{"id":"court_ctb_2563_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":2563,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION In re:","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"### **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\nIn re:\n\nHO WAN KWOK,<sup>1</sup>\n\nChapter 11\n\nCase No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\nDebtor.\n\nFebruary 5, 2024\n\n# **G CLUB OPERATIONS LLC'S OBJECTION AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO TRUSTEE'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF ORDER EXTENDING DEADLINE FOR TRUSTEE TO FILE AVOIDANCE ACTIONS UNDER BANKRUPTCY CODE SECTIONS, 108, 546(A), AND 549**\n\nG Club Operations, LLC (\"G Club\") respectfully objects to, and files this memorandum of law in opposition to, the *Motion for Entry of Order Extending Deadline for Trustee to File Avoidance Actions Under Bankruptcy Code Sections, 108, 546(a), and 549* (ECF No. 2509, the \"Motion\"), filed by Luc Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee (the Trustee\"). For the following reasons, the Court should deny the Motion.\n\n### **I. INTRODUCTION**\n\nWithout an act of Congress, the statutes of limitations set forth Bankruptcy Code § 546(a) cannot be extended. Make no mistake, the Trustee's Motion seeks to judicially alter a law passed by Congress. The Trustee seeks to usurp the Constitutional authority of Congress to pass laws and substitute the Trustee's desire to change Bankruptcy Code § 546(a). No authority exists for this Court, or any court, to judicially amend the Bankruptcy Code.\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as other aliases) last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation.\n\nThe Motion, therefore, should be denied for the following reasons: (1) this Court does not have Constitutional authority to rule on this matter as it involves \"private rights of action,\" which, pursuant to *Stern v. Marshall*, 564 U.S. 462, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), can only be exercised by the District Court. Thus, were this Court to even rule on this Motion it would have to do so by way of a report and recommendation to the District Court; (2) the Court does not have statutory authority to prospectively modify the statute of limitations set forth in Bankruptcy Code § 546(a) as nothing in the Bankruptcy Code permits this or any court to do so; (3) the tolling arguments raised by the Trustee in his Motion are fact intensive, must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis and cannot be raised prospectively and in a blanket fashion; and (4) the Trustee has created an unnecessary emergency by presenting this Motion to the Court only days prior to the 2-year statute of limitations running and it is inequitable that such significant, and unprecedented, relief has been requested at the last minute, especially where it is beyond dispute that the Trustee has planned to ask for this relief for, at least, many months.\n\nThe Trustee has not cited any compelling authority to support its Motion *and* asks the Court to ignore the plain meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2075, which states clearly that any rule of procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court for bankruptcy practice \"shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right,\" like a federally-imposed statute of limitations. The Honorable James T. Tancredi in *In re Walnut Hill, Inc.,* 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 1589, at \\*2-3 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 1, 2018), addressed this precise issue and held that Fed. R. Bank. P. 9006(b) \"cannot\" apply to Bankruptcy Code § 546(a) \"without violating the separation of powers preserved in the Constitution.\" Further, equitable tolling only applies in a commenced action once a statute of limitations defense has been asserted. The Trustee's attempts to distinguish *Walnut Hill* and other similar cases are without merit.