{"id":"court_ctb_2565_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":2565,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION )","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"#### **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n)\n\n)\n\n)\n\n)\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_)\n\nIn re: ) Chapter 11\n\nHO WAN KWOK, et al., ) Case No. 22:50073 (JAM)\n\nDebtors. ) (Jointly Administered)\n\n### **OBJECTION OF NON-PARTIES RULE OF LAW FOUNDATION III, INC., AND RULE OF LAW SOCIETY IV, INC., TO MOTION FOR ENTRY OF ORDER EXTENDING DEADLINE FOR TRUSTEE TO FILE AVOIDANCE ACTIONS UNDER BANKRUPTCY CODE SECTIONS 108, 546(a), AND 549**\n\nNon-parties Rule of Law Foundation III, Inc. (\"**ROLF**\"), and Rule of Law Society IV, Inc. (\"**ROLS**,\" and together with ROLF, the \"**Rule of Law Entities**\"), hereby object to the Motion for Entry of Order Extending Deadline for Trustee to File Avoidance Actions Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 108, 546(a), and 549 [ECF No. 2509] (the \"**Tolling Motion**\") filed by Luc A. Despins in his capacity as the Chapter 11 Trustee (the \"**Trustee**\"). As more fully set forth below, the Tolling Motion should be denied as to the Rule of Law Entities because (i) the authority relied upon by the Trustee in support of the Tolling Motion does **not** authorize this Court to enter a prospective, blanket tolling order; (ii) the Trustee already has conducted extensive discovery with respect to the Rule of Law Entities, and cannot sustain his burden of proving that the circumstances are so \"extraordinary\" that the doctrine of equitable tolling should apply as pertains to any potential claims against the Rule of Law Entities; and (iii) the relief sought by the Trustee is highly prejudicial to the Rule of Law Entities which, as non-parties to this case, have no ability to conduct any discovery or to effectively challenge the many statements of alleged fact upon which the Trustee relies, which results in the Rule of Law Entities being deprived of due process.\n\n## **OBJECTION TO TRUSTEE'S PRELIMINARY STATEMENT AND BACKGROUND FACTS**\n\n1. Like any party objecting to the motion of an adversary – especially one seeking the type of extraordinary relief as that sought by the Trustee in the Tolling Motion – the Rule of Law Entities normally would present here facts in rebuttal to the statement of facts alleged by the Trustee in ¶¶ 1 through 26 of the Tolling Motion. As a non-party to this bankruptcy proceeding, however, the Rule of Law Entities have had little involvement in this case (other than as set forth in ¶ 16 below) or in the other proceedings referenced by the Trustee in the Tolling Motion, and thus have no ability to meaningfully respond to the Trustee's factual allegations. Further, the Rule of Law Entities apparently are not entitled to conduct any discovery with respect to the alleged facts and matters set forth in ¶¶ 1-26 of the Tolling Motion – which facts and matters, it must be pointed out, are **not** supported by an affidavit or declaration from the Trustee or anyone else with personal knowledge, and thus are not properly before this Court. See, e.g., Callahan v. City of New Haven Bd. of Educ., No. 3:17CV-00617 (JAM), 2019 WL 1649940, at \\*1 (D. Conn. Apr. 16, 2019)**<sup>1</sup>** (parties' failure to include \"fact-by-fact citation to affidavits or other admissible evidence of record\" in support of their statements of fact in connection with summary judgment motion as required by local rule renders court without a \"reliable factual basis to decide the motion for summary judgment.\"). The Rule of Law Entities are thus fighting the Tolling Motion with one arm tied behind their proverbial backs; they can argue that the Trustee is wrong on the\n\n**<sup>1</sup>** Copies of unreported decisions are attached for the Court's convenience.\n\nlaw (which he most certainly is), but they have no meaningful ability to counter the lengthy, unsupported statement of facts upon which the Tolling Motion relies and without which there would be no basis whatsoever for the entry of the extraordinary relief sought by the Trustee. This is simply unfair, and as set forth below, the inability of all prospective defendants to meaningfully challenge the grounds asserted by those seeking equitable tolling on a prospective basis is one reason that a number of courts have refused to grant such relief.\n\n#### **ARGUMENT**\n\n# Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) Does Not Permit This Court to Toll a Statutory Limitations Period\n\n2. The Trustee's assertion that Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) authorizes this Court to toll\n\nthe limitations periods contained in Sections 108, 546(a) and 549 of the Bankruptcy Code is\n\nsimply wrong. Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) states, in relevant part:\n\nExcept as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of this subdivision, when an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified period by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court, the court for cause shown may … order the period enlarged if the request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order ….\n\nFed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)(1) (emphasis added). As is clear from this language, the authority of the court to enlarge a time period under Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) is expressly limited to time periods specified \"by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court.\" Noticeably missing from this language is any authorization for the court to enlarge a time period specified by statute.\n\n3. Several bankruptcy courts in Connecticut have expressly held that Rule 9006(b) does not authorize a court to enlarge the limitations period contained in a statute. In In re Damach, Inc., 235 B.R. 727 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1999), Judge Krechevsky relied on the plain\n\nlanguage of both Bankr. R. 9006(b) and Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 60(b) to conclude that neither rule \"permits a court to extend a time limitation set by Congress in a statute; they permit modification only of time limitations imposed by other rules or by the court.\"\n\n4. More recently, Judge Tancredi rejected a trustee's argument that Rule 9006(b) permitted the court to enlarge the time within which the trustee could file an avoidance action under Section 546(a). In re Walnut Hill, Inc., No. 16-20960 (JJT), 2018 WL 2672242 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 1, 2018). As the Walnut Hill court correctly noted, \"[b]y its plain language, Rule 9006(b) only applies to deadlines set 'by these rules or by a notice given thereunder[,] [*sic*] or by order of court'. Nowhere in the Rule does it mention statutory deadlines.\" Id. at \\*1. The court also found instructive that Rule 9006(a) expressly states that it is applicable to \"any statute that does not specify a method of computing time,\" whereas Rule 9006(b) does not state that it applies to statutes. Id. (\"Rule 9006(b) is noticeably missing the same, or similar, language involving its application to a statute.\").**<sup>2</sup>** Finally, the court observed that \"Rule 9006(b) cannot apply to Section 546(a) without violating the separation of powers preserved in the Constitution. Where the legislature has spoken authoritatively, it is not within the province of the judiciary to modify its determination. As Rule 9006(b) does not apply to Section 546(a), it is unnecessary for this Court to determine whether cause was shown for an extension of the statutory deadline.\" Id. at \\*2.\n\n**<sup>2</sup>** The Trustee seems to suggest that because Rule 9006(a) expressly applies to statutes, Rule 9006(b) can also be construed to apply to statutes. This argument ignores the fact that Rule 9006(a) does not allow the court to *override* a limitations period in a statute; instead, it only applies to statutes that do \"not specify a method of computing time.\" Thus, Rule 9006(a) does not allow a court to modify a time period established by Congress.\n\n5. Other courts around the country have similarly held that Rule 9006(b) does not authorize the enlargement of a time period prescribed by statute. For example, in In re Federated Food Courts, Inc., 222 B.R. 396 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1998), the court rejected the debtor's attempt to obtain an extension time pursuant to Bankr. R. 9006(b) within which to assume or reject an unexpired lease pursuant to Section 365(d)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code after the debtor failed to timely file the statutorily permitted motion for extension of time. As the court explained:\n\nThe difficulty here is that Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) is a rule governing the enlargement of time periods prescribed in other Bankruptcy Rules or court orders. Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) refers to deadlines set by \"these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of the court.\" It does not refer to enlarging time periods prescribed by statute. The 60–day deadline for filing a motion to assume a non-residential lease, however, is set by statute, not by the Bankruptcy Rules, not by a notice given under the Bankruptcy Rules, and not by an order of the Court. Thus, Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) does not give the bankruptcy court the discretion to allow a late motion to extend the time for assuming a lease, even if the mistake were the result of excusable neglect.\n\nId. at 398.\n\n6. Likewise, in In re Randolph Hosp., Inc., No. 20-10247, 2022 WL 19298765 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2022), the court concluded that Rule 9006(b) \"may not be used to extend statutory deadlines such as those established under 11 U.S.C. §§ 108 and 546….