{"id":"court_ctb_2620_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":2620,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION | -------------------------------------------","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"## **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| ------------------------------------------------------<br>x |        |                         |  |  |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------|--------|-------------------------|--|--|\n|                                                             | :      |                         |  |  |\n| In re:                                                      | :      | Chapter 11              |  |  |\n| et al.,1<br>HO WAN KWOK,                                    | :<br>: | Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |  |  |\n|                                                             | :      |                         |  |  |\n| Debtors.                                                    | :      | (Jointly Administered)  |  |  |\n|                                                             | :      |                         |  |  |\n| ------------------------------------------------------x     |        |                         |  |  |\n\n## **OMNIBUS REPLY OF CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE (I) IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ENTRY OF ORDER EXTENDING DEADLINE FOR TRUSTEE TO FILE AVOIDANCE ACTIONS UNDER BANKRUPTCY CODE SECTIONS 108, 546(a), AND 549, AND (II) IN RESPONSE TO OBJECTIONS THERETO**\n\n<span id=\"page-0-0\"></span> <sup>1</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\nLuc A. Despins, in his capacity as the chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") appointed in the chapter 11 case of Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"), by and through his undersigned counsel, hereby files this reply (the \"Reply\") (i) in support of the Trustee's *Motion for Entry of Order Extending Deadline for Trustee to File Avoidance Actions Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 108, 546(a), and 549* [Docket No. 2509] (the \"Motion\") and (ii) in response to the objections and responses filed thereto. In support of this Reply, the Trustee respectfully states as follows:\n\n#### **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\n1. The Trustee served the Motion on approximately 1,000 entities and individuals, and while the Trustee received numerous informal comments and queries, only twelve objections and one reservation of rights were filed. One objection, filed by UBS AG, has since been settled. Of the eleven remaining objections, *ten* were filed by the Debtor's family members or close associates, or entities affiliated with (if not controlled by) the Debtor. These remaining objections all sing the same chorus, professing outrage and indignation on behalf of the recipients of the Motion that did not object, which the objectors have no standing to do. They also, incredibly, assert the moral high ground by casting themselves as protecting the sanctity of the Bankruptcy Code. This, of course, ignores that all of the remaining objectors, with one exception, are the very individuals and entities that either themselves obstructed and delayed the Trustee's investigation or benefited from the delay and obstruction of others.\n\n2. Tellingly, none of the objectors, with the exception of Mei Guo—who, ironically, has interfered with the Trustee's investigation as anyone—takes material issue with the central factual premise underlying the Motion that the Trustee has conducted his investigation diligently. As set forth in detail in the Motion, and as reflected by the docket in this case, the record is clear that the Trustee has acted diligently at all times, with his inability to complete his investigation\n\n1\n\nby the February 15 deadline due solely to issues beyond his control—namely, the shear breadth and complexity of the Debtor's worldwide shell game, and the near constant obstruction he has faced from the Debtor and others, including certain of the objectors, who have refused to comply with subpoenas and court orders and have otherwise sought to delay and complicate the Trustee's work in every way possible.\n\n3. Unable to rebut the extensive factual record supporting the Motion, the objectors press the legal argument, citing to the *Walnut Hill* ruling from this district, that this Court is purportedly powerless to equitably toll the statute of limitations prior to the filing of an adversary complaint. But that is not correct. The only inquiry is whether the Trustee, despite due diligence, was prevented from completing his investigation and discovery process by extraordinary circumstances beyond his control. There is no requirement that the Court perform this analysis on a claim-by-claim, defendant-by-defendant basis only after the filing of a complaint, and *Walnut Hill* is incorrect to the extent it concluded otherwise.\n\n4. The Trustee filed the Motion because he had no choice: despite the diligent efforts of the Trustee and his professionals, and the significant and important progress and success he has already made, the enormity of the Trustee's task and the constant obstruction he faced has rendered it impossible for him to complete his investigation and bring all available claims prior to February 15. As multiple bankruptcy courts in multiple jurisdictions have recognized, it simply cannot be the case that the Trustee is left with no recourse.