{"id":"court_ctb_2585_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":2585,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"JUDGMENT","filed_date":"2024-02-07","title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION In Re \\* Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) \\* HO WAN KW","summary_zh":"简易判决动议庭审笔录 —— Ho Wan Kwok 破产案（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo），CTB 22-50073（兼对抗性诉讼 Adv. Proc. No. 23-05007）ECF #2585（2024-02-07立案）。记录了 2024 年 1 月 30 日由破产法官 Julie A. Manning 主持的听证会，涉及 Genever Holdings LLC 诉 AIG 财产保险公司关于雪梨荷兰酒店（Sherry-Netherland）18 层公寓火灾损失保险理赔的简易判决动议辩论。","summary_en":"Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment — In re Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo / Guo Wengui), CTB Case No. 22-50073, Adv. Proc. No. 23-05007, ECF No. 2585 (filed Feb 7, 2024). Official transcript of the January 30, 2024 hearing before Judge Julie A. Manning regarding Genever Holdings LLC's motion for summary judgment against AIG Property Casualty Company concerning property insurance coverage for fire loss at the Sherry-Netherland apartment.","body_en":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION In Re \\* Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) \\* HO WAN KWOK and GENEVER \\* HOLDINGS CORPORATION, \\* \\* Debtors. \\* GENEVER HOLDINGS LLC, \\* Adv. Proc. No. 23-05007 \\* Plaintiff, \\* v. \\* \\* Bridgeport, Connecticut AIG PROPERTY CASUALTY \\* January 30, 2024 COMPANY, \\* \\* Defendant. \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HONORABLE JULIE A. MANNING UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE #51 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT APPEARANCES: For Genever Holdings LLC: MICHAEL T. McCORMACK, ESQ. O'Sullivan McCormack Jensen & Bliss PC 180 Glastonbury Blvd. Suite 206 Glastonbury, CT 06033 Chapter 11 Trustee: LUC A. DESPINS, ESQ. Paul Hastings LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166 Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording, transcript produced by transcription service. **Fiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc. Shelton, CT 06484 (203)732-6461**\n\nAPPEARANCES: (Cont'd) For AIG Property Casualty: JOHN FREDERICK O'CONNOR, JR., ESQ. Steptoe & Johnson LLP 1330 Connecticut Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036 MICHAEL P. THOMPSON, ESQ. Gordon & Rees LLP Gorden Rees Scully Mansukhani 95 Glastonbury Blvd. Suite 206\n\nGlastonbury, CT 06033\n\n2\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 3 of 41\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024 3 (Proceedings commenced at 2:10 p.m.) THE COURT: On the calendar at 2:00 p.m., so I ask the courtroom deputy to please call the calendar. THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Case No. 23-5007, Genever Holdings LLC versus AIG Property Casualty Company. THE COURT: Good afternoon. If we could have appearances for the record, please. MR. McCORMACK: Good afternoon, Your Honor. On behalf of the plaintiff Genever Holdings LLC, I am Michael McCormack from O'Sullivan McCormack Jensen & Bliss. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. McCORMACK: And with me is Luc Despins. MR. DESPINS: Chapter 11 Trustee, Your Honor. Thank you. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. O'CONNOR: Good afternoon, Your Honor. John O'Connor and Michael Thompson for AIG. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. THOMPSON: Good afternoon, Your Honor. THE COURT: So Mr. McCormack, this is your motion, correct? MR. McCORMACK: Yes, it is, Your Honor. THE COURT: Please proceed. MR. McCORMACK: Thank you. Does Your Honor prefer if I argue from the table or the --\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 4 of 41\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024 4 THE COURT: You can -- you can argue wherever you're comfortable. MR. McCORMACK: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: It's fine with the Court. MR. McCORMACK: Your Honor, this is our motion for summary judgment on count four of the adversary complaint, in which we seek a declaratory judgment that AIG Property and Casualty Company is obligated to provide coverage under the property insurance coverage section of the insurance policy that it issued to Genever Holdings for the period March 6th, 2023 to March 6th, 2024. We seek declaratory relief that Genever is entitled to coverage for its fire losses that it sustained in the form of property damage and contents losses as a result of the fire. And as we indicate in our brief, in a declaratory judgment action involving insurance coverage there are two issues. One is is -- has the insured triggered coverage under the insuring agreement? And if it has, has the insurance company met its burden of proving that an exclusion clearly and unambiguously takes it out of coverage. And under the undisputed facts and the record evidence, Genever has established coverage under the\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 5 of 41\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024 5 insuring agreement of the property insurance policy. First, this is an all-risk insurance policy for purposes of property coverage. And by it's clear terms, it provides coverage to the named insured, Genever, against all risks of direct physical loss or damages to your house, contents. and other permanent structures. And under the clear terms of the policy, the definition of you or your is the named insured, Genever Holdings. And so for purposes of coverage for property loss under an all risk insurance policy, the insured has to prove three things. Number one, that there is the -- there is an all risk insurance policy. Number two, that the insured has an insurable interest in the subject of the insurance policy and the insured contents. And number three, there was a fortuitous loss of covered property. And as we set forth in our brief, based upon the undisputed facts and the law, all three of those elements are met here. One, as I indicated, it's an all risk policy. That's determined by the clear terms of the policy. And that is a question of law for the Court. Two, there is no dispute that Genever Holdings LLC\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024 6 was the owner of the 18th floor apartment at the Sherry- Netherland that caught fire and for which coverage is sought. And third, there is no dispute and cannot be dispute that this was a fortuitous loss to the named insured. As we indicate in our brief, a fortuitous loss -- a loss is fortuitous, it's a question of law. A loss is fortuitous unless the loss results from inherent defect, ordinary wear and tear, or intentional misconduct of the insured. And there is no evidence to indicate that there was any intentional conduct of Genever Holdings LLC. And there is no evidence that this was anything involving -- a loss involving an inherent defect or ordinary wear and tear. So as the evidence we put forth in the motion for summary judgment we think is undisputed, we have triggered an obligation of AIG to provide coverage under the all-risk policy portion of the policy. Now, to avoid coverage, AIG has to come forward with evidence to show that an insuring exclusion clearly and unambiguously applies. And as we indicate in our brief, that's a heavy burden for an insurance company. In order to avoid coverage under an exclusion, an insurer has to show that an exclusion is clear and\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 6 of 41\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 7 of 41\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024 7 unmistakable in its language, it's subject to no other interpretation, and it clearly applies to the particular facts of the case. And here, AIG has not put forth any evidence to show that there's an exclusion that takes away coverage after Genever has established that it sustained a loss under the all-risk policy. In its opposition and in its special defenses, AIG cited three or four exclusions. And they don't state that the exclusions apply. They simply state that Genever is not entitled to coverage if or to the extent the exclusions apply. They've not met their heavy burden of proving that any of the exclusions apply. They have cited an intentional acts exclusion, a dishonest acts exclusion, a business property exclusion, and a -- I forget what the other one is, but it's in our brief, I apologize, Your Honor -- but they don't rely upon -- they don't cite the business property or they don't provide any evidence to show that the business property exclusion or the other exclusions apply. What they argue here, and this is critical, is they argue that there's a question of fact as to the cause and origin of the fire and whether Mr. Kwok may have been involved with the fire. And those simply are not issues of\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\nfact for purposes of the issue whether Genever is entitled\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 8 of 41\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024 8\n\nto declaratory relief.\n\n And the reason for that is because, number one, Genever under an all-risk policy does not have to establish the precise cause of the loss. It just has to establish that it was a fortuitous loss, not involving intentional conduct on the part of Genever. That's been established here.\n\n And what AIG argues throughout their brief, and I think they've argued throughout this case, is that somehow Mr. Kwok is an insured under the policy, or they believe that Mr. Kwok was insured under the policy, and if he were insured under the policy, that they would be able to rely upon the exclusions, the intentional act exclusions and the dishonest act exclusions.\n\n And all the Court needs to do to show -- to conclude that AIG has not met its burden of proving that they can avoid coverage for property loss under the exclusions is look at the clear and unambiguous terms of the exclusions. And that's in the policy. It's exclusion number 21 and 22.