{"id":"court_ctb_2565_1","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":2565,"sub_number":1,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"2019 WL 1649940 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States District Court, D. Connecticut.","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"2019 WL 1649940 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States District Court, D. Connecticut.\n\nTachica CALLAHAN, Plaintiff,\n\nv.\n\n# CITY OF NEW HAVEN BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant.\n\nNo. 3:17cv-00617 (JAM) | Signed 04/16/2019\n\n**Attorneys and Law Firms**\n\nTachica Callahan, New Haven, CT, pro se.\n\n[Robert J. Vontell, III,](http) ) [W. Martyn Philpot, Jr.](http) ), Law Offices of W. Martyn Philpot, Jr., LLC, New Haven, CT, for Defendant.\n\n# **ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WITHOUT PREJUDICE**\n\n[Jeffrey Alker Meyer](http) ), United States District Judge\n\n**\\*1** On February 14, 2019, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. Defendant's motion did not comply with the Court's local rules for the filing of a motion for summary judgment in two ways that warrant its denial without prejudice.\n\nFirst, although defendant submitted a Local Rule 56(a)(1) statement of material facts (Doc. #42), the statement does not contain any citations to source materials for each alleged statement of fact. *See* [D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56\\(a\\)\\(3\\)](http) ) (requiring that each statement of fact in a Local Rule 56(a)(1) statement \"must be followed by a specific citation to (1) the affidavit of a witness competent to testify as to the facts at trial, or (2) other evidence that would be admissible at trial\").\n\nSecond, defendant did not file the required notice to a selfrepresented litigant informing plaintiff of the specific manner and format in which she must file any opposition to the motion for summary judgment. *See* [D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56\\(b\\)](http) ) (describing notice requirements); *see also [Vital v. Interfaith](http)#co_pp_sp_506_620 ) Med. Ctr.*[, 168 F.3d 615, 620-21 \\(2d Cir. 1999\\)](http)#co_pp_sp_506_620 ) (reversing grant of summary judgment for failure to furnish proper notice).[1](#page-0-0)\n\n<span id=\"page-0-1\"></span>Plaintiff has opposed defendant's motion for summary judgment but, not having received a proper Local Rule 56(b) notice from defendant, her opposition papers do not comply with the Court's local rules. First, she has failed to file a proper Local Rule 56(a)(2) statement that states her agreement or disagreement with each of defendant's alleged facts in the [Rule 56\\(a\\)\\(1\\)](http) ) statement. *See* [D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56\\(a\\)\\(2\\)](http) ) [\\(i\\)](http) ). Nor has she included a separate section of \"Additional Material Facts\" that sets forth any additional material facts, along with supporting citations to the record. *See* [D. Conn. L.](http) ) [Civ. R. 56\\(a\\)\\(2\\)\\(ii\\).](http) ) Plaintiff has filed her own statement of facts (Doc. #46-1) but her statement lacks fact-by-fact citation to affidavits or other admissible evidence of record as required under [D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56\\(a\\)\\(3\\)](http) ).\n\nThe end result is that the Court is unable to discern from the parties' filings precisely what evidence supports each of their local rule statements of material fact and to what degree the parties actually disagree about material facts. The Court does not have a reliable factual basis to decide the motion for summary judgment.\n\n**\\*2** Accordingly, because the parties have filed summary judgment papers that fail in major respects to comply with the requirements of the Court's local rules and because this failure is attributable to defendant's failure to follow the requirements of Local Rule 56, the Court DENIES defendant's motion for summary judgment (Doc. #39) without prejudice to defendant's re-filing of a properly supported motion for summary judgment by **May 6, 2019** that fully complies with the requirements of Local Rule 56. The Court CANCELS the previously-scheduled hearing on defendant's motion.\n\nIt is so ordered.\n\n# **All Citations**\n\nNot Reported in Fed. Supp., 2019 WL 1649940\n\n### Footnotes\n\n<span id=\"page-0-0\"></span>[1](#page-0-1) After defendant filed its summary judgment motion and the Court noticed that defendant had failed to file a notice to the self-represented plaintiff, the Court sua sponte entered an order instructing defendant to file a notice pursuant to [D.](http) ) [Conn. L. Civ. R. 12](http) ) (Doc. #43) and defendant did so (Doc. #44). This was mistaken because defendant was required by the Local Rules to file a different form of notice as required under Local Rule 56(b) rather than the notice required for a motion to dismiss under [Fed. R. Civ. P. 12.](http) ) It is regrettable that the Court mistakenly instructed defendant to file the wrong type of notice, but of course it was defendant's responsibility in the first place to have filed the proper notice that was required under Local Rule 56(b) without the Court's prompting.\n\n2018 WL 2672242 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Connecticut, Hartford Division.\n\nIN RE: WALNUT HILL, INC., Debtor.\n\nCASE No. 16–20960 (JJT) | Signed 06/01/2018\n\n#### **Attorneys and Law Firms**\n\n[Joel M. Grafstein,](http) ) Grafstein & Arcaro, Farmington, CT, for Debtor.\n\n# **MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON THE TRUSTEE'S MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF DEADLINE TO FILE AVOIDANCE ACTIONS GOVERNED BY 11 U.S.C. § 546(a)**\n\n[James J. Tancredi,](http) ) United States Bankruptcy Judge\n\n**\\*1** Pending before the Court is the Motion for Extension of Deadline to File Avoidance Actions Governed by [11 U.S.C.](http)#co_pp_8b3b0000958a4 ) [§ 546\\(a\\)](http)#co_pp_8b3b0000958a4 ) (\"Motion\") (ECF No. 195) filed by the Chapter 7 Trustee (\"Trustee\") and the corresponding Objections filed by APEX Healthcare Partners, LLC (ECF No. 210), Annemarie Griggs (ECF No. 211), and Grand Street Nursing, LLC (ECF No. 212). For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the Motion.\n\n#### I. DISCUSSION\n\nThe Court must decide whether [Rule 9006\\(b\\) of the Federal](http) ) [Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure](http) ) applies to [11 U.S.C. § 546\\(a\\)](http)#co_pp_8b3b0000958a4 ), providing the bankruptcy court with the authority to enlarge the [Section 546\\(a\\)](http)#co_pp_8b3b0000958a4 ) deadline for commencing avoidance actions. If [Rule 9006\\(b\\)](http) ) does not apply, then the Court must determine whether the doctrine of equitable tolling can be properly invoked before an adversary proceeding has been commenced. The Trustee has proffered facts to show cause for an extension under [Rule 9006\\(b\\).](http) ) In this instance, however, the Court can rule on the Motion as a matter of law before the questions of fact are resolved.