{"id":"court_ctb_2970_2","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":2970,"sub_number":2,"doc_type":"UNKNOWN","filed_date":"2024-02-15","title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT HO WAN KWOK, *et al.*, ) (Jointly Administered)","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"Case 22-50073 Doc 2921 Filed 02/15/24 Entered 02/15/24 19:38:31 Page 1 of 21 Case 22-50073 Doc 2970-2 Filed 02/28/24 Entered 02/28/24 16:42:19 Page 1 of 21\n\n## **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\nHO WAN KWOK, *et al.*, ) (Jointly Administered)\n\n ) )\n\n)\n\nIn re: ) Chapter 11 ) Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\nDebtors. ) Re: ECF No. 2509\n\n# **APPEARANCES**\n\nAvram E. Luft Douglass Barron Paul Hastings LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166 Patrick R. Linsey Neubert, Pepe & Montieth 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, CT 06510\n\nand\n\nNicholas A. Bassett (argued) Paul Hastings LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C. 20036\n\n*Counsel for Movant Mr. Luc A. Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee for the Estate of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok*\n\nLee Vartan Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC One Boland Drive West Orange, NJ 07052\n\nand\n\nSam Della Fera, Jr. (argued) Melissa F. Wernick Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC 105 Eisenhower Parkway Roseland, NJ 07068\n\nStephen M. Kindseth Aaron Romney James M. Moriarty Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. 10 Middle Street Bridgeport, CT 06604\n\n*Counsel for Respondent Ms. Mei Guo*\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2921 Filed 02/15/24 Entered 02/15/24 19:38:31 Page 2 of 21 Case 22-50073 Doc 2970-2 Filed 02/28/24 Entered 02/28/24 16:42:19 Page 2 of 21\n\nAdam H. Friedman Katherine E. Mateo (argued) Olshan Frome Wolosky LLP 1325 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10019\n\n*Counsel for Respondent Mr. Defeng Cao*\n\nLisa J. Fried Herbert Smith Freehills New York LLP 450 Lexington Avenue New York, NY 10017\n\n*Counsel for Respondent UBS AG*\n\nGenevieve G. Weiner Sidley Austin LLP 555 West Fifth Street Los Angeles, CA 90013 William S. Fish, Jr. Hinckley, Allen & Snyder LLP 20 Church Street, 18th Floor Hartford, CT 06103\n\n*Counsel for Respondent DBS Bank Ltd.*\n\nMichael T. Conway (argued) Lazare Potter Giacovas & Moyle LLP 747 Third Avenue, 16th Floor New York, NY 10017\n\n*Counsel for Respondents Taurus Fund, LLC, Taurus Management, LLC, and Mr. Scott Barnett*\n\nCarolina A. Fornos Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP 31 West 52nd Street New York, NY 10019\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz (argued) Kelliane Baranowsky Green & Sklarz LLC One Audubon Street, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06511\n\n*Counsel for Respondent G Club Operations LLC*\n\nDouglas M. Evans (argued) Shapiro, Dorry, & Masterson LLC 71 Raymond Road West Hartford, CT 06107\n\n*Counsel for Respondents Rule of Law Foundation III, Inc. and Rule of Law Society IV, Inc.*\n\nEric T. Schmitt (argued) The Quinlan Law Firm, LLC 233 South Wacker Drive, Suite 6142 Chaicago, IL 60606\n\nJon Newton Reid and Reige, P.C. One Financial Plaza, 21st Floor Hartford, CT 06103\n\n# *Counsel for Respondents Mr. Chris Lee and Mr. Qidong Xia*\n\nChristopher J. Major (argued) Austin D. Kim Meister Seelig & Fein PLLC 125 Park Avenue, 7th Floor New York, NY 10017\n\n*Counsel for Respondents Greenwich Land, LLC and Ms. Hing Chi Ngok*\n\nBarry R. Lax Robert J. Grand (argued) Lax & Neville, LLP 350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 4640 New York, NY 10018\n\nJordan W. Schur Houser LLP 8 Wright Street, Suite 107 Westport, CT 06880\n\n## *Counsel for Respondent GS Security Solutions, Inc.*\n\nDavid H. Wander (argued) Michael J. Grudberg Tarter Krinsky & Drogin LLP 1350 Broadway New York, NY 10018\n\n# *Counsel for Respondent Ms. Yinying Wang*\n\nAnthony M. Saccullo Mary Augustine A.M. Saccullo Legal, LLC 27 Crimson King Drive Bear, DE 19701\n\nStephen P. Brown (argued) Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP 1010 Washington Boulevard Stamford, CT 06901\n\n*Counsel for Respondent Sotheby's International Realty, Inc.*\n\nJames Nealon (argued) Nealon Law LLC 1266 East Main Street, Suite 700R Stamford, CT 06902\n\n*Counsel for Respondent Mr. Yongbing Zhang, Esquire*\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 2921 Filed 02/15/24 Entered 02/15/24 19:38:31 Page 4 of 21 Case 22-50073 Doc 2970-2 Filed 02/28/24 Entered 02/28/24 16:42:19 Page 4 of 21\n\n## **MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION TO EXTEND DEADLINES**\n\nJulie A. Manning, United States Bankruptcy Judge\n\n### **I. INTRODUCTION**\n\nBefore the Court is the Motion for Entry of Order Extending Deadline for Trustee to File Avoidance Actions (the \"Motion to Extend Deadlines\") filed by Mr. Luc A. Despins, in his capacity as Chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") for the bankruptcy estate of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Individual Debtor\"). (ECF No. 2509.) For the reasons stated below, the Motion to Extend Deadlines is **GRANTED IN PART**.\n\n## **II. BACKGROUND**\n\nOn February 15, 2022, the Individual Debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition (the \"Petition\") in this Court. (ECF No. 1.) The Individual Debtor's case is jointly administered with two affiliated corporate Chapter 11 cases. (ECF Nos. 970, 1141.) For the reasons set forth therein, on June 15, 2022, the Court entered a memorandum of decision and order appointing a Chapter 11 trustee. (ECF No. 465.) *In re Kwok*, 640 B.R. 514 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022). On July 8, 2022, Mr. Despins was appointed as the Trustee. (ECF No. 523.)\n\nOn January 9, 2024, the Trustee filed a motion (the \"Notice Motion\") to schedule a hearing on and establish notice and service procedures for a forthcoming motion to extend or toll the statute of limitations set by sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d) of title 11 (the \"Bankruptcy Code\"). (ECF No. 2494.) On January 15, 2024, in light of no objections to the Notice Motion having been timely filed, the Court took it on the papers. (ECF No. 2505.) On January 19, 2024, the Court granted the Notice Motion and entered an order scheduling a hearing on the Motion to Extend Deadlines, which had at that point been filed, and establishing notice and service procedures (the \"Notice and Service Procedures Order\"). (ECF No. 2515.)\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 2921 Filed 02/15/24 Entered 02/15/24 19:38:31 Page 5 of 21 Case 22-50073 Doc 2970-2 Filed 02/28/24 Entered 02/28/24 16:42:19 Page 5 of 21\n\nOn January 18, 2024, the Trustee filed the Motion to Extend Deadlines. (ECF No. 2509.) On January 31, 2024, the Trustee filed a notice of service and publication notice of the Motion to Extend Deadlines pursuant to the Notice and Service Procedures Order, indicating service was made by mail on January 22, 2024 and publication notice was made thereafter. (ECF No. 2540.)\n\nOn February 5, 2024, objections to the Motion to Extend Deadlines were filed by Ms. Mei Guo (\"Ms. Guo\"); Mr. Defeng Cao (\"Mr. Cao\"); UBS AG (\"UBS\"); Taurus Fund LLC, Taurus Management LLC, and Mr. Scott Barnett (collectively, the \"Taurus Parties\") jointly; G Club Operations LLC (\"G Club\"); Rule of Law Foundation III, Inc. and Rule of Law Society IV, Inc. (collectively, the \"ROL Parties\") jointly; Mr. Chris Lee (\"Mr. Lee\") and Mr. Qidong Xia (\"Mr. Xia\") jointly; Greenwich Land, LLC and Ms. Hing Chi Ngok (collectively, the \"Greenwich Parties\") jointly; and GS Security Solutions, Inc. (\"GS Security\"). (ECF Nos. 2551, 2553, 2554, 2557, 2563, 2565, 2566, 2569, 2571.) That same date, February 5, 2024, DBS Bank filed a reservation of rights to object to any extension or tolling of the statute of limitations beyond what the Motion to Extend Deadlines seeks. (ECF No. 2556.) On February 7, 2024, objections were untimely filed by Ms. Yinying Wang (\"Ms. Wang\") and Sotheby's International Realty, Inc. (\"Sotheby's\"). (ECF Nos. 2582, 2584.) On February 8, 2024, Mr. Yongbing Zhang (\"Mr. Zhang\") untimely filed an objection to the Motion to Extend Deadlines. (ECF No. 2591.)\n\nOn February 9, 2024, the Trustee filed an omnibus reply to the objections. (ECF No. 2620.) On February 12, 2024, the Trustee filed a list of witnesses and exhibits, which identified the Trustee as a witness and contained a list of pleadings and orders publicly filed in these jointly administered Chapter 11 cases and related adversary proceedings as exhibits. (ECF No. 2763.)