\n\n#### **RELEVANT ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND**\n\n5. The Trustee filed the Notice Motion on January 9, 2024, and the Motion on January 18, 2024. On January 19, 2024, the Court entered an order granting the Notice Motion [Docket No. 2515] (the \"Notice Order\"). Among other things, the Notice Order established\n\n2\n\nFebruary 5, 2024 as the deadline to object to the Motion, and on January 31, 2024 the Trustee filed a notice [Docket No. 2540] describing the ways, in accordance with the Notice Order, in which notice of the Motion was provided (the \"Notice of Service\").\n\n6. Since filing the Motion, the Trustee has continued to investigate additional facts and information that could, with further investigation and analysis, lead to actionable claims. AS one example, the Trustee has been diligently cataloging the contents of a storage facility that was discovered in connection with the adversary proceeding brought against Taurus Fund (one of the Objectors). While that process is not yet complete, the Trustee's examination has revealed boxes of documents that should have been turned over to the Trustee, but were not. This is just one example of the numerous ongoing activities that could lead to additional claims.\n\n7. In addition, to the extent the Trustee's investigation has already uncovered sufficient information to support actionable claims, the Trustee is busy preparing complaints to file by the February 15 deadline, including against many of the Objectors.[2](#page-3-0) These complaints (which are numerous) will seek, among other things, the avoidance and recovery of fraudulent transfers, additional alter ego findings, and damages for violation of U.S. racketeering laws.\n\n8. The Trustee has received objections and responses (collectively, the \"Objections,\" filed by the \"Objectors\") to the motion by Mei Guo [Docket No. 2551], Defeng Cao [Docket No. 2553], UBS AG [Docket No. 2554], DBS Bank [Docket No. 2556], the Taurus Entities and Scott Barnett [Docket No. 2557], G Club Operations [Docket No. 2563], Rule of Law Entities [Docket No. 2565], Chris Lee and Qidong Xia [Docket No. 2566], Greenwich Land [Docket No. 2569], GS Security Solutions [Docket No. 2571], Yinying Wang [Docket No. 2582], Sotheby's International Realty, Inc. [Docket No. 2584], and Yongbing Zhang [Docket No. 2591].\n\n<span id=\"page-3-0\"></span> <sup>2</sup> For example, on February 6, 2024, the Trustee commenced an adversary proceeding against Defeng Cao.\n\n#### **REPLY**\n\n### **I. Most Objectors Are Complicit in Debtor's Scheme and Obstruction Efforts And Have No Standing to Assert Rights of Other Parties**\n\n9. As noted above, with one exception, all of the remaining Objectors have been complicit in the efforts to obstruct and delay the Trustee's investigation, or they have directly benefited from those efforts. Accordingly, when considering the Trustee's request for equitable tolling, the equities weigh strongly against these parties.\n\n10. One of the lead Objectors is the Debtor's daughter, Mei Guo, who is a central figure in the Debtor's shell game and has sought to impede the Trustee's work at every turn. As the Court is aware, Mei Guo caused the shell company she nominally owned to file an adversary proceeding asserting ownership of the Lady May yacht, even though Judge Ostrager of the New York Supreme Court had already found that Mei Guo's testimony \"that she owns and controls the Lady May cannot be credited in any respect.\"[3](#page-4-0) She also concealed from the Trustee the existence of another yacht, the Lady May II. The Trustee eventually prevailed in the litigation and recovered both yachts, but not without significant cost, expense, and delay.\n\n11. Mei Guo further obstructed discovery efforts by failing to comply with validly issued subpoenas, which ultimately led to her being found in contempt of court and to the imposition of sanctions against her and her counsel. Mei Guo also gave false testimony concerning the proceeds of the sale of a Bombardier private jet controlled by the Debtor, testifying that she had sold the Bombardier to a buyer whose name she did not recall and that, while she was the \"owner\" of the proceeds, she did not recall where the proceeds were located\n\n<span id=\"page-4-0\"></span> <sup>3</sup> February 9, 2022 Decision & Order, at 6-7, *PAX v. Kwok*, Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), NYSCEF Doc. No. 1181.\n\nand could not access them.[4](#page-5-0) This was shown to be false when the Trustee received documents showing Mei Guo had extensive correspondence with an entity named JNFX Ltd., which was holding the proceeds, and that she was able to control the disposition of the funds.[5](#page-5-1) More recently, this Court found that \"Ms. Guo has made contradictory statements under oath.