will be seeking reimbursement of those expenses with his own fee application that will be filed in the future. So it's not going to be awarded as part of this fee application. THE COURT: Is there a revised, proposed order? MS. CLAIBORN: I haven't yet seen one. I'm assuming that Trustee Despins' camp is in the process of putting them together. MR. DESPINS: Yeah. Your Honor, we don't have one right now, but we'll submit it to the Court after showing it to Attorney Claiborn. THE COURT: Okay. MS. CLAIBORN: Thank you. THE COURT: That's fine. With regard to the interim application for compensation, I have reviewed the application for compensation and the fees. And now the expenses are going to be sought separately, so I'm just dealing with the fees, Attorney Claiborn, is that correct? MS. CLAIBORN: There is a small award of expenses.\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 11 It's \\$26. THE COURT: Okay. So I think that's reasonable. MS. CLAIBORN: But the rest of it will be subject to a future application by the barrister, Paul Wright. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Then the fees and the \\$26 in expenses that are going to be sought to be approved, that are sought to be approved, not going to be, that are sought to be approved, I find are reasonable and necessary under the circumstances of this case and the related proceedings in the U.K. The application was properly served. The notice of hearing was served. No one filed any objection to the application for compensation. The objection deadline was January 16, 2024. There were no objections filed. There was no -- there were no responses filed. Nothing was filed in connection with the interim application for compensation. As noted on the record by the Chapter 11 Trustee and the Office of the United States Trustee, there is a reduction in the fees that were sought in dollar amount in the application and that the parties will be submitting a revised proposed order that will memorialize that agreement. And I did see that the United States Trustee's Case 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 11 of\n\n Office did file a statement of no objection with regard to the reduced fees that appears at 2502 on the docket of this Chapter 11 case.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 12 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 12 So for all those reasons, the interim application for compensation is granted and the revised proposed order will be submitted to the Court. You can submit it to the courtroom deputy email box. You don't need to file it on the docket. But just make sure, as I think Trustee Despins already said he would, that Attorney Claiborn will be shown the order and cc'd on the submission of the order to the Court. So that application is granted. MR. DESPINS: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you. So then the pretrial conference that's on the calendar, really, as I said already with regard to the adversary proceeding commenced against the defendants Lamp Capital and others, that's the original, scheduled, pretrial conference. Obviously, there's a lot of things that have already happened in this pretrial -- in this adversary proceeding, excuse me, and we don't necessarily have to have a pretrial conference in the vein that we would normally talk about, has anybody filed a responsive pleading, what are discovery issues, and are we going to enter into a pretrial order, when we have other matters. I already know what the status of the adversary proceeding is in general. Obviously, defaults have entered.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 13 of\n\n| | 111 |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024
13 |\n| 1 | And now on the calendar is a motion for a default |\n| 2 | judgment and two motions to set aside default. |\n| 3 | So Attorney Bassett, I assume that you would |\n| 4 | obviously like the Court to enter a default judgment, but |\n| 5 | you also acknowledge that motions to set aside the defaults |\n| 6 | have been filed and are on the calendar, correct? |\n| 7 | MR. BASSETT:
Yes.
That's correct, Your Honor. |\n| 8 | Obviously, we'll take up the motion for default |\n| 9 | judgment against Lamp Capital and Infinity Treasury |\n| 10 | Management today, as well as their response to that, |\n| 11 | accompanied by a Rule 55(c) motion to set aside default. |\n| 12 | And we also, as the Court noted, had the motion to set |\n| 13 | aside default by Defendant Leading Shine. |\n| 14 | There are also the other three defendants, Mei Guo |\n| 15 | and the two Hudson Diamond entities, who have filed a motion |\n| 16 | to dismiss. |\n| 17 | I have actually conferred with Attorney Moriarty |\n| 18 | and we have -- we're both in agreement that pending that |\n| 19 | motion to dismiss, the case should proceed forward as to |\n| 20 | those defendants in both of our views and, therefore, our |\n| 21 | plan was to coordinate as to a litigation schedule and have |\n| 22 | something to submit to the Court shortly. |\n| 23 | But other than that, I don't think there's |\n| 24 | anything else that needs to be done today by way of a |\n| 25 | pretrial conference. |\n| | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 14 of\n\n| | 111 |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024
14 |\n| 1 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Thank you. |\n| 2 | Does anyone else wish to be heard on the pretrial |\n| 3 | conference issues as opposed to the specific motions on the |\n| 4 | calendar? |\n| 5 | MR. ROMNEY:
No, Your Honor. |\n| 6 | THE COURT:
Thank you. |\n| 7 | All right.
So I'm not going to schedule any |\n| 8 | further pretrial conferences at this time.
The parties can |\n| 9 | always request a conference, which may or may not be |\n| 10 | granted, but, there's no need, given the activity in the |\n| 11 | adversary proceeding, to schedule a further pretrial |\n| 12 | conference at this time. |\n| 13 | So Attorney Bassett, obviously, the calendar |\n| 14 | appears -- the motion for default judgment appears first, |\n| 15 | but there's the motions to set aside default as well, so how |\n| 16 | do you propose to proceed? |\n| 17 | MR. BASSETT:
I would propose, Your Honor, and, |\n| 18 | obviously, subject to the Court's preferences, to go ahead |\n| 19 | and proceed with the motion for default judgment because |\n| 20 | sequentially that's how the pleadings were filed, the papers |\n| 21 | were filed on the docket. |\n| 22 | The response to that motion by Lamp Capital and |\n| 23 | Infinity Treasury Management really sort of responds by |\n| 24 | raising the 55(c) issue, so, therefore, I can address the |\n| 25 | default, you know, the response, the arguments and response |\n| | |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 15 to the 55(c), and then, you know, counsel could respond to that, and then we could address Leading Shine second, if that works for the Court. THE COURT: All right. Go right ahead then. MR. BASSETT: Your Honor, may I approach the podium? THE COURT: Yes, please. MR. BASSETT: Again, Good afternoon, Your Honor. And for the record, it's Nick Bassett from Paul Hastings on behalf of the Chapter 11 Trustee. Your Honor, the -- I would say both of the matters that we have before the Court today are unfortunately part of what is becoming a disturbing trend in these cases. It is a trend in which an entity that the Trustee has alleged to be a shell company of the debtor, and which has all kinds of connections to the debtor and to other parties and individuals who have appeared in pleadings and in evidence throughout the course of the year plus of these cases, are selectively deciding when to participate in these cases and when not to. 21 In both cases, we have defendants here who were previously served with 2004 discovery, were previously served with subpoenas, those subpoenas were ignored. In the case of Lamp Capital, they were held in contempt of court and liable for the Trustee's fees. They Case 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 15 of\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 16 of\n\n| | 111 |\n|----|------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024
16 |\n| 1 | never appeared.
They never did anything.
And Lamp Capital, |\n| 2 | by the way, is a company that, as the Court will recall and |\n| 3 | as we have put out in our papers, actually paid the debtor's |\n| 4 | counsels' fees to file this bankruptcy case.
They remain |\n| 5 | silent.
They refuse to participate.
They did not allow the |\n| 6 | Trustee to get discovery to which he was entitled.
We |\n| 7 | served a complaint and, again, nothing, no response. |\n| 8 | They now belatedly appear and ask to be heard late |\n| 9 | when convenient for them. |\n| 10 | This trend, Your Honor, shows an utter contempt |\n| 11 | for the rule of law, for the procedures of this court, and |\n| 12 | for the Court's authority.
It has to stop. |\n| 13 | The motion for default judgment that the Trustee |\n| 14 | filed as to Lamp Capital and Infinity Treasury Management |\n| 15 | should be granted because all of the requirements for a |\n| 16 | default judgment have been satisfied. |\n| 17 | First of all, and I don't think there's any |\n| 18 | question about this, the complaint was properly served.
The |\n| 19 | complaint was filed on October 26th, 2023.
The summons was |\n| 20 | issued on October 31st, 2023. |\n| 21 | And the complaint was served the same day, |\n| 22 | pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b)(1)(B), |\n| 23 | which authorizes service on a -- on a corporation or an LLC |\n| 24 | by delivering service of process to its agent authorized by |\n| 25 | appointment or law to receive process. |\n| | |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 17 Here, the Trustee served the complaint and summons on each of Lamp Capital's and Infinity Treasury Management's registered agents. In the case of, this is out in the papers, in the case of Infinity Treasury Management, the Trustee did received correspondence from the registered agent in response saying that Infinity Treasury Management was no longer licensed to do business in Delaware. But that registered agent remained the registered agent of Infinity Treasury Management according to Delaware State Records and, therefore, pursuant to Delaware law, a statute which we cite in our papers, service is effective because that registered agent remained the registered agent at the time of service. And again, I don't believe there's really a dispute about that, so service was proper. It's also no dispute that a default occurred. The answer deadline, based on the service of the summons and the complaint and their issuance on October 31st, was November 30th, 2023 under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 12. That deadline was unquestionably not met. Now, the last element for a default judgment is for the Trustee to demonstrate that its complaint makes a prima facie showing that its claims are sufficient as a matter of law. And the Trustee's complaint here far exceeds Case 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 17 of\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 2539 | Filed 01/31/24 | Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 | Page 18 of |\n|---------------|----------|----------------|---------------------------|------------|\n|---------------|----------|----------------|---------------------------|------------|\n\n| | 111 |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024
18 |\n| 1 | that showing to demonstrate that Lamp Capital is both -- or |\n| 2 | is the alter ego of the debtor, or alternatively that the |\n| 3 | debtor beneficially owned and controlled Lamp Capital. |\n| 4 | The Court is familiar with this standard from many |\n| 5 | past adversary proceedings we've already had in this case, |\n| 6 | but the standard for determining whether or not an alter ego |\n| 7 | exists under Delaware law includes two primary elements. |\n| 8 | The first of which is to show that the entity in |\n| 9 | question operated as a single economic unit with the person |\n| 10 | who allegedly uses that entity as its alter ego.
As the |\n| 11 | Court is aware, there are a list of factors that are |\n| 12 | considered.
None of those factors is dispositive and they |\n| 13 | are also not exhaustive. |\n| 14 | The second element of the alter ego analysis under |\n| 15 | Delaware law is to show that there's an element of injustice |\n| 16 | or unfairness that has been perpetuated by the use of the |\n| 17 | entity as the alter ego. |\n| 18 | Both of those requirements are amply satisfied by |\n| 19 | the allegations in the Trustee's complaint as to Lamp |\n| 20 | Capital and Infinity Treasury Management. |\n| 21 | First of all -- and by the way, the thrust of the |\n| 22 | claim in the complaint is that Lamp Capital is the debtor's |\n| 23 | alter ego -- and I'll get to this later -- but Infinity |\n| 24 | Treasury Management is named as a defendant because it is |\n| 25 | nominally the sole member of Lamp Capital and, therefore, we |\n| | |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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19 |\n| 1 | need an order from this court causing Infinity Treasury |\n| 2 | Management to turn over its interest in Lamp Capital to the |\n| 3 | estate. |\n| 4 | As to Lamp Capital and the allegations that it |\n| 5 | operated as a single economic unit with the debtor, Lamp |\n| 6 | Capital was created by the debtor with his own counsel in |\n| 7 | September 2020.
As I said, the sole member of Lamp Capital |\n| 8 | is Infinity Treasury Management.
A sole shareholder of |\n| 9 | Infinity Treasury Management is the debtor's son. |\n| 10 | Lamp Capital at all times operated from the same |\n| 11 | address as the debtor's other shell companies, including |\n| 12 | Golden Spring and HK (USA), both of which have already been |\n| 13 | adjudged to be the debtor's alter egos. |\n| 14 | Lamp Capital, as alleged in the complaint, |\n| 15 | operated through the same individuals acting at the debtor's |\n| 16 | direction, who have taken instruction from the debtor for |\n| 17 | his other shell companies.
That includes Daniel Podowsky |\n| 18 | and Max Krasner with whom the Court is intimately familiar |\n| 19 | based on other allegations and other evidence presented in |\n| 20 | this case. |\n| 21 | The complaint alleges that Lamp Capital did not |\n| 22 | operate as a business or generate any revenue.
The sole |\n| 23 | purpose of Lamp Capital rather was to make and receive |\n| 24 | transfers on behalf of the debtor.
It effectively was a |\n| 25 | shell company used to fund the debtor's lavish spending and |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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20 |\n| 1 | his shell game that he has used to keep assets from |\n| 2 | creditors.
It's essentially his piggy bank. |\n| 3 | Lamp Capital, as alleged in the complaint, in |\n| 4 | fact, made transfers to fund the debtor's luxurious |\n| 5 | lifestyle, including transfers that funded the debtor's use |\n| 6 | of the Bombardier private jet, which is the subject of |\n| 7 | another adversary proceeding, and also the Lady May, which |\n| 8 | this court has already determined the debtor owns. |\n| 9 | In addition, Lamp Capital has funded prepaid debit |\n| 10 | cards for the debtor's family. |\n| 11 | And finally, as I mentioned before, Your Honor, |\n| 12 | Lamp Capital, in fact, funded the debtor's own expenses to |\n| 13 | commence this Chapter 11 case. |\n| 14 | Based on those allegations and others in the |\n| 15 | complaint, I think there's no doubt that we've more than |\n| 16 | satisfied our pleading burden to demonstrate that Lamp |\n| 17 | Capital is, in fact, the alter ego of the debtor. |\n| 18 | And by the way, the second requirement of the |\n| 19 | alter ego analysis that the entity be used for a fraudulent |\n| 20 | or otherwise unjust purpose is also satisfied. |\n| 21 | Again, Lamp Capital, consistent with a number of |\n| 22 | the other entities that this court is familiar with that are |\n| 23 | involved in this case, was used as an instrumental part of |\n| 24 | the debtor's shell game in order to help fund his lifestyle, |\n| 25 | pay his expenses, transfer funds to his other companies, to |\n| | |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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21 |\n| 1 | his family, to his relatives.
It was an instrumental part |\n| 2 | of keeping assets from his creditors and that more than |\n| 3 | satisfies that second requirement of the alter ego analysis. |\n| 4 | In response to the motion for default judgment, |\n| 5 | Your Honor, the defendants I would say don't really -- they |\n| 6 | don't really respond to the motion for a default judgment |\n| 7 | per se other than to assert their Rule 55(c) motion to |\n| 8 | vacate the default. |\n| 9 | And as the Court is now well familiar from |\n| 10 | argument we've had in the HK -- HCHK adversary proceeding, |\n| 11 | there, in the Second Circuit, are three primary elements |\n| 12 | that a court will consider in determining whether a movant |\n| 13 | has satisfied its burden of demonstrating good cause to |\n| 14 | vacate a default. |\n| 15 | The first is whether the default was willful.
The |\n| 16 | second is whether the movant has a meritorious defense.
And |\n| 17 | the third, which need not be considered if there is no |\n| 18 | meritorious defense, is whether there is prejudice to the |\n| 19 | plaintiff.
I'll take each of those elements quickly in |\n| 20 | turn. |\n| 21 | As to willfulness, despite what you would see in |\n| 22 | the papers and despite arguments that have been made by |\n| 23 | others, under Second Circuit law there is no requirement to |\n| 24 | show bad faith, which I don't know that that matters, |\n| 25 | because I would argue there is bad faith here anyway.
But |\n\n### Case 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 22 of\n\n| | 111 |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024
22 |\n| 1 | clearly under Second Circuit law bad faith is not required. |\n| 2 | Rather, what the courts look at, and you can look |\n| 3 | at the Bricklayers case, Second Circuit from 2015 that we |\n| 4 | cite in our papers, is it requires conduct that is, quote, |\n| 5 | \"Not satisfactorily explained deliberate conduct.
Conduct |\n| 6 | that is not excusable based on mere mistake or negligence.\" |\n| 7 | In response -- in their motion for -- to vacate |\n| 8 | the default judgment, Your Honor, all Lamp Capital and |\n| 9 | Infinity Treasury Management do is they have asserted in a |\n| 10 | brief filed by counsel, with no supporting affidavit, no |\n| 11 | statement from any individual, no sworn testimony from any |\n| 12 | representative of these entities, they have simply stated |\n| 13 | that notwithstanding that service was proper, they did not |\n| 14 | have actual notice of the complaint and, therefore, they |\n| 15 | were unable to respond on time. |\n| 16 | Your Honor, under the circumstances of these |\n| 17 | defendants and of this case, that is woefully insufficient |\n| 18 | for these defendants to satisfy their burden to demonstrate |\n| 19 | that the default was not willful. |\n| 20 | Again, service was proper. |\n| 21 | And critically here, Your Honor, these defendants |\n| 22 | are not at all strangers to this Chapter 11 case.
They are |\n| 23 | ultimately owned by the debtor's son who undoubtedly, no |\n| 24 | question, has knowledge about this Chapter 11 case.
Lamp |\n| 25 | Capital also funded the case by paying Brown Rudnick's legal |\n| | |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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23 |\n| 1 | fees prior to the case's commencement. |\n| 2 | Lamp Capital and Infinity Treasury Management have |\n| 3 | been named in numerous pleadings that the Trustee has filed |\n| 4 | in adversary proceedings and otherwise. |\n| 5 | Based on those circumstances, there is no credible |\n| 6 | argument that these entities had no idea that this |\n| 7 | litigation was commenced. |\n| 8 | And what's most telling about all of this is that |\n| 9 | not only is there no affidavit, no sworn declaration, but |\n| 10 | the brief submitted by counsel that simply says they didn't |\n| 11 | have actual notice doesn't contain any of the background or |\n| 12 | surrounding information. |\n| 13 | There is nothing at all in the brief about how or |\n| 14 | when these defendants ultimately did receive actual notice |\n| 15 | of the complaint because obviously they have it now, they're |\n| 16 | here. |\n| 17 | There's no statement about who all of a sudden |\n| 18 | alerted, allegedly, Lamp Capital and Infinity Treasury |\n| 19 | Management to this complaint. |\n| 20 | We had a meet and confer with counsel on December |\n| 21 | 22nd I believe it was, or thereabouts, when he first |\n| 22 | contacted the Trustee, after the deadline to respond to the |\n| 23 | complaint, and we asked when were you first contacted about |\n| 24 | this engagement, and by whom, and the response was they had |\n| 25 | no answer. |\n| | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 24 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 24 Your Honor, there are basic details that absolutely need to be explained for these defendants to even come close to meeting their burden on the first factor. Turning to the second factor, Your Honor, this is whether there's a meritorious defense to the causes of action, the case law on this element is very clear that something more than a conclusory denial is required. Defendants, rather, must come forward with evidence to show their defense. You can look at the *Bailey's Express* case that we cite, quote, \"Formulaic recitations of affirmative defenses fall short.\" In that case, the defendant filed an answer with its motion to lift the default, along with nine affirmative defenses, the Court still said that was not enough because it was simply boilerplate denials. Cases are legion in supporting that same proposition. *State Street Bank*, Second Circuit 2004, 374 F.3d. 158, same concept. *Sony Corporation*, Second Circuit 1986, all these are cited in our papers, same concept. Here, Your Honor, we don't have any facts of any kind to suggest that, you know, Lamp Capital and Infinity Treasury Management are actual operating companies that have independence from the debtor, that have, you know, bank accounts that they use for particular purposes or, you know, lines of operations that they use for investing, employees,\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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25 |\n| 1 | all the basic facts that any real, legitimate, independent |\n| 2 | entity would know, you see none of that. |\n| 3 | I think that's extremely telling because there is |\n| 4 | no person there.
There is no individual who could come and |\n| 5 | testify to those facts, both because that person doesn't |\n| 6 | exist and because it wouldn't be true.
Because it didn't do |\n| 7 | anything.
It was a slush fund for the debtor. |\n| 8 | What you have instead in response to the complaint |\n| 9 | in the 55(c) motion, are effectively 12(b)(6) failure to |\n| 10 | state a claim arguments. |\n| 11 | And I think that's significant because A, it's |\n| 12 | telling about the fact that there's no defense on the facts, |\n| 13 | and B, it is absolutely 100 percent appropriate for the |\n| 14 | Court to consider and decide those types of arguments on a |\n| 15 | 55(c) motion.
Courts do it all the time.
That's the entire |\n| 16 | point. |\n| 17 | In determining whether a meritorious defense |\n| 18 | exists as a matter of law, the Court has to look at if these |\n| 19 | defenses that are raised, legal defenses, whether they |\n| 20 | actually have merit or not. |\n| 21 | If you look at the State Street Bank case that I |\n| 22 | cited, Second Circuit 2004, there is an extensive, several |\n| 23 | page analysis of the legal issues and arguments raised by |\n| 24 | the movant in its 55(c) motion.
The Court analyzed them and |\n| 25 | said that denial of the motion was proper because a thorough |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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26 |\n| 1 | analysis of those defenses reveals that they fail.
And |\n| 2 | that's the case for each of the defendant's arguments here. |\n| 3 | They argue that Infinity Treasury Management is |\n| 4 | not a proper defendant to the complaint because the Trustee |\n| 5 | pleads few allegations against it. |\n| 6 | But Your Honor, as I described, the Trustee's |\n| 7 | argument and theory in the case is that Lamp Capital is the |\n| 8 | debtor's alter ego and that Infinity Treasury Management is |\n| 9 | the nominal owner of Lamp Capital. |\n| 10 | Infinity Treasury Management is obviously a |\n| 11 | defendant in the complaint because the Trustee needs relief |\n| 12 | against it.
It is holding property, i.e., an ownership |\n| 13 | interest in Lamp Capital that has to be turned over.
That's |\n| 14 | fundamental bankruptcy turnover law.
Of course they're a |\n| 15 | defendant. |\n| 16 | The defendants also argue, they make -- they make |\n| 17 | a couple of arguments that this court has heard in the past |\n| 18 | and already rejected. |\n| 19 | One of them is the argument that under Delaware |\n| 20 | law, there, by definition, cannot be an alter ego finding |\n| 21 | here because the debtor is not alleged to have been the |\n| 22 | nominal owner or an officer or director of these entities. |\n| 23 | The Court already addressed that in HK (USA) and |\n| 24 | rejected it.
There is no such requirement under Delaware |\n| 25 | law that that type of relationship exist in order for an |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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27 |\n| 1 | entity to be found to be the alter ego of another. |\n| 2 | They also argue, Your Honor, that this case is |\n| 3 | distinguishable from the HK (USA), and they argue that that |\n| 4 | must be some reason for the claims here to fail.
But this |\n| 5 | argument, Your Honor, proves nothing. |\n| 6 | As they correctly point out, yes, the cases are |\n| 7 | different.
HK (USA) was a shell company that held title to |\n| 8 | a single asset of the debtor.
Lamp Capital is an entity |\n| 9 | that the debtor used as a shell company to fund his lavish |\n| 10 | lifestyle, to use it as his personal piggy bank. |\n| 11 | The debtor had at least two types of shell |\n| 12 | companies that he used as part of his shell game to avoid |\n| 13 | creditors.
One classic entity is HK (USA), which held title |\n| 14 | to an asset.
Or Greenwich Land, which we've alleged did the |\n| 15 | same for his home in Connecticut.
Or Bravo Luck, which held |\n| 16 | title to the apartment in New York. |\n| 17 | Other types of entities are those that he used as |\n| 18 | his slush funds to transfer assets to and from other shell |\n| 19 | companies to pay for expenses.
One of those, a significant |\n| 20 | one of those, is Lamp Capital.
Different facts, but no less |\n| 21 | an alter ego. |\n| 22 | The final defense that they raise in the nature of |\n| 23 | a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is the in |\n| 24 | pari delicto in Wagoner
rule defenses, which, again, this |\n| 25 | court has already considered and rejected in the HK (USA) |\n| | |\n\n| | Case 22-50073 | Doc 2539 | Filed 01/31/24 | Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 | Page 28 of |\n|--|---------------|----------|----------------|---------------------------|------------|\n|--|---------------|----------|----------------|---------------------------|------------|\n\n| | 111 | | | | | |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|----|--|--|--|--|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 | 28 | | | | |\n| 1 | adversary proceeding. | | | | | |\n| 2 | As the Court correctly concluded, those defenses | | | | | |\n| 3 | do not apply to a defense, sorry, to a claim brought by the | | | | | |\n| 4 | Trustee under Section 544(c) of the Bankruptcy Code on | | | | | |\n| 5 | behalf of creditors.
Moreover, the insider exception to the | | | | | |\n| 6 | in pari delicto doctrine also applies in this case. | | | | | |\n| 7 | So Your Honor, for all of those reasons, there is | | | | | |\n| 8 | no meritorious defense.
All the arguments essentially have | | | | | |\n| 9 | either been rejected by this court previously, or very | | | | | |\n| 10 | clearly fail on their merits because the Trustee has more | | | | | |\n| | | | | | | |\n\n than satisfied his pleading burden of demonstrating that if his allegations are true, he is entitled to relief as a matter of law.\n\n Because of that, the case law is very clear that the Court need not even consider whether there's prejudice to the Trustee. Cases, again, are legion in that regard. The *Bricklayers* case that I mentioned before. The *Bailey's Express* case. *Global Metallurgical* cited in our papers, 327 B.R. 182. All of those cases, and many others, stand for that proposition.\n\n However, if the Court were to consider prejudice, I think there is no doubt that there is, in fact, prejudice to the Trustee here. And what you'll see in the papers is, well, delay alone cannot be prejudice.\n\nBut, here, we're talking about a lot more than\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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29 |\n| 1 | simply delay.
We're talking about gamesmanship by parties, |\n| 2 | as I said at the outset, who are selectively deciding when |\n| 3 | to avail themselves of this court, when to participate in |\n| 4 | the legal process, and when not to. |\n| 5 | And that's especially significant here where you |\n| 6 | have defendants who are asserting, essentially pleading, |\n| 7 | arguments that the Trustee has failure -- has failed to |\n| 8 | state a claim for relief in his complaint. |\n| 9 | And those same defendants are the ones who ducked |\n| 10 | 2004 discovery and subpoenas previously, which the Trustee |\n| 11 | is entitled to as a matter of law and pursuant to court |\n| 12 | orders, and would have been able to use the results of in |\n| 13 | pleading his complaints. |\n| 14 | They can't duck the discovery obligations that |\n| 15 | they owe to this court and to the Trustee and then come in |\n| 16 | belatedly later and ask for the mercy of the Court and to |\n| 17 | participate. |\n| 18 | Notably, we heard nothing from the defendants when |\n| 19 | they first reached out to us, or through today, about how |\n| 20 | they were going to cure the contempt order that they're |\n| 21 | already under, which they obviously can't do at this point |\n| 22 | anyway. |\n| 23 | But Your Honor, there is real prejudice if the |\n| 24 | Court allows this type of conduct to persist.
The |\n| 25 | obstruction that the Trustee has seen from day one in this |\n| | |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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30 |\n| 1 | case is only going to continue and it's only going to get |\n| 2 | worse. |\n| 3 | And we also have significant concerns about |\n| 4 | spoliation of discovery given that these parties have |\n| 5 | refused to comply in the past. |\n| 6 | I don't know why the Court would think that |\n| 7 | they're likely to comply with their discovery obligations in |\n| 8 | this adversary proceeding, so there is prejudice under these |\n| 9 | circumstances. |\n| 10 | But, as I said, it need not be found by the Court |\n| 11 | to enter a default given that the other elements have not |\n| 12 | been satisfied. |\n| 13 | Your Honor, that's all I have at the moment, |\n| 14 | unless the Court has any questions. |\n| 15 | THE COURT:
I'm just looking to see if I have any |\n| 16 | questions.
I think I do not, but I would just like to |\n| 17 | confirm that.
I do not have any questions at this time, |\n| 18 | Attorney Bassett.
Thank you. |\n| 19 | MR. BASSETT:
Thank you, Your Honor. |\n| 20 | THE COURT:
Who's going to respond first. |\n| 21 | MR. GRAND:
Your Honor, Robert Grand -- |\n| 22 | THE COURT:
Okay. |\n| 23 | MR. GRAND:
-- from Lax & Neville on behalf of |\n| 24 | Lamp and Infinity Treasury. |\n| 25 | THE COURT:
You just need to speak more clearly |\n| | |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 31 and closely to the microphone, sir, because I cannot hear you. MR. GRAND: Sure. I can approach over there if that makes it easy. THE COURT: Sure. Thank you. MR. BASSETT: And Your Honor, just to be clear, I did not address the Leading Shine 55(c) motion yet because that's not -- THE COURT: Right. MR. BASSETT: -- subject to our motion for a default judgment. THE COURT: We're just dealing with the default judgment motion right now. MR. BASSETT: Thank you, Your Honor. MR. GRAND: Do you want me to respond to that part, or do you want to have -- THE COURT: Well -- MR. GRAND: -- Trustee's counsel address the Leading Shine motion? THE COURT: -- I want the parties who should be responding to the motion for a default judgment to respond, which are Lamp Capital and Infinity. MR. GRAND: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Again, Robert Grand from Lax & Neville on behalf of Lamp Capital and Infinity Treasury Management. Case 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 31 of\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 32 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 32 So I just want to start with Trustee's counsel's first assertion that these defendants did not essentially respond to the default judgment motion, but only advocated in favor of the application to set aside the default. The reason why the arguments were set forth that way is because the law is clear that when a motion for -- to set aside a default is filed before the default judgment is entered, the standard that the Court should apply in determining whether the default should be set aside is governed by Rule 55(c), not Rule 60(b), which governs default judgment. And the law, Second Circuit law, is clear from the *Enron* case 20 years ago, through cases in this court, and in the District of Connecticut issued within the last year, that the standards, while the factors are the same, whether or not the default was willful, whether or not the plaintiff will suffer prejudice if the default is set aside, and whether or not the defendant has asserted a meritorious defense, all the factors are the same, when addressing a Rule 55(c) motion, the Court applies those standards much less rigorously than if a judgment had already been entered and the defendant is seeking to set aside a default judgment.\n\n So from that framework, the motion to set aside the default addresses those factors, and also was submitted,\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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33 |\n| 1 | the brief that we submitted was submitted also in opposition |\n| 2 | to the default judgment. |\n| 3 | But really we don't need to get to the default |\n| 4 | judgment aspect of it because we first need to decide |\n| 5 | whether or not the default should be set aside.
It's a two |\n| 6 | step process. |\n| 7 | So as we set forth in our papers, it seems clear |\n| 8 | that when applying those standards and giving the deference |\n| 9 | that courts give to resolving cases on their merits, rather |\n| 10 | than through defaults, that these defendants have met each |\n| 11 | of those -- have satisfied each of those factors and that |\n| 12 | they weigh in their favor. |\n| 13 | There's no possible way that the failure to |\n| 14 | respond to the complaint in this case can be determined to |\n| 15 | be willful because, as we set forth in our papers, the |\n| 16 | defendants had no notice of the complaint. |\n| 17 | THE COURT:
What do you mean by that, had no |\n| 18 | notice of the complaint, they were served with the |\n| 19 | complaint. |\n| 20 | MR. GRAND:
Well, with respect to Infinity |\n| 21 | Treasury Management, the Trustee alleges that he served |\n| 22 | their registered agent in New Jersey -- in Delaware.
The |\n| 23 | registered agent in Delaware responded to the Trustee's |\n| 24 | counsel and said -- |\n| 25 | THE COURT:
I understand. |\n| | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 34 of\n\n| | 111 |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024
34 |\n| 1 | MR. GRAND:
-- that Infinity Treasury Management |\n| 2 | is not active.
We don't have any contact information for |\n| 3 | them.
We can't find them. |\n| 4 | THE COURT:
I understand. |\n| 5 | MR. GRAND:
We can't deliver this complaint to |\n| 6 | them, so we're returning it to you. |\n| 7 | THE COURT:
I understand that. |\n| 8 | MR. GRAND:
So Infinity Treasury Management -- |\n| 9 | THE COURT:
But under law, your corporation has an |\n| 10 | obligation to have an agent for service of process.
And if |\n| 11 | your corporation, your client, didn't correct that issue, |\n| 12 | then that's your client's problem. |\n| 13 | The law doesn't say that that doesn't result -- |\n| 14 | show me a case where it says the law says that that equals |\n| 15 | your argument, that it's not notice even though this agent |\n| 16 | was served, the agent that your client listed as the agent |\n| 17 | for service of process? |\n| 18 | MR. GRAND:
The issue is notice, not service. |\n| 19 | Nobody -- |\n| 20 | THE COURT:
No.
The issue isn't notice.
Where's |\n| 21 | the issue of notice, Counsel?