\n\nFinally, the Trustee is not prejudiced if the Motion is denied. The Trustee can still invoke equitable tolling after he files any adversary proceeding in response to any asserted statute of limitations defense, and the Trustee and the defendant can litigate the issue on specific, operative facts. Indeed, the Trustee recognizes that \"[e]quitable tolling must be decided on a case-by-case basis and is not limited to a particular set of facts.\" *See* Motion ¶45. Consequently, the Motion should be denied.\n\n#### **II. FACTS AND BACKGROUND**\n\nThe facts of this case and the procedural history of this case are well known to the Court and G Club requests the Court take judicial notice of the docket of this Bankruptcy Case concerning the investigations by the Trustee, the timing of the Motion in light of various reports made by the Court regarding filing of Chapter 5 claims and the Trustee's intent to file this Motion, as well as any other related matters.\n\n#### **III. LAW AND ARGUMENT**\n\n## **A. The Court Does Not Have Constitutional Authority to Enter a Final Judgment on this Motion**\n\nThe Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that Bankruptcy Courts *do not* have Constitutional authority to enter final rulings on preference actions, fraudulent transfer actions, and other similar claims derived from the common law – so called \"private rights\" claims. *Stern*, 564 U.S. 462, 492, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2614 (\"As a consequence, we concluded that fraudulent conveyance actions were more accurately characterized as a private rather than a public right as we have used those terms in our Article III decisions.\") (Cleaned up). The Trustee ignored *Stern* and its progeny and treats the Motion as almost routine.\n\nTherefore, even if the Court were to consider the Trustee's Motion, it would need to write a report and recommendation for review by the District Court. Clearly, the claims that the Trustee may bring arise under Chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code or state law. The Trustee has not identified any Bankruptcy Code-specific \"public rights\" claims in his Motion. Therefore, the Court lacks Constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on the Motion.\n\n#### **B. The Trustee Cannot Rewrite the Bankruptcy Code**\n\nThe Trustee asks this Court to judicially amend the Bankruptcy Code § 546(a) to permit for a prospective extension of statutes of limitations. Nothing in the Constitution or Bankruptcy Code permits this. *See* U.S. Const., Art. § 1 (\"All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.\") Thus, unless the Trustee can identify a specific provision of the Bankruptcy Code that allows the Court to judicially extend the statute of limitation in Bankruptcy Code § 546(a), the relief sought cannot be granted. Here, the Trustee cites no Bankruptcy Code provision (because there is none), and the Motion must be denied.\n\nFirst, if a legislative authority wants to grant a court the power to extend a statute of limitations, the legislature will provide a mechanism. For example, the Connecticut legislature allows medical malpractice victims to petition the Connecticut Superior Court for an extension of the statute of limitations. *See* Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-190a(b) (\"Upon petition to the clerk of any superior court or any federal district court to recover damages resulting from personal injury or wrongful death, an automatic ninety-day extension of the statute of limitations shall be granted to allow the reasonable inquiry required by subsection (a) of this section. This period shall be in addition to other tolling periods.\"). Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code, or anywhere else in the United States Code, affords courts the power to extend the statute of limitations set forth in Bankruptcy Code § 546(a).\n\nSecond, a Bankruptcy Rule cannot provide authority for a court to change a statute. 