{"id":"court_ctb_2566_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":2566,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION In re:","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"## **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\nIn re:\n\nChapter 11\n\nHO WAN KWOK,\n\nCase No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\nDebtor.\n\n# **OBJECTIONS OF THIRD PARTIES CHRIS LEE AND QIDONG XIA TO TRUSTEE'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF ORDER EXTENDING DEADLINE FOR TRUSTEE TO FILE AVOIDANCE ACTIONS UNDER BANKRUPTCY CODE SECTIONS 108, 546(a), AND 549**\n\nThird-Party Objectors Chris Lee and Qidong Xia, by and through their undersigned counsel, hereby object to the Trustee's Motion for Entry of Order Extending Deadline for Trustee to File Avoidance Actions Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 108, 546(a), and 549 (the \"Tolling Motion\") (ECF No. 2509). In support of their Objections, Lee and Xia respectfully state as follows:\n\n## **INTRODUCTION**\n\n1. Lee and Xia are individuals that the Trustee has included among the 331 individuals and entities he identified as \"Currently Known Alternative Service Defendants\" in an exhibit he attached to the Notice for the Tolling Motion. Notably, although he has referred to them as \"Defendants,\" the Trustee has not filed a complaint against Lee or Xia. Nor has he identified the possible claims he believes he holds against Lee or Xia.\n\n2. By the Tolling Motion, the Trustee seeks to toll the statutes of limitations set forth under sections 108, 546(a), and 549 of the Bankruptcy Code on any possible claims he could bring against any possible defendants—including, presumably Lee and Xia—for some unspecified amount of time pursuant to both the doctrine of equitable tolling and Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b). The Trustee argues that he is entitled to do so based not on the actions of Lee, Xia, or any other possible defendant or because he has been prevented from pursuing any specific claims against Lee, Xia, or any other possible defendant. Indeed, he has not, at this time, even identified any possible claim he might hold against Lee or Xia. Instead, the Trustee seeks to toll the statutes of limitations on all possible claims he could bring against Lee, Xia, and anyone else based on the alleged general effects that the Debtor's alleged actions and the concurrently pending criminal case against the Debtor have had on the Trustee's discovery in this case.\n\n 3. The Trustee's argument should be rejected for two reasons. First, as laid out in more detail in the Objection of Mei Guo to the Tolling Motion (ECF No. 2551), which Lee and Xia hereby join, the Court lacks the power to grant the relief requested in the Tolling Motion because the doctrine of equitable tolling cannot be applied to prospective, unfiled claims and Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) does not authorize extensions to statutory deadlines. Second, even were such relief possible, it would still be unwarranted in the present circumstances because the Trustee's failure to identify the claims he believes he holds against Lee and Xia, let alone explain how the Debtor's alleged actions have purportedly prevented him from filing those claims, means that he has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that such claims should be equitably tolled: that \"extraordinary circumstances\" have prevented him from filing the claims against Lee, Xia, and any other third parties which he seeks to toll.