{"id":"court_ctb_3055_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":3055,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"UNKNOWN","filed_date":"2024-03-28","title":"1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTIC","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION IN RE: . Chapter 11 . Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) HO WAN KWOK, et al., . . (Jointly Administered) Debtors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 . Adversary Proceeding TRUSTEE, . No. 23-05018 (JAM) . Plaintiff, . . v. . . GOLDEN SPRING (NEW YORK) . LTD., and CHINA GOLDEN . SPRING GROUP (HONG KONG) . LIMITED, . . Defendants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LUC A. DESPINS, et al., . Adversary Proceeding . No. 23-05028 (JAM) Plaintiffs, . . v. . . Courtroom 123 ACE DECADE HOLDINGS . Brien McMahon Federal Building LIMITED, et al., . 915 Lafayette Boulevard . Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604 Defendants. . . Tuesday, March 26, 2024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1:04 p.m. TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE JULIE A. MANNING UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE Case 22-50073 Doc 3055 Filed 03/28/24 Entered 03/28/24 09:22:13 Page 1 of 57\n\n| | Case 22-50073 | Doc 3055 | Filed 03/28/24 | | Entered 03/28/24 09:22:13 | Page 2 of 57 | |\n|--------|--------------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|--|\n| | | | | | | 2 | |\n| 1 | | APPEARANCES: | | | | | |\n| | | | | | | | |\n| 2 | For the Chapter 11
Trustee: | | | Patrick R. Linsey, Esquire | | | |\n| 3 | | | | | NEUBERT PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C.
195 Church Street | | |\n| 4
5 | | | | | 13th Floor
New Haven, Connecticut 06510 | | |\n| 6 | | | | | -and- | | |\n| 7 | | | | | Luc A. Despins, Esquire
PAUL HASTINGS, LLP | | |\n| 8 | | | | | 200 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10166 | | |\n| 9 | | | | | Nicholas A. Bassett, Esquire
2050 M Street, NW | | |\n| 10 | | | | | Washington, DC 20036 | | |\n| 11 | | For Yanping \"Yvette\" | | | | | |\n| 12 | Wang: | | | | Carl Gulliver, Esquire
CARL GULLIVER LAW, LLC
470 James Street | | |\n| 13 | | | | | Suite 007 | | |\n| 14 | | | | | New Haven, Connecticut 06513 | | |\n| 15 | | | | | -and- | | |\n| 16 | | | | | Cooper J. Macco, Esquire
MACCO & COREY, P.C. | | |\n| 17 | | | | | 2950 Express Drive South
Suite 109 | | |\n| 18 | | | | Islandia, New York 11749 | | | |\n| 19 | | | | | | | |\n| 20 | | Audio Operator: | | | Electronically recorded | | |\n| 21 | | Transcription Company: | | | Reliable | | |\n| 22 | | | | The Nemours Building
1007 N. Orange Street, Suite 110 | | | |\n| 23 | | | Wilmington, Delaware 19801
Telephone: (302)654-8080 | | | | |\n| 24 | | | | | Email:
gmatthews@reliable-co.com | | |\n| 25 | | | | | Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording,
transcript produced by transcription service. | | |\n| | | | | | | | |\n| | | | | | | | |\n| | | | | | | | |\n\n INDEX MOTIONS: PAGE Matter No. 1: (Re: 40) Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee for Order Enforcing Judgment and Requiring Turnover of Storage Unit Contents to Chapter 11 Estate filed by Plaintiff Despins, Luc A., Chapter 11 Trustee Court's Ruling: 11 Matter No. 2: (Re: 16) Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding Filed by Cooper J. Macco on behalf of Yanping \"Yvette\" Wang, Defendant Court's Ruling: 45 Transcriptionist's Certificate 57 Case 22-50073 Doc 3055 Filed 03/28/24 Entered 03/28/24 09:22:13 Page 3 of 57\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3055 Filed 03/28/24 Entered 03/28/24 09:22:13 Page 4 of 57\n\n4\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 (Proceedings commenced at 1:03 p.m.) THE CLERK: Case Number 22-50073, Ho Wan Kwok. Adversary 23-05018, Despins v -- I'm sorry, I lost my screen -- Despins v Golden Spring, et al.; Adversary 23- 05028, Despins v Ace Decade Holdings Ltd., et al. THE COURT: Okay. Good afternoon. If we could have appearances for the record, starting with the Chapter 11 Trustee, please. MR. DESPINS: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Luc Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. BASSETT: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Nick Bassett from Paul Hastings on behalf of the Chapter 11 Trustee. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. LINSEY: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Patrick Linsey, Neubert Pepe & Monteith, Connecticut counsel for the trustee. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. MACCO: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Cooper Macco, Macco & Corey, in the Ace Decade adversary proceeding, on behalf of Defendant Yvette Wang, admitted pro hac vice. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. GULLIVER: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Carl Gulliver. I have local counsel to Mr. Macco.\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 3055 | Filed 03/28/24 | Entered 03/28/24 09:22:13 | Page 5 of 57 |\n|---------------|----------|----------------|---------------------------|--------------|\n| | | | | |\n\nTHE COURT: Good afternoon.\n\n1\n\n2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 All right. We have some matters in the main case and in the Adversary 5018 regarding the turnover of the storage unit contents. And I haven't studied, but I think I saw a revised -- that there was a revised proposed order. Attorney Bassett, you look like you're going to talk about this matter; is that right? MR. BASSETT: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Go right ahead. MR. BASSETT: Thank you, Your Honor. So I am pleased to report that I believe we have resolved this matter and this is the motion that we filed on February 23rd in the Golden Spring Adversary Proceeding 23- 5018, ECF 40, a motion seeking to turn over to the estate of certain contents of storage units that are the subject of a subpoena that the trustee had executed. We filed that motion. See, there are four storage units located at a place called Westy Storage, which is not far from the Mahwah mansion in Mahwah, New Jersey. We filed that motion on the 23rd. The Court issued a notice of hearing setting an objection deadline of March 19th. In accordance with that order, we then served that notice of hearing on Westy Storage, and then on both, the entity HGA, which we understand to be the current tenant of those units, and then on the Taurus Fund entities, which was the prior\n\n1 tenant of the units.\n\n2 3 The objection deadline of March 19th, 2024, came and went.\n\n4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 There was one objection filed on the evening of March 19th by Taurus Fund and it was really a limited objection which basically stated that Taurus -- that Taurus Fund was objecting to the motion insofar that it applied to the contents of two of the storage units, which Taurus Fund alleges contain property that is theirs. We dispute that. But for purposes, we were able to resolve that, which I'll get to in a second. And then they said that the other two storage units at issue were ones that they took no position with respect to. They weren't asserting any ownership interests over the contents.\n\n15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 So after receiving that objection, we reached out to counsel for Taurus Fund and we were able to resolve their objection through the revised proposed order, which we submitted at ECF 44, I believe, yesterday, which the Court referred to. And, basically, what that order says is that all the property in the two storage units with respect to which Taurus Fund took no position, those are storage units 1A32 and CF09, the order states that all the contents of those units are property of the estate and shall be immediately turned over to the estate.\n\n25\n\nThe order says that the other two units, the ones\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 with respect to which Taurus Fund is asserting an ownership interests, and those are units CA14 and CB14, those -- the contents of those units will, at the trustee's direction and supervision, be transferred to the Mahwah Mansion for safekeeping, pending the resolution of that Mahwah adversary proceeding involving the Taurus Funds or further order of the Court; the idea being that all rights are reserved, with respect to the contents of those units.\n\n9 10 11 12 13 14 15 To be clear, you know, this order and the agreement by the trustee to this order is not any sort of concession that the contents of those units do, in fact, belong to Taurus Fund. And we think, for the reasons we set out in our motion, that they are actually property of the estate, but we also are fine with not litigating that issue right now.\n\n16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 The most important thing for the trustee is that the contents be preserved, so we're going to have them transferred to the mansion. They will, at all times, be subject to the existing preliminary injunction order that governs the mansion, its contents, and all property of Taurus Fund, including the provisions, with respect to the oversight of the security firm that's there. So the idea is that those contents will remain there until such time as that adversary proceeding is concluded or until such time that it's viewed as otherwise teed up to determine if those contents are\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 property of the estate now, irrespective of the adversary proceeding. So, that's the sum and substance of the order, Your Honor. It gives us the contents of two of the units now and sort of preserves the issue of the other two for another day while also making sure that they are kept and stored safely in the meantime. THE COURT: Okay. I, again, am holding a revised proposed order that I see changes, but I haven't really read it, although, I'm somewhat reading it. In the two units where everything is going to be turned over to the trustee, I presume, which I shouldn't, I suppose, that you have some process for that to happen? MR. BASSETT: Yes, Your Honor. I mean, we don't have -- we have not ironed out the specific logistics of how and where we are going to transfer the contents. Some of the contents are, you know, relatively small things, boxes, et cetera, that I think can easily, with the assistance of Kroll, be taken from there to another secure location. Another option, if we deem it necessary, would be to get permission to continue paying for the lease of that storage unit and just keep the property there. We still need to figure out the logistics of that -- THE COURT: Okay.\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MR. BASSETT: -- but the important thing for purposes of this motion was just to get the relief that allows us to dictate what happens to those contents going forward. THE COURT: I understand. I'm just asking questions so that if something occurs, then I have some idea of whether or not there was some process in place, right. And then I think I have a recollection that the motion stated somewhere, and maybe more than one place, that there's been a detailed inventory of all these units done by the trustee or by the trustee's professionals; is that correct? MR. BASSETT: That's correct, Your Honor. THE COURT: So you know what's supposed to be in the two units that are where the contents are being turned over to the trustee in accordance with this order and the two units where the contents are going to be transferred to the Mahwah Mansion? MR. BASSETT: That's correct, Your Honor. Based on the site visits that have occurred at the direction, and with the attendance of the trustee's professionals, we do have an inventory. We also were assured by talking to the owner of the storage facility and its counsel, that all of the locks and passwords have been changed, such that only the trustee could access those units. So we're relatively\n\n1 2 3 confident that, you know, there's not going to be any issue between now and getting the contents out of, you know, anything being removed.\n\n4 5 THE COURT: The people that operate the Westy changed all the locks? Is that --\n\n6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 MR. BASSETT: When we -- we had filed a motion related to the subpoena that we served, which the Court granted that gave the trustee the authority to go in and conduct inspections of the units. Pursuant to the authority granted by that subpoena, Westy Storage and its counsel have been very, very cooperative. They understand that pursuant to the subpoena, the trustee was given the ability to not only initiate, but also complete his investigation during a period in which there would be no risk of any contents being, you know, removed, modified, et cetera. And to facilitate that, they made sure that only the trustee had access to the units. THE COURT: And I'm making a -- I'm ordering that the estate contents are property of the debtors' Chapter 11 estate and counsel agreed to that? MR. BASSETT: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: I assume -- I mean, you're saying he did, but I hope he read that. In any event, he should have if he's agreeing to it, right?\n\nMR. BASSETT: That's correct, Your Honor.\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 I think it's clear from their objection, and I've had multiple conversations with Attorney Conway, and he stated very clearly that Taurus Fund is not taking a position whatsoever as to those two units and, therefore, is not contesting the finding that they are property of the estate. THE COURT: Okay. All right. Does anyone else wish to be heard on the trustee's motion for order enforcing judgment and requiring turnover of storage unit contents to the Chapter 11 estate? (No verbal response) THE COURT: Okay. Hearing nothing, I, as I said, Attorney Bassett, I'm holding the order. I haven't read it thoroughly without you and I talking while I'm reading it, but I mean, it looks fine to me. I asked the questions that I had regarding the order. I don't have any other questions, so I assume that this order will enter. The motion is granted, insofar as it's agreed to that this agreed-upon order resolves the motion and the objection and I don't see any reason why, as I'm sitting here right now, that I would make any change to this order. So the motion is granted and the revised proposed order will enter. MR. BASSETT: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. And that was filed in both, the adversary and the\n\n 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 main case, so that takes care of the first two matters on the calendar. So then, we're turning -- just give me one moment, please. (Pause) THE COURT: So in the Despins v Ace Decade Holdings case, we have a pretrial conference that was scheduled routinely by the Clerk's Office in connection with the issuance of the summons in the adversary and then we have the motion to dismiss on behalf of Yvette Wang. I don't know that we really need to have a pretrial conference, per se, since we're addressing the motion to dismiss, but Attorney Bassett or Attorney Linsey or Trustee Despins, do you have a different view of that? MR. BASSETT: No, Your Honor. Other than that after we have the argument on the motion to dismiss, the trustee may want to update the Court -- THE COURT: That's fine. MR. BASSETT: -- as to certain ongoing proceedings in the United Kingdom that relate to this adversary proceeding. THE COURT: Okay. Then let's turn to the motion to dismiss. Attorney Macco, would you -- it's your motion. Please proceed. Case 22-50073 Doc 3055 Filed 03/28/24 Entered 03/28/24 09:22:13 Page 12 of 57\n\n| 1 | MR. MACCO:
Good afternoon, Your Honor. |\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | We're here on the Defendant Yvette Wang's motion |\n| 3 | to dismiss the adversary proceeding, particularly the fifth |\n| 4 | and sixth claims of reef as they are against Defendant Wang. |\n| 5 | My motion, I'm confident on the papers.
