{"id":"court_ctb_2571_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":2571,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION OBJECTION OF GS SECURITY SOLUTIONS, INC., TO","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n---------------------------------------------------------------x : In re: : Chapter 11 : HO WAN KWOK, *et al*., : Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) : Debtors. : : ---------------------------------------------------------------x\n\n# **OBJECTION OF GS SECURITY SOLUTIONS, INC., TO TRUSTEE'S MOTION TO TOLL OR ENLARGE PERIOD TO FILE AVOIDANCE ACTIONS UNDER BANKRUPTCY CODE SECTIONS 108, 546(a) AND 549**\n\nGS Security Solutions, Inc. (\"GS Security\"), through its undersigned counsel, hereby objects to the Motion for Entry of Order Tolling or Enlarging Period for Trustee to File Avoidance Actions Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 108, 546(a), and 549 (the \"Motion\") [ECF 2509], filed by Luc A. Despins, as chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") for the estate of Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"). GS Security hereby objects to the Motion, as follows:\n\n# **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\n1. The limitation period for avoidance actions in this matter runs on February 15, 2024. On January 18, 2024, the Trustee filed this Motion seeking to toll or enlarge the limitation period. The Trustee advances the same baseless argument for both that has already been unequivocally rejected by this Court: \"the Debtor, his family members and his associates have sought to obstruct the Trustee's [investigative] efforts at every turn\" and therefore (i) the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled or, alternatively, (ii) good cause exists to permit an extension of the statute of limitations pursuant to Fed. R. Bank. P. 9006(b).\n\n2. As Judge Tancredi explained when rejecting the identical request in *In re Walnut*\n\n*Hill, Inc.*, No. 16-20960 (JJT), 2018 WL 2672242, at \\*2 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 1, 2018), (i) equitable tolling may only be interposed in response to a statute of limitations defense asserted in a pending adversary proceeding and therefore \"reaching the issue of equitable tolling is premature and procedurally inappropriate at this time\" and (ii) \"[t]he plain language of Rule 9006(b) prohibits this Court from enlarging the Section 546(a) statute of limitations.\"\n\n3. Furthermore, even if the Trustee's equitable tolling argument were ripe at this time, and even if the Court were not prohibited from enlarging the limitation period under Section 546(a) by Rule 9006(b), any such tolling or enlargement of the statute of limitations would be inappropriate with respect to GS Security. The Trustee's Motion is predicated exclusively on the alleged lack of cooperation and obstruction by \"the Debtor, his family members and his associates.\" The Trustee's Motion does not even name GS Security, much less identify any alleged misconduct by GS Security. Indeed, even as to the Debtor, the Trustee's Motion is utterly devoid of any allegation that the alleged lack of cooperation and obstruction by \"the Debtor, his family members and his associates\" has impeded in any way the Trustee's ability to obtain complete presuit discovery from GS Security of its financial transactions purportedly involving the Debtor or his associates.\n\n4. GS Security has, in fact, fully cooperated with the Trustee's discovery efforts and the Trustee has had all documents responsive to the Subpoena in his possession, including, among many others, GS Security's bank account statements, since at least November 17, 2023, when GS Security timely produced them. The Trustee has not identified any document or information he has not obtained from GS Security or otherwise addressed GS Security and its full and voluntary cooperation in non-party discovery. The Trustee instead attempts to obtain a procedurally improper and inequitable indefinite exemption from the statute of limitations by lumping GS\n\nSecurity in with both the Debtor and an array of third-parties unrelated to GS Security, an independent entity owned and operated by Scott Barnett.