{"id":"court_ctb_2921_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":2921,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"UNKNOWN","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT ) )","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\n ) )\n\n)\n\nIn re: ) Chapter 11 ) Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) HO WAN KWOK, *et al.*, ) (Jointly Administered)\n\nDebtors. ) Re: ECF No. 2509\n\n# **APPEARANCES**\n\nAvram E. Luft Douglass Barron Paul Hastings LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166 Patrick R. Linsey Neubert, Pepe & Montieth 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, CT 06510\n\nand\n\nNicholas A. Bassett (argued) Paul Hastings LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C. 20036\n\n*Counsel for Movant Mr. Luc A. Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee for the Estate of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok*\n\nLee Vartan Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC One Boland Drive West Orange, NJ 07052\n\nand\n\nSam Della Fera, Jr. (argued) Melissa F. Wernick Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC 105 Eisenhower Parkway Roseland, NJ 07068\n\nStephen M. Kindseth Aaron Romney James M. Moriarty Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. 10 Middle Street Bridgeport, CT 06604\n\n*Counsel for Respondent Ms. Mei Guo*\n\nAdam H. Friedman Katherine E. Mateo (argued) Olshan Frome Wolosky LLP 1325 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10019\n\n*Counsel for Respondent Mr. Defeng Cao*\n\nLisa J. Fried Herbert Smith Freehills New York LLP 450 Lexington Avenue New York, NY 10017\n\n*Counsel for Respondent UBS AG*\n\nGenevieve G. Weiner Sidley Austin LLP 555 West Fifth Street Los Angeles, CA 90013 William S. Fish, Jr. Hinckley, Allen & Snyder LLP 20 Church Street, 18th Floor Hartford, CT 06103\n\n*Counsel for Respondent DBS Bank Ltd.*\n\nMichael T. Conway (argued) Lazare Potter Giacovas & Moyle LLP 747 Third Avenue, 16th Floor New York, NY 10017\n\n*Counsel for Respondents Taurus Fund, LLC, Taurus Management, LLC, and Mr. Scott Barnett*\n\nCarolina A. Fornos Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP 31 West 52nd Street New York, NY 10019\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz (argued) Kelliane Baranowsky Green & Sklarz LLC One Audubon Street, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06511\n\n*Counsel for Respondent G Club Operations LLC*\n\nDouglas M. Evans (argued) Shapiro, Dorry, & Masterson LLC 71 Raymond Road West Hartford, CT 06107\n\n*Counsel for Respondents Rule of Law Foundation III, Inc. and Rule of Law Society IV, Inc.*\n\nEric T. Schmitt (argued) The Quinlan Law Firm, LLC 233 South Wacker Drive, Suite 6142 Chaicago, IL 60606\n\nJon Newton Reid and Reige, P.C. One Financial Plaza, 21st Floor Hartford, CT 06103\n\n*Counsel for Respondents Mr. Chris Lee and Mr. Qidong Xia*\n\nChristopher J. Major (argued) Austin D. Kim Meister Seelig & Fein PLLC 125 Park Avenue, 7th Floor New York, NY 10017\n\n*Counsel for Respondents Greenwich Land, LLC and Ms. Hing Chi Ngok*\n\nBarry R. Lax Robert J. Grand (argued) Lax & Neville, LLP 350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 4640 New York, NY 10018\n\nJordan W. Schur Houser LLP 8 Wright Street, Suite 107 Westport, CT 06880\n\n## *Counsel for Respondent GS Security Solutions, Inc.*\n\nDavid H. Wander (argued) Michael J. Grudberg Tarter Krinsky & Drogin LLP 1350 Broadway New York, NY 10018\n\n## *Counsel for Respondent Ms. Yinying Wang*\n\nAnthony M. Saccullo Mary Augustine A.M. Saccullo Legal, LLC 27 Crimson King Drive Bear, DE 19701\n\nStephen P. Brown (argued) Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP 1010 Washington Boulevard Stamford, CT 06901\n\n*Counsel for Respondent Sotheby's International Realty, Inc.*\n\nJames Nealon (argued) Nealon Law LLC 1266 East Main Street, Suite 700R Stamford, CT 06902\n\n*Counsel for Respondent Mr. Yongbing Zhang, Esquire*\n\n# **MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION TO EXTEND DEADLINES**\n\nJulie A. Manning, United States Bankruptcy Judge\n\n### **I. INTRODUCTION**\n\nBefore the Court is the Motion for Entry of Order Extending Deadline for Trustee to File Avoidance Actions (the \"Motion to Extend Deadlines\") filed by Mr. Luc A. Despins, in his capacity as Chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") for the bankruptcy estate of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Individual Debtor\"). (ECF No. 2509.) For the reasons stated below, the Motion to Extend Deadlines is **GRANTED IN PART**.\n\n### **II. BACKGROUND**\n\nOn February 15, 2022, the Individual Debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition (the \"Petition\") in this Court. (ECF No. 1.) The Individual Debtor's case is jointly administered with two affiliated corporate Chapter 11 cases. (ECF Nos. 970, 1141.) For the reasons set forth therein, on June 15, 2022, the Court entered a memorandum of decision and order appointing a Chapter 11 trustee. (ECF No. 465.) *In re Kwok*, 640 B.R. 514 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022). On July 8, 2022, Mr. Despins was appointed as the Trustee. (ECF No. 523.)\n\nOn January 9, 2024, the Trustee filed a motion (the \"Notice Motion\") to schedule a hearing on and establish notice and service procedures for a forthcoming motion to extend or toll the statute of limitations set by sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d) of title 11 (the \"Bankruptcy Code\"). (ECF No. 2494.) On January 15, 2024, in light of no objections to the Notice Motion having been timely filed, the Court took it on the papers. (ECF No. 2505.) On January 19, 2024, the Court granted the Notice Motion and entered an order scheduling a hearing on the Motion to Extend Deadlines, which had at that point been filed, and establishing notice and service procedures (the \"Notice and Service Procedures Order\"). (ECF No. 2515.)\n\nOn January 18, 2024, the Trustee filed the Motion to Extend Deadlines. (ECF No. 2509.) On January 31, 2024, the Trustee filed a notice of service and publication notice of the Motion to Extend Deadlines pursuant to the Notice and Service Procedures Order, indicating service was made by mail on January 22, 2024 and publication notice was made thereafter. (ECF No. 2540.)\n\nOn February 5, 2024, objections to the Motion to Extend Deadlines were filed by Ms. Mei Guo (\"Ms. Guo\"); Mr. Defeng Cao (\"Mr. Cao\"); UBS AG (\"UBS\"); Taurus Fund LLC, Taurus Management LLC, and Mr. Scott Barnett (collectively, the \"Taurus Parties\") jointly; G Club Operations LLC (\"G Club\"); Rule of Law Foundation III, Inc. and Rule of Law Society IV, Inc. (collectively, the \"ROL Parties\") jointly; Mr. Chris Lee (\"Mr. Lee\") and Mr. Qidong Xia (\"Mr. Xia\") jointly; Greenwich Land, LLC and Ms. Hing Chi Ngok (collectively, the \"Greenwich Parties\") jointly; and GS Security Solutions, Inc. (\"GS Security\"). (ECF Nos. 2551, 2553, 2554, 2557, 2563, 2565, 2566, 2569, 2571.) That same date, February 5, 2024, DBS Bank filed a reservation of rights to object to any extension or tolling of the statute of limitations beyond what the Motion to Extend Deadlines seeks. (ECF No. 2556.) On February 7, 2024, objections were untimely filed by Ms. Yinying Wang (\"Ms. Wang\") and Sotheby's International Realty, Inc. (\"Sotheby's\"). (ECF Nos. 2582, 2584.) On February 8, 2024, Mr. Yongbing Zhang (\"Mr. Zhang\") untimely filed an objection to the Motion to Extend Deadlines. (ECF No. 2591.)\n\nOn February 9, 2024, the Trustee filed an omnibus reply to the objections. (ECF No. 2620.) On February 12, 2024, the Trustee filed a list of witnesses and exhibits, which identified the Trustee as a witness and contained a list of pleadings and orders publicly filed in these jointly administered Chapter 11 cases and related adversary proceedings as exhibits. (ECF No. 2763.)