I'm happy to go into |\n| 6 | further detail, but, specifically, as to the findings that |\n| 7 | the property in question was property of the estate, the |\n| 8 | complaint is devoid of any details related to whether that |\n| 9 | motion, the order itself, was ever served upon Ms. Wang or |\n| 10 | competent counsel at the time entitled to receive notice. |\n| 11 | Further, to the extent that that order may be |\n| 12 | binding that that there was a finding that this was property |\n| 13 | of the estate, the transfer of the stocks was not willful in |\n| 14 | as much that Defendant Wang was not aware of the order, |\n| 15 | because, again, it was never served or provided to the |\n| 16 | Defendant or her counsel at that time. |\n| 17 | Counseling referenced in the complaint, Alex |\n| 18 | Lipman did not appear in this matter.
He had not appeared in |\n| 19 | the criminal matters that had not started at that time.
He |\n| 20 | represented Ms. Wang in a separate criminal matter, which was |\n| 21 | not part of the Ho Wan Kwok Enterprise, as it's been |\n| 22 | referenced in the other matters.
So I believe that the |\n| 23 | complaint, on its face, devoid of factual allegations in |\n| 24 | order to find a holding that Ms. Wang should be sanctions or |\n| 25 | damages related to this transfer. |\n\n 14 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 As specifically set forth in the motion, and I'll go into as much detail as the Court likes, but -- THE COURT: Well, it's your motion, so you go into as much detail as you like. MR. MACCO: Understood, Your Honor. The motion itself was a motion for contempt of Court as against the debtor. The debtor is not the Defendant and the Defendant was not served with that motion. The finding in there, as it relates to the Defendant's interest in property would violate the Constitution if it took her property without proper notice and an opportunity to be heard on that. So -- THE COURT: What property? MR. MACCO: Property being a share of stock that was subsequently transferred, which is the basis of this adversary proceeding. THE COURT: So she's claiming it's her property? MR. MACCO: The property that's referenced, it was certainly her property. It was titled in her name in the British Virgin Islands, as I'm sure the trustee is aware based on his discovery from Trident, the agent for Ace Decade, as he has referenced in that matter. That is a titled asset; it is not a bearer asset. For a finding that this was actually property of another entity, the debtor in this matter, there would have Case 22-50073 Doc 3055 Filed 03/28/24 Entered 03/28/24 09:22:13 Page 14 of 57\n\n| 1 | to be some notice to the actual owner of that property, the |\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | Defendant, Ms. Wang.
There was no notice to Ms. Wang and, |\n| 3 | therefore, there could be no determination that it was not |\n| 4 | her property, as to her. |\n| 5 | For the findings as to contempt, that finding |\n| 6 | should -- is fine.
It's valid.
It has no issues here, but |\n| 7 | that was against the debtor and the debtor defended that |\n| 8 | motion.
He appeared in that motion.
He was served with that |\n| 9 | motion for contempt. |\n| 10 | The Defendant Ms. Wang was not, was not granted |\n| 11 | due process related to it, and, therefore, was not bound by |\n| 12 | the findings in that order. |\n| 13 | THE COURT:
Well, you just said it wasn't contempt |\n| 14 | as against her, so why would she need due process? |\n| 15 | MR. MACCO:
Because the trustee is using the |\n| 16 | findings of that order, specifically, the findings that the |\n| 17 | share -- that Ace Decade was an entity that belonged to the |\n| 18 | debtor, as a finding against Ms. Wang in this adversary |\n| 19 | proceeding. |\n| 20 | THE COURT:
Isn't there evidence that the British |\n| 21 | Virgin Islands company was served?
Wasn't she the director |\n| 22 | of it? |\n| 23 | MR. MACCO:
Ms. Wang was a director of the British |\n| 24 | Virgin Islands company. |\n| 25 | THE COURT:
Isn't there evidence that the British |\n| | |\n\n 16 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Virgin Islands companies were served? MR. MACCO: Your Honor, I'm not aware of that evidence. THE COURT: Shouldn't you know that? I mean, you're coming in and saying that her due process rights have been violated. She didn't know. But she was acting in her capacity. She didn't personally own the share, right? She didn't own the share personally as Yvette Wang; she owned it as -- the company entity owned it and she was the director of it. MR. MACCO: She owned the share personally, Your Honor. THE COURT: Personally, when? MR. MACCO: She did own it. THE COURT: When did she own the share personally? MR. MACCO: I believe it was in early 2022, into '23 and then the transfer occurred. THE COURT: So post-petition? MR. MACCO: She owned the share of stock prepetition and post-petition. THE COURT: Okay. MR. MACCO: She was always the owner of the share of stock personally. THE COURT: She was listed on the debtors' schedules as a creditor and served with things in this case Case 22-50073 Doc 3055 Filed 03/28/24 Entered 03/28/24 09:22:13 Page 16 of 57\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 in the main case; isn't that correct? MR. MACCO: She may have been. There was some question at that time as to the debtors' address -- sorry - to the Defendant's address as related to the Defendant's security concerns. It's my understanding that at the time of this motion, the trustee -- THE COURT: At the time of which motion? MR. MACCO: The motion -- the contempt motion - sorry -- the contempt motion against the debtor, the trustee was not aware of Defendant Wang's address and could not serve her. Part of the finding in that contempt motion was that the debtor was obligated to find Ms. Wang and provide her with a copy of that motion, a finding which the Court later said was insufficient because the debtor had not provided sufficient evidence that that order had actually been turned over to Ms. Wang. That was on the subsequent, the final contempt motion, not the partial resolution order. So, although Ms. Wang was listed as a creditor, it is not evident that Ms. Wang was ever served with matters going forward and that's why there was a derivative in the partial resolution order for the debtor to serve Ms. Wang -- THE COURT: The partial resolution had to do with the corporate -- I'm not sure you're mixing up two things here.\n\n 18 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MR. MACCO: I apologize, Your Honor. THE COURT: Wasn't one of them about -- well, anyway, keep going. I'm not sure you're accurate on that. There was a corporate governance order -- MR. MACCO: Corporate governance order, correct. THE COURT: -- that's what, which there was a partial resolution. MR. MACCO: There was a corporate governance order entered on -- I apologize for the delay, Your Honor -- the corporate governance order was entered in August of 2022. In October of 2022, the trustee brought a contempt motion for the debtors' alleged failure to comply with the corporate governance order. Subsequently, in of -- November 17th, 2022, a partial resolution order resolving the contempt motion was entered by the Court. That order included a finding that Ace Decade was property of the debtor. That was a contempt motion filed against the debtor, not against the Defendant. The language of that order directed the debtor to find and deliver a copy of that order to the Defendant, Ms. Wang. That was later found in the contempt order resolving the remainder of the motion entered in January 24th, 2023, to have not been complied with. So the Court, by its own terms, in the language of the contempt order from early 2023, found that Ms. Wang had Case 22-50073 Doc 3055 Filed 03/28/24 Entered 03/28/24 09:22:13 Page 18 of 57\n\n 19 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 not been served with the partial resolution order or that insufficient evidence -- THE COURT: I don't think that's accurate, but that's okay. You can make the argument. MR. MACCO: I apologize, Your Honor. I thought that the language of the contempt order, specifically, paragraphs 5 through 8, said the debtor did not officially establish that -- THE COURT: Tell me the order -- give me the -- if you would, it would be helpful for me to -- tell me what ECF number is at the top of the order that you're reading it from. MR. MACCO: I apologize, I do not have the ECF orders in front of me. I have the dates listed. THE COURT: All right. What's the date? MR. MACCO: The date for the contempt -- MR. BASSETT: Your Honor, the partial resolution order is at ECF 1110 in the main case. The order I'm reading from is the contempt order, which was entered January 24th, 2023. THE COURT: All right. Well, let's take them in order. MR. MACCO: Okay. THE COURT: Let's take the orders in order. So, what's the first one, Mr. Bassett? 1101? Case 22-50073 Doc 3055 Filed 03/28/24 Entered 03/28/24 09:22:13 Page 19 of 57\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 3055
Filed 03/28/24
Entered 03/28/24 09:22:13
Page 20 of 57 |\n|---------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | 20 |\n| 1 | MR. BASSETT:
1110. |\n| 2 | THE COURT:
1110.
All right.
Order regarding |\n| 3 | partial resolution of trustee's contempt motion, November 17, |\n| 4 | 2022, ECF Number 1110. |\n| 5 | Holding Ho Wan Kwok, the debtor, in civil contempt |\n| 6 | for failure to comply with the corporate governance rights |\n| 7 | order and imposing appropriate sanctions.
And upon evidence |\n| 8 | presented, including a transcript of the April 6th, 2022, |\n| 9 | meeting of creditors under Section 341, the particular of |\n| 10 | claims -- oh, yes, now, this is bringing back some memories. |\n| 11 | So, isn't the particular of claims in the U.K. |\n| 12 | filed where Mr. Kwok says he owns Ace Decade; isn't that what |\n| 13 | that was? |\n| 14 | MR. DESPINS:
Yes. |\n| 15 | THE COURT:
Yeah, I think that's where -- you |\n| 16 | might want to look at that, counsel. |\n| 17 | And it's ordered that the Court finds that the |\n| 18 | debtor exclusively beneficially owned and controlled Ace |\n| 19 | Decade Holdings, Ltd. on February 15, 2022, petition date, |\n| 20 | and maintained such exclusive beneficial ownership and |\n| 21 | control, up to and immediately prior to the date of the |\n| 22 | trustee's appointment.
And that Dawn State, together with |\n| 23 | Ace Decade, the Ace Decade's entities is -- the Ace Decade |\n| 24 | wholly-owned subsidiary and is exclusively owned and |\n| 25 | controlled by Ace Decade. |\n| | |\n\n| 1 | For the avoidance of doubt, Yvette Yanping Wang, |\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | is not, and has never been a beneficial owner of the shares |\n| 3 | in Dawn State.
The debtor does not contest these findings in |\n| 4 | this paragraph and will not appeal such. |\n| 5 | While I have an absolute visual recollection of |\n| 6 | this hearing right now, of Mr. Henzy (phonetic), standing |\n| 7 | right where you are and saying that he would not contest the |\n| 8 | findings and would not appeal the findings.
So, it says |\n| 9 | that -- that's what it says, okay.
The debtor has -- |\n| 10 | represents he's never transferred or purported to transfer |\n| 11 | ownership of Ace Decade to any other person or entity since |\n| 12 | the petition date. |\n| 13 | And remember, I think, actually, and Mr. Bassett, |\n| 14 | I'm sure, will confirm or correct me if I'm wrong, but the |\n| 15 | reason the 341 meeting testimony is mentioned in this order |\n| 16 | is because Mr. Kwok testified he owned Ace Decade at the 341 |\n| 17 | meeting; isn't that correct, Mr. Bassett? |\n| 18 | MR. BASSETT:
That's correct, Your Honor. |\n| 19 | THE COURT:
Okay.
So that's where you have to |\n| 20 | start, okay.
