{"id":"court_ctb_2553_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":2553,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION In re:","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\nIn re:\n\nChapter 11\n\nHO WAN KWOK, et al.1 , Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\nDebtors.\n\n(Jointly Administered)\n\n# **NON-PARTY DEFENG CAO'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION FOR ENTRY OF ORDER EXTENDING DEADLINE FOR TRUSTEE TO FILE AVOIDANCE ACTIONS UNDER BANKRUPTCY CODE SECTIONS 108, 546(A), AND 549**\n\n1 The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\n# Table of Contents\n\n| | | Page |\n|------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|\n| | Preliminary Statement 1 | |\n| | Statement of Facts 4 | |\n| | Argument 5 | |\n| I. | The Bankruptcy Rules do not Allow for the Extension of a Statutory
Deadline. 5 | |\n| II. | It is Premature to Seek to Apply Equitable Tolling to an Unknown Set of
Claims Against a Voluminous List of Merely \"Potential Defendants.\" 8 | |\n| III. | Equitable Tolling is not Warranted to Extend the Trustee's Deadline to
File an Avoidance Action Against Mr. Cao10 | |\n| | Conclusion 12 | |\n\n## Table of Authorities\n\n## CASES\n\n| Asp v. Milardo Photography, Inc.,
573 F. Sup. 2d 677 (D. Conn. 2008) 9 |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.,
495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974)9 |\n| In re Builders Holding Co. Corp.,
No-16-06643 (Bankr. D. P.R. Apr. 25, 2019) 10 |\n| In re Colad Group, Inc.,
324 B.R. 208 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2005) 6 |\n| In re Cramer,
636 B.R. 830 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2022) 8, 9 |\n| In re Damach, Inc.,
235 B.R. 727 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1999) 6 |\n| In re Farwest Pump Co.,
No. 4:17-bk-11112 (BMW), 2020 WL 257784 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Jan. 15, 2020) 10 |\n| In re Fawson,
338 B.R. 505 (Bankr. D. Utah 2006) 6 |\n| In re Fundamental Long Term Care, Inc.,
501 B.R. 784 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Nov. 13, 2013) 11 |\n| In re Int'l Admin. Servs., Inc.,
408 F.3d 689 (11th Cir. 2005) 7 |\n| In re No. 1 Contracting Corp.,
No. BR 5-10-BK-01755-JJT, 2012 WL 4114818
(Bankr. M.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2012)9 |\n| In re Randolph Hosp., Inc.,
No. 20-10247, 2022 WL 19298765 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2022) 8 |\n| In re Rockport Dev., Inc.,
No. 20-11339 (SC) (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2022) 10 |\n| In re Visiting Nurse Ass'n of Inland and Counties,
No. 18-16908 (MH) (Bankr. C.D. Cal. July 30, 2020) 10 |\n\n| In re Walnut Hill, Inc.,
No. 16-20960 (JJT), 2018 WL 2672242 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 1, 2018) 6, 7, 9 | |\n|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|\n| In re Win Trucking, Inc.,
236 B.R. 774 (Bankr. D. Utah 1999) 7 | |\n| Law v. Siegel,
571 U.S. 415 (2014) 5 | |\n| Long v. Abbott Mortg. Corp.,
459 F. Supp. 108 (D. Conn. 1978) 9 | |\n| Marsh v. Levy (In re Martin Levy of Berlin D.M.D., P.C.),
416 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009) 10 | |\n| Zerilli-Edelglass v. New York City Transit Auth.,
333 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 2003)10 | |\n\n| § 1082, 8 | |\n|--------------------|--|\n| § 5462, 6, 8 | |\n| § 5492 | |\n| | |\n| 28 U.S.C. § 2075 5 | |\n| | |\n\nNon-party Defeng Cao (\"Mr. Cao\"), by and through his undersigned counsel, respectfully submits this memorandum of law in opposition to the *Motion for Entry of an Order Extending Deadline for Trustee to Bring Avoidance Actions Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 108, 546, and 549* [ECF No. 2509] (the \"Tolling Motion\") and states as follows:\n\n## Preliminary Statement\n\n1. The Tolling Motion is a thinly-veiled request for a declaration that the Trustee can equitably toll the statutory deadline for filing avoidance actions *carte blanche* as against hundreds of \"*Potential* Defendants\" without any case or controversy before the Court. Nothing justifies the imposition of such a blanket extension. Aside from listing the names of what appear to be any and all entities and associates with *any* connection to the Debtor – no matter how remote – the Tolling Motion is noticeably silent on the specifics of what claims the Trustee intends to bring and specifically against whom. Indeed, the *Notice of Motion for Extension of Time for Trustee to Bring Claims Against Potential Defendants* (the \"Notice\") confirms the overbroad and unlawful latitude the Trustee seeks, stating to \"Potential Defendants\" that: the Tolling Motion \"requests a tolling of the statutory deadline(s) to file causes of action *seeking recovery or other relief* from Potential Defendants…. [t]he fact that you received this Notice **does not** necessarily mean that *any claims have yet, or will be, brought against you* or that, if such claims are brought, you will be found liable.\" [ECF No. 2515 at 5-6 (italicized added, bolding in original).] On those naked assertions the Trustee claims he has provided ample notice to \"Potential Defendants\" of the adversary proceedings he intends to bring against them and is affording them a full and fair opportunity to object. Not so.