\n\nOn February 13, 2024, a hearing was held on the Motion to Extend Deadlines. Prior to the hearing, UBS filed a notice of withdrawal of its objection to the Motion to Extend Deadlines,\n\nwhich withdrawal UBS repeated on the record. (ECF No. 2810.) During the hearing, Sotheby's also withdrew its objection to the Motion to Extend Deadlines on the record. DBS reiterated that it was not objecting to the Motion to Extend Deadlines but only reserving its rights regarding any future motion to extend or toll the statute of limitations. Ms. Guo, Mr. Cao, the Taurus Parties, G Club, the ROL Parties, Mr. Lee, Mr. Xia, the Greenwich Parties, GS Security, Ms. Wang, and Mr. Zhang (collectively, the \"Objecting Parties\") pressed their objections to the Motion to Extend Deadlines.1\n\nThe Trustee testified and was cross-examined by the Objecting Parties. The Trustee requested the Court take judicial notice of the record of these jointly administered Chapter 11 cases and related adversary proceedings. The Trustee and the Objecting Parties each presented their arguments. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Motion to Extend Deadlines was taken under advisement.\n\nThis matter is ripe for decision.\n\n### **III. JURISDICTION**\n\nThe United States District Court for the District of Connecticut has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). This Court has authority to hear and determine this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) and the Order of Reference of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut dated September 21, 1984. The instant matter is a statutorily core proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A).\n\nNevertheless, the Objecting Parties make two arguments against jurisdiction. First, the Objecting Parties argue that under *Stern v. Marshall*, 564 U.S. 462, 487–99 (2011), the Court\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Objecting Parties, for the most part, join in each other's arguments. Hence, the Court will refer to them in the collective throughout the discussion below.\n\nlacks jurisdiction to determine this matter because avoidance actions are matters of private – not public – right and must, therefore, be determined by an Article III court unless the parties consent to another court's exercise of jurisdiction, *see Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif*, 575 U.S. 665, 686 (2015) (holding that parties may consent to entry of a final order by bankruptcy courts notwithstanding the holding in *Stern*). Second, the Objecting Parties argue that there is no case or controversy because no party has asserted a statute of limitations defense in an avoidance action.\n\nThe Court concludes that its determination of the Motion to Extend Deadlines is not contrary to *Stern*. Determination of the Motion to Extend Deadlines does not require that this Court finally determine the merits of any avoidance action. Rather, it requires the Court to determine as a matter of equity whether the statute of limitations contained in sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d) of the Bankruptcy Code may be extended. These time limitations are contained in the Bankruptcy Code. Furthermore, they are solely applicable in bankruptcy cases and embody bankruptcy policy considerations; namely, how to balance the need of a bankruptcy trustee to determine and prosecute the estate's causes of actions and the mandate to ensure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every case and proceeding. *Compare* 11 U.S.C. §§ 108(a), 546(a), 549(a) *with* Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1001. Therefore, this Court may determine the issues raised by the Motion to Extend Deadlines. *See Young v. United States*, 535 U.S. 43, 49– 50 (2002) (unanimous) (holding equitable tolling is particularly available where Congress enacts provisions intended to be applied by bankruptcy courts, which are courts of equity).\n\nThe Court also concludes that there is presently a case or controversy. There are jointly administered Chapter 11 cases pending. Hence, the time limits contained in sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d) of the Bankruptcy Code are in effect. The Trustee argues that (i) there are\n\npotential estate causes of action he is currently pursuing but cannot file before the two-year period expires while also meeting the standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and (ii) there are undoubtedly estate causes of action completely unknown to him, given his experience and knowledge of these cases to date. The Trustee seeks to extend these time limits to allow him to bring more actions without being time-barred.\n\nTherefore, the Court determines it has jurisdiction over this matter. Moreover, venue in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.\n\n### **IV. DISCUSSION**\n\nThe Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052 are set forth below.\n\n### **A. Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)**\n\nRule 9006(b) provides that, generally, \"when an act is required to be done at or within a specified period by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion . . . order the period enlarged if the request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order.\" Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b).\n\nThe parties dispute whether Rule 9006(b) may be utilized to extend the deadlines set forth in sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d). The Trustee, relying on *IBT International, Inc. v. Northern (In re International Administrative Services, Inc.)*, 408 F.3d 689 (11th Cir. 2005), and its progeny, argues that it is within the Court's discretion to extend the deadlines. The Objecting Parties – particularly G Club – rely on 28 U.S.C. § 2075, *Joint Council Dining Car Employees Local 370 v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Company*, 157 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1946), *In re Walnut Hill*, No. 16-50960 (JJT), 2018 WL 2672242 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 1, 2018) (Tancredi, J.), and *In re Damach Inc.*, 235 B.R. 727 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1999) (Krechevsky, J.), to argue that Rule 9006(b) may not extend the deadlines set forth in sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d).\n\nThe first question is whether 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d) contain statutes of limitation – subject to tolling, extension, equitable estoppel, and other principles of equity – or statutes of repose, which are not susceptible to equity. *Compare Young*, 535 U.S. at 49–50 (stating that provisions in the Bankruptcy Code are particularly susceptible to equity because they are drafted with the background understanding that bankruptcy courts are courts of equity) *with Arellano v. McDonough*, 598 U.S. 1, 12–13 (2023) (distinguishing the congressional intent behind 38 U.S.C. § 5110 from that behind 11 U.S.C. § 507 and, hence, arriving at different result than *Young*.) Here, as in *Young* and unlike in *Arellano*, sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d) have either no tolling provisions or tolling provisions that supplement rather than supplant traditional principles of equity. 11 U.S.C. §§ 108(a) (no tolling provision), 546(a) (potentially tolled by the first appointment of a trustee within the two-year period), 549(d) (no tolling provision); *compare Young*, 535 U.S. at 52–53 *with Arellano*, 598 U.S. at 12–14; *see IBT Int'l*, 408 F.3d at 699 (11th Cir. 2005); *Ernst & Young v. Matsumoto (In re United Ins. Mgmt., Inc.)*, 14 F.3d 1380, 1385 (9th Cir. 1994); *see also* 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 108.2[1] (16th ed. 2023) (stating 11 U.S.C. § 108(a) does not apply to statutes of repose, only statutes of limitations) (collecting cases); 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 546.02[4] (stating 11 U.S.C. § 546 is not jurisdictional) (collecting cases); *but see Martin v. First Nat'l Bank of Louisville (In re Butcher)*, 829 F.2d 596 (6th Cir. 1987). The Court agrees with the majority position that sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d) are subject to extension under principles of equity and disagrees with *Butcher*, upon which the\n\nObjecting Parties rely. *Compare* H.R. Rep. No. 103-835, at 49–50 (1994) *with Butcher*, 829 F.2d at 599–600.