\n\n### **FACTUAL BACKGROUND**\n\n4. Lee and Xia are both included in the list of 331 \"Currently Known Alternative Service Defendants\" whom the Trustee purportedly served January 22, 2024 via alternative service with the Tolling Motion. (ECF No. 2540 at ECF p. 2; *id* at ECF p. 97 (listing Lee as a \"Currently Known Alternative Service Defendant\"), *id* at ECF P. 102 (listing Xia as same).)\n\n2\n\n5. The Trustee first sought discovery from Lee on November 6, 2023, when he applied to the Court for permission to conduct Lee's examination pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2004(a) as part of the Ninth Supplemental Omnibus Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee for Entry of Order Under Bankruptcy Rule 2004 and Local Rule 2004-1 Authorizing Discovery With Respect to Additional Entities and Individuals Affiliated with Debtor and Entities Doing Business With Debtor (the \"Ninth Supplemental Omnibus Motion\"). (ECF No. 2308 at 8.) Lee is currently in the process of responding to the subpoena issued pursuant to the Ninth Supplemental Omnibus Motion. The Trustee has not, at any point during these proceedings, sought to conduct Xia's examination or to otherwise take discovery from Xia.\n\n 6. Although the Trustee has referred to Lee and Xia as \"Currently Known Alternative Service Defendants,\" the Tolling Motion does not identify any specific claims that the Trustee believes he may have against Lee or Xia. (*See* ECF No. 2509.) Indeed, neither Lee nor Xia is mentioned—either directly or by implication—in the Tolling Motion. (*See id.*) Instead, the Trustee requests the following relief, which apparently concerns any possible claims the debtor's estate may have against any possible third party: \"entry of the Proposed Order extending the statute of limitations in sections 108, 546, and 549 of the Bankruptcy Code, which will allow the Trustee to continue his investigation and bring additional actions under chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code.\" (Tolling Mot., ¶ 27.) Moreover, although the topic of waiver is not mentioned in the Tolling Motion itself, the Proposed Order included with the Tolling Motion includes an expansive request regarding waiver, requesting that the Court order that \"any party that has received notice, whether actual or constructive, of the [Tolling] Motion and did not object to the Motion has waived its right to assert a limitations period defense if ultimately named in an action that is timely brought under the terms of this Order.\" (ECF Doc. 2509, Ex. 1, at 2.)