\n\nOn February 13, 2024, a hearing was held on the Motion to Extend Deadlines. Prior to the hearing, UBS filed a notice of withdrawal of its objection to the Motion to Extend Deadlines,\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 2921 Filed 02/15/24 Entered 02/15/24 19:38:31 Page 6 of 21 Case 22-50073 Doc 2970-2 Filed 02/28/24 Entered 02/28/24 16:42:19 Page 6 of 21\n\nwhich withdrawal UBS repeated on the record. (ECF No. 2810.) During the hearing, Sotheby's also withdrew its objection to the Motion to Extend Deadlines on the record. DBS reiterated that it was not objecting to the Motion to Extend Deadlines but only reserving its rights regarding any future motion to extend or toll the statute of limitations. Ms. Guo, Mr. Cao, the Taurus Parties, G Club, the ROL Parties, Mr. Lee, Mr. Xia, the Greenwich Parties, GS Security, Ms. Wang, and Mr. Zhang (collectively, the \"Objecting Parties\") pressed their objections to the Motion to Extend Deadlines.1\n\nThe Trustee testified and was cross-examined by the Objecting Parties. The Trustee requested the Court take judicial notice of the record of these jointly administered Chapter 11 cases and related adversary proceedings. The Trustee and the Objecting Parties each presented their arguments. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Motion to Extend Deadlines was taken under advisement.\n\nThis matter is ripe for decision.\n\n### **III. JURISDICTION**\n\nThe United States District Court for the District of Connecticut has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). This Court has authority to hear and determine this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) and the Order of Reference of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut dated September 21, 1984. The instant matter is a statutorily core proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A).\n\nNevertheless, the Objecting Parties make two arguments against jurisdiction. First, the Objecting Parties argue that under *Stern v. Marshall*, 564 U.S. 462, 487–99 (2011), the Court\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Objecting Parties, for the most part, join in each other's arguments. Hence, the Court will refer to them in the collective throughout the discussion below.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 2921 Filed 02/15/24 Entered 02/15/24 19:38:31 Page 7 of 21 Case 22-50073 Doc 2970-2 Filed 02/28/24 Entered 02/28/24 16:42:19 Page 7 of 21\n\nlacks jurisdiction to determine this matter because avoidance actions are matters of private – not public – right and must, therefore, be determined by an Article III court unless the parties consent to another court's exercise of jurisdiction, *see Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif*, 575 U.S. 665, 686 (2015) (holding that parties may consent to entry of a final order by bankruptcy courts notwithstanding the holding in *Stern*). Second, the Objecting Parties argue that there is no case or controversy because no party has asserted a statute of limitations defense in an avoidance action.\n\nThe Court concludes that its determination of the Motion to Extend Deadlines is not contrary to *Stern*. Determination of the Motion to Extend Deadlines does not require that this Court finally determine the merits of any avoidance action. Rather, it requires the Court to determine as a matter of equity whether the statute of limitations contained in sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d) of the Bankruptcy Code may be extended. These time limitations are contained in the Bankruptcy Code. Furthermore, they are solely applicable in bankruptcy cases and embody bankruptcy policy considerations; namely, how to balance the need of a bankruptcy trustee to determine and prosecute the estate's causes of actions and the mandate to ensure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every case and proceeding. *Compare* 11 U.S.C. §§ 108(a), 546(a), 549(a) *with* Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1001. Therefore, this Court may determine the issues raised by the Motion to Extend Deadlines. *See Young v. United States*, 535 U.S. 43, 49– 50 (2002) (unanimous) (holding equitable tolling is particularly available where Congress enacts provisions intended to be applied by bankruptcy courts, which are courts of equity).\n\nThe Court also concludes that there is presently a case or controversy. There are jointly administered Chapter 11 cases pending. Hence, the time limits contained in sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d) of the Bankruptcy Code are in effect. The Trustee argues that (i) there are\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 2921 Filed 02/15/24 Entered 02/15/24 19:38:31 Page 8 of 21 Case 22-50073 Doc 2970-2 Filed 02/28/24 Entered 02/28/24 16:42:19 Page 8 of 21\n\npotential estate causes of action he is currently pursuing but cannot file before the two-year period expires while also meeting the standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and (ii) there are undoubtedly estate causes of action completely unknown to him, given his experience and knowledge of these cases to date. The Trustee seeks to extend these time limits to allow him to bring more actions without being time-barred.\n\nTherefore, the Court determines it has jurisdiction over this matter. Moreover, venue in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.\n\n## **IV. DISCUSSION**\n\nThe Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052 are set forth below.\n\n## **A. Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)**\n\nRule 9006(b) provides that, generally, \"when an act is required to be done at or within a specified period by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion . . . order the period enlarged if the request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order.\" Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b).\n\nThe parties dispute whether Rule 9006(b) may be utilized to extend the deadlines set forth in sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d). The Trustee, relying on *IBT International, Inc. v. Northern (In re International Administrative Services, Inc.)*, 408 F.3d 689 (11th Cir. 2005), and its progeny, argues that it is within the Court's discretion to extend the deadlines. The Objecting Parties – particularly G Club – rely on 28 U.S.C. § 2075, *Joint Council Dining Car Employees Local 370 v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Company*, 157 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1946), *In re Walnut Hill*, No. 16-50960 (JJT), 2018 WL 2672242 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 1, 2018)\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 2921 Filed 02/15/24 Entered 02/15/24 19:38:31 Page 9 of 21 Case 22-50073 Doc 2970-2 Filed 02/28/24 Entered 02/28/24 16:42:19 Page 9 of 21\n\n(Tancredi, J.), and *In re Damach Inc.*, 235 B.R. 727 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1999) (Krechevsky, J.), to argue that Rule 9006(b) may not extend the deadlines set forth in sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d).\n\nThe first question is whether 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d) contain statutes of limitation – subject to tolling, extension, equitable estoppel, and other principles of equity – or statutes of repose, which are not susceptible to equity. *Compare Young*, 535 U.S. at 49–50 (stating that provisions in the Bankruptcy Code are particularly susceptible to equity because they are drafted with the background understanding that bankruptcy courts are courts of equity) *with Arellano v. McDonough*, 598 U.S. 1, 12–13 (2023) (distinguishing the congressional intent behind 38 U.S.C. § 5110 from that behind 11 U.S.C. § 507 and, hence, arriving at different result than *Young*.) Here, as in *Young* and unlike in *Arellano*, sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d) have either no tolling provisions or tolling provisions that supplement rather than supplant traditional principles of equity. 11 U.S.C. §§ 108(a) (no tolling provision), 546(a) (potentially tolled by the first appointment of a trustee within the two-year period), 549(d) (no tolling provision); *compare Young*, 535 U.S. at 52–53 *with Arellano*, 598 U.S. at 12–14; *see IBT Int'l*, 408 F.3d at 699 (11th Cir. 2005); *Ernst & Young v. Matsumoto (In re United Ins. Mgmt., Inc.)*, 14 F.3d 1380, 1385 (9th Cir. 1994); *see also* 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 108.2[1] (16th ed. 2023) (stating 11 U.S.C. § 108(a) does not apply to statutes of repose, only statutes of limitations) (collecting cases); 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 546.02[4] (stating 11 U.S.C. § 546 is not jurisdictional) (collecting cases); *but see Martin v. First Nat'l Bank of Louisville (In re Butcher)*, 829 F.2d 596 (6th Cir. 1987). The Court agrees with the majority position that sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d) are subject to extension under principles of equity and disagrees with *Butcher*, upon which the\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 2921 Filed 02/15/24 Entered 02/15/24 19:38:31 Page 10 of 21 Case 22-50073 Doc 2970-2 Filed 02/28/24 Entered 02/28/24 16:42:19 Page 10 of 21\n\nObjecting Parties rely. *Compare* H.R. Rep. No. 103-835, at 49–50 (1994) *with Butcher*, 829 F.2d at 599–600.