{"id":"court_ctb_2586_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":2586,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"UNKNOWN","filed_date":"2024-02-07","title":"| | UNITED STATES B","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"| | UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
BRIDGEPORT DIVISION |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| In Re | *
Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |\n| HO WAN KWOK and GENEVER
HOLDINGS CORPORATION, | *
*
*
* |\n| Debtors. | * |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11
TRUSTEE, | *
Adv. Proc. No. 23-05008
*
* |\n| Plaintiff, | * |\n| v.
MEI GUO, | *
*
Bridgeport, Connecticut
*
February 5, 2024 |\n| Defendant. | *
* |\n| * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * | * |\n| #2532
AVOIDANCE CLAIM ADVERSARY PROCEEDINGS
#88
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT | BEFORE THE HONORABLE JULIE A. MANNING
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
MOTION FOR ORDER APPROVING PROCEDURES APPLICABLE TO |\n| APPEARANCES: | |\n| For the Chapter 11 Trustee: | AVRAM EMMANUEL LUFT, ESQ.
Paul Hastings LLP
200 Park Avenue
New York, NY
10166 |\n| | PATRICK R. LINSEY, ESQ.
Neubert Pepe and Monteith
195 Church Street,13th Floor
New Haven, CT
06510 |\n| Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording,
transcript produced by transcription service. | Fiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.
Shelton, CT 06484 (203)732-6461 |\n| | |\n\nAPPEARANCES: (Cont'd) Chapter 11 Trustee: LUC A. DESPINS, ESQ. Paul Hastings LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166 For the U.S. Trustee: HOLLEY L. CLAIBORN, ESQ. Office of the United States Trustee The Giaimo Federal Building 150 Court Street, Room 302 New Haven, CT 06510 For the Creditors Committee: KRISTIN B. MAYHEW, ESQ. Pullman & Comley 850 Main Street Bridgeport, CT 06601 For the Creditor, Pacific STUART M. SARNOFF, ESQ. Alliance Asia Opportunity O'Melveny & Myers LLP Fund L.P.: Times Square Tower 7 Times Square New York, NY 10036 TREVOR L. BRADLEY, ESQ. Robinson & Cole LLP 1055 Washington Blvd. Stamford, CT 06901 For the Defendant, Mei Guo: MELISSA F. WERNICK, ESQ. Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi, PC 105 Eisenhauer Pkwy Roseland, NJ 07068 JAMES M. MORIARTY, ESQ. Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. 10 Middle Street, 15th FL Bridgeport, CT 06604\n\n2\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 3 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 3 (Proceedings commenced at 1:09 p.m.) THE COURT: We're now proceeding on the calendar at 1:00 p.m., so I ask the courtroom deputy to please call the calendar. THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Case No. 22-50073, Ho Wan Kwok, and Adversary No. 23-5008, Despins versus Guo. THE COURT: Good afternoon. If we could have appearances for the record starting with the Chapter 11 Trustee, please. MR. DESPINS: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Luc Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. LINSEY: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Patrick Linsey for the Trustee. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. LUFT: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Avi Luft on behalf of the Chapter 11 Trustee. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MS. CLAIBORN: Good afternoon. Holley Claiborn for the U.S. Trustee. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MS. WERNICK: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Melissa Wernick for Defendant Mei Guo in the adversary proceeding 23-5008. THE COURT: Good afternoon.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 4 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 4 MR. MORIARTY: Good afternoon, Your Honor. James Moriarty, from Zeisler & Zeisler, also for Ms. Guo in the adversary proceeding. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MS. MAYHEW: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Kristin Mayhew, Pullman & Comley, on behalf of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, appearing in the main case. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. SARNOFF: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Stuart Sarnoff, O'Melveny & Myers, on behalf of Creditor PAX, in the main case. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. BRADLEY: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Trevor Bradley, of Robinson & Cole, also for PAX. THE COURT: We couldn't hear you, Mr. Bradley. Could you just -- MR. BRADLEY: I apologize. THE COURT: That's okay. MR. BRADLEY: Trevor Bradley of Robinson & Cole for PAX. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. All right. On the calendar then in the main case is a motion filed by the Trustee in connection with administrative issues related to the filing of upcoming\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 5 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 5 adversary proceedings. And then in the adversary proceeding is the motion for summary judgment. So I would assume we're starting with the main case motion, Trustee Despins? MR. DESPINS: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. And, Mr. Linsey, I saw you stand. Are you going to be arguing that? MR. LINSEY: I will, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Go right ahead. MR. LINSEY: Thank you. May I approach? THE COURT: Yes, you may. Thank you. MR. LINSEY: Thank you, Your Honor. The Chapter 11 Trustee has filed a motion requesting that the Court approve of procedures that would govern the imminent avoidance actions which are expected to be filed. At this point, the Trustee expects to file in excess of 100 of these avoidance actions by February 15th. We have noted that in other cases courts in this circuit have approved litigation procedures that are meant to affect an orderly administration and procedural flow of these cases. We have tried to, you know, only include what we need I think in order for thing to move forward in an\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 6 orderly fashion, so I will just briefly outline what those procedures are. First, the avoidance procedures deal with the confidentiality provisions of the protective order, and with respect to the FDIC, the protective order addendum. Under the protective order and the protective order addendum, producing parties have marked certain documents confidential and highly confidential. That includes many of the bank records from which the transfers in the avoidance procedures were discovered, such that arguably these complaints and schedules attached to the complaints contain confidential and highly confidential information. So what the avoidance procedures do is they provide that notwithstanding anything in the protective order and the protective order addendum, provided that a defendant and the defendant's counsel sign the agreements that are attached to the addendum and the protective order becoming bound by them, the Trustee is permitted to provide those complaints to the defendant and the defendant's counsel. And I note that as to the defendant as well, because under the highly confidential provisions of the protective order, typically those would be attorney's eyes only. Case 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 6 of 57\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 7 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 7 In light of the limited information in these, in these complaints, which is generally transfers that went to the defendant in the complaint, we believe it's appropriate that the defendant should be able to see those. And in the interest of, you know, maximum notice, in addition to the notice procedures that were provided under the order expediting the hearing, the Trustee did send a copy of the motion by last Tuesday to anyone who produced discovery to the Trustee under the Rule 2004 order so that -- so that they had notice of these. So basically, anybody who had marked something confidential or highly-confidential has notice of what this -- what this sort of tweak is in that regard. Earlier today the Trustee filed a revised, proposed order on granting the motion that adds a provision, at the request of the FDIC, where -- which, in light of some of the statutory obligations it has governing privacy, wanted to see some additional language. And the reason that we had that conversation with the -- with the FDIC is the FDIC is one of those parties that we sent the -- we sent the motion to. What the -- what the confidentiality provisions will also do is they will relieve us and the Court of the obligation of having to file separate motions to seal in each and every one of these adversary proceedings, which\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 8 of 57\n\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024
8 |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | would be a burden to the Trustee and to the Court |\n| 2 | essentially to hear the same motion in excess of 100 times |\n| 3 | to decide the same thing. |\n| 4 | Does Your Honor have a question? |\n| 5 | THE COURT:
That motion to seal, that issue, |\n| 6 | you're only talking about the complaint though? |\n| 7 | MR. LINSEY:
Correct, Your Honor.
This is limited |\n| 8 | to the complaint -- |\n| 9 | THE COURT:
Okay. |\n| 10 | MR. LINSEY:
-- and we will -- |\n| 11 | THE COURT:
That's what I read.
That's my |\n| 12 | understanding. |\n| 13 | That if there was some other motions or something |\n| 14 | that needed to be filed that had seal issues, that might |\n| 15 | need to be sealed, you'd be filing a motion then with that? |\n| 16 | MR. LINSEY:
Absolutely, Your Honor. |\n| 17 | And it may be that there are issues that emerge |\n| 18 | that are common to many of these avoidance proceedings.
In |\n| 19 | that case, there is a procedure under the avoidance |\n| 20 | procedures for the Trustee to file a supplemental motion |\n| 21 | that would affect all of the avoidance procedures on notice |\n| 22 | to all of the avoidance defendants. |\n| 23 | But right here, what we're really limited to is, |\n| 24 | as far as the confidentiality and sealing goes, is the |\n| 25 | initial complaint. |\n| | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 9 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 9 Beyond that, the avoidance procedures provide additional time for the defendant to respond to the complaint, 60 days from the completion of service, and provide the Trustee 60 days to respond to any motion filed under 12(b) seeking to dismiss a complaint. Again, those provisions are largely in light of the volume of complaints that are expected to be filed. Further, the avoidance procedures provide that the clerk and the Court will not automatically schedule initial case conferences for each and every one of these avoidance proceedings. We didn't think it would be productive to have in excess of 100 pretrial conferences that, in light of the timing of the filing of these cases, would probably be bunched up a couple of months from now. Rather, we have a procedure whereby triggering from the response deadline for the defendant to respond to the complaint, the Trustee and the defendant will conference regarding the appropriate scheduling order, submit it to the Court for the Court's consideration, or if the parties cannot agree on a scheduling order, we'll request a pretrial conference. The defendant, of course, or the Trustee, any party, is free to request a pretrial conference at any time. And, you know, something else I'll point out is, any defendant that upon the filing of an adversary\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 10 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 10 proceeding feels that the avoidance procedures are not appropriate to that defendant, has the right to seek amendment of the procedures as to that amendment -- as to that defendant after the filing. So no one's locked into this. But, you know, at the same time, the procedures that I've outlined, we don't view them as burdensome to the defendants. If any of the defendants coming in disagree, they can -- they can bring that issue to the Court's attention at the appropriate time. So with that, I believe that's all I have unless Your Honor has any questions. THE COURT: I do have a few questions, but not very many. MR. LINSEY: Sure. THE COURT: The FDIC is only involved on behalf of one bank is my recollection in that protective -- that amendment to the protective order. It's not the FDIC as a whole, right? They've only filed an appearance. And that stipulated addendum is only with regard to a bank that begins with an S. MR. LINSEY: Signature Bank, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Right? Is that correct? MR. LINSEY: That's correct. However, there were a number of accounts at\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 11 Signature Bank. And I would call them particularly fertile accounts as far as avoidable transfers go. So I think that -- THE COURT: So you're saying there'll be more than one adversary proceeding in which a bank account at Signature Bank will be the subject of a proceeding or -- MR. LINSEY: Off the top of my head, I would estimate dozens. THE COURT: Okay. All right. I just want to make sure. They didn't file any other appearance that I'm aware of or filing other documents other than on behalf of Signature Bank? MR. LINSEY: Correct, Your Honor. I did speak with them several times after they got a copy of the motion last week and we were able to work out agreed upon language prior to the objection deadline. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Now I understand. I saw that you had a redline version of the order and that the 1974 Privacy Act language was at the request of the FDIC on -- as the receiver of the bank? MR. LINSEY: That's correct, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. MR. LINSEY: That applies to obligations that they have with respect to privacy that are -- that can be modified, but require an order from the Court with this\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 11 of 57\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 12 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 12 language, so that's why we've consented to put that language in. THE COURT: That's fine. Okay. With regard to the avoidance action procedures notice that you're going to file in every adversary proceeding -- MR. LINSEY: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: -- it says that it will be served -- that notice will be served like a summons and complaint with -- it doesn't refer to 7004, but you don't need to. And that's fine. I think the anticipation is, but it doesn't say it clearly, I don't -- and I don't think you need to change it, I'm just asking you this question, that the notice that you're going to file in each adversary proceeding, if this motion is granted, would be served along with the summons and complaint. Is that your anticipation? Because, to me, that seems to make the most sense. MR. LINSEY: That's correct, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. All right. Then I read -- MR. LINSEY: And I'll say it was a little vague on that and that was because we did not have the -- we did not know the timing of when the Court would consider this. THE COURT: Sure. MR. LINSEY: So just in case we were to have filed\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 13 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 13 and served previously -- THE COURT: Well, you might need to -- MR. LINSEY: -- but that is -- THE COURT: -- change this order a little bit anyways -- MR. LINSEY: Sure. THE COURT: -- so if you want to add to that paragraph B the Trustee shall serve a copy of the avoidance notice with the summons and complaint, you can do that too. So I -- when you filed this motion, or when the motion was filed, I talked with the clerk of the court obviously because the clerk of the court is going to need to address all these issues. Right? MR. LINSEY: Sure. THE COURT: And the -- I don't think we can do what you're asking in C, but I think there's a way to accomplish the same thing. Okay? MR. LINSEY: Okay. THE COURT: Because the problem will be if you file a -- I understand that it's only motions that, or at least I believe I understand, that it's only motions -- you would only file motions in the main case that have common issues in a number of adversary proceedings. Correct? That's the thought behind this paragraph C? MR. LINSEY: Correct, Your Honor.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 14 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 14 THE COURT: So the problem with that is, from the clerk's office perspective, and I understand it, is that it'll provide -- it can provide problems if there are any appeals because the document won't be in the adversary proceeding. So I suggested, and the clerk of the court thought it would work, and I think it will, I don't -- if you had -- this is -- this was the example I came up with. It doesn't mean that this is an example of what you would actually file, but that you're two or three months down the road. You've got, I don't know, 40 adversary proceedings in which you're agreeing to further extend the response date to the defendants, right, in those 40 out of 100 the way that it could be accomplished so you only have one document, even though it's going to have -- because you're still going to be filing a notice in each of the adversary proceedings, so you still were going to be filing a main document, at least this is the way I read it, a document in the main case and then notices of that document in each adversary proceeding? MR. LINSEY: I don't -- I don't believe that was the thought. The thought was that the -- by email, any counsel would be served or any defendant would be served, under 7004, if they weren't -- if they weren't appearing, a\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 15 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 15 certificate of service would be filed in the main case. The thought behind this, and obviously we're absolutely flexible about how to do that, how to do this, was, one, the burden to the Trustee of filing north of 100 kind of the same motion over and over again. And then the burden to the Court -- THE COURT: Yeah. I don't want you to have to do that -- MR. LINSEY: -- of having -- THE COURT: -- except you're going to -- MR. LINSEY: Yeah. THE COURT: -- have to do it in a certain way I think -- MR. LINSEY: Sure. THE COURT: -- a different way -- MR. LINSEY: Okay. THE COURT: -- than the main case. I think what you could do, and the clerk of the court believes that there's no problem with this -- MR. LINSEY: Okay. THE COURT: -- from CM/ECF perspective, okay, that you would just -- if it's a motion on consent to extend the time to reply, further extend the time to reply, you create one motion with all the captions in it of the cases and you just -- you're going to have to file it in all 40 of them,\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 16 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 16 but it's one document. MR. LINSEY: Okay. THE COURT: It's not -- it's not 40 documents. Okay? I think you're still going to have to file it in every one of them though. Because if there is an appeal, it's not -- it has to be -- that docket has to be correct and accurate, right? MR. LINSEY: Understood, Your Honor. THE COURT: And the district court, I'm not going to have the district court saying, well, wait a minute, you've got some notice. Or you don't even have it in the adversary, it's in the main case. You know. That's not how it works, right? So it might be a little burdensome insofar as it would have to be filed on numerous cases, however, it's the same document. You don't have to create 40 documents. MR. LINSEY: Understood, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay? So I think we can figure out a way. And if you -- and I -- the clerk in the court and I have, we talked about it today. Okay? So I mean, it's not -- if there's any issue after this hearing with regard to that, then the clerk of the court will reach out to you. But I think what the -- C would have to be modified to say that you can absolutely file a motion that's\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 17 of 57\n\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024
17 |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | common to more than one adversary proceeding, such as my |\n| 2 | example that I gave you, Attorney Linsey.