\n\n#### *a. Application of [Rule 9006\\(b\\)](http) ) to [11 U.S.C. § 546\\(a\\)](http)#co_pp_8b3b0000958a4 )*\n\nSection 546(a) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides a twoyear limitation to exercise avoidance powers. The Trustee has asked the Court to extend the statutory limitation by applying Rule 9006(b) of the Bankruptcy Rules to [Section 546\\(a\\)](http)#co_pp_8b3b0000958a4 ). [Rule 9006\\(b\\)](http) ) allows for enlargement of extension of certain deadlines when cause is shown.\n\nBy its plain language, [Rule 9006\\(b\\)](http) ) only applies to deadlines set \"by these rules or by a notice given thereunder[,] [*sic*] or by order of court\". Nowhere in the Rule does it mention statutory deadlines.\n\nThis Court (Krechevsky, J.) has addressed this issue in the past and held that [Rule 9006\\(b\\)](http) ) does not \"permit[ ] a court to extend a time limitation set by Congress in a statute\". *[In](http)#co_pp_sp_164_731 ) re Damach, Inc.*[, 235 B.R. 727, 731 \\(Bankr. D. Conn. 1999\\).](http)#co_pp_sp_164_731 ) Instead, it \"permit[s] modification only of time limitations imposed by other rules or by the court.\" *Id.* In *[In re Colad](http)#co_pp_sp_164_225 ) Group, Inc.*[, 324 B.R. 208, 225 \\(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2005\\),](http)#co_pp_sp_164_225 ) the court held that \"Bankruptcy [Rule 9006](http) ) allows an enlargement or reduction of many of the time limits in the Bankruptcy Rules. However, [S]ection 546(a) [*sic*] is a statute, not a rule.\" Consequently, the court held that it did not have the authority to act under [Rule 9006](http) ) relative to statutory deadlines.[1](#page-3-0)\n\n<span id=\"page-2-0\"></span>While Judge Krechevsky, in dicta, in the *[Matter of Sutera](http)#co_pp_sp_164_523 )*, [157 B.R. 519, 523 \\(Bankr. D. Conn. 1993\\)](http)#co_pp_sp_164_523 ) also stated \"that Congress intended that the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure be applicable in full, and without exception, to all provisions of the Bankruptcy Code\", that decision only addressed the application of [Rule 9006\\(a\\)](http) ) to [11 U.S.C. §](http)#co_pp_8b3b0000958a4 ) [546\\(a\\)](http)#co_pp_8b3b0000958a4 ), *not* the reach of [Rule 9006\\(b\\)](http) ). [Rule 9006\\(a\\)](http) ) plainly provides that it applies to \"*any statute* that does not specify a method of computing time.\" (Emphasis added.) However, [Rule 9006\\(b\\)](http) ) is noticeably missing the same, or similar, language involving its application to a statute. This distinction is highlighted by the fact that Judge Krechevsky six years later held that [Rule 9006\\(b\\)](http) ) could not modify substantive deadlines established by Congress. *[In re Damach, Inc.](http)#co_pp_sp_164_731 )*, 235 B.R. at 731.\n\n**\\*2** Lastly, Congress has dictated that the Bankruptcy Rules \"shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.\" [28 U.S.C. § 2075.](http) ) Where the Rules and Code are inconsistent, the statutory Code controls. [H.R. Rep. No. 95–595](http) ), pt. 1, at 449 (1977).\n\n[Rule 9006\\(b\\)](http) ) cannot apply to [Section 546\\(a\\)](http)#co_pp_8b3b0000958a4 ) without violating the separation of powers preserved in the Constitution. Where the legislature has spoken authoritatively, it is not within the province of the judiciary to modify its determination. As [Rule](http) ) [9006\\(b\\)](http) ) does not apply to [Section 546\\(a\\)](http)#co_pp_8b3b0000958a4 ), it is unnecessary for this Court to determine whether cause was shown for an extension of the statutory deadline.\n\n### *b. Equitable Tolling*\n\nThe Trustee has also asked the Court to equitably toll the statute of limitations in [Section 546\\(a\\)](http)#co_pp_8b3b0000958a4 ) in conjunction with the request for a deadline extension under [Rule 9006\\(b\\)](http) ). These issues are separate and distinct.\n\nProcedurally, the doctrine of equitable tolling is recognized as a response to a statute of limitations defense asserted in a pending litigation. *[Long v. Abbott Mortg. Corp.](http)#co_pp_sp_345_113 )*, 459 F. Supp. [108, 113 \\(D. Conn. 1978\\)](http)#co_pp_sp_345_113 ). The Trustee points to a case from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals where the court held that [Rule 9006\\(b\\)](http) ) applies to all Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and seemingly relied upon [Rule 9006\\(b\\)](http) ) to justify its decision in enlarging the [Section 546\\(a\\)](http)#co_pp_8b3b0000958a4 ) deadline for starting avoidance actions. *[In re Int'l Admin. Servs., Inc.](http) )*, 408 [F.3d 689 \\(11th Cir. 2005\\).](http) ) The Court rejects that conclusion. Upon closer examination, the holding of the Circuit Court relied upon the doctrine of equitable tolling, which had been interposed after a statute of limitations defense was asserted in a pending adversary proceeding.\n\n[Section 546\\(a\\)](http)#co_pp_8b3b0000958a4 ) is a statute of limitations, and like any statute of limitations, is subject to equitable tolling. *Id.* [at 699.](http)#co_pp_sp_506_699 ) Where\n\n### Footnotes\n\n<span id=\"page-3-0\"></span>[1](#page-2-0) This Court rejects the notion that [Rule 9006\\(b\\)](http) ) would support an extension of time for the expiration of the statute of limitations premised upon the fact that the statute of limitations in [Section 546\\(a\\)](http)#co_pp_8b3b0000958a4 ) terminates two years after an order for relief.\n\nthere was \"fraud or extraordinary circumstances beyond the trustee's control, equitable tolling prevents the expiration of [§](http)#co_pp_8b3b0000958a4 ) [546\\(a\\)](http)#co_pp_8b3b0000958a4 )'s limitations period\". *Id.*\n\nAll parties to this case acknowledge that an adversary proceeding has not been filed at this time. Pursuant to [Section 546\\(a\\),](http)#co_pp_8b3b0000958a4 ) the Trustee's statute of limitations for filing an adversary proceeding will expire on June 14, 2018, which has not yet come to pass. It is wholly premature and procedurally flawed to address equitable tolling outside the context of an evidentiary hearing on the facts and circumstances to be proven in the adversary proceeding against specific defendants, once a statute of limitations defense has been asserted.\n\n### II. CONCLUSION\n\nThe plain language of [Rule 9006\\(b\\)](http) ) prohibits this Court from enlarging the [Section 546\\(a\\)](http)#co_pp_8b3b0000958a4 ) statute of limitations. Additionally, reaching the issue of equitable tolling is premature and procedurally inappropriate at this time.