That's where you have to start. |\n| 21 | So it goes on and it says -- and what was going on |\n| 22 | at the time was the trustee was trying to get the Ace Decade |\n| 23 | shares into his name as the representative of the debtors' |\n| 24 | estate, who the debtor had already testified he owned, and |\n\nthat his lawyers in this bankruptcy case said, they're not\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 going to contest the findings that he never transferred or purported to transfer any ownership or control of Ace Decade to any other person or entity since the petition date. So, I think that's part of your problem, right, is this order. And it says: The debtor stipulates to the admissibility of Trustee Exhibit 13 on the issue between -- of the relationship between the debtor and Yvette Wang. MR. MACCO: But, Your Honor, the debtor is stipulating to these matters, not the defendant in this matter, Yvette Wang. THE COURT: I understand all that, counsel. MR. MACCO: I apologize for interrupting you, Your Honor. THE COURT: No, I understand what you're saying, but she testified in this case. She was deposed before the shares of the stock were transferred to whomever they're transferred to now. She knew what was going on in this case. She was working for the debtor. MR. MACCO: Your Honor, regardless of her knowledge of what was going on -- whether she had knowledge or did not have knowledge of the specifics of (indiscernible) this case, the language of the partial resolution order, specifically, the findings that the debtor stipulates to, can't be binding on Ms. Wang as a third party.\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 THE COURT: Where does it say anywhere that this had to be served on Yvette Wang? I don't see that. MR. MACCO: I believe -- well, that order, the debtor was directed to serve a letter, I believe -- THE COURT: No, not this order. That doesn't say that. This order doesn't say that. You're talking about a letter that the trustee had asked counsel to sign and file and he wouldn't do it. But then he sent -- Mr. Kwok sent some letter that said the trustee thinks I have an interest in this and, you know - anyway, I recall what happened. There's nothing in this order here. I don't see where it says that this order had to be served on Yvette Wang. So, with regard to the November 17th order, that argument about it, you know, not being served on her, okay, I'm not finding that persuasive. So what's the next order? MR. MACCO: Just one more quick matter on that. Whether it directed her to be served, it did have an effect on her interest in property and in order for her to have due process under the law -- THE COURT: What interest did she have in the property at the time of the filing? MR. MACCO: She had an ownership interest in Ace Decade, a personal ownership in the (indiscernible).\n\n 24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 THE COURT: Well, that's not what Mr. Kwok said. MR. MACCO: I understand that, but I -- you know, Mr. Kwok -- THE COURT: So, why isn't she challenging, then, what Mr. Kwok said? MR. MACCO: Your Honor -- THE COURT: She -- he testified at a 341 meeting and he wrote -- he put in a -- she was the -- an officer or director of Ace Decade, right? MR. MACCO: Correct, Your Honor. THE COURT: So she's saying he's lying? MR. MACCO: Your Honor, without going into - without testifying on behalf of my client, because it would be inappropriate in this matter, Ms. Kwok -- Ms. Wang believes that there was some confusion about the ownership interests in Ace Decade at the time of the testimony. THE COURT: Well, what would be the confusion? She was an officer and director so if there was confusion, why didn't she fix it? MR. MACCO: Ms. Wang asserts, or I believe she will assert, that this ownership interest in Ace Decade was never actually held in the name of Mr. Kwok. I think there was some confusion on the testimony, which will certainly be flushed out later in the adversary proceeding. THE COURT: Well, this doesn't say it was in his Case 22-50073 Doc 3055 Filed 03/28/24 Entered 03/28/24 09:22:13 Page 24 of 57\n\n 25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 name. That's not what this order says. MR. MACCO: It says he's the beneficial owner. THE COURT: It says he exclusively and beneficially owned and controlled Ace Decade. They never said it was in his name. There's a difference. MR. MACCO: Understood, Your Honor. Moving on then to the -- THE COURT: What's the next order you want me to look at? MR. MACCO: The contempt order, which is January 24th, 2023. THE COURT: Okay. Hold on a minute. I'll find it. MR. MACCO: And, specifically, paragraphs 5 through 8. THE COURT: You've got to give me a minute to get to the docket number. What? UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Right there. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 1572. An order granting motion to hold debtor in contempt of corporate governance order, January 24, 2023. So you want me to go to -- well, let me read it, the introduction and background first before we get to the paragraphs that you're talking about. Case 22-50073 Doc 3055 Filed 03/28/24 Entered 03/28/24 09:22:13 Page 25 of 57\n\n(Pause)\n\n1\n\n2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 THE COURT: So, it says, starting on page 3 of the order, findings of fact. The Court has already made the findings of fact contained in the paragraphs 1 and 2 below, as set forth in the partial resolution order, the first being, the debtor exclusively beneficially owned and controlled Ace Decade on February 15, 2022, petition date, and maintained exclusive beneficial ownership and control up to, and including, and mainly prior to the date of the trustee's appointment. All what I've already read, okay. For the avoidance of doubt, Yvette Wang, here and after, Ms. Wang, is not, and never had been a beneficial owner of shares in Ace Decade or Dawn State. And then that references Trustee Exhibits 6 and 7, 10 and 15 that were introduced in the November evidentiary hearing that included excerpts from depositions.\n\n17 18 19 20 21 MR. MACCO: So, Your Honor, assuming that the partial resolution order found that Ms. Wang was the owner of this property, there is no evidence that Ms. Wang would then be on subsequent notice of the automatic stay without being provided some sort of notice. The findings --\n\n22 23 THE COURT: What do you mean being provided some sort of notice?\n\n24 25 MR. MACCO: There's a finding that property that was titled in her name, the share of stock, was property of\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 the debtors' bankruptcy estate; that was made in the partial resolution order. Assuming that's adopted for the purposes of this adversary proceeding against Ms. Wang, there must also be a showing that Ms. Wang made a willful violation of the bankruptcy stay before she can be held liable for sanctions or damages. THE COURT: Well, that's damages. That's not necessarily sanctions. There's two different steps in that provision of the Code. MR. MACCO: I apologize, Your Honor. THE COURT: You might be right about damages and you might be right about certain damages, but just because she -- I don't have to find somebody acted willfully to say that they violated the automatic stay. MR. MACCO: Absolutely not. The willful definition really indicates that there was knowledge of the automatic stay. That's the case law. THE COURT: Well, I'm not sure that's exactly true, but that's fine. MR. MACCO: I apologize, that's my understanding. THE COURT: So, what's your point? So you're saying, at least, what sounds to me what you're saying is, I can't -- I might not be able to have her pay damages, if I can't find that she acted willfully. Is that our point?\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 3055
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Page 28 of 57 |\n|---------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | 28 |\n| 1 | MR. MACCO:
Correct.
And she -- |\n| 2 | THE COURT:
But that doesn't mean that I can't |\n| 3 | find that she's not -- I could still find she's in violation |\n| 4 | of the automatic stay.
People can be violation of the |\n| 5 | automatic stay even if they don't know about a bankruptcy |\n| 6 | case. |\n| 7 | MR. MACCO:
Certainly understood, Your Honor. |\n| 8 | And whether or not this transfer is avoidable is |\n| 9 | not the issue in the adversary proceeding as against |\n| 10 | Ms. Wang.
It's whether they -- the trustee is entitled to |\n| 11 | sanctions and damages against Ms. Wang as the transferor and, |\n| 12 | therefore, knowledge of the bankruptcy automatic stay must |\n| 13 | come into play to a certain extent. |\n| 14 | The finding in the contempt order -- |\n| 15 | THE COURT:
Yeah, but not to a full extent. |\n| 16 | MR. MACCO:
The finding in the contempt order |\n| 17 | finds that there was not sufficient evidence that Mr. Kwok |\n| 18 | ever delivered the letter advising Ms. Wang of the partial |\n| 19 | resolution order or did not do anything with the stocks to |\n| 20 | Ms. Wang. |\n| 21 | THE COURT:
I don't think the letter had nothing |\n| 22 | to do with the partial resolution order at all.
That's my |\n| 23 | recollection.
My recollection is that Mr. Despins was trying |\n| 24 | to come up with a solution and I think there was a discussion |\n| 25 | on the record with Mr. Kwok's counsel about a letter being |\n| | |\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 sent United Kingdom to address this issue. The letter -- where I'm having a little difficulty is I don't think the two are connected at all. Partial resolution was with regard to the corporate governance order. With regard to what was going on in -- in the United Kingdom in an action that Mr. Kwok commenced with Ace Decade and Dawn State as the Plaintiffs is my recollection, or whatever -- and maybe they're not called \"Plaintiffs\" -- Petitioners, he said under oath, that he owned Ace Decade. So, I don't think you're -- I don't think that's correct that they're connected, okay. MR. MACCO: Understood, Your Honor. THE COURT: So what's your point? MR. MACCO: Just for clarification, Ms. Wang is in the United Kingdom. There's litigation ongoing in the United Kingdom regarding Ace Decade, but Ms. Wang currently sits at MDC in Brooklyn. She was located in New York, I believe, at all relevant times before this. So the letter sent to the United Kingdom, I'm not sure, is the letter referenced by the contempt order, but that was my understanding and I apologize if that's incorrect. Your Honor, just to wrap this up, and I apologize for taking too much of the Court's time. THE COURT: No, that's what we're here for; we're here for this hearing.\n\n| 1 | MR. MACCO:
I think there must be some finding |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | that Ms. Wang was, A, on notice of the automatic stay in |\n| 3 | order to find damages in this matter and potentially |\n| 4 | sanctions.
Secondly, I don't believe that the partial |\n| 5 | resolution order, to the extent it attempts to bind Ms. Wang |\n| 6 | for the purposes that Ace Decade, the share of Ace Decade was |\n| 7 | property of the debtors' estate, was properly served on |\n| 8 | Ms. Wang in order for her to appear, defend, or otherwise be |\n| 9 | heard on this.
