{"id":"court_ctb_2557_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":2557,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2024-02-05","title":"LAZARE POTTER GIACOVAS & MOYLE LLP Michael T. Conway, Esq. 747 Third Avenue, 16th Floor New York, NY 10017 Telephone: (9","summary_zh":"异议书 —— Ho Wan Kwok 破产案（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo），CTB 22-50073 ECF #2557（2024-02-05立案）。Taurus Fund LLC、Taurus Management LLC 与 Scott Barnett 提交异议，反对第 11 章受托人 Luc A. Despins 延长根据《破产法典》第 108、546(a) 及 549 条提起撤销权诉讼期限的动议，主张法院无权予以先发制人的衡平法中止（equitable tolling）。","summary_en":"Objection — In re Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo / Guo Wengui), CTB No. 22-50073, ECF #2557 (filed Feb 5, 2024). Taurus Fund LLC, Taurus Management LLC, and Scott Barnett object to Chapter 11 Trustee Luc A. Despins' motion to extend the deadline to file avoidance actions under Bankruptcy Code §§ 108, 546(a), and 549, arguing the court lacks authority to grant preemptive equitable tolling.","body_en":"LAZARE POTTER GIACOVAS & MOYLE LLP Michael T. Conway, Esq. 747 Third Avenue, 16th Floor New York, NY 10017 Telephone: (917) 242-1597 [mconway@lpgmlaw.com](mailto:mconway@lpgmlaw.com)\n\n*Counsel for Taurus Fund LLC, Scott Barnett, as Trustee of Taurus Fund and Taurus Management LLC, as Trustee of Taurus Fund LLC*\n\n## IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT\n\nIn re: Chapter 11\n\nHO WAN KWOK, *et al.*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\n\nDebtor. (Jointly Administered)\n\n## **OBJECTION TO THE CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF AN ORDER EXTENDING DEADLINE FOR TRUSTEE TO FILE AVOIDANCE ACTIONS UNDER BANKRUPTCY CODE SECTIONS 108, 546(a), AND 549**\n\nTaurus Fund, LLC (\"Taurus Fund\"), Taurus Management, LLC (\"Taurus Management\"), and Scott Barnett (collectively, \"Taurus\") hereby file this Objection (\"Objection\") to the Chapter 11 Trustee's (the \"Trustee\") Motion for Entry of Order Extending Deadline for Trustee to File Avoidance Actions Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 108, 546(a), and 549 (\"Tolling Motion\"), and in support thereof respectfully state as follows:\n\n## **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\nThe Tolling Motion seeks relief on grounds that have recently been considered and squarely denied by this Court. Specifically, the Trustee seeks to pre-emptively extend the statute of limitations for all future avoidance actions pursuant to either the doctrine of equitable tolling or the time extension provisions of Bankruptcy Rule 9006[1](#page-1-0) . However, in 2018, this Court specifically held that neither of those grounds permit a Court to extend the statutes of limitations in Section 546(a). In *In re: Walnut Hill, Inc.*, 2018 WL 2672242 (Bank. D. Conn 2018), the Honorable James J. Tancredi held that: (1) the doctrine of equitable tolling could not be used preemptively; and (2) Bankruptcy Rule 9006 could not be used to extend the time limits set forth by Congress in the Bankruptcy Code. *See e.g. In re: Walnut Hill, Inc.*, 2018 WL 2672242 at \\* 1-2. Nevertheless, the Trustee argues that the *Walnut Hill* holding can be disregarded merely by providing notice of the Tolling Motion to all prospective known and unknown defendants. However, such notice does not cure the core defect in the Trustee's request for equitable tolling. Per the applicable caselaw, the Trustee may only raise the doctrine of equitable tolling as a defense to a statute of limitations challenge in an adversary proceeding. Simply put, this Court currently lacks authority to grant the relief that the Trustee requests.\n\nMoreover, even if this Court was inclined to disregard the holding of *Walnut Hill* and its progeny, the Trustee's Tolling Motion should still be denied as to Taurus. The Trustee has not alleged that Taurus has engaged in any conduct that has prevented the Trustee from bringing all of his claims in the already-pending adversary proceeding against Taurus. Statutes of limitation reflect the importance of finality and settled expectations in our civil justice system. As Congress noted, \"the purpose of a statute of limitations [in Section 546] is to define the period of time that a party is at risk of suit.\" H.R. REP. 103-835, 49, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3358. Taurus is already a party to the Adversary Proceeding, and it would be manifestly unjust for this Court to further extend the statute of limitations for the Trustee to bring additional claims against Taurus when the Trustee could have done so within the prescribed statutes of limitation. As more fully\n\n<span id=\"page-1-0\"></span><sup>1</sup> As used herein, the term \"Rule\" refers to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.\n\ndiscussed in this Opposition, Taurus respectfully requests that the Court deny the Trustee's Tolling Motion.\n\n#### **RELEVANT BACKGROUND**\n\n1. On February 15, 2022, the debtor, Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"), filed a voluntary petition for protection under Chapter 11 of Title 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in this Court, commencing the above-captioned bankruptcy proceedings.\n\n2. On July 11, 2023, the Chapter 11 Trustee, Luc A. Despins (\"Trustee\"), filed a complaint to commence an adversary proceeding (Adversary Proceeding No. 23-05017) (the \"Adversary Proceeding\") against Taurus seeking: (i) a declaratory judgment that Debtor is the equitable owner of certain real property, and for turnover of that real property to the Trustee; (ii) declaratory judgment that Debtor is the equitable owner of Taurus Fund, and for turnover of both Taurus Fund and Taurus Fund's assets to the Trustee; and (iii) declaratory judgment that Taurus Fund is Debtor's alter ego, and for turnover of both Taurus Fund and Taurus Fund's assets to the estate.\n\n3. On January 9, 2024, Trustee filed an Emergency Motion for Entry of Order, Pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Section 105(a) and Bankruptcy Rules 2002 and 9014, (I) Approving Form and Manner of Notice of Trustee's Forthcoming Tolling Motion and (II) Scheduling Hearing (the \"Notice Motion\") [Dkt. No. 2494]. In the Notice Motion, the Trustee sought Court approval of the form and manner in which the Trustee would notice this Tolling Motion.\n\n4. On January 18, 2024, the Trustee filed this Tolling Motion.\n\n5. On January 19, 2024, the Court granted the Trustee's Notice Motion [Dkt. No. 2515], and approved the form notice of the Tolling Motion (the \"Notice\").\n\n3\n\n#### **ARGUMENT**\n\n6. The Court should deny the Tolling Motion because this Court does not have the power to grant the requested relief. As was recently held by this Court in *Walnut Hill*, it is premature to consider the equitable tolling doctrine at this juncture. Trustee's Notice does not cure this procedurally improper application of the doctrine. Moreover, as also held in *Walnut Hill*, Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) cannot extend the deadlines enacted by Congress in a statute. In the alternative, even if this Court was to disregard the holdings of *Walnut Hill*, and rule that the Court does have the power to alter the statutes of limitation set forth in Section 546(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, the doctrine of equitable tolling should not be applied as to Taurus.