\n\nThe next question is whether Rule 9006(b) provides a mechanism for such equitable extension. While the Court recognizes and respects the prior decisions in this District by the Honorable James J. Tancredi in *Walnut Hill* and the Honorable Robert L. Krechevsky in *Damach*, and the reliance by the Objecting Parties upon those decisions, there is no binding precedent on this issue from the United States Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, or the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. The only United States Court of Appeals to opine on the issue is the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. In *IBT International*, the Eleventh Circuit held that a bankruptcy court has the discretion under Rule 9006(b) to enlarge the period of time to bring avoidance actions set forth in section 546(a), notwithstanding the omission of \"statute\" from the text of Rule 9006(b), because Rule 9006(b) governs the filing of adversary proceedings pursuant to Rules 7001 and 7003. 408 F.3d at 699.\n\nThe Objecting Parties argue that the Eleventh Circuit's analysis is flawed because it ignores the Rules Enabling Act and would be in defiance of the separation of powers. The Court disagrees. The basis of their argument is the language: \"Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.\" 28 U.S.C. § 2075. Limitation periods are not, generally, substantive. *Young*, 535 at 49. As discussed above, this Court – and the majority of courts to consider the issue – concludes that sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d) present statutes of limitation, subject to principles of equity – which the Eleventh Circuit *does* address regarding section 546(a). *IBT Int'l*, 408 F.3d at 699. That is, they are not substantive. *See Young*, 535 at 49. For these reasons, the Court respectfully disagrees with the portion of *Walnut Hill*\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 2921 Filed 02/15/24 Entered 02/15/24 19:38:31 Page 11 of 21 Case 22-50073 Doc 2970-2 Filed 02/28/24 Entered 02/28/24 16:42:19 Page 11 of 21\n\naddressing Rule 9006(b) and concludes that the Rules Enabling Act does not preclude Rule 9006(b) from providing a mechanism for extending the statutes of limitation set forth in sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d). *Damach*, upon which *Walnut Hill* relies, was decided pre-*Young* and dealt with a motion to accept or reject a lease under section 365(d)(4) where a lessor's *substantive* contractual rights were involved – not, as here, on a motion to extend deadlines, or in *Young*, which dealt with equitable tolling, a non-substantive statute of limitations. 235 B.R. at 729–30, 731–32.\n\nCiting the Second Circuit's decision in *Dining Car*, the Objecting Parties also argue by analogy that because Rule 6 cannot be used to modify statutes of limitation in non-bankruptcy civil litigation, Rule 9006(b) cannot be used here. The analogy, however, fails because of key differences between bankruptcy proceedings and other civil actions. *Dining Car* considered, and rejected, the argument that Rule 6(a)'s proscribed methodology for computation of time applied to limitation periods existing independent of the filed civil action. 157 F.2d at 420. The limitation periods set forth by sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d) are all dependent on a bankruptcy case existing. Unless an order for relief enters in a bankruptcy case, which orders have been entered in each of these jointly administered Chapter 11 cases, these sections have no effect. 11 U.S.C. §§ 108(a), 546(a), 549(d). Similarly, adversary proceedings depend upon a related bankruptcy case existing. *Dining Car* recognized Rule 6(a)'s applicability to statutes that govern procedure of a civil action after it has been filed. The Trustee here asks the Court to extend statutes of limitations that only come into effect after a bankruptcy case has been filed. 11 U.S.C. §§ 108(a), 546(a), 549(d). *Butcher*, relied upon by the Objecting Parties, disregards the obvious difference between adversary proceedings commenced in a bankruptcy case and traditional civil actions. 829 F.2d at 599–600.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 2921 Filed 02/15/24 Entered 02/15/24 19:38:31 Page 12 of 21 Case 22-50073 Doc 2970-2 Filed 02/28/24 Entered 02/28/24 16:42:19 Page 12 of 21\n\nThe Court concludes for these reasons that Rule 9006(b) could provide a mechanism to extend the statutes of limitation set forth by sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d). The next question is whether it does. In light of (i) the general exhortation of Rule 1001 that \"[t]hese rules shall be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every case and proceeding\"; (ii) the Eleventh's Circuit's ruling in *IBT International* and its rationale based on the applicability of Rule 9006(b) in adversary proceedings and its determination that section 546(a) is a statute of limitations \"subject to waiver, tolling, and equitable estoppel\", *see* Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001, 7003; *IBT Int'l*, 408 F.3d at 699; (iii) the lack of any controlling precedent in this Circuit; and (iv) the reasons discussed above as to why the Court is not persuaded by the Objecting Parties' arguments based on the Rules Enabling Act and *Dining Car*, the Court concludes that it may extend the statutes of limitation set forth by sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d) pursuant to Rule 9006(b) despite Rule 9006(b) not including \"statute\" in its language. *IBT Int'l*, 408 F.3d at 698–99; *In re Fundamental Long Term Care, Inc.*, 501 B.R. 784, 787–791 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2013); *Marsh v. Levy (In re Martin Levy of Berlin D.M.D., P.C.)*, 416 B.R. 1, 8 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009); *Frentz v. Stites & Harbinson (In re ThermoView Indus., Inc.)*, 381 B.R. 225, 227 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2008); *but see In re Cramer*, 636 B.R. 830, 833 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2022); *In re Randolph Hosp., Inc.*, No. 20-10247 (LMJ), 2022 WL 19298765, at \\*1 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. April 25, 2022); *Walnut Hill*, 2018 WL 2672242, at \\*2.\n\nThe remaining issue, therefore, is whether there is \"cause,\" on the facts and circumstances before the Court to extend the statutes of limitation in sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d). Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b). The Court determines that on the very specific and\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 2921 Filed 02/15/24 Entered 02/15/24 19:38:31 Page 13 of 21 Case 22-50073 Doc 2970-2 Filed 02/28/24 Entered 02/28/24 16:42:19 Page 13 of 21\n\nextraordinary facts and circumstances of these jointly administered Chapter 11 cases, cause exists to extend the statutes of limitation in sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d).\n\nRegardless of the Objecting Parties' arguments that they have individually caused no harm to the Trustee's investigation, as courts have observed, albeit in the context of equitable tolling, the equities to consider in determining whether to extend or toll a statute of limitations in a bankruptcy proceeding often involve whether the debtor failed to cooperate with the bankruptcy trustee or indeed sought to impede the trustee's investigation and liquidation of assets for the benefit of creditors. *Gladstone v. U.S. Bancorp*, 811 F.3d 1133, 1143 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing *Olsen v. Zerbetz (In re Olsen)*, 36 F.3d 71, 72–73 (9th Cir. 1994) and holding that concealment by the debtor rather than the defendant could support equitable tolling). As the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Minnesota stated:\n\nA bankruptcy case presents a rather different slant on equitable tolling. In the typical situation, it is the debtor's conduct rather than the defendant's conduct which invokes equitable tolling. In some senses, this is unfair to the defendant. On the other hand, unlike the usual civil case where a plaintiff at least has the advantage of being a party to the underlying transaction, a bankruptcy trustee must rely almost entirely on a third party (the debtor) to provide the information necessary to uncover avoidable transfers.\n\n*Moratzka v. Pomaville (In re Pomaville)*, 190 B.R. 632, 637 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1995) (denying summary judgment because there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the statute of limitations could be equitably tolled).\n\nAs observed in *Pomaville*, fairness to defendants is the animating concern among courts that decline to extend statutes of limitation under Rule 9006(b). In *Cramer*, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California was primarily concerned with the lack of notice to the potential defendants. 