So I think the partial resolution order, to |\n| 10 | the extent it attempts to take property of Ms. Wang without |\n| 11 | giving her due process, violates the Constitution. |\n| 12 | And then to the extent that the other matters, the |\n| 13 | contempt order or the partial resolution order provided to |\n| 14 | Ms. Wang, I don't think she had sufficient knowledge in order |\n| 15 | to take a willful violation of the bankruptcy stay, whether |\n| 16 | the transfer of such -- whether if the transfer of the share |\n| 17 | of Ace Decade is determined to be a violation of the |\n| 18 | bankruptcy stay. |\n| 19 | I have nothing further, Your Honor. |\n| 20 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Thank you. |\n| 21 | Attorney Bassett? |\n| 22 | MR. BASSETT:
Your Honor, may I use the podium? |\n| 23 | THE COURT:
Certainly. |\n| 24 | MR. BASSETT:
Thank you. |\n| 25 | Again, for the record, Nick Bassett from Paul |\n\n1 Hastings on behalf of the Chapter 11 Trustee.\n\n2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Your Honor, we often jump into arguments in the middle of substance and I think in this case, it's helpful to take one step back and just give the Court the kind of lay of the land or history as far as what this complaint seeks. And, frankly, you know, as you look at this complaint at issue in this adversary proceeding, as far as this Chapter 11 case is concerned, this complaint is about as simple as you're going to find compared to the complexity of many of the other complaints that the trustee has brought.\n\n11 12 13 14 15 16 It's really this simple. On November 17th, 2022, this Court entered the partial resolution order, which we just went through, very clearly finding that Ace Decade, the ownership of Ace Decade is property of the estate and, also, that it was never, and is not property of Defendant Yvette Wang.\n\n17 18 19 20 21 22 Then, less than two months later, on January 3rd, 2023, the Defendants, both Defendant Wang and the other Defendant who was the transferee, violated the automatic stay by causing Yvette Wang's ownership, purported nominal ownership of Ace Decade to be transferred to Defendant Hao (phonetic) in Switzerland.\n\n23 24 25 Based on those simple facts, the trustee seeks in the complaint -- he has three causes of action. The first seeks a declaration that the transfer of the share is void ab\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 initio as a violation of the automatic stay. The second seeks damages against both Defendants for violation of the automatic stay under Section 362(k) of the Bankruptcy Code. And the third cause of action seeks sanctions, including punitive damages from the Defendants for that same violation of the automatic stay.\n\n7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Now, an adversary proceeding based on these simple facts should be able to be resolved quickly in this court. It seems apparent to us that Defendant Wang does not want that to happen, hence the filing of the motion to dismiss before the Court today, which as I see it, can really only be viewed as a delay tactic. Because I think it's very clear that none of the arguments have any merit and it's very clear that none of the arguments being made are really proper arguments to raise on a motion to dismiss where the only issue is whether the trustee has melt his minimal pleading burden, and he has easily done so.\n\n18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Now, I want first want to point out that the motion to dismiss, and I think the Court sort of acknowledged this, but the motion to dismiss does not even take issue with the first cause of action in the complaint. So Defendant Wang is not arguing that there was no violation of the automatic stay here and therefore, she's not seeking dismissal of the cause of action that seeks a declaration that the transfer is void ab initio. She's only seeking\n\n1 2 3 4 5 dismissal of the other two counts, which seek damages or sanctions against her. So regardless of the outcome of this motion to dismiss, that count, which is sort of the principal claim at issue, making sure that there's a finding that the transfer is void, that goes forward.\n\n6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Defendant Wang only seeks dismissal of Counts 2 and 3 of the complaint, as I said, and these are -- all the arguments they make do not actually identify any claim deficiencies and, at best, could raise issues of fact charitably, that could be considered as the litigation moves forward. The issue that the Court has heard about, and really, which is at the heart of the Defendant's argument, is whether or not Defendant Wang had notice of the finding of the Court that the Ace Decade share is property of the estate.\n\n16 17 18 19 20 21 22 And what she argues is that there is no allegations in the complaint that the share is property of the estate. That's obviously contradicted by the plain allegations in the complaint, which refer to and discuss in detail, the partial resolution order and its findings that, as I said before, the Ace Decade is property of the estate and is not property of Defendant Wang.\n\n23 24 25 She then argues, though, that that order is somehow not valid because she was not on notice of it prior to its entry. That's both legally irrelevant and factually\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 false. It's legally irrelevant because as we argue in our papers, there is no requirement that everyone in the world be on notice of a finding of the Court that property is property of the estate for them to be bound by that order. And were that the law, it would be completely unworkable and would lead to absurd results and a Chapter 11 process that simply would not function correctly.\n\n8 9 10 11 12 13 One of the cases that we cite in our opposition to the motion to dismiss is the, In re Motors Liquidation Company case. It's an SDNY case from 2018, affirmed by the Second Circuit which talks about how the law of the case doctrine applies in bankruptcy cases across adversary proceedings and contested matters. There, the Court said:\n\n14 15 16 17 18 \"The law of the case doctrine does not turn on whether all parties to a proceeding participated in the earlier resolution of a legal issue. And the Bankruptcy Court was not required to revisit anew, the same question each time a new party joined the bankruptcy proceedings.\"\n\n19 20 21 22 That's the law and it makes good sense because, otherwise, it would be unworkable to retry issues every time a new party tried to come in and revisit a past order of the Court.\n\n23 24 25 But as I said, Your Honor, it's also a factually erroneous argument when you look at the allegations of the complaint and the history of this case. First of all, just\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 to sort of point out the elephant in the room, what you don't hear counsel saying is that Defendant Wang did not, in fact, have notice of the partial resolution order and the automatic stay. I would submit that, of course, she did and the complaint and the circumstances surrounding and of which the Court can take judicial notice in this case, make that abundantly clear.\n\n8 9 10 11 12 13 14 First of all, paragraph 38 of the complaint - and, by the way, when we're talking about a motion to dismiss, Your Honor, you obviously have to take a step back and remember the standard that we're dealing with. Under Iqbal, the standard is, has the trustee sufficiently alleged allegations to render it plausible that he's entitled to relief on his claims in the complaint?\n\n15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 And all that's necessary for that to be the case is for the allegations of the complaint to allow the Court to infer the existence of the facts necessary to prove - necessary for the Plaintiff to prove. And here, we have readily met that standard for numerous reasons. First of all, paragraph 38 of the complaint expressly alleges, pointblank, that Defendant Wang's conduct in causing the Ace Decade transfer was intentional and that she had prior knowledge of the automatic stay at the time. That alone is enough.\n\n25\n\nDefendant Wang complains that we haven't alleged\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 details surrounding her notice. Not necessary to do so to satisfy our pleading burden, but we have done so anyway. Specifically, we have alleged that on November 15th, 2023, counsel to the trustee emailed a copy of the proposed form of partial resolution order to Mr. Alex Lipman, who the trustee understands acted as counsel for Wang at a prior point in time or at that time, even.\n\n8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Now, counsel has said that Mr. Lipman was counsel for Ms. Wang in an unrelated criminal matter. Even if that's the case, I would submit that under that basis of the allegation alone, it is at the very least, plausible that Ms. Wang came to have notice of the partial resolution order through somebody who either, at the time or previously, had acted as her counsel.\n\n15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 But in addition to that, and this is what the Court mentioned, and which Defendant Wang does not even mention in her motion to dismiss or her reply brief, in which counsel was not familiar with, we specifically allege in the complaint that on November 16th, 2022, counsel to the trustee served a copy of the partial resolution order on Ace Decade, care of Trident Trust Company, its registered agent in the BVI.\n\n23 24 25 Now, Defendant Wang claims to be the both, nominal and beneficial owner of Ace Decade. If she is, in fact, the owner of Ace Decade, she absolutely would have gotten notice\n\n1 2 3 4 by virtue of the fact that we served the registered agent for that company in the BVI. At the very least, it have well more than plausible that she had notice as a result of that service.\n\n5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 In addition to those allegations, Your Honor, we have, of course, the factual backdrop of this case. As the Court acknowledged earlier, Ms. Wang is certainly no stranger to the Chapter 11 case. She was deposed in connection with the DIP financing motion back, I believe, in April of 2022, where she served as a representative for Golden Spring. Obviously, anybody who sits for a deposition in a bankruptcy case is aware of the bankruptcy case's existence.\n\n13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 The last thing I want to note, Your Honor, is that now there's both, in the comments counsel made today and the motion to dismiss, there are statements made to the effect of, well, Ms. Wang was not served with the motion for contempt, which ultimately led to the partial resolution order. And she should have been served with that is the implication. But that sort of belies and ignores the history surrounding the filing of the contempt motion and what had been told to the trustee at that time.\n\n22 23 24 25 Prior to the trustee's filing of the motion, and, in fact, up until I think days before the hearing on the motion, the debtor, as the Court acknowledged, based on his filings in the United Kingdom, had stated under oath that he\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 was the owner of Ace Decade. But more than that, and which counsel didn't knowledge, Defendant Yvette Wang signed the particulars of claim form filed in the United Kingdom, which contained that statement. It was not until the eve of the hearing on the contempt motion that all of a sudden the debtor in an obvious attempt to avoid the trustee getting control over the Ace Decade share, said that, Oh, no, my employee/assistant, now criminal co-defendant, Yvette Wang, is the actual owner of the share. So, we could not have, and had no reason to serve her with a contempt motion, or as counsel suggests in their brief, file an adversary proceeding to get ownership of the share. That was completely unnecessary, because it had been represented to us by both, the debtor and Defendant Yvette Wang that the Debtor owned the share. So, Your Honor, for all these reasons, we think it's very clear that none of the arguments raised in the motion to dismiss have merit. They don't actually identify any legitimate pleading deficiency in the trustee's complaint and therefore, we would ask that the motion to dismiss be denied. Thank you. THE COURT: Thank you. Counsel, any response? MR. MACCO: Briefly, Your Honor. There was some question as to when that email to\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 3055
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Page 39 of 57 |\n|---------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | 39 |\n| 1 | Alex Lipman was sent.
Counsel to the trustee just indicated |\n| 2 | that it was sent in November of 2023, as of the pleading. |\n| 3 | This is well after -- |\n| 4 | MR. BASSETT:
I meant November '22, Your Honor. |\n| 5 | That was my mistake. |\n| 6 | MR. MACCO:
Your Honor, but the pleading does say |\n| 7 | November '23, which raises separate issues, other and apart |\n| 8 | from that. |\n| 9 | As to the indication that we don't need to |\n| 10 | relitigate matters as parties become aware of proceedings, |\n| 11 | while that's certainly true, the only party that should be on |\n| 12 | notice, and not every party on notice, the party that may |\n| 13 | hold an ownership interest, which may be determined by the |\n| 14 | Court. |\n| 15 | Further, and finally, whether or not -- not |\n| 16 | finally -- furthermore, in response to the trustee's |\n| 17 | allegations that the Defendant should have made some |\n| 18 | allegation that she wasn't on notice, specifically, that's |\n| 19 | inappropriate for this type of motion and couldn't be |\n| 20 | considered because it would be outside the record anyway. |\n| 21 | THE COURT:
Well, let's step back and see what is |\n| 22 | appropriate. |\n| 23 | This is a motion to dismiss for failure to state a |\n| 24 | claim upon which relief can be granted, correct? |\n| 25 | MR. MACCO:
Correct. |\n| | |\n\n 40 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 THE COURT: So the standard is I have to accept all the allegations as true, right? MR. MACCO: Correct, Your Honor. THE COURT: So how -- I'd like you to tell me, and first, I did review your motion and you don't contest -- you say a few things. You don't move to dismiss Count 1, but you move to dismiss Counts 2 and 3, and then you're proposed order -- and there's more than counts -- there's more than three counts in the complaint is my recollection, as well. And then you ask the Court to grant the motion as to 2 and 3 and then dismiss the complaint in its entirety. I don't know how I could possibly do that. MR. MACCO: Your Honor, I believe it says dismiss -- and if not, that's addressing our dismiss the complaint in its entirety as against Ms. Wang. The complaints to avoid the transfer against the recipient of the transfer, Mr. Hao or Hao. THE COURT: Well, that's not what your proposed order says. But in any event -- MR. MACCO: Well, I apologize. That's a typographical error. THE COURT: What you haven't answered -- you keep saying the trustee hasn't established. The trustee doesn't have to establish anything. He just has to plead. So, how is the pleading not plausible? Now is the Case 22-50073 Doc 3055 Filed 03/28/24 Entered 03/28/24 09:22:13 Page 40 of 57\n\n| 1 | pleading, on its face, deficient when it asserts in Count 1 |\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | that the transfer is in violation of the automatic stay?
It |\n| 3 | isn't just a recitation of the statute, which is one of the |\n| 4 | reasons that motions to dismiss are granted, is because |\n| 5 | somebody, you know, the pleader just puts forth a statute. |\n| 6 | But he doesn't do that.
That's not what the |\n| 7 | complaint does.
So how is it insufficiently pled?
And if |\n| 8 | it's insufficiently pled, then why didn't you file a motion |\n| 9 | for a more definite statement?
I mean, how is it |\n| 10 | insufficiently pled?
I'm having difficulty seeing why your |\n| 11 | motion should be granted. |\n| 12 | You may be right at trial.
I don't know.
But |\n| 13 | that's not where we are.
We're at the motion to dismiss |\n| 14 | stage and I'm bound to find that all the allegations, as |\n| 15 | pled, are true.
And you're saying he hasn't established.
He |\n| 16 | doesn't have to establish anything. |\n| 17 | So how is it deficient?