\n\n#### **A. Court Has no Power to Grant the Requested Relief**\n\n### **i. The Doctrine of Equitable Tolling Cannot Be Applied Prospectively**\n\n7. Taurus does not dispute that courts across the country have largely held that the doctrine of equitable tolling applies to the statues of limitations set forth in Section 546(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. *See e.g. Souden* v. *Citicorp (In re Souden)*, Docket Nos. 00-34501 (LMW), 08-3055 (LMW), 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 1019, at \\*9 (Bankr. D. Conn. Apr. 20, 2009) (\"[T]he limitations period of Section 546(a)(1) is amenable to the doctrine of equitable tolling\"). However, courts across the country have been inconsistent as to the proper timing of this doctrine's applicability. Courts in those states that have specifically considered the appropriate timing of the equitable tolling doctrine, such as in Connecticut, rule that equitable tolling cannot be applied prospectively. *See Walnut Hill*, 2018 WL 2672242 at \\*2. In *Walnut Hill,* this Court noted that \"[p]rocedurally, the doctrine of equitable tolling is recognized as a **response to a statute of limitations defense** asserted in a **pending litigation**.\" *Id.*, *citing Long v. Abbott Mortg. Corp.* 459 F. Supp. 108, 113 (D. Conn. 1978) (emphasis added).\n\n8. Specifically, when faced with a request to toll the statutes of limitation in Section 546(a) prior to expiration of these statues, the court in *Walnut Hill* found that:\n\nIt is wholly premature and procedurally flawed to address equitable tolling outside the context of an evidentiary hearing on the facts and circumstances to be proven in the adversary proceeding against specific defendants, once a statute of limitations defense has been asserted.\n\n*Id.* Since the decision in *Walnut Hill*, numerous courts have agreed with this holding. *See In re Cramer*, 636 B.R. 830, 832 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2022) (\"The trustee remains free to raise equitable tolling at a later date after filing untimely complaints\"); *In re Randolph Hosp., Inc*., No. 20-10247, 2022 WL 19298765, at \\*1 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2022) (\"While the limitations periods of § 546 and § 108, like any statute of limitations, are subject to equitable tolling, the preemptive finding the Liquidation Trustee seeks is premature given there are no identified defendants and no pending adversary proceedings related to the overpayment claims\").\n\n9. While the Trustee does cite some out-of-circuit cases that have granted relief prospectively, none of these cases actually considered the proper timing of bringing an equitable tolling argument (and are not binding on this Court, in any event). In most of the Trustee's cited cases, the motions to extend time were granted unopposed (*In re Rockport Dev., Inc.*, Case No. 20- 11339 and *In re Visiting Nurse Ass'n of Inland Counties,* Case No. 18-16908, both filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California; and *In re Builders Holding Co.*, Case No. 16-06643 filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court of Puerto Rico), or were objected to on grounds other than equitable tolling (*In re Dwek*, Case No. 07-11757). The Courts in these cases never had an opportunity to consider the merits of the trustees' arguments on equitable tolling.\n\n10. The two other allegedly prospective relief cases are also not helpful to the Trustee. In *In re Farwest Pump Company*, 2020 WL 257784 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2020), the Court did not, in fact, extend the deadlines to toll prospectively. There, the Committee of Unsecured Creditors filed its motion to toll on the deadline for the parties to file adversary actions to recover preference payments and/or fraudulent transfers. *In re Farwest Pump Company*, 2020 WL 257784 at \\*2. The court determined, \"upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances,\" that the statutes of limitations had been equitably tolled because the court had yet to decide whether the Committee of Unsecured Creditors had standing to pursue fraudulent transfers and/or preference claims. *Id.* at 3-4 (emphasis added). This was not done prospectively, but rather, after the statute of limitations had expired. And, of course, in the case *sub judice*, there is no open question as to the Trustee's standing to pursue fraudulent transfers and/or preference claims.\n\n11. Finally, in *Marsh v. Levy (In re Martin Levy of Berlin D.M.D., P.C.*), 416 B.R.1, 8 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009), there was never even an issue with respect to equitable tolling. There, the trustee's initial motion to extend the deadlines of Section 546(a), filed two days prior to the expiration period, did not actually cite to any law in support of an extension. Instead, the trustee's grounds were rooted in the facts of the case - there was still a pending a motion to compel against creditors for information that might result in one or more actions or proceedings. *Id.* at 3. No parties challenged this motion. Eventually, when the trustee filed the adversary proceeding, the defendants raised the statute of limitations defense. The court in *Marsh v. Levy* did not consider equitable tolling, but rather ruled on whether the defendants waived their statute of limitations defense when they did not object to trustee's initial motion. Again, an equitable tolling issue was never litigated.\n\n12. Just like the *Walnut Hill* case, this matter has not yet reached the point where, procedurally, the doctrine of equitable tolling is relevant as to the prospective defendants. The statutory deadlines to file additional causes of actions have not yet passed. As to Taurus, there is\n\nalready a pending Adversary Proceeding in which statute of limitations has not been raised as an issue. The Trustee has not initiated any other adversary proceedings against Taurus. Thus, it is both wholly premature and procedurally improper to seek to extend a deadline by way of equitable tolling given the facts of this case.\n\n#### **ii. The Notice is not Sufficient to Overcome** *Walnut Hill***'s Holding.**\n\n13. The Trustee seeks to sidestep the holding of *Walnut Hill* and its progeny by providing the Notice of the Tolling Motion. The Trustee reasons that notice was the \"primary concern\" of the courts that have \"declined to rely on equitable tolling to prospectively toll a statute of limitations.\" Tolling Motion at 13. None of the cases cited lend themselves to a reading that a simple notice could cure a premature equitable tolling defense.\n\n14. In *Cramer*, the court did indeed express concern about the lack of notice to potentially affected parties because trustee's motion to equitably toll statutes of limitation to bring avoidance actions was brought *ex parte*. However, the holding was more fundamental: the court required the trustee to actually commence an adversary proceeding before the court could even consider the equitable tolling doctrine. *See In re Cramer*, 636 B.R. at 832 (\"The trustee remains free to raise equitable tolling at a later date after filing untimely complaints.