{"id":"court_ctb_2551_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":2551,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION In re:","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"## **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\nIn re:\n\nHO WAN KWOK,[1](#page-0-0)\n\nChapter 11\n\nCase No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\nDebtor.\n\n# **OBJECTION OF MEI GUO TO TRUSTEE'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF ORDER EXTENDING DEADLINE FOR TRUSTEE TO FILE AVOIDANCE ACTIONS UNDER BANKRUPTCY CODE SECTIONS 108, 546(a), AND 549**\n\nMei Guo (\"Ms. Guo\"), by and through her undersigned counsel, hereby objects to the Trustee's Motion for Entry of Order Extending Deadline for Trustee to File Avoidance Actions Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 108, 546(a), and 549 (the \"Motion\") [ECF 2509], and in support of the Objection respectfully states as follows:\n\n## **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\n1. As specifically held by the Honorable James T. Tancredi in In re Walnut Hill, Inc., No. 16-20960 (JJT), 2018 WL 2672242, at \\*2-5 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 1, 2018), based on his well-reasoned and well-supported analysis: (i) Fed. R. Bank. P. 9006(b) \"cannot\" apply to Section 546(a) \"without violating the separation of powers preserved in the Constitution\"; and (ii) equitable tolling only applies in the context of a commenced action once a statute of limitations defense has been asserted.\n\n<span id=\"page-0-0\"></span><sup>1</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as other aliases) last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and the Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\n2. The rationale for not applying equitable tolling prospectively is obvious. Potential defendants need to know and have the right to know what factual allegations and causes of action are being asserted against them, so they have a full and fair opportunity to respond to the equitable tolling claim. Only after the commencement of the adversary proceedings with these contentions having been actually made can those defendants and this Court evaluate whether the Trustee, despite his diligent pursuit of his and the bankruptcy estate's rights, was prevented by extraordinary circumstances from timely commencing the actions.[2](#page-1-0)\n\n3. The relief sought is premature, plain and simple – no one knows what the Trustee will discover in the future that he was prevented from discovering up until now.\n\n4. Moreover, the Trustee is not prejudiced in any way if the Motion is denied. The Trustee has represented that he timely will commence numerous adversary proceedings, and the Trustee will still retain the right after he files any untimely proceeding to invoke equitable tolling in response to any asserted statute of limitations defense. Any adversary proceeding filed after the expiration of the statutory deadline would likely be commenced before this Court, which certainly has the ability and relevant case knowledge to determine on an appropriate case-by-case basis whether invocation of the equitable tolling doctrine is warranted. Even the Trustee recognizes that \"[e]quitable tolling must be decided on a case-by-case basis and is not limited to a particular set of facts.\" See Motion ¶45. Ms. Guo could not agree more.\n\n### **LEGAL ARGUMENT**\n\n5. There is no statutory authority for the Trustee's request to extend the statute of limitations in 11 U.S.C. §§ 546(a)(1) and 549(d), and the doctrine of equitable tolling simply does\n\n<span id=\"page-1-0\"></span><sup>2</sup> The absurdity of the Trustee's proposition is also made evident by the fact that while he seeks from this Court a sweeping factual determination that he has been impeded from bringing any further actions, he apparently fully intends timely to bring numerous adversary proceedings. See Motion ¶1.\n\nnot apply before the commencement of the specific action. Furthermore, the Trustee has not been prevented by extraordinary circumstances from commencing any further adversary proceedings, as evidenced most obviously by the fact that he intends to commence numerous additional actions prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations on February 15, 2024. Accordingly, the Motion should be denied. The Trustee may and almost certainly will assert equitable tolling in response to any pled statute of limitations defense in the adversary proceedings he actually commences, and then this Court can decide the matter appropriately on a full record and on a case-by-case basis.\n\n## **A. Equitable Tolling Is Not Applied Prospectively**\n\n6. Judge Tancredi correctly rejected the assertion that equitable tolling could be applied prospectively - before the underlying action has even been commenced. See In re Walnut Hill, Inc., 2018 WL 2672242, at \\*2.