It was served. |\n| 22 | MR. GRAND:
Right. |\n| 23 | THE COURT:
It has to be served under the Federal |\n| 24 | Rules of Civil Procedure -- |\n| 25 | MR. GRAND:
Right. |\n| | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 35 of\n\n| | 111 | |\n|---|---------------------------------------------------|----|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 | 35 |\n| 1 | THE COURT:
-- with a complaint, which you were | |\n\nunder Rule 4, right?\n\nMR. GRAND: Correct.\n\nTHE COURT: Okay. So where do you get to notice?\n\nMR. GRAND: Notice is the -- is whether or not the\n\n default was willful, you have to have notice of a complaint. THE COURT: You were served with the -- are you --\n\nMR. GRAND: But nobody from the company ever\n\nreceived it, so they didn't --\n\n THE COURT: And who -- that's your company's problem.\n\n Show me a case that says what you just said. I'd like to see it.\n\n MR. GRAND: Sure. In *Nature's First* case that we cite, which is at --\n\n THE COURT: Okay. Hold on a second. I really -- I'm serious. It's no problem. I want to see exactly what you're citing, so I want to make sure we're all on the same page.\n\n MR. GRAND: Page 5 of our brief, Your Honor. THE COURT: I don't want the brief. I'm going to look at the case -- MR. GRAND: Okay. THE COURT: -- so hold on a second.\n\nMR. GRAND: Sure.\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 36 THE COURT: Okay. So what is the cite of your -- of the case, please. MR. GRAND: 436 F. Supp. 2nd. 368 at 374-375, it's a District of Connecticut case from 2006 in which -- THE COURT: Hold on a second. Let me get there. *Nature's First*. MR. BASSETT: Could I have the paragraph number of the brief, please. MR. GRAND: It's on page 5. I think it's paragraph 12 where this argument is addressed. THE COURT: Okay. So tell me where in the brief, I'm sorry, Counsel, in the opinion -- MR. GRAND: On pages 374-375. THE COURT: Okay. Give me one second, please. MR. GRAND: And that case was a default judgment actually, and that default judgment was vacated, where the defendant was aware that the action had been filed against -- was not aware, excuse me, that the action had been filed against it until after the plaintiff had obtained a default judgment. THE COURT: Okay. Hold on a second, please. 373 and 374? MR. GRAND: 374-375. THE COURT: So I'm looking at 373 where it says the affidavit submitted by the defendant, and there were no Case 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 36 of\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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37 |\n| 1 | affidavits submitted by the defendant in connection with |\n| 2 | these motions, denied that service was made.
That's what |\n| 3 | the -- on page 373, this decision says, before you get to |\n| 4 | your 374 and 375. |\n| 5 | So Judge Dorsey found that he relied on an |\n| 6 | affidavit by a defendant that denied service was made.
I'm |\n| 7 | looking at the first, full paragraph on page 373 of Nature's |\n| 8 | First, Inc. vs. Nature's First Law, Inc. |\n| 9 | So that's a factual issue that's not present in |\n| 10 | this case.
You haven't denied that service was made.
No |\n| 11 | one has denied that service was made.
And none of the |\n| 12 | defendants have filed any affidavits to support the |\n| 13 | assertions in response to the motion for default judgment. |\n| 14 | So go ahead, what else have you got? |\n| 15 | MR. GRAND:
Well, there's another case that we |\n| 16 | cited there too, the Global Mining, Global Gold Mining case. |\n| 17 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Give me a moment.
What's the |\n| 18 | cite on that? |\n| 19 | MR. GRAND:
That case is 983 F. Supp. 2d. 378 -- |\n| 20 | THE COURT:
983 -- |\n| 21 | MR. GRAND:
-- at 387.
There are also several |\n| 22 | other cases, Your Honor. |\n| 23 | THE COURT:
Hold on.
983 F. Supp. 2d at what? |\n| 24 | MR. GRAND:
387.
It's a Southern District of New |\n| 25 | York case which was affirmed by the Second Circuit. |\n| | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 38 of\n\n| | 111 |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024
38 |\n| 1 | THE COURT:
Well, there was a lack of personal |\n| 2 | jurisdiction in that case according to this decision that |\n| 3 | I'm looking at, so there was a finding that there was a lack |\n| 4 | of personal jurisdiction. |\n| 5 | Where in this case do you want me to look? |\n| 6 | MR. GRAND:
They're showing that -- that case held |\n| 7 | that a showing under default was inadvertent, is sufficient |\n| 8 | to -- |\n| 9 | THE COURT:
Tell me where, what page? |\n| 10 | MR. GRAND:
387. |\n| 11 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Just give me a moment, please. |\n| 12 | So 387, the bottom of 386 onto page 387, starts |\n| 13 | because the lack of personal jurisdiction mandates vacature |\n| 14 | of the default judgment under Rule 60(b)(4), the remaining |\n| 15 | arguments are rendered moot.
That's the -- that's the |\n| 16 | section that you're citing me to. |\n| 17 | So what else do you want me to read there? |\n| 18 | MR. GRAND:
Your Honor, I don't have that case in |\n| 19 | front of me unfortunately, but I -- there are multiple |\n| 20 | cases, multiple cases, that I'm happy to bring to Your |\n| 21 | Honor's attention that -- |\n| 22 | THE COURT:
Well, you've already brought them to |\n| 23 | my attention in your brief. |\n| 24 | MR. GRAND:
Well, I have -- |\n| 25 | THE COURT:
I'm asking you right now, I asked you |\n| | |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 39 specifically, what case holds what you just stated, which is that you have a -- you have to have a lack of notice, not service? That was my question to you. Because there is no assertion in any of these pleadings that you've filed, that any of the defendants have filed, that they weren't served with the complaint. And there's no -- and there are no affidavits of any of the defendants. And the time to do all that has already passed. MR. GRAND: Respectfully, there's no -- there's no requirement under -- THE COURT: Well, how am I going to find a fact that your client didn't have notice if your client isn't going to swear that they didn't get notice and that they weren't served? How am I going to find -- I already found, the default already entered based upon the review of how service was made under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the applicable rules of the state law governing how service needed to be made on these defendants. So your job then would be to controvert that. And your argument to the Court at this point is not that you -- it's not that you weren't served, it's that you didn't have actual notice. And so I asked you where in the cases that you've cited does it hold, does the Second Circuit Court of Appeals Case 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 39 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 40 hold, that you have to have actual notice, and you haven't been able to show me one yet. MR. GRAND: Your Honor, if -- I can -- I can certainly deliver those cases. We did not have -- THE COURT: It's not an issue of delivery. You're here right now. MR. GRAND: I understand. THE COURT: This is the argument. MR. GRAND: We didn't have an opportunity to submit a reply. We got these opposition papers on Friday night and, you know, that was one day, one business day, before the hearing. I'm happy to -- THE COURT: The default entered -- when did the default enter, Counsel? The default entered -- MR. GRAND: In the middle of December I believe. THE COURT: I'll tell you. We'll go back and figure it out. MR. GRAND: I think the default entered on December 14th. MR. BASSETT: That's right. THE COURT: Yeah. December 14th. It's January 23rd. MR. GRAND: Yes. THE COURT: So you've had time. MR. GRAND: To? As soon as we were engaged, we Case 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 40 of\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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41 |\n| 1 | reached out to the Trustee's counsel and conversing with |\n| 2 | them. |\n| 3 | THE COURT:
We don't know when you were engaged. |\n| 4 | And by the way -- and Lamp Capital already |\n| 5 | appeared in the main case.
They were represented by counsel |\n| 6 | at the beginning of this case in 2022. |\n| 7 | So when you say as soon as you were -- you know, |\n| 8 | you have to think a lot about -- |\n| 9 | MR. GRAND:
In this -- not in -- in this case? |\n| 10 | THE COURT:
In the main case, Counsel.
The |\n| 11 | adversary proceeding is another case within the main case. |\n| 12 | MR. GRAND:
Right.
Right.
In a proceeding in New |\n| 13 | York before it was transferred here. |\n| 14 | THE COURT:
No, no, no, no, no, no.
In here in |\n| 15 | Connecticut.
I can go back to the main case in this -- in |\n| 16 | Mr. Kwok's Chapter 11 case and I can find for you, it will |\n| 17 | take me a few minutes, but I can find for you the notice of |\n| 18 | appearance that was filed on behalf of Lamp Capital.
Okay? |\n| 19 | They already appeared in Mr. Kwok's case and then suddenly |\n| 20 | decided to withdraw their appearance. |\n| 21 | So no, not when it was in New York.
When it was |\n| 22 | in this court when Mr. Kwok was the -- was the debtor in |\n| 23 | possession before the Trustee was appointed. |\n| 24 | MR. GRAND:
I mean, look, Your Honor, as I |\n| 25 | explained, we were engaged at the end of December -- |\n| | |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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42 |\n| 1 | THE COURT:
I'm not suggesting anything about you. |\n| 2 | MR. GRAND:
We're new.
We're getting -- |\n| 3 | THE COURT:
I'm saying the facts are what the |\n| 4 | facts are, right? |\n| 5 | MR. GRAND:
Right. |\n| 6 | THE COURT:
When you came into the world to become |\n| 7 | part of this, the facts surrounding Lamp Capital already |\n| 8 | existed.
You had no control over that.
I understand that. |\n| 9 | MR. GRAND:
Right. |\n| 10 | THE COURT:
I'm not suggesting anything to the |\n| 11 | contrary.
However, facts existed.
Lamp Capital funded the |\n| 12 | retainer of the debtor's in possession's counsel.
That was |\n| 13 | all disclosed to this court in pleadings filed under penalty |\n| 14 | of perjury.
Okay.
Then Lamp Capital also had appearance of |\n| 15 | counsel in Mr. Kwok's case. |\n| 16 | So I understand the arguments that you're making. |\n| 17 | But my question to you was, which I still don't |\n| 18 | have an answer to, so I'm beginning to believe there isn't |\n| 19 | an answer, which is where is a case that says that you have |\n| 20 | to have actual notice, because I have never seen one. |\n| 21 | Because otherwise -- |\n| 22 | MR. GRAND:
I can supply you with one. |\n| 23 | THE COURT:
-- you would defeat the whole purpose |\n| 24 | -- |\n| 25 | MR. GRAND:
I don't have -- |\n| | |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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43 |\n| 1 | THE COURT:
-- you'd defeat the whole purpose of |\n| 2 | Rule 55, that's what you'd be -- |\n| 3 | You're saying I have to have actual notice?
Then |\n| 4 | what's the point of Rule 55?
There's no point. |\n| 5 | You're taking the policy of Rule 55 and throwing |\n| 6 | it out the window and saying -- and there's nothing in any |\n| 7 | Second Circuit case that I've seen that says that the |\n| 8 | defendant has to have actual notice.
It makes no sense, |\n| 9 | Counsel.
It makes absolutely no sense. |\n| 10 | Because that's the whole reason you have an agent |\n| 11 | for service of process.
You are a corporate entity.
You |\n| 12 | have to file certain documents and follow corporate |\n| 13 | regulations and statutes in order to be granted the benefits |\n| 14 | of being a corporate entity.
And one of those burdens of |\n| 15 | being a corporate entity is you have to have an agent for |\n| 16 | service of process. |\n| 17 | And to be -- and to come here and say, well, we |\n| 18 | didn't have an agent for service of process in place |\n| 19 | anymore, that's the company's problem. |\n| 20 | MR. GRAND:
That's not what I -- that's not what |\n| 21 | -- |\n| 22 | THE COURT:
Well, that's what you just said. |\n| 23 | MR. GRAND:
No. |\n| 24 | THE COURT:
You just said -- |\n| 25 | MR. GRAND:
No. |\n| | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 44 of\n\n| | 111 | | | | |\n|----|---------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|--|--|--|\n| | | Ho Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024
44 | | | |\n| 1 | THE COURT: | No, you did.
Because you said | | | |\n| 2 | | counsel's even admitted that he got a response from the | | | |\n| 3 | | agent of service of process who says they don't have a -- | | | |\n| 4 | they're not their registered agent anymore. | | | | |\n| 5 | MR. GRAND: | No.
That's not what they said. | | | |\n| 6 | THE COURT: | What did they say then? | | | |\n| 7 | MR. GRAND: | They said that we can't find Infinity | | | |\n| 8 | Treasury Management. | They are no longer active in Delaware. | | | |\n| 9 | | And we don't have any contact information for -- to deliver | | | |\n| 10 | the complaint -- | | | | |\n| 11 | THE COURT: | Right. | | | |\n| 12 | MR. GRAND: | -- that you served on us. | | | |\n| 13 | THE COURT: | All right.
But that doesn't mean that | | | |\n| 14 | it wasn't served. | | | | |\n| 15 | MR. GRAND: | So they're a defunct entity.
I didn't | | | |\n| 16 | -- | | | | |\n| 17 | THE COURT: | It doesn't mean it wasn't served. | | | |\n| 18 | MR. GRAND: | We're not contesting service. | | | |\n| 19 | THE COURT: | Well, then you don't -- | | | |\n| 20 | MR. GRAND: | I can -- | | | |\n| 21 | THE COURT: | -- have an argument on notice. | | | |\n| 22 | Where's the -- show me a case. | | | | |\n| 23 | MR. GRAND: | I don't have it in front of me today. | | | |\n| 24 | THE COURT: | Well, that's -- | | | |\n| 25 | MR. GRAND: | Your Honor -- | | | |\n| | | | | | |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 45 THE COURT: -- today's the day. MR. GRAND: -- we did not have an opportunity to submit -- THE COURT: Today's the day. MR. GRAND: I can happily supply you with -- THE COURT: I don't want you -- I don't -- this -- MR. GRAND: -- multiple cases that stand for that proposition. THE COURT: Okay. Well, I think you're wrong. And you go ahead and make the rest of your argument then. MR. GRAND: Okay. So that argument is, obviously, those two defendants, which we believe are inactive companies, could not have responded to a complaint that they never actually received, so the failure to do so was not willful. And then it's upon learning about that complaint, they, the entities, sought to retain counsel and immediately sought to defend against the merits of the case. So when it comes to the next factor, legal prejudice, there's really no meaningful delay here in this case that would fall under -- that would cause that factor to weigh in favor of the Trustee. Excuse me for one minute. As we explained in our papers, as soon as we were engaged, reached out to Trustee's counsel, and sought to get\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 45 of\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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46 |\n| 1 | more time to respond to the complaint.
This was Friday, on |\n| 2 | December 22nd, the Friday before the Christmas holiday.
And |\n| 3 | when we finally did connect later in that day, my colleague |\n| 4 | was unavailable. |\n| 5 | And in any event, Mr. Lindsey, Trustee's counsel, |\n| 6 | said that if we wanted to discuss any of the merits in terms |\n| 7 | of getting more time, the default, any of the procedural |\n| 8 | posture of the case, we'd need to loop in New York counsel, |\n| 9 | the Paul Hastings folks. |\n| 10 | So Mr. Lindsey followed up with an email to me on |\n| 11 | Saturday night, the next night, looping in Trustee's |\n| 12 | counsel.
We reached out to them on the 26th, the day after |\n| 13 | Christmas, sought to have a conversation.
And I think I |\n| 14 | sent an email.
And 15 or 20 minutes after I sent the email, |\n| 15 | before I heard a response, the motion for default judgment |\n| 16 | was filed. |\n| 17 | We did speak the next day.
And when we conferred |\n| 18 | the next day, we, you know, said that we were appearing on |\n| 19 | behalf of Infinity and on behalf of Lamp, sought additional |\n| 20 | time to respond to the complaint, sought to have the Trustee |\n| 21 | withdraw the default because the defendants were intending |\n| 22 | to defend the case on the merits, and the Trustee declined |\n| 23 | to do that. |\n| 24 | We then filed our move to get admitted as quickly |\n| 25 | as we could during the holiday week, filed our appearances |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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47 |\n| 1 | as quickly as we could, and timely filed our motion for -- |\n| 2 | to set aside the default well in advance of the deadline |\n| 3 | that the Court had set to respond to the motion for a |\n| 4 | default judgment. |\n| 5 | So there's really no meaningful delay here that |\n| 6 | would cause any prejudice to the Trustee should they have to |\n| 7 | reopen the default and prosecute the case on the merits. |\n| 8 | And, indeed, the case law is clear that having to prosecute |\n| 9 | a case on the merits is not sufficient prejudice when |\n| 10 | opposing a motion to vacate a default. |\n| 11 | And so, you know, the other prejudice that the |\n| 12 | Trustee argues it will suffer in terms of what the standard |\n| 13 | is, excuse me, is that the non-defaulting party here must |\n| 14 | show that it will -- its ability to prosecute its case will |\n| 15 | be impeded by either the loss of evidence, or increased |\n| 16 | difficulties with discovery, or a greater opportunity for |\n| 17 | fraud and collusion, and there's no showing here of any of |\n| 18 | those things.
I mean, the -- |\n| 19 | THE COURT:
Hasn't your client already been held |\n| 20 | in contempt by this court for failure to comply with |\n| 21 | discovery, Counsel? |\n| 22 | MR. GRAND:
Yes. |\n| 23 | THE COURT:
Okay. |\n| 24 | MR. GRAND:
And if we -- and that's -- I |\n| 25 | understand that, but that hasn't -- but opening the default |\n| | |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 48 won't -- the Trustee needs to show that opening the default will result in additional, you know, loss of discovery, and that sort of makes no sense. I don't have -- you know, I don't -- we were not involved, you know, a year ago when Infinity -- or when Lamp was served was this Rule 2004 subpoena. I don't know why it didn't respond one way or another. But we're here now. We're happy to respond to those discovery requests and to do discovery in the context of the case as a party. So I -- there's really no evidence or showing that -- that there's going to be any -- just the opposite. Now that -- now that -- you know, I mean, look, the Trustee has already, you know, uncovered -- THE COURT: Couldn't your client have already provided all the information to the Trustee in order to purge itself of contempt? You now -- you now want the default set aside so that they're going to have to serve discovery requests to which you're going to oppose? That's what your -- that's what your argument is? MR. GRAND: No. My argument is that we will -- we will participate in discovery and comply with whatever's ordered. THE COURT: Well, you're already in contempt of court with regard to discovery, so when are you going to Case 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 48 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 49 comply? MR. GRAND: If the -- if Your Honor wants Lamp to comply, we can -- THE COURT: Wait a minute. Let me just stop you right there. If I want? I have -- there's a court order holding your client in contempt for failure to comply with discovery. Don't you think that burden's on you? MR. GRAND: Yeah. And I'm -- what I'm saying is that Lamp Capital will produce documents -- THE COURT: When? When? MR. GRAND: I mean, we have -- we're -- I have to find out what's there. We have to -- THE COURT: Shouldn't you have done that already? MR. GRAND: We're barely in this case, Your Honor. The first thing we need to do is try and set aside the default. THE COURT: It doesn't matter. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure you have initial disclosure obligations, don't you? MR. GRAND: Yes. But -- THE COURT: Yeah. MR. GRAND: -- we're -- I mean, we can -- we're happy to produce those documents. We're happy to look at it. We were not involved when that subpoena was served. I'm not even -- Case 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 49 of\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 50 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 50 THE COURT: I didn't say you were. Counsel, I started by saying before, I understand there are facts that were here in effect that you had nothing to do with. I understand that. But the problem is that doesn't help you. It's there's still the facts. And you can't ignore that those facts exist. MR. GRAND: I'm not trying to ignore them. We need to wrap our hands around them -- THE COURT: Well, then -- but you -- but you haven't -- MR. GRAND: -- which we haven't had sufficient time to do that. THE COURT: What's your -- what's your plan to get your client out of default -- out of contempt? MR. GRAND: Our first plan is to get the client out of default, as Your Honor just mentioned. Once the -- THE COURT: Well, you've already been in contempt well before default. MR. GRAND: I recognize that. And again, I appreciate that there's a lot that's happened in this case before we came on the scene. And I agree we can't control what happened in the past. All we can say is that we are here now on behalf of those two entities and will comply with court orders. We'll comply with discovery obligations. And we'll participate in\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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51 |\n| 1 | discovery in a meaningful way.
We have -- we're here. |\n| 2 | THE COURT:
Well, I don't know what you mean by |\n| 3 | that, because you're already subject to a court order. |\n| 4 | This isn't going to be a situation where the |\n| 5 | Trustee's going to have to propound discovery and then |\n| 6 | you're going to get to seek a protective order or a quash, |\n| 7 | that's not going to happen, Counsel.
Your client is already |\n| 8 | in contempt. |\n| 9 | MR. GRAND:
We understand. |\n| 10 | THE COURT:
So then I don't know what you mean -- |\n| 11 | MR. GRAND:
In other words -- |\n| 12 | THE COURT:
--
when you say you're going to |\n| 13 | participate in meaningful discovery.
I don't understand |\n| 14 | what that means.
You either turn over everything they've |\n| 15 | already requested, which is subject of the contempt, or you |\n| 16 | don't.
I mean, that, it's that simple. |\n| 17 | MR. MILLER:
Your Honor, may I be heard? |\n| 18 | THE COURT:
No, you may not. |\n| 19 | MR. MILLER:
This is Robert Miller. |\n| 20 | THE COURT:
You've already got one lawyer |\n| 21 | representing your clients.
No. |\n| 22 | So go ahead, Counsel. |\n| 23 | MR. GRAND:
I mean, as I said, we're just in this |\n| 24 | case. |\n| 25 | If the default is not going to be vacated then I'm |\n| | |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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52 |\n| 1 | -- then, you know, I don't know, you know.
If there's a |\n| 2 | judgment that's going to be entered, you know, I don't know |\n| 3 | where that leaves the discovery obligations.
If we're in |\n| 4 | the case -- |\n| 5 | THE COURT:
The motion -- the contempt order was |\n| 6 | issued in the main case, so it has nothing to do with |\n| 7 | whether or not the default gets set aside in this case. |\n| 8 | Your client is in contempt of this court for failing to |\n| 9 | comply with discovery obligations under the Federal Rules of |\n| 10 | Bankruptcy Procedure. |\n| 11 | MR. GRAND:
If Your Honor sets a time, we will do |\n| 12 | our best to comply with discovery obligations. |\n| 13 | THE COURT:
We don't need -- I don't need to set a |\n| 14 | time. |\n| 15 | MR. GRAND:
We'll do -- |\n| 16 | THE COURT:
I already set a time -- |\n| 17 | MR. GRAND:
So we will -- |\n| 18 | THE COURT:
-- by the way I think in the original |\n| 19 | order. |\n| 20 | MR. GRAND:
So we'll do our best to obtain those |\n| 21 | documents now. |\n| 22 | But the first thing that we're trying to do in |\n| 23 | this case, in this adversary proceeding, is set aside the |\n| 24 | default so that the clients, the entities, can defend the |\n| 25 | case on the merits.
And in that context, we will provide |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 53 of\n\n| | 111 |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024
53 |\n| 1 | discovery as soon as we can get our hands on this case.
We |\n| 2 | just -- we just appeared.
We've just been put in this case. |\n| 3 | We recognize that a lot has gone on. |\n| 4 | THE COURT:
You didn't just appear though. |\n| 5 | MR. GRAND:
We did. |\n| 6 | THE COURT:
You did.
You as lawyers, I agree. |\n| 7 | MR. GRAND:
Yeah.
Yes. |\n| 8 | THE COURT:
But Lamp Capital didn't. |\n| 9 | MR. GRAND:
I understand that.
And as I said, I |\n| 10 | can only control what we can control as lawyers now that |\n| 11 | we're in the case.
So I -- we are here.
The entities |\n| 12 | intend to defend the case.
And the entities -- |\n| 13 | THE COURT:
And, okay, so let's get to that. |\n| 14 | What's your meritorious defense? |\n| 15 | MR. GRAND:
So the meritorious defense in this |\n| 16 | case is that it's -- when it comes to piercing the corporate |\n| 17 | veil under Delaware law it's very difficult to do.
The |\n| 18 | Trustee in this case tries to sort of lump Lamp and Infinity |\n| 19 | in with the HK case, and the facts are completely different, |\n| 20 | as the Trustee acknowledges. |\n| 21 | In the HK case, the entity had one asset that had |\n| 22 | already been judicially determined to be beneficially owned |\n| 23 | by the debtor.
That case and that decision was a summary |\n| 24 | judgment decision after discovery had taken place.
There |\n| 25 | was no dispute that the entity had no officers, directors, |\n| | |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 54 didn't -- it did not comply with any corporate formalities. It's completely different than the facts of this case. THE COURT: And what has your client done? MR. GRAND: Lamp has officers and directors. Lamp has had bank accounts. THE COURT: Where is that? MR. GRAND: HK didn't. THE COURT: Where is that in the record by the way? Where is any evidence that that's -- it's accurate. MR. GRAND: It's alleged in the complaint. THE COURT: Okay. So you're going to stand on the allegations in the complaint. You're not going to submit any other kind of evidence. You're not going to have anyone from Lamp Capital come testify to support the assertions that this wasn't just an entity that just -- that funds flowed through? MR. GRAND: That's not required for purposes of this motion. THE COURT: I didn't say it was required. I asked you whether you were going to do that? MR. GRAND: We'll defend the merits of the case when we get into it. THE COURT: That's why I asked you what's your meritorious defense? I still don't know what it is. What is it? Case 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 54 of\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 55 of\n\n| | 111 |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024
55 |\n| 1 | MR. GRAND:
That they have -- that they -- that |\n| 2 | the Trustee will not necessarily be able to establish that |\n| 3 | Lamp Capital is an alter ego of the debtor. |\n| 4 | THE COURT:
That's not a defense.
That's just a |\n| 5 | denial.
What's your defense? |\n| 6 | MR. GRAND:
That's a -- that's a defense. |\n| 7 | THE COURT:
No.
That's a denial, Counsel. |\n| 8 | MR. GRAND:
Yeah. |\n| 9 | THE COURT:
What's your defense? |\n| 10 | MR. GRAND:
But that's -- that's sufficient. |\n| 11 | THE COURT:
No.
I don't think it is actually |\n| 12 | under the law.
You can't just come in and say they're not |\n| 13 | going to be able to prove it.
That's just a denial. |\n| 14 | MR. GRAND:
Well, we didn't say that.
We made the |\n| 15 | argument based on the different -- the different facts and |\n| 16 | under the law.
Certainly -- |\n| 17 | THE COURT:
What facts? |\n| 18 | MR. GRAND:
The facts that -- the facts that in |\n| 19 | the complaint -- the facts in the -- |\n| 20 | THE COURT:
The facts in the complaint right now |\n| 21 | are -- |\n| 22 | MR. GRAND:
Are alleged allegations in the -- |\n| 23 | THE COURT:
-- are true until and unless the |\n| 24 | default gets set aside. |\n| 25 | MR. GRAND:
Yes.
And even under those -- |\n| | |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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56 |\n| 1 | THE COURT:
What evidence have you got to prove |\n| 2 | that they're not true? |\n| 3 | You have to -- the Second Circuit says you can't |\n| 4 | just come forward and say they're not going to be able to |\n| 5 | prove it.
And that's what you're saying.
Your meritorious |\n| 6 | defense is they're not going to be able to prove it. |\n| 7 | Well, right now it's proven under the Federal |\n| 8 | Rules of Civil Procedure.
It is -- those are the facts. |\n| 9 | Unless and until the default gets set aside, those are the |\n| 10 | facts.
That's what the law -- the law is very clear about |\n| 11 | that. |\n| 12 | So your job is to show the Court what is your |\n| 13 | meritorious defense?
And if -- and if your answer is that |\n| 14 | they aren't going to be able to prove it, fine, then that's |\n| 15 | your answer. |\n| 16 | MR. GRAND:
Yes. |\n| 17 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Fine. |\n| 18 | MR. GRAND:
Our answer is that they will need to |\n| 19 | make that showing that it's -- that there's -- alter ego |\n| 20 | liability will attached, and we don't believe that they're |\n| 21 | going to make -- be able to prove that.
And the facts as |\n| 22 | alleged in the complaint are insufficient, as we say in our |\n| 23 | papers under Delaware law, to pierce the veil under -- and |\n| 24 | obtain alter ego liability. |\n| 25 | Secondly, there's -- there's an in pari delicto |\n| | |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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57 |\n| 1 | defense that can be asserted by both defendants in this case |\n| 2 | as we argue in our papers. |\n| 3 | And more than that, there's also the allegations |\n| 4 | in the complaint are -- there's no allegation of wrongdoing |\n| 5 | on behalf of Infinity Treasury Management.
They're only |\n| 6 | identified in here as the sole member of Lamp.
But Infinity |\n| 7 | Treasury is not accused of -- of any wrongful conduct. |\n| 8 | So as we set forth in our papers, you know, under |\n| 9 | the law, those allegations are deficient as well. |\n| 10 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Anything further, Counsel? |\n| 11 | MR. GRAND:
I'll add only that the cases mentioned |\n| 12 | by the Trustee that they relied on in their papers, the |\n| 13 | Bailey's Express case, and the -- and the Bricklayers case, |\n| 14 | are not relevant to this motion because both of those cases |\n| 15 | involved seeking to set aside default judgments. |\n| 16 | And in the Bricklayers case, there was no dispute |\n| 17 | that the defendant was aware of the complaint because its |\n| 18 | counsel sought additional time to respond, but yet failed to |\n| 19 | file a responsive pleading for nine months. |\n| 20 | And that's certainly not the case here.
You know, |\n| 21 | we sought to appear and assert defenses almost as soon as we |\n| 22 | were engaged and very shortly after the defendants learned |\n| 23 | of the existence of the complaint. |\n| 24 | And as well, the Bailey's Express
case, the Court |\n| 25 | found that the default to be willful where the defendant |\n| | |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 58 failed to appear for five court conferences and months after its counsel had been discussing the case with the plaintiff's counsel in that case. And again, you know, those facts are just not what we have here. You know, as we say in our papers, you know, we understand that shortly after the client learned about -- that the defendants learned about the complaint, we were contacted and sought immediately to step in and try and defend the case on the merits. So I don't think that there could be a finding of willfulness. There's certainly no prejudice as a result of opening the default. There's no evidence or showing that any additional documents are going to be lost or not discoverable. You know, we've said the opposite. And certainly we believe that their defenses to the underlying alter ego claims are -- are meritorious in that the facts of -- the facts in Lamp are not all the same as the facts set forth in HK. And again Your Honor, given that we received the opposition papers late Friday night, I'm happy by the end of the day today to supply the Court with -- THE COURT: No. There'll be no need for any further briefing. MR. GRAND: -- with the evidence, Your Honor. THE COURT: No need for a briefing. I know what Case 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 58 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 59 the standards are. I know what the issues are. And I would note for the record that the *Bricklayers* case was a default, not a default judgment. MR. GRAND: I understand, Your Honor. THE COURT: Well, you said just the opposite. MR. GRAND: I understand. I misstated. I meant to say the *Bailey's Express* case and not the *Bricklayers* case. But the fact remains that the -- the *Bricklayers* case was -- there was no responsive pleading filed for nine months after the defense lawyer acknowledged receiving the complaint. That's certainly not anywhere close to the delay that we have in this case. THE COURT: Okay. Anything further, Counsel? MR. GRAND: Nothing, Your Honor. Thank you. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Who's going to argue for the remaining defendants, Mr. Romney or Mr. Moriarty? MR. ROMNEY: I am, Your Honor -- THE COURT: Okay. MR. ROMNEY: -- but it's a separate motion, Your Honor. THE COURT: Well, yes, it is. I understand. I just want to make sure I understand who's arguing. MR. ROMNEY: It will be me, Your Honor. Case 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 59 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 60 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. MR. ROMNEY: Thank you. THE COURT: Any further response, Attorney Bassett? MR. BASSETT: Just very briefly, Your Honor. May I approach? THE COURT: Yes. MR. BASSETT: So again, for the record, Nick Bassett from Paul Hastings on behalf of the Chapter 11 Trustee. Your Honor, just a few brief points in response. First, on the willfulness prong of the analysis, obviously the Court had a back and forth with counsel as to whether or not, you know, it matters if his clients received actual notice of the complaint. I would submit for the reasons that Your Honor articulated it does not because their clients unquestionably were served. And as the Court correctly noted, it is their obligation as corporations to have registered agents who are able to accept service of process. But I don't think that the analysis needs to end there. Because even if it didn't matter whether or not they had actual notice, they have to remember that it is their burden to come to this court under Rule 55(c) and demonstrate that their default was not willful. If they're going to come and argue that they did Case 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 60 of\n\n### Case 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 61 of\n\n| | 111 |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024
61 |\n| 1 | not have actual notice, it is incumbent upon them to come |\n| 2 | forward to the Court and to present a credible explanation |\n| 3 | sufficient to carry their burden of demonstrating how |\n| 4 | somehow, despite service being complete and effective, they |\n| 5 | did not get actual notice and there is absolutely none of |\n| 6 | that here. |\n| 7 | There's no affidavit from anyone.