636 B.R. at 832. *Randolph Hospital* shared this concern. 2022 WL 19298765, at \\*1. Here, however, there has been extensive notice of the Motion to Extend Deadlines via traditional service where possible, alternative service where possible, and\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 2921 Filed 02/15/24 Entered 02/15/24 19:38:31 Page 14 of 21 Case 22-50073 Doc 2970-2 Filed 02/28/24 Entered 02/28/24 16:42:19 Page 14 of 21\n\npublication notice, in English and Mandarin Chinese, in substantially the form approved by the Court pursuant to the Notice and Service Procedures Order. *See Cramer*, 636 B.R. at 832 nn. 1, 2 (distinguishing cases where defendants had notice of the motion seeking an extension of time). Nevertheless, in light of this concern, the Court will not determine the issue of waiver of a statute of limitations defense at this time, but rather will reserve that issue for determination when and if it is raised in an adversary proceeding. As such, the Court finds it difficult for any party to argue that their substantive rights have been impacted by this decision.\n\nRegarding the counterbalance noted in *Pomaville*, in these jointly administered Chapter 11 cases, the Trustee received no books and records from the Individual Debtor and no cooperation from the Individual Debtor. The Individual Debtor filed incomplete or inaccurate schedules and statement of affairs and did not comply with his duties under the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 521. The Individual Debtor affirmatively disclaimed and qualified the sworn information in his schedules and statements of affairs by filing \"Global Notes\", which are not official forms and not in compliance with the Individual Debtor's duties under section 521. (ECF Nos. 77–78.) Arguably, the failure of the Individual Debtor to comply with his duties could result in a finding that the statutes of limitation contained in sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d) have not even begun to run.\n\nInstead of receiving compliance and cooperation from the Individual Debtor, the Trustee has faced ceaseless recalcitrance, obstruction, and flagrant disregard of court orders by the Individual Debtor, his family members, his associates and employees, and entities the Trustee alleges he controls since the Trustee's appointment. (*See, e.g.*, ECF Nos. 913, 1046, 1303, 1345, 1362, 1397, 1453, 1521, 1537, 1546, 1709, 1805, 1892, 1896, 2009, 2035, 2036, 2080, 2093, 2342, 2396; *Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Kwok (In re Kwok)*, No. 22-50073 (JAM),\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 2921 Filed 02/15/24 Entered 02/15/24 19:38:31 Page 15 of 21 Case 22-50073 Doc 2970-2 Filed 02/28/24 Entered 02/28/24 16:42:19 Page 15 of 21\n\nAdv. P. No. 22-05032 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 13, 2023), ECF No. 133; *Despins ex rel. Kwok v. Mei Guo* (*In re Kwok)*, No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05008 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2023), ECF No. 32; *Guo*, No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05008 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Nov. 7, 2023), ECF No. 46.) Ultimately, the Court has entered at least eight orders holding the Individual Debtor, his daughter, Ms. Guo, and entities allegedly controlled by the Individual Debtor in contempt for failure to turn over assets and discovery abuse. (ECF Nos. 1372, 1537, 1709, 1892, 1896, 2009, 2035, 2093.) To date, each contemnor remains in contempt of court. The severity of nonperformance of statutory duties, *see* 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(3), (4), and noncompliance with this Court's orders in these jointly administered Chapter 11 cases, is extraordinary.\n\nFaced with these circumstances, the Trustee has had to seek extensive and ongoing third party discovery in addition to his efforts to obtain discovery from the Individual Debtor, his family, his associates, and entities he allegedly controls. (ECF Nos. 636–38, 839, 1116, 1259, 1592, 1789, 2079, 2249, 2304, 2308, 2434, 2508, 2514.) The Court has granted all fifteen of the Trustee's motions for Rule 2004 examinations, authorizing the examination of hundreds of entities. (ECF Nos. 756–58, 866, 1184, 1339, 1646, 1891, 2210, 2281, 2393, 2394, 2474, 2534, 2537.) The Court credits the Trustee's testimony that attempting to piece together the Individual Debtor's financial affairs from cold bank records and other documents evidencing a massive web of entities, bank accounts, and money transfers across multiple countries, continents, and jurisdictions is a time-consuming and difficult endeavor over an ever-increasing data set of unknown ultimate dimensions. This testimony is particularly credible because the Trustee is operating without the Individual Debtor's statutorily required cooperation. Moreover, the Trustee's investigation has been and continues to be impeded by the active obstruction of the\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 2921 Filed 02/15/24 Entered 02/15/24 19:38:31 Page 16 of 21 Case 22-50073 Doc 2970-2 Filed 02/28/24 Entered 02/28/24 16:42:19 Page 16 of 21\n\nIndividual Debtor, his family members, associates, employees, followers, and associated entities.\n\nThe \"puzzle\" the Trustee is faced with in these jointly administered Chapter 11 cases is\n\nparticularly severe and the facts of these cases are similar to the facts of *IBT International*, which\n\nalso involved allegations of a complex asset diversion plan, where there was a \"jigsaw puzzle of\n\ntransfers.\" 408 F.3d at 702.\n\nThe Objecting Parties argue that, nevertheless, the Trustee has been less than diligent in\n\nhis attempts to understand the bankruptcy estate's potential causes of action. Counsel for the\n\nIndividual Debtor, who also signed the objection submitted by the Individual Debtor's daughter,\n\nMs. Guo, has previously testified that, contrary to Ms. Guo's present argument, the Trustee was\n\ntoo forceful in his statutory investigative duties, *see* 11 U.S.C. § 1106:\n\nQ. You testified, Mr. Kindseth, that prior to the meeting, you had urged the Trustee strenuously to quote, unquote, stand down. Is that right? A. Probably 50 times. Yes. Q. And -- A. Gradually, too. Just to be clear. It wasn't just, do nothing. It's, can you please just stand down some to give us some space to let the settlement come together. Yes. Q. What you meant by that was stand down on the investigation, correct? A. Stand down on the perpetual bombs, you know, attacks, 50 2004 exams, expedited hearings, just this perpetual attack, 12, 14 lawyers at Paul Hastings going all, you know, full board [sic]. I said, can you just reign [sic] it in a little bit to give us some time to\n\n(Dec. 12, 2022 Hr'g Tr. at \\*894:2–18, *Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund*, No. 22-50073 (JAM),\n\nAdv. P. No. 22-05032 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Dec. 15, 2022), ECF No. 111.)\n\nbreathe and work out a settlement.\n\nIndeed, the Individual Debtor's position in fall of 2022 was that the Trustee was\n\nproceeding too rapidly with his investigation. Prior to Attorney Kindseth's testimony, his\n\ncolleague, also appearing on behalf of the Individual Debtor, repeatedly objected to the Trustee's\n\nurgent pursuit of his investigation. The exchange below during a hearing held on October 13,\n\n2022, on the Trustee's Motion for Entry of Order Authorizing Compliance with Rule 2004\n\nSubpoenas and Enforcing Consent Order Regarding Control of Attorney-Client Privilege and\n\nWork Product Protection is illustrative:\n\nMr. Henzy: Next week I'm going to be fully engulfed in potentially reviewing documents which actually I wanted to ask Your Honor a question about. But I'm not sure, Your Honor, what the hurry is. But I'm not sure what the hurry –\n\nMr. Despins: Your Honor, the hurry is that we're supposed to have control of these entities. We're being deprived of control -- of access to privilege in relation -- for to those entities because that's the same counsel representing Mr. Kwok and those two entities. And so to say there's no rush, I don't know what to say about that. It's been ten -- we're not rushing, meaning we've asked for this for a while now. And if we are correct that he owns it, the rush is that he's just disregarding this case completely. So I don't know what to say about the issue of no rush.\n\n(Oct. 13, 2022 Hr'g Tr. at 106:8–23, ECF No. 1020; *see also* Sept. 27, 2022 Status Conference\n\nTr. at 23:1–20, ECF No. 936.)