I don't know that |\n| 3 | that's, you know -- but that it's that you're going to have |\n| 4 | to file it in the -- you can put all the captions in one |\n| 5 | document, right? |\n| 6 | Or maybe, maybe the way we can do it is this too. |\n| 7 | You list all of them in the motion and it just gets filed. |\n| 8 | MR. LINSEY:
Yeah. |\n| 9 | THE COURT:
But the problem is what caption do you |\n| 10 | use if you do that?
That's part of the problem, right? |\n| 11 | MR. LINSEY:
I would suggest something in the |\n| 12 | form.
Obviously they're not going to be consolidated, but |\n| 13 | something consolidated, a caption that looks consolidated |\n| 14 | ish for this particular purpose in light of the fact that -- |\n| 15 | otherwise there are -- |\n| 16 | THE COURT:
Well, maybe you say -- |\n| 17 | MR. LINSEY:
-- going to be 20 pages of caption. |\n| 18 | Yeah. |\n| 19 | THE COURT:
I understand that too. |\n| 20 | So, you know, maybe what we have to figure out is |\n| 21 | -- you know, the problem is you're not going to be listing |\n| 22 | the plaintiff and the defendant in -- if you don't have a |\n| 23 | caption that says plaintiff and defendant, right? |\n| 24 | So maybe you have to say plaintiff, and then |\n| 25 | defendants in avoidance actions, and then you list the |\n| | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 18 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 18 defendants in the pleading. However you're going to do it -- MR. LINSEY: Sure. THE COURT: -- we'll talk to the clerk of the court again to make sure we're all on the same page, but it can't be filed in the main case, unfortunately. It just can't. It's just not going to work. MR. LINSEY: So it won't be filed in the main case. That was what I wanted to clarify. THE COURT: Yeah. MR. LINSEY: Okay. Understood. THE COURT: It cannot be filed in the main case. It's got to be filed in an -- in the adversary proceedings. MR. LINSEY: Okay. THE COURT: It won't work. The transfer of documents from the clerk's office to the clerk's office presents a number -- if it was on appeal, presents a number of logistical issues anyway. And that would add to problems that we don't want to have. Okay? MR. LINSEY: Understood, Your Honor. THE COURT: So we'll figure out how to do that, whether it's you put all the captions in or you -- we agree that -- I mean, I could agree in this order, subject to talking to the clerk of the court again, Attorney Linsey, so just to let you know, that you had some kind of generic\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 19 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 19 caption, but you've got to -- it's got to be listed in the pleading, every adversary number at least, otherwise it's not going to make any sense. MR. LINSEY: Sure. THE COURT: All right. So we'll have to figure that out. All right. With regard to D, does there need to be, and maybe there doesn't, okay, but I'm going to ask the question, does there need to be any reference to the privileges order? We've got the protective order and the addendum for the sealing. MR. LINSEY: They're just not, Your Honor. There's not any privileged information. THE COURT: Okay. Okay. Good. I just am asking the question. Then I think you need to change the language in D to be similar to the language that the FDIC asked for, which just says this order is acting as an order granting the motion to seal all the complaints when necessary. Right? Because otherwise there isn't going to be an order that says you -- you have the right to seal. Right? MR. LINSEY: Okay. THE COURT: You're not going to file a motion because you already filed the motion. This is the\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 20 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 20 procedure. What the FDIC language said -- something about this order constitutes an order of the Court, you know, and so I think you'd have to say this order constitutes an order of the Court allowing for the avoidance complaint to be filed under seal when it's -- it contains information -- it or its exhibits contains information that has been designated highly-confidential or confidential under the terms of the protective order and the protective order addendum. Okay? MR. LINSEY: Yes, Your Honor. And just to set the Court's expectations, this is really only going to apply to the schedules that are attached that itemize specific transfers. We're not -- we're not expecting the contents of the complaint. THE COURT: Okay. MR. LINSEY: It's part of the complaint in that they're schedules -- THE COURT: Okay. MR. LINSEY: -- that are included in the complaint. THE COURT: That's fine. MR. LINSEY: But the provisions of the complaint will be out there. And those will be filed. So basically what we'll be doing with sealed ones is filing, filing\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 21 complaints with redacted schedules, and then -- and then filing the unredacted schedules with the complaints under seal. THE COURT: Okay. And then it says service of a redacted avoidance complaint shall constitute sufficient service of a complaint as required. You mean after service has been made, right? I mean, you're not saying that this order, just because you file a redacted avoidance complaint, is service? MR. LINSEY: Correct, Your Honor. The issue here is we don't want an argument later that, well, because you didn't initially send us the unredacted, because we can't give them the unredacted complaint until they sign the exhibit. THE COURT: Fine. That's fine. MR. LINSEY: Yeah. THE COURT: Okay. That's fine. Thank you. I just wanted to make sure that I understood that. MR. LINSEY: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Then the only other question I had, you've already -- you did address. I didn't realize it until after I read it more. The periods, you know, the Trustee should have 60 days to respond to a motion to dismiss, but you have below that any party can seek to change those time periods. So\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 21 of 57\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 22 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 22 that's -- that's in there. So that's fine. At some point, I don't know when that will be, but H talks about -- I completely agree, no pretrial conferences will be scheduled. The summons won't have a pretrial date. There's no problem with that. At some point, I guess, you'll have to -- we can talk about it in hearings if they come up, you know, we'll have to know somewhere where things are headed I suppose in these adversaries at some point. I don't know, there could be several groupings of adversaries depending upon what's going on, right? MR. LINSEY: I expect there will be organizational and administrative issues to address with the Court after these are filed, and I think that the specifics of those will come into more -- into greater relief, again, after they're filed. THE COURT: All right. So that's the only questions or concerns that I see. And the major one being the filing in the main case at C. MR. LINSEY: Understood, Your Honor. THE COURT: And so, I will talk to the -- I'll talk to the clerk of the court again, but -- and you can think about it if you want in the meantime, but I think -- I don't know how it's going to be, whether it's the caption issue or the listing, but we have to figure that out.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 23 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 23 MR. LINSEY: Your Honor, that's absolutely acceptable to the Trustee. Would Your Honor like us to file a revised order or -- THE COURT: Well, what's acceptable, because I said two different things? So I just want to make sure I understand. MR. LINSEY: The combined caption and the filing in the individual cases. THE COURT: So you're going to put all of the adversary captions in the -- in the thing -- in the motion, or are you just going to put one that says -- I don't know what it's going to say. See -- MR. LINSEY: A combined caption that says the Trustee against the defendants in the -- in the avoidance actions and refers to all of the adversary proceeding numbers. THE COURT: That is applicable to that motion. And then you're still going to have to file it in every one of those, unfortunately. MR. LINSEY: Understood, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. All right. That's fine. I think that's fine, subject to what the clerk of the court says. He could tell me I'm wrong. So if there's any problems, someone will reach out to you. Okay? MR. LINSEY: So then will the -- will the Court\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 24 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 24 amend the order or would you like us to file an amended order? THE COURT: Well, I would like you to not do anything yet until we talk to the clerk of the court and then he'll communicate with you, okay -- MR. LINSEY: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: -- as to what's the best thing to do. Because I wanted to hear what your thoughts were on it first, right? I don't know. I could have been reading it wrong. I just wanted to make sure I understood what you were trying -- I completely understand what you're trying to accomplish. I just want to make sure the order does that properly and the process is acceptable to the clerk of the court. Okay? MR. LINSEY: That's fine, Your Honor. Thank you. THE COURT: You're welcome. Attorney Claiborn just stood up. So I would assume you would like to be heard? MS. CLAIBORN: I just had a brief comment to make, Your Honor. THE COURT: Sure. MS. CLAIBORN: In two parts. One, is to say that the U.S. Trustee does not oppose any of the relief that's being requested in the\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 25 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 25 Trustee's motion. And the second part is to assert that the U.S. Trustee does have statutory rights under Section 107. And to the extent that the U.S. Trustee seeks access to the sealed documents, that will be the way it goes. I just want to make sure that no one here understood this to be a waiver of any of those rights. MR. LINSEY: We do not. THE COURT: Okay. I would assume that that was correct, but that's good to make -- MS. CLAIBORN: Better to have said it out loud so everyone's on the same page. THE COURT: That is correct. It's better to make it known on the record. All right. Does anyone else wish to be heard in connection with the Trustee's motion for procedures applicable to avoidance claim adversary proceedings? (No response.) THE COURT: All right. Hearing no response, the -- I have as I said, reviewed your motion, reviewed the proposed order. I understand why you're seeking to do this. I think it's appropriate under the circumstances that you've described in the motion and during this hearing, so the motion is going to be granted, going to be granted. The only issue is that issue about paragraph C.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 26 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 26 So someone will reach out to you and let you know whether or not you need to submit a revised propose order on that issue or if it will just be taken care of. I don't know the answer to that yet. Okay? MR. LINSEY: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Thank you. So that motion is granted. All right. Then the second matter on the calendar is the motion for summary judgment filed on behalf of the Trustee in adversary 23-5008. MR. LINSEY: Thank you, Your Honor. Again, Patrick Linsey for the Trustee. This adversary proceeding involves a familiar fact pattern in this case, but also an interesting kind of philosophical question, which is what does it really mean to own an asset? In this case, we have a debtor who funded the purchase of a valuable asset, a Bombardier private jet, originally purchase by the debtor for \\$37 million. The debtor caused the asset to be transferred to shell companies owned by his subordinates and family members. In this case, first, the debtor's family chef, Hung Chung Wong, and then Mei Guo, the debtor's daughter. After the debtor transferred the asset to insider-held shell companies, the debtor continued to fund the asset\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 27 of 57\n\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024
27 |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | and the debtor continued to use the asset.
The debtor also |\n| 2 | spent at least \\$5 million to maintain and operate the asset. |\n| 3 | And finally, the debtor's insider, who purportedly |\n| 4 | owns the shell company who last owned the asset, has no |\n| 5 | plausible explanation for how she came to own it. |\n| 6 | Obviously, those are -- that's a fact pattern that we've |\n| 7 | seen time and again in this case, particularly with respect |\n| 8 | to this defendant as regards the Lady May. |\n| 9 | But worse, in this case, we have the debtor |\n| 10 | orchestrating the sale of the asset during the bankruptcy |\n| 11 | without notice to the Court, without notice to the estate, |\n| 12 | that was accomplished through the debtor's alter ego, Golden |\n| 13 | Spring.
Your Honor will recall that Golden Spring |\n| 14 | participated in this case at the outset as the proposed DIP |\n| 15 | lender.
And then once the Trustee was appointed, |\n| 16 | disappeared. |\n| 17 | Following the sale, the debtor, again through |\n| 18 | Golden Spring, first tried to send the sale proceeds to the |\n| 19 | debtor's son in Kazakhstan and then the proceeds were sent |\n| 20 | overseas to London.
All of this is shown by evidence that |\n| 21 | is wholly undisputed. |\n| 22 | The defendant's burden, under those circumstances, |\n| 23 | are to come forward with evidence to show genuine issues of |\n| 24 | material fact and the defendant has failed to do so. |\n| 25 | Rather, in this adversary proceeding, the defendant has |\n| | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 28 of 57\n\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024
28 |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | consistently invoked the Fifth Amendment. |\n| 2 | Now, that is the defendant's right.
As I'll |\n| 3 | discuss later, the Trustee is not seeking a negative |\n| 4 | inference on that basis, but the defendant's decision does |\n| 5 | have consequences. |\n| 6 | And one of those consequences is that the |\n| 7 | defendant may not -- may not avoid having to testify at a |\n| 8 | deposition, may not avoid producing evidence in discovery, |\n| 9 | and then come forward with what is effectively testimony and |\n| 10 | evidence in seeking to oppose the merits in the action. |\n| 11 | Now, I'll briefly outline the facts here. |\n| 12 | And I'm going to be a little bit vague because |\n| 13 | some of the -- some of the exhibits at issue were designated |\n| 14 | highly-confidential.
And while I believe everyone in this |\n| 15 | courtroom -- |\n| 16 | MR. DESPINS:
No. |\n| 17 | MR. LINSEY:
Actually, PAX and the -- PAX and the |\n| 18 | committee have signed the Exhibit A to the protective order. |\n| 19 | I don't know that everybody in the courtroom has signed |\n| 20 | Exhibit A to the protective order. |\n| 21 | MR. DESPINS:
No. |\n| 22 | MR. LINSEY:
So it's up to Your Honor whether Your |\n| 23 | Honor wants to close the courtroom to people who have signed |\n| 24 | Exhibit A of the protective order and agreed to be bound by |\n| 25 | it.
I can try to be a little bit vague, but some of the -- |\n| | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 29 of 57\n\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024
29 |\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | THE COURT:
Why don't you try being vague first |\n| 2 | and then we'll see how it goes. |\n| 3 | MR. LINSEY:
Okay.
The debtor purchased the |\n| 4 | aircraft in September of 2009 for just over \\$37 million |\n| 5 | through Headwind Group for his private use. |\n| 6 | In 2012, the debtor refinanced the Bombardier.
He |\n| 7 | represented himself in the course of that refinancing to be |\n| 8 | the beneficial owner of the aircraft and he executed loan |\n| 9 | documents, including a personal guarantee of the financing |\n| 10 | operations. |\n| 11 | Between 2012 and 2005, the debtor repeatedly |\n| 12 | declared to the lender that the Headwind Group was a single |\n| 13 | person -- single-purpose entity -- |\n| 14 | Yes, Your Honor. |\n| 15 | THE COURT:
Can you tell me the years again.
I'm |\n| 16 | sorry.
I didn't hear what you said.
You said I think |\n| 17 | between 2005, did you just say? |\n| 18 | MR. LINSEY:
I'm sorry.
I said 2012 and 2015. |\n| 19 | THE COURT:
I'm sorry. |\n| 20 | MR. LINSEY:
Did I say 2000 -- |\n| 21 | THE COURT:
That was my fault. |\n| 22 | MR. LINSEY:
I think I misspoke, Your Honor. |\n| 23 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Okay. |\n| 24 | MR. LINSEY:
Between 2012 and 2015, the debtor |\n| 25 | repeatedly declared to the lender that Headwind was a |\n| | |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 30 single-purpose entity that didn't produce financial statements, and it's only -- it's only purpose was to hold the aircraft. In July of 2015, the debtor caused Headwind Group to engage ACASS Canada, which is a company that operates and maintains aircraft. The debtor executed an aircraft managing agreement for Headwind with ACASS. ACASS is going to be a name that comes up a lot in this story. Now, in that initial aircraft management agreement and in many other documents, the notice address that was listed was that for Golden Spring, which is the debtor's alter ego. Between March and July of 2016, Headwind transferred the aircraft to Anton Development, and there's no evidence of any consideration being paid for that transfer. At the time of the transfer, Anton Development was -- was nominally owned by the -- by Hung Chung Wong, who the debtor's wife has testified was the debtor's family chef. During the same time frame, in May of 2016, the debtor directed transfers in order to repay loan obligations. So not only was Anton Development getting the aircraft transferred, they were -- the loan obligations were also being paid off. The following month, if that weren't a sweet\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 30 of 57\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 31 of 57\n\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024
31 |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | enough deal, the debtor caused to be transferred \\$1.16 |\n| 2 | million to Anton Development from a Headwind account. |\n| 3 | Thereafter, in June of 2017, Mr. Hung, that's Hung |\n| 4 | Chung Wong, surrendered his equity in Anton Development to |\n| 5 | the defendant for no consideration.