There's no |\n| 8 | specificity even, setting aside the absence of an affidavit, |\n| 9 | which I think is fatal in and of itself under the |\n| 10 | circumstances of this case where there's a real question as |\n| 11 | to whether there's even an individual behind this company. |\n| 12 | The briefing simply says they didn't have notice. |\n| 13 | There's no discussion whatsoever as to, okay, well, what are |\n| 14 | the circumstances that led to no actual notice.
If service |\n| 15 | was complete on the register agents, why is that actual |\n| 16 | notice was not transmitted to Lamp Capital and to Infinity |\n| 17 | Treasury Management? |\n| 18 | Is the argument that, you know, the mail got lost |\n| 19 | by the mail carrier, that somebody who was supposed to turn |\n| 20 | it over to the right person at Lamp Capital threw it in the |\n| 21 | trash, there's none of that. |\n| 22 | And that's the only situation in which courts ever |\n| 23 | show lenience in this situation is where there is some |\n| 24 | credible, detailed explanation as to why they were unable to |\n| 25 | respond to the complaint.
Here, there's none of that. |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 62 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 62 And moreover, again, in counsel's explanation in the briefing we still have no idea when his clients actually, sorry, when his clients and he actually became aware of the complaint. They obviously have actual notice now. When did that happen? There's zero statement in the briefing that explains that. They could have had notice for months as far as we know. I mean, I guess they're alleging that notice came sometime after the answer deadline, but they're not saying when and they're not saying how. I'd also note that it's interesting that the same counsel appeared in this case as counsel for another entity that the debtor, sorry, that the Trustee served with 2004 discovery, an entity called G.S. Security, which is an entity owned by Scott Barnett, whom the Court understands from other proceedings in this case to be the debtor's bodyguard, and whom the Trustee has alleged is another person the Trustee relies upon to nominally hold interest in shell companies for the debtor of which we believe G.S. Security is another. And I say that, and by the way, this was I think in October or November of 2023, and I say that because I'd be curious to know if the person who contacted counsel was the same person for both G.S. Security and for Lamp Capital? I think that would be telling, because the only possible\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 63 relationship between those entities is the debtor. There's nothing, again Your Honor. No details. I couldn't imagine a set of facts where the burden has been so -- where the movant has come so far away from meeting their burden. As to prejudice, Your Honor, the first thing I would note is that Your Honor had said that, you know, Lamp Capital, through counsel, had entered an appearance in this case. I will be candid, I don't recall that. Your Honor's memory is much better than mine. And I don't doubt that you're correct. But even if -- even if that weren't the case, even it hadn't entered an appearance through counsel, Lamp Capital funded the debtor's case, as the Court noted, by paying Brown Rudnick's expenses. The discovery in 2004 that the Trustee served on Lamp Capital was in August of 2022, over a year ago, almost a year and a half ago. The Court ordered Lamp Capital to comply with that discovery in January of 2023. It found Lamp Capital in contempt of court in April 2023. Absolutely nothing has been done. To the extent Lamp Capital is going to decide to get counsel and appear in this case, the first thing it should have done, before it even thought about filing a Case 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 63 of\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 64 of\n\n| | 111 |\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024
64 |\n| 1 | 55(c) motion or appearing in this adversary proceeding, is |\n| 2 | purge itself of contempt.
It hasn't done that.
And that's |\n| 3 | a prejudice that cannot be cured because that was pre |\n| 4 | complaint discovery you're supposed to get under Rule 2004. |\n| 5 | It's not happened.
And I have zero confidence, |\n| 6 | and I don't think the Court should have any confidence at |\n| 7 | all, that if this adversary proceeds this defendant, given |\n| 8 | the history of the case, would actually comply with its |\n| 9 | discovery obligations. |\n| 10 | Lastly, Your Honor, as to the meritorious defense |\n| 11 | prong, essentially what they're arguing, as the Court noted, |\n| 12 | it's conclusory denials.
What they're really arguing is |\n| 13 | that we're not going to be able to prove our alter ego |\n| 14 | allegations. |\n| 15 | The case law on that is crystal clear, that you |\n| 16 | can't have a conclusory denial and that some specific |\n| 17 | evidence to support your defense to the allegations in the |\n| 18 | complaint is required. |\n| 19 | I will just end by citing to the Sony case which I |\n| 20 | mentioned before.
That was a case where the |\n| 21 | defendant/movant actually submitted affidavits by |\n| 22 | individuals/principals denying the allegations of the |\n| 23 | complaint and the Court still said that was insufficient. |\n| 24 | There they had sworn affidavits saying this isn't |\n| 25 | true and the Court said, sorry, all you're doing is |\n| | |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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65 |\n| 1 | submitting an affidavit denying the allegations.
That's not |\n| 2 | enough under Rule 55(c). |\n| 3 | Here, the defendants haven't even done that.
They |\n| 4 | haven't come close, Your Honor, and, therefore, the Rule |\n| 5 | 55(c) motion should be denied, and we would respectfully |\n| 6 | request that the motion for a default judgment be granted. |\n| 7 | That's all I have, Your Honor, unless the Court |\n| 8 | has questions. |\n| 9 | THE COURT:
All right.
Thank you. |\n| 10 | With regard to your statement about Lamp Capital |\n| 11 | appearing, you could be correct there wasn't a formal |\n| 12 | appearance, but there was -- but, there might have been.
I |\n| 13 | might be correct.
You know.
There's 3,000 docket entries. |\n| 14 | MR. BASSETT:
I just wanted to point out that I |\n| 15 | didn't recall. |\n| 16 | THE COURT:
And in addition to that, however, |\n| 17 | whether they appeared through counsel or not, they -- it was |\n| 18 | represented in the DIP financing motion that was filed back |\n| 19 | in April of 2022 that Lamp Capital was the funding source |\n| 20 | for the -- may not have been the funding source for the 8.8 |\n| 21 | million, but was definitely the funding source for the |\n| 22 | payment of the million dollar retainer to Brown Rudnick. |\n| 23 | Which had to be disclosed because the United |\n| 24 | States Trustee's Office and others required the Court, and |\n| 25 | under the rules, the debtor's counsel, even if the debtor |\n| | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 66 of\n\n| | 111 |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024
66 |\n| 1 | wasn't being paid by the debtor individually, the disclosure |\n| 2 | of compensation that's required under the rules, the Federal |\n| 3 | Rules of Civil Procedure -- Federal Rules of Bankruptcy |\n| 4 | Procedure, excuse me, 2016, and our local rules in the |\n| 5 | United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of |\n| 6 | Connecticut requires such disclosure. |\n| 7 | And so if we go back to the beginning of the case, |\n| 8 | you know, in the very early days of the case, you would find |\n| 9 | in the disclosure of compensation for counsel that the -- |\n| 10 | when I say counsel, I'm talking about Brown Rudnick -- that |\n| 11 | the -- that the funds were, according to Brown Rudnick, |\n| 12 | provided by Lamp Capital. |\n| 13 | And so I'm trying to find it as we talk. |\n| 14 | But Attorney Claiborn can remember that because |\n| 15 | the United States Trustee's Office was one of the parties |\n| 16 | that requested that that disclosure be made. |\n| 17 | Now, this could be it.
Yes.
ECF No. 54 filed on |\n| 18 | March 1st, 2022 in the main Chapter 11 case of Ho Wan Kwok, |\n| 19 | case number 22-50073. |\n| 20 | So less than two weeks after the case was filed, |\n| 21 | the firm was retained, agreed to a retainer of \\$1 million. |\n| 22 | The retainer was paid by wire in two equal installments of |\n| 23 | 500,000.
The first on February 14, 2022, which was the day |\n| 24 | before the filing, and the second early in the day on |\n| 25 | February 15th, 2022, prior to the commencement of this case. |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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67 |\n| 1 | And the source of the retainer was Lamp Capital, LLC. |\n| 2 | Lamp Capital, LLC made a million dollar loan to |\n| 3 | Mr. Kwok.
And Mr. Kwok directed Lamp Capital, LLC to remit |\n| 4 | the proceeds directly to the firm.
A signed engagement |\n| 5 | letter between the firm and Mr. Kwok is attached as Exhibit |\n| 6 | A. |\n| 7 | The Exhibit A letter from Brown Rudnick dated |\n| 8 | February 14, 2022, the day before the filing, talks about |\n| 9 | you shall deliver to the firm a retainer of \\$1 million.
You |\n| 10 | being defined as Mr. Kwok, actually Guo Wengui, also known |\n| 11 | as Miles Guo.
That is the document attached to a pleading |\n| 12 | that's signed by Guo Wengui, a/k/a Miles Guo, on February |\n| 13 | 15, 2022. |\n| 14 | And that was filed, as I said, even in the first |\n| 15 | -- the case was filed on February 15, this was March 1st, |\n| 16 | and it was already up to ECF No. 54, and that's the -- from |\n| 17 | very beginning of the case Lamp Capital was involved. |\n| 18 | In fact, prior to the case, according to the |\n| 19 | letter from the debtor's counsel, the first retainer payment |\n| 20 | was made the day before the case.
And then -- and that had |\n| 21 | -- and that was arranged before the filing of the case. |\n| 22 | So whether I could have been mistaken, and I very |\n| 23 | well could have been that there was actually notice of |\n| 24 | appearance, but I still thought there was.
And maybe I'm |\n| 25 | wrong. |\n| | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 68 of\n\n| | 111 |\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024
68 |\n| 1 | But regardless of that, within two weeks of the |\n| 2 | commencement of the case, Lamp Capital was disclosed as the |\n| 3 | funding source to Mr. Kwok for the payment of a million |\n| 4 | dollars of attorneys fee retainer to his Chapter 11 counsel |\n| 5 | in this court from them. |\n| 6 | So if I misspoke about the appearance, then I want |\n| 7 | to correct the record. |\n| 8 | But I also note for the record that that document |\n| 9 | that I just referred to, ECF 55, filed in the main case on |\n| 10 | March 1st, 2022, is an admission that Lamp Capital funded |\n| 11 | the debtor's attorneys fees for this Chapter 11 case in the |\n| 12 | amount -- the retainer in the amount of a million dollars. |\n| 13 | Okay? |\n| 14 | MR. BASSETT:
Thank you, Your Honor. |\n| 15 | THE COURT:
So I just wanted to clarify that for |\n| 16 | the record. |\n| 17 | MR. BASSETT:
Thank you very much, Your Honor. |\n| 18 | THE COURT:
Thank you. |\n| 19 | Any further response, Counsel? |\n| 20 | MR. GRAND:
Just to address, briefly, it's -- the |\n| 21 | initial point that Trustee's counsel made was that it |\n| 22 | couldn't figure out how the defendants could not have |\n| 23 | received notice when service was effected on the registered |\n| 24 | agent. |\n| 25 | Again, the registered agent literally took that |\n| | |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 69 complaint that it received it and sent it back to Trustee's counsel and said we don't know where -- the defendant is inactive and we have no forwarding information. So we're not contesting that service was properly effected or was effected on the registered agent, but when Trustee's counsel says it makes no sense that the defendants can argue they didn't receive it, well, the registered agent is telling Trustee's counsel that they didn't receive it because they didn't sent it to them. So there's just -- THE COURT: Then how did you become aware of it? How did you become aware of the complaint then? How did Lamp Capital ever become aware then? MR. GRAND: My understanding is that -- THE COURT: Or Infinity. How did they ever become aware? MR. GRAND: -- Lamp Capital became aware of it through the grapevine of other -- THE COURT: Other matters in these cases? MR. GRAND: -- other matters in these cases, not through directly receiving it. THE COURT: Why would they be in the grapevine of other matters in these cases? MR. GRAND: You mentioned that -- there's not a dispute that Infinity -- THE COURT: Well, Brown Rudnick's been gone since Case 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 69 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 70 July of 2022. MR. GRAND: Right. THE COURT: Right. MR. GRAND: There's not a dispute that Infinity is owned by -- by the debtor's son and that -- and that Infinity is the sole member of Lamp. Those allegations in the complaint, we understand to be true. And as Your Honor mentioned, the debtor's son, and as the Trustee mentioned in the papers, has been in their other, I guess other shell companies that he's been affiliated with. There are other ways that, you know, I guess some information has been transmitted to him. I'm not privy to it, nor do I think my colleagues are, but at some point he was made aware of this. And my understanding is that he wasn't made aware of it and didn't see it -- THE COURT: Who is he? MR. GRAND: The debtor's son, who is the -- THE COURT: So is that who retained you, the debtor's son? MR. GRAND: I believe so, yes. THE COURT: Okay. MR. GRAND: I mean, on behalf of the entities. But that's my understanding. THE COURT: Okay. Case 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 70 of\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 71 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 71 MR. GRAND: So it was my understanding that at some point through -- he learned about it or he was told about it, but that was after the time to respond to the complaint had already lapsed. And when he was -- when he learned about it -- THE COURT: But there's no facts in the record supporting anything you're saying. There's no affidavit or anything. I mean, you're telling me what you believe to be true, but there's no facts to support that. MR. GRAND: It's the representation of counsel based on -- THE COURT: I understand. MR. GRAND: -- based on those communications. Yeah. But there's no requirement -- there's no requirement under the law that an affidavit be supplied. I mean -- THE COURT: I didn't say there was. MR. GRAND: -- I just want that to be clear. THE COURT: I just said you're asking me to find facts that aren't in the record. That you're asking me to find facts that are not in the record. You're saying we didn't -- we learned about it sometime through the grapevine, and he heard it through different places, and he retained us on behalf of the entities after the response date passed. MR. GRAND: I'm not --\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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72 |\n| 1 | THE COURT:
That's a lot of facts that don't have |\n| 2 | any support in the record. |\n| 3 | MR. GRAND:
But I'm not suggesting that Your Honor |\n| 4 | needs to necessarily find those facts to be true. |\n| 5 | The issue is when there's a dispute over when or |\n| 6 | whether notice of a complaint was issued -- was received -- |\n| 7 | THE COURT:
Well, that's where you're -- that's |\n| 8 | where we, you and I, that's where I asked you the question |\n| 9 | where is the case that says you have to have actual notice? |\n| 10 | The two cases you pointed me to don't say that. |\n| 11 | MR. GRAND:
And as I -- as I -- |\n| 12 | THE COURT:
And as I said, I don't -- |\n| 13 | MR. GRAND:
-- I can supply those cases -- |\n| 14 | THE COURT:
That doesn't make any sense. |\n| 15 | MR. GRAND:
-- this afternoon. |\n| 16 | THE COURT:
That doesn't make any sense to me why |\n| 17 | you would have to have actual notice, because then there |\n| 18 | would be no reason for Rule 55. |\n| 19 | MR. GRAND:
But Rule -- but it's a two-step |\n| 20 | process.
In other words -- |\n| 21 | THE COURT:
I understand it's a two-step process. |\n| 22 | MR. GRAND:
-- you're not getting the default |\n| 23 | judgment immediately.
You're getting -- |\n| 24 | THE COURT:
I understand it's a two-step process. |\n| 25 | But if you had notice before the response date and |\n| | |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 73 you chose, your client chose not to respond, then that's a willful act. MR. GRAND: I would agree, but that's not the facts here. That's not what happened. THE COURT: Well, how do we know that's not the facts. You don't have any facts to the contrary. MR. GRAND: The facts to the contrary are that -- are representations of counsel based on those communications. THE COURT: No. Based upon your assertion that there has to be actual knowledge and that service isn't enough. That's your assertion. That's your argument. Your argument is that there had to be actual knowledge of the complaint. And I would like to know where in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure it says that, because that would be new to me. MR. GRAND: As I said, Your Honor, there are -- there are multiple cases in this district, in the Second Circuit, that -- THE COURT: That say actual notice, you have to have actual notice. MR. GRAND: Yes. That hold that where there's a dispute as to whether the defendants actually received notice of a complaint -- Case 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 73 of\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 74 of\n\n| | 111 |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024
74 |\n| 1 | THE COURT:
No, no, no, no, no. |\n| 2 | MR. GRAND:
-- even where service is alleged to |\n| 3 | have been properly effected -- |\n| 4 | THE COURT:
Okay.
All right. |\n| 5 | MR. GRAND:
-- that's sufficient. |\n| 6 | THE COURT:
I'll read your cases.
I don't think |\n| 7 | that that's what any of them say. |\n| 8 | MR. GRAND:
As I said, I can -- if -- |\n| 9 | THE COURT:
I don't want any further briefing. |\n| 10 | The time to brief has already passed. |\n| 11 | MR. GRAND:
Okay.
Thank you, Your Honor. |\n| 12 | MR. BASSETT:
Your Honor, very quickly, just two |\n| 13 | seconds, if I may? |\n| 14 | I just wanted to reiterate even if actual notice |\n| 15 | were a requirement, it is still the movant's burden to show |\n| 16 | that they did not receive actual notice. |\n| 17 | Given that he has conceded, as he must, that Lamp |\n| 18 | Capital is connected to the grapevine of this case, which |\n| 19 | they're, in fact, deeply imbedded in, cannot demonstrate a |\n| 20 | lack of actual notice because it doesn't necessarily mean |\n| 21 | actual notice by getting it from a registered agent. |\n| 22 | They could have actual notice by checking the |\n| 23 | docket, by the son talking to other people involved in the |\n| 24 | case.
There are a million different ways when you have an |\n| 25 | entity that has connected as Lamp Capital to this case were |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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75 |\n| 1 | you could have actual notice.
But under those |\n| 2 | circumstances, to satisfy your burden, you have to do a lot |\n| 3 | more than what was done here. |\n| 4 | The second thing I would just like to point out is |\n| 5 | that I don't believe there's been any suggestion -- counsel |\n| 6 | keeps talking about how Infinity Treasury Management's |\n| 7 | registered agent said we don't know where to find Infinity |\n| 8 | Treasury Management.
A, that's irrelevant to service and |\n| 9 | also irrelevant to actual notice under the circumstances. |\n| 10 | But B, I don't think there's been any allegation that Lamp |\n| 11 | Capital's registered agent didn't find Lamp Capital.
And |\n| 12 | Lamp Capital is really the entity that we're all talking |\n| 13 | about here primarily. |\n| 14 | So there's simply no basis to find that the |\n| 15 | default was anything other than willful, Your Honor.
Thank |\n| 16 | you. |\n| 17 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Thank you. |\n| 18 | I'm going to take the motion for default judgment |\n| 19 | under advisement. |\n| 20 | MR. ROMNEY:
Your Honor, if I may, Aaron Romney, |\n| 21 | please? |\n| 22 | THE COURT:
Sure.
What are you asking, and then |\n| 23 | I'll tell you if you may. |\n| 24 | MR. ROMNEY:
Based on statements that were just |\n| 25 | made, obviously in my presence, I've been sitting here the |\n| | |\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 76 of\n\n| | 111 |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024
76 |\n| 1 | whole time, I do feel compelled to make I wouldn't use the |\n| 2 | word disclosures to the Court, but to provide certain facts |\n| 3 | for the record since I do have knowledge of certain things |\n| 4 | that were -- that were just discussed.
And I'm happy to put |\n| 5 | them on the record.
I'm happy not to. |\n| 6 | But what I don't want to be accused of ever is |\n| 7 | having sat in this room and had it been suggested that I |\n| 8 | should have spoken up because, as I've said, I have personal |\n| 9 | knowledge of some of the events that were just the subject |\n| 10 | of questioning over the last hour. |\n| 11 | THE COURT:
Well, unless you're going to take the |\n| 12 | stand, I don't really see what the point is, right?
I mean |\n| 13 | -- right? |\n| 14 | MR. ROMNEY:
Your Honor, what I'm saying is I'm |\n| 15 | making a disclosure to the Court that I have personal |\n| 16 | knowledge of certain facts that were just discussed.
And so |\n| 17 | that if anyone were to ever ask about my silence, I've made |\n| 18 | that disclosure.
I'm happy to say nothing or answer any of |\n| 19 | the Court's questions, but that's all. |\n| 20 | THE COURT:
I don't have any questions. |\n| 21 | MR. ROMNEY:
Thank you, Your Honor. |\n| 22 | THE COURT:
Thank you. |\n| 23 | All right.
With regard to the motion for default |\n| 24 | judgment, as I just noted, I will take that under |\n| 25 | advisement. |\n| | |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 77 MR. MILLER: Your Honor, Robert Miller. If I could be excused, I have another engagement, if you're finished with Lamp Capital. THE COURT: Yes. Thank you. MR. MILLER: I just wanted to let Your Honor know. Thank you. THE COURT: All right. Then the motion to set aside default has been filed by Attorney Romney on behalf of Leading Shine New York, Limited, Defendant, is the next matter on the calendar. Attorney Romney, you indicated you'd be making the argument? MR. ROMNEY: I will be, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Go right ahead, please. MR. ROMNEY: Aaron Romney, Zeisler & Zeisler, on behalf of Leading Shine, Limited. May I deliver argument from counsel's table, Your Honor? THE COURT: Certainly. MR. ROMNEY: Your Honor, as been discussed at length this morning, the standard on a Rule 55(c) motion is -- the three prongs are willfulness, a meritorious defense, and prejudice. Beginning with willfulness, the standard in this circuit, as well as this district, is something more than negligence and deliberate conduct. Both of those cases are Case 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 77 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 78 cited on page 4 of Leading Shine's motion to set aside. Here, there was no willful conduct, no motive for willful conduct, to avoid participating in this adversary proceeding on behalf of Leading Shine. What there was, in light of the Trustee's allegations, as well as the history of this case, was a need to determine that the individual who believed correctly that she had the authority to defend on behalf or direct a defense on behalf of Leading Shine, in fact, had that authority. In this case, there has been an instance, which is discussed as nauseam in my papers as well as has been discussed ad nauseam in this courtroom, where at the direction of the same principal of this company, I filed an appearance. I was then informed by the general counsel of Hodgson Russ that my client did not have that authority. I relied on a verbal representation at that time. And once I was informed by the general counsel of Hodgson Russ, I took what I believed to be a required action on my part to disclose what had happened to opposing counsel and to the Court. I was not -- I was not about, on my watch, to allow a rerun of that which would have served nobody's interest, not the Court's, not the Trustee's, not mine, not Case 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 78 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 79 Leading Shine's, not Ms. Guo's. We received, meaning Ms. Guo received, and her counsel, an unredacted version -- THE COURT: Well, you're her counsel? MR. ROMNEY: Correct. THE COURT: Okay. MR. ROMNEY: To be clear, yes, I was one of them, but Mr. -- THE COURT: Well, you still are, right? MR. ROMNEY: I am. THE COURT: Okay. Well, you just said Ms. Guo and her counsel as if it was somebody that's not you. MR. ROMNEY: No. No. I apologize. I meant to indicate that it was not just me. It was me, it was Mr. Moriarty, it was Ms. Wernick, it was Mr. Vartan, I believe are the ones that received those documents. And I believe the date was November 27th. That was the first time that we had an unredacted version of the complaint as well as the sealed exhibits that were the first piece of any sort of evidence that actually tied Ms. Guo to Leading Shine, although it was conflicting because there was evidence that tied another individual to Leading Shine. And in fact, the public version of the complaint identifies that the Trustee, with all of his resources and\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 79 of\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 80 of\n\n| | 111 |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024
80 |\n| 1 | all -- the scope of his investigation, does not know who the |\n| 2 | owner of Leading Shine was.
And those particular |\n| 3 | circumstances and allegations required a particularly -- a |\n| 4 | particular level of due diligence particularly in light of |\n| 5 | the history that happened with the Hudson Diamond entities. |\n| 6 | At that point, I directed my staff, my team at -- |\n| 7 | within my firm, to undertake a review of the records that |\n| 8 | were at our disposal to indicate if we had anything one way |\n| 9 | or another to actually verify who was in control of Leading |\n| 10 | Shine. |\n| 11 | We did not -- we were unable to locate anything |\n| 12 | despite the voluminous number of documents that we have |\n| 13 | received, both from the Trustee in this case, some from |\n| 14 | third parties, which have been produced by us to the |\n| 15 | Trustee. |\n| 16 | At that point, I undertook to personally speak |\n| 17 | with several individuals who I knew to have represented the |\n| 18 | debtor, various members of the debtor's family, and various |\n| 19 | entities that are owned -- were owned by various members of |\n| 20 | the debtor's family.
Not one of those individuals had any |\n| 21 | documentation that they could provide to me one way or |\n| 22 | another who controlled this entity. |\n| 23 | Again, until I had that documentation, I was not |\n| 24 | about to file an appearance.
And I know of no other |\n| 25 | attorney who was willing to under the circumstances of the |\n| | |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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81 |\n| 1 | history of this file. |\n| 2 | I reached out to Ms. Guo's personal accountant |\n| 3 | directly.
I received information from her that was |\n| 4 | suggestive that Ms. Guo was the control person of Leading |\n| 5 | Shine, but it was not definitive. |\n| 6 | However, I then learned the name of the law firm |\n| 7 | that formed Leading Shine.
I don't recall the year.
I |\n| 8 | believe it was either 2018 or 2019.
I contacted that firm. |\n| 9 | I was told that the attorney who represented Leading Shine |\n| 10 | was no longer with the firm.
I contacted the attorney at |\n| 11 | his successor firm. |\n| 12 | We're now getting ourselves into mid, late |\n| 13 | December and the holidays.
And obviously the world is not |\n| 14 | operating at the same pace as then, although certainly I was |\n| 15 | doing my best to operate at that pace. |\n| 16 | Upon speaking with the counsel who formed Leading |\n| 17 | Shine, he informed me he no longer had access to his |\n| 18 | records, but verified to me that Ms. Guo was his natural |\n| 19 | person affiliated with Leading Shine, Ltd.
He referred me |\n| 20 | back to his prior firm that had the file.
The file had to |\n| 21 | be retrieved from storage.
I had several discussions with |\n| 22 | his former associate. |\n| 23 | And at that point, I satisfied myself that Ms. Guo |\n| 24 | did have authority to direct me and my firm, and Mr. Vartan |\n| 25 | and his firm, and Ms. Wernick, and Mr. Moriarty, to appear |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 82 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 82 on behalf of Leading Shine, which we did, and we promptly, the second day of the year, the first business day, filed a motion to set aside default.\n\n There was no intentional desire to evade. In fact, there was the exact opposite of a desire to evade, but there was an equal desire to ensure that nothing happened that could cause either Ms. Guo, myself, my firm, or anybody else to have done something that lacked corporate authority that would have resulted in a waste of the Trustee's resources, and this court's resources, and most importantly this court's time.\n\n As is evidenced by Ms. Guo's participation in this litigation, which was timely, as well as Hudson Diamond Holdings and Hudson Diamond New York, which was timely, there was no desire to evade the process in this litigation.\n\n There was the opposite. There was a desire to appear and assert defenses and that is what they're going to do, and that's what they have done to date. And the defenses are meritorious.\n\n The standards in a -- in alter ego action are quite different from the standards in certain other actions that are the subject of a number of the decisions that have been cited by both parties. This is not an account-stated. This is not a failure to fund an ERISA account where the money is simply gone. This is a very fact-intensive case\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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83 |\n| 1 | that has implications that are very broad reaching, |\n| 2 | particularly in a case like this. |\n| 3 | The Trustee's allegations, as they concern Leading |\n| 4 | Shine, are threadbare.
The Trustee hasn't alleged who -- |\n| 5 | even contends is the actual owner of Leading Shine. |\n| 6 | The Trustee identifies a number of allegations, |\n| 7 | excuse me, I misspoke, a number of transfers that were made |\n| 8 | to or from Leading Shine.
But the law is clear that |\n| 9 | transfers alone, there's a distinction between fraudulent |\n| 10 | transfers, even if they're fraudulent, and we're certainly |\n| 11 | not conceding that they are, but transfers, even if they are |\n| 12 | fraudulent, do not establish alter ego. |\n| 13 | The law is equally clear that common officers and |\n| 14 | agents do not establish alter ego successor liability. |\n| 15 | There's simply nothing in the complaints that even |\n| 16 | if true would establish that Leading Shine is the alter ego |\n| 17 | of anyone other than its legal owner Ms. Guo.
And actually, |\n| 18 | as stated in the complaint, with the allegations taken as |\n| 19 | true, that there isn't even that because the complaint |\n| 20 | doesn't even allege who the legal owner of Leading Shine is. |\n| 21 | With respect to the merits, if the Trustee |\n| 22 | believes that there is no dispute that Leading Shine is the |\n| 23 | alter ego of the debtor, then it should be very easy for the |\n| 24 | Trustee to immediately file a summary judgment.
There won't |\n| 25 | be a distraction.
There won't be an expense.
But the |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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84 |\n| 1 | Trustee has not done that to date.
And until he establishes |\n| 2 | his case, Leading Shine should be able to put forth a |\n| 3 | defense. |\n| 4 | Moving on to prejudice, clearly there is not even |\n| 5 | an allegation that evidence has been lost or destroyed in |\n| 6 | the several weeks since the initial response date.
And even |\n| 7 | less time since the extended response date that the Trustee |\n| 8 | was courteous enough to extend to Ms. Guo in light of the |\n| 9 | fact that we initially received a redacted complaint that |\n| 10 | would have been near impossible to respond to.
Only several |\n| 11 | weeks has passed.
No discovery has been served or |\n| 12 | transpired with anyone.
And there's no basis to believe |\n| 13 | that any evidence has been lost. |\n| 14 | Second, Rule 54(b) precludes the entry of default |\n| 15 | judgments that could be inconsistent with the allegations |\n| 16 | against appearing defendants who are prepared to defend on |\n| 17 | the merits. |\n| 18 | Ms. Guo has timely appeared and is defending on |\n| 19 | the merits. |\n| 20 | Clearly a finding, a default finding, that -- |\n| 21 | against Leading Shine would be inconsistent with a judgment |\n| 22 | that Ms. Guo is the owner of Leading Shine, Ltd. |\n| 23 | Ms. Guo cannot be defaulted because she timely |\n| 24 | appeared.
And under that basis alone, there's no -- a |\n| 25 | default judgment cannot enter against Leading Shine at this |\n| | |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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85 |\n| 1 | time and, therefore, there would be no prejudice from |\n| 2 | allowing it to fully and -- fully participate in its |\n| 3 | defense. |\n| 4 | With that, unless the Court has any questions, I |\n| 5 | would rest on my -- on my initial brief as well as my reply. |\n| 6 | THE COURT:
I do not have any questions at this |\n| 7 | time.
Thank you. |\n| 8 | MR. ROMNEY:
Thank you, Your Honor. |\n| 9 | THE COURT:
Mr. Bassett? |\n| 10 | MR. BASSETT:
Your Honor, may I approach the |\n| 11 | podium? |\n| 12 | THE COURT:
Sure. |\n| 13 | MR. BASSETT:
Again Your Honor, Nick Bassett from |\n| 14 | Paul Hastings on behalf of the Chapter 11 Trustee. |\n| 15 | Attorney Romney started his argument by walking |\n| 16 | through a lengthy recitation of all the sort of detailed and |\n| 17 | convoluted steps he had to take to determine, over the |\n| 18 | course of more than two months, if his client, Mei Guo, is |\n| 19 | actually the nominal owner of Leading Shine. |\n| 20 | That story, Your Honor, is irrelevant, and beside |\n| 21 | the point, for reasons I'll explain as to the willfulness |\n| 22 | inquiry.
And it absolutely, 100 percent, supports beyond a |\n| 23 | reasonable doubt the Trustee's position as to whether there |\n| 24 | could possibly be meritorious defenses in this adversary |\n| 25 | proceeding. |\n| | |\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 86 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 86 As to the willfulness inquiry, Your Honor, I'm having trouble even understanding the logic behind the argument because I have heard nothing in the papers or in argument today to explain why anyone would ever decide, under these circumstances, to just allow -- again, there's no argument or suggestion that Mei Guo and Leading Shine did not have notice of this complaint and the answer deadline. And this is critical for the case law. There was a deliberate decision under those circumstances to simply ignore the answer deadline. Whether or not Attorney Romney and his client couldn't figure out somehow if she owned this legal entity or not for two months, there has been zero explanation, and again, there's no affidavit, nothing from Mei Guo herself, zero explanation for why they decided to just remain silent and do nothing. Now, Attorney Romney says, well, we got into this big mess in the past with the Hudson Diamond entities, and I couldn't appear and purport to represent an entity unless I had authority, Your Honor, there are a million things that could have been done. How about starting with simple transparency and openness and communication? How about calling the Trustee and saying you know what, we had this issue before, we're having an issue again, this entity does not want to default on the complaint, but I'm trying to figure out, as\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 87 implausible as it might be, that Ms. Guo -- I'm trying to figure out if she owns this company. There was none of that. Not to the Trustee's counsel. And beyond that, I feel for Attorney Romney in some respects here, but this is not his problem. It is Leading Shine's and Mei Guo's problem. If she and Leading Shine were on notice of this complaint and couldn't figure out if they owned the entity or not, that is on them. She could have reached out to the Trustee. She could have sent the letter to the Court. Somebody could have done something prior to the answer deadline rather than simply sit there and let it pass by. And again, with Leading Shine, like the other defendants, they're no strangers to this case. The Trustee sought and obtained 2004 discovery from Leading Shine in April of 2023 I believe it was and they defaulted on the subpoena. Now, the immediate question that comes to my mind is, I mean, wouldn't that have been the time for Mei Guo and Attorney Romney to start conducting their lengthy journey to figure out if she owned the company so they could comply with 2004 discovery? No. They sat around and did nothing. And then somehow, for some reason, somebody on that, you know, abyss side of the Kwok universe said you know what, we should probably do something about this Case 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 87 of\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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88 |\n| 1 | Leading Shine complaint.