\" See also In re Barnes, 308 B.R. 77, 81 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2004) (in rejecting debtor's argument to apply Rule 9006(b) to extend deadline to file plan, court holds that \"the Bankruptcy Rules cannot override substantive provisions provided in the Bankruptcy Code and any conflict between the Bankruptcy Code and the Bankruptcy Rules must be settled in favor of the Code.\") (internal quotation omitted).\n\n7. Reliance on Rule 9006(b) to extend a statutory limitations period was also rejected in In re Cramer, 636 B.R. 830 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2022). In that case, the trustee sought an extension of the deadline to file claims under Sections 546 and 549 because the debtor had not cooperated in the trustee's investigation of the debtor's assets. Id. at \\*831. In fact, the court noted that the debtor's discharge had been revoked due to concealment of assets. Id. Nonetheless, the court rejected the trustee's motion on the basis that Rule 9006(b) did not authorize such relief. Citing Judge Tancredi's decision in Walnut Hill, among other cases, the court concluded that \"[t]he Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure contain no rule to extend statutory deadlines such as the ones in sections 546 & 549. No procedure supports the relief in the current motion. Id. at 831-32.\n\n8. The Trustee relies heavily on In re Int'l Admin. Servs., Inc., 408 F.3d 689 (11th Cir. 2005), for the proposition that Rule 9006(b) allows a court to enlarge a legislatively established limitations period. This reliance is misplaced. First, although the court in Int'l Admin. Servs. seems to suggest that Rule 9006(b) may apply to statutory limitations periods, its actual holding does not appear to rely on the applicability of that rule. Instead, after concluding that Section 546 is a statute of limitations rather than a jurisdictional bar, the court concluded that Section 546 is \"subject to waiver, equitable tolling, and equitable estoppel,\" without further mentioning (or relying upon) Rule 9006(b). Id. at 699. Nonetheless, even if the Eleventh Circuit's decision can be read to hold that Rule 9006(b) permits a bankruptcy court to enlarge a limitations period established by Congress, the Rule of Law Entities respectfully submit that the case was incorrectly decided, and in any event, it is not binding precedent in this Circuit.\n\n9. In ¶ 35 of the Tolling Motion, the Trustee offers a string cite to cases which he claims support his argument that statutory limitations periods can be enlarged pursuant to Rule 9006(b). Most of these decisions are unreported orders that contain few if any facts, little to no\n\n- 6 -\n\nanalysis, and appear to have been uncontested. For example, the Trustee cites to In re Network Services Sols., LLC, No. 17-50309-gwz (Bankr. D. Nev. Mar. 6, 2019), which is attached to the Tolling Motion as Exhibit 7. This Order contains no recitation of the facts of the case or the authority upon which the court relies to grant the motion, and notes that no objection was filed. Most importantly, **there does not appear to be a single reference to Rule 9006(b) in the Order**, and thus there is no way to determine the legal basis upon which the court entered the Order. As such, it lends no support to the Trustee's argument. The same is true of the orders in In re Anton & Chia, LLP, No. 18-12565-TA (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2020), and In re Uplift RX, LLC, No. 17-32186 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2019), which are attached to the Tolling Motion as Exhibits 9 and 10. And although the Order in In re Farm-Rite, Inc., No. 20-19379-JNP (Bankr. D.N.J. Aug. 3, 2022) (Exhibit 8) mentions Rule 9006(b), it likewise contains no discussion of the facts of the case or the legal analysis applied by the court. As a result, the authoritative value of these cases is nil.\n\n10. Based on the foregoing, the Rule of Law Entities respectfully submit that Rule 9006(b) does not authorize the relief sought by the Trustee. As the court in Walnut Hill recognized, Rule 9006(b) does not pertain to statutory deadlines, and applying the rule to extend Congressionally established limitations periods would violate the separation of powers preserved in the Constitution.,\n\n### **Prospective Equitable Tolling is Not Appropriate in this Case**\n\n11. The Trustee's request that this Court equitably toll the limitations periods under Bankruptcy Code §§ 108, 546(a) and 549 on a *prospective basis* as to all potential defendants is not supported by the better-reasoned decisions examining this issue, is not supported by any admissible evidence, and is not justified as to the Rule of Law Entities.**<sup>3</sup>**\n\n12. \"Equitable tolling is appropriate only in rare and exceptional circumstances and should be used only sparingly. Maslar v. United States, No. CIV.A 3:06CV2056CFD, 2009 WL 1858868, at \\*2 (D. Conn. June 25, 2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted). \"To obtain the benefit of the doctrine, the Trustee bears the burden of establishing that she, (1) has acted with reasonable diligence during the time period she seeks to have tolled, and (2) has proved that the circumstances are so extraordinary that the doctrine should apply.