\n\nAccordingly, the Motion is denied, and the Objections are sustained consistent with this decision.\n\nIT IS SO ORDERED in Hartford, Connecticut on this 1st day of June 2018.\n\n#### **All Citations**\n\nNot Reported in B.R. Rptr., 2018 WL 2672242\n\n2022 WL 19298765 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. North Carolina, Greensboro Division.\n\n# IN RE: [RANDOLPH HOSPITAL,](http)&saveJuris=False&contentType=BUSINESS-INVESTIGATOR&startIndex=1&contextData=(sc.Default)&categoryPageUrl=Home%2fCompanyInvestigator&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem )\n\n[INC.](http)&saveJuris=False&contentType=BUSINESS-INVESTIGATOR&startIndex=1&contextData=(sc.Default)&categoryPageUrl=Home%2fCompanyInvestigator&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem ) d/b/a Randolph Health,[1](#page-5-0) Debtors.\n\n> <span id=\"page-4-0\"></span>Case No. 20-10247 | Signed April 25, 2022\n\n### **Attorneys and Law Firms**\n\n[Rayford K. Adams, III,](http) ) [Kayla Ives Russell](http) ), Spilman Thomas & Battle, PLLC, Winston-Salem, NC, [Boris I. Mankovetskiy,](http) ) [Andrew Howard Sherman](http) ), Sills Cummis & Gross P.C., Newark, NJ, for Creditor Committee Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors.\n\n[Jody Bedenbaugh](http) ), Columbia, SC, [Terri L. Gardner,](http) ) Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP, Raleigh, NC, [Jason](http) ) [L. Hendren,](http) ) [Rebecca F. Redwine](http) ), Benjamin E.F.B. Waller, Hendren Redwine & Malone, PLLC, Raleigh, NC, [Graham](http) ) [S. Mitchell,](http) ) Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, Columbia, SC, [Dylan Gillespie Trache](http) ), Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP, Washington, DC, for Debtor Randolph Hospital, Inc.\n\n# **ORDER**\n\n# **Denying Motion for Entry of Order Tolling the Statute of Limitations**\n\n[LENA MANSORI JAMES](http) ), UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE\n\n**\\*1** THIS MATTER came before the Court on the motion of Louis E. Robichaux, IV, as Liquidation Trustee of the Randolph Health Liquidation Trust (the \"Liquidation Trustee\"), for entry of an order extending by 120 days the statutory deadline to file chapter 5 causes of action against certain of the Debtors' healthcare providers (Docket No. 1166, the \"Motion\"). The Liquidation Trustee believes the Debtors may have overpaid certain non-debtor healthcare providers on account of claims and benefits under employee health care plans. With the impending expiration of the\n\n<span id=\"page-4-2\"></span><span id=\"page-4-1\"></span>maximum two-year period available for pursuing potential causes of action under [11 U.S.C. §§ 108](http) )[2](#page-5-1) and [546](http) ), [3](#page-5-2) the Liquidation Trustee requests the Court equitably toll the pertinent limitations periods and extend the filing deadlines, which he asserts would not only provide additional time for the Liquidation Trust to commence avoidance actions but also allow an extended due diligence period for any potential purchaser of the alleged overpayment claims. The United States Bankruptcy Administrator filed an objection to the Motion (Docket No. 1195), alleging that the requested extension is not supported by the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and that any equitable tolling of the pertinent statutes of limitations would be premature at this juncture as no adversary proceedings have been filed. The Court held a hearing on April 19, 2022, at which Rebecca Redwine and Jody Bedenbaugh appeared on behalf of the Liquidation Trustee and Robert P. Price, Jr., appeared in his capacity as Assistant United States Bankruptcy Administrator.\n\nUpon review of the arguments and law presented, the Court finds that [Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9006\\(b\\)](http) ) may not be used to extend statutory deadlines such as those established under [11 U.S.C. §§ 108](http) ) and [546.](http) ) *See [In re](http)#co_pp_sp_164_831 ) Cramer*[, 636 B.R. 830, 831–32 \\(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2022\\);](http)#co_pp_sp_164_831 ) *[In](http)#co_pp_sp_999_2 ) re Walnut Hill, Inc.*[, No. 16-20960, 2018 WL 2672242, at](http)#co_pp_sp_999_2 ) [\\\\*1–2 \\(Bankr. D. Conn. June 1, 2018\\)](http)#co_pp_sp_999_2 ); *see also [In re Tubular](http)#co_pp_sp_164_711 ) Techs., LLC*[, 348 B.R. 699, 711 \\(Bankr. D.S.C. 2006\\);](http)#co_pp_sp_164_711 ) *[In re](http)#co_pp_sp_999_2 ) Ducks in a Row, Inc.*[, No. 03-40170, 2004 WL 4399096, at](http)#co_pp_sp_999_2 ) [\\\\*2 \\(Bankr. E.D. Va. Apr. 16, 2004\\).](http)#co_pp_sp_999_2 ) While the limitations periods of [§ 546](http) ) and [§ 108,](http) ) like any statute of limitations, are subject to equitable tolling, the preemptive finding the Liquidation Trustee seeks is premature given there are no identified defendants and no pending adversary proceedings related to the overpayment claims. Given this procedural posture, the Court agrees with those decisions finding that a trustee \"cannot win the argument of whether or not equitable tolling applies in advance and without notice and opportunity for the defendant to resist application of the doctrine.\" *[In re](http)#co_pp_sp_164_833 ) Cramer*[, 636 B.R. at 833](http)#co_pp_sp_164_833 ); *see also [In re Walnut Hill](http)#co_pp_sp_999_2 )*, 2018 [WL 2672242, at \\\\*2;](http)#co_pp_sp_999_2 ) *In re No. 1 Contracting Corp.*, No. 5-10 bk-01755, [2012 WL 4114818, at \\\\*1 \\(Bankr. M.D. Pa. Sept.](http)#co_pp_sp_999_1 ) [19, 2012\\)](http)#co_pp_sp_999_1 ). While the Court will deny the instant Motion, it makes no finding on the applicability of equitable tolling, and the Liquidation Trustee is free to reassert the doctrine in a more appropriate procedural setting, i.e., after the Liquidation Trustee, or a subsequent purchaser, initiates actions against identifiable and properly noticed defendants.\n\n**\\*2** Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion is DENIED without prejudice to the Liquidation Trustee raising equitable tolling if a future defendant asserts a statute of limitations defense to an untimely filed complaint.\n\n# **SO ORDERED.**\n\n## **All Citations**\n\nNot Reported in B.R. Rptr., 2022 WL 19298765\n\n# Footnotes\n\n<span id=\"page-5-0\"></span>[1](#page-4-0) The Debtors are Randolph Hospital, Inc., d/b/a Randolph Health, Case No. 20-10247; Randolph Specialty Group Practice, Case No. 20-10248; MRI of Asheboro, LLC d/b/a Randolph MRI Center, Case No. 20-10249.\n\n# <span id=\"page-5-1\"></span>[2](#page-4-1) **[§ 108](http) ) Extension of time**\n\n(a) If applicable nonbankruptcy law, an order entered in a nonbankruptcy proceeding, or an agreement fixes a period within which the debtor may commence an action, and such period has not expired before the date of the filing of the petition, the trustee may commence such action only before the later of—\n\n(1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such period occurring on or after the commencement of the case; or\n\n(2) two years after the order for relief.