\n\n The intentional acts exclusion specifically says we do not cover any loss caused by any act whose consequences could have been foreseen by a reasonable person committed by, by or at the direction of you, your spouse, or a family member, and with the intent to cause loss or\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 9 of 41\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024 9 damage. That language is significant because it is limited to conduct committed by you, your spouse, or a family member. And under the clear and unambiguous terms of the policy, the definitions, the term you and your specifically refers to Genever LLC. It does not refer to an individual. And so, therefore, AIG has not met its burden of establishing that the intentional act exclusion allows them to avoid coverage under the property coverage section of the policy. The dishonest acts exclusion is exclusion 22. And for the Court's reference, I'm referring to the policy at page 21 of 45, document No. 66-5. Again, a dishonest acts exclusion states we do not cover any loss caused by any dishonest or criminal act by or at the direction of you or any family member. Again, that definition of you is limited to Genever Holdings. So, Your Honor, with respect to -- there's no factual basis on which AIG could establish or has established that these exclusions apply. I want to address the argument they make with respect to the fact that they -- or they argue that they were led to believe that Mr. Kwok was the member of Genever LLC, and they learned after the fire that that was not true, that Genever (BVI) was the member of the LLC.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 10 of 41\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024 10 As we submit in our papers, and in particular our reply brief, that issue does not create any material issue of fact in this case because the clear terms of the policy limit the property coverage of the policy to coverage for the named insured, Genever. And there's no dispute that Genever was the owner of this apartment that caught fire at all times from 2018 up until the date of the fire. What AIG argues in their brief, and they argue this incorrectly, is that had Mr. Kwok been the member of Genever LLC, he would have been insured under the policy. And they argue that they somehow could have argued that if he was involved with the fire, or that there's -- if there's a question of fact as to whether he was involved in the fire, then that should defeat summary judgment because then the insured would have -- there is a question as to whether the insured would have been involved in the fire. But as we submit in our reply brief, and this is under again the clear terms of the policy, which is a question of law to be interpreted by the Court, the AIG relies upon what's called the additional insured endorsement, or, I'm sorry, insured person endorsement, and that's found in the policy, specifically page 44 of 45, and page 45 of document No. 66-5. And that's the document that AIG relies upon to\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 11 of 41\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024 11 say that they understood that Mr. Kwok was the member of Genever LLC and they believe that he would have been an additional insured under the policy. But that endorsement, by it's clear and unambiguous terms, only applies to liability coverage under the policy, a situation where somebody is suing Genever LLC claiming Genever is liable for some type of loss. That's the liability coverage. The fourth claim for relief seeks property damage under the property coverage. That's a completely separate coverage element. And all that this insured person endorsement says, it says that with respect to the liability coverage, liability only applies to an occurrence arising out of the ownership of the residence listed above. Additionally, the limited liability corporation members and managers of the limited liability corporation are an insured person with respect to ownership of the house. As I said, all that does is indicate that if there's an individual member of the LLC, and there's a claim for liability brought against that member, that member may be an insured under the policy for purposes of liability coverage only. It does not change the terms of the property\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024 12 coverage section of the policy which is section two of the policy. And that's the reason why AIG's argument that they somehow were misled to believe that Mr. Kwok was the member and they issued the policy based upon that makes no material difference and does not create a question of fact. Because at all times, under this -- at all times, AIG wrote the policy with Genever as the named insured. No dispute. No dispute that Genever owned the apartment at all times. And under the clear terms of the policy, the property coverage only applies to the property owned by Genever. It does not provide coverage to people who are not named insureds under the policy. In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, there's an argument made that the motion is premature and that there has to be -- there is a need for discovery on a variety of topics. Again, as we point out in our reply brief, there is no additional discovery that would create a material issue of fact with respect to whether property coverage exists under part two of the policy for Genever. And the reason for that is because it's an all risk policy. The Court looks at the terms of the policy and determines whether Genever has met its burden of proof of triggering coverage and whether AIG has established its Case 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 12 of 41\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024 13 heavy burden of showing that an exclusion applies and it has not. They argue that discovery may determine the cause or origin of the fire. As I indicated previously, the cause and origin is not an element of proof for purposes of establishing property coverage under this policy. They also argue that they might -- they want discovery with respect to the application process back in 2018. Again, as I explained, that doesn't make a difference whether Mr. Kwok was a member of the LLC or, as the true facts are of the -- or the facts are that Genever (BVI) was the sole member of Genever LLC, it can't change the clear terms of the policy. And I think what's important also for the Court is there's no evidence of any misrepresentation by Genever LLC. But importantly, if you accept this argument that they want discovery to determine whether Mr. Kwok was or was not the member of Genever LLC and what AIG thought, it doesn't matter for purposes of the events in 2023. Because as I explained earlier, if Mr. Kwok was the member of Genever LLC, like AIG argues it believed, he would have only been insured or could have only been insured under limited circumstances for liability purposes. It wouldn't -- would not make a difference for purposes of the Case 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 13 of 41\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024 14 property coverage. And so, therefore, whatever they learned, it makes no difference with respect to the risk that AIG insured the apartment building. Second, as the Court is aware, and as we put forth in our brief, in August of 2022, Mr. Kwok was stripped of any economic ownership or any rights that he had in any property or in any corporations. So even if this -- even if AIG believed that he was the member of Genever LLC in 2018, as of August of 2022 and September of '22, he was stripped of any ownership interests and Clair Ebrehart was entered as a -- or was appointed as the Director of Genever (BVI) and, therefore, the -- which was the member of Genever LLC. And so when you fast forward to the March fire, there's no issue with respect to any ownership interest or membership interest that this -- Mr. Kwok as an individual may have had as AIG, you know, claims it believed. So the point is, Your Honor, is that whatever happened in 2018 doesn't change the clear terms of the policy language here and doesn't change the undisputed fact that he would -- if he were a member of the LLC in 2018, he would have been removed in this bankruptcy proceeding in August of 2022. And finally, you know, again this goes with Case 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 14 of 41\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 15 of 41\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024 15 respect to the issue of whether or not Mr. Kwok was an insured under the policy, AIG argues that Genever should be estopped from arguing that he was not an insured under the policy. And as we put forth in our brief, the issue of estoppel does not create a question of fact because the issue of estoppel cannot be used by AIG to alter the clear terms of the policy. Accepting AIG's argument would be, in effect, asking the Court to rewrite the clear and unambiguous terms of the property coverage of the policy, section two. And as we state in our reply brief, the Court is not allowed to do that. And so in sum, Your Honor, I don't think there's any dispute based upon the record evidence that Genever met its burden of establishing a right to property coverage under the policy. And AIG has not come forward with evidence, admissible evidence, to, one, show that an exclusion clearly and unambiguously takes away coverage or that there's a question of fact out there as to whether a particular exclusion would apply. And for those reasons, under the law, Genever is entitled to a declaratory judgment establishing that there is property coverage under the terms of the policy.