\" In re Anderson, 623 B.R. 199, 217 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2020). Thus, if there are \"extraordinary or exceptional circumstances,\" the common law doctrine of equitable tolling allows a court to \"extend a statute of limitations on a case-by-case basis to prevent inequity, even when the limitations period would otherwise have expired.\" Id. \"Equitable tolling permits courts to extend a limitations period on a case-by-case basis to prevent inequity, even when such period would otherwise have expired.\" In re Camus, 386 B.R. 396, 398 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2008).\n\n13. In Walnut Hill, Judge Tancredi rejected a trustee's attempt to apply equitable tolling on a prospective basis. Walnut Hill, 2018 WL 2672242 at \\*2. The court first observed that \"[p]rocedurally, the doctrine of equitable tolling is recognized as a response to a statute of limitations defense asserted in a *pending litigation*.\" Id. (emphasis added). After noting that all parties acknowledged that an adversary proceeding had not yet been filed and the deadline to do\n\n**<sup>3</sup>** Just as with many of the cases cited by the Trustee in support of his argument that Rule 9006(b) authorizes the relief sought herein [see ¶ 8, *supra*], a number of the cases cited by the Trustee in support of his argument that equitable tolling on a prospective basis is appropriate are mere orders and are utterly devoid of any discussion of the underlying facts and/or legal reasoning. See Tolling Motion, ¶ 30 and Exs. 2-5. As a result, these cases have little to no precedential value.\n\nso had not yet passed, the court concluded that \"[i]t is wholly premature and procedurally flawed to address equitable tolling outside the context of an evidentiary hearing on the facts and circumstances to be proven in the adversary proceeding against specific defendants, once a statute of limitations defense has been asserted.\" Id.\n\n14. Similarly, in In re Randolph Hosp., Inc., No. 20-10247, 2022 WL 19298765 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2022), the court held that application of the equitable tolling doctrine on a prospective basis would essentially deprive the future defendant of the opportunity to challenge whether the doctrine actually applied on the facts of the case. As the court explained, \"[w]hile the limitations periods of § 546 and § 108, like any statute of limitations, are subject to equitable tolling, the preemptive finding the Liquidation Trustee seeks is premature given there are no identified defendants and no pending adversary proceedings related to the overpayment claims. Given this procedural posture, the Court agrees with those decisions finding that a trustee 'cannot win the argument of whether or not equitable tolling applies in advance and without notice and opportunity for the defendant to resist application of the doctrine.'\" Id. at \\*1. Other courts have also rejected similar requests for prospective equitable tolling. See, e.g., In re Cramer, 636 B.R. 830, 833–34 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2022) (\"If a bankruptcy trustee has a sufficient basis for application of the doctrine of equitable tolling, then the trustee will prevail later in the adversary proceeding after filing the untimely complaint.\").\n\n15. In In re No. 1 Contracting Corp., No. BR 5-10-BK-01755-JJT, 2012 WL 4114818 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2012), the court distinguished the Eleventh Circuit's decision in International Administrative Services and rejected a trustee's request to equitably toll the limitations period in § 546 on a prospective basis. Notably, the trustee in that case, like the\n\nTrustee here, alleged that the debtor's principal has been uncooperative, refused to answer questions at numerous Section 341 meetings, and invoked his constitutional right not to answer questions. Id. at \\*1. And as in the present case, the trustee in No. 1 Contracting Corp. claimed that, as a result of the refusal of the debtor's principal to cooperate, he was unable to \"determine whether there are avoidance and/or other related actions including preferential and fraudulent transfer actions that can be asserted on behalf of the Debtor's estate.\" Id. The court was unmoved and found the decision in *International Administrative Services* to be distinguishable because, in that case, \"there was a pending action before the Bankruptcy Court at the time the Trustee filed his request to extend the time within which to file claims against potential future defendants.