That fact is admitted |\n| 6 | in the 56(a)(2) statement at No. 13. |\n| 7 | That was on the same date that the defendant |\n| 8 | received nominal ownership of Eastern Profit Corporation |\n| 9 | Limited from Mr. Hung, and that is a -- that's an entity |\n| 10 | that Judge Liman, in his decision, found to be the debtor's |\n| 11 | alter ego. |\n| 12 | When the Trustee asked the debtor about the |\n| 13 | Bombardier at the debtor's Rule 2004 obligation, or rather |\n| 14 | examination deposition, the debtor invoked the Fifth |\n| 15 | Amendment. |\n| 16 | Following the petition date, the debtor caused the |\n| 17 | Bombardier to be sold, without notice to the Court or to the |\n| 18 | estate, and that sale was orchestrated through the debtor's |\n| 19 | alter ego Golden Spring.
The Trustee has deposed Jetlaw, |\n| 20 | which was counsel for the seller in this transaction. |\n| 21 | Kent Jackson of Jetlaw testified that it was clear |\n| 22 | to him that Max Krasner, Director of Operations for Golden |\n| 23 | Spring, was the -- was the contact for, quote/unquote, \"the |\n| 24 | principal.\"
The principal is known to be one of the |\n| 25 | debtor's aliases.
In fact, reference to the flight -- the |\n| | |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 32 ACASS flight logs shows that the debtor was described as the principal. And if that weren't already clear, the supplemental declaration that ACASS provided reflects that any user other than -- other than the debtor was redacted from those flight logs. So again, it's clear that the debtor was the one being referred to as the principal. ACASS sent a letter of intent to purchase the Bombardier to Whitecroft. That letter of intent was directed to the attention of Golden Spring, listed Max Krasner and Yvette Wang, using Golden Spring email addresses. Around the time that the -- that the aircraft was sold, this is in August of 2022, ACASS wired \\$135,000 to Golden Spring, which transaction was booked as a, quote/unquote, \"refund\" to Whitecroft. The Bombardier was sold for \\$13.5 million pursuant to an aircraft purchase agreement. The counterparty to that agreement was ACASS USA, which is an affiliate of ACASS Canada. And correspondence reflects that Max Krasner emailed with ACASS about where to send the sale proceeds. Originally Mr. Krasner asked the sale proceeds be wired for the benefit of the debtor's son, Kwong Guo, at a bank in Kazakhstan. Case 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 32 of 57\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 33 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 33 When that didn't work, the sale proceeds were then directed overseas to JNFX, a financial institution that deals in foreign exchange. Your Honor is aware of the ins and outs of those events from the preliminary injunction motion that Your Honor already heard. I know the Court is at this point well familiar with the legal standards applicable to summary judgment, so I'll just very quickly go through that summary judgment is appropriate when there's no genuine issue of material facts. When the moving party's evidence demonstrates the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the defendant to go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts to show that there's a genuine issue for trial, and here that's not been done. One thing that's been an issue throughout this case and, in fact, even throughout this proceeding and, in fact, even before this adversary proceeding was filed, is the inability of the Trustee to get any evidence whatsoever from the defendant regarding -- regarding Whitecroft and the aircraft. Well prior to this adversary proceeding being filed in August of 2022, the Trustee served a Rule 2004 subpoena on the defendant. That subpoena included Whitecroft under the subject matter, requested documents related to any transactions that Whitecroft was engaged in.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 34 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 34 Your Honor recalls the proceedings that occurred, the compliance and contempt proceedings, regarding that subpoena, and yet the defendant never provided responsive documents that would have shown the existence of the aircraft, indeed, before the sale had closed. After the Trustee filed this adversary proceeding, the defendant invoked the Fifth Amendment and has invoked the Fifth Amendment throughout this adversary proceeding. The Trustee did seek documents from Whitecroft and Anton Development, and ultimately Whitecroft and Anton Development were compelled to comply with the Trustee's subpoenas. However, even then, the Trustee believes that the Trustee has not received all documents. The documents came late. And at the 30(b)(6) deposition of Whitecroft, the defendant appeared as Whitecroft's corporate representative and then invoked the Fifth Amendment in response to practically every substantive question that was posed. Corporations do not have a Fifth Amendment privilege. The defendant has argued in papers, including her summary judgment opposition, that the defendant has the individual right under the Fifth Amendment. That misses the point. The law under the -- in the Second Circuit appears in numerous cases that corporations are obligated to produce\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 35 a corporate representative who will not invoke the Fifth Amendment. And those cases are cited in the Trustee's reply to the 56(a)(2) statement at -- there's *SEC v. CKB168 Holdings*, which is 2014 U.S. District, Lexus 2004, 204380. That cites numerous other cases that are also cited in the 56(a)(2) reply. Here, we don't have a corporation who designated a representative who showed up and then perhaps unexpectedly invoked the Fifth Amendment. We have a corporate representative who showed up at the deposition for the purpose of invoking the Fifth Amendment with respect to practically every substantive question that was asked. Again, contrary to the debtor's opposition, the Trustee is not requesting at the summary judgment stage that the Court draw an adverse inference. However, the Trustee may point out that the defendant's actions in this adversary proceeding and invocation of the Fifth Amendment do have consequences which include that the defendant may not testify as to -- as to her theory of the case after refusing to do so in discovery. Likewise, citing evidence after the defendant provided a blanket refusal to provide any written discovery in this 2004 -- rather, in this adversary proceeding. Case 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 35 of 57\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 36 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 36 The legal standards of the Trustee's substantive claims are not under -- are not in dispute to the Trustee's knowledge. I'm happy to answer any questions about them. Broadly stated, we have two legal claims that involve a lot of overlapping facts. One is under New York Law for beneficial ownership. This is the same legal standard that governed Justice Ostrager's decision regarding the Lady May. The other is a claim for beneficial ownership under British Virgin Islands law, that is, that the defendant was a nominee owner, that her interests was purely nominal, and that she was, the term of art that is used there is, a bare trustee for the beneficial owner who is the defendant. So the same facts reflect both that the debtor beneficially own the Bombardier under New York Beneficial Ownership Law and that the defendant was a bare trustee under BVI law. And if we look at this case through the factors that are considered under New York Beneficial Ownership Law, I think -- I think it becomes quickly obvious how compelling the Trustee's case is. First of all, New York Beneficial Ownership Law will consider who funded the asset. In this case, the debtor financed the purchase of\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 37 of 57\n\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024
37 |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | the asset through Headwind Group.
The debtor signed loan |\n| 2 | obligations with respect to that financing.
The debtor |\n| 3 | personally guaranteed those obligations.
Then the debtor |\n| 4 | paid off the financing when the -- when the aircraft was |\n| 5 | transferred to Anton Development. |\n| 6 | Those transfers from -- of the Bombardier to Anton |\n| 7 | and then to Whitecroft, the surrendering of the equity in |\n| 8 | Anton Development from Mr. Hung to the defendant, there's no |\n| 9 | evidence of any -- of any consideration. |\n| 10 | The defendant has admitted that she did not pay |\n| 11 | consideration to receive the equity in Anton Development, an |\n| 12 | entity that at the time owned a very valuable private jet. |\n| 13 | Number two, who nominally owned the shell company |\n| 14 | and what was their connection to the debtor? |\n| 15 | Here, the nominal owners of the shell company is |\n| 16 | at issue, Anton Development and Whitecroft, or the debtor's |\n| 17 | family chef, a personal employee of the debtor, and the |\n| 18 | debtor's daughter, an insider and close family member. |\n| 19 | Number three, who used and controlled the asset? |\n| 20 | If we look at the ACASS flight logs, we see that |\n| 21 | it was the debtor who continued to use and control the asset |\n| 22 | even after the Bombardier was transferred to Anton |\n| 23 | Development and then Whitecroft.
In fact, the debtor flew |\n| 24 | on the Bombardier 57 times during that period. |\n| 25 | In her opposition papers, the defendant argues |\n| | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 38 of 57\n\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024
38 |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | that she used the aircraft too.
But if we follow the |\n| 2 | citation that's listed for that premise, what we see is a |\n| 3 | reference to the defendant's 2004 testimony that she flew on |\n| 4 | the aircraft as a child with her family.
That does not |\n| 5 | prove the defendant had any real or beneficial interest in |\n| 6 | the aircraft, rather, that supports the Trustee's case. |\n| 7 | We also see that the debtor bragged about his |\n| 8 | ownership of the aircraft, including in videos posted to |\n| 9 | social media.
In fact, in these videos, he even joked about |\n| 10 | being -- about claiming to be destitute while being able to |\n| 11 | enjoy the use of a luxurious private aircraft. |\n| 12 | We also see who orchestrated the sale of the |\n| 13 | aircraft, and that was Whitecroft -- that was rather Golden |\n| 14 | Spring, which by this court's judgment is the debtor's alter |\n| 15 | ego. |\n| 16 | Number four, who funded the maintenance and |\n| 17 | operation of the aircraft?
Essentially, who took care of |\n| 18 | that? |\n| 19 | Again, the evidence here is undisputed, it was the |\n| 20 | debtor who funded the aircraft through Golden Spring, the |\n| 21 | debtor's alter ego. |\n| 22 | And then lastly, what explanation does the |\n| 23 | purported shareholder of the shell company have that she, in |\n| 24 | fact, was the beneficial owner, was the legitimate owner of |\n| 25 | the aircraft, of the asset? |\n| | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 39 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 39 And here we have no explanation whatsoever. These undisputed facts reflect that it was the debtor who enjoyed all of the benefits of ownership of the Bombardier. They also demonstrate that any role that the defendant had with respect to Whitecroft was purely nominal and that the defendant served as nothing more than a bare trustee subject to the debtor's rights as the beneficial owner. And one of the key features that we see under BVI law is that the bare trustee is obligated to the beneficial owner to surrender the asset upon the beneficial owner's demand. That right, that right to obtain the asset, is now property of the estate subject to turnover to the Trustee under Section 542(a). So for that reason, under count one, the Court should order that the Bombardier proceeds in the amount of \\$13.5 million be turned over to the Trustee for the benefit of the estate. And to the extent that the defendant turns over any amounts less than \\$13.5 million, a judgment should enter with respect to the deficiency. As to count four, which is the BVI claim, I'm speaking specifically with respect to Whitecroft here, the Court should enter that all equity interest in Whitecroft shall be turned over to the Trustee, including all rights of\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 40 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 40 corporate control of Whitecroft. I'll briefly discuss the facts applicable to the other BVI shell companies. The evidence is likewise undisputed that the debtor, not the defendant, owns the BVI -- the other BVI shell companies as defined in the complaint. The defendant testified in her Rule 2004 deposition, this was prior to the adversary proceeding being filed, since which time she's invoked the Fifth Amendment, that she transferred companies in 2017 by, quote, \"people managing her family fund.\" At least two of the BVI shell companies were previously nominally owned by the debtor's family chef, that's Whitecroft, as I discussed earlier, and also Rosiaque (ph) Ventures Limited. Corporate registration forms and other documents associated with the BVI shell companies link these shell companies to the debtor. These forms required that the owner of the BVI shell companies provide contact information. They list the debtor's phone number. How do we know that it was the debtor's phone number? Because it's the same number that the debtor wrote down on his application to purchase property at the Sherry- Netherland. The verification forms also list 22 South Bay Road\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 41 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 41 as the address. We know that that is an address associated with the debtor in Hong Kong because that property was insured through Leading Shine Limited, which was listed as a related foreign company to the -- on Golden Spring's tax return. We also see an address similar to that address that likewise appears on the application to purchase property at the Sherry-Netherland. Moreover, the -- providing these entities to the defendant as a bare trustee is utterly consistent with the debtor's modus operandi handling his financial affairs and having, you know, shell companies that hold his assets being nominally held by insiders, family members, or people subject to his control. In response to the Trustee's undisputed evidence, the defendant has offered no evidence that she paid any consideration to assume ownership of these entities, nor has she provided any plausible explanation of how she came to nominally own these entities. And again, the explanation here, as with Whitecroft, as with Bombardier, is the obvious one, which is that the debtor -- the defendant was serving as a nominal owner so that the -- so that the debtor could have assets, at the same time have them be insulated from the reach of his creditors.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 42 of 57\n\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | 42 |\n| 1 | In the absence of any facts to oppose summary |\n| 2 | judgment, the opposition rests largely on evidentiary |\n| 3 | objections, and all of those objections fail. |\n| 4 | I'll address them briefly, but I'm happy to answer |\n| 5 | any specific questions that Your Honor has. |\n| 6 | I'll also note that as an attachment to the |\n| 7 | 56(a)(2) reply that the Trustee filed, there is a chart that |\n| 8 | specifically treats each exhibit to which there was an |\n| 9 | evidentiary objection and lists the Trustee's responses. |\n| 10 | First, there are the authentication objections. |\n| 11 | There were more than 20 authentication objections. |\n| 12 | From the outset, it bears noting that the standard |\n| 13 | for authentication of evidence under 901 of the Federal |\n| 14 | Rules of Evidence is not particularly high.
The standard is |\n| 15 | just that the -- where there is sufficient proof introduced |\n| 16 | so that a reasonable juror could find in favor of |\n| 17 | authenticity for identification. |\n| 18 | And it's notable here, with respect to all of |\n| 19 | these authenticity objections, the defendant does not claim |\n| 20 | that any of the exhibits at issue are inauthentic.
The |\n| 21 | defendant simply says that the Trustee failed to adequately |\n| 22 | authenticate them. |\n| 23 | So in light of this, and this is a procedure that |\n| 24 | I suppose is now familiar from Greenwich Land, the defendant |\n| 25 | went to the producing parties, who produced the evidence at |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 43 of 57\n\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024
43 |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | issue, obtained authentication declarations that |\n| 2 | authenticate these exhibits. |\n| 3 | Those authentication declarations were filed as |\n| 4 | exhibits with the Trustee's reply papers.
So in light of |\n| 5 | those declarations, you know, the authentication objections, |\n| 6 | to the extent that they ever had weight, are now muted -- |\n| 7 | are now mooted. |\n| 8 | I'll briefly discuss the hearsay objections for |\n| 9 | the documents at issue.
