{"id":"court_ctb_2969_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":2969,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT In re:","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"## **IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\nIn re:\n\nHO WAN KWOK, *et al.*,\n\nDebtors.<sup>1</sup>\n\nChapter 11\n\nCase No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n(Jointly Administered)\n\nFebruary 28, 2024\n\n## **NOTICE OF APPEAL**\n\nPLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8001 *et seq.,* G Club\n\nOperations, LLC (\"**G Club Operations**\"), hereby files notice of its appeal from the Bankruptcy\n\nCourt's February 15, 2024, *Memorandum of Decision and Order Granting in Part Motion to*\n\n*Extend Deadlines* (ECF No. 2921, the \"**Ruling**\"), granting the Trustee, Luc A. Despins, Chapter\n\n11 Trustee (the \"**Trustee**\") *Motion for Entry of Order Extending Deadline for Trustee to File*\n\n*Avoidance Actions* (ECF No. 2509, the \"**Extension Motion**\"). A copy of the Ruling is attached\n\nhereto as Exhibit A.\n\nThe names of all parties to the Court's order appealed from and the names, addresses and telephone numbers of their respective attorneys are as follows:\n\n**Jeffrey M. Sklarz Kellianne T. Baranowsky** Green & Sklarz LLC One Audubon Street, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06511 (203) 285-8545\n\n*Representing* **G Club Operations LLC** 53 Calle Palmeras, Suite 1401 Puerta De Tierra San Juan, Puerto Rico 00901\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595) (the \"Debtor\"), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and the Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\nFax: (203) 823-4546 [jsklarz@gs-lawfirm.com](mailto:jsklarz@gs-lawfirm.com) [kbaranowsky@gs-lawfirm.com](mailto:kbaranowsky@gs-lawfirm.com)\n\nand\n\nCarolina A. Fornos (*pro hac vice*) PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP 31 West 52nd Street New York, NY 10019 Tel: 212-858-1558 carolina.fornos@pillsburylaw.com\n\n\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\n\nDouglas S. Skalka (ct00616) Patrick R. Linsey (ct29437) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 781- 2847 dskalka@npmlaw.com plinsey@npmlaw.com and\n\nand\n\nNicholas A. Bassett (pro hac vice) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C., 20036 (202) 551-1902 nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\nand\n\nAvram E. Luft (pro hac vice) Douglass Barron (pro hac vice) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6079 aviluft@paulhastings.com\n\nCounsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee\n\n{00353547.1 }\n\n*Party-in-Interest and Appellant*\n\n*Representing*\n\n**Luc A. Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee** PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166\n\n*Chapter 11 Trustee and Appellee*\n\n### THE PARTY-IN-INTEREST G CLUB OPERATIONS LLC\n\nBy: /s/Jeffrey M. Sklarz Jeffrey M. Sklarz (ct20938) Green & Sklarz LLC 700 State St, Suite 100 New Haven, CT 06511 (203) 285-8545 Fax: (203) 823-4546 jsklarz@gs-lawfirm.com\n\n# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI hereby certify that on the date set forth below a copy of the foregoing was served by CMECF and/or mail on anyone unable to accept electronic filing. Notice of this filing will be sent by email to all parties by operation of the Court's electronic filing system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as indicated on the Notice of Electronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF System.\n\nDate: February 28, 2024 /s/ Jeffrey M. Sklarz\n\n# **EXHIBIT A**\n\n{00353547.1 }\n\n### **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\n ) )\n\n)\n\nIn re: ) Chapter 11 ) Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) HO WAN KWOK, *et al.*, ) (Jointly Administered)\n\nDebtors. ) Re: ECF No. 2509\n\n### **APPEARANCES**\n\nAvram E. Luft Douglass Barron Paul Hastings LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166 Patrick R. Linsey Neubert, Pepe & Montieth 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, CT 06510\n\nand\n\nNicholas A. Bassett (argued) Paul Hastings LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C. 20036\n\n*Counsel for Movant Mr. Luc A. Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee for the Estate of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok*\n\nLee Vartan Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC One Boland Drive West Orange, NJ 07052\n\nand\n\nSam Della Fera, Jr. (argued) Melissa F. Wernick Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC 105 Eisenhower Parkway Roseland, NJ 07068\n\nStephen M. Kindseth Aaron Romney James M. Moriarty Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. 10 Middle Street Bridgeport, CT 06604\n\n*Counsel for Respondent Ms. Mei Guo*\n\nAdam H. Friedman Katherine E. Mateo (argued) Olshan Frome Wolosky LLP 1325 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10019\n\n*Counsel for Respondent Mr. Defeng Cao*\n\nLisa J. Fried Herbert Smith Freehills New York LLP 450 Lexington Avenue New York, NY 10017\n\n*Counsel for Respondent UBS AG*\n\nGenevieve G. Weiner Sidley Austin LLP 555 West Fifth Street Los Angeles, CA 90013 William S. Fish, Jr. Hinckley, Allen & Snyder LLP 20 Church Street, 18th Floor Hartford, CT 06103\n\n*Counsel for Respondent DBS Bank Ltd.*\n\nMichael T. Conway (argued) Lazare Potter Giacovas & Moyle LLP 747 Third Avenue, 16th Floor New York, NY 10017\n\n*Counsel for Respondents Taurus Fund, LLC, Taurus Management, LLC, and Mr. Scott Barnett*\n\nCarolina A. Fornos Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP 31 West 52nd Street New York, NY 10019\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz (argued) Kelliane Baranowsky Green & Sklarz LLC One Audubon Street, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06511\n\n*Counsel for Respondent G Club Operations LLC*\n\nDouglas M. Evans (argued) Shapiro, Dorry, & Masterson LLC 71 Raymond Road West Hartford, CT 06107\n\n*Counsel for Respondents Rule of Law Foundation III, Inc. and Rule of Law Society IV, Inc.*\n\nEric T. Schmitt (argued) The Quinlan Law Firm, LLC 233 South Wacker Drive, Suite 6142 Chaicago, IL 60606\n\nJon Newton Reid and Reige, P.C. One Financial Plaza, 21st Floor Hartford, CT 06103\n\n*Counsel for Respondents Mr. Chris Lee and Mr. Qidong Xia*\n\nChristopher J. Major (argued) Austin D. Kim Meister Seelig & Fein PLLC 125 Park Avenue, 7th Floor New York, NY 10017\n\n*Counsel for Respondents Greenwich Land, LLC and Ms. Hing Chi Ngok*\n\nBarry R. Lax Robert J. Grand (argued) Lax & Neville, LLP 350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 4640 New York, NY 10018\n\nJordan W. Schur Houser LLP 8 Wright Street, Suite 107 Westport, CT 06880\n\n### *Counsel for Respondent GS Security Solutions, Inc.*\n\nDavid H. Wander (argued) Michael J. Grudberg Tarter Krinsky & Drogin LLP 1350 Broadway New York, NY 10018\n\n### *Counsel for Respondent Ms. Yinying Wang*\n\nAnthony M. Saccullo Mary Augustine A.M. Saccullo Legal, LLC 27 Crimson King Drive Bear, DE 19701\n\nStephen P. Brown (argued) Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP 1010 Washington Boulevard Stamford, CT 06901\n\n*Counsel for Respondent Sotheby's International Realty, Inc.*\n\nJames Nealon (argued) Nealon Law LLC 1266 East Main Street, Suite 700R Stamford, CT 06902\n\n*Counsel for Respondent Mr. Yongbing Zhang, Esquire*\n\n### **MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION TO EXTEND DEADLINES**\n\nJulie A. Manning, United States Bankruptcy Judge\n\n#### **I. INTRODUCTION**\n\nBefore the Court is the Motion for Entry of Order Extending Deadline for Trustee to File Avoidance Actions (the \"Motion to Extend Deadlines\") filed by Mr. Luc A. Despins, in his capacity as Chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") for the bankruptcy estate of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Individual Debtor\"). (ECF No. 2509.) For the reasons stated below, the Motion to Extend Deadlines is **GRANTED IN PART**.\n\n### **II. BACKGROUND**\n\nOn February 15, 2022, the Individual Debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition (the \"Petition\") in this Court. (ECF No. 1.) The Individual Debtor's case is jointly administered with two affiliated corporate Chapter 11 cases. (ECF Nos. 970, 1141.) For the reasons set forth therein, on June 15, 2022, the Court entered a memorandum of decision and order appointing a Chapter 11 trustee. (ECF No. 465.) *In re Kwok*, 640 B.R. 514 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022). On July 8, 2022, Mr. Despins was appointed as the Trustee. (ECF No. 523.)