\n\n5. The Motion should be denied.\n\n## **BACKGROUND**\n\n6. On February 15, 2022, the Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the United Stated Bankruptcy Code in this Court (the \"Petition Date\") and on July 8, 2022, the Court entered an order appointing the Trustee in this case. [ECF 523].\n\n7. More than a year later, on August 11, 2023, the Trustee applied for an order permitting pre-litigation discovery pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2004 of certain individuals and entities identified by the Trustee, including GS Security, as possibly having knowledge of the Debtor's assets and financial activities (the \"Rule 2004 Motion\"). [ECF 2079]. The Bankruptcy Court granted the Rule 2004 Motion on September 19, 2023. [ECF 2210].\n\n8. On or about September 21, 2023, the Trustee issued a Subpoena for Rule 2004 Examination to GS Security (the \"Subpoena\"), which sought the production of a broad scope of documents and the examination of a GS Security representative on November 3, 2023. Thereafter, the Trustee agreed to a brief two-week extension of GS Security's time to produce documents in response to the Subpoena through and including November 17, 2023, and further agreed to advise counsel for GS Security after completing his review whether an examination would be necessary.\n\n9. GS Security did not object to the Subpoena and did not file a motion for protective order or motion to quash with respect to the Rule 2004 examination or the Subpoena. On November 17, 2023, approximately three months before the Section 546(a) statute of limitation runs, GS Security voluntarily produced all documents responsive to the Subpoena in its possession, custody or control.\n\n10. The Trustee has not identified any deficiencies in GS Security's production or sought to conduct a Rule 2004 Examination of GS Security.\n\n### **ARGUMENT**\n\n#### **A. Equitable Tolling Is Improper and Inapplicable to GS Security**\n\n11. The Trustee first argues – in the face of this Court's recent precedent – that this Court should issue a blanket order equitably tolling the statute of limitation for commencing avoidance actions under Section 546(a) against any and all future defendants, both prior to the expiration of the Section 546(a) limitation period and before any adversary proceedings have been filed against any of those potential defendants, including GS Security. Motion ¶¶ 29-30. As noted above, this Court in *In re Walnut Hill, Inc.*, 2018 WL 2672242, at \\*2, squarely rejected any such prospective application of equitable tolling as \"premature and procedurally inappropriate.\"\n\n12. In denying the chapter 7 Trustee's motion to both equitably toll the Section 546(a) limitations period and enlarge the statutory deadline under Rule 9006(b) – precisely the same grounds upon which the Trustee seeks an extension in the instant Motion – Judge Tancredi observed, \"[p]rocedurally, the doctrine of equitable tolling is recognized as a response to a statute of limitations defense asserted in a pending litigation.\" *Id.* (citing *Long v. Abbott Mortg. Corp.*, 459 F. Supp. 108, 113 (D. Conn. 1978) (\"[t]he equitable tolling doctrine does not come into play, of course, until the defendant has claimed that the plaintiff's cause is time-barred.\"); *see also In re Anderson*, 623 B.R. 199, 217 (Bankr.D.Conn. 2020) (\"As a procedural matter, equitable tolling is interposed in response to a statute of limitations defense.\") (citing *In re Walnut Hill, Inc., supra*).