\n\nThe next question is whether Rule 9006(b) provides a mechanism for such equitable extension. While the Court recognizes and respects the prior decisions in this District by the Honorable James J. Tancredi in *Walnut Hill* and the Honorable Robert L. Krechevsky in *Damach*, and the reliance by the Objecting Parties upon those decisions, there is no binding precedent on this issue from the United States Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, or the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. The only United States Court of Appeals to opine on the issue is the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. In *IBT International*, the Eleventh Circuit held that a bankruptcy court has the discretion under Rule 9006(b) to enlarge the period of time to bring avoidance actions set forth in section 546(a), notwithstanding the omission of \"statute\" from the text of Rule 9006(b), because Rule 9006(b) governs the filing of adversary proceedings pursuant to Rules 7001 and 7003. 408 F.3d at 699.\n\nThe Objecting Parties argue that the Eleventh Circuit's analysis is flawed because it ignores the Rules Enabling Act and would be in defiance of the separation of powers. The Court disagrees. The basis of their argument is the language: \"Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.\" 28 U.S.C. § 2075. Limitation periods are not, generally, substantive. *Young*, 535 at 49. As discussed above, this Court – and the majority of courts to consider the issue – concludes that sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d) present statutes of limitation, subject to principles of equity – which the Eleventh Circuit *does* address regarding section 546(a). *IBT Int'l*, 408 F.3d at 699. That is, they are not substantive. *See Young*, 535 at 49. For these reasons, the Court respectfully disagrees with the portion of *Walnut Hill*\n\naddressing Rule 9006(b) and concludes that the Rules Enabling Act does not preclude Rule 9006(b) from providing a mechanism for extending the statutes of limitation set forth in sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d). *Damach*, upon which *Walnut Hill* relies, was decided pre-*Young* and dealt with a motion to accept or reject a lease under section 365(d)(4) where a lessor's *substantive* contractual rights were involved – not, as here, on a motion to extend deadlines, or in *Young*, which dealt with equitable tolling, a non-substantive statute of limitations. 235 B.R. at 729–30, 731–32.\n\nCiting the Second Circuit's decision in *Dining Car*, the Objecting Parties also argue by analogy that because Rule 6 cannot be used to modify statutes of limitation in non-bankruptcy civil litigation, Rule 9006(b) cannot be used here. The analogy, however, fails because of key differences between bankruptcy proceedings and other civil actions. *Dining Car* considered, and rejected, the argument that Rule 6(a)'s proscribed methodology for computation of time applied to limitation periods existing independent of the filed civil action. 157 F.2d at 420. The limitation periods set forth by sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d) are all dependent on a bankruptcy case existing. Unless an order for relief enters in a bankruptcy case, which orders have been entered in each of these jointly administered Chapter 11 cases, these sections have no effect. 11 U.S.C. §§ 108(a), 546(a), 549(d). Similarly, adversary proceedings depend upon a related bankruptcy case existing. *Dining Car* recognized Rule 6(a)'s applicability to statutes that govern procedure of a civil action after it has been filed. The Trustee here asks the Court to extend statutes of limitations that only come into effect after a bankruptcy case has been filed. 11 U.S.C. §§ 108(a), 546(a), 549(d). *Butcher*, relied upon by the Objecting Parties, disregards the obvious difference between adversary proceedings commenced in a bankruptcy case and traditional civil actions. 829 F.2d at 599–600.\n\nThe Court concludes for these reasons that Rule 9006(b) could provide a mechanism to extend the statutes of limitation set forth by sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d). The next question is whether it does. In light of (i) the general exhortation of Rule 1001 that \"[t]hese rules shall be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every case and proceeding\"; (ii) the Eleventh's Circuit's ruling in *IBT International* and its rationale based on the applicability of Rule 9006(b) in adversary proceedings and its determination that section 546(a) is a statute of limitations \"subject to waiver, tolling, and equitable estoppel\", *see* Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001, 7003; *IBT Int'l*, 408 F.3d at 699; (iii) the lack of any controlling precedent in this Circuit; and (iv) the reasons discussed above as to why the Court is not persuaded by the Objecting Parties' arguments based on the Rules Enabling Act and *Dining Car*, the Court concludes that it may extend the statutes of limitation set forth by sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d) pursuant to Rule 9006(b) despite Rule 9006(b) not including \"statute\" in its language. *IBT Int'l*, 408 F.3d at 698–99; *In re Fundamental Long Term Care, Inc.*, 501 B.R. 784, 787–791 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2013); *Marsh v. Levy (In re Martin Levy of Berlin D.M.D., P.C.)*, 416 B.R. 1, 8 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009); *Frentz v. Stites & Harbinson (In re ThermoView Indus., Inc.)*, 381 B.R. 225, 227 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2008); *but see In re Cramer*, 636 B.R. 830, 833 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2022); *In re Randolph Hosp., Inc.*, No. 20-10247 (LMJ), 2022 WL 19298765, at \\*1 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. April 25, 2022); *Walnut Hill*, 2018 WL 2672242, at \\*2.\n\nThe remaining issue, therefore, is whether there is \"cause,\" on the facts and circumstances before the Court to extend the statutes of limitation in sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d). Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b). The Court determines that on the very specific and\n\nextraordinary facts and circumstances of these jointly administered Chapter 11 cases, cause exists to extend the statutes of limitation in sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d).\n\nRegardless of the Objecting Parties' arguments that they have individually caused no harm to the Trustee's investigation, as courts have observed, albeit in the context of equitable tolling, the equities to consider in determining whether to extend or toll a statute of limitations in a bankruptcy proceeding often involve whether the debtor failed to cooperate with the bankruptcy trustee or indeed sought to impede the trustee's investigation and liquidation of assets for the benefit of creditors. *Gladstone v. U.S. Bancorp*, 811 F.3d 1133, 1143 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing *Olsen v. Zerbetz (In re Olsen)*, 36 F.3d 71, 72–73 (9th Cir. 1994) and holding that concealment by the debtor rather than the defendant could support equitable tolling). As the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Minnesota stated:\n\nA bankruptcy case presents a rather different slant on equitable tolling. In the typical situation, it is the debtor's conduct rather than the defendant's conduct which invokes equitable tolling. In some senses, this is unfair to the defendant. On the other hand, unlike the usual civil case where a plaintiff at least has the advantage of being a party to the underlying transaction, a bankruptcy trustee must rely almost entirely on a third party (the debtor) to provide the information necessary to uncover avoidable transfers.\n\n*Moratzka v. Pomaville (In re Pomaville)*, 190 B.R. 632, 637 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1995) (denying summary judgment because there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the statute of limitations could be equitably tolled).