{"id":"court_ctb_2584_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":2584,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION | ______________________________","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"## **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| ______________________________              |   |                         |\n|---------------------------------------------|---|-------------------------|\n| In re:                                      | : | Chapter 11              |\n|                                             | : |                         |\n| HO WAN KWOK, et al.,                        | : | Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |\n|                                             | : | (Jointly Administered)  |\n| Debtors.<br>______________________________: | : |                         |\n|                                             |   | Re: Docket No. 2509     |\n\n# **OBJECTION OF SOTHEBY'S INTERNATIONAL REALTY, INC. TO CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF AN ORDER EXTENDING DEADLINE FOR TRUSTEE TO FILE AVOIDANCE ACTIONS UNDER BANKRUPTCY CODE SECTIONS 108, 546(a), AND 549**\n\nSotheby's International Realty, Inc., (\"SIR\") by and through its undersigned counsel, respectfully submits this objection (the \"Objection\") to the *Motion for Entry of Order Extending Deadline for Trustee to File Avoidance Actions under Bankruptcy Code Sections 108, 546(a), and 549* [Docket No. 2509] (the \"Motion\"), filed by Luc A. Despins, chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") appointed for the chapter 11 debtors (collectively, the \"Debtors\") in the above-captioned chapter 11 cases. In support of this Objection, SIR respectfully states as follows:\n\n## **BACKGROUND**\n\n1. On January 18, 2024, the Trustee filed the Motion seeking leave to file avoidance actions against certain entities listed on exhibits to the Motion as well as entities who \"have received any transfers from any of the parties listed\" on a schedule to the notice of the Motion.\n\n2. On Friday, February 2, 2024, an affiliate of SIR, but not SIR, received service of the Motion, which has an objection deadline of Monday, February 5, 2024. Given the insufficient notice the Trustee provided to SIR, SIR respectfully requests that this Court hear this Objection despite its filing shortly after the Motion's objection deadline.\n\n3. SIR is not specifically listed on the Motion and can only assume that the Trustee served SIR with notice of the Motion solely because SIR is one of more than 250 recipients of Bankruptcy Rule 2004 subpoenas. To be clear, SIR is not aware of any basis upon which the Trustee could bring an avoidance action against SIR. SIR files this Objection out of an abundance of caution and specifically reserves all rights to oppose the relief requested by the Trustee if the Trustee asserts any claims against SIR.\n\n### **OBJECTION**\n\n4. There is no legal basis to grant the Motion. Moreover, SIR has not received sufficient information to even determine if the Motion applies to SIR.