\n\nIn a case with more than 2900 docket entries and more than 250 associated adversary proceedings, where the Trustee has, by counsel to the Individual Debtor's own admission and in this Court's own observation, aggressively pursued discovery relating to the Individual Debtor's financial affairs and recovery of assets, the Court concludes that the Trustee has shown more than reasonable diligence in his efforts. That not every lead has borne fruit, that not every stone has been unturned, that not every action has been successful, does not diminish the fact that the Trustee has been more than reasonably diligent.\n\nThe facts and circumstances of the present case are wholly unlike the facts Judge Tancredi faced in *Walnut Hill*. In *Walnut Hill,* the Chapter 7 trustee had the entire two-year time period set forth in sections 108(a) and 546(a) to fulfill his investigative duties and bring causes of action. Here, the Trustee was appointed five months into the case – which means he had nineteen months to perform his investigation in the Individual Debtor's Chapter 11 case. (ECF No. 514.) Furthermore, in *Walnut Hill*, the Chapter 7 trustee filed her first motion for Rule 2004\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 2921 Filed 02/15/24 Entered 02/15/24 19:38:31 Page 18 of 21 Case 22-50073 Doc 2970-2 Filed 02/28/24 Entered 02/28/24 16:42:19 Page 18 of 21\n\nexamination eleven months after the petition was filed. (*In re Walnut Hill*, No. 16-20960 (JJT) (Bankr. D. Conn. May 31, 2017), ECF No. 78.) In this case, the Trustee filed his first motion to conduct a Rule 2004 motion less than a month after the approval of his appointment and continues to vigorously seek discovery as part of his ongoing investigation. (ECF No. 636.)\n\nNevertheless, the Objecting Parties also argue against the Trustee's diligence on the basis of the Trustee's testimony that hiring a forensic accountant had to wait until the estate had funding. In particular, the Objecting Parties focus on the Trustee's testimony that even if a forensic accountant was willing to work on a contingency basis, they would have demanded to be treated *pari passu* with the Trustee and his lawyers. However, the Objecting Parties ignore that the necessity of forensic accountant has been caused by the Individual Debtor's failure to cooperate with the Trustee and the discovery abuses in these jointly administered Chapter 11 cases. They also ignore that administrative insolvency – which is when *pari passu* treatment of administrative claims would pose a concern to the Trustee's counsel – would be to the detriment of the Individual Debtor's unsecured creditors, to whom the Trustee is a fiduciary. The Court is not persuaded by the Objecting Parties' focus on this testimony to support their claims that the Trustee's investigation has lacked diligence.\n\nFor these reasons, the Court concludes that there is cause to extend the statute of limitations set forth by sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d) pursuant to Rule 9006(b). Therefore, the Motion to Extend Deadlines is granted to the extent set forth below.\n\n## **B. Equitable Tolling**\n\nStatutes of limitations in the Bankruptcy Code are drafted with implied awareness of general principles of equity, including equitable tolling – particularly because bankruptcy courts are courts of equity. *Young*, 535 U.S. at 49–50.\"Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 2921 Filed 02/15/24 Entered 02/15/24 19:38:31 Page 19 of 21 Case 22-50073 Doc 2970-2 Filed 02/28/24 Entered 02/28/24 16:42:19 Page 19 of 21\n\nbears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.\" *Pace v. DiGuglielmo*, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005) (citing *Irwin v. Dep't of Veteran Affs.*, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990)); *see Castillo ex rel. A.Q.C. v. United States*, 656 F.3d 135, 144 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting *Pace*). Equitable tolling is not to be confused with fraudulent concealment by the defendant: the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has \"held explicitly that the application of the doctrine of equitable tolling is not limited to [cases with fraudulent concealment].\" *Donely ex rel. Valdez v. United States*, 518 F.3d 173, 183 (2d Cir. 2008) (collecting cases). Indeed, equitable tolling does not require any wrongdoing by a defendant. *Donely*, 518 F.3d at 182–83; *Canales v. Sullivan*, 936 F.2d 755, 758, *on reh'g* 947 F.2d 45, 758 (2d Cir. 1991); *Fundamental Long Term Care*, 501 B.R. at 791; *Fam. Golf Ctrs., Inc. v. Acushnet Co. (In re Randall's Island Fam. Golf Ctrs., Inc.)*, 288 B.R. 701, 705–06 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003). Moreover, insofar as misconduct is alleged, in bankruptcy proceedings it is often the debtor's rather than the defendant's conduct that is relevant. *Gladstone*, 811 F.3d at 1143; *Pomaville*, 190 B.R. at 637.\n\nThe Objecting Parties dispute whether the Trustee may properly seek equitable tolling now or must instead assert equitable tolling when and if a defendant in an adversary proceeding asserts a defense that the Trustee's complaint is time-barred. The Objecting Parties – particularly the Taurus Parties and the Greenwich Parties – argue that equitable tolling is not yet ripe and that the proper consideration is instead, as discussed above, whether the statute of limitations can be extended. The Trustee argues that equitable tolling can be considered prospectively.\n\nThe Court agrees with the Objecting Parties. As Judge Tancredi observed in *Walnut Hill*, in *IBT International*, the Eleventh Circuit only considered equitable tolling in the context of a\n\n19\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 2921 Filed 02/15/24 Entered 02/15/24 19:38:31 Page 20 of 21 Case 22-50073 Doc 2970-2 Filed 02/28/24 Entered 02/28/24 16:42:19 Page 20 of 21\n\nmotion to dismiss raising a statute of limitations defense to a complaint in an adversary proceeding. 408 F.3d at 700–03. While it is not entirely clear from the decision itself, a review of the pleadings before the Eleventh Circuit supports the conclusion that the Eleventh Circuit found that the bankruptcy court's orders extending the statute of limitation were within its discretion pursuant to Rule 9006(b) and that, in any event, equitable tolling would apply to defeat the statute of limitation defense. *Id.* at 695–703; *see Fundamental Long Term Care*, 501 B.R. at 789 (\"It seems to the Court that the appropriate standard would be the \"for cause\" analysis under Rule 9006. The Trustee here seeks an enlargement of time before the period has expired (equitable tolling presumably comes into play after the limitations period has expired). And that was the analysis the Eleventh Circuit initially applied in *In re International Administrative Services*, before turning to the equitable tolling analysis in an abundance of caution.\").\n\nTherefore, the Court denies the Motion to Extend Deadlines insofar as it seeks an order equitably tolling the statutes of limitations set forth by sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d), without prejudice to the Trustee raising equitable tolling or other equitable arguments in response to a defense that an adversary proceeding commenced by the Trustee is time-barred.\n\n### **V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER**\n\nTherefore, having reviewed and considered the arguments of the Trustee and the Objecting Parties during the hearing and raised in their briefs, the caselaw cited during the hearing and in the briefs, and the equities, the Court grants in part the Trustee's Motion to Extend Deadlines based upon good cause having been shown. Accordingly, it is hereby\n\n**ORDERED:** Pursuant Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b), the Motion to Extend Deadlines is **GRANTED IN PART** as set forth herein; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** The time limitations set forth in 11 U.S.C. 108, 546, and 549 for the Trustee to commence avoidance actions are extended through and including August 15, 2024 (such extension, the \"Ordered Extension\"), which date may be further extended upon notice and a hearing; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** Notwithstanding anything in this Order to the contrary, pursuant to the agreement of the parties, this Order and the Ordered Extension herein shall not apply to (i) UBS AG; and (ii) Sotheby's International Realty, Inc., Sotheby's International Realty Affiliates LLC, Sotheby's International Realty Referral Company LLC, Sotheby's International Realty Referral Company Inc., Martha Turner Sotheby's International Realty Referral Company LLC, Martha Turner Properties, LP, MTPGP, LLC, Anywhere Advisors LLC, Anywhere Real Estate Services Group LLC, Anywhere Real Estate Group LLC, Anywhere Intermediate Holdings LLC, and Anywhere Real Estate Inc.; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** The Motion to Extend Deadlines is **DENIED IN PART** with respect to the request for prospective equitable tolling, without prejudice to the Trustee raising equitable tolling or other equitable arguments in response to a defense that an adversary proceeding commenced by the Trustee is time-barred; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** The terms and conditions of this Order shall be immediately effective and enforceable upon its entry; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** The Court shall retain jurisdiction with respect to all matters arising from or related to the interpretation or implementation of this Order.