\n\nAs observed in *Pomaville*, fairness to defendants is the animating concern among courts that decline to extend statutes of limitation under Rule 9006(b). In *Cramer*, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California was primarily concerned with the lack of notice to the potential defendants. 636 B.R. at 832. *Randolph Hospital* shared this concern. 2022 WL 19298765, at \\*1. Here, however, there has been extensive notice of the Motion to Extend Deadlines via traditional service where possible, alternative service where possible, and\n\npublication notice, in English and Mandarin Chinese, in substantially the form approved by the Court pursuant to the Notice and Service Procedures Order. *See Cramer*, 636 B.R. at 832 nn. 1, 2 (distinguishing cases where defendants had notice of the motion seeking an extension of time). Nevertheless, in light of this concern, the Court will not determine the issue of waiver of a statute of limitations defense at this time, but rather will reserve that issue for determination when and if it is raised in an adversary proceeding. As such, the Court finds it difficult for any party to argue that their substantive rights have been impacted by this decision.\n\nRegarding the counterbalance noted in *Pomaville*, in these jointly administered Chapter 11 cases, the Trustee received no books and records from the Individual Debtor and no cooperation from the Individual Debtor. The Individual Debtor filed incomplete or inaccurate schedules and statement of affairs and did not comply with his duties under the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 521. The Individual Debtor affirmatively disclaimed and qualified the sworn information in his schedules and statements of affairs by filing \"Global Notes\", which are not official forms and not in compliance with the Individual Debtor's duties under section 521. (ECF Nos. 77–78.) Arguably, the failure of the Individual Debtor to comply with his duties could result in a finding that the statutes of limitation contained in sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d) have not even begun to run.\n\nInstead of receiving compliance and cooperation from the Individual Debtor, the Trustee has faced ceaseless recalcitrance, obstruction, and flagrant disregard of court orders by the Individual Debtor, his family members, his associates and employees, and entities the Trustee alleges he controls since the Trustee's appointment. (*See, e.g.*, ECF Nos. 913, 1046, 1303, 1345, 1362, 1397, 1453, 1521, 1537, 1546, 1709, 1805, 1892, 1896, 2009, 2035, 2036, 2080, 2093, 2342, 2396; *Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Kwok (In re Kwok)*, No. 22-50073 (JAM),\n\nAdv. P. No. 22-05032 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 13, 2023), ECF No. 133; *Despins ex rel. Kwok v. Mei Guo* (*In re Kwok)*, No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05008 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2023), ECF No. 32; *Guo*, No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05008 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Nov. 7, 2023), ECF No. 46.) Ultimately, the Court has entered at least eight orders holding the Individual Debtor, his daughter, Ms. Guo, and entities allegedly controlled by the Individual Debtor in contempt for failure to turn over assets and discovery abuse. (ECF Nos. 1372, 1537, 1709, 1892, 1896, 2009, 2035, 2093.) To date, each contemnor remains in contempt of court. The severity of nonperformance of statutory duties, *see* 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(3), (4), and noncompliance with this Court's orders in these jointly administered Chapter 11 cases, is extraordinary.\n\nFaced with these circumstances, the Trustee has had to seek extensive and ongoing third party discovery in addition to his efforts to obtain discovery from the Individual Debtor, his family, his associates, and entities he allegedly controls. (ECF Nos. 636–38, 839, 1116, 1259, 1592, 1789, 2079, 2249, 2304, 2308, 2434, 2508, 2514.) The Court has granted all fifteen of the Trustee's motions for Rule 2004 examinations, authorizing the examination of hundreds of entities. (ECF Nos. 756–58, 866, 1184, 1339, 1646, 1891, 2210, 2281, 2393, 2394, 2474, 2534, 2537.) The Court credits the Trustee's testimony that attempting to piece together the Individual Debtor's financial affairs from cold bank records and other documents evidencing a massive web of entities, bank accounts, and money transfers across multiple countries, continents, and jurisdictions is a time-consuming and difficult endeavor over an ever-increasing data set of unknown ultimate dimensions. This testimony is particularly credible because the Trustee is operating without the Individual Debtor's statutorily required cooperation. Moreover, the Trustee's investigation has been and continues to be impeded by the active obstruction of the\n\nIndividual Debtor, his family members, associates, employees, followers, and associated entities.\n\nThe \"puzzle\" the Trustee is faced with in these jointly administered Chapter 11 cases is\n\nparticularly severe and the facts of these cases are similar to the facts of *IBT International*, which\n\nalso involved allegations of a complex asset diversion plan, where there was a \"jigsaw puzzle of\n\ntransfers.\" 408 F.3d at 702.\n\nThe Objecting Parties argue that, nevertheless, the Trustee has been less than diligent in\n\nhis attempts to understand the bankruptcy estate's potential causes of action. Counsel for the\n\nIndividual Debtor, who also signed the objection submitted by the Individual Debtor's daughter,\n\nMs. Guo, has previously testified that, contrary to Ms. Guo's present argument, the Trustee was\n\ntoo forceful in his statutory investigative duties, *see* 11 U.S.C. § 1106:\n\nQ. You testified, Mr. Kindseth, that prior to the meeting, you had urged the Trustee strenuously to quote, unquote, stand down. Is that right? A. Probably 50 times. Yes. Q. And -- A. Gradually, too. Just to be clear. It wasn't just, do nothing. It's, can you please just stand down some to give us some space to let the settlement come together. Yes. Q. What you meant by that was stand down on the investigation, correct? A. Stand down on the perpetual bombs, you know, attacks, 50 2004 exams, expedited hearings, just this perpetual attack, 12, 14 lawyers at Paul Hastings going all, you know, full board [sic]. I said, can you just reign [sic] it in a little bit to give us some time to\n\nbreathe and work out a settlement.\n\n(Dec. 12, 2022 Hr'g Tr. at \\*894:2–18, *Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund*, No. 22-50073 (JAM),\n\nAdv. P. No. 22-05032 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Dec. 15, 2022), ECF No. 111.)\n\nIndeed, the Individual Debtor's position in fall of 2022 was that the Trustee was\n\nproceeding too rapidly with his investigation. Prior to Attorney Kindseth's testimony, his\n\ncolleague, also appearing on behalf of the Individual Debtor, repeatedly objected to the Trustee's\n\nurgent pursuit of his investigation. The exchange below during a hearing held on October 13,\n\n2022, on the Trustee's Motion for Entry of Order Authorizing Compliance with Rule 2004\n\nSubpoenas and Enforcing Consent Order Regarding Control of Attorney-Client Privilege and\n\nWork Product Protection is illustrative:\n\nMr. Henzy: Next week I'm going to be fully engulfed in potentially reviewing documents which actually I wanted to ask Your Honor a question about. But I'm not sure, Your Honor, what the hurry is. But I'm not sure what the hurry –\n\nMr. Despins: Your Honor, the hurry is that we're supposed to have control of these entities. We're being deprived of control -- of access to privilege in relation -- for to those entities because that's the same counsel representing Mr. Kwok and those two entities. And so to say there's no rush, I don't know what to say about that. It's been ten -- we're not rushing, meaning we've asked for this for a while now. And if we are correct that he owns it, the rush is that he's just disregarding this case completely. So I don't know what to say about the issue of no rush.