\n\n3\n\n#### **ARGUMENT**\n\n7. The Tolling Motion should be denied for two separate reasons. First, the Court does not have the authority to grant the relief requested in the Tolling motion under either of the bases identified by the Trustee: the doctrine of equitable tolling or Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b). Second, even if the Court did have such authority, it should still deny the Motion as to Lee and Xia because the Trustee has failed to meet his high burden of demonstrating that \"exceptional\" circumstances exist which would justify tolling such claims. In particular, the Trustee has failed to explain why, as he must, the circumstances that have prevented him from filing the specific claims against Lee or Xia (or any third party) which he seeks to toll.\n\n### **I. The Court Lacks Authority to Grant the Relief Requested in the Tolling Motion Because Equitable Tolling Cannot Be Applied Prospectively and Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) Does Not Authorize Extensions to Statutory Deadlines.**\n\n8. Initially, the Court should deny the Tolling Motion because both of the legal bases on which the Trustee premises the Tolling Motion are incorrect as a matter of law. The doctrine of equitable tolling cannot, as the Trustee seeks, operate prospectively. And Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b), as a rule, cannot and does not permit a court to extend statutory deadlines such as those set forth in Sections 108, 546(a), and 549 of the Bankruptcy Code. These positions are set out in detail in Mei Guo's concurrently filed Objections to the Tolling Motion, which Lee and Xia join and incorporate by reference. (*See* ECF No. 2551, ¶¶ 6-22.)\n\n9. Given that they are joining Mei Guo's Objections on these issues, Lee and Xia will not rehash at length the entirety of the arguments set forth therein. Instead, Lee and Xia simply urge the Court to adopt the straightforward and well-reasoned analysis of Judge James T. Tancredi in rejecting identical arguments in the case of *In re Walnut Hill, Inc.*, No. 16-20960 (JJT), 2018 WL 2672242 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 1, 2018).\n\n10. Specifically, with respect to the prospective application of equitable tolling, Judge Tancredi noted that \"[p]rocedurally, the doctrine of equitable tolling is recognized as a response to a statute of limitations defense asserted in a pending litigation.\" *Id.* at \\*2 (citing *Long v. Abbott Mortg. Corp.*, 459 F. Supp. 108, 113 (D. Conn. 1978).) Therefore, \"[i]t is wholly premature and procedurally flawed to address equitable tolling outside the context of an evidentiary hearing on the facts and circumstances to be proven in the adversary proceeding against specific defendants, once a statute of limitations defense has been asserted.\" *Id.* at \\*2.\n\n11. With respect to the applicability of Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b), Judge Tancredi found that 9006(b) was inapplicable to the deadlines set forth in section 545(a) because \"[b]y its plain language, Rule 9006(b) only applies to deadlines set 'by these rules or by a notice given thereunder[,] [sic] or by order of court'. Nowhere in the Rule does it mention statutory deadlines.\" *Id.* at \\*1. Additionally, Judge Tancredi found that, any interpretation of Rule 9006(b) that held otherwise would unconstitutionally \"violat[e] the separation of powers preserved in the Constitution\" because \"Congress has dictated that the Bankruptcy Rules 'shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.'