28\n\nU.S.C. § 2075, which authorized the Supreme Court to promulgate the Bankruptcy Rules, specifically states: \"[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.\" 28 U.S.C. § 2075 is clear:\n\n> Because Bankruptcy Rule 9006(a) does not extend or limit the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts, *see* 28 U.S.C. § 2075, it does not alter our conclusion that a complaint must be filed within two years from the date of the trustee's appointment. The two-year limitations period begins to run on the date of the trustee's appointment and expires twenty-four months later, irrespective of whether the last day falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday. Like the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Bankruptcy Rules govern procedural matters after a proceeding has been timely commenced. Jurisdiction must arise from section 546(a) without reference to Bankruptcy Rule 9006(a).\n\n*In re Butcher*, 829 F.2d 596, 600-01 (6th Cir. 1987). Thus, to invoke Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006, the Trustee would first have to commence an action.<sup>2</sup>\n\nIn *Walnut Hill*, Judge Tancredi carefully analyze the applicable statutes, rules, and cases and held: \"Rule 9006(b) only applies to deadlines set by these rules or by a notice given thereunder[,][sic] or by order of court. *Nowhere* in the Rule does it mention statutory deadlines.\" (emphasis added; cleaned up). 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 1589, at \\*2. Judge Tancredi reviewed precedent on this topic and drew from, among others, Judge Krechevsky's holding in *In re Damach, Inc.,* 235 B.R. 727, 731 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1999), which similarly ruled that that Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006 does not serve as authority to extend statutes of limitations prospectively.\n\n<sup>2</sup> The *Butcher* Court applied the statute of limitations in Bankruptcy Code § 546(a) as it was drafted in 1982. In 1994, Bankruptcy Code § 546(a) was amended to provide that its statute of limitation requires that an action be commenced by the later of (a) two-years of the entry of an order for relief (in this case, the day the voluntary petition was filed by the Debtor) or (b) one-year from the appointment of a trustee, if appointed within with two-years of case commencement. There is no dispute that the statute of limitations under Bankruptcy Code § 546(a) lapses in this chapter 11 case on February 15, 2024. Regardless, the analysis undertaken by the Sixth Circuit is correct: Bankruptcy Rule 9006(a) cannot be used to extend the statute of limitations in Bankruptcy Code § 546(a).\n\nFollowing 28 U.S.C. § 2075, Judge Tancredi explained that \"Congress has dictated that the Bankruptcy Rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right. Where the Rules and Code are inconsistent, the statutory Code controls.\" *Walnut Hill,* Bankr. LEXIS 1589, at \\*2 (cleaned up). The law is clear: *the Court cannot prospectively toll statutes of limitations based on a Bankruptcy Rule.*\n\nThe Trustee states \"that many courts have granted [equitable tolling] relief prospectively.\" Motion ¶30. But three of the cases cited by the Trustee<sup>3</sup> provide no guidance at all. They allowed uncontested motions and there were no written decisions analyzing the legal propriety of the uncontested orders that were entered. Stated differently, these cases are not authoritative precedent to support the Trustee's argument. Three \"so ordered\" uncontested motions do not count.\n\nMoreover, *Marsh v. Levy (In re Martin Levy of Berlin D.M.D., P.C.*), 416 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009), which does contain some analysis, is factually dissimilar. There, the trustee filed a motion to extend the time to bring a claim against *three related potential defendants*. \"The Motion to Extend was served upon [the potential defendants]…. No objections to the Motion to Extend were filed, and, accordingly, on April 11, 2008, the Court entered the following order on the Motion to Extend: GRANTED. THE DEADLINE IS HEREBY EXTENDED TO JUNE 30, 2008. NO OBJECTIONS HAVE BEEN FILED.