Most of the -- there were, again, |\n| 10 | in excess of 20 hearsay objections. |\n| 11 | Most of these objections are resolved by the |\n| 12 | business records exception to the hearsay rule because the |\n| 13 | documents were made by a person with knowledge at or near |\n| 14 | the time of the events in question, were maintained as part |\n| 15 | of a regular practice of the business, and were kept in the |\n| 16 | course of regularly conducted activity. |\n| 17 | Again, those -- those standards are met by the |\n| 18 | authentication objections, rather, by the authentication |\n| 19 | declarations that were filed by the Trustee with the |\n| 20 | Trustee's reply papers.
And there are specific citations to |\n| 21 | those authentication declarations, which also reflect the |\n| 22 | business records exception applying in the Trustee's |\n| 23 | 56(a)(2) reply. |\n| 24 | There are other exceptions to the hearsay rule |\n| 25 | that apply as well. |\n| | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 44 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 44 One example is the debtor's monologs about the experience of flying on the private jet. Those are subject to the present sense exception to the, rather, present sense impression exception to the hearsay prohibition. If you read the content of the debtor's -- the debtor's monologs, he's quite literally describing his experiences as they occur, including the sounds he is hearing, the upholstery he is touching, sometimes the food that he is tasting. The debtor's lengthy monolog in which he talks about buying a -- buying the Bombardier, and jokes about pretending to be penniless, also falls against the statement -- falls under the statement against interest exception to the hearsay rule. First of all, the debtor invoking the Fifth Amendment makes it clear that the debtor is an unavailable witness. And these statements the debtor made are contrary to the declarant's proprietary or pecuniary interest. And I think that's clear from the fact that the debtor's pecuniary interests, as manifested by his conduct throughout this Chapter 11 case, are to have his assets nominally held by family members in order to protect them from his creditors. Finally, I just want to briefly address the defendant's frivolous estoppel argument.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 45 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 45 The defendant claims that the Court, in granting a motion to compel filed by the Trustee, apparently secretly determined the merits of this adversary proceeding in favor of the defendant. This was the motion to compel Whitecroft and Anton Development to comply with the Trustee's subpoenas, the motion to compel, and the Court's order granting it, provided that the defendant must act in her capacity with respect to the entities in order to ensure compliance. The defendant contends that by seeking discovery from these shell companies through their nominal owner, who held herself out as controlling the companies, the Trustee is now precluded from making the very argument that he sought the discovery to support. And the defendant, in making this argument, quite brazenly omits to disclose that at least five times in the motion to compel the Trustee referred to the defendant's interest in the companies at nominal. In fact, the Court's order refers to the defendant's interest in the companies as nominal. Moreover, the defendant's argument in the context of the debtor's shell game is simply a non sequitur. The defendant's role as a nominal director and shareholder of Anton Development and Whitecroft is in no way inconsistent with the Trustee's claims.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 46 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 46 This is at the core of the debtor's shell game, is to have insiders and close family members as nominal shareholders, nominal officers or directors, of entities with the debtor as the beneficial owner. So for the foregoing reasons, under the first count, the Court should determine that the Bombardier proceeds are property of the estate, order that they be turned over within five business days. And to the extent that the proceeds turned over to the Trustee are less than the amount of the Bombardier proceeds, and again that's \\$13.5 million, the Court should enter a money judgment against the defendant. On count four, the Court should determine that Whitecroft and the other BVI shell companies are property of the estate, and the Court should order that all equity interests in these companies and rights of corporate control be turned over to the Trustee. And with that, I'm happy to answer any questions the Court may have. THE COURT: I do not have any questions at the moment. MR. LINSEY: Two corrections, Your Honor. First of all, I mixed up my former Soviet Republics. It's Kurdistan, not Kazakhstan. I think there was a West Wing episode where someone messed those up.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 47 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 47 Second, I referred to the defendant as having gotten declarations, it was the Trustee that went and got the declarations after the defendant raised those evidentiary objections. I apologize for misspeaking. And again, I'm happy to answer any questions. THE COURT: When you're talking about the declarations, you mean the -- what were attached to your reply with the authentication of the documents? Is that what you're talking about? MR. LINSEY: Correct, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. I don't have any questions at the moment. Thank you. MR. LINSEY: Thank you. Attorney Wernick, are you going to argue or Attorney Moriarty? MS. WERNICK: I will be, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. MS. WERNICK: Thank you. Thank you, Your Honor. And good afternoon. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MS. WERNICK: I want to start with why we're here this afternoon. And as Attorney Linsey presented, the Trustee filed a motion for summary judgment on the first and fourth\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 48 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 48 counterclaims as to the beneficial ownership of the Bombardier and the Bombardier proceeds, together with the entity Whitecroft Shore Limited, as well as a handful of other BVI companies that the Trustee refers to as BVI shell entities in their papers. And when Attorney Linsey came up here, he started with what he presented as a philosophical question as what does it mean to own an asset? And I would respectfully submit to Your Honor that summary judgment is not the appropriate forum to be addressing such philosophical questions. The standard for summary judgment is well known, but I think the most important part of the Court's consideration this afternoon. Summary judgment may only be granted where there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the fact as to which there are no such issues warrant judgment for the moving party as a matter of law. In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the Court must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to and draw all inferences in favor of the non-movant. And summary judgment is improper if there's any evidence in the record that could reasonably support a verdict for the nonmoving party.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 49 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 49 And if there is evidence in the record from any source from which a reasonable inference in the nonmoving party's favor may be drawn, the moving party has not obtained summary judgment. The Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party and it may not make credibility determinations or waive evidence. Credibility determinations and the weighing of evidence are not appropriate at the summary judgment stage. In this case, and in this posture, all ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the defendant, Ms. Guo, and all inferences must be drawn in favor of Ms. Guo at this stage of the proceeding. And this is critically important because the Trustee makes much of Ms. Guo's purported failure to present affirmative evidence in this case. But courts within this district have denied even unopposed motions for summary judgment where the moving party has failed to its burden. It's the Trustee's burden to present evidence that would prove his claim. But looking at the evidence relied upon by the Trustee, the defendant respectfully submits that he failed to do so here where every reasonable inference must be given the defendant. I want to start where Attorney Linsey ended with\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 50 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 50 respect to the BVI companies. The Trustee asserts that the debtor is a beneficial owner of the BVI companies, including Whitecroft, despite acknowledging that each of the BVI companies identify Ms. Guo as their sole owner. And in order to ask the Court to make this leap, the Trustee relies on a smattering of evidence that don't add up to the inference that the Trustee's asking Your Honor to draw. By merely referring to an address on a verification page that undisputably indicates that Ms. Guo is the owner of these entities, the Trustee asks the Court, because that same or similar address appeared on other papers relating to other entities, concludes that these companies must be associated with the debtor. That is not a reasonable inference to draw under this circumstance and do not -- and does not allow the Court to draw the conclusion that the BVI companies referred to in the pleading are beneficially owned by the debtor. The same is true with respect to Whitecroft, where the evidence is even stronger, as it's undisputed that Ms. Guo is and always was the sole member and shareholder of Whitecroft, signed agreements relating to the entity, and has been identified by numerous law firms as the owner of Whitecroft.