{"id":"court_ctb_2569_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":2569,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"#### **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n---------------------------------------------------------x In re HO WAN KWOK, *et al.*, Chapter 11\n\nCase No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n(Jointly Administered)\n\n---------------------------------------------------------x\n\nDebtor.\n\n# **OBJECTION TO THE CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF AN ORDER EXTENDING DEADLINE FOR TRUSTEE TO FILE AVOIDANCE ACTIONS UNDER BANKRUPTCY CODE SECTIONS 108, 546(A), AND 549 AND JOINDER TO OBJECTIONS FILED BY MEI GUO (ECF 2551), UBS AG (ECF 2554), DEFENG CAO (ECF 2553), TAURUS FUND, LLC, TAURUS MANAGEMENT, LLC AND SCOTT BARNETT (ECF 2557), AND G CLUB OPERATIONS LLC (ECF 2563)**\n\nGreenwich Land, LLC (\"Greenwich Land\") and Hing Chi Ngok (\"Ms. Guo\" and together with Greenwich Land, the \"Greenwich Land Parties\") respectfully file this objection and joinder\n\n(the \"Objection\") to the Chapter 11 Trustee's Motion for Entry of Order Extending Deadline for\n\nTrustee to File Avoidance Actions under Bankruptcy Code Sections 108, 546(a), and 549 (the\n\n\"Tolling Motion\"), and in support thereof respectfully state as follows:\n\n## **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\n1. The Trustee asks the Court to judicially extend the statutes of limitations set by Congress. No authority exists for the Court to do so.\n\n2. The Trustee also asks this Court to reject Judge Tancredi's well-reasoned decision in *In re: Walnut Hill, Inc.*, 2018 WL 2672242 (Bankr. D.Conn. June 1, 2018) in favor of inapplicable non-circuit cases, and grant the premature and extraordinary relief to equitably toll and extend Trustee's time to commence avoidance actions against unnamed individuals and entities.\n\n3. Although the Greenwich Land Parties do not believe the Trustee has any basis to bring any avoidance claims against them, to the extent the Trustee intends to do so in the future, the Tolling Motion should be denied for the reasons set forth by Judge Tancredi in *Walnut Hill*, and the objections filed by Mei Guo (ECF 2551), Defeng Cao (ECF 2553), UBS AG (ECF 2554), Taurus Fund LLC, Taurus Management, LLC, and Scott Barnett (ECF 2557), and G Club Operations, LLC (ECF 2563) which objections the Greenwich Land Parties join in and adopt.\n\n4. Contrary to the Trustee's assertion, Judge Tancredi neither \"asked the wrong question,\" nor did he get \"the wrong answer.\" NYSCEF 2509, ¶38. In *Walnut Hill*, the Court (Judge Tancredi) considered whether Rule 9006(b) is a vehicle to preemptively and prospectively extend the Trustee's statute of limitations to commence an avoidance action under the Bankruptcy Code. *See Walnut Hill*, 2018 WL 2672242 \\*2 (\"The plain language of Rule 9006(b) prohibits this Court from enlarging the Section 546(a) statute of limitations.\"); *see also In re Damach, Inc.