\" *Id.*at 3-4. After an avoidance action was filed, the now-defendants moved to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds. The court denied the motion to dismiss on the narrow ground that the statute of limitations defense had been waived: \"the Court determines that [the defendants]…. waived the time deadline set forth in 11 U.S.C. §\n\n<sup>3</sup> *Citing In re Rockport Dev., Inc.*, No. 20-11339 (SC) (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2022); *In re Visiting Nurse Ass'n of Inland and Counties*, No. 18-16908 (MH) (Bankr. C.D. Cal. July 30, 2020) and *In re Builders Holding Co. Corp.,* No-16-06643 (EAG7) (Bankr. D. P.R. Apr. 25, 2019).\n\n546(a), when they failed to respond or object to the Trustee's motion to extend the deadline.\" *Id.* at 9.\n\nHere, G Club has timely objected to the Motion and the Trustee is seeking a global extension of the statute of limitations against hundreds or potentially thousands of differently situated potential defendants. Thus, *Marsh* has neither factual nor legal similarity to the case before the Court. The Trustee has cited no case in which a trustee has requested, and a court has granted, a prospective extension of a statute of limitations as to any potential defendant a trustee may wish to sue in the future.\n\nIn sum, the Court should deny the Motion because 28 U.S.C. § 2075 and Bankruptcy Code §546(a) say so. Courts cannot rewrite laws passed by Congress for the convenience of any party. 4\n\n## **C. Equitable Tolling Cannot Be Sought Prospectively Before an Action is Commenced**\n\nIn *Walnut Hill*, the Court held that that \"the doctrine of equitable tolling is recognized as a response to a statute of limitations defense asserted in a pending litigation.\" 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 1589, at \\*4. Here, no actions have been commenced that can be tolled: \"[i]t is wholly premature and procedurally flawed to address equitable tolling outside the context of an evidentiary hearing on the facts and circumstances to be proven in the adversary proceeding against specific defendants, once a statute of limitations defense has been asserted.\" *Id*. 5 Thus, the Trustee needs to commence an action, wait until a statute of limitations defense is asserted, and then, respond by claiming some tolling doctrine, e.g. equitable tolling, applies to extend the statute of limitations.\n\n<sup>4</sup> If the Trustee's reasoning was correct, any litigant could petition any District Court to extend a statute of limitations under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6. But for the pending Bankruptcy Case, the Trustee would be laughed out of District Court were he to file an equitable action to extend statutes of limitations based on some provision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allowing for extensions of time.\n\n<sup>5</sup> Judge Tancredi cites many examples of cases in which the Trustee's argument was rejected.\n\nEven the cases that allow extension of the Bankruptcy Code § 546(a) periods do not do so prospectively. Rather, those cases discuss whether Bankruptcy Code § 546(a) is jurisdictional and therefore can be waived, extended by agreement, or can be equitably tolled, also consider whether it constitutes a repose period to which no tolling doctrine applies. *See Pugh v. Brook (In re Pugh)*, 158 F.3d 530, 537-38 (11th Cir. 1998).\n\n*IBT Int'l, Inc. v. N. (In re Int'l Admin. Servs.)*, 408 F.3d 689 (11th Cir. 2005), cited by the Trustee, is instructive in this regard. The Trustee relies on this case to support his request that courts can prospectively apply equitable tolling to un-commenced actions and that Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006 allows courts to extend the Bankruptcy Code § 546(a) statute of limitations. Motion at ¶35. But that reading of *IBT* misses the point of the case. The Eleventh Circuit *did not* analyze the Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006 issue: \"[w]hile we think a bankruptcy court has the discretion to extend the filing period for an adversary proceeding, that resolution is only the tip of the iceberg.