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 51 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 51 With respect to the Bombardier itself, the Trustee relies upon affidavits that were not submitted in connection with his initial moving papers on summary judgment, and only provided on reply in connection with a statement, or apply to a local Rule 56(a)(2) statement, which I understand not to be called for under the local rules and to not be considered by the Court. With respect to the Bombardier itself, the Trustee also asks the Court to make improper leaps and inferences based on facts such as that Mr. Krasner was somehow associated with the sale of the plane and, therefore, could have only been working for Golden Spring as opposed to Whitecroft. It's undisputed that Whitecroft was the record title owner of the plane dating back to 2018. And in this case, drawing all reasonable -- all reasonable inferences in favor of Ms. Guo, summary judgment cannot be entered. And with that, I'll rely on papers (indiscernible). THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. I don't have any questions at the moment. Thank you. MS. WERNICK: All right. Thank you, Your Honor. MR. LINSEY: Can we have a few seconds, Your Honor? THE COURT: Yes, you may.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 52 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 52 MR. LINSEY: Thank you. (Pause.) MR. LINSEY: Just a couple of points, Your Honor. First of all, the law is clear that we're -- the Trustee has made his case. On the basis of facts under summary judgment, under *Celotex*, and other case law, it is the defendant's obligation to affirmatively come forward with facts. The defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, the cases cited by the defendant with respect to unopposed motions for summary judgment do not apply. Briefly, as to Mr. Krasner, we know that Mr. Krasner was working for Golden Spring because Mr. Krasner identified himself as the Director of Operations for Golden Spring. Mr. Jackson of Jetlaw specifically testified to that. It's also seen in documentary evidence that we obtained from Jetlaw. I'll also just refer to something that the defendant's -- defense counsel said in passing. Defense counsel referred to letters from law firms. I believe what she's referring to there is two of the exhibits that the -- were attached to the declaration of Mr. Vartan together with the defendant's opposition papers. Those exhibits are discussed in the Trustee's 56(a)(2)\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 53 of 57\n\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024
53 |\n|----|------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | reply.
And the Trustee has, as pointed out in that reply, |\n| 2 | that those exhibits are improper. |\n| 3 | And the reason that they're improper is that the |\n| 4 | Trustee sought to ask questions of the defendant as the |\n| 5 | corporate representative for Whitecroft at the Whitecroft |\n| 6 | deposition and the defendant invoked the Fifth Amendment as |\n| 7 | to those specific documents. |\n| 8 | They may be opinion letters by counsel in the BVI. |\n| 9 | We don't know exactly what they are.
And the reason we |\n| 10 | don't know exactly what they are is because of exchanges |\n| 11 | like this. |\n| 12 | I asked the question we're going to move on to |\n| 13 | Exhibit 11, please take a look at this document and let me |\n| 14 | know when you've familiarized yourself.
The defendant |\n| 15 | finished reviewing. |\n| 16 | Have you seen this document before?
Answer, I |\n| 17 | don't remember.
What is this document?
Answer, Fifth |\n| 18 | Amendment.
What is Vistra?
That was -- Vistra was the |\n| 19 | signer of one of the letters.
Fifth Amendment.
What is |\n| 20 | Vistra Legal BVI Limited?
Fifth Amendment.
Who signed this |\n| 21 | document for Vistra Legal BVI Limited?
Fifth Amendment. |\n| 22 | Why was this document created?
Fifth Amendment. |\n| 23 | I will represent to you that Whitecroft produced |\n| 24 | this document to the Trustee, the plaintiff, in response to |\n| 25 | the plaintiff's subpoena.
From where did Whitecroft obtain |\n| | |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 54 this document to produce it to the Trustee? Fifth Amendment. That's cited on page 45, that exchange is cited on page 45 of the defendant's, rather, the Trustee's 56(a)(2) reply. Also cited as a similar exchange with respect to the other exhibit. Again, discussed glancingly by defendant's counsel. It is, therefore, wholly improper for the defendant to seek to use that evidence in order to oppose summary judgment. Finally, I'll just point out in closing, the same thing I said in starting, which is that this is -- this is really starting to become -- these cases are almost starting to become echoes of one another. The similarities between this case and the Lady May case are so -- are so close, sometimes they almost look like carbon copies of one another. We have valuable assets that were transferred, funded by the debtor, transferred from the debtor through one of the debtor's subordinates to be nominally held through a shell company by the debtor's family member. We have, notwithstanding the nominal ownership by the shell company ostensibly held by the family member, the debtor continues to use and enjoy the asset. The debtor continues to fund and control the asset rather than the Case 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 54 of 57\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 55 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 55 defendant. In light of the case law described, the compelling facts that have been set forth in the Trustee's motion for summary judgment, none of which have been disputed, the Court should enter judgment as requested. Thank you. THE COURT: Thank you. MS. WERNICK: Your Honor, just an extremely brief reply? THE COURT: Certainly. Go right ahead. MS. WERNICK: Thank you. So I want to start with Attorney Linsey's harkening back to the Lady May action. And I think, again, what's most important here is that we're here in connection with a separate proceeding and the Trustee must satisfy his burden with respect to summary judgment in this proceeding. I wanted to point Your Honor's attention to the case *Jones vs. Sampson*, which is from the District of Connecticut, where in footnote one the Court made clear that there are no replies to Rule 56(a)(2) statements and declined to consider such a statement in that case. And I have a Westlaw cite if Your Honor would like. THE COURT: Yes. Did you cite that in your brief? MS. WERNICK: It was -- it was only in response to\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 56 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 56 the reply submission -- THE COURT: Okay. All right. MS. WERNICK: -- so we would not have briefing. THE COURT: So, go ahead. Say that again. MS. WERNICK: It's *Jones vs. Sampson*. THE COURT: *Jones*. Right. MS. WERNICK: 2023 Westlaw 1069487. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. MS. WERNICK: And so with that, we respectfully disagree with Attorney Linsey and the Trustee's position that the Trustee has satisfied its burden with respect to the facts presented here, and the application of the facts to the law do not warrant the entry of summary judgment in this case. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. All right. All right. Does anyone else wish to be heard in connection with the motion for summary judgment? (No response.) THE COURT: All right. I have -- I did look at the motions prior to today, but I obviously have to go back and look at them again given the presentations made by counsel this afternoon, so I will take the matter, the motion for summary judgment in adversary 23-5008 under advisement. Are there any other matters we need to address\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 57 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 57 this afternoon? MR. DESPINS: Not at this time, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Then those are the only matters that -- those are the remaining matters on today's calendar. So thank you all. Court is adjourned. (Proceedings concluded at 2:21 p.m.) I, CHRISTINE FIORE, court-approved transcriber and certified electronic reporter and transcriber, certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the official electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above- entitled matter. 15 February 7, 2024 16 Christine Fiore, CERT","body_zh":"美国破产法院\n康涅狄格州地区\n布里奇波特分部\n\n关于 *\n案号 22-50073 (JAM)\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）和 GENEVER\nHOLDINGS CORPORATION（Genever控股公司）， *\n*\n*\n*\n债务人。 *\nLUC A. DESPINS（吕克·A·德斯潘），第11章\n受托人， *\n对抗程序案号 23-05008\n*\n*\n原告， *\n诉\nMEI GUO（郭梅）， *\n*\n康涅狄格州布里奇波特\n*\nFebruary 5, 2024\n被告。 *\n*\n* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *\n#2532\n撤销请求对抗程序\n#88\n在尊敬的 JULIE A. MANNING（朱莉·A·曼宁）法官面前提出的简易判决动议\n美国破产法官\n申请裁定批准适用于下列事项的程序之动议\n出庭人员：\n代表第11章受托人： AVRAM EMMANUEL LUFT（阿夫拉姆·伊曼纽尔·卢夫特），律师\nPaul Hastings LLP（保罗·哈斯廷斯律师事务所）\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, NY\n\nPATRICK R. LINSEY（帕特里克·R·林西），律师\nNeubert Pepe and Monteith（纽伯特、佩佩和蒙蒂斯律师事务所）\n195 Church Street,13th Floor\nNew Haven, CT\n\n庭审程序由电子录音记录，\n庭审记录由转录服务机构制作。 Fiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷记录与转录服务公司）\nShelton, CT 06484 (203)732-6461\n\n出庭人员：（续）第11章受托人：LUC A. DESPINS（吕克·A·德斯潘），律师 Paul Hastings LLP（保罗·哈斯廷斯律师事务所）200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166 代表美国受托人：HOLLEY L. CLAIBORN（霍莉·L·克莱伯恩），律师 Office of the United States Trustee（美国受托人办公室）The Giaimo Federal Building 150 Court Street, Room 302 New Haven, CT 06510 代表债权人委员会：KRISTIN B. MAYHEW（克里斯汀·B·梅休），律师 Pullman & Comley（普尔曼与科姆利律师事务所）850 Main Street Bridgeport, CT 06601 代表债权人 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机遇基金有限合伙企业）：STUART M. SARNOFF（斯图尔特·M·萨诺夫），律师 O'Melveny & Myers LLP（奥梅尔韦尼与迈尔斯律师事务所）Times Square Tower 7 Times Square New York, NY 10036 TREVOR L. BRADLEY（特雷弗·L·布拉德利），律师 Robinson & Cole LLP（罗宾逊与科尔律师事务所）1055 Washington Blvd. Stamford, CT 06901 代表被告郭梅：MELISSA F. WERNICK（梅丽莎·F·韦尼克），律师 Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi, PC（基耶萨、沙希尼安与贾恩托马西律师事务所）105 Eisenhauer Pkwy Roseland, NJ 07068 JAMES M. MORIARTY（詹姆斯·M·莫里亚蒂），律师 Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（蔡斯勒与蔡斯勒律师事务所）10 Middle Street, 15th FL Bridgeport, CT 06604\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 3 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 3 （程序于下午1:09开始）法庭：现开始处理下午1:00的日程，因此请法警书记员宣读日程。法警书记员：案号22-50073，Ho Wan Kwok，以及对抗程序案号23-5008，Despins诉Guo。法庭：下午好。请从第11章受托人开始，为记录说明出庭情况。DESPINS先生：下午好，法官阁下。Luc Despins，第11章受托人。法庭：下午好。LINSEY先生：下午好，法官阁下。Patrick Linsey，代表受托人。法庭：下午好。LUFT先生：下午好，法官阁下。Avi Luft，代表第11章受托人。法庭：下午好。CLAIBORN女士：下午好。Holley Claiborn，代表美国受托人。法庭：下午好。WERNICK女士：下午好，法官阁下。Melissa Wernick，代表对抗程序23-5008中的被告郭梅。法庭：下午好。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 4 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 4 MORIARTY先生：下午好，法官阁下。James Moriarty，来自Zeisler & Zeisler，也代表该对抗程序中的郭女士。法庭：下午好。MAYHEW女士：下午好，法官阁下。Kristin Mayhew，Pullman & Comley，代表无担保债权人正式委员会，在主案中出庭。法庭：下午好。SARNOFF先生：下午好，法官阁下。Stuart Sarnoff，O'Melveny & Myers，代表债权人PAX，在主案中出庭。法庭：下午好。BRADLEY先生：下午好，法官阁下。Trevor Bradley，来自Robinson & Cole，也代表PAX。法庭：我们听不见您说话，Bradley先生。您能否——BRADLEY先生：抱歉。法庭：没关系。BRADLEY先生：Trevor Bradley，来自Robinson & Cole，代表PAX。法庭：好的。谢谢。那么，主案日程中有一项由受托人提出的动议，涉及与即将提起的\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 5 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 5 对抗程序提交有关的行政事项。对抗程序中则有简易判决动议。因此，我想我们先从主案动议开始，Despins受托人？DESPINS先生：是，法官阁下。法庭：好的。Linsey先生，我看到您站起来了。您将就此进行辩论吗？LINSEY先生：是的，法官阁下。法庭：好的。请开始。LINSEY先生：谢谢。我可以上前吗？法庭：可以。谢谢。LINSEY先生：谢谢，法官阁下。第11章受托人已提出动议，请求法院批准规范预计即将提起的撤销诉讼的程序。目前，受托人预计将在February 15th之前提起超过100项此类撤销诉讼。我们注意到，在本巡回区的其他案件中，法院已批准旨在促使这些案件有序管理和程序流转的诉讼程序。我们已尽量只纳入我们认为为使事项能够有序推进所必需的内容，因此我将简要概述这些程序。\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 6 首先，撤销程序涉及保护令中的保密条款，以及就FDIC而言，保护令附录。根据保护令和保护令附录，提供文件的当事方已将某些文件标记为保密和高度保密。其中包括许多银行记录，撤销程序中的转账即从该等记录中发现，因此可以说，这些起诉状和作为起诉状附件的附表载有保密和高度保密信息。因此，撤销程序规定，尽管保护令和保护令附录中有任何相反规定，只要被告及其律师签署作为附录和保护令附件的协议，从而受其约束，受托人即可向被告及其律师提供该等起诉状。我还特别指出包括被告，因为根据保护令中关于高度保密的规定，通常该等文件仅供律师查阅。Case 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 6 of 57\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 7 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 7 鉴于这些起诉状中的信息有限，通常只是起诉状中向被告进行的转账，我们认为被告应能够看到该等信息是适当的。为最大限度地确保通知，除加快听证裁定所规定的通知程序外，受托人还于上周二向根据Rule 2004命令向受托人提供过证据开示的任何人发送了该动议副本，以便他们知悉这些事项。因此，基本上，任何曾将某物标记为保密或高度保密的人，均已知悉这一方面的此项调整。今天早些时候，受托人提交了一份经修订的拟准许该动议的裁定，其中应FDIC的请求增加了一项条款；鉴于其负有若干规范隐私的法定义务，FDIC希望看到一些额外措辞。我们与FDIC进行该次沟通的原因是，FDIC是我们向其发送该动议的当事方之一。保密条款还将使我们和法院无需在每一项该等对抗程序中分别提出密封提交动议，而这\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 8 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024\n1 实质上会给受托人和法院带来负担，\n2 因为需要就同一事项审理超过100次相同的动议，\n3 以作出相同决定。\n4 法官阁下有问题吗？\n5 法庭：\n关于该密封提交动议、该问题，\n6 不过您只是在谈论起诉状，对吗？\n7 LINSEY先生：\n正确，法官阁下。这仅限于\n8 起诉状——\n9 法庭：\n好的。\n10 LINSEY先生：\n——并且我们将——\n11 法庭：\n这正是我所理解的。这是我的\n12 理解。\n13 如果有其他动议或其他事项\n14 需要提交，涉及密封问题，\n15 可能需要密封，届时您会随同该文件提出动议？\n16 LINSEY先生：\n完全正确，法官阁下。\n17 并且，可能会出现对许多该等撤销程序\n18 共同适用的问题。在\n19 该情形下，撤销程序规定了一项程序，\n20 受托人可以提出补充动议，\n21 该动议在通知所有撤销诉讼被告后\n22 将适用于所有撤销程序。\n23 但在此，我们真正限于的，\n24 就保密和密封提交而言，是\n25 最初的起诉状。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 9 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 9 除此之外，撤销程序规定被告自送达完成之日起有额外时间对起诉状作出回应，即60天；并规定受托人有60天时间对依据12(b)提出、请求驳回起诉状的任何动议作出回应。再次说明，这些规定主要是鉴于预计将提交的大量起诉状。此外，撤销程序规定，书记员和法院不会就每一项该等撤销程序自动安排初始案件会议。我们认为，举行超过100次审前会议并无成效；鉴于这些案件的提交时间，相关会议可能会集中在数月之后举行。相反，我们设有一项程序，以被告对起诉状作出回应的期限为触发点，受托人与被告将就适当的排期令进行协商，并将其提交法院供法院考虑；或者，如果当事人无法就排期令达成一致，则请求举行审前会议。当然，被告、受托人或任何当事人均可随时请求举行审前会议。并且，我还要指出，任何被告如在对抗程序提起时认为撤销程序不适用于该被告，均有权在提起后就该被告请求修改该等程序。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 10 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok - February 5, 2024 10 因此，没有人被锁定在这些程序之中。但是，同时，我所概述的程序，我们并不认为会给被告造成负担。如任何日后加入的被告不同意，他们可以在适当时候将该问题提请法院注意。因此，除非法官阁下有任何问题，我想这就是我要说的全部内容。法庭：我确实有几个问题，但不多。LINSEY先生：当然。法庭：据我记得，FDIC仅代表一家银行参与了保护令的该项修订。并非FDIC整体参与，对吗？他们只提交了出庭登记。而且，该项约定附录仅涉及一家名称以S开头的银行。LINSEY先生：Signature Bank，法官阁下。法庭：好的。对吗？这是否正确？LINSEY先生：正确。然而，有若干账户在\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- February 5, 2024 11 Signature Bank（签名银行）。而且，就可撤销转让而言，我会称这些账户尤其可能涉及大量可撤销转让。因此，我认为——法庭：所以您的意思是，将会有不止一宗对抗程序，其中 Signature Bank 的银行账户将成为程序的标的，还是——林西律师：凭我目前所知，我估计会有数十宗。法庭：好的。明白了。我只是想确认一下。据我所知，他们除代表 Signature Bank 外，没有提交任何其他出庭登记或其他文件，对吗？林西律师：正确，法官阁下。我在他们上周收到该动议副本后曾与他们交谈数次，我们得以在异议截止日期前就措辞达成一致。法庭：好的。谢谢。现在我明白了。我看到您有该命令的修订对比版本，而关于 1974 Privacy Act 的措辞，是应 FDIC（联邦存款保险公司）作为该银行接管人的要求加入的？林西律师：正确，法官阁下。法庭：好的。林西律师：该措辞适用于他们就隐私所承担的义务；这些义务可以修改，但须由本法庭作出包含该措辞的命令，因此我们同意加入该措辞。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 11 of 57\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 12 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- February 5, 2024 12 该措辞，因此我们同意加入该措辞。法庭：可以。好的。关于您将在每一宗对抗程序中提交的撤销诉讼程序通知——林西律师：是，法官阁下。法庭：——其中写明该通知将被送达——该通知将如同传票和起诉书一样被送达——它没有提到 7004，但不必提及。这没有问题。我认为其预期是，尽管表述得并不明确，我不——我认为您也不需要修改它，我只是问您这个问题：如果该动议获准，您将在每一宗对抗程序中提交的通知，将与传票和起诉书一并送达。这是您的预期吗？因为在我看来，这样最合理。林西律师：正确，法官阁下。法庭：好的。明白。那么我读到——林西律师：我会说，关于这一点表述得稍微含糊，原因是我们没有——我们不知道法庭何时会审议此事。法庭：当然。林西律师：所以，以防我们已经提交并送达了——\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 13 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- February 5, 2024 13 并在此前送达了——法庭：那么，您可能需要——林西律师：——但那是——法庭：——无论如何对这项命令作一点修改——林西律师：当然。法庭：——所以，如果您想在该 B 段中加入“受托人应将撤销通知副本与传票和起诉书一并送达”，您也可以这样做。因此，我——当您提交这项动议时，或者说当该动议被提交时，我显然与法院书记官谈过，因为法院书记官将需要处理所有这些问题。对吗？林西律师：当然。法庭：而且——我认为我们不能按您在 C 中所请求的方式办理，但我认为有办法实现同样的目的。好的？林西律师：好的。法庭：因为问题在于，如果您提交一项——我理解，只有动议，或者至少我相信我理解的是，只有动议——您只会在主案中提交那些在多宗对抗程序中具有共同问题的动议。正确吗？这就是该 C 段背后的构想？林西律师：正确，法官阁下。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 14 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- February 5, 2024 14 法庭：因此，从书记官办公室的角度来看，问题在于——我理解这一点——如果有任何上诉，这可能会造成问题，因为该文件不会在对抗程序中。因此，我建议过，法院书记官也认为可行，而且我认为也会可行，我不——如果您有——这是——这是我想出的例子。这并不意味着这是您实际会提交的例子，但假设两三个月后，您有，我不知道，40 宗对抗程序，在这 100 宗中的 40 宗里，您同意进一步延长被告的答复期限，对吗？实现方式可以是您只有一份文件，尽管它将会有——因为您仍将要在每一宗对抗程序中提交一份通知，所以您仍将提交一份主要文件，至少这是我对它的理解，即在主案中提交一份文件，然后在每一宗对抗程序中提交该文件的通知？林西律师：我不——我不认为那是原本的构想。原本的构想是，通过电子邮件，向任何律师送达，或者向任何被告送达；若他们没有——若他们没有出庭，则依 7004 送达，并在主案中提交送达证明。该构想背后的原因，显然我们对如何办理、如何这样办理完全灵活，是第一，受托人反复提交 100 多份大致相同动议的负担。然后是法庭的负担——\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 15 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- February 5, 2024 15 法庭：是的。我不希望您必须那样做——林西律师：——即拥有——法庭：——但您将要——林西律师：是。法庭：——我认为必须以某种方式来做——林西律师：当然。法庭：——以不同于主案的方式——林西律师：好的。法庭：——我认为您可以这样做，而且法院书记官认为从 CM/ECF 的角度看没有问题——林西律师：好的。法庭：——即，如果这是经同意延长答复期限、进一步延长答复期限的动议，您制作一份动议，在其中列出所有案件的案由栏，然后您只需——您将不得不在全部 40 宗案件中提交它，\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 16 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- February 5, 2024 16 但它是一份文件。林西律师：好的。法庭：它不是——它不是 40 份文件。好的？不过，我认为您仍必须在每一宗案件中提交它。因为如果有上诉，它不是——必须——该案卷记录必须正确且准确，对吗？林西律师：明白，法官阁下。法庭：而且地区法院，我不会让地区法院说，等等，您有某种通知。或者您甚至没有将其放在对抗程序中，而是在主案中。您知道。这不是运作方式，对吗？因此，就必须在众多案件中提交而言，这可能会有些负担；但是，它是同一份文件。您不必制作 40 份文件。林西律师：明白，法官阁下。法庭：好的？所以我认为我们可以想出一个办法。而且，如果您——我——法院书记官和我今天已经谈过此事。好的？我的意思是，这不是——如果本次庭审后就此有任何问题，法院书记官将会联系您。但我认为，C 必须修改为表明您当然可以提交一项动议，该动议是——\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 17 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- February 5, 2024\n1 适用于不止一宗对抗程序的共同动议，例如我向您举的例子，\n2 林西律师。我不知道那是否是——但是，您将必须在——\n3 提交它；您可以在一份文件中列出所有案由栏，\n4 对吗？\n5 或者，也许，也许我们也可以这样做。\n6 您在动议中列出所有案件，然后就提交该动议。\n7 林西律师：是。\n8 法庭：但问题是，如果这样做，您使用什么案由栏？\n9 这正是问题的一部分，对吗？\n10 林西律师：我建议采用某种形式。\n11 显然，它们不会被合并审理，但考虑到——\n12 为了这一特定目的，采用看起来类似合并案件的案由栏，\n13 因为——\n14 否则将会有——\n15 法庭：那么，也许您写——\n16 林西律师：——20 页案由栏。\n17 是。\n18 法庭：我也理解这一点。\n19 所以，您知道，也许我们必须弄清楚的是——\n20 您知道，问题在于，如果您没有写明原告和被告的案由栏，\n21 您将不会列出原告和被告，对吗？\n22 所以，也许您必须写明原告，然后写\n23 撤销诉讼中的被告，然后在诉状中列出\n24 被告。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 18 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- February 5, 2024 18 无论您将如何办理——林西律师：当然。法庭：——我们会再次与法院书记官沟通，以确保我们意见一致，但遗憾的是，它不能在主案中提交。就是不能。这样根本行不通。林西律师：所以它不会在主案中提交。这正是我想澄清的。法庭：是。林西律师：好的，明白。法庭：它不能在主案中提交。必须在一宗——在各对抗程序中提交。林西律师：好的。法庭：这样行不通。文件从书记官办公室转送至书记官办公室——如果案件正在上诉——无论如何会产生许多后勤问题。这将增加我们不希望出现的问题。好的？林西律师：明白，法官阁下。法庭：所以我们会弄清楚如何办理，无论是您列入全部案由栏，还是您——我们达成一致，即——我的意思是，林西律师，在再次与法院书记官沟通的前提下，我可以在这项命令中同意您采用某种通用的——\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 19 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- February 5, 2024 19 案由栏，但您必须——必须至少在诉状中列明每一个对抗程序编号，否则根本说不通。林西律师：当然。法庭：好的。所以我们必须弄清楚这一点。好的。关于 D，是否需要——或许并不需要，好的，但我要问这个问题——是否需要提及特权命令？我们已有保护令和有关密封的附录。林西律师：并不需要，法官阁下。不存在任何特权信息。法庭：好的。好的。我只是提出这个问题。那么我认为您需要将 D 中的措辞修改为与 FDIC 所要求的措辞类似，即仅写明：本命令作为一项命令，准许在必要时密封所有起诉书的动议。对吗？因为否则将不会有一项命令说明您——您有权密封。对吗？林西律师：好的。法庭：您不会提交动议，因为您已经提交了该动议。这就是——\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 20 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- February 5, 2024 20 程序。FDIC 的措辞是怎么说的——大意是本命令构成法院的一项命令，你知道，所以我认为你们必须说明：当撤销诉讼起诉状——其本身或其附件——包含依照保护令及保护令附录的条款被指定为高度保密或保密的信息时，本命令构成允许该撤销诉讼起诉状以密封方式提交的法院命令。明白吗？林赛律师：是的，法官阁下。并且，为了明确法院的预期，这实际上只会适用于所附的、逐项列明具体转账的附表。我们并不——我们并不预期起诉状的正文会受到影响。法院：好的。林赛律师：它们作为附表，是起诉状的一部分——法院：好的。林赛律师：——即被纳入起诉状的附表。法院：这没问题。林赛律师：但起诉状的条款将会公开。并且这些将会提交。因此，基本上，对于密封的案件，我们将提交——提交附表经删节的起诉状，然后——然后将未经删节的附表随起诉状一并以密封方式提交。\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- February 5, 2024 21 起诉状，并附经删节的附表，然后——然后将未经删节的附表随起诉状一并以密封方式提交。法院：好的。然后其中写道，送达经删节的撤销诉讼起诉状应构成法律要求的对起诉状的充分送达。你的意思是在已经完成送达之后，对吗？我的意思是，你并不是说，仅仅因为你提交了一份经删节的撤销诉讼起诉状，本命令就构成送达？林赛律师：正确，法官阁下。这里的问题是，我们不希望日后有人提出这样的论点：嗯，因为你们一开始没有向我们发送未经删节的文本——因为在他们签署附件之前，我们不能向他们提供未经删节的起诉状。法院：好。这没问题。林赛律师：是的。法院：好的。这没问题。谢谢。我只是想确认我理解了这一点。林赛律师：是的，法官阁下。法院：那么，我仅有的另一个问题，你已经——确实作了说明。我在进一步阅读之后才意识到。期限，你知道，受托人应有 60 天时间对驳回动议作出答复，但你在下方规定任何一方均可寻求变更这些期限。所以——\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 2586 提交日期 02/07/24 登记日期 02/07/24 21:30:54 第 21 页，共 57 页\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 2586 提交日期 02/07/24 登记日期 02/07/24 21:30:54 第 22 页，共 57 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- February 5, 2024 22 那——那已经写在里面了。