\n\nOn January 9, 2024, the Trustee filed a motion (the \"Notice Motion\") to schedule a hearing on and establish notice and service procedures for a forthcoming motion to extend or toll the statute of limitations set by sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d) of title 11 (the \"Bankruptcy Code\"). (ECF No. 2494.) On January 15, 2024, in light of no objections to the Notice Motion having been timely filed, the Court took it on the papers. (ECF No. 2505.) On January 19, 2024, the Court granted the Notice Motion and entered an order scheduling a hearing on the Motion to Extend Deadlines, which had at that point been filed, and establishing notice and service procedures (the \"Notice and Service Procedures Order\"). (ECF No. 2515.)\n\nOn January 18, 2024, the Trustee filed the Motion to Extend Deadlines. (ECF No. 2509.) On January 31, 2024, the Trustee filed a notice of service and publication notice of the Motion to Extend Deadlines pursuant to the Notice and Service Procedures Order, indicating service was made by mail on January 22, 2024 and publication notice was made thereafter. (ECF No. 2540.)\n\nOn February 5, 2024, objections to the Motion to Extend Deadlines were filed by Ms. Mei Guo (\"Ms. Guo\"); Mr. Defeng Cao (\"Mr. Cao\"); UBS AG (\"UBS\"); Taurus Fund LLC, Taurus Management LLC, and Mr. Scott Barnett (collectively, the \"Taurus Parties\") jointly; G Club Operations LLC (\"G Club\"); Rule of Law Foundation III, Inc. and Rule of Law Society IV, Inc. (collectively, the \"ROL Parties\") jointly; Mr. Chris Lee (\"Mr. Lee\") and Mr. Qidong Xia (\"Mr. Xia\") jointly; Greenwich Land, LLC and Ms. Hing Chi Ngok (collectively, the \"Greenwich Parties\") jointly; and GS Security Solutions, Inc. (\"GS Security\"). (ECF Nos. 2551, 2553, 2554, 2557, 2563, 2565, 2566, 2569, 2571.) That same date, February 5, 2024, DBS Bank filed a reservation of rights to object to any extension or tolling of the statute of limitations beyond what the Motion to Extend Deadlines seeks. (ECF No. 2556.) On February 7, 2024, objections were untimely filed by Ms. Yinying Wang (\"Ms. Wang\") and Sotheby's International Realty, Inc. (\"Sotheby's\"). (ECF Nos. 2582, 2584.) On February 8, 2024, Mr. Yongbing Zhang (\"Mr. Zhang\") untimely filed an objection to the Motion to Extend Deadlines. (ECF No. 2591.)\n\nOn February 9, 2024, the Trustee filed an omnibus reply to the objections. (ECF No. 2620.) On February 12, 2024, the Trustee filed a list of witnesses and exhibits, which identified the Trustee as a witness and contained a list of pleadings and orders publicly filed in these jointly administered Chapter 11 cases and related adversary proceedings as exhibits. (ECF No. 2763.)\n\nOn February 13, 2024, a hearing was held on the Motion to Extend Deadlines. Prior to the hearing, UBS filed a notice of withdrawal of its objection to the Motion to Extend Deadlines,\n\nwhich withdrawal UBS repeated on the record. (ECF No. 2810.) During the hearing, Sotheby's also withdrew its objection to the Motion to Extend Deadlines on the record. DBS reiterated that it was not objecting to the Motion to Extend Deadlines but only reserving its rights regarding any future motion to extend or toll the statute of limitations. Ms. Guo, Mr. Cao, the Taurus Parties, G Club, the ROL Parties, Mr. Lee, Mr. Xia, the Greenwich Parties, GS Security, Ms. Wang, and Mr. Zhang (collectively, the \"Objecting Parties\") pressed their objections to the Motion to Extend Deadlines.1\n\nThe Trustee testified and was cross-examined by the Objecting Parties. The Trustee requested the Court take judicial notice of the record of these jointly administered Chapter 11 cases and related adversary proceedings. The Trustee and the Objecting Parties each presented their arguments. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Motion to Extend Deadlines was taken under advisement.\n\nThis matter is ripe for decision.\n\n### **III. JURISDICTION**\n\nThe United States District Court for the District of Connecticut has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). This Court has authority to hear and determine this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) and the Order of Reference of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut dated September 21, 1984. The instant matter is a statutorily core proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A).\n\nNevertheless, the Objecting Parties make two arguments against jurisdiction. First, the Objecting Parties argue that under *Stern v. Marshall*, 564 U.S. 462, 487–99 (2011), the Court\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Objecting Parties, for the most part, join in each other's arguments. Hence, the Court will refer to them in the collective throughout the discussion below.\n\nlacks jurisdiction to determine this matter because avoidance actions are matters of private – not public – right and must, therefore, be determined by an Article III court unless the parties consent to another court's exercise of jurisdiction, *see Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif*, 575 U.S. 665, 686 (2015) (holding that parties may consent to entry of a final order by bankruptcy courts notwithstanding the holding in *Stern*). Second, the Objecting Parties argue that there is no case or controversy because no party has asserted a statute of limitations defense in an avoidance action.\n\nThe Court concludes that its determination of the Motion to Extend Deadlines is not contrary to *Stern*. Determination of the Motion to Extend Deadlines does not require that this Court finally determine the merits of any avoidance action. Rather, it requires the Court to determine as a matter of equity whether the statute of limitations contained in sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d) of the Bankruptcy Code may be extended. These time limitations are contained in the Bankruptcy Code. Furthermore, they are solely applicable in bankruptcy cases and embody bankruptcy policy considerations; namely, how to balance the need of a bankruptcy trustee to determine and prosecute the estate's causes of actions and the mandate to ensure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every case and proceeding. *Compare* 11 U.S.C. §§ 108(a), 546(a), 549(a) *with* Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1001. Therefore, this Court may determine the issues raised by the Motion to Extend Deadlines. *See Young v. United States*, 535 U.S. 43, 49– 50 (2002) (unanimous) (holding equitable tolling is particularly available where Congress enacts provisions intended to be applied by bankruptcy courts, which are courts of equity).\n\nThe Court also concludes that there is presently a case or controversy. There are jointly administered Chapter 11 cases pending. Hence, the time limits contained in sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d) of the Bankruptcy Code are in effect. The Trustee argues that (i) there are\n\npotential estate causes of action he is currently pursuing but cannot file before the two-year period expires while also meeting the standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and (ii) there are undoubtedly estate causes of action completely unknown to him, given his experience and knowledge of these cases to date. The Trustee seeks to extend these time limits to allow him to bring more actions without being time-barred.\n\nTherefore, the Court determines it has jurisdiction over this matter. Moreover, venue in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.\n\n### **IV. DISCUSSION**\n\nThe Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052 are set forth below.\n\n#### **A. Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)**\n\nRule 9006(b) provides that, generally, \"when an act is required to be done at or within a specified period by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion . . . order the period enlarged if the request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order.\" Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b).\n\nThe parties dispute whether Rule 9006(b) may be utilized to extend the deadlines set forth in sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d). The Trustee, relying on *IBT International, Inc. v. Northern (In re International Administrative Services, Inc.)*, 408 F.3d 689 (11th Cir. 2005), and its progeny, argues that it is within the Court's discretion to extend the deadlines. The Objecting Parties – particularly G Club – rely on 28 U.S.C. § 2075, *Joint Council Dining Car Employees Local 370 v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Company*, 157 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1946), *In re Walnut Hill*, No. 16-50960 (JJT), 2018 WL 2672242 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 1, 2018) (Tancredi, J.), and *In re Damach Inc.*, 235 B.R. 727 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1999) (Krechevsky, J.), to argue that Rule 9006(b) may not extend the deadlines set forth in sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d).