\n\n7. In Walnut Hill, the chapter 7 trustee requested the Court to both equitably toll the statute of limitations period in Bankruptcy Code Section 546(a), and extend that statutory deadline under Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b). Id. The Court noted that \"the doctrine of equitable tolling is recognized as a response to a statute of limitations defense asserted in a pending litigation.\" Id. (citing Long v. Abbott Mortg. Corp., 459 F. Supp. 108, 113 (D. Conn. 1978). Continuing, Judge Tancredi stated in pertinent part:\n\nAll parties to this case acknowledge that an adversary proceeding has not been filed at this time. Pursuant to Section 546(a), the Trustee's statute of limitations for filing an adversary proceeding will expire on June 14, 2018, which has not yet come to pass. It is **wholly premature and procedurally flawed** to address equitable tolling outside the context of an evidentiary hearing on the facts and circumstances **to be proven in the adversary proceeding against specific defendants, once a statute of limitations defense has been asserted**.\n\nId. (emphasis added). The Court thus concluded that \"reaching the issue of equitable tolling is premature and procedurally inappropriate at this time.\" Id.\n\n8. As in Walnut Hill, the adversary proceedings in which the Trustee seeks equitable tolling of the statute of limitations have yet to be filed. The potential defendants, therefore, are unable to respond in any meaningful way to the Trustee's assertion of equitable tolling. The causes of action that he allegedly has been impeded from discovering despite his purported diligence, and those that he may discover and establish in the future, are not and cannot be known at this time. Equitable tolling only applies **after** the underlying action has been commenced and a statute of limitations defense has been asserted. Accordingly, the Court should follow Walnut Hill and deny any prospective equitable tolling of the limitations statute. In due course, the Trustee will still have the right to respond with the equitable tolling doctrine and, in all likelihood, the applicability of the principle will be decided by this Court on a case-by-case basis.\n\n9. Several courts outside this District have also denied requests for prospective equitable tolling based upon the same logic set forth in Walnut Hill. See, e.g., In re Randolph Hospital, No. 20-10247 (LMJ), 2022 WL 19298765, at \\*1 (Bankr. M.D. N.C. Apr. 25, 2022) (holding that Trustee's motion to extend statutory limitations was not supported by the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and that any equitable tolling of the statutory limitations would be premature since no adversary proceedings had been filed); In re No. 1 Contracting Corp., 2012 WL 4114818, at \\*1 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. Sept., 19, 2012) (denying chapter 7 trustee's request for prospective relief to extend the statute of limitations period to bring avoidance actions); In re Cramer, 636 B.R. 830 (Bankr. C.D. Colo. 2022) (holding that no basis in law exists to grant trustee's prospective motion to extend two-year statutory deadline, as \"Federal Rules of Bankruptcy procedure contain no rule to extend statutory deadlines such as the ones in sections 546 & 549\").\n\n4\n\n10. The Bankruptcy Court in In re Cramer easily denied the trustee's motion to extend\n\nstatutory deadlines by invoking the equitable tolling doctrine before the filing of an adversary\n\nproceeding, stating that:\n\n[t]he trustee remains free to raise equitable tolling at a later date after filing untimely complaints. At that point, the defendants will have notice and an opportunity to contest the application of the doctrine of equitable tolling. Granting the pending motion would deprive them of that opportunity and that would be fundamentally unfair. Walnut Hill, 2018 WL 2672242, \\*2 2018Bankr. LEXIS 1589, \\*5 (\"It is wholly premature and procedurally flawed to address equitable tolling outside the context of an evidentiary hearing on the facts and circumstances to be proven in the adversary proceeding against specific defendants, once a statute of limitations defense has been asserted.\").\n\nId. at 831-33. The Cramer court acknowledged the holding of Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals\n\nin IBT Int'l, Inc. v. Northern (In re International Administrative Services), 408 F.3d 689, 699 (11th\n\nCir. 2005), which granted equitable tolling relief prospectively, but thoroughly explained why it\n\ndisagreed with the holding, citing Walnut Hill:\n\nHowever, this approach deprives future defendants of constitutional due process of law because they received no notice of the relief in advance and no opportunity to contest whether or not equitable tolling is warranted. Perhaps for this unstated reason, the Eleventh Circuit proceeded to also find that equitable tolling applied regardless of whether any order had been entered by the bankruptcy court granting a motion to extend the statutory deadline. Id. at 700-702. In this Court's view, that was the better analysis because it allowed the defendant an opportunity to challenge the application of equitable tolling. **Granting a motion to extend in advance, however, deprives the defendant of that opportunity**.