*, 235 B.R. 727, 731 (Bankr. D.Conn. 1999) (Krechevsky, J.) (Rule 9006(b) does not \"permit[] a court to extend a time limitation set by Congress in a statute\"). No court in this District has granted the expansive relief the Trustee seeks in the Tolling Motion, and the Trustee cites none. The Court should adopt the reasoning and decisions issued by Judge Tancredi and Judge Krechevsky and deny the Tolling Motion in its entirety.\n\n5. The bar against prospectively applying the doctrine of equitable tolling is wellestablished in this District. *Walnut Hill*, 2018 WL 2672242 \\*2 (\"It is wholly premature and procedurally flawed to address equitable tolling outside the context of an evidentiary hearing on the facts and circumstances to be proven in the adversary proceeding against specific defendants, once a statute of limitations defense has been asserted\"). If the Trustee has any intention to bring an avoidance action against the Greenwich Land Parties, the Greenwich Land Parties are entitled to know the basis for the Trustee's claims, the causes of actions that may be asserted against them, and have a full and fair opportunity, based on the facts, to assert their defenses, including a statute of limitations defense. The Trustee's request to issue a broad extension as to all prospective actions as to all prospective defendants is \"premature and procedurally flawed.\" *Walnut Hill*, 2018 WL 2672242 \\*2.\n\n6. The Trustee's reliance on the Eleventh Circuit's decision in *In re Int'l Admin. Servs., Inc.*, 408 F.3d 689 (11th Cir. 2005) is misplaced and further establishes why the Trustee's preemptive and premature Tolling Motion should be denied. ECF 2509, ¶37. The trustee in *Walnut Hill*, made the exact same argument made here—that *In re Int'l Admin Servs.,* stands for the broad proposition that \"Rule 9006(b) applies to all Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure,\" and can be used to \"justify…enlarging the Section 546(a) deadline for starting avoidance actions.\" *Walnut Hill*, 2018 WL 2672242 \\*2; ECF 2509, ¶37. Judge Tancredi \"reject[ed] that conclusion,\" and found that \"[u]pon closer examination, the holding of the Circuit Court relied upon the doctrine of equitable tolling, which had been interposed after a statute of limitations defense was asserted in a pending adversary proceeding.\" *Id*. Consistent with Judge Tancredi's decision, the absence of any pending adversary avoidance proceeding where a statute of limitations defense could be raised defeats any attempt to draw a parallel between this case and the Eleventh Circuit's decision in *In re Int'l Admin Servs.*\n\n7. The prospective relief the Trustee asks this Court to grant includes a global omnibus order \"that any party that has received notice, whether actual or constructive, of the Motion and did not object to the Motion has waived its right to assert a limitations period defense if ultimately named in an action that is timely brought under the terms of this Order.\" ECF 2509, Exhibit 1. In other words, the Trustee asks this Court to place the burden on countless unnamed\n\nindividuals and entities located anywhere in the world to engage counsel and participate in this proceeding based on the mere possibility that the Trustee may, one day, decide to bring an avoidance action against them. It is entirely premature for the Court to grant the Trustee global prospective relief based on potential defenses that may be raised in a hypothetical avoidance proceeding that the Trustee may one day pursue.