\n\nThe first question is whether 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d) contain statutes of limitation – subject to tolling, extension, equitable estoppel, and other principles of equity – or statutes of repose, which are not susceptible to equity. *Compare Young*, 535 U.S. at 49–50 (stating that provisions in the Bankruptcy Code are particularly susceptible to equity because they are drafted with the background understanding that bankruptcy courts are courts of equity) *with Arellano v. McDonough*, 598 U.S. 1, 12–13 (2023) (distinguishing the congressional intent behind 38 U.S.C. § 5110 from that behind 11 U.S.C. § 507 and, hence, arriving at different result than *Young*.) Here, as in *Young* and unlike in *Arellano*, sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d) have either no tolling provisions or tolling provisions that supplement rather than supplant traditional principles of equity. 11 U.S.C. §§ 108(a) (no tolling provision), 546(a) (potentially tolled by the first appointment of a trustee within the two-year period), 549(d) (no tolling provision); *compare Young*, 535 U.S. at 52–53 *with Arellano*, 598 U.S. at 12–14; *see IBT Int'l*, 408 F.3d at 699 (11th Cir. 2005); *Ernst & Young v. Matsumoto (In re United Ins. Mgmt., Inc.)*, 14 F.3d 1380, 1385 (9th Cir. 1994); *see also* 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 108.2[1] (16th ed. 2023) (stating 11 U.S.C. § 108(a) does not apply to statutes of repose, only statutes of limitations) (collecting cases); 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 546.02[4] (stating 11 U.S.C. § 546 is not jurisdictional) (collecting cases); *but see Martin v. First Nat'l Bank of Louisville (In re Butcher)*, 829 F.2d 596 (6th Cir. 1987). The Court agrees with the majority position that sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d) are subject to extension under principles of equity and disagrees with *Butcher*, upon which the\n\nObjecting Parties rely. *Compare* H.R. Rep. No. 103-835, at 49–50 (1994) *with Butcher*, 829 F.2d at 599–600.\n\nThe next question is whether Rule 9006(b) provides a mechanism for such equitable extension. While the Court recognizes and respects the prior decisions in this District by the Honorable James J. Tancredi in *Walnut Hill* and the Honorable Robert L. Krechevsky in *Damach*, and the reliance by the Objecting Parties upon those decisions, there is no binding precedent on this issue from the United States Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, or the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. The only United States Court of Appeals to opine on the issue is the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. In *IBT International*, the Eleventh Circuit held that a bankruptcy court has the discretion under Rule 9006(b) to enlarge the period of time to bring avoidance actions set forth in section 546(a), notwithstanding the omission of \"statute\" from the text of Rule 9006(b), because Rule 9006(b) governs the filing of adversary proceedings pursuant to Rules 7001 and 7003. 408 F.3d at 699.\n\nThe Objecting Parties argue that the Eleventh Circuit's analysis is flawed because it ignores the Rules Enabling Act and would be in defiance of the separation of powers. The Court disagrees. The basis of their argument is the language: \"Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.\" 28 U.S.C. § 2075. Limitation periods are not, generally, substantive. *Young*, 535 at 49. As discussed above, this Court – and the majority of courts to consider the issue – concludes that sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d) present statutes of limitation, subject to principles of equity – which the Eleventh Circuit *does* address regarding section 546(a). *IBT Int'l*, 408 F.3d at 699. That is, they are not substantive. *See Young*, 535 at 49. For these reasons, the Court respectfully disagrees with the portion of *Walnut Hill*\n\naddressing Rule 9006(b) and concludes that the Rules Enabling Act does not preclude Rule 9006(b) from providing a mechanism for extending the statutes of limitation set forth in sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d). *Damach*, upon which *Walnut Hill* relies, was decided pre-*Young* and dealt with a motion to accept or reject a lease under section 365(d)(4) where a lessor's *substantive* contractual rights were involved – not, as here, on a motion to extend deadlines, or in *Young*, which dealt with equitable tolling, a non-substantive statute of limitations. 235 B.R. at 729–30, 731–32.\n\nCiting the Second Circuit's decision in *Dining Car*, the Objecting Parties also argue by analogy that because Rule 6 cannot be used to modify statutes of limitation in non-bankruptcy civil litigation, Rule 9006(b) cannot be used here. The analogy, however, fails because of key differences between bankruptcy proceedings and other civil actions. *Dining Car* considered, and rejected, the argument that Rule 6(a)'s proscribed methodology for computation of time applied to limitation periods existing independent of the filed civil action. 157 F.2d at 420. The limitation periods set forth by sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d) are all dependent on a bankruptcy case existing. Unless an order for relief enters in a bankruptcy case, which orders have been entered in each of these jointly administered Chapter 11 cases, these sections have no effect. 11 U.S.C. §§ 108(a), 546(a), 549(d). Similarly, adversary proceedings depend upon a related bankruptcy case existing. *Dining Car* recognized Rule 6(a)'s applicability to statutes that govern procedure of a civil action after it has been filed. The Trustee here asks the Court to extend statutes of limitations that only come into effect after a bankruptcy case has been filed. 11 U.S.C. §§ 108(a), 546(a), 549(d). *Butcher*, relied upon by the Objecting Parties, disregards the obvious difference between adversary proceedings commenced in a bankruptcy case and traditional civil actions. 829 F.2d at 599–600.\n\nThe Court concludes for these reasons that Rule 9006(b) could provide a mechanism to extend the statutes of limitation set forth by sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d). The next question is whether it does. In light of (i) the general exhortation of Rule 1001 that \"[t]hese rules shall be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every case and proceeding\"; (ii) the Eleventh's Circuit's ruling in *IBT International* and its rationale based on the applicability of Rule 9006(b) in adversary proceedings and its determination that section 546(a) is a statute of limitations \"subject to waiver, tolling, and equitable estoppel\", *see* Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001, 7003; *IBT Int'l*, 408 F.3d at 699; (iii) the lack of any controlling precedent in this Circuit; and (iv) the reasons discussed above as to why the Court is not persuaded by the Objecting Parties' arguments based on the Rules Enabling Act and *Dining Car*, the Court concludes that it may extend the statutes of limitation set forth by sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d) pursuant to Rule 9006(b) despite Rule 9006(b) not including \"statute\" in its language. *IBT Int'l*, 408 F.3d at 698–99; *In re Fundamental Long Term Care, Inc.*, 501 B.R. 784, 787–791 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2013); *Marsh v. Levy (In re Martin Levy of Berlin D.M.D., P.C.)*, 416 B.R. 1, 8 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009); *Frentz v. Stites & Harbinson (In re ThermoView Indus., Inc.)*, 381 B.R. 225, 227 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2008); *but see In re Cramer*, 636 B.R. 830, 833 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2022); *In re Randolph Hosp., Inc.*, No. 20-10247 (LMJ), 2022 WL 19298765, at \\*1 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. April 25, 2022); *Walnut Hill*, 2018 WL 2672242, at \\*2.\n\nThe remaining issue, therefore, is whether there is \"cause,\" on the facts and circumstances before the Court to extend the statutes of limitation in sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d). Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b). The Court determines that on the very specific and\n\nextraordinary facts and circumstances of these jointly administered Chapter 11 cases, cause exists to extend the statutes of limitation in sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d).\n\nRegardless of the Objecting Parties' arguments that they have individually caused no harm to the Trustee's investigation, as courts have observed, albeit in the context of equitable tolling, the equities to consider in determining whether to extend or toll a statute of limitations in a bankruptcy proceeding often involve whether the debtor failed to cooperate with the bankruptcy trustee or indeed sought to impede the trustee's investigation and liquidation of assets for the benefit of creditors. *Gladstone v. U.S. Bancorp*, 811 F.3d 1133, 1143 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing *Olsen v. Zerbetz (In re Olsen)*, 36 F.3d 71, 72–73 (9th Cir. 1994) and holding that concealment by the debtor rather than the defendant could support equitable tolling). As the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Minnesota stated:\n\nA bankruptcy case presents a rather different slant on equitable tolling. In the typical situation, it is the debtor's conduct rather than the defendant's conduct which invokes equitable tolling. In some senses, this is unfair to the defendant. On the other hand, unlike the usual civil case where a plaintiff at least has the advantage of being a party to the underlying transaction, a bankruptcy trustee must rely almost entirely on a third party (the debtor) to provide the information necessary to uncover avoidable transfers.