\n\nThe bankruptcy court decision in In re Walnut Hill, Inc., 2018 WL 2672242, 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 1589 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2018) is well reasoned and directly on point. In that case, the chapter 7 trustee filed a similar motion that the bankruptcy court denied. The court distinguished International Administrative Services and held that 'reaching the issue of equitable tolling is premature and procedurally inappropriate at this time.' Id.\n\nCramer, 636 B.R. at 833 (emphasis added). Put simply, by granting the Trustee prospective relief,\n\nMs. Guo and potentially hundreds of other defendants would be denied the right to challenge the\n\napplication of equitable tolling to the specific facts and circumstances asserted by the Trustee in the future, and with respect to events that will only happen in the future.\n\n11. In the Motion, the Trustee cites to two decisions and four court orders in support of his extraordinary request for prospective equitable tolling. Motion at ¶30. None of them constitute binding authority upon this Court, and their reasoning is deeply flawed as explained by Judge Tancredi and the other decisions cited above.\n\n12. In addition, in four of the cases relied upon by the Trustee, Marsh v. Levy (In re Martin Levy of Berlin D.M.D., P.C.), 416 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009), In re Rockport Dev., Inc., No. 20-11339 (SC) (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2022); In re Visiting Nurse Ass'n of Inland and Counties, No. 18-16908 (MH) (Bankr. C.D. Cal. July 30, 2020) and In re Builders Holding Co. Corp., No-16-06643 (EAG7) (Bankr. D. P.R. Apr. 25, 2019), no objections were filed to the relief requested and, consequently, it appears that the issues were not fully vetted through an adversarial process.\n\n13. In an attempt to circumvent the application of these fundamental principles that establish why prospective equitable tolling is without any legal basis, the Trustee mischaracterizes the issue presented as merely one of notice – a transparent straw man argument.\n\n14. The Trustee suggests that the many courts that have rejected equitable tolling to extend statutory limitations have done so primarily, if not exclusively, on notice and/or procedural grounds, which he asserts he has sufficiently addressed in his Motion. But those courts, including in this District, have expressed legitimate substantive concerns over potential defendants having their day in court and a fair opportunity to challenge the application of equitable tolling to the specific claims actually brought against them.\n\n6\n\n15. The Trustee seeks to convince this Court that he has given adequate notice and that, as such, due process has been satisfied. [See ECF no. 2494]. He is wrong. Notice is not simply providing a copy of the Motion, or a brief description of its filing, to potentially hundreds of defendants around the world. As articulated in case law within this District, notice means much more than that. Proper notice with respect to equitable tolling can only be provided **after** the filing of an adversary proceeding alleging specific facts and specific claims for relief against specific defendants. The Trustee has not, and cannot, provide that notice. In fact, no amount of notice of the relief sought would be sufficient to overcome the impossibility of disclosing causes of action that have not yet been asserted and events that have not yet occurred – information essential for future defendants to respond to the future equitable tolling assertion.\n\n16. The draconian relief sought by the Trustee is made more evident by the order he proposes, which asks this Court to declare that:\n\nany party that has received notice, whether actual or constructive, of the Motion and did not object to the Motion has waived its right to asset a limitations period defense if ultimately named in an action that is timely brough under the terms of this Order.