所以这没问题。在某个时候，我不知道会是什么时候，但 H 谈到——我完全同意，不会安排审前会议。传票不会载明审前日期。这没有问题。我想，在某个时候，你们将不得不——如果它们出现，我们可以在听证会上讨论，你知道，我想在某个时候，我们必须知道这些对抗程序将走向何方。我不知道，视具体情况而定，这些对抗程序可能会分成若干组，对吗？林赛律师：我预计，在这些文件提交后，将有需要与法院处理的组织和行政问题；我认为，这些问题的具体情况同样将在提交之后变得更为清晰。法院：好。因此，这是我看到的唯一问题或关切。主要问题是 C 项中在主案卷内提交的问题。林赛律师：明白，法官阁下。法院：因此，我会与——我会再次同书记官沟通，但是——与此同时，如果你愿意，你也可以考虑一下；但我认为——我不知道将会如何处理，无论是案由标题问题还是列示问题，但我们必须把它弄清楚。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 2586 提交日期 02/07/24 登记日期 02/07/24 21:30:54 第 23 页，共 57 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- February 5, 2024 23 林赛律师：法官阁下，这对受托人完全可以接受。法官阁下是否希望我们提交一份修订命令，还是——法院：嗯，什么是可以接受的，因为我说了两件不同的事？所以我只是想确认我理解了。林赛律师：合并案由标题，以及在各个个案中提交。法院：那么，你们是要将所有对抗程序的案由标题都放在——放在那份文件中——动议中，还是只放一个写着——我不知道它会写什么。明白——林赛律师：一项合并案由标题，载明受托人起诉撤销诉讼中的被告，并援引所有对抗程序编号。法院：这适用于该动议。然后，不幸的是，你们仍然必须在每一份案卷中提交。林赛律师：明白，法官阁下。法院：好的。好。这没问题。我认为这没问题，但须以书记官所说为准。他可能会告诉我我错了。所以如果有任何问题，有人会联系你们。明白吗？林赛律师：那么，法院是否将——法院\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 2586 提交日期 02/07/24 登记日期 02/07/24 21:30:54 第 24 页，共 57 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- February 5, 2024 24 修改命令，还是希望我们提交一份修改后的命令？法院：嗯，我希望你们暂时不要做任何事，直到我们与书记官沟通；然后他会同你们联系，好吗——林赛律师：谢谢，法官阁下。法院：——告知应当采取何种最佳做法。因为我想先听听你们对此的想法，对吗？我不知道。我可能理解错了。我只是想确认我理解了你们试图——我完全理解你们试图实现的目的。我只是想确保命令恰当地实现该目的，而且该程序为书记官所接受。明白吗？林赛律师：没问题，法官阁下。谢谢。法院：不客气。Claiborn 律师（克莱伯恩）刚刚站起来。因此，我想你希望发表意见？克莱伯恩女士：我只是想作一个简短评论，法官阁下。法院：当然。克莱伯恩女士：分两部分。第一，是说明 U.S. Trustee（美国受托人）不反对受托人动议中请求的任何救济。第二部分是主张，美国受托人根据 Section 107 享有法定权利。在美国受托人寻求查阅密封文件的范围内，将按该方式进行。我只是想确保在场任何人都不会将此理解为放弃其中任何权利。林赛律师：我们不会这样理解。法院：好的。我本来会认为这是正确的，但明确说明这一点是好的——克莱伯恩女士：最好大声说出来，以便大家达成共识。法院：这是正确的。最好在记录中予以明确。好。还有其他人希望就受托人关于适用于撤销请求对抗程序之程序的动议发表意见吗？（无人回应。）法院：好。既然没有回应，正如我所说，我已经审阅了你们的动议，审阅了拟议命令。我理解你们为何寻求采取这一做法。我认为，根据你们在动议中以及本次听证期间所述的情形，这是适当的，因此该动议将获准，将获准。唯一的问题是关于 C 段的那个问题。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 2586 提交日期 02/07/24 登记日期 02/07/24 21:30:54 第 25 页，共 57 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- February 5, 2024 25 受托人动议中请求的任何救济。第二部分是主张，美国受托人根据 Section 107 享有法定权利。在美国受托人寻求查阅密封文件的范围内，将按该方式进行。我只是想确保在场任何人都不会将此理解为放弃其中任何权利。林赛律师：我们不会这样理解。法院：好的。我本来会认为这是正确的，但明确说明这一点是好的——克莱伯恩女士：最好大声说出来，以便大家达成共识。法院：这是正确的。最好在记录中予以明确。好。还有其他人希望就受托人关于适用于撤销请求对抗程序之程序的动议发表意见吗？（无人回应。）法院：好。既然没有回应，正如我所说，我已经审阅了你们的动议，审阅了拟议命令。我理解你们为何寻求采取这一做法。我认为，根据你们在动议中以及本次听证期间所述的情形，这是适当的，因此该动议将获准，将获准。唯一的问题是关于 C 段的那个问题。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 2586 提交日期 02/07/24 登记日期 02/07/24 21:30:54 第 26 页，共 57 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- February 5, 2024 26 因此，有人会联系你们，并告知你们是否需要就该问题提交一份修订后的拟议命令，或者是否将会直接处理。我目前还不知道答案。明白吗？林赛律师：谢谢，法官阁下。法院：好。谢谢。因此，该动议获准。好。那么日程表上的第二事项是代表受托人在对抗程序 23-5008 中提交的简易判决动议。林赛律师：谢谢，法官阁下。再次说明，我是代表受托人的 Patrick Linsey（帕特里克·林赛）。本对抗程序涉及本案中一种熟悉的事实模式，但也涉及一个有趣的哲学问题，即真正拥有一项资产究竟意味着什么？在本案中，我们有一名债务人，他为购买一项有价值资产提供资金，即一架 Bombardier（庞巴迪）私人喷气机，该飞机最初由债务人以 \\$37 million 购买。债务人促使该资产被转让给由其下属和家庭成员拥有的空壳公司。在本案中，先是债务人的家庭厨师 Hung Chung Wong（黄宏忠），然后是债务人的女儿 Mei Guo（郭美）。债务人将该资产转让给由内部人士持有的空壳公司后，债务人继续为该资产提供资金。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 2586 提交日期 02/07/24 登记日期 02/07/24 21:30:54 第 27 页，共 57 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- February 5, 2024 债务人还继续使用该资产。债务人还至少花费 \\$5 million 用于维护和运营该资产。最后，债务人的内部人士——据称拥有最后持有该资产的空壳公司的人——对于她如何取得该资产的所有权，没有任何合理解释。显然，这是——这是我们在本案中反复见到的一种事实模式，尤其是就本被告及 Lady May（“Lady May”号）而言。但更糟的是，在本案中，债务人在破产期间安排出售该资产，未通知法院，未通知破产财产；该出售是通过债务人的另一个自我 Golden Spring（高盛泉）完成的。法官阁下会记得，Golden Spring 最初作为拟议的 DIP 贷款人参与本案。然后，一旦受托人被任命，便消失了。出售后，债务人再次通过 Golden Spring，先试图将出售所得发送给债务人在 Kazakhstan（哈萨克斯坦）的儿子，随后该所得被汇往 London（伦敦）境外。所有这些均由完全无争议的证据证明。在这种情形下，被告的责任是提出证据以证明存在对重大事实的真实争议，而被告未能做到。相反，在本对抗程序中，被告一直援引 Fifth Amendment（第五修正案）。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 2586 提交日期 02/07/24 登记日期 02/07/24 21:30:54 第 28 页，共 57 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- February 5, 2024 被告有此权利。正如我稍后将要讨论的，受托人并未据此寻求不利推定，但被告的决定确有后果。其中一个后果是，被告不得——不得避免在证言录取中作证，不得避免在证据开示中提供证据，然后在寻求就本案实体问题提出反对时，提交实质上构成证言和证据的材料。现在，我将简要概述此处的事实。我会稍微说得含糊一些，因为所涉的一些附件被指定为高度保密。而且，尽管我相信本法庭中的每个人——Despín 律师（德斯平）：不。林赛律师：实际上，PAX（PAX）和——PAX 及委员会已经签署了保护令的附件 A。我不知道法庭中的每个人是否都签署了保护令的附件 A。德斯平律师：没有。林赛律师：因此，是否要将法庭对已签署保护令附件 A 并同意受其约束以外的人员关闭，由法官阁下决定。我可以尽量说得含糊一些，但其中一些——\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 2586 提交日期 02/07/24 登记日期 02/07/24 21:30:54 第 29 页，共 57 页\n\n郭文贵（Ho Wan Kwok）— 2024年2月5日\n\n法庭：\n您何不先试着说得含糊一些，然后我们再看看情况如何。\n\nLINSEY 律师：\n好的。债务人于 2009年9月通过 Headwind Group（海德温集团）购买了该飞机，供其私人使用，购买价格略高于 $37 million。\n\n2012年，债务人对该庞巴迪飞机（Bombardier）进行了再融资。在该再融资过程中，他自称为该飞机的受益所有人，并签署了贷款文件，包括对该融资业务作出的个人担保。\n\n在 2012年至 2005年期间，债务人多次向贷款人声明，Headwind Group 是一个单一人士——单一目的实体——\n\n是的，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：\n您能再说一遍年份吗？抱歉，我没听清您说了什么。我想您刚才说的是 2005年之间，是吗？\n\nLINSEY 律师：\n抱歉。我说的是 2012年和 2015年。\n\n法庭：\n抱歉。\n\nLINSEY 律师：\n我说成了 2000年——\n\n法庭：\n是我的错。\n\nLINSEY 律师：\n我想我说错了，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：\n好的。好的。\n\nLINSEY 律师：\n在 2012年至 2015年期间，债务人多次向贷款人声明，Headwind 是一个不编制财务报表的单一目的实体，其唯一——唯一目的就是持有该飞机。\n\n郭文贵（Ho Wan Kwok）— 2024年2月5日\n\n单一目的实体，其唯一目的就是持有该飞机。2015年7月，债务人促使 Headwind Group 聘用 ACASS Canada（加拿大 ACASS），该公司从事飞机运营和维护。债务人为 Headwind 与 ACASS 签署了一份飞机管理协议。ACASS 将会是在本案叙述中频繁出现的名称。\n\n现在，在该最初的飞机管理协议及许多其他文件中，所列的通知地址均为 Golden Spring（金泉）的地址，而 Golden Spring 是债务人的另一个自我。\n\n在 2016年3月至7月期间，Headwind 将该飞机转让给 Anton Development（安东开发），没有证据表明就该转让支付了任何对价。转让时，Anton Development 名义上由 Hung Chung Wong（黄中雄）所有；债务人的妻子已作证称，黄中雄是债务人家中的厨师。\n\n在同一时期，即 2016年5月，债务人指示进行转账以偿还贷款债务。因此，Anton Development 不仅获得了转让的飞机，贷款债务也被偿清。\n\n若这还不算一笔足够划算的交易，次月债务人又促使从一个 Headwind 账户向 Anton Development 转让 $1.16 million。\n\n案号 22-50073，文件 2586，提交于 02/07/24，录入于 02/07/24 21:30:54，第 30 页，共 57 页\n\n案号 22-50073，文件 2586，提交于 02/07/24，录入于 02/07/24 21:30:54，第 31 页，共 57 页\n\n郭文贵（Ho Wan Kwok）— 2024年2月5日\n\n此后，于 2017年6月，Hung 先生，即黄中雄（Hung Chung Wong），无偿将其在 Anton Development 的股权让渡给被告。该事实载于 56(a)(2) 陈述第 13 项，并已获承认。\n\n同日，被告从 Hung 先生处取得 Eastern Profit Corporation Limited（东利有限公司）的名义所有权；Liman 法官（Judge Liman）在其裁决中认定，该实体为债务人的另一个自我。\n\n当受托人（Trustee）在债务人的 Rule 2004 义务履行程序中，或者说，在审查证言中，就该庞巴迪飞机询问债务人时，债务人援引了第五修正案。\n\n在申请日之后，债务人促使该庞巴迪飞机在未通知法庭或破产财产的情况下被出售，该出售由债务人的另一个自我 Golden Spring 安排。受托人已对 Jetlaw（捷特劳）进行了证言录取；该律师事务所在该交易中担任卖方律师。\n\nJetlaw 的 Kent Jackson（肯特·杰克逊）作证称，对他而言很清楚，Golden Spring 的运营总监 Max Krasner（马克斯·克拉斯纳）是所谓“principal”的联系人。“principal”已知是债务人的一个别名。\n\n事实上，查阅 ACASS 的飞行日志可见，债务人被称为“principal”。而且，即使这还不够清楚，ACASS 提供的补充声明表明，飞行日志中除债务人以外的任何使用人均被涂黑。因此，再次可以清楚看出，被称为“principal”的人是债务人。\n\nACASS 向 Whitecroft（怀特克罗夫特）发送了一份购买该庞巴迪飞机的意向书。该意向书指定 Golden Spring 收件，列明 Max Krasner 和 Yvette Wang（王伊薇特），并使用 Golden Spring 的电子邮件地址。\n\n在该飞机出售前后，即 2022年8月，ACASS 向 Golden Spring 电汇 $135,000，该交易被记账为向 Whitecroft 作出的所谓“refund”。该庞巴迪飞机根据一份飞机购买协议以 $13.5 million 出售。\n\n该协议的相对方是 ACASS USA（美国 ACASS），其为 ACASS Canada 的关联方。通信记录显示，Max Krasner 曾与 ACASS 就应将出售所得款项汇往何处发送电子邮件。最初，Krasner 先生要求将出售所得款项电汇至债务人之子 Kwong Guo（郭强）在哈萨克斯坦一家银行的受益账户。\n\n案号 22-50073，文件 2586，提交于 02/07/24，录入于 02/07/24 21:30:54，第 32 页，共 57 页\n\n案号 22-50073，文件 2586，提交于 02/07/24，录入于 02/07/24 21:30:54，第 33 页，共 57 页\n\n郭文贵（Ho Wan Kwok）— 2024年2月5日\n\n在此未能实现后，出售所得款项随后被指示汇往境外的 JNFX（JNFX），一家从事外汇业务的金融机构。法官阁下已在先前听审的初步禁令动议中了解这些事件的来龙去脉。\n\n我知道法庭此时已十分熟悉适用于简易判决的法律标准，因此我仅非常简要地说明：在不存在任何重大事实真实争议时，适宜作出简易判决。当动议方的证据证明不存在任何重大事实真实争议时，举证责任即转移给被告，被告必须超出诉状范围并指定具体事实，以表明存在应由审判解决的真实争议；而本案中并未做到这一点。\n\n在本案始终存在的一个问题，事实上甚至在本程序期间始终存在，并且甚至在提起本对抗程序之前就已存在，即受托人完全无法从被告处获得任何有关 Whitecroft 和该飞机的证据。\n\n早在 2022年8月提起本对抗程序之前，受托人即向被告送达了一份 Rule 2004 传票。该传票在主题事项中包括 Whitecroft，并要求提供与 Whitecroft 参与的任何交易有关的文件。\n\n案号 22-50073，文件 2586，提交于 02/07/24，录入于 02/07/24 21:30:54，第 34 页，共 57 页\n\n案号 22-50073，文件 2586，提交于 02/07/24，录入于 02/07/24 21:30:54，第 34 页，共 57 页\n\n郭文贵（Ho Wan Kwok）— 2024年2月5日\n\n法官阁下记得就该传票发生的程序，即有关遵从和藐视法庭的程序；然而，被告从未提供任何回应性文件，而这些文件本可显示该飞机的存在，实际上是在出售完成之前。\n\n在受托人提起本对抗程序后，被告援引第五修正案，并在整个对抗程序中始终援引第五修正案。受托人确实向 Whitecroft 和 Anton Development 索取文件，最终 Whitecroft 和 Anton Development 被强制要求遵从受托人的传票。然而，即便如此，受托人仍认为其未收到全部文件。文件提交迟延。\n\n在 Whitecroft 的 30(b)(6) 证言录取中，被告作为 Whitecroft 的公司代表出席，随后对几乎每一个被提出的实体性问题援引第五修正案。公司不享有第五修正案特权。\n\n被告在书面文件中，包括其对简易判决动议的反对意见中主张，被告根据第五修正案享有个人权利。这未抓住要点。第二巡回法院（Second Circuit）法律在众多案件中表明，公司有义务提供一名不会援引第五修正案的公司代表。\n\n这些案件被引用于受托人对 56(a)(2) 陈述的答复中——其中有 SEC v. CKB168 Holdings，即 2014 U.S. District, Lexis 2004, 204380。该案引用了众多其他案件，而这些案件也被引用于 56(a)(2) 答复中。\n\n在本案中，并非一家公司指定一名代表出席，随后或许出乎意料地援引第五修正案。我们面对的是一名公司代表为就几乎每一个被提出的实体性问题援引第五修正案之目的而出席证言录取。\n\n再次说明，与债务人的反对意见相反，受托人并未请求法庭在简易判决阶段作出不利推定。然而，受托人可以指出，被告在本对抗程序中的行为及其援引第五修正案确有后果，其中包括：被告在证据开示中拒绝作证后，不得就其案件理论作证。同样，在被告于本 2004——或者说，于本对抗程序中一概拒绝提供任何书面证据开示后，也不得援引证据。\n\n案号 22-50073，文件 2586，提交于 02/07/24，录入于 02/07/24 21:30:54，第 35 页，共 57 页\n\n案号 22-50073，文件 2586，提交于 02/07/24，录入于 02/07/24 21:30:54，第 36 页，共 57 页\n\n郭文贵（Ho Wan Kwok）— 2024年2月5日\n\n据受托人所知，受托人实体性请求所适用的法律标准并无争议。我很乐意回答关于这些标准的任何问题。\n\n概括而言，我们有两项涉及大量重叠事实的法律请求。一项是依据纽约州法律提出的受益所有权请求。这与 Ostrager 法官（Justice Ostrager）就 Lady May（“五月夫人”号）作出裁决所适用的法律标准相同。\n\n另一项是依据英属维尔京群岛法律提出的受益所有权请求，即被告是一名名义所有人，其权益纯属名义性，并且她——该地使用的专业术语是——是为受益所有人即被告设立的裸信托受托人。\n\n因此，同一事实既表明债务人根据纽约受益所有权法受益所有该庞巴迪飞机，也表明被告根据英属维尔京群岛法律是一名裸信托受托人。\n\n如果我们根据纽约受益所有权法所考量的因素审视本案，我认为——我认为很快就会显而易见，受托人的案件是多么有力。首先，纽约受益所有权法将考量由谁为该资产提供资金。在本案中，债务人为购买该飞机提供融资。\n\n郭文贵（Ho Wan Kwok）—2024年2月5日\n\n通过 Headwind Group（海德温集团）取得该资产。债务人就该融资签署了贷款义务文件。债务人亲自为该等义务提供担保。随后，当该飞机被转让给 Anton Development（安东开发公司）时，债务人偿清了该融资款项。\n\n庞巴迪（Bombardier）从——向 Anton Development 转让，随后再转让给 Whitecroft（怀特克罗夫特），以及 Hung 先生向被告移交 Anton Development 的股权，均无任何对价的证据。被告已承认，她未支付任何对价以取得 Anton Development 的股权；该实体当时拥有一架价值极高的私人飞机。\n\n第二，谁名义上拥有该空壳公司，其与债务人有何关系？\n\n在此，所涉空壳公司 Anton Development 和 Whitecroft 的名义所有人，是债务人的家庭厨师，即债务人的私人雇员，以及债务人的女儿，后者是内部人士及近亲属。\n\n第三，谁使用并控制该资产？\n\n如果我们查看 ACASS 飞行日志，我们会看到，即使在庞巴迪被转让给 Anton Development、随后又转让给 Whitecroft 之后，仍是债务人持续使用并控制该资产。事实上，债务人在该期间内乘坐庞巴迪飞行了57次。\n\n被告在其反对文件中主张，她也使用过该飞机。但如果我们追踪为该主张所列的引证，我们所看到的是提及被告于2004年作出的证言，即她幼年时曾与家人乘坐该飞机。这并不能证明被告对该飞机享有任何实际或受益权益；相反，这支持了受托人的主张。\n\n我们还看到，债务人曾吹嘘其对该飞机的所有权，包括在发布到社交媒体的视频中。事实上，在这些视频中，他甚至开玩笑说，他一面——一面声称自己身无分文，一面却能够享用豪华私人飞机。\n\n我们还看到是谁策划了该飞机的出售，那是 Whitecroft——或者说，是 Golden Spring（戈尔登斯普林）；根据本院的判决书，Golden Spring 是债务人的另一个自我。\n\n第四，谁为该飞机的维护和运营提供资金？实质上，谁负责照料它？\n\n再次，本案证据无争议：是债务人通过 Golden Spring，即债务人的另一个自我，为该飞机提供资金。\n\n最后，该空壳公司的所谓股东有何解释，以证明她事实上是该飞机、该资产的受益所有人、合法所有人？