\n\n# [11 U.S.C. § 108\\(a\\)](http)#co_pp_8b3b0000958a4 ).\n\n# <span id=\"page-5-2\"></span>[3](#page-4-2) **[§ 546](http) ) Limitations on avoiding powers**\n\n(a) An action or proceeding under section 544, 545, 547, 548, or 553 of this title may not be commenced after the earlier of—\n\n(1) the later of—\n\n(A) 2 years after the entry of the order for relief; or\n\n(B) 1 year after the appointment or election of the first trustee under section 702, 1104, 1163, 1202, or 1302 of this title if such appointment or such election occurs before the expiration of the period specified in subparagraph (A); or\n\n(2) the time the case is closed or dismissed.\n\n### [11 U.S.C. 546\\(a\\).](http)#co_pp_8b3b0000958a4 )\n\n2009 WL 1858868 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States District Court, D. Connecticut.\n\n[Michael MASLAR](http)&saveJuris=False&contentType=BUSINESS-INVESTIGATOR&startIndex=1&contextData=(sc.Default)&categoryPageUrl=Home%2fCompanyInvestigator&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem ), Plaintiff,\n\nv.\n\nUNITED STATES, Respondent.\n\nCivil Action No. 3:06 CV 2056(CFD). | June 25, 2009.\n\nWest KeySummary\n\n**1 [Habeas Corpus](http) )** [Bar of limitations in](http) ) [general](http) )\n\n> **[Habeas Corpus](http) )** [Petitioner's mental state,](http) ) [ignorance, or lack of skill](http) )\n\nA habeas petitioner that challenged his sentence of incarceration after pleading guilty to bank robbery was barred from the relief he sought as the one-year statute of limitations had lapsed. The petitioner's habeas corpus petitioner was filed nearly two years after he pled guilty to bank robbery and was sentenced. In addition, the petitioner had failed to present any evidence regarding his alleged mental incapacity that would merit equitable tolling and the evidence produced by the government indicated that the petitioner was capable of rational thought during the time period that he wished to toll. [28](http) ) [U.S.C.A. § 2255](http) ).\n\n### **Attorneys and Law Firms**\n\nMichael Maslar, White Deer, PA, pro se.\n\nJonathan Freimann, [Peter S. Jongbloed,](http) ) U.S. Attorney's Office, New Haven, CT, for Respondent.\n\n# **RULING ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS**\n\n#### [CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY](http) ), District Judge.\n\n**\\*1** Michael Maslar, the petitioner, is serving a 165–month sentence of incarceration after pleading guilty to Bank Robbery in violation of [18 U.S.C. § 2113\\(a\\).](http)#co_pp_8b3b0000958a4 ) He now seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to [28 U.S.C. § 2255](http) ) on the grounds that his defense counsel failed to provide adequate representation because he did not raise a diminished mental capacity defense. Maslar argues that the one-year statute of limitations for his petition should be tolled because his state of mind did not permit rational thinking and decision-making. For the reasons that follow, Maslar's petition is dismissed.\n\n### **I. Background**\n\n#### **A. Procedural History**\n\nOn July 23, 2002, a federal grand jury returned an indictment charging the petitioner with one count of Bank Robbery and one count of attempted Bank Robbery, in violation of [18 U.S.C. § 2113\\(a\\).](http)#co_pp_8b3b0000958a4 ) On October 7, 2002, the petitioner pled guilty to Bank Robbery. The trial court sentenced the petitioner to 165 months' imprisonment on March 14, 2003, after a hearing at which the Court considered and rejected the defense arguments for a downward departure based on, among other things, Maslar's mental and emotional conditions. Maslar did not appeal either the Court's decision on the requested downward departure or the sentence.\n\nOn December 27, 2006, the petitioner filed a motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence pursuant to [28 U.S.C. §](http) ) [2255](http) ). After requesting and receiving one extension of time to respond to the petition for relief, the government filed its response to the petition on April 30, 2008.\n\n### **II. Discussion**\n\n#### **A. Statute of Limitations**\n\nEffective April 24, 1996, § 105 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (\"AEDPA\") imposed a one-year limitations period on the filing of a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus or seeking collateral review of his conviction and sentence. [28 U.S.C. § 2255.](http) ) The limitations period runs from the latest of\n\n(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final; (2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action; (3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or (4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.\n\n[28 U.S.C. § 2255](http) ).\n\nFor purposes of [§ 2255](http) ) motions, an unappealed federal criminal judgment becomes final when the time for filing a direct appeal expires. *[Moshier v. United States,](http)#co_pp_sp_506_118 )* 402 F.3d 116, [118 \\(2d Cir.2005\\)](http)#co_pp_sp_506_118 ). Because no appeal was taken in this case, the petitioner's conviction became final on April 8, 2003, ten business days after the judgment of conviction was entered on March 25, 2003. See [Fed.R.App.P. 4\\(b\\)](http)#co_pp_a83b000018c76 )[\\(1\\(A\\)\\(I\\)\\).](http) ) Therefore, the petitioner had one year from that date to file his petition under [§ 2255](http) ), or until April 8, 2004. The petitioner filed his petition on December 12, 2006, over two years after the end of the limitations period. Accordingly, the petition is untimely unless the deadline is equitably tolled.\n\n#### **B. Tolling**\n\n**\\*2** In certain circumstances, a court may excuse a defendant's delay in filing a motion pursuant to [§ 2255](http) ) under the doctrine of equitable tolling. *[United States v. White,](http) )* No. 05 [Civ. 6476\\(DC\\), 02 Cr. 939\\(DC\\), 2005 WL 2878158 \\(S.D.N.Y.](http) ) [Sept. 20, 2005\\)](http) ) (citing *[Smith v. McGinnis,](http)#co_pp_sp_506_17 )* 208 F.3d 13, [17 \\(2d Cir.2000\\)\\)](http)#co_pp_sp_506_17 ). Equitable tolling is appropriate only in \"rare and exceptional circumstance[s],\" *id.,* and should be used \"only sparingly.\" *Id.* (quoting *[Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans](http) ) Affairs,* [498 U.S. 89, 96, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435](http) ) [\\(1990\\)\\)](http) ). The party seeking to rely on the doctrine bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way. *[Pace v. DiGuglielmo,](http) )* 544 [U.S. 408, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 161 L.Ed.2d 669 \\(2005\\).](http) ) These requirements are to be strictly construed. *White,* [2005 WL](http) ) [2878158 at \\\\*2](http) ) (citing *[Barbosa v. United States,](http) )* No. 01 Civ. [7522\\(JFK\\), 2002 WL 869553 at \\\\*2 \\(S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2002\\)](http) )).