\n\n*Moratzka v. Pomaville (In re Pomaville)*, 190 B.R. 632, 637 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1995) (denying summary judgment because there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the statute of limitations could be equitably tolled).\n\nAs observed in *Pomaville*, fairness to defendants is the animating concern among courts that decline to extend statutes of limitation under Rule 9006(b). In *Cramer*, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California was primarily concerned with the lack of notice to the potential defendants. 636 B.R. at 832. *Randolph Hospital* shared this concern. 2022 WL 19298765, at \\*1. Here, however, there has been extensive notice of the Motion to Extend Deadlines via traditional service where possible, alternative service where possible, and\n\npublication notice, in English and Mandarin Chinese, in substantially the form approved by the Court pursuant to the Notice and Service Procedures Order. *See Cramer*, 636 B.R. at 832 nn. 1, 2 (distinguishing cases where defendants had notice of the motion seeking an extension of time). Nevertheless, in light of this concern, the Court will not determine the issue of waiver of a statute of limitations defense at this time, but rather will reserve that issue for determination when and if it is raised in an adversary proceeding. As such, the Court finds it difficult for any party to argue that their substantive rights have been impacted by this decision.\n\nRegarding the counterbalance noted in *Pomaville*, in these jointly administered Chapter 11 cases, the Trustee received no books and records from the Individual Debtor and no cooperation from the Individual Debtor. The Individual Debtor filed incomplete or inaccurate schedules and statement of affairs and did not comply with his duties under the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 521. The Individual Debtor affirmatively disclaimed and qualified the sworn information in his schedules and statements of affairs by filing \"Global Notes\", which are not official forms and not in compliance with the Individual Debtor's duties under section 521. (ECF Nos. 77–78.) Arguably, the failure of the Individual Debtor to comply with his duties could result in a finding that the statutes of limitation contained in sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d) have not even begun to run.\n\nInstead of receiving compliance and cooperation from the Individual Debtor, the Trustee has faced ceaseless recalcitrance, obstruction, and flagrant disregard of court orders by the Individual Debtor, his family members, his associates and employees, and entities the Trustee alleges he controls since the Trustee's appointment. (*See, e.g.*, ECF Nos. 913, 1046, 1303, 1345, 1362, 1397, 1453, 1521, 1537, 1546, 1709, 1805, 1892, 1896, 2009, 2035, 2036, 2080, 2093, 2342, 2396; *Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Kwok (In re Kwok)*, No. 22-50073 (JAM),\n\nAdv. P. No. 22-05032 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 13, 2023), ECF No. 133; *Despins ex rel. Kwok v. Mei Guo* (*In re Kwok)*, No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05008 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2023), ECF No. 32; *Guo*, No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05008 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Nov. 7, 2023), ECF No. 46.) Ultimately, the Court has entered at least eight orders holding the Individual Debtor, his daughter, Ms. Guo, and entities allegedly controlled by the Individual Debtor in contempt for failure to turn over assets and discovery abuse. (ECF Nos. 1372, 1537, 1709, 1892, 1896, 2009, 2035, 2093.) To date, each contemnor remains in contempt of court. The severity of nonperformance of statutory duties, *see* 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(3), (4), and noncompliance with this Court's orders in these jointly administered Chapter 11 cases, is extraordinary.\n\nFaced with these circumstances, the Trustee has had to seek extensive and ongoing third party discovery in addition to his efforts to obtain discovery from the Individual Debtor, his family, his associates, and entities he allegedly controls. (ECF Nos. 636–38, 839, 1116, 1259, 1592, 1789, 2079, 2249, 2304, 2308, 2434, 2508, 2514.) The Court has granted all fifteen of the Trustee's motions for Rule 2004 examinations, authorizing the examination of hundreds of entities. (ECF Nos. 756–58, 866, 1184, 1339, 1646, 1891, 2210, 2281, 2393, 2394, 2474, 2534, 2537.) The Court credits the Trustee's testimony that attempting to piece together the Individual Debtor's financial affairs from cold bank records and other documents evidencing a massive web of entities, bank accounts, and money transfers across multiple countries, continents, and jurisdictions is a time-consuming and difficult endeavor over an ever-increasing data set of unknown ultimate dimensions. This testimony is particularly credible because the Trustee is operating without the Individual Debtor's statutorily required cooperation. Moreover, the Trustee's investigation has been and continues to be impeded by the active obstruction of the\n\nIndividual Debtor, his family members, associates, employees, followers, and associated entities.\n\nThe \"puzzle\" the Trustee is faced with in these jointly administered Chapter 11 cases is\n\nparticularly severe and the facts of these cases are similar to the facts of *IBT International*, which\n\nalso involved allegations of a complex asset diversion plan, where there was a \"jigsaw puzzle of\n\ntransfers.\" 408 F.3d at 702.\n\nThe Objecting Parties argue that, nevertheless, the Trustee has been less than diligent in\n\nhis attempts to understand the bankruptcy estate's potential causes of action. Counsel for the\n\nIndividual Debtor, who also signed the objection submitted by the Individual Debtor's daughter,\n\nMs. Guo, has previously testified that, contrary to Ms. Guo's present argument, the Trustee was\n\ntoo forceful in his statutory investigative duties, *see* 11 U.S.C. § 1106:\n\nQ. You testified, Mr. Kindseth, that prior to the meeting, you had urged the Trustee strenuously to quote, unquote, stand down. Is that right? A. Probably 50 times. Yes. Q. And -- A. Gradually, too. Just to be clear. It wasn't just, do nothing. It's, can you please just stand down some to give us some space to let the settlement come together. Yes. Q. What you meant by that was stand down on the investigation, correct? A. Stand down on the perpetual bombs, you know, attacks, 50 2004 exams, expedited hearings, just this perpetual attack, 12, 14 lawyers at Paul Hastings going all, you know, full board [sic]. I said, can you just reign [sic] it in a little bit to give us some time to\n\nbreathe and work out a settlement.\n\n(Dec. 12, 2022 Hr'g Tr. at \\*894:2–18, *Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund*, No. 22-50073 (JAM),\n\nAdv. P. No. 22-05032 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Dec. 15, 2022), ECF No. 111.)\n\nIndeed, the Individual Debtor's position in fall of 2022 was that the Trustee was\n\nproceeding too rapidly with his investigation. Prior to Attorney Kindseth's testimony, his\n\ncolleague, also appearing on behalf of the Individual Debtor, repeatedly objected to the Trustee's\n\nurgent pursuit of his investigation. The exchange below during a hearing held on October 13,\n\n2022, on the Trustee's Motion for Entry of Order Authorizing Compliance with Rule 2004\n\nSubpoenas and Enforcing Consent Order Regarding Control of Attorney-Client Privilege and\n\nWork Product Protection is illustrative:\n\nMr. Henzy: Next week I'm going to be fully engulfed in potentially reviewing documents which actually I wanted to ask Your Honor a question about. But I'm not sure, Your Honor, what the hurry is. But I'm not sure what the hurry –\n\nMr. Despins: Your Honor, the hurry is that we're supposed to have control of these entities. We're being deprived of control -- of access to privilege in relation -- for to those entities because that's the same counsel representing Mr. Kwok and those two entities. And so to say there's no rush, I don't know what to say about that. It's been ten -- we're not rushing, meaning we've asked for this for a while now. And if we are correct that he owns it, the rush is that he's just disregarding this case completely. So I don't know what to say about the issue of no rush.