\") Nothing from the reading of *Cramer* indicates that serving a notice of a motion to toll would cure the fact that it is premature to raise equitable tolling prior to initiating any avoidance actions. *Id.* at 833 (\"[T]he trustee cannot win the argument of whether or not equitable tolling applies *in advance* and without notice and an opportunity for the defendant to resist application of the doctrine\") (emphasis added); *see also Walnut Hill,* 2018 WL 2672242 at \\*2 (\"[p]rocedurally, the doctrine of equitable tolling is recognized as a response to a statute of limitations defense asserted in a pending litigation\") (emphasis added).\n\n15. Similarly, and as quoted by the Trustee, the court in *In re Randolph Hospital, Inc*., No. 20-10247, 2022 WL 19298765, \\*1 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2022) denied, without prejudice, a motion to equitably toll the limitations period, to be renewed after the trustee \"**initiates actions**  against identifiable and properly noticed defendants.\" Tolling Motion at 13, *citing In re Randolph Hosp., Inc*., 2022 WL 19298765 at \\*1 (emphasis added). Again, these cases indicate that serving a notice on prospective defendants is not enough for the Court to consider an equitable tolling doctrine to be properly raised.\n\n16. Moreover, the common law doctrine of equitable tolling allows a court to \"extend a statute of limitations on a case-by-case basis to prevent inequity.\" *In re Anderson*, 623 B.R. 199, 217 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2020) (emphasis added). Here, the Trustee is seeking a blanket extension of all statutes of limitation against all known and unknown potential defendants. At this point, none of the prospective defendants who received the Notice actually know what they could be potentially sued for, the grounds of such suit, or the amount in controversy. Without a properly filed and served complaint in an adversary proceeding, a potential defendant is unable to properly object, or to determine whether an objection would be appropriate, cost-effective, or worth the Court's time[2](#page-7-0) , to the Trustee's blanket application of the equitable tolling doctrine. Accordingly, the Court cannot make a proper determination as to whether equitable tolling is appropriate in every one of these situations on a case-by-case basis as required by law.\n\n<span id=\"page-7-0\"></span><sup>2</sup> Notably, here, the Trustee is asserting that equitable tolling should apply to hundreds of potential defendants. Currently, the *Walnut Hill* case gives those potential defendants significant comfort that Trustee's motion will be denied without their intervention. However, should the Court adopt Trustee's position and grant the motion, the next time such an issue arises, the Court would likely be flooded with hundreds of independent opposition briefs by potential defendants that need to protect against the *possibility* of a claim. The Court should never be faced with such a logistical nightmare; rather, by requiring the filing of adversary proceedings prior to the application of equitable tolling, it ensures that only actual defendants facing real claims will be litigating this issue in front of the Court.\n\n# **iii. Rule 9006(b) May Not Be Used to Extend Statutory Deadlines, Including Those In** § **546**\n\n17. The Trustee's motion must also be denied because Rule 9006(b) does not provide\n\nthe Court with authority to extend a statute of limitations that is set by Congress. As the Court\n\nheld in *Walnut Hill*:\n\nRule 9006(b) cannot apply to Section 546(a) without violating the separation of powers preserved in the Constitution. Where the legislature has spoken authoritatively, it is not within the province of the judiciary to modify its determination.\n\n*In re Walnut Hill, Inc.*, 2018 WL 2672242, at \\*2\n\n18. Pursuant to Rule 9006(b), the Court may only enlarge deadlines for \"when an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified period *by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of the court*….\" Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b) (emphasis added). A plain reading of Rule 9006(b) confirms that the rule applies only to deadlines set by Court rules or Court order, not statutory deadlines.\n\n19. Fundamentally, the plain language of Rule 9006(b) militates against using it to enlarge a Section 546(a) deadline, particularly in context of the language contained in other portions of the rule. Indeed, while Rule 9006(b) explicitly applies to \"a specified period by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court,\" the section immediately above it, Rule 9006(a) appliesto \"computing any time period specified in these rules, in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in any local rule or court order, *or in any statute* that does not specify a method of computing time.\" *See* Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(a) and (b) (emphasis added). Thus, the absence of language identical or similar to \"or in any statute\" in Rule 9006(b) while such language is present in Rule 9006(a) supports the conclusion that Rule 9006(b) is not intended to apply to deadlines articulated in the Bankruptcy Code, such as Section 546(a). *Walnut Hill* agreed with this reasoning. *See Walnut Hill*, 2018 WL 2672242 at \\*1 (\"However, Rule 9006(b) is noticeably missing the same, or similar, language involving its application to a statute [as Rule 9006(a) does]\"). Simply put, Rule 9006(b) does not provide a mechanism by which the Court can enlarge the Section 546(a) deadlines.\n\n#### **iv. Eleventh Circuit Opinion is Not Binding, and Adopts Faulty Argument**\n\n20. The Trustee argues that the Court in *Walnut Hill* got the decision wrong. *See* Tolling Motion at 15-16. Trustee urges this Court to adopt the analysis on this issue adopted by the Eleventh Circuit in *In re Int'l Admin. Servs., Inc.*, 408 F.3d 689 (11th Cir. 2005). That case, which is not binding on this Court, involved very particular set of circumstances. Although the underlying Bankruptcy Court originally extended the deadline for the Committee to file avoidance actions under Rule 9006, the Committee had actually commenced an adversary proceeding by the time the defendant raised a statute of limitations defense and elevated the controversy to the Court of Appeals. As a result, the Eleventh Circuit analyzed this case not only under 9006(b), but also under the doctrine of equitable tolling in the context of a pending adversary proceeding. The Eleventh Circuit ultimately determined that the Committee satisfied its burden for equitable tolling in a pending adversary proceeding. In light of the Court's finding of equitable tolling, its discussion of Rule 9006 is effectively dicta.