\" *Id.* (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2075).\n\n12. The Court should apply this same reasoning to deny the present motion. To do otherwise would, as Mei Guo explains in her Objection, \"deprive[] future defendants [such as Lee and Xia] of constitutional due process of law because they received no notice of the relief in advance and no opportunity to contest whether or not equitable tolling is warranted.\" (ECF No. 2551, ¶ 10 (quoting *In re Cramer*, 636 B.R. 830, 831-33 (Bankr. C.D. Colo. 2022)).)\n\n**II. Even Were It to Be Applicable to Prospective Claims, The Application of the Doctrine of Equitable Tolling Would Still Be Unwarranted Because the Trustee Has Failed to Meet His Burden of Demonstrating that \"Exceptional\" Circumstances Have Prevented Him from Filing Claims Against Lee or Xia.**\n\n13. Additionally, even were the doctrine of equitable tolling applicable to prospective claims, application of the doctrine would still be unwarranted to any claims against Lee or Xia (or any other possible third-party defendants) because the Trustee has failed to meet a core aspect of his burden of demonstrating that such claims should be equitably tolled: that \"exceptional\" circumstances exist which have prevented him from filing claims against Lee or Xia.\n\n14. \"Equitable tolling applies only in the 'rare and exceptional circumstance[ ].'\" *Smith v. McGinnis*, 208 F.3d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting *Turner v. Johnson,* 177 F.3d 390, 391-92 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1007 (1999)). \"A party seeking to benefit from the doctrine bears the burden of proving that tolling is appropriate.\" *United States v. All Funds Distributed To, or o/b/o Weiss*, 345 F.3d 49, 54–55 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing *Chapman v. ChoiceCare Long Island Term Disability Plan*, 288 F.3d 506, 512 (2d Cir. 2002)).\n\n15. The Trustee sets forth the equitable tolling standard he must meet as follows: \"To obtain the benefit of the doctrine, the Trustee bears the burden of establishing that []he (1) has acted with reasonable diligence during the time period she seeks to have tolled, and (2) has proved that the circumstances are so extraordinary that the doctrine should apply.\" (Tolling Mot., ¶ 47 (quoting *In re Anderson*, 623 B.R. 199, 217 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2020)).) With respect to the second prong in the equitable tolling standard, the existence of \"extraordinary\" circumstances, however, the Trustee's statement of the doctrine is incomplete. Specifically, the party seeking to equitably toll the statute of limitations must not show only that \"extraordinary\" circumstances exist, but also that those circumstances have prevented him or her from filing the specific claim he or she wishes to toll. *See Smaldone v. Senkowski*, 273 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2001) (\"To merit application of equitable tolling, the petitioner must demonstrate that he acted with 'reasonable diligence' during the period he wishes to have tolled, but that despite his efforts, extraordinary circumstances 'beyond his control' prevented successful filing during that time.