\n\n2. As is clear from the list, the \"Potential Defendants\" vary greatly, including numerous individuals and entities from all over the world, inherently with different connections to the Debtor. And, for each, the Trustee is at different stages of his investigation, which involve\n\nentirely different factual allegations, as well as potential claims (to the extent there are any). Yet, the Tolling Motion does not assert *any* crystallized claims – or even any barebones claims – against *any* of the \"Potential Defendants.\" Without such information, the \"Potential Defendants\" cannot possibly have a full and fair opportunity to defend themselves against Trustee's blanket request.\n\n3. To justify his ask, the Trustee conflates Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 9006 and the doctrine of equitable tolling. Neither authorizes the Trustee's requested extension. First, Rule 9006 cannot be used to extend statutory deadlines, such as those established under 11 U.S.C. §§ 108, 546, and 549. As *Walnut Hill and* its progeny confirm, judicial modification of substantive deadlines established by Congress would violate the separation of powers preserved in the Constitution since, where the legislature has spoken authoritatively, it is not within the province of the judiciary to modify its determination. Although the Trustee begs that the Court adopt the contrary analysis endorsed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in *International Administrative Services*, that case concedes that Rule 9006 does *not* explicitly encompass statutory timeframes. *International Administrative Services* is neither binding on this Court nor more appropriate for application to this case than *Walnut Hill*, which is more recent and analogous, and emerges from this very Court. The Trustee cannot hide from these realities.\n\n4. Alternatively, the Trustee avails himself of the equitable tolling doctrine to warrant his extension. While statutory deadlines are subject to equitable tolling, any such arguments are procedurally premature at this juncture as there are no *actual* identified defendants and no *pending* adversary proceedings ripe for consideration. As the caselaw makes abundantly clear, the Court can only properly consider whether equitable tolling is appropriate *after* a belated adversary proceeding is commenced and a statute of limitations defense is asserted. This is\n\nlogical since application of equitable tolling requires a fact-based assessment. Indeed, the Court would need to analyze whether the Trustee, despite his diligence, was unable to commence the action against that defendant due to extraordinary circumstances. The Trustee does not dispute this, conceding that \"[e]quitable tolling must be decided on a case-by-case basis and is not limited to a particular set of facts.\" See Tolling Mot. ¶ 45.\n\n5. Despite this concession, the Trustee hopes to dodge these requirements. Instead, the Tolling Motion offers two main reasons for preemptively extending the Trustee's deadline to assert avoidance actions against hundreds of \"Potential Defendants:\" (1) the Debtor's allegedly obstructive behavior and (2) alleged dilatory conduct and interference by the Debtor's associates. Neither justifies the Trustee's request to this Court, and certainly not with regard to Mr. Cao, who has fully cooperated with the Trustee and who is not mentioned anywhere in the Tolling Motion. Throughout the Trustee's investigation, Mr. Cao has not opposed *any* of the Rule 2004 subpoenas seeking information from him or about him, including requests made to a litany of third-parties. Mr. Cao also voluntarily accepted service of his own Rule 2004 subpoena from the Trustee, timely served written responses thereto, and produced responsive documents. In addition, Mr. Cao subsequently sat for a 7-hour deposition nearly four months ago in which he responded substantively to the Trustee's questions and, at no point, refused to answer a question on the basis of possible criminal exposure. That is because, as Mr. Cao has consistently maintained, he has not done anything wrong, further confirmed by his lack of involvement in the parallel criminal action.\n\n6. Having had a thorough opportunity to examine Mr. Cao at length and under oath, and having received all relevant documents in his possession and from numerous third-parties, the Trustee has been afforded complete and unfettered discovery from Mr. Cao. Yet, the Trustee has\n\nnot filed any adversary action against Mr. Cao in the four months since his deposition or asserted *any* potential claims against him. As such, equitable tolling – aside from being procedurally improper to consider at this stage – cannot justify extending the deadline for the Trustee to file an avoidance action against Mr. Cao.\n\n7. For the reasons explained herein, Mr. Cao respectfully requests that the Court wholly deny the Tolling Motion.\n\n## Statement of Facts\n\n8. On May 15, 2023, the Trustee filed the *Fifth Supplemental Omnibus Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee for Entry of Order Under Bankruptcy Rule 2004 and Local Rule 2004-1 Authorizing Discovery With Respect to Additional Entities and Individuals Affiliated With Debtor, and Entities Doing Business With Debtor and Affiliated Entities* (the \"2004 Motion\"). [ECF No. 1789.] As part of the 2004 Motion, the Trustee sought information from Mr. Cao – a college student. *Id.