\n\n17. The Trustee is essentially asking this Court to enter a declaratory judgment. [3](#page-6-0) As to every person in the world, the Trustee seeks to have this Court determine that they had a full and fair opportunity to respond to the Trustee's equitable tolling claim and knowingly and intentionally waived their right to assert it, based upon the grossly inadequate contentions made in the Motion - grossly inadequate largely because the most critical events necessary for the application of the\n\n<span id=\"page-6-0\"></span><sup>3</sup> Section 2201(a), Title 28, U.S.C., permits any court of the United States, \"[i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction,\" and \"upon the filing of an appropriate pleading,\" to \"declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.\" 11 U.S.C. § 2201(a). \"Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.\" Id. Rule 57 of the Fed. R. Civ. P. provides that \"these rules govern the procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment under 28 U.S.C. 2201.\"\n\nequitable tolling doctrine have not even occurred yet. The proposition is not only procedurally improper, but repugnant to any notion of due process.\n\n#### **B. Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) Does Not Authorize Extensions to Statutory Deadlines**\n\n18. A Bankruptcy Rule cannot modify a legislatively enacted statute like 11 U.S.C. § 546(a). See In re Walnut Hill, Inc., No. 16-20960 (JJT), 2018 WL 2672242, at \\*2 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 1, 2018). In Walnut Hill, the Court held that by its plain language, \"Rule 9006(b) only applies to deadlines set 'by these rules or by a notice given thereunder[,][sic] or by order of court.' **Nowhere** in the Rule does it mention statutory deadlines.\" (emphasis added). Walnut Hill, Inc., 2018 WL 2672242, at \\*2.\n\n19. Judge Tancredi emphasized in Walnut Hill that a Connecticut Bankruptcy Court had addressed this issue in the past when Judge Krechevsky held \"that Rule 9006(b) does not 'permit[] a court to extend a time limitation set by Congress in a statute.'\" In re Damach, Inc., 235 B.R. 727, 731 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1999). Instead, it 'permit[s] modification only of time limitations imposed by other rules or by the court.' Id.\" Judge Tancredi recognized the importance of not allowing Bankruptcy Rules to trump statutory Code when he stated \"Congress has dictated that the Bankruptcy Rules 'shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.' Where the Rules and Code are inconsistent, the statutory Code controls.\" (citations omitted). Walnut Hill, Inc., 2018 WL 2672242, at \\*2.\n\n20. The court in Walnut Hill clearly distinguished Bankruptcy Rule 9006(a) from Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) regarding each rule's respective ability to extend statutory deadlines. \"Rule 9006(a) plainly provides that it applies to 'any statute that does not specify a method of computing time.' However, Rule 9006(b) is noticeably missing the same, or similar, language involving its application to a statute. This distinction is highlighted by the fact that Judge\n\n8\n\nKrechevsky six years later held that Rule 9006(b) could not modify substantive deadlines established by Congress.\" (citing In re Demach, Inc., 235 B.R. at 731) (stating that the rules of bankruptcy procedure do not permit \"a court to extend a time limitation set by Congress in a statute\"). Given the prior ruling in Walnut Hill, this Court should find that Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9006(b) may not be used to extend statutory deadlines such as those established under 11 U.S.C § 546(a), and, as a result, deny the Motion.\n\n#### **C. The Above Principles Apply Equally to Bankruptcy Code Section 549(d)**\n\n21. With some statutory limitations, Bankruptcy Code Section 549(a) permits the Trustee to avoid unauthorized transfers of property of this bankruptcy estate that occurred after the commencement of this bankruptcy case on February 15, 2022. 11 U.S.C. § 549(a). Section 549(d) precludes commencing such action after the earlier of \"two years after the date of the transfer sought to be avoided\" or the \"time the case is close or dismissed.\" 11 U.S.C. § 549(d).\n\n22. For the same reasons as set forth above, Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) cannot be relied upon to modify the statutory deadline established by Bankruptcy Code Section 549(d). Similarly, equitable tolling does not and cannot be applied prospectively to declare now that the Trustee will be impeded in the future, despite his diligence, from discovering post-petition transfers and causes of action, that he ultimately discovers in the future.\n\n## **D. Equitable Tolling Is Not Warranted on the Facts in this Case**\n\n23. The Trustee argues that \"the factual record easily demonstrates that (i) extraordinary circumstances prevented the Trustee form bringing the Avoidance Actions and (ii) the Trustee acted diligently in pursuing his rights.