\" *Id.* at 699. This statement does not cite any supporting statute or case. *Cf.* 28 U.S.C. § 2075. In fact, Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006 is referenced only *four times* in the decision, 28 U.S.C. § 2075 is *not* cited, and there is no discussion concerning the interplay between the Bankruptcy Rules and the Bankruptcy Code.\n\nThe point of the case was *only* whether Bankruptcy Code § 546(a) was jurisdictional, a statute of limitation, or a statute of repose. The Eleventh Circuit held that Bankruptcy Code § 546(a) is a statute of limitation and equitable tolling can apply. *Id.* at 699.<sup>6</sup> Because the Eleventh\n\n<sup>6</sup> \"There is the threshold matter of whether the bankruptcy court had any authority - either by its own order or the doctrine of equitable tolling - to enlarge the § 546(a) period for commencing avoidance actions. The Defendants suggest that rather than a statute of limitations, § 546(a) operates as a jurisdictional bar, and point to Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b), which does not specifically provide for enlargement of time period created by statute, as opposed to those created by the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure or a court order. We find no merit in this argument. Rule 9006(b) states:\n\nCircuit focused on whether Bankruptcy Code § 546(a) was jurisdictional, it did not truly consider whether a Bankruptcy Rule can overrule a Bankruptcy Code provision; it just assumed it could. Moreover, the one case *IBT* cites regarding Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006, *Pryor v. Barbara (In re Rodriguez)*, 283 B.R. 112, 120 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2001) considered whether a statute of limitations could be waived and based on specific facts, held: \"the Court finds that section 546(a) is a statute of limitations which can be extended by agreement between the parties. Accordingly, the stipulations signed by Barbara served to extend the Trustee's time to bring this action, and it is timely commenced.\" Like *IBT*, the court in *Rodriquez* made no effort to analyze the issues presented in this case. It only enforced the consensual extension of the time within which a trustee could commence an action.\n\nJudge Tancredi's opinion in *Walnut Hill* and Judge Krechevsky's opinion *Damach* are directly on point and thoroughly analyze why the prospective, blanket relief sought by the Trustee is not available. Thus they, not *IBT*, should be followed. To be clear, G Club does not suggest that equitable tolling may *never* apply or may not ultimately be found to apply to a specific adversary proceeding the Trustee may commence later. But before that question is joined, the Trustee must commence an action and a statute of limitations defense has to be asserted, and before it is decided, the Trustee must prove that equitable tolling applies is available and is supported by the specific facts of the specific adversary proceeding as explained in *Walnut Hill*.\n\nWhen an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified period by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court, the court for cause may at any time in its discretion…order the period enlarged.\"\n\nAlthough 'by these rules…or by order of court' does not explicitly encompass statutory timeframes, it does bring all of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure under its umbrella. Not surprisingly, this would include Rule 7001, which defines an adversary proceeding as one 'to recover money or property' and Rule 7003, which governs the commencement of adversary proceedings. *To read a jurisdictional bar into § 546* would lead to absurd results, and the Defendants did not cite any authority for such a proposition. Therefore, § 546 is indeed a statute of limitations, subject to waiver, equitable tolling, and equitable estoppel.