Tell me how it's |\n| 18 | deficient, because I'm having troubles being persuaded by |\n| 19 | your argument. |\n| 20 | MR. MACCO:
Your Honor, without re-hashing it -- |\n| 21 | THE COURT:
Well, you have to re-hash it, because |\n| 22 | I'm asking you to. |\n| 23 | MR. MACCO:
When I say \"establish,\" I meant \"pled |\n| 24 | with particularity,\" and I apologize for -- |\n| 25 | THE COURT:
Well, it doesn't have to be pled with |\n| | |\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 particularity. It's not a Rule 9 issue. If she had a share of stock and she transferred it knowing there was a case and an automatic stay, that -- if it's a violation of the automatic stay, that transfer is void. That's what the law says and that's what the complaint says.\n\n7 8 9 10 So how is it -- your job, your burden is to tell me that the complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted, so how does it state a claim -- how does it not state a claim upon which relief can be granted?\n\n11 12 I'm not saying I'm going to grant it. We haven't gotten there.\n\n13 14 MR. MACCO: Your Honor, just -- it indicates that she was on notice because of the emails to Alex Lipman.\n\n15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 THE COURT: Well, it indicates she was on notice because of a lot of reasons, not just because of the emails to Alex Lipman. She was -- Ace Decade was served with the order that you keep talking about as the basis for her rights not being properly protected, with regard to that share, even though the company was served through its agent of service of process in the BVI. I recall all of that. I mean, I don't have it -- I can't tell you -- I can go through and find the certificate of service, because we've looked at those things already in this case, right. There are -- those are issues that have come up in this main case -- not in this adversary\n\n 43 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 proceeding -- but in this main case more than once. There's 3,000-some-odd docket entries in the main case, counsel. There's been a lot going on. So what I'm saying to you is, it's not just about an email to Alex Lipman, and even if it is, so what? That's a -- he's stating a claim upon which relief could be granted. You might prove something different, but where does it say anywhere under Rule 12(b)(6) where you say, well, he wasn't her lawyer at the time. Well, I don't have any evidence in front of me either way on that. This isn't evidentiary. This is, does it state a claim upon -- does this complaint -- and you don't -- and you're not moving to dismiss Count 1. Well, Count 1 is the whole -- is that there's a violation of a stay. And if I have to accept the allegations as pled as true in 2 and 3, then I don't know how you win. I don't know how you succeed on a motion to dismiss because Count 1 stays, even if you were to win on 2 and 3. Count 1 stays. It's a violation of the stay. But on Counts 2 and 3, those are factual issues; they're not legal issues. You're raising issues of fact. You're saying, Well, you can't find contempt because she wasn't served with the motion. You can't find this because she didn't know about the automatic stay.\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 In order for me to agree with you, I'd have to make findings of fact. I don't have to make findings of fact on a motion to dismiss. That's the nice thing about it, right? I don't have to do that. All I have to find is that the complaint, as pled, states a claim upon which relief can be granted. And I find\n\n7 8 9 10 that it does. And I'm not going to write some big decision on it because there's no need. I mean, there's no need for me to write a long-winded decision on whether or not the complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted.\n\n11 12 13 14 15 16 17 When you have a 12(b)(6) motion, you know, there are things that you have to be able to argue on the law, that there's nothing here. Your law is she didn't have notice. She wasn't bound by the -- Mr. Bassett has got law that says, It doesn't matter whether she didn't have notice, because if you're in violation of the stay, you're in violation of the stay. That's all there is to it.\n\n18 19 20 21 22 Whether you get to the damages part, that might be, but that's a factual inquiry. You can't -- I can't make that determination on a motion to dismiss. I don't have any facts, other than the facts as pled, and if I accept them all as true, then your client could be responsible for damages.\n\n23 24 25 So, that's why I asked you. If there's something else you want to tell me, please tell me, but I just don't see it. I don't see how this motion to dismiss should be\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 granted; in fact, I feel it should be denied. But I'm giving you your opportunity to make whatever remaining arguments you want to make. But it's very clear you haven't moved to dismiss the first count on which the other counts are predicated. So I just -- I don't understand that. MR. MACCO: I have nothing further, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Anything further, Mr. Bassett? MR. BASSETT: Not from me, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. MR. BASSETT: But the trustee, I believe -- THE COURT: Yeah, I'll -- I just want to make it clear for the record. I've reviewed the motion to dismiss. I reviewed the response of the trustee and objection to the motion to dismiss. I've reviewed the reply from the Plaintiff -- excuse me -- from the Defendant to the trustee's opposition to the motion to dismiss. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), that is applicable in adversary proceedings under Rule 7012, the standard that the Court must apply in determining a motion to dismiss under 12(b) is whether or not the complaint states a plausible cause of action upon which relief can be granted. For the reasons set forth in the trustee's opposition and for what I've reviewed in this case as a whole -- not just this adversary proceeding -- and case law\n\n1 2 3 4 that applies to motions to dismiss, the claims in Counts 2 and 3, which are the only counts that are the subject of the motion to dismiss, state a claim upon which relief can be granted.\n\n5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 As I've stated to counsel for the Defendant, the moving party, that doesn't mean we've had a trial. We haven't. This is whether or not these causes of the complaint survive and I find that they do. And it's too late under the Rules to file a motion for a more definite statement, because you would have had to file that before you filed a motion to dismiss and you didn't do that, so now you're going to have to file an answer.\n\n13 14 15 16 So the motion to dismiss is denied for the reasons stated on the record and under the general rules of pleading, I think you only have 14 days to answer. I mean, I'll look again, but I think that's how things progress.\n\n17 18 Oh, I'm looking at the wrong thing. So give me a second and I'll look.\n\n19 (Pause)\n\n20 21 22 23 24 THE COURT: If the Court denies the motion -- this is 7000(12)(a) -- if the Court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial, the responsive pleadings shall be served within 14 days after notice of the Court's action. So, there, yes.\n\n25\n\nSo I'm going to enter some form of an order;\n\n| 1 | probably, counsel, a virtual order, saying something like, |\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | \"Order denying motion to dismiss\" and say there was a hearing |\n| 3 | held today.
I've reviewed your papers, which I did.
I |\n| 4 | reviewed trustee's counsel's paper, which I did.
I listened |\n| 5 | to your arguments.
I looked at the main Chapter 11 cases as |\n| 6 | a whole and this adversary proceeding and I find that the |\n| 7 | Counts 2 and 3 state a claim upon which relief could be |\n| 8 | granted and, therefore, the motion to dismiss is denied.
And |\n| 9 | then you have 14 days, okay. |\n| 10 | Whether that gets entered this afternoon or |\n| 11 | tomorrow morning, I don't know.
I can't say for sure, but |\n| 12 | that's what will happen. |\n| 13 | All right.
Do you have any questions? |\n| 14 | MR. MACCO:
No, Your Honor. |\n| 15 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Thank you. |\n| 16 | All right.
Trustee Despins, Attorney Bassett |\n| 17 | indicated you want to talk about matters relating to the case |\n| 18 | as a whole and matters in the United Kingdom; is that right? |\n| 19 | MR. DESPINS:
Yeah, it's related to this, but it's |\n| 20 | not on the merits of the motion, itself.
But I just wanted |\n| 21 | to give the Court -- because I'm not sure we've given you the |\n| 22 | full picture.
I think we may have, but Ace Decade, as far as |\n| 23 | we know at this stage, is just an entity that has -- that |\n| 24 | owns another entity called Dawn State and these entities may |\n| 25 | have claims against UBS.
This is what has been alleged in |\n\n1 the U.K. proceedings.\n\n| 2 | And we are in that position because Mr. Kwok also |\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 3 | asserted claims against UBS.
We basically have to get |\n| 4 | involved in that litigation.
And the situation that we're |\n| 5 | in, in the U.K. is that we filed a motion seeking a stay of |\n| 6 | that proceeding on the basis that we need to get a -- we |\n| 7 | believe that the Court here has already found that we own |\n| 8 | those shares and we control that company, but there's |\n| 9 | somebody in the U.K. appearing on behalf of Ace Decade |\n| 10 | saying, No, somebody else controls Ace Decade and, therefore, |\n| 11 | trustee, you don't speak on behalf of Ace Decade or Dawn |\n| 12 | State. |\n| 13 | So we've told the U.K. Court, please stay the UBS |\n| 14 | proceeding until we have a final resolution of this issue, |\n| 15 | and this is why we're -- this is why this adversary |\n| 16 | proceeding was brought.
The reason I raise this is there are |\n| 17 | timing issues here.
We obtained the six-month stay, which |\n| 18 | expires on July 1st.
Now, we can seek extensions of that, |\n| 19 | but, obviously, for us, you know, it's important to show |\n| 20 | progress in the case and that's why we've been pushing this |\n| 21 | as aggressively as we could, but I wanted to make sure Your |\n| 22 | Honor was aware of the six-month stay that was granted -- |\n| 23 | THE COURT:
I don't think I was aware of that, |\n| 24 | actually. |\n| 25 | MR. DESPINS:
Okay.
So it -- |\n| | |\n\n 49 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 THE COURT: If I was, I don't recall it, so sorry. MR. DESPINS: So it expires on July 1st and, obviously, we can seek an extension of that. In the meantime, there are attempts to serve the Swiss resident, you know, that's the recipient of the transfer. THE COURT: Uh-huh. MR. DESPINS: Not so successful at this point. It's a complicated process and we'll follow-up on that, but that -- so that's ongoing, as well. But I wanted to make sure Your Honor knew because this puts us in a kind of impossible position where UBS is saying, We're going to seek costs against the Plaintiffs, because we believe this action against UBS is without merit. Okay. We hear that, but we have no ability to settle that claim because UBS will say, Oh, you want to settle? Okay. Do you have the power to settle? As well, I'm sure my Court would tell -- or our Bankruptcy Court would tell you we have the power. Yes, but we have these people showing up in the U.K. saying, You don't have to power to do this. That's why we need a resolution so that we can fish or cut bait in that proceeding and move on. And, unfortunately, it's more complicated than it has to be because the -- and, by the way, it's no accident that this Case 22-50073 Doc 3055 Filed 03/28/24 Entered 03/28/24 09:22:13 Page 49 of 57\n\n| 1 | was transferred to somebody in Switzerland, because serving |\n|----|------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | people in Switzerland is the most complicated -- one of the |\n| 3 | most complex jurisdictions to do that in -- and so that's |\n| 4 | going to cause a delay, probably, et cetera, et cetera. |\n| 5 | But I wanted to make sure Your Honor knew that in |\n| 6 | the U.K., the posture is to tell the Court, There's no point |\n| 7 | in proceeding with that litigation because there's a dispute |\n| 8 | as to who owns the claim.
We think it's very clear who owns |\n| 9 | the claim, but we need a final determination of that. |\n| 10 | Thank you, Your Honor. |\n| 11 | THE COURT:
Okay.
I understand.
Thank you. |\n| 12 | So if the stay is in place until July, but it may |\n| 13 | be extended, but you'd have to have UBS' agreement, |\n| 14 | apparently; is that right? |\n| 15 | MR. DESPINS:
Probably, Your Honor. |\n| 16 | And if not, we would -- frankly, sitting here |\n| 17 | today, I don't know why they wouldn't consent, because |\n| 18 | they're a Defendant.
Why would they say no?
But, you know, |\n| 19 | believe it or not, in the past, it is Ace Decade and Dawn |\n| 20 | State that has opposed the stay.
Eventually, they consented |\n| 21 | to it, but for three or four months, they were arguing that |\n| 22 | no stay should be granted. |\n| 23 | THE COURT:
Well, this matter is on for pretrial |\n| 24 | conference, as well, today, as I said at the beginning of the |\n| 25 | day, I think, because the summons was issued and so there's a |\n| | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3055 Filed 03/28/24 Entered 03/28/24 09:22:13 Page 51 of 57\n\n51\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 pretrial conference. So now Ms. Wang has to file an answer within 14 days of the entry of the order. I don't see any reason why that time frame shouldn't be complied with. This adversary proceeding was commenced in December. It's almost April. I just want to take a look at it. Just hold on a second. (Pause) THE COURT: Summonses were served on January 3rd. (Pause) THE COURT: So, what are you doing? What's everybody doing? Don't you have an obligation to exchange initial disclosures at this point and get things done or what are we doing? Are we moving for any kind of dispositive motion, besides the motion to dismiss, which has now been denied? I mean, if we need -- you know, I need to understand what the thought process is, and maybe you both need to talk about that. Maybe you're not prepared to talk about that right now, and that's fine, but it's -- you have 14 days to file an answer, so -- Go ahead. MR. MACCO: Your Honor, Cooper Macco, on behalf of Defendant Wang. I represent Ms. Wang only. There are other Defendants in this matter, which I believe the trustee --\n\n 52 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 THE COURT: I understand. MR. MACCO: -- indicated haven't been served. While I'm prepared to file an answer within 14 days, I'm not sure if this matter can go forward until summonses have been effected on all parties. Additionally, as the Court is aware -- THE COURT: Well, I think they've effected on all parties. Is there a summons that hasn't been effected on a party in this case? MR. MACCO: It's my understanding the trustee just said he was having trouble serving a Swiss individual. THE COURT: That's not in this case. MR. MACCO: It is. THE COURT: Oh, it is? It's in this, as well? MR. BASSETT: The other Defendant is the transferee. THE COURT: Oh, I see. I'm sorry, I'm confusing it with what you were just talking about. Okay. MR. MACCO: So while Ms. Wang is prepared to file an answer, I think there are some issues if we move forward without all necessary parties. THE COURT: I'm sure that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will figure that out for us, but you still need to file an answer within 14 days. Case 22-50073 Doc 3055 Filed 03/28/24 Entered 03/28/24 09:22:13 Page 52 of 57\n\n| 1 | MR. MACCO:
The answer will be filed, Your Honor. | | | | | | |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|\n| 2 | And then that brings us back to another issue, | | | | | | |\n| 3 | which the trustee has already raised in separate adversary | | | | | | |\n| 4 | proceedings, which is that there's a criminal trial starting | | | | | | |\n| 5 | in the middle of May in which my -- | | | | | | |\n| 6 | THE COURT:
It has no impact on this. | | | | | | |\n| 7 | MR. MACCO:
Your Honor, my client is a Defendant | | | | | | |\n| 8 | in that criminal trial. | | | | | | |\n| 9 | THE COURT:
I understand that. | | | | | | |\n| 10 | It has no impact.