\" Motion at ¶48. Given the extremely accelerated prosecution of the Trustee's Motion, Ms. Guo has not had a full and fair opportunity to test these factual contentions through discovery concerning those relevant past events. Of course, for the reasons set forth above, many of the events relevant to considering the equitable tolling doctrine have not yet even occurred and equitable tolling does not yet apply. Therefore, this Court should not consider any of the Trustee's alleged evidence in support of his equitable tolling contention at this time.\n\n24. Furthermore, the undisputed record herein demonstrates that the Trustee had only contacted one forensic accounting firm within his first 11 months as Trustee after July 2022, and took no formal investigative action for a total of approximately 14 months before finally deciding to file an application to retain a forensic accountant in September 2023.\n\n25. On June 2, 2023, Ms. Guo and HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited LLC filed a Motion for Stay Pending Appeal of the Second Summary Judgment Order (\"Motion for Stay\"). [Adv. Pro. No. 22-05003, ECF No. 227]. Following a June 6, 2023, status conference, the Bankruptcy Court entered an Order expediting consideration of the Motion for Stay and held a hearing on June 13, 2023.\n\n26. During the June 13 hearing, the Trustee's counsel called the Trustee as a witness to testify about the purported harm that would befall the individual debtor's estate if the Motion for Stay was granted. A purported harm identified by the Trustee was an inability to retain forensic accounting professionals. (Transcript of June 13, 2023, Proceeding before the Hon. Julie A. Manning, (\"June 13, 2023 Tran.\"), at 35:22-36:7). [4](#page-9-0) However, despite the Trustee representing to the Bankruptcy Court during his testimony that evidence is getting stale while he waits to retain professionals, the Trustee testified that he had only attempted to engage one professional firm to undertake the forensic accounting work that he claims needed to be done, *i.e.*, Alix Partners (id., at 36:2-25).\n\n<span id=\"page-9-0\"></span><sup>4</sup> The relevant portion of the June 13, 2023 Tran. is attached hereto as Exh. 1.\n\n27. Even if the Trustee claims he had no money in the estate to retain professionals for the first several months of the bankruptcy case, the June 13 hearing was conducted two and a half months **after** the bankruptcy estate was awarded summary judgment on the question of ownership of the Lady May/Lady May II vessels [Adv. Pro. No. 22-05003, ECF No. 172], and just under one month **after** summary judgment was entered in favor of the Trustee on the related \\$37 million bond escrow [Adv. Pro. No. 22-05003, ECF No. 221].\n\n28. The Motion for Stay was denied on June 26, 2023. [Adv. Pro. No. 22-05003, ECF No. 247]. The application to retain Kroll, LLC as forensic accountants was not filed until September 1, 2023, effective August 2, 2023. Even with an August 2, 2023 effective date, the retention was still four months after the summary judgment was obtained on the Lady May/Lady May II. Moreover, Kroll was not the firm that the Trustee testified he had approached about serving as forensic accounts, that was AlixPartners.\n\n29. The Trustee asks this Court to believe that he acted diligently by retaining a forensic accounting firm 14 months into his tenure. It should not.\n\n30. Furthermore, as this Court is well-aware, the Trustee has expended millions upon millions (if not tens of millions) of dollars conducting discovery from hundreds of persons, including taking numerous depositions and obtaining hundreds of thousands of documents, to investigate potential claims. The Trustee's claimed inability to bring any further causes of action is belied by the Trustee's own acknowledgement that he will commence numerous adversary proceedings before the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, see Motion ¶ 1, including a civil action brought pursuant to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68.[5](#page-11-0) It is literally impossible for this Court to conclude that the Trustee has been precluded, despite his alleged diligence and due to extraordinary circumstances, from commencing any additional actions before February 15, 2024, when he will, in fact, commence numerous such actions.\n\n31. Given the circumstances in this bankruptcy case in conjunction with the status of and positions taken in the criminal proceeding pending against the Debtor, it appears to Ms. Guo that the Trustee - while having more than sufficient information to bring adversary proceedings in this bankruptcy case against persons that the Trustee has already identified - is making the strategic decision, through the inapplicable and inappropriate application of the equitable tolling doctrine, to try to postpone commencing many of these adversary proceeding until various determinations have been made in the criminal proceeding including the forfeiture of hundreds of millions of dollars of now frozen funds, and its distribution to victims through the criminal restitution process.