* at ¶ 9. As the Trustee admitted, before the filing of the 2004 Motion, Mr. Cao had no involvement in the Bankruptcy. *Id*. The Trustee plucked Mr. Cao's name from a list of proposed suretors in a bond proposal for a defendant in the parallel criminal action – not the Debtor. *Id*. That bond proposal was denied by the criminal court. Mr. Cao has never been named as a target in the criminal action and, aside from serving as a proposed suretor for the rejected bond package, has had no involvement with the criminal case.\n\n9. After the Court granted the Trustee's 2004 Motion on June 7, 2023, [ECF No. 1891], Mr. Cao promptly retained counsel and authorized his counsel to accept service of the Trustee's 2004 subpoena, despite the fact that it would have taken additional effort for the Trustee to effectively serve Mr. Cao. The 2004 subpoena contained 14 requests for production, most of which were exceedingly broad, and included inquiry of more than 100 allegedly \"associated\" individuals and entities. Even though Mr. Cao voluntarily agreed to accept service and to cooperate and\n\nfacilitate discovery, his counsel explained that it would be difficult for Mr. Cao to comply with the voluminous discovery requests within the tight timeframe requested by the Trustee, and the parties agreed to a later response date. At no time did Mr. Cao file a motion for protective order or seek to quash the subpoena. Quite the opposite, Mr. Cao has fully cooperated with the Trustee and his attorneys. Specifically, Mr. Cao timely served written responses and responsive documents, and sat for a deposition on October 20, 2023, which lasted approximately seven hours. During the deposition, Mr. Cao did not refuse to answer any questions on the basis of his Fifth Amendment rights.\n\n10. The Trustee has since listed Mr. Cao as an \"Associated Individual\" in his subsequent Rule 2004 subpoenas. Despite learning that information has since been requested about him in these subpoenas, Mr. Cao has *never* filed for a protective order, requested to quash the subpoenas, or instructed any third-party not to comply with providing information about him to the Trustee.\n\n11. On January 18, 2024, the Trustee filed the Tolling Motion, listing Mr. Cao as a \"Potential Defendant\" in an avoidance action, but otherwise failed to provide any inkling as to what potential claims the Trustee was seeking to assert, when, regarding what alleged transfers, or how those transfers trace to the Debtor. [ECF No. 2494, Schedule I at 57.]\n\n## Argument\n\nI. The Bankruptcy Rules do not Allow for the Extension of a Statutory Deadline.\n\n12. As the Trustee \"recognizes[,] section 105(a) cannot be used to take an action the Bankruptcy Code prohibits….\" Tolling Mot. ¶ 42; *see Law v. Siegel*, 571 U.S. 415, 421 (2014). The Bankruptcy Court does not have the authority to extend the deadline for filing avoidance actions, which is set by the legislature. See 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (dictating that the Bankruptcy Rules \"shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.\"). The Trustee looks to Rule\n\n9006(b) for such authority. But, as Bankruptcy courts – including this Court – have consistently held, the express terms of Rule 9006(b) make clear that it *only* applies to deadlines set by \"these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court\" and not to time limitations set by Congress in a statute, as the Trustee requests to do here:\n\n> when an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified period *by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court,* the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if the request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order or (2) on motion made after the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect.\n\nFed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b) (emphasis added). \"Rule 9006(b) cannot apply to Section 546(a) without violating the separation of powers preserved in the Constitution.\" *In re Walnut Hill, Inc.*, No. 16-20960 (JJT), 2018 WL 2672242, at \\*2 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 1, 2018). That is because \"[w]here the legislature has spoken authoritatively, it is not within the province of the judiciary to modify its determination.\" *Id.*; *see also In re Damach, Inc.*, 235 B.R. 727, 731 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1999) (holding that Rule 9006(b) does not \"permit[] a court to extend a time limitation set by Congress in a statute; they permit modification only of time limitations imposed by other rules or by the court.\"); *In re Colad Group, Inc.*, 324 B.R. 208, 225 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that \"Bankruptcy Rule 9006 allows an enlargement or reduction of many of the time limits in the Bankruptcy Rules. However, section 546(a) is a statute, not a rule. Consequently, this court lacks authority\" to act under Rule 9006 relative to statutory deadlines.); *In re Fawson*, 338 B.R. 505 (Bankr. D. Utah 2006) (stating that \"Rule 9006(b)(1) only allows parties to enlarge the time when an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified period by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court. By its own terms, Rule 9006(b) does not allow courts to enlarge time periods expressly set forth in the Code.\"); *In re Win Trucking, Inc.*, 236 B.R. 774, 780 n.10 (Bankr. D. Utah 1999) (noting that \"[Rule] 9006(b) covers only enlargement of time fixed by the Bankruptcy Rules or by court order, and not time fixed by the Code itself.\").