\n\n21. To the extent the Court in *International Administrative Services, Inc*. actually addressed the operation of Rule 9006(b), the Court's analysis was unsound. The Court acknowledged that Rule 9006(b) did not explicitly apply to statutory deadlines, but concluded that because the Bankruptcy Rules generally discuss adversary proceedings, Rule 9006(b) can somehow be read to apply to statutory statutes of limitation. *In re Int'l Admin. Servs., Inc*., 408 F.3d at 699. However, the adversary proceeding rules, Rules 7001, *et seq*., do not discuss various statutes of limitations established by the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, Rule 9006(b) cannot be fairly read to apply to statutory deadlines to begin avoidance actions.\n\n22. Moreover, Rule 9006(b) does not, in fact, apply to all the rules under its umbrella. As the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 9006 state, \"[i]n the interest of prompt administration of bankruptcy cases certain time periods may **not** be extended.\" Advisory Committee Notes to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006 (emphasis added). As evidence of this intent, Rule 9006(b), by its own language, says that it does not apply to all rules – it specifically carves out rules which the court may not enlarge – the filing of list of 20 largest unsecured creditors (Rule 1007(d), the meeting of creditors in general and the election of a Trustee under Chapter 7 (Rule 2003(a) and 2003(d)), time for filing a motion to alter or amend findings or for additional findings after entry of judgment (Rule 7052), time for filing a motion for a new trial or to alter or amend a judgment (Rule 9023), and time for filing a motion for relief from judgment or order (Rule 9024). Accordingly, the Court's reasoning in *International Administrative Services, Inc.* is faulty.\n\n23. The Trustee cannot seriously ask the Court to disregard its own ruling in *Walnut Hill* to follow a non-binding Eleventh Circuit's ruling, especially when subsequent courts in the Eleventh Circuit have themselves narrowed the holding of *International Administrative Services, Inc.* For example, in a 2022 case, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida refused to preemptively extend the deadlines for Section 546(a) causes of action upon the same grounds as *International Administrative Services*, despite acknowledging that this case is the controlling case on 546(a) extensions in the Eleventh Circuit. *See In re Am. Purchasing Servs., LLC,* 2022 WL 17096649, at \\*3 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Nov. 21, 2022) (\"Although *International Administrative Services* is controlling law in this Circuit – bestowing this Court with authority to grant the requested relief – this Court reads *International Administrative Services* narrowly and based on a specific set of facts.\") In *American Purchasing Services*, the Court concluded that the Eleventh Circuit's ruling merely \"permits – but does not require – the Court to extend the section\n\n546(a) deadline under appropriately egregious circumstances: like where the litigation targets themselves are stymying the trustee's discovery efforts.\" *Id.*\n\n24. In an interesting footnote, the Court in *American Purchasing Services* noted that\n\n*International Administrative Services* was decided in 2005 – about a decade before the Supreme Court held in *Law v. Siegel* that a bankruptcy court may not exercise Bankruptcy Code section 105(a) and its inherent powers in contravention of the Bankruptcy Code. 571 U.S. 415, 421 (2014) (\"It is hornbook law that § 105(a) 'does not allow the bankruptcy court to override explicit mandates of other sections of the Bankruptcy Code.'\") (quoting 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 105.01[2], p. 105–6 (16th ed. 2013)). Although *International Administrative Services* does not specifically discuss section 105, the spirit of pre-*Law v. Siegel* section 105 jurisprudence certainly permeates the Eleventh Circuit's analysis.\n\n*In re Am. Purchasing Servs., LLC*, 2022 WL 17096649, fn. 28.\n\n25. For all the foregoing reasons, this Court should not abandon the ruling of *Walnut Hill* in favor of a non-binding, criticized Eleventh Circuit opinion.\n\n# **v. Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code Is Not Applicable to Extend Statute of Limitations in Section 546(a).**\n\n26. Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code similarly cannot be used to extend the deadlines in Section 546(a). As a practical matter, if Section 105(a) could be used to extend the statutes of limitations in Section 546(a), litigants would rely on this Section when requesting extensions of time. The Trustee cites no direct cases on this point, and there are a dearth of cases on this issue as it relates to extensions of time to file avoidance actions.\n\n27. Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that, \"[t]he court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. 11 U.S.C.A. § 105. \"Section 105(a) empowers the bankruptcy court to exercise its equitable powers—where 'necessary' or 'appropriate'—to facilitate the implementation of other Bankruptcy Code provisions. . .Although expansively phrased, section 105(a) affords bankruptcy courts considerably less discretion than first meets the eye, and in no sense constitutes a roving commission to do equity.\" *In re Ludlow Hosp. Soc., Inc*., 124 F.3d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 1997) (emphasis added). In 2014, the Supreme Court analyzed Section 105(a) and ruled that \"whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code.\" *Love. v. Siegel*, 571 U.S. 415, 421 (2014).\n\n28. As stated, there are virtually no cases discussing the interplay between Section 546(a) and the extension of those deadlines pursuant to Section 105(a)[3](#page-12-0) . However, courts have routinely refused to utilize Section 105(a) to extend other deadlines that are explicitly set forth in the Bankruptcy Code. In the most analogous cases, Courts have refused to utilize Section 105(a) to extend the time period to file adversary proceedings to dispute the dischargeability of certain debt. *See e.g. In re Hunter*, 552 B.R. 864, 870 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2016). As the court stated in *Hunter*, \"[t]he Code and Bankruptcy Rules provide that untimely complaints are disallowed. Section 105(a) may not be employed in contradiction of the Code and Bankruptcy Rules to allow late-file complaints, even under the weight of equity.\" *Id.* at 871. Courts have also held that Section 105(a) could not be used to extend the statutory deadline that expressly limited the time period during which a plan could be filed. *See In re Randi's, Inc.*, 474 B.R. 783, 787 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2012). In *Randi's, Inc.*, the court looked at the general statutory interpretation principle that \"a more general statute gives way to a more specific one when there exists friction between the two.\" *Id.* at 787-788. The court thus concluded that since one section of the Bankruptcy Code specifically set forth the deadlines by which the relevant plan needed to be filed, and \"11 U.S.C. §\n\n<span id=\"page-12-0\"></span><sup>3</sup> While *American Purchasing Services* (discussed above) does reference Section 105(a) in passing, it does not discuss the application of Section 105(a) on requests to extend the time limits in Section 546(a). Instead, the court in *American Purchasing Services* delves into distinguishing the facts of the case before the court from those in *International Administrative Services*, a case that was decided prior to the Supreme Court limiting the reach of Section 105(a) in *Love v. Siegel*. Ultimately, the court reached its decision pursuant to the doctrine of equitable tolling, not Section 105(a).