\n\n(Oct. 13, 2022 Hr'g Tr. at 106:8–23, ECF No. 1020; *see also* Sept. 27, 2022 Status Conference\n\nTr. at 23:1–20, ECF No. 936.)\n\nIn a case with more than 2900 docket entries and more than 250 associated adversary proceedings, where the Trustee has, by counsel to the Individual Debtor's own admission and in this Court's own observation, aggressively pursued discovery relating to the Individual Debtor's financial affairs and recovery of assets, the Court concludes that the Trustee has shown more than reasonable diligence in his efforts. That not every lead has borne fruit, that not every stone has been unturned, that not every action has been successful, does not diminish the fact that the Trustee has been more than reasonably diligent.\n\nThe facts and circumstances of the present case are wholly unlike the facts Judge Tancredi faced in *Walnut Hill*. In *Walnut Hill,* the Chapter 7 trustee had the entire two-year time period set forth in sections 108(a) and 546(a) to fulfill his investigative duties and bring causes of action. Here, the Trustee was appointed five months into the case – which means he had nineteen months to perform his investigation in the Individual Debtor's Chapter 11 case. (ECF No. 514.) Furthermore, in *Walnut Hill*, the Chapter 7 trustee filed her first motion for Rule 2004\n\nexamination eleven months after the petition was filed. (*In re Walnut Hill*, No. 16-20960 (JJT) (Bankr. D. Conn. May 31, 2017), ECF No. 78.) In this case, the Trustee filed his first motion to conduct a Rule 2004 motion less than a month after the approval of his appointment and continues to vigorously seek discovery as part of his ongoing investigation. (ECF No. 636.)\n\nNevertheless, the Objecting Parties also argue against the Trustee's diligence on the basis of the Trustee's testimony that hiring a forensic accountant had to wait until the estate had funding. In particular, the Objecting Parties focus on the Trustee's testimony that even if a forensic accountant was willing to work on a contingency basis, they would have demanded to be treated *pari passu* with the Trustee and his lawyers. However, the Objecting Parties ignore that the necessity of forensic accountant has been caused by the Individual Debtor's failure to cooperate with the Trustee and the discovery abuses in these jointly administered Chapter 11 cases. They also ignore that administrative insolvency – which is when *pari passu* treatment of administrative claims would pose a concern to the Trustee's counsel – would be to the detriment of the Individual Debtor's unsecured creditors, to whom the Trustee is a fiduciary. The Court is not persuaded by the Objecting Parties' focus on this testimony to support their claims that the Trustee's investigation has lacked diligence.\n\nFor these reasons, the Court concludes that there is cause to extend the statute of limitations set forth by sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d) pursuant to Rule 9006(b). Therefore, the Motion to Extend Deadlines is granted to the extent set forth below.\n\n## **B. Equitable Tolling**\n\nStatutes of limitations in the Bankruptcy Code are drafted with implied awareness of general principles of equity, including equitable tolling – particularly because bankruptcy courts are courts of equity. *Young*, 535 U.S. at 49–50.\"Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling\n\nbears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.\" *Pace v. DiGuglielmo*, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005) (citing *Irwin v. Dep't of Veteran Affs.*, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990)); *see Castillo ex rel. A.Q.C. v. United States*, 656 F.3d 135, 144 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting *Pace*). Equitable tolling is not to be confused with fraudulent concealment by the defendant: the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has \"held explicitly that the application of the doctrine of equitable tolling is not limited to [cases with fraudulent concealment].\" *Donely ex rel. Valdez v. United States*, 518 F.3d 173, 183 (2d Cir. 2008) (collecting cases). Indeed, equitable tolling does not require any wrongdoing by a defendant. *Donely*, 518 F.3d at 182–83; *Canales v. Sullivan*, 936 F.2d 755, 758, *on reh'g* 947 F.2d 45, 758 (2d Cir. 1991); *Fundamental Long Term Care*, 501 B.R. at 791; *Fam. Golf Ctrs., Inc. v. Acushnet Co. (In re Randall's Island Fam. Golf Ctrs., Inc.)*, 288 B.R. 701, 705–06 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003). Moreover, insofar as misconduct is alleged, in bankruptcy proceedings it is often the debtor's rather than the defendant's conduct that is relevant. *Gladstone*, 811 F.3d at 1143; *Pomaville*, 190 B.R. at 637.\n\nThe Objecting Parties dispute whether the Trustee may properly seek equitable tolling now or must instead assert equitable tolling when and if a defendant in an adversary proceeding asserts a defense that the Trustee's complaint is time-barred. The Objecting Parties – particularly the Taurus Parties and the Greenwich Parties – argue that equitable tolling is not yet ripe and that the proper consideration is instead, as discussed above, whether the statute of limitations can be extended. The Trustee argues that equitable tolling can be considered prospectively.\n\nThe Court agrees with the Objecting Parties. As Judge Tancredi observed in *Walnut Hill*, in *IBT International*, the Eleventh Circuit only considered equitable tolling in the context of a\n\nmotion to dismiss raising a statute of limitations defense to a complaint in an adversary proceeding. 408 F.3d at 700–03. While it is not entirely clear from the decision itself, a review of the pleadings before the Eleventh Circuit supports the conclusion that the Eleventh Circuit found that the bankruptcy court's orders extending the statute of limitation were within its discretion pursuant to Rule 9006(b) and that, in any event, equitable tolling would apply to defeat the statute of limitation defense. *Id.* at 695–703; *see Fundamental Long Term Care*, 501 B.R. at 789 (\"It seems to the Court that the appropriate standard would be the \"for cause\" analysis under Rule 9006. The Trustee here seeks an enlargement of time before the period has expired (equitable tolling presumably comes into play after the limitations period has expired). And that was the analysis the Eleventh Circuit initially applied in *In re International Administrative Services*, before turning to the equitable tolling analysis in an abundance of caution.\").\n\nTherefore, the Court denies the Motion to Extend Deadlines insofar as it seeks an order equitably tolling the statutes of limitations set forth by sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d), without prejudice to the Trustee raising equitable tolling or other equitable arguments in response to a defense that an adversary proceeding commenced by the Trustee is time-barred.