And that's when this exercise |\n| 2 | started. |\n| 3 | But it doesn't change the fact that the default |\n| 4 | was clearly willful.
They had knowledge of the complaint. |\n| 5 | They sat there.
They did nothing. |\n| 6 | Mr. Romney said there was, quote, \"No intentional |\n| 7 | desire to evade,\" end quote.
That is absolutely not the |\n| 8 | standard.
The standard is whether the default was willful |\n| 9 | and whether they've come forward with some explanation to |\n| 10 | demonstrate to the Court as to why their failure to respond |\n| 11 | should be excused.
They have utterly failed to do that. |\n| 12 | As to the meritorious defense argument, Your |\n| 13 | Honor, again, no affidavit, no facts, just legal arguments. |\n| 14 | And why is there no affidavit and why are there no |\n| 15 | facts, because his client until a week ago or so didn't even |\n| 16 | know that she owned this entity.
Of course she is going to |\n| 17 | be entirely incapable of ever putting forth a defense on the |\n| 18 | merits to show that Leading Shine is an alter ego of the |\n| 19 | debtor if she didn't even know and had to take two months to |\n| 20 | figure out if she nominally owned it. |\n| 21 | There is next to zero possibility of her ever |\n| 22 | setting forth a meritorious defense, and that's exactly why |\n| 23 | there's no affidavit, there's no facts, there's nothing |\n| 24 | talking about, hey, Leading Shine is not the debtor's alter |\n| 25 | ego because it does X, Y and Z.
It actually operates in |\n| | |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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89 |\n| 1 | this industry, but does these types of things on a regular |\n| 2 | basis, has these employees, has these officers and |\n| 3 | directors, there's none of that, because there's no source |\n| 4 | of that information here. |\n| 5 | Mr. Romney, again, essentially raises a 12(b)(6) |\n| 6 | motion to dismiss argument saying -- he raises in pari |\n| 7 | delicto and other arguments that have already been directed, |\n| 8 | and then today he spent most of his time alleging that the |\n| 9 | allegations of the complaint are insufficient to demonstrate |\n| 10 | that Leading Shine is, in fact, the debtor's alter ego. |\n| 11 | First of all, as I noted before, if that's the |\n| 12 | defense that they're going to raise, that there's no |\n| 13 | evidence and it's just 12(b)(6) type arguments, that's |\n| 14 | exactly what is appropriate for the Court to consider on a |\n| 15 | motion to vacate a default under 55(c). |\n| 16 | And those arguments that he has raised all fail |\n| 17 | because the complaint more than sufficiently meets the |\n| 18 | requirements to allege alter ego under Delaware law. |\n| 19 | Mr. Romney took issue with the fact that the |\n| 20 | complaint doesn't specifically allege who exactly is the |\n| 21 | nominal owner of the entity. |\n| 22 | It's mystifying how that can be turned around and |\n| 23 | put on the Trustee given that Mei Guo, the defendant, is the |\n| 24 | purported owner. |\n| 25 | But in any event, the reason why the Trustee said |\n| | |\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 90 of\n\n| | 111 |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024
90 |\n| 1 | what he said in the complaint is because in discovery the |\n| 2 | Trustee has found account opening statements, which are |\n| 3 | cited to in the complaint, where both Yvette Wang, the |\n| 4 | debtor's co-conspirator in the criminal fraud case, and Mei |\n| 5 | Guo, have both opened accounts on behalf of Leading Shine. |\n| 6 | So I would think that supports the Trustee's allegations. |\n| 7 | The Trustee also alleges in the complaint that an |\n| 8 | individual the Court knows as the family chef has taken |\n| 9 | actions on behalf of Leading Shine. |\n| 10 | Leading Shine has the same address of the debtor's |\n| 11 | other shell companies, including Golden Spring, which is now |\n| 12 | the debtor's alter -- which is now owned by the Trustee as |\n| 13 | the debtor's alter ego, as well as HK (USA), for which the |\n| 14 | same finding has been made. |\n| 15 | Again, Leading Shine, like Lamp Capital, is a |\n| 16 | different kind of shell company used by the debtor from HK |\n| 17 | (USA).
It is of the funding kind.
It is another entity |\n| 18 | that the debtor used as his personal piggy bank to move |\n| 19 | around funds to and from his companies and to pay for his |\n| 20 | expenses and those of his family. |\n| 21 | There's allegations in the complaint about |\n| 22 | transfers from Gold Spring, Saraca, Hudson Diamond, ACA |\n| 23 | Capital, transfers to other shell companies, Golden Spring, |\n| 24 | Greenwich Land, Gypsy Mei, a company owned by the debtor's |\n| 25 | daughter. |\n\n### Case 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 91 of\n\n| | 111
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91 |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | The debtor also, as alleged in the complaint, used |\n| 2 | Leading Shine to pay his personal expenses, including his |\n| 3 | personal counsel in the United Kingdom in the Ace Decade |\n| 4 | litigation, including other counsel in the U.K., Berkeley |\n| 5 | Rowe, which is the same counsel who represented the Himalaya |\n| 6 | entity, purportedly owned by William Je, and the \\$37 million |\n| 7 | loan made to HK (USA). |\n| 8 | There's allegations in the complaint that the |\n| 9 | debtor transferred -- that Leading Shine transferred funds |\n| 10 | to an aircraft design company on behalf of the debtor. |\n| 11 | And of course there's also the mention in the |\n| 12 | complaint that the debtor, when asked about Leading Shine, |\n| 13 | took the Fifth on all relevant questions. |\n| 14 | Your Honor, there is an abundance of evidence in |\n| 15 | the complaint to support, at this stage, a 55(c) denial and |\n| 16 | an ultimate finding of default judgment in favor of the |\n| 17 | Trustee. |\n| 18 | The Trustee does not, as Attorney Romney insists, |\n| 19 | need to prove its allegations right now. |\n| 20 | The posture of this case is they have defaulted, |\n| 21 | the Trustee has alleged what he has alleged in the |\n| 22 | complaint, and it's their burden to come forward with |\n| 23 | evidence on a meritorious defense and they've failed to do |\n| 24 | that. |\n| 25 | Lastly Your Honor, on prejudice, I would just go |\n| | |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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92 |\n| 1 | back to some of the comments I made at the outset, and which |\n| 2 | we've sort of discussed ad nauseam here today, this is not |\n| 3 | an entity or a purported owner of such entity who are |\n| 4 | strangers to this case. |\n| 5 | Mei Guo has been a participant in this case from |\n| 6 | the beginning, has her own history of issues complying with |\n| 7 | discovery requests. |\n| 8 | Lamp, Leading Shine, rather, was served with a |\n| 9 | subpoena back in April.
Failed to comply with it.
Nobody |\n| 10 | bothered to take any steps at that time to determine who |\n| 11 | owned it and whether they were going to respond. |\n| 12 | Your Honor, for this court to maintain order and |\n| 13 | the rule of law and to make sure that the Trustee can |\n| 14 | continue his investigations unobstructed, it cannot be that |\n| 15 | parties can pick and choose when they participate in these |\n| 16 | cases. |\n| 17 | And therefore, allowing parties such as Lamp |\n| 18 | Capital, such as Leading Shine, to decide belatedly that |\n| 19 | they want to participate and be able to do so is, in fact, |\n| 20 | prejudicial to the Trustee and should not be permitted. |\n| 21 | But again, I will reiterate, the prejudice |\n| 22 | element, as very clear under Second Circuit law, does not |\n| 23 | need to be satisfied; whereas, here, the defendant has |\n| 24 | fallen extraordinarily short of demonstrating a meritorious |\n| 25 | defense. |\n| | |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 93 That's all I had, Your Honor, unless the Court has questions. THE COURT: I do not have any questions at the moment. Thank you. MR. BASSETT: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Any response, Attorney Romney? MR. ROMNEY: Yes, briefly, Your Honor. Your Honor, Mr. Bassett said a moment ago that there was a deliberate decision to ignore. There is absolutely no evidence of that or plausible basis to believe that in light of the representations that I have made, as well as Ms. Guo's active participation individually, in a timely manner. There was a deliberate decision to ensure that Ms. Guo had the authority to direct Leading Shine to avoid another circus, for lack of a better word, that occupied considerable amounts of time and resources. Mr. Bassett says someone could have reached out to the Trustee. That is 100 percent wrong according or based upon the events that have happened in this case. With the Hudson Diamond issue, Attorney Vartan reached out to the Trustee. He did not appear. And when there were questions of authority, he was the subject of an order to show to cause. Case 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 93 of\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 94 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 94 Everyone, Ms. Guo, her counsel, including myself, are viewing this case and how we should conduct ourselves with an eye towards how this -- how we have gotten here today, and trying to avoid circumstances where our clients and our arts are put in a position where it might appear or has appeared that we're trying to be evasive or, you know, impede the process. What we're trying to do is avoid distractions, make sure that we have our facts straight, before we take action. The same applies to Ms. guo personally. The issue was not whether I or my firm or Mr. Vartan or his firm were willing to take direction from Ms. Guo. The issue that both Ms. Guo had, as well as what we had, is that given the allegations in the complaint, given the lack of documentation at either of our fingertips at the time, we determined, given the options of taking action and then having allegations made, accusations made, that we shouldn't have taken that accusation -- or the action, and that we somehow did so for some nefarious purpose, that it made more sense, would be less distraction, less distracting, and less wasteful, to get our ducks in a row, and do it the right way, and appear now, some three weeks later. The Trustee has not identified any case, because\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 95 of\n\n| | 111 |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024
95 |\n| 1 | there is none, where a Rule 55(c) motion has been denied |\n| 2 | within weeks of the answer date, and a coherent, |\n| 3 | comprehensive, explanation as to why it took a little bit |\n| 4 | more time has been placed on the record.
I am unaware of |\n| 5 | any, and I don't believe there are any. |\n| 6 | Everything that the Trustee has said, Mr. Bassett |\n| 7 | as his counsel, with regard to the merits, exclusive of what |\n| 8 | I began by acknowledging, that there are some alleged |\n| 9 | transfers and that there are alleged common agents of |\n| 10 | Leading Shine and third-party entities, everything else is |\n| 11 | pure speculation and conjecture.
Hypothetical questions, |\n| 12 | why don't we have this, why don't we have that. |\n| 13 | The complaint was filed on October 30th.
It was |\n| 14 | heavily redacted. |\n| 15 | There are many moving parts in this case.
I think |\n| 16 | Your Honor said something like we're up to 3,000 docket |\n| 17 | entries.
We're all human beings.
We're doing our best. |\n| 18 | But we can't focus on everything at one time.
This is not |\n| 19 | the only case on this court's docket.
It's not the only |\n| 20 | case on my firm's docket. |\n| 21 | We have the right, Leading Shine has the right, |\n| 22 | Ms. Guo has the right, to present a defense.
That's what |\n| 23 | she wants to do.
And at this point, articulation, our |\n| 24 | defense is, as well as the weaknesses in the Trustee's own |\n| 25 | allegations and the failure to satisfy the elements that is |\n| | |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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96 |\n| 1 | his burden to satisfy, is sufficient for a Rule 55(c) |\n| 2 | motion. |\n| 3 | And Judge Tancredi wrote a very articulate |\n| 4 | decision stating exactly just that in the Walnut Hill case |\n| 5 | that's cited on page 6 of our reply. |\n| 6 | With that, I have nothing further.
Thank you, |\n| 7 | Your Honor, for your time. |\n| 8 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Thank you. |\n| 9 | Anything further, Mr. Bassett? |\n| 10 | MR. BASSETT:
Yeah.
Just very briefly, Your |\n| 11 | Honor.
Your Honor, again for the record, Nick Bassett from |\n| 12 | Paul Hastings on behalf of the Chapter 11 Trustee. |\n| 13 | I don't think much more needs to be said on the |\n| 14 | willfulness element.
The fact of the matter is there was -- |\n| 15 | there no questionably was service of the complaint, an |\n| 16 | actual notice, and it was not responded to knowingly. |\n| 17 | There's no allegation at all that there was some mistake or |\n| 18 | other extraneous factor that presented -- that prevented any |\n| 19 | kind of response. |\n| 20 | Again, it's not up to Attorney Romney.
Mei Guo, |\n| 21 | and Leading Shine, they're the party.
They're the ones who |\n| 22 | had the obligation to meet their deadline.
They decided to |\n| 23 | take no action, to sit there and do nothing.
So the |\n| 24 | willfulness -- and again, it's their burden on willfulness. |\n| 25 | They have not satisfied it. |\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 97 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 97 As to meritorious, the meritorious defense prong, I won't rehash what's been said before other than to note again there is zero evidence in the record to show that there's a meritorious defense that could be offered. That's not surprising, because the only actual party involved here is Mei Guo, who knows nothing about this entity. And the last point I would make on that, Your Honor, is that I think it's a little convenient for Mr. Romney to rest his entire argument on the meritorious defense prong on the idea, incorrect as it may be, that the Trustee has not included sufficient allegations of the alter ego relationship in his complaint, when his client, the party here, ducked the Trustee's 2004 discovery that he was entitled to. The entire purpose of 2004 discovery made available to a trustee is to allow the Trustee to uncover the facts necessary to bring potential causes of action to acquire and recover assets for the estate. They cannot have it both ways. It's entirely improper and indicative of the gamesmanship that has been occurring. I have nothing further, Your Honor. Thank you very much. THE COURT: Thank you. All right. I do not have any further questions\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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98 |\n| 1 | with regard to the motion to set aside default on behalf of |\n| 2 | Leading Shine, Inc., ECF 30, so I will take that matter |\n| 3 | under advisement. |\n| 4 | And then we'll move to the final matter on today's |\n| 5 | calendar, which is the motion to set aside default filed on |\n| 6 | behalf -- |\n| 7 | Well, I mean, you've argued it in some respects, |\n| 8 | Attorney Grand, but I suppose you can argue again. |\n| 9 | We were arguing the motion for default judgment, |\n| 10 | but you also argued the motion to set aside default, |\n| 11 | although I'm happy to let you argue again if you'd like to. |\n| 12 | MR. GRAND:
Well, Your Honor, it wasn't clear that |\n| 13 | our -- that Lamp Capital and Infinity Treasury Management |\n| 14 | motions to set aside the default was -- |\n| 15 | THE COURT:
Yeah. |\n| 16 | MR. GRAND:
-- going to be -- |\n| 17 | THE COURT:
So then go ahead and argue. |\n| 18 | MR. GRAND:
-- heard today, so. |\n| 19 | THE COURT:
What do you mean it wasn't clear. |\n| 20 | It's on the calendar. |\n| 21 | MR. GRAND:
I did not see it on the calendar. |\n| 22 | THE COURT:
It's on the calendar. |\n| 23 | MR. GRAND:
I only saw Infinity's, I'm sorry, the |\n| 24 | Trustee's motion for default judgment and Leading Shine's |\n| 25 | motion to set aside a default. |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 99 THE COURT: It's on the calendar. MR. GRAND: That's what I'm saying. When I looked at Your Honor's calendar for today, I didn't see the motion there. THE COURT: Am I -- I'm looking at the courtroom staff. Isn't there -- aren't there -- isn't there another motion to set aside default on ECF 42? MR. GRAND: Yeah. THE COURT: Okay. MR. GRAND: It may be there now. I'm just saying, when I looked at it yesterday when I was trying to figure out whether or not it was on the calendar, I didn't -- I didn't see it on the Court's calendar. MR. BASSETT: Your Honor, if I may? I mean, so the Rule 55(c) motion was filed in response to the motion for a default judgment sort of as -- I think it was styled as a cross-motion. And I pointed this out earlier. And the real reason I pointed it was just to help the Court sort of understand the process to help us decide how to proceed today, which is that there wasn't so much a response separately to the motion for a default judgment that the Trustee filed -- THE COURT: Yeah. They filed -- instead they -- MR. BASSETT: -- it was really just a 55(c) as a Case 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 99 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 100 response to the default judgment. So what I had thought we were doing, and thought made sense, was for me just to address that. Counsel would address the 55(c) and respond, as I think he did -- THE COURT: Well, he did address the 55(c). Yeah. MR. BASSETT: -- and, therefore, I don't -- THE COURT: Yeah. MR. BASSETT: -- I don't think we need to further -- THE COURT: I don't think there's any further need for any further argument. I mean, he's correct, if you look at the docket, Counsel, of the adversary proceeding. MR. GRAND: I'm not suggesting that we not handle it all today or that I want to come back again and argue another time, I'm only pointing out that it was a bit unclear. In other words, the motion to set aside the default, there was a notice of hearing that the Court issued in response setting today as the hearing date to hear that. The motion for a default judgment, there was a notice of hearing setting today as the hearing date to address that, our motion to set aside the default, and I understand that it was a motion to set aside the default. And our brief that we submitted in support of that motion was submitted for two purposes, both in support of Case 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 100 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 101 that motion, but also in opposition to the Trustee's motion for a default judgment. So it served two purposes. But all I'm -- I'm only pointing out that I just didn't see a notice of hearing saying it was going to be addressed today. THE COURT: There wasn't a notice of hearing -- MR. GRAND: Right. THE COURT: -- because that was your response to the motion to set aside the motion -- MR. GRAND: It was both. THE COURT: -- for default judgment. MR. GRAND: Right. It was both. It was both. And -- THE COURT: And you've made the argument. You made the argument. MR. GRAND: I have. I mean -- but I appreciate Your Honor's, you know, offering me another, you know, additional time. I mean, I only point out that, you know, a couple of case cites on the issue we addressed before on the notice point, and I can provide those to you, a few of them, now -- THE COURT: You can provide -- MR. GRAND: -- that I was able to just find in the last few minutes. THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. Give me a -- Case 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 101 of\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 102 of\n\n| | | | | | 111 | | | |\n|--|--|--|--|--|-----|--|--|--|\n|--|--|--|--|--|-----|--|--|--|\n\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024
102 |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | MR. GRAND:
I know Your Honor didn't want |\n| 2 | additional briefing. |\n| 3 | THE COURT:
Give me a -- give me the cites then. |\n| 4 | MR. GRAND:
Sure. |\n| 5 | THE COURT:
Please, when you get a chance. |\n| 6 | MR. GRAND:
Sure.
An Eastern District case.
It |\n| 7 | can be found at 2023 Westlaw 170595. |\n| 8 | THE COURT:
That's the full cite?
Decor Holdings, |\n| 9 | Inc.? |\n| 10 | MR. GRAND:
Yes.
Which was affirmed by the Second |\n| 11 | Circuit. |\n| 12 | THE COURT:
Well, it's an unreported decision, so, |\n| 13 | but let's -- it's an unreported slip opinion according to |\n| 14 | this.
So where -- what am I looking at here? |\n| 15 | MR. GRAND:
So -- |\n| 16 | THE COURT:
What page? |\n| 17 | MR. GRAND:
You can look to page, I believe it's 4 |\n| 18 | and 5 where, hang on, I'm doing this on my phone, so I |\n| 19 | appreciate -- |\n| 20 | THE COURT:
This appeal turns on whether B&J was |\n| 21 | an authorized agent for service of process of the Bankruptcy |\n| 22 | Rule 7004(b)(3).
That's what the District Court, the United |\n| 23 | States District Court of Eastern District of New York said. |\n| 24 | So the case was about whether or not there was an entity |\n| 25 | that was actually the agent for service of process. |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 103 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 103 MR. GRAND: Yes. But further up, I believe, in that case, the Court distinguished on a motion to vacate a default judgment, based on improper service where the defaulting defendant had actual notice of the original proceeding but delayed in response, is different than a situation where the Court said, however, whereas, here, it is in dispute whether defendant had actual notice before the entry of default judgment courts have found that the burden of proof properly remains with the plaintiff. THE COURT: This was the burden of proof for vacating a default judgment -- MR. GRAND: Right. Which is -- THE COURT: -- depends upon whether the defendant had actual notice. We're not dealing a default judgment. We're dealing with a default. MR. GRAND: I understand. And the willfulness standard is applied even less rigorously in that circumstance. THE COURT: Well, it says on a motion to vacate a default judgment, based upon improper service of process, where the defaulting defendant had actual notice of the proceeding but delayed in bringing the motion. And this was based on -- You have -- you haven't alleged that there wasn't\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 104 improper service of process. MR. GRAND: Right. I'm talking about the -- THE COURT: You just alleged you -- MR. GRAND: This decision said that where service -- even where service is -- it doesn't -- THE COURT: No. It says when improper service was made and the defendant had actual notice, the defendant bears the burden of proof to establish that the purported service did not occur. MR. GRAND: Right. The next sentence. THE COURT: Okay. However, whereas, here, it is in dispute whether the defendant had actual notice -- MR. GRAND: Yes. THE COURT: -- of the entry of the default judgment, Counsel. Not the default, the default judgment. MR. GRAND: I understand that. And in this circumstance, when we're only dealing with the default and not a judgment, the willfulness standard is even less rigorously applied. THE COURT: It doesn't say that, Counsel. I disagree. That's not what it says. MR. GRAND: That's the stuff along the Second Circuit for -- THE COURT: That's not what it says. MR. GRAND: -- 20 years. Case 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 104 of\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 105 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 105 THE COURT: It says the burden of proof for vacating a default judgment. And this whole case was about whether the entity that was supposedly the agent of service really was the agent of service. MR. GRAND: But that's not what it -- right. But the point was that irrespective of whether the agent was proper or not, the point was that the defendant never received notice. THE COURT: No, that's -- no, it's not. That's not what it says. That's not what it says. MR. GRAND: It was. Due process does -- THE COURT: No. It's citing to another -- another case. It doesn't say -- MR. GRAND: We can look at that case as well if that's where the quote comes from. THE COURT: Okay. Let's look at it. Again, an unreported decision from the Eastern District of New York, so there has no precedential value. And it's -- and it's under Rule 60(b)(1), which is a default judgment, not a default. MR. BASSETT: Your Honor, I don't have -- I don't have access to that case, so if I could just have the -- MR. GRAND: I'll give you the cite. MR. BASSETT: Thank you. THE COURT: The second one?\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 106 MR. BASSETT: Yeah. The second one that we're now -- THE COURT: 22 Westlaw -- 2022 Westlaw 16754744. MR. BASSETT: Thank you. THE COURT: This whole case, the second, is dealing with the vacature under Rule 60(b), not 55(c). That's what the Court says. MR. GRAND: Your Honor, I recognize that. The point is that if all the factors are the same, they're applied even less rigorously in -- THE COURT: Where does it say that, Counsel? It doesn't say that -- MR. GRAND: It says that throughout our papers. In the *Enron* case. In the -- in the -- THE COURT: Okay. Well, I'll look at your papers then -- MR. GRAND: I can point you to that if you'd like. THE COURT: -- but it doesn't say that. I asked you specifically and that -- and those are the cases that you cited to, so I'll look. MR. GRAND: Judge, I'm not sure what you're asking. If you're asking whether or not -- THE COURT: I'm not asking anything. You said -- MR. GRAND: -- the standard under Rule 55(c) is -- THE COURT: I'm not asking anything. You said you Case 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 106 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 107 wanted to cite to me additional cases and so you are. MR. GRAND: There's also the *U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission vs. McCrudden* case which addresses some of these issues. THE COURT: What's the cite to that case? MR. GRAND: That cite is 2015 Westlaw 5944229. THE COURT: Okay. Anything else? MR. GRAND: I just want to confirm that that's all I have. I appreciate one minute, and then I think I'll either have more or not. I think that is -- THE COURT: Okay. That prior case that you cited that we just to, talked about, is actual notice, is broader because there was an improper service. There's no assertion in this case that there's improper service. MR. GRAND: That's not the point. THE COURT: No assertion whatsoever. MR. GRAND: The point is that because they didn't receive notice. That's what those cases hold. THE COURT: No, they don't, Counsel. They don't. MR. GRAND: Okay. THE COURT: Because if they did then Rule 55 would not need to be in existence. They don't. They do not hold that. And the case that I'm looking at mow, *U.S. Commodity Future Trading vs. McCrudden*, they talk about the Case 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 107 of\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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108 |\n| 1 | elements in Wang, the request for an entry of default |\n| 2 | judgment, the elements we've gone over today, which we all |\n| 3 | know what they are. |\n| 4 | MR. GRAND:
I understand.
And they articulate |\n| 5 | that the elements are to be applied less rigorously -- |\n| 6 | THE COURT:
Where does it say that?
I haven't |\n| 7 | seen it once, not once, not in any of the cases that you |\n| 8 | cited. |\n| 9 | MR. GRAND:
In all of the -- in all of the cases |\n| 10 | that I've cited.
Our brief has many of those cases. |\n| 11 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Then I think we've -- I'm happy |\n| 12 | to -- I will go back and read them, Counsel, but not one of |\n| 13 | the cases say that there -- it's applied less -- it doesn't |\n| 14 | say what you say. |\n| 15 | None of them say that when you acknowledge that |\n| 16 | service is proper you also have to have actual notice.
So |\n| 17 | none of them say that.
Not one.
And they couldn't. |\n| 18 | Because then it would render Rule 55's purpose, there would |\n| 19 | be no reason for Rule 55. |\n| 20 | Then every single defendant would have to have |\n| 21 | actual notice of a complaint.
In your argument, if you take |\n| 22 | it to its -- every single person, there would be no reason |\n| 23 | that you could ever seek a default. |\n| 24 | MR. GRAND:
Your Honor, the default is premised on |\n| 25 | service. |\n| | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 109 of\n\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024
109 |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | THE COURT:
That's correct. |\n| | |\n| 2 | MR. GRAND:
Correct.
Nobody is suggesting here |\n| 3 | that the default that was entered -- |\n| 4 | THE COURT:
Okay.
And where does it say that you |\n| 5 | can set aside a default because you didn't get actual |\n| 6 | notice? |\n| 7 | MR. GRAND:
That's what the -- |\n| 8 | THE COURT:
Where does it say that in Rule 55, |\n| 9 | Counsel?
Where does it say that? |\n| 10 | MR. GRAND:
It said it in the cases that I just |\n| 11 | cited to Your Honor. |\n| 12 | THE COURT:
No, it doesn't.
No, I'm sorry, it |\n| 13 | doesn't. |\n| 14 | MR. GRAND:
Okay. |\n| 15 | THE COURT:
I disagree with you. |\n| 16 | MR. GRAND:
Okay. |\n| 17 | THE COURT:
It doesn't say that.
Okay? |\n| 18 | MR. GRAND:
Yeah.
Thank you. |\n| 19 | THE COURT:
All right.
Well, then I'm -- all |\n| 20 | these matters have been addressed by the Court.