\" Id. As the court went on to explain, unlike in the Eleventh Circuit case, \"there is no action in any form pending before this Court. It is unknown whether future defendants will even assert the statute of limitations defense. It is for this reason that the Court will deny the Trustee's request to extend the time in which to file complaints and equitably toll the statute of limitations in 11 U.S.C. § 546(a), without prejudice to raise equitable tolling should the Trustee file adversary complaints.\" Id.; see also In re Cramer, 636 B.R. 830, 833–34 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2022) (rejecting request for prospective equitable tolling of avoidance claims because \"[i]f a bankruptcy trustee has a sufficient basis for application of the doctrine of equitable tolling, then the trustee will prevail later in the adversary proceeding after filing the untimely complaint. If, on the other hand, a trustee does not have a sufficient basis for application of the doctrine of equitable tolling, the courts should not permit the trustee to avoid the consequences of such a deficiency by obtaining an order applying equitable tolling in advance without notice to the affected party.\").\n\n16. In the present case, the Trustee appears to believe that by providing notice of the Tolling Motion to all potential defendants and obtaining an order from this Court authorizing the service of that notice by alternate means, he has cured the unfair and inequitable result of seeking prospective relief. This simply is not so. The parties against whom equitable tolling is sought are entitled to more than mere notice; they have a right to notice and an *opportunity to resist application of the doctrine*. In re Randolph Hosp., Inc., No. 20-10247, 2022 WL 19298765 at \\*1 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2022). Moreover, since equitable tolling \"permits courts to extend a limitations period on a case-by-case basis,\" Camus, 386 B.R. at 398, the potential defendants should have the right to have each of their cases adjudicated based on the specific facts of each case, rather than in a complete vacuum of specific facts as is presented by the Tolling Motion. None of those safeguards are present in connection with the Tolling Motion.**<sup>4</sup>** As non-parties to this bankruptcy proceeding, most of the potential defendants noticed by the Trustee – including the Rule of Law Entities – have had little or no involvement in the bankruptcy proceedings or the other proceedings referenced by the Trustee in the Tolling Motion, and thus know little if anything about the case or about whether the Trustee \"has acted with reasonable diligence during the time period [he] seeks to have tolled, and (2) has proved that the circumstances are so extraordinary that the doctrine should apply.\" Anderson, 623 B.R. at 217. Further, the Rule of Law Entities apparently are not entitled to conduct any discovery with respect to the alleged facts\n\n<sup>4</sup> In addition, since no adversary proceeding has been filed and it cannot be known at this time whether any particular future defendant will even raise a statute of limitations defense, the Tolling Motion essentially seeks an impermissible advisory opinion where no actual claim or controversy yet exists. See Ass'n of Car Wash Owners Inc. v. City of New York, 911 F.3d 74, 85 (2d Cir. 2018) (\"federal courts may not give an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.\") (internal quotations omitted).\n\nand matters set forth in the Tolling Motion. As a result, they have no ability to *meaningfully* resist the application of the doctrine of equitable tolling or to gather information necessary to respond to the Trustee's factual allegations (which, as noted above, are unsupported by any affidavit or declaration of the Trustee). The Rule of Law Entities are thus fighting the Tolling Motion with one arm tied behind their proverbial backs; they can argue that the Trustee is wrong on the law (which he most certainly is), but they have no meaningful ability to counter the lengthy statement of facts upon which the Tolling Motion relies and without which there would be no basis whatsoever for the entry of the extraordinary relief sought by the Trustee.**<sup>5</sup>**\n\n17. Moreover, even if it is assumed that the entry of prospective relief might be appropriate as to *some* of the potential defendants noticed by the Trustee (which it is not), it certainly is not appropriate as to the Rule of Law Entities, which have endeavored to cooperate with all efforts by the Trustee to obtain documents and information from them. In support of this Objection, the Rule of Law Entities have filed herewith the Declaration of Bryan Ha dated February 5, 2024 (the \"Declaration\"), the terms of which and the exhibits annexed thereto are incorporated herein by reference.\n\n18. Based on the facts set forth in the Declaration, it is clear that, regardless of whether the Trustee has been unable to complete his investigation as to potential claims against other potential defendants, the Trustee has already conducted an investigation with respect to the Rule of Law Entities. The Rule of Law Entities have each complied in full with their obligations\n\n**<sup>5</sup>** The Trustee cynically argues that the manner in which he is proceeding \"preserves the rights of all potential defendants.