\n\n8. As to the Greenwich Land Parties, the burden is on the Trustee to act within the statute of limitations, and within the confines of a pending avoidance proceeding, after a statute of limitations defense is raised, to establish why their claim is saved by equitable tolling. The Trustee correctly acknowledges that \"[e]quitable tolling must be decided on a case-by-case basis and is not limited to a particular set of facts.\" ECF 2509, ¶45. Despite this, the Trustee contends that it is appropriate for the Court to issue an omnibus one-size-fits-all order without making any showing that equitable tolling should be applied to any particular case. The Trustee cites alleged delay caused by the Debtor, but makes no showing as to how or why this purported delay has impeded the Trustee's ability to bring an avoidance claim against the Greenwich Land Parties (assuming the Trustee has any such basis).\n\n9. As the Court held in *In re Walnut Hill*, \"Rule 9006(b) only applies to deadlines set by these or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court.\" *In re Wlnut Hill*, 2018 WL 2672242, \\*2. Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) does not authorize extensions of statutory deadlines, like the applicable statutes of limitation.\n\n10. These principles, as outlined by other decisions in this District, apply to 11 U.S.C. § 549. Thus, Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) cannot be a basis for modifying the applicable statute of limitations.\n\n4\n\n11. The Trustee's equitable tolling arguments are premature and could only be argued on a case-by-case basis in actually filed adversary proceedings, especially given the fact-specific nature of the inquiry. The Trustee's attempt for a blanket and sweeping order is improper.\n\n12. The Greenwich Land Parties object to the Trustee's Proposed Order, which aside from the fact that the Trustee is not entitled to any portion being granted, he seeks draconian relief.\n\n13. The Greenwich Land Parties object to the Trustee's creation of a fire drill just days prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations and imposing such an accelerated briefing schedule. Therefore, the Greenwich Land Parties to add and modify their arguments, and to join in the arguments of other objectors. In addition, the Greenwich Land Parties reserve their right to request an evidentiary hearing.\n\n14. The Bankruptcy Court does not have Constitutional authority to rule on this matter, as it involves private rights of action which under *Stern v. Marshall*, 546 U.S. 462 (2011) could only be decided by the District Court.\n\n15. The Greenwich Land Parties object to any ruling by the Bankruptcy Court that should be made by the District Court and/or a jury, including, but not limited to, any rulings any party, jury, or court will rely upon to reach any decision that only an Article III Court or a jury can determine under the U.S. Constitution, *Stern v. Marshall* and its progeny, and other applicable law.