Did you read the decisions of | | | | | | |\n| 11 | the United States District Court for the Southern District of | | | | | | |\n| 12 | New York trial judge, who said that there's no reason for the | | | | | | |\n| 13 | bankruptcy case to be stayed and that the issues are | | | | | | |\n| 14 | separate, so | | | | | | |\n| 15 | MR. MACCO:
I have, Your Honor, but I've also read | | | | | | |\n| 16 | the motion of the trustee seeking to stay the other adversary | | | | | | |\n| 17 | proceeding for the same reason, though. | | | | | | |\n| 18 | THE COURT:
It's not for the same reason, so I | | | | | | |\n| 19 | disagree with that. | | | | | | |\n| 20 | MR. MACCO:
Understood, Your Honor. | | | | | | |\n| 21 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Mr. Bassett, was there | | | | | | |\n| 22 | something you wanted to add? | | | | | | |\n| 23 | MR. BASSETT:
Nothing further, Your Honor.
I was | | | | | | |\n| 24 | just going to say that I think it would make sense for us to | | | | | | |\n| 25 | receive and review the answer and also assess for ourselves, | | | | | | |\n| | | | | | | | |\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 possible pathways forward in light of the fact that we have multiple Defendants, and then also confer with counsel, as necessary. We'll certainly do that. THE COURT: What I mistakenly said is, I was confusing what Trustee Despins just said, but it's true that in this adversary proceeding, the transferee hasn't been served -- that's the problem -- because the transferee is in Switzerland. MR. BASSETT: That's correct, Your Honor. And I would have to -- to be clear, I'll just add the caveat that I would have to talk to my colleague, who is kind of more up to speed on the Hague Convention service process that we are undergoing there. MR. DESPINS: I'm familiar with it, Your Honor. The first phase of service was attempted and failed. Now, we're going through the Swiss authorities that need to actually execute the service themselves and that takes time. THE COURT: Understood. But when I look at the docket, I think everyone else has been -- every other Defendant, excuse me, I believe has been served. That's what I see anyway. MR. BASSETT: That's correct, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. All right. Well, then, what I'm going to note for the record\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 is that the pretrial conference was held. No further pretrial conferences will be scheduled at this time; however, as everyone should know, and I'm sure does know, a party can ask for a status conference or a pretrial conference at any time. Whether the Court will grant that request, who knows, but I do think we -- I think that there should be some form of a conference set today -- what is today, March 26th? - sometime in May if we don't, or before. If something occurs, you know, anybody can ask for a conference. So if something occurs, we'll see what happens. Now, the other Defendants haven't filed any answers either, have they? They haven't filed anything. MR. DESPINS: That's correct, Your Honor. THE COURT: Well, I'll let you do whatever you think is appropriate under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; obviously, you're entitled to do that. I certainly don't need to say that. So, I'm not sure there's anything else we can address this afternoon. Is there anything else we can address? MR. DESPINS: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. All right. Then, as I noted, there'll be an order entered on the motion to dismiss denying the motion to dismiss.\n\n| 1 | The order with regard to the storage units, I just | | | | | | | |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|\n| 2 | need to look at it again, but from my review sitting here, it | | | | | | | |\n| 3 | looked fine, and I think that will enter. | | | | | | | |\n| 4 | So I thank you all.
That's our last hearing | | | | | | | |\n| 5 | today, so court is adjourned. | | | | | | | |\n| 6 | THE CLERK:
All rise.
Court is adjourned. | | | | | | | |\n| 7 | (Proceedings concluded at 2:19 p.m.) | | | | | | | |\n| 8 | | | | | | | | |\n| 9 | | | | | | | | |\n| 10 | | | | | | | | |\n| 11 | | | | | | | | |\n| 12 | | | | | | | | |\n| 13 | | | | | | | | |\n| 14 | | | | | | | | |\n| 15 | | | | | | | | |\n| 16 | | | | | | | | |\n| 17 | | | | | | | | |\n| 18 | | | | | | | | |\n| 19 | | | | | | | | |\n| 20 | | | | | | | | |\n| 21 | | | | | | | | |\n| 22 | | | | | | | | |\n| 23 | | | | | | | | |\n| 24 | | | | | | | | |\n| 25 | | | | | | | | |\n| | | | | | | | | |\n| | | | | | | | | |\n| | | | | | | | | |\n\n| Case 22-50073 | | Doc 3055 | Filed 03/28/24 | Entered 03/28/24 09:22:13 | Page 57 of 57 | | | | |\n|---------------|------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------|----------------|--|--|--|--|\n| | | | | | 57 | | | | |\n| 1 | CERTIFICATION | | | | | | | | |\n| 2 | I certify that the foregoing is a correct | | | | | | | | |\n| 3 | transcript from the electronic sound recording of the | | | | | | | | |\n| 4 | proceedings in the above-entitled matter to the best of my | | | | | | | | |\n| 5 | knowledge and ability. | | | | | | | | |\n| 6 | | | | | | | | | |\n| 7 | | /s/ William J. Garling | | | March 27, 2024 | | | | |\n| 8 | | | William J. Garling, CET-543 | | | | | | |\n| 9 | | | Certified Court Transcriptionist | | | | | | |\n| 10 | | For Reliable | | | | | | | |\n| 11 | | | | | | | | | |\n| 12 | | | | | | | | | |\n| 13 | | | | | | | | | |\n| 14 | | | | | | | | | |\n| 15 | | | | | | | | | |\n| 16 | | | | | | | | | |\n| 17 | | | | | | | | | |\n| 18 | | | | | | | | | |\n| 19 | | | | | | | | | |\n| 20 | | | | | | | | | |\n| 21 | | | | | | | | | |\n| 22