\n\n13. As Judge Tancredi and numerous other courts have noted, fairness and due process require that the issue of equitable tolling be addressed only after it is interposed in a pending adversary proceeding in response to a statute of limitations defense:\n\nAll parties to this case acknowledge that an adversary proceeding has not been filed at this time. Pursuant to Section 546(a), the Trustee's statute of limitations for filing an adversary proceeding will expire on June 14, 2018, which has not yet come to pass. It is **wholly premature and procedurally flawed** to address equitable tolling outside the context of an evidentiary hearing on the facts and circumstances **to be proven in the adversary proceeding against specific defendants, once a statute of limitations defense has been asserted**.\n\n*In re Walnut Hill, Inc., supra* (emphasis added); *see In re No. 1 Contracting Corp.*, 2012 WL 4114818, at \\*1 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2012 Sept., 19, 2012) (denying chapter 7 trustee's request to equitably toll the Section 546(a) statute of limitations prior to commencement of avoidance actions as premature where there was no case or controversy before the court and therefore it was unknown whether future defendants would even assert the statute of limitations defense); *In re Cramer*, 636 B.R. 830 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2022) (denying Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee's motion for an extension of the two-year statutory deadline to commence avoidance actions despite argument that debtor had been insufficiently responsive with the investigation and that discharge had already been revoked due to debtor's concealment of assets, as such an extension would deprive future defendants of constitutional due process of law because they would receive no notice of the relief in advance and no opportunity to contest whether equitable tolling was warranted on the particular facts of their case); *In re Randolph Hospital*, No. 20-10247 (LMJ), 2022 WL 19298765, at \\*1 (Bankr. M.D. N.C. Apr. 25, 2022) (denying Trustee's motion to equitably toll the statutory limitations period as premature since no adversary proceedings had been filed and noting that Trustee would be free to reassert equitable tolling in response to statute of limitations defense in a pending litigation).\n\n14. Here, the statutory deadline of February 15, 2024 has not yet passed, the Trustee has not yet filed an adversary proceeding against GS Security or any of the other potential defendants identified in the Motion and, therefore, in accordance with this Court's holding in *In re Walnut Hill, Inc.* and the other foregoing authorities, the request for indefinite equitable tolling as to any and all potential defendants is prospective, unripe and procedurally improper.\n\n15. The Trustee attempts to distinguish *In re Walnut Hill, Inc.* and the decisions from other jurisdictions rejecting the prospective application of equitable tolling by falsely asserting that he has provided sufficient notice of the tolling motion to the potential defendants in this case, who have an opportunity to object. Motion ¶¶ 32-34.\n\n16. The Trustee is misstating both the holdings in those cases and the sufficiency of his own \"notice\" even if notice were the issue. Neither the Trustee's Motion nor the Form of Notice [ECF 2515] accompanying the Motion, which this Court directed the Trustee to serve on potential defendants, including GS Security, contained any indicia of the causes of action the Trustee may assert in the future against GS Security or any other defendant or the facts and circumstances underlying those unidentified causes of action. While GS Security can argue in this objection that equitable tolling is not appropriate based on the limited knowledge gained from the documents sought by the Trustee in the Subpoena, it is in no position to assert an affirmative defense because the Trustee has asserted no claims against it. Its position is indistinguishable from the position of prospective defendants in *Walnut Hill* and other cases reaching the same conclusion.\n\n17. Even if this Court were to prematurely entertain the assertion of equitable tolling the Trustee has failed to allege any basis for equitable tolling against GS Security. The Second Circuit has held that \"[e]quitable tolling is generally considered appropriate (1) where the plaintiff actively pursued judicial remedies but filed a defective pleading during the specified time period; (2) where plaintiff was unaware of his or her cause of action due to misleading conduct of the defendant; or (3) where a plaintiff's medical condition or mental impairment prevented her from proceeding in a timely fashion.