\n\n#### **BASIS FOR OBJECTION**\n\n5. The Trustee asks the Court to judicially extend the statutes of limitations set by Congress. No authority exists to do so. The Trustee further asks this Court to reject Judge Tancredi's well-reasoned decision in *In re: Walnut Hill, Inc.,* 2018 WL 2672242 (Bankr. D. Conn. Jun. 1, 2018) in favor of non-binding law. This Court should not grant the Motion. The Motion is an improper, premature request for extraordinary relief against unnamed individuals and entities.\n\n6. As the Trustee acknowledges in his Motion, which relies primarily on authorities from outside the District of Connecticut, at least one bankruptcy court in the District of Connecticut has held that a motion to equitably toll the limitations period for avoidance actions is premature and improper when filed prospectively. Motion at ¶ 31 *citing In re Walnut Hill, Inc.,* 2018 WL 2672242, at \\*2 (Bankr. D. Conn. Jun. 1, 2018). In *Walnut Hill,* the Court held it was \"wholly premature and procedurally flawed\" to seek to toll the limitations period before a statute of limitations defense has been asserted, and \"outside the context\" of allegations \"against specific defendants.\" *Id.* The Trustee relies upon largely unpublished decisions from outside of the Second Circuit as the basis for the requested relief. Motion at ¶ 30. The purported authorities are readily distinguishable.<sup>1</sup>\n\n7. In *Walnut Hill,* the Court considered and rejected the assertion that Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) is a vehicle to preemptively and prospectively extend the Trustee's statute of limitations to commence an avoidance action under the Bankruptcy Code. *See Walnut Hill,* 2018 WL 2672242 at \\*2 (\"The plain language of Rule 9006(b) prohibits the Court from enlarging the Section 546(a) statute of limitations\"); *see also In re Damach, Inc.,* 235 B.R. 727, 731 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1999) (Krechevsky, J.) (Rule 9006(b) does not \"permit a court to extend a time limitation set by Congress in a statute\"). No Court in this District has granted the expansive relief the Trustee seeks in the Motion, and the Trustee cites none. The Court should adopt the reasoning and decisions issued by Judge Tancredi and Judge Krechevsky and deny the Motion.\n\n8. In further support of this Objection, SIR incorporates herein by reference as if fully set forth herein the arguments made by Greenwich Land, LLC and Hing Chi Ngok in their objection to the Motion regarding the impropriety of: (a) prospective relief, (b) equitable tolling, (c) the Trustee's proposed form of order, (d) the needless, accelerated schedule of the Motion, and (d) this Court's determination of the Motion under *Stern v. Marshall,* 546 U.S. 462 (2011)*. See*  Docket No. 2569 at ¶¶ 6-15.\n\n9. SIR's compliance with the Rule 2004 subpoena shows that SIR in no way contributed to, much less created, any circumstances that might justify equitable tolling. The\n\n<sup>1</sup> *See In re Farwest Pump Co.,* 2020 WL 257784, at \\*3 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Jan. 15, 2020) (tolling granted where it was proposed in chapter 11 plan and no parties objected); *In re Martin Levy of Berlin D.M.D., P.C.,* 416 B.R. 1, 8 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009) (tolling granted where motion was unopposed); *In re Rockport Dev., Inc.