\n\n### **V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER**\n\nTherefore, having reviewed and considered the arguments of the Trustee and the Objecting Parties during the hearing and raised in their briefs, the caselaw cited during the hearing and in the briefs, and the equities, the Court grants in part the Trustee's Motion to Extend Deadlines based upon good cause having been shown. Accordingly, it is hereby\n\n**ORDERED:** Pursuant Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b), the Motion to Extend Deadlines is **GRANTED IN PART** as set forth herein; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** The time limitations set forth in 11 U.S.C. 108, 546, and 549 for the Trustee to commence avoidance actions are extended through and including August 15, 2024 (such extension, the \"Ordered Extension\"), which date may be further extended upon notice and a hearing; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** Notwithstanding anything in this Order to the contrary, pursuant to the agreement of the parties, this Order and the Ordered Extension herein shall not apply to (i) UBS AG; and (ii) Sotheby's International Realty, Inc., Sotheby's International Realty Affiliates LLC, Sotheby's International Realty Referral Company LLC, Sotheby's International Realty Referral Company Inc., Martha Turner Sotheby's International Realty Referral Company LLC, Martha Turner Properties, LP, MTPGP, LLC, Anywhere Advisors LLC, Anywhere Real Estate Services Group LLC, Anywhere Real Estate Group LLC, Anywhere Intermediate Holdings LLC, and Anywhere Real Estate Inc.; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** The Motion to Extend Deadlines is **DENIED IN PART** with respect to the request for prospective equitable tolling, without prejudice to the Trustee raising equitable tolling or other equitable arguments in response to a defense that an adversary proceeding commenced by the Trustee is time-barred; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** The terms and conditions of this Order shall be immediately effective and enforceable upon its entry; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** The Court shall retain jurisdiction with respect to all matters arising from or related to the interpretation or implementation of this Order.\n\nDated at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 15th day of February, 2024.","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格联邦地区破产法院\n\n) )\n\n)\n\n关于：) 第11章 ) 案号 22-50073 (JAM)\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，) （合并管理）\n\n债务人。) 关于：ECF No. 2509\n出庭人员\n\nAvram E. Luft（艾弗拉姆·E·拉夫）\nDouglass Barron（道格拉斯·巴伦）\nPaul Hastings LLP（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所）\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, NY 10166\nPatrick R. Linsey（帕特里克·R·林赛）\nNeubert, Pepe & Montieth（纽伯特、佩佩和蒙蒂斯律师事务所）\n195 Church Street, 13th Floor\nNew Haven, CT 06510\n\n以及\n\nNicholas A. Bassett（尼古拉斯·A·巴塞特）（出庭陈述）\nPaul Hastings LLP\n2050 M Street NW\nWashington, D.C. 20036\n\n动议方律师：Luc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯）先生，以HO WAN KWOK先生遗产第11章受托人身份\n\nLee Vartan（李·瓦尔坦）\nChiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC（基耶萨、沙希尼安及詹托马西律师事务所）\nOne Boland Drive\nWest Orange, NJ 07052\n\n以及\n\nSam Della Fera, Jr.（小萨姆·德拉费拉）（出庭陈述）\nMelissa F. Wernick（梅丽莎·F·韦尼克）\nChiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC\n105 Eisenhower Parkway\nRoseland, NJ 07068\n\nStephen M. Kindseth（斯蒂芬·M·金德塞思）\nAaron Romney（阿伦·罗姆尼）\nJames M. Moriarty（詹姆斯·M·莫里亚蒂）\nZeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（蔡斯勒与蔡斯勒律师事务所）\n10 Middle Street\nBridgeport, CT 06604\n\n被申请人Mei Guo（郭美）女士的律师\n\nAdam H. Friedman（亚当·H·弗里德曼）\nKatherine E. Mateo（凯瑟琳·E·马特奥）（出庭陈述）\nOlshan Frome Wolosky LLP（奥尔尚·弗罗姆·沃洛斯基律师事务所）\n1325 Avenue of the Americas\nNew York, NY 10019\n\n被申请人Defeng Cao（曹德峰）先生的律师\n\nLisa J. Fried（丽莎·J·弗里德）\nHerbert Smith Freehills New York LLP（赫伯特·史密夫·富律师事务所纽约分所）\n450 Lexington Avenue\nNew York, NY 10017\n\n被申请人UBS AG（瑞银集团）的律师\n\nGenevieve G. Weiner（吉纳维芙·G·韦纳）\nSidley Austin LLP（盛德律师事务所）\n555 West Fifth Street\nLos Angeles, CA 90013\nWilliam S. Fish, Jr.（小威廉·S·菲什）\nHinckley, Allen & Snyder LLP（欣克利、艾伦和斯奈德律师事务所）\n20 Church Street, 18th Floor\nHartford, CT 06103\n\n被申请人DBS Bank Ltd.（星展银行有限公司）的律师\n\nMichael T. Conway（迈克尔·T·康威）（出庭陈述）\nLazare Potter Giacovas & Moyle LLP（拉扎尔、波特、贾科瓦斯和莫伊尔律师事务所）\n747 Third Avenue, 16th Floor\nNew York, NY 10017\n\n被申请人Taurus Fund, LLC（金牛基金有限责任公司）、Taurus Management, LLC（金牛管理有限责任公司）及Scott Barnett（斯科特·巴尼特）先生的律师\n\nCarolina A. Fornos（卡罗莱纳·A·福尔诺斯）\nPillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP（皮尔斯伯里·温斯洛普·肖·皮特曼律师事务所）\n31 West 52nd Street\nNew York, NY 10019\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz（杰弗里·M·斯克拉兹）（出庭陈述）\nKelliane Baranowsky（凯利安·巴拉诺夫斯基）\nGreen & Sklarz LLC（格林与斯克拉兹有限责任公司）\nOne Audubon Street, 3rd Floor\nNew Haven, CT 06511\n\n被申请人G Club Operations LLC（G俱乐部运营有限责任公司）的律师\n\nDouglas M. Evans（道格拉斯·M·埃文斯）（出庭陈述）\nShapiro, Dorry, & Masterson LLC（夏皮罗、多里和马斯特森有限责任公司）\n71 Raymond Road\nWest Hartford, CT 06107\n\n被申请人Rule of Law Foundation III, Inc.（法治基金会III公司）及Rule of Law Society IV, Inc.（法治协会IV公司）的律师\n\nEric T. Schmitt（埃里克·T·施密特）（出庭陈述）\nThe Quinlan Law Firm, LLC（昆兰律师事务所有限责任公司）\n233 South Wacker Drive, Suite 6142\nChicago, IL 60606\n\nJon Newton（乔恩·牛顿）\nReid and Reige, P.C.（里德和赖奇律师事务所）\nOne Financial Plaza, 21st Floor\nHartford, CT 06103\n\n被申请人Chris Lee（克里斯·李）先生及Qidong Xia（夏启东）先生的律师\n\nChristopher J. Major（克里斯托弗·J·梅杰）（出庭陈述）\nAustin D. Kim（奥斯汀·D·金）\nMeister Seelig & Fein PLLC（迈斯特、西利格和范恩律师事务所）\n125 Park Avenue, 7th Floor\nNew York, NY 10017\n\n被申请人Greenwich Land, LLC（格林尼治土地有限责任公司）及Hing Chi Ngok（吴庆儿）女士的律师\n\nBarry R. Lax（巴里·R·拉克斯）\nRobert J. Grand（罗伯特·J·格兰德）（出庭陈述）\nLax & Neville, LLP（拉克斯与内维尔律师事务所）\n350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 4640\nNew York, NY 10018\n\nJordan W. Schur（乔丹·W·舒尔）\nHouser LLP（豪瑟律师事务所）\n8 Wright Street, Suite 107\nWestport, CT 06880\n被申请人GS Security Solutions, Inc.（GS安保解决方案公司）的律师\n\nDavid H. Wander（大卫·H·万德）（出庭陈述）\nMichael J. Grudberg（迈克尔·J·格鲁德伯格）\nTarter Krinsky & Drogin LLP（塔特、克林斯基和德罗金律师事务所）\n1350 Broadway\nNew York, NY 10018\n被申请人Yinying Wang（王茵茵）女士的律师\n\nAnthony M. Saccullo（安东尼·M·萨库洛）\nMary Augustine（玛丽·奥古斯丁）\nA.M. Saccullo Legal, LLC（A.M.萨库洛法律有限责任公司）\n27 Crimson King Drive\nBear, DE 19701\n\nStephen P. Brown（斯蒂芬·P·布朗）（出庭陈述）\nWilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP（威尔逊·埃尔瑟·莫斯科维茨·埃德尔曼和迪克尔律师事务所）\n1010 Washington Boulevard\nStamford, CT 06901\n\n被申请人Sotheby's International Realty, Inc.（苏富比国际地产公司）的律师\n\nJames Nealon（詹姆斯·尼隆）（出庭陈述）\nNealon Law LLC（尼隆法律有限责任公司）\n1266 East Main Street, Suite 700R\nStamford, CT 06902\n\n被申请人Yongbing Zhang（张永兵）律师的律师\n部分准许延长期限动议的裁定备忘录及命令\n\nJulie A. Manning（朱莉·A·曼宁），美国破产法官\nI. 导言\n\n本院审理的是Luc A. Despins先生以HO WAN KWOK先生（以下简称“个人债务人”）破产遗产第11章受托人（以下简称“受托人”）身份提出的《请求作出命令以延长受托人提起撤销诉讼期限的动议》（以下简称“延长期限动议”）。（ECF No. 2509。）基于下述理由，延长期限动议予以部分准许。\n\nII. 背景\n\n2022年2月15日，个人债务人在本院提出自愿第11章破产申请（以下简称“申请”）。（ECF No. 1。）个人债务人的案件与两个关联公司第11章案件合并管理。（ECF Nos. 970, 1141。）基于其中所述理由，2022年6月15日，本院作出指定第11章受托人的裁定备忘录及命令。（ECF No. 465。）In re Kwok, 640 B.R. 514 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022)。2022年7月8日，Despins先生被指定为受托人。（ECF No. 523。）\n\n2024年1月9日，受托人提出动议（以下简称“通知动议”），请求就拟议提出的延长或中止《美国法典》第11编（以下简称“破产法”）第108(a)、546(a)及549(d)条规定的时效期间之动议，安排听证并确立通知及送达程序。（ECF No. 2494。）2024年1月15日，鉴于未及时提交对通知动议的异议，本院根据书面材料审理该动议。（ECF No. 2505。）2024年1月19日，本院准许通知动议，并作出命令，安排就当时已提交的延长期限动议举行听证，并确立通知及送达程序（以下简称“通知及送达程序命令”）。（ECF No. 2515。）\n\n2024年1月18日，受托人提交延长期限动议。（ECF No. 2509。）2024年1月31日，受托人依据通知及送达程序命令提交了延长期限动议的送达通知和公告通知，表明已于2024年1月22日通过邮寄完成送达，并于其后进行公告通知。（ECF No. 2540。）\n\n2024年2月5日，Mei Guo女士（以下简称“Guo女士”）、Defeng Cao先生（以下简称“Cao先生”）、UBS AG（以下简称“UBS”）、Taurus Fund LLC、Taurus Management LLC及Scott Barnett先生（合称“金牛各方”）共同、G Club Operations LLC（以下简称“G Club”）、Rule of Law Foundation III, Inc.及Rule of Law Society IV, Inc.（合称“ROL各方”）共同、Chris Lee先生（以下简称“Lee先生”）及Qidong Xia先生（以下简称“Xia先生”）共同、Greenwich Land, LLC及Hing Chi Ngok女士（合称“格林尼治各方”）共同，以及GS Security Solutions, Inc.（以下简称“GS Security”）分别对延长期限动议提出异议。（ECF Nos. 2551, 2553, 2554, 2557, 2563, 2565, 2566, 2569, 2571。）同日，即2024年2月5日，DBS Bank提交保留权利声明，保留对超出延长期限动议所请求范围的任何时效延长或中止提出异议的权利。（ECF No. 2556。）2024年2月7日，Yinying Wang女士（以下简称“Wang女士”）及Sotheby's International Realty, Inc.（以下简称“Sotheby's”）逾期提交异议。（ECF Nos. 2582, 2584。）2024年2月8日，Yongbing Zhang先生（以下简称“Zhang先生”）逾期提交对延长期限动议的异议。（ECF No. 2591。）\n\n2024年2月9日，受托人提交了对各项异议的综合答复。（ECF No. 2620。）2024年2月12日，受托人提交证人及证物清单，该清单将受托人列为证人，并将该等合并管理第11章案件及相关对抗程序中公开提交的诉状和命令清单列为证物。（ECF No. 2763。）\n\n2024年2月13日，就延长期限动议举行听证。听证前，UBS提交撤回其对延长期限动议所提异议的通知，\n\nUBS随后在记录中再次确认该撤回。（ECF No. 2810。）听证期间，Sotheby's亦在记录中撤回其对延长期限动议的异议。DBS重申，其并未反对延长期限动议，而仅保留就任何未来延长或中止时效期间的动议所享有的权利。Guo女士、Cao先生、金牛各方、G Club、ROL各方、Lee先生、Xia先生、格林尼治各方、GS Security、Wang女士及Zhang先生（合称“异议各方”）坚持其对延长期限动议提出的异议。1\n\n受托人作证，并接受异议各方交叉询问。受托人请求本院对该等合并管理第11章案件及相关对抗程序的记录予以司法认知。受托人与异议各方分别陈述其论点。听证结束时，延长期限动议留待裁决。\n\n本案现已具备裁决条件。\n\nIII. 管辖权\n\n康涅狄格联邦地区法院（United States District Court for the District of Connecticut）依据28 U.S.C. § 1334(b)对本案享有管辖权。本院依据28 U.S.C. § 157(a)以及康涅狄格联邦地区法院于1984年9月21日作出的移送命令，有权审理和裁决本案。本案属于法定核心程序。28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A)。\n\n然而，异议各方就管辖权提出两项论点。