\n\n案件 22-50073 文档 2586 于 02/07/24 提交，于 02/07/24 21:30:54 登记，第38页，共57页\n\n郭文贵（Ho Wan Kwok）—2024年2月5日\n\n在此，我们完全没有任何解释。这些无争议事实表明，是债务人享有庞巴迪所有权的一切利益。它们还表明，被告就 Whitecroft 所发挥的任何作用纯属名义上的作用，而且被告不过是一名受制于债务人作为受益所有人的权利的名义受托人。\n\n根据英属维尔京群岛（BVI）法律，我们看到的关键特征之一是，名义受托人有义务在受益所有人提出要求时向其交出该资产。该项权利，即取得该资产的权利，现为破产财产，须根据第542(a)条向受托人交付。\n\n因此，就第一项主张而言，法院应命令将金额为 $13.5 million 的庞巴迪出售所得交付给受托人，以惠及破产财产。在被告交付的任何金额低于 $13.5 million 的范围内，应就该不足额作出判决书。\n\n就第四项主张，即英属维尔京群岛主张而言，我在此具体针对 Whitecroft 发言，法院应裁定 Whitecroft 的全部股权权益均应交付给受托人，包括 Whitecroft 的一切公司控制权。\n\n案件 22-50073 文档 2586 于 02/07/24 提交，于 02/07/24 21:30:54 登记，第39页，共57页\n\n郭文贵（Ho Wan Kwok）—2024年2月5日\n\n我将简要讨论适用于其他英属维尔京群岛空壳公司的事实。证据同样无争议：如起诉状所界定，英属维尔京群岛——其他英属维尔京群岛空壳公司的所有人是债务人，而非被告。\n\n被告在其依据 Rule 2004（规则2004）进行的询问证言中作证——该证言作出于提起对抗程序之前，此后她援引了第五修正案——称，她于2017年通过，引用原话，“管理其家族基金的人”，转让了公司。\n\n至少两家英属维尔京群岛空壳公司此前由债务人的家庭厨师名义持有，即如我此前所述的 Whitecroft，以及 Rosiaque Ventures Limited（罗西亚克风险投资有限公司）。\n\n公司登记表格及与这些英属维尔京群岛空壳公司相关的其他文件，将这些空壳公司与债务人联系起来。这些表格要求英属维尔京群岛空壳公司的所有人提供联系信息。表格中列有债务人的电话号码。我们如何得知那是债务人的电话号码？因为那与债务人在其申请购买 Sherry-Netherland（谢里-内瑟兰）房产时填写的号码相同。\n\n核验表格还将 22 South Bay Road 列为地址。我们知道该地址是与债务人在香港有关联的地址，因为该房产是通过 Leading Shine Limited（领尚有限公司）投保的；该公司在 Golden Spring 的纳税申报表中被列为相关外国公司。我们还看到一个与该地址相似的地址，同样出现在购买 Sherry-Netherland 房产的申请中。\n\n此外，将这些实体提供给被告作为名义受托人，完全符合债务人处理其财务事务的一贯手法，即让持有其资产的空壳公司由内部人士、家庭成员或受其控制的人名义持有。\n\n针对受托人无争议的证据，被告未提供任何证据证明她为取得这些实体的所有权支付过任何对价，也未对她如何成为这些实体的名义所有人作出任何合理解释。\n\n再次，如同 Whitecroft、如同庞巴迪一样，此处的解释显而易见，即债务人——被告担任名义所有人，以便债务人能够拥有资产，同时使该等资产免受其债权人的追索。\n\n案件 22-50073 文档 2586 于 02/07/24 提交，于 02/07/24 21:30:54 登记，第42页，共57页\n\n郭文贵（Ho Wan Kwok）—2024年2月5日\n\n在不存在任何事实以反对简易判决的情况下，反对意见主要依赖于证据异议，而所有这些异议均不能成立。\n\n我将简要说明，但也乐意回答法官阁下提出的任何具体问题。\n\n我还要指出，作为受托人所提交的 56(a)(2) 答复的附件，有一份图表专门处理了每一份遭到证据异议的证物，并列明了受托人的答复。\n\n首先，是认证异议。认证异议超过20项。\n\n首先应当指出，根据《联邦证据规则》第901条，证据认证的标准并不特别高。该标准仅为——提出足够证明，使理性陪审员能够认定该证据真实并可供识别。\n\n而且值得注意的是，对于所有这些真实性异议，被告并未主张任何涉案证物不真实。被告只是称受托人未能充分认证这些证物。\n\n因此，鉴于此，并且我认为这项程序现在已因 Greenwich Land（格林尼治土地）而为人所熟知，被告向提交方取得了认证声明；提交方提供了涉案证据，而该等认证声明对这些证物进行了认证。\n\n该等认证声明作为证物随受托人的答复文件一并提交。因此，鉴于这些声明，认证异议——即使其曾经具有分量——现已不再具有意义，现已失去争议性。\n\n我将简要讨论对涉案文件提出的传闻证据异议。大部分——再次，有超过20项传闻证据异议。\n\n大部分该等异议均可通过传闻证据规则中的业务记录例外予以解决，因为这些文件由知情人在有关事件发生时或其后不久制作，作为企业惯常做法的一部分加以保存，并在经常开展的活动过程中留存。\n\n再次，这些——这些标准由认证异议——或者说，由受托人随其答复文件提交的认证声明所满足。受托人的 56(a)(2) 答复中还具体引用了这些认证声明，该等声明亦表明业务记录例外适用。\n\n传闻证据规则中的其他例外也同样适用。\n\n案件 22-50073 文档 2586 于 02/07/24 提交，于 02/07/24 21:30:54 登记，第44页，共57页\n\n郭文贵（Ho Wan Kwok）—2024年2月5日\n\n一个例子是债务人关于乘坐私人飞机体验的独白。这些独白适用现场感知例外——或者说，传闻证据禁止规则中的即时印象例外。如果您阅读债务人——债务人的独白内容，他确实是在描述其发生当时的体验，包括他听到的声音、他触摸的内饰，有时还有他品尝的食物。\n\n债务人的长篇独白中，他谈到购买一——购买庞巴迪，并开玩笑说假装身无分文，这同样属于传闻证据规则中不利于己陈述例外。首先，债务人援引第五修正案，明确表明债务人是无法出庭的证人。而债务人作出的这些陈述，不利于陈述人的财产或金钱利益。我认为，这一点从债务人的金钱利益即可清楚看出；正如其在本 Chapter 11（第11章）案件期间的行为所体现的那样，其金钱利益在于让家庭成员名义持有其资产，以保护这些资产免受其债权人追索。\n\n最后，我只想简要回应被告毫无根据的禁止反言论点。\n\n案件 22-50073 文档 2586 于 02/07/24 提交，于 02/07/24 21:30:54 登记，第45页，共57页\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- 2024年2月5日 45 被告主张，法院在准许受托人提出的强制执行动议时，显然秘密地作出了有利于被告的、关于本对立程序实体问题的认定。该动议旨在强制Whitecroft（怀特克罗夫特）和Anton Development（安东开发公司）遵从受托人的传票；该强制执行动议及法院准许该动议的命令规定，被告必须就该等实体以其身份采取行动，以确保遵从。被告主张，受托人通过这些空壳公司的名义所有人寻求取证，而该名义所有人自称控制这些公司，因此，受托人现已不得提出其寻求该证据所要支持的论点。而被告在提出该论点时，颇为肆无忌惮地未披露以下事实：受托人在强制执行动议中至少五次将被告在这些公司中的权益称为名义权益。事实上，法院的命令也将被告在这些公司中的权益称为名义权益。此外，在债务人的空壳把戏这一背景下，被告的论点根本不合逻辑。被告作为Anton Development和Whitecroft的名义董事及股东的角色，与受托人的主张毫不矛盾。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 46 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- 2024年2月5日 46 这正是债务人空壳把戏的核心，即由内部人士和近亲属担任实体的名义股东、名义高级职员或董事，而债务人为实益所有人。因此，基于上述理由，就第一项罪名项而言，法院应认定庞巴迪所得款项属于破产财产，并命令在五个营业日内移交该等款项。在移交给受托人的款项少于庞巴迪所得款项金额的范围内，再次说明，该金额为$13.5 million，法院应作出对被告不利的金钱判决。就第四项罪名项而言，法院应认定Whitecroft及其他英属维尔京群岛空壳公司属于破产财产，并应命令将这些公司的全部股权权益及公司控制权移交给受托人。就这些事项，我乐意回答法院可能提出的任何问题。法院：目前我没有问题。LINSEY先生（林赛先生）：法官阁下，两项更正。首先，我把前苏维埃共和国弄混了。是库尔德斯坦，不是哈萨克斯坦。我想有一集《白宫风云》里有人把它们弄混了。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 47 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- 2024年2月5日 47 其次，我提到被告取得了声明；实际上是在被告提出那些证据异议后，由受托人去取得了声明。我对口误表示歉意。再次，我乐意回答任何问题。法院：您说的声明，是指——附在您的答复文件中、附有文件认证的那些声明吗？您说的是这个吗？LINSEY先生：是的，法官阁下。法院：好的。目前我没有问题。谢谢。LINSEY先生：谢谢。WERNICK律师（温尼克律师），是您进行辩论，还是MORIARTY律师（莫里亚蒂律师）？WERNICK女士：我来，法官阁下。法院：好的。谢谢。WERNICK女士：谢谢。谢谢您，法官阁下。下午好。法院：下午好。WERNICK女士：我想从我们今天下午为何在此开始。如LINSEY律师所述，受托人就第一项和第四项反诉提出了简易判决动议，涉及庞巴迪飞机及庞巴迪所得款项的实益所有权，以及Whitecroft Shore Limited（怀特克罗夫特海岸有限公司）实体，还有受托人在其书面文件中称为英属维尔京群岛空壳实体的若干其他英属维尔京群岛公司。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 48 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- 2024年2月5日 48 当LINSEY律师走上来时，他先提出了一个自称为哲学问题的问题，即拥有一项资产意味着什么。我谨向法官阁下陈述，简易判决并不是处理这类哲学问题的适当程序。简易判决的标准众所周知，但我认为这是法院今天下午审理时最重要的部分。只有在不存在任何真实的重大事实争议，并且不存在此类争议的事实依法要求对动议方作出判决时，方可作出简易判决。在确定是否存在真实的重大事实争议时，法院必须以最有利于非动议方的角度审查证据，并作出有利于非动议方的一切推论。若案卷中有任何证据可合理支持作出有利于非动议方的裁决，则作出简易判决不当。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 49 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- 2024年2月5日 49 如果案卷中有来自任何来源的证据，可据此作出有利于非动议方的合理推论，则动议方未能获得简易判决。法院必须作出所有有利于非动议方的合理推论，且不得作出可信性判断或衡量证据。可信性判断和证据权衡不适于在简易判决阶段进行。在本案及当前程序阶段，一切歧义均必须作有利于被告Guo女士（郭女士）的解释，并且在本程序阶段，所有推论均必须作有利于Guo女士的解释。这一点至关重要，因为受托人极力强调Guo女士据称未能在本案中提出积极证据。但本区法院即使在无人反对的简易判决动议中，若动议方未能履行其举证责任，也会驳回该等动议。受托人负有提出能够证明其主张的证据之责任。但审视受托人所依赖的证据后，被告谨此陈述，他在本案中未能做到这一点，因为一切合理推论都必须给予被告。我想从LINSEY律师就英属维尔京群岛公司所作陈述的结尾处开始。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 50 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- 2024年2月5日 50 受托人主张，债务人是包括Whitecroft在内的英属维尔京群岛公司的实益所有人，尽管其承认每一家英属维尔京群岛公司均将Guo女士列为其唯一所有人。为请求法院作出这一跳跃性认定，受托人依赖于一些零散证据，这些证据无法汇集成受托人请求法官阁下作出的推论。受托人仅仅援引一页核验文件上的地址，该文件无争议地表明Guo女士是这些实体的所有人，并请求法院因相同或类似地址出现在与其他实体有关的其他文件上，便得出这些公司必然与债务人有关联的结论。在此情形下，这不是可以作出的合理推论，也不能使法院得出诉状中所提及的英属维尔京群岛公司由债务人实益拥有的结论。对于Whitecroft也是如此，且相关证据更为有力，因为无争议的是，Guo女士现在及始终是Whitecroft的唯一成员和股东，签署了与该实体相关的协议，并被多家律师事务所认定为Whitecroft的所有人。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 51 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- 2024年2月5日 51 关于庞巴迪飞机本身，受托人依赖的宣誓书并未随其最初的简易判决动议文件提交，而仅在答复中就一项陈述提交，或者适用于一份地方规则56(a)(2)陈述；据我理解，地方规则并未要求该陈述，且法院不应予以考虑。关于庞巴迪飞机本身，受托人还请求法院基于不当的跳跃性认定和推论，例如Krasner先生（克拉斯纳先生）不知何故与飞机出售有关联，因此只能为Golden Spring（金泉）而非Whitecroft工作。无争议的是，自2018年起，Whitecroft一直是该飞机登记产权所有人。在本案中，作出一切合理——一切合理推论均有利于Guo女士的情况下，不得作出简易判决。就此，我将依赖书面文件（听不清）。法院：好的。谢谢。目前我没有问题。谢谢。WERNICK女士：好的。谢谢您，法官阁下。LINSEY先生：法官阁下，我们可以有几秒钟时间吗？法院：可以。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 52 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- 2024年2月5日 52 LINSEY先生：谢谢。（暂停。）LINSEY先生：仅说明几点，法官阁下。首先，法律很明确，我们——受托人已经证明了其主张。根据有关简易判决事实及Celotex和其他判例法，被告有义务积极提出事实。被告未能这样做。因此，被告援引的关于无人反对的简易判决动议的案件不适用。简要而言，关于Krasner先生，我们知道Krasner先生为Golden Spring工作，因为Krasner先生自称是Golden Spring的运营总监。Jetlaw（捷特劳）的Jackson先生（杰克逊先生）已就此作出具体证言。这也见于我们从Jetlaw取得的书面证据。我还将仅提及被告——辩护律师顺带说的一点。辩护律师提到了律师事务所的信函。我相信她所指的是随Vartan先生（瓦尔坦先生）的声明及被告的反对文件附上的两项证据。这些证据在受托人的56(a)(2)中有所讨论。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2586 Filed 02/07/24 Entered 02/07/24 21:30:54 Page 53 of 57\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- 2024年2月5日\n1 答复。\n受托人已如该答复中所指出的那样，\n2 说明该等证据不当。\n3 该等证据不当的原因是，\n4 受托人曾试图向作为Whitecroft公司代表的被告提问，\n5 该提问发生在Whitecroft的证言录取中，\n6 而被告就那些具体文件援引了第五修正案权利。\n7 它们可能是英属维尔京群岛律师出具的意见函。\n8 我们并不确切知道它们是什么。\n其原因是\n9 我们并不确切知道它们是什么，是因为有如下的问答。\n10 \n11 我问：我们将转到证据11，请查看该文件，\n12 并在您熟悉其内容后告知我。\n被告\n13 完成审阅。\n14 您以前见过该文件吗？\n回答：我\n15 不记得。该文件是什么？\n回答：第五\n16 修正案。Vistra（维仕达）是什么？\n那是——Vistra是其中一封信函的\n17 签署人。第五修正案。Vistra Legal BVI Limited（维仕达法律英属维尔京群岛有限公司）是什么？\n18 第五修正案。谁代表Vistra Legal BVI Limited签署该\n19 文件？第五修正案。为何制作该文件？\n第五修正案。\n20 \n21 \n22 \n23 我向您陈述，Whitecroft已应\n24 原告传票，将该文件提交给原告受托人。\nWhitecroft从何处取得\n25\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- February 5, 2024 54\n\n该文件以向受托人提交？第五修正案。这一点载于第45页；该问答内容载于被告方的——更确切地说，是受托人的——56(a)(2)答复第45页。就另一份证物而言，亦援引了类似的问答内容。同样，被告律师只是略作讨论。因此，被告试图利用该证据以反对简易判决，完全不当。最后，我仅在结束时指出我开头所说的同一点，即，这实际上——这些案件几乎开始变成彼此的回响。这一案件与 Lady May（“Lady May”案）之间的相似之处如此——如此接近，有时几乎像是彼此的碳复写件。我们有由债务人转移、提供资金的有价值资产；该资产由债务人经由其下属之一转移，名义上由债务人的家庭成员通过一家空壳公司持有。尽管该空壳公司名义上由该家庭成员持有，债务人仍持续使用并享受该资产。债务人仍持续为该资产提供资金并控制该资产，而非\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 2586 提交日期 02/07/24 登记日期 02/07/24 21:30:54 第 54 页，共 57 页\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 2586 提交日期 02/07/24 登记日期 02/07/24 21:30:54 第 55 页，共 57 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- February 5, 2024 55\n\n被告。鉴于所述判例法、受托人在其简易判决动议中提出的有力事实——其中无一受到争议——法院应当按所请求作出判决。谢谢。\n\n法庭：谢谢。\n\nWERNICK 女士：法官阁下，能否作一个极其简短的答复？\n\n法庭：当然。请继续。\n\nWERNICK 女士：谢谢。因此，我想先谈谈 LINSEY 律师对 Lady May（“Lady May”案）的追溯援引。我认为，再次强调，最重要的是，我们是在一项独立程序中出庭，受托人必须就本程序中的简易判决履行其举证责任。我想请法官阁下注意 Jones vs. Sampson（琼斯诉桑普森案），该案来自 District of Connecticut（康涅狄格联邦地区法院）；该法院在脚注一中明确说明，对于 Rule 56(a)(2) 陈述不存在答复，并拒绝在该案中考虑此类陈述。如果法官阁下需要，我有 Westlaw 引证。\n\n法庭：好的。你在书面陈述中引用过该案吗？\n\nWERNICK 女士：那——那只是在答复中\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 2586 提交日期 02/07/24 登记日期 02/07/24 21:30:54 第 56 页，共 57 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- February 5, 2024 56\n\n提交的——\n\n法庭：好的。明白。\n\nWERNICK 女士：——所以我们不会有书面陈述。\n\n法庭：那么，请继续。再说一遍。\n\nWERNICK 女士：是 Jones vs. Sampson（琼斯诉桑普森案）。\n\n法庭：Jones。对。\n\nWERNICK 女士：2023 Westlaw 1069487。\n\n法庭：好的。谢谢。\n\nWERNICK 女士：因此，就此而言，我们谨不同意 LINSEY 律师及受托人的立场，即受托人已就此处提出的事实履行其举证责任，并且将事实适用于法律并不足以支持在本案中作出简易判决。\n\n法庭：好的。谢谢。好。好。还有其他人希望就简易判决动议发表意见吗？\n\n（无人答复。）\n\n法庭：好的。我——我在今天之前确实看过这些动议，但鉴于律师们今天下午所作的陈述，我显然必须回去再次审阅，因此我将对对抗程序 23-5008 中的简易判决动议保留裁决。今天下午还有其他需要处理的事项吗\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 2586 提交日期 02/07/24 登记日期 02/07/24 21:30:54 第 57 页，共 57 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- February 5, 2024 57\n\n？\n\nDESPINS 先生：目前没有，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：好的。那么，那些是——那些是今日日程中其余的事项。因此，谢谢各位。现在休庭。\n\n（程序于 2:21 p.m. 结束。）\n\n本人，CHRISTINE FIORE（克里斯汀·菲奥雷），经法院批准的记录转录员及经认证的电子记录员和转录员，兹证明，上述内容系根据上述案件程序的正式电子录音制作的正确笔录。\n\n15 February 7, 2024\n\n16 Christine Fiore（克里斯汀·菲奥雷）, CERT","key_entities":["Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Je","Guo","Despins","CIPA","Paul Hastings","Luc Despins"],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":13439,"status":"published","published_at":"2024-02-07 00:00:00","created_at":"2024-02-07","updated_at":"2026-08-23 21:34:45"}