\n\n32. But the limitations set forth in Sectons 546(a) and 549(d) are not optional. The Trustee is compelled to bring timely the adversary proceedings he is capable of bringing. For those he does not commence by February 15, 2024, and brings later, the named defendants named, whoever they may be, have the right, then knowing that they are in fact targets, to assert the statute of limitations defense and the Trustee has the right to assert equitable tolling in response. The defendants also have the right, knowing the causes of action alleged, to conduct discovery as to what the Trustee knew before February 15, 2024, and discovered after February 15, 2024, to test the Trustee's proposition that he was impeded, despite his diligence, by extraordinary\n\n<span id=\"page-11-0\"></span><sup>5</sup> Response of Chapter 11 Trustee and Genever Debtors in Opposition to Defendant Ho Wan Kwok's Renewed Motion to Stay Bankruptcy Cases Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 234) at 8, United States v. Ho Wan Kwok, No. 1:23- CR-118-1 (AT) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2024).\n\ncircumstances, from timely commencing the adversary proceeding. And then and only then (after they have actually occurred) can this Court decide those factual issues on a case-by case basis.\n\n33. Thus, because (i) equitable tolling does not apply at this time, (ii) reliance upon\n\nBankruptcy Rule 9006(b) to extend the time limitations imposed by Sections 546(a) and 549(d) is misplaced, and (ii) the Trustee has not been impeded by extraordinary circumstances and is, in fact, capable of commencing numerous additional adversary proceedings, the Motion should be denied.\n\n## **CONCLUSION**\n\n**WHEREFORE**, Mei Guo respectfully requests this Court deny the Motion, and grant such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable.\n\nDated: February 5, 2024 */s/ Lee Vartan*\n\nRoseland, New Jersey Lee Vartan (admitted *pro hac vice*) [lvartan@csglaw.com](mailto:lvartan@csglaw.com) Sam Della Fera, Jr. (admitted *pro hac vice*) [sdellafera@csglaw.com](mailto:sdellafera@csglaw.com) Melissa F. Wernick (admitted *pro hac vice*) [mwernick@csglaw.com](mailto:mwernick@csglaw.com) **CHIESA SHAHINIAN & GIANTOMASI PC** 105 Eisenhower Parkway Roseland, NJ 07068 Telephone: (973) 325-1500 Facsimile: (973) 325-1501 *Attorneys for Mei Guo* Stephen M. Kindseth (ct14640)\n\n[skindseth@zeislaw.com](mailto:skindseth@zeislaw.com) Aaron A. Romney (ct28144) [aromney@zeislaw.com](mailto:aromney@zeislaw.com) James M. Moriarty (ct21876) [jmoriarty@zeislaw.com](mailto:jmoriarty@zeislaw.com)\n\n## **ZEISLER & ZEISLER PC**\n\n10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, CT 06604 Telephone: (203) 368-4234 Facsimile: (203) 368-5485 *Local Counsel for Mei Guo and HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC*","body_zh":"美国破产法院\n康涅狄格州联邦地区\n布里奇波特分院\n\n关于：\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）,[1]\n\n第11章\n\n案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n\n债务人。\nMEI GUO（郭美）对受托人请求作出命令以延长其根据《破产法典》第108、546(a)及549条提起撤销诉讼期限之动议的异议\n\nMei Guo（郭美，以下简称“郭女士”）通过其下方署名律师，特此对受托人请求作出命令以延长其根据《破产法典》第108、546(a)及549条提起撤销诉讼期限之动议（以下简称“该动议”）[ECF 2509]提出异议，并谨就本异议陈述如下：\n\n初步陈述\n\n1. 正如尊敬的James T. Tancredi法官在In re Walnut Hill, Inc.（关于核桃山公司案）, No. 16-20960 (JJT), 2018 WL 2672242, at \\*2-5 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 1, 2018)中基于其论证周详且依据充分的分析所明确裁定的：(i) Fed. R. Bank. P. 9006(b)如适用于第546(a)条，将“违反宪法所保障的权力分立”；以及(ii)衡平时效中止仅适用于已提起诉讼且已提出诉讼时效抗辩的情形。\n\n1 本第11章案件中的债务人为Ho Wan Kwok（亦称Guo Wengui、Miles Guo及Miles Kwok，以及其他别名）（税务识别号码后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（税务识别号码后四位：8202）以及Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC及Genever Holdings Corporation的邮寄地址为：Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166，c/o Luc A. Despins，作为Ho Wan Kwok遗产的受托人（仅为通知及通信之目的）。\n\n2. 不予前瞻性适用衡平时效中止的理由显而易见。潜在被告需要知悉且有权知悉针对其提出的事实主张及诉因，以便其有充分、公平的机会回应衡平时效中止主张。只有在对抗诉讼已经提起且实际提出该等主张之后，该等被告及本院方能评估，受托人尽管勤勉追索其自身及破产财产的权利，是否因非常情形而未能及时提起诉讼。[2]\n\n3. 所请求的救济显然为时过早——无人知晓受托人将来会发现何种此前一直无法发现之事项。\n\n4. 此外，如驳回该动议，受托人不会以任何方式受到不利影响。受托人已表示其将及时提起多项对抗诉讼；而在其提交任何逾期诉讼后，受托人仍保有针对任何提出的诉讼时效抗辩援引衡平时效中止的权利。在法定期限届满后提起的任何对抗诉讼，很可能将在本院提起；本院显然有能力且具备相关案件知识，能够在适当的逐案基础上判断是否有必要援引衡平时效中止原则。即使受托人也承认，“[e]quitable tolling必须逐案决定，并不限于特定的一组事实。”见动议第45段。郭女士完全同意。\n\n法律论证\n\n5. 对于受托人要求延长11 U.S.C. §§ 546(a)(1)和549(d)所规定诉讼时效的请求，并无法定授权；且衡平时效中止原则根本不适用于特定诉讼提起之前。此外，受托人并未因非常情形而无法提起任何进一步的对抗诉讼；最明显的证据是，其拟在2024年2月15日诉讼时效届满之前提起多项额外诉讼。因此，应驳回该动议。受托人可以且几乎必然会在其实际提起的对抗诉讼中，针对任何经诉状提出的诉讼时效抗辩主张衡平时效中止；届时，本院即可依据完整记录并逐案适当地裁定该事项。\n\n2 受托人主张的荒谬性亦可由以下事实显现：其一方面请求本院作出一项广泛的事实认定，即其被阻碍提起任何进一步诉讼；另一方面，其显然完全打算及时提起多项对抗诉讼。见动议第1段。\n\nA. 衡平时效中止不予前瞻性适用\n\n6. Tancredi法官正确驳回了衡平时效中止可在前瞻性层面适用——即在基础诉讼尚未提起之前适用——的主张。见In re Walnut Hill, Inc.（关于核桃山公司案）, 2018 WL 2672242, at \\*2。\n\n7. 