23 | | | | | | | | | |\n| 24 | | | | | | | | | |\n| 25 | | | | | | | | | |\n| | | | | | | | | | |\n| | | | | | | | | | |\n| | | | | | | | | | |","body_zh":"美国破产法院\n康涅狄格州联邦地区\n布里奇波特分院\n\n关于： 第11章\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）等， 案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n债务人。 （合并管理）\n\nLuc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯潘斯），第11章 对抗诉讼\n受托人， 案号 23-05018 (JAM)\n\n原告，\n\n诉\n\nGOLDEN SPRING (NEW YORK) LTD.（金泉〔纽约〕有限公司）及 CHINA GOLDEN SPRING GROUP (HONG KONG) LIMITED（中国金泉集团〔香港〕有限公司），\n\n被告。\n\nLuc A. Despins 等， 对抗诉讼\n 案号 23-05028 (JAM)\n原告，\n\n诉\n\nACE DECADE HOLDINGS LIMITED（艾斯十年控股有限公司）等， 法庭 123\n Brien McMahon Federal Building（布赖恩·麦克马洪联邦大楼）\n被告。 915 Lafayette Boulevard\n Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604\n\n 2024年3月26日，星期二\n 下午1时04分\n\n尊敬的 JULIE A. MANNING（朱莉·A·曼宁）法官主持听证会记录\n美国破产法院法官\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 3055 提交日期 03/28/24 录入日期 03/28/24 09:22:13 第 1 页，共 57 页\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 3055 提交日期 03/28/24 录入日期 03/28/24 09:22:13 第 2 页，共 57 页\n\n出庭人员：\n\n代表第11章\n受托人： Patrick R. Linsey（帕特里克·R·林赛）律师\nNEUBERT PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C.（纽伯特·佩佩与蒙蒂思律师事务所，专业公司）\n195 Church Street\n13th Floor\nNew Haven, Connecticut 06510\n-及-\nLuc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯潘斯）律师\nPAUL HASTINGS, LLP（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所）\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, New York 10166\nNicholas A. Bassett（尼古拉斯·A·巴西特）律师\n2050 M Street, NW\nWashington, DC 20036\n\n代表 Yanping “Yvette” Wang（王艳萍，别名“伊薇特”）：\nCarl Gulliver（卡尔·古利弗）律师\nCARL GULLIVER LAW, LLC（卡尔·古利弗律师事务所，有限责任公司）\n470 James Street\nSuite 007\nNew Haven, Connecticut 06513\n-及-\nCooper J. Macco（库珀·J·马科）律师\nMACCO & COREY, P.C.（马科与科里律师事务所，专业公司）\n2950 Express Drive South\nSuite 109\nIslandia, New York 11749\n\n音频操作员： 电子录音\n\n转录公司： Reliable（可靠转录公司）\nThe Nemours Building\n1007 N. Orange Street, Suite 110\nWilmington, Delaware 19801\n电话：(302)654-8080\n电子邮箱：\ngmatthews@reliable-co.com\n\n程序由电子录音记录，\n记录由转录服务机构制作。\n\n目录\n\n动议： 页码\n\n事项第1项：（关于 40）原告第11章受托人 Luc A. Despins 提交的第11章受托人关于执行判决书并要求将储物单元内物品移交第11章财产的动议\n法院裁定：11\n\n事项第2项：（关于 16）Cooper J. Macco 代表被告 Yanping “Yvette” Wang 提交的驳回对抗诉讼动议\n法院裁定：45\n\n转录员证明书 57\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 3055 提交日期 03/28/24 录入日期 03/28/24 09:22:13 第 3 页，共 57 页\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 3055 提交日期 03/28/24 录入日期 03/28/24 09:22:13 第 4 页，共 57 页\n\n（程序于下午1时03分开始。）\n\n书记员：案号 22-50073，Ho Wan Kwok。对抗诉讼 23-05018，Despins 诉——抱歉，我的屏幕不见了——Despins 诉 Golden Spring 等；对抗诉讼 23-05028，Despins 诉 Ace Decade Holdings Ltd. 等。\n\n法院：好的。下午好。请各方为记录出庭，先请第11章受托人。\n\nDESPINS 先生：下午好，法官阁下。Luc Despins，第11章受托人。\n\n法院：下午好。\n\nBASSETT 先生：下午好，法官阁下。我是来自 Paul Hastings、代表第11章受托人的 Nick Bassett。\n\n法院：下午好。\n\nLINSEY 先生：下午好，法官阁下。Patrick Linsey，Neubert Pepe & Monteith 律师事务所，受托人的康涅狄格州代理律师。\n\n法院：下午好。\n\nMACCO 先生：下午好，法官阁下。Cooper Macco，Macco & Corey 律师事务所，在 Ace Decade 对抗诉讼中代表被告 Yvette Wang，获准临时出庭。\n\n法院：下午好。\n\nGULLIVER 先生：下午好，法官阁下。Carl Gulliver。我是 Macco 先生的本地代理律师。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 3055 提交日期 03/28/24 录入日期 03/28/24 09:22:13 第 5 页，共 57 页\n\n法院：下午好。\n\n好的。主案和关于移交储物单元内物品的对抗诉讼 5018 中有一些事项。我尚未仔细研究，但我想我看到了一份修订版——有一份修订后的拟议命令。Bassett 律师，看起来您将就此事项发言；对吗？\n\nBASSETT 先生：是的，法官阁下。\n\n法院：请讲。\n\nBASSETT 先生：谢谢您，法官阁下。因此，我很高兴地报告，我相信我们已经解决了这一事项。这是我们于2月23日在 Golden Spring 对抗诉讼 23-5018 中提交的动议，即 ECF 40，该动议寻求将受托人已执行传票所涉储物单元中的某些物品移交给破产财产。我们提交了该动议。嗯，有四个储物单元位于一个名为 Westy Storage（韦斯蒂仓储）的地点，离新泽西州马瓦的 Mahwah mansion（马瓦庄园）不远。我们于23日提交了该动议。法院发出听证通知，将异议截止日期定为3月19日。根据该命令，我们随后向 Westy Storage 送达了该听证通知，又向我们所了解为该等单元现承租人的实体 HGA，以及向该等单元先前承租人的 Taurus Fund entities（金牛基金实体）送达了该通知。\n\n2024年3月19日的异议截止日期已经届满。\n\nTaurus Fund（金牛基金）于3月19日晚间提交了一份异议，该异议确实是有限异议，基本上称 Taurus Fund——即 Taurus Fund 反对该动议，限于该动议适用于两个储物单元内物品的范围，因为 Taurus Fund 主张其中含有属于其的财产。我们对此有争议。但为目前目的，我们能够解决该问题，我稍后会谈到。然后，他们称，另外两个涉案储物单元是他们对此不持立场的单元。他们未就其中物品主张任何所有权权益。\n\n收到该异议后，我们联系了 Taurus Fund 的律师，并且我们能够通过修订后的拟议命令解决其异议。我们于昨天在 ECF 44 提交了该命令，我相信，法院已提及该命令。该命令基本上规定，在 Taurus Fund 不持立场的两个储物单元中，亦即储物单元 1A32 和 CF09，其中所有财产均为破产财产，并应立即移交给破产财产。该命令规定，另两个单元，即 Taurus Fund 正主张所有权权益的单元，分别为 CA14 和 CB14 号单元，该等单元——其中物品将在受托人的指示和监督下被转移至马瓦庄园妥善保管，直至涉及 Taurus Funds 的马瓦对抗诉讼得到解决或法院进一步命令；其含义是，关于该等单元内物品的一切权利均予保留。\n\n为明确起见，您知道，该命令以及受托人同意该命令，并不构成任何形式的让步，即该等单元内物品事实上属于 Taurus Fund。我们认为，基于我们在动议中阐述的理由，它们实际上是破产财产，但我们也同意目前不就该问题进行诉讼。\n\n对受托人最重要的是保全该等物品，因此我们将把它们转移至庄园。它们将在任何时候均受管辖该庄园、其内物品以及 Taurus Fund 所有财产的现有初步禁令命令约束，包括有关监督驻场安保公司之规定。因此，其含义是，该等物品将继续留在那里，直至该对抗诉讼结束，或直至以其他方式认为已具备条件来裁定，无论该对抗诉讼如何，该等物品现时是否为破产财产。因此，法官阁下，这就是该命令的全部实质内容。它现在使我们取得其中两个单元的物品，并将另外两个单元的问题留待日后处理，同时还确保在此期间它们得到安全保管和储存。\n\n法院：好的。我再次拿着一份修订后的拟议命令，我看到其中有改动，但我实际上还没有阅读，尽管我正在略读。在两个单元中，所有物品都将移交给受托人，我想——我不该这么想，我想——你们有某种程序来实现此事吗？\n\nBASSETT 先生：有，法官阁下。我的意思是，我们尚未敲定将如何以及在何处转移该等物品的具体后勤安排。其中一些物品，您知道，体积相对较小，例如箱子等，我认为在 Kroll（克罗尔）协助下，可以轻易从那里转移到另一安全地点。另一种选择是，如果我们认为有必要，可以取得许可继续支付该储物单元的租赁费用，并将财产保留在那里。我们仍需确定有关后勤安排——\n\n法院：好的。\n\nBASSETT 先生：——但就本动议而言，重要的是取得使我们能够决定今后如何处置该等物品的救济。\n\n法院：我明白。我只是在提问，以便如果发生什么事情，我对是否已有某种程序安排有所了解，对吧。然后，我想我记得动议中某处——也许不止一处——称受托人或受托人的专业人员已对所有这些单元进行了详细清点；正确吗？\n\nBASSETT 先生：正确，法官阁下。\n\n法院：因此，依照该命令，对于其中物品将移交给受托人的两个单元，以及其中物品将转移至马瓦庄园的两个单元，您知道里面应当有什么？\n\nBASSETT 先生：正确，法官阁下。根据在受托人专业人员指示下并由其在场进行的现场查看，我们确有一份清单。我们还通过与该储存设施的所有者及其律师交谈获得保证，所有锁和密码均已更换，因此只有受托人能够进入该等单元。因此，我们相当确信，您知道，从现在到取出该等物品期间，不会出现任何物品被移走等问题。\n\n法院：运营 Westy 的人员更换了所有锁？这是否——\n\nBASSETT 先生：我们——我们曾就我们送达的传票提交了一项动议，法院准许了该动议，授予受托人进入并检查这些单元的权限。根据该传票授予的权限，Westy Storage 及其律师一直非常、非常配合。他们理解，根据该传票，受托人获准不仅启动而且完成其调查，期间不存在任何物品被移走、修改等风险。为促成此事，他们确保只有受托人能够进入该等单元。\n\n法院：而我正在作出——我正在命令，破产财产内的物品属于债务人的第11章破产财产，律师同意该项内容吗？\n\nBASSETT 先生：是的，法官阁下。\n\n法院：我假定——我的意思是，您说他同意，但我希望他已经读过该内容。无论如何，如果他同意，就应当已经读过，对吧？\n\nBASSETT 先生：正确，法官阁下。\n\n我认为，从他们的异议可以清楚看出，我也与 Conway律师（康威律师）进行过多次沟通，他非常明确地表示，Taurus Fund（陶鲁斯基金）对于那两个储物单元完全不持任何立场，因此并未对其属于破产财产这一认定提出异议。法院：好的。好。还有其他人希望就受托人提出的、关于执行判决并要求将储物单元内容物移交给第11章破产财产的动议发表意见吗？（无人作口头回应）法院：好的。无人发言。正如我所说，Bassett律师（巴塞特律师），我暂缓作出该裁定。我在阅读该裁定时尚未在与您交谈的情况下仔细通读，但我的意思是，它看起来没有问题。我已就该裁定提出了我所关切的问题。我没有其他问题，因此我认为该裁定将予作出。鉴于各方同意该协议裁定解决本动议及异议，故本动议获准；而且，就我目前所见，我看不出有任何理由要对该裁定作出任何修改。因此，本动议获准，经修订的拟议裁定将予作出。BASSETT先生：谢谢您，法官阁下。法院：好的。谢谢。该文件已在对抗程序案件和主案中均予提交，因此这就处理了日程表上的前两项事项。那么，我们转向——请稍等片刻。（暂停）法院：那么，在 Despins（德斯平斯）诉 Ace Decade Holdings（艾斯十年控股公司）一案中，我们有一场由书记官办公室因对抗程序中传票的签发而例行安排的审前会议，随后还有代表 Yvette Wang（伊薇特·王）提出的驳回动议。鉴于我们正在处理驳回动议，我不知道是否确有必要举行审前会议本身；但 Bassett律师、Linsey律师（林赛律师）或 Despins受托人（德斯平斯受托人），你们对此有不同看法吗？BASSETT先生：没有，法官阁下。只是，在就驳回动议进行辩论后，受托人可能希望向法院更新——法院：可以。BASSETT先生：——有关与本对抗程序相关的英国某些持续进行中的程序。法院：好的。那么我们转向驳回动议。Macco律师（麦科律师），这是你的动议。请开始。案件 22-50073 文书 3055 提交日期 03/28/24 登记日期 03/28/24 09:22:13 第 12 页，共 57 页\n\nMACCO先生：下午好，法官阁下。我们今日审理的是被告 Yvette Wang提出的驳回本对抗程序动议，尤其是针对 Wang被告的第五项和第六项救济请求。我的动议，我相信书面材料已经充分支持。我很愿意进一步详细说明，但具体而言，就涉案财产被认定为破产财产一事，起诉状完全没有任何细节说明该动议或该裁定本身是否曾向 Wang女士，或当时有权接收通知的合资格律师送达。此外，即便该裁定可能具有约束力，并且其中认定该财产属于破产财产，股票的转让也并非故意，因为 Wang被告并不知道该裁定；同样，该裁定从未向被告或其当时的律师送达或提供。起诉状中提及的律师 Alex Lipman（亚历克斯·利普曼）未曾在本案中出庭。他也未在当时尚未开始的刑事案件中出庭。他在另一宗与 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）企业无关的刑事案件中代理 Wang女士，正如其他案件中所提及的那样。因此，我认为，起诉状表面上缺乏事实主张，无法据此认定 Wang女士应因该转让而受到制裁或承担损害赔偿责任。\n\n如动议中具体阐明的，我可以按法院希望的程度详细说明，但是——法院：这是你的动议，所以你可以按你希望的程度详细说明。MACCO先生：明白，法官阁下。该动议本身是针对债务人的藐视法庭动议。