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 16 of 41\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024 16 Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: I just have one question. MR. McCORMACK: Sure. THE COURT: I think I understand, but I want to make sure I do. When you were -- before I hear from Attorney O'Connor, I want to -- you said, and I believe this is what you were saying, so I just want to make sure I am accurate, that the membership of Genever LLC changed in 2022. And you're talking about when the Trustee had proceedings in the BVI that changed the membership structure? MR. McCORMACK: That's correct, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. That's what I wanted to make sure. MR. McCORMACK: Yes. THE COURT: Okay. MR. McCORMACK: Yes. THE COURT: Thank you. MR. McCORMACK: And on that point too, just on the issue of their claim that they need more discovery, I think it's important to remember, as we point out in our brief, that they have had since about May of last year to conduct whatever discovery they wanted in terms of cause and origin or anything and they -- they've done some discovery, they just haven't pursued any additional discovery.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 17 of 41\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024 17 They did not pursue any discovery on the issues raised in our summary judgment after the motion was filed. And they've not pursued any discovery up to this point. So the argument that, you know, they want additional discovery before the Court rules on the summary judgment should not be accepted. 7 The Court has everything it needs for purposes of interpreting this policy and determining as a matter of law whether or not Genever has triggered or has established a right to coverage under the property coverage portion of the policy. Thank you. THE COURT: Thank you. Attorney O'Connor. MR. O'CONNOR: Your Honor, I'll proceed from the podium. THE COURT: Sure. Whatever you're comfortable with. MR. O'CONNOR: Thank you, Your Honor. The posture we're at here today is a lot different from the one that existed at the time of the preliminary injunction motion. At the PI hearing, the Court needed to make factual calls, and that's expected, and that's understood, and that's appropriate. That is not the procedural posture\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 18 of 41\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024 18 we're in right now. Right now all disputed issues of material fact must be resolved in favor of my client. And we still have four months of discovery left. So the question isn't even really do all the factual disputes that exist right now are there any that would preclude summary judgment, but it's can we really say that -- I can confidently say none would -- no additional factual disputes will be developed in the four months that we have left of discovery. I mean, the Court set a discovery schedule in November, provided for seven months of discovery. We have four months left of that period. And I think AIG is entitled. I mean, I think the evidence we have right now is sufficient to defeat summary judgment, but we're entitled to continue to build on that and we have four months to do it. And there was no requirement that you do this in month one and this in month two. We have seven months to do discovery and that goes all the way until May 17th. I want to talk about -- one of the things Mr. McCormack talked about was the various defenses that AIG has propounded in this case. And three of them in particular I think are important for purposes of this motion. And those are\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024 19 misrepresentation, estoppel, and subsumed within those there are agency concepts. And thing that all three of those have in common is they're almost never properly resolved on summary judgment. And it's particularly when there's -- when discovery has not even been completed, because those are deeply imbedded -- they involve deeply imbedded questions of fact. I want to start with misrepresentation because I think the way that Genever has framed that is incorrect. Genever I think doesn't seriously argue that AIG was told the correct facts about the ownership of Genever either at the issuance of the first policies in 2018 or at renewal in 2023. AIG's understanding, provided by Wolfson, the broker, was that Mr. Kwok was the sole member of this LLC. Because as Jordan Gerber testified at the preliminary injunction hearing, and his testimony is in the summary judgment record, ordinarily the market that AIG sells insurance to is individuals. And sometimes those individuals will have an LLC because they want to, you know, not have their name in the property records or whatever, but they want an individual standing behind that property. And so the argument, they take misrepresentation Case 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 19 of 41\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024 20 as if that's got to somehow go to one of the other defenses in the case, but that's not true. Under New York Law, which I think everyone agrees applies here, if a misrepresentation is made to the insurer such as the insurer would not have issued the policy if it had known the true facts, the insurer is entitled to disclaim coverage on that basis and rescind the policy. And what do we have in the summary judgment record? Mr. Gerber's testimony at the preliminary injunction hearing, and we also have his declaration, and what does he say at paragraph 8, AIG's PCG, that's private client group, would not have issued the policies based on the information received if its underwriters had been correctly informed that a holding company, and not Mr. Kwok, owned Genever. Would not have issued. And the Court has to credit that on summary judgment. And so if that fact is established by the fact finder at a trial of this case, then we would be entitled to avoid coverage based on misrepresentation because we were insuring a collection of people and entities that we didn't understand. AIG had an understanding that it was insuring Genever Holdings, an LLC that just owns this apartment, and a couple of other servants quarters and one guy, and instead it was insuring a British Virgin Islands company.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 20 of 41\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 21 of 41\n\n|    | Ho Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024<br>21                           |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1  | And that became important, not because the British             |\n| 2  | Virgin Island company is out doing other business, but it      |\n| 3  | became important because then, when the Trustee came in late   |\n| 4  | in 2022 and changed the ownership of Genever (BVI), that all   |\n| 5  | occurred without AIG knowing that this change in ownership,    |\n| 6  | and the change in the circumstances of who was an insured      |\n| 7  | under the policy, had occurred because it got done above       |\n| 8  | Genever Holdings.<br>It got done at the British Virgin Islands |\n| 9  | level.<br>So you have misrepresentation.                       |\n| 10 | Now, one of the things that Genever has said is,               |\n| 11 | well, the misrepresentation was relayed to AIG by the          |\n| 12 | broker.<br>And the Court found at the -- at the preliminary    |\n| 13 | injunction stage, where it has to make factual calls, that     |\n| 14 | more likely than not the broker would be found, at a trial,    |\n| 15 | to be AIG's agent.                                             |\n| 16 | Now, with respect, we disagree with the Court's                |\n| 17 | finding there.<br>We acknowledge it had to make a finding and  |\n| 18 | it was appropriate to make a finding.                          |\n| 19 | It's not appropriate to make a finding here at                 |\n| 20 | this stage because now we're talking -- we're not talking      |\n| 21 | about injunctive relief, we're talking about the whole         |\n| 22 | enchilada.<br>We're talking about a judgment.<br>And we don't  |\n| 23 | make judgments on summary judgment based on the Court's        |\n| 24 | weighing of the evidence.                                      |\n| 25 | The evidence here, and Mr. Gerber was very clear               |\n|    |                                                                |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 22 of 41\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024 22 about that in paragraph 23 of his declaration where he said at no time did Wolfson act as AIG's agent in connection with the issuance of the insurance policies to Genever. Wolfson was acting on Genever's behalf with respect to issuance and renewal of the AIG policies. The decision whether to issue or to renew Genever -- the Genever policies was made by AIG based on information provided to it by Genever and its broker Wolfson. So the summary judgment record has clear evidence from Mr. Gerber that Wolfson was acting on behalf of the policy holder, not on behalf of AIG, did not have any authority with respect to issuance of the policies. That authority rested solely with AIG and that has to be accepted at the summary judgment stage. And turning to estoppel, as we've stated in our brief and stated at the preliminary injunction hearing, one of our points is Genever should be estopped from denying that Mr. Kwok was the sole member of Genever Holdings LLC, because AIG had been told that he was and AIG proceeded on that basis in issuing and renewing the policies. And that becomes significant when we have a fire. And lord knows, I'm not suggesting that Mr. Despins had something to do with the fire, but AIG's understanding was that Mr. Kwok was the owner of Genever, not Mr. Despins, which turned out to be the facts that had been undisclosed\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 23 of 41\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024 23 to AIG. And Genever does -- they misread read the LLC endorsement at the back of the homeowner's policy. There's two sentences there. One sentence says the member or members of an LLC are additional insureds for purpose of liability. A separate sentence says they're an insured with respect to ownership of the premises. So they -- you know, to AIG's understanding at all times, Mr. Kwok was an insured with respect to the property coverage and the liability coverage that was issued under those policies. Now, we've cited a number of cases in our brief that say estoppel almost never should be decided on summary judgment because it's they're deeply imbedded questions of fact about reliance, reasonable reliance, those are issues that get sussed out at a trial. They don't get sussed out generally on summary judgment, and certainly not on summary judgment when we're four months before the close of discovery and not all the facts have been developed. I want to add that there's no practical benefit to doing summary judgment piecemeal partway through discovery, and presumably they'll be summary judgment motions at the end of discovery. One, as for the reasons I've said here, if the\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 24 of 41\n\n|    | Ho Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024<br>24                         |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1  | Court were to grant summary -- partial summary judgment when |\n| 2  | we have clear facts in the record relating to                |\n| 3  | misrepresentation, estoppel, and agency, and we have four    |\n| 4  | months more of discovery that would be chopped off,          |\n| 5  | truncated, at least as it relates to coverage under the      |\n| 6  | property policy, in our view, that would be injecting error  |\n| 7  | into this process and we'd have to do it all again at some   |\n| 8  | point when summary judgment's going to get done again in     |\n| 9  | four months or five month, whenever the summary judgment     |\n| 10 | deadline is.                                                 |\n| 11 | But as a practical matter, it doesn't even move              |\n| 12 | this claim along because partial summary judgment doesn't    |\n| 13 | advance final resolution of the claim because you can't      |\n| 14 | execute on a grant of partial summary judgment.              |\n| 15 | It also doesn't really narrow the discovery in any           |\n| 16 | meaningful way because, as Genever points out, we need to    |\n| 17 | take discovery on all of the other claims in this case,      |\n| 18 | which include the third-party liability claims that Genever  |\n| 19 | has made, the bad faith claim that Genever added when it     |\n| 20 | amended its complaint in December.                           |\n| 21 | So there's not a practical benefit to taking a               |\n| 22 | pause half way through discovery, or not even half way       |\n| 23 | through discovery, and saying I'm going to rule on this now  |\n| 24 | when the record is replete with evidence.                    |\n| 25 | One, I'm refuting the positions that Genever is              |\n|    |                                                              |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024 25 taking with respect to misrepresentation, estoppel, and agency. Two, there's still discovery to be taken with respect to the cause of the fire, which is likely to inform multiple of the defenses in this case. And three, when there's just no practical benefit to it. If the Court has questions, I'm happy to take them, but we just think this is premature to do this in the middle of discovery. And I think Mr. Gerber's declaration clearly sets forth disputed facts on misrepresentation, agency and estoppel. THE COURT: The only question I have at the moment, and I just don't have the page cite in front of me of the policy, you were saying that there was a provision in the policy that said -- that supports your argument that if Mr. Kwok was the member of the LLC that he would be an additional insured -- and I don't know if that's the exact term you used, so I apologize, I may be using the wrong term -- but you were arguing, when you were talking about the broker and whether the broker was really an agent of AIG, you were talking about misrepresentations and you were saying that -- you were pointing me to a provision that I don't know that I looked at before.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 25 of 41\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 26 of 41\n\n|    | Ho Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024<br>26                          |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n|    |                                                               |\n| 1  | MR. O'CONNOR:<br>I can point Your Honor to it.                |\n| 2  | THE COURT:<br>Okay.                                           |\n| 3  | MR. O'CONNOR:<br>And just to clarify the argument,            |\n| 4  | misrepresentation doesn't really have much to do with the     |\n| 5  | LLC endorsement, because all that really matters for          |\n| 6  | misrepresentation is AIG was told a set of facts, those       |\n| 7  | facts were false or incorrect, even innocently incorrect,     |\n| 8  | and if AIG had known the truth, it actually would not have    |\n| 9  | issued the policy that it issued.<br>So those don't even get  |\n| 10 | to that.                                                      |\n| 11 | But the endorsement does bear on issues relating              |\n| 12 | to estoppel.                                                  |\n| 13 | THE COURT:<br>Okay.                                           |\n| 14 | MR. O'CONNOR:<br>And the page is -- it's ECF 66-5,            |\n| 15 | and at the PDF, 44-45.<br>It's the second to last page of the |\n| 16 | exhibit.                                                      |\n| 17 | THE COURT:<br>Okay.<br>I just want to make sure I had         |\n| 18 | the -- I'm looking at what you're asking me to, well, what    |\n| 19 | you were discussing during your argument and I want to make   |\n| 20 | sure I had the right cite.                                    |\n| 21 | MR. O'CONNOR:<br>Yes, Your Honor.                             |\n| 22 | And one thing I should have said on estoppel that             |\n| 23 | I didn't is really what Genever says about estoppel is you    |\n| 24 | can't rewrite policy.<br>I agree with that, 100 percent agree |\n| 25 | with that, but that's not what estoppel does here.            |\n|    |                                                               |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 27 of 41\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024 27 What estoppel does here is it estops Genever from asserting a set of facts that are inconsistent with what it told AIG at the time that AIG issued the policies and renewed them. We're not trying to change what the policy says. We're trying to prohibit Genever from changing courses from what it initially told AIG. Thank you. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Mr. McCormack, would you like to respond? MR. McCORMACK: Your Honor, with the Court's permission, may I just have a few moments to confer with my client? THE COURT: Certainly. Certainly. MR. McCORMACK: Thank you. (Pause.) MR. McCORMACK: May I just step out, Your Honor? THE COURT: Certainly. MR. McCORMACK: Thank you. (Pause.) MR. McCORMACK: Thank you, Your Honor. I want to direct the Court back to the insured person endorsement that Attorney O'Connor -- or which Attorney O'Connor was just referring to. And as I mentioned in my opening portion, that is document No. 66-5. It's pages 44 and 45 of document 66-5. That endorsement does not\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 28 of 41\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024 28 say what Attorney O'Connor indicated it says. It specifically starts out with respect to coverage provided by this endorsement, all provisions and conditions of the policy apply unless they are changed by this endorsement. And then there are three sections. A refers to part three, liability. Part three liability is part three for liability coverage of the policy. Our request for declaratory relief is under part two, property of the policy. So that first paragraph doesn't apply to this property coverage claim. And then it has paragraph B. It simply identifies the address of Genever Holdings LLC as 71 Fifth Avenue, 18th Floor, New York. That's the location of the apartment that is owned by Genever. And then on the page that we were discussing earlier, and Attorney O'Connor referenced, that refers to, quote, \"Part 3-Liability.\" And again, that's part three, liability coverage of the policy. It's not part two, the property coverage of policy, which is what our summary judgment is focused on. And that part three liability section states that part three liability only applies to an occurrence arising out of the ownership of the residence listed above. Additionally, the limited liability corporation members and manager of the limited liability corporation, trust, or\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 29 of 41\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024 29 trustees, are also an insured person with respect to the ownership of the residence. Under the clear terms of this endorsement, that's only applicable to the liability coverage of the policy. And the reason why they have that in there is on the first page of the endorsement it changes the insuring agreement of the liability coverage section of the policy. And it says we will pay damages and insured person becomes legally obligated to pay because of personal injury or property damage caused by an occurrence. As I indicated earlier, that's if there was a claim of liability asserted against somebody. This endorsement identifies who the insured persons are for purposes of that liability claim. And the language that we're focused on indicates that an individual, the member of the LLC, might be an insured person for purposes of liability coverage if it relates to ownership of the house. We're not talking about that on the motion for summary judgment. Genever seeks declaratory relief that it's entitled to property coverage under part two of the policy. With respect to the misrepresentation issue, it's clear under the law that AIG would have to establish that there was a material misrepresentation.