\n\n(Oct. 13, 2022 Hr'g Tr. at 106:8–23, ECF No. 1020; *see also* Sept. 27, 2022 Status Conference\n\nTr. at 23:1–20, ECF No. 936.)\n\nIn a case with more than 2900 docket entries and more than 250 associated adversary proceedings, where the Trustee has, by counsel to the Individual Debtor's own admission and in this Court's own observation, aggressively pursued discovery relating to the Individual Debtor's financial affairs and recovery of assets, the Court concludes that the Trustee has shown more than reasonable diligence in his efforts. That not every lead has borne fruit, that not every stone has been unturned, that not every action has been successful, does not diminish the fact that the Trustee has been more than reasonably diligent.\n\nThe facts and circumstances of the present case are wholly unlike the facts Judge Tancredi faced in *Walnut Hill*. In *Walnut Hill,* the Chapter 7 trustee had the entire two-year time period set forth in sections 108(a) and 546(a) to fulfill his investigative duties and bring causes of action. Here, the Trustee was appointed five months into the case – which means he had nineteen months to perform his investigation in the Individual Debtor's Chapter 11 case. (ECF No. 514.) Furthermore, in *Walnut Hill*, the Chapter 7 trustee filed her first motion for Rule 2004\n\nexamination eleven months after the petition was filed. (*In re Walnut Hill*, No. 16-20960 (JJT) (Bankr. D. Conn. May 31, 2017), ECF No. 78.) In this case, the Trustee filed his first motion to conduct a Rule 2004 motion less than a month after the approval of his appointment and continues to vigorously seek discovery as part of his ongoing investigation. (ECF No. 636.)\n\nNevertheless, the Objecting Parties also argue against the Trustee's diligence on the basis of the Trustee's testimony that hiring a forensic accountant had to wait until the estate had funding. In particular, the Objecting Parties focus on the Trustee's testimony that even if a forensic accountant was willing to work on a contingency basis, they would have demanded to be treated *pari passu* with the Trustee and his lawyers. However, the Objecting Parties ignore that the necessity of forensic accountant has been caused by the Individual Debtor's failure to cooperate with the Trustee and the discovery abuses in these jointly administered Chapter 11 cases. They also ignore that administrative insolvency – which is when *pari passu* treatment of administrative claims would pose a concern to the Trustee's counsel – would be to the detriment of the Individual Debtor's unsecured creditors, to whom the Trustee is a fiduciary. The Court is not persuaded by the Objecting Parties' focus on this testimony to support their claims that the Trustee's investigation has lacked diligence.\n\nFor these reasons, the Court concludes that there is cause to extend the statute of limitations set forth by sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d) pursuant to Rule 9006(b). Therefore, the Motion to Extend Deadlines is granted to the extent set forth below.\n\n### **B. Equitable Tolling**\n\nStatutes of limitations in the Bankruptcy Code are drafted with implied awareness of general principles of equity, including equitable tolling – particularly because bankruptcy courts are courts of equity. *Young*, 535 U.S. at 49–50.\"Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling\n\nbears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.\" *Pace v. DiGuglielmo*, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005) (citing *Irwin v. Dep't of Veteran Affs.*, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990)); *see Castillo ex rel. A.Q.C. v. United States*, 656 F.3d 135, 144 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting *Pace*). Equitable tolling is not to be confused with fraudulent concealment by the defendant: the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has \"held explicitly that the application of the doctrine of equitable tolling is not limited to [cases with fraudulent concealment].\" *Donely ex rel. Valdez v. United States*, 518 F.3d 173, 183 (2d Cir. 2008) (collecting cases). Indeed, equitable tolling does not require any wrongdoing by a defendant. *Donely*, 518 F.3d at 182–83; *Canales v. Sullivan*, 936 F.2d 755, 758, *on reh'g* 947 F.2d 45, 758 (2d Cir. 1991); *Fundamental Long Term Care*, 501 B.R. at 791; *Fam. Golf Ctrs., Inc. v. Acushnet Co. (In re Randall's Island Fam. Golf Ctrs., Inc.)*, 288 B.R. 701, 705–06 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003). Moreover, insofar as misconduct is alleged, in bankruptcy proceedings it is often the debtor's rather than the defendant's conduct that is relevant. *Gladstone*, 811 F.3d at 1143; *Pomaville*, 190 B.R. at 637.\n\nThe Objecting Parties dispute whether the Trustee may properly seek equitable tolling now or must instead assert equitable tolling when and if a defendant in an adversary proceeding asserts a defense that the Trustee's complaint is time-barred. The Objecting Parties – particularly the Taurus Parties and the Greenwich Parties – argue that equitable tolling is not yet ripe and that the proper consideration is instead, as discussed above, whether the statute of limitations can be extended. The Trustee argues that equitable tolling can be considered prospectively.\n\nThe Court agrees with the Objecting Parties. As Judge Tancredi observed in *Walnut Hill*, in *IBT International*, the Eleventh Circuit only considered equitable tolling in the context of a\n\nmotion to dismiss raising a statute of limitations defense to a complaint in an adversary proceeding. 408 F.3d at 700–03. While it is not entirely clear from the decision itself, a review of the pleadings before the Eleventh Circuit supports the conclusion that the Eleventh Circuit found that the bankruptcy court's orders extending the statute of limitation were within its discretion pursuant to Rule 9006(b) and that, in any event, equitable tolling would apply to defeat the statute of limitation defense. *Id.* at 695–703; *see Fundamental Long Term Care*, 501 B.R. at 789 (\"It seems to the Court that the appropriate standard would be the \"for cause\" analysis under Rule 9006. The Trustee here seeks an enlargement of time before the period has expired (equitable tolling presumably comes into play after the limitations period has expired). And that was the analysis the Eleventh Circuit initially applied in *In re International Administrative Services*, before turning to the equitable tolling analysis in an abundance of caution.\").\n\nTherefore, the Court denies the Motion to Extend Deadlines insofar as it seeks an order equitably tolling the statutes of limitations set forth by sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d), without prejudice to the Trustee raising equitable tolling or other equitable arguments in response to a defense that an adversary proceeding commenced by the Trustee is time-barred.\n\n#### **V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER**\n\nTherefore, having reviewed and considered the arguments of the Trustee and the Objecting Parties during the hearing and raised in their briefs, the caselaw cited during the hearing and in the briefs, and the equities, the Court grants in part the Trustee's Motion to Extend Deadlines based upon good cause having been shown. Accordingly, it is hereby\n\n**ORDERED:** Pursuant Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b), the Motion to Extend Deadlines is **GRANTED IN PART** as set forth herein; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** The time limitations set forth in 11 U.S.C. 108, 546, and 549 for the Trustee to commence avoidance actions are extended through and including August 15, 2024 (such extension, the \"Ordered Extension\"), which date may be further extended upon notice and a hearing; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** Notwithstanding anything in this Order to the contrary, pursuant to the agreement of the parties, this Order and the Ordered Extension herein shall not apply to (i) UBS AG; and (ii) Sotheby's International Realty, Inc., Sotheby's International Realty Affiliates LLC, Sotheby's International Realty Referral Company LLC, Sotheby's International Realty Referral Company Inc., Martha Turner Sotheby's International Realty Referral Company LLC, Martha Turner Properties, LP, MTPGP, LLC, Anywhere Advisors LLC, Anywhere Real Estate Services Group LLC, Anywhere Real Estate Group LLC, Anywhere Intermediate Holdings LLC, and Anywhere Real Estate Inc.; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** The Motion to Extend Deadlines is **DENIED IN PART** with respect to the request for prospective equitable tolling, without prejudice to the Trustee raising equitable tolling or other equitable arguments in response to a defense that an adversary proceeding commenced by the Trustee is time-barred; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** The terms and conditions of this Order shall be immediately effective and enforceable upon its entry; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** The Court shall retain jurisdiction with respect to all matters arising from or related to the interpretation or implementation of this Order.