\n\nDated at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 15th day of February, 2024.","body_zh":"案号 22-50073 文档 2921 提交于 02/15/24 登记于 02/15/24 19:38:31 第 1 页，共 21 页；案号 22-50073 文档 2970-2 提交于 02/28/24 登记于 02/28/24 16:42:19 第 1 页，共 21 页\n美国康涅狄格地区破产法院（UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT）\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等， ) （合并管理）\n\n ) )\n\n)\n\n关于： ) 第 11 章 ) 案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n债务人。 ) 关联：ECF No. 2509\n出庭人员\n\nAvram E. Luft（埃夫拉姆·E·卢夫特） Douglass Barron（道格拉斯·巴伦） Paul Hastings LLP（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所） 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166 Patrick R. Linsey（帕特里克·R·林赛） Neubert, Pepe & Montieth（纽伯特、佩佩及蒙蒂思律师事务所） 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, CT 06510\n\n以及\n\nNicholas A. Bassett（尼古拉斯·A·巴塞特，庭辩） Paul Hastings LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C. 20036\n\n动议方 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）先生破产财产第 11 章受托人 Luc A. Despins（吕克·A·德斯平斯）先生的代理律师\n\nLee Vartan（李·瓦尔坦） Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC（基耶萨、沙希尼安及贾恩托马西专业公司） One Boland Drive West Orange, NJ 07052\n\n以及\n\nSam Della Fera, Jr.（小萨姆·德拉费拉，庭辩） Melissa F. Wernick（梅丽莎·F·韦尼克） Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC 105 Eisenhower Parkway Roseland, NJ 07068\n\nStephen M. Kindseth（斯蒂芬·M·金德塞斯） Aaron Romney（阿伦·罗姆尼） James M. Moriarty（詹姆斯·M·莫里亚蒂） Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（蔡斯勒与蔡斯勒专业公司） 10 Middle Street Bridgeport, CT 06604\n\n被答辩方 Mei Guo（郭梅）女士的代理律师\n\n案号 22-50073 文档 2921 提交于 02/15/24 登记于 02/15/24 19:38:31 第 2 页，共 21 页；案号 22-50073 文档 2970-2 提交于 02/28/24 登记于 02/28/24 16:42:19 第 2 页，共 21 页\n\nAdam H. Friedman（亚当·H·弗里德曼） Katherine E. Mateo（凯瑟琳·E·马特奥，庭辩） Olshan Frome Wolosky LLP（奥尔尚、弗罗姆及沃洛斯基律师事务所） 1325 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10019\n\n被答辩方 Defeng Cao（曹德锋）先生的代理律师\n\nLisa J. Fried（莉萨·J·弗里德） Herbert Smith Freehills New York LLP（赫伯特·史密夫·富希尔斯纽约律师事务所） 450 Lexington Avenue New York, NY 10017\n\n被答辩方 UBS AG（瑞银集团）的代理律师\n\nGenevieve G. Weiner（吉纳维芙·G·韦纳） Sidley Austin LLP（盛德律师事务所） 555 West Fifth Street Los Angeles, CA 90013 William S. Fish, Jr.（小威廉·S·菲什） Hinckley, Allen & Snyder LLP（欣克利、艾伦及斯奈德律师事务所） 20 Church Street, 18th Floor Hartford, CT 06103\n\n被答辩方 DBS Bank Ltd.（星展银行有限公司）的代理律师\n\nMichael T. Conway（迈克尔·T·康韦，庭辩） Lazare Potter Giacovas & Moyle LLP（拉扎尔、波特、贾科瓦斯及莫伊尔律师事务所） 747 Third Avenue, 16th Floor New York, NY 10017\n\n被答辩方 Taurus Fund, LLC（金牛基金有限责任公司）、Taurus Management, LLC（金牛管理有限责任公司）及 Scott Barnett（斯科特·巴尼特）先生的代理律师\n\nCarolina A. Fornos（卡罗莱纳·A·福尔诺斯） Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP（博钦律师事务所） 31 West 52nd Street New York, NY 10019\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz（杰弗里·M·斯克拉兹，庭辩） Kelliane Baranowsky（凯莉安娜·巴拉诺夫斯基） Green & Sklarz LLC（格林与斯克拉兹有限责任公司） One Audubon Street, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06511\n\n被答辩方 G Club Operations LLC（G Club 运营有限责任公司）的代理律师\n\nDouglas M. Evans（道格拉斯·M·埃文斯，庭辩） Shapiro, Dorry, & Masterson LLC（夏皮罗、多里及马斯特森有限责任公司） 71 Raymond Road West Hartford, CT 06107\n\n被答辩方 Rule of Law Foundation III, Inc.（法治基金会 III 公司）及 Rule of Law Society IV, Inc.（法治协会 IV 公司）的代理律师\n\nEric T. Schmitt（埃里克·T·施密特，庭辩） The Quinlan Law Firm, LLC（昆兰律师事务所有限责任公司） 233 South Wacker Drive, Suite 6142 Chicago, IL 60606\n\nJon Newton（乔恩·牛顿） Reid and Reige, P.C.（里德与赖格专业公司） One Financial Plaza, 21st Floor Hartford, CT 06103\n被答辩方 Chris Lee（克里斯·李）先生及 Qidong Xia（夏启东）先生的代理律师\n\nChristopher J. Major（克里斯托弗·J·梅杰，庭辩） Austin D. Kim（奥斯汀·D·金） Meister Seelig & Fein PLLC（迈斯特、锡利格及费恩专业有限责任公司） 125 Park Avenue, 7th Floor New York, NY 10017\n\n被答辩方 Greenwich Land, LLC（格林尼治土地有限责任公司）及 Hing Chi Ngok（吴庆熙）女士的代理律师\n\nBarry R. Lax（巴里·R·拉克斯） Robert J. Grand（罗伯特·J·格兰德，庭辩） Lax & Neville, LLP（拉克斯与内维尔律师事务所） 350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 4640 New York, NY 10018\n\nJordan W. Schur（乔丹·W·舒尔） Houser LLP（豪泽律师事务所） 8 Wright Street, Suite 107 Westport, CT 06880\n被答辩方 GS Security Solutions, Inc.（GS 安保解决方案公司）的代理律师\n\nDavid H. Wander（大卫·H·万德，庭辩） Michael J. Grudberg（迈克尔·J·格鲁德伯格） Tarter Krinsky & Drogin LLP（塔特、克林斯基及德罗金律师事务所） 1350 Broadway New York, NY 10018\n被答辩方 Yinying Wang（王音英）女士的代理律师\n\nAnthony M. Saccullo（安东尼·M·萨库洛） Mary Augustine（玛丽·奥古斯丁） A.M. Saccullo Legal, LLC（A.M. 萨库洛法律有限责任公司） 27 Crimson King Drive Bear, DE 19701\n\nStephen P. Brown（斯蒂芬·P·布朗，庭辩） Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP（威尔逊·埃尔瑟、莫斯科维茨、埃德尔曼及迪克尔律师事务所） 1010 Washington Boulevard Stamford, CT 06901\n\n被答辩方 Sotheby's International Realty, Inc.（苏富比国际地产公司）的代理律师\n\nJames Nealon（詹姆斯·尼隆，庭辩） Nealon Law LLC（尼隆法律有限责任公司） 1266 East Main Street, Suite 700R Stamford, CT 06902\n\n被答辩方 Yongbing Zhang（张永兵）律师的代理律师\n\n案号 22-50073 文档 2921 提交于 02/15/24 登记于 02/15/24 19:38:31 第 4 页，共 21 页；案号 22-50073 文档 2970-2 提交于 02/28/24 登记于 02/28/24 16:42:19 第 4 页，共 21 页\n关于部分准许延长期限动议的裁判备忘录及命令\n\n美国破产法官 Julie A. Manning（朱莉·A·曼宁）\n一、引言\n\n本院面前的是 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）先生破产财产第 11 章受托人 Luc A. Despins（吕克·A·德斯平斯）先生以第 11 章受托人（以下简称“受托人”）身份提交的、请求作出延长受托人提起撤销权诉讼期限之命令的动议（以下简称“延长期限动议”）。（ECF No. 2509。）基于下述理由，延长期限动议予以部分准许。\n\n二、背景\n\n2022 年 2 月 15 日，个人债务人在本院提交了自愿第 11 章申请（以下简称“申请”）。（ECF No. 1。）个人债务人的案件与两起关联公司第 11 章案件合并管理。（ECF Nos. 970, 1141。）基于其中所述理由，2022 年 6 月 15 日，本院作出裁判备忘录及命令，指定一名第 11 章受托人。（ECF No. 465。）In re Kwok, 640 B.R. 514 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022)。2022 年 7 月 8 日，Despins 先生被指定为受托人。（ECF No. 523。）\n\n2024 年 1 月 9 日，受托人提交动议（以下简称“通知动议”），请求就即将提交的、延长或中止《美国法典》第 11 编（以下简称“破产法”）第 108(a)、546(a)及 549(d)条规定的时效期间之动议安排听证，并确立通知及送达程序。（ECF No. 2494。）2024 年 1 月 15 日，鉴于未及时对通知动议提出异议，本院根据书面材料审理该动议。（ECF No. 2505。）2024 年 1 月 19 日，本院准许通知动议，并作出命令，就当时已提交的延长期限动议安排听证，并确立通知及送达程序（以下简称“通知及送达程序命令”）。（ECF No. 2515。）\n\n案号 22-50073 文档 2921 提交于 02/15/24 登记于 02/15/24 19:38:31 第 5 页，共 21 页；案号 22-50073 文档 2970-2 提交于 02/28/24 登记于 02/28/24 16:42:19 第 5 页，共 21 页\n\n2024 年 1 月 18 日，受托人提交延长期限动议。（ECF No. 2509。）2024 年 1 月 31 日，受托人依照通知及送达程序命令，提交了延长期限动议的送达通知及公告通知，表明已于 2024 年 1 月 22 日通过邮件完成送达，且此后已作出公告通知。（ECF No. 2540。）\n\n2024 年 2 月 5 日，Mei Guo（郭梅）女士（以下简称“Guo 女士”）、Defeng Cao（曹德锋）先生（以下简称“Cao 先生”）、UBS AG（瑞银集团，以下简称“UBS”）、Taurus Fund LLC、Taurus Management LLC 及 Scott Barnett（斯科特·巴尼特）先生（合称“金牛各方”）共同、G Club Operations LLC（G Club 运营有限责任公司，以下简称“G Club”）、Rule of Law Foundation III, Inc.（法治基金会 III 公司）及 Rule of Law Society IV, Inc.（法治协会 IV 公司）（合称“ROL 各方”）共同、Chris Lee（克里斯·李）先生（以下简称“Lee 先生”）及 Qidong Xia（夏启东）先生（以下简称“Xia 先生”）共同、Greenwich Land, LLC（格林尼治土地有限责任公司）及 Hing Chi Ngok（吴庆熙）女士（合称“格林尼治各方”）共同，以及 GS Security Solutions, Inc.（GS 安保解决方案公司，以下简称“GS Security”）对延长期限动议提出异议。（ECF Nos. 2551, 2553, 2554, 2557, 2563, 2565, 2566, 2569, 2571。）同日，即 2024 年 2 月 5 日，DBS Bank Ltd.（星展银行有限公司）提交权利保留，保留其对超出延长期限动议所请求范围的任何时效期间延长或中止提出异议的权利。（ECF No. 2556。）2024 年 2 月 7 日，Yinying Wang（王音英）女士（以下简称“Wang 女士”）和 Sotheby's International Realty, Inc.（苏富比国际地产公司，以下简称“Sotheby's”）逾期提交异议。（ECF Nos. 2582, 2584。）2024 年 2 月 8 日，Yongbing Zhang（张永兵）先生（以下简称“Zhang 先生”）逾期提交对延长期限动议的异议。（ECF No. 2591。）\n\n2024 年 2 月 9 日，受托人提交了对各项异议的综合答复。（ECF No. 2620。）2024 年 2 月 12 日，受托人提交证人及证物清单，其中将受托人列为证人，并将这些合并管理的第 11 章案件及相关对抗程序中公开提交的诉状和命令清单列作证物。（ECF No. 2763。）\n\n2024 年 2 月 13 日，就延长期限动议举行听证。听证前，UBS 提交通知，撤回其对延长期限动议的异议，\n\n案号 22-50073 文档 2921 提交于 02/15/24 登记于 02/15/24 19:38:31 第 6 页，共 21 页；案号 22-50073 文档 2970-2 提交于 02/28/24 登记于 02/28/24 16:42:19 第 6 页，共 21 页\n\nUBS 亦在庭审记录中重复该撤回。（ECF No. 2810。）在听证期间，Sotheby's 亦在庭审记录中撤回其对延长期限动议的异议。DBS 重申其并未反对延长期限动议，而仅就任何未来延长或中止时效期间的动议保留其权利。Guo 女士、Cao 先生、金牛各方、G Club、ROL 各方、Lee 先生、Xia 先生、格林尼治各方、GS Security、Wang 女士及 Zhang 先生（合称“异议各方”）坚持其对延长期限动议的异议。1\n\n受托人作证，并接受异议各方交叉询问。受托人请求本院对这些合并管理的第 11 章案件及相关对抗程序的记录予以司法认知。受托人与异议各方各自陈述其论点。听证结束时，延长期限动议留待审议。\n\n本事项已具备作出裁判的条件。\n\n三、管辖权\n\n美国康涅狄格地区联邦地区法院（United States District Court for the District of Connecticut）依据 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) 对本事项享有管辖权。本院依据 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) 及美国康涅狄格地区联邦地区法院于 September 21, 1984 作出的移交命令，有权审理并裁定本事项。本事项依法属于核心程序。28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A)。\n\n然而，异议各方提出两项反对管辖权的论点。第一，异议各方主张，根据 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 487–99 (2011)，本院无权裁定本事项，因为撤销权诉讼涉及私权而非公权，因此必须由《美国宪法》第三条法院裁定，除非当事人同意由另一法院行使管辖权，见 Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 575 U.S. 665, 686 (2015)（裁定尽管 Stern 中作出判决，当事人仍可同意由破产法院作出终局命令）。第二，异议各方主张，不存在案件或争议，因为尚无任何一方在撤销权诉讼中提出时效抗辩。\n\n1 异议各方大体上加入彼此的论点。因此，本院在下文讨论中将统称其为异议各方。\n\n案号 22-50073 文档 2921 提交于 02/15/24 登记于 02/15/24 19:38:31 第 7 页，共 21 页；案号 22-50073 文档 2970-2 提交于 02/28/24 登记于 02/28/24 16:42:19 第 7 页，共 21 页\n\n本院认定，其对延长期限动议的裁定不违反 Stern。对延长期限动议作出裁定，并不要求本院终局裁定任何撤销权诉讼的是非曲直。相反，这要求本院作为衡平法事项，裁定《破产法》第 108(a)、546(a)及 549(d)条所载的时效期间是否可以延长。这些期限规定载于《破产法》。