\" *Zerilli-Edelglass* v. *New York City Transit Authority*, 333 F.3d 74, 80 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotations and citations omitted). When determining whether equitable tolling is applicable, a court must consider whether the person seeking application of the equitable tolling doctrine (1) has \"acted with reasonable diligence during the time period she seeks to have tolled,\" and (2) has proved that the circumstances are so extraordinary that the doctrine should apply. *Id.* at 80-81 (citing *Chapman v. ChoiceCare Long Island Term Disability Plan,* 288 F.3d 506, 512 (2d Cir.2002).\n\n18. The doctrine of equitable tolling allows a court to extend a statute of limitations \"on a case-by-case basis to prevent inequity.\" *Warren v. Garvin*, 219 F.3d 111, 113 (2d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 531 U.S. 968, 121 S.Ct. 404, 148 L.Ed.2d 312 (2000). \"Equitable tolling applies as a matter of fairness where a party has been prevented in some extraordinary way from exercising his rights.\" *Iavorski v. I.N.S.*, 232 F.3d 124, 129 (2d. Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).\n\n19. The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that the conditions for applying the doctrine are strict. \"Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.\" *Pace v. DiGuglielmo*, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005); *accord Lawrence v. Florida*, 549 U.S. 327, 336, 127 S.Ct. 1079, 166 L.Ed.2d 924 (2007) (noting that the extraordinary circumstance must have \"prevented timely filing\").\n\n20. The Second Circuit has repeatedly cautioned that \"equitable tolling is considered a drastic remedy applicable only in rare and exceptional circumstances.\" *A.Q.C. ex rel. Castillo v. United States*, 656 F.3d 135, 144 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); *accord Phillips v. Generations Family Health Ctr.*, 723 F.3d 144, 150 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting *A.Q.C. ex rel. Castillo*, 656 F.3d at 144); *Bertin v. United States*, 478 F.3d 489, 494 n.3 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting *Smith v. McGinnis*, 208 F.3d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam)). Thus, \"[w]hen a movant does not provide any grounds showing equitable tolling may be appropriate, it will not be applied.\" *Mark v. Gawker Media LLC*, 2014 WL 5557489, at \\*2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2004) (citing *Ouedraogo v. A–1 Int'l Courier Serv., Inc*., 2013 WL 3466810, at \\*4 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2013)).\n\n21. The Trustee has failed to allege any facts supporting equitable tolling on claims against GS Security. On the contrary, as noted above, GS Security has fully cooperated with the Trustee's discovery efforts and has never engaged in any of the misconduct the Trustee argues has impeded his investigation. Indeed, the Trustee's Motion is premised entirely on the lack of cooperation and obstruction by \"the Debtor, his family members and his associates.\" The Trustee's Motion does not even name GS Security much less identify any alleged misconduct by GS Security.\n\n22. The Trustee cites *In re Fundamental Long Term Care, Inc.*, 501 B.R. 784, 791 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2013), for the proposition that the two-year statute of limitations to file avoidance actions may still be equitably tolled as against a potential target defendant even where that defendant did not participate in or was not responsible for impeding or delaying the Trustee's investigation. Motion ¶ 51. In that case, however, the evidence established that the Trustee's ability to pursue avoidance claims against potential target defendants was hampered by the debtor's wrongful conduct. As other courts have held, while it may not be necessary to conclude that a defendant perpetrated the fraud or wrongful conduct blocking the Trustee's investigation, \"there must be a nexus between the defendant and the wrongful conduct\" in order for equitable tolling to apply. blocking the Trustee's discovery. *In re Maxon Eng'g Servs., Inc.