\" Tolling Motion, ¶ 10. To the contrary, absent the ability to conduct discovery, the potential defendants are losing all ability to meaningfully object to the application of the equitable tolling doctrine against them.\n\nto produce documents to the Trustee in accordance with the Rule 2004 Subpoenas served upon them and with the December 2, 2022, e-mail from counsel narrowing the scope of the documents to be produced. Thus, if the Trustee believes he has one or more potential causes of action against either of the Rule of Law Entities, there is no reason he cannot and should not be required to commence that action prior to the expiration of the applicable deadline. In light of the length of time the Trustee has been in possession of requested documents from the Rule of Law Entities (since at least May 2023) and the fact that he has not, until very recently, **<sup>6</sup>** sought further discovery from them, the Trustee simply cannot make a colorable claim that the circumstances are so \"extraordinary\" that the doctrine of equitable tolling should apply as pertains to any potential claims against the Rule of Law Entities. Anderson, 623 B.R. at 217.\n\n17. Finally, the Trustee's reliance on Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code to support the extraordinary relief he seeks is without merit. As succinctly explained by the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York,\n\nSection 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code permits the court to \"issue any order, process or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.\" 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). However, it is well established that this power must and can only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code. This equitable power may not be used to circumvent any section of the Bankruptcy Code or any Bankruptcy Rule. As such, this Court cannot use § 105(a) to grant Plaintiff's request for an extension of the applicable limitations period to [file an adversary proceeding].\n\n**<sup>6</sup>** See Exhibits G – J to the Declaration. The Trustee's efforts to again seek documents from the Rule of Law Entities a few weeks before filing his Tolling Motion is an obvious but futile attempt to manufacture an equitable tolling argument.\n\nIn re Yashaya, 403 B.R. 278, 288 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted), aff'd sub nom. Yesh Diamonds, Inc. v. Yashaya, No. 09-CV-2016 DLI RER, 2010 WL 3851993 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2010).\n\n# **CONCLUSION**\n\nFor the reasons outlined above, the Rule of Law Entities respectfully ask this Court to deny the Trustee's Tolling Motion.\n\n> NON-PARTIES, RULE OF LAW FOUNDATION III, INC., and RULE OF LAW SOCIETY IV, INC.\n\nBy */s/ Douglas M. Evans*\n\n Douglas M. Evans, Esq. BBO No. 646715 Shapiro, Dorry, & Masterson LLC d/b/a SDM Law Group 71 Raymond Road West Hartford, CT 06107 860-590-7578 devans@sdmlawgroup.com\n\n# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI hereby certify that on February 5, 2024, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was filed electronically and served by mail on anyone unable to accept electronic filing. Notice of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties by operation of the Court's electronic filing system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as indicated on the Notice of Electronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF System.\n\n> */s/ Douglas M. Evans* Douglas M. Evans, Esq.","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院布里奇波特分院\n\n)\n\n)\n\n)\n\n)\n\n_________________________________________________________________\n\n_________________________________________________________________)\n\n关于：) 第11章\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，) 案号：22:50073 (JAM)\n\n债务人。) （合并管理）\n\n非当事人 Rule of Law Foundation III, Inc.（法治基金会III公司）及 Rule of Law Society IV, Inc.（法治协会IV公司）对要求作出命令、延长受托人根据《破产法》第108、546(a)及549条提起撤销诉讼期限之动议的异议\n\n非当事人 Rule of Law Foundation III, Inc.（“ROLF”）及 Rule of Law Society IV, Inc.（“ROLS”，与ROLF合称“法治实体”）特此对 Luc A. Despins（卢克·A. 德斯平斯）以第11章受托人（“受托人”）身份提交的《要求作出命令、延长受托人根据《破产法》第108、546(a)及549条提起撤销诉讼期限之动议》[ECF No. 2509]（“停止时效动议”）提出异议。如下文更充分阐述，就法治实体而言，应驳回停止时效动议，因为：(i) 受托人为支持停止时效动议所援引的授权并未授权本院作出具有前瞻性的一揽子停止时效命令；(ii) 受托人已就法治实体进行了广泛的证据开示，且无法承担其证明责任以表明情形极为“特殊”，从而使衡平停止时效原则应适用于针对法治实体的任何潜在请求权；以及(iii) 受托人所请求的救济对法治实体造成严重不利影响，法治实体作为本案非当事人，既无能力进行任何证据开示，也无法有效质疑受托人所依赖的诸多所谓事实陈述，致使法治实体被剥夺正当程序。\n\n对受托人初步陈述及背景事实的异议\n\n1. 与任何对对方当事人动议提出异议的一方一样——尤其是在对方寻求受托人在停止时效动议中所请求的此类非常救济时——法治实体通常会在此提出事实，以反驳受托人在停止时效动议第¶¶ 1至26段中所主张的事实陈述。然而，作为本破产程序的非当事人，法治实体除下文第¶ 16段所述之外，甚少参与本案或受托人在停止时效动议中提及的其他程序，因此无能力对受托人的事实主张作出有意义的回应。此外，法治实体显然无权就停止时效动议第¶¶ 1-26段所述的所谓事实及事项进行任何证据开示——必须指出的是，该等事实及事项并无受托人或任何其他具有亲身知悉者的宣誓书或声明支持，因此未被适当地提交至本院。