此外，其仅适用于破产案件，并体现破产政策考量；即，如何平衡破产受托人查明和追诉破产财产诉因的需要，与确保每一案件和程序获得公正、迅速且低廉裁判的要求。比较 11 U.S.C. §§ 108(a), 546(a), 549(a) 与 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1001。因此，本院可以裁定延长期限动议所提出的问题。见 Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49–50 (2002)（全体一致）（裁定在国会制定旨在由作为衡平法院的破产法院适用的规定时，衡平性中止尤其可得适用）。\n\n本院还认定，目前存在案件或争议。有经合并管理的 Chapter 11 案件尚待审理。因此，《破产法典》第 108(a)、546(a) 和 549(d) 条规定的期限正在有效运行。受托人主张：(i) 存在他目前正在追查的潜在财产原因诉讼，但他无法在两年期限届满前提起诉讼，同时又满足 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 的标准；以及 (ii) 鉴于其迄今对这些案件的经验和了解，无疑存在其完全不知情的财产原因诉讼。受托人请求延长这些期限，以便其能够提起更多诉讼而不受时效限制。\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 2921 提交 02/15/24 录入 02/15/24 19:38:31 第 8 页，共 21 页 案件 22-50073 文书 2970-2 提交 02/28/24 录入 02/28/24 16:42:19 第 8 页，共 21 页\n\n因此，本院认定其对本事项具有管辖权。此外，依据 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409，本地区为适格审理地。\n\nIV. 讨论\n\n下文载明本院根据 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052 作出的事实认定和法律结论。\n\nA. 破产规则 9006(b)\n\n规则 9006(b) 规定，一般而言，“当本规则或根据本规则发出的通知或法院命令要求在指定期间内或于指定期间届满前实施某一行为时，如在原定期间届满前或经先前命令延长的期间届满前提出有关请求，法院可在任何时候酌情于显示正当理由后……命令延长期限。”Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)。\n\n各方当事人争议是否可以利用规则 9006(b) 延长第 108(a)、546(a) 和 549(d) 条规定的截止期限。受托人依赖 IBT International, Inc. v. Northern (In re International Administrative Services, Inc.), 408 F.3d 689 (11th Cir. 2005) 及其后续判例，主张延长该等截止期限属于本院的酌处权范围。异议方——尤其是 G Club——依赖 28 U.S.C. § 2075、Joint Council Dining Car Employees Local 370 v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Company, 157 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1946)、In re Walnut Hill, No. 16-50960 (JJT), 2018 WL 2672242 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 1, 2018)\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 2921 提交 02/15/24 录入 02/15/24 19:38:31 第 9 页，共 21 页 案件 22-50073 文书 2970-2 提交 02/28/24 录入 02/28/24 16:42:19 第 9 页，共 21 页\n\n(Tancredi, J.)，以及 In re Damach Inc., 235 B.R. 727 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1999) (Krechevsky, J.)，主张规则 9006(b) 不得延长第 108(a)、546(a) 和 549(d) 条规定的截止期限。\n\n首要问题是，第 108(a)、546(a) 和 549(d) 条所包含的是时效期间——可适用中止计算、延长、衡平禁止反言及其他衡平原则——还是除斥期间，后者不适用衡平原则。比较 Young, 535 U.S. at 49–50（指出《破产法典》中的规定尤其适用衡平原则，因为其起草背景理解是破产法院属于衡平法院）与 Arellano v. McDonough, 598 U.S. 1, 12–13 (2023)（区分国会对 38 U.S.C. § 5110 的立法意图与对 11 U.S.C. § 507 的立法意图，因此得出与 Young 不同的结论）。本案中，如同 Young 且不同于 Arellano，第 108(a)、546(a) 和 549(d) 条要么没有中止计算规定，要么其规定是对传统衡平原则的补充而非替代。11 U.S.C. §§ 108(a)（无中止计算规定）、546(a)（可能因在两年期间内首次任命受托人而中止计算）、549(d)（无中止计算规定）；比较 Young, 535 U.S. at 52–53 与 Arellano, 598 U.S. at 12–14；见 IBT Int'l, 408 F.3d at 699 (11th Cir. 2005)；Ernst & Young v. Matsumoto (In re United Ins. Mgmt., Inc.), 14 F.3d 1380, 1385 (9th Cir. 1994)；另见 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 108.2[1] (16th ed. 2023)（指出 11 U.S.C. § 108(a) 不适用于除斥期间，仅适用于时效期间）（汇集判例）；5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 546.02[4]（指出 11 U.S.C. § 546 不涉及管辖权）（汇集判例）；但见 Martin v. First Nat'l Bank of Louisville (In re Butcher), 829 F.2d 596 (6th Cir. 1987)。本院同意多数观点，即第 108(a)、546(a) 和 549(d) 条可依据衡平原则予以延长，并不同意异议方所依赖的 Butcher。比较 H.R. Rep. No. 103-835, at 49–50 (1994) 与 Butcher, 829 F.2d at 599–600。\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 2921 提交 02/15/24 录入 02/15/24 19:38:31 第 10 页，共 21 页 案件 22-50073 文书 2970-2 提交 02/28/24 录入 02/28/24 16:42:19 第 10 页，共 21 页\n\n下一个问题是，规则 9006(b) 是否为此类衡平性延长提供机制。尽管本院承认并尊重本地区 James J. Tancredi 法官在 Walnut Hill 案中作出的先前裁判以及 Robert L. Krechevsky 法官在 Damach 案中作出的先前裁判，亦承认并尊重异议方对该等裁判的依赖，但美国联邦最高法院、United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit（美国第二巡回上诉法院）或 United States District Court for the District of Connecticut（美国康涅狄格联邦地区法院）均未就该问题作出具有约束力的先例。唯一就该问题发表意见的美国联邦上诉法院是 United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit（美国第十一巡回上诉法院）。在 IBT International 案中，第十一巡回上诉法院裁定，尽管规则 9006(b) 的文本中未出现“statute”一词，破产法院仍可依规则 9006(b) 酌情延长第 546(a) 条规定的提起撤销诉讼的期限，因为规则 9006(b) 根据规则 7001 和 7003 管辖对抗程序的提交。408 F.3d at 699。\n\n异议方主张，第十一巡回上诉法院的分析存在缺陷，因为其忽视了《规则授权法》，并将违背权力分立原则。本院不同意。其论点的依据是如下文字：“此类规则不得削减、扩大或修改任何实体权利。”28 U.S.C. § 2075。时效期间通常不属于实体性事项。Young, 535 at 49。如上所述，本院——以及审议过该问题的大多数法院——认定第 108(a)、546(a) 和 549(d) 条规定的是时效期间，适用衡平原则——第十一巡回上诉法院就第 546(a) 条确实对此作出了论述。IBT Int'l, 408 F.3d at 699。也就是说，它们不属于实体性事项。见 Young, 535 at 49。基于上述理由，本院谨不同意 Walnut Hill 中\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 2921 提交 02/15/24 录入 02/15/24 19:38:31 第 11 页，共 21 页 案件 22-50073 文书 2970-2 提交 02/28/24 录入 02/28/24 16:42:19 第 11 页，共 21 页\n\n涉及规则 9006(b) 的部分，并认定《规则授权法》并不排除规则 9006(b) 为延长第 108(a)、546(a) 和 549(d) 条规定的时效期间提供机制。Walnut Hill 所依赖的 Damach 作出于 Young 之前，且其涉及的是根据第 365(d)(4) 条提出的接受或拒绝租赁的动议，其中涉及出租人的实体合同权利——而非如本案般涉及延长截止期限的动议，亦非如 Young 中涉及的衡平性中止计算这一非实体性的时效期间。235 B.R. at 729–30, 731–32。\n\n异议方援引第二巡回法院在 Dining Car 案中的裁判，还类推主张，由于规则 6 不能用于修改非破产民事诉讼中的时效期间，规则 9006(b) 亦不能在本案中使用。然而，该类推因破产程序与其他民事诉讼之间的关键差异而不成立。Dining Car 审议并驳回了如下主张：规则 6(a) 规定的时间计算方法适用于独立于已提起民事诉讼而存在的时效期间。157 F.2d at 420。第 108(a)、546(a) 和 549(d) 条规定的时效期间均以破产案件的存在为前提。除非在破产案件中作出救济命令，而在每一件经合并管理的 Chapter 11 案件中均已作出此类命令，否则这些条款不发生效力。11 U.S.C. §§ 108(a), 546(a), 549(d)。同样，对抗程序亦以相关破产案件的存在为前提。Dining Car 承认规则 6(a) 适用于民事诉讼提起后管辖其程序的法律。本案中，受托人请求本院延长仅在破产案件已被提起后方发生效力的时效期间。11 U.S.C. §§ 108(a), 546(a), 549(d)。异议方所依赖的 Butcher 忽视了在破产案件中提起的对抗程序与传统民事诉讼之间的明显差异。829 F.2d at 599–600。\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 2921 提交 02/15/24 录入 02/15/24 19:38:31 第 12 页，共 21 页 案件 22-50073 文书 2970-2 提交 02/28/24 录入 02/28/24 16:42:19 第 12 页，共 21 页\n\n本院基于上述理由认定，规则 9006(b) 可为延长第 108(a)、546(a) 和 549(d) 条规定的时效期间提供机制。下一个问题是其是否确实提供该机制。鉴于：(i) 规则 1001 的一般性要求，即“[本]规则应由法院和当事人解释、管理和运用，以确保每一案件和程序获得公正、迅速且经济的裁决”；(ii) 第十一巡回法院在 IBT International 案中的裁判及其依据，即规则 9006(b) 在对抗程序中的适用性，以及其认定第 546(a) 条是一项“受放弃、中止计算和衡平禁止反言约束”的时效期间，见 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001, 7003；IBT Int'l, 408 F.3d at 699；(iii) 本巡回区不存在任何控制性先例；以及 (iv) 上文所讨论的本院不受异议方基于《规则授权法》和 Dining Car 提出的论点说服的理由，本院认定，尽管规则 9006(b) 的措辞中未包括“statute”，本院仍可依据规则 9006(b) 延长第 108(a)、546(a) 和 549(d) 条规定的时效期间。IBT Int'l, 408 F.3d at 698–99；In re Fundamental Long Term Care, Inc., 501 B.R. 784, 787–791 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2013)；Marsh v. Levy (In re Martin Levy of Berlin D.M.D., P.C.), 416 B.R. 1, 8 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009)；Frentz v. Stites & Harbinson (In re ThermoView Indus., Inc.), 381 B.R. 225, 227 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2008)；但见 In re Cramer, 636 B.R. 830, 833 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2022)；In re Randolph Hosp., Inc., No. 20-10247 (LMJ), 2022 WL 19298765, at \\*1 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. April 25, 2022)；Walnut Hill, 2018 WL 2672242, at \\*2。\n\n因此，剩余问题是，基于本院面前的事实和情形，是否存在“正当理由”延长第 108(a)、546(a) 和 549(d) 条规定的时效期间。Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)。本院认定，基于这些经合并管理的 Chapter 11 案件极为具体且\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 2921 提交 02/15/24 录入 02/15/24 19:38:31 第 13 页，共 21 页 案件 22-50073 文书 2970-2 提交 02/28/24 录入 02/28/24 16:42:19 第 13 页，共 21 页\n\n非同寻常的事实和情形，存在正当理由延长第 108(a)、546(a) 和 549(d) 条规定的时效期间。\n\n尽管提出异议的当事人主张其各自均未对受托人的调查造成损害，但正如法院所观察到的，尽管是在衡平停止时效的语境下，在破产程序中确定是否延长或停止诉讼时效时所应考虑的衡平因素，往往涉及债务人是否未能与破产受托人合作，或者实际上是否试图阻碍受托人为债权人利益而进行的资产调查和清算。Gladstone v. U.S. Bancorp, 811 F.3d 1133, 1143 (9th Cir. 2016)（援引 Olsen v. Zerbetz (In re Olsen), 36 F.3d 71, 72–73 (9th Cir. 1994)，并认定债务人而非被告的隐瞒行为可支持衡平停止时效）。正如 United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Minnesota（美国明尼苏达州联邦破产法院）所述：\n\n破产案件对衡平停止时效提出了一种颇为不同的视角。在典型情形下，引起衡平停止时效的是债务人的行为，而非被告的行为。在某些意义上，这对被告并不公平。另一方面，不同于通常的民事案件——原告至少具有作为基础交易当事人的优势——破产受托人几乎完全必须依赖第三方（债务人）提供发现可撤销转让所必需的信息。\n\nMoratzka v. Pomaville (In re Pomaville), 190 B.R. 632, 637 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1995)（因关于诉讼时效是否可被衡平停止仍存在真实的重大事实争议，而驳回简易判决）。\n\n如 Pomaville 所述，对被告的公平性，是拒绝根据 Rule 9006(b) 延长诉讼时效的法院所关注的核心问题。在 Cramer 一案中，United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California（美国加利福尼亚州中区联邦破产法院）主要关注潜在被告未获通知的问题。636 B.R. at 832。Randolph Hospital 亦有此项顾虑。2022 WL 19298765, at \\*1。然而，在本案中，已通过在可能情况下采用传统送达、在可能情况下采用替代送达，以及\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 2921 于 02/15/24 提交，于 02/15/24 19:38:31 录入，第 14 页，共 21 页　案件 22-50073 文书 2970-2 于 02/28/24 提交，于 02/28/24 16:42:19 录入，第 14 页，共 21 页\n\n依照本院根据《通知及送达程序命令》批准的基本形式，以英文和中文普通话发布公告通知，对《延长期限动议》进行了广泛通知。参见 Cramer, 636 B.R. at 832 nn. 1, 2（区分被告已收到寻求延长期限动议通知的案件）。不过，鉴于此项顾虑，本院目前不会裁定放弃诉讼时效抗辩的问题，而将保留该问题，以待其在对抗程序中被提出时再行裁定。因此，本院认为，任何当事人均难以主张其实体权利受到本决定的影响。\n\n关于 Pomaville 中指出的制衡因素，在这些合并管理的 Chapter 11 案件中，受托人未从个人债务人处获得任何账簿和记录，也未获得个人债务人的任何合作。个人债务人提交了不完整或不准确的财产清单及事务说明，且未履行其在《破产法》项下的义务。11 U.S.C. § 521。个人债务人通过提交“Global Notes”，明确否认并限制其在财产清单及事务说明中经宣誓提供的信息；该等“Global Notes”并非官方表格，且不符合个人债务人在 section 521 项下的义务。(ECF Nos. 77–78.) 可以认为，个人债务人未履行其义务，可能导致认定 sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d) 所载的诉讼时效甚至尚未开始起算。\n\n受托人自获任命以来，未从个人债务人处获得履行义务和合作，反而持续面对个人债务人、其家庭成员、其关联人士及雇员，以及受托人主张由其控制的实体所表现出的顽固不从、阻挠及公然无视法院命令的行为。