*, 397 B.R. 228, 230–31 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2008), *aff'd,* No. CIV. 08-2274CCC, 2009 WL 1597635 (D.P.R. June 5, 2009) (\"The Court concludes that it would be inequitable to allow the trustee to use the doctrine of equitable tolling to bring these actions against general trade creditors for prepetition preferences, since these defendants played no role in the alleged wrongful conduct perpetrated by the debtor's representative post-petition.\"). Here, the Trustee has offered no allegation that the lack of cooperation and obstruction by \"the Debtor, his family members and his associates\" has impeded in any way the Trustee's ability to obtain complete pre-suit discovery from GS Security of its financial transactions purportedly involving the Debtor or his associates, which the Trustee has had in his possession for nearly three months.\n\n23. Again, GS Security itself fully cooperated with the Trustee's pre-suit discovery efforts and the Trustee was in possession of all responsive documents in GS Security's control that might pertain to any financial transactions between GS Security and the Debtor or his affiliates upon which the Trustee may seek to initiate avoidance claims. The Trustee has neither sought additional documents nor a Rule 2004 examination of GS Security, and there is no basis to conclude, in advance of any claims against GS Security, that the filing of those claims has been in any way impeded by GS Security or the Debtor.\n\n### **B. Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) Does Not Permit Enlargement of Statutory Deadlines**\n\n24. In *In re Walnut Hill, Inc.*, *supra,* Judge Tancredi held:\n\nBy its plain language, Rule 9006(b) only applies to deadlines set 'by these rules or by a notice given thereunder[,][sic] or by order of court.' **Nowhere** in the Rule does it mention statutory deadlines.\n\nThis Court (Krechevsky, J.) has addressed this issue in the past and held that Rule 9006(b) does not 'permit[] a court to extend a time limitation set by Congress in a statute. *In re Damach, Inc.*, 235 B.R. 727, 731 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1999). Instead, it 'permit[s] modification only of time limitations imposed by other rules or by the court.' *Id*.\"\n\n*In re Walnut Hill, Inc.*, 2018 WL 2672242, at \\*1. (emphasis added); *see In re Cramer*, 636 B.R. at 831 (\"The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure contain no rule to extend statutory deadlines such as the ones in sections 546 & 549. No procedure supports the relief in the current motion.\").\n\n25. It bears repeating that, even if this Court were to allow the Trustee to extend the Section 546(a) deadline under Rule 9006(b), there are absolutely no facts that have been alleged establishing good \"cause\" to support such an extension in this case. On the contrary, and as noted above, GS Security has fully cooperated with the Trustee in his pre-litigation discovery efforts and has not \"actively interfered with the Trustee's discovery efforts\" as the Trustee alleges with repect to the Debtor.\n\n#### **C. The Trustee Has Not Acted Diligently in Pursuing His Rights Against GS Security**\n\n26. While GS Security is not in any position to assess whether the Trustee has diligently pursued his investigation of the Debtor's financial affairs, it is not disputed that GS Security fully complied with the Trustee's pre-litigation discovery efforts by turning over to the Trustee all documents responsive to the Subpoena in its possession, custody or, which the Trustee has had in his possession for nearly three months. The Trustee thus has had plenty of time to assert his claims against GS Security. Accordingly, the Motion should be denied.