\n\nDated at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 15th day of February, 2024.","body_zh":"美利坚合众国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院\n\n关于：\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，\n\n债务人。1\n\n第11章\n\n案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n\n（合并管理）\n\nFebruary 28, 2024\n上诉通知\n\n兹通知，根据 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8001 及以下条款，G Club Operations, LLC（G Club Operations 有限责任公司，以下简称“G Club Operations”）特此就破产法院于 February 15, 2024 作出的《关于部分准许延长期限动议的裁定理由书及命令》（ECF No. 2921，以下简称“裁定”）提起上诉；该裁定准许了第11章受托人 Luc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯，以下简称“受托人”）提出的《关于作出命令延长受托人提起撤销诉讼期限的动议》（ECF No. 2509，以下简称“延长期限动议”）。裁定副本随附于本通知，作为附件A。\n\n被上诉法院命令所涉全部当事人的姓名，以及其各自律师的姓名、地址和电话号码如下：\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz（杰弗里·M·斯克拉兹）\nKellianne T. Baranowsky（凯利安娜·T·巴拉诺夫斯基）\nGreen & Sklarz LLC（格林与斯克拉兹有限责任公司）\nOne Audubon Street, 3rd Floor\nNew Haven, CT 06511\n(203) 285-8545\n\n代理 G Club Operations LLC\n53 Calle Palmeras, Suite 1401\nPuerta De Tierra\nSan Juan, Puerto Rico 00901\n\n1 本第11章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（税务识别号后四位：9595）（以下简称“债务人”）、Genever Holdings LLC（Genever Holdings 有限责任公司）（税务识别号后四位：8202）及 Genever Holdings Corporation（Genever Holdings 公司）。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 及 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为 Paul Hastings LLP（宝盛律师事务所），200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166，转交 Luc A. Despins，作为 Ho Wan Kwok 财产的受托人（仅为通知及通信之目的）。\n\n传真：(203) 823-4546\n[jsklarz@gs-lawfirm.com]\n[kbaranowsky@gs-lawfirm.com]\n\n以及\n\nCarolina A. Fornos（卡罗琳娜·A·福尔诺斯）（pro hac vice）\nPILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP（Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman 律师事务所）\n31 West 52nd Street\nNew York, NY 10019\n电话：212-858-1558\ncarolina.fornos@pillsburylaw.com\n\n\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\*\n\nDouglas S. Skalka（道格拉斯·S·斯卡尔卡）（ct00616）\nPatrick R. Linsey（帕特里克·R·林赛）（ct29437）\nNEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C.（诺伊伯特、佩佩与蒙泰思律师事务所）\n195 Church Street, 13th Floor\nNew Haven, Connecticut 06510\n(203) 781-2847\ndskalka@npmlaw.com\nplinsey@npmlaw.com\n以及\n\n以及\n\nNicholas A. Bassett（尼古拉斯·A·巴塞特）（pro hac vice）\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP（宝盛律师事务所）\n2050 M Street NW\nWashington, D.C., 20036\n(202) 551-1902\nnicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n以及\n\nAvram E. Luft（阿夫拉姆·E·卢夫特）（pro hac vice）\nDouglass Barron（道格拉斯·巴伦）（pro hac vice）\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP（宝盛律师事务所）\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, New York 10166\n(212) 318-6079\naviluft@paulhastings.com\n\n第11章受托人之律师\n\n{00353547.1 }\n\n利益相关方及上诉人\n\n代理\n\nLuc A. Despins，第11章受托人\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, New York 10166\n\n第11章受托人及被上诉人\n利益相关方 G CLUB OPERATIONS LLC\n\n签署人：/s/Jeffrey M. Sklarz\nJeffrey M. Sklarz（ct20938）\nGreen & Sklarz LLC\n700 State St, Suite 100\nNew Haven, CT 06511\n(203) 285-8545\n传真：(203) 823-4546\njsklarz@gs-lawfirm.com\n送达证明\n\n本人特此证明，于下列日期，通过 CM/ECF 和/或邮寄方式，向任何无法接受电子提交的人送达了上述文件副本。本次提交的通知将通过法院电子提交系统的运行，以电子邮件发送给所有当事人，或如电子提交通知所示，通过邮寄方式发送给任何无法接受电子提交的人。当事人可通过法院的 CM/ECF 系统查阅本次提交。\n\n日期：February 28, 2024 /s/ Jeffrey M. Sklarz\n附件A\n\n{00353547.1 }\n美利坚合众国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院\n\n ) )\n\n)\n\n关于： ) 第11章 ) 案号：22-50073 (JAM)\nHO WAN KWOK 等， ) （合并管理）\n\n债务人。 ) 事由：ECF No. 2509\n出庭人员\n\nAvram E. Luft\nDouglass Barron\nPaul Hastings LLP\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, NY 10166\nPatrick R. Linsey\nNeubert, Pepe & Montieth\n195 Church Street, 13th Floor\nNew Haven, CT 06510\n\n以及\n\nNicholas A. Bassett（出庭辩论）\nPaul Hastings LLP\n2050 M Street NW\nWashington, D.C. 20036\n\n动议人 Luc A. Despins 先生之律师，其为 Ho Wan Kwok 先生财产的第11章受托人\n\nLee Vartan（李·瓦尔坦）\nChiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC（基耶萨、沙希尼安与贾恩托马西律师事务所）\nOne Boland Drive\nWest Orange, NJ 07052\n\n以及\n\nSam Della Fera, Jr.（小萨姆·德拉费拉）（出庭辩论）\nMelissa F. Wernick（梅丽莎·F·韦尼克）\nChiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC\n105 Eisenhower Parkway\nRoseland, NJ 07068\n\nStephen M. Kindseth（斯蒂芬·M·金德塞思）\nAaron Romney（亚伦·罗姆尼）\nJames M. Moriarty（詹姆斯·M·莫里亚蒂）\nZeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（蔡斯勒与蔡斯勒律师事务所）\n10 Middle Street\nBridgeport, CT 06604\n\n被申请人 Mei Guo 女士之律师\n\nAdam H. Friedman（亚当·H·弗里德曼）\nKatherine E. Mateo（凯瑟琳·E·马特奥）（出庭辩论）\nOlshan Frome Wolosky LLP（奥尔尚·弗罗姆·沃洛斯基律师事务所）\n1325 Avenue of the Americas\nNew York, NY 10019\n\n被申请人 Defeng Cao 先生之律师\n\nLisa J. Fried（莉萨·J·弗里德）\nHerbert Smith Freehills New York LLP（赫伯特·史密夫·自由律师事务所纽约分所）\n450 Lexington Avenue\nNew York, NY 10017\n\n被申请人 UBS AG（瑞银集团）之律师\n\nGenevieve G. Weiner（日内维芙·G·韦纳）\nSidley Austin LLP（世达律师事务所）\n555 West Fifth Street\nLos Angeles, CA 90013\nWilliam S. Fish, Jr.（小威廉·S·菲什）\nHinckley, Allen & Snyder LLP（欣克利、艾伦与斯奈德律师事务所）\n20 Church Street, 18th Floor\nHartford, CT 06103\n\n被申请人 DBS Bank Ltd.（星展银行有限公司）之律师\n\nMichael T. Conway（迈克尔·T·康韦）（出庭辩论）\nLazare Potter Giacovas & Moyle LLP（拉扎尔、波特、贾科瓦斯与莫伊尔律师事务所）\n747 Third Avenue, 16th Floor\nNew York, NY 10017\n\n被申请人 Taurus Fund, LLC（Taurus Fund 有限责任公司）、Taurus Management, LLC（Taurus Management 有限责任公司）及 Scott Barnett 先生之律师\n\nCarolina A. Fornos\nPillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP\n31 West 52nd Street\nNew York, NY 10019\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz（出庭辩论）\nKelliane Baranowsky（凯利安娜·巴拉诺夫斯基）\nGreen & Sklarz LLC\nOne Audubon Street, 3rd Floor\nNew Haven, CT 06511\n\n被申请人 G Club Operations LLC 之律师\n\nDouglas M. Evans（道格拉斯·M·埃文斯）（出庭辩论）\nShapiro, Dorry, & Masterson LLC（夏皮罗、多里与马斯特森有限责任公司）\n71 Raymond Road\nWest Hartford, CT 06107\n\n被申请人 Rule of Law Foundation III, Inc.（法治基金会III公司）及 Rule of Law Society IV, Inc.（法治协会IV公司）之律师\n\nEric T. Schmitt（埃里克·T·施密特）（出庭辩论）\nThe Quinlan Law Firm, LLC（昆兰律师事务所有限责任公司）\n233 South Wacker Drive, Suite 6142\nChicago, IL 60606\n\nJon Newton（乔恩·牛顿）\nReid and Reige, P.C.（里德与赖格律师事务所）\nOne Financial Plaza, 21st Floor\nHartford, CT 06103\n\n被申请人 Chris Lee 先生及 Qidong Xia 先生之律师\n\nChristopher J. Major（克里斯托弗·J·梅杰）（出庭辩论）\nAustin D. Kim（奥斯汀·D·金）\nMeister Seelig & Fein PLLC（迈斯特、锡利格与费恩律师事务所）\n125 Park Avenue, 7th Floor\nNew York, NY 10017\n\n被申请人 Greenwich Land, LLC（格林尼治土地有限责任公司）及 Hing Chi Ngok 女士之律师\n\nBarry R. Lax（巴里·R·拉克斯）\nRobert J. Grand（罗伯特·J·格兰德）（出庭辩论）\nLax & Neville, LLP（拉克斯与内维尔律师事务所）\n350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 4640\nNew York, NY 10018\n\nJordan W. Schur（乔丹·W·舒尔）\nHouser LLP（豪瑟律师事务所）\n8 Wright Street, Suite 107\nWestport, CT 06880\n被申请人 GS Security Solutions, Inc.（GS 安全解决方案公司）之律师\n\nDavid H. Wander（戴维·H·万德）（出庭辩论）\nMichael J. Grudberg（迈克尔·J·格鲁德伯格）\nTarter Krinsky & Drogin LLP（塔特、克林斯基与德罗金律师事务所）\n1350 Broadway\nNew York, NY 10018\n被申请人 Yinying Wang 女士之律师\n\nAnthony M. Saccullo（安东尼·M·萨库洛）\nMary Augustine（玛丽·奥古斯丁）\nA.M. Saccullo Legal, LLC（A.M. Saccullo 法律有限责任公司）\n27 Crimson King Drive\nBear, DE 19701\n\nStephen P. Brown（斯蒂芬·P·布朗）（出庭辩论）\nWilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP（威尔逊·埃尔瑟·莫斯科维茨·埃德尔曼与迪克尔律师事务所）\n1010 Washington Boulevard\nStamford, CT 06901\n\n被申请人 Sotheby's International Realty, Inc.（苏富比国际地产公司）之律师\n\nJames Nealon（詹姆斯·尼隆）（出庭辩论）\nNealon Law LLC（尼隆法律有限责任公司）\n1266 East Main Street, Suite 700R\nStamford, CT 06902\n\n被申请人 Yongbing Zhang 律师之律师\n关于部分准许延长期限动议的裁定理由书及命令\n\nJulie A. Manning（朱莉·A·曼宁），美国联邦破产法官\n一、引言\n\n本院审理的是 Luc A. Despins 先生以 Ho Wan Kwok 先生（以下简称“个人债务人”）破产财产第11章受托人（以下简称“受托人”）身份提出的《关于作出命令延长受托人提起撤销诉讼期限的动议》（以下简称“延长期限动议”）。（ECF No. 2509。）基于下述理由，延长期限动议获部分准许。\n\n二、背景\n\nFebruary 15, 2022，个人债务人在本院提交了一份自愿第11章申请（以下简称“申请书”）。（ECF No. 1。）个人债务人案件与两宗关联公司第11章案件合并管理。（ECF Nos. 970, 1141。）基于其中载明的理由，June 15, 2022，本院作出指定第11章受托人的裁定理由书及命令。（ECF No. 465。）In re Kwok, 640 B.R. 514 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022)。July 8, 2022，Despins 先生被指定为受托人。（ECF No. 523。）\n\nJanuary 9, 2024，受托人提出一项动议（以下简称“通知动议”），请求安排听证，并就即将提出的延长或中止《破产法典》第11编第108(a)、546(a)及549(d)条规定的诉讼时效之动议，确立通知及送达程序。（ECF No. 2494。）January 15, 2024，鉴于未及时对通知动议提出异议，本院依据书面材料审理该动议。（ECF No. 2505。）January 19, 2024，本院准许通知动议，并作出命令，安排对当时已提交的延长期限动议举行听证，并确立通知及送达程序（以下简称“通知及送达程序命令”）。（ECF No. 2515。）\n\nJanuary 18, 2024，受托人提交了延长期限动议。（ECF No. 2509。）January 31, 2024，受托人根据通知及送达程序命令，提交延长期限动议的送达通知及公告通知，表明已于 January 22, 2024 通过邮寄完成送达，并于此后发布公告通知。（ECF No. 2540。）\n\nFebruary 5, 2024，Mei Guo 女士（以下简称“Guo 女士”）、Defeng Cao 先生（以下简称“Cao 先生”）、UBS AG（以下简称“UBS”）、Taurus Fund LLC、Taurus Management LLC 及 Scott Barnett 先生（合称“ Taurus 各方”）共同、G Club Operations LLC（以下简称“G Club”）、Rule of Law Foundation III, Inc. 及 Rule of Law Society IV, Inc.（合称“ROL 各方”）共同、Chris Lee 先生（以下简称“Lee 先生”）及 Qidong Xia 先生（以下简称“Xia 先生”）共同、Greenwich Land, LLC 及 Hing Chi Ngok 女士（合称“Greenwich 各方”）共同，以及 GS Security Solutions, Inc.