\n\nTo establish extraordinary circumstances, the petitioner must support his allegations with evidence; he cannot rely solely on personal conclusions or assessments. *[White,](http) )* [2005 WL 2878158 at \\\\*2](http) ) (citing *[Mendez v. Artuz,](http) )* No. 99 [Civ. 2472\\(DLC\\), 2000 WL 991336 at \\\\*2 \\(S.D.N.Y. July](http) ) [18, 2000\\)](http) )). The petitioner also must demonstrate a causal relationship between the extraordinary circumstances on which the claim for equitable tolling rests and the lateness of his filing, a demonstration that cannot be made if the petitioner, acting with reasonable diligence, could have filed on time notwithstanding the extraordinary circumstances. *Rios v. Mazzuca,* [78 Fed.Appx. 742, 2003 WL 22426961 \\(2d](http) ) [Cir.2003\\)](http) ) (quoting *[Hizbullahankhamon v. Walker,](http)#co_pp_sp_506_75 )* 255 F.3d [65, 75 \\(2d Cir.2001\\)](http)#co_pp_sp_506_75 )).\n\nIn general, equitable tolling is appropriate \"where a plaintiff's medical condition or [mental impairment](http)&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0 ) prevented him from proceeding in a timely fashion.\" *Id.* [at 744](http)#co_pp_sp_6538_744 ) (quoting *[Zerilli–](http)#co_pp_sp_506_80 ) [Edelglass v. N.Y. City Transit Auth.,](http)#co_pp_sp_506_80 )* 333 F.3d 74, 80 (2d [Cir.2003\\)](http)#co_pp_sp_506_80 )) (internal brackets omitted). Whether a person is sufficiently mentally disabled to justify tolling of a limitations period is highly case-specific. *Id.* \"At a minimum, however, a petitioner must provide a particularized description of how his condition adversely affected his capacity to function generally or in relationship to the pursuit of his rights.\" *Id.* (quoting *Boos v. Runyon,* [201 F.3d 178, 185 \\(2d Cir.2000\\)](http)#co_pp_sp_506_185 )) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted).\n\nThe petitioner has failed to present any evidence regarding his alleged mental incapacity for the period he wishes to toll, nor has he provided a \"particularized description of how his condition adversely affected his capacity to function generally or in relationship to the pursuit of his rights.\" Moreover, the evidence produced by the government contradicts the petitioner's unsupported claims. *See* Declaration of James Davison, Ph.D. (stating that during the time period encompassing that which the petitioner seeks to toll, the petitioner was capable of rational thought, could appreciate his situation and could both understand his legal situation and seek appropriate legal recourse).\n\n#### **C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel**\n\n**\\*3** Even were the Court to reach the merits of Maslar's petition, there is no evidence that counsel for the petitioner was ineffective. Under the Supreme Court's decision in *Strickland v. Washington,* [466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052,](http) ) [80 L.Ed.2d 674 \\(1984\\)](http) ), to prove ineffective assistance of counsel the petitioner bears the burden of establishing that his \"counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.\" *Id.* [at 686.](http) ) To make\n\nthis showing, petitioner must prove two things: first, that counsel's \"representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness\" as judged by \"prevailing professional norms,\" *id.* [at 688;](http) ) second, that the defense was prejudiced by the errors—in other words, that \"there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.\" *Id.* [at](http) ) [694.](http) )\n\nMaslar claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in that he did not raise a diminished mental capacity defense. This claim is without merit. First, Maslar pled guilty only after being canvassed at length by the Court as to his mental capacity, and after counsel for the defendant ensured that the Court was made aware of Maslar's mental condition and medications he was taking. The Court asked Maslar if the medications he was taking impaired his ability to understand the proceedings or to think clearly, and Maslar indicated that his mind was clear and that the medications \"[didn't] impair anything\" and only \"help[ed him] think more like a normal person.\" *See* Transcript of Change of Plea Hearing, Oct. 7, 2002. Second, counsel for the petitioner submitted a Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing in which he argued for a downward departure\n\nbased on Maslar's mental problems. Counsel also argued for a downward departure based on the petitioner's mental and emotional conditions at the petitioner's sentencing hearing. *See* Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, March 14, 2003. This representation in no way \"fell below an objective standard of reasonableness\" under *Strickland,* and the petitioner has not shown that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.\n\n# **III. Conclusion**\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, Maslar's petition for a writ of habeas corpus [Dkt. # 1] is DENIED.\n\nJudgment shall enter for the respondent. The Clerk is directed to close this case.\n\nSO ORDERED.\n\n### **All Citations**\n\nNot Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2009 WL 1858868\n\n2012 WL 4114818 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.\n\n# In re NO. 1 CONTRACTING CORPORATION, Debtor.\n\nNo. 5–10–bk–01755–JJT. | Sept. 19, 2012.\n\n### **Attorneys and Law Firms**\n\n[Ronald V. Santora](http) ), Bresset and Santora, Forty Fort, PA, for Debtor.\n\n[David J. Harris](http) ), Wilkes–Barre, PA, [Michael G. Oleyar](http) ), Hazle Township, PA, [Myles P. McAliney,](http) ) McAliney & McAliney, Pittston, PA, for Trustee.\n\n[Gregory Benjamin Schiller,](http) ) U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the U.S. Trustee, Harrisburg, PA, for Asst. U.S. Trustee.\n\n# <span id=\"page-9-0\"></span>*OPINION* [1](#page-10-0)\n\n[JOHN J. THOMAS](http) ), Bankruptcy Judge.