I will go |\n| 21 | back and review all the matters and I will take all the |\n| 22 | matters that were on the calendar, other than the interim |\n| 23 | application for compensation, which is granted, for which a |\n| 24 | revised, proposed order will be submitted, there will be no |\n| 25 | further pretrial conferences set, and the matters will all |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 110 be taken under advisement. Is there anything further we need to address this afternoon, Trustee Despins? MR. DESPINS: Just a few seconds, Your Honor. Mr. Shaiban (ph) sent a letter to the Court asking to get permission to sue the assignee for the benefit of creditors. We want to make sure that we'll have enough (indiscernible) to respond to that. I assume Your Honor will enter an order -- THE COURT: If he sends a letter asking for permission to do something, I will take no action on it. You file a motion in this court. That's how it works. MR. DESPINS: I understand. Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. All right. Then that concludes today's hearings, this afternoon's hearings. Thank you, all. Court is adjourned. (Proceedings concluded at 3:36 p.m.) Case 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 110 of\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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111 |\n| 1 | I, CHRISTINE FIORE, court-approved transcriber and |\n| 2 | certified electronic reporter and transcriber, certify that |\n| 3 | the foregoing is a correct transcript from the official |\n| 4 | electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above |\n| 5 | entitled matter. |\n| 6 | |\n| 7 | |\n| 8 | January 29, 2024 |\n| 9 | Christine Fiore, CERT |\n| 10 | |\n| 11 | |\n| 12 | |\n| 13 | |\n| 14 | |\n| 15 | |\n| 16 | |\n| 17 | |\n| 18 | |\n| 19 | |\n| 20 | |\n| 21 | |\n| 22 | |\n| 23 | |\n| 24 | |\n| | |\n| | |","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院 布里奇波特分院\n关于 * 案号：22-50073 (JAM)\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）及 GENEVER HOLDINGS CORPORATION（GENEVER 控股公司）， *\n *\n债务人。 *\nLUC A. DESPINS（卢克·A·德斯平斯），第 11 章 * 对抗程序案号：23-05023\n受托人， *\n *\n原告， *\n诉 *\n * 康涅狄格州布里奇波特\nLAMP CAPITAL LLC（蓝普资本有限责任公司）等， * 2024年1月23日\n *\n被告。 *\n *\n *\n *\n *\n *\n *\n *\n *\n *\n *\n *\n *\n *\n *\n *\n *\n *\n在美国联邦破产法官 JULIE A. MANNING（朱莉·A·曼宁）阁下面前的庭审记录\n\n出庭人员：\n代表第 11 章受托人：\nNICHOLAS A. BASSETT（尼古拉斯·A·巴塞特），律师\nPaul Hastings LLP（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所）\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, NY 10166\n\n第 11 章受托人：\nLUC A. DESPINS，律师\n保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, NY 10166\n\n庭审程序由电子录音记录，庭审记录由速记服务机构制作。\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷记录与庭审记录服务公司）\nShelton, CT 06484\n(203)732-6461\n\n出庭人员：（续）\n代表 Lamp Capital 和\nInfinity Treasury\nManagement（无限财政管理公司）：\nROBERT J. GRAND（罗伯特·J·格兰德），律师\nROBERT RUSH MILLER（罗伯特·拉什·米勒），律师\nLax & Neville LLP（拉克斯与内维尔律师事务所）\n350 Fifth Avenue\nSuite 4640\nNew York, NY 10118\n\n代表美国受托人：\nHOLLEY L. CLAIBORN（霍莉·L·克莱伯恩），律师\n美国受托人办公室\nGiaimo Federal Building（贾亚莫联邦大楼）\n150 Court Street, Room 302\nNew Haven, CT 06510\n\n代表 Hudson Diamond NY, LLC（哈德逊钻石纽约有限责任公司）、\nHudson Diamond Holding, LLC（哈德逊钻石控股有限责任公司）、\nLeading Shine NY Ltd.（领耀纽约有限公司）及\nMei Guo（郭梅）：\nJAMES M. MORIARTY（詹姆斯·M·莫里亚蒂），律师\nAARON ROMNEY（亚伦·罗姆尼），律师\nZeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（蔡斯勒与蔡斯勒专业公司）\n10 Middle Street, 15th FL\nBridgeport, CT 06604\n2475 关于报酬的临时申请；Pallas Partners, LLP（帕拉斯合伙律师事务所）作为其他专业人员提出的第一份临时报酬申请；费用：$318,591.60，支出：$4,953.04\n4 审前会议\n18 根据 Fed. R. Civ. P.55(b)(2) 请求法院就 Lamp Capital LLC\n及 Infinity Treasury Management, Inc. 作出缺席判决的动议\n30 由 Aaron Romney 提出的撤销缺席裁定动议\n42 由 Robert J. Grand 提出的撤销缺席裁定动议\n案号 22-50073 文件 2539 提交日期 01/31/24 登记日期 01/31/24 13:29:55 第 4 页，共 111 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok - 2024年1月23日 4\n（庭审于下午 1:05 开始。）\n法庭书记员：案号 22-50073，Ho Wan Kwok，以及对抗程序案号 23-5023，Despins 诉 Lamp Capital, LLC 等。\n法庭：好的。各位下午好。请各方为记录目的说明出庭身份，先请第 11 章受托人。\nDESPINS 先生：下午好，法官阁下。Luc Despins，第 11 章受托人。\nBASSETT 先生：下午好，法官阁下。我是 Paul Hastings 的 Nick Bassett，担任第 11 章受托人的律师。法官阁下，我想说明，我们的共同代理律师 Lindsey 先生原计划出席，但不幸在前往法庭途中发生了车祸。\n法庭：哦。\nBASSETT 先生：他没有大碍。\n法庭：那很好，很高兴听到这个消息。\nBASSETT 先生：但因此无法如原计划那样到庭。\n法庭：好的。谢谢。\nCLAIBORN 女士：下午好。我是代表美国受托人的 Holley Claiborn。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 2539 提交日期 01/31/24 登记日期 01/31/24 13:29:55 第 5 页，共 111 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok - 2024年1月23日 5\n法庭：下午好。\nGRAND 先生：下午好。我是 Lax & Neville 的 Robert Grand，代表 Lamp Capital 和 Infinity Treasury Management。\n法庭：下午好。\n法庭书记员：抱歉。我没有听清您的姓氏？\nGRAND 先生：Grand，G-R-A-N-D。\n法庭：Grand 先生，在本法庭内，所有事项均以录音记录。因此，如果我听不见您说话，我会要求您提高音量，因为这是我们在本案中保存记录的唯一方式。我们所有记录均为录音记录。明白吗？\nGRAND 先生：是的。谢谢。\n法庭：谢谢。\nMILLER 先生：法官阁下，通过视频出席的是 Lax & Neville 的 Robert Miller，代表 Lamp Capital 和 Infinity Treasury。\n法庭：下午好。\nMORIARTY 先生：下午好，法官阁下。\nROMNEY 先生：下午好。\nMORIARTY 先生：抱歉。下午好，法官阁下。我是 Zeisler & Zeisler 的 James Moriarty，代表 Hudson Diamond New York, LLC、Hudson Diamond Holding, LLC、Leading Shine New York, Limited 和 Mei Guo。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 2539 提交日期 01/31/24 登记日期 01/31/24 13:29:55 第 6 页，共 111 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok - 2024年1月23日\n1 法庭：\n下午好。\n2 ROMNEY 先生：\n下午好，法官阁下。我是\n3 Zeisler & Zeisler 的 Aaron Romney，代表同一批当事人。\n4 法庭：\n下午好。\n5 Moriarty 先生、Romney 先生，Vartan 先生\n6 的律师事务所今天会有人出席吗？\n7 ROMNEY 先生：\n不会，法官阁下。\n8 法庭：\n好的。我只是想在\n9 记录中说明，Vartan 先生和 Wernick 女士已代表 Holdings 和 Guo 女士提交了\n10 出庭通知，但未代表 New York，即 Hudson Diamond New York 提交，\n11 尽管他们近期提交——他们签署了一份诉状，我想\n12 是答复，其中他们提交——该文件系代表\n13 所有三方签署，全部三名被告，即 Hudson\n14 Diamond Holdings、Hudson Diamond New York 和 Guo 女士，因此\n15 我们需要对此予以纠正。明白吗？\n16 \n17 ROMNEY 先生：\n明白，法官阁下。\n18 法庭：\n好的。\n19 ROMNEY 先生：\n我想，我们将在\n20 今天结束前提交他们的出庭通知。谢谢。\n21 法庭：\n可以。我只是想确保，\n22 因为出庭通知看起来仅——它们仅显示代表 Holdings 和\n23 Guo 女士出庭，而后续提交的诉状则由 Vartan 先生\n24 代表全部三名被告签署。\n25 \n\n案号 22-50073 文件 2539 提交日期 01/31/24 登记日期 01/31/24 13:29:55 第 7 页，共 111 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok - 2024年1月23日 7\nROMNEY 先生：明白，法官阁下。我认为，相关背景只是，其代表 Holdings 和 Guo 女士的 pro hac vice 申请此前已获批准，而其代表 New York 的 pro hac vice 申请昨天才刚获批准。\n法庭：嗯，也许。好的。那么也许这就是原因。好的。可以。谢谢。只是当你们——我们只是想确保——我们希望对此予以纠正，以便记录准确。\nROMNEY 先生：谢谢，法官阁下。\n法庭：好的。谢谢。那么，今天日程中本案的事项是——关于报酬的临时申请。然后是原定的审前会议，该会议在与对抗程序有关的传票发出时，始终由法院书记员办公室安排。显然，我们随后还有对抗程序中的动议需要处理。那么，Bassett 先生，我们是否先处理报酬申请？\nDESPINS 先生：是的，法官阁下。我来处理该事项。\n法庭：哦，好的。抱歉。好的。请继续，Despins 受托人。\nDESPINS 先生：好的。法官阁下，这是 Pallas Partners 的申请，案卷编号 2475，\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 2539 提交日期 01/31/24 登记日期 01/31/24 13:29:55 第 8 页，共 111 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok - 2024年1月23日\n1 于 12 月 27 日提交。该\n2 报酬申请请求的救济金额为 318,591。但\n3 该金额实际上是针对从 1 月至 11 月、\n4 11 月底的近一年期间。并且还请求\n5 报销 4,952.80 的支出。\n6 现在，美国受托人对该\n7 申请提出了一些意见，她实际上协商将 Pallas 的\n8 费用从 318,591 降至 305,791，减少\n9 12,800，并将支出减少 4,927，因为这些\n10 支出是大律师的支出，而他将\n11 另行请求报销其费用。\n12 而且，法官阁下，您此前从未处理过那家\n13 Pallas 律师事务所的事项，因此我认为值得花两分钟说明\n14 一下，您知道——他们是我们在 UBS\n15 诉讼中的英国律师。\n16 在过去一年中，您知道，他们协助\n17 我们尝试，您知道，尝试从曾代表 Kwok 先生及\n18 该诉讼中其他——其他原告\n19 起诉 UBS 的律师事务所取得受律师—客户特权保护的报告。\n20 \n21 他们最近还协助我们提交\n22 一项动议，以寻求中止该诉讼。\n23 因为我们提出的观点是，在对谁控制\n24 该诉讼存在分歧的情况下，继续进行该诉讼\n25 毫无意义，\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 2539 提交日期 01/31/24 登记日期 01/31/24 13:29:55 第 9 页，共 111 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok - 2024年1月23日 9\n即我们的立场是，根据您的裁定，受托人拥有 Ace Decade 和 Dawn State。但英国有一家律师事务所代表 Ace Decade 出庭。他们不肯说明——他们接受谁的指示，但他们表示代表 Ace Decade 并反对我们。因此，我们在英国法院提交了这项中止动议，基本上是说，我们需要一劳永逸地解决谁拥有 Ace Decade 这一问题，同时也要避免 Yvette Wang 于 2023 年 1 月将 Ace Decade 的股份转让回去。您或许记得此事。因此，我们已在您面前提起对抗程序，请求该项救济，该程序将自行推进。您知道，我不知道 Wang 女士是否会缺席，但——被告是 Ace Decade、Wang 女士，以及一名现为 Ace Decade 股票持有人的先生，该人士位于瑞士。这就是目前的情况。这是他们在英国为我们受聘处理的全部事项。除非法官阁下有任何问题，否则我们请求法院按照与美国受托人讨论后修改的内容批准该申请。\n法庭：目前我没有任何问题。谢谢。Claiborn 女士？\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 2539 提交日期 01/31/24 登记日期 01/31/24 13:29:55 第 10 页，共 111 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok - 2024年1月23日 10\nCLAIBORN 女士：法官阁下，仅为补充记录，我所提交、确认 Despins 受托人刚才所作陈述的声明载于 ECF 2502。并且，为进一步明确涉及支出的核心问题，大律师 Paul Wright 将通过其日后提交的自身报酬申请，请求报销这些支出。因此，该等支出不会作为本报酬申请的一部分获裁定。\n法庭：是否有经修订的拟议命令？\nCLAIBORN 女士：我尚未见到。我假定 Despins 受托人的团队正在编制。\nDESPINS 先生：是的。法官阁下，我们现在没有，但我们将在向 Claiborn 律师出示后提交给法院。\n法庭：好的。\nCLAIBORN 女士：谢谢。\n法庭：可以。关于报酬的临时申请，我已审阅该报酬申请及费用。现在支出将另行请求，因此我只处理费用，Claiborn 律师，是否正确？\nCLAIBORN 女士：有一笔小额支出获准。\n\nHo Wan Kwok - 2024年1月23日 11\n金额为 $26。\n法庭：好的。那么我认为这是合理的。\nCLAIBORN 女士：但其余部分将由大律师 Paul Wright 日后通过申请处理。\n法庭：好的。谢谢。那么，请求批准的费用和 $26 支出——是请求批准，不是将要批准，是请求批准——我认定在本案及英国相关程序的情形下属合理且必要。该申请已适当送达。听证通知已送达。无人对报酬申请提出任何异议。异议截止日期为 2024年1月16日。未提交任何异议。未提交任何答复。未就关于报酬的临时申请提交任何文件。如第 11 章受托人和美国受托人办公室在记录中所述，申请中以美元金额请求的费用有所减少，当事人将提交一份经修订的拟议命令，以记载该协议。我确实看到，美国受托人办公室已就减少后的费用提交无异议声明，该声明载于本第 11 章案件案卷中的 2502。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 2539 提交日期 01/31/24 登记日期 01/31/24 13:29:55 第 11 页，共 111 页\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 2539 提交日期 01/31/24 登记日期 01/31/24 13:29:55 第 12 页，共 111 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- January 23, 2024 12\n\n因此，基于所有这些理由，关于补偿的临时申请获准，经修订的拟议命令将提交本院。你们可以将其提交至法庭书记员的电子邮箱。无需在案卷中提交。但请确保，正如我认为受托人 Despins（德斯潘斯）已经表示他会做的那样，律师 Claiborn（克莱伯恩）将看到该命令，并在向本院提交该命令时被抄送。因此，该申请获准。\n\nDESPINS 先生：谢谢您，法官阁下。\n\n本院：谢谢。那么，日程表上的审前会议，确实如我先前就针对被告 Lamp Capital（蓝普资本）及其他被告提起的对抗程序所说，是原先排定的审前会议。显然，在本次审前程序——抱歉，是在本对抗程序中——已经发生了许多事情，我们未必需要以通常的方式举行审前会议，例如讨论是否有人提交了答辩状、存在何种证据开示问题，以及我们是否将订立审前命令，因为我们还有其他事项。我已经大致了解该对抗程序的状态。显然，已经作出缺席登记。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 2539 提交于 01/31/24 录入于 01/31/24 13:29:55 第13页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- January 23, 2024\n\n1 目前日程表上有一项缺席判决动议以及两项撤销缺席登记动议。\n\n2 \n\n3 因此，Bassett（巴塞特）律师，我假定您显然希望本院作出缺席判决，但您也承认，撤销缺席登记的动议已经提交并列入日程，对吗？\n\n4 \n\n5 \n\n6 \n\n7 BASSETT 先生：是的。确实如此，法官阁下。\n\n8 显然，我们今天将审理针对 Lamp Capital（蓝普资本）和 Infinity Treasury Management（无限财政管理公司）的缺席判决动议，以及其对此的回应，该回应附有一项根据 Rule 55(c) 提出的撤销缺席登记动议。\n\n9 \n\n10 \n\n11 \n\n12 此外，如本院所指出，我们还有被告 Leading Shine（领盛公司）提出的撤销缺席登记动议。\n\n13 \n\n14 另有其他三名被告，即 Mei Guo（郭梅）以及两家 Hudson Diamond（哈德森钻石）实体，已提出驳回动议。\n\n15 \n\n16 \n\n17 我实际上已与 Moriarty（莫里亚蒂）律师协商，我们双方一致认为，在该驳回动议待决期间，本案应当就那些被告继续推进；因此，我们的计划是就诉讼时间表进行协调，并将很快向本院提交相关内容。\n\n18 \n\n19 \n\n20 \n\n21 \n\n22 \n\n23 但除此之外，我认为今天无需以审前会议的方式处理其他事项。\n\n24 \n\n25 \n\n案号 22-50073 文件 2539 提交于 01/31/24 录入于 01/31/24 13:29:55 第14页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- January 23, 2024\n\n1 本院：好的。谢谢。\n\n2 还有其他人希望就审前会议事项，而非日程表上具体动议，发表意见吗？\n\n3 \n\n4 \n\n5 ROMNEY 先生：没有，法官阁下。\n\n6 本院：谢谢。\n\n7 好的。因此，目前我不会安排任何进一步的审前会议。\n\n8 当事人始终可以请求召开会议，该请求可能获准，也可能不获准；但是，鉴于该对抗程序中的进展，目前没有必要安排进一步的审前会议。\n\n9 \n\n10 \n\n11 \n\n12 \n\n13 那么，Bassett（巴塞特）律师，显然日程表上似乎先列的是缺席判决动议，但也有撤销缺席登记的动议，因此您建议如何进行？\n\n14 \n\n15 \n\n16 \n\n17 BASSETT 先生：法官阁下，我建议——当然，须遵从本院的偏好——先就缺席判决动议进行，因为从顺序上看，诉状和文件就是这样提交到案卷中的。\n\n18 \n\n19 \n\n20 \n\n21 \n\n22 Lamp Capital（蓝普资本）和 Infinity Treasury Management（无限财政管理公司）对该动议的回应，实际上是通过提出 55(c) 问题作出回应；因此，我可以陈述关于缺席登记的事项、该回应、论点以及对 55(c) 的回应，然后对方律师可以作出回应，之后我们可以第二项处理 Leading Shine（领盛公司）的问题，如果这符合本院的安排。\n\n23 \n\n24 \n\n25 \n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- January 23, 2024 15\n\n本院：好的。那么请开始。\n\nBASSETT 先生：法官阁下，我可以到讲台前吗？\n\n本院：可以，请。\n\nBASSETT 先生：再次向您问候，法官阁下。为记录在案，我是代表 Chapter 11 Trustee（第11章受托人）的 Paul Hastings（普衡律师事务所）律师 Nick Bassett（尼克·巴塞特）。法官阁下，我想说，今天在本院面前的两项事项，不幸地都是这些案件中正在形成的一种令人不安趋势的一部分。这种趋势是：受托人指称为债务人空壳公司的实体，以及与债务人、并与在这些案件一年多的进程中于诉状和证据中出现过的其他当事人及个人有各种联系的实体，正在选择性地决定何时参与这些案件、何时不参与这些案件。\n\n21 在两起案件中，我们这里的被告此前均已收到 Rule 2004 证据开示请求，此前均已收到传票，而这些传票均被置之不理。就 Lamp Capital（蓝普资本）而言，其被裁定藐视法庭，并被判定应承担受托人的费用。他们\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 2539 提交于 01/31/24 录入于 01/31/24 13:29:55 第15页，共\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 2539 提交于 01/31/24 录入于 01/31/24 13:29:55 第16页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- January 23, 2024\n\n1 从未出庭。他们从未采取任何行动。顺便说一句，正如本院将会记得且我们已在提交文件中说明的，Lamp Capital（蓝普资本）实际上支付了债务人为提交本破产案件而聘请的律师的费用。他们始终保持沉默。他们拒绝参与。他们没有让受托人获得其有权取得的证据开示材料。我们送达了起诉状，结果仍然一无所获，没有回应。\n\n2 \n\n3 \n\n4 \n\n5 \n\n6 \n\n7 \n\n8 如今，他们迟迟才出庭，并在对他们方便时请求迟延陈述意见。\n\n9 \n\n10 法官阁下，这种趋势显示出对法治、对本院程序以及对本院权威的彻底蔑视。它必须停止。\n\n11 \n\n12 \n\n13 受托人就 Lamp Capital（蓝普资本）和 Infinity Treasury Management（无限财政管理公司）提出的缺席判决动议应予准许，因为缺席判决的所有要求均已满足。\n\n14 \n\n15 \n\n16 \n\n17 首先，我认为对此不存在任何疑问，起诉状已被适当送达。起诉状于 October 26th, 2023 提交。传票于 October 31st, 2023 签发。\n\n18 \n\n19 \n\n20 \n\n21 起诉状于同日依 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b)(1)(B) 送达，该规则授权通过将送达文书交付给经指定或依法获授权接收送达文书的代理人，向公司或 LLC 送达。\n\n22 \n\n23 \n\n24 \n\n25 \n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- January 23, 2024 17\n\n在本案中，受托人向 Lamp Capital（蓝普资本）和 Infinity Treasury Management（无限财政管理公司）各自的注册代理人送达了起诉状和传票。就——该情况载于提交文件中——Infinity Treasury Management（无限财政管理公司）而言，受托人确实收到注册代理人的回函，称 Infinity Treasury Management（无限财政管理公司）已不再获准在 Delaware（特拉华州）开展业务。但根据 Delaware State Records（特拉华州记录），该注册代理人仍为 Infinity Treasury Management（无限财政管理公司）的注册代理人；因此，根据 Delaware law（特拉华州法律）及我们在提交文件中援引的一项法规，由于该注册代理人在送达时仍为注册代理人，送达有效。再次说明，我认为对此并无真正争议，因此送达适当。\n\n同样没有争议的是，已经发生缺席。根据传票和起诉状的送达及其于 October 31st, 2023 的签发日期，答辩期限依 Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 12 为 November 30th, 2023。该期限毫无疑问未获遵守。\n\n现在，缺席判决的最后一项要素，是受托人证明其起诉状初步显示，其主张在法律上充分。而受托人在本案中的起诉状远远超过了\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 2539 提交于 01/31/24 录入于 01/31/24 13:29:55 第17页，共\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 2539 提交于 01/31/24 录入于 01/31/24 13:29:55 第18页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- January 23, 2024\n\n1 该证明标准，以证明 Lamp Capital（蓝普资本）既是——或者说，是债务人的另一个自我；或者，作为替代主张，债务人实益拥有并控制 Lamp Capital（蓝普资本）。\n\n2 \n\n3 \n\n4 本院通过我们已在本案中进行过的许多先前对抗程序，熟悉这一标准；但根据 Delaware law（特拉华州法律），判断另一个自我是否存在的标准包括两个主要要素。\n\n5 \n\n6 \n\n7 \n\n8 第一个要素是证明相关实体与被指称将该实体作为其另一个自我使用的人构成单一经济单位。正如本院所知，需要考量一系列因素。这些因素均不具有决定性，且也并非穷尽。\n\n9 \n\n10 \n\n11 \n\n12 \n\n13 \n\n14 根据 Delaware law（特拉华州法律）进行另一个自我分析的第二个要素，是证明因将该实体作为另一个自我使用而持续存在不公正或不公平的因素。\n\n15 \n\n16 \n\n17 \n\n18 受托人起诉状中关于 Lamp Capital（蓝普资本）和 Infinity Treasury Management（无限财政管理公司）的陈述，充分满足了这两项要求。\n\n19 \n\n20 \n\n21 首先——顺便说一句，起诉状中主张的核心是 Lamp Capital（蓝普资本）是债务人的另一个自我——我稍后会谈到这一点——但 Infinity Treasury Management（无限财政管理公司）被列为被告，是因为其名义上是 Lamp Capital（蓝普资本）的唯一成员，因此我们\n\n22 \n\n23 \n\n24 \n\n25 \n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 2539\n提交于 01/31/24\n录入于 01/31/24 13:29:55\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- January 23, 2024\n\n1 需要本院作出命令，要求 Infinity Treasury Management（无限财政管理公司）将其在 Lamp Capital（蓝普资本）中的权益移交给破产财产。\n\n2 \n\n3 \n\n4 就 Lamp Capital（蓝普资本）以及其与债务人作为单一经济单位运作的指称而言，Lamp Capital（蓝普资本）由债务人于 September 2020 在其自己的律师协助下设立。正如我所说，Lamp Capital（蓝普资本）的唯一成员是 Infinity Treasury Management（无限财政管理公司）。Infinity Treasury Management（无限财政管理公司）的唯一股东是债务人的儿子。\n\n5 \n\n6 \n\n7 \n\n8 \n\n9 \n\n10 Lamp Capital（蓝普资本）始终在与债务人的其他空壳公司相同的地址经营，包括 Golden Spring（金泉）和 HK (USA)，二者均已被裁定为债务人的另一个自我。\n\n11 \n\n12 \n\n13 \n\n14 如起诉状所指称，Lamp Capital（蓝普资本）通过同一批受债务人指示行事的个人运作；这些个人曾就债务人的其他空壳公司接受债务人的指令。其中包括 Daniel Podowsky（丹尼尔·波多夫斯基）和 Max Krasner（马克斯·克拉斯纳），本院基于本案中提出的其他指称和其他证据，对二人极为熟悉。\n\n15 \n\n16 \n\n17 \n\n18 \n\n19 \n\n20 \n\n21 起诉状指称，Lamp Capital（蓝普资本）并未作为企业经营，也未产生任何收入。Lamp Capital（蓝普资本）的唯一目的反而是代表债务人进行和接收转账。它实际上是一家用于资助债务人奢靡开支的空壳公司，并且\n\n1 其为向债权人隐匿资产而使用的障眼法。\n\n2 这实质上是他的私人钱箱。\n\n3 如起诉状所述，Lamp Capital（蓝普资本）事实上进行了多笔转账，以资助债务人的奢侈生活方式，包括资助债务人使用 Bombardier（庞巴迪）私人飞机的转账；该飞机是另一宗对抗程序的标的；还包括 Lady May（“五月夫人”号），本院已认定该船归债务人所有。\n\n4 此外，Lamp Capital 还为债务人的家人充值预付借记卡。\n\n5 最后，如我先前所述，法官阁下，Lamp Capital 事实上还资助了债务人为启动本 Chapter 11 案件而支出的费用。\n\n6 基于起诉状中的上述指控及其他指控，我认为毫无疑问，我们已完全满足举证责任，证明 Lamp Capital 事实上是债务人的另一个自我。\n\n7 顺便说一句，另一个自我分析的第二项要求，即该实体被用于欺诈性或其他不公正目的，也已得到满足。\n\n8 同样，Lamp Capital 与本院熟悉的、涉及本案的其他若干实体一致，被用作债务人障眼法的一个工具性组成部分，以帮助资助其生活方式、支付其开支、向其其他公司转移资金，向\n\n案号 22-50073\n文档 2539\n提交日期 01/31/24\n录入日期 01/31/24 13:29:55\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— January 23, 2024\n\n1 其家人及其亲属转移资金。其是向其债权人隐匿资产的一个工具性组成部分，这完全满足了另一个自我分析的第二项要求。\n\n2 就缺席判决动议而言，法官阁下，我想说被告实际上并未——他们实际上并未就缺席判决动议本身作出回应，除了提出其根据 Rule 55(c) 提出的撤销缺席裁定动议。\n\n3 而且，正如本院现已从我们在 HK -- HCHK 对抗程序中的辩论中充分了解的那样，在 Second Circuit（第二巡回法院），法院在确定动议方是否已满足其证明存在正当理由以撤销缺席裁定的举证责任时，会考虑三个主要要素。\n\n4 第一是该缺席是否属故意。第二是动议方是否具有有理据的抗辩。第三项，如不存在有理据的抗辩则无需考虑，是原告是否受到损害。我将依次简要说明各项要素。\n\n5 关于故意性，尽管你们会在书面文件中看到相反说法，尽管其他人已提出相关论点，根据第二巡回法院法律，并不要求证明恶意；我不知道这是否重要，因为我会主张此处无论如何均存在恶意。但是，显然根据第二巡回法院法律，恶意并非必要条件。\n\n6 相反，法院所考察的是——你们可以参阅我们在书面文件中引用的第二巡回法院 2015 年 Bricklayers（砌砖工人）案——其要求的行为是，引用原文，“未得到令人满意解释的故意行为。并非仅因错误或疏忽即可免责的行为。”\n\n7 为回应——在其撤销缺席判决的动议中，法官阁下，Lamp Capital 和 Infinity Treasury Management（无限财政管理公司）所做的仅仅是，在律师提交的一份书面陈述中——没有支持性宣誓书，没有任何个人的陈述，也没有这些实体任何代表的宣誓证言——简单声称，尽管送达适当，它们并未实际知悉起诉状，因此无法及时作出回应。\n\n8 法官阁下，在这些被告及本案的情形下，这远不足以使这些被告满足其证明该缺席并非故意的举证责任。\n\n9 同样，送达是适当的。\n\n10 而且至关重要的是，法官阁下，这些被告绝非本 Chapter 11 案件的陌生者。它们最终由债务人的儿子所有，而其无疑、毫无疑问知悉本 Chapter 11 案件。Lamp Capital 还在本案启动前支付 Brown Rudnick（布朗·鲁德尼克）的律师费，从而资助本案。\n\n案号 22-50073 文档 2539 提交日期 01/31/24 录入日期 01/31/24 13:29:55 第 22 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok— January 23, 2024\n\n1 Lamp Capital 和 Infinity Treasury Management 已在受托人于对抗程序及其他程序中提交的众多书面文件中被列名。\n\n2 基于上述情形，不存在任何可信论点认为这些实体不知道本诉讼已经启动。\n\n3 而所有这些情况中最能说明问题的是，不仅没有宣誓书、没有宣誓声明，而且律师提交的、仅称其未实际知悉的书面陈述中，也不包含任何背景或周边信息。