\n\n105 is a general grant of equitable powers,\" the more specific statute with the deadlines governs. *Id.* at 788. Here, Section 546(a) has explicitly provided for statutes of limitations for filing avoidance actions. The Court may not utilize a more general statute, Section 105(a), to extend these deadlines.\n\n29. The Trustee cites two cases for the proposition that \"courts have specifically relied on section 105(a) to extend limitations periods set out in the Bankruptcy Code.\" Tolling Motion at 17, *citing Morgan v. United States (In re Morgan)*, 182 F.3d 775 (11th Cir. 1999) and *United States v. Richards (In re Richards)*, 994 F.2d 763 (10th Cir. 1993). Both of these cases deal with the provision of the Bankruptcy Code[4](#page-13-0) dealing with statutorily-prescribed \"priority status\" periods for income tax claims. In *Morgan*, the Eleventh Circuit utilized the Bankruptcy Court's equitable powers under Section 105(a) to toll the three-year priority status afforded to tax liabilities. *Morgan v. United States (In re Morgan)*, 182 F.3d at 779. The Court held that \"[d]ue to congressional intent, which favors allowing the government sufficient time to collect taxes, and the fear that taxpayers may abuse the bankruptcy process in order to avoid paying taxes, we hold that the equities will generally favor the government in cases such as this.\" *Id.* at 779-780. *Richards* was an earlier case, involving a similar issue with respect to the statutorily-prescribed priority status period of IRS' claims for unpaid income taxes. In *Richards*, the court suspended the Bankruptcy Code's 240-day assessment period for purposes of preserving the priority status of the IRS' claim for unpaid income taxes. *United States v. Richards (In re Richards)*, 994 F.2d at 765. Similar to *Morgan*, the court reasoned that tolling this period \"preserves Congress's intent to afford the\n\n<span id=\"page-13-0\"></span><sup>4</sup> It appears that the Bankruptcy Code was revised in the interim between the decisions in *Richards* and *Morgan*. Accordingly, while it appears that the courts were considering different provisions of the Bankruptcy Code dealing with the priority status of income tax claims, these provisions are indeed the same for purposes of the present matter.\n\ngovernment certain time periods to pursue collection efforts, and at the same time prevents the debtor from avoiding priority by prolonging the initial bankruptcy proceeding.\" *Id.*\n\n30. This matter is more akin to the cases dealing with the tolling of complaints to file nondischargeability actions, since Section 546(a) is a statute that dictates the time periods within which to bring avoidance actions. Accordingly, per the reasoning in *Hunter* and *Randi's*, *Inc.* as discussed above, Section 105(a) would not apply to extend the statute of limitations set forth in Section 546(a). As Congress noted, \"the purpose of a statute of limitations [in Section 546(a)(1)] is to define the period of time that a party is at risk of suit.\" H.R. REP. 103-835, 49, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3358. It would go against Congressional intent to extend the period within which a party is at a risk of a lawsuit utilizing the equities power of Section 105(a).\n\n#### **B. Trustee Is Not Entitled to Equitable Tolling.**\n\n31. Even if the Trustee could prove that this Court has the authority to extend the statute of limitations at this time, the Trustee is still not entitled to equitably toll the statutes of limitations for avoidance actions as to Taurus. \"Equitable tolling is an **extraordinary remedy appropriate only in rare and exceptional circumstance**. . .in which a party is prevented in some extraordinary way from exercising his rights.\" *Anderson v. Lewis*, No. 3:20-CV-370 (VAB), 2023 WL 6378924, at \\*8 (D. Conn. Sept. 29, 2023) (emphasis added). \"To obtain the benefit of the doctrine, the Trustee bears the burden of establishing that [he], '(1) has acted with reasonable diligence during the time period [he] seeks to have tolled, and (2) has proved that the circumstances are so extraordinary that the doctrine should apply.'\" *In re Anderson*, 623 B.R. at 217 (internal citations omitted).\n\n32. While Trustee cites to cases where it is debtor's conduct that has led Courts to conclude that extraordinary circumstances exist to toll the statutes of limitation as to all parties, that is not a uniform understanding across all courts in this country. There is a considerable split \"in the case law regarding whether the **defendant** must have actively participated in the fraud or wrongful conduct that forms the basis for application of equitable tolling, or whether it is enough that the **debtor** fraudulently concealed the transfer.\" *In re Sasso*, 550 B.R. 550, 555–56 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2016), *citing In re Maxon Eng'g Services, Inc.*, 397 B.R. 228, 230 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2008) (emphasis added). The *Maxon* Court held that there must be a sufficient nexus between the fraudulent conduct and the **defendant** to apply equitable tolling to the limitations period set forth in Section 546(a). *In re Maxon Eng'g Services, Inc.*, 397 B.R. at 230.\n\n33. This Court has not yet taken a stance on whether a Trustee must prove that the **debtor's** dilatory and/or fraudulent conduct is enough to apply equitable tolling to other parties. However, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, and the one Court in this Circuit that has considered the issue – The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, indicate that it is the **defendant's** conduct that must be considered in order to decide whether to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling. *See Bennett v. U.S. Lines, Inc.,* 64 F.3d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 1995) (\"equitable tolling prevents the running of a statute of limitations against a plaintiff who is unaware that he has a cause of action because of **defendant's** fraudulent acts or concealment\"); *see also In re Level 8 Apparel, LLC*, 2021 WL 1977161, \\*5 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2021) (stating that equitable tolling is \"available to a plaintiff who establishes that (1) the **defendant** concealed from plaintiff the existence of plaintiff's cause of action; (2) upon discovering the cause of action, plaintiff commenced an action within the time period prescribed by the applicable statute of limitations; and (3) plaintiff's ignorance of the cause of action was not the result of a lack of due diligence on his part\").\n\n34. Similarly, in *American Purchasing Services, LLC*[5](#page-16-0) , the Court reasoned that:\n\n. . .