\n\n**\\*1** Michael G. Oleyar, Esquire, the Chapter 7 Panel Trustee appointed in the above-captioned Chapter 7 case has filed a Motion for Enlargement of Time in Which to Commence Avoidance Proceedings and Other Actions (Doc. # 160). Several creditors to the above estate filed an Objection to this Motion (Doc. # 164). The Motion alleges that the Debtor's principal has failed to cooperate with the Trustee by not providing information and documentation requested by the Trustee through his repeated demands. Trustee further alleges Debtor's principal has failed to respond to questions at \"numerous continued creditor meetings held under Section 341\" and has invoked his right not to respond to the Trustee's questions by asserting protection under the 5th and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution. As a result of this alleged failure to cooperate with the Trustee, the Trustee asserts that he cannot determine whether there are avoidance and/or other related actions including preferential and fraudulent transfer actions that can be asserted on behalf of the Debtor's estate. The Trustee cites [Rule 9006\\(b\\) of the](http)#co_pp_a83b000018c76 ) [Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure](http)#co_pp_a83b000018c76 ) and the case of *[In](http) ) [re International Administrative Services, Inc.,](http) )* 408 F.3d 689 [\\(11th Cir.2005\\)](http) ) as support for this Court's authorization to enlarge the time in which to file avoidance actions and extend the statute of limitations as provided by [11 U.S.C. § 546.](http) )\n\nAt the time of the hearing on the underlying Motion, the Court expressed concern several times that, while a trial court could rule that a statute was tolled over a period of time in regard to a particular defendant, could it extend the statute with regard to unnamed and unidentified defendants when there was no case or controversy before the Court?\n\nThe Doctrine of Equitable Tolling applies to every federal statute of limitations. *[Holmberg v. Armbrecht,](http) )* 327 U.S. [392, 66 S.Ct. 582, 90 L.Ed. 743 \\(1946\\).](http) ) Unquestionably, I have authority to equitably toll the statute of limitations as provided under [11 U.S.C. § 546\\(a\\)](http)#co_pp_8b3b0000958a4 ). *[Pugh v. Brook \\(In](http) ) re Pugh),* [158 F.3d 530 \\(11th Cir.1998\\)](http) ); *[In re M & L](http) ) Business Mach. Co, Inc.,* [75 F.3d 586 \\(10th Cir.1996\\)](http) ); *[In re United Ins. Management. Inc.,](http) )* 14 F.3d 1380 (9th [Cir.1994\\)](http) ); *[In re International Administrative Services, Inc.,](http) )* [408 F.3d 689 \\(11th Cir.2005\\).](http) ) The only support cited by the Trustee as to whether I can equitably toll a statute when there is no case or controversy pending was the *In re International Administrative Services, Inc.* case. *Id.* That case is distinguishable, however, from the facts presented by the instant Motion in that there was a pending action before the Bankruptcy Court at the time the Trustee filed his request to extend the time within which to file claims against potential future defendants. Though the Trustee filed adversary complaints against several defendants in the *In re International Administrative Services, Inc .* case *after* the Bankruptcy Court extended the time in which to file those complaints, the appeals court writes that the Trustee's ability to investigate transfers were hampered by delayed document production and withheld discovery responses. Unlike that case, there is no action in any form pending before this Court. It is unknown whether future defendants will even assert the statute of limitations defense. It is for this reason that the Court will deny the Trustee's request to extend the time in which to file complaints and equitably toll the statute of limitations in [11 U.S.C. § 546\\(a\\),](http)#co_pp_8b3b0000958a4 ) without prejudice to raise equitable tolling should the Trustee file adversary complaints.\n\n**\\*2** An Order will follow.\n\n# **All Citations**\n\nNot Reported in B.R., 2012 WL 4114818\n\n# Footnotes\n\n<span id=\"page-10-0\"></span>[1](#page-9-0) Drafted with the assistance of Richard P. Rogers, Law Clerk.","body_zh":"2019 WL 1649940 目前仅有 Westlaw 引证。United States District Court, D. Connecticut（康涅狄格州联邦地区法院）。\n\nTachica CALLAHAN（塔奇卡·卡拉汉），原告，\n\n诉\n\nCITY OF NEW HAVEN BOARD OF EDUCATION（纽黑文市教育委员会），被告。\n\nNo. 3:17cv-00617 (JAM)　签署于 04/16/2019\n\n代理律师及律师事务所\n\nTachica Callahan（塔奇卡·卡拉汉），New Haven, CT，自行诉讼。\n\nRobert J. Vontell, III（罗伯特·J·冯特尔三世）；W. Martyn Philpot, Jr.（W·马丁·菲尔波特二世），W. Martyn Philpot, Jr., LLC（W·马丁·菲尔波特二世律师事务所），New Haven, CT，代理被告。\n不影响再次提出动议地驳回简易判决动议的命令\n\nJeffrey Alker Meyer（杰弗里·阿尔克·迈耶），United States District Judge（美国联邦地区法官）\n\n*1 2019 年 2 月 14 日，被告提交了简易判决动议。被告的动议在两个方面未遵守本院关于提交简易判决动议的地方法规则，因此应在不影响再次提出动议的情况下予以驳回。\n\n首先，尽管被告提交了《地方法规则》56(a)(1)项重要事实陈述（Doc. #42），该陈述未就每一项所称事实陈述载明对源材料的任何引证。参见 D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a)(3)（要求《地方法规则》56(a)(1)项陈述中的每项事实陈述“后必须附具对以下材料的具体引证：(1) 有资格就审判中的事实作证的证人宣誓书，或 (2) 可在审判中采纳的其他证据”）。\n\n其次，被告未提交要求向自行诉讼当事人发出的通知，该通知应告知原告必须以何种具体方式和格式提交对简易判决动议的任何异议。参见 D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(b)（说明通知要求）；另参见 Vital v. Interfaith Med. Ctr., 168 F.3d 615, 620-21 (2d Cir. 1999)（因未提供适当通知而撤销准予简易判决的裁定）。[1]\n\n原告已对被告的简易判决动议提出异议，但由于未从被告处收到适当的《地方法规则》56(b)项通知，其异议文件未遵守本院地方法规则。首先，她未提交适当的《地方法规则》56(a)(2)项陈述，以说明其对《规则》56(a)(1)项陈述中被告所称各项事实的同意或不同意。参见 D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a)(2)(i)。她也未载入单独的“补充重要事实”部分，列明任何补充重要事实，并附具对记录的支持性引证。参见 D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a)(2)(ii)。原告已提交其自己的事实陈述（Doc. #46-1），但其陈述未按 D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a)(3) 的要求，就每项事实附具对宣誓书或其他可采纳在案证据的引证。\n\n最终结果是，本院无法从当事人提交的文件中辨明，究竟何种证据支持其各自依据地方法规则提交的重要事实陈述，以及当事人实际上在何种程度上对重要事实存在争议。本院不具有可靠的事实基础以裁决该简易判决动议。\n\n*2 因此，鉴于当事人提交的简易判决文件在重大方面未遵守本院地方法规则的要求，且该未遵守系因被告未遵循《地方法规则》56的要求所致，本院不影响被告在 2019 年 5 月 6 日前重新提交一项有适当支持且完全遵守《地方法规则》56要求的简易判决动议，驳回被告的简易判决动议（Doc. #39）。本院取消先前已安排的被告动议听证会。\n\n特此命令。\n\n所有引证\n\n未载于 Fed. Supp.，2019 WL 1649940\n\n脚注\n\n[1] 被告提交其简易判决动议后，本院注意到被告未向自行诉讼的原告提交通知，遂依职权作出命令，指示被告根据 D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 12 提交通知（Doc. #43），而被告已照办（Doc. #44）。这是错误的，因为地方法规则要求被告提交《地方法规则》56(b)项规定的不同形式通知，而非依据 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 对驳回动议所要求的通知。本院错误指示被告提交错误类型的通知，实属遗憾；但当然，被告原本有责任在无需本院提示的情况下提交《地方法规则》56(b)项所要求的适当通知。\n\n2018 WL 2672242 目前仅有 Westlaw 引证。United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Connecticut, Hartford Division（康涅狄格州联邦破产法院哈特福德分院）。\n\n关于：WALNUT HILL, INC.（沃尔纳特希尔公司），债务人。\n\nCASE No. 16–20960 (JJT)　签署于 06/01/2018\n\n代理律师及律师事务所\n\nJoel M. Grafstein（乔尔·M·格拉夫斯坦），Grafstein & Arcaro（格拉夫斯坦与阿卡罗律师事务所），Farmington, CT，代理债务人。\n关于受托人延长提交受 11 U.S.C. § 546(a) 规制的撤销行动期限之动议的裁决备忘录\n\nJames J. Tancredi（詹姆斯·J·坦克雷迪），United States Bankruptcy Judge（美国联邦破产法官）\n\n*1 本院目前待决的是第 7 章受托人（“受托人”）提交的《关于延长提交受 11 U.S.C. § 546(a) 规制的撤销行动期限的动议》（“动议”）（ECF No. 195），以及 APEX Healthcare Partners, LLC（APEX 医疗保健合伙人有限责任公司）（ECF No. 210）、Annemarie Griggs（安妮玛丽·格里格斯）（ECF No. 211）和 Grand Street Nursing, LLC（大街护理有限责任公司）（ECF No. 212）提交的相应异议。基于下述理由，本院驳回该动议。\n\n一、讨论\n\n本院必须决定《联邦破产程序规则》第 9006(b) 条是否适用于 11 U.S.C. § 546(a)，从而赋予破产法院延长第 546(a) 条规定的提起撤销行动期限的权限。如第 9006(b) 条不适用，本院则必须决定，在对抗程序开始前是否可适当援引衡平时效中止原则。受托人已提出事实，以说明根据第 9006(b) 条延长期限的理由。然而，在本案中，本院可在事实问题得到解决前，作为法律问题对该动议作出裁决。\n\na. 第 9006(b) 条对 11 U.S.C. § 546(a) 的适用\n\n美国《破产法典》第 546(a) 条规定，行使撤销权的期限为两年。受托人请求本院将《破产程序规则》第 9006(b) 条适用于第 546(a) 条，以延长该法定期限。第 9006(b) 条允许在有理由的情况下延长某些期限。\n\n依其明文规定，第 9006(b) 条仅适用于“由本规则或依本规则发出的通知[,] [原文如此]，或由法院命令”设定的期限。