第一，异议各方主张，根据Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 487–99 (2011)，本院无权裁决本案，因为撤销诉讼涉及私人权利而非公共权利，因此必须由《美国宪法》第III条法院裁决，除非当事人同意由其他法院行使管辖权，参见Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 575 U.S. 665, 686 (2015)（认定尽管Stern案作出裁决，当事人仍可同意由破产法院作出终局命令）。第二，异议各方主张，不存在案件或争议，因为没有任何一方在撤销诉讼中提出时效抗辩。\n\n1 异议各方大体上均加入彼此的论点。因此，本院将在以下讨论中统称其为异议各方。\n\n本院认定，对延长期限动议作出裁决并不违反Stern案。对延长期限动议作出裁决，不要求本院对任何撤销诉讼的实体理由作出终局裁决。相反，该项裁决要求本院作为衡平事项，确定《破产法》第108(a)、546(a)及549(d)条所载时效是否可以延长。这些期限规定载于《破产法》。此外，该等规定仅适用于破产案件，并体现破产政策考量；即如何平衡破产受托人为确定及追诉破产遗产诉因的需要，与确保每一案件及程序得到公正、迅速且低成本裁决的要求。比较11 U.S.C. §§ 108(a), 546(a), 549(a)与Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1001。因此，本院可以裁决延长期限动议提出的问题。参见Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49–50 (2002)（全体一致）（认定当国会制定旨在由作为衡平法院的破产法院适用的规定时，衡平中止尤其适用）。\n\n本院还认定，目前存在案件或争议。合并管理第11章案件尚在审理中。因此，《破产法》第108(a)、546(a)及549(d)条所载期限正在生效。受托人主张：(i)其目前正在追查潜在的破产遗产诉因，但在两年期限届满前，无法既提起诉讼又符合Fed. R. Civ. P. 11的标准；且(ii)鉴于其迄今对本案的经验和了解，无疑存在其完全不知晓的破产遗产诉因。受托人请求延长该等期限，以便其能够提起更多诉讼而不受时效限制。\n\n因此，本院认定其对本案享有管辖权。此外，根据28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409，本地区为适格审判地。\n\nIV. 讨论\n\n本院依据Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052作出的事实认定及法律结论如下。\n\nA. 破产规则9006(b)\n\n规则9006(b)规定，通常，“当本规则、依本规则作出的通知或法院命令要求在指定期限当日或期限内实施某一行为时，法院可基于所示理由，随时酌情……在延长期限的请求于原定期限届满前或先前命令所延长期限届满前提出的情况下，命令延长期限。”Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)。\n\n各方争议规则9006(b)是否可用于延长第108(a)、546(a)和549(d)条规定的期限。受托人援引IBT International, Inc. v. Northern（International Administrative Services, Inc. 破产案），408 F.3d 689 (11th Cir. 2005)及其后续判例，主张是否延长期限属于法院的酌处权范围。异议方——尤其是G Club——援引28 U.S.C. § 2075、Joint Council Dining Car Employees Local 370 v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Company，157 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1946)、In re Walnut Hill，No. 16-50960 (JJT)，2018 WL 2672242 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 1, 2018) (Tancredi, J.)，以及In re Damach Inc.，235 B.R. 727 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1999) (Krechevsky, J.)，主张规则9006(b)不得延长第108(a)、546(a)和549(d)条规定的期限。\n\n第一个问题是，第108(a)、546(a)和549(d)条是否包含诉讼时效——受时效中止、延长、衡平法上的禁止反言及其他衡平法原则约束——还是包含不受衡平法影响的除斥期间。比较Young，535 U.S. at 49–50（指出，《破产法典》中的规定尤其容易适用衡平法，因为其起草背景理解为破产法院属于衡平法院）与Arellano v. McDonough，598 U.S. 1, 12–13 (2023)（区分国会对38 U.S.C. § 5110的立法意图与其对11 U.S.C. § 507的立法意图，因此得出与Young不同的结论）。本案与Young相同、而不同于Arellano，第108(a)、546(a)和549(d)条要么没有时效中止规定，要么其时效中止规定是对而非取代传统衡平法原则的补充。11 U.S.C. §§ 108(a)（无时效中止规定）、546(a)（可能因两年期间内首次任命受托人而中止）、549(d)（无时效中止规定）；比较Young，535 U.S. at 52–53与Arellano，598 U.S. at 12–14；见IBT Int'l，408 F.3d at 699 (11th Cir. 2005)；Ernst & Young v. Matsumoto（United Insurance Management, Inc. 破产案），14 F.3d 1380, 1385 (9th Cir. 1994)；另见2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 108.2[1] (16th ed. 2023)（指出11 U.S.C. § 108(a)不适用于除斥期间，仅适用于诉讼时效）（汇集判例）；5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 546.02[4]（指出11 U.S.C. § 546不涉及管辖权）（汇集判例）；但参见Martin v. First Nat'l Bank of Louisville（Butcher 破产案），829 F.2d 596 (6th Cir. 1987)。法院赞同多数立场，即第108(a)、546(a)和549(d)条可依衡平法原则予以延长，并不同意异议方所依赖的Butcher案。比较H.R. Rep. No. 103-835，at 49–50 (1994)与Butcher，829 F.2d at 599–600。\n\n下一个问题是，规则9006(b)是否为此类衡平法上的延长提供机制。虽然法院承认并尊重本地区尊敬的James J. Tancredi（詹姆斯·J·坦克雷迪）法官在Walnut Hill案中作出的先前裁决、尊敬的Robert L. Krechevsky（罗伯特·L·克雷切夫斯基）法官在Damach案中作出的先前裁决，以及异议方对这些裁决的依赖，但美国最高法院（United States Supreme Court）、美国第二巡回上诉法院（United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit）或美国康涅狄格联邦地区法院（United States District Court for the District of Connecticut）均未就此问题作出具有约束力的先例。唯一就该问题发表意见的美国联邦上诉法院是美国第十一巡回上诉法院（United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit）。在IBT International案中，第十一巡回法院认定，尽管规则9006(b)的文本中未包含“statute”，但由于规则9006(b)依规则7001和7003管辖对抗程序的提交，破产法院有权依规则9006(b)酌情延长第546(a)条规定的提起撤销诉讼的期限。408 F.3d at 699。\n\n异议方主张，第十一巡回法院的分析存在缺陷，因为其忽视了《规则授权法》，并将违背权力分立原则。法院不同意。其论点所依据的措辞为：“该等规则不得削减、扩大或修改任何实体权利。”28 U.S.C. § 2075。时效期间通常并非实体性事项。Young，535 at 49。如上所述，本院——以及审理过该问题的大多数法院——认定，第108(a)、546(a)和549(d)条规定的是受衡平法原则约束的诉讼时效——第十一巡回法院确实就第546(a)条讨论了该问题。IBT Int'l，408 F.3d at 699。即，它们并非实体性事项。见Young，535 at 49。基于这些理由，法院谨不同意Walnut Hill案中涉及规则9006(b)的部分，并认定《规则授权法》并不排除规则9006(b)为延长第108(a)、546(a)和549(d)条规定的诉讼时效提供机制。Walnut Hill所依赖的Damach案作出于Young案之前，且涉及根据第365(d)(4)条提出的接受或拒绝租赁的动议，其中涉及出租人的实体合同权利——而非如本案中延长期限的动议，或如Young案中涉及衡平法时效中止这一非实体性诉讼时效。235 B.R. at 729–30, 731–32。\n\n异议方援引第二巡回法院在Dining Car案中的裁决，还类比主张，由于规则6不得用于修改非破产民事诉讼中的诉讼时效，规则9006(b)亦不得在本案中使用。然而，该类比不能成立，因为破产程序与其他民事诉讼之间存在关键差异。Dining Car案审议并驳回了如下主张：规则6(a)规定的时间计算方法适用于独立于已提起民事诉讼而存在的时效期间。157 F.2d at 420。第108(a)、546(a)和549(d)条规定的时效期间均以破产案件的存在为前提。除非在破产案件中作出救济命令，而此等共同管理的第11章案件均已作出救济命令，否则这些条款不发生效力。11 U.S.C. §§ 108(a), 546(a), 549(d)。同样，对抗程序以相关破产案件的存在为前提。Dining Car案承认，规则6(a)适用于已提起民事诉讼后管辖其程序的法规。此处，受托人请求法院延长仅在破产案件已提起后才发生效力的诉讼时效。11 U.S.C. §§ 108(a), 546(a), 549(d)。异议方所依赖的Butcher案忽视了在破产案件中启动的对抗程序与传统民事诉讼之间的明显区别。829 F.2d at 599–600。\n\n法院因此认定，规则9006(b)可以为延长第108(a)、546(a)和549(d)条规定的诉讼时效提供机制。下一个问题是，它是否确实提供该机制。鉴于：(i) 规则1001的一般指示，即“本规则应由法院和当事人为确保每一案件和程序获得公正、迅速且低成本的裁判而解释、管理和适用”；(ii) 第十一巡回法院在IBT International案中的裁决，以及其基于规则9006(b)在对抗程序中适用的理由，并认定第546(a)条为“受放弃、时效中止和衡平法上的禁止反言约束”的诉讼时效，见Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001, 7003；IBT Int'l，408 F.3d at 699；(iii) 本巡回区不存在任何控制性先例；以及(iv) 上文所述法院不受异议方基于《规则授权法》和Dining Car案所提出论点说服的理由，法院认定，尽管规则9006(b)的措辞未包括“statute”，法院仍可依规则9006(b)延长第108(a)、546(a)和549(d)条规定的诉讼时效。IBT Int'l，408 F.3d at 698–99；In re Fundamental Long Term Care, Inc.，501 B.R. 784, 787–791 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2013)；Marsh v. Levy（Martin Levy of Berlin D.M.D., P.C. 破产案），416 B.R. 1, 8 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009)；Frentz v. Stites & Harbinson（ThermoView Indus., Inc. 破产案），381 B.R. 225, 227 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2008)；但参见In re Cramer，636 B.R. 830, 833 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2022)；In re Randolph Hosp., Inc.，No. 20-10247 (LMJ)，2022 WL 19298765, at \\*1 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. April 25, 2022)；Walnut Hill，2018 WL 2672242, at \\*2。\n\n因此，剩余问题是，根据本院面前的事实和情形，是否存在“理由”延长第108(a)、546(a)和549(d)条中的诉讼时效。Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)。法院认定，在这些共同管理的第11章案件极为具体且非同寻常的事实和情形下，存在延长第108(a)、546(a)和549(d)条诉讼时效的理由。\n\n无论异议方主张其各自均未对受托人的调查造成任何损害，正如法院所观察到的，尽管是在衡平法时效中止的情境下，在确定是否应在破产程序中延长或中止诉讼时效时需考量的衡平因素，通常涉及债务人是否未与破产受托人合作，或实际上是否试图阻碍受托人为债权人利益进行的调查和资产清算。Gladstone v. U.S. Bancorp，811 F.3d 1133, 1143 (9th Cir. 2016)（援引Olsen v. Zerbetz（Olsen 破产案），36 F.3d 71, 72–73 (9th Cir. 1994)，并认定债务人而非被告的隐瞒行为可以支持衡平法时效中止）。正如美国明尼苏达联邦破产法院（United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Minnesota）所述：\n\n破产案件对衡平法时效中止提出了一种颇为不同的视角。在典型情形中，引发衡平法时效中止的是债务人的行为，而非被告的行为。在某些意义上，这对被告并不公平。另一方面，与通常民事案件中原告至少具有作为基础交易一方当事人的优势不同，破产受托人几乎完全必须依赖第三方（债务人）提供发现可撤销转让所必需的信息。\n\nMoratzka v. Pomaville（Pomaville 破产案），190 B.R. 632, 637 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1995)（因关于诉讼时效是否可被衡平法中止仍存在真实的重大事实争议，而驳回简易判决）。\n\n正如Pomaville案所观察到的，对被告的公平性是拒绝依规则9006(b)延长诉讼时效的法院所关切的核心。在Cramer案中，美国加利福尼亚中区联邦破产法院（United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California）主要关切的是潜在被告未获通知。636 B.R. at 832。Randolph Hospital案亦有此关切。2022 WL 19298765, at \\*1。然而，在本案中，已通过可行时的传统送达、可行时的替代送达，以及\n\n英文和普通话中文的公告通知，其形式实质上应符合本院依照《通知和送达程序命令》批准的形式。见 Cramer（克雷默）, 636 B.R. at 832 nn. 1, 2（区分被告已知悉请求延长期限之动议的案件）。不过，鉴于这一顾虑，本院此时不会裁定放弃时效抗辩的问题，而是保留该问题，以待其在对抗程序中被提出时再行裁定。因此，本院认为，任何一方均难以主张其实体权利受到本决定的影响。\n\n关于 Pomaville（波马维尔）案中指出的平衡因素，在这些联合管理的 Chapter 11（第11章）案件中，受托人未从个人债务人处获得任何账簿和记录，也未获得个人债务人的任何配合。个人债务人提交了不完整或不准确的财产清单及事务说明书，且未履行其在《破产法》下的义务。11 U.S.C. § 521。个人债务人通过提交“Global Notes”，明确否认并限定其在财产清单及事务说明书中经宣誓提供的信息；该等“Global Notes”并非正式表格，且不符合个人债务人依第521条所负的义务。(ECF Nos. 77–78.) 可以认为，个人债务人未履行其义务，可能导致认定第108(a)、546(a)及549(d)条所载的时效期限甚至尚未开始起算。\n\n自受任以来，受托人非但未获得个人债务人的遵从与配合，反而持续面对个人债务人、其家庭成员、其关联人士及雇员，以及受托人指称由其控制的实体所表现出的不服从、阻挠及公然无视法院命令的行为。(See, e.g., ECF Nos. 913, 1046, 1303, 1345, 1362, 1397, 1453, 1521, 1537, 1546, 1709, 1805, 1892, 1896, 2009, 2035, 2036, 2080, 2093, 2342, 2396; Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Kwok（郭文贵） (In re Kwok), No. 22-50073 (JAM),\n\nAdv. P. No. 22-05032 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 13, 2023), ECF No. 133; Despins ex rel. Kwok v. Mei Guo（郭梅） (In re Kwok), No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05008 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2023), ECF No. 32; Guo, No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05008 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Nov. 7, 2023), ECF No. 46.) 