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 30 of 41\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024 30 And there's no issue, as I -- as I indicated earlier, there's no -- there's no materiality here based upon their belief that Mr. Kwok was the sole member of the LLC because it doesn't change the terms of the property coverage of the policy. And also, as I indicated earlier, when Attorney -- when Mr. Despins was appointed Trustee and given control of the LLC, through the corporate governance order in August of '22, and then a new director of Genever (BVI) was appointed, AIG was informed in December of '22 of the bankruptcy of Genever LLC and Genever (BVI), and they were aware of the change in control that took place in August of '22. Three months later, they renewed the policy on March 6th, 2023, which is the policy that applies for purposes of the fire loss that occurred on March 15, 2023. So there was a change in control and Genever, excuse me, AIG doesn't address that issue in their opposition. And we point out in our reply brief there's nothing in the insurance policy that limits coverage or takes away coverage if there's a change in control of a corporation, change of control of Genever LLC. There's nothing in the policy that restricts that. In fact, I think it was in our reply brief that this bankruptcy proceeding, under the clear terms of the\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 31 of 41\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024 31 policy, has no affect on coverage under the policy. There's a provision in the policy that says bankruptcy proceedings do not affect AIG's obligation to provide coverage under the clear terms of the policy. With respect to this, again, what AIG understood when it issued the first policy in March of 2018 is not material to what occurred when the policy -- when a new policy was issued in March of 2023. But with respect to AIG's argument, there is no dispute that there's nothing in the application for insurance that AIG identifies as any misrepresentation. And we can conclude that by looking at what is called the request to issue coverage. And it's document No. 66-20 in the court record, pages 5 and 6, and pages 7 and 8. And when -- if the Court looks at that document, it will see that there's no representation in that request to bind coverage, in the application, that the insured was anything other than Genever Holdings LLC for purposes of this apartment. There's no reference to an individual being a member. There's no reference to any request for information as to the members of Genever LLC. And Attorney O'Connor pointed to paragraph 8 of Mr. Jordan's declaration, that does not, excuse me, Mr. Gordon's declaration, that does not have any admissible evidence that creates a material issue of fact.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 32 of 41\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024 32 Because what Mr. Gerber said in that paragraph -- in that paragraph was that AIG relied upon statements that the broker made in telephone conversations and emails with Mr. Gerber. And as we point out in a footnote in our reply brief, there's no evidence of any telephone conversations or emails between the broker and Mr. Gerber, excuse me, where there was any representation made to that effect. Mr. Gerber admits, in paragraph 8, that he does not know what the broker and Wolfson were told. And what he says is that they would not issue a policy under which Genever (BVI) would be insured. Again, it's not -- this case is not about Genever (BVI) being insured. It's about who owned the apartment and who is entitled to property coverage under section two, the property portion of the policy. And there can be no dispute that that coverage is limited to the named insured, which is Genever Holdings LLC. And there is no dispute, and can be no dispute, that at all times AIG knew and it did issue a policy under which Genever was the named insured. And it knew, and there's no dispute, that Genever owned that apartment under which property coverage, excuse me, owned the apartment -- owned the apartment that is insured under part two, property coverage, of the policy.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 33 of 41\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024 33 So there's nothing here that can be -- for which any additional discovery is needed. AIG had the opportunity to conduct whatever discovery it needed to address the issue of property coverage and it has not put forth any evidence to properly refute the limited motion for summary judgment seeking declaratory relief on that issue, and we respectfully request that the motion be granted. Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you. Attorney O'Connor, would you like to respond? MR. O'CONNOR: Very, very briefly, Your Honor. THE COURT: Sure. MR. O'CONNOR: Genever, with respect to misrepresentation, keeps wanting to go back to the LLC endorsement. But as I said at the end of my presentation, that's not -- that's not part of the path of this misrepresentation defense. The question is was AIG told things that weren't true? Would AIG have issued this policy if it had known the true facts? And Mr. Gerber's declaration couldn't be clearer on the answer to those, and at minimum it creates a factual dispute. And Mr. McCormack said, well, there's no evidence\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 34 of 41\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024 34 of Kwok being mentioned or his name, well, paragraphs 2 through 8 of Mr. Gerber's declaration lay out we got a call from Wolfson, said they had a high net worth individual. A Ms. Skivicki (ph) said it was Ho Wan Kwok. They asked who lives there? They're told Ho Wan Kwok lives there. Then the LLC endorsement comes in and said I left the individual's name off the form for privacy purposes because he's -- well, I can think of a lot of reasons he might have wanted to remain private -- but the declaration makes very clear, it lays out in detail, emails, telephone\n\n conversations, so the idea that there's no record evidence that AIG was told that Ho Wan Kwok was the guy that owned Genever Holdings, just doesn't, that's not consistent with the record.\n\n And the last thing I want to say is this whole debate about what was told to Mr. Gerber, what Mr. Gerber did, and what he would have done, sounds awfully facty to me, and that's -- and that's not a mistake, it's because this is a fact-bound question.\n\n You know, you could go to a trial and the finder of fact could just believe Mr. Gerber. They could think he's a perjurer. But that's not the role for this proceeding right here.\n\n Mr. Gerber has made very clear we would not -- AIG would not have issued this policy had it known the true\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 35 of 41\n\n|    | Ho Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024<br>35                          |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1  | facts and that should be accepted on summary judgment.<br>And |\n| 2  | that's frankly enough to deny partial summary judgment at     |\n| 3  | this point in the case.                                       |\n| 4  | Thank you.                                                    |\n| 5  | THE COURT:<br>Thank you.                                      |\n| 6  | All right.<br>Well, I thank you both for your                 |\n| 7  | arguments today.<br>I need to go back obviously and look at   |\n| 8  | some of the documents that you've referred to that I have     |\n| 9  | looked at, but I haven't looked at recently, so I need to go  |\n| 10 | -- and I haven't looked at them necessarily in the context    |\n| 11 | of summary judgment.                                          |\n| 12 | So I need to go and review them as well as the                |\n| 13 | cases that you've cited in your briefs.                       |\n| 14 | And I will take the matter under advisement and               |\n| 15 | rule when we can.                                             |\n| 16 | I will tell you that I can't guarantee it will be             |\n| 17 | in the next two weeks or so.<br>It might be a little longer   |\n| 18 | depending upon other matters that are pressing in other       |\n| 19 | cases in addition to this case.                               |\n| 20 | But I understand the issues.<br>You've answered my            |\n| 21 | questions, the questions that I had, and I appreciate that.   |\n| 22 | And I think that I know there's still the issue               |\n| 23 | out there that you both asked me to talk -- decide some time  |\n| 24 | ago that I haven't decided yet, again, unfortunately,         |\n| 25 | because that has -- the priorities just didn't elevate that,  |\n|    |                                                               |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024 36 but believe me I know it's out there. I know you want me to answer that question. And I'm going to try to do both of those things at or around the same time, so that you know where things stand, and then we'll go from there. In the meantime, there is a pretrial order in place. You do whatever you think is appropriate in accordance with the terms and conditions of the pretrial order. I do know, I believe, there was an order issued on consent in this adversary proceeding in the last day or so seeking some discovery. Attorney O'Connor, you were seeking some discovery from the fire department I think, is that right? MR. O'CONNOR: That's right, Your Honor. THE COURT: And that order entered I think, didn't it? MR. O'CONNOR: It did. THE COURT: Okay. MR. O'CONNOR: It entered yesterday. THE COURT: Okay. So we will -- we will see where things go. But I appreciate the presentations of counsel and I will take it under advisement. MR. O'CONNOR: Thank you, Your Honor.