\n\n4 该书面陈述完全没有说明这些被告最终如何或何时实际获悉起诉状，因为显然它们现在已经拿到了起诉状，它们就在这里。\n\n5 没有任何陈述说明是谁突然——据称——将这份起诉状告知 Lamp Capital 和 Infinity Treasury Management。\n\n6 我相信是在 12 月 22 日或前后，在其首次联系受托人时，我们与律师进行了会谈；当时已超过回应起诉状的期限。我们问，你们何时首次因该委托受到联系，以及由谁联系，答复是他们没有答案。\n\n案号 22-50073 文档 2539 提交日期 01/31/24 录入日期 01/31/24 13:29:55 第 24 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok— January 23, 2024\n\n24 法官阁下，存在一些基本细节，必须绝对予以解释，这些被告才可能接近满足其在第一项要素上的举证责任。转向第二项要素，法官阁下，即是否对诉讼请求存在有理据的抗辩。关于这一要素，判例法非常明确，所需的不仅是概括性否认。相反，被告必须提出证据以证明其抗辩。你们可以参阅我们引用的 Bailey's Express（贝利快运）案，引用原文，“对积极抗辩的公式化复述并不足够。”在该案中，被告随其撤销缺席裁定动议提交了一份答辩状，并提出九项积极抗辩，法院仍表示这还不够，因为其仅仅是样板式否认。支持同一命题的判例不胜枚举。State Street Bank（州街银行）案，第二巡回法院 2004 年，374 F.3d. 158，同一概念。Sony Corporation（索尼公司）案，第二巡回法院 1986 年，我们在书面文件中引用的所有这些案件，都是同一概念。此处，法官阁下，我们没有任何种类的事实表明，Lamp Capital 和 Infinity Treasury Management 是实际运营的公司、独立于债务人，表明它们有为特定目的使用的银行账户，或者有用于投资的业务线、雇员，\n\n案号 22-50073\n文档 2539\n提交日期 01/31/24\n录入日期 01/31/24 13:29:55\n\nHo Wan Kwok— January 23, 2024\n\n1 任何真实、合法、独立实体应当知晓的所有基本事实，你们看不到其中任何一项。\n\n2 我认为这极具说明性，因为那里没有任何人。没有任何个人能够前来就这些事实作证，既因为该人并不存在，也因为那不会是真实的。因为它没有做任何事。它是债务人的一个秘密资金池。\n\n3 相反，你们在对起诉状的回应、在 55(c) 动议中所看到的，实际上是根据 12(b)(6) 提出的未能陈述可获救济请求的论点。\n\n4 我认为这很重要，原因有二：第一，它说明在事实上不存在抗辩；第二，本院在 55(c) 动议中考虑和裁决该类论点完全、百分之百适当。法院一直如此。这正是全部要点所在。\n\n5 在确定作为法律问题是否存在有理据的抗辩时，本院必须审视所提出的这些抗辩、这些法律抗辩，是否实际上具有依据。\n\n6 如果你们参阅我所引用的 State Street Bank 案，第二巡回法院 2004 年，其中对动议方在其 55(c) 动议中提出的法律问题和论点进行了数页的详尽分析。法院对其进行了分析，并称驳回该动议是适当的，因为对这些抗辩的彻底分析表明它们不能成立。这也适用于本案被告的每一项论点。\n\n7 它们主张，Infinity Treasury Management 不是起诉状中的适格被告，因为受托人针对其提出的指控很少。\n\n8 但是，法官阁下，正如我所述，受托人在本案中的论点和理论是，Lamp Capital 是债务人的另一个自我，而 Infinity Treasury Management 是 Lamp Capital 的名义所有人。\n\n9 Infinity Treasury Management 显然是起诉状中的被告，因为受托人需要对其取得救济。它持有财产，即必须交付的 Lamp Capital 所有权权益。这是破产交付法的基本原则。当然它们是被告。\n\n10 被告还提出——它们提出了——本院过去已听取并驳回的若干论点。\n\n11 其中之一是主张，根据 Delaware（特拉华州）法律，依定义不可能在此作出另一个自我的认定，因为并未指称债务人是这些实体的名义所有人、高管或董事。\n\n12 本院已在 HK (USA)（HK（美国））案中处理并驳回该论点。根据特拉华州法律，并不存在此种要求，即必须存在该类关系，某实体才可被认定为另一实体的另一个自我。\n\n案号 22-50073\n文档 2539\n提交日期 01/31/24\n录入日期 01/31/24 13:29:55\n\nHo Wan Kwok— January 23, 2024\n\n1 它们还主张，法官阁下，本案可与 HK (USA) 区分，并主张这必定是本案请求不能成立的某种理由。但该论点，法官阁下，不能证明任何事情。\n\n2 正如它们正确指出的，是的，这些案件不同。HK (USA) 是一家壳公司，持有债务人一项资产的所有权。Lamp Capital 是债务人用作壳公司的实体，用以资助其奢侈生活方式，作为其个人钱箱使用。\n\n3 债务人至少有两类壳公司，他将其作为其障眼法的一部分，用以规避债权人。一类典型实体是 HK (USA)，其持有某项资产的所有权。或者 Greenwich Land（格林威治地产），我们指称其对其位于 Connecticut（康涅狄格州）的住宅做了同样的事。或者 Bravo Luck（布拉沃幸运），其持有纽约公寓的所有权。\n\n4 另一类实体是他用作秘密资金池的实体，用于在其他壳公司之间转入和转出资产以支付费用。其中之一，也是重要的其中之一，是 Lamp Capital。事实不同，但同样是另一个自我。\n\n5 它们提出的最后一项抗辩，性质上属于以未能陈述可获救济请求为由提出的驳回动议，是 in pari delicto（同等过错）及 Wagoner rule（Wagoner 规则）抗辩；本院同样已在 HK (USA)\n\n案号 22-50073 文档 2539 提交日期 01/31/24 录入日期 01/31/24 13:29:55 第 28 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2024年1月23日 28\n1 对抗诉讼程序。\n2 如法院正确认定的那样，这些抗辩理由\n3 不适用于受托人根据《破产法》第544(c)条\n4 代表债权人提出的抗辩，抱歉，提出的请求。\n5 此外，\n6 同过错抗辩原则中的内部人例外在本案中也适用。\n7 因此，法官阁下，基于所有这些理由，\n8 不存在有理据的抗辩。所有论点实质上\n9 要么此前已被本院驳回，要么\n10 显然在实体上不能成立，因为受托人已经充分\n\n履行了其诉辩责任，证明如果其指控属实，他依法有权获得救济。\n\n因此，判例法非常明确，法院甚至无需考虑是否对受托人造成不利影响。在这方面，判例不胜枚举。此前我提到的 Bricklayers（砌砖工人）案。Bailey's Express（贝利快运）案。我们书面文件中援引的 Global Metallurgical（环球冶金）案，327 B.R. 182。所有这些案件以及许多其他案件均确立了该项主张。\n\n不过，如果法院考虑不利影响，我认为毫无疑问，此处确实对受托人造成了不利影响。你们将在书面文件中看到，嗯，仅有拖延不能构成不利影响。\n\n但是，本案所涉及的远不止\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件编号 2539\n提交日期 01/31/24\n录入日期 01/31/24 13:29:55\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2024年1月23日\n\n1 单纯的拖延。我们所说的是当事人的策略性操作，\n2 正如我在开头所说，他们选择性地决定何时\n3 利用本院，何时参与\n4 法律程序，以及何时不参与。\n5 而且，在本案中，这一点尤为重要，因为\n6 被告实质上是在主张、诉辩称，\n7 受托人在其起诉状中未能——未能\n8 提出可获救济的请求。\n9 而这些相同的被告此前规避了\n10 2004 审查取证和传票，而受托人\n11 依法并依照法院命令\n12 有权获得这些材料，并本可利用其结果\n13 来起草其起诉状。\n14 他们不能规避其对本院和受托人\n15 负有的取证义务，然后\n16 迟延到庭请求法院宽恕并\n17 要求参与诉讼。\n18 值得注意的是，在被告首次联系我们时，\n19 直至今日，我们均未从被告处获悉\n20 他们将如何纠正他们已经受制于的\n21 藐视法庭命令，而无论如何，他们此时显然\n22 已经无法纠正。\n23 但是，法官阁下，如果法院允许此类行为持续存在，\n24 确实会对受托人造成不利影响。\n25 受托人自本案伊始所遭遇的\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件编号 2539\n提交日期 01/31/24\n录入日期 01/31/24 13:29:55\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2024年1月23日\n\n1 阻挠只会持续，并且只会\n2 更加严重。\n3 我们也对\n4 证据毁损存在重大担忧，因为这些当事人\n5 过去曾拒绝遵守规定。\n6 我不知道法院为何会认为\n7 他们很可能会履行其在本对抗诉讼程序中的\n8 取证义务，因此，在这些情形下存在不利影响。\n9 \n10 但是，正如我所说，鉴于其他要件未获满足，\n11 法院无需认定该项不利影响\n12 即可作出缺席裁定。\n13 法官阁下，我目前的陈述到此为止，\n14 除非法院有任何问题。\n15 法官：我只是看看我是否有任何\n16 问题。我认为没有，但我想\n17 确认一下。目前我没有任何问题，\n18 Bassett 律师。谢谢。\n19 BASSETT 先生：谢谢，法官阁下。\n20 法官：谁先作出回应？\n21 GRAND 先生：法官阁下，Robert Grand（罗伯特·格兰德）——\n22 法官：好的。\n23 GRAND 先生：——代表 Lamp（兰普）和 Infinity Treasury（无限金库）的\n24 Lax & Neville（拉克斯与内维尔）律师事务所。\n25 法官：先生，您需要说得更清楚一些，\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2024年1月23日 31\n并且靠近麦克风，因为我听不见您。GRAND 先生：当然。如果这样更方便，我可以到那边去。法官：当然。谢谢。BASSETT 先生：法官阁下，为明确起见，我尚未就 Leading Shine（领先之光）55(c)动议作出陈述，因为该动议并非——法官：对。BASSETT 先生：——我们缺席判决动议的标的。法官：我们现在只处理缺席判决动议。BASSETT 先生：谢谢，法官阁下。GRAND 先生：您希望我就该部分作出回应，还是希望——法官：嗯——GRAND 先生：——由受托人的律师就 Leading Shine 动议作出陈述？法官：——我希望应当回应缺席判决动议的当事人作出回应，即 Lamp Capital（兰普资本）和 Infinity（无限）。GRAND 先生：下午好，法官阁下。再次说明，我是代表 Lamp Capital 和 Infinity Treasury Management（无限金库管理）的 Lax & Neville 律师事务所的 Robert Grand。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件编号 2539 提交日期 01/31/24 录入日期 01/31/24 13:29:55 第31页，共\n案号 22-50073 文件编号 2539 提交日期 01/31/24 录入日期 01/31/24 13:29:55 第32页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2024年1月23日 32\n\n因此，我想先谈谈受托人律师的第一项主张，即这些被告实质上并未回应缺席判决动议，而只是主张支持撤销缺席的申请。之所以以该种方式提出论点，是因为法律明确规定，当在作出缺席判决之前提出撤销缺席的动议时，法院在决定是否应撤销缺席时应适用的标准受 Rule 55(c)（规则55(c)）管辖，而非管辖缺席判决的 Rule 60(b)（规则60(b)）。第二巡回区的法律明确表明，从 20 年前的 Enron（安然）案，直至本院的案件以及在过去一年内作出的康涅狄格联邦地区法院案件，标准虽相同，考量因素也相同，即缺席是否为故意、如撤销缺席原告是否会遭受不利影响，以及被告是否提出了有理据的抗辩；所有因素均相同，但在处理 Rule 55(c) 动议时，法院适用这些标准的严格程度远低于已经作出判决、而被告寻求撤销缺席判决时的严格程度。\n\n因此，从该框架出发，撤销缺席的动议处理了这些因素，而且我们提交的书面陈述也被提交为对缺席判决的反对意见，\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件编号 2539\n提交日期 01/31/24\n录入日期 01/31/24 13:29:55\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2024年1月23日\n\n1 我们提交的书面陈述也被提交为对\n2 缺席判决的反对意见。\n3 但实际上，我们不需要处理\n4 缺席判决这一方面，因为我们首先需要决定\n5 是否应撤销缺席。这是一个\n6 两步骤程序。\n7 因此，正如我们在书面文件中所述，\n8 显然，在适用这些标准并给予\n9 法院在实体审理案件而非通过缺席\n10 解决案件时所给予的尊重的情况下，这些被告已经满足\n11 其中每一项——已经满足每一项\n12 因素，且这些因素对他们有利。\n13 在本案中，未对\n14 起诉状作出回应绝不可能被认定为\n15 故意，因为，正如我们在书面文件中所述，\n16 被告并未获悉起诉状。\n17 法官：您所说的“未获悉\n18 起诉状”是什么意思？他们已经被送达了\n19 起诉状。\n20 GRAND 先生：嗯，就 Infinity\n21 Treasury Management 而言，受托人主张其已向\n22 他们在新泽西州——在特拉华州的登记代理人送达。\n23 特拉华州的登记代理人回复受托人的\n24 律师称——\n25 法官：我明白。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件编号 2539 提交日期 01/31/24 录入日期 01/31/24 13:29:55 第34页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2024年1月23日\n\n1 GRAND 先生：——Infinity Treasury Management\n2 并未运营。我们没有他们的联系信息。\n3 我们找不到他们。\n4 法官：我明白。\n5 GRAND 先生：我们无法将这份起诉状送达\n6 给他们，因此我们将其退还给您。\n7 法官：我明白。\n8 GRAND 先生：因此，Infinity Treasury Management——\n9 法官：但是，根据法律，你们公司有义务设立\n10 诉讼文书送达代理人。而且，如果\n11 你们公司，即你们的客户，没有纠正该问题，\n12 那就是你们客户的问题。\n13 法律并未规定这不构成——\n14 请向我出示一个案件，说明法律规定这就等于\n15 你方的论点，即即使该代理人已被送达，\n16 即你们客户列为诉讼文书\n17 送达代理人的代理人，这仍不构成通知？\n18 GRAND 先生：问题在于通知，而不是送达。\n19 没有人——\n20 法官：不。问题不在于通知。\n21 通知问题在哪里，律师？已经送达了。\n22 GRAND 先生：对。\n23 法官：必须依照《联邦民事诉讼规则》——\n24 GRAND 先生：对。\n25 \n\n案号 22-50073 文件编号 2539 提交日期 01/31/24 录入日期 01/31/24 13:29:55 第35页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2024年1月23日 35\n1 法官：——向你们送达起诉状，而你们已根据 Rule 4（规则4）被送达，对吗？\n\nGRAND 先生：正确。\n\n法官：好的。那么你们如何得出通知的问题？\n\nGRAND 先生：通知是——是关于缺席是否为故意的问题；你必须获悉起诉状。法官：你们已被送达——你们是否——\n\nGRAND 先生：但是公司中从未有人收到它，所以他们没有——\n\n法官：而且谁——那是你们公司的问题。向我出示一个案件，说明你刚才所说的内容。我想看看。\n\nGRAND 先生：当然。在我们援引的 Nature's First（自然优先）案中，该案载于——\n\n法官：好的。请稍等。我确实——我是认真的。这没有问题。我想准确看看你所援引的内容，因此我要确保我们都在同一页上。\n\nGRAND 先生：法官阁下，在我们书面陈述第 5 页。\n\n法官：我不要书面陈述。我要看该案——\n\nGRAND 先生：好的。\n\n法官：——所以请稍等。\n\nGRAND 先生：当然。\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2024年1月23日 36\n\n法官：好的。那么请告诉我该案的引注——你所援引案件的引注。\n\nGRAND 先生：436 F. Supp. 2nd. 368 at 374-375，这是康涅狄格联邦地区法院 2006 年的一宗案件，其中——\n\n法官：请稍等。让我找到那里。Nature's First。\n\nBASSETT 先生：请问可以告知书面陈述的段落编号吗。\n\nGRAND 先生：在第 5 页。我认为是在论及该论点的第 12 段。\n\n法官：好的。那么请告诉我在书面陈述中的哪里，抱歉，律师，在判决意见中——\n\nGRAND 先生：在第 374-375 页。\n\n法官：好的。请给我一秒钟。\n\nGRAND 先生：而且该案实际上涉及缺席判决，该缺席判决被撤销，当时被告知道针对——抱歉，并不知道针对其提起了该诉讼，直至原告取得缺席判决之后。\n\n法官：好的。请稍等。373 和 374？\n\nGRAND 先生：374-375。\n\n法官：所以我正在看第 373 页，其中写道被告提交的宣誓书，而且没有\n\n案号 22-50073 文件编号 2539 提交日期 01/31/24 录入日期 01/31/24 13:29:55 第36页，共\n\n被告就这些动议提交的宣誓书否认已完成送达。第 373 页上，在到达你所说的第 374 页和第 375 页之前，该裁决就是这样写的。\n\n因此，多尔西法官（Judge Dorsey）认定，他所依据的是一名被告提交的、否认已完成送达的宣誓书。我正在看的是 Nature's First, Inc.（自然第一公司）诉 Nature's First Law, Inc.（自然第一法律公司）一案第 373 页的第一个完整段落。\n\n因此，那是本案中不存在的事实争议。你们并未否认已完成送达。没有人否认已完成送达。并且，没有任何被告提交宣誓书，以支持其针对缺席判决动议所作的主张。那么请继续，你还有什么？\n\n格兰德律师（MR. GRAND）：嗯，我们在其中还引用了另一宗案件，即 Global Mining, Global Gold Mining（全球采矿、全球黄金采矿）案。\n\n法院：好的。请稍等。该案的引注是什么？\n\n格兰德律师：该案是 983 F. Supp. 2d. 378——\n\n法院：983——\n\n格兰德律师：——第 387 页。还有其他几宗案件，法官阁下。\n\n法院：等等。983 F. Supp. 2d 的哪一页？\n\n格兰德律师：387。这是纽约南区（Southern District of New York）的一宗案件，第二巡回上诉法院（Second Circuit）维持了该案判决。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 2539 提交 01/31/24 录入 01/31/24 13:29:55 第 38 页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2024年1月23日\n\n法院：嗯，根据我正在查阅的这项裁决，该案中缺乏对人管辖权，因此认定缺乏对人管辖权。本案中你希望我看哪里？\n\n格兰德律师：该案表明——该案裁定，在缺席情况下证明该情形属非故意，即足以——\n\n法院：告诉我在哪里，哪一页？\n\n格兰德律师：387。\n\n法院：好的。请稍等。那么，第 387 页，从第 386 页底部延续至第 387 页，开头写道：由于缺乏对人管辖权要求根据 Rule 60(b)(4) 撤销缺席判决，其余论点均无实际意义。这就是——这就是你引用给我的部分。那么你还希望我在那里阅读什么？\n\n格兰德律师：法官阁下，很遗憾，我现在手边没有那宗案件，但是我——有多宗案件，多宗案件，我很乐意提请法官阁下注意，证明——\n\n法院：嗯，你已经在你的书面意见中提请我注意这些案件了。\n\n格兰德律师：嗯，我有——\n\n法院：我现在问你的是，我已经具体问过你，哪宗案件支持你刚才所说的内容，即你必须缺乏通知，而不是送达？这就是我问你的问题。因为在你提交的任何这些诉状中，也在任何被告提交的诉状中，均未主张他们没有收到起诉状的送达。并且，没有——也没有任何被告的宣誓书。作出这些事情的期限早已届满。\n\n格兰德律师：恭敬地说，并不存在——并不存在以下要求——\n\n法院：那么，如果你的当事人不愿宣誓说他们没有收到通知且未被送达，我怎么能认定你的当事人没有获得通知？我怎么能认定——我已经认定，根据对送达如何依照《联邦民事诉讼规则》以及规范必须如何向这些被告送达的适用州法规则作出的审查，已经作出缺席登记。因此，你的职责就是反驳该认定。而你此时向法院提出的论点不是你——不是你们没有被送达，而是你们没有获得实际通知。因此，我问你，在你所引用的案件中，哪里裁定——第二巡回上诉法院裁定——\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 2539 提交 01/31/24 录入 01/31/24 13:29:55 第 39 页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2024年1月23日\n\n第二巡回上诉法院裁定，你必须获得实际通知，而你至今未能向我指出任何一宗这样的案件。\n\n格兰德律师：法官阁下，如果——我可以——我当然可以提交那些案件。我们没有——\n\n法院：这不是提交的问题。你现在就在这里。\n\n格兰德律师：我明白。\n\n法院：这就是辩论。\n\n格兰德律师：我们没有机会提交答复。我们在周五晚上收到这些反对文件，而且，您知道，那是在听证会前一个工作日。我很乐意——\n\n法院：缺席登记是在——何时作出的缺席登记，律师？缺席登记是在——\n\n格兰德律师：我相信是在 12 月中旬。\n\n法院：我来告诉你。我们回去查明一下。\n\n格兰德律师：我认为缺席登记是在 12 月 14 日作出的。\n\n巴西特律师（MR. BASSETT）：没错。\n\n法院：是的。12 月 14 日。现在是 1 月 23 日。\n\n格兰德律师：是。\n\n法院：所以你们有时间。\n\n格兰德律师：来做什么？我们一受聘，就——\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 2539 提交 01/31/24 录入 01/31/24 13:29:55 第 40 页，共\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 2539\n提交 01/31/24\n录入 01/31/24 13:29:55\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2024年1月23日\n\n联系了受托人律师，并与他们沟通。\n\n法院：我们不知道你们何时受聘。顺便说一句——Lamp Capital（蓝普资本）已经在主案中出庭。他们在本案于 2022 年开始时就有律师代理。\n\n因此，当你说一受聘——你知道，你必须仔细考虑很多事情——\n\n格兰德律师：在这——不在——在这宗案件中？\n\n法院：在主案中，律师。对抗程序是主案中的另一宗案件。\n\n格兰德律师：对。对。在该案被移送到这里之前，曾在纽约进行的一项程序中。\n\n法院：不，不，不，不，不，不。在康涅狄格这里。我可以回到本案——回到郭先生的 Chapter 11 案件中，我可以为你找到代表 Lamp Capital 提交的出庭通知。这需要我几分钟时间，但我可以为你找到。好吗？他们已经在郭先生的案件中出庭，随后又突然决定撤回出庭。\n\n所以，不是在该案位于纽约时。而是在该案位于本法院、郭先生在受托人获任命之前担任占有中的债务人时。\n\n格兰德律师：我的意思是，您看，法官阁下，如我所解释的，我们是在 12 月底受聘的——\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 2539\n提交 01/31/24\n录入 01/31/24 13:29:55\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2024年1月23日\n\n法院：我并未对你提出任何暗示。\n\n格兰德律师：我们是新来的。我们正在——\n\n法院：我是在说，事实就是事实，对吧？\n\n格兰德律师：对。\n\n法院：当你进入这个领域并成为其中一部分时，围绕 Lamp Capital 的事实已经存在。你对此没有控制权。我明白这一点。\n\n格兰德律师：对。\n\n法院：我并未作出任何相反的暗示。不过，事实已经存在。Lamp Capital 为占有中的债务人的律师预付费提供了资金。这一切都在以伪证罪处罚为保证而提交给本法院的诉状中披露。好吗？随后，Lamp Capital 在郭先生的案件中也有律师出庭。\n\n因此，我理解你所提出的论点。但我对你的问题是，我至今仍未得到答案，所以我开始相信不存在答案：哪一宗案件说你必须获得实际通知，因为我从未见过这样的案件。因为否则——\n\n格兰德律师：我可以向您提供一宗。\n\n法院：——你将破坏整个目的——\n\n格兰德律师：我没有——\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 2539\n提交 01/31/24\n录入 01/31/24 13:29:55\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2024年1月23日\n\n法院：——你会破坏 Rule 55 的整个目的，这正是你会——\n\n你是在说我必须有实际通知？那么 Rule 55 的意义何在？毫无意义。\n\n你是在把 Rule 55 的政策抛到窗外，并且说——而我所见过的第二巡回法院任何案件中，没有任何案件说被告必须获得实际通知。这毫无道理，律师。完全毫无道理。\n\n因为这正是你需要送达代理人的全部原因。你是一个法人实体。为了获得作为法人实体的利益，你必须提交某些文件，并遵守公司规章和法律。而作为法人实体的负担之一，就是你必须设有送达代理人。\n\n而来到这里说，嗯，我们已经不再设有送达代理人，这是公司的问题。\n\n格兰德律师：这不是我——这不是——\n\n法院：嗯，这正是你刚才所说的。\n\n格兰德律师：不是。\n\n法院：你刚才说——\n\n格兰德律师：不是。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 2539 提交 01/31/24 录入 01/31/24 13:29:55 第 44 页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2024年1月23日\n\n法院：不，你说了。因为你说，对方律师甚至承认，他从送达代理人那里得到答复，后者说他们没有——他们不再是其登记代理人。\n\n格兰德律师：不是。那不是他们所说的。\n\n法院：那么他们说了什么？\n\n格兰德律师：他们说我们无法找到 Infinity Treasury Management（无限财资管理公司）。他们在特拉华州已不再活跃。我们没有任何联系信息可用于——送达起诉状——\n\n法院：对。\n\n格兰德律师：——就是你们向我们送达的那份起诉状。\n\n法院：好的。但这并不意味着没有完成送达。\n\n格兰德律师：所以他们是一个已失效的实体。我没有——\n\n法院：这并不意味着没有完成送达。\n\n格兰德律师：我们不对送达提出异议。\n\n法院：嗯，那么你就没有——\n\n格兰德律师：我可以——\n\n法院：——关于通知的论点。在哪里——给我看一宗案件。\n\n格兰德律师：我今天手边没有。\n\n法院：嗯，那——\n\n格兰德律师：法官阁下——\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2024年1月23日\n\n法院：——今天就是那一天。\n\n格兰德律师：——我们没有机会提交——\n\n法院：今天就是那一天。\n\n格兰德律师：我可以愉快地向您提供——\n\n法院：我不希望你——我不——这——\n\n格兰德律师：——多宗支持该命题的案件。\n\n法院：好的。嗯，我认为你错了。然后你继续提出你其余的论点吧。\n\n格兰德律师：好的。那么，该论点显然是，我们认为是非活跃公司的那两名被告，不可能对他们从未实际收到的起诉状作出回应，因此未作回应并非故意。随后，在得知该起诉状后，他们，即这些实体，寻求聘请律师，并立即寻求就案件实体问题进行抗辩。因此，关于下一个因素，即法律上的不利影响，本案中实际上不存在任何实质性延误，会落入——会导致该因素倾向于受托人。请原谅我一分钟。如我们在书面意见中所说明，我们一受聘，就联系了受托人律师，并试图获得\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 2539 提交 01/31/24 录入 01/31/24 13:29:55 第 45 页，共\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 2539\n提交 01/31/24\n录入 01/31/24 13:29:55\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2024年1月23日\n\n需要更多时间对起诉状作出答复。这是在星期五，即12月22日，圣诞假期前的那个星期五。当天晚些时候我们终于取得联系时，我的同事无法出席。\n\n无论如何，Lindsey先生（林赛），受托人律师，表示，如果我们想讨论任何实体问题，例如争取更多时间、缺席、或本案的任何程序状态，我们需要让纽约律师，即Paul Hastings（保罗·哈斯廷斯律师事务所）的人士参与进来。\n\n因此，Lindsey先生于次日星期六晚上向我发送了一封后续电子邮件，并将受托人律师抄送其中。我们于圣诞节后的12月26日联系了他们，寻求进行交谈。我想我发送了一封电子邮件。在我发送该电子邮件后15或20分钟，即我尚未收到答复之前，缺席判决动议便已提交。\n\n我们次日确实进行了交谈。次日协商时，我们表示，我们代表Infinity（因菲尼蒂）和Lamp（兰普）出庭，请求获得更多时间答复起诉状，请求受托人撤销缺席登记，因为被告打算就案件实体进行抗辩，但受托人拒绝这样做。\n\n随后，我们在假期周内尽快提交了准许出庭的申请，尽快提交了出庭通知，并在法院为答复缺席判决动议所设期限之前很早，及时提交了撤销缺席登记的动议。\n\n因此，此处确实不存在任何实质性延误，若受托人必须重新开启缺席状态并就案件实体进行诉讼，也不会给其造成任何不利影响。而且，判例法明确规定，在反对撤销缺席登记的动议时，必须就案件实体进行诉讼并不构成充分的不利影响。\n\n并且，受托人主张其将遭受的另一种不利影响，就该标准而言，抱歉，是指本案中的非缺席方必须证明，其诉讼案件的能力将因证据灭失、取证困难增加，或欺诈和串通机会增加而受到妨碍，而本案中并未证明存在任何此类情形。我的意思是——\n\n法院：你的当事人是否已经因未遵守取证要求而被本院判处藐视法庭，律师？\n\nGRAND律师（格兰德）：是。\n\n法院：好。\n\nGRAND律师：如果我们——而且那——我理解这一点，但那并没有——但重新开启缺席状态不会——受托人需要证明，重新开启缺席状态将导致额外的，您知道，取证损失，而这似乎毫无道理。我没有——您知道，我不知道——大约一年前Infinity——或者说Lamp被送达该《规则2004》传票时，我们并未参与。我不知道它为何没有以任何方式作出回应。但我们现在在这里。我们乐意回应那些取证请求，并以当事人的身份在本案框架内进行取证。因此，我——确实没有任何证据或证明表明——表明将会有任何——恰恰相反。现在——现在——您知道，我是说，看，受托人已经，您知道，发现了——\n\n法院：你的当事人本来难道不能已经向受托人提供全部信息，以消除其藐视法庭状态吗？你现在——你现在希望撤销缺席登记，以便他们必须送达取证请求，而你们将对此提出异议？这就是你——这就是你的论点吗？\n\nGRAND律师：不是。我的论点是，我们将——我们将参与取证并遵守任何命令。\n\n法院：那么，你已经因取证问题而藐视法庭，那么你何时将——\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 2539\n提交日期 01/31/24\n录入日期 01/31/24 13:29:55\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— 2024年1月23日\n\n遵守？\n\nGRAND律师：如果——如果法官阁下希望Lamp遵守，我们可以——\n\n法院：等一下。让我就在这里打断你。如果我希望？我已经——有一项法院命令，认定你的当事人因未遵守取证要求而藐视法庭。你不认为该责任在你方吗？\n\nGRAND律师：是。而且我——我所说的是，Lamp Capital（兰普资本）将提交文件——\n\n法院：何时？何时？\n\nGRAND律师：我的意思是，我们——我们正在——我必须查明有什么。我们必须——\n\n法院：你不是应该已经这样做了吗？\n\nGRAND律师：我们刚刚进入本案，法官阁下。我们需要做的第一件事是尝试撤销缺席登记。\n\n法院：这无关紧要。根据《联邦民事诉讼规则》，你负有初步披露义务，不是吗？\n\nGRAND律师：是。但是——\n\n法院：是。\n\nGRAND律师：——我们——我的意思是，我们可以——我们乐意提交那些文件。我们乐意审查此事。该传票送达时我们并未参与。我甚至不——\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 2539\n提交日期 01/31/24\n录入日期 01/31/24 13:29:55\n第49页，共\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 2539\n提交日期 01/31/24\n录入日期 01/31/24 13:29:55\n第50页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— 2024年1月23日\n\n法院：我没有说你参与了。律师，我之前一开始就说过，我理解其中存在实际上与你毫无关系的事实。我理解这一点。但问题在于，这对你没有帮助。事实仍然存在。你不能无视这些事实的存在。\n\nGRAND律师：我并非试图无视它们。我们需要掌握这些情况——\n\n法院：那么——但你——但你还没有——\n\nGRAND律师：——而我们没有足够时间这样做。\n\n法院：你有什么计划使你的当事人脱离缺席状态——脱离藐视法庭状态？\n\nGRAND律师：正如法官阁下刚才提到的，我们的首要计划是使当事人脱离缺席状态。一旦——\n\n法院：嗯，你们在缺席之前很久就已经处于藐视法庭状态。\n\nGRAND律师：我承认这一点。而且再次，我理解本案在我们出现之前已经发生了很多事情。我同意我们无法控制过去发生的事。我们所能说的是，我们现在代表这两个实体出庭，并将遵守法院命令。我们将遵守取证义务。我们将以有实质意义的方式参与取证。我们已经——我们在这里。\n\n法院：嗯，我不知道你所说的是什么意思，因为你已经受到一项法院命令的约束。这不会是一种受托人必须提出取证请求，然后你们可以寻求保护令或撤销令的情形；这不会发生，律师。你的当事人已经藐视法庭。\n\nGRAND律师：我们理解。\n\n法院：那么我不知道你的意思是——\n\nGRAND律师：换句话说——\n\n法院：——当你说你将参与有实质意义的取证时。我不明白这是什么意思。你要么交出他们已经要求提供的全部材料，即藐视法庭事项的标的，要么不交。我的意思是，就这么简单。\n\nMILLER律师（米勒）：法官阁下，我可以发言吗？\n\n法院：不，你不能。\n\nMILLER律师：我是Robert Miller（罗伯特·米勒）。\n\n法院：你们已经有一名律师代表你们的当事人了。不可以。那么请继续，律师。\n\nGRAND律师：我的意思是，如我所说，我们刚刚进入本案。如果不撤销缺席登记，那么我——那么，您知道，我不知道，您知道。如果将作出判决，您知道，我不知道那将使取证义务处于何种状态。如果我们在本案中——\n\n法院：该藐视法庭命令是在主案中作出的，因此与本案是否撤销缺席登记无关。你的当事人因未遵守《联邦破产程序规则》规定的取证义务而藐视本院。\n\nGRAND律师：如果法官阁下设定一个时间，我们将尽最大努力遵守取证义务。\n\n法院：我们不需要——我不需要设定一个时间。\n\nGRAND律师：我们将——\n\n法院：我已经设定了一个时间——\n\nGRAND律师：因此我们将——\n\n法院：——顺便说一句，我认为是在原命令中。\n\nGRAND律师：因此，我们现在将尽最大努力取得那些文件。但我们在本案中，即在该对抗性程序中，首先试图做的是撤销缺席登记，以便当事人、这些实体能够就案件实体进行抗辩。在该背景下，我们将尽快在我们掌握本案情况后提供取证材料。我们刚刚——我们刚刚出庭。我们刚刚被纳入本案。我们承认已经发生了很多事情。\n\n法院：不过，你并非刚刚出庭。\n\nGRAND律师：我们是。\n\n法院：你们是。作为律师的你们，我同意。\n\nGRAND律师：是。是。\n\n法院：但Lamp Capital不是。\n\nGRAND律师：我理解这一点。而且如我所说，既然我们已进入本案，我现在只能控制我们作为律师所能控制的事情。因此，我——我们在这里。这些实体打算对本案进行抗辩。而这些实体——\n\n法院：好，那么我们谈谈这个。你们有什么有胜诉可能的抗辩？\n\nGRAND律师：因此，本案中的有胜诉可能的抗辩是——根据特拉华州法律，在揭开公司面纱方面非常困难。本案受托人试图将Lamp和Infinity与HK案混为一谈，而正如受托人承认的，事实完全不同。