（以下简称“GS Security”）分别就延长期限动议提交异议。（ECF Nos. 2551, 2553, 2554, 2557, 2563, 2565, 2566, 2569, 2571。）同日，即 February 5, 2024，DBS Bank 提交保留权利声明，就超出延长期限动议所请求范围的任何延长或中止诉讼时效保留提出异议的权利。（ECF No. 2556。）February 7, 2024，Yinying Wang 女士（以下简称“Wang 女士”）及 Sotheby's International Realty, Inc.（以下简称“Sotheby's”）逾期提交异议。（ECF Nos. 2582, 2584。）February 8, 2024，Yongbing Zhang 先生（以下简称“Zhang 先生”）逾期就延长期限动议提交异议。（ECF No. 2591。）\n\nFebruary 9, 2024，受托人针对异议提交综合答复。（ECF No. 2620。）February 12, 2024，受托人提交证人及证物清单，其中列明受托人为证人，并将本合并管理第11章案件及相关对抗程序中公开提交的诉状和命令清单作为证物。（ECF No. 2763。）\n\nFebruary 13, 2024，本院就延长期限动议举行听证。听证前，UBS 提交撤回其对延长期限动议所提异议的通知，\n\nUBS 亦在记录中重申该撤回。（ECF No. 2810。）听证期间，Sotheby's 亦在记录中撤回其对延长期限动议的异议。DBS 重申，其并未反对延长期限动议，仅就任何未来延长或中止诉讼时效的动议保留其权利。Guo 女士、Cao 先生、Taurus 各方、G Club、ROL 各方、Lee 先生、Xia 先生、Greenwich 各方、GS Security、Wang 女士及 Zhang 先生（合称“异议各方”）坚持其对延长期限动议的异议。1\n\n受托人作证，并接受异议各方的交叉询问。受托人请求本院对本合并管理第11章案件及相关对抗程序的记录予以司法认知。受托人与异议各方分别提出其论点。听证结束时，延长期限动议留待裁决。\n\n本事项已具备裁决条件。\n\n三、管辖权\n\n康涅狄格联邦地区法院（United States District Court for the District of Connecticut）根据 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) 对本事项具有管辖权。本院根据 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) 以及康涅狄格联邦地区法院于 September 21, 1984 作出的移送命令（Order of Reference），有权审理并裁定本事项。本事项属于法定核心程序。28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A).\n\n然而，异议方提出两项反对管辖权的论点。第一，异议方主张，根据 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 487–99 (2011)，本院\n\n1 异议方在很大程度上相互加入对方的论点。因此，本院将在下文讨论中统称其为异议方。\n\n无权裁定本事项，因为撤销之诉属于私人权利而非公共权利事项，因而必须由 Article III 法院裁定，除非当事人同意由其他法院行使管辖权，见 Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 575 U.S. 665, 686 (2015)（裁定尽管 Stern 作出了该项认定，当事人仍可同意由破产法院作出终局命令）。第二，异议方主张，不存在案件或争议，因为没有任何当事人在撤销之诉中提出诉讼时效抗辩。\n\n本院认定，其对延长期限动议（Motion to Extend Deadlines）的裁定并不违反 Stern。对延长期限动议作出裁定，并不要求本院最终裁定任何撤销之诉的实体问题。相反，该动议要求本院基于衡平原则裁定，《破产法典》（Bankruptcy Code）第 108(a)、546(a) 和 549(d) 条所载的时效期间是否可以延长。这些期限规定载于《破产法典》。此外，其仅适用于破产案件，并体现了破产政策考量；即如何平衡破产受托人确定并提起破产财产诉因的需要，与确保对每一案件和程序作出公正、迅速且低成本裁定的要求。比较 11 U.S.C. §§ 108(a), 546(a), 549(a) 与 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1001。因此，本院可以裁定延长期限动议提出的问题。见 Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49– 50 (2002)（一致裁定）（认定在国会制定旨在由作为衡平法院的破产法院适用的规定时，尤其可以适用衡平中止）。\n\n本院还认定，目前存在案件或争议。现有共同管理的 Chapter 11 案件正在审理中。因此，《破产法典》第 108(a)、546(a) 和 549(d) 条所载的期限正在生效。受托人主张，(i) 存在其目前正在追究、但在两年期限届满前无法提起，同时又无法满足 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 标准的潜在破产财产诉因；并且 (ii) 鉴于其迄今对这些案件的经验和了解，无疑存在其完全不知悉的破产财产诉因。受托人寻求延长这些期限，以便其能够提起更多诉讼而不受时效限制。\n\n因此，本院认定其对本事项具有管辖权。此外，根据 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409，本地区的审判地适当。\nIV. 讨论\n\n本院根据 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052 作出的事实认定和法律结论载列如下。\nA. 破产规则 9006(b)\n\n规则 9006(b) 规定，通常，“当本规则、依其发出的通知或法院命令要求在指定期间届满时或届满前实施某项行为时，法院可在有正当理由显示的情况下，随时酌情……如在原定期间或先前命令延长的期间届满前提出该请求，则命令延长该期间。” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b).\n\n当事人争议规则 9006(b) 是否可被用于延长第 108(a)、546(a) 和 549(d) 条规定的期限。受托人援引 IBT International, Inc. v. Northern (In re International Administrative Services, Inc.), 408 F.3d 689 (11th Cir. 2005) 及其后续判例，主张延长期限属于本院的酌处权范围。异议方——尤其是 G Club——援引 28 U.S.C. § 2075、Joint Council Dining Car Employees Local 370 v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Company, 157 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1946)、In re Walnut Hill, No. 16-50960 (JJT), 2018 WL 2672242 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 1, 2018) (Tancredi, J.)，以及 In re Damach Inc., 235 B.R. 727 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1999) (Krechevsky, J.)，主张规则 9006(b) 不得延长第 108(a)、546(a) 和 549(d) 条规定的期限。\n\n第一个问题是，108(a)、546(a) 和 549(d) 是否包含受中止、延长、衡平禁止反言及其他衡平原则约束的诉讼时效，抑或包含不受衡平原则影响的除斥期间。比较 Young, 535 U.S. at 49–50（指出《破产法典》中的规定尤其受衡平原则约束，因为其起草时的背景理解是破产法院为衡平法院）与 Arellano v. McDonough, 598 U.S. 1, 12–13 (2023)（区分国会在 38 U.S.C. § 5110 背后的意图与其在 11 U.S.C. § 507 背后的意图，并因此得出与 Young 不同的结论）。在本案中，如同 Young 且不同于 Arellano，第 108(a)、546(a) 和 549(d) 条要么不包含中止规定，要么包含补充而非取代传统衡平原则的中止规定。11 U.S.C. §§ 108(a) (no tolling provision), 546(a) (potentially tolled by the first appointment of a trustee within the two-year period), 549(d) (no tolling provision); 比较 Young, 535 U.S. at 52–53 与 Arellano, 598 U.S. at 12–14; 见 IBT Int'l, 408 F.3d at 699 (11th Cir. 2005); Ernst & Young v. Matsumoto (In re United Ins. Mgmt., Inc.), 14 F.3d 1380, 1385 (9th Cir. 1994); 另见 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 108.2[1] (16th ed. 2023)（指出 11 U.S.C. § 108(a) 不适用于除斥期间，仅适用于诉讼时效）（汇集判例）；5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 546.02[4]（指出 11 U.S.C. § 546 不涉及管辖权）（汇集判例）；但见 Martin v. First Nat'l Bank of Louisville (In re Butcher), 829 F.2d 596 (6th Cir. 1987)。本院同意多数立场，即第 108(a)、546(a) 和 549(d) 条可根据衡平原则予以延长，并不同意异议方所依赖的 Butcher。比较 H.R. Rep. No. 103-835, at 49–50 (1994) 与 Butcher, 829 F.2d at 599–600.\n\n下一个问题是，规则 9006(b) 是否为此类衡平延长提供机制。虽然本院承认并尊重本地区 James J. Tancredi 法官在 Walnut Hill 案以及 Robert L. Krechevsky 法官在 Damach 案中的先前裁定，并承认异议方对这些裁定的依赖，但美国最高法院（United States Supreme Court）、美国联邦第二巡回上诉法院（United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit）或康涅狄格联邦地区法院均未就此问题作出具有约束力的先例。唯一就该问题发表意见的美国联邦上诉法院是美国联邦第十一巡回上诉法院（United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit）。在 IBT International 案中，第十一巡回法院认定，根据规则 9006(b)，破产法院有酌处权延长第 546(a) 条规定的提起撤销之诉的期间，尽管“statute”一词未载于规则 9006(b) 的文本，因为规则 9006(b) 依照规则 7001 和 7003 管辖对抗程序的提起。408 F.3d at 699.\n\n异议方主张，第十一巡回法院的分析存在缺陷，因为其忽视《规则授权法》（Rules Enabling Act），并将违背权力分立原则。本院不同意。其论点的依据是以下文字：“此类规则不得削减、扩大或修改任何实体权利。” 28 U.S.C. § 2075。期限规定通常不属于实体性规定。Young, 535 at 49。如上所述，本院——以及审议过该问题的大多数法院——认定，第 108(a)、546(a) 和 549(d) 条规定的是受衡平原则约束的诉讼时效——第十一巡回法院确实就第 546(a) 条论及这些原则。IBT Int'l, 408 F.3d at 699。即，它们并非实体性规定。见 Young, 535 at 49。基于这些理由，本院谨不同意 Walnut Hill 中涉及规则 9006(b) 的部分，并认定《规则授权法》并不排除规则 9006(b) 为延长第 108(a)、546(a) 和 549(d) 条规定的诉讼时效提供机制。Walnut Hill 所依赖的 Damach 于 Young 之前作出，且涉及根据第 365(d)(4) 条接受或拒绝租约的动议，其中涉及出租人的实体合同权利——而非如本案中延长期限的动议，或 Young 中涉及的衡平中止这一非实体性的诉讼时效。235 B.R. at 729–30, 731–32.\n\n异议方还援引第二巡回法院在 Dining Car 案中的裁定，类推主张，由于规则 6 不可用于修改非破产民事诉讼中的诉讼时效，规则 9006(b) 也不可在此用于修改期限。然而，该类推因破产程序与其他民事诉讼之间的关键差异而不能成立。Dining Car 审议并驳回了以下论点：规则 6(a) 规定的时间计算方法适用于独立于已提起民事诉讼而存在的期限规定。157 F.2d at 420。第 108(a)、546(a) 和 549(d) 条规定的期限均以存在破产案件为前提。除非在破产案件中作出救济命令，而在每一个共同管理的 Chapter 11 案件中均已作出该等命令，否则这些条款不发生效力。11 U.S.C. §§ 108(a), 546(a), 549(d)。同样，对抗程序以存在相关破产案件为前提。Dining Car 承认规则 6(a) 适用于管辖民事诉讼在提起后程序的法律规定。本案中，受托人请求本院延长仅在破产案件提起后才发生效力的诉讼时效。11 U.S.C. §§ 108(a), 546(a), 549(d)。异议方所依赖的 Butcher 忽视了在破产案件中提起的对抗程序与传统民事诉讼之间的明显差异。829 F.2d at 599–600.\n\n本院基于上述理由认定，规则9006(b)可以提供一种机制，以延长第108(a)、546(a)和549(d)条规定的时效期间。下一个问题是，它是否确实如此。鉴于：(i) 规则1001的一般性要求，即“[本]规则应由法院和当事人解释、管理和适用，以确保每一案件和程序得到公正、迅速且经济的裁决”；(ii) 第十一巡回上诉法院（Eleventh Circuit）在IBT International（IBT国际公司）案中的裁决及其理由，该理由基于规则9006(b)在对抗程序中的适用性，以及其认定第546(a)条属于“可被放弃、停止计算和适用衡平禁止反言”的时效法规，见 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001, 7003; IBT Int'l, 408 F.3d at 699；(iii) 本巡回区内缺乏任何具有控制力的先例；以及 (iv) 上文讨论的、本院未被提出异议的当事人基于《规则授权法》（Rules Enabling Act）和Dining Car案提出的论点说服的理由，本院认定，尽管规则9006(b)的措辞中未包括“法规”一词，本院仍可依据规则9006(b)延长第108(a)、546(a)和549(d)条规定的时效期间。IBT Int'l, 408 F.3d at 698–99; In re Fundamental Long Term Care, Inc., 501 B.R. 784, 787–791 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2013); Marsh v. Levy (In re Martin Levy of Berlin D.M.D., P.C.), 416 B.R. 1, 8 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009); Frentz v. Stites & Harbinson (In re ThermoView Indus., Inc.), 381 B.R. 225, 227 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2008); but see In re Cramer, 636 B.R. 830, 833 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2022); In re Randolph Hosp., Inc., No. 20-10247 (LMJ), 2022 WL 19298765, at \\*1 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. April 25, 2022); Walnut Hill, 2018 WL 2672242, at \\*2.\n\n因此，剩余的问题是，根据本院面前的事实和情形，是否存在“理由”延长第108(a)、546(a)和549(d)条中的时效期间。Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)。本院认定，在这些合并管理的第11章案件极为具体和特殊的事实及情形下，存在延长第108(a)、546(a)和549(d)条中时效期间的理由。\n\n无论提出异议的当事人主张其各自均未对受托人的调查造成任何损害，正如法院所观察到的，尽管是在衡平停止计算的背景下，确定是否应在破产程序中延长或停止计算时效期间时所应考虑的衡平因素，通常涉及债务人是否未能与破产受托人合作，或者是否确实试图阻碍受托人为债权人利益进行的调查和资产清算。Gladstone v. U.S. Bancorp, 811 F.3d 1133, 1143 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Olsen v. Zerbetz (In re Olsen), 36 F.3d 71, 72–73 (9th Cir. 1994) and holding that concealment by the debtor rather than the defendant could support equitable tolling). 正如明尼苏达州联邦破产法院（United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Minnesota）所述：\n\n破产案件对衡平停止计算提出了颇为不同的视角。在典型情形中，引发衡平停止计算的是债务人的行为，而非被告的行为。从某些意义上说，这对被告并不公平。另一方面，与通常的民事案件不同，在通常的民事案件中，原告至少具有作为基础交易当事人的优势，而破产受托人几乎必须完全依赖第三方（债务人）提供揭示可撤销转让所必需的信息。\n\nMoratzka v. Pomaville (In re Pomaville), 190 B.R. 632, 637 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1995)（因对于时效法规是否可以衡平地停止计算仍存在真实的重大事实争议，而驳回简易判决）。\n\n如Pomaville案所观察到的，对被告的公平性是那些拒绝根据规则9006(b)延长时效期间的法院所关注的核心。在Cramer案中，加利福尼亚中央区联邦破产法院（United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California）主要关注潜在被告未获通知的问题。636 B.R. at 832。Randolph Hospital案也有此担忧。2022 WL 19298765, at \\*1。然而，在本案中，已通过在可能的情况下采用传统送达、在可能的情况下采用替代送达，以及根据本院依《通知和送达程序命令》（Notice and Service Procedures Order）批准的基本形式，以英文和普通话中文发布公告通知的方式，就延期动议作出广泛通知。