\"[6](#page-5-2)\n\n12. The other Objectors have likewise obstructed the Trustee's investigation. For example, Defeng Cao is Mei Guo's longtime boyfriend who, as detailed in the complaint filed against him, helped the Debtor conceal assets in Cao's name. The Taurus Fund Entities and Scott Barnett (who also nominally owns GS Security Solutions) helped hide the Mahwah Mansion, as did Greenwich Land the Debtor's home in Connecticut. G-Club and the Rule of Law Entities are also controlled by the Debtor, with G-Club having refused to comply with its discovery obligations, and the Rule of Law Entities having assisted in the protest and harassment campaign enjoined by the Court. Finally, Yinying Wang, Chris Lee, and Qidong Xia are members of the purported HCHK Creditors Committee led by Objector Yongbing Zhang, who has been sanctioned multiple times for his frivolous litigation against the Trustee and others.\n\n13. Cognizant of their own unclean hands, certain of the Objectors seek to advance the interests of \"potentially hundreds of other defendants\" who could be affected by the Motion.[7](#page-5-3) Each Objector, however, has standing only to advance *its own* interests. *See Renco Grp., Inc. v. Wilmington Trust (In re Magnesium Corp. of Am.)*, 583 B.R. 637, 647 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018) (prudential standing \"bars litigants from asserting the rights or legal interests of others in order to\n\n<span id=\"page-5-0\"></span> <sup>4</sup> *Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment* ¶ 16 (Adv. Proc. No. 23-05008, Docket No. 91).\n\n<span id=\"page-5-1\"></span><sup>5</sup> *Id.* ¶ 17.\n\n<sup>6</sup> *Order Holding Hudson Diamond Holding LLC in Contempt*, at 9 (Docket No. 2545) .\n\n<span id=\"page-5-3\"></span><span id=\"page-5-2\"></span><sup>7</sup> Mei Guo Obj. ¶ 10; Cao Obj. ¶ 25; Taurus Obj. ¶ 16; Greenwich Obj. ¶ 7.\n\nobtain relief from injury to themselves … [party] generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties\").\n\n14. Ironically, in attempting to distinguish cases cited by the Trustee in which courts have extended the statutory limitations period in sections 108, 546, and 549 of the Bankruptcy Code based on equitable tolling, the Objectors argue that the Court should ignore some of those decisions because the tolling was unopposed. But this simply proves the Trustee's point: if a party has not objected to the Motion, it is unopposed as to that party and should be granted as to that party, even if it is ultimately denied as to the Objectors (which it should not be).\n\n### **II. Court Should Not Follow** *Walnut Hill***; Equitable Tolling Does Not Require a Pending Adversary Proceeding**\n\n15. Citing *In re Walnut Hill, Inc.*, No. 16–20960 (JJT), 2018 WL 2672242, at \\*2 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 1, 2018), Mei Guo argues that equitable tolling \"only applies *after* the underlying action has been commenced and a statute of limitations defense has been asserted.\"[8](#page-6-0) The other Objections make similar claims, all relying on *Walnut Hill*. [9](#page-6-1)\n\n16. The Motion acknowledged *Walnut Hill*'s ruling, and argued that *Walnut Hill* came to the wrong conclusion—and the Trustee stands by that position. *Walnut Hill* is a short opinion, with a limited analysis of equitable tolling. In *Walnut Hill*, the court noted that no adversary proceeding was pending and held that equitable tolling was premature because it should not be addressed \"outside the context of an evidentiary hearing on the facts and circumstances to be proven in the adversary proceeding against specific defendants.\" *In re Walnut Hill, Inc.*, 2018 WL 2672242, at \\*2*.* The court attempted to reconcile this holding with the Eleventh Circuit's ruling in *IBT International, Inc. v. Northern (In re International*\n\n<span id=\"page-6-1\"></span><span id=\"page-6-0\"></span>\n\n<sup>8</sup> Mei Guo Obj. ¶ 8 (emphasis in original). 9 *See, e.g.*, GS Security Obj. ¶ 2; Greenwich Obj. ¶¶ 4-5; Rule of Law Obj. ¶ 13.\n\n*Administrative Services, Inc.)*, 408 F.3d 689, 695 (11th Cir. 2005) (\"*IAS*\"), claiming that \"upon closer examination\" of the ruling, *IAS* \"relied upon the doctrine of equitable tolling, which had been interposed after a statute of limitations defense was asserted in a pending adversary proceeding.\" *In re Walnut Hill, Inc.*, 2018 WL 2672242, at \\*2.\n\n17. But *Walnut Hill* misunderstood the *IAS* ruling. In *IAS*, the official committee moved for an extension of the time to file avoidance actions *before* the expiration of the statutory period. The bankruptcy court entered a \"bridge order,\" extending the limitations period through the time of a hearing by a Special Master appointed to oversee discovery. At the conclusion of that hearing, the Special Master determined that the debtor had deliberately hidden certain transfer documents; based on these findings of fact, the trustee (as successor to the official committee) made an oral motion to further extend the time to file avoidance actions. That oral motion was granted, and the period was further extended to February 10, 1999. On that date, the trustee filed an adversary complaint against a number of defendants, and six months later, on August 17, 1999, the trustee named two more defendants, IBT and SCSD. IBT and SCSD raised a limitations defense, which the Eleventh Circuit ultimately rejected.