\" (Emphasis added.)\n\n#### **D. It is Inequitable to Provide the Trustee Further Time to Commence Actions**\n\nEven if the Court has the power to extend Bankruptcy Code § 546(a) prospectively and on a blanket basis, it shouldn't. The Trustee has been saying he intended to seek this relief since the fall of 2023 but waited until a few weeks prior to the 2-year deadline to file the Motion. The Trustee has known, and publicly stated, he would be pursuing claims against hundreds, and perhaps thousands, of parties. This Motion should have been filed months ago to afford the Court sufficient time to consider it. The relief sought is novel and the Court should be afforded more than a few days to consider the extraordinary argument of the Trustee. The Trustee's delay is not this Court's emergency. *See Kai Lu v. Vivente 1, Inc.*, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102157, at \\*13 (N.D. Cal. June 12, 2023) (\"Here, Plaintiff filed for relief over a year after receiving the Notice and over ten months after the UD complaint was filed. This delay is another ground for denying the motion for a TRO.\") (Internal citations omitted.)\n\nIn addition to the delay by the Trustee, granting the Trustee prospective relief would deprive G Club and any other potential defendant, the right to challenge the application of equitable tolling generally or based on the specific facts supporting such equitable tolling arguments. The Trustee argues that \"the factual record easily demonstrates that (i) extraordinary circumstances prevented the Trustee form bringing the Avoidance Actions and (ii) the Trustee acted diligently in pursuing his rights.\" Motion at ¶48. However, the undisputed record contains no reason why equitable tolling as to G Club – or any specific potential defendant – should be allowed (other than the Trustee's refrain of \"obstruction,\" which is not factually correct as to G Club).\n\n### **IV. CONCLUSION**\n\nFor the foregoing reasons the Court should deny the Motion and enter such other relief as is just and equitable, including that all of G Club's rights, claims, defenses and counterclaims, including without limitation any based on statutes of limitation are preserved, if the Trustee commences an adversary proceeding or otherwise asserts claims against it.\n\n## **G CLUB OPERATIONS LLC**\n\nBy: */s/ Jeffrey M. Sklarz* Jeffrey M. Sklarz (ct20938) Kellianne Baranowsky (ct26684) GREEN & SKLARZ LLC One Audubon St, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06511 (203) 285-8545 jsklarz@gs-lawfirm.com kbaranowsky@gs-lawfirm.com\n\nCarolina A. Fornos (*pro hac vice*) PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP 31 West 52nd Street New York, NY 10019 (212) 858-1558 carolina.fornos@pillsburylaw.com\n\n*Attorneys for Appellant*\n\n### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI hereby certify that on the date set forth below, a copy of the foregoing was served via CM/ECF. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF system.\n\nDate: February 5, 2024 /s/ Jeffrey M. Sklarz","body_zh":"美国破产法院 康涅狄格区 布里奇波特分院\n\n关于：\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵），1\n\n第11章\n\n案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n\n债务人。\n\n2024年2月5日\nG Club Operations LLC 反对受托人关于根据《破产法典》第108条、第546(a)条及第549条延长受托人提起撤销权诉讼期限的命令准予动议之异议及法律备忘录\n\nG Club Operations, LLC（“G Club”）谨此对第11章受托人 Luc Despins（“受托人”）提交的《关于根据〈破产法典〉第108条、第546(a)条及第549条延长受托人提起撤销权诉讼期限的命令准予动议》（ECF No. 2509，“本动议”）提出异议，并提交本反对法律备忘录。基于以下理由，法院应驳回本动议。\n\nI. 引言\n\n非经国会立法，《破产法典》§ 546(a)规定的诉讼时效不得延长。毫无疑问，受托人的动议试图通过司法途径修改国会通过的法律。受托人试图侵夺国会制定法律的宪法权力，并以受托人意图改变《破产法典》§ 546(a)的意愿取而代之。本法院或任何法院均无权通过司法途径修改《破产法典》。\n\n1 这些第11章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵，亦称 Guo Wengui、Miles Guo 及 Miles Kwok，以及其他化名，税务识别号后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（税务识别号后四位：8202）以及 Genever Holdings Corporation。