See Cramer, 636 B.R. at 832 nn. 1, 2（区分被告已获知寻求延长期限动议的案件）。尽管如此，鉴于这一关切，本院此时不会裁定放弃时效抗辩的问题，而将在其于对抗程序中被提出时（如有）保留该问题以供裁定。因此，本院认为，任何当事人均难以主张其实体权利因该决定而受到影响。\n\n关于Pomaville案中指出的制衡因素，在这些合并管理的第11章案件中，受托人未从个人债务人处收到任何账簿和记录，也未获得个人债务人的任何合作。个人债务人提交了不完整或不准确的财产清单和事务陈述，且未履行其根据《破产法》（Bankruptcy Code）承担的义务。11 U.S.C. § 521。个人债务人通过提交“Global Notes”，积极否认并限定其在财产清单和事务陈述中经宣誓提供的信息；该等文件并非正式表格，且不符合个人债务人根据第521条承担的义务。(ECF Nos. 77–78.) 可以说，个人债务人未履行其义务，可能导致认定第108(a)、546(a)和549(d)条所载的时效期间甚至尚未开始起算。\n\n自受托人获任以来，受托人不仅未从个人债务人处获得履行义务和合作，反而一直面临个人债务人、其家庭成员、其关联人士和雇员，以及受托人主张由其控制的实体持续不断的不合作、阻挠以及对法院命令的公然漠视。(See, e.g., ECF Nos. 913, 1046, 1303, 1345, 1362, 1397, 1453, 1521, 1537, 1546, 1709, 1805, 1892, 1896, 2009, 2035, 2036, 2080, 2093, 2342, 2396; Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Kwok (In re Kwok), No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 22-05032 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 13, 2023), ECF No. 133; Despins ex rel. Kwok v. Mei Guo (In re Kwok), No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05008 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2023), ECF No. 32; Guo, No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05008 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Nov. 7, 2023), ECF No. 46.) 最终，本院至少作出八项命令，认定个人债务人、其女儿郭女士（Ms. Guo）以及据称由个人债务人控制的实体，因未移交资产和滥用证据开示程序而构成藐视法庭。(ECF Nos. 1372, 1537, 1709, 1892, 1896, 2009, 2035, 2093.) 截至目前，每一藐视法庭者仍处于藐视法庭状态。在这些合并管理的第11章案件中，未履行法定义务的严重程度，见 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(3), (4)，以及不遵守本院命令的严重程度，均属非同寻常。\n\n面对这些情形，受托人除努力从个人债务人、其家人、其关联人士及其据称控制的实体取得证据开示外，还不得不寻求广泛且持续的第三方证据开示。(ECF Nos. 636–38, 839, 1116, 1259, 1592, 1789, 2079, 2249, 2304, 2308, 2434, 2508, 2514.) 本院准许了受托人提出的全部十五项规则2004审查动议，授权对数百个实体进行审查。(ECF Nos. 756–58, 866, 1184, 1339, 1646, 1891, 2210, 2281, 2393, 2394, 2474, 2534, 2537.) 本院采信受托人的证词，即试图从冰冷的银行记录和其他文件中拼凑出个人债务人的财务事务，该等文件表明在多个国家、大洲和司法辖区之间存在由实体、银行账户和资金转移组成的庞大网络；在规模不断增加且最终范围未知的数据集中进行此项工作，既耗时又困难。该证词尤其可信，因为受托人在缺乏个人债务人依法必须提供的合作的情况下开展工作。此外，受托人的调查一直并仍在受到个人债务人、其家庭成员、关联人士、雇员、追随者及关联实体的积极阻挠。\n\n受托人在这些合并管理的第11章案件中面临的“拼图”尤为严峻，且这些案件的事实与IBT International案的事实相似；该案同样涉及复杂资产转移计划的指控，其中存在“转移的拼图”。408 F.3d at 702.\n\n提出异议的当事人主张，尽管如此，受托人在试图了解破产财团潜在诉因方面仍不够勤勉。个人债务人的律师同时签署了个人债务人女儿郭女士提交的异议书；该律师此前曾作证称，与郭女士目前的主张相反，受托人在履行其法定调查职责时过于强硬，见 11 U.S.C. § 1106：\n\n问：Kindseth先生，您作证称，在会议之前，您曾强烈敦促受托人，引用原话，“收手”。对吗？答：大概50次。是的。问：而且——答：也是逐步地。澄清一下。这并不只是说，什么也不做。而是说，您能否请稍微收手一些，给我们一些空间，让和解得以达成。是的。问：您的意思是停止调查，对吗？答：停止那些无休止的炸弹，您知道的，攻击，50次2004审查，加急听证，就是这种无休止的攻击，Paul Hastings的12、14名律师全都，您知道的，全力以赴[sic]。我说，您能否稍微收敛[sic]一些，给我们一些时间喘口气并商定和解。\n\n(Dec. 12, 2022 Hr'g Tr. at \\*894:2–18, Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund, No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 22-05032 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Dec. 15, 2022), ECF No. 111.)\n\n实际上，个人债务人在2022年秋季的立场是，受托人的调查推进得过于迅速。在Kindseth律师作证之前，其同事亦代表个人债务人出庭，并一再反对受托人紧急推进其调查。以下是在2022年10月13日举行的、就受托人《关于作出裁定授权遵从规则2004传票并执行有关控制律师—当事人特权及工作成果保护的同意命令的动议》举行的听证中进行的交流，颇具说明性：\n\nHenzy先生：下周我将完全投入到可能审阅文件之中，实际上，我想就此问法官阁下一个问题。但我不确定，法官阁下，为什么这么急。但我不确定为什么这么急——\n\nDespins先生：法官阁下，之所以急，是因为我们本应控制这些实体。我们被剥夺了控制权——被剥夺了与那些实体有关的特权获取权——因为是同一位律师同时代理Kwok先生（郭文贵）和那两个实体。因此，说不急，我不知道该如何回应。已经十——我们并非在仓促行事，意思是我们已经为此提出请求有一段时间了。如果我们认定他拥有该等实体是正确的，那么急迫之处在于，他完全无视本案。因此，对于不急的问题，我不知道该如何回应。\n\n(Oct. 13, 2022 Hr'g Tr. at 106:8–23, ECF No. 1020; see also Sept. 27, 2022 Status Conference Tr. at 23:1–20, ECF No. 936.)\n\n在本案中，卷宗条目超过2900项，并有超过250项相关对抗程序；据个人债务人之律师本人承认并经本院亲自观察，受托人已积极推进与个人债务人财务事务及资产追回有关的证据开示。本院认为，受托人在其努力中已表现出超出合理程度的勤勉。并非每一条线索均有成果，并非每一块石头均已翻开，并非每一项行动均告成功，并不减损受托人已表现出超出合理程度勤勉这一事实。\n\n本案的事实和情形与Tancredi法官在Walnut Hill（沃尔纳特山案）中所面对的事实完全不同。在Walnut Hill案中，第7章受托人拥有sections 108(a) and 546(a)规定的完整两年期限，以履行其调查职责并提起诉因。本案中，受托人于案件开始后五个月被任命——这意味着其有十九个月时间在个人债务人的第11章案件中开展调查。(ECF No. 514.) 此外，在Walnut Hill案中，第7章受托人在申请提交后十一个月才提出其首项要求进行Rule 2004 examination（规则2004审查）的动议。(In re Walnut Hill, No. 16-20960 (JJT) (Bankr. D. Conn. May 31, 2017), ECF No. 78.) 在本案中，受托人在其任命获批准后不足一个月即提出首项进行Rule 2004审查的动议，并继续作为其持续调查的一部分积极寻求证据开示。(ECF No. 636.)\n\n然而，提出异议的各方还依据受托人的证言对受托人的勤勉提出异议，该证言称，聘用法务会计师必须等到破产财产获得资金之后。具体而言，提出异议的各方着重于受托人的证言，即使法务会计师愿意以风险代理方式工作，其亦会要求与受托人及其律师享有pari passu（同等顺位）待遇。然而，提出异议的各方忽视了，对法务会计师的必要性是由个人债务人未能与受托人合作以及这些共同管理的第11章案件中的证据开示滥用所造成。其亦忽视了，行政偿付不能——即对行政债权给予pari passu待遇将使受托人的律师产生顾虑的情形——将损害个人债务人的无担保债权人的利益，而受托人对该等债权人负有信义义务。本院不受提出异议的各方对该证言的侧重所说服，因其试图借此支持其关于受托人的调查欠缺勤勉的主张。\n\n基于上述理由，本院认定，依照Rule 9006(b)，存在理由延长sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d)规定的诉讼时效。因此，延长期限动议在下述范围内获准。\n\nB. 衡平法上的中止时效\n\n《破产法典》中的诉讼时效规定，其起草时已默示认识到一般衡平法原则，包括衡平法上的中止时效——尤其是因为破产法院属于衡平法院。Young, 535 U.S. at 49–50。“通常，寻求衡平法上的中止时效的诉讼当事人负有证明以下两个要件的责任：(1)其一直勤勉地行使其权利；以及(2)某种特殊情形阻碍了其行使权利。”Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005) (citing Irwin v. Dep't of Veteran Affs., 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990)); see Castillo ex rel. A.Q.C. v. United States, 656 F.3d 135, 144 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Pace). 衡平法上的中止时效不应与被告的欺诈性隐瞒混淆：United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit（美国联邦第二巡回上诉法院）已“明确认定，衡平法上的中止时效原则的适用并不限于[存在欺诈性隐瞒的案件]。”Donely ex rel. Valdez v. United States, 518 F.3d 173, 183 (2d Cir. 2008) (collecting cases). 事实上，衡平法上的中止时效不要求被告存在任何不当行为。Donely, 518 F.3d at 182–83; Canales v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 755, 758, on reh'g 947 F.2d 45, 758 (2d Cir. 1991); Fundamental Long Term Care, 501 B.R. at 791; Fam. Golf Ctrs., Inc. v. Acushnet Co. (In re Randall's Island Fam. Golf Ctrs., Inc.), 288 B.R. 701, 705–06 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003). 此外，就被主张存在的不当行为而言，在破产程序中，相关的通常是债务人而非被告的行为。Gladstone, 811 F.3d at 1143; Pomaville, 190 B.R. at 637.\n\n提出异议的各方对受托人目前是否可以适当地寻求衡平法上的中止时效提出争议，或者受托人是否必须等到对抗程序中的被告主张受托人的起诉状已过时效这一抗辩时，才主张衡平法上的中止时效。提出异议的各方——特别是Taurus Parties（金牛座各方）和Greenwich Parties（格林尼治各方）——主张，衡平法上的中止时效尚未成熟，适当考量的应是如上文所述诉讼时效是否可以延长。受托人主张，可以前瞻性地审议衡平法上的中止时效。\n\n本院同意提出异议的各方。如Tancredi法官在Walnut Hill案中所观察到，在IBT International案中，第十一巡回法院仅在一项提出对抗程序起诉状诉讼时效抗辩的驳回动议的背景下审议衡平法上的中止时效。408 F.3d at 700–03。虽然判决本身并非完全清楚，但审查第十一巡回法院审理的诉状支持如下结论：第十一巡回法院认定，破产法院延长诉讼时效的裁定依照Rule 9006(b)属于其自由裁量范围；且无论如何，衡平法上的中止时效将适用，以排除诉讼时效抗辩。Id. at 695–703; see Fundamental Long Term Care, 501 B.R. at 789 (“本院认为，适当的标准应是Rule 9006下的‘有理由’分析。本案受托人在期间届满前寻求延长期限（衡平法上的中止时效推定在时效期间届满后才适用）。而这正是第十一巡回法院在In re International Administrative Services案中最初适用的分析，之后出于谨慎又转而进行衡平法上的中止时效分析。”).\n\n因此，本院驳回延长期限动议中寻求作出衡平法上中止sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d)规定的诉讼时效之裁定的部分，但不妨碍受托人在针对由受托人提起的对抗程序已过时效的抗辩作出回应时，提出衡平法上的中止时效或其他衡平法论点。\n\nV. 结论及命令\n\n因此，在审阅并考虑受托人与提出异议的各方在听证会上提出及其书面陈述中提出的论点、听证会及书面陈述中援引的判例法以及衡平因素后，本院基于已证明存在正当理由，部分准许受托人的延长期限动议。据此，特此\n\n命令：依照Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)，延长期限动议按本命令所述部分准许；并进一步\n\n命令：11 U.S.C. 108, 546, and 549规定的受托人提起撤销诉讼的期限延长至并包括August 15, 2024（该延长期限称为“命令延长期限”），该日期可经通知和听证进一步延长；并进一步\n\n命令：尽管本命令有任何相反规定，依照各方协议，本命令及本命令中的命令延长期限不适用于(i) UBS AG；及(ii) Sotheby's International Realty, Inc., Sotheby's International Realty Affiliates LLC, Sotheby's International Realty Referral Company LLC, Sotheby's International Realty Referral Company Inc., Martha Turner Sotheby's International Realty Referral Company LLC, Martha Turner Properties, LP, MTPGP, LLC, Anywhere Advisors LLC, Anywhere Real Estate Services Group LLC, Anywhere Real Estate Group LLC, Anywhere Intermediate Holdings LLC, and Anywhere Real Estate Inc.；并进一步\n\n命令：就前瞻性衡平法上的中止时效请求而言，延长期限动议部分驳回，但不妨碍受托人在针对由受托人提起的对抗程序已过时效的抗辩作出回应时，提出衡平法上的中止时效或其他衡平法论点；并进一步\n\n命令：本命令的条款和条件应于录入后立即生效并可执行；并进一步\n\n命令：本院对因本命令的解释或实施而产生或与之相关的所有事项保留管辖权。\n\n于2024年2月15日作于康涅狄格州布里奇波特。","key_entities":["Je","Kwok","Guo","Despins","Paul Hastings","Ho Wan Kwok","RICO"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":1,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":32,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":46,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":78,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":111,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":133,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":465,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":514,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":523,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":636,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":936,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1020,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2494,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2505,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2509,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2515,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2540,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2556,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2591,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2620,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2763,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2810,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2921,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":6911,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 19:50:46"}