\n\n18. This procedural history forces a reexamination of *Walnut Hill*. As noted, *Walnut Hill* characterizes *IAS* as a case in which equitable tolling was raised by specific defendants named in a pending adversary proceeding. But the court ignored that these defendants did not raise the limitations defense until after the bankruptcy court had already twice extended the limitations period. This means that—contrary to *Walnut Hill*'s ruling and its characterization of the *IAS* ruling—the *IAS* court affirmed the extension of the limitations period *before* the limitations period had run and *before* the specific defendants were served a complaint. Stated\n\n7\n\nsimply, *Walnut Hill* was correct that equitable tolling requires an evidentiary showing, but was wrong that this showing can be made only after the filing of an adversary proceeding.\n\n#### **III. Equitable Tolling Does Not Require Misconduct By Any Specific Objector**\n\n19. Multiple Objectors claim that the Motion cannot be granted as against them because (they assert) they have not, themselves, delayed the discovery process or otherwise interfered with the Trustee's investigation.[10](#page-8-0) As noted above, this argument is implausible (to say the least) with respect to ten of the Objectors, all of whom are complicit in the Debtor's fraudulent scheme, including its continuation post-petition, and/or have actively participated in efforts to hinder, delay, or harass the Trustee.\n\n20. This line of argument is also incorrect as a matter of law, because \"equitable tolling is not limited to situations involving … the adversary's misconduct.\" *Fam. Golf Ctrs., Inc. v. Acushnet Co. (In re Randall's Island Fam. Golf Centers, Inc.)*, 288 B.R. 701, 705-06 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (subsequent history omitted). In fact, the Second Circuit \"has rejected the position that equitable tolling is permissible only in misconduct cases.\" *Canales v. Sullivan*, 936 F.2d 755, 758 (2d Cir. 1991), *on reh'g*, 947 F.2d 45, 758 (2d Cir. 1991). The Second Circuit later explained that because misconduct and concealment is (of course) a basis for equitable tolling, \"equitable tolling is often confused with fraudulent concealment.\" *Donely ex rel. Valdez v. United States*, 518 F.3d 173, 182-83 (2d Cir. 2008). The Second Circuit, therefore, \"clarif[ied] that fraudulent concealment is not essential to equitable tolling,\" because equitable tolling \"*does not assume a wrongful – or any – effort by the defendant to prevent the plaintiff from suing*.\" *Id.* (internal quotations and references omitted) (emphasis added).[11](#page-8-1)\n\n <sup>10</sup> *See, e.g*., Rule of Law Obj. ¶ 17; Lee and Xia Obj. ¶ 18; Taurus Obj. ¶ 36.\n\n<span id=\"page-8-1\"></span><span id=\"page-8-0\"></span><sup>11</sup> The Second Circuit's rulings provide another reason this Court should not follow *Walnut Hill*. By requiring the commencement of an adversary proceeding and an evidentiary showing as \"against specific defendants\" in that\n\n21. Properly understood, equitable tolling requires only (i) extraordinary circumstances and (ii) due diligence. The Trustee easily satisfies both of these requirements based on, among other things, the factual and legal findings the Court has already made in published opinions and other rulings.\n\n#### **IV. Court Has Sufficient Evidence Right Now to Make Required Findings**\n\n22. Implicit in the Objectors' argument that the Trustee cannot obtain equitable tolling until an adversary proceeding is filed is their contention that, if the Trustee has information prior to the expiration of the limitations period related to a claim he ends up filing later, equitable tolling is *per se* unavailable. But courts have rejected such a \"bright-line\" rule. As one court explained, \"bright-line rules like this are too narrow in the equitable tolling context. For example, a plaintiff could be diligent in attempting to discover information, but actually discovers (or should have discovered) the information the day before the statute of limitations period expires.\" *Schmidt v. Twosons Corp. (In re Black Elk Energy Offshore Operations, LLC)*, No. 15-34287, 2022 WL 1589190, at \\*13, n.15 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 19, 2022) (equitable tolling can exist even where \"plaintiff learned of its claims during the limitations period\").\n\n23. Accordingly, regardless of whether the Trustee has information in his possession presently that could support claims he eventually files against the Objectors (beyond the claims against them that the Trustee intends to file before the deadline), the Trustee's failure to locate, analyze, and act on such information prior to February 15 does not mean equitable tolling is not warranted. To the contrary, equitable tolling *is* warranted because there is no question that the Trustee has acted diligently at all times notwithstanding the extraordinary obstruction he has faced, which has affected the Trustee's investigation as to *all* potential defendants. Any inability\n\nproceeding, *Walnut Hill* adopts a blanket rule that, as a practical matter, is contrary to the Second Circuit's directive that equitable tolling does not require misconduct by each (or any) specific defendant.\n\nof the Trustee to review and analyze every document or piece of information in his possession for potential claims prior to the February 15 deadline does not show a lack of diligence.