\" (quoting *Smith v. McGinnis*, 208 F.3d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 2000)).\n\n16. Consistent with this principle, in each of the cases cited by the Trustee involving what the Trustee alleges are analogous circumstances to the present case, courts found that the plaintiff seeking to toll the statute of limitations had shown not only that, as the Trustee characterizes it, they were \"unable to make progress on discovery, especially in light of the debtor's obstruction,\" (Tolling Mot., ¶ 50) but also that the thwarted discovery was material to the specific claim the plaintiff was seeking to toll. For instance:\n\n- In *In re Int'l Admin. Servs., Inc.*, 408 F.3d 689, 702 (11th Cir. 2005), the court found that equitable tolling was justified because the debtor and defendant had failed to timely produce documents which \"evidenced a money trail\" from the debtor to the defendant and that, \"without that information, it would have been careless, and perhaps malpractice, for the Trustee to file this adversary proceeding prior to the delivery of these documents.\"\n- In *In re Bender*, No. ADV. 02-00773-RTB, 2010 WL 6467681, at \\*9 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2010), *aff'd,* 480 F. App'x 445 (9th Cir. 2012), the court found that equitable tolling was justified where the trustee was unable to identify the debtor's interest in the specific parcel of real property at issue in the adversary proceeding at the time of the expiration of the statute of limitations, \"at least in substantial part, due to the failure of [the debtor] to provide documentation regarding the extent or lack of his ownership\" of the property.\n- In *In re Livemercial Aviation Holding*, LLC, 508 B.R. 58, 70-71 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2014) the court denied a motion to dismiss brought on statute of limitations grounds based on its\n\nfinding that the trustee was unable to obtain specifically identified and requested \"information and documentation necessary to the Trustee to obtain to investigate the transaction which [was] the subject of th[e] case.\"\n\n In *In re Ochs*, 608 B.R. 252, 259, 261 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2019), the court, also on a motion to dismiss, found that equitable tolling was permitted based, in part, on the trustee's allegation that \"Debtor delayed and attempted to thwart their efforts to discover information relevant to the Transfers and his use of the Charitable Trusts\" that were at issue in the adversary proceedings.\n\n17. Such decisions are not surprising because, as noted in *In re Int'l Admin. Servs., Inc.*, 408 F.3d 689, 701–02 (11th Cir. 2005), the central case on which the Trustee relies, \"the applicability of equitable tolling is a fact-based decision\" and \"the bankruptcy court determines whether equitable tolling governs on a case-by-case basis.\"\n\n18. In the Tolling Motion, the Trustee identifies two reasons why he believes that extraordinary circumstances exist justifying the application of equitable tolling in the present case. First, \"the Debtor and his unidentified associates [allegedly] have, and continue to, actively interfered with the Trustee's discovery efforts.