\n\n#### Dated: February 5, 2024 **MEISTER SEELIG & FEIN PLLC**\n\nBy: */s/ Christopher J. Major*\n\nChristopher J. Major, Esq. Austin D. Kim, Esq. 125 Park Avenue, 7th Floor New York, NY 10017 Tel: (212) 655-3500 Email: cjm@msf-law.com adk@msf-law.com *Attorneys for Defendants*\n\n## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI hereby certify that on the 5 th day of February, 2024, I caused the foregoing to be filed and served on all appearing parties in the Adversary Proceeding via the Court's Electronic Case Filing System.\n\n> By: */s/ Christopher J. Major* Christopher J. Major, Esq.","body_zh":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION（美国康涅狄格区破产法院布里奇波特分部）\n\n---------------------------------------------------------x\nIn re HO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）, et al., Chapter 11（第 11 章）\nCase No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n(Jointly Administered)（合并审理）\nDebtor（债务人）.\n\nOBJECTION TO THE CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF AN ORDER EXTENDING DEADLINE FOR TRUSTEE TO FILE AVOIDANCE ACTIONS UNDER BANKRUPTCY CODE SECTIONS 108, 546(A), AND 549 AND JOINDER TO OBJECTIONS FILED BY MEI GUO (ECF 2551), UBS AG (ECF 2554), DEFENG CAO (ECF 2553), TAURUS FUND, LLC, TAURUS MANAGEMENT, LLC AND SCOTT BARNETT (ECF 2557), AND G CLUB OPERATIONS LLC (ECF 2563)（对第 11 章受托人请求依据《破产法典》第 108 条、第 546(a) 条及第 549 条作出延长受托人提起撤销之诉期限之命令的动议的异议，以及对 Mei Guo（郭美，ECF 2551）、UBS AG（瑞银集团，ECF 2554）、Defeng Cao（曹德丰，ECF 2553）、Taurus Fund, LLC（金牛基金有限责任公司）、Taurus Management, LLC（金牛管理有限责任公司）与 Scott Barnett（ECF 2557）以及 G Club Operations LLC（ECF 2563）所提异议的附议）\n\nGreenwich Land, LLC（格林威治土地有限责任公司，下称“Greenwich Land”）与 Hing Chi Ngok（岳庆芝，下称“Ms. Guo（郭女士）”，并与 Greenwich Land 合称“Greenwich Land Parties（Greenwich Land 各方）”）谨就第 11 章受托人请求依据《破产法典》第 108 条、第 546(a) 条及第 549 条作出延长受托人提起撤销之诉期限之命令的动议（下称“《时效中止动议》”）提出本异议与附议（下称“《异议》”），并据此恭敬申述如下：\n\nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT（初步陈述）\n\n1. 受托人请求法院通过司法手段延长由国会设定的诉讼时效。法院并不具备做出此项行为的任何授权。\n\n2. 受托人还请求本法院否定 Tancredi（坦克雷迪）法官在 In re: Walnut Hill, Inc., 2018 WL 2672242 (Bankr. D.Conn. June 1, 2018) 一案中论证严密的裁决，转而采纳不适用的非本巡回区先例，并准予过早且非常规的救济，以衡平法上的时效中止来延长受托人对未具名个人和实体提起撤销之诉的期限。\n\n3. 尽管 Greenwich Land 各方认为受托人没有任何依据对其提起任何撤销主张，但即便受托人日后有意提起此类主张，基于 Tancredi 法官在 Walnut Hill 案中阐述的理由，以及 Mei Guo（郭美，ECF 2551）、Defeng Cao（曹德丰，ECF 2553）、UBS AG（瑞银集团，ECF 2554）、Taurus Fund LLC、Taurus Management, LLC 与 Scott Barnett（ECF 2557）以及 G Club Operations, LLC（ECF 2563）所提交的异议（Greenwich Land 各方对这些异议予以附议并采纳），该《时效中止动议》亦应被驳回。\n\n4. 与受托人的主张相反，Tancredi 法官既没有“问错问题”，也没有得出“错误的答案”。NYSCEF 2509, ¶38。在 Walnut Hill 案中，法院（Tancredi 法官）审理了《联邦破产程序规则》第 9006(b) 条是否可作为先发制人且前瞻性地延长受托人依据《破产法典》提起撤销之诉的诉讼时效的手段。参见 Walnut Hill, 2018 WL 2672242 *2（“第 9006(b) 条的明文规定禁止本法院延长第 546(a) 条规定的诉讼时效。”）；另见 In re Damach, Inc., 235 B.R. 727, 731 (Bankr. D.Conn. 1999) (Krechevsky, J.)（第 9006(b) 条并“不允许法院延长国会在成文法中设定的时间限制”）。本司法管辖区内没有任何法院准予过受托人在《时效中止动议》中所请求的这种扩张性救济，受托人亦未援引任何此类判例。法院应当采纳 Tancredi 法官和 Krechevsky（克雷切夫斯基）法官作出的推理与裁决，并全盘驳回《时效中止动议》。\n\n5. 在本司法管辖区内，禁止前瞻性地适用衡平法时效中止原则已是确立已久的裁判规则。Walnut Hill, 2018 WL 2672242 *2（“一旦被告提出诉讼时效抗辩，在针对特定被告的对抗性诉讼中就有待证明的事实和情况举行证据听证会之外脱离该具体情境来处理衡平法时效中止问题，在程序上完全是不成熟且存在缺陷的”）。如果受托人有意对 Greenwich Land 各方提起撤销之诉，Greenwich Land 各方有权知晓受托人诉求的依据、可能对其主张的诉由，并有权获得基于事实提出自身抗辩（包括诉讼时效抗辩）的充分且公正的机会。