*International Administrative Services* does not give a trustee authority **to obtain a blanket extension of the section 546(a) deadline as to all potential litigation targets whenever a trustee is not yet ready – or professes to be unable – to bring his claims**. Rather, a trustee must demonstrate sufficiently egregious actions by the litigation targets or those in concert with them – similar to those detailed in *International Administrative Services* – to obtain such extraordinary relief.\n\n35. *In re Am. Purchasing Servs., LLC*, 2022 WL 17096649, at \\*3 (emphasis added).\n\nBut again, the Trustee must demonstrate the egregious actions by Taurus in order to obtain extension of the deadlines to file additional avoidance causes of action against Taurus. Mere allegations of wrongdoing by the Debtor are simply not enough to extend a blanket extension of the Section 546(a) deadlines as to all potential known and unknown defendants.[6](#page-16-1)\n\n36. Here, there are no allegations that Taurus's actions prevented the Trustee from bringing all of Trustee's avoidance claims against Taurus in a timely manner. The Trustee already initiated an adversary proceeding against Taurus in this bankruptcy proceeding almost seven months ago. Taurus has dutifully participated in discovery with the Trustee, until the matter was stayed at the Trustee's request a few days ago. It is manifestly prejudicial to Taurus to have the Court extend statute of limitations so that Trustee could bring additional causes of action against Taurus. Statutes of limitation exist for a reason – they reflect the importance of finality and settled\n\n<span id=\"page-16-0\"></span><sup>5</sup> The case in which the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida narrowed the ruling of *International Administrative Services, Inc.*, as discussed in Section A(iv) above.\n\n<span id=\"page-16-1\"></span><sup>6</sup> In ¶ 51 of the Tolling Motion, the Trustee cites to *In re Fundamental Long Term Care, Inc.*, 501 B.R. 784, 791 (Bankr. M.D.Fla. Nov. 13, 2013) for the proposition that if one potential defendant engaged or participated in blocking the Trustee's discovery, then the deadline should be tolled as to all claims. Tolling Motion at 21. *Fundamental Long Term Care* was decided before *American Purchasing Services*, also a Florida case. There is a possibility that had *Fundamental Long Term Care* been decided after *American Purchasing Services*, it would not have made such a proclamation regarding tolling the statute of limitations as against all prospective defendants.\n\nexpectations in the civil justice system. As Congress noted, \"the purpose of a statute of limitations [in Section 546] is to define the period of time that a party is at risk of suit.\" H.R. REP. 103-835, 49, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3358. And as the Supreme Court pointedly stated, \"[d]eadlines may lead to unwelcome results, but they prompt parties to act and they produce finality.\" *Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz*, 503 U.S. 638, 644 (1992). The Trustee has failed to allege facts that would support the application of the equitable tolling doctrine as Taurus.\n\n### **CONCLUSION**\n\nFor all the foregoing reasons, Taurus Fund and Taurus Management respectfully request that: (1) the Court deny the Tolling Motion; and (2) grant such and further relief that is necessary and just.\n\nDated: February 5, 2024 New York, New York\n\nLAZARE POTTER GIACOVAS & MOYLE LLP\n\nBy: /s/ Michael T. Conway Michael T. Conway Lazare Potter Giacovas & Moyle LLP 747 Third Avenue, 16th Floor New York, NY 10017 Telephone: (917) 242-1597 [mconway@lpgmlaw.com](mailto:mconway@lpgmlaw.com)\n\n*Counsel for Taurus Fund LLC, Scott Barnett, as Trustee of Taurus Fund and Taurus Management LLC, as Trustee of Taurus Fund LLC*\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2557 Filed 02/05/24 Entered 02/05/24 13:21:55 Page 19 of 19\n\n## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nThe undersigned certifies that on February 5, 2024, a copy of the foregoing Opposition was served on all parties of record via CM/ECF.\n\nDated: February 5, 2024 /s/ Michael T. Conway Michael T. Conway","body_zh":"LAZARE POTTER GIACOVAS & MOYLE LLP Michael T. Conway, Esq. 747 Third Avenue, 16th Floor New York, NY 10017 电话：(917) 242-1597 [mconway@lpgmlaw.com]\n\nTaurus Fund LLC、作为Taurus Fund受托人的Scott Barnett，以及作为Taurus Fund LLC受托人的Taurus Management LLC的律师\n\n美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院\n\n关于：第11章\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n\n____________________________________________________________\n\n____________________________________________________________\n\n债务人。（合并管理）\n对第11章受托人请求作出命令、延长受托人根据《破产法典》第108、546(a)及549条提起撤销权诉讼期限之动议的异议\n\nTaurus Fund, LLC（“Taurus Fund”）、Taurus Management, LLC（“Taurus Management”）及Scott Barnett（以下统称“Taurus”）特此对第11章受托人（“受托人”）提出的《关于作出命令延长受托人根据《破产法典》第108、546(a)及549条提起撤销权诉讼期限的动议》（“时效中止动议”）提交本异议（“异议”），并谨就此陈述如下：\n\n初步陈述\n\n时效中止动议所请求的救济，所依据的理由近期已由本院审理并明确驳回。具体而言，受托人寻求依据衡平法时效中止原则或《联邦破产程序规则》第9006条[1]的期限延长规定，预先延长所有未来撤销权诉讼的诉讼时效。然而，2018年，本院明确裁定，该等理由均不允许法院延长第546(a)条规定的诉讼时效。在 In re: Walnut Hill, Inc., 2018 WL 2672242 (Bank. D. Conn 2018) 一案中，James J. Tancredi 法官裁定：(1) 衡平法时效中止原则不得被预先适用；且(2)《联邦破产程序规则》第9006条不得用于延长国会在《破产法典》中规定的期限。参见，例如，In re: Walnut Hill, Inc., 2018 WL 2672242 at * 1-2。尽管如此，受托人主张，仅向所有已知及未知的潜在被告发出时效中止动议通知，即可不予理会Walnut Hill案的裁定。然而，该等通知并未弥补受托人请求衡平法时效中止所存在的核心瑕疵。根据适用判例法，受托人仅可在对抗程序中，作为对诉讼时效抗辩的回应而援引衡平法时效中止原则。简而言之，本院目前无权授予受托人所请求的救济。\n\n此外，即使本院倾向于不予理会Walnut Hill案及其后续判例的裁定，对于Taurus而言，受托人的时效中止动议仍应被驳回。受托人并未主张Taurus实施了任何妨碍受托人在已对Taurus提起的对抗程序中提出其全部请求的行为。诉讼时效体现了我国民事司法制度中终局性和既定预期的重要性。正如国会所指出：“诉讼时效[在第546条中]的目的在于界定一方当事人面临被诉风险的期间。”H.R. REP. 103-835, 49, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3358。Taurus已是该对抗程序的一方；若受托人本可在规定的诉讼时效期间内对Taurus提出额外请求，而本院仍进一步延长其提出该等请求的诉讼时效，将显然不公。如下文更全面\n\n1 如本文所用，“规则”一词系指《联邦破产程序规则》。\n\n所述，Taurus谨请求本院驳回受托人的时效中止动议。\n\n相关背景\n\n1. 2022年2月15日，债务人Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（“债务人”）向本院提交自愿申请，请求依《美国破产法典》第11编第11章获得保护，从而启动上述破产程序。\n\n2. 2023年7月11日，第11章受托人Luc A. Despins（“受托人”）提交起诉状，对Taurus启动一项对抗程序（对抗程序案号23-05017）（“对抗程序”），请求：(i) 作出确认判决，确认债务人是某些不动产的衡平法所有权人，并命令将该等不动产交付受托人；(ii) 作出确认判决，确认债务人是Taurus Fund的衡平法所有权人，并命令将Taurus Fund及Taurus Fund的资产均交付受托人；以及(iii) 作出确认判决，确认Taurus Fund是债务人的另我，并命令将Taurus Fund及Taurus Fund的资产均交付破产财产。\n\n3. 2024年1月9日，受托人根据《破产法典》第105(a)条及《联邦破产程序规则》第2002条和第9014条，提交《关于作出紧急命令：(I) 批准受托人即将提出的时效中止动议的通知格式及方式，以及(II) 安排听证会的紧急动议》（“通知动议”）[Dkt. No. 2494]。在通知动议中，受托人请求本院批准其就本时效中止动议发出通知的格式及方式。\n\n4. 2024年1月18日，受托人提交本时效中止动议。\n\n5. 2024年1月19日，本院准许受托人的通知动议[Dkt. No. 2515]，并批准了时效中止动议的通知格式（“通知书”）。\n\n论证\n\n6. 本院应驳回时效中止动议，因为本院无权授予所请求的救济。正如本院近期在Walnut Hill案中裁定的，在目前这一阶段审议衡平法时效中止原则尚属过早。受托人的通知书并未弥补对该原则的这种程序上不当的适用。此外，正如Walnut Hill案亦裁定的，《联邦破产程序规则》第9006(b)条不能延长国会在成文法中制定的期限。或者，即使本院不予理会Walnut Hill案的裁定，并裁定本院有权变更《破产法典》第546(a)条规定的诉讼时效，衡平法时效中止原则亦不应适用于Taurus。\n\nA. 本院无权授予所请求的救济\n\ni. 衡平法时效中止原则不得被前瞻性适用\n\n7. Taurus不否认，全国各地法院大体裁定，衡平法时效中止原则适用于《破产法典》第546(a)条规定的诉讼时效。参见，例如，Souden v. Citicorp (In re Souden), Docket Nos. 00-34501 (LMW), 08-3055 (LMW), 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 1019, at *9 (Bankr. D. Conn. Apr. 20, 2009)（“[第]546(a)(1)条的时效期间可适用衡平法时效中止原则”）。然而，全国各地法院对于适用该原则的适当时机并不一致。对于已具体审议衡平法时效中止原则适当适用时机的州法院，例如康涅狄格州法院，均裁定衡平法时效中止不得被前瞻性适用。