\n\n13. *Walnut Hill* is instructive. There, like here, United States Bankruptcy Judge James J. Tancredi presided over a motion for extension of deadline to file avoidance actions filed by a Chapter 7 trustee. *In re Walnut Hill, Inc.*, 2018 WL 2672242, at \\*1. In holding that Rule 9006(b) \"*only* applies to deadlines set 'by these rules or by a notice given thereunder[,] [sic] or by order of court,'\" this Court confirmed that \"[n]owhere in the Rule does it mention statutory deadlines.\" *Id*. To confirm its interpretation, Judge Tancredi contrasted Rule 9006(b) with Rule 9006(a), which expressly applies to \"any time period specified in these rules, in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in any local rule or court order, or in *any statute that does not specify a method of computing time*.\" *Id.*; *see* Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(a) (emphasis added). Judge Tancredi further observed that application of Rule 9006(b) to modify a statutory deadline would be unconstitutional. *In re Walnut Hill, Inc.*, 2018 WL 2672242, at \\*2.\n\n14. The only case the Trustee cites to suggest that the Court can use Rule 9006(b) to proactively extend a statute of limitations is the Eleventh Circuit's decision in *In re International Administrative Services, Inc*. But, in that case – which is not binding on this Court – there *was* a pending action before the Bankruptcy Court within which it was assessing whether the filing deadline should have been tolled. *In re Int'l Admin. Servs., Inc.*, 408 F.3d 689, 694 (11th Cir. 2005). That is not the case here. The Trustee has not filed any avoidance action in which he is seeking to toll the filing deadline, and does not even know if he will bring *any* claims against *any* of the hundreds of \"Potential Defendants.\"\n\n15. And, even assuming that Rule 9006(b) could be used to extend the Section 546(a) deadline, such enlargement would be inappropriate on the facts against Mr. Cao because the decision to enlarge a deadline under Rule 9006(b) must be \"for cause shown.\" Here, the Trustee has not demonstrated any basis that justify extending the deadline to file an avoidance action against Mr. Cao. Indeed, the Trustee dedicates numerous pages to describing alleged conduct of the Debtor and his associates, none of which includes Mr. Cao. Quite the contrary, as explained above and further below, Mr. Cao has fully cooperated with the Trustee and his attorneys in an effort to resolve his questions, as opposed to wasting the Trustee's time and resources over motion practice or engaging in a \"shell game\" – as the Trustee alleges few individuals and entities have done.\n\n16. Given the gravity of the Trustee's request to the Court and the lack of authority to fulfill such request, the Court should deny the Tolling Motion.\n\nII. It is Premature to Seek to Apply Equitable Tolling to an Unknown Set of Claims Against a Voluminous List of Merely \"Potential Defendants.\"\n\n17. Even though Bankruptcy courts have the power to equitably toll statutory deadlines, it would be premature for the Court to decide those issues now – before the Trustee files an adversary proceeding that asserts specific claims against an identifiable defendant, and that defendant asserts a statute of limitations defense. *In re Cramer*, 636 B.R. 830, 832 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2022) (\"Should [a court] adjudicate the doctrine of equitable tolling in response to an ex parte motion by the trustee prior to the filing of the adversary proceeding or should it do so in the adversary proceeding that the trustee ultimately files? Fairness and due process require the latter.\"); *In re Randolph Hosp., Inc.*, No. 20-10247, 2022 WL 19298765, at \\*1 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2022) (\"While the limitations periods of § 546 and § 108, like any statute of limitations, are subject to equitable tolling, the preemptive finding the Liquidation Trustee seeks is premature\n\ngiven there are no identified defendants and no pending adversary proceedings related to the overpayment claims.\"). Procedurally, the doctrine of equitable tolling is a response to a statute of limitations defense. *See. e.g., Asp v. Milardo Photography, Inc.*, 573 F. Sup. 2d 677, 698 (D. Conn. 2008); *Long v. Abbott Mortg. Corp.*, 459 F. Supp. 108, 113 (D. Conn. 1978). For this reason, \"[t]he equitable tolling doctrine does not come into play, of course, until the defendant has claimed that the plaintiff's cause is time barred.\" *Long*, 459 F. Sup. at 113 (*citing Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.*, 495 F.2d 448, 461 (2d Cir. 1974)).\n\n18. For example, in *In re Cramer* the Bankruptcy trustee moved for an extension of the twoyear statutory deadline to commence avoidance actions. *In re Cramer*, 636 B.R. at 831. There, like here, the two-year deadline was approaching rapidly and the trustee contended that the debtor had been insufficiently responsive with the investigation and had concealed assets. *Id*. In rejecting the Trustee's request, the court decisively held that \"[t]he Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure contain no rule to extend statutory deadlines.\" *Id*. The court further held that the trustee may not invoke the doctrine of equitable tolling *before* filing a late adversary proceeding, reasoning that allowing such prospective invocation would deprive affected parties of the due process of law. *Id*.; *accord In re Walnut Hill, Inc.