\n\n### **V. Other Objections Are Without Merit**\n\n24. Again relying on *Walnut Hill*, virtually all of the Objections argue that Rule 9006(b) cannot be used to extend the limitations period found in a statute. But the Objections do not address the Motion's argument that Rule 9006 obviously can modify a statute, because even *Walnut Hill* agrees that Rule 9006*(a)* does so. Indeed, at least one district court in this Circuit has applied Rule 9006(b) to a statute. *In re Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc.*, No. 11-CV-1338 CS, 2011 WL 5546954, at \\*7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2011) (Rule 9006(b) allowed enlargement of time period in section 366 of the Bankruptcy Code).\n\n25. Finally, Greenwich Land invokes *Stern v. Marshall*, and claims that the Motion \"involves private rights of action\" that could only be decided by the District Court.[12](#page-10-0) However, it cites no authority for this proposition, and bankruptcy courts rule on equitable tolling motions as a matter of course. This argument lacks merit.[13](#page-10-1)\n\n#### **VI. Changes to Proposed Order**\n\n26. The Trustee has received numerous informal queries and comments in response to the Motion. One such informal comment observed that the Proposed Order submitted with the Motion could inadvertently be construed as extending the statute of limitations even for state law claims that expired prior to the petition date. That is not the intent of the Motion, and the Trustee proposes clarifying changes to the Proposed Order, as reflected in the attached blackline.\n\n<span id=\"page-10-0\"></span> <sup>12</sup> Greenwich Obj. ¶ 14.\n\n<span id=\"page-10-1\"></span><sup>13</sup> Trustee has received numerous informal queries and comments in response to the Motion. One such informal comment, which resolved a potential objection, is reflected in the blackline proposed order submitted herewith.\n\nWHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the Trustee respectfully requests that the Court enter the Proposed Order granting the relief requested herein and grant any other relief as the Court considers proper.\n\nDated: February 9, 2024 LUC A. DESPINS,\n\nNew Haven, Connecticut CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE\n\nBy: */s/ Douglass Barron*\n\nAvram E. Luft (admitted *pro hac vice*) Douglass Barron (admitted *pro hac vice*) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6079 aviluft@paulhastings.com douglassbarron@paulhastings.com\n\n*and*\n\nNicholas A. Bassett (admitted *pro hac vice*) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C., 20036 (202) 551-1902 nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n*and*\n\nPatrick R. Linsey (ct29437) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 781-2847 plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n*Counsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee*\n\n# **Exhibit A Revised Proposed Order**\n\n(Changes in **bold** and underlined)\n\n## **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| ------------------------------------------------------<br>x |   |                         |  |  |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------|---|-------------------------|--|--|\n|                                                             | : |                         |  |  |\n| In re:                                                      | : | Chapter 11              |  |  |\n|                                                             | : |                         |  |  |\n| et al.,14<br>HO WAN KWOK,                                   | : | Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |  |  |\n|                                                             | : |                         |  |  |\n| Debtors.                                                    | : | (Jointly Administered)  |  |  |\n|                                                             | : |                         |  |  |\n| ------------------------------------------------------x     |   |                         |  |  |\n\n## **[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ENTRY OF ORDER EXTENDING DEADLINE FOR TRUSTEE TO FILE AVOIDANCE ACTIONS UNDER BANKRUPTCY CODE SECTIONS 108, 546(a), AND 549**\n\nUPON CONSIDERATION OF the Chapter 11 Trustee's *Motion for Entry of Order*\n\n*Extending Deadline for Trustee to File Avoidance Actions Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 108,*\n\n*546(a), and 549* (the \"Motion\"), and good cause having been shown, and the Court having\n\nconsidered any and all objections and other responses to the Motion, and the Court finding that\n\n(i) there is good cause for the relief requested, (ii) there are extraordinary circumstances\n\njustifying the relief requested, (iii) the Trustee has acted diligently, and (iv) the Motion has been\n\nserved in accordance with the Court's prior Order granting the Notice Motion, and such notice is\n\nproper and sufficient under the circumstances and no other notice is required, and the relief\n\nprovided herein being narrowly tailored to serve the foregoing purposes, it is by the Court,\n\nhereby\n\nORDERED, that the Motion is granted as set forth herein; and it is further\n\n<span id=\"page-13-0\"></span> <sup>14</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\nORDERED, that the time limitations set forth in 11 U.S.C. 108, 546, and 549 for the Trustee to commence avoidance actions and other actions on behalf of the