\n\n27. Lastly, the Trustee asserts that, absent an extension, he \"will be forced to litigate the limitations period on a one-off basis in a free-standing adversary proceeding with any potential defendant who raises the issue,\" which the Trustee contends, without explanation, \"is not just difficult; it is likely impossible.\" Motion ¶ 51. The Trustee provides no justification for why responding to a statute of limitations defense asserted in a pending adversary proceeding will be any more costly or prejudicial than it is in every other case in this District and the other Districts in which prospective tolling against the entire universe of potential defendants is not permitted.\n\n28. The Trustee will suffer no prejudice if his rights to interpose equitable tolling to enlarge the statute of limitations are preserved until after a statute of limitations defense is asserted in a pending adversary proceeding. *See In re Cramer*, 636 B.R. at 833-834 (\"If a bankruptcy trustee has a sufficient basis for application of the doctrine of equitable tolling, then the trustee will prevail later in the adversary proceeding after filing the untimely complaint. If, on the other hand, a trustee does not have a sufficient basis for application of the doctrine of equitable tolling, the courts should not permit the trustee to avoid the consequences of such a deficiency by obtaining an order applying equitable tolling in advance without notice to the affected party.\").\n\n#### **CONCLUSION**\n\nWHEREFORE, GS Security requests this Court deny the Motion, and grant such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable.\n\nSubmitted: New York, New York February 5, 2024\n\n> LAX & NEVILLE, LLP */s/ Barry R. Lax* Barry R. Lax, Esq. (phv09611) Robert J. Grand, Esq. (ct24113) 350 5 th Avenue, Suite 4640 New York, NY 10018 Tel: (212) 696-1999\n\n### HOUSER LLP\n\n/s/ Jordan W. Schur Jordan W. Schur, Esq. 8 Wright Street, Ste 107 Westport, Connecticut 06880 jschur@houser-law.com Tel: 212-490-3333 Fax: 212-490-3332\n\n*Attorneys for GS Security Solutions, Inc.*","body_zh":"美国破产法院 康涅狄格区 布里奇波特分庭\n\n---------------------------------------------------------------x\n关于：\n第 11 章\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，\n案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。\n---------------------------------------------------------------x\nGS SECURITY SOLUTIONS, INC. 对受托人依据《破产法典》第 108 条、第 546(a) 条和第 549 条申请中止计算或延长提起撤销权诉讼期限之动议的异议\n\nGS Security Solutions, Inc.（“GS Security”）通过其下文署名的代理律师，特此对 Luc A. Despins 作为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（“债务人”）破产财产的第 11 章受托人（“受托人”）提交的《关于作出命令中止计算或延长受托人依据〈破产法典〉第 108 条、第 546(a) 条和第 549 条提起撤销权诉讼期限的动议》（“动议”）[ECF 2509] 提出异议。GS Security 特此提出异议如下：\n\n引言\n\n1. 本案中撤销权诉讼的诉讼时效将于 2024年2月15日 届满。2024年1月18日，受托人提交本动议，请求中止计算或延长该诉讼时效期限。受托人就这两项请求提出了已被本法院明确驳回过的相同且毫无根据的论点：“债务人、其家庭成员及其关联方千方百计阻挠受托人的[调查]工作”，因此 (i) 诉讼时效应予衡平法上的中止计算，或者作为备选方案，(ii) 存在依据《联邦破产诉讼程序规则》第 9006(b) 条准予延长诉讼时效的正当理由。\n\n2. 正如 Tancredi 法官在 In re Walnut Hill, Inc., No. 16-20960 (JJT), 2018 WL 2672242, at *2 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 1, 2018) 一案中驳回完全相同的请求时所阐述的那样，(i) 衡平法上的中止计算只能作为对正在审理的对抗性诉讼中主张的诉讼时效抗辩的回应而提出，因此“在目前阶段审理衡平法中止计算问题尚不成熟，且在程序上是不当的”，并且 (ii) “第 9006(b) 条规则的明文规定禁止本法院延长第 546(a) 条规定的诉讼时效。”\n\n3. 此外，即便受托人关于衡平法中止计算的论点在此时已成熟，且即便第 9006(b) 条规则未禁止法院延长第 546(a) 条项下的时效期限，对诉讼时效的任何此类中止计算或延长对 GS Security 而言也都是不恰当的。受托人的动议完全建立在所谓的“债务人、其家庭成员及其关联方”不予配合和进行阻挠的基础之上。受托人的动议甚至根本没有提及 GS Security 的名称，更谈不上指明 GS Security 存在任何所谓的违规行为。事实上，即使针对债务人，受托人的动议中也完全没有指控所谓的“债务人、其家庭成员及其关联方”的不予配合和阻挠在任何方面妨碍了受托人从 GS Security 处获取有关其据称涉及债务人或其关联方的财务交易的完整诉前证据开示的能力。\n\n4. 事实上，GS Security 完全配合了受托人的证据开示工作，并且至少自 GS Security 及时提交这些文件的 2023年11月17日 以来，受托人就已实际占有响应传票的所有文件，其中包括（除许多其他文件外）GS Security 的银行账户明细账单。受托人并未指出其未从 GS Security 获取的任何文件或信息，也未提及 GS Security 及其在非当事人证据开示中的全面且自愿的配合。相反，受托人企图通过将 GS Security 与债务人以及一系列与 GS Security 无关的第三方混为一谈，以获取在程序上不当且不公平的无限期诉讼时效豁免，而 GS Security 是一家由 Scott Barnett 拥有和运营的独立实体。\n\n5. 该动议应予驳回。\n\n背景情况\n\n6. 2022年2月15日，债务人向本法院提交了依据《美国破产法典》第 11 章寻求救济的自愿破产申请（“破产申请日”），2022年7月8日，法院作出任命本案受托人的命令。