\n\n因此，基于以下理由，应驳回本动议：(1) 本法院对本事项无作出裁决的宪法权力，因为该事项涉及“私人诉权”，根据 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011)，该权利只能由地区法院行使。因此，即使本法院要对本动议作出裁决，也必须以向地区法院出具报告和建议的方式进行；(2) 法院无前瞻性修改《破产法典》§ 546(a)所设诉讼时效的法定权力，因为《破产法典》中没有任何规定允许本法院或任何法院这样做；(3) 受托人在其动议中提出的时效中止主张高度依赖事实，必须按个案分别进行评估，而不能以前瞻性且一刀切的方式提出；以及 (4) 受托人在2年诉讼时效届满仅数天前才向法院提交本动议，制造了不必要的紧急状态，且在最后一刻请求给予如此重大且史无前例的救济是不公平的，尤其是在受托人至少在数月前就已计划请求此项救济是无可争议的事实的情况下。\n\n受托人未援引任何具有说服力的权威依据来支持其动议，并要求法院忽视 28 U.S.C. § 2075 的字面明文含义，该条款明确规定最高法院为破产实务颁布的任何程序规则“不得剥夺、扩大或修改任何实体权利”，例如联邦法定的诉讼时效。James T. Tancredi 法官阁下在 In re Walnut Hill, Inc., 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 1589, at *2-3 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 1, 2018) 一案中直接处理了这一确切问题，并认定《联邦破产程序规则》第9006(b)条“不能”适用于《破产法典》§ 546(a)，“否则将违反宪法所维护的三权分立原则”。此外，合理中止仅适用于在已提起的诉讼中提出诉讼时效抗辩之后。受托人试图区分 Walnut Hill 案及其他类似判例的主张毫无根据。\n\n最后，如果驳回本动议，受托人不会受到任何损害。受托人在提起任何对抗性诉讼后，仍可在面对任何被主张的诉讼时效抗辩时援引合理中止，受托人与被告亦可就具体的、关键的事实对此问题展开诉讼。事实上，受托人也承认“合理中止必须按个案具体裁定，且不限于特定事实情形”。见动议第45段。因此，本动议应予驳回。\n\nII. 事实与背景\n\n本案的事实与诉讼程序历史为法院所熟知，G Club 请求法院对本破产案件的案卷记录进行司法认知，内容涉及受托人的调查、鉴于法院就提起第5章主张所作的各项报告以及受托人提出本动议的意图而提交本动议的时间点，以及任何其他相关事项。\n\nIII. 法律与论证\n\nA. 法院无对本动议作出终局判决的宪法权力\n\n最高法院已反复重申，破产法院对偏颇性清偿诉讼、欺诈性转让诉讼以及其他源自普通法的类似权利主张——即所谓的“私权”主张——无作出终局裁决的宪法权力。Stern, 564 U.S. 462, 492, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2614（“因此，我们的结论是，欺诈性转让诉讼更准确地应定性为私权而非公权，正如我们在涉及第三条的判决中所使用这些术语的含义那样。”）（省略修饰）。受托人忽视了 Stern 案及其衍生先例，将本动议几乎视作常规程序对待。\n\n因此，即使法院考虑受托人的动议，也需要撰写报告和建议供地区法院审查。显然，受托人可能提起的权利主张系根据《破产法典》第5章或州法产生。受托人在其动议中未明确任何特定于《破产法典》的“公权”主张。因此，法院缺乏对本动议作出终局判决的宪法权力。\n\nB. 受托人不得重写《破产法典》\n\n受托人请求本法院通过司法途径修改《破产法典》§ 546(a)，以允许前瞻性地延长诉讼时效。宪法或《破产法典》均无任何允许此举的规定。参见《美国宪法》第一条第一款（“本宪法所授予之全部立法权，均属于由参议院与众议院组成之美利坚合众国国会。”）因此，除非受托人能够指出《破产法典》中允许法院通过司法途径延长《破产法典》§ 546(a)所设诉讼时效的具体条款，否则所请求的救济不能予以准许。在本案中，受托人未援引任何《破产法典》条款（因为根本不存在），本动议必须予以驳回。\n\n第一，如果立法机关希望赋予法院延长诉讼时效的权力，立法机关自会提供相应的机制。例如，康涅狄格州立法机关允许医疗事故受害者向康涅狄格州高等法院申请延长诉讼时效。参见 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-190a(b)（“在向任何高等法院或任何联邦地区法院书记官提交申请以追讨因人身伤害或非正常死亡导致的损害赔偿时，应自动准予九十天的诉讼时效延长，以允许进行本条(a)款所要求的合理调查。该期限应在其他中止期限之外另行计算。”）。在《破产法典》中，或在《美国法典》的任何其他地方，均未赋予法院延长《破产法典》§ 546(a)所设诉讼时效的权力。\n\n第二，破产规则不能成为法院更改法律的授权依据。授权最高法院颁布破产规则的 28 U.S.C. § 2075 明确规定：“此等规则不得剥夺、扩大或修改任何实体权利。”28 U.S.C. § 2075 的规定十分明确：\n\n> 由于《破产规则》第9006(a)条并未扩大或限制破产法院的管辖权，参见 28 U.S.C. § 2075，因此它并不改变我们的结论，即起诉状必须自受托人被任命之日起两年内提交。两年的时效期间自受托人被任命之日起算，并于二十四个月后届满，无论最后一日是否适逢星期六、星期日或法定节假日。正如《联邦民事诉讼规则》一样，《破产规则》规范的是诉讼程序被适时提起之后的程序性事项。管辖权必须源自第546(a)条，而无需参照《破产规则》第9006(a)条。\n\nIn re Butcher, 829 F.2d 596, 600-01 (6th Cir. 1987)。因此，要援引《联邦破产程序规则》第9006条，受托人首先必须提起诉讼。2\n\n在 Walnut Hill 案中，Tancredi 法官仔细分析了适用的法律、规则及判例，并认定：“第9006(b)条仅适用于根据这些规则或据其发出的通知[，][原文如此]或根据法院命令所设定的截止期限。该规则全文从未提及法定时限。”（强调为后加；省略修饰）。2018 Bankr. LEXIS 1589, at *2。Tancredi 法官审查了关于该主题的先例，除其他判例之外，还借鉴了 Krechevsky 法官在 In re Damach, Inc., 235 B.R. 727, 731 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1999) 中的判决，该判决同样裁定《联邦破产程序规则》第9006条不得作为前瞻性延长诉讼时效的依据。\n\n2 Butcher 案法院适用的是1982年起草的《破产法典》§ 546(a)中的诉讼时效。1994年，《破产法典》§ 546(a)被修正，规定其诉讼时效要求诉讼应在以下较晚期限之前提起：(a) 救济命令作出之日起两年（在本案中，为债务人提交自愿破产申请之日），或 (b) 自受托人被任命之日起一年（若在案件开始之日起两年内被任命）。在本第11章案件中，关于《破产法典》§ 546(a)项下的诉讼时效于2024年2月15日届满是毫无争议的。无论如何，第六巡回法院所作的分析是正确的：《破产规则》第9006(a)条不能用于延长《破产法典》§ 546(a)所设的诉讼时效。\n\n依据 28 U.S.C. § 2075，Tancredi 法官解释道：“国会已明确规定，破产规则不得剥夺、扩大或修改任何实体权利。在规则与法典发生冲突时，以成文法典为准。”Walnut Hill, Bankr. LEXIS 1589, at *2（省略修饰）。法律规定是明确的：法院不能依据破产规则前瞻性地中止诉讼时效。\n\n受托人声称“已有许多法院前瞻性地准予了[合理中止]救济”。动议第30段。但受托人引用的案例中有三件3根本无法提供任何指导意义。这三起案件准许的是未受异议的动议，且并未作出任何分析所作出的无异议命令在法律上是否正当的书面判决。换言之，这些案件并非支持受托人论点的具权威性先例。三份“照准”的无异议动议并不作数。\n\n此外，确实包含若干分析的 Marsh v. Levy (In re Martin Levy of Berlin D.M.D., P.C.), 416 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009) 一案在事实上并不相同。在该案中，受托人提交了延长向三名相关的潜在被告提起权利主张之期限的动议。“延期动议送达至[潜在被告]……未有针对延期动议提出任何异议，因此，在2008年4月11日，法院就延期动议作出了如下命令：准予。期限特此延长至2008年6月30日。未有异议提交。”同上，第3-4页。在提起撤销权诉讼后，如今已成为被告的当事人以诉讼时效为由提请驳回起诉。