在Walnut Hill案中，第7章受托人请求法院既对《破产法典》第546(a)条规定的诉讼时效期间予以衡平中止，又根据《破产规则》9006(b)延长该法定期限。同上。法院指出，“衡平时效中止原则被认可为对待决诉讼中提出的诉讼时效抗辩所作的回应。”同上（援引Long v. Abbott Mortg. Corp., 459 F. Supp. 108, 113 (D. Conn. 1978)）。Tancredi法官继而在相关部分指出：\n\n本案各方均承认，目前尚未提交对抗诉讼。根据第546(a)条，受托人提起对抗诉讼的诉讼时效将于2018年6月14日届满，该日期尚未到来。在已对特定被告提出诉讼时效抗辩之后，于针对将在对抗诉讼中证明的事实和情形举行证据听证会的背景之外处理衡平时效中止问题，完全为时过早且在程序上存在瑕疵。\n\n同上（强调为原文所加）。因此，法院结论认为，“在此时处理衡平时效中止问题为时过早且在程序上不当。”同上。\n\n8. 如同Walnut Hill案，受托人寻求对诉讼时效进行衡平中止的对抗诉讼尚未提起。因此，潜在被告无法以任何有意义的方式回应受托人关于衡平时效中止的主张。其据称尽管勤勉仍被阻碍发现的诉因，以及其将来可能发现并确立的诉因，目前尚不知悉且不能知悉。衡平时效中止仅在基础诉讼已提起且已提出诉讼时效抗辩后适用。因此，法院应遵循Walnut Hill案，并拒绝对诉讼时效法规作出任何前瞻性衡平中止。在适当时候，受托人仍将有权以衡平时效中止原则作出回应，并且该原则的适用性极有可能由本院逐案裁定。\n\n9. 本地区以外的数个法院亦基于Walnut Hill案所阐述的相同逻辑，驳回了前瞻性衡平时效中止的请求。见，例如，In re Randolph Hospital（关于伦道夫医院案）, No. 20-10247 (LMJ), 2022 WL 19298765, at \\*1 (Bankr. M.D. N.C. Apr. 25, 2022)（裁定受托人延长法定时效的动议不受《联邦破产程序规则》支持，且由于尚未提交任何对抗诉讼，对法定时效的任何衡平中止均为时过早）；In re No. 1 Contracting Corp.（关于第一承包公司案）, 2012 WL 4114818, at \\*1 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. Sept., 19, 2012)（驳回第7章受托人要求前瞻性救济以延长提起撤销诉讼之诉讼时效期间的请求）；In re Cramer（关于Cramer案）, 636 B.R. 830 (Bankr. C.D. Colo. 2022)（裁定法律上不存在批准受托人前瞻性动议以延长两年法定期限的依据，因为“Federal Rules of Bankruptcy procedure不包含延长诸如第546及549条所规定法定期限的规则”）。\n\n10. In re Cramer（关于Cramer案）中的破产法院轻易驳回了受托人在提交对抗诉讼之前援引衡平时效中止原则以延长法定期限的动议，并称：\n\n[t]he trustee在日后提交逾期起诉状后，仍可自由主张衡平时效中止。届时，被告将获得通知并有机会质疑衡平时效中止原则的适用。准许待决动议将剥夺其该等机会，这将构成根本性不公平。Walnut Hill, 2018 WL 2672242, \\*2 2018Bankr. LEXIS 1589, \\*5（“在已对特定被告提出诉讼时效抗辩之后，于针对将在对抗诉讼中证明的事实和情形举行证据听证会的背景之外处理衡平时效中止问题，完全为时过早且在程序上存在瑕疵。”）。\n\n同上，第831-33页。Cramer法院确认Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals（第十一巡回上诉法院）在IBT Int'l, Inc. v. Northern (In re International Administrative Services)（IBT国际公司诉Northern，关于国际行政服务案）, 408 F.3d 689, 699 (11th Cir. 2005)中的裁定，该裁定前瞻性地给予衡平时效中止救济，但援引Walnut Hill案详细说明了其不同意该裁定的理由：\n\n然而，这一做法剥夺了未来被告的宪法正当程序权，因为其未事先获得救济通知，亦无机会质疑衡平时效中止是否具有正当性。或许正因这一未明言的理由，第十一巡回上诉法院继而认定，无论破产法院是否已作出准许延长法定期限动议的命令，衡平时效中止均适用。同上，第700-702页。本院认为，那一分析更为妥当，因为其使被告有机会质疑衡平时效中止的适用。然而，预先准许延长动议会剥夺被告该等机会。\n\n破产法院在In re Walnut Hill, Inc., 2018 WL 2672242, 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 1589 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2018)中的裁定论证充分且与本案直接相关。在该案中，第7章受托人提出了一项类似动议，破产法院予以驳回。该法院区分了International Administrative Services案，并裁定“在此时处理衡平时效中止问题为时过早且在程序上不当。”同上。\n\nCramer, 636 B.R. at 833（强调为原文所加）。简言之，若向受托人授予前瞻性救济，郭女士及可能数百名其他被告将被剥夺质疑衡平时效中止适用于受托人将来主张的特定事实和情形，以及仅将在未来发生的事件的权利。\n\n11. 在该动议中，受托人援引两项裁决及四项法院命令，以支持其有关前瞻性衡平时效中止的非常请求。动议第30段。它们均不构成对本院有约束力的先例，且其推理如Tancredi法官及上述其他裁决所说明，存在根本缺陷。\n\n12. 此外，在受托人所依赖的四个案件中，即Marsh v. Levy (In re Martin Levy of Berlin D.M.D., P.C.)（Marsh诉Levy，关于柏林Martin Levy牙科专业公司案）, 416 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009)、In re Rockport Dev., Inc.（关于Rockport开发公司案）, No. 20-11339 (SC) (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2022)；In re Visiting Nurse Ass'n of Inland and Counties（关于内陆及各县访视护士协会案）, No. 18-16908 (MH) (Bankr. C.D. Cal. July 30, 2020)以及In re Builders Holding Co. Corp.（关于Builders Holding公司案）, No-16-06643 (EAG7) (Bankr. D. P.R. Apr. 25, 2019)，均未就所请求的救济提出异议；因此，相关问题似乎未通过对抗程序得到充分审查。\n\n13. 为规避这些确立前瞻性衡平时效中止毫无法律依据的基本原则之适用，受托人将所呈问题歪曲为仅是通知问题——一种明显的稻草人论证。\n\n14. 受托人认为，许多拒绝以衡平停止延长法定期限的法院，主要（即使并非完全）是基于通知和／或程序方面的理由作出该等裁决；其主张已在其动议中充分处理这些问题。但这些法院，包括本辖区内的法院，均对潜在被告获得其在法庭上的陈述机会，以及获得公平机会以质疑衡平停止对实际向其提出的特定请求之适用，表达了正当的实质性关切。\n\n15. 受托人试图说服本院，其已给予充分通知，因此正当程序已获满足。[见 ECF no. 2494]。他错了。通知并非仅仅是向世界各地可能数以百计的被告提供该动议的副本，或对其提交作简要说明。如本辖区判例法所阐明，通知的含义远不止于此。关于衡平停止的适当通知，只能在提起对特定被告主张特定事实及特定救济请求的对抗程序后方可给予。受托人尚未、且无法提供该等通知。事实上，无论就所请求的救济给予何种程度的通知，均不足以克服无法披露尚未主张的诉因及尚未发生的事件这一不可能性——该等信息对于未来被告回应未来的衡平停止主张至关重要。\n\n16. 受托人所寻求的严苛救济，因其拟议命令而更加明显；该命令请求本院宣告：\n\n任何已实际或推定收到该动议通知、且未对该动议提出异议的一方，如最终在依本命令条款及时提起的诉讼中被列为当事人，即放弃其主张时效期间抗辩的权利。\n\n17. 受托人实质上是在请求本院作出确认判决。[3] 就世界上的每一个人而言，受托人寻求让本院裁定：其已获得充分且公平的机会回应受托人的衡平停止主张，并基于该动议中提出的严重不足的论点，明知且故意放弃了主张该项权利；这些论点严重不足，主要是因为适用衡平停止原则所必需的最关键事件甚至尚未发生。该主张不仅程序上不当，而且违背任何正当程序观念。\n\n3 《美国法典》第28编第2201(a)条允许任何美国法院，“[在其管辖范围内存在实际争议的案件中]”，并且“在提交适当诉状后”，就任何寻求该等宣告的利害关系方的权利及其他法律关系作出宣告，无论是否正在或能够寻求进一步救济。11 U.S.C. § 2201(a)。“任何该等宣告均应具有终局判决或裁定的效力，并应可作为该等判决或裁定予以复审。”同上。《联邦民事诉讼规则》第57条规定，“本规则适用于根据 28 U.S.C. 2201 获得确认判决的程序。”\n\nB. 破产程序规则9006(b)并不授权延长法定期限\n\n18. 破产程序规则不能修改诸如 11 U.S.C. § 546(a) 之类经立法机关制定的法令。见 In re Walnut Hill, Inc., No. 16-20960 (JJT), 2018 WL 2672242, at *2 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 1, 2018)。在 Walnut Hill 一案中，法院认为，依其明文规定，“规则9006(b)仅适用于由‘本规则、依本规则发出的通知[，][原文如此]或法院命令’设定的期限。该规则中没有任何地方提及法定期限。”（强调系后加）。Walnut Hill, Inc., 2018 WL 2672242, at *2。\n\n19. Tancredi 法官在 Walnut Hill 一案中强调，康涅狄格州破产法院过去曾处理过该问题，当时 Krechevsky 法官裁定，“规则9006(b)并不‘允许法院延长国会在法令中设定的期限限制。’”In re Damach, Inc., 235 B.R. 727, 731 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1999)。相反，它“仅允许修改由其他规则或法院施加的期限限制。”同上。”Tancredi 法官在指出“国会已规定破产程序规则‘不得缩减、扩大或修改任何实体权利。’凡规则与法典不一致之处，以法定法典为准”时，承认不允许破产程序规则凌驾于法定法典之上的重要性。（引文略）。Walnut Hill, Inc., 2018 WL 2672242, at *2。