[ECF 523]。\n\n7. 一年多后的 2023年8月11日，受托人依据《破产规则》第 2004 条申请作出命令，允许对受托人认定的可能知悉债务人资产及财务活动的特定个人和实体（包括 GS Security）进行诉前证据开示（“第 2004 条动议”）。[ECF 2079]。破产法院于 2023年9月19日 准许了该第 2004 条动议。[ECF 2210]。\n\n8. 2023年9月21日 或前后，受托人向 GS Security 发出了《第 2004 条调查传票》（“传票”），要求提交范围广泛的文件，并要求于 2023年11月3日 对 GS Security 的代表进行调查质问。此后，受托人同意将 GS Security 响应传票提交文件的时间短暂延长两周，直至并包括 2023年11月17日，并进一步同意在完成审阅后告知 GS Security 的代理律师是否有必要进行调查质问。\n\n9. GS Security 未对传票提出异议，也未就第 2004 条调查或传票提交保护令动议或撤销传票动议。2023年11月17日，即在第 546(a) 条诉讼时效届满前约三个月，GS Security 自愿提交了其占有、保管或控制下的所有响应传票的文件。\n\n10. 受托人未指出 GS Security 提交的文件中存在任何缺陷，也未寻求对 GS Security 进行第 2004 条调查质问。\n\n法律论点\n\nA. 衡平法中止计算是不当的且不适用于 GS Security\n\n11. 受托人首先主张——不顾本法院近期的判例——本法院应作出概括性命令，在第 546(a) 条时效期限届满前，且在针对包括 GS Security 在内的任何潜在被告提起任何对抗性诉讼之前，对依据第 546(a) 条对任何及所有未来被告提起撤销权诉讼的诉讼时效予以衡平法上的中止计算。动议第 29-30 段。如上所述，本法院在 In re Walnut Hill, Inc., 2018 WL 2672242, at *2 中，明确驳回了任何此类前瞻性适用衡平法中止计算的主张，认定其“尚不成熟且在程序上是不当的”。\n\n12. 在驳回第 7 章受托人既请求对第 546(a) 条时效期限进行衡平法中止计算又请求依据第 9006(b) 条规则延长法定截止日期的动议时——受托人在本动议中正是基于完全相同的理由寻求延期——Tancredi 法官指出：“在程序上，衡平法中止计算原则被公认为是对在审诉讼中主张的诉讼时效抗辩的回应。”出处同上（引用 Long v. Abbott Mortg. Corp., 459 F. Supp. 108, 113 (D. Conn. 1978)（“当然，直到被告声称原告的事由已过诉讼时效之前，衡平法中止计算原则并不发生作用。”）；另见 In re Anderson, 623 B.R. 199, 217 (Bankr.D.Conn. 2020)（“作为程序事项，衡平法中止计算是作为对诉讼时效抗辩的回应而提出的。”）（引用上诉 In re Walnut Hill, Inc. 案））。\n\n13. 正如 Tancredi 法官和许多其他法院所指出的那样，公平和正当程序原则要求，衡平法中止计算问题只有在正在审理的对抗性诉讼中作为对诉讼时效抗辩的回应提出之后才能予以审理：\n\n本案所有各方均承认，目前尚未提起对抗性诉讼。依据第 546(a) 条，受托人提起对抗性诉讼的诉讼时效将于 2018年6月14日 届满，目前尚未届满。在一旦提出诉讼时效抗辩后针对具体被告在对抗性诉讼中待证明的事实和情况进行证据听证的范畴之外去审理衡平法中止计算，完全是不成熟的且在程序上有瑕疵的。\n\n上诉 In re Walnut Hill, Inc. 案（后加下划线强调）；见 In re No. 1 Contracting Corp., 2012 WL 4114818, at *1 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2012 Sept., 19, 2012)（在法院面前不存在案件或争议因而无法得知未来被告是否会提出诉讼时效抗辩的情况下，以不成熟为由驳回第 7 章受托人在提起撤销权诉讼前请求对第 546(a) 条诉讼时效进行衡平法中止计算的申请）；In re Cramer, 636 B.R. 830 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2022)（驳回第 7 章破产受托人关于延长提起撤销权诉讼的两年法定截止期限的动议，尽管其辩称债务人在配合调查方面不充分且因债务人隐匿资产已撤销其免责，因为此类延期将剥夺未来被告宪法上的正当法律程序，盖因他们预先不会收到救济通知，也没有机会就其案件的具体事实是否具有衡平法中止计算的理由提出抗辩）；In re Randolph Hospital, No. 20-10247 (LMJ), 2022 WL 19298765, at *1 (Bankr. M.D. N.C. Apr. 25, 2022)（以尚未提起对抗性诉讼故尚不成熟为由，驳回受托人关于对法定诉讼时效进行衡平法中止计算的动议，并指出受托人在在审诉讼中可自由地重新主张衡平法中止计算以回应诉讼时效抗辩）。\n\n14. 在本案中，2024年2月15日 的法定截止日期尚未届满，受托人尚未针对 GS Security 或动议中指明的任何其他潜在被告提起对抗性诉讼，因此，根据本法院在 In re Walnut Hill, Inc. 案中的裁定及上述其他判例，针对任何及所有潜在被告请求无限期衡平法中止计算具有前瞻性、尚未成熟且在程序上是不当的。\n\n15. 受托人企图区分 In re Walnut Hill, Inc. 案以及其他司法管辖区驳回前瞻性适用衡平法中止计算的裁决，虚假地声称其已向本案中的潜在被告提供了关于中止计算动议的充分通知，而这些潜在被告有机会提出异议。动议第 32-34 段。\n\n16. 即使通知是一个问题，受托人也既歪曲了这些案件中的裁定，也歪曲了其自身“通知”的充分性。受托人的动议以及随附该动议的《通知格式》[ECF 2515]（本法院曾指示受托人向包括 GS Security 在内的潜在被告送达该文件），均未包含受托人未来可能针对 GS Security 或任何其他被告主张的诉由的任何迹象，亦未包含作为这些未指明诉由基础的事实和情况。虽然 GS Security 在本异议中可以根据从受托人在传票中寻求的文件中所获知的有限信息主张衡平法中止计算是不恰当的，但其根本无法提出积极抗辩，因为受托人尚未对其提出任何主张。其立场与 Walnut Hill 案以及得出相同结论的其他案件中预期被告的立场毫无二致。\n\n17. 即使本法院过早审理关于衡平法时效中止（equitable tolling）的主张，受托人（Trustee）也未能针对 GS Security 主张任何适用衡平法时效中止的依据。第二巡回法院（Second Circuit）已裁定，“衡平法时效中止通常被认为适用于：(1) 原告积极寻求司法救济但在规定期限内提交了有瑕疵的诉状；(2) 原告由于被告的误导行为而不知晓其诉因；或 (3) 原告的身体状况或精神障碍阻止了其及时提起诉讼。”Zerilli-Edelglass v. New York City Transit Authority, 333 F.3d 74, 80 (2d Cir. 2003)（内部引文及引证省略）。在确定衡平法时效中止是否适用时，法院必须考虑寻求适用衡平法时效中止原则的人是否：(1) “在其寻求中止的时限内已尽到合理的勤勉”，以及 (2) 证明了情况极其特殊以至于应当适用该原则。同上，第 80-81 页（援引 Chapman v. ChoiceCare Long Island Term Disability Plan, 288 F.3d 506, 512 (2d Cir.2002)）。\n\n18. 衡平法时效中止原则允许法院“根据具体案件情况延长诉讼时效，以防止不公。”Warren v. Garvin, 219 F.3d 111, 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 968, 121 S.Ct. 404, 148 L.Ed.2d 312 (2000)。“当一方当事人以某种极其特殊的方式被阻止行使其权利时，衡平法时效中止出于公平考量而适用。”Iavorski v. I.N.S., 232 F.3d 124, 129 (2d. Cir. 2000)（内部引号和修改省略）。\n\n19. 然而，最高法院（Supreme Court）已明确指出，适用该原则的条件是严格的。“通常，寻求衡平法时效中止的诉讼当事人承担确立两项要件的举证责任：(1) 其一直在勤勉地追求其权利，以及 (2) 存在某种阻碍其行使权利的特殊情况。”Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005)；一致判决 Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336, 127 S.Ct. 1079, 166 L.Ed.2d 924 (2007)（指出特殊情况必须“阻止了及时提交”）。\n\n20. 第二巡回法院一再告诫，“衡平法时效中止被视为一种严厉的救济措施，仅适用于罕见和例外的特殊情况。”