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 36 of 41\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 37 of 41\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024 37 MR. McCORMACK: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. MR. O'CONNOR: Your Honor, could I raise one housekeeping matter? THE COURT: Certainly. MR. O'CONNOR: It deals with the preliminary injunction decision which the Court ruled. We all agree with respect to the homeowner's policy. The liability -- the excess policy is a different question. THE COURT: Right. MR. O'CONNOR: The Court directed AIG to withdraw the notices of cancellation, which we did. THE COURT: Right. MR. O'CONNOR: Those policies are expiring the month after -- in March. THE COURT: Oh, that's true, isn't it? Yes. MR. O'CONNOR: And so the question is, it wasn't entirely clear to me whether the Court's injunction was intended to require AIG to keep some coverage in place for Genever. And if that's the Court's intention, then they'll renew the policies. If it's not the Court's -- if the Court's intention was you have these policies, you've got to -- you can't cancel them. And then we'll -- you know, everything\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 38 of 41\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024 38 else falls where it may, then that's a different question. And I think, at least talking to Mr. McCormack, I think their view is that the Court would have intended that AIG keep coverage in place. I just need an answer. THE COURT: Yeah. You know, I haven't looked back at the preliminary injunction decision for some time as I'm sure you can understand. MR. O'CONNOR: I do. THE COURT: And I will do that. But I believe that, yes, it was the intention that AIG continue to provide insurance as long as the estate pays the premium. Right? I mean, that's -- you know, obviously if the estate didn't pay the premium, that's a different issue. MR. O'CONNOR: Sure. THE COURT: Okay. But that is -- that was the -- I'm virtually certain that was the intent of the -- without having the preliminary injunction decision in front of me. And if for some reason I think otherwise, I will let you know. What time -- what kind of cancellation? Do you have to give them 30 days or something? MR. O'CONNOR: 45, which has -- THE COURT: Oh. MR. O'CONNOR: -- technically passed.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 39 of 41\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024 39 THE COURT: Yeah. MR. O'CONNOR: So we're looking for clarification. THE COURT: Well, again, I don't have it in front of me, so I'm a little bit at a disadvantage, but my recollection of the proceedings and the testimony of different people, including some of the testimony you've talked about, both of you have talked about today, and what I found in connection with the preliminary injunction, which obviously is a preliminary injunction, and I understand all your rights and remedies with regard to that, is that, yes, AIG was going to continue to provide insurance -- MR. O'CONNOR: Okay. THE COURT: -- to Genever as long as there was payment of premium. MR. O'CONNOR: Sure. Understood, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. MR. O'CONNOR: We'll proceed on that basis, unless the Court tells us otherwise. THE COURT: And I'll tell you why else I believe that's accurate, even though I don't have the preliminary injunction in front of me, but I have recollections, you know, which you can correct if you think I'm wrong, but there was a whole section of that hearing about the inability to obtain other insurance, right? MR. O'CONNOR: There was. There was.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 40 of 41\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024 40 THE COURT: And the -- and in a Chapter 11 -- in a Chapter 7 case, it doesn't even have to be a Chapter 11, an asset can't be uninsured. It just can't. And so -- I mean, it can, but that's a problem, that's a much bigger problem. Right? And my, again, recollection is that I think I made it clear to Trustee Despins that the estate has to pay. You've got pay the premium. Okay? MR. O'CONNOR: The Court made that clear. THE COURT: But if the premium is paid, then, yes, the coverage should continue. MR. O'CONNOR: Okay. THE COURT: Okay? MR. O'CONNOR: We will -- thank you, Your Honor. We'll proceed down the path of renewal unless the Court at some point tells us otherwise. THE COURT: Yeah. And I would tell you that I don't -- I believe I will not tell you anything other than that, but I will certainly go back and look at it based upon your request today. MR. O'CONNOR: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. MR. McCORMACK: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, all. Does that conclude anything we need to do in the\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 41 of 41\n\n|    | Ho Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024                             | 41 |\n|----|------------------------------------------------------------|----|\n| 1  | Kwok cases today, Trustee Despins?                         |    |\n| 2  | MR. DESPINS:<br>Yes, Your Honor.                           |    |\n| 3  | THE COURT:<br>Okay.<br>All right.<br>Thank you, all.       |    |\n| 4  | (Proceedings concluded at 3:08 p.m.)                       |    |\n| 5  | I, CHRISTINE FIORE, court-approved                         |    |\n| 6  | transcriber and certified electronic reporter and          |    |\n| 7  | transcriber, certify that the foregoing is a correct       |    |\n| 8  | transcript from the official electronic sound recording of |    |\n| 9  | the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.              |    |\n| 10 |                                                            |    |\n| 11 |                                                            |    |\n| 12 | February 7, 2024                                           |    |\n| 13 | Christine Fiore, CERT                                      |    |\n| 14 |                                                            |    |\n| 15 |                                                            |    |\n| 16 |                                                            |    |\n| 17 |                                                            |    |\n| 18 |                                                            |    |\n| 19 |                                                            |    |\n| 20 |                                                            |    |\n| 21 |                                                            |    |\n| 22 |                                                            |    |\n| 23 |                                                            |    |\n| 24 |                                                            |    |\n| 25 |                                                            |    |\n|    |                                                            |    |","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院布里奇波特分庭\n\n关于　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　＊　案件编号：22-50073 (JAM)\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）及 GENEVER\nHOLDINGS CORPORATION（Genever控股公司），　＊\n\n债务人。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　＊\n\nGENEVER HOLDINGS LLC（Genever控股有限责任公司），　＊　对抗程序编号：23-05007\n\n原告，　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　＊\n\n诉　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　＊\n\n　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　＊　康涅狄格州布里奇波特\n\nAIG PROPERTY CASUALTY　　　　　　＊　2024年1月30日\nCOMPANY（AIG财产意外保险公司），　　＊\n\n被告。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　＊\n\n＊　＊　＊　＊　＊　＊　＊　＊　＊　＊　＊　＊　＊　＊　＊　＊　＊　＊\n\n在尊敬的 JULIE A. MANNING（朱莉·A·曼宁）美国联邦破产法官面前进行的程序记录\n\n第51号简易判决动议\n\n出庭人员：\n\n代表 Genever Holdings LLC：\n\nMICHAEL T. McCORMACK, ESQ.（迈克尔·T·麦考马克，律师）\nO'Sullivan McCormack Jensen & Bliss PC（奥沙利文·麦考马克·延森与布利斯律师事务所）\n180 Glastonbury Blvd.\nSuite 206\nGlastonbury, CT 06033\n\n第11章受托人：\n\nLUC A. DESPINS, ESQ.（吕克·A·德斯潘，律师）\nPaul Hastings LLP（保罗·哈斯廷斯律师事务所）\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, NY 10166\n\n程序由电子录音记录，记录文本由速记服务机构制作。\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷记录与速记服务公司）\nShelton, CT 06484\n(203)732-6461\n\n出庭人员：（续）\n\n代表 AIG Property Casualty：\n\nJOHN FREDERICK O'CONNOR, JR., ESQ.（小约翰·弗雷德里克·奥康纳，律师）\nSteptoe & Johnson LLP（思特普托与约翰逊律师事务所）\n1330 Connecticut Avenue, NW\nWashington, DC 20036\n\nMICHAEL P. THOMPSON, ESQ.（迈克尔·P·汤普森，律师）\nGordon & Rees LLP（戈登与里斯律师事务所）\nGorden Rees Scully Mansukhani\n95 Glastonbury Blvd.\nSuite 206\n\nGlastonbury, CT 06033\n\n案件 22-50073，文书 2585，提交日期 02/07/24，登记日期 02/07/24 21:27:14，第 3 页，共 41 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2024年1月30日　3\n\n（程序于下午2时10分开始。）\n\n法庭：本案下午2时列入日程，因此请法庭书记员宣读日程。\n\n法庭书记员：案件编号23-5007，Genever Holdings LLC诉AIG Property Casualty Company。\n\n法庭：下午好。请各位为记录说明出庭身份。\n\n麦考马克先生：下午好，法官阁下。我代表原告Genever Holdings LLC，我是来自O'Sullivan McCormack Jensen & Bliss的迈克尔·麦考马克。\n\n法庭：下午好。\n\n麦考马克先生：与我一同出庭的是吕克·德斯潘。\n\n德斯潘先生：第11章受托人，法官阁下。谢谢。\n\n法庭：下午好。\n\n奥康纳先生：下午好，法官阁下。约翰·奥康纳和迈克尔·汤普森代表AIG出庭。\n\n法庭：下午好。\n\n汤普森先生：下午好，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：那么，麦考马克先生，这是你方的动议，正确吗？\n\n麦考马克先生：是的，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：请继续。\n\n麦考马克先生：谢谢。法官阁下是否倾向于让我在席位处陈述，还是——\n\n案件 22-50073，文书 2585，提交日期 02/07/24，登记日期 02/07/24 21:27:14，第 4 页，共 41 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2024年1月30日　4\n\n法庭：你可以——你可以在任何你觉得舒适的地方陈述。\n\n麦考马克先生：谢谢，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：本院对此没有意见。\n\n麦考马克先生：法官阁下，这是我方就对抗程序诉状第四项罪名提出的简易判决动议；我方请求作出确认判决，确认AIG Property and Casualty Company有义务根据其向Genever Holdings签发的保险单中财产保险保障部分提供保险保障，保险期间为2023年3月6日至2024年3月6日。我方请求确认性救济，确认Genever有权就其因火灾遭受的火灾损失获得保险保障，该等损失表现为财产损坏和室内物品损失。正如我方在书面意见中所指出，在涉及保险保障的确认判决诉讼中，有两个问题。其一是——被保险人是否已根据保险协议触发保险保障？如果已触发，保险公司是否已履行其举证责任，证明某项除外责任明确且毫不含糊地将该损失排除在保险保障之外。根据无争议事实及案卷证据，Genever已根据财产保险单的保险协议确立保险保障。\n\n案件 22-50073，文书 2585，提交日期 02/07/24，登记日期 02/07/24 21:27:14，第 5 页，共 41 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2024年1月30日　5\n\n该财产保险单的保险协议。首先，就财产保险保障而言，这是一份全险保险单。