*, 2018 WL 2672242, at \\*2 (\"reaching the issue of equitable tolling is premature and procedurally inappropriate at this time.\"); *In re No. 1 Contracting Corp.*, No. BR 5-10-BK-01755-JJT, 2012 WL 4114818, at \\*1 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2012) (rejecting request for extension and expressing concern about whether it could \"extend the statute with regard to unnamed and unidentified defendants when there was no case or controversy before the Court.\").\n\n19. The caselaw cited by the Trustee in the Tolling Motion are not binding and are easily distinguishable. For example, in *Farwest*, the debtor failed to file any avoidance actions, which\n\nforced the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors' to file an emergency motion to toll the deadline to file avoidance actions on the eve of the limitations period to preserve those actions. *In re Farwest Pump Co.*, No. 4:17-bk-11112 (BMW), 2020 WL 257784, at \\*3 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Jan. 15, 2020). Such emergent circumstances do not exist here as the Trustee has already filed several adversary proceedings and claims he intends to timely file others. Tolling Mot. ¶ 1. In the other cases the Trustee cites for support, unlike here, there were no objections filed to the extension motions.2\n\n20. Given the infancy of any potential claims the Trustee seeks to bring against any \"Potential Defendants\" and that the statutory deadline has not passed, it is inappropriate and wholly premature to discuss the doctrine of equitable tolling at this time. For this reason, the Trustee's request is improperly putting the cart before the horse by functionally seeking a declaration from this Court as to whether equitable tolling would be appropriate at some later point in time in any number of possible adversary proceedings asserting any number of claims against any number of \"Potential Defendants.\" Nothing justifies issuing the Trustee this blank check *en masse* – certainly not considerations of fairness.\n\nIII. Equitable Tolling is not Warranted to Extend the Trustee's Deadline to File an Avoidance Action Against Mr. Cao\n\n21. Even if the Court were to accept that equitable tolling could be considered at this stage – which it should not – as the Trustee admits, \"[t]o obtain the benefit of the doctrine, the Trustee bears the burden of establishing that []he (1) has acted with reasonable diligence during the time period she seeks to have tolled, and (2) has proved that the circumstances are so extraordinary\n\n2 *See Marsh v. Levy (In re Martin Levy of Berlin D.M.D., P.C.)*, 416 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009), *In re Rockport Dev., Inc.*, No. 20-11339 (SC) (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2022); *In re Visiting Nurse Ass'n of Inland and Counties*, No. 18-16908 (MH) (Bankr. C.D. Cal. July 30, 2020); *In re Builders Holding Co. Corp.*, No-16-06643 (EAG7) (Bankr. D. P.R. Apr. 25, 2019).\n\nthat the doctrine should apply.\" *Zerilli-Edelglass v. New York City Transit Auth.*, 333 F.3d 74, 80–81 (2d Cir. 2003), as amended (July 29, 2003) (internal quotations omitted). Although the Trustee boasts that the \"factual record easily demonstrates that (i) extraordinary circumstances prevented the Trustee from bringing the Avoidance Actions and (ii) the Trustee acted diligently in pursuing his rights,\" nothing can be further from the truth. Tolling Mot. at ¶ 48.\n\n22. Citing a Florida decision, *In re Fundamental Long Term Care, Inc.*, 501 B.R. 784, 791 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Nov. 13, 2013), the Trustee claims that, to prevail on equitable tolling, he \"need not prove that any (let alone all) potential defendant engaged or participated in blocking the Trustee's discovery.\" Tolling Mot. ¶ 51. The Trustee conveniently fails to quote the rest of the paragraph from the case, which makes clear that the concern there was that \"[a] target that is potentially liable for an avoidance action would essentially receive a windfall if it is another target that actively or negligently conceals the Trustee's potential claim.\" *Id*. That is clearly not a concern with regard to Mr. Cao.\n\n23. The reasons advanced by the Trustee for seeking an extension of time to file avoidance actions – allegedly obstructive and dilatory behavior by the Debtor and a few of his alleged associates – do not apply to Mr. Cao, whose history of compliance and cooperation with the Trustee confirm that extraordinary circumstances do not exist. Indeed, Mr. Cao's identity was obtained from an unrelated court filing for a bond package of a non-party defendant in the criminal action – not through any investigation in the Bankruptcy case or connection to another target in the Bankruptcy case. After learning about the Rule 2004 Motion, Mr. Cao retained legal counsel, authorized his counsel to accept service, served written responses, produced responsive documents, and sat for a lengthy 7-hour deposition. At no time did Mr. Cao spend the Trustee's resources challenging the 2004 Motion or any subsequent subpoena served to third-\n\nparties requesting information about Mr. Cao. Quite the opposite, Mr. Cao has fully cooperated with the Trustee in all respects. Tellingly, Mr. Cao is not named *anywhere* in the Tolling Motion, despite the Trustee's lengthy recitation of allegedly obstructive and dilatory behavior *by others* in this action. As such, there is no concern that Mr. Cao would be getting any \"windfall\" from any allegedly obstructive behavior of another party – indeed, how the Trustee learned about Mr. Cao has nothing to do with any other target in the Bankruptcy case.