\" (Tolling Mot., ¶ 52.) Second, the Debtor is a defendant in a \"wide-ranging criminal case\" that has \"complicated\" the Trustee's investigation. (Tolling Mot., ¶ 54.) The Trustee makes no attempt, however, to explain why these allegations, even if true (which Lee and Xia do not concede) have prevented him from filing any claims against Lee and Xia—or anyone else for that matter. Nor could the Trustee do so, as he has failed—either in the Tolling Motion or anywhere else—to actually identify what claims he believes he holds against Lee or Xia.\n\n19. Because the Trustee has, therefore, failed to even attempt to meet his high burden of demonstrating that the circumstances in the present case have prevented him from filing claims against Lee and Xia specifically, his request that the Court apply the doctrine of equitable tolling to any possible claims he might have against Lee and Xia must fail. As a result, even if the doctrine of equitable tolling is applicable to prospective claims, the Tolling Motion should still be denied.\n\n### **CONCLUSION**\n\nFor the reasons set forth above, Third-Party Objectors Chris Lee and Qidong Xia respectfully request this Court deny the Tolling Motion and grant such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable.\n\nDated: February 5, 2024 */s/ Jon Newton*\n\nJon Newton Federal Bar No. ct03376 Reid and Reige, P.C. One Financial Plaza, 21st Floor Hartford, CT 06103 (860) 278-1150 Fax (860) 240-1002 jnewton@rrlawpc.com\n\nAnd\n\nEric T. Schmitt (*pro hac vice* motion pending) eschmitt@quinlanfirm.com docketing@quinlanfirm.com **THE QUINLAN LAW FIRM, LLC**  233 S. Wacker Dr., Ste. 6142 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 883-5500\n\n*Attorneys for Chris Lee and Qidong Xia*","body_zh":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION（美国康涅狄格区联邦破产法院布里奇波特分院）\n\n案件涉及：\n\n第11章\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），\n\n案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n\n债务人。\n第三方异议人 CHRIS LEE（李克里斯）与 QIDONG XIA（夏启东）对受托人关于根据《破产法典》第108条、第546(a)条及第549条延长受托人提起撤销权诉讼期限的命令作出动议提出的异议\n\n第三方异议人 Chris Lee（李克里斯）与 Qidong Xia（夏启东）通过其下述签字律师，特此对受托人关于根据《破产法典》第108条、第546(a)条及第549条延长受托人提起撤销权诉讼期限的命令作出动议（以下简称“《诉讼时效中止动议》”）（ECF No. 2509）提出异议。为支持其异议，李克里斯与夏启东恭敬陈述如下：\n引言\n\n1. 受托人在其随《诉讼时效中止动议》通知所附的一份附件中确定了331名个人和实体，列为“目前已知的替代送达被告”，李克里斯与夏启东均属于受托人列入其中的个人。值得注意的是，尽管受托人将他们称为“被告”，但受托人并未对李克里斯或夏启东提起任何诉状。受托人亦未明确指出其认为对李克里斯或夏启东可能享有的主张。\n\n2. 通过《诉讼时效中止动议》，受托人依据衡平法诉讼时效中止原则及《破产规则》第9006(b)条，试图在一段未明确的时间内，中止《破产法典》第108条、第546(a)条及第549条所规定的诉讼时效，该中止适用于受托人可能对任何潜在被告——推测包括李克里斯与夏启东——提起的任何可能的主张。受托人主张其有权这样做，并非基于李克里斯、夏启东或任何其他潜在被告的行为，也不是因为受托人在针对李克里斯、夏启东或任何其他潜在被告追究任何具体主张时受到了阻碍。事实上，受托人目前甚至尚未明确其可能对李克里斯或夏启东享有的任何潜在主张。相反，受托人试图针对其可能向李克里斯、夏启东及其他任何人提出的所有潜在主张中止诉讼时效，其依据纯粹是声称债务人的指称行为以及针对债务人并期审理中的刑事案件对受托人在本案中的证据开示产生了概括性的普遍影响。\n\n3. 受托人的主张应予驳回，理由有二。首先，正如 Mei Guo（郭美）对《诉讼时效中止动议》的异议（ECF No. 2551）（李克里斯与夏启东特此加入该异议）中所更详尽阐述的那样，法院缺乏准予《诉讼时效中止动议》所请求之救济的权力，因为衡平法诉讼时效中止原则不得适用于前瞻性的、尚未提起的诉讼主张，且《破产规则》第9006(b)条并未授权延长法定期限。