*, No. 20-11339-SC (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2022) [Docket No. 822] (tolling granted where motion was unopposed); *In re Dwek*, No. 07- 11757 (KCF) (Bankr. D.N.J. Feb. 2, 2009) [Docket No. 3790] (tolling granted where federal investigations delayed trustee's investigation); *In re Visiting Nurse Ass'n of Inland Counties*, No. 18-16908-MH (Bankr C.D. Cal. July 30, 2020) [Docket No. 683] (tolling granted in six-line order with no rationale stated); *In re Builders Holding Co*., No. 16-06643- EAG7 (Bankr. D.P.R. April 25, 2019) [Docket No. 501] (tolling granted for 90 days where \"super priority order\" impeded trustee's administration of the estate).\n\nTrustee's allegations of obstruction by the Debtors, have no relevance to the Motions requested relief against SIR. *See Maxon Eng'g Servs. v. Alex Hornedo Robles & Assoc. (In re Maxon Eng'g Servs.),* 397 B.R. 228, 229 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2008) (for equitable tolling to apply, the defendant against whom tolling is sought \"must have at least been a party to the wrongful conduct.\")\n\n10. Although the Trustee claims that the service of the *Chapter 11 Trustee's Emergency Motion for Entry of an Order, Pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Section 105(a) and Bankruptcy Rules 2002 and 9014, (I) Approving Form and Manner of Notice of Trustee's Forthcoming Tolling Motion and (II) Scheduling Hearing* [Docket No. 2494] renders potential due process concerns \"not applicable,\" Motion ¶ 7, the Trustee has to date not made any showing whatsoever of what claims he might seek to pursue against SIR. SIR is therefore by definition not a \"properly noticed defendant\" with respect to any unasserted claims that the Trustee may seek to bring in an avoidance action. *See, e.g., In re Randolph Hosp., Inc.,* 2022 WL 19298765, at \\*1 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2022). Moreover, the authority offered by the Trustee in support of his assertion that notice has been sufficient is misplaced, since the facts in that case bear no resemblance to the present case. *See In re Martin Levy of Berlin* D.M.D., P.C., 416 B.R. 1, 8 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009) (\"Defendants cannot avoid trustees who seek information, ignore a trustee request to extend the statute of limitations, wait for the limitations period to pass and then, months later after a complaint is filed, claim that the trustee is out of luck\"). SIR has produced documents and has not ignored or avoided the Trustee.\n\n11. Even if the Motion were procedurally sound (a proposition SIR rejects), the Trustee cannot demonstrate that \"extraordinary circumstances\" prevent him from bringing any action specifically as against SIR by February 15, 2024. Motion at ¶ 2. The Trustee has had in his possession for months SIR's response to the Trustee's subpoena. The Trustee cannot credibly argue that he presently lacks sufficient knowledge of any possible claims he may believe he has against SIR. The Trustee also cannot credibly allege any reason why alleged claims could not be brought prior to the statute of limitations.