法院以诉讼时效抗辩已被放弃这一狭窄理由驳回了驳回起诉动议：“法院认定[各被告]……放弃了 11 U.S.C. § 所设定的时限\n\n3 引述 In re Rockport Dev., Inc., No. 20-11339 (SC) (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2022)；In re Visiting Nurse Ass'n of Inland and Counties, No. 18-16908 (MH) (Bankr. C.D. Cal. July 30, 2020) 以及 In re Builders Holding Co. Corp., No-16-06643 (EAG7) (Bankr. D. P.R. Apr. 25, 2019)。\n\n546(a)条，因其未对受托人延长截止日期的动议作出回应或提出异议。”同上，第9页。\n\n在本案中，G Club（G俱乐部）已对该动议及时提出异议，且受托人正针对数百名或可能数千名处境各异的潜在被告，寻求全面延长诉讼时效。因此，Marsh案在本法院审理的案件面前既无事实相似性，亦无法律相似性。受托人未援引任何判例表明受托人曾提出请求、且法院曾批准针对受托人未来可能希望起诉的任何潜在被告前瞻性地延长诉讼时效。\n\n总而言之，法院应当驳回该动议，因为 28 U.S.C. § 2075 和 Bankruptcy Code（《破产法典》）§ 546(a) 正是如此规定的。法院不能为了任何一方的便利而重写国会通过的法律。4\nC. 在诉讼提起之前，不能前瞻性地寻求衡平法时效中止\n\n在 Walnut Hill 案中，法院裁定“衡平法时效中止原则被认可为对未决诉讼中所主张的时效抗辩的回应。”2018 Bankr. LEXIS 1589, at *4。在此，尚未提起任何可以中止时效的诉讼：“一旦提出诉讼时效抗辩，在针对特定被告的对抗性诉讼中就有待证明的事实和情况进行证据听证的语境之外去处理衡平法时效中止，完全是为时过早且在程序上有瑕疵的。”同上，第5页。5 因此，受托人需要提起诉讼，等待对方提出诉讼时效抗辩，然后通过主张适用某种中止原则（例如衡平法时效中止）来延长诉讼时效作为回应。\n\n4 如果受托人的推理是正确的，任何诉讼当事人都可以根据 Fed. R. Civ. P. 6（《联邦民事诉讼规则》第6条）请求任何地区法院延长诉讼时效。若非本破产案件尚在审理中，受托人如果根据《联邦民事诉讼规则》中允许延期的某些条款提起衡平法诉讼以延长诉讼时效，在地区法院早就贻笑大方了。\n\n5 Tancredi法官列举了许多受托人的论点被驳回的判例。\n\n即使是允许延长《破产法典》§ 546(a) 期限的案件，也没有前瞻性地这样做。相反，那些案件讨论的是《破产法典》§ 546(a) 是否属于管辖权性质从而可以被放弃、通过协议延长或可以适用衡平法时效中止，同时也考虑了它是否构成不适用任何中止原则的除斥期间。参见 Pugh v. Brook (In re Pugh), 158 F.3d 530, 537-38 (11th Cir. 1998)。\n\n受托人援引的 IBT Int'l, Inc. v. N. (In re Int'l Admin. Servs.), 408 F.3d 689 (11th Cir. 2005) 在这方面具有启发意义。受托人依靠该判例来支持其主张，即法院可以前瞻性地对未提起的诉讼适用衡平法时效中止，以及 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006（《联邦破产诉讼规则》第9006条）允许法院延长《破产法典》§ 546(a) 的诉讼时效。动议第35段。但对 IBT 的这种解读未能抓住案件的要点。Eleventh Circuit（第十一巡回上诉法院）并未分析《联邦破产诉讼规则》第9006条这一问题：“虽然我们认为破产法院有权酌情延长对抗性诉讼的起诉期限，但这解决的只是冰山一角。”同上，第699页。该表述并未引用任何支持的成文法或判例。对比 28 U.S.C. § 2075。事实上，《联邦破产诉讼规则》第9006条在该裁决中仅被提及四次，28 U.S.C. § 2075 未被引用，且没有任何关于破产规则与《破产法典》之间相互作用的讨论。\n\n该案的要点仅在于《破产法典》§ 546(a) 是属于管辖权性质、诉讼时效还是除斥期间。第十一巡回上诉法院认定《破产法典》§ 546(a) 是一项诉讼时效，并且可以适用衡平法时效中止。同上，第699页。6 由于第十一\n\n6 “存在一个先决问题，即破产法院是否有任何权力——无论是通过其自身命令还是通过衡平法时效中止原则——来延长提起撤销诉讼的 § 546(a) 期限。被告认为 § 546(a) 并非诉讼时效，而是作为管辖权障碍运作，并指出破产规则 9006(b) 并未明确规定延长由成文法设定的期限，这与由《联邦破产诉讼规则》或法院命令设定的期限不同。我们认为这一论点毫无根据。规则 9006(b) 规定：\n\n当根据这些规则或据此发出的通知或根据法院命令，要求或允许在指定期间内进行某项行为时，法院有正当理由可随时酌情……下令延长该期间。”\n\n尽管‘根据这些规则……或根据法院命令’并未明确涵盖法定时间框架，但它确实将所有的《联邦破产诉讼规则》纳入其涵盖范围。不足为奇的是，这将包括将对抗性诉讼定义为‘追回金钱或财产’的规则 7001，以及管辖对抗性诉讼提起的规则 7003。若将 § 546 解读为管辖权障碍将导致荒谬的结果，且被告并未引用任何支持此类主张的权威依据。因此，§ 546 确实是一项诉讼时效，可受制于放弃、衡平法时效中止和衡平法不容反悔。”（强调为后加。）\nD. 给受托人进一步延长提起诉讼的时间是不衡平的\n\n即便法院有权前瞻性且一揽子延长《破产法典》§ 546(a)，法院也不应这样做。受托人自2023年秋季以来就一直称其打算寻求此项救济，却一直拖延至2年截止日期前几周才提交本动议。受托人一直知悉并公开声明其将对数百名、甚至可能数千名当事人提起索赔诉讼。该动议本应在数月前提交，以便为法院留出充足的时间予以考虑。所寻求的救济是新颖的，应当给予法院数天以上的时间来考虑受托人的非寻常论点。受托人的延误并非本法院的紧急状况。参见 Kai Lu v. Vivente 1, Inc., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102157, at *13 (N.D. Cal. June 12, 2023)（“在此，原告在收到通知一年多后、在非法拘禁起诉书提交十个多月后才申请救济。这种延误是驳回临时限制令动议的另一理由。”）（内部引用省略。）\n\n除了受托人的延误之外，给予受托人前瞻性救济将剥夺 G Club 以及任何其他潜在被告在总体上或基于支持此类衡平法时效中止论点的具体事实来对衡平法时效中止之适用提出质疑的权利。受托人主张“事实记录轻易表明：(i) 异常情况阻碍了受托人提起撤销诉讼，且 (ii) 受托人尽职尽责地主张了其权利。”动议第48段。然而，无可争议的记录中没有任何理由说明为何应当允许针对 G Club——或任何具体的潜在被告——适用衡平法时效中止（除了受托人反复提及的“阻碍”，就 G Club 而言这在事实上并不准确）。\nIV. 结论\n\n基于前述理由，法院应当驳回该动议，并作出公正且衡平的其他救济，包括如果受托人对 G Club 提起对抗性诉讼或以其他方式对其主张权利，G Club 的所有权利、主张、抗辩和反诉（包括但不限于基于诉讼时效的任何权利、主张、抗辩和反诉）均予以保留。\nG CLUB OPERATIONS LLC\n\n签署人：/s/ Jeffrey M. Sklarz Jeffrey M. Sklarz (ct20938) Kellianne Baranowsky (ct26684) GREEN & SKLARZ LLC One Audubon St, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06511 (203) 285-8545 jsklarz@gs-lawfirm.com kbaranowsky@gs-lawfirm.com\n\nCarolina A. Fornos (pro hac vice/特许出庭) PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP 31 West 52nd Street New York, NY 10019 (212) 858-1558 carolina.fornos@pillsburylaw.com\n\n上诉人律师\n送达证明\n\n我特此证明，在下文载明的日期，前述文书的副本已通过 CM/ECF 进行了送达。各方当事人可通过法院的 CM/ECF 系统查阅此份备案文件。\n\n日期：2024年2月5日 /s/ Jeffrey M. Sklarz","key_entities":["Je","Kwok","Guo","Ho Wan Kwok","Miles Guo","Despins","Luc Despins"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":2509,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":3598,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 13:42:26"}