estate, as well as for amending any pending complaints, are extended through and including August 15, 2024 **(such extension, the \"Ordered Extension\")**, which date may be further extended; and it is further\n\nORDERED, that any party that has received notice, whether actual or constructive, of the Motion and did not object to the Motion has waived its right to assert a limitations period defense **solely in respect of the Ordered Extension** if ultimately named in an action that is timely brought under the terms of this Order; and it is further\n\nORDERED, that the terms and conditions of this Order shall be immediately effective and enforceable upon its entry; and it is further\n\nORDERED, that the Trustee is authorized to take all actions necessary to effectuate the relief granted herein; and it is further\n\nORDERED, that the Court shall retain jurisdiction with respect to all matters arising from or related to the interpretation or implementation of this Order.\n\nDated: \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_, 2024\n\nJulie A. Manning, United States Bankruptcy Judge\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\n\n## **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| ------------------------------------------------------<br>x |             |                         |  |  |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|-------------------------|--|--|\n| In re:                                                      | :<br>:      | Chapter 11              |  |  |\n| et al.,1<br>HO WAN KWOK,                                    | :<br>:<br>: | Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |  |  |\n| Debtors.                                                    | :<br>:      | (Jointly Administered)  |  |  |\n| ------------------------------------------------------x     |             |                         |  |  |\n\n## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nThe undersigned hereby certifies that on February 9, 2024, the foregoing Reply was electronically filed. Notice of this filing was sent by e-mail to all parties to the above-captioned chapter 11 case by operation of the Court's electronic filing (\"CM/ECF\") system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as indicated on the Notice of Electronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF system.\n\nDated: February 9, 2024 New Haven, Connecticut\n\n> By: */s/ Douglass Barron*  Douglass Barron (admitted *pro hac vice*) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6000 douglassbarron@paulhastings.com\n\n *Counsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee*\n\n<span id=\"page-15-0\"></span> <sup>1</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).","body_zh":"美国破产法院 康涅狄格地区 布里奇波特分院\n\nx\n\n关于：　：　第11章\net al.,1\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），　：\n：　案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n债务人。　：　（联合管理）\n\n第11章受托人就（I）支持要求作出命令延长受托人根据《破产法典》第108、546(a)及549条提起撤销诉讼期限的动议，以及（II）答复对此提出的异议而提交的综合答复\n\n1 本第11章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（又名 Guo Wengui、Miles Guo 和 Miles Kwok，以及众多其他别名）（税务识别号码后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（税务识别号码后四位：8202）和 Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 和 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为 Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166，转交 Luc A. Despins，作为 Ho Wan Kwok 遗产的受托人（仅为通知和通信之目的）。\n\nLuc A. Despins，以在 Ho Wan Kwok（“债务人”）第11章案件中获指定的第11章受托人（“受托人”）身份，经由其下列签署的律师，特此提交本答复（“答复”），以（i）支持受托人提出的《要求作出命令延长受托人根据《破产法典》第108、546(a)及549条提起撤销诉讼期限的动议》[案卷编号 2509]（“动议”），以及（ii）答复就此提交的异议和回应。为支持本答复，受托人谨陈述如下：\n\n初步陈述\n\n1. 受托人向约1,000个实体和个人送达了该动议，尽管受托人收到大量非正式意见和询问，但仅提交了十二项异议和一项权利保留。一项由 UBS AG（瑞银集团）提出的异议此后已达成和解。在其余十一项异议中，十项由债务人的家庭成员或密切关联人，或与债务人关联（如非由债务人控制）的实体提出。这些其余异议均唱着同一首调子，代表未提出异议的动议接收人宣称愤怒与不满，而异议人无权如此行事。更令人难以置信的是，他们将自己描绘为维护《破产法典》神圣性，从而声称占据道德制高点。当然，这忽略了一个事实：除一项例外外，其余所有异议人正是那些自己阻挠和拖延受托人调查，或者从他人的拖延和阻挠中获益的个人和实体。\n\n2. 值得注意的是，除 Mei Guo（郭美）外，没有任何异议人对该动议所依据的核心事实前提提出实质性争议，即受托人已勤勉开展其调查；具有讽刺意味的是，她比任何人都更干扰受托人的调查。如动议中详细阐述，以及本案案卷所反映的，记录清楚表明受托人始终勤勉行事；其未能在 February 15 截止日期前完成调查，完全是由于其控制范围之外的问题，即债务人在全球范围内空壳公司操作的极端广度和复杂性，以及其所面对的来自债务人和其他人士（包括某些异议人）的近乎持续不断的阻挠；后者拒绝遵守传票和法院命令，并以一切可能方式试图拖延和复杂化受托人的工作。\n\n3. 异议人无法反驳支持该动议的大量事实记录，遂援引本地区 Walnut Hill（核桃山）裁决提出法律论点，声称本院无权在提交对抗性诉状之前对诉讼时效进行衡平中止。但这并不正确。唯一需要审查的是，受托人是否尽管已尽到应有勤勉，仍因其控制范围之外的特殊情形而无法完成其调查和证据开示程序。并无要求本院仅在提交诉状后，才按逐项请求、逐一被告的方式进行该项分析；Walnut Hill 在作出相反结论的范围内是错误的。\n\n4. 受托人提出该动议，是因为他别无选择：尽管受托人及其专业人士作出勤勉努力，且其已取得重大且重要的进展和成功，但受托人任务的庞大规模及其所遭遇的持续阻挠，使其不可能在 February 15 前完成调查并提出所有可用请求。正如多个司法辖区的多家破产法院所承认的，受托人不可能毫无救济途径。\n\n相关补充背景\n\n5. 受托人于 January 9, 2024 提交通知动议，并于 January 18, 2024 提交该动议。于 January 19, 2024，本院作出命令批准通知动议[案卷编号 2515]（“通知命令”）。除其他事项外，通知命令将 February 5, 2024 确定为对该动议提出异议的截止日期；于 January 31, 2024，受托人提交通知[案卷编号 2540]，说明依照通知命令送达该动议通知的方式（“送达通知”）。\n\n6. 自提交该动议以来，受托人继续调查其他事实和信息，这些事实和信息经进一步调查和分析后，可能导致可诉请求。作为一个例子，受托人一直在勤勉编目一处储存设施的内容物，该储存设施是在针对 Taurus Fund（Taurus Fund（托罗斯基金），异议人之一）提起的对抗性程序中发现的。虽然该程序尚未完成，但受托人的审查已发现数箱本应移交受托人但未予移交的文件。这只是众多可能导致额外请求的持续活动中的一个例子。\n\n7. 此外，在受托人的调查已发现足以支持可诉请求的信息的范围内，受托人正忙于准备须于 February 15 截止日期前提交的诉状，包括针对众多异议人的诉状。[2] 这些诉状（数量众多）将寻求的救济包括但不限于撤销和追回欺诈性转让、作出额外的另一自我认定，以及就违反美国反敲诈勒索法律请求损害赔偿。\n\n8. 