\n\n24. The Trustee also cannot demonstrate he has been diligent in asserting any claims against Mr. Cao. After all, it has been almost four months since Mr. Cao's deposition – when Mr. Cao provided substantive responses to the Trustee's questions over the course of seven hours. Since then, the Trustee has not filed any avoidance actions against Mr. Cao and has not sought additional information from Mr. Cao regarding any potential claims against him. The Trustee simply cannot justify sitting idly on his hands for four months regarding any potential claims he may have against Mr. Cao.\n\n25. There can be no greater abuse of due process than what the Trustee seeks: to exploit allegations of misconduct by few others to prospectively toll the limitations period against hundreds of \"Potential Defendants\" – especially those who have been cooperative with the Trustee's discovery efforts, such as Mr. Cao. Given the complete and unfettered discovery from Mr. Cao, the Trustee has no basis to equitably toll the statutory deadline as to Mr. Cao.\n\n## Conclusion\n\n26. For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Cao respectfully requests that the Court deny the Trustee's Tolling Motion. To the extent consistent with the objections raised herein, Mr. Cao also joins in the objections filed by other parties to the Tolling Motion. Mr. Cao reserves all rights to make such further and/or future objections to the Tolling Motion as may be necessary and appropriate.\n\nDated: New York, New York February 5, 2024\n\n## OLSHAN FROME WOLOSKY LLP\n\nBy: */s/ Adam H. Friedman*\n\n Adam H. Friedman Katherine E. Mateo (*pro hac vice motion forthcoming*) 1325 Avenue of the Americas New York, New York 10019 (212) 451-2300 *Attorneys for Non-Party Defeng Cao*\n\n# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI, KATHERINE E. MATEO, hereby certify that on February 5th, 2024 I caused true and correct copies of the foregoing document to be served on all counsel of record by CM/ECF. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF System.\n\n> /s/ *Katherine E. Mateo* \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_ KATHERINE E. MATEO","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格联邦破产法院布里奇波特分庭\n\n关于：\n\n第11章\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等人1，案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n债务人。\n\n（合并管理）\n\n非当事人 DEFENG CAO（曹德凤）反对就延长受托人依据《破产法典》第 108、546(A) 及 549 条提起撤销诉讼期限作出命令之动议的法律备忘录\n\n1 本第11章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（亦称 Guo Wengui（郭文贵）、Miles Guo（郭文贵）及 Miles Kwok（郭文贵），以及众多其他别名）（税务识别号码后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（税务识别号码后四位：8202）及 Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 及 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为 Paul Hastings LLP（保尔·黑斯廷斯律师事务所），200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166，c/o Luc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯），作为 Ho Wan Kwok 破产财产的受托人（仅为通知及通信之目的）。\n\n目录\n\n页码\n\n初步陈述 1\n事实陈述 4\n论证 5\nI. 《联邦破产程序规则》不允许延长法定期限。5\nII. 在针对仅为“潜在被告”的大量名单中一组未知请求权寻求适用衡平时效中止，尚属过早。8\nIII. 没有理由适用衡平时效中止以延长受托人对曹先生提起撤销诉讼的期限 10\n结论 12\n\n法律依据表\n\n判例\n\nAsp v. Milardo Photography, Inc.,\n573 F. Sup. 2d 677 (D. Conn. 2008) 9\n\nDetroit v. Grinnell Corp.,\n495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974) 9\n\nIn re Builders Holding Co. Corp.,\nNo-16-06643 (Bankr. D. P.R. Apr. 25, 2019) 10\n\nIn re Colad Group, Inc.,\n324 B.R. 208 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2005) 6\n\nIn re Cramer,\n636 B.R. 830 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2022) 8, 9\n\nIn re Damach, Inc.,\n235 B.R. 727 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1999) 6\n\nIn re Farwest Pump Co.,\nNo. 4:17-bk-11112 (BMW), 2020 WL 257784 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Jan. 15, 2020) 10\n\nIn re Fawson,\n338 B.R. 505 (Bankr. D. Utah 2006) 6\n\nIn re Fundamental Long Term Care, Inc.,\n501 B.R. 784 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Nov. 13, 2013) 11\n\nIn re Int'l Admin. Servs., Inc.,\n408 F.3d 689 (11th Cir. 2005) 7\n\nIn re No. 1 Contracting Corp.,\nNo. BR 5-10-BK-01755-JJT, 2012 WL 4114818\n(Bankr. M.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2012) 9\n\nIn re Randolph Hosp., Inc.,\nNo. 20-10247, 2022 WL 19298765 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2022) 8\n\nIn re Rockport Dev., Inc.,\nNo. 20-11339 (SC) (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2022) 10\n\nIn re Visiting Nurse Ass'n of Inland and Counties,\nNo. 18-16908 (MH) (Bankr. C.D. Cal. July 30, 2020) 10\n\nIn re Walnut Hill, Inc.,\nNo. 16-20960 (JJT), 2018 WL 2672242 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 1, 2018) 6, 7, 9\n\nIn re Win Trucking, Inc.,\n236 B.R. 774 (Bankr. D. Utah 1999) 7\n\nLaw v. Siegel,\n571 U.S. 415 (2014) 5\n\nLong v. Abbott Mortg. Corp.,\n459 F. Supp. 108 (D. Conn. 1978) 9\n\nMarsh v. Levy (In re Martin Levy of Berlin D.M.D., P.C.),\n416 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009) 10\n\nZerilli-Edelglass v. New York City Transit Auth.,\n333 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 2003) 10\n\n§ 108 2, 8\n\n§ 546 2, 6, 8\n§ 549 2\n\n28 U.S.C. § 2075 5\n\n非当事人 Defeng Cao（“曹先生”）通过其下列署名律师，谨提交本法律备忘录，以反对《就延长受托人依据《破产法典》第 108、546 及 549 条提起撤销诉讼期限作出命令之动议》[ECF No. 2509]（“时效中止动议”），并陈述如下：\n\n初步陈述\n\n1. 