该规则在任何地方均未提及法定期限。\n\n本院（Krechevsky 法官）过去曾处理过这一问题，并裁定第 9006(b) 条不“允许法院延长国会在法规中设定的时限”。In re Damach, Inc., 235 B.R. 727, 731 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1999)。相反，它“仅允许修改由其他规则或法院施加的时限”。同上。在 In re Colad Group, Inc., 324 B.R. 208, 225 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2005) 一案中，法院裁定：“《破产规则》第 9006 条允许延长或缩短《破产规则》中的许多期限。然而，第 546(a) 条[原文如此]是一项法规，而非规则。”因此，该法院裁定，其无权就法定期限适用第 9006 条采取行动。[1]\n\n尽管 Krechevsky 法官在 Matter of Sutera, 157 B.R. 519, 523 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1993) 一案中以附带意见表示，“国会意图使《联邦破产程序规则》完整且毫无例外地适用于《破产法典》的所有规定”，该裁定仅处理了第 9006(a) 条对 11 U.S.C. § 546(a) 的适用，而非第 9006(b) 条的适用范围。第 9006(a) 条明确规定，其适用于“未规定计算时间方法的任何法规。”（着重号为原文所加。）然而，第 9006(b) 条明显未载有关于其适用于法规的相同或类似表述。这一区别因 Krechevsky 法官六年后裁定第 9006(b) 条不能修改由国会设定的实体期限而更加突出。In re Damach, Inc., 235 B.R. at 731。\n\n*2 最后，国会规定，《破产规则》“不得限制、扩大或修改任何实体权利。”28 U.S.C. § 2075。规则与法典不一致时，法定《法典》具有控制效力。H.R. Rep. No. 95–595, pt. 1, at 449 (1977)。\n\n第 9006(b) 条如适用于第 546(a) 条，将违反宪法所保留的权力分立原则。在立法机关已作出权威性规定之处，修改其决定不属于司法机关的职权范围。由于第 9006(b) 条不适用于第 546(a) 条，本院无须决定是否已显示延长法定期限的理由。\n\nb. 衡平时效中止\n\n受托人还请求本院结合其根据第 9006(b) 条提出的延长期限请求，对第 546(a) 条的时效进行衡平中止。这些问题相互独立且彼此不同。\n\n从程序上讲，衡平时效中止原则被认可为对待决诉讼中提出的时效抗辩的回应。Long v. Abbott Mortg. Corp., 459 F. Supp. 108, 113 (D. Conn. 1978)。受托人援引第十一巡回上诉法院的一宗案件，其中法院裁定第 9006(b) 条适用于所有《联邦破产程序规则》，并似乎依赖第 9006(b) 条来证明其延长启动撤销行动的第 546(a) 条期限之决定的正当性。In re Int'l Admin. Servs., Inc., 408 F.3d 689 (11th Cir. 2005)。本院不接受该结论。经进一步审查，该巡回法院的裁定所依据的是衡平时效中止原则，该原则是在待决对抗程序中提出时效抗辩后援引的。\n\n第 546(a) 条是一项时效法规，并且如同任何时效法规一样，受衡平时效中止原则约束。同上，第 699 页。在存在“欺诈或超出受托人控制范围的特殊情形”时，衡平时效中止可防止第 546(a) 条的时效期间届满。同上。\n\n脚注\n\n[1] 本院不接受如下观点：由于第 546(a) 条规定的时效在救济命令作出两年后届满，第 9006(b) 条将支持延长该时效届满的时间。\n\n本案各方均承认，目前尚未提交对抗程序。根据第 546(a) 条，受托人提交对抗程序的时效将于 2018 年 6 月 14 日届满，该日期尚未到来。在具体被告于对抗程序中提出时效抗辩后，在有关待于该对抗程序中证明的事实和情形的证据听证会之外处理衡平时效中止问题，完全为时过早且在程序上存在瑕疵。\n\n二、结论\n\n[规则 9006(b)] 的明文禁止本院延长 [第 546(a) 条] 的诉讼时效。此外，此时审理衡平中止问题尚属过早，且在程序上不适当。\n\n因此，驳回该动议，并依照本裁决支持各项异议。\n\n兹于 2018 年 6 月 1 日在康涅狄格州哈特福德作出命令。\n\n所有引证\n\n未载于 B.R. Rptr.，2018 WL 2672242\n\n2022 WL 19298765 目前仅可获得 Westlaw 引证。United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. North Carolina, Greensboro Division（美国北卡罗来纳州中区破产法院，格林斯伯勒分院）。\n\n关于：RANDOLPH HOSPITAL, INC.（伦道夫医院公司），以 Randolph Health（伦道夫健康）名义营业，[1] 债务人。\n\n案号 20-10247　签署于 2022 年 4 月 25 日\n\n律师及律师事务所\n\nRayford K. Adams, III（雷福德·K·亚当斯三世）、Kayla Ives Russell（凯拉·艾夫斯·拉塞尔），Spilman Thomas & Battle, PLLC（斯皮尔曼·托马斯与巴特尔律师事务所），北卡罗来纳州温斯顿-塞勒姆；Boris I. Mankovetskiy（鲍里斯·I·曼科韦茨基）、Andrew Howard Sherman（安德鲁·霍华德·舍曼），Sills Cummis & Gross P.C.（西尔斯·卡米斯与格罗斯律师事务所），新泽西州纽瓦克，代表债权人委员会——无担保债权人正式委员会。\n\nJody Bedenbaugh（乔迪·贝登博），南卡罗来纳州哥伦比亚；Terri L. Gardner（特丽·L·加德纳），Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP（纳尔逊·马林斯·赖利与斯卡伯勒律师事务所），北卡罗来纳州罗利；Jason L. Hendren（杰森·L·亨德伦）、Rebecca F. Redwine（丽贝卡·F·雷德温）、Benjamin E.F.B. Waller（本杰明·E.F.B.·沃勒），Hendren Redwine & Malone, PLLC（亨德伦·雷德温与马隆律师事务所），北卡罗来纳州罗利；Graham S. Mitchell（格雷厄姆·S·米切尔），Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP（纳尔逊·马林斯·赖利与斯卡伯勒律师事务所），南卡罗来纳州哥伦比亚；Dylan Gillespie Trache（迪伦·吉莱斯皮·特拉奇），Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP（纳尔逊·马林斯·赖利与斯卡伯勒律师事务所），哥伦比亚特区华盛顿，代表债务人 Randolph Hospital, Inc.（伦道夫医院公司）。\n\n裁定\n\n驳回关于作出中止诉讼时效命令的动议\n\nLENA MANSORI JAMES（莉娜·曼索里·詹姆斯），美国破产法官\n\n*1 本案因 Louis E. Robichaux, IV（路易斯·E·罗比肖四世）作为 Randolph Health Liquidation Trust（伦道夫健康清算信托）的清算受托人（以下简称“清算受托人”）提出动议，请求作出命令，将针对债务人若干医疗保健服务提供者提起第 5 章诉因的法定期限延长 120 天（案卷编号 1166，以下简称“该动议”），而提交本院审理。清算受托人认为，债务人可能因雇员医疗保健计划项下的债权和福利，而向某些非债务人医疗保健服务提供者多付了款项。鉴于依据 [11 U.S.C. §§ 108] 和 [546] 追索潜在诉因所允许的最长两年期限即将届满，清算受托人请求本院衡平中止相关时效期间并延长提交期限；其主张，此举不仅将给予清算信托更多时间提起撤销诉讼，也将使任何潜在购买据称多付款项债权的买方获得延长的尽职调查期间。United States Bankruptcy Administrator（美国破产管理人）就该动议提出异议（案卷编号 1195），主张所请求的延期并无《联邦破产程序规则》支持，且由于尚未提起任何对抗程序，在此阶段对相关诉讼时效进行任何衡平中止均属过早。本院于 2022 年 4 月 19 日举行听证会，Rebecca Redwine（丽贝卡·雷德温）和 Jody Bedenbaugh（乔迪·贝登博）代表清算受托人出庭，Robert P. Price, Jr.（罗伯特·P·普赖斯二世）以美国助理破产管理人身份出庭。\n\n经审查所提出的论点和法律，本院认定，[Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9006(b)] 不得用于延长诸如 [11 U.S.C. §§ 108] 和 [546] 所规定的法定期限。参见 In re Cramer, 636 B.R. 830, 831–32 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2022)；In re Walnut Hill, Inc., No. 16-20960, 2018 WL 2672242, at *1–2 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 1, 2018)；另见 In re Tubular Techs., LLC, 348 B.R. 699, 711 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006)；In re Ducks in a Row, Inc., No. 03-40170, 2004 WL 4399096, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Apr. 16, 2004)。尽管 [§ 546] 和 [§ 108] 的时效期间与任何诉讼时效一样，均可适用衡平中止，但鉴于尚无确定的被告，且没有与多付款项债权有关的待决对抗程序，清算受托人所寻求的预先认定尚属过早。鉴于这一程序状况，本院同意以下判决的认定：受托人“不能在事先、且未通知被告并给予其反对适用该原则的机会的情况下，就衡平中止是否适用这一争议获胜。”In re Cramer, 636 B.R. at 833；另见 In re Walnut Hill, 2018 WL 2672242, at *2；In re No. 1 Contracting Corp., No. 5-10 bk-01755, 2012 WL 4114818, at *1 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2012)。尽管本院将驳回本动议，但本院不对衡平中止的适用性作出认定；清算受托人可在更适当的程序背景下，即在清算受托人或后续买方对可识别且已获适当通知的被告提起诉讼后，再次主张该原则。\n\n*2 因此，现命令：驳回该动议，但不妨碍清算受托人在未来被告就逾期提交的起诉状提出诉讼时效抗辩时主张衡平中止。\n\n特此命令。\n\n所有引证\n\n未载于 B.R. Rptr.，2022 WL 19298765\n\n脚注\n\n[1] 债务人为：Randolph Hospital, Inc.，以 Randolph Health 名义营业，案号 20-10247；Randolph Specialty Group Practice（伦道夫专科集团诊所），案号 20-10248；MRI of Asheboro, LLC（阿什伯勒磁共振成像有限责任公司），以 Randolph MRI Center（伦道夫磁共振成像中心）名义营业，案号 20-10249。\n\n[2] [§ 108] 期限延长\n\n(a) 如适用的非破产法、在非破产程序中作出的命令或协议规定债务人可在其内提起诉讼的期间，且该期间在提交申请书之日前尚未届满，则受托人仅可在下列较晚者之前提起该诉讼——\n\n(1) 该期间届满时，包括在案件开始之日或之后发生的对该期间的任何中止；或\n\n(2) 救济令作出后两年。\n\n[11 U.S.C. § 108(a)]。\n\n[3] [§ 546] 对撤销权的限制\n\n(a) 不得在下列较早者之后，提起本法典第 544、545、547、548 或 553 条项下的诉讼或程序——\n\n(1) 下列较晚者——\n\n(A) 救济令作出后 2 年；或\n\n(B) 如依本法典第 702、1104、1163、1202 或 1302 条首次任命或选举受托人发生在第 (A) 目规定期间届满之前，则自该首次任命或选举后 1 年；或\n\n(2) 案件结案或驳回之时。\n\n[11 U.S.C. 546(a)]。\n\n2009 WL 1858868 目前仅可获得 Westlaw 引证。United States District Court, D. Connecticut（美国康涅狄格州联邦地区法院）。\n\nMichael MASLAR（迈克尔·马斯拉尔），原告，\n\n诉\n\nUNITED STATES（美国），被申请人。\n\n民事诉讼案号 3:06 CV 2056(CFD)。2009 年 6 月 25 日。\n\nWest KeySummary\n\n1 [人身保护令] [一般] [时效障碍]\n\n[人身保护令] [申请人的精神状态、无知或技能缺乏]\n\n一名人身保护令申请人，在就银行抢劫罪作出有罪答辩后对其监禁刑提出异议，因一年诉讼时效已经届满而不得获得其所寻求的救济。该申请人的人身保护令申请是在其就银行抢劫罪作出有罪答辩并被判刑近两年后提出。此外，申请人未能就其所称足以支持衡平中止的精神无行为能力提出任何证据，而政府提出的证据表明，在其希望中止计算的期间内，申请人具备理性思考能力。[28 U.S.C.A. § 2255]。\n\n律师及律师事务所\n\nMichael Maslar（迈克尔·马斯拉尔），宾夕法尼亚州怀特迪尔，自行辩护。\n\nJonathan Freimann（乔纳森·弗赖曼）、Peter S. Jongbloed（彼得·S·琼布洛德），U.S. Attorney's Office（美国联邦检察官办公室），康涅狄格州纽黑文，代表被申请人。\n\n关于人身保护令申请的裁定\n\nCHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY（克里斯托弗·F·德罗尼），地区法官。\n\n*1 申请人 Michael Maslar（迈克尔·马斯拉尔）因承认违反 [18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)] 的银行抢劫罪，现正服 165 个月监禁刑。他现依据 [28 U.S.C. § 2255] 寻求人身保护令，理由是其辩护律师未提出精神能力减弱抗辩，因而未能提供充分代理。马斯拉尔主张，其申请的一年诉讼时效应予中止，因为其精神状态不允许其进行理性思考和作出决定。基于下述理由，驳回马斯拉尔的申请。\n\nI. 背景\n\nA. 程序经过\n\n2002 年 7 月 23 日，联邦大陪审团作出起诉书，指控申请人一项银行抢劫罪名项和一项银行抢劫未遂罪名项，违反 [18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)]。