受托人已收到 Mei Guo [案卷编号 2551]、Defeng Cao（曹德凤）[案卷编号 2553]、UBS AG [案卷编号 2554]、DBS Bank（星展银行）[案卷编号 2556]、Taurus Entities（Taurus实体）和 Scott Barnett（斯科特·巴尼特）[案卷编号 2557]、G Club Operations（G俱乐部运营公司）[案卷编号 2563]、Rule of Law Entities（法治实体）[案卷编号 2565]、Chris Lee（李克里斯）和 Qidong Xia（夏启东）[案卷编号 2566]、Greenwich Land（格林威治地产）[案卷编号 2569]、GS Security Solutions（GS安保解决方案）[案卷编号 2571]、Yinying Wang（王银英）[案卷编号 2582]、Sotheby's International Realty, Inc.（苏富比国际地产公司）[案卷编号 2584]及 Yongbing Zhang（张永兵）[案卷编号 2591]就该动议提交的异议和回应（统称“异议”，由“异议人”提交）。\n\n2 例如，于 February 6, 2024，受托人针对 Defeng Cao 提起对抗性程序。\n\n答复\n\nI. 大多数异议人共谋参与债务人的计划和阻挠行为，且无资格主张其他当事人的权利\n\n9. 如上所述，除一项例外外，所有其余异议人均共谋参与阻挠和拖延受托人调查的努力，或者直接从该等努力中获益。因此，在审议受托人关于衡平中止的请求时，衡平因素强烈不利于这些当事人。\n\n10. 主要异议人之一是债务人的女儿 Mei Guo，她是债务人空壳公司操作中的核心人物，并且每逢机会均试图阻碍受托人的工作。如本院所知，Mei Guo 使其名义上拥有的空壳公司提起对抗性程序，主张拥有 Lady May 游艇，尽管纽约州最高法院的 Ostrager 法官此前已认定，Mei Guo 关于“她拥有并控制 Lady May”的证词“在任何方面均不可信”。[3] 她还向受托人隐瞒另一艘游艇 Lady May II 的存在。受托人最终在诉讼中胜诉并追回两艘游艇，但付出了巨大的成本、费用和延误。\n\n11. Mei Guo 还因未遵守有效发出的传票而阻挠证据开示工作，最终导致其被认定藐视法庭，并对其及其律师施加制裁。Mei Guo 还就债务人控制的一架 Bombardier（庞巴迪）私人飞机出售所得作出虚假证词，证称她已将该 Bombardier 出售给一名她不记得姓名的买方，并称虽然她是该所得的“所有人”，但她不记得所得位于何处\n\n3 February 9, 2022 Decision & Order, at 6-7, PAX v. Kwok, Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), NYSCEF Doc. No. 1181.\n\n且无法取得该等所得。[4] 当受托人收到文件表明 Mei Guo 与持有该等所得的名为 JNFX Ltd. 的实体存在大量通信往来，并且她能够控制该资金的处置时，该证词被证明是虚假的。[5] 更近来，本院认定“Guo 女士曾在宣誓后作出相互矛盾的陈述。”[6]\n\n12. 其他异议人同样阻挠了受托人的调查。例如，Defeng Cao 是 Mei Guo 的长期男友，如针对他提交的诉状中详述，他帮助债务人将资产隐匿于 Cao 名下。Taurus Fund Entities（Taurus基金实体）和 Scott Barnett（其亦名义上拥有 GS Security Solutions）帮助隐匿 Mahwah Mansion（马瓦豪宅），债务人在 Connecticut（康涅狄格州）的住所 Greenwich Land 亦是如此。G-Club（G俱乐部）和 Rule of Law Entities 也由债务人控制，其中 G-Club 拒绝履行其证据开示义务，而 Rule of Law Entities 协助实施了被本院禁令禁止的抗议和骚扰活动。最后，Yinying Wang、Chris Lee 和 Qidong Xia 是由异议人 Yongbing Zhang 领导的所谓 HCHK Creditors Committee（HCHK债权人委员会）的成员；Yongbing Zhang 因其针对受托人和其他人士的轻率诉讼已多次受到制裁。\n\n13. 某些异议人意识到其自身手不干净，试图推进“可能数百名其他被告”的利益，这些被告可能受到该动议影响。[7] 然而，每一异议人仅有资格推进其自身利益。参见 Renco Grp., Inc. v. Wilmington Trust (In re Magnesium Corp. of Am.), 583 B.R. 637, 647 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018)（审慎资格“禁止诉讼当事人为\n\n4 Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment ¶ 16 (Adv. Proc. No. 23-05008, Docket No. 91).\n\n5 Id. ¶ 17.\n\n6 Order Holding Hudson Diamond Holding LLC in Contempt, at 9 (Docket No. 2545) .\n\n7 Mei Guo Obj. ¶ 10; Cao Obj. ¶ 25; Taurus Obj. ¶ 16; Greenwich Obj. ¶ 7.\n\n获得其自身损害的救济而主张他人的权利或法律利益……[当事人]通常必须主张其自身的法律权利和利益，且不得将其救济请求建立在第三方的法律权利或利益之上”）。\n\n14. 具有讽刺意味的是，异议人在试图区分受托人援引的案件时——在这些案件中，法院基于衡平中止延长了《破产法典》第108、546和549条规定的法定限制期间——主张本院应忽略其中某些裁判，因为相关中止未受异议。但这恰恰证明了受托人的观点：如某一当事人未对该动议提出异议，则就该当事人而言，该动议未受异议，并应就该当事人获准，即便该动议最终被驳回针对异议人的部分（而其不应被驳回）。\n\nII. 本院不应遵循 Walnut Hill；衡平中止不要求存在尚未审结的对抗性程序\n\n15. Mei Guo（郭美）援引 In re Walnut Hill, Inc., No. 16–20960 (JJT), 2018 WL 2672242, at *2 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 1, 2018)，主张衡平时效中止“仅在基础诉讼已提起且已提出时效抗辩后适用。”[8] 其他异议提出了类似主张，均依赖 Walnut Hill。[9]\n\n16. 该动议承认 Walnut Hill 的裁决，并主张 Walnut Hill 得出了错误结论——受托人坚持该立场。Walnut Hill 是一份简短意见，对衡平时效中止的分析有限。在 Walnut Hill 一案中，法院指出不存在待决的对抗程序，并裁定衡平时效中止尚不成熟，因为不应在“针对特定被告的对抗程序中待证明的事实和情形举行证据听证的背景之外”处理该问题。In re Walnut Hill, Inc., 2018 WL 2672242, at *2。法院试图使该裁定与第十一巡回上诉法院在 IBT International, Inc. v. Northern (In re International Administrative Services, Inc.), 408 F.3d 689, 695 (11th Cir. 2005)（“IAS”）中的裁决相协调，声称经“更仔细审查”该裁决，IAS“依赖于衡平时效中止原则，该原则是在待决对抗程序中提出时效抗辩后才被援引的。”In re Walnut Hill, Inc., 2018 WL 2672242, at *2。\n\n8 Mei Guo 异议 ¶ 8（原文强调）。9 参见，例如，GS Security（GS Security）异议 ¶ 2；Greenwich（格林尼治）异议 ¶¶ 4-5；Rule of Law（法治）异议 ¶ 13。\n\n17. 但 Walnut Hill 误解了 IAS 裁决。在 IAS 中，正式委员会在法定期间届满前申请延长提起撤销诉讼的期限。破产法院作出一项“过渡命令”，将时效期间延长至由获任监督证据开示的特别专员举行听证之时。在该听证结束时，特别专员认定债务人故意隐匿了某些转让文件；基于这些事实认定，受托人（作为正式委员会的继任者）口头申请进一步延长提起撤销诉讼的期限。该口头动议获准，期限进一步延长至 February 10, 1999。当日，受托人针对多名被告提交对抗诉状，六个月后，即 August 17, 1999，受托人又列入两名被告，即 IBT 和 SCSD。IBT 和 SCSD 提出了时效抗辩，最终被第十一巡回上诉法院驳回。\n\n18. 该程序经过要求重新审视 Walnut Hill。如前所述，Walnut Hill 将 IAS 描述为一宗由待决对抗程序中被列名的特定被告提出衡平时效中止的案件。但该法院忽略了，这些被告直至破产法院已两次延长时效期间之后，才提出时效抗辩。这意味着——与 Walnut Hill 的裁决及其对 IAS 裁决的描述相反——IAS 法院在时效期间届满之前、且特定被告尚未被送达诉状之前，确认了对时效期间的延长。简言之，Walnut Hill 关于衡平时效中止需要证据证明的观点是正确的，但其关于该证明只能在提起对抗程序之后作出的观点是错误的。\n\nIII. 衡平时效中止不要求任何特定异议人存在不当行为\n\n19. 多名异议人主张，该动议不能针对其获准，因为（其声称）其本人并未延误证据开示程序或以其他方式干扰受托人的调查。[10] 如上所述，就十名异议人而言，该论点至少可以说是难以置信的；他们均参与了债务人的欺诈计划，包括其在申请后继续实施的欺诈计划，和／或积极参与了阻碍、拖延或骚扰受托人的努力。\n\n20. 该论证路径在法律上亦不正确，因为“衡平时效中止并不限于……对方当事人不当行为的情形。”Fam. Golf Ctrs., Inc. v. Acushnet Co. (In re Randall's Island Fam. Golf Centers, Inc.), 288 B.R. 701, 705-06 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003)（后续程序经过略）。事实上，第二巡回上诉法院“已否定衡平时效中止仅在不当行为案件中才获准的立场。”Canales v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 755, 758 (2d Cir. 1991), on reh'g, 947 F.2d 45, 758 (2d Cir. 1991)。第二巡回上诉法院后来解释，由于不当行为和隐瞒当然是衡平时效中止的依据，“衡平时效中止常常与欺诈性隐瞒相混淆。”Donely ex rel. Valdez v. United States, 518 F.3d 173, 182-83 (2d Cir. 2008)。因此，第二巡回上诉法院“澄清，欺诈性隐瞒并非衡平时效中止的必要条件”，因为衡平时效中止“并不假定被告为阻止原告起诉而作出的不当——或任何——努力。”同上（内部引文及引用略）（强调为原文所加）。[11]\n\n10 参见，例如，Rule of Law 异议 ¶ 17；Lee（李）和 Xia（夏）异议 ¶ 18；Taurus（金牛）异议 ¶ 36。\n\n11 第二巡回上诉法院的裁决还提供了本院不应遵循 Walnut Hill 的另一理由。通过要求在该程序中启动对抗程序，并针对“特定被告”作出证据证明，Walnut Hill 采纳了一项一概规则；从实际效果而言，该规则与第二巡回上诉法院关于衡平时效中止不要求每一名（或任何一名）特定被告存在不当行为的指示相悖。\n\n21. 正确理解，衡平时效中止仅要求：(i) 非常情形；及 (ii) 应有勤勉。受托人基于包括本院已在公开意见和其他裁决中作出的事实及法律认定在内的事项，轻易满足这两项要求。\n\nIV. 本院现已有足够证据作出所需认定\n\n22. 异议人关于受托人须待对抗程序提起后方可获得衡平时效中止的论点，隐含其主张：如受托人在时效期间届满前掌握与其后来提起的某项请求有关的信息，则衡平时效中止当然不可适用。但法院已否定该种“一刀切”规则。如一法院解释：“在衡平时效中止的背景下，此类一刀切规则过于狭窄。例如，原告可能勤勉地试图发现信息，但实际上在时效期间届满前一天才发现（或本应发现）该信息。”