时效中止动议实质上是请求宣告：在本院尚无任何案件或争议的情况下，受托人可以不加限制地对数百名“潜在被告”衡平地中止提起撤销诉讼的法定期限。没有任何理由支持施加此类一揽子延期。除列出似乎与债务人存在任何关联的所有实体和关联人员的姓名外——无论该关联多么遥远——时效中止动议明显未说明受托人拟提起何种具体请求权及具体针对何人。事实上，《关于延长受托人向潜在被告提出请求权期限的动议通知》（“通知”）证实了受托人所寻求的过宽且违法的自由裁量权，其向“潜在被告”声明：时效中止动议“请求中止提起诉因以向潜在被告寻求追偿或其他救济的法定期限……[t]he fact that you received this Notice does not necessarily mean that any claims have yet, or will be, brought against you or that, if such claims are brought, you will be found liable。”[ECF No. 2515 at 5-6（斜体为后加，粗体为原文所示。）] 受托人依据这些毫无实质内容的断言，主张其已就拟对“潜在被告”提起的对抗程序给予充分通知，并给予其充分且公平的异议机会。事实并非如此。\n\n2. 如该名单所清楚表明，“潜在被告”之间差异极大，包括来自世界各地、与债务人具有不同关联的众多个人和实体。并且，对于每一名潜在被告，受托人的调查处于不同阶段，涉及完全不同的事实指控以及潜在请求权（如存在任何请求权）。然而，时效中止动议并未针对任何“潜在被告”提出任何已明确形成的请求权——甚至未提出任何最基本的请求权。没有此类信息，“潜在被告”不可能获得充分且公平的机会，就受托人的一揽子请求为自身辩护。\n\n3. 为证明其请求正当，受托人混同了《联邦破产程序规则》第 9006 条与衡平时效中止原则。二者均未授权受托人所请求的延期。首先，第 9006 条不得用于延长法定期限，例如依据 11 U.S.C. §§ 108、546 及 549 所设定的期限。正如 Walnut Hill 及其后续判例所确认，对国会设定的实体期限作出司法修改，将违反宪法所保留的权力分立原则，因为在立法机关已作出权威性规定时，修改其决定并非司法机关的职权。尽管受托人恳请本院采纳第十一巡回上诉法院在 International Administrative Services 案中认可的相反分析，但该案承认第 9006 条并未明确涵盖法定期限。International Administrative Services 对本院既无约束力，也不比 Walnut Hill 更适宜适用于本案；后案时间更近、情形更为类似，且正是出自本院。受托人无法回避这些现实。\n\n4. 或者，受托人援引衡平时效中止原则来支持其延期。尽管法定期限可以适用衡平时效中止，但鉴于目前没有已实际确定的被告，也没有任何待决且已成熟可供审理的对抗程序，任何此类主张在程序上均为时过早。如判例法明确表明，只有在迟延提起对抗程序且有人提出时效抗辩后，本院才能适当审议衡平时效中止是否适用。这在逻辑上是合理的，因为适用衡平时效中止需要基于事实作出评估。事实上，本院需要分析，尽管受托人已勤勉行事，其是否因特殊情况而无法对该被告提起诉讼。受托人并不否认这一点，其承认“[e]quitable tolling must be decided on a case-by-case basis and is not limited to a particular set of facts.” 见 Tolling Mot. ¶ 45。\n\n5. 尽管作出此项承认，受托人仍希望规避这些要求。相反，时效中止动议提出两项主要理由，以预先延长受托人针对数百名“潜在被告”主张撤销诉讼的期限：(1) 债务人被指具有阻碍性的行为；以及 (2) 债务人关联方被指存在拖延行为和干扰。两者均不足以证明受托人向本院提出的请求正当，更不用说就曹先生而言；曹先生已充分配合受托人，且时效中止动议中未在任何地方提及他。在受托人整个调查期间，曹先生未反对任何寻求获取其本人或与其有关信息的第 2004 条传票，包括向大量第三方提出的请求。曹先生还自愿接受受托人向其本人送达的第 2004 条传票，及时就此提交书面答复，并出示了回应性文件。此外，曹先生随后于近四个月前接受了长达 7 小时的证言录取，在该过程中，他对受托人的问题作出实质性答复，且从未以可能承担刑事责任为由拒绝回答问题。这是因为，正如曹先生一直主张的，他没有实施任何不当行为；其未参与平行刑事诉讼亦进一步证实了这一点。\n\n6. 受托人已获得充分机会，对曹先生进行长时间且宣誓下的审查，并已收到其持有的所有相关文件以及来自众多第三方的文件，故受托人已从曹先生处获得完整且不受限制的证据开示。然而，自曹先生接受证言录取后的四个月内，受托人未对曹先生提起任何对抗诉讼，也未对其主张任何潜在请求权。因此，衡平时效中止——除在此阶段审议其在程序上并不适当外——不能证明延长受托人对曹先生提起撤销诉讼期限具有正当性。\n\n7. 基于本文所述理由，曹先生谨请求本院完全驳回时效中止动议。\n\n事实陈述\n\n8. 于 May 15, 2023，受托人提交了《第11章受托人依据《联邦破产程序规则》第 2004 条及地方规则 2004-1 就与债务人有关联的其他实体和个人、以及与债务人和关联实体开展业务的实体进行证据开示而作出命令的第五份补充综合动议》（“2004 动议”）。[ECF No. 1789.] 作为 2004 动议的一部分，受托人向作为大学生的曹先生寻求信息。Id. at ¶ 9. 正如受托人所承认，在提交 2004 动议之前，曹先生未参与该破产案件。Id. 受托人从平行刑事诉讼中一名被告的保释金提案所列拟议保证人名单中选取了曹先生的姓名——而该被告并非债务人。Id. 该保释金提案被刑事法院驳回。曹先生从未在该刑事诉讼中被列为目标，除作为被驳回保释方案的拟议保证人外，其未参与该刑事案件。\n\n9. 在本院于 June 7, 2023 批准受托人的 2004 动议后，[ECF No. 1891]，曹先生立即聘请律师，并授权其律师接受受托人第 2004 条传票的送达，尽管受托人若要有效送达曹先生将需付出额外努力。该第 2004 条传票载有 14 项文件出示请求，其中大部分范围极其宽泛，并包括对 100 多名被指“有关联”的个人和实体的调查。尽管曹先生自愿同意接受送达、予以配合并协助证据开示，其律师仍说明，曹先生难以在受托人要求的紧迫期限内遵守大量证据开示请求，双方遂同意较晚的答复日期。曹先生从未提出保护令动议，亦未寻求撤销该传票。恰恰相反，曹先生一直充分配合受托人及其律师。具体而言，曹先生及时提交书面答复及回应性文件，并于 October 20, 2023 接受了证言录取，历时约七小时。在证言录取期间，曹先生未以其第五修正案权利为由拒绝回答任何问题。\n\n10. 此后，受托人在其后续依据第 2004 条规则发出的传票中，将曹先生（Mr. Cao）列为“关联个人”。尽管已获悉这些传票此后要求提供有关其本人的信息，曹先生从未申请保护令、请求撤销传票，或指示任何第三方不得向受托人提供有关其本人的信息。\n\n11. 2024 年 1 月 18 日，受托人提交了时效中止动议（Tolling Motion），将曹先生列为撤销权诉讼中的“潜在被告”，但除此之外，未就受托人拟主张何种潜在请求权、何时主张、涉及何种被指称的转让，或该等转让如何追溯至债务人，提供任何线索。[ECF No. 2494, Schedule I at 57.]\n\n论证\n\nI. 《破产程序规则》不允许延长法定期限。\n\n12. 正如受托人“承认的那样，[第] 105(a) 条不得被用于采取《破产法》所禁止的行动……。”Tolling Mot. ¶ 42; see Law v. Siegel, 571 U.S. 415, 421 (2014). 破产法院无权延长提起撤销权诉讼的期限，该期限由立法机关设定。See 28 U.S.C. § 2075（规定《破产程序规则》“不得缩减、扩大或修改任何实体权利。”）。受托人援引第 9006(b) 条规则作为该等权限的依据。但是，正如破产法院——包括本院——一贯认定的那样，第 9006(b) 条规则的明文规定清楚表明，其仅适用于由“本规则、依其发出的通知或法院命令”设定的期限，而不适用于由国会在法律中设定的时限，如受托人在此请求的那样：\n\n当本规则、依其发出的通知或法院命令要求或允许在指定期限内或于指定期限届满时完成某项行为时，法院可在具备正当理由的情况下，随时酌情决定：(1) 如延长期限的请求于原定期限或先前命令延长后的期限届满前提出，则不论是否经动议或通知，命令延长期限；或 (2) 如在指定期限届满后提出动议，且未能采取行动系因可宽恕的疏忽所致，则准许完成该项行为。\n\nFed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)（强调部分为后加）。“将第 9006(b) 条规则适用于第 546(a) 条，将违反宪法所保障的权力分立。”In re Walnut Hill, Inc., No. 16-20960 (JJT), 2018 WL 2672242, at \\*2 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 1, 2018). 这是因为，“[当]立法机关已作出权威性规定时，修改其决定不属于司法机关的权限范围。”Id.; see also In re Damach, Inc., 235 B.R. 727, 731 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1999)（认定第 9006(b) 条规则并不“允许法院延长国会在法律中设定的时限；其仅允许修改由其他规则或法院施加的时限。”）；In re Colad Group, Inc., 324 B.R. 208, 225 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2005)（认定“《破产程序规则》第 9006 条允许延长或缩短《破产程序规则》中的许多期限。然而，第 546(a) 条是一项法律，而非规则。因此，本院无权”依据第 9006 条规则就法定期限采取行动。）；In re Fawson, 338 B.R. 505 (Bankr. D. Utah 2006)（称“第 9006(b)(1) 条规则仅允许当本规则、依其发出的通知或法院命令要求或允许在指定期限内或于指定期限届满时完成某项行为时，当事人延长期限。根据其自身条款，第 9006(b) 条规则不允许法院延长《法典》明确规定的期限。”）；In re Win Trucking, Inc., 236 B.R. 774, 780 n.10 (Bankr. D. Utah 1999)（指出“[第] 9006(b) 条规则仅涵盖延长由《破产程序规则》或法院命令确定的期限，而不涵盖由《法典》本身确定的期限。”）。\n\n13. Walnut Hill 案具有指导意义。在该案中，与本案相同，美国破产法官 James J. Tancredi（詹姆斯·J·坦克雷迪）主持审理了一名第 7 章受托人提出的延长提起撤销权诉讼期限的动议。In re Walnut Hill, Inc., 2018 WL 2672242, at \\*1. 在认定第 9006(b) 条规则“仅适用于由‘本规则、依其发出的通知[,] [原文如此]或法院命令’设定的期限”时，本院确认，“该规则中没有任何地方提及法定期限。”Id. 为确认其解释，Tancredi 法官将第 9006(b) 条规则与第 9006(a) 条规则进行了对比，后者明确适用于“本规则、《联邦民事诉讼规则》、任何地方法规或法院命令中规定的任何期限，或任何未规定时间计算方法的法律中规定的任何期限。”Id.; see Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(a)（强调部分为后加）。Tancredi 法官进一步指出，适用第 9006(b) 条规则修改法定期限将属违宪。In re Walnut Hill, Inc., 2018 WL 2672242, at \\*2.\n\n14. 受托人为表明法院可以使用第 9006(b) 条规则主动延长时效期间而援引的唯一案件，是第十一巡回上诉法院在 In re International Administrative Services, Inc. 一案中的裁决。但是，在该案中——该案对本院并无约束力——破产法院审理中的一项待决诉讼涉及其评估提交期限是否应予中止。