其次，即使此类救济在法律上存在可能，在目前情况下也是毫无依据的，因为受托人未能确定其认为对李克里斯和夏启东享有的主张，更未说明债务人的指称行为究竟如何阻碍了其提起这些主张，这意味着受托人未能履行其证明此类主张应适用衡平法中止的举证责任：即未能证明存在“异常情况”阻碍了其对李克里斯、夏启东以及其试图中止诉讼时效的任何其他第三方提起诉讼主张。\n事实背景\n\n4. 李克里斯与夏启东均被列入受托人据称于2024年1月22日通过替代送达方式送达《诉讼时效中止动议》的331名“目前已知的替代送达被告”名单中。（ECF No. 2540，ECF第2页；同上，ECF第97页（将李克里斯列为“目前已知的替代送达被告”），同上，ECF第102页（将夏启东列为同一类别）。）\n\n5. 受托人首次向李克里斯寻求证据开示是在2023年11月6日，当时受托人向法院提出申请，请求根据《联邦破产诉讼程序规则》第2004(a)条对李克里斯进行质询，该申请属于《第11章受托人根据破产规则第2004条及本地规则第2004-1条请求作出授权针对与债务人存在关联的额外实体和个人以及与债务人开展业务的实体进行证据开示的命令的第九次补充综合动议》（以下简称“《第九次补充综合动议》”）的一部分。（ECF No. 2308，第8页。）李克里斯目前正在依法应对依据《第九次补充综合动议》发出的传票。在本案诉讼程序的任何阶段，受托人均未曾试图对夏启东进行质询或以其他方式向夏启东获取证据开示。\n\n6. 尽管受托人已将李克里斯和夏启东称为“目前已知的替代送达被告”，但《诉讼时效中止动议》中并未明确受托人认为其可能对李克里斯或夏启东享有的任何具体主张。（见 ECF No. 2509。）事实上，在《诉讼时效中止动议》中，无论直接还是间接，均未提及李克里斯或夏启东。（见同上。）相反，受托人请求了以下救济，该救济显然关涉债务人破产财产可能对任何潜在第三方享有的任何可能的主张：“作出拟议裁定以延长《破产法典》第108条、第546条和第549条中的诉讼时效，这将允许受托人继续其调查并根据《破产法典》第5章提起额外的诉讼。”（《诉讼时效中止动议》，第27段。）此外，尽管《诉讼时效中止动议》本身未提及放弃权利的事项，但随附于《诉讼时效中止动议》的拟议裁定却包含了一项关于弃权的宽泛请求，请求法院命令“任何已收到本[诉讼时效中止]动议的实际或推定通知且未对该动议提出异议的当事人，如果最终在根据本裁定条款及时提起的诉讼中被列为被告，即视为已放弃主张诉讼时效抗辩的权利。”（ECF Doc. 2509, Ex. 1, 第2页。）\n\n辩论理由\n\n7. 《诉讼时效中止动议》应予驳回，理由有二。首先，根据受托人提出的两项法律依据（即衡平法诉讼时效中止原则或《破产规则》第9006(b)条），法院均无权准予《诉讼时效中止动议》中所请求的救济。其次，即使法院拥有此类权力，针对李克里斯和夏启东亦应驳回该动议，因为受托人未能履行其沉重的举证责任，以证明存在足以证明中止此类诉讼主张具有正当性的“异常”情况。特别是，受托人未能依其法定义务解释究竟是何种情况阻碍了其针对李克里斯或夏启东（或任何第三方）提起其试图中止时效的具体主张。\n\nI. 法院缺乏准予《诉讼时效中止动议》所请求之救济的权力，因为衡平法诉讼时效中止不能前瞻性适用，且《破产规则》第9006(b)条并未授权延长法定期限。\n\n8. 首先，法院应驳回《诉讼时效中止动议》，因为受托人提出该动议所依据的两项法律基础在法律层面上均不成立。衡平法诉讼时效中止原则不能如受托人所谋求的那样前瞻性地发生效力。而且作为一项诉讼规则，《破产规则》第9006(b)条不能也不允许法院延长法定期限，例如《破产法典》第108条、第546(a)条和第549条中规定的期限。这些立场在郭美同时提交的对《诉讼时效中止动议》的异议中有详尽阐述，李克里斯与夏启东特此加入该异议并通过援引纳入本异议书。（见 ECF No. 2551，第6-22段。）\n\n9. 鉴于李克里斯和夏启东在这些问题上加入了郭美的异议，他们不再在此赘述其中所载的全部论点。相反，李克里斯和夏启东仅恳请法院采纳 James T. Tancredi（詹姆斯·T·坦克雷迪）法官在 In re Walnut Hill, Inc.（核桃山公司破产案），No. 16-20960 (JJT), 2018 WL 2672242 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 1, 2018) 一案中驳回完全相同论点时所作出的直接且论证严密的分析。\n\n10. 具体而言，关于衡平法诉讼时效中止的前瞻性适用，坦克雷迪法官指出：“从程序上看，衡平法诉讼时效中止原则被公认为是针对未决诉讼中所主张的诉讼时效抗辩的回应。”同上，第2页（援引 Long v. Abbott Mortg. Corp., 459 F. Supp. 108, 113 (D. Conn. 1978)）。因此，“在针对特定被告提起的对抗性诉讼中，一旦当事人主张了诉讼时效抗辩，在脱离了就该诉讼中有待证明的事实和情况举行的证据听证会的情境下去处理衡平法诉讼时效中止问题，是完全不成熟的且在程序上存在缺陷。”同上，第2页。\n\n11. 关于《破产规则》第9006(b)条的适用性，坦克雷迪法官认定第9006(b)条不适用于第546(a)条规定的期限，因为“根据其明确文义，规则第9006(b)条仅适用于‘由本规则或根据本规则发出的通知[,] [原文如此] 或由法院命令’规定的期限。该规则全文从未提及法定期限。”同上，第1页。此外，坦克雷迪法官认定，对规则第9006(b)条作出任何相反的解释都将违宪地“违反宪法所维护的三权分立”，因为“国会已明令破产规则‘不得剥夺、扩大或修改任何实体权利’。”同上（援引 28 U.S.C. § 2075）。\n\n12. 法院应适用这同一推理逻辑来驳回本动议。如果不这样做，正如郭美在其异议书中所解释的那样，将“剥夺未来被告[例如李克里斯和夏启东]享有的宪法正当法律程序权利，因为他们预先没有收到有关该救济的通知，也没有机会对是否应当适用衡平法诉讼时效中止提出抗辩。”（ECF No. 2551，第10段（援引 In re Cramer, 636 B.R. 830, 831-33 (Bankr. C.D. Colo. 2022)）。）\n\nII. 即使衡平法诉讼时效中止原则可适用于前瞻性主张，该原则的适用仍属毫无根据，因为受托人未能履行其证明存在阻碍其对李克里斯或夏启东提起主张的“异常”情况的举证责任。\n\n13. 此外，即使衡平法诉讼时效中止原则适用于前瞻性主张，将该原则适用于针对李克里斯或夏启东（或任何其他潜在第三方被告）的任何主张仍属毫无依据，因为受托人未能履行证明此类主张应适用衡平法中止的核心举证责任：即未能证明存在阻碍其对李克里斯或夏启东提起诉讼主张的“异常”情况。\n\n14. “衡平法诉讼时效中止仅适用于‘罕见和异常的情况’。”Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 2000)（援引 Turner v. Johnson, 177 F.3d 390, 391-92 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1007 (1999)）。“谋求从该原则中获益的当事人承担证明中止诉讼时效具有正当性的举证责任。”United States v. All Funds Distributed To, or o/b/o Weiss, 345 F.3d 49, 54–55 (2d Cir. 2003)（援引 Chapman v. ChoiceCare Long Island Term Disability Plan, 288 F.3d 506, 512 (2d Cir. 2002)）。