(See, e.g., ECF Nos. 913, 1046, 1303, 1345, 1362, 1397, 1453, 1521, 1537, 1546, 1709, 1805, 1892, 1896, 2009, 2035, 2036, 2080, 2093, 2342, 2396; Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Kwok (In re Kwok), No. 22-50073 (JAM),\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 2921 于 02/15/24 提交，于 02/15/24 19:38:31 录入，第 15 页，共 21 页　案件 22-50073 文书 2970-2 于 02/28/24 提交，于 02/28/24 16:42:19 录入，第 15 页，共 21 页\n\nAdv. P. No. 22-05032 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 13, 2023), ECF No. 133; Despins ex rel. Kwok v. Mei Guo (In re Kwok), No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05008 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2023), ECF No. 32; Guo, No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05008 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Nov. 7, 2023), ECF No. 46.) 最终，本院至少作出八项命令，认定个人债务人、其女儿 Guo 女士以及被指由个人债务人控制的实体，因未移交资产及滥用证据开示程序而构成藐视法庭。(ECF Nos. 1372, 1537, 1709, 1892, 1896, 2009, 2035, 2093.) 截至目前，每名被认定藐视法庭者仍处于藐视法庭状态。未履行法定义务的严重程度，参见 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(3), (4)，以及在这些合并管理的 Chapter 11 案件中不遵守本院命令的情形，均属非同寻常。\n\n面对这些情形，除努力从个人债务人、其家人、其关联人士及其被指控制的实体获取证据开示外，受托人还不得不寻求广泛且持续的第三方证据开示。(ECF Nos. 636–38, 839, 1116, 1259, 1592, 1789, 2079, 2249, 2304, 2308, 2434, 2508, 2514.) 本院已准许受托人提出的全部十五项 Rule 2004 examinations 动议，授权对数百个实体进行审查。(ECF Nos. 756–58, 866, 1184, 1339, 1646, 1891, 2210, 2281, 2393, 2394, 2474, 2534, 2537.) 本院采信受托人的证言：试图仅根据冷冰冰的银行记录及其他文件，拼凑出个人债务人的财务事务——该等文件显示在多个国家、大洲及司法管辖区之间存在由实体、银行账户和资金转移构成的庞大网络——是在一个最终规模未知且不断扩大的数据集上耗时且困难的工作。该证言尤其可信，因为受托人在缺乏个人债务人法定要求的合作情况下开展工作。此外，受托人的调查一直且仍在受到个人\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 2921 于 02/15/24 提交，于 02/15/24 19:38:31 录入，第 16 页，共 21 页　案件 22-50073 文书 2970-2 于 02/28/24 提交，于 02/28/24 16:42:19 录入，第 16 页，共 21 页\n\n债务人、其家庭成员、关联人士、雇员、追随者及关联实体积极阻挠。\n\n受托人在这些合并管理的 Chapter 11 案件中所面对的“拼图”尤为复杂，而这些案件的事实与 IBT International 的事实相似；后案同样涉及复杂资产转移计划的指控，其中存在“转移的拼图”。408 F.3d at 702。\n\n提出异议的当事人主张，尽管如此，受托人在试图了解破产财产可能的诉因时，未尽到应有勤勉。个人债务人的律师——其亦签署了由个人债务人的女儿 Guo 女士提交的异议——此前曾作证称，与 Guo 女士当前的主张相反，受托人在履行其法定调查职责时过于强势，参见 11 U.S.C. § 1106：\n\n问：Kindseth 先生，您作证称，在该会议之前，您曾强烈敦促受托人——引号——“退一步”。对吗？答：可能有 50 次。是。问：而且——答：也是逐步地。为澄清起见。这并不只是说，什么都别做。而是说，您能否请稍微退一步，给我们一些空间，让和解能够达成。是。问：您所说的是在调查方面退一步，对吗？答：在那些无休止的炸弹般的、你知道的攻击方面退一步，50 次 2004 审查、加急听证会，就是这种持续不断的攻击，Paul Hastings 的 12、14 名律师，你知道的，全力以赴 [原文如此]。我说，您能不能稍微收敛 [原文如此] 一点，给我们一些时间来\n\n(Dec. 12, 2022 Hr'g Tr. at \\*894:2–18, Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund, No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 22-05032 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Dec. 15, 2022), ECF No. 111.)\n\n喘口气并达成和解。\n\n事实上，个人债务人在 2022 年秋季的立场是，受托人的调查推进得过于迅速。在 Kindseth 律师作证之前，其同事——同样代表个人债务人出庭——曾多次反对受托人紧急推进其调查。以下是在 2022 年 10 月 13 日就受托人《请求作出命令以授权遵守 Rule 2004 传票并执行关于控制律师—客户特权及工作成果保护的同意命令之动议》举行的听证会上发生的对话，具有说明意义：\n\nHenzy 先生：下周我将完全投入于可能审阅文件，实际上我想就此向法官阁下提一个问题。但我不确定，法官阁下，这有什么紧急的。但我不确定这有什么紧急的——\n\nDespins 先生：法官阁下，紧急之处在于我们本应控制这些实体。我们被剥夺了控制权——被剥夺了与这些实体有关的特权资料获取权——因为同一位律师同时代表 Kwok 先生和那两个实体。因此，若说不存在紧迫性，我不知道该如何回应。已经十——我们并非仓促行事，也就是说，我们早已提出这一请求。如果我们关于他拥有该等实体的主张正确，紧急之处在于他完全无视本案。因此，对于不存在紧迫性的问题，我不知道该如何回应。\n\n(Oct. 13, 2022 Hr'g Tr. at 106:8–23, ECF No. 1020; see also Sept. 27, 2022 Status Conference Tr. at 23:1–20, ECF No. 936.)\n\n在一个拥有超过 2900 项案卷记录及超过 250 宗相关对抗程序的案件中，受托人依个人债务人律师本人的承认以及本院自身的观察，积极推进与个人债务人财务事务及资产追回有关的证据开示，本院认定，受托人在其努力中已展现出超过合理程度的勤勉。并非每一条线索均有收获，并非每一块石头均被翻开，并非每一项行动均告成功，均不减损受托人已超出合理勤勉程度这一事实。\n\n本案的事实和情形与 Tancredi 法官在 Walnut Hill 一案中所面对的事实完全不同。在 Walnut Hill 一案中，Chapter 7 受托人拥有 sections 108(a) and 546(a) 所规定的完整两年期限，以履行其调查职责并提起诉因。本案中，受托人在案件开始五个月后才获任命——这意味着其在个人债务人的 Chapter 11 案件中有十九个月时间进行调查。(ECF No. 514.) 此外，在 Walnut Hill 一案中，Chapter 7 受托人在申请提交十一个月后才提出其首项 Rule 2004\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 2921 于 02/15/24 提交，于 02/15/24 19:38:31 录入，第 18 页，共 21 页　案件 22-50073 文书 2970-2 于 02/28/24 提交，于 02/28/24 16:42:19 录入，第 18 页，共 21 页\n\n审查动议。(In re Walnut Hill, No. 16-20960 (JJT) (Bankr. D. Conn. May 31, 2017), ECF No. 78.) 在本案中，受托人在其任命获准后不到一个月，即提出其首项进行 Rule 2004 审查的动议，并持续作为其进行中调查的一部分积极寻求证据开示。(ECF No. 636.)\n\n然而，异议方还以受托人证言为依据，对受托人的勤勉程度提出异议；该证言称，聘请法务会计师必须等到财产具有资金后才能进行。具体而言，异议方着重指出，受托人证言称，即使法务会计师愿意按风险代理基础工作，他们也会要求与受托人及其律师享有同等顺位待遇。然而，异议方忽视了，聘请法务会计师的必要性是由于个人债务人未能与受托人合作，以及这些合并管理的 Chapter 11 案件中的证据开示滥用所致。他们还忽视了，行政无力清偿——即行政债权的同等顺位待遇将引起受托人律师担忧的情形——将损害个人债务人的无担保债权人的利益，而受托人对该等债权人负有信义义务。法院不认为异议方着重援引该证言足以支持其关于受托人调查缺乏勤勉的主张。\n\n基于上述理由，法院认定，根据 Rule 9006(b)，有理由延长 sections 108(a)、546(a) 和 549(d) 规定的时效期限。因此，延期动议获准，但以如下所述范围为限。\n\nB. 衡平中止\n\n《破产法》中的时效法规在起草时隐含地认识到衡平法的一般原则，包括衡平中止——尤其是因为破产法院属于衡平法院。Young, 535 U.S. at 49–50。“一般而言，寻求衡平中止的诉讼当事人\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 2921 提交于 02/15/24 录入于 02/15/24 19:38:31 第 19 页，共 21 页 案件 22-50073 文件 2970-2 提交于 02/28/24 录入于 02/28/24 16:42:19 第 19 页，共 21 页\n\n负有确立两项要件的举证责任：(1) 其一直在勤勉行使其权利；以及 (2) 存在某种非常情形阻碍了其行使权利。”Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005) (citing Irwin v. Dep't of Veteran Affs., 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990)); see Castillo ex rel. A.Q.C. v. United States, 656 F.3d 135, 144 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Pace)。衡平中止不应与被告的欺诈性隐瞒相混淆：United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit（美国联邦第二巡回上诉法院）已“明确认定，衡平中止原则的适用并不限于［存在欺诈性隐瞒的案件］。”Donely ex rel. Valdez v. United States, 518 F.3d 173, 183 (2d Cir. 2008) (collecting cases)。事实上，衡平中止并不要求被告存在任何不当行为。Donely, 518 F.3d at 182–83; Canales v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 755, 758, on reh'g 947 F.2d 45, 758 (2d Cir. 1991); Fundamental Long Term Care, 501 B.R. at 791; Fam. Golf Ctrs., Inc. v. Acushnet Co. (In re Randall's Island Fam. Golf Ctrs., Inc.), 288 B.R. 701, 705–06 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003)。此外，就被主张存在不当行为而言，在破产程序中，相关的往往是债务人的行为，而非被告的行为。Gladstone, 811 F.3d at 1143; Pomaville, 190 B.R. at 637。\n\n异议方对受托人现在是否可以适当地请求衡平中止，还是必须在对抗程序中的被告主张受托人起诉状已过时效的抗辩时及若该抗辩提出时，再主张衡平中止，存有争议。异议方——特别是 Taurus Parties 和 Greenwich Parties——主张，衡平中止尚未成熟，适当的考量应当是，如上所述，时效期限能否被延长。受托人主张，可以前瞻性地审议衡平中止。\n\n法院同意异议方的意见。正如 Tancredi 法官在 Walnut Hill 一案中所指出，在 IBT International 一案中，第十一巡回上诉法院仅在以下情形中审议衡平中止：针对对抗程序中起诉状提出时效抗辩的驳回动议。408 F.3d at 700–03。尽管该判决本身并非完全明确，但审查提交给第十一巡回上诉法院的诉状支持如下结论：第十一巡回上诉法院认定，破产法院根据 Rule 9006(b) 作出的延长时效期限的命令属于其自由裁量范围；且无论如何，衡平中止将适用，以排除时效抗辩。Id. at 695–703; see Fundamental Long Term Care, 501 B.R. at 789（“法院认为，适当的标准应当是 Rule 9006 下的‘有理由’分析。此处受托人在期限届满前寻求延长期限（衡平中止推定于时效期限届满后适用）。而这正是第十一巡回上诉法院在转而基于格外谨慎进行衡平中止分析之前，最初在 In re International Administrative Services 一案中采用的分析。”）。\n\n因此，法院驳回延期动议中请求就 sections 108(a)、546(a) 和 549(d) 规定的时效期限作出衡平中止命令的部分，但不妨碍受托人在针对受托人提起的对抗程序已过时效的抗辩作出回应时，提出衡平中止或其他衡平论点。\n\nV. 结论和命令\n\n因此，法院已审查并考虑受托人和异议方在听证期间及其书面陈述中提出的论点、在听证期间及书面陈述中援引的判例法以及衡平因素，并认定已证明存在正当理由，故部分准许受托人的延期动议。据此，现命令如下：\n\n命令：根据 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)，延期动议按本命令所述范围予以部分准许；并进一步\n\n命令：11 U.S.C. 108、546 和 549 规定的受托人提起撤销诉讼的期限延长至 2024 年 8 月 15 日（包括该日）（该延长期限，称为“命令延长期限”）；该日期可在通知和听证后进一步延长；并进一步\n\n命令：尽管本命令中有任何相反规定，根据各方协议，本命令及本命令所规定的命令延长期限不适用于：(i) UBS AG；以及 (ii) Sotheby's International Realty, Inc., Sotheby's International Realty Affiliates LLC, Sotheby's International Realty Referral Company LLC, Sotheby's International Realty Referral Company Inc., Martha Turner Sotheby's International Realty Referral Company LLC, Martha Turner Properties, LP, MTPGP, LLC, Anywhere Advisors LLC, Anywhere Real Estate Services Group LLC, Anywhere Real Estate Group LLC, Anywhere Intermediate Holdings LLC, and Anywhere Real Estate Inc.；并进一步\n\n命令：对于前瞻性衡平中止的请求，延期动议予以部分驳回，但不妨碍受托人在针对受托人提起的对抗程序已过时效的抗辩作出回应时，提出衡平中止或其他衡平论点；并进一步\n\n命令：本命令的条款和条件自录入之时起立即生效并可执行；并进一步\n\n命令：法院对因解释或执行本命令而产生或与之相关的所有事项保留管辖权。\n\n签署于 Connecticut（康涅狄格州）Bridgeport（布里奇波特），2024 年 2 月 15 日。","key_entities":["Je","Guo","Kwok","Despins","Ho Wan Kwok","Paul Hastings"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":1,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":32,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":46,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":78,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":111,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":133,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":465,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":514,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":523,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":636,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":936,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1020,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2494,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2505,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2509,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2515,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2540,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2556,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2591,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2620,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2763,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2810,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2921,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":6860,"status":"published","published_at":"2024-02-15 00:00:00","created_at":"2024-02-15","updated_at":"2026-08-23 19:45:35"}