In re Int'l Admin. Servs., Inc., 408 F.3d 689, 694 (11th Cir. 2005). 本案并非如此。受托人尚未提起任何其寻求中止提交期限的撤销权诉讼，甚至不知道其是否会对数百名“潜在被告”中的任何一人提出任何请求权。\n\n15. 而且，即使假定第 9006(b) 条规则可被用于延长第 546(a) 条规定的期限，鉴于针对曹先生的事实情况，该等延长亦不适当，因为根据第 9006(b) 条规则延长期限的决定必须“具有正当理由”。在此，受托人未能证明任何足以延长对曹先生提起撤销权诉讼期限的依据。事实上，受托人用了数页篇幅描述债务人及其关联人的被指称行为，其中没有任何行为涉及曹先生。恰恰相反，如上文及下文进一步说明，曹先生已充分配合受托人及其律师，努力解决其问题，而非通过动议程序浪费受托人的时间和资源，或如受托人所称少数个人和实体所做的那样进行“空壳游戏”。\n\n16. 鉴于受托人向法院提出的请求性质严重，且法院缺乏准许该等请求的权限，法院应驳回时效中止动议。\n\nII. 对仅属“潜在被告”的大量名单中不明的一组请求权寻求适用衡平时效中止，尚属过早。\n\n17. 尽管破产法院有权对法定期限适用衡平时效中止，但法院现在裁决这些问题尚属过早——即在受托人提起针对可识别被告主张具体请求权的对抗诉讼，且该被告提出时效抗辩之前。In re Cramer, 636 B.R. 830, 832 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2022)（“[法院]应当在受托人于提起对抗诉讼前提出的单方动议中裁决衡平时效中止原则，还是应当在受托人最终提起的对抗诉讼中作出裁决？公平和正当程序要求采取后者。”）；In re Randolph Hosp., Inc., No. 20-10247, 2022 WL 19298765, at \\*1 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2022)（“尽管 § 546 和 § 108 的期限与任何时效期间一样，均可适用衡平时效中止，但鉴于不存在已确定的被告，且不存在与多付款项请求相关的待决对抗诉讼，清算受托人所寻求的预先认定尚属过早。”）。从程序上看，衡平时效中止原则是对时效抗辩的回应。See. e.g., Asp v. Milardo Photography, Inc., 573 F. Sup. 2d 677, 698 (D. Conn. 2008); Long v. Abbott Mortg. Corp., 459 F. Supp. 108, 113 (D. Conn. 1978). 因此，“当然，衡平时效中止原则只有在被告主张原告的诉因已过时效后才会发挥作用。”Long, 459 F. Sup. at 113 (citing Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 461 (2d Cir. 1974)).\n\n18. 例如，在 In re Cramer 一案中，破产受托人申请延长提起撤销权诉讼的两年法定期限。In re Cramer, 636 B.R. at 831. 在该案中，与本案相同，两年期限迅速临近，受托人主张债务人对调查的回应不足且隐瞒资产。Id. 法院驳回受托人的请求，明确认定“《联邦破产程序规则》不包含延长法定期限的规则。”Id. 法院进一步认定，受托人不得在提起迟延的对抗诉讼之前援引衡平时效中止原则，理由是允许此种预先援引将剥夺受影响当事人的正当法律程序。Id.; accord In re Walnut Hill, Inc., 2018 WL 2672242, at \\*2（“在当前阶段处理衡平时效中止问题尚属过早且不符合程序。”）；In re No. 1 Contracting Corp., No. BR 5-10-BK-01755-JJT, 2012 WL 4114818, at \\*1 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2012)（驳回延长期限请求，并对在法院面前不存在案件或争议时其是否能够“就未具名和未识别的被告延长法定期限”表示关切。）。\n\n19. 受托人在时效中止动议中援引的判例均不具有约束力，且易于区分。例如，在 Farwest 案中，债务人未提起任何撤销权诉讼，这迫使无担保债权人官方委员会在时效期间届满前夕提出紧急动议，以中止提起撤销权诉讼的期限，从而保全该等诉讼。In re Farwest Pump Co., No. 4:17-bk-11112 (BMW), 2020 WL 257784, at \\*3 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Jan. 15, 2020). 本案不存在此类紧急情形，因为受托人已经提起数项对抗诉讼，并称其拟及时提起其他诉讼。Tolling Mot. ¶ 1. 在受托人援引以支持其主张的其他案件中，与本案不同，未有人对延长动议提出异议。2\n\n20. 鉴于受托人寻求针对任何“潜在被告”提出的任何潜在请求权尚处于萌芽阶段，且法定期限尚未届满，此时讨论衡平时效中止原则既不适当，也完全为时过早。因此，受托人的请求不当地本末倒置，实质上寻求本院就衡平时效中止是否会在日后某一时点、在数量不限的可能对抗诉讼中、针对数量不限的“潜在被告”主张数量不限的请求权时适当，而作出宣告。没有任何理由证明应当向受托人集体开出这张空白支票——公平考量当然不能构成理由。\n\nIII. 不应适用衡平时效中止以延长受托人针对曹先生提起撤销权诉讼的期限\n\n21. 即使法院接受现阶段可以审议衡平时效中止——而其不应如此——如受托人承认，“为获得该原则的利益，受托人负有证明[]其 (1) 在其寻求中止的期间内已采取合理勤勉行动，以及 (2) 已证明情形如此特殊”的举证责任\n\n2 See Marsh v. Levy (In re Martin Levy of Berlin D.M.D., P.C.), 416 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009), In re Rockport Dev., Inc., No. 20-11339 (SC) (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2022); In re Visiting Nurse Ass'n of Inland and Counties, No. 18-16908 (MH) (Bankr. C.D. Cal. July 30, 2020); In re Builders Holding Co. Corp., No-16-06643 (EAG7) (Bankr. D. P.R. Apr. 25, 2019).\n\n该原则应当适用。”Zerilli-Edelglass v. New York City Transit Auth., 333 F.3d 74, 80–81 (2d Cir. 2003), as amended (July 29, 2003)（省略内部引文）。尽管受托人大言不惭地称，“事实记录轻易表明：(i) 特殊情形阻止受托人提起撤销权诉讼；以及 (ii) 受托人在追索其权利时勤勉行事”，但事实恰恰相反。时效中止动议第¶ 48段。\n\n22. 受托人援引一项佛罗里达州判决，In re Fundamental Long Term Care, Inc., 501 B.R. 784, 791 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Nov. 13, 2013)，主张，为在衡平时效中止问题上胜诉，其“无需证明任何（更不用说所有）潜在被告曾从事或参与阻碍受托人的调查取证。”时效中止动议第¶ 51段。受托人刻意未引用该案该段落的其余内容，后者明确表明，其关注点在于：“如果是另一目标对象积极或因过失隐瞒受托人的潜在请求权，则可能对撤销权诉讼承担责任的目标对象实际上将获得意外之利。”同上。这显然并非就Cao先生（曹德峰）而言所存在的担忧。\n\n23. 受托人为寻求延长提起撤销权诉讼的期限而提出的理由——据称债务人及其若干被指称的关联人存在阻碍和拖延行为——并不适用于Cao先生；其遵从并配合受托人的一贯记录证实，不存在特殊情形。事实上，Cao先生的身份信息系从刑事诉讼中一名非当事人被告的保释担保材料所涉一份无关法院文件中获得——而非通过破产案件中的任何调查，亦非通过与破产案件中另一目标对象的关联而获得。在获悉第2004条动议后，Cao先生聘请了法律顾问，授权其法律顾问接受送达，提交书面答复，提供了相关文件，并接受了长达7小时的证言录取。Cao先生从未因质疑第2004条动议或其后向第三方送达、要求提供有关Cao先生信息的任何传票而耗费受托人的资源。恰恰相反，Cao先生在所有方面均充分配合受托人。值得注意的是，尽管受托人长篇陈述本案中其他人据称存在的阻碍和拖延行为，时效中止动议中却未在任何地方提及Cao先生。因此，不存在Cao先生会因另一方任何据称的阻碍行为而获得任何“意外之利”的担忧——事实上，受托人如何获悉Cao先生，与破产案件中的任何其他目标对象毫无关系。\n\n24. 受托人亦无法证明其在主张针对Cao先生的任何请求权时一直勤勉。毕竟，自Cao先生接受证言录取以来已近四个月——在该次证言录取中，Cao先生在七个小时内对受托人的问题作出了实质性答复。此后，受托人未对Cao先生提起任何撤销权诉讼，亦未就针对其的任何潜在请求权向Cao先生寻求补充信息。受托人根本无法为其就可能针对Cao先生提出的任何请求权而闲置四个月作出正当说明。\n\n25. 不存在比受托人所寻求者更严重的正当程序滥用：利用少数其他人的不当行为指控，对数百名“潜在被告”预先中止时效期间——尤其是对那些如Cao先生般配合受托人调查取证工作的人员。鉴于已从Cao先生处获得完整且不受限制的调查取证，受托人没有任何依据就Cao先生衡平地中止法定期限。\n\n结论\n\n26. 基于上述理由，Cao先生谨请求法院驳回受托人的时效中止动议。在与本文件提出的异议一致的范围内，Cao先生亦加入其他当事人就时效中止动议提出的异议。Cao先生保留提出任何可能属必要和适当的进一步及/或未来针对时效中止动议的异议的全部权利。\n\n日期：New York, New York February 5, 2024\nOLSHAN FROME WOLOSKY LLP（奥尔尚·弗罗姆·沃洛斯基律师事务所）\n\n签署人：/s/ Adam H. Friedman\n\nAdam H. Friedman（亚当·H·弗里德曼） Katherine E. Mateo（凯瑟琳·E·马特奥）（即将提交pro hac vice动议） 1325 Avenue of the Americas New York, New York 10019 (212) 451-2300 非当事人Defeng Cao（曹德峰）的代理律师\n送达证明\n\n本人，KATHERINE E. MATEO（凯瑟琳·E·马特奥），特此证明，于February 5th, 2024，本人已通过CM/ECF向所有登记在案的律师送达上述文件的真实、正确副本。当事人可通过法院的CM/ECF系统查阅本文件。\n\n/s/ Katherine E. Mateo _________ KATHERINE E. MATEO","key_entities":["Je","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Guo","Miles Guo","Despins","Paul Hastings","CIPA"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":1789,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1891,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2494,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2509,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2515,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":4778,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 18:41:04"}