根据其明确条款，该保险单向记名被保险人Genever提供保障，承保对您的房屋、室内物品及其他永久性建筑物造成直接物理损失或损害的一切风险。根据保险单的明确条款，“您”或“您的”定义为记名被保险人Genever Holdings。因此，就全险保险单项下的财产损失保险保障而言，被保险人必须证明三项事项。第一，存在一份全险保险单。第二，被保险人对保险单标的及被保险室内物品具有可保利益。第三，被保险财产发生了意外损失。正如我方在书面意见中所述，根据无争议事实和法律，这三项要件在本案中均已满足。第一，如我方所述，这是一份全险保险单。这由保险单明确条款所决定，且属于本院应裁决的法律问题。第二，无争议的是，Genever Holdings LLC\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2024年1月30日　6\n\n是发生火灾并据此请求保险保障的位于Sherry-Netherland的第18层公寓的所有人。第三，无争议且不可能存在争议的是，这对记名被保险人而言属于意外损失。正如我方在书面意见中所指出，意外损失——某项损失是否属于意外，属于法律问题。除非损失系因固有缺陷、通常磨损或被保险人的故意不当行为所致，否则该损失属于意外损失。没有证据表明Genever Holdings LLC存在任何故意行为。也没有证据表明这涉及——因固有缺陷或通常磨损造成的损失。因此，我方认为，我方在简易判决动议中提出的证据无争议，我方已触发AIG根据保险单全险部分提供保险保障的义务。现在，为避免提供保险保障，AIG必须提出证据，证明某项保险除外责任明确且毫不含糊地适用。正如我方在书面意见中所指出，这对保险公司而言是一项沉重负担。为依据除外责任避免提供保险保障，保险人必须证明某项除外责任的措辞明确且\n\n案件 22-50073，文书 2585，提交日期 02/07/24，登记日期 02/07/24 21:27:14，第 6 页，共 41 页\n\n案件 22-50073，文书 2585，提交日期 02/07/24，登记日期 02/07/24 21:27:14，第 7 页，共 41 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2024年1月30日　7\n\n不容置疑，不存在任何其他解释，并且显然适用于本案的具体事实。在本案中，在Genever已证明其在全险保险单项下遭受损失后，AIG并未提出任何证据证明存在一项排除保险保障的除外责任。在其反对意见及特别抗辩中，AIG列举了三项或四项除外责任。其并未称这些除外责任适用。其只是称，如果或在何种程度上该等除外责任适用，Genever便无权获得保险保障。其并未履行证明任何除外责任适用这一沉重举证责任。其列举了一项故意行为除外责任、一项不诚实行为除外责任、一项商业财产除外责任，以及一项——我忘了另一项是什么，但在我方书面意见中，抱歉，法官阁下——但其并不依据——其并未援引商业财产除外责任，也未提出任何证据证明商业财产除外责任或其他除外责任适用。其在此提出的论点，而这至关重要，是火灾的原因和起因以及Kwok先生是否可能参与火灾存在事实争议。但对于Genever是否有权获得\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷记录与速记服务公司）\n\n确认性救济这一问题而言，这些根本不是事实\n\n案件 22-50073，文书 2585，提交日期 02/07/24，登记日期 02/07/24 21:27:14，第 8 页，共 41 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2024年1月30日　8\n\n争议。\n\n其原因在于，第一，Genever在全险保险单项下无需证明损失的确切原因。其仅须证明该损失为意外损失，且不涉及Genever的故意行为。这一点在本案中已经确立。\n\nAIG在其书面意见中始终主张，而且我认为其在整个案件中均一直主张，Kwok先生以某种方式属于保险单项下的被保险人，或者其认为Kwok先生属于保险单项下的被保险人；如果他属于保险单项下的被保险人，其便能够援引除外责任，即故意行为除外责任和不诚实行为除外责任。\n\n本院为表明——为认定AIG未履行其举证责任、未能证明其可依据除外责任避免就财产损失提供保险保障，仅需查看除外责任明确且毫不含糊的条款。这些条款载于保险单中，为第21项和第22项除外责任。\n\n故意行为除外责任具体规定：对于由您、您的配偶或家庭成员实施、指使或依其指示实施，并意图造成损失或\n\n案件 22-50073，文书 2585，提交日期 02/07/24，登记日期 02/07/24 21:27:14，第 9 页，共 41 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2024年1月30日　9\n\n损害，且其后果可由理性人预见的任何行为所造成的任何损失，我方不予承保。该措辞意义重大，因为其仅限于由您、您的配偶或家庭成员实施的行为。根据保险单明确且毫不含糊的条款及定义，“您”和“您的”明确指Genever LLC，并不指个人。因此，AIG未能履行其举证责任，未能证明故意行为除外责任使其得以避免根据保险单的财产保险保障部分提供保险保障。不诚实行为除外责任为第22项除外责任。供本院参阅，我所指的是保险单第21页（共45页），文书编号66-5。同样，不诚实行为除外责任规定：对于由您或任何家庭成员实施、指使或依其指示实施的任何不诚实或犯罪行为所造成的任何损失，我方不予承保。同样，“您”的该项定义仅限于Genever Holdings。因此，法官阁下，就此而言——没有任何事实基础可供AIG据以证明，或者其已经证明，这些除外责任适用。我想回应其就以下事实提出的论点：其——或者其主张，其被引导相信Kwok先生是Genever LLC的成员，而其在火灾发生后得知该说法并不真实，Genever (BVI)才是该有限责任公司的成员。\n\n案件 22-50073，文书 2585，提交日期 02/07/24，登记日期 02/07/24 21:27:14，第 10 页，共 41 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2024年1月30日　10\n\n正如我方在提交的文件中，特别是在答复书面意见中所主张，该问题并未在本案中产生任何重大事实争议，因为保险单明确条款将保险单的财产保险保障限于对记名被保险人Genever的保障。无争议的是，自2018年至火灾发生之日，Genever始终是这间发生火灾的公寓的所有人。AIG在其书面意见中提出的论点——而且其提出得不正确——是，倘若Kwok先生是Genever LLC的成员，他便会是保险单项下的被保险人。其主张，其以某种方式可以提出，如果他参与了火灾，或者——如果对于他是否参与火灾存在事实争议，那么这应当阻却简易判决，因为届时被保险人将会——将会存在被保险人是否参与火灾的问题。但正如我方在答复书面意见中所主张，且这再次依据保险单明确条款，该条款属于由本院解释的法律问题，AIG所依据的是所谓附加被保险人批单，或者，抱歉，是被保险人批单；该批单载于保险单中，具体为第44页（共45页），以及文书编号66-5的第45页。这正是AIG所依据的文件，以\n\n案件 22-50073，文书 2585，提交日期 02/07/24，登记日期 02/07/24 21:27:14，第 11 页，共 41 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- January 30, 2024 11 表示，他们理解郭先生是 Genever LLC（Genever有限责任公司）的成员，并且他们相信他本应是该保单项下的附加被保险人。但是，该批单依其明确且无歧义的条款，仅适用于保单项下的责任保险保障，即有人起诉 Genever LLC，主张 Genever 对某类损失承担责任的情形。这就是责任保险保障。第四项救济请求寻求的是财产保险保障项下的财产损失赔偿。这是完全独立的保险保障要素。而该被保险人批单所述的一切是，就责任保险保障而言，责任仅适用于因拥有上述所列住所而产生的事故。此外，该有限责任公司的成员和经理，就该房屋的所有权而言，属于被保险人。正如我所说，这仅表明，如果有限责任公司有一名个人成员，并且针对该成员提出责任索赔，则该成员可能仅为责任保险保障之目的而属于该保单项下的被保险人。这并不改变财产保险的条款。\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024 12 该保单的保险保障部分，即保单第二部分。这就是为什么 AIG（美国国际集团）主张其不知何故被误导而相信郭先生是成员，并据此签发保单，毫无实质性区别，也不会产生事实争议。因为在任何时候，根据该——在任何时候，AIG 均以 Genever 为记名被保险人签发保单。对此没有争议。对于 Genever 在任何时候均拥有该公寓，也没有争议。根据保单的明确条款，财产保险保障仅适用于 Genever 所拥有的财产。该保单不为非保单记名被保险人提供保险保障。在反对简易判决动议时，有人主张该动议为时过早，并且有必要——需要就多项议题进行证据开示。再次，如我们在答辩状中指出，不存在任何额外证据开示能够就 Genever 是否在保单第二部分下享有财产保险保障产生实质性事实争议。原因在于，这是一份一切险保单。法院审查保单条款，并确定 Genever 是否已履行其启动保险保障的举证责任，以及 AIG 是否已证明其 案号 22-50073 文档 2585 提交于 02/07/24 登记于 02/07/24 21:27:14 第12页，共41页\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024 13 已履行证明某项除外责任适用的沉重举证责任，而其并未履行。他们主张，证据开示可能确定火灾的起因或源头。如我先前所述，为根据该保单确立财产保险保障，起因和源头并非证明要素。他们还主张，他们可能——他们希望就 2018 年的投保申请程序进行证据开示。再次，如我所解释，无论郭先生是该有限责任公司的成员，还是——事实是 Genever (BVI)（Genever（英属维尔京群岛））是 Genever LLC 的唯一成员，这都不会改变保单的明确条款。我认为，对法院而言同样重要的是，没有任何证据表明 Genever LLC 作出过任何虚假陈述。但重要的是，即使您接受他们的论点，即他们希望通过证据开示确定郭先生是否为 Genever LLC 的成员以及 AIG 的想法，这对于 2023 年发生的事件而言也无关紧要。因为如我先前所解释，如果郭先生是 Genever LLC 的成员，如 AIG 所称其相信的那样，他也仅会或可能仅会在有限情形下为责任保险目的而受保。这对于 案号 22-50073 文档 2585 提交于 02/07/24 登记于 02/07/24 21:27:14 第13页，共41页\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024 14 财产保险保障而言不会——不会产生区别。因此，无论他们查明什么，对于 AIG 为该公寓楼承保的风险均无区别。第二，如法院所知，并如我们在书状中提出，在 August of 2022，郭先生被剥夺了其在任何财产或任何公司中拥有的任何经济所有权或任何权利。因此，即使——即使 AIG 相信他在 2018 年是 Genever LLC 的成员，截至 August of 2022 和 September of '22，他已被剥夺任何所有权权益，而 Clair Ebrehart（克莱尔·埃布雷哈特）被列为——或者说，被任命为 Genever (BVI) 的董事，因而该公司——即 Genever LLC 的成员。因此，当时间推进至 March 的火灾时，关于郭先生作为个人可能拥有的任何所有权权益或成员权益，并不存在争议，尽管 AIG 称其相信他拥有该等权益。因此，法官阁下，关键在于，2018 年发生的任何事情都不会改变此处保单语言的明确条款，也不会改变无争议的事实，即如果他在 2018 年是该有限责任公司的成员，他本会在 August of 2022 的本破产程序中被解除成员资格。最后，您知道，再次，这与 案号 22-50073 文档 2585 提交于 02/07/24 登记于 02/07/24 21:27:14 第14页，共41页\n\n案号 22-50073 文档 2585 提交于 02/07/24 登记于 02/07/24 21:27:14 第15页，共41页\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024 15 郭先生是否为该保单项下被保险人的问题有关，AIG 主张应禁止 Genever 主张他不是该保单项下的被保险人。如我们在书状中提出，禁止反言问题不会产生事实争议，因为 AIG 不能利用禁止反言问题改变保单的明确条款。接受 AIG 的论点，实际上将要求法院改写该保单第二部分财产保险保障的明确且无歧义的条款。如我们在答辩状中所述，法院不得如此行事。因此，总而言之，法官阁下，我认为，根据案卷证据，对于 Genever 已履行其证明有权获得保单项下财产保险保障的举证责任，并不存在任何争议。AIG 未能提出证据，即可采证据，以第一，表明某项除外责任明确且无歧义地排除了保险保障，或者表明对于某一特定除外责任是否适用存在事实争议。因此，根据法律，Genever 有权获得确认性判决，确认其根据保单条款享有财产保险保障。\n\n案号 22-50073 文档 2585 提交于 02/07/24 登记于 02/07/24 21:27:14 第16页，共41页\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024 16 谢谢您，法官阁下。法庭：我只有一个问题。Mr. McCORMACK（麦考马克先生）：当然。法庭：我认为我明白了，但我想确保我确实明白。在我听取 Attorney O'Connor（奥康纳律师）的陈述之前，我想——您说过，而且我相信这就是您的意思，所以我只是想确保我的理解准确，即 Genever LLC 的成员构成在 2022 年发生了变化。您说的是受托人在 BVI 进行的、改变成员构成的程序？Mr. McCORMACK：正是如此，法官阁下。法庭：好的。这正是我想确认的。Mr. McCORMACK：是。法庭：好的。Mr. McCORMACK：是。法庭：谢谢。Mr. McCORMACK：还有，就他们声称需要更多证据开示这一点，我认为重要的是要记住，如我们在书状中指出，他们自去年约 May 起就可以就起因和源头或任何事项进行他们希望进行的证据开示，而且他们——他们已经进行了一些证据开示，只是没有继续进行任何额外的证据开示。\n\n案号 22-50073 文档 2585 提交于 02/07/24 登记于 02/07/24 21:27:14 第17页，共41页\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024 17 在该动议提出后，他们没有就我们的简易判决中提出的问题进行任何证据开示。截至目前，他们也没有进行任何证据开示。因此，他们主张，在法院就简易判决作出裁定之前，他们希望进行额外证据开示，不应被接受。7 法院拥有解释该保单并依法确定 Genever 是否已启动或证明其有权获得保单财产保险保障部分保险保障所需的一切资料。谢谢。法庭：谢谢。奥康纳律师。Mr. O'CONNOR（奥康纳先生）：法官阁下，我将在讲台上陈述。法庭：当然。以您觉得舒适的方式为准。Mr. O'CONNOR：谢谢您，法官阁下。我们今天所处的程序阶段，与初步禁令动议时存在的程序阶段大为不同。在初步禁令听证会上，法院需要作出事实认定，这是预期之中的，也是可以理解的，并且是适当的。这并不是我们目前所处的程序阶段。\n\n案号 22-50073 文档 2585 提交于 02/07/24 登记于 02/07/24 21:27:14 第18页，共41页\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024 18 目前，所有存在争议的实质性事实问题都必须作有利于我的当事人的认定。而且我们还有四个月的证据开示时间。因此，问题实际上甚至不是，当前存在的所有事实争议中，是否有任何争议足以排除简易判决；而是，我们是否真的可以说——我是否能够自信地说，在我们剩余四个月的证据开示期间，不会形成任何新的事实争议。我的意思是，法院在 November 设定了证据开示进度，规定了七个月的证据开示期限。我们还剩该期间的四个月。我认为 AIG 有此权利。我的意思是，我认为我们目前拥有的证据足以击败简易判决，但我们有权继续补充这些证据，并且我们还有四个月时间这样做。并没有要求必须在第一月做这个、第二月做那个。我们有七个月进行证据开示，该期限一直持续至 May 17th。我想谈谈——McCormack 先生谈到的事项之一，是 AIG 在本案中提出的各项抗辩。其中我认为有三项对于本动议尤其重要。它们是\n\nHo Wan Kwok - January 30, 2024 19 虚假陈述、禁止反言，以及包含在其中的代理概念。这三项的共同之处在于，它们几乎从来都不适宜通过简易判决解决。特别是在——在证据开示尚未完成时，因为这些问题深深植根于——它们涉及深层的事实问题。我想从虚假陈述开始，因为我认为 Genever 对该问题的表述不正确。我认为 Genever 并未认真主张，AIG 在 2018 年签发首批保单时或在 2023 年续保时，被告知了有关 Genever 所有权的正确事实。AIG 从经纪人 Wolfson（沃尔夫森）处获得的理解是，郭先生是该有限责任公司的唯一成员。因为正如 Jordan Gerber（乔丹·格伯）在初步禁令听证会上作证的那样，而其证言已载入简易判决案卷，AIG 通常向其销售保险的市场是个人。有时这些个人会拥有一个有限责任公司，因为他们想要，您知道，不让其姓名出现在财产记录中或其他原因，但他们希望有一个个人为该财产承担责任。因此，该论点，他们将虚假陈述 案号 22-50073 文档 2585 提交于 02/07/24 登记于 02/07/24 21:27:14 第19页，共41页\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2024年1月30日 20 仿佛这必然会以某种方式涉及本案中的其他抗辩理由之一，但事实并非如此。根据纽约州法律，我认为各方都同意该法律适用于本案，如果向保险人作出虚假陈述，以致保险人若知悉真实事实便不会签发保单，则保险人有权据此拒绝承保并撤销保单。简易判决记录中有什么？Gerber（格伯）先生在初步禁令听证会上的证词，我们还有他的声明；他在第8段中说了什么？AIG（美国国际集团）的 PCG，即私人客户组，如果其核保人员被正确告知是一家控股公司而非 Kwok（郭）先生拥有 Genever（吉尼弗），则不会基于收到的信息签发该等保单。不会签发。在简易判决阶段，法院必须采信这一点。因此，如果本案审理中的事实裁判者认定该事实成立，那么我们将有权基于虚假陈述而拒绝承保，因为我们承保的是一批我们并不了解的个人和实体。AIG 的理解是，其承保的是 Genever Holdings（一家有限责任公司），该公司仅拥有这套公寓、另外几间佣人宿舍以及一名个人；而实际上，它承保的是一家英属维尔京群岛公司。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 2585 提交日期 02/07/24 录入日期 02/07/24 21:27:14 第 20 页，共 41 页\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 2585 提交日期 02/07/24 录入日期 02/07/24 21:27:14 第 21 页，共 41 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2024年1月30日\n\n1　而这变得重要，并非因为该英属维尔京群岛公司在从事其他业务，而是因为随后，当受托人在2022年末介入并变更 Genever (BVI) 的所有权时，AIG 并不知道这一所有权变更，以及保单项下被保险人身份状况的变更，已经发生，因为该变更是在 Genever Holdings 之上完成的。它是在英属维尔京群岛层面完成的。因此，存在虚假陈述。\n\n10　现在，Genever 所说的一件事是，嗯，虚假陈述是由经纪人转达给 AIG 的。法院在初步禁令阶段作出认定，当时法院必须对事实作出判断，即在审判中，经纪人更有可能被认定为 AIG 的代理人。\n\n16　现在，恕我们直言，我们不同意法院在该问题上的认定。我们承认法院必须作出认定，而且作出认定是适当的。在现阶段作出认定并不适当，因为现在我们谈论的不是禁令救济，而是整个案件。我们谈论的是判决。我们不会基于法院对证据的权衡，在简易判决阶段作出判决。\n\n25　这里的证据，以及 Gerber 先生在其声明第23段中对此说得非常清楚，他说，Wolfson（沃尔夫森）从未就向 Genever 签发保险保单一事作为 AIG 的代理人行事。Wolfson 就 AIG 保单的签发和续保事宜代表 Genever 行事。是否签发或续保 Genever——Genever 的保单，由 AIG 根据 Genever 及其经纪人 Wolfson 向其提供的信息作出决定。因此，简易判决记录中有 Gerber 先生明确的证据，证明 Wolfson 是代表保单持有人而非代表 AIG 行事，对保单签发不具有任何授权。该授权仅属于 AIG，在简易判决阶段必须予以采信。接下来谈到禁止反言，正如我们在书面陈述中所述并在初步禁令听证会上所说，我们的一个观点是，应禁止 Genever 否认 Kwok 先生是 Genever Holdings LLC 的唯一成员，因为 AIG 曾被告知他是该唯一成员，AIG 在签发及续保保单时也是基于此行事。而当发生火灾时，这一点就变得重要。天知道，我并非暗示 Despins（德斯平斯）先生与火灾有关，但 AIG 的理解是，Genever 的所有人是 Kwok 先生，而非 Despins 先生；而事实证明，后者才是未向 AIG 披露的事实。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 2585 提交日期 02/07/24 录入日期 02/07/24 21:27:14 第 22 页，共 41 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2024年1月30日 23 而且 Genever——其误读了房主保单末尾的 LLC 批单。那里有两句话。一句话说，为承担责任之目的，LLC 的成员属于附加被保险人。另一句话说，就该房产的所有权而言，他们属于被保险人。因此，你知道，按照 AIG 一贯的理解，Kwok 先生就根据该等保单签发的财产保险和责任保险而言均是被保险人。现在，我们在书面陈述中引用了若干案件，它们指出禁止反言几乎不应在简易判决阶段作出裁定，因为其中深深嵌入了有关信赖、合理信赖的事实问题；这些问题应在审判中查明。一般不应在简易判决阶段查明，尤其不应在距离证据开示截止尚有四个月、且所有事实尚未查明的简易判决阶段作出查明。我想补充一点，在证据开示进行到一半时分阶段作出简易判决，没有实际益处，而且推定在证据开示结束时将会提出简易判决动议。