A.Q.C. ex rel. Castillo v. United States, 656 F.3d 135, 144 (2d Cir. 2011)（内部引号和修改省略）；一致判决 Phillips v. Generations Family Health Ctr., 723 F.3d 144, 150 (2d Cir. 2013)（援引 A.Q.C. ex rel. Castillo, 656 F.3d at 144）；Bertin v. United States, 478 F.3d 489, 494 n.3 (2d Cir. 2007)（援引 Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam)）。因此，“当动议人未提供任何表明衡平法时效中止可能适用的理由时，将不予适用。”Mark v. Gawker Media LLC, 2014 WL 5557489, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2004)（援引 Ouedraogo v. A–1 Int'l Courier Serv., Inc., 2013 WL 3466810, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2013)）。\n\n21. 受托人未能指控任何支持对 GS Security 的主张适用衡平法时效中止的事实。相反，如上所述，GS Security 完全配合了受托人的证据开示工作，并且从未从事过受托人所主张的阻碍其调查的任何不当行为。事实上，受托人的动议完全建立在“债务人、其家庭成员及其关联方”的不配合和阻挠的基础上。受托人的动议甚至没有提及 GS Security 的名称，更不用说指出 GS Security 的任何涉嫌不当行为了。\n\n22. 受托人援引 In re Fundamental Long Term Care, Inc., 501 B.R. 784, 791 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2013) 来说明以下主张：即使潜在目标被告未参与或不对阻碍或拖延受托人的调查负责，提起撤销之诉的两年诉讼时效仍可针对该被告适用衡平法时效中止。动议第 51 段。然而在该案中，证据确立了受托人对潜在目标被告提起撤销之诉的能力受到了债务人违法行为的阻碍。正如其他法院所裁定的那样，虽然可能没有必要认定是被告实施了阻碍受托人调查的欺诈或违法行为，但为了适用衡平法时效中止，“被告与违法行为之间必须存在关联”。In re Maxon Eng'g Servs., Inc., 397 B.R. 228, 230–31 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2008), aff'd, No. CIV. 08-2274CCC, 2009 WL 1597635 (D.P.R. June 5, 2009)（“本法院认定，允许受托人利用衡平法时效中止原则对普通商业债权人提起破产申请前偏颇性清偿诉讼是不公平的，因为这些被告在破产申请后债务人代表所实施的涉嫌违法行为中未扮演任何角色。”）。在审案件中，受托人没有提出任何指控表明“债务人、其家庭成员及其关联方”的不配合和阻挠在任何方面阻碍了受托人从 GS Security 处获取关于其据称涉及债务人或其关联方的金融交易的完整诉前证据开示，而受托人持有这些证据材料已有近三个月之久。\n\n23. 再次重申，GS Security 本身完全配合了受托人的诉前证据开示工作，受托人已经掌握了 GS Security 控制下的所有可能与 GS Security 与债务人或其关联方之间的金融交易有关的应答文件，而受托人可能据此寻求提起撤销之诉。受托人既未寻求额外的文件，也未要求对 GS Security 进行《联邦破产诉讼规则》第 2004 条规定的审查（Rule 2004 examination），并且没有任何依据在对 GS Security 提起任何索赔之前断定提起这些索赔受到了 GS Security 或债务人的任何阻碍。\n\nB. 《联邦破产诉讼规则》第 9006(b) 条不允许延长法定截止期限\n\n24. 在上述 In re Walnut Hill, Inc. 一案中，Tancredi 法官裁定：\n\n根据其明文规定，第 9006(b) 条仅适用于“由本规则或根据本规则发出的通知[，][原文如此]或由法院裁定”设定的截止期限。该规则全文未提及法定截止期限。\n\n本法院（Krechevsky 法官）过去曾审理过该问题，并裁定第 9006(b) 条不“允许法院延长国会在成文法中设定的时限。In re Damach, Inc., 235 B.R. 727, 731 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1999)。相反，它‘仅允许修改由其他规则或由法院施加的时限。’同上。”\n\nIn re Walnut Hill, Inc., 2018 WL 2672242, at *1.（强调为后加）；参见 In re Cramer, 636 B.R. at 831（“《联邦破产诉讼规则》不包含延长诸如第 546 条和第 549 条中的法定截止期限的规则。没有任何程序支持当前动议中的救济。”）。\n\n25. 值得重申的是，即使本法院允许受托人根据第 9006(b) 条延长第 546(a) 条的截止期限，本案中也完全没有指控任何确立支持该延期的正当“事由”的事实。相反，且如上所述，GS Security 在受托人的诉讼前证据开示工作中与其全力配合，并没有像受托人就债务人所指控的那样“积极干扰受托人的证据开示工作”。\n\nC. 受托人在针对 GS Security 追求其权利方面未尽勤勉\n\n26. 尽管 GS Security 无法评估受托人是否勤勉地对其调查债务人的财务状况进行了追查，但无可争议的是，GS Security 通过向受托人移交其所占有、保管或控制的针对传票的所有应答文件，完全配合了受托人的诉前证据开示工作，而受托人持有这些文件已有近三个月之久。因此，受托人有充裕的时间对 GS Security 主张其权利。据此，该动议应当予以驳回。\n\n27. 最后，受托人主张，若不给予延期，他“将被迫在与提出该问题的任何潜在被告的单独对抗性诉讼中，逐一针对诉讼时效期间进行诉讼”，受托人未经解释地声称这“不仅困难；而且可能根本不可能。”动议第 51 段。受托人没有提供任何合理解释，说明为何在未决的对抗性诉讼中回应诉讼时效抗辩会比在该司法管辖区以及不允许针对所有潜在被告进行预期性时效中止的其他司法管辖区中的所有其他案件中更具成本或更具偏见。\n\n28. 如果受托人提出衡平法时效中止以延长诉讼时效的权利被保留至在未决的对抗性诉讼中提出诉讼时效抗辩之后，受托人不会受到任何不利影响。参见 In re Cramer, 636 B.R. at 833-834（“如果破产受托人具备适用衡平法时效中止原则的充分依据，那么受托人在提交逾期诉状后，将在随后的对抗性诉讼中胜诉。另一方面，如果受托人缺乏适用衡平法时效中止原则的充分依据，法院不应允许受托人通过在未通知受影响方的情况下预先获得适用衡平法时效中止的裁定来规避这种缺陷带来的后果。”）。\n\n结论\n\n基于上述理由，GS Security 请求本法院驳回该动议，并给予法院认为公正和衡平的其他及进一步的救济。\n\n提交地点：纽约州纽约市\n提交日期：2024年2月5日\n\nLAX & NEVILLE, LLP\n/s/ Barry R. Lax\nBarry R. Lax 律师 (phv09611)\nRobert J. Grand 律师 (ct24113)\n350 5th Avenue, Suite 4640\nNew York, NY 10018\n电话: (212) 696-1999\n\nHOUSER LLP\n\n/s/ Jordan W. Schur\nJordan W. Schur 律师\n8 Wright Street, Ste 107\nWestport, Connecticut 06880\njschur@houser-law.com\n电话: 212-490-3333\n传真: 212-490-3332\n\nGS Security Solutions, Inc. 的代理律师","key_entities":["Je","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Despins","CIPA"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":523,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2079,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2210,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2509,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2515,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":3421,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 13:40:12"}