\n\n在HK案中，该实体拥有一项资产，该资产已经被司法认定由债务人享有受益所有权。该案及该裁决是在完成取证后的简易判决裁决。对于该实体没有高级管理人员、董事，也没有遵守任何公司形式要件，并无争议。这与本案事实完全不同。\n\n法院：而你的当事人做了什么？\n\nGRAND律师：Lamp有高级管理人员和董事。Lamp设有银行账户。\n\n法院：这些在哪里？\n\nGRAND律师：HK没有。\n\n法院：顺便问一下，案卷中这些在哪里？有什么证据表明那——那是准确的？\n\nGRAND律师：起诉状中有此主张。\n\n法院：好。那么你们将依据起诉状中的主张。你们不会提交任何其他类型的证据。你们不会让Lamp Capital的任何人员出庭作证，以支持以下主张：这并非只是一个资金流经的实体？\n\nGRAND律师：就本动议而言，这并非必要。\n\n法院：我没有说这是必要的。我问你是否将这样做？\n\nGRAND律师：当我们进入案件实体审理时，我们将就案件实体进行抗辩。\n\n法院：这就是我问你们有什么有胜诉可能的抗辩的原因。我仍然不知道那是什么。是什么？\n\n格兰德先生：\n他们已经——他们——受托人未必能够证明 Lamp Capital（兰普资本）是债务人的另我。\n\n法院：\n那不是抗辩。那只是一个否认。你的抗辩是什么？\n\n格兰德先生：\n那是——那是一项抗辩。\n\n法院：\n不。那是一个否认，律师。\n\n格兰德先生：\n是的。\n\n法院：\n你的抗辩是什么？\n\n格兰德先生：\n但那——那已经足够了。\n\n法院：\n不。我认为实际上根据法律并非如此。你不能只是到庭说他们将无法证明。这只是一个否认。\n\n格兰德先生：\n嗯，我们并没有这么说。我们是基于不同的——不同的事实，并根据法律提出该论点。当然——\n\n法院：\n什么事实？\n\n格兰德先生：\n事实是——起诉书中的事实——其中的事实——\n\n法院：\n目前起诉书中的事实是——\n\n格兰德先生：\n是其中所称的主张——\n\n法院：\n——在缺席被撤销之前，均属真实。\n\n格兰德先生：\n是。即使根据那些——\n\n案件 22-50073\n文件 2539\n提交日期 01/31/24\n录入日期 01/31/24 13:29:55\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- 2024年1月23日\n\n法院：\n你有什么证据证明它们不真实？你必须——第二巡回法院认为，你不能只是提出说他们将无法证明。而这正是你所说的。你所谓有实质依据的抗辩是，他们将无法证明。\n\n嗯，目前根据《联邦民事诉讼规则》，这已经得到证明。那些就是事实。在缺席被撤销之前，那些就是事实。法律——法律对此非常明确。\n\n因此，你的任务是向法院表明，你有何有实质依据的抗辩？如果——如果你的回答是他们将无法证明，好，那么那就是你的回答。\n\n格兰德先生：\n是。\n\n法院：\n好的。好。\n\n格兰德先生：\n我们的回答是，他们需要证明——证明存在——另我责任将成立，而我们认为他们将无法——无法证明这一点。并且，如我们在书面文件中所述，起诉书中所称的事实根据 Delaware（特拉华州）法律不足以揭开公司面纱并——取得另我责任。\n\n第二，还有一项同等过错抗辩，本案两名被告均可提出，正如我们在书面文件中所论证的。\n\n此外，起诉书中的主张是——没有任何关于 Infinity Treasury Management（无限财政管理公司）存在不当行为的主张。其仅在此被指认为 Lamp 的唯一成员。但 Infinity Treasury 未被指控——存在任何不当行为。\n\n因此，如我们在书面文件中所述，根据法律，这些主张同样存在缺陷。\n\n法院：\n好的。还有其他内容吗，律师？\n\n格兰德先生：\n我仅补充一点，受托人在其书面文件中援引的案件，即 Bailey's Express（贝利快递案）以及——Bricklayers（砌砖工人案），与本动议无关，因为这两个案件均涉及寻求撤销缺席判决。\n\n而在 Bricklayers 案中，被告知悉起诉书一事不存在争议，因为其律师曾请求额外时间作出答复，但仍未在九个月内提交答辩状。\n\n而这显然不是本案的情况。我们在受聘后几乎立即寻求出庭并提出抗辩，且是在被告知悉起诉书存在后不久。\n\n此外，在 Bailey's Express 案中，法院认定该缺席具有故意性，因为被告未出席五次庭前会议，并且在其律师已与该案原告律师讨论案件数月后仍未出庭。\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- 2024年1月23日\n\n被告未出席五次庭前会议，并且在其律师已与该案原告律师讨论案件数月后仍未出庭。再者，您知道，那些事实并不是我们本案所具有的事实。正如我们在书面文件中所述，据我们了解，在客户得知——被告得知起诉书后不久，我们即被联系，并立即寻求介入并尝试就案件实体进行抗辩。因此，我认为不可能作出具有故意性的认定。撤销缺席不会造成任何损害。没有任何证据或说明表明任何额外文件将会丢失或无法通过证据开示取得。我们说的是相反的情况。而且，我们当然认为，他们对基础另我主张的抗辩具有实质依据，因为 Lamp 中的事实并不完全与 HK 中所述的事实相同。再者，法官阁下，鉴于我们于周五深夜收到反对文件，我很乐意在今天结束前向法院提供——\n\n法院：\n不需要进一步提交书面材料。\n\n格兰德先生：\n——证据，法官阁下。\n\n法院：\n无需提交书面材料。我知道\n\n案件 22-50073\n文件 2539\n提交日期 01/31/24\n录入日期 01/31/24 13:29:55\n第 58 页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- 2024年1月23日\n\n相关标准是什么。我知道争点是什么。我还要为记录说明，Bricklayers 案涉及的是缺席，而非缺席判决。\n\n格兰德先生：\n我明白，法官阁下。\n\n法院：\n嗯，你说的恰恰相反。\n\n格兰德先生：\n我明白。我表述有误。我本意是说 Bailey's Express 案，而不是 Bricklayers 案。但事实仍然是——在 Bricklayers 案中，辩方律师确认收到起诉书后九个月内未提交答辩状。这显然完全无法与我们本案中的延迟相提并论。\n\n法院：\n好的。还有其他内容吗，律师？\n\n格兰德先生：\n没有了，法官阁下。谢谢。\n\n法院：\n好的。谢谢。剩余被告将由谁进行辩论，Romney先生还是 Moriarty先生？\n\n罗姆尼先生：\n由我，法官阁下——\n\n法院：\n好的。\n\n罗姆尼先生：\n——但这是另一项动议，法官阁下。\n\n法院：\n嗯，是的。我明白。我只是想确认由谁进行辩论。\n\n罗姆尼先生：\n将由我进行，法官阁下。\n\n案件 22-50073\n文件 2539\n提交日期 01/31/24\n录入日期 01/31/24 13:29:55\n第 59 页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- 2024年1月23日\n\n法院：\n好的。谢谢。\n\n罗姆尼先生：\n谢谢。\n\n法院：\nBassett律师，是否还有进一步答复？\n\n巴塞特先生：\n仅非常简短地答复，法官阁下。我可以上前吗？\n\n法院：\n可以。\n\n巴塞特先生：\n因此，再次为记录说明，我是代表 Chapter 11 Trustee（第11章受托人）的 Paul Hastings（宝禄律师事务所）的 Nick Bassett（尼克·巴塞特）。法官阁下，以下是针对回应的几项简要意见。\n\n首先，关于该分析中的故意性要件，显然，法院已与律师就其当事人是否实际收到起诉书通知是否重要进行了交谈。我谨基于法官阁下所阐明的理由提出，该问题并不重要，因为其当事人无疑已被送达。正如法院正确指出，作为公司，他们有义务设立能够接受诉讼文书送达的登记代理人。\n\n但我认为分析不应止于此。因为即使其是否实际收到通知并不重要，他们也必须记住，根据 Rule 55(c)，由他们负担责任向本法院证明其缺席并非故意。如果他们到庭主张他们没有实际收到通知，他们就有责任向法院提出并提供可信的解释，足以承担其证明责任，说明为何在送达已经完成且有效的情况下，他们竟未实际收到通知，而本案中完全没有这方面的内容。\n\n没有任何人的宣誓书。即便暂且不论没有宣誓书，连具体说明都没有；我认为，在本案这种情形下，没有宣誓书本身就是致命的，因为存在一个真正的问题，即该公司背后是否甚至有一个个人。\n\n书面陈述只是说他们没有收到通知。完全没有讨论，好的，那么导致没有实际通知的情形是什么。如果已向登记代理人完成送达，为何实际通知没有转达给 Lamp Capital 和 Infinity Treasury Management？\n\n他们的论点是，邮件被邮递员弄丢了，还是本应将其交给 Lamp Capital 中适当人员的某人把它扔进了垃圾桶？完全没有这类内容。\n\n而法院在这种情形下唯一会予以宽待的情况，是存在某种可信且详细的解释，说明他们为何无法对起诉书作出回应。本案中，没有这类内容。\n\n案件 22-50073\n文件 2539\n提交日期 01/31/24\n录入日期 01/31/24 13:29:55\n第 62 页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- 2024年1月23日\n\n此外，再次说来，在律师于书面陈述中作出的解释中，我们仍然不知道其当事人实际上——抱歉，其当事人和他本人实际上是在何时知悉起诉书的。他们现在显然已经实际知悉。那是在何时发生的？书面陈述中完全没有说明这一点。他们可能已知悉数月，就我们所知而言。我是说，我想他们主张通知是在答辩期限届满后的某个时候收到的，但他们没有说明何时，也没有说明如何收到。\n\n我还要指出，有意思的是，同一位律师在本案中还作为另一实体的律师出庭，该实体曾被债务人——抱歉，受托人依据 2004 证据开示程序送达文件，该实体名为 G.S. Security（G.S.安保公司），该实体由 Scott Barnett（斯科特·巴尼特）拥有；法院从本案其他程序中了解到，该人是债务人的保镖，而受托人主张，该人是受托人所依赖的另一人，其名义上为债务人持有空壳公司的权益，我们认为 G.S. Security 是其中另一家。\n\n我之所以提到这一点，顺便说一句，我认为这是在 2023 年 10 月或 11 月；我之所以提到这一点，是因为我想知道，联系律师的人是否对 G.S. Security 和 Lamp Capital 是同一个人？我认为这将颇具说明性，因为这些实体之间唯一可能的\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- 2024年1月23日\n\n关系就是债务人。再说一次，法官阁下，没有任何细节。我无法想象有一组事实能够表明，动议人距离满足其证明责任竟如此之远。\n\n关于损害，法官阁下，我首先要指出的是，法官阁下曾说，Lamp Capital 已通过律师在本案中出庭。我坦率地说，我不记得这一点。法官阁下的记忆比我好得多。我并不怀疑您是正确的。\n\n但即便——即便不是这种情况，即便其未通过律师出庭，正如法院指出，Lamp Capital 通过支付 Brown Rudnick（布朗·拉德尼克律师事务所）的费用，为债务人的案件提供了资金。受托人向 Lamp Capital 送达的 2004 证据开示请求是在 2022 年 8 月，即一年多以前，接近一年半以前。法院于 2023 年 1 月命令 Lamp Capital 遵守该证据开示请求。法院于 2023 年 4 月认定 Lamp Capital 藐视法庭。绝对没有任何行动。\n\n如果 Lamp Capital 决定聘请律师并在本案中出庭，那么它本应做的第一件事，甚至在考虑提交一份之前，\n\n若未就 Rule 55(c) 动议作出回应或在本对抗程序中出庭，便无法消除其藐视法庭状态。它并未这样做。这种不利影响无法补救，因为那是你本应根据 Rule 2004 获得的起诉前证据开示。此事尚未发生。而且我毫无信心，也不认为本院应有任何信心，即若本对抗程序继续进行，鉴于本案的历史，该被告实际上会履行其证据开示义务。\n\n最后，法官阁下，关于有胜诉可能的抗辩这一要件，如本院所指出的，他们实质上所主张的是结论性否认。他们真正主张的是，我们将无法证明我们关于另我关系的指控。\n\n对此的判例法极为明确：不能仅作结论性否认，必须提供某些具体证据以支持你对起诉书中指控的抗辩。\n\n我最后仅引用我之前提到的 Sony（索尼）案。该案中，被告／动议人实际提交了个人／主要负责人宣誓书，否认起诉书中的指控，而法院仍认定这不足够。\n\n在那里，他们提交了宣誓书，声称这不是真实的，而法院说，抱歉，你们所做的只是提交一份否认指控的宣誓书。根据 Rule 55(c)，这并不够。\n\n在这里，被告甚至没有这样做。他们远未达到这一程度，法官阁下，因此，Rule 55(c) 动议应予驳回，我们恭请准许缺席判决动议。\n\n我的陈述完毕，法官阁下，除非本院有问题。\n\n法 院：好的。谢谢。\n\n关于你所称 Lamp Capital（蓝普资本）出庭一事，你可能是对的，即不存在正式出庭通知，但确实曾有——不过，也可能曾有。我可能是对的。你知道，案卷中有 3,000 项记录。\n\n巴塞特先生：我只是想指出，我记不起了。\n\n法 院：此外，无论他们是否通过律师出庭，2022 年 4 月提交的 DIP 融资动议中均陈述，Lamp Capital 是——或许不是 8.8 million 的资金来源，但肯定是向 Brown Rudnick（布朗·拉德尼克律师事务所）支付 million dollar 预付聘金的资金来源。\n\n该事项必须披露，因为 United States Trustee's Office（美国受托人办公室）和其他人要求本院披露；并且根据规则，即使债务人的律师并非由债务人本人支付，Federal Rules of Civil Procedure（联邦民事诉讼规则）——抱歉，是 Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure（联邦破产程序规则）2016，以及 United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut（康涅狄格地区美国破产法院）的本地规则，均要求披露报酬。\n\n因此，如果我们回到本案开始时，也就是案件非常早期，你会在律师报酬披露中发现——我所说的律师，是指 Brown Rudnick——根据 Brown Rudnick 所述，资金由 Lamp Capital 提供。\n\n因此，我在我们谈话期间正试图找到它。\n\n但 Claiborn（克莱伯恩）律师能够记得这一点，因为美国受托人办公室是要求作出该披露的当事方之一。\n\n现在，这可能就是它。是的。在 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）主 Chapter 11 案件中，即案号 22-50073，2022 年 March 1st 提交的 ECF No. 54。\n\n因此，在案件提交后不到两周，该律师事务所即受聘，并同意收取 \\$1 million 的预付聘金。该预付聘金通过电汇以两笔各 500,000 的等额款项支付。第一笔于 February 14, 2022 支付，即提交申请的前一天；第二笔于 February 15th, 2022 当日早些时候、在本案开始之前支付。\n\n案号 22-50073\nDoc 2539\nFiled 01/31/24\nEntered 01/31/24 13:29:55\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— January 23, 2024\n\n该预付聘金的来源是 Lamp Capital, LLC（蓝普资本有限责任公司）。\n\nLamp Capital, LLC 向 Kwok 先生提供了 million dollar 贷款。Kwok 先生指示 Lamp Capital, LLC 将款项直接汇给该律师事务所。该律师事务所与 Kwok 先生签署的聘用函附为 Exhibit A。\n\nBrown Rudnick 的 Exhibit A 函件日期为 February 14, 2022，即提交申请的前一天，其中写道，你应向该律师事务所交付 \\$1 million 的预付聘金。此处“你”的定义是 Kwok 先生，实际为 Guo Wengui（郭文贵），又名 Miles Guo（郭文贵）。该文件附于一份由 Guo Wengui, a/k/a Miles Guo 于 February 15, 2022 签署的诉状。\n\n正如我所说，该文件是在最初阶段提交的——案件于 February 15 提交，该文件于 March 1st 提交，当时 ECF No. 已经到 54 号，而这表明从案件一开始，Lamp Capital 就已参与其中。\n\n事实上，根据债务人律师的函件，在案件开始之前，第一笔预付聘金付款是在案件提交前一天作出的。并且——那是——那是在案件提交之前安排的。\n\n因此，尽管我可能记错了，而且很可能确实记错了，即实际上存在出庭通知，但我仍然认为有。也许我是错的。\n\n案号 22-50073\nDoc 2539\nFiled 01/31/24\nEntered 01/31/24 13:29:55\n第 68 页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— January 23, 2024\n\n但无论如何，在案件开始后两周内，Lamp Capital 被披露为向 Kwok 先生提供资金、用于向其在本院的 Chapter 11 律师支付 million dollars 律师费预付聘金的资金来源。\n\n因此，如果我关于出庭的说法有误，我希望更正记录。\n\n但我还要为记录指出，我刚刚提到的文件，即于 March 1st, 2022 在主案件中提交的 ECF 55，是承认 Lamp Capital 为债务人本 Chapter 11 案件的律师费提供了资金，金额——预付聘金金额为 million dollars。\n\n巴塞特先生：谢谢，法官阁下。\n\n法 院：因此，我只是想为记录澄清这一点。\n\n巴塞特先生：非常感谢，法官阁下。\n\n法 院：谢谢。律师，还有进一步答复吗？\n\n格兰德先生：仅作简短回应，受托人律师最初提出的观点是，其无法理解在向注册代理人送达后，被告怎么可能没有收到通知。\n\n再次说明，注册代理人实际收到该起诉书后，将其退回给受托人律师，并说我们不知道——被告已不活跃，我们没有转寄信息。因此，我们并不争议送达已适当完成，或者已向注册代理人完成送达；但当受托人律师说，被告主张未收到起诉书毫无道理时，注册代理人正是在告诉受托人律师，他们没有收到，因为注册代理人没有将其发送给他们。因此，这只是——\n\n法 院：那么你们是如何得知此事的？那么你们又是如何得知该起诉书的？Lamp Capital 又是如何得知的？\n\n格兰德先生：据我了解——\n\n法 院：或者 Infinity（无限）。他们又是如何得知的？\n\n格兰德先生：——Lamp Capital 是通过其他事项的传闻得知的——\n\n法 院：本案中的其他事项？\n\n格兰德先生：——本案中的其他事项，而非通过直接收到该文件得知。\n\n法 院：为什么他们会处于本案其他事项的传闻圈中？\n\n格兰德先生：您提到——不存在争议的是 Infinity——\n\n法 院：嗯，Brown Rudnick 自 July of 2022 起就已退出。\n\n格兰德先生：是的。\n\n法 院：是的。\n\n格兰德先生：不存在争议的是，Infinity 由——由债务人的儿子所有，并且——并且 Infinity 是 Lamp 的唯一成员。我们理解，起诉书中的这些指控是真实的。如法官阁下所提及，以及如受托人在书面文件中所称，债务人的儿子曾在其关联的其他——我想说，其他空壳公司中出现。还有其他方式，您知道，我想有些信息被传递给了他。我无从知悉，我也不认为我的同事知悉，但在某个时候，他得知了此事。据我了解，他并非在——\n\n法 院：他是谁？\n\n格兰德先生：债务人的儿子，他是——\n\n法 院：那么，是债务人的儿子聘请你们的吗？\n\n格兰德先生：我相信是的。\n\n法 院：好的。\n\n格兰德先生：我的意思是，代表这些实体。但据我了解是这样。\n\n法 院：好的。\n\n案号 22-50073\nDoc 2539\nFiled 01/31/24\nEntered 01/31/24 13:29:55\n第 71 页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— January 23, 2024\n\n格兰德先生：因此，据我了解，在某个时候，他通过——得知了此事，或者有人告诉了他，但那是在答复起诉书的期限已经届满之后。而当他——当他得知此事时——\n\n法 院：但案卷中没有任何事实支持你所说的内容。没有宣誓书，也没有任何材料。我的意思是，你告诉我的是你相信为真的事情，但没有事实支持。\n\n格兰德先生：这是律师基于——作出的陈述。\n\n法 院：我明白。\n\n格兰德先生：——基于那些沟通。是的。但法律并不要求——并不要求提供宣誓书。我的意思是——\n\n法 院：我没有说有这一要求。\n\n格兰德先生：——我只是想澄清这一点。\n\n法 院：我只是说，你要求我认定案卷中不存在的事实。你要求我认定案卷中不存在的事实。你说我们没有——我们是通过某种传闻得知此事的，他从不同地方听说了此事，并且在答复期限届满后，他代表这些实体聘请了我们。\n\n格兰德先生：我并不是——\n\n案号 22-50073\nDoc 2539\nFiled 01/31/24\nEntered 01/31/24 13:29:55\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— January 23, 2024\n\n法 院：这是许多没有任何案卷支持的事实。\n\n格兰德先生：但我并非主张法官阁下必然需要认定这些事实为真。\n\n问题在于，当就起诉书通知是在何时或是否发出——是否收到——存在争议时——\n\n法 院：嗯，那正是你——正是我们，你和我，正是我问你，哪一个判例说必须实际收到通知？\n\n你向我指出的两个案件并没有这样说。\n\n格兰德先生：正如我——正如我——\n\n法 院：而且正如我所说，我不——\n\n格兰德先生：——我可以在今天下午提供那些案件——\n\n法 院：这毫无道理。\n\n格兰德先生：——给您。\n\n法 院：在我看来，要求实际收到通知毫无道理，因为那样就没有 Rule 55 的理由了。\n\n格兰德先生：但 Rule——但这是一个两步程序。换言之——\n\n法 院：我明白这是一个两步程序。\n\n格兰德先生：——你们并不会立即获得缺席判决。你们获得的是——\n\n法 院：我明白这是一个两步程序。但如果你在答复期限之前已收到通知，并且\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- January 23, 2024 73 你作出了选择，你的委托人选择不作回应，那么那就是故意行为。格兰德先生（MR. GRAND）：我同意，但这不是本案事实。事实并非如此。法庭：那么，我们如何知道这不是事实？你没有任何相反的事实。格兰德先生：相反的事实是——是律师基于这些沟通所作的陈述。法庭：不。是基于你关于必须具有实际知情且送达并不足够的主张。这是你的主张。这是你的论点。你的论点是，必须对起诉状具有实际知情。我想知道《联邦民事诉讼规则》的何处有此规定，因为这对我而言将是新鲜事。格兰德先生：正如我所说，法官阁下，本区以及第二巡回区有——有多项判例——法庭：这些判例说必须有实际通知，必须有实际通知。格兰德先生：是。这些判例认为，在被告是否实际收到起诉状通知存在争议时——案号 22-50073 文件 2539 提交日期 01/31/24 登记日期 01/31/24 13:29:55 第 73 页，共\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 2539 提交日期 01/31/24 登记日期 01/31/24 13:29:55 第 74 页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024\n\n1 法庭：不，不，不，不，不。\n\n2 格兰德先生：——即使据称送达已经\n\n3 得到适当完成——\n\n4 法庭：好的。好。\n\n5 格兰德先生：——这就足够了。\n\n6 法庭：我会阅读你所援引的判例。我不认为\n\n7 其中任何一项是这么说的。\n\n8 格兰德先生：如我所说，我可以——如果——\n\n9 法庭：我不想要进一步的书面陈述。\n\n10 提交书面陈述的期限已经过去了。\n\n11 格兰德先生：好的。谢谢您，法官阁下。\n\n12 巴塞特先生（MR. BASSETT）：法官阁下，很快地，只占用\n\n13 两秒钟，可以吗？\n\n14 我只是想重申，即使实际通知\n\n15 是一项要求，仍应由动议方负担证明\n\n16 其未收到实际通知的责任。\n\n17 鉴于他已如其必须承认的那样，承认 Lamp Capital（蓝普资本）\n\n18 与本案的信息网络相连，且事实上\n\n19 深度卷入其中，其无法证明\n\n20 不存在实际通知，因为实际通知并不必然意味着\n\n21 必须通过登记代理人取得该通知。\n\n22 他们可以通过查阅\n\n23 案卷、儿子与本案其他涉案人员交谈而获得实际通知。\n\n24 当一个如 Lamp Capital 般与本案相连的实体存在时，有无数种不同方式\n\n25 可以获得实际通知。\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 2539\n提交日期 01/31/24\n登记日期 01/31/24 13:29:55\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024\n\n1 可以获得实际通知。但在这些\n\n2 情形下，要满足你方的举证责任，你必须做出远多于本案所做的事情。\n\n3 \n\n4 我还想指出的第二点是，\n\n5 我认为从未有人提出任何说法——律师\n\n6 一直谈论 Infinity Treasury Management（无限财政管理公司）的\n\n7 登记代理人称，我们不知道在哪里找到 Infinity\n\n8 Treasury Management。这一点与送达无关，\n\n9 并且在这些情形下也与实际通知无关。\n\n10 但第二，我认为从未有人主张 Lamp\n\n11 Capital 的登记代理人没有找到 Lamp Capital。而且\n\n12 Lamp Capital 实际上才是我们在此主要\n\n13 讨论的实体。\n\n14 因此，根本没有依据认定\n\n15 该缺席并非故意，法官阁下。谢谢您。\n\n16 \n\n17 法庭：好的。谢谢。\n\n18 我将对缺席判决动议\n\n19 保留裁定。\n\n20 罗姆尼先生（MR. ROMNEY）：法官阁下，如果可以，亚伦·罗姆尼（Aaron Romney），\n\n21 可以吗？\n\n22 法庭：当然。你想要求什么，然后\n\n23 我会告诉你是否可以。\n\n24 罗姆尼先生：基于刚才\n\n25 作出的陈述，显然是在我在场的情况下，我一直坐在这里\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 2539 提交日期 01/31/24 登记日期 01/31/24 13:29:55 第 76 页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024\n\n1 全程，我确实感到有必要作出——我不愿使用\n\n2 “披露”一词——但为记录提供某些事实，\n\n3 因为我确实知悉刚才讨论的\n\n4 某些事情。我很乐意将\n\n5 其载入记录。我也很乐意不这样做。\n\n6 但我绝不希望被指称\n\n7 我坐在这个房间里，而有人认为我\n\n8 应当发言，因为正如我所说，我对过去一小时中\n\n9 刚刚成为询问对象的某些事件\n\n10 具有亲身知情。\n\n11 法庭：嗯，除非你准备出庭作证，\n\n12 否则我确实看不出这有什么意义，对吗？我的意思是\n\n13 ——对吗？\n\n14 罗姆尼先生：法官阁下，我的意思是，我向法庭披露，\n\n15 我对刚刚讨论的某些事实具有亲身知情。因此，\n\n16 如果将来有人询问我为何保持沉默，\n\n17 我已作出该披露。我可以什么都不说，\n\n18 也可以回答法庭的任何问题，但仅此而已。\n\n19 \n\n20 法庭：我没有任何问题。\n\n21 罗姆尼先生：谢谢您，法官阁下。\n\n22 法庭：谢谢。\n\n23 好的。关于缺席\n\n24 判决动议，如我刚才所述，我将对其\n\n25 保留裁定。\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 77 米勒先生（MR. MILLER）：法官阁下，罗伯特·米勒（Robert Miller）。如果您已处理完 Lamp Capital 事项，我可否获准离席？法庭：可以。谢谢。米勒先生：我只是想让法官阁下知道。谢谢。法庭：好的。那么，日程表上的下一事项是，罗姆尼律师代表被告 Leading Shine New York, Limited（Leading Shine New York 有限公司）提出的撤销缺席裁定动议。罗姆尼律师，您表示将进行辩论？罗姆尼先生：是的，法官阁下。法庭：好的。请开始。罗姆尼先生：亚伦·罗姆尼，Zeisler & Zeisler（泽斯勒律师事务所），代表 Leading Shine, Limited。法官阁下，我可以在律师席上陈述辩论吗？法庭：当然可以。罗姆尼先生：法官阁下，如今天上午已长时间讨论的，根据规则 55(c) 提出的动议，其标准——三个要件是故意性、有效抗辩以及损害。从故意性开始，本巡回区以及本区的标准是，高于过失，且须为蓄意行为。这两项判例均载于 Leading Shine 撤销动议第 4 页。就本案而言，不存在故意行为，也不存在为代表 Leading Shine 避免参与该对抗程序而实施故意行为的动机。鉴于受托人的指控以及本案的历史，所存在的是有必要确定：该名正确地相信自己有权代表 Leading Shine 进行抗辩或指示进行抗辩的个人，事实上是否具有该权限。在本案中，正如我在书面材料中一再详尽讨论、也如本法庭中一再详尽讨论的，曾发生过一次情形：在该公司同一主要负责人的指示下，我提交了出庭通知。随后 Hodgson Russ（霍奇森·拉斯律师事务所）的总法律顾问告知我，我的委托人并无该权限。当时我依赖了一项口头陈述。并且，在 Hodgson Russ 的总法律顾问告知我后，我采取了我认为自己有义务采取的行动，向对方律师和法庭披露所发生的情况。我不会——在我的任职期间——允许重演那种情形，因为那不会服务于任何人的利益，不会服务于法庭、受托人、我的利益、Leading Shine 的利益，也不会服务于郭女士（Ms. Guo）的利益。我们收到，即郭女士及其律师收到了一份未经删节的版本——\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 78 法庭：嗯，你是她的律师？\n\n罗姆尼先生：是的。\n\n法庭：好的。\n\n罗姆尼先生：为明确起见，是的，我是其中之一，但——\n\n法庭：嗯，你现在仍然是，对吗？\n\n罗姆尼先生：我是。\n\n法庭：好的。嗯，你刚才说郭女士及其律师，仿佛那是其他人而不是你。\n\n罗姆尼先生：不，不。我道歉。我是想表示，不只是我收到。我、莫里亚蒂先生（Mr. Moriarty）、韦尼克女士（Ms. Wernick）和瓦尔坦先生（Mr. Vartan），我相信是收到那些文件的人。我相信日期是 November 27th。那是我们首次取得未经删节的起诉书版本以及密封证物；它们是首次以任何形式实际将郭女士与 Leading Shine 联系起来的证据，尽管其中存在矛盾，因为有证据将另一名个人与 Leading Shine 联系起来。事实上，起诉书的公开版本表明，受托人凭借其所有资源以及\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 2539 提交日期 01/31/24 登记日期 01/31/24 13:29:55 第 79 页，共\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 2539 提交日期 01/31/24 登记日期 01/31/24 13:29:55 第 80 页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024\n\n1 其调查的全部范围，并不知道 Leading Shine 的\n\n2 所有人是谁。这些具体\n\n3 情形和指控要求特别程度的\n\n4 尽职调查，尤其考虑到 Hudson Diamond（哈德逊钻石）实体\n\n5 所发生事件的历史。\n\n6 当时，我指示我的工作人员、我所在律师事务所\n\n7 的团队，对我们掌握的记录\n\n8 进行审查，以确定我们是否有任何资料能够\n\n9 实际核实究竟谁控制 Leading\n\n10 Shine。\n\n11 尽管我们已收到数量庞大的文件——其中既有本案受托人提供的，\n\n12 也有第三方提供的文件，且这些文件已由我们提交给\n\n13 受托人——我们仍未能找到\n\n14 任何能够证实任一说法的材料。\n\n15 \n\n16 当时，我亲自与数名我知道曾代表\n\n17 债务人、债务人若干家庭成员以及由债务人若干家庭成员\n\n18 拥有或曾拥有的各实体的人员交谈。\n\n19 \n\n20 这些人中没有一人拥有能够向我提供的文件，以证明\n\n21 究竟是谁控制该实体。\n\n22 \n\n23 再次强调，在我取得该等文件之前，\n\n24 我不会提交出庭通知。据我所知，在本案档案历史的\n\n25 情形下，也没有其他律师愿意这样做。\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 2539\n提交日期 01/31/24\n登记日期 01/31/24 13:29:55\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024\n\n1 本案档案的历史情形下。\n\n2 我直接联系了郭女士的个人会计师。\n\n3 我从她那里获得的信息\n\n4 表明郭女士是 Leading\n\n5 Shine 的控制人，但并非确定无疑。\n\n6 不过，我随后得知了设立 Leading\n\n7 Shine 的律师事务所名称。我不记得年份。我\n\n8 相信是 2018 或 2019。我联系了该律师事务所。\n\n9 我被告知曾代表 Leading Shine 的律师\n\n10 已不再任职于该所。我在其后任职的律师事务所联系了该律师。\n\n11 \n\n12 此时已进入十二月中下旬以及假期期间。\n\n13 显然，世界的运转节奏已不同于当时，尽管我当然\n\n14 尽力按那个节奏推进。\n\n15 \n\n16 与设立 Leading Shine 的律师交谈后，\n\n17 他告知我，他已无法查阅其\n\n18 记录，但向我确认，郭女士是与 Leading Shine, Ltd. 关联的\n\n19 自然人。他将我\n\n20 转回其原先保管该档案的律师事务所。该档案必须\n\n21 从存储处调取。我与他的前同事进行了数次讨论。\n\n22 \n\n23 至此，我已确认郭女士\n\n24 确有权限指示我和我的律师事务所、瓦尔坦先生\n\n25 及其律师事务所、韦尼克女士和莫里亚蒂先生代表\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 2539 提交日期 01/31/24 登记日期 01/31/24 13:29:55 第 82 页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 23, 2024 82 Leading Shine 出庭，我们也确实如此做了；并且我们迅速于新年第二日，即第一个营业日，提交了撤销缺席裁定动议。\n\n不存在任何故意规避的意图。事实上，恰恰相反，并无规避的意图；但同样存在一种意图，即确保不会发生任何可能导致郭女士、我本人、我的律所或其他任何人在缺乏公司授权的情况下作出某种行为，并由此浪费受托人的资源、本院的资源，尤其是本院时间的情况。\n\n正如郭女士及时参与本诉讼，以及 Hudson Diamond Holdings（Hudson Diamond Holdings公司）和 Hudson Diamond New York（Hudson Diamond New York公司）及时参与所表明的那样，并无规避本诉讼程序的意图。\n\n情况恰恰相反。其意图是出庭并提出抗辩，而这正是他们将要做的，也是他们迄今所做的。并且，这些抗辩具有依据。\n\n在一项——在另我诉讼中，适用标准与双方援引的多项判决所涉某些其他诉讼中的标准大为不同。这不是已结算账目请求。这不是未向 ERISA 账户注资、资金已经消失的情形。这是一个高度依赖事实的案件。\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 2539\n提交日期 01/31/24\n录入日期 01/31/24 13:29:55\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- January 23, 2024\n\n1 其影响极为广泛，\n2 尤其是在像本案这样的案件中。\n3 受托人关于 Leading\n4 Shine（Leading Shine公司）的指控毫无实质内容。受托人并未指称谁——\n5 甚至主张谁是 Leading Shine 的实际所有人。\n6 受托人列举了多项指控，\n7 抱歉，我失言了，列举了多笔作出的转账，\n8 转入或转出 Leading Shine。但法律明确规定，\n9 仅凭转账，欺诈性\n10 转账与普通转账存在区别，即使其属于欺诈性转账，而我们当然\n11 并未承认其属于欺诈性转账，但转账，即使其属于\n12 欺诈性转账，也不能确立另我关系。\n13 法律同样明确规定，共同高管和\n14 代理人并不能确立另我继受责任。\n15 诉状中完全没有任何内容，即使\n16 属实，也足以确立 Leading Shine 是除其法定所有人郭女士以外任何人的\n17 另我。实际上，\n18 如诉状所述，即使将其中指控视为\n19 真实，也连这一点都不存在，因为诉状\n20 甚至没有指称 Leading Shine 的法定所有人是谁。\n21 就实体问题而言，如果受托人\n22 认为 Leading Shine 是债务人另我这一点不存在争议，\n23 那么受托人应当很容易\n24 立即提出简易判决动议。不会\n25 造成干扰。