参见Walnut Hill, 2018 WL 2672242 at *2。在Walnut Hill案中，本院指出：“从程序上看，衡平法时效中止原则被认可为对正在进行的诉讼中所提出的诉讼时效抗辩的回应。”Id., citing Long v. Abbott Mortg. Corp. 459 F. Supp. 108, 113 (D. Conn. 1978)（着重号系后加）。\n\n8. 具体而言，在面对一项于第546(a)条诉讼时效届满前请求中止该等诉讼时效的申请时，Walnut Hill案法院认定：\n\n在特定被告的对抗程序中，就待证明的事实和情形举行证据听证会的背景之外，并在诉讼时效抗辩被提出之前，审议衡平法时效中止完全为时过早且存在程序瑕疵。\n\nId. 自Walnut Hill案作出裁决以来，众多法院同意该裁定。参见 In re Cramer, 636 B.R. 830, 832 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2022)（“受托人在日后提交逾期起诉状后，仍可自由援引衡平法时效中止”）；In re Randolph Hosp., Inc., No. 20-10247, 2022 WL 19298765, at *1 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2022)（“尽管第546条和第108条的时效期间，如同任何诉讼时效，均受衡平法时效中止原则约束，但鉴于尚无已确定的被告，且不存在与超额付款请求有关的待决对抗程序，清算受托人所寻求的预先认定为时过早”）。\n\n9. 尽管受托人确实援引了一些准许前瞻性救济的巡回区外案件，但这些案件均未实际审议提出衡平法时效中止主张的适当时机（而且无论如何，对本院均无约束力）。在受托人所援引的大多数案件中，延长期限的动议均在无人反对的情况下获准（In re Rockport Dev., Inc., Case No. 20- 11339 和 In re Visiting Nurse Ass'n of Inland Counties, Case No. 18-16908，均提交于 United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California（加利福尼亚中央区联邦破产法院）；以及 In re Builders Holding Co., Case No. 16-06643，提交于 United States Bankruptcy Court of Puerto Rico（波多黎各联邦破产法院）），或者所受异议基于衡平法时效中止以外的理由（In re Dwek, Case No. 07-11757）。这些案件中的法院从未有机会审议受托人关于衡平法时效中止主张的是非曲直。\n\n10. 另外两个据称涉及前瞻性救济的案件对受托人亦无帮助。在 In re Farwest Pump Company, 2020 WL 257784 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2020) 一案中，法院事实上并未前瞻性延长中止时效的期限。在该案中，无担保债权人委员会于当事人提起对抗性诉讼以追回优先支付和/或欺诈性转让的截止日，提交了其时效中止动议。In re Farwest Pump Company, 2020 WL 257784 at *2。法院认定，“经审议全部情形”，诉讼时效已被衡平法中止，因为法院尚未决定无担保债权人委员会是否具有追究欺诈性转让和/或优先权请求的当事人资格。Id. at 3-4（着重号系后加）。这并非前瞻性地作出，而是在诉讼时效届满后作出。而且，当然，在本案中，关于受托人追究欺诈性转让和/或优先权请求的当事人资格不存在任何未决问题。\n\n11. 最后，在 Marsh v. Levy (In re Martin Levy of Berlin D.M.D., P.C.), 416 B.R.1, 8 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009) 一案中，甚至从未出现过任何有关衡平法时效中止的问题。在该案中，受托人于期限届满前两日提交的、请求延长第546(a)条期限的初始动议，实际上并未援引任何法律以支持延长。相反，受托人的理由基于案件事实——针对债权人、要求提供可能导致一项或多项诉讼或程序的信息的强制动议仍在待决。Id. at 3。没有任何一方对该动议提出异议。最终，当受托人提起对抗程序时，被告提出诉讼时效抗辩。Marsh v. Levy案法院并未审议衡平法时效中止，而是裁定被告在未反对受托人的初始动议时是否放弃了其诉讼时效抗辩。再次强调，衡平法时效中止问题从未经过诉讼。\n\n12. 如同Walnut Hill案一样，本案在程序上尚未达到衡平法时效中止原则与潜在被告相关的阶段。提起额外诉因的法定期限尚未届满。就Taurus而言，存在\n\n在一项尚未提出诉讼时效问题的待决对抗程序中。受托人未对 Taurus（Taurus）提起任何其他对抗程序。因此，鉴于本案事实，通过衡平中止寻求延长期限既完全为时过早，也不符合程序规定。\n\nii. 该通知不足以推翻 Walnut Hill（沃尔纳特山）案的裁决。\n\n13. 受托人试图通过提供《中止动议通知》来规避 Walnut Hill 案及其后续判例的裁决。受托人认为，通知是那些“拒绝依赖衡平中止以预先中止诉讼时效”的法院所“主要关切”的问题。Tolling Motion at 13。所援引的任何案件均不能被解读为：一项简单通知可以补救一项为时过早的衡平中止抗辩。\n\n14. 在 Cramer 案中，法院确实对未向可能受影响的当事人发出通知表示关切，因为受托人关于衡平中止提起撤销诉讼的诉讼时效的动议是单方面提出的。然而，该裁决更具根本性：法院要求受托人必须实际提起对抗程序，法院方可考虑衡平中止原则。见 In re Cramer, 636 B.R. at 832 (“The trustee remains free to raise equitable tolling at a later date after filing untimely complaints.”)。对 Cramer 案的任何解读均未表明，送达一项中止动议通知可以补救在未提起任何撤销诉讼前提出衡平中止为时过早这一事实。Id. at 833 (“[T]he trustee cannot win the argument of whether or not equitable tolling applies in advance and without notice and an opportunity for the defendant to resist application of the doctrine”)（强调为后加）；另见 Walnut Hill, 2018 WL 2672242 at \\*2（“[p]rocedurally, the doctrine of equitable tolling is recognized as a response to a statute of limitations defense asserted in a pending litigation”）（强调为后加）。\n\n15. 同样，如受托人所引述，In re Randolph Hospital, Inc., No. 20-10247, 2022 WL 19298765, \\*1 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2022) 一案的法院驳回了一项衡平中止诉讼时效期间的动议，且不妨碍该动议在受托人“对可识别且已获适当通知的被告提起诉讼”后重新提出。Tolling Motion at 13, citing In re Randolph Hosp., Inc., 2022 WL 19298765 at \\*1（强调为后加）。再次，这些案件表明，仅向潜在被告送达通知，并不足以使法院认为衡平中止原则已被适当提出。\n\n16. 此外，衡平中止这一普通法原则允许法院“在个案基础上延长诉讼时效，以防止不公。”In re Anderson, 623 B.R. 199, 217 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2020)（强调为后加）。在此，受托人寻求对所有已知和未知潜在被告适用的所有诉讼时效作出一概延长。此时，收到通知的潜在被告均并不实际知晓他们可能因何事被起诉、此类诉讼的依据为何，或争议金额为何。在对抗程序中未适当提交并送达起诉状的情况下，潜在被告无法适当地提出异议，亦无法确定对受托人一概适用衡平中止原则提出异议是否适当、是否具有成本效益，或是否值得占用法院的时间[2]。因此，法院无法依法就衡平中止是否适用于每一种此类情形作出适当的逐案判断。\n\n2 值得注意的是，在此受托人主张衡平中止应适用于数百名潜在被告。目前，Walnut Hill 案使这些潜在被告颇感安心，即受托人的动议将在无需其介入的情况下被驳回。然而，若法院采纳受托人的立场并准许该动议，则下次出现此类问题时，法院很可能会收到数百份由须防范索赔可能性的潜在被告分别提交的反对意见书。法院绝不应面临此类后勤噩梦；相反，通过要求在适用衡平中止之前先行提起对抗程序，可以确保只有面临真实索赔的实际被告才会在法院面前就此问题进行诉讼。\n\niii. Rule 9006(b) 不得用于延长法定期限，包括 § 546 所规定的期限\n\n17. 受托人的动议亦必须被驳回，因为 Rule 9006(b) 未赋予法院延长由国会规定的诉讼时效的权限。正如 Walnut Hill 案中的法院所裁定：\n\nRule 9006(b) 不能适用于 Section 546(a)，否则将违反宪法所维护的权力分立原则。立法机关已作出权威规定之处，司法机关无权修改其决定。\n\nIn re Walnut Hill, Inc., 2018 WL 2672242, at \\*2\n\n18. 根据 Rule 9006(b)，法院仅可延长期限，该期限须为“依本规则、依据本规则作出的通知，或依照法院命令，要求或允许在指定期间内或于该期间内完成某项行为……。”Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)（强调为后加）。对 Rule 9006(b) 的通常解读确认，该规则仅适用于由法院规则或法院命令设定的期限，而不适用于法定期限。\n\n19. 从根本上说，Rule 9006(b) 的明确文义不支持将其用于延长 Section 546(a) 的期限，尤其是结合该规则其他部分所包含的措辞。事实上，Rule 9006(b) 明确适用于“依本规则、依依据本规则作出的通知，或依照法院命令的指定期间”，而紧接其上的 Rule 9006(a) 则适用于“计算本规则、Federal Rules of Civil Procedure、任何地方法规或法院命令，或任何未规定计算时间方法的法规中所规定的任何期限。”见 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(a) and (b)（强调为后加）。因此，Rule 9006(b) 未包含“或任何法规中”相同或类似的措辞，而 Rule 9006(a) 包含此类措辞，这支持如下结论：Rule 9006(b) 并非旨在适用于《破产法典》中规定的期限，例如 Section 546(a)。Walnut Hill 案同意这一推理。见 Walnut Hill, 2018 WL 2672242 at \\*1（“然而，Rule 9006(b) 显著缺少涉及其适用于法规的相同或类似措辞[而 Rule 9006(a) 包含该等措辞]”）。简言之，Rule 9006(b) 未提供法院可据以延长 Section 546(a) 期限的机制。\n\niv. 第十一巡回区意见不具约束力，且采纳了存在缺陷的论点\n\n20. 受托人主张 Walnut Hill 案中的法院作出了错误裁决。见 Tolling Motion at 15-16。受托人敦促本院采纳第十一巡回上诉法院在 In re Int'l Admin. Servs., Inc., 408 F.3d 689 (11th Cir. 2005) 中就该问题所采用的分析。该案对本院不具约束力，且涉及一组非常特定的情形。尽管原审破产法院最初根据 Rule 9006 延长了委员会提起撤销诉讼的期限，但截至被告提出诉讼时效抗辩并将争议上诉至上诉法院时，委员会实际上已经提起了一项对抗程序。因此，第十一巡回上诉法院不仅依据 9006(b)，还在待决对抗程序的背景下依据衡平中止原则分析该案。第十一巡回上诉法院最终认定，委员会已在待决对抗程序中满足其适用衡平中止的举证责任。鉴于法院作出了衡平中止的认定，其对 Rule 9006 的讨论实质上属于附带意见。\n\n21. 就 International Administrative Services, Inc. 案中的法院实际论及 Rule 9006(b) 的运作而言，该法院的分析并不合理。该法院承认 Rule 9006(b) 并未明确适用于法定期限，但得出结论称，由于《破产规则》总体上讨论对抗程序，Rule 9006(b) 因而可被解读为以某种方式适用于法定诉讼时效。In re Int'l Admin. Servs., Inc., 408 F.3d at 699。然而，对抗程序规则，即 Rules 7001, et seq.，并未讨论《破产法典》所规定的各种诉讼时效。因此，不能公平地将 Rule 9006(b) 解读为适用于提起撤销诉讼的法定期限。\n\n22. 此外，Rule 9006(b) 实际上并不适用于其所涵盖的全部规则。正如 Rule 9006 的咨询委员会注释所述，“[为]了迅速管理破产案件的利益，某些期限不得延长。”Advisory Committee Notes to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006（强调为后加）。作为该意图的证据，Rule 9006(b) 按其自身文义规定，它并不适用于所有规则——它特别排除了法院不得延长的规则——提交20名最大无担保债权人名单的期限（Rule 1007(d)）、一般债权人会议及根据 Chapter 7 选举受托人的期限（Rule 2003(a) and 2003(d)）、判决书作出后提交变更或修正认定或请求作出补充认定的动议的期限（Rule 7052）、提交请求重新审判或变更或修正判决书的动议的期限（Rule 9023），以及提交请求免除判决书或命令的动议的期限（Rule 9024）。因此，International Administrative Services, Inc. 案中法院的推理存在缺陷。\n\n23. 受托人不能认真地要求本院无视其在 Walnut Hill 案中的自身裁决，而遵循不具约束力的第十一巡回上诉法院裁决，尤其是在第十一巡回区后续法院本身已经缩窄 International Administrative Services, Inc. 案裁决范围的情况下。例如，在一宗 2022 年案件中，United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida（美国佛罗里达南区破产法院）拒绝基于与 International Administrative Services 相同的理由预先延长 Section 546(a) 诉因的期限，尽管其承认该案是第十一巡回区关于 546(a) 延期的控制性判例。见 In re Am. Purchasing Servs., LLC, 2022 WL 17096649, at \\*3 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Nov. 21, 2022)（“尽管 International Administrative Services 是本巡回区的控制性法律——赋予本院准许所请求救济的权限——本院对 International Administrative Services 作狭义解读，并认为其基于一组特定事实。”）。在 American Purchasing Services 案中，法院认定，第十一巡回上诉法院的裁决仅仅“允许——但并不要求——法院在适当的严重情形下延长 section 546(a) 的期限：例如，诉讼目标本身正在阻挠受托人的证据开示工作时。”Id.\n\n24. 