\n\nWHEREFORE, SIR respectfully requests that this Court deny the Motion as applied to SIR and grant such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.\n\n# Dated: February 7, 2024 **WILSON ELSER MOSKOWITZ EDELMAN & DICKER LLP**\n\nBy: */s/ Stephen P. Brown* (ct 19876)\n\nStephen P. Brown, Esq. **Counsel for Defendant SOTHEBY'S INTERNATIONAL REALTY, INC**. **1010 Washington Boulevard Stamford, CT 06901 (203) 388-9100 Our File No. TBD**\n\n]\n\n-and-\n\nA.M. SACCULLO LEGAL, LLC Anthony M. Saccullo (DE No. 4141) Mary Augustine (DE No. 4477) 27 Crimson King Drive Bear, DE 19701 Telephone: (302) 836-8877 Facsimile: (302) 836-8787 Email: ams@saccullolegal.com meg@saccullolegal.com\n\n*Counsel to the Sotheby's International Realty, Inc.*\n\n#### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\nI hereby certify that on February 7, 2024, a copy of the foregoing Notice of Appearance was filed electronically. Notice of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties by operation of the Court's electronic filing system. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF System.\n\n*/s/ Stephen P. Brown*\n\nStephen P. Brown","body_zh":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION（美国康涅狄格区破产法院布里奇波特分部）\n\n关于：　:　第 11 章\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，　:　案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n:　（合并审理）\n债务人。\n______________________________:　:\n相关：Docket No. 2509\nSOTHEBY'S INTERNATIONAL REALTY, INC. 对第 11 章受托人请求作出根据《破产法典》第 108 条、第 546(a) 条及第 549 条延长受托人提起撤销权诉讼期限之命令的动议的异议\n\nSotheby's International Realty, Inc.（苏富比国际地产公司，下称「SIR」）通过其下述签字律师，谨此对第 11 章破产受托人 Luc A. Despins（下称「受托人」）为上述标题所列第 11 章案件中被指派的第 11 章债务人（统称「债务人」）提交的《请求作出根据〈破产法典〉第 108 条、第 546(a) 条及第 549 条延长受托人提起撤销权诉讼期限之命令的动议》[Docket No. 2509]（下称「该动议」）提出本异议（下称「本异议」）。为支持本异议，SIR 谨陈述如下：\n\n背景\n\n1. 2024 年 1 月 18 日，受托人提交了该动议，寻求许可针对该动议所附附件中列出的某些实体以及该动议通知清单中「从所列任何一方收到任何转让」的实体提起撤销权诉讼。\n\n2. 2024 年 2 月 2 日星期五，SIR 的一家关联公司（但非 SIR 本身）收到了该动议的送达，该动议规定的异议截止日期为 2024 年 2 月 5 日星期一。鉴于受托人向 SIR 提供的通知时间不足，SIR 谨请求本法院审理本异议，尽管其提交时间略晚于该动议的异议截止日期。\n\n3. SIR 并未被具体列入该动议中，并且只能推测受托人向 SIR 送达该动议通知仅仅是因为 SIR 是 250 多个《破产规则》第 2004 条传票接收者之一。明确地说，SIR 并不知道受托人可据以对 SIR 提起撤销权诉讼的任何依据。SIR 提交本异议是出于高度谨慎，并明确保留在受托人对 SIR 提出任何主张时反对受托人所请求救济的一切权利。\n\n异议\n\n4. 准予该动议缺乏法律依据。此外，SIR 甚至未收到足够的信息来确定该动议是否适用于 SIR。\n\n异议依据\n\n5. 受托人请求法院通过司法途径延长国会规定的诉讼时效。并不存在这样做的授权。受托人进一步请求本法院拒绝 Tancredi 法官在 In re: Walnut Hill, Inc., 2018 WL 2672242 (Bankr. D. Conn. Jun. 1, 2018) 一案中论证充分的裁定，转而采纳无约束力的判例法。本法院不应准予该动议。该动议是一项针对未具名个人和实体寻求非常规救济的不当、过早的请求。\n\n6. 正如受托人在主要依赖康涅狄格区以外先例的动议中所承认的那样，康涅狄格区的至少一家破产法院已经裁定，前瞻性提交的关于公平中止撤销权诉讼时效期间的动议属于过早且不当。动议第 31 段引用 In re Walnut Hill, Inc., 2018 WL 2672242, at *2 (Bankr. D. Conn. Jun. 1, 2018)。在 Walnut Hill 案中，法院裁定，在诉讼时效抗辩被提出之前，以及在「针对特定被告」的指控「语境之外」寻求中止时效期间是「完全过早且在程序上有瑕疵的」。出处同上。受托人主要依赖 Second Circuit（第二巡回区）以外未公布的裁定作为所请求救济的依据。动议第 30 段。这些所谓的判例依据显然可以区分。1\n\n7. 在 Walnut Hill 案中，法院审理并驳回了关于《破产规则》第 9006(b) 条是先发制人和前瞻性延长受托人根据《破产法典》提起撤销权诉讼时效之工具的主张。参见 Walnut Hill, 2018 WL 2672242 at *2（「第 9006(b) 条的明文禁止法院扩大第 546(a) 条的诉讼时效」）；另见 In re Damach, Inc., 235 B.R. 727, 731 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1999) (Krechevsky, J.)（第 9006(b) 条并不「允许法院延长国会在法规中设定的时限」）。