第一，基于我在这里所说的理由，如果法院在记录中有关于虚假陈述、禁止反言和代理关系的明确事实、且尚有四个月的证据开示将被切断、缩短时批准简易——部分简易判决，至少就财产保单下的承保范围而言，我们认为这将把错误注入这一程序；而在四个月或五个月后，无论简易判决期限何时届满，我们都不得不在某个时候重新进行全部程序，因为届时还会再次处理简易判决。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 2585 提交日期 02/07/24 录入日期 02/07/24 21:27:14 第 24 页，共 41 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2024年1月30日\n\n11　但从实际角度看，这甚至不会推进该请求，因为部分简易判决并不能推进该请求的最终解决，因为你不能执行授予部分简易判决的裁定。\n\n15　它也不会以任何有意义的方式真正缩小证据开示范围，因为正如 Genever 指出，我们需要就本案中的所有其他请求进行证据开示，其中包括 Genever 提出的第三方责任请求，以及 Genever 在12月修改其起诉状时增加的恶意请求。\n\n21　因此，在证据开示进行到一半，或者甚至尚未进行到一半时暂停下来，并说我现在要对此作出裁定，并没有实际益处，因为记录中充满了证据。第一，我正在反驳 Genever 就虚假陈述、禁止反言和代理关系所采取的立场。第二，关于火灾原因，仍需进行证据开示，而这很可能会影响本案中的多项抗辩理由。第三，这样做根本没有实际益处。如果法院有问题，我很乐意回答，但我们只是认为在证据开示期间作出这一裁定为时过早。我认为 Gerber 先生的声明清楚列明了关于虚假陈述、代理关系和禁止反言的争议事实。\n\n法院：我目前唯一的问题是，我手边没有保单的页码引注。你说保单中有一项条款支持你的论点，即如果 Kwok 先生是该 LLC 的成员，他将是附加被保险人——我不知道这是否是你所使用的确切术语，因此很抱歉，我可能使用了错误的术语——但在你谈论经纪人以及经纪人是否确实是 AIG 的代理人时，你在论证虚假陈述，并说——你指引我查看一项我不知道自己此前是否看过的条款。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 2585 提交日期 02/07/24 录入日期 02/07/24 21:27:14 第 25 页，共 41 页\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 2585 提交日期 02/07/24 录入日期 02/07/24 21:27:14 第 26 页，共 41 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2024年1月30日\n\n1　O'Connor（奥康纳）先生：我可以向法官阁下指出该条款。\n\n2　法院：好的。\n\n3　O'Connor 先生：并且澄清一下论点，虚假陈述实际上与 LLC 批单没有太大关系，因为对虚假陈述而言，真正重要的是 AIG 被告知一组事实，这些事实是虚假的或不正确的，即使是无意中不正确的；并且如果 AIG 知道真相，它实际上不会签发其所签发的保单。因此，这些甚至不涉及该问题。\n\n11　但该批单确实涉及与禁止反言有关的问题。\n\n13　法院：好的。\n\n14　O'Connor 先生：页码是——ECF 66-5，PDF 第44至45页。它是证物倒数第二页。\n\n17　法院：好的。我只是想确保我有——我正在查看你要求我看的内容，嗯，你在论证期间所讨论的内容，我想确保我有正确的引注。\n\n21　O'Connor 先生：是的，法官阁下。还有一点我本应就禁止反言说但没有说的是，Genever 对禁止反言所说的其实是，你不能重写保单。我同意这一点，百分之百同意，但这并不是禁止反言在这里的作用。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 2585 提交日期 02/07/24 录入日期 02/07/24 21:27:14 第 27 页，共 41 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2024年1月30日 27 禁止反言在这里的作用，是禁止 Genever 主张一组与其在 AIG 签发和续保保单时向 AIG 所告知内容不一致的事实。我们并非试图改变保单所载内容。我们试图禁止 Genever 改变其最初向 AIG 所作陈述的立场。谢谢。\n\n法院：好的。谢谢。McCormack（麦科马克）先生，你想回应吗？\n\nMcCormack 先生：法官阁下，经法院许可，我能否用几分钟与我的当事人商议？\n\n法院：当然。当然。\n\nMcCormack 先生：谢谢。\n\n（暂停。）\n\nMcCormack 先生：法官阁下，我可以出去一下吗？\n\n法院：当然。\n\nMcCormack 先生：谢谢。\n\n（暂停。）\n\nMcCormack 先生：谢谢，法官阁下。我想请法院重新注意 O'Connor 律师——或者说 O'Connor 律师刚才提到的被保险人批单。正如我在开场部分所提到的，那是文件第66-5号。它是文件66-5的第44和45页。该批单并未\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 2585 提交日期 02/07/24 录入日期 02/07/24 21:27:14 第 28 页，共 41 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— 2024年1月30日 28 奥康纳律师所称的内容。其开头明确载明，就本批单提供的承保而言，除非本批单对保险单的条款作出变更，否则保险单的所有条款和条件均适用。随后有三个部分。A部分涉及第三部分，即责任险。第三部分责任险即保险单中关于责任承保的第三部分。我们请求的确认性救济依据的是保险单第二部分，即财产险。因此，该第一段不适用于本项财产承保请求。随后是B段。该段仅将 Genever Holdings LLC（杰内弗控股有限责任公司）的地址确定为纽约 Fifth Avenue 71号18层。这是由 Genever 所拥有的公寓所在地。随后，在我们此前讨论且奥康纳律师提及的页面中，所指的是：“第三部分——责任险。”同样，这是保险单第三部分，即责任承保，而不是我们简易判决动议所关注的保险单第二部分财产承保。该第三部分责任险章节规定，第三部分责任险仅适用于因上述所列住所的所有权而产生的事故。此外，有限责任公司的成员和经理、有限责任公司、信托或\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 2585 于 02/07/24 提交，于 02/07/24 21:27:14 登记，第 29 页，共 41 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— 2024年1月30日 29 受托人，就该住所的所有权而言，亦属于被保险人。根据本批单的明确条款，这仅适用于保险单的责任承保。之所以作出该规定，是因为在本批单的第一页，其变更了保险单责任承保章节的保险协议。该协议规定，对于被保险人因事故导致的人身伤害或财产损失而依法负有支付义务的损害赔偿，我们将予以支付。如我先前所述，这适用于有人向某人提出责任索赔的情形。本批单确定了为该责任索赔之目的哪些人为被保险人。我们所关注的措辞表明，如与房屋所有权有关，有限责任公司的成员个人可能为责任承保之目的的被保险人。我们在简易判决动议中所谈论的并非该问题。Genever 请求确认性救济，确认其有权获得保险单第二部分项下的财产承保。关于不实陈述问题，法律明确规定，AIG（美国国际集团）必须证明存在重大不实陈述。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 2585 于 02/07/24 提交，于 02/07/24 21:27:14 登记，第 30 页，共 41 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— 2024年1月30日 30 而且，如我先前所述，基于其认为郭先生是该有限责任公司的唯一成员，并不存在任何重大性问题，因为这并未改变保险单财产承保的条款。此外，如我先前所述，当 Despins 先生于22年8月通过公司治理命令被指定为受托人并被授予该有限责任公司的控制权，以及 Genever (BVI)（杰内弗〈英属维尔京群岛〉）的新董事获任命时，AIG 于22年12月获悉 Genever LLC（杰内弗有限责任公司）和 Genever (BVI) 的破产，并且其知悉发生于22年8月的控制权变更。三个月后，其于 2023年3月6日续保，该保险单适用于发生于 2023年3月15日的火灾损失。因此，曾发生控制权变更，而 Genever，抱歉，AIG 在其反对意见中并未处理该问题。我们在答复状中指出，保险单中没有任何内容规定，公司控制权变更或 Genever LLC 控制权变更将限制或取消承保。保险单中没有任何限制该事项的规定。事实上，我认为是在我们的答复状中指出，根据保险单的明确条款，本破产程序\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 2585 于 02/07/24 提交，于 02/07/24 21:27:14 登记，第 31 页，共 41 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— 2024年1月30日 31 不影响该保险单项下的承保。保险单中有一项条款规定，破产程序不影响 AIG 根据保险单明确条款提供承保的义务。就此而言，AIG 在2018年3月签发首份保险单时所理解的情况，与2023年3月签发新保险单时发生的情况无关紧要。但就 AIG 的论点而言，毫无争议的是，AIG 未指出保险申请中的任何内容构成不实陈述。我们可通过查阅所谓的承保签发请求得出该结论。该文件在法院记录中为第66-20号文件，第5页和第6页，以及第7页和第8页。若法院查阅该文件，将会发现，该约束承保请求或申请中并无任何陈述表明，就该公寓而言，被保险人并非 Genever Holdings LLC。没有提及任何个人为成员，也没有提及任何要求提供有关 Genever LLC 成员的信息。奥康纳律师援引了 Jordan 先生声明的第8段，该声明，不好意思，是 Gordon 先生的声明，其中并无任何可采证据足以形成实质性事实争议。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 2585 于 02/07/24 提交，于 02/07/24 21:27:14 登记，第 32 页，共 41 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— 2024年1月30日 32 因为 Gerber 先生在该段——该段中所说的是，AIG 依赖于经纪人在与 Gerber 先生的电话交谈和电子邮件中作出的陈述。而且，如我们在答复状的脚注中指出，没有任何证据证明经纪人与 Gerber 先生之间存在任何电话交谈或电子邮件，不好意思，其中作出了任何此类陈述。Gerber 先生在第8段承认，他不知道经纪人和 Wolfson 被告知了什么。他所说的是，他们不会签发一份由 Genever (BVI) 作为被保险人的保险单。再次说明，本案并非关于 Genever (BVI) 是否被保险的问题。本案涉及谁拥有该公寓，以及谁有权获得保险单第二部分，即财产部分项下的财产承保。而且，毫无争议的是，该承保仅限于列名被保险人，即 Genever Holdings LLC。毫无争议且不可能有争议的是，AIG 一直知悉并确实签发了一份以 Genever 为列名被保险人的保险单。而且，毫无争议的是，其知悉 Genever 拥有该公寓，并且该公寓——不好意思，拥有该公寓——即保险单第二部分财产承保项下受保险保障的公寓。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 2585 于 02/07/24 提交，于 02/07/24 21:27:14 登记，第 33 页，共 41 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— 2024年1月30日 33 因此，此处不存在任何需要进行额外证据开示的事项。AIG 有机会进行其为处理财产承保问题所需的任何证据开示，但其未提出任何证据，以适当反驳就该问题寻求确认性救济的有限简易判决动议，因此我们恭请准许该动议。谢谢，法官阁下。法院：谢谢。奥康纳律师，您是否希望作出回应？奥康纳先生：非常简短地回应，法官阁下。法院：当然。奥康纳先生：Genever 就不实陈述问题一直希望回到有限责任公司批单。但如我在陈述结尾所说，那并非该不实陈述抗辩的路径的一部分。问题是，AIG 是否被告知了不真实的事情？如果 AIG 知道真实事实，其是否会签发本保险单？Gerber 先生的声明对这些问题的答案再清楚不过，而且至少形成了事实争议。McCormack 先生说，嗯，没有证据表明提到了郭或者他的名字，但 Gerber 先生声明的第2至8段阐明了：我们接到 Wolfson 的电话，称他们有一名高净值个人。一位 Skivicki 女士（音）称其是 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）。他们问谁住在那里？被告知 Ho Wan Kwok 住在那里。随后有限责任公司批单送达，并称我出于隐私目的未在表格上填写该个人的姓名，因为他——嗯，我能想到他可能希望保持私密的许多原因——但该声明非常明确，其详细列出了电子邮件、电话\n\n交谈，因此，认为没有记录证据表明 AIG 被告知 Ho Wan Kwok 是拥有 Genever Holdings 的人，这一说法与记录不一致。\n\n我最后想说的是，关于向 Gerber 先生告知了什么、Gerber 先生做了什么以及他本会做什么的整场争论，在我看来极具事实性，而且这——这并非错误，因为这是一个受事实约束的问题。\n\n你知道，你可以进行审判，而事实认定者可能完全相信 Gerber 先生。他们也可能认为他作伪证。但这不是本程序在此处应当发挥的作用。\n\nGerber 先生已非常明确地表示，若其知悉真实\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 2585 于 02/07/24 提交，于 02/07/24 21:27:14 登记，第 35 页，共 41 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— 2024年1月30日\n事实，AIG 不会签发本保险单，而这应当在简易判决阶段予以接受。\n\n坦率地说，这已足以在本案目前阶段驳回部分简易判决动议。\n\n谢谢。\n\n法院：谢谢。\n\n好的。我感谢二位今天的辩论。我显然需要回去审阅你们提到的一些文件；我曾经看过，但近期未看，而且我不一定是在简易判决的背景下审阅过这些文件。\n\n因此，我还需要审阅这些文件以及你们在书状中援引的判例。\n\n我将对此事保留裁定，并在能够裁定时作出裁定。\n\n我要说明的是，我不能保证将在未来两周左右作出裁定。根据除本案之外其他案件中紧迫事项的情况，可能会稍长一些。\n\n但我理解这些问题。你们已经回答了我的问题，即我所提出的问题，我对此表示感谢。\n\n我认为，我知道仍有一个问题存在，你们双方在一段时间以前要求我讨论——裁定该问题，但我尚未作出裁定，再次不幸地，因为该事项——其优先级尚未提高，\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— 2024年1月30日 36 但请相信我，我知道该问题仍然存在。我知道你们希望我回答该问题。我将尝试在大致相同的时间处理这两件事，以便你们知道目前的情况，然后我们再继续处理。与此同时，已有一项审前命令生效。你们应当依照审前命令的条款和条件，采取你们认为适当的任何行动。我确实知道，我相信，在过去一天左右，本对抗程序中已根据同意签发了一项寻求某些证据开示的命令。奥康纳律师，我认为您正在向消防部门寻求某些证据开示，对吗？奥康纳先生：是的，法官阁下。法院：而且该命令已经登记了，我想，是吗？奥康纳先生：是的。法院：好的。奥康纳先生：该命令于昨天登记。法院：好的。那么我们将——我们将看看事态如何发展。但我感谢律师的陈述，并将对此保留裁定。奥康纳先生：谢谢，法官阁下。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 2585 于 02/07/24 提交，于 02/07/24 21:27:14 登记，第 36 页，共 41 页\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 2585 于 02/07/24 提交，于 02/07/24 21:27:14 登记，第 37 页，共 41 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- January 30, 2024　37　麦科马克先生：谢谢您，法官阁下。法院：好的。奥康纳先生：法官阁下，我能否提出一项事务性问题？法院：当然可以。奥康纳先生：这涉及法院作出的初步禁令裁定。关于房主保险单，我们的意见一致。责任险——超额保险单则是另一个问题。法院：对。奥康纳先生：法院指示 AIG 撤回取消通知，我们已经这样做了。法院：对。奥康纳先生：这些保险单将于下个月——三月到期。法院：哦，确实如此，不是吗？是的。奥康纳先生：所以问题是，我并不完全清楚法院的禁令是否旨在要求 AIG 为 Genever（杰纳维尔）继续维持某些保险保障。若这是法院的意图，他们将续保这些保险单。如果这不是法院的——如果法院的意图是你们持有这些保险单，就必须——你们不能取消它们。然后我们将——您知道，一切\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 38 of 41\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- January 30, 2024　38　其他事项顺其自然，那么就是另一个问题。我认为，至少根据与麦科马克先生的交谈，我认为他们的观点是，法院本意应当是 AIG 维持保险保障。我只是需要一个答复。法院：是的。您知道，我有一段时间没有回看初步禁令裁定了，我相信您可以理解。奥康纳先生：我理解。法院：我会去看。但我相信，是的，意图是只要遗产支付保费，AIG 就继续提供保险。对吗？我的意思是，那就是——您知道，显然如果遗产未支付保费，那是另一个问题。奥康纳先生：当然。法院：好的。但那就是——那是——在我没有看到初步禁令裁定的情况下，我几乎确信那就是该裁定的意图。如果出于某种原因我认为并非如此，我会告知您。取消保险需要多长时间——需要提前 30 天之类的吗？奥康纳先生：45 天，而这——法院：哦。奥康纳先生：——严格来说已经过了。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 39 of 41\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- January 30, 2024　39　法院：是的。奥康纳先生：因此我们寻求澄清。法院：嗯，再说一次，我手头没有该裁定，所以我略处于不利地位，但我对程序的记忆以及不同人士的证言——包括你们二位今天都谈到的一些证言——还有我在作出初步禁令时所作出的认定，显然，该禁令是一项初步禁令，我理解你们就此享有的一切权利和救济，是的，AIG 将继续提供保险——奥康纳先生：好的。法院：——给 Genever，只要支付保费。奥康纳先生：当然。明白了，法官阁下。法院：好的。奥康纳先生：除非法院另有告知，我们将据此办理。法院：即使我手头没有初步禁令，我也要告诉您我为何相信这是准确的，不过我有一些记忆，您知道，如果您认为我错了，可以予以纠正，但在那次听证中，有整整一节是关于无法获得其他保险的问题，对吗？奥康纳先生：有。确实有。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 40 of 41\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- January 30, 2024　40　法院：而且——在第 11 章——在第 7 章案件中，甚至不必是第 11 章案件，资产不能没有保险。就是不能。因此——我的意思是，可以没有保险，但那是个问题，是个大得多的问题。对吗？而且我再次记得，我认为我已向受托人德斯平斯（Trustee Despins）明确表示，遗产必须支付。你们必须支付保费。好的？奥康纳先生：法院已明确说明这一点。法院：但如果保费已支付，那么，是的，保险保障应当继续。奥康纳先生：好的。法院：好的？奥康纳先生：我们将——谢谢您，法官阁下。除非法院在某个时候另有告知，我们将沿续保的路径办理。法院：是的。而且我要告诉您，我不——我相信我不会告诉您任何与此不同的内容，但我当然会根据您今天的请求回去查看。奥康纳先生：谢谢您，法官阁下。法院：好的。谢谢。麦科马克先生：谢谢您，法官阁下。法院：好的。谢谢各位。德斯平斯受托人，今天我们在郭文贵案件中需要处理的事项是否至此全部结束？\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2585 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:27:14 Page 41 of 41\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- January 30, 2024　41\n\n1　郭文贵案件今天需要处理的事项是否至此全部结束，德斯平斯受托人？\n2　德斯平斯先生：是的，法官阁下。\n3　法院：好的。好吧。谢谢各位。\n4　（程序于下午 3:08 结束。）\n5　本人，CHRISTINE FIORE（克里斯汀·菲奥雷），经法院批准的记录誊写员及经认证的电子记录员和誊写员，特此证明，上述内容系根据上述案件程序的官方电子录音制作的准确记录。\n12　February 7, 2024\n13　Christine Fiore（克里斯汀·菲奥雷）, CERT","key_entities":["Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Despins","Guo","Je","Luc Despins","Paul Hastings"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":66,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":9508,"status":"published","published_at":"2024-02-07 00:00:00","created_at":"2024-02-07","updated_at":"2026-08-23 20:41:19"}