参见，例如，Callahan v. City of New Haven Bd. of Educ., No. 3:17CV-00617 (JAM), 2019 WL 1649940, at *1 (D. Conn. Apr. 16, 2019)1（当事人未依当地规则要求，在其与简易判决动议相关的事实陈述中纳入“逐项事实援引宣誓书或其他可采纳的案卷证据”，使法院没有“可靠的事实基础以裁定简易判决动议。”）。因此，法治实体是在一只手被比喻性地绑在背后的情况下抗辩停止时效动议；它们可以主张受托人在法律上错误（而他无疑确实错误），但它们无有意义的能力反驳停止时效动议所依赖的冗长、无支持的事实陈述；若无该等陈述，便完全没有依据作出受托人所请求的非常救济。这显然不公平，而且如下文所述，所有潜在被告无法有意义地质疑那些前瞻性寻求衡平停止时效者所主张的依据，正是若干法院拒绝给予此类救济的原因之一。\n\n1 为方便本院参考，随附未刊载裁决的副本。\n\n论证\n\n《破产规则》9006(b)不允许本院停止法定时效期限的进行\n\n2. 受托人主张《破产规则》9006(b)授权本院停止《破产法》第108、546(a)和549条所规定的时效期限之进行，这完全错误。《破产规则》9006(b)的相关规定如下：\n\n除本分项第(2)及(3)款另有规定外，凡依本规则、依据本规则作出的通知或法院命令要求或允许在指定期间内或于指定期间届满前完成某项行为时，法院在有正当理由的情况下可以……如在原定期间或经先前命令延长的期间届满前提出请求，则命令延长该期间……。\n\nFed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)(1)（着重号系后加）。如该文字明确所示，法院依据《破产规则》9006(b)延长期间的权限，明确限于“依本规则、依据本规则作出的通知或法院命令”所指定的期间。该文字显著缺失的是任何授权法院延长由法规规定的期间。\n\n3. 康涅狄格州若干破产法院已明确判定，规则9006(b)并未授权法院延长法规规定的时效期限。在 In re Damach, Inc., 235 B.R. 727 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1999) 一案中，Krechevsky法官依据 Bankr. R. 9006(b) 和 Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 60(b) 的明文，认定两项规则均“不允许法院延长国会在法规中规定的时限；其仅允许修改由其他规则或法院施加的时限。”\n\n4. 此后，Tancredi法官驳回了受托人的主张，即规则9006(b)允许法院延长受托人根据第546(a)条提起撤销诉讼的期限。In re Walnut Hill, Inc., No. 16-20960 (JJT), 2018 WL 2672242 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 1, 2018)。正如 Walnut Hill 法院正确指出：“依其明文，规则9006(b)仅适用于‘依本规则、依据本规则作出的通知[,] [原文如此]或法院命令’所设定的期限。该规则没有任何地方提及法定期限。”Id. at *1。法院还认为，规则9006(a)明确规定其适用于“任何未规定计算时间方法的法规”，而规则9006(b)并未说明其适用于法规，这一点具有启发意义。Id.（“规则9006(b)显著缺少关于其适用于法规的相同或类似措辞。”）。2 最后，法院指出，“若规则9006(b)适用于第546(a)条，将违反宪法所保留的权力分立原则。在立法机关已作出权威性规定之处，修改其决定不属于司法机关的职责范围。由于规则9006(b)不适用于第546(a)条，本院无须裁定是否已显示延长法定期限的正当理由。”Id. at *2。\n\n2 受托人似乎主张，由于规则9006(a)明确适用于法规，规则9006(b)也可被解释为适用于法规。该主张忽略了以下事实：规则9006(a)并不允许法院推翻法规中的时效期限；相反，它仅适用于“未规定计算时间方法”的法规。因此，规则9006(a)不允许法院修改由国会确立的期间。\n\n5. 全国其他法院同样判定，规则9006(b)并未授权延长法规规定的期间。例如，在 In re Federated Food Courts, Inc., 222 B.R. 396 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1998) 一案中，债务人未能及时提交法规允许提出的延期动议后，法院驳回债务人试图依据 Bankr. R. 9006(b) 获得延长期限，以便根据《破产法》第365(d)(4)条承接或拒绝未到期租约的请求。正如法院解释：\n\n此处的困难在于，《破产规则》9006(b)是一项规范延长其他《破产规则》或法院命令所规定期间的规则。《破产规则》9006(b)提及“本规则、依据本规则作出的通知或法院命令”所设定的期限。它并未提及延长法规规定的期间。然而，提交承接非住宅租约动议的60日期限系由法规规定，而非由《破产规则》、依据《破产规则》作出的通知或法院命令规定。因此，《破产规则》9006(b)并未赋予破产法院酌处权，允许逾期提出延长承接租约期限的动议，即使该错误系可宽恕的疏忽所致。\n\nId. at 398.\n\n6. 同样，在 In re Randolph Hosp., Inc., No. 20-10247, 2022 WL 19298765 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2022) 一案中，法院认定规则9006(b)“不得用于延长法定期限，例如根据11 U.S.C. §§ 108和546确立的期限……。”另见 In re Barnes, 308 B.R. 77, 81 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2004)（在驳回债务人适用规则9006(b)以延长提交计划期限的主张时，法院判定“《破产规则》不得推翻《破产法》中的实体性规定，《破产法》与《破产规则》之间的任何冲突必须以《破产法》为准。”）（省略内部引文）。\n\n7. 在 In re Cramer, 636 B.R. 830 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2022) 一案中，法院也驳回了依赖规则9006(b)延长法定时效期限的请求。在该案中，由于债务人未配合受托人调查债务人的资产，受托人寻求延长根据第546和549条提出请求的期限。Id. at *831。事实上，法院指出，债务人的免责已因隐瞒资产而被撤销。Id. 尽管如此，法院仍以规则9006(b)未授权此类救济为由驳回受托人的动议。除其他案件外，法院援引Tancredi法官在 Walnut Hill 案中的裁决，认定：“《联邦破产程序规则》并无任何规则可延长诸如第546及549条规定的法定期限。没有任何程序支持当前动议所请求的救济。Id. at 831-32。\n\n8. 受托人严重依赖 In re Int'l Admin. Servs., Inc., 408 F.3d 689 (11th Cir. 2005)，主张规则9006(b)允许法院延长由立法机关确立的时效期限。该依赖不当。首先，尽管 Int'l Admin. Servs. 法院似乎暗示规则9006(b)可能适用于法定时效期限，但其实际裁决似乎并不依赖该规则的适用性。相反，法院在认定第546条属于时效法规而非管辖权障碍后，认定第546条“可被放弃、适用衡平停止时效及衡平禁止反言”，此后未再提及或依赖规则9006(b)。Id. at 699。尽管如此，即使第十一巡回法院的裁决可被解读为认定规则9006(b)允许破产法院延长国会规定的时效期限，法治实体仍谨此主张该案裁决有误，且无论如何，其并非本巡回区具有约束力的先例。\n\n9. 在停止时效动议第¶ 35段中，受托人列举一系列案件，声称该等案件支持其主张，即可依据规则9006(b)延长法定时效期限。这些裁决大多数是未刊载命令，几乎不包含任何事实，几乎没有任何\n\n分析，且似乎未受到争议。例如，受托人援引了 In re Network Services Sols., LLC, No. 17-50309-gwz (Bankr. D. Nev. Mar. 6, 2019)，该案作为附件7附于中止时效动议之后。该命令未记载本案事实，亦未说明法院据以准许该动议的法律依据，并注明未提交任何异议。最重要的是，该命令中似乎没有任何一处提及 Rule 9006(b)，因此无法确定法院作出该命令所依据的法律基础。因此，该案并不支持受托人的论点。附于中止时效动议之后作为附件9和10的 In re Anton & Chia, LLP, No. 18-12565-TA (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2020) 和 In re Uplift RX, LLC, No. 17-32186 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2019) 中的命令亦是如此。尽管 In re Farm-Rite, Inc., No. 20-19379-JNP (Bankr. D.N.J. Aug. 3, 2022)（附件8）中的命令提及 Rule 9006(b)，但其同样未讨论本案事实或法院所采用的法律分析。因此，这些案件的权威价值为零。\n\n10. 基于上述理由，法治实体（Rule of Law Entities）谨此主张，Rule 9006(b) 并不授权受托人所寻求的救济。如 Walnut Hill 一案法院所认识到的，Rule 9006(b) 不适用于法定期限，将该规则适用于延长由国会设定的时效期限将违反宪法所维护的权力分立原则。\n本案不宜进行前瞻性衡平中止时效\n\n11. 受托人请求本院就所有潜在被告以前瞻性方式对 Bankruptcy Code §§ 108, 546(a) and 549 规定的时效期间进行衡平中止时效，该请求既未获审查此问题的较具说服力判决所支持，也未获任何可采证据支持，并且就法治实体而言亦无正当依据。3\n\n12. “衡平中止时效仅在罕见且特殊的情形下才适当，并且仅应谨慎适用。Maslar v. United States, No. CIV.A 3:06CV2056CFD, 2009 WL 1858868, at \\*2 (D. Conn. June 25, 2009)（省略内部引文和援引）。” “为获得该原则的利益，受托人负有举证责任，证明其：(1) 在其请求中止计算的期间内已尽合理勤勉；以及 (2) 已证明相关情形极为特殊，以致该原则应予适用。” In re Anderson, 623 B.R. 199, 217 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2020)。因此，如存在“非同寻常或特殊情形”，衡平中止时效这一普通法原则允许法院“根据个案延长法定时效，以防止不公平，即使该时效期间本已届满。” Id. “衡平中止时效允许法院根据个案延长时效期间，以防止不公平，即使该期间本已届满。” In re Camus, 386 B.R. 396, 398 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2008)。\n\n13. 在 Walnut Hill 一案中，Tancredi 法官驳回了受托人以前瞻性方式适用衡平中止时效的尝试。Walnut Hill, 2018 WL 2672242 at \\*2。法院首先指出：“从程序上看，衡平中止时效原则被认可为对待决诉讼中提出的时效抗辩作出的回应。” Id.