受托人关于对所有潜在被告的所有潜在诉讼作出广泛延期的请求是“过早且程序上存在缺陷的”。Walnut Hill, 2018 WL 2672242 *2。\n\n6. 受托人对第十一巡回上诉法院在 In re Int'l Admin. Servs., Inc., 408 F.3d 689 (11th Cir. 2005) 一案中所作裁决的依赖是不当的，这进一步证明了为何应当驳回受托人先发制人且过早提出的《时效中止动议》。ECF 2509, ¶37。Walnut Hill 案中的受托人提出了与此处完全相同的主张——即 In re Int'l Admin Servs. 支持一项广泛的主张，即“第 9006(b) 条适用于所有《联邦破产程序规则》”，并可用于“证明……延长第 546(a) 条提起撤销之诉的截止期限具有正当性”。Walnut Hill, 2018 WL 2672242 *2; ECF 2509, ¶37。Tancredi 法官“驳回了该结论”，并认定“经仔细审查，巡回上诉法院的判决依据的是衡平法时效中止原则，而该原则是在未决的对抗性诉讼中提出诉讼时效抗辩之后才被引入的”。同上。与 Tancredi 法官的裁决一致，在没有任何可以提出诉讼时效抗辩的未决对抗性撤销诉讼的情况下，任何试图将本案与第十一巡回法院在 In re Int'l Admin Servs. 案中的裁决进行类比的尝试均告破灭。\n\n7. 受托人请求本法院准予的前瞻性救济包括一项全局性的一揽子命令，即“任何收到该动议的实际或推定通知且未对该动议提出异议的当事人，如果在根据本命令条款及时提起的诉讼中最终被列为被告，即视为放弃提出诉讼时效抗辩的权利。”ECF 2509, Exhibit 1。换言之，受托人请求本法院将聘请律师并参与本诉讼程序的负担，强加给身处世界各地的无数未具名个人和实体，而其依据仅仅是受托人有朝一日可能会决定对他们提起撤销之诉的可能性。法院若仅凭受托人日后可能提起的假设性撤销诉讼中可能提出的潜在抗辩，就准予受托人全局性的前瞻性救济，完全为时过早。\n\n8. 就 Greenwich Land 各方而言，应当由受托人承担在诉讼时效内行事的举证责任，并在对方提出诉讼时效抗辩后，在未决撤销诉讼的范围内证明为何其请求权可通过衡平法时效中止予以挽救。受托人正确地承认“衡平法时效中止必须逐案判定，且不局限于特定的一组事实。”ECF 2509, ¶45。尽管如此，受托人却声称，法院在未就衡平法时效中止应适用于任何特定案件作出任何举证的情况下，发布一项一刀切的一揽子命令是正当合理的。受托人援引了所谓由债务人造成的拖延，但未就此种所谓的拖延如何或为何阻碍了受托人对 Greenwich Land 各方提起撤销主张的能力作出任何证明（假定受托人具备任何此类依据）。\n\n9. 正如法院在 In re Walnut Hill 案中所认定的那样，“第 9006(b) 条仅适用于由本规则、依其发出的通知或依法院命令所规定的截止期限。”In re Walnut Hill, 2018 WL 2672242, *2。《破产规则》第 9006(b) 条并未授权延长法定的截止期限，例如适用的诉讼时效。\n\n10. 正如本司法管辖区其他裁决所概述的那样，这些原则同样适用于 11 U.S.C. § 549。因此，《破产规则》第 9006(b) 条不能作为修改适用诉讼时效的依据。\n\n11. 受托人的衡平法时效中止主张为时过早，且鉴于该项审查具有特定于事实的性质，只能在实际提起的对抗性诉讼中逐案进行辩论。受托人试图谋求一项笼统且全面的命令是不恰当的。\n\n12. Greenwich Land 各方对受托人提议的命令提出异议，受托人除了无权获得任何一部分准许之外，其寻求的还是严苛的救济。\n\n13. Greenwich Land 各方对受托人在诉讼时效届满前数日制造紧急突击情况并强加如此仓促的简报日程表示异议。因此，Greenwich Land 各方保留补充和修改其辩论理由以及附议其他异议人主张的权利。此外，Greenwich Land 各方保留请求举行证据听证会的权利。\n\n14. 破产法院缺乏对本事项作出裁决的宪法授权，因为本案涉及私人诉求权，根据 Stern v. Marshall, 546 U.S. 462 (2011) 案，该诉求权只能由地区法院审理判决。\n\n15. Greenwich Land 各方对破产法院应当由地区法院和/或陪审团作出的任何裁定提出异议，包括但不限于任何当事人、陪审团或法院将依赖以作出根据《美国宪法》、Stern v. Marshall 案及其后续判例以及其他适用法律仅能由第三条法院或陪审团决定的任何判决的裁定。\n\nDated: February 5, 2024\nMEISTER SEELIG & FEIN PLLC\n\nBy: /s/ Christopher J. Major\n\nChristopher J. Major, Esq.\nAustin D. Kim, Esq.\n125 Park Avenue, 7th Floor\nNew York, NY 10017\nTel: (212) 655-3500\nEmail: cjm@msf-law.com\nadk@msf-law.com\nAttorneys for Defendants（被告代理律师）\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE（送达证明）\n\nI hereby certify that on the 5th day of February, 2024, I caused the foregoing to be filed and served on all appearing parties in the Adversary Proceeding via the Court's Electronic Case Filing System.（我谨在此证明，本人已于 2024 年 2 月 5 日通过法院的电子案件申报系统提交了前述文件，并送达给本对抗性诉讼中所有出庭当事人。）\n\nBy: /s/ Christopher J. Major\nChristopher J. Major, Esq.","key_entities":["Je","Guo","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","CIPA"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":2509,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2551,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2553,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2554,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2557,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2563,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":1553,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 12:54:27"}