2002 年 10 月 7 日，申请人就银行抢劫罪作出有罪答辩。2003 年 3 月 14 日，经听证会后，审判法院判处申请人 165 个月监禁；在该听证会上，本院审议并驳回了辩方提出的、包括基于马斯拉尔精神和情绪状况在内的从轻减刑请求。马斯拉尔既未就本院关于所请求从轻减刑的决定提出上诉，也未就刑罚提出上诉。\n\n2006 年 12 月 27 日，申请人依据 [28 U.S.C. § 2255] 提出动议，请求撤销、搁置或更正其刑罚。在请求并获得一次延长答复救济申请期限后，政府于 2008 年 4 月 30 日提交了对该申请的答复。\n\nII. 讨论\n\nA. 诉讼时效\n\n自 1996 年 4 月 24 日起生效的《1996 年反恐怖主义和有效死刑法》（“AEDPA”）第 105 条，对提交联邦人身保护令申请或寻求对其定罪和刑罚进行附带审查规定了一年时效期间。[28 U.S.C. § 2255]。时效期间自下列日期中最晚者起算：\n\n(1) 定罪判决生效之日；(2) 如申请人因违反美国宪法或法律的政府行为而被阻止提出动议，则该政府行为所造成的提出动议障碍被消除之日；(3) 所主张的权利首次获最高法院承认之日，如该权利为最高法院新近承认且被规定可追溯适用于附带审查案件；或 (4) 经行使应有勤勉本可发现支持所提出主张的一项或多项事实之日。\n\n[28 U.S.C. § 2255]。\n\n就 § 2255 动议而言，未经上诉的联邦刑事判决，在提起直接上诉的期限届满时即告确定。Moshier（莫希尔） v. United States（美国）, 402 F.3d 116, 118 (2d Cir. 2005)。由于本案未提起上诉，申请人的定罪于2003年4月8日生效确定，即定罪判决于2003年3月25日作出后十个营业日。参见 Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(I)。因此，申请人自该日起有一年时间根据 § 2255 提交其申请，即截至2004年4月8日。申请人于2006年12月12日提交其申请，已超过时效期间届满后两年多。因此，除非该期限获得衡平中止，否则该申请已逾期。\n\nB. 中止\n\n第2页　在某些情形下，法院可依据衡平中止原则，宽免被告根据 § 2255 提交动议的迟延。United States（美国） v. White（怀特）, No. 05 Civ. 6476(DC), 02 Cr. 939(DC), 2005 WL 2878158 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2005)（援引 Smith（史密斯） v. McGinnis（麦金尼斯）, 208 F.3d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 2000)）。衡平中止仅在“罕见且例外的情形”下适用，id.，且应“仅谨慎适用”。Id.（引述 Irwin（欧文） v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs（退伍军人事务部）, 498 U.S. 89, 96, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990)）。寻求援引该原则的一方负有证明两项要件的责任：(1) 其一直勤勉地行使其权利；以及 (2) 存在某一非常情形阻碍其行使权利。Pace（佩斯） v. DiGuglielmo（迪古列尔莫）, 544 U.S. 408, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005)。这些要求应严格解释。White, 2005 WL 2878158 at *2（援引 Barbosa（巴博萨） v. United States（美国）, No. 01 Civ. 7522(JFK), 2002 WL 869553 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2002)）。\n\n为证明非常情形，申请人必须以证据支持其主张；其不得仅依赖个人结论或评估。White, 2005 WL 2878158 at *2（援引 Mendez（门德斯） v. Artuz（阿图兹）, No. 99 Civ. 2472(DLC), 2000 WL 991336 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2000)）。申请人还必须证明其衡平中止主张所依据的非常情形与其提交迟延之间存在因果关系；若申请人在合理勤勉行事的情况下，尽管存在该非常情形仍本可及时提交，则无法作出此种证明。Rios（里奥斯） v. Mazzuca（马祖卡）, 78 Fed.Appx. 742, 2003 WL 22426961 (2d Cir. 2003)（引述 Hizbullahankhamon（希兹布拉汉卡蒙） v. Walker（沃克）, 255 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 2001)）。\n\n一般而言，衡平中止适用于“原告的身体状况或精神障碍妨碍其及时采取行动”的情形。Id. at 744（引述 Zerilli–Edelglass（泽里利—埃德尔格拉斯） v. N.Y. City Transit Auth.（纽约市交通局）, 333 F.3d 74, 80 (2d Cir. 2003)）（内部方括号从略）。某人是否具有足以证明中止时效期间正当性的精神障碍，高度取决于个案具体情况。Id. “然而，至少申请人必须具体说明，其状况如何不利地影响其一般履行功能的能力，或不利地影响其寻求行使权利的能力。”Id.（引述 Boos（布斯） v. Runyon（鲁尼恩）, 201 F.3d 178, 185 (2d Cir. 2000)）（内部方括号及引号从略）。\n\n申请人未就其希望中止的期间内其所称精神无行为能力提出任何证据，也未提供“其状况如何不利地影响其一般履行功能的能力，或不利地影响其寻求行使权利的能力”的具体说明。此外，政府提交的证据与申请人未经支持的主张相矛盾。参见 James Davison（詹姆斯·戴维森）, Ph.D. 的声明（称，在涵盖申请人请求中止的期间内，申请人具备理性思考能力，能够理解其处境，并能够理解其法律状况及寻求适当的法律救济）。\n\nC. 律师无效协助\n\n第3页　即使本院审理 Maslar（马斯拉尔）申请的实体问题，也没有证据表明申请人的律师提供了无效协助。根据美国联邦最高法院在 Strickland（斯特里克兰） v. Washington（华盛顿）, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) 一案中的裁决，为证明律师无效协助，申请人负有证明责任，即其“律师的行为如此破坏对抗程序的正常运作，以致不能认为审判产生了公正结果”。Id. at 686。\n\n为作出该证明，申请人必须证明两点：第一，按照“现行专业规范”判断，律师的“代理低于客观合理性标准”，id. at 688；第二，辩护因该等错误而受到损害——换言之，“如果没有律师不专业的错误，程序结果很可能会有所不同”。Id. at 694。\n\nMaslar 主张，其审判律师未提出精神能力减弱抗辩，因而构成无效协助。该主张毫无根据。第一，Maslar 仅在本院就其精神能力进行了详尽询问后，并在被告律师确保本院知悉 Maslar 的精神状况及其正在服用的药物后，才作出认罪答辩。本院询问 Maslar，其服用的药物是否损害其理解诉讼程序或清晰思考的能力，Maslar 表示其头脑清醒，且药物“没有损害任何事情”，只“帮助[他]更像一个正常人那样思考”。参见认罪答辩变更听证会记录，2002年10月7日。第二，申请人的律师提交了一份量刑协助备忘录，其中主张应基于 Maslar 的精神问题作出向下偏离量刑。\n\n律师还在申请人的量刑听证会上，主张应基于申请人的精神和情绪状况作出向下偏离量刑。参见量刑听证会记录，2003年3月14日。该代理绝未低于 Strickland 所规定的“客观合理性标准”，且申请人未能表明，若非律师所称错误，程序结果很可能会有所不同。\n\nIII. 结论\n\n基于上述理由，驳回 Maslar 的人身保护令申请 [Dkt. # 1]。\n\n应为被申请人作出判决。书记官奉命结案。\n\n特此命令。\n\n所有引证\n\n未载于 F.Supp.2d，2009 WL 1858868\n\n2012 WL 4114818　目前仅有 Westlaw 引证可用。United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Pennsylvania（宾夕法尼亚中区美国破产法院）。\nIn re NO. 1 CONTRACTING CORPORATION（第一承包公司），债务人。\n\nNo. 5–10–bk–01755–JJT。2012年9月19日。\n\n律师及律师事务所\n\nRonald V. Santora（罗纳德·V·桑托拉），Bresset and Santora（布雷塞特和桑托拉），宾夕法尼亚州福蒂福特，代理债务人。\n\nDavid J. Harris（戴维·J·哈里斯），宾夕法尼亚州威尔克斯-巴里；Michael G. Oleyar（迈克尔·G·奥利亚尔），宾夕法尼亚州黑兹尔镇；Myles P. McAliney（迈尔斯·P·麦卡莱尼），McAliney & McAliney（麦卡莱尼与麦卡莱尼），宾夕法尼亚州皮茨顿，代理受托人。\n\nGregory Benjamin Schiller（格雷戈里·本杰明·席勒），U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the U.S. Trustee（美国司法部美国受托人办公室），宾夕法尼亚州哈里斯堡，代理助理美国受托人。\n\n意见 [1]\n\nJOHN J. THOMAS（约翰·J·托马斯），破产法官。\n\n第1页　Michael G. Oleyar, Esquire，即在上述标题所列第7章案件中获任命的第7章受托人小组受托人，已提交延长提起撤销程序及其他诉讼期限的动议（Doc. # 160）。上述遗产的数名债权人对该动议提出异议（Doc. # 164）。该动议称，债务人的负责人未能配合受托人，未按照受托人多次要求提供其所要求的信息和文件。受托人进一步称，债务人的负责人未能在“根据第341条举行的多次延期债权人会议”上回答问题，并援引 United States Constitution（美国宪法）第五修正案和第十四修正案规定的保护，主张其有权不回答受托人的问题。由于所称未能配合受托人的行为，受托人主张其无法确定是否存在可代表债务人遗产提出的撤销及／或其他相关诉讼，包括优先清偿转让和欺诈性转让诉讼。受托人援引 Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure（联邦破产程序规则）Rule 9006(b) 及 In re International Administrative Services, Inc.（国际行政服务公司破产案）, 408 F.3d 689 (11th Cir. 2005)，作为本院有权延长提起撤销诉讼的期限并延长 11 U.S.C. § 546 规定的时效期间的依据。\n\n在就该项基础动议举行听证会时，本院数次表示关切：尽管审判法院可以裁定就某一特定被告而言某项法定时效在一段期间内被中止，但在本院面前并无案件或争议的情况下，其是否可以就未具名且身份不明的被告延长该法定时效？\n\n衡平中止原则适用于每一项联邦时效法规。Holmberg（霍姆伯格） v. Armbrecht（阿姆布雷希特）, 327 U.S. 392, 66 S.Ct. 582, 90 L.Ed. 743 (1946)。毫无疑问，我有权对 11 U.S.C. § 546(a) 规定的时效期间实行衡平中止。Pugh（普） v. Brook（布鲁克） (In re Pugh（普破产案）), 158 F.3d 530 (11th Cir. 1998)；In re M & L Business Mach. Co, Inc.（M & L 商业机器公司破产案）, 75 F.3d 586 (10th Cir. 1996)；In re United Ins. Management. Inc.（联合保险管理公司破产案）, 14 F.3d 1380 (9th Cir. 1994)；In re International Administrative Services, Inc.（国际行政服务公司破产案）, 408 F.3d 689 (11th Cir. 2005)。受托人就我能否在没有任何待决案件或争议时对法定时效实行衡平中止所援引的唯一依据，是 In re International Administrative Services, Inc. 一案。Id. 然而，该案与本动议所呈现的事实不同，因为在受托人提出延长其对潜在未来被告提起请求的期限之申请时，破产法院已有待决诉讼。尽管受托人在破产法院延长提交该等诉状的期限后，确曾在 In re International Administrative Services, Inc. 案中对数名被告提交对抗程序诉状，但上诉法院写道，受托人调查转让的能力因文件迟延提供及证据开示答复被扣留而受到妨碍。与该案不同，本院目前不存在任何形式的待决诉讼。未来被告是否甚至会提出时效抗辩，尚属未知。因此，本院将驳回受托人延长提交诉状期限并对 11 U.S.C. § 546(a) 规定的时效进行衡平中止的请求，但不妨碍受托人在其提交对抗程序诉状时主张衡平中止。\n\n第2页　后续将作出命令。\n\n所有引证\n\n未载于 B.R.，2012 WL 4114818\n\n脚注\n\n[1] 在 Richard P. Rogers（理查德·P·罗杰斯）法律助理协助下起草。","key_entities":["Je","CIPA","Pro Se","pro se"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":39,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":42,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":43,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":44,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":46,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":160,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":164,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":195,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":210,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":211,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":212,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":5361,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 19:08:45"}