（强调为原文所加）。在指出各方均承认尚未提起对抗性程序，且提起该程序的期限尚未届满之后，法院认定：“在特定被告的对抗性程序中，就待证明的事实和情形举行证据听证的背景之外，在时效抗辩已被提出之前处理衡平中止时效，完全为时过早且存在程序瑕疵。” Id.\n\n3 正如受托人为支持其关于 Rule 9006(b) 授权本案所请求救济的论点而援引的许多案件一样[见上文 ¶ 8]，受托人为支持其关于前瞻性衡平中止时效适当的论点而援引的若干案件仅为命令，且完全没有讨论基础事实和/或法律推理。见中止时效动议，¶ 30 及附件2-5。因此，这些案件几乎不具有或完全不具有先例价值。\n\n14. 同样，在 In re Randolph Hosp., Inc., No. 20-10247, 2022 WL 19298765 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2022) 一案中，法院认为，以前瞻性方式适用衡平中止时效原则实质上将剥夺未来被告就该原则是否确实适用于本案事实提出质疑的机会。正如法院所解释的：“尽管 § 546 和 § 108 的时效期间与任何法定时效一样，均可适用衡平中止时效，但鉴于不存在已确定的被告，且不存在与超额付款请求有关的待决对抗性程序，清算受托人所寻求的预先认定为时过早。鉴于这一程序状况，本院同意那些判决的观点，即受托人‘不能在事先、未通知且未给予被告反对适用该原则机会的情况下，就衡平中止时效是否适用这一问题胜诉。’” Id. at \\*1。其他法院亦驳回了类似的前瞻性衡平中止时效请求。参见，例如，In re Cramer, 636 B.R. 830, 833–34 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2022)（“如果破产受托人有足够依据适用衡平中止时效原则，那么受托人在提交逾期起诉状后，将在对抗性程序中于之后胜诉。”）。\n\n15. 在 In re No. 1 Contracting Corp., No. BR 5-10-BK-01755-JJT, 2012 WL 4114818 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2012) 一案中，法院区分了第十一巡回法院（Eleventh Circuit）在 International Administrative Services 案中的判决，并驳回了受托人以前瞻性方式对 § 546 中的时效期间进行衡平中止时效的请求。值得注意的是，该案受托人与本案受托人一样，主张债务人的主要负责人一直不合作，在多次 Section 341 会议上拒绝回答问题，并援引其不回答问题的宪法权利。Id. at \\*1。而且，与本案相同，No. 1 Contracting Corp. 一案的受托人主张，由于债务人的主要负责人拒绝合作，他无法“确定是否存在可代表债务人财产主张的撤销和/或其他相关诉讼，包括优先转让及欺诈性转让诉讼。” Id. 法院对此未予认同，认定 International Administrative Services 一案的判决可予区分，因为在该案中，“受托人提出延长针对潜在未来被告提起请求的期限时，破产法院已有待决诉讼。” Id. 法院继而解释，与第十一巡回法院案件不同，“本院目前不存在任何形式的待决诉讼。未来被告是否会主张时效抗辩亦不得而知。因此，本院将驳回受托人延长提起起诉状期限并对 11 U.S.C. § 546(a) 规定的时效进行衡平中止时效的请求，但不妨碍受托人在其提起对抗性起诉状后提出衡平中止时效。” Id.; 另见 In re Cramer, 636 B.R. 830, 833–34 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2022)（驳回以前瞻性方式对撤销请求进行衡平中止时效的请求，理由是：“如果破产受托人有足够依据适用衡平中止时效原则，那么受托人在提交逾期起诉状后，将在对抗性程序中于之后胜诉。反之，如受托人没有足够依据适用衡平中止时效原则，法院不应允许受托人通过事先在未通知受影响当事人的情况下取得适用衡平中止时效的命令，来规避该等欠缺的后果。”）。\n\n16. 在本案中，受托人似乎认为，通过向所有潜在被告送达中止时效动议通知，并取得本院授权以替代方式送达该通知的命令，他已纠正了寻求前瞻性救济所造成的不公平且不公正的结果。这显然并非如此。被请求适用衡平中止时效的一方享有的不仅仅是通知；其有权获得通知，并有机会反对适用该原则。In re Randolph Hosp., Inc., No. 20-10247, 2022 WL 19298765 at \\*1 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2022)。此外，由于衡平中止时效“允许法院根据个案延长时效期间”，Camus, 386 B.R. at 398，潜在被告应有权基于每一案件的具体事实对各自案件作出裁判，而非如中止时效动议所呈现的那样，在完全缺乏具体事实的情况下作出裁判。与中止时效动议有关的程序中不存在任何此类保障。4 作为本破产程序的非当事人，受托人已通知的大多数潜在被告——包括法治实体——极少或根本未参与破产程序或受托人在中止时效动议中提及的其他程序，因此对本案或对受托人是否“在其请求中止计算的期间内已尽合理勤勉，并且 (2) 已证明相关情形极为特殊，以致该原则应予适用”几乎毫不知情。Anderson, 623 B.R. at 217。此外，法治实体显然无权就中止时效动议中所述的指称事实\n\n4 此外，由于尚未提起任何对抗性程序，且目前无法知悉任何特定未来被告是否会提出时效抗辩，中止时效动议实质上寻求一项不被允许的咨询意见，而目前尚不存在实际的请求或争议。见 Ass'n of Car Wash Owners Inc. v. City of New York, 911 F.3d 74, 85 (2d Cir. 2018)（“联邦法院不得就假定事实状态下法律将会如何作出意见。”）（省略内部引文）。\n\n及事项进行任何证据开示。因此，其无法有意义地反对适用衡平中止时效原则，亦无法收集回应受托人事实指称所必需的信息（如上所述，该等指称未获受托人任何宣誓书或声明支持）。因此，法治实体是在一只手臂被比喻性地绑在背后的情况下对抗中止时效动议；其可以主张受托人在法律上错误（而他确实如此），但其无法有意义地反驳中止时效动议所依据的冗长事实陈述；若无该陈述，则根本不存在作出受托人所寻求的非常救济的任何依据。5\n\n17. 此外，即使假定就受托人已通知的某些潜在被告而言作出前瞻性救济可能适当（但事实并非如此），就法治实体而言，该救济也绝不适当，因为其一直努力配合受托人为从其处获取文件和信息所作的一切努力。为支持本异议，法治实体随本文件提交了 Bryan Ha 于 February 5, 2024 作出的声明（以下简称“声明”），该声明的条款及其所附证据材料均通过援引纳入本文件。\n\n18. 根据声明书所载事实，显然，无论受托人是否尚未完成其对其他潜在被告之潜在请求权的调查，受托人已经就 Rule of Law Entities（法治实体）进行了调查。法治实体均已完全履行其义务\n\n5 受托人讥讽地辩称，其进行方式“保留了所有潜在被告的权利。”时效中止动议，第10段。恰恰相反，如无法进行证据开示，潜在被告将丧失对衡平时效中止原则适用于其自身提出实质性异议的一切能力。\n\n依照向其送达的 Rule 2004 Subpoenas（第2004条传票）以及律师于 December 2, 2022 发送、缩小待提交文件范围的电子邮件，向受托人提交文件。因此，如受托人认为其对任一法治实体享有一项或多项潜在诉因，则没有理由其不能且不应被要求在适用期限届满前提起该诉讼。鉴于受托人持有法治实体所请求文件的时间之长（至少自 May 2023 起），以及其直到最近才 6 向其寻求进一步证据开示，受托人根本无法提出有表面根据的主张，称情形如此“非同寻常”，以致衡平时效中止原则应适用于针对法治实体的任何潜在请求权。Anderson, 623 B.R. at 217.\n\n17. 最后，受托人为支持其所请求的非常救济而援引《破产法典》第105(a)条，毫无依据。正如 Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York（纽约东区破产法院）简明说明：\n\n《破产法典》第105(a)条允许法院“签发为执行本法典规定所必需或适当的任何裁定、程序或判决书。”11 U.S.C. § 105(a)。然而，已经确立的是，该权力必须且只能在《破产法典》的界限内行使。该衡平权力不得用于规避《破产法典》的任何条款或任何《破产程序规则》。因此，本院不能利用 § 105(a) 批准原告延长适用时效期限以[提起对抗程序]的请求。\n\n6 参见声明书附件 G – J。受托人在提交其时效中止动议前数周再次试图向法治实体索取文件，显然但徒劳地试图制造衡平时效中止的论点。\n\nIn re Yashaya, 403 B.R. 278, 288 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009)（省略内部引文及援引），aff'd sub nom. Yesh Diamonds, Inc. v. Yashaya, No. 09-CV-2016 DLI RER, 2010 WL 3851993 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2010)。\n\n结论\n\n基于上述理由，法治实体谨请本院驳回受托人的时效中止动议。\n\n非当事人，RULE OF LAW FOUNDATION III, INC.（法治基金会III公司），及 RULE OF LAW SOCIETY IV, INC.（法治协会IV公司）\n\n由 /s/ Douglas M. Evans（道格拉斯·M·埃文斯）\n\nDouglas M. Evans（道格拉斯·M·埃文斯），Esq. BBO No. 646715 Shapiro, Dorry, & Masterson LLC d/b/a SDM Law Group 71 Raymond Road West Hartford, CT 06107 860-590-7578 devans@sdmlawgroup.com\n\n送达证明\n\n本人特此证明，于 February 5, 2024，上述文件的真实、正确副本已以电子方式提交，并通过邮件送达给任何无法接受电子提交的人。根据法院电子提交系统的运行，关于本次提交的通知将通过电子邮件发送给所有当事人，或按照电子提交通知所示，通过邮件发送给任何无法接受电子提交的人。当事人可通过法院的 CM/ECF System 查阅本次提交。\n\n/s/ Douglas M. Evans（道格拉斯·M·埃文斯） Douglas M. Evans（道格拉斯·M·埃文斯），Esq.","key_entities":["Je","CIPA","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Despins"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":2509,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":4520,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 18:27:02"}