\n\n15. Trustee（受托人）陈述了他必须满足的衡平法中止（equitable tolling）标准如下：“为获得该原则的益处，受托人承担举证责任证明其 (1) 在其请求中止的期间内采取了合理的勤勉行动，并且 (2) 已经证明情况非常特殊以至于该原则应当适用。”（《中止动议》（Tolling Mot.）第 47 段（引自 In re Anderson, 623 B.R. 199, 217 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2020)））。然而，关于衡平法中止标准中的第二项要件，即存在“特殊”情况，受托人对该原则的陈述并不完整。具体而言，请求根据衡平法中止诉讼时效的一方不仅必须表明存在“特殊”情况，还必须表明这些情况阻止了其提起其希望中止的特定索赔请求。参见 Smaldone v. Senkowski, 273 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2001)（“为使衡平法中止得以适用，请愿人必须证明其在其希望中止的期间内采取了‘合理的勤勉行动’，但尽管其作出了努力，其‘无法控制’的特殊情况仍阻止了其在该期间内成功提起诉讼。”（引自 Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 2000)））。\n\n16. 与该原则一致的是，在受托人所引用的每一个涉及受托人声称与本案情况类似的判例中，法院均认定，请求中止诉讼时效的原告不仅表明了如受托人所描述的他们“无法在证据开示方面取得进展，特别是考虑到债务人的阻挠”（《中止动议》第 50 段），而且还表明了受挫的证据开示对原告寻求中止的特定索赔请求是至关重要的。例如：\n\n- 在 In re Int'l Admin. Servs., Inc., 408 F.3d 689, 702 (11th Cir. 2005) 一案中，法院认定衡平法中止是有正当理由的，因为债务人和被告未能及时提供“证明存在资金流向轨迹”从债务人流向被告的文件，并且“如果没有这些信息，受托人在送交这些文件之前提起这项对抗性诉讼程序（adversary proceeding）将是粗心大意的，甚至可能构成执业过失。”\n- 在 In re Bender, No. ADV. 02-00773-RTB, 2010 WL 6467681, at *9 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2010), aff'd, 480 F. App'x 445 (9th Cir. 2012) 一案中，法院认定衡平法中止是有正当理由的，其中在诉讼时效届满之时受托人无法查明债务人在该对抗性诉讼程序所涉特定不动产地块中的权益，“至少在很大程度上是由于[债务人]未能提供有关其对该财产所有权程度或缺乏所有权的文件。”\n- 在 In re Livemercial Aviation Holding, LLC, 508 B.R. 58, 70-71 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2014) 一案中，法院驳回了基于诉讼时效理由提起的驳回动议，其理由是认定受托人无法获取已被明确指出并被要求的“受托人为调查作为本案标的的交易所必需获取的信息和文件。”\n\n在 In re Ochs, 608 B.R. 252, 259, 261 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2019) 一案中，法院同样在审理一项驳回动议时认定允许适用衡平法中止，部分理由是受托人主张“债务人拖延并企图阻挠他们发现与对抗性诉讼程序中所涉及的转让及其对慈善信托的使用相关信息的努力。”\n\n17. 此类裁定并不令人意外，因为正如受托人所依赖的核心判例 In re Int'l Admin. Servs., Inc., 408 F.3d 689, 701–02 (11th Cir. 2005) 所指出的，“衡平法中止的适用性是一项基于事实的裁决”，并且“破产法院依个案具体情况确定衡平法中止是否适用。”\n\n18. 在《中止动议》中，受托人指出了他认为存在证明在本案中适用衡平法中止具有正当理由的特殊情况的两点理由。第一，“债务人及其未指明的同伙[据称]已经并且继续主动干预受托人的证据开示工作。”（《中止动议》第 52 段）。第二，债务人是一起“错综复杂的刑事案件”中的被告，该案“使受托人的调查复杂化。”（《中止动议》第 54 段）。然而，受托人并未试图解释为什么这些主张即使属实（李（Lee）和夏（Xia）并不承认），也阻止了他对李和夏——或就此而言对任何其他人——提起任何索赔请求。受托人也无法做到这一点，因为无论是在《中止动议》中还是在任何其他地方，他都未能实际指明他认为自己对李或夏持有何种索赔请求。\n\n19. 因此，由于受托人甚至未能试图满足其高度举证责任以证明本案中的情况已阻止其具体对李和夏提起索赔请求，其请求法院对可能针对李和夏拥有的任何索赔请求适用衡平法中止原则的主张必须予以驳回。因此，即便衡平法中止原则适用于前瞻性的索赔请求，《中止动议》仍应被驳回。\n\n结论\n\n基于上述理由，Third-Party Objectors（第三方异议人）Chris Lee（李）和 Qidong Xia（夏启东）谨请求本法院驳回《中止动议》，并给予法院认为公正且衡平的其他及进一步救济。\n\n日期：2024年2月5日 /签名/ Jon Newton\n\nJon Newton\n联邦律师协会编号：ct03376\nReid and Reige, P.C.\nOne Financial Plaza, 21st Floor\nHartford, CT 06103\n(860) 278-1150\n传真：(860) 240-1002\njnewton@rrlawpc.com\n\n以及\n\nEric T. Schmitt（pro hac vice 申请待决）\neschmitt@quinlanfirm.com\ndocketing@quinlanfirm.com\nTHE QUINLAN LAW FIRM, LLC\n233 S. Wacker Dr., Ste. 6142\nChicago, IL 60606\n(312) 883-5500\n\nChris Lee 和 Qidong Xia 的代理律师","key_entities":["Je","Guo","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":2308,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2509,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2540,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2551,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":2714,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 13:20:36"}