\n\n20. Walnut Hill 一案中的法院明确区分了破产程序规则9006(a)与破产程序规则9006(b)各自延长法定期限的能力。“规则9006(a)明确规定，其适用于‘任何未规定计算时间方法的法令。’然而，规则9006(b)明显缺少有关其适用于法令的相同或类似措辞。这一区别因 Krechevsky 法官六年后裁定规则9006(b)不得修改由国会确立的实体期限而得到凸显。”（援引 In re Demach, Inc., 235 B.R. at 731）（指出破产程序规则不允许“法院延长国会在法令中设定的期限限制”）。鉴于 Walnut Hill 一案先前的裁定，本院应认定《联邦破产程序规则》9006(b)不得用于延长诸如 11 U.S.C § 546(a) 所规定的法定期限，并因此驳回该动议。\n\nC. 上述原则同样适用于《破产法典》第549(d)条\n\n21. 在受若干法定限制的前提下，《破产法典》第549(a)条允许受托人撤销在2022年2月15日该破产案件开始后发生的、未经授权转让该破产财产的行为。11 U.S.C. § 549(a)。第549(d)条禁止在“拟撤销的转让之日起两年后”或“案件结案或被驳回时”两者中较早的时间之后提起该等诉讼。11 U.S.C. § 549(d)。\n\n22. 基于上文所述相同理由，不得依赖破产程序规则9006(b)修改《破产法典》第549(d)条规定的法定期限。同样，衡平停止不得、也无法被前瞻性适用，以现在即宣告受托人将来即使勤勉行事，仍将无法发现其最终在未来发现的破产申请后转让及诉因。\n\nD. 衡平停止不因本案事实而具有正当性\n\n23. 受托人主张，“事实记录轻易表明：(i) 非同寻常情形阻碍受托人提起撤销之诉，以及 (ii) 受托人勤勉地追求其权利。”动议第 ¶48 段。鉴于受托人动议的推进速度极为加快，郭女士（Ms. Guo）尚未有充分且公平的机会，通过就该等相关过去事件进行证据开示来检验这些事实主张。当然，基于上文所述理由，许多与审议衡平停止原则相关的事件甚至尚未发生，衡平停止尚不适用。因此，本院此时不应审议受托人为支持其衡平停止主张而提出的任何所谓证据。\n\n24. 此外，本案无争议的记录表明，受托人在2022年7月后担任受托人的最初11个月内仅联系过一家法务会计师事务所，并且在最终决定于2023年9月提交聘用法务会计师的申请前，合计约14个月未采取任何正式调查行动。\n\n25. 2023年6月2日，郭女士及 HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited LLC（香港国际基金投资（美国）有限责任公司）提交了就第二份简易判决命令上诉期间中止执行的动议（“中止执行动议”）。[Adv. Pro. No. 22-05003, ECF No. 227]。在2023年6月6日的状态会议后，破产法院作出命令，加快审议中止执行动议，并于2023年6月13日举行听证会。\n\n26. 在6月13日的听证中，受托人的律师传唤受托人作为证人，就若批准中止执行动议将对个人债务人的破产财产造成的所谓损害作证。受托人指出的一项所谓损害是无法聘用法务会计专业人员。（在 Julie A. Manning 阁下法官前进行的2023年6月13日程序记录（“2023年6月13日记录”），第35:22-36:7页）。[4] 然而，尽管受托人在其证言中向破产法院表示，在其等待聘用专业人员期间证据正在失效，受托人仍作证称，其仅曾尝试聘请一家专业事务所承担其声称需要进行的法务会计工作，即 Alix Partners（艾利克斯合伙人公司）（同上，第36:2-25页）。\n\n4 2023年6月13日记录的相关部分作为附件1随附于此。\n\n27. 即使受托人主张其在破产案件最初数月内没有破产财产资金可聘用专业人员，6月13日听证会举行时，距破产财产就 Lady May/Lady May II 船舶所有权问题获得简易判决仅两个半月[Adv. Pro. No. 22-05003, ECF No. 172]，且距受托人就相关 $37 million 保证金托管款获得简易判决不足一个月[Adv. Pro. No. 22-05003, ECF No. 221]。\n\n28. 中止执行动议于2023年6月26日被驳回。[Adv. Pro. No. 22-05003, ECF No. 247]。直至2023年9月1日才提交聘用 Kroll, LLC（克罗尔有限责任公司）作为法务会计师的申请，其生效日期为2023年8月2日。即使以2023年8月2日为生效日期，该聘用仍是在就 Lady May/Lady May II 获得简易判决四个月后。此外，Kroll 并非受托人作证称其曾接洽担任法务会计师的事务所；该事务所是 AlixPartners。\n\n29. 受托人请求本院相信，其在任14个月后聘请法务会计师事务所即属勤勉行事。本院不应如此相信。\n\n30. 此外，正如本院所充分知悉，受托人已花费数以百万计（即使不是数千万计）美元，对数百人进行证据开示，包括进行多次证言录取并取得数十万份文件，以调查潜在请求。受托人所称其无法提起任何进一步诉因，因其自己承认将在适用时效届满前提起多项对抗程序而不攻自破，见动议第 ¶ 1 段，其中包括依据 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 提起的民事诉讼。[5] 本院实际上不可能得出如下结论：尽管受托人声称勤勉行事且因非同寻常情形，其被阻止在2024年2月15日前提起任何额外诉讼；而其事实上将提起多项该等诉讼。\n\n31. 鉴于该破产案件中的情形，并结合针对债务人待决刑事程序的状态及其中采取的立场，郭女士认为，受托人——虽然已有绰绰有余的信息可在该破产案件中对其已识别的人员提起对抗程序——正通过不适用且不当适用衡平停止原则，作出策略性决定，试图推迟提起许多该等对抗程序，直至刑事程序中作出各种裁定，包括没收现已冻结资金中的数亿美元，以及通过刑事赔偿程序向受害人分配该等资金。\n\n32. 但是，Sections 546(a) and 549(d) 规定的限制并非可选择适用。受托人必须及时提起其有能力提起的对抗性程序。对于其未在 February 15, 2024 前提起而在此后提起的程序，无论被指名的被告是谁，该等被告一旦知悉其事实上是被追诉对象，均有权提出时效抗辩；受托人则有权作出衡平中止时效的抗辩。被告在知悉所主张的诉因后，也有权就受托人在 February 15, 2024 之前知悉的事项及在 February 15, 2024 之后发现的事项进行证据开示，以检验受托人所称其虽已尽到勤勉义务，仍因特殊情形而无法及时提起对抗性程序的主张。届时且仅届时（在该等情形实际发生之后），本院方可逐案裁决该等事实问题。\n\n5 Chapter 11 受托人及 Genever 债务人就反对被告 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）提出的要求暂缓破产案件的经更新动议所作的答复，以及要求复议的动议（ECF No. 234），第 8 页，United States（美国）诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵），No. 1:23- CR-118-1 (AT) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2024)。\n\n33. 因此，由于 (i) 衡平中止时效目前并不适用，(ii) 依赖 Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) 延长 Sections 546(a) and 549(d) 规定的时限并不恰当，以及 (ii) 受托人并未因特殊情形而受到阻碍，且事实上有能力提起大量额外的对抗性程序，该动议应予驳回。\n\n结论\n\n因此，Mei Guo（郭美）谨请求本院驳回该动议，并给予本院认为公正且衡平的其他及进一步救济。\n\n日期：February 5, 2024 /s/ Lee Vartan（李·瓦尔坦）\n\nRoseland, New Jersey 李·瓦尔坦（获准 pro hac vice 出庭）[lvartan@csglaw.com] 萨姆·德拉·费拉，小（获准 pro hac vice 出庭）[sdellafera@csglaw.com] 梅丽莎·F·韦尼克（获准 pro hac vice 出庭）[mwernick@csglaw.com] CHIESA SHAHINIAN & GIANTOMASI PC（凯萨·沙希尼安及贾恩托马西律师事务所）105 Eisenhower Parkway Roseland, NJ 07068 电话：(973) 325-1500 传真：(973) 325-1501 Mei Guo（郭美）的代理律师 Stephen M. Kindseth（斯蒂芬·M·金德塞思）(ct14640)\n\n[skindseth@zeislaw.com] Aaron A. Romney（亚伦·A·罗姆尼）(ct28144) [aromney@zeislaw.com] James M. Moriarty（詹姆斯·M·莫里亚蒂）(ct21876) [jmoriarty@zeislaw.com]\nZEISLER & ZEISLER PC（蔡斯勒及蔡斯勒律师事务所）\n\n10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, CT 06604 电话：(203) 368-4234 传真：(203) 368-5485 Mei Guo（郭美）及 HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC（香港国际基金投资（美国）有限责任公司）的当地代理律师","key_entities":["Guo","Je","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Miles Guo","Despins","Paul Hastings","forfeiture"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":172,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":221,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":227,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":234,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":247,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2494,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2509,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":4180,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 18:19:16"}