Schmidt v. Twosons Corp. (In re Black Elk Energy Offshore Operations, LLC), No. 15-34287, 2022 WL 1589190, at *13, n.15 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 19, 2022)（即使“原告在时效期间内得知其请求权”，衡平时效中止仍可能存在）。\n\n23. 因此，无论受托人目前所持有的信息是否能够支持其最终针对异议人提出的请求（除受托人拟在截止日期前针对其提出的请求之外），受托人未能在 February 15 前找到、分析并依据该等信息采取行动，并不意味着衡平时效中止没有正当理由。恰恰相反，衡平时效中止具有正当理由，因为毫无疑问，尽管受托人面临非同寻常的阻碍——该阻碍影响了受托人对所有潜在被告的调查——其始终勤勉行事。受托人未能在 February 15 截止日期前审阅和分析其所持有的每一份文件或每一项信息以确定潜在请求，并不表明其缺乏勤勉。\n\nV. 其他异议均无依据\n\n24. 几乎所有异议再次依赖 Walnut Hill，主张不得使用 Rule 9006(b) 延长法条规定的时效期间。但异议人并未回应该动议的论点，即 Rule 9006 显然可以修改法条，因为即使 Walnut Hill 也同意 Rule 9006(a) 具有该作用。事实上，本巡回区至少有一所地区法院已将 Rule 9006(b) 适用于一项法条。In re Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., No. 11-CV-1338 CS, 2011 WL 5546954, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2011)（Rule 9006(b) 允许延长《破产法典》第 366 条规定的期限）。\n\n25. 最后，Greenwich Land（格林尼治土地）援引 Stern v. Marshall，并主张该动议“涉及私人诉权”，只能由地区法院裁决。[12] 然而，其未引用任何支持该命题的依据，且破产法院通常裁决衡平时效中止动议。该论点无依据。[13]\n\nVI. 对拟议命令的修改\n\n26. 受托人已收到对该动议的大量非正式问询和意见。其中一项非正式意见指出，随该动议提交的拟议命令可能被无意中解释为，即使对在申请日之前已经届满的州法请求，其时效也获得延长。这并非该动议的意图，受托人提议对拟议命令作出澄清性修改，具体见所附修订痕迹稿。\n\n12 Greenwich 异议 ¶ 14。\n\n13 受托人已收到对该动议的大量非正式问询和意见。一项已解决潜在异议的此类非正式意见，已反映在随附提交的修订痕迹拟议命令中。\n\n因此，基于上述理由，受托人谨请求本院作出拟议命令，准予本文件所请求的救济，并准予本院认为适当的其他救济。\n\n日期：February 9, 2024　LUC A. DESPINS（吕克·A·德斯潘斯），\n\nNew Haven, Connecticut　Chapter 11 受托人\n\n签署人：/s/ Douglass Barron\n\nAvram E. Luft（阿夫拉姆·E·卢夫特）（获准 pro hac vice）\nDouglass Barron（道格拉斯·巴伦）（获准 pro hac vice）\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所）\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, New York 10166\n(212) 318-6079\naviluft@paulhastings.com\ndouglassbarron@paulhastings.com\n\n以及\n\nNicholas A. Bassett（尼古拉斯·A·巴西特）（获准 pro hac vice）\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP\n2050 M Street NW\nWashington, D.C., 20036\n(202) 551-1902\nnicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n以及\n\nPatrick R. Linsey（帕特里克·R·林赛）（ct29437）\nNEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C.（纽伯特、佩佩及蒙泰思专业公司）\n195 Church Street, 13th Floor\nNew Haven, Connecticut 06510\n(203) 781-2847\nplinsey@npmlaw.com\n\nChapter 11 受托人代理律师\n附件 A　经修订的拟议命令\n\n（修改内容以粗体和下划线标示）\nUNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT（美国破产法院）\nDISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT（康涅狄格区）\nBRIDGEPORT DIVISION（布里奇波特分院）\n\nx\n\n关于：　：　Chapter 11\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，14　：　案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n债务人。　：　（合并管理）\n\n［拟议］准予受托人根据《破产法典》第 108、546(a) 及 549 条延长提起撤销诉讼截止日期之动议的命令\n\n经审议 Chapter 11 受托人提出的准予命令以延长受托人根据《破产法典》第 108、546(a) 及 549 条提起撤销诉讼截止日期的动议（“该动议”），并已显示存在正当理由，且本院已审议针对该动议提出的任何及所有异议和其他回应，且本院认定：(i) 所请求救济具有正当理由，(ii) 存在使所请求救济正当化的非常情形，(iii) 受托人已勤勉行事，及 (iv) 该动议已依照本院先前准予送达通知动议的命令送达，且在该等情形下该通知适当且充分，无需其他通知，并且本命令所提供的救济为实现上述目的而作出的适当限缩，故本院现\n\n兹命令，该动议按本命令所载获准；并进一步命令\n\n14 本第11章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（又名 Guo Wengui、Miles Guo 和 Miles Kwok，以及众多其他别名）（税务识别号码后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（Genever Holdings有限责任公司）（税务识别号码后四位：8202）及 Genever Holdings Corporation（Genever Holdings公司）。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 和 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为：Paul Hastings LLP（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所），200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166，转交 Luc A. Despins（吕克·A·德斯平斯），作为 Ho Wan Kwok 遗产的受托人（仅用于通知和通信）。\n\n兹命令，11 U.S.C. 108、546 和 549 规定的受托人代表遗产提起撤销权诉讼及其他诉讼，以及修改任何未决起诉状的期限，延长至并包括 August 15, 2024（该延期称为“裁定延期”），该日期可进一步延长；并进一步\n\n兹命令，任何已实际或推定收到该动议通知但未对该动议提出异议的当事人，如最终在根据本命令条款及时提起的诉讼中被列为当事人，即放弃其仅就裁定延期主张时效抗辩的权利；并进一步\n\n兹命令，本命令的条款和条件自录入之时起立即生效并可执行；并进一步\n\n兹命令，授权受托人采取一切必要行动，以实现本命令所授予的救济；并进一步\n\n兹命令，本院对因解释或实施本命令而产生或与之相关的一切事项保留管辖权。\n\n日期：__________________, 2024\n\nJulie A. Manning（朱莉·A·曼宁），美国联邦破产法院法官\n\n____________________________________________________________\n\nUNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION（美国康涅狄格地区联邦破产法院布里奇波特分院）\n\nx\n\n关于：　　　　　　　　　　　第11章\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等人，1　案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。　　　　　　　　　　（合并管理）\n\n送达证明\n\n下列签署人特此证明，于 February 9, 2024，前述答复已以电子方式提交。该提交通知已通过本院电子提交（“CM/ECF”）系统的运作，以电子邮件发送给上述第11章案件的所有当事人，或按照电子提交通知所示，通过邮寄发送给无法接受电子提交的任何人。当事人可通过本院的 CM/ECF 系统查阅该提交文件。\n\n日期：February 9, 2024，New Haven, Connecticut\n\n签署人：/s/ Douglass Barron（道格拉斯·巴伦）\nDouglass Barron（获准 pro hac vice 出庭）\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所）\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, New York 10166\n(212) 318-6000\ndouglassbarron@paulhastings.com\n\n第11章受托人之律师\n\n1 本第11章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（又名 Guo Wengui、Miles Guo 和 Miles Kwok，以及众多其他别名）（税务识别号码后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（Genever Holdings有限责任公司）（税务识别号码后四位：8202）及 Genever Holdings Corporation（Genever Holdings公司）。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 和 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为：Paul Hastings LLP（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所），200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166，转交 Luc A. Despins（吕克·A·德斯平斯），作为 Ho Wan Kwok 遗产的受托人（仅用于通知和通信）。","key_entities":["Je","Guo","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Paul Hastings","Despins","Miles Guo","HCHK","CIPA"],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":4453,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 18:37:38"}