本区没有任何法院准予过受托人在该动议中寻求的广泛救济，受托人也未引用任何此类先例。法院应采纳 Tancredi 法官和 Krechevsky 法官作出的论理和裁定，并驳回该动议。\n\n8. 为进一步支持本异议，SIR 在此援引 Greenwich Land, LLC 和 Hing Chi Ngok（伍庆芝）在其对该动议的异议中提出的论点，如同在此已完整阐述一样，该论点涉及以下各项的不当性：(a) 前瞻性救济，(b) 公平中止，(c) 受托人拟议的命令形式，(d) 该动议不必要的加速审理日程，以及 (d) 本法院根据 Stern v. Marshall, 546 U.S. 462 (2011) 案对该动议的认定。参见 Docket No. 2569 第 6-15 段。\n\n9. SIR 对第 2004 条传票的遵守表明，SIR 绝没有助长、更没有制造任何可能构成公平中止正当理由的情形。\n\n1 参见 In re Farwest Pump Co., 2020 WL 257784, at *3 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Jan. 15, 2020)（中止在第 11 章计划中提出且无任何当事方反对的情况下获准）；In re Martin Levy of Berlin D.M.D., P.C., 416 B.R. 1, 8 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009)（在动议无人反对的情况下准予中止）；In re Rockport Dev., Inc., No. 20-11339-SC (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2022) [Docket No. 822]（在动议无人反对的情况下准予中止）；In re Dwek, No. 07-11757 (KCF) (Bankr. D.N.J. Feb. 2, 2009) [Docket No. 3790]（在联邦调查延误受托人调查的情况下准予中止）；In re Visiting Nurse Ass'n of Inland Counties, No. 18-16908-MH (Bankr C.D. Cal. July 30, 2020) [Docket No. 683]（在未陈述理由的六行命令中准予中止）；In re Builders Holding Co., No. 16-06643-EAG7 (Bankr. D.P.R. April 25, 2019) [Docket No. 501]（在「超级优先权命令」阻碍受托人管理破产财产的情况下准予中止 90 天）。\n\n受托人关于债务人阻挠的指控，与动议中针对 SIR 所请求的救济毫无关联。参见 Maxon Eng'g Servs. v. Alex Hornedo Robles & Assoc. (In re Maxon Eng'g Servs.), 397 B.R. 228, 229 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2008)（适用公平中止的前提是，被寻求中止时效的被告「必须至少是不当行为的一方参与者」）。\n\n10. 尽管受托人声称，送达《第 11 章受托人依据〈破产法典〉第 105(a) 条及〈破产规则〉第 2002 条和第 9014 条请求作出 (I) 批准受托人即将提交的中止动议的通知形式与方式以及 (II) 确定听证日期的命令的紧急动议》[Docket No. 2494] 使得潜在的正当程序担忧「不适用」（动议第 7 段），但受托人迄今为止根本未就其可能寻求对 SIR 提出何种权利主张作出任何说明。因此，就受托人可能试图在撤销权诉讼中提起的任何未主张的权利主张而言，SIR 从定义上讲并非「受到适当通知的被告」。参见，例如 In re Randolph Hosp., Inc., 2022 WL 19298765, at *1 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2022)。此外，受托人为支持其关于通知已充分的主张而提供的先例并不适用，因为该案的事实与本案毫无相似之处。参见 In re Martin Levy of Berlin D.M.D., P.C., 416 B.R. 1, 8 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009)（「被告不能躲避索取信息的受托人、无视受托人延长诉讼时效的请求、等待时效期间届满，然后在提起起诉状数月后声称受托人运气不佳」）。SIR 已经提供了文件，并未无视或躲避受托人。\n\n11. 即使该动议在程序上合理（SIR 否定这一主张），受托人也无法证明存在「非常规情形」阻止其在 2024 年 2 月 15 日前专门针对 SIR 提起任何诉讼。动议第 2 段。受托人持有 SIR 对受托人传票的答复已有数月之久。受托人无法令人信服地主张其目前对其认为可能对 SIR 拥有的任何潜在权利主张缺乏足够的了解。受托人也无法令人信服地提出所称权利主张无法在诉讼时效届满前被提起的任何理由。\n\n为此，SIR 谨请求本法院驳回适用于 SIR 的该动议，并准予法院认为公正和适当的其他及进一步救济。\n\n日期：2024 年 2 月 7 日\nWILSON ELSER MOSKOWITZ EDELMAN & DICKER LLP\n\n签署人：/s/ Stephen P. Brown (ct 19876)\n\nStephen P. Brown, Esq.\n被告 SOTHEBY'S INTERNATIONAL REALTY, INC. 的代理律师\n1010 Washington Boulevard\nStamford, CT 06901\n(203) 388-9100\n本所案号：待定\n\n以及\n\nA.M. SACCULLO LEGAL, LLC\nAnthony M. Saccullo (DE No. 4141)\nMary Augustine (DE No. 4477)\n27 Crimson King Drive\nBear, DE 19701\n电话：(302) 836-8877\n传真：(302) 836-8787\n电子邮箱：ams@saccullolegal.com\nmeg@saccullolegal.com\n\nSotheby's International Realty, Inc. 的代理律师\n\n送达证书\n\n本人特此证明，于 2024 年 2 月 7 日，上述出庭通知的副本已通过电子方式提交。本提交的通知将通过法院电子提交系统的运行以电子邮件形式发送给所有当事方。各当事方可通过法院的 CM/ECF 系统查阅本次提交的文件。\n\n/s/ Stephen P. Brown\n\nStephen P. Brown","key_entities":["Je","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Despins"],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":1581,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 12:55:57"}