最终，本院已至少作出八项命令，认定个人债务人、其女儿 Guo 女士及据称由个人债务人控制的实体因未移交资产及滥用证据开示程序而构成藐视法庭。(ECF Nos. 1372, 1537, 1709, 1892, 1896, 2009, 2035, 2093.) 截至目前，各藐视法庭者仍处于藐视法庭状态。法定义务未履行的严重程度，见 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(3), (4)，以及在这些联合管理的 Chapter 11（第11章）案件中未遵从本院命令的程度，均属非同寻常。\n\n面对这些情形，除其为从个人债务人、其家属、其关联人士及据称由其控制的实体取得证据开示所作的努力外，受托人还不得不寻求广泛且持续的第三方证据开示。(ECF Nos. 636–38, 839, 1116, 1259, 1592, 1789, 2079, 2249, 2304, 2308, 2434, 2508, 2514.) 本院已准许受托人提出的全部十五项依据 Rule 2004（规则2004）进行审查的动议，授权对数百个实体进行审查。(ECF Nos. 756–58, 866, 1184, 1339, 1646, 1891, 2210, 2281, 2393, 2394, 2474, 2534, 2537.) 本院采信受托人的证言：试图仅凭冷冰冰的银行记录及其他文件，拼凑出个人债务人的财务状况——该等文件显示，在多个国家、大洲及司法管辖区之间存在由实体、银行账户及资金转移组成的庞大网络——是一项耗时且困难的工作，且所涉数据集不断扩大、最终规模未知。该证言尤其可信，因为受托人在缺乏个人债务人依法必须提供的配合的情况下开展工作。此外，受托人的调查一直并持续受到以下人员及实体的积极阻挠：\n\n个人债务人、其家属、关联人士、雇员、追随者及关联实体。\n\n受托人在这些联合管理的 Chapter 11（第11章）案件中所面对的“拼图”尤为复杂，而本案事实与 IBT International（IBT国际）案的事实相似；该案同样涉及复杂资产转移计划的指控，其中存在“由转移组成的拼图”。408 F.3d at 702。\n\n然而，异议方主张，受托人在试图了解破产财团潜在诉因方面并未尽到应有勤勉。个人债务人的律师亦在个人债务人女儿 Guo 女士提交的异议书上签字；该律师先前曾作证称，与 Guo 女士目前的主张相反，受托人在履行其法定调查职责时过于强势，见 11 U.S.C. § 1106：\n\n问：Kindseth（金德塞思）先生，您作证称，在会议之前，您曾强烈敦促受托人，引用原话，停止行动。对吗？答：大概50次。是。问：而且——答：也是逐步地。为澄清起见。这并不只是说，什么都不要做。而是说，您能否请稍微停止一些行动，给我们一些空间，让和解能够达成。是。问：您的意思是停止对调查的推进，对吗？答：停止那些无休止的炸弹式行动，您知道的，攻击，50项2004审查，加急听证会，就是这种无休止的攻击，Paul Hastings（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所）的12、14名律师全都，您知道的，全力以赴 [sic]。我说，您能否稍微收敛 [sic] 一点，给我们一些时间\n\n喘息并协商达成和解。\n\n(Dec. 12, 2022 Hr'g Tr. at \\*894:2–18, Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund, No. 22-50073 (JAM),\n\nAdv. P. No. 22-05032 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Dec. 15, 2022), ECF No. 111.)\n\n事实上，个人债务人在2022年秋季的立场是，受托人推进其调查的速度过快。在 Kindseth 律师作证之前，其同事亦代表个人债务人出庭，并一再反对受托人紧急推进其调查。以下是在2022年10月13日举行的听证会上，就受托人提出的《请求作出命令以授权遵从 Rule 2004 传票，并执行关于控制律师—当事人特权及工作成果保护之同意命令的动议》所进行的交谈，颇具说明性：\n\nHenzy（亨齐）先生：下周我将完全投入于可能审阅文件，实际上，我本想就此向法官阁下提出一个问题。但是，我不确定，法官阁下，为何如此着急。但是，我不确定为何如此着急——\n\nDespins（德斯潘）先生：法官阁下，着急的原因是，我们本应控制这些实体。我们被剥夺了控制权——被剥夺了就这些实体取得特权信息的机会——因为同一律师同时代表 Kwok 先生和那两个实体。因此，说没有紧迫性，我不知道该如何回应。已经十——我们并非在赶时间，意思是我们此前已就此提出请求一段时间。而且，如果我们关于他拥有这些实体的判断正确，紧迫性就在于他完全无视本案。因此，对于不存在紧迫性这一问题，我不知道该如何回应。\n\n(Oct. 13, 2022 Hr'g Tr. at 106:8–23, ECF No. 1020; see also Sept. 27, 2022 Status Conference\n\nTr. at 23:1–20, ECF No. 936.)\n\n在一宗拥有超过2900项案卷记录及超过250项相关对抗程序的案件中，受托人就个人债务人的财务状况及资产追收积极推进证据开示；这一点既经个人债务人律师本人承认，亦为本院亲自观察所见。本院认定，受托人在其努力中已表现出超过合理程度的勤勉。并非每一条线索均有成果，并非每一块石头均被翻开，并非每一项行动均告成功，均不减损受托人已超过合理程度地尽到勤勉义务这一事实。\n\n本案的事实和情形与 Tancredi（坦克雷迪）法官在 Walnut Hill（核桃山）案中面对的事实完全不同。在 Walnut Hill 案中，Chapter 7（第7章）受托人拥有第108(a)及546(a)条规定的完整两年期限，以履行其调查职责并提起诉因。本案中，受托人在案件开始五个月后获任——这意味着其在个人债务人的 Chapter 11（第11章）案件中有十九个月时间进行调查。(ECF No. 514.) 此外，在 Walnut Hill 案中，Chapter 7（第7章）受托人在申请提交十一个月后才提出其首项依据 Rule 2004 进行审查的动议。(In re Walnut Hill, No. 16-20960 (JJT) (Bankr. D. Conn. May 31, 2017), ECF No. 78.) 本案中，受托人在其任命获批准后不到一个月，即提出其首项进行 Rule 2004 审查的动议，并持续在其进行中的调查中积极寻求证据开示。(ECF No. 636.)\n\n然而，异议方还依据受托人的证言主张受托人缺乏勤勉，即聘请法务会计师必须等到财团获得资金后才能进行。具体而言，异议方着重援引受托人的证言，即即使法务会计师愿意按风险代理方式工作，其仍会要求与受托人及其律师享有同等顺位待遇。然而，异议方忽视了，聘请法务会计师的必要性系由个人债务人未与受托人配合，以及这些联合管理的 Chapter 11（第11章）案件中对证据开示程序的滥用所致。他们还忽视了，行政资不抵债——即行政债权同等顺位待遇会引起受托人律师关切的情形——将不利于个人债务人的无担保债权人，受托人对该等债权人负有受托义务。本院不接受异议方以该证言支持其关于受托人调查缺乏勤勉之主张的论点。\n\n基于上述理由，本院认定，根据 Rule 9006(b)，存在延长第108(a)、546(a)及549(d)条规定时效期限的理由。因此，延长期限动议在下述范围内获准。\nB. 衡平停止期间\n\n《破产法》中的时效法规起草时已默示考虑到衡平法的一般原则，包括衡平停止期间——尤其是因为破产法院属于衡平法院。Young（扬）, 535 U.S. at 49–50。“一般而言，寻求衡平停止期间的诉讼当事人负有证明以下两项要件的责任：(1)其一直勤勉行使其权利；以及(2)存在某种非常情形阻碍其行使权利。”Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005) (citing Irwin v. Dep't of Veteran Affs., 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990)); see Castillo ex rel. A.Q.C. v. United States, 656 F.3d 135, 144 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Pace). 衡平停止期间不应与被告的欺诈性隐瞒相混淆：United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit（美国联邦第二巡回上诉法院）已“明确认定，衡平停止期间原则的适用并不限于[存在欺诈性隐瞒的案件]。”Donely ex rel. Valdez v. United States, 518 F.3d 173, 183 (2d Cir. 2008) (collecting cases). 事实上，衡平停止期间并不要求被告存在任何不当行为。Donely, 518 F.3d at 182–83; Canales v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 755, 758, on reh'g 947 F.2d 45, 758 (2d Cir. 1991); Fundamental Long Term Care, 501 B.R. at 791; Fam. Golf Ctrs., Inc. v. Acushnet Co. (In re Randall's Island Fam. Golf Ctrs., Inc.), 288 B.R. 701, 705–06 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003). 此外，就被指称存在不当行为而言，在破产程序中，相关的往往是债务人而非被告的行为。Gladstone, 811 F.3d at 1143; Pomaville, 190 B.R. at 637.\n\n异议方就受托人现时能否适当请求衡平时效中止，还是必须在对抗程序中的被告提出受托人起诉状已过时效的抗辩时（如发生该情形）主张衡平时效中止，存在争议。异议方——尤其是 Taurus Parties（金牛座各方）和 Greenwich Parties（格林尼治各方）——主张，衡平时效中止尚未成熟，应当考虑的适当问题反而是，如上所述，诉讼时效能否延长。受托人主张，可以前瞻性地考虑衡平时效中止。\n\n法院同意异议方的意见。正如 Tancredi 法官在 Walnut Hill（沃尔纳特希尔案）中所指出的，在 IBT International（IBT International 案）中，第十一巡回上诉法院仅在一项提出对抗程序起诉状受诉讼时效限制之抗辩的驳回动议的背景下考虑了衡平时效中止。408 F.3d at 700–03。尽管从该判决本身并不完全清楚，但审查第十一巡回上诉法院审理的诉状支持如下结论：第十一巡回上诉法院认定，破产法院根据 Rule 9006(b) 作出的延长诉讼时效裁定属于其自由裁量权范围内；并且，无论如何，衡平时效中止将适用，以排除诉讼时效抗辩。Id. at 695–703; see Fundamental Long Term Care, 501 B.R. at 789（“法院认为，适当的标准应当是 Rule 9006 规定的‘有正当理由’分析。本案受托人在期限届满前请求延长期限（衡平时效中止推定在时效期间届满后才会发挥作用）。而这正是第十一巡回上诉法院在 In re International Administrative Services 中最初适用的分析，之后其出于审慎考虑转而进行衡平时效中止分析。”）。\n\n因此，法院驳回延长期限动议中寻求作出衡平中止 sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d) 规定的诉讼时效之命令的部分，但不影响受托人在回应一项主张由受托人提起的对抗程序已过时效的抗辩时提出衡平时效中止或其他衡平论点。\nV. 结论及命令\n\n因此，法院在审阅并考虑了受托人和异议方在听证会上提出及其书面陈述中提出的论点、在听证会上及书面陈述中援引的判例法以及衡平因素后，认定已证明存在正当理由，故部分准许受托人的延长期限动议。据此，现命令如下：\n\n命令：根据 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)，按本命令所述，延长期限动议予以部分准许；并进一步\n\n命令：11 U.S.C. 108, 546, and 549 规定的受托人提起撤销诉讼的时限延长至并包括 August 15, 2024（该项延长称为“Ordered Extension”），该日期可经通知和听证后进一步延长；并进一步\n\n命令：尽管本命令中有任何相反规定，根据各方协议，本命令及本命令所规定的延长不适用于：(i) UBS AG；以及 (ii) Sotheby's International Realty, Inc., Sotheby's International Realty Affiliates LLC, Sotheby's International Realty Referral Company LLC, Sotheby's International Realty Referral Company Inc., Martha Turner Sotheby's International Realty Referral Company LLC, Martha Turner Properties, LP, MTPGP, LLC, Anywhere Advisors LLC, Anywhere Real Estate Services Group LLC, Anywhere Real Estate Group LLC, Anywhere Intermediate Holdings LLC, and Anywhere Real Estate Inc.；并进一步\n\n命令：就请求前瞻性衡平时效中止的部分，延长期限动议予以部分驳回，但不影响受托人在回应一项主张由受托人提起的对抗程序已过时效的抗辩时提出衡平时效中止或其他衡平论点；并进一步\n\n命令：本命令的条款和条件自其录入之时起立即生效并可执行；并进一步\n\n命令：法院保留对因解释或执行本命令而产生或与之相关的一切事项的管辖权。\n\n于 2024 年 February 15th 日在 Connecticut 州 Bridgeport 签署。","key_entities":["Je","Guo","Kwok","Despins","Ho Wan Kwok","Paul Hastings"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":1,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":32,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":46,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":78,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":111,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":133,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":465,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":514,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":523,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":636,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":936,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1020,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2494,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2505,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2509,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2515,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2540,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2556,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2591,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2620,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2763,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2810,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":6375,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 19:26:08"}