不会产生费用。但是受托人\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 2539\n提交日期 01/31/24\n录入日期 01/31/24 13:29:55\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- January 23, 2024\n\n1 迄今并未这样做。在其确立\n2 其主张之前，应允许 Leading Shine 提出\n3 抗辩。\n4 接下来谈损害，显然，甚至没有指称\n5 在自最初答复日期以来的数周内，证据已经灭失或毁损。\n6 而且，\n7 自受托人考虑到我们最初收到的是一份经删节的诉状，因而\n8 礼貌地为郭女士延长答复期限的延长期限以来，经过的时间更短；\n9 对该诉状作出答复几乎\n10 不可能。仅仅过去了数周。\n11 尚未向任何人送达或进行任何证据开示。\n12 也没有理由认为\n13 任何证据已经灭失。\n14 第二，规则 54(b) 排除了作出可能与针对\n15 已出庭被告的指控不一致的缺席判决，\n16 而该等被告准备就\n17 实体问题进行抗辩。\n18 郭女士已及时出庭，并正在就\n19 实体问题进行抗辩。\n20 显然，一项认定，即针对——\n21 Leading Shine 作出的缺席认定，将与确认\n22 郭女士是 Leading Shine, Ltd. 所有人的判决不一致。\n23 郭女士不能被缺席判决，因为她已及时\n24 出庭。仅凭这一点，就不能——此时不能对 Leading Shine 作出\n25 缺席判决，因此，允许其充分并——充分参与\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 2539\n提交日期 01/31/24\n录入日期 01/31/24 13:29:55\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- January 23, 2024\n\n1 其抗辩，不会造成任何损害。\n2 \n3 说完这些，除非法院有任何问题，我\n4 将援引我的——我的初步书面意见以及答复意见。\n5 法庭：我目前没有任何问题。\n6 \n7 谢谢。\n8 ROMNEY 律师：谢谢您，法官阁下。\n9 法庭：Bassett 律师？\n10 BASSETT 律师：法官阁下，我可以走近\n11 讲台吗？\n12 法庭：当然可以。\n13 BASSETT 律师：再次说明，法官阁下，我是代表\n14 Chapter 11 受托人的 Paul Hastings（普衡律师事务所）律师 Nick Bassett（尼克·巴塞特）。\n15 Romney 律师在其论证开始时，逐一讲述了他为确定\n16 其当事人郭美是否\n17 实际上是 Leading Shine 的名义所有人，而不得不采取的一系列冗长、\n18 复杂的步骤，历时\n19 两个多月。\n20 法官阁下，出于我将就故意性审查说明的理由，该故事无关紧要，\n21 也偏离重点。\n22 而且，它绝对、百分之百地，以排除合理怀疑的程度，支持\n23 受托人关于本对抗程序中是否可能存在\n24 有依据的抗辩的立场。\n25 \n\n案号 22-50073 文件 2539 提交日期 01/31/24 录入日期 01/31/24 13:29:55 第 86 页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- January 23, 2024 86\n\n就故意性审查而言，法官阁下，我甚至难以理解该论证背后的逻辑，因为无论在书面材料中还是在今天的论证中，我都没有听到任何解释，说明为何任何人在这些情形下会决定仅仅允许——再次说明，并无任何论证或主张称郭美和 Leading Shine 未收到该诉状及答辩期限的通知。这对判例法至关重要。在这些情形下，存在一项蓄意决定，即干脆无视答辩期限。无论 Romney 律师及其当事人是否因某种原因无法在两个月内弄清楚她是否拥有该法人实体，对他们为何决定仅仅保持沉默、无所作为，完全没有任何解释；再次说明，没有宣誓书，也没有郭美本人作出的任何陈述，完全没有解释。现在，Romney 律师说，好吧，我们过去曾因 Hudson Diamond 实体陷入这样的重大麻烦，而如果我没有授权，我就不能出庭并声称代表某个实体，法官阁下，有一百万件事情本可做到。何不从简单的透明、坦诚和沟通开始？何不给受托人打电话并说，你知道吗，我们以前有过这个问题，现在又遇到了问题，该实体不希望就该诉状被缺席判决，但我正在试图弄清楚，尽管这听起来或许难以置信，郭女士——我正在试图弄清楚她是否拥有这家公司。完全没有这样做。没有向受托人的律师这样做。而且除此之外，我在某些方面同情 Romney 律师，但这不是他的问题。这是 Leading Shine 和郭美的问题。如果她和 Leading Shine 已收到该诉状通知，却无法弄清楚他们是否拥有该实体，那是他们自己的责任。她本可以联系受托人。她本可以向法院寄送信函。本可以有人在答辩期限届满之前采取行动，而不是仅仅坐等其过去。再次说明，与其他被告一样，Leading Shine 对本案并不陌生。我相信是在 2023 年 4 月，受托人曾向 Leading Shine 寻求并获得 Rule 2004 证据开示，而他们未遵从传票。现在，我脑海中立即出现的问题是，我的意思是，难道那不应当是郭美和 Romney 律师开始其漫长历程以弄清她是否拥有该公司的时候，从而使他们能够遵从 Rule 2004 证据开示吗？不是。他们坐等且无所作为。然后，不知出于何种原因，Kwok 宇宙那个、你知道的、深渊一侧的某个人说，你知道吗，我们或许应该就这份\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- January 23, 2024 87\n\nLeading Shine 诉状采取些行动。于是这项工作\n2 才开始。\n3 但这并不能改变如下事实：该缺席显然\n4 是故意的。他们知悉该诉状。\n5 他们坐等。他们无所作为。\n6 Romney 律师称，引用，“不存在任何故意\n7 规避的意图”，引文结束。这绝对不是\n8 标准。标准是该缺席是否系故意，以及他们是否提出某种解释，\n9 向法院说明其未作答复\n10 为何应被宽免。他们完全未能做到这一点。\n11 \n12 关于有依据抗辩的论点，法官阁下，再次说明，没有宣誓书，没有事实，仅有法律论点。\n13 \n14 为何没有宣誓书，为何没有事实，因为直到大约一周前，\n15 他的当事人甚至不知道她拥有该实体。\n16 当然，如果她甚至不知道并且用了两个月\n17 才弄清楚自己是否名义上拥有该实体，她就完全不可能就实体问题提出抗辩，\n18 以证明 Leading Shine 是\n19 债务人的另我。\n20 \n21 她几乎不可能提出有依据的抗辩，这也正是\n22 为何没有宣誓书、没有事实、没有任何内容\n23 说明，例如，Leading Shine 不是债务人的另我，因为它从事 X、Y 和 Z。\n24 \n25 它实际上在\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 2539\n提交日期 01/31/24\n录入日期 01/31/24 13:29:55\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- January 23, 2024\n\n1 该行业经营，但定期从事这类活动，\n2 拥有这些雇员，拥有这些高管和\n3 董事，完全没有这些内容，因为这里不存在\n4 该等信息的来源。\n5 Romney 律师再次实质上提出了一项 12(b)(6)\n6 驳回动议论点，称——他提出了 in pari\n7 delicto（同等过错）及其他已经被指示的论点，\n8 而后在今天，他将大部分时间用于主张\n9 诉状中的指控不足以证明\n10 Leading Shine 事实上是债务人的另我。\n11 首先，如我先前指出，如果这就是他们将要提出的\n12 抗辩，即不存在证据，仅是 12(b)(6) 类型的论点，\n13 \n14 那么这正是法院在审议根据 55(c) 撤销缺席的动议时\n15 适宜考虑的内容。\n16 而他提出的所有这些论点均不能成立，\n17 因为该诉状完全充分地满足了\n18 根据 Delaware（特拉华州）法律指称另我的要求。\n19 Romney 律师对\n20 诉状未具体指称该实体的名义所有人究竟是谁提出异议。\n21 \n22 鉴于被告郭美是\n23 据称的所有人，竟然能将此事反过来归咎于受托人，实在令人费解。\n24 \n25 但无论如何，受托人所说的原因是\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 2539 提交日期 01/31/24 录入日期 01/31/24 13:29:55 第 90 页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- January 23, 2024\n\n1 他在诉状中所述，是因为在取证过程中，\n2 受托人发现了开户文件，其中\n3 引用于诉状，显示 Yvette Wang（王悦特·王），即\n4 债务人在刑事欺诈案件中的共谋者，以及 Mei\n5 Guo（郭美），均代表 Leading Shine（领先光辉公司）开立了账户。\n6 因此，我认为这支持受托人的主张。\n7 受托人还在诉状中主张，一名\n8 法院所知为该家庭厨师的个人，曾代表 Leading Shine 采取\n9 行动。\n10 Leading Shine 与债务人的\n11 其他空壳公司使用同一地址，包括 Golden Spring（金泉公司），该公司现\n12 作为债务人的另我而由受托人所有，以及\n13 HK (USA)（香港〔美国〕公司），就该公司\n14 亦已作出同样认定。\n15 再次说明，Leading Shine 与 Lamp Capital（兰普资本公司）一样，是\n16 债务人用于区别于 HK\n17 (USA) 的另一类空壳公司。它属于资金筹措类。它是债务人\n18 用作其个人小金库的另一实体，用于\n19 在其公司之间调拨资金，并支付其\n20 本人及其家属的费用。\n21 诉状中载有关于\n22 从 Gold Spring（黄金泉公司）、Saraca（萨拉卡公司）、Hudson Diamond（哈德逊钻石公司）、ACA\n23 Capital（ACA资本公司）进行转账，以及向其他空壳公司 Golden Spring、\n24 Greenwich Land（格林尼治土地公司）、Gypsy Mei（吉普赛·梅公司）进行转账的主张；Gypsy Mei 是债务人\n25 女儿所有的一家公司。\n案号 22-50073 文书 2539 提交日期 01/31/24 登记日期 01/31/24 13:29:55 第 91 页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— 2024年1月23日\n1 诉状还主张，债务人使用\n2 Leading Shine 支付其个人费用，包括其\n3 在英国 Ace Decade（艾斯十年）诉讼中的个人律师费用，\n4 以及其他英国律师的费用，即 Berkeley\n5 Rowe（伯克利·罗伊），该律师亦曾代理据称由 William Je（威廉·杰）\n6 所有的 Himalaya（喜马拉雅）实体，以及向 HK (USA) 发放的\n7 $37 million 贷款。\n8 诉状中还主张，\n9 债务人转移了——即 Leading Shine 代表债务人\n10 向一家飞机设计公司转移了资金。\n11 当然，诉状还提及，\n12 债务人在被问及 Leading Shine 时，\n13 就所有相关问题援引第五修正案拒绝作答。\n14 法官阁下，诉状中有大量证据\n15 支持在本阶段驳回根据 Rule 55(c) 提出的动议，并最终作出有利于\n16 受托人的缺席判决\n17 认定。\n18 正如 Romney（罗姆尼）律师所坚持的，受托人\n19 目前无须证明其主张。\n20 本案的程序状态是：他们已缺席，\n21 受托人已在\n22 诉状中提出其主张，而由他们负担提出\n23 关于具有实质理由的抗辩之证据的责任，但他们未能\n24 做到。\n25 最后，法官阁下，关于不利影响，我只想\n\n案号 22-50073\n文书 2539\n提交日期 01/31/24\n登记日期 01/31/24 13:29:55\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— 2024年1月23日\n\n1 回到我在开头所作的一些评论，以及\n2 我们今天在这里已经某种程度上反复讨论的问题：这并非\n3 一个与本案毫无关联的实体，或该实体的所谓所有人。\n4 \n5 Mei Guo 从一开始就是本案参与者，\n6 其本人亦有未能遵守\n7 取证请求的相关问题记录。\n8 应当说的是 Leading Shine，而非 Lamp，早在四月便被\n9 送达传票。其未遵守传票。没有人\n10 在当时费心采取任何步骤，以确定\n11 谁拥有该公司，以及他们是否会作出回应。\n12 法官阁下，为使本院维持秩序\n13 和法治，并确保受托人能够\n14 不受阻碍地继续其调查，不能允许\n15 当事人自行选择何时参与这些\n16 案件。\n17 因此，允许诸如 Lamp\n18 Capital、Leading Shine 之类的当事人迟至此时才决定\n19 参与并得以如此行事，事实上\n20 会对受托人造成不利影响，不应获准。\n21 但再次说明，我要重申，不利影响\n22 要件，根据 Second Circuit（第二巡回区）的法律规定非常明确，\n23 无须得到满足；而本案中，被告\n24 在证明其具有实质理由的\n25 抗辩方面远未达到要求。\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— 2024年1月23日 93 我陈述至此，法官阁下，除非法院有问题。法院：目前我没有任何问题。谢谢。BASSETT（巴塞特）先生：谢谢，法官阁下。法院：Romney 律师，有任何回应吗？ROMNEY 律师：有，简要说明，法官阁下。法官阁下，Bassett 先生刚才称，曾作出故意置之不理的决定。鉴于我已作出的陈述，以及 Guo 女士本人及时且积极的参与，绝无任何证据或合理依据支持该说法。曾作出的故意决定，是确保 Guo 女士有权指示 Leading Shine，以避免另一场——恕我找不到更贴切的说法——占用大量时间和资源的闹剧。Bassett 先生称有人本可以联系受托人。根据本案已经发生的事件，该说法百分之百错误。在 Hudson Diamond 问题中，Vartan（瓦尔坦）律师联系了受托人。他没有出庭。并且，当其权限受到质疑时，他成为说明理由令的对象。案号 22-50073 文书 2539 提交日期 01/31/24 登记日期 01/31/24 13:29:55 第 93 页，共\n\n案号 22-50073 文书 2539 提交日期 01/31/24 登记日期 01/31/24 13:29:55 第 94 页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— 2024年1月23日 94 每个人，包括 Guo 女士、她的律师以及我本人，都在审视本案以及我们应如何行事，并着眼于我们为何会走到今天这一步，努力避免出现使我们的客户及我们的行为被置于可能显得、或已显得我们试图回避或阻碍程序的境地。我们试图做的是避免干扰，确保在采取行动之前掌握准确事实。这同样适用于 Guo 女士本人。问题并不在于我、我的律所、Vartan 先生或其律所是否愿意接受 Guo 女士的指示。Guo 女士和我们所面临的问题是，鉴于诉状中的主张，并鉴于当时我们双方手头均缺乏文件，我们认为，考虑到采取行动后可能有人提出主张和指控，称我们本不应采取该行动，且我们出于某种不正当目的而采取该行动，那么先做好充分准备、以正确方式行事，并在三周后的现在出庭，会更合理、造成更少干扰、更不具干扰性且更少浪费。受托人未指出任何案件，因为\n\n案号 22-50073 文书 2539 提交日期 01/31/24 登记日期 01/31/24 13:29:55 第 95 页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— 2024年1月23日\n\n1 根本不存在任何案件，在答辩到期日后数周内，\n2 根据 Rule 55(c) 提出的动议被驳回，且\n3 关于为何需要多一些时间的连贯、\n4 全面解释已被载入记录。我不知道有\n5 任何此类案件，也不认为存在任何此类案件。\n6 受托人及其律师 Bassett 先生\n7 就案件实体所说的一切，除我一开始承认的\n8 存在一些被主张的转账，及\n9 Leading Shine 与第三方实体之间存在被主张的共同代理人外，\n10 其余一切均为纯粹猜测和臆断。\n11 假设性问题，\n12 为什么我们没有这个，为什么我们没有那个。\n13 诉状于 October 30th 提交。其\n14 经大量删节。\n15 本案涉及许多相互关联的事项。我认为\n16 法官阁下曾说过类似的话，即我们已有约 3,000 项\n17 案卷记录。我们都是人。我们已尽力而为。\n18 但我们无法同时关注所有事情。本案并非\n19 本院案卷中唯一的案件。也不是\n20 我律所案卷中唯一的案件。\n21 我们有权，Leading Shine 有权，\n22 Guo 女士有权提出抗辩。这正是\n23 她想做的。在此阶段，对我们\n24 抗辩的阐述，以及受托人自身主张中的缺陷和其未能满足\n25 其负有举证责任的要件，已经足以支持根据 Rule 55(c) 提出的\n\n案号 22-50073\n文书 2539\n提交日期 01/31/24\n登记日期 01/31/24 13:29:55\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— 2024年1月23日\n\n1 动议。\n2 \n3 Tancredi（坦克雷迪）法官在\n4 我方答复第6页所引用的 Walnut Hill（核桃山）案中作出了一项表述十分清晰的\n5 裁决，所述正是如此。\n6 就这些，我没有其他补充。谢谢，\n7 法官阁下拨冗审理。\n8 法院：\n好的。谢谢。\n9 Bassett 先生，还有其他事项吗？\n10 BASSETT 先生：\n有。非常简要地说明一下，法官\n11 阁下。法官阁下，为记录在案，我是代表 Chapter 11 Trustee（第11章受托人）的 Paul Hastings（保尔·哈斯汀斯律师事务所）的 Nick Bassett（尼克·巴塞特）。\n12 \n13 我认为关于主观故意要件\n14 无须再作过多陈述。事实上，确实已经——\n15 毫无疑问地送达了诉状，且当事人实际知悉该诉状，\n16 并且明知而未作回应。\n17 完全没有主张存在任何错误或\n18 其他外在因素导致——妨碍作出任何形式的\n19 回应。\n20 再次说明，这不取决于 Romney 律师。Mei Guo\n21 和 Leading Shine 才是当事人。他们\n22 有义务遵守其期限。他们决定\n23 不采取任何行动，坐视不管。因此，关于\n24 主观故意——再次说明，主观故意的举证责任由他们承担。\n25 他们未能满足该责任。\n案号 22-50073 文书 2539 提交日期 01/31/24 登记日期 01/31/24 13:29:55 第 97 页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— 2024年1月23日 97 关于具有实质理由的抗辩这一要件，除再次指出案卷中完全没有证据表明可以提出具有实质理由的抗辩外，我不会重述此前所言。这并不令人意外，因为此处唯一实际涉入的当事人是 Mei Guo，而她对该实体一无所知。法官阁下，关于这一点我最后要说的是，我认为 Romney 先生将其关于具有实质理由的抗辩要件的全部论点建立在这样一种观点上，似乎有些投机取巧：即使该观点可能不正确，即受托人未在其诉状中纳入关于另我关系的充分主张；而他的客户，即本案当事人，却规避了受托人有权进行的 2004 取证。向受托人提供 2004 取证的全部目的，是使受托人能够查明提出潜在诉因、取得并追收遗产资产所需的事实。他们不能两面讨巧。这完全不当，并表明一直以来存在的策略性操作。我没有其他补充，法官阁下。非常感谢。法院：谢谢。好的。关于\n\n案号 22-50073\n文书 2539\n提交日期 01/31/24\n登记日期 01/31/24 13:29:55\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— 2024年1月23日\n\n1 代表 Leading Shine, Inc.（领先光辉公司）的撤销缺席动议，ECF 30，\n2 我没有其他问题，因此我将对该事项\n3 保留裁定。\n4 随后我们将处理今天\n5 日程表上的最后一项事项，即代表——提出的撤销缺席\n6 动议。\n7 嗯，我的意思是，Grand（格兰德）律师，您在某些方面已经进行了辩论，\n8 但我想您可以再次辩论。\n9 我们刚才审理的是缺席判决动议，\n10 但您也就撤销缺席动议进行了辩论，\n11 不过若您愿意，我很乐意让您再次辩论。\n12 GRAND 律师：\n嗯，法官阁下，当时并不清楚\n13 我方——即 Lamp Capital 和 Infinity Treasury Management（无限财资管理公司）\n14 提出的撤销缺席动议是否——\n15 法院：\n是。\n16 GRAND 律师：\n——会在今天——\n17 法院：\n那么请继续辩论。\n18 GRAND 律师：\n——审理，所以。\n19 法院：\n您所说“不清楚”是什么意思。\n20 它在日程表上。\n21 GRAND 律师：\n我没有看到它在日程表上。\n22 法院：\n它在日程表上。\n23 GRAND 律师：\n我只看到了 Infinity 的，抱歉，我是说\n24 受托人的缺席判决动议，以及 Leading Shine 的\n25 撤销缺席动议。\n\n郭文贵（Ho Wan Kwok）—2024年1月23日\n\n法庭：该事项已列入日程。\n\nGRAND先生（格兰德先生）：这正是我所说的。当我查看法官阁下今日的日程时，我没有看到该动议列在上面。\n\n法庭：我是否——我在问法庭工作人员。是否有——是否有——是否还有一项载于 ECF 42 的撤销缺席裁定动议？\n\nGRAND先生：是的。\n\n法庭：好的。\n\nGRAND先生：现在可能已经在上面了。我只是说，昨天我试图确定它是否列入日程时，我没有——我没有在法庭的日程上看到它。\n\nBASSETT先生（巴塞特先生）：法官阁下，如果我可以说几句？我的意思是，Rule 55(c) 动议是为回应缺席判决动议而提交的，某种意义上——我认为其形式是作为交叉动议。此前我曾指出这一点。我真正指出这一点的原因，只是为了帮助法庭大致了解程序，从而帮助我们决定今天如何继续进行，即：就受托人提交的缺席判决动议而言，并没有单独作出那么多回应——\n\n法庭：是的。他们提交了——相反，他们——\n\nBASSETT先生：——实际上只是作为对缺席判决的 55(c) 动议。因此，我原以为我们正在做的、且我认为合理的做法，是由我仅就此作出陈述。律师将就 55(c) 作出陈述并回应，正如我认为他已经做的那样——\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 99 of\n\n郭文贵（Ho Wan Kwok）—2024年1月23日\n\n法庭：嗯，他确实就 55(c) 作出了陈述。是的。\n\nBASSETT先生：——因此，我不——\n\n法庭：是的。\n\nBASSETT先生：——我认为我们无需进一步——\n\n法庭：我认为没有必要再作进一步辩论。我的意思是，律师，如果你查看对抗程序的案卷，他是正确的。\n\nGRAND先生：我并不是建议我们今天不处理完所有事项，也不是说我希望再回来另行辩论一次；我只是指出，情况有些不明确。换言之，对于撤销缺席裁定动议，法庭为回应该动议发出了开庭通知，确定今天为审理该动议的日期。对于缺席判决动议，也有一份开庭通知，确定今天为审理该事项以及我们撤销缺席裁定动议的日期；我理解那是一项撤销缺席裁定动议。我们为支持该动议而提交的书面陈述具有两个目的，既是为了支持该动议，\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 100 of\n\n郭文贵（Ho Wan Kwok）—2024年1月23日\n\n也是为了反对受托人的缺席判决动议。因此，它具有两个目的。但我只是——我只是指出，我没有看到任何开庭通知称该事项将在今天审理。\n\n法庭：并没有开庭通知——\n\nGRAND先生：对。\n\n法庭：——因为那是你对撤销该动议——\n\nGRAND先生：两者都是。\n\n法庭：——缺席判决动议的回应。\n\nGRAND先生：对。两者都是。两者都是。而且——\n\n法庭：而且你已经提出了论点。你已经提出了论点。\n\nGRAND先生：是的。我的意思是——但我感谢法官阁下，您知道，给予我另一段、额外的时间。我的意思是，我只是指出，您知道，关于我们先前讨论的通知问题，有几项判例引注，我现在可以向您提供其中几项——\n\n法庭：你可以提供——\n\nGRAND先生：——我在过去几分钟里刚刚找到的。\n\n法庭：好的。请继续。给我一——\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 101 of\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 102 of\n\n郭文贵（Ho Wan Kwok）—2024年1月23日\n\n1 GRAND先生：我知道法官阁下不希望有补充书面陈述。\n\n2\n\n3 法庭：那就给我——给我引注。\n\n4 GRAND先生：当然。\n\n5 法庭：请在你方便时提供。\n\n6 GRAND先生：当然。这是一宗纽约东区联邦地区法院（United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York）案件。该案可见于 2023 Westlaw 170595。\n\n8 法庭：这就是完整引注？Decor Holdings, Inc.？\n\n10 GRAND先生：是的。该案获第二巡回法院（Second Circuit）维持。\n\n12 法庭：嗯，这是一项未报告裁判，因此，不过让我们——根据这里的记载，这是一项未报告的临时意见。那么——我在看什么？\n\n15 GRAND先生：所以——\n\n16 法庭：第几页？\n\n17 GRAND先生：我认为你可以看第 4 和第 5 页，稍等，我正在用手机操作，所以请见谅——\n\n20 法庭：该上诉取决于 B&J 是否为依 Bankruptcy Rule 7004(b)(3) 送达诉讼文书的获授权代理人。这是纽约东区联邦地区法院所述。因此，该案涉及是否存在一个实体实际上是送达诉讼文书的代理人。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 103 of\n\n郭文贵（Ho Wan Kwok）—2024年1月23日\n\nGRAND先生：是的。但我认为，在该案更前面的部分，法庭区分了以下情形：在一项撤销缺席判决动议中，基于送达不当，而缺席被告实际知悉原程序却延迟作出回应；这与如下情形不同，即法庭称，然而，在本案中，被告在缺席判决作出前是否实际知悉存在争议时，法院认定举证责任适当地仍由原告承担。\n\n法庭：这是关于撤销缺席判决的举证责任——\n\nGRAND先生：对。也就是说——\n\n法庭：——取决于被告是否实际知悉。我们处理的不是缺席判决。我们处理的是缺席裁定。\n\nGRAND先生：我明白。而在该情形下，对故意性的标准适用得更不严格。\n\n法庭：嗯，该案称，在一项基于诉讼文书送达不当的撤销缺席判决动议中，缺席被告实际知悉程序却延迟提出动议。而这基于——你——你并未主张不存在——\n\n郭文贵（Ho Wan Kwok）—2024年1月23日\n\n送达诉讼文书不当。\n\nGRAND先生：对。我说的是——\n\n法庭：你只是主张你——\n\nGRAND先生：该裁判称，在送达——即使送达是——它并不——\n\n法庭：不。它称，当送达不当且被告实际知悉时，被告承担举证责任，以证明所称送达未发生。\n\nGRAND先生：对。下一句。\n\n法庭：好的。然而，在本案中，被告是否实际知悉——\n\nGRAND先生：是的。\n\n法庭：——缺席判决的作出，律师。不是缺席裁定，而是缺席判决。\n\nGRAND先生：我明白。而在本情形中，我们仅处理缺席裁定而非判决，对故意性的标准适用得更不严格。\n\n法庭：该案并未如此表述，律师。我不同意。它不是这样说的。\n\nGRAND先生：这是第二巡回法院二十年来一直以来的观点——\n\n法庭：它不是这样说的。\n\nGRAND先生：——二十年。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 104 of\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 105 of\n\n郭文贵（Ho Wan Kwok）—2024年1月23日\n\n法庭：该案说的是撤销缺席判决的举证责任。而且该案全部内容都是关于被称为送达代理人的实体是否确实是送达代理人。\n\nGRAND先生：但那不是它所——对。但关键是，不论该代理人是否适格，关键是被告从未收到通知。\n\n法庭：不，那——不，不是。它不是这么说的。它不是这么说的。\n\nGRAND先生：是的。正当程序并不——\n\n法庭：不。它是在援引另一宗——另一宗案件。它没有说——\n\nGRAND先生：如果引文出自那宗案件，我们也可以看看那宗案件。\n\n法庭：好的。我们来看看。再次说明，这是一项纽约东区联邦地区法院的未报告裁判，因此不具有先例价值。而且它——而且它依据的是 Rule 60(b)(1)，即缺席判决，而非缺席裁定。\n\nBASSETT先生：法官阁下，我没有——我无法查阅那宗案件，因此如果我能得到——\n\nGRAND先生：我会给你引注。\n\nBASSETT先生：谢谢。\n\n法庭：第二宗？\n\n郭文贵（Ho Wan Kwok）—2024年1月23日\n\nBASSETT先生：是的。就是我们现在——\n\n法庭：22 Westlaw——2022 Westlaw 16754744。\n\nBASSETT先生：谢谢。\n\n法庭：这整宗第二案处理的是依据 Rule 60(b) 撤销，而非依据 55(c)。这正是该法院所说的。\n\nGRAND先生：法官阁下，我承认这一点。关键是，如果所有因素相同，它们在——中适用得更不严格——\n\n法庭：律师，哪里是这样说的？它没有这样说——\n\nGRAND先生：这在我们全部书面陈述中都有说。在 Enron 案中。在——在——\n\n法庭：好的。那么我会查看你们的书面陈述——\n\nGRAND先生：如果您愿意，我可以为您指出来。\n\n法庭：——但它并没有这样说。我专门问了你，而那——那些是你所援引的案件，所以我会查看。\n\nGRAND先生：法官，我不确定您在问什么。如果您问的是——\n\n法庭：我没有问任何问题。你说——\n\nGRAND先生：——Rule 55(c) 下的标准是否——\n\n法庭：我没有问任何问题。你说你——\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2539 Filed 01/31/24 Entered 01/31/24 13:29:55 Page 106 of\n\n郭文贵（Ho Wan Kwok）—2024年1月23日\n\n想向我援引其他案件，因此你正在这样做。\n\nGRAND先生：还有 U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. McCrudden 一案，该案涉及其中一些问题。\n\n法庭：该案的引注是什么？\n\nGRAND先生：引注是 2015 Westlaw 5944229。\n\n法庭：好的。还有别的吗？\n\nGRAND先生：我只想确认这就是我所有的内容。请给我一分钟，我想届时我或者会有更多内容，或者没有。我认为就是——\n\n法庭：好的。你此前援引、我们刚刚谈到的那宗案件，关于实际知悉，其范围更广，因为其中存在送达不当。本案并没有主张送达不当。\n\nGRAND先生：那不是重点。\n\n法庭：完全没有这种主张。\n\nGRAND先生：重点是，因为他们没有收到通知。这正是那些案件所持的观点。\n\n法庭：不，律师，它们不是这样说的。不是。\n\nGRAND先生：好的。\n\n法庭：因为如果它们确实如此，Rule 55 就无需存在。不是。它们并不持有这种观点。而且我现在正在看的案件，U.S. Commodity Future Trading v. McCrudden，讨论的是——\n\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 2539\nFiled 01/31/24\nEntered 01/31/24 13:29:55\n\n郭文贵（Ho Wan Kwok）—2024年1月23日\n\n1 Wang 案中的要件，即请求作出缺席判决的要件，也就是我们今天已经讨论过、我们都知道是什么的要件。\n\n4 GRAND先生：我明白。而且该案阐明，这些要件应适用得更不严格——\n\n6 法庭：哪里是这样说的？我一次也没看到过，一次也没有，在你所援引的任何案件中都没有。\n\n9 GRAND先生：在我所援引的全部——全部案件中。我们的书面陈述中有许多此类案件。\n\n11 法庭：好的。那么我认为我们已经——我很乐意——我会回去阅读它们，律师，但没有一宗案件说它——适用得更不严格；它并没有说你所说的内容。\n\n15 没有一宗案件称，在你承认送达适格时，你还必须实际知悉。因此，它们没有一宗这样说。一宗也没有。而且它们不可能这样说。\n\n18 因为那样就会使 Rule 55 的目的落空，也就没有 Rule 55 存在的理由。\n\n20 那么每一名被告都必须实际知悉一份起诉状。按照你的论点，如果将其推至——每一个人都将不存在可以寻求缺席裁定的理由。\n\n24 GRAND先生：法官阁下，缺席裁定以送达为前提。\n\n案号 22-50073 文书 2539 提交于 01/31/24 登记于 01/31/24 13:29:55 第 109 页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— 2024年1月23日\n\n1 法庭：\n没错。\n\n2 GRAND 律师：\n没错。\n没有人主张在此\n3 已作出的缺席裁定——\n4 法庭：\n好的。\n那又是在哪里规定，你\n5 可以因为未收到实际通知而撤销缺席裁定？\n6 \n7 GRAND 律师：\n那正是——\n8 法庭：\n《规则》第55条在哪里有此规定，\n9 律师？在哪里有此规定？\n10 GRAND 律师：\n我刚才向法庭援引的判例中\n11 就是这么说的。\n12 法庭：\n不，并不是。抱歉，\n13 并不是。\n14 GRAND 律师：\n好的。\n15 法庭：\n我不同意你的看法。\n16 GRAND 律师：\n好的。\n17 法庭：\n并没有这样规定。明白吗？\n18 GRAND 律师：\n是的。谢谢。\n19 法庭：\n好的。那么，我——所有\n20 这些事项均已由法庭处理。我将回头\n21 审查所有事项，并将把日程表上的所有\n22 事项，除获准的中期报酬申请外，\n23 均留待裁决；就该申请而言，\n24 将提交经修订的拟议命令；不再安排进一步的审前会议，\n25 所有事项均将留待裁决。\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— 2024年1月23日 110\n\n法庭：本日下午我们还有任何需要处理的事项吗，Despins（德斯平斯）受托人？\n\nDESPINS 先生：只需几秒钟，法官阁下。Shaiban（沙伊班）先生（按发音）致函法庭，请求许可起诉为债权人利益受让人。我们希望确保我们有足够的（听不清）对此作出回应。我假定法官阁下将签发一项命令——\n\n法庭：如果他发函请求许可做某事，我不会就此采取任何行动。你必须向本法院提交动议。这就是程序。\n\nDESPINS 先生：我明白。好的。谢谢您，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：好的。好。那么，今日的听证、今日下午的听证至此结束。谢谢各位。现在休庭。\n\n（程序于下午3时36分结束。）\n\n案号 22-50073 文书 2539 提交于 01/31/24 登记于 01/31/24 13:29:55 第 110 页，共\n\n案号 22-50073\n文书 2539\n提交于 01/31/24\n登记于 01/31/24 13:29:55\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— 2024年1月23日\n\n1 本人，CHRISTINE FIORE（克里斯蒂娜·菲奥雷），经法院批准的\n2 速记员及经认证的电子记录员和速记员，特此证明，\n3 上述内容系根据上述\n4 案由事项程序的官方电子录音所作的正确\n5 笔录。\n\n8 2024年1月29日\n9 Christine Fiore（克里斯蒂娜·菲奥雷），CERT","key_entities":["Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Guo","Je","Despins","CIPA","Paul Hastings","Miles Guo","Luc Despins","William Je","Himalaya","HCHK","Saraca"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":30,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":42,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":54,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":55,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2502,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":30675,"status":"published","published_at":"2024-01-31 00:00:00","created_at":"2024-01-31","updated_at":"2026-08-23 22:34:52"}