在一则值得关注的脚注中，American Purchasing Services 案中的法院指出，International Administrative Services 于 2005 年作出裁决——约在最高法院于 Law v. Siegel 案中裁定破产法院不得以违反《破产法典》的方式行使 Bankruptcy Code section 105(a) 及其固有权力的十年前。571 U.S. 415, 421 (2014)（“这是教科书式的法律常识：§ 105(a) ‘不允许破产法院推翻《破产法典》其他条款的明确规定。’”）（引自 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 105.01[2], p. 105–6 (16th ed. 2013)）。尽管 International Administrative Services 并未具体讨论 section 105，但 Law v. Siegel 案之前关于 section 105 的判例法精神无疑贯穿于第十一巡回上诉法院的分析。\n\nIn re Am. Purchasing Servs., LLC, 2022 WL 17096649, fn. 28.\n\n25. 基于上述全部理由，本院不应放弃 Walnut Hill 案的裁决，而采纳一项不具约束力且受到批评的第十一巡回法院意见。\n\nv. 《破产法典》第 105(a) 条不适用于延长第 546(a) 条规定的时效期限。\n\n26. 《破产法典》第 105(a) 条同样不得用于延长第 546(a) 条规定的期限。实际上，如第 105(a) 条可被用于延长第 546(a) 条规定的时效期限，当事人在申请延长期限时将会援引该条。受托人未援引任何直接涉及该问题的案件，而且，就延长提起撤销诉讼的期限而言，涉及该问题的案件也极为稀少。\n\n27. 《破产法典》第 105(a) 条规定：“法院可以发布为执行本法典规定所必需或适当的任何命令、程序或判决。11 U.S.C.A. § 105。” “第 105(a) 条授权破产法院在‘必要’或‘适当’时行使其衡平权力，以促进其他《破产法典》规定的实施。……尽管措辞宽泛，第 105(a) 条赋予破产法院的裁量权远小于初看之下所显示的程度，并且绝非一项可任意施行衡平救济的授权。” In re Ludlow Hosp. Soc., Inc., 124 F.3d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 1997)（强调部分为原文所加）。2014 年，最高法院对第 105(a) 条进行了分析并裁定，“破产法院所保留的任何衡平权力，必须且只能在《破产法典》的范围内行使。” Law v. Siegel, 571 U.S. 415, 421 (2014)。\n\n28. 如前所述，几乎没有案件讨论第 546(a) 条与根据第 105(a) 条延长该等期限之间的相互关系[3]。然而，法院一贯拒绝利用第 105(a) 条延长《破产法典》中明确规定的其他期限。在最为类似的案件中，法院拒绝利用第 105(a) 条延长提起对某些债务可否免除提出异议的对抗程序的期限。参见，例如，In re Hunter, 552 B.R. 864, 870 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2016)。正如 Hunter 案法院所述：“《法典》和《破产规则》规定，不及时提出的诉状不予准许。不得以第 105(a) 条违背《法典》和《破产规则》而准许迟延提出的诉状，即使基于衡平考量亦然。” Id. at 871。法院还裁定，第 105(a) 条不得用于延长明确限定可提交计划期限的法定期限。参见 In re Randi's, Inc., 474 B.R. 783, 787 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2012)。在 Randi's, Inc. 案中，法院考察了以下一般法定解释原则：“当一般法与特别法之间存在冲突时，一般法应让位于特别法。” Id. at 787-788。因此，法院认定，由于《破产法典》的一项条款具体规定了相关计划必须提交的期限，且“11 U.S.C. §\n\n3 尽管 American Purchasing Services（如上所述）顺带提及第 105(a) 条，但其并未讨论第 105(a) 条对延长第 546(a) 条期限请求的适用。相反，American Purchasing Services 案法院着重将其审理案件的事实与 International Administrative Services 案的事实加以区分；后案作出于最高法院在 Law v. Siegel 案中限制第 105(a) 条适用范围之前。最终，该法院依据衡平停止期间原则而非第 105(a) 条作出了裁决。\n\n105 是对衡平权力的一般性授予”，故规定期限的更具体法条应予适用。Id. at 788。在本案中，第 546(a) 条已明确规定了提起撤销诉讼的时效期限。法院不得利用更具一般性的第 105(a) 条来延长这些期限。\n\n29. 受托人援引两个案件以支持“法院已明确依据第 105(a) 条延长《破产法典》规定的时效期间”这一主张。Tolling Motion at 17, citing Morgan v. United States (In re Morgan), 182 F.3d 775 (11th Cir. 1999) and United States v. Richards (In re Richards), 994 F.2d 763 (10th Cir. 1993)。这两个案件均涉及《破产法典》[4]中关于所得税债权法定“优先地位”期间的规定。在 Morgan 案中，第十一巡回法院利用破产法院根据第 105(a) 条享有的衡平权力，对税务债务享有的三年优先地位期间实行停止计算。Morgan v. United States (In re Morgan), 182 F.3d at 779。法院裁定：“鉴于国会意图倾向于给予政府充足时间征收税款，且考虑到纳税人可能滥用破产程序以逃避缴纳税款，我们认为，在此类案件中，衡平考量通常将有利于政府。” Id. at 779-780。Richards 是较早的案件，涉及 IRS 未缴所得税债权的法定优先地位期间的类似问题。在 Richards 案中，法院中止《破产法典》的 240 日期限计算，以维持 IRS 未缴所得税债权的优先地位。United States v. Richards (In re Richards), 994 F.2d at 765。与 Morgan 案相似，法院认为，对该期间实行停止计算“既维护了国会意图，即给予\n\n4 看来，《破产法典》在 Richards 案和 Morgan 案裁决之间的期间经过修订。因此，尽管两法院似乎审议的是《破产法典》中关于所得税债权优先地位的不同规定，但就本案而言，这些规定实属相同。\n\n政府一定期限以进行征收工作，同时也防止债务人通过拖延最初的破产程序来逃避优先地位。” Id.\n\n30. 本案更类似于涉及停止计算提起不可免债诉讼之诉状期限的案件，因为第 546(a) 条是一项规定提起撤销诉讼期限的法条。因此，按照上述 Hunter 案和 Randi's, Inc. 案的推理，第 105(a) 条不适用于延长第 546(a) 条规定的时效期限。正如国会所指出，“时效法规[第 546(a)(1) 条]的目的，是界定一方当事人面临诉讼风险的期间。” H.R. REP. 103-835, 49, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3358。利用第 105(a) 条的衡平权力延长一方当事人面临诉讼风险的期间，将违背国会意图。\n\nB. 受托人无权获得衡平停止期间。\n\n31. 即使受托人能够证明本院目前有权延长时效期限，受托人仍无权就针对 Taurus 的撤销诉讼时效期限适用衡平停止期间。“衡平停止期间是一项非常救济，仅在罕见且特殊的情形中适用……即当事人以某种非常方式被阻止行使其权利的情形。” Anderson v. Lewis, No. 3:20-CV-370 (VAB), 2023 WL 6378924, at \\*8 (D. Conn. Sept. 29, 2023)（强调部分为原文所加）。“为获得该原则的利益，受托人负有举证责任，证明其‘(1) 在其请求停止计算的期间内已尽到合理勤勉义务，且 (2) 已证明情形极为特殊，以致该原则应予适用。’” In re Anderson, 623 B.R. at 217（省略内部引文）。\n\n32. 尽管受托人援引了一些案件，其中债务人的行为导致法院认定存在可对所有当事人停止计算时效期限的特殊情形，但这并非全国所有法院的一致理解。关于“被告是否必须积极参与构成适用衡平停止期间依据的欺诈或不当行为，抑或债务人欺诈性隐瞒转让即已足够”的判例法，存在显著分歧。In re Sasso, 550 B.R. 550, 555–56 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2016), citing In re Maxon Eng'g Services, Inc., 397 B.R. 228, 230 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2008)（强调部分为原文所加）。Maxon 案法院裁定，若要对第 546(a) 条规定的时效期间适用衡平停止期间，欺诈行为与被告之间必须具有充分关联。In re Maxon Eng'g Services, Inc., 397 B.R. at 230。\n\n33. 本院尚未就受托人是否必须证明债务人的拖延和／或欺诈行为足以对其他当事人适用衡平停止期间表明立场。然而，第二巡回上诉法院，以及本巡回区内审议过该问题的一家法院——United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York（美国纽约南区破产法院）——表明，为决定是否适用衡平停止期间原则，必须考量被告的行为。参见 Bennett v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 64 F.3d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 1995)（“衡平停止期间防止时效期限对因被告的欺诈行为或隐瞒而不知道其享有诉因的原告开始计算”）；另参见 In re Level 8 Apparel, LLC, 2021 WL 1977161, \\*5 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2021)（指出，衡平停止期间“适用于证明以下事项的原告：(1) 被告向原告隐瞒原告诉因的存在；(2) 原告发现诉因后，在适用时效法规规定的期限内提起诉讼；及 (3) 原告不知道该诉因并非因其未尽到应有勤勉义务所致”）。\n\n34. 同样，在 American Purchasing Services, LLC[5] 案中，法院推理称：\n\n……International Administrative Services 并未授权受托人在其尚未准备好——或声称无法——提出其请求时，就所有潜在诉讼对象一概获得第 546(a) 条期限的延长。相反，受托人必须证明诉讼对象或与其共同行动者存在足够严重的行为——类似于 International Administrative Services 案中详述的行为——方可获得此种非常救济。\n\n35. In re Am. Purchasing Servs., LLC, 2022 WL 17096649, at \\*3（强调部分为原文所加）。\n\n但再次强调，受托人必须证明 Taurus 存在严重行为，方可获得延长针对 Taurus 提起额外撤销诉讼请求期限的救济。仅仅指称债务人存在不当行为，显然不足以就所有已知和未知的潜在被告一概延长第 546(a) 条期限。[6]\n\n36. 在本案中，并无指称表明 Taurus 的行为妨碍受托人及时对 Taurus 提出受托人的全部撤销请求。受托人已于近七个月前在本破产程序中对 Taurus 提起对抗程序。Taurus 一直勤勉地参与与受托人的证据开示，直至数日前应受托人请求而暂停该事项。若法院延长时效期限，以便受托人可对 Taurus 提出额外诉讼请求，将显然对 Taurus 造成不利影响。时效法规存在其理由——其反映了终局性和既定\n\n6 在《中止时效动议》第 51 段中，受托人援引 In re Fundamental Long Term Care, Inc.（基础长期护理公司重整案）, 501 B.R. 784, 791 (Bankr. M.D.Fla. Nov. 13, 2013)，主张如果一名潜在被告从事或参与阻碍受托人的证据开示，则所有请求权的期限均应中止。《中止时效动议》第 21 页。Fundamental Long Term Care 一案的裁决早于同为佛罗里达州案件的 American Purchasing Services（美国采购服务公司）一案。不排除这样一种可能性：如果 Fundamental Long Term Care 一案是在 American Purchasing Services 一案之后作出的裁决，其可能不会就针对所有潜在被告中止诉讼时效作出此类表述。\n\n民事司法制度中的预期。正如国会指出：“[Section 546] 中诉讼时效的目的，是界定一方当事人面临被起诉风险的期间。”H.R. REP. 103-835, 49, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3358。正如最高法院明确指出：“期限可能导致不受欢迎的结果，但它们促使当事人采取行动，并产生终局性。”Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 644 (1992)。受托人未能陈述支持对 Taurus（Taurus）适用衡平时效中止原则的事实。\n\n结论\n\n基于上述全部理由，Taurus Fund（金牛座基金）和 Taurus Management（金牛座管理公司）谨此请求：(1) 法院驳回《中止时效动议》；以及 (2) 准予一切必要且公正的其他及进一步救济。\n\n日期：February 5, 2024　New York, New York\n\nLAZARE POTTER GIACOVAS & MOYLE LLP（拉扎尔·波特·贾科瓦斯与莫伊尔律师事务所）\n\n代理人：/s/ Michael T. Conway\n\nMichael T. Conway（迈克尔·T·康威）\n\nLazare Potter Giacovas & Moyle LLP\n\n747 Third Avenue, 16th Floor\n\nNew York, NY 10017\n\n电话：(917) 242-1597\n\n[mconway@lpgmlaw.com]\n\n*Taurus Fund LLC、作为 Taurus Fund 受托人的 Scott Barnett，以及作为 Taurus Fund LLC 受托人的 Taurus Management LLC 的代理律师*\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2557 Filed 02/05/24 Entered 02/05/24 13:21:55 Page 19 of 19\n\n送达证明\n\n下列签署人证明，于 February 5, 2024，上述《反对意见书》副本已通过 CM/ECF 向所有登记在案的当事人送达。\n\n日期：February 5, 2024　/s/ Michael T. Conway\n\nMichael T. Conway","key_entities":["Je","CIPA","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Despins","RICO"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":2494,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2515,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":6011,"status":"published","published_at":"2024-02-05 00:00:00","created_at":"2024-02-05","updated_at":"2026-08-23 19:14:53"}