债务人并非被告，被告也未获送达该动议。该动议中关于被告在财产中权益的认定，如在未给予其适当通知及就此获得陈述机会的情况下剥夺其财产，将违反宪法。因此——法院：什么财产？MACCO先生：即后来被转让的一股股票，该股票是本对抗程序的基础。法院：所以她主张那是她的财产？MACCO先生：所提及的财产当然是她的财产。该财产以她的名义在英属维尔京群岛登记；我相信受托人根据其从 Ace Decade的代理人 Trident（特里登特）处进行的证据开示已经知悉此事，正如他在该事项中所提及的。那是一项登记资产；并非不记名资产。若要认定该财产实际上属于另一实体，即本案中的债务人，则必须向该财产的实际所有人，即 Wang女士这一被告，发出某种通知。未向 Wang女士发出任何通知，因此，就她而言，不可能作出该财产并非其财产的认定。案件 22-50073 文书 3055 提交日期 03/28/24 登记日期 03/28/24 09:22:13 第 14 页，共 57 页\n\n关于藐视法庭的认定，该认定——没有问题。它有效。在此并无争议，但该认定是针对债务人作出的，且债务人对该动议进行了抗辩。他就该动议出庭。他获送达了该藐视法庭动议。Wang女士这一被告未获正当程序保障，因此不受该裁定中认定的约束。法院：你刚才说该藐视法庭程序并非针对她，那么她为什么需要正当程序？MACCO先生：因为受托人正在将该裁定中的认定，具体而言，将 Ace Decade是属于债务人的实体这一认定，作为在本对抗程序中针对 Wang女士的认定。法院：没有证据表明英属维尔京群岛公司已获送达吗？她不是该公司的董事吗？MACCO先生：Wang女士是该英属维尔京群岛公司的董事。法院：没有证据表明英属维尔京群岛公司已获送达吗？MACCO先生：法官阁下，我不知道有此证据。法院：你难道不应当知道吗？我的意思是，你来到这里称她的正当程序权利受到侵犯。她并不知情。但她是在以其职务身份行事。她并非亲自拥有该股份，对吗？她并非以 Yvette Wang个人身份拥有该股份；是公司实体拥有该股份，而她是该公司的董事。MACCO先生：法官阁下，她是亲自拥有该股份的。法院：何时亲自拥有？MACCO先生：她确实拥有。法院：她何时亲自拥有该股份？MACCO先生：我相信是在 2022 年初至 2023 年期间，之后发生了转让。法院：所以是在申请破产之后？MACCO先生：她在申请破产前及申请破产后均拥有该股票股份。法院：好的。MACCO先生：她一直是该股票股份的个人所有人。法院：她在债务人的清单中被列为债权人，并且在本案主案中获送达了文件，不是吗？案件 22-50073 文书 3055 提交日期 03/28/24 登记日期 03/28/24 09:22:13 第 16 页，共 57 页\n\nMACCO先生：她可能被列入了。当时对于债务人的地址——抱歉——对于与被告安全关切有关的被告地址，存在一些问题。据我了解，在提出该动议时，受托人——法院：在哪一项动议提出时？MACCO先生：该动议——藐视法庭动议——抱歉——针对债务人的藐视法庭动议，当时受托人不知道 Wang被告的地址，无法向她送达。该藐视法庭动议中的部分认定是，债务人有义务找到 Wang女士并向她提供该动议的副本；法院后来认为该项认定未获充分履行，因为债务人未能提供充分证据证明该裁定实际上已经交给 Wang女士。那是在后续的、最终的藐视法庭动议中，而非部分解决裁定中。因此，尽管 Wang女士被列为债权人，但并不明显表明 Wang女士曾获送达后续事项，这也是为什么部分解决裁定中衍生出要求债务人向 Wang女士送达的规定——法院：部分解决涉及公司——我不确定你是否混淆了两件事。\n\nMACCO先生：抱歉，法官阁下。法院：其中一项不是关于——嗯，无论如何，请继续。我不确定你所述是否准确。曾有一项公司治理命令——MACCO先生：公司治理命令，正确。法院：——该命令曾有部分解决。MACCO先生：一项公司治理命令于——抱歉耽搁了，法官阁下——2022 年 8 月作出。2022 年 10 月，受托人就债务人被指未遵守公司治理命令提出藐视法庭动议。随后，于 2022 年 11 月 17 日，法院作出部分解决裁定，以解决该藐视法庭动议。该裁定包括一项认定，即 Ace Decade属于债务人的财产。该藐视法庭动议是针对债务人提出的，而非针对被告。该裁定的措辞指示债务人找到被告 Wang女士，并向其交付该裁定的副本。后来，在 2023 年 1 月 24 日作出的、解决该动议剩余部分的藐视法庭裁定中，法院认定该项指示未获遵守。因此，法院依其自身条款，在 2023 年初藐视法庭裁定的措辞中认定，Wang女士未获送达部分解决裁定，或者证据不足——案件 22-50073 文书 3055 提交日期 03/28/24 登记日期 03/28/24 09:22:13 第 18 页，共 57 页\n\n法院：我认为这并不准确，但没关系。你可以提出该论点。MACCO先生：抱歉，法官阁下。我认为藐视法庭裁定的措辞，尤其是第 5 至第 8 段，说债务人并未正式证明——法院：告诉我该裁定——请告诉我——这对我会有帮助——请告诉我你所阅读裁定首页顶部的 ECF 编号。MACCO先生：抱歉，我手头没有 ECF 裁定。我列有日期。法院：好。日期是什么？MACCO先生：该藐视法庭裁定的日期——BASSETT先生：法官阁下，部分解决裁定在主案 ECF 1110 中。我正在阅读的裁定是于 January 24th, 2023 作出的藐视法庭裁定。法院：好。那么我们按顺序处理。MACCO先生：好的。法院：我们按顺序处理裁定。那么，第一项是什么，Bassett先生？1101？案件 22-50073 文书 3055 提交日期 03/28/24 登记日期 03/28/24 09:22:13 第 19 页，共 57 页\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 3055\n提交日期 03/28/24\n登记日期 03/28/24 09:22:13\n\n巴塞特先生：\n\n法庭：\n\n好的。关于受托人藐视法庭动议部分解决的命令，November 17, 2022，ECF Number 1110。因债务人 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）未遵守公司治理权利命令，而认定其构成民事藐视法庭并施加适当制裁。根据已提交的证据，包括根据 Section 341 举行的 April 6th, 2022 债权人会议记录、诉状详述——哦，是的，现在这让我想起一些事情。那么，英国的诉状详述是不是由 Kwok 先生提交的，其中他说他拥有 Ace Decade；是不是那份文件？\n\n德斯平斯先生：\n\n是。\n\n法庭：\n\n是的，我认为就是在那里——律师，你可能要查一下那个。并且，兹命令，本庭认定：债务人于 February 15, 2022，即申请日，对 Ace Decade Holdings, Ltd.（艾斯十年控股有限公司）享有排他性的受益所有权并实施控制，且一直维持该等排他性的受益所有权和控制，直至受托人获任命之日之前及紧接该日之前。并且，Dawn State（道恩州）连同 Ace Decade，Ace Decade 的实体是——Ace Decade 的全资子公司，并由 Ace Decade 排他性拥有和控制。\n\n为免生疑，Yvette Yanping Wang（王雁平）并非且从未是 Dawn State 股份的受益所有人。债务人不对本段中的该等认定提出异议，且不会对此提起上诉。\n\n此刻我对这次听证会有绝对清晰的视觉记忆，Henzy 先生（音译）就站在你现在所在的位置，并表示他不会对这些认定提出异议，也不会对这些认定提起上诉。所以，命令就是这样写的，好吗。债务人表示，自申请日以来，他从未将 Ace Decade 的所有权转让或声称转让给任何其他个人或实体。\n\n并且请记住，我认为实际上，Bassett 先生肯定会确认，或者如果我错了会纠正我，但该命令提及 341 会议证言的原因，是 Kwok 先生在 341 会议上作证称他拥有 Ace Decade；对吗，Bassett 先生？\n\n巴塞特先生：\n\n正确，法官大人。\n\n法庭：\n\n好的。所以这就是你必须开始的地方，好吗。这就是你必须开始的地方。所以接着它说——当时的情况是，受托人正试图以债务人破产财产代表的身份，将 Ace Decade 的股份转到自己名下；债务人此前已经作证称他拥有这些股份，而且他在本破产案中的律师说，他们不会对以下认定提出异议：自申请日以来，他从未将 Ace Decade 的任何所有权或控制权转让或声称转让给任何其他个人或实体。所以，我认为这正是你的问题的一部分，对吗，即这项命令。命令还说：债务人就债务人与 Yvette Wang（王雁平）之间关系这一争点，约定受托人证物 13 可采。\n\n马科先生：\n\n但是，法官大人，债务人约定的是这些事项，而不是本案被告 Yvette Wang。\n\n法庭：\n\n我明白这一切，律师。\n\n马科先生：\n\n抱歉打断您，法官大人。\n\n法庭：\n\n不，我明白你的意思，但她在本案中作过证。在股票被转让给无论现在转让给谁之前，她接受过询问。她知道本案中发生的事情。她为债务人工作。\n\n马科先生：\n\n法官大人，不论她是否知道当时发生的事情——不论她是否知晓本案具体事项的情况——部分解决命令的措辞，特别是债务人所约定的认定，不能对作为第三方的 Wang 女士具有约束力。\n\n法庭：\n\n哪里有任何地方说这项命令必须送达给 Yvette Wang？我没有看到。\n\n马科先生：\n\n我相信——嗯，该命令指示债务人送达一封信，我相信——\n\n法庭：\n\n不，不是这项命令。它没有这样说。这项命令没有这样说。你说的是受托人要求律师签署并提交、而他没有这样做的一封信。但随后他寄出了——Kwok 先生寄出了一封信，说受托人认为我对此有一项权益，而且，你知道——无论如何，我记得发生了什么。这项命令中没有任何此类内容。我没有看到哪里说这项命令必须送达给 Yvette Wang。因此，就 November 17th 命令而言，关于该命令没有向她送达的论点，好吧，我不认为这具有说服力。那么下一项命令是什么？\n\n马科先生：\n\n关于这一点，还有一项简短事项。无论该命令是否指示向她送达，它确实影响了她对财产的权益；为了使她根据法律获得正当程序——\n\n法庭：\n\n在提交申请时，她对该财产有什么权益？\n\n马科先生：\n\n她对 Ace Decade 享有所有权权益，即对其中不可辨明部分的个人所有权权益。\n\n法庭：\n\n嗯，那不是 Kwok 先生所说的。\n\n马科先生：\n\n我明白，但我——你知道，Kwok 先生——\n\n法庭：\n\n那么，她为什么不对 Kwok 先生所说的提出质疑？\n\n马科先生：\n\n法官大人——\n\n法庭：\n\n她——他在 341 会议上作证，并且他写——他提交了一份——她是 Ace Decade 的一名高级管理人员或董事，对吗？\n\n马科先生：\n\n正确，法官大人。\n\n法庭：\n\n所以她是说他在撒谎？\n\n马科先生：\n\n法官大人，在不代表我的当事人作证的情况下，因为在本案中那样做并不适当，Kwok 女士——Wang 女士认为，在作证当时，关于 Ace Decade 的所有权权益存在一些混淆。\n\n法庭：\n\n那么，混淆会是什么？她是一名高级管理人员和董事，所以如果存在混淆，她为什么没有纠正？\n\n马科先生：\n\nWang 女士主张，或者我相信她将会主张，Ace Decade 的这项所有权权益实际上从未登记在 Kwok 先生名下。我认为证言中存在一些混淆，这当然会在之后的对抗诉讼中得到澄清。\n\n法庭：\n\n嗯，这并没有说它登记在他的名下。那不是这项命令所说的。\n\n马科先生：\n\n它说他是受益所有人。\n\n法庭：\n\n它说他对 Ace Decade 享有排他性的受益所有权并实施控制。他们从未说它登记在他的名下。这是有区别的。\n\n马科先生：\n\n明白，法官大人。那么接下来转到——\n\n法庭：\n\n你要我看的下一项命令是什么？\n\n马科先生：\n\n藐视法庭命令，即 January 24th, 2023 的命令。\n\n法庭：\n\n好的。等一下。我来找一下。\n\n马科先生：\n\n具体是第 5 至第 8 段。\n\n法庭：\n\n你得给我一点时间查到案卷编号。什么？\n\n身份不明的发言人：\n\n就在那儿。\n\n法庭：\n\n好的。谢谢。1572。一项准许动议、认定债务人藐视公司治理命令的命令，January 24, 2023。那么你要我看——嗯，在看你说的那些段落之前，先让我读一下引言和背景。\n\n（暂停）\n\n法庭：\n\n所以，命令从第 3 页开始说，事实认定。本庭已经作出了以下第 1 和第 2 段所载的事实认定，如部分解决命令所述；第一项是，债务人于 February 15, 2022，即申请日，对 Ace Decade 享有排他性的受益所有权并实施控制，且一直维持该排他性的受益所有权和控制，直至并包括受托人获任命之日，以及主要是在该日之前。就是我刚才已经读过的全部内容，好吗。为免生疑，Yvette Wang，以下称 Wang 女士，并非且从未是 Ace Decade 或 Dawn State 股份的受益所有人。随后引用了在 November 证据听证会上引入的受托人证物 6 和 7、10 和 15，其中包括证言笔录摘录。\n\n马科先生：\n\n因此，法官大人，假定部分解决命令认定 Wang 女士是该财产的所有人，没有证据表明，在未向 Wang 女士提供某种通知的情况下，她随后会知悉自动停止。该等认定——\n\n法庭：\n\n你说提供某种通知是什么意思？\n\n马科先生：\n\n有一项认定，即登记在她名下的财产，也就是该股票股份，是债务人破产财产的财产；该认定是在部分解决命令中作出的。假定为本项针对 Wang 女士的对抗诉讼之目的而采纳该认定，还必须证明 Wang 女士故意违反了破产自动停止，之后才能认定她应承担制裁或损害赔偿责任。\n\n法庭：\n\n嗯，那是损害赔偿。那不一定是制裁。《法典》的那项规定中有两个不同的步骤。\n\n马科先生：\n\n抱歉，法官大人。\n\n法庭：\n\n关于损害赔偿，你可能是对的；关于某些损害赔偿，你可能也是对的，但仅仅因为她——我不必认定某人是故意行为，才能说其违反了自动停止。\n\n马科先生：\n\n绝对不是。故意的定义实际上表明其知悉自动停止。这是判例法。\n\n法庭：\n\n嗯，我不确定这是否完全正确，但没关系。\n\n马科先生：\n\n抱歉，这是我的理解。\n\n法庭：\n\n那么，你的观点是什么？所以至少——在我看来，你所说的是，我不能——如果我不能认定她是故意行为，我可能无法让她支付损害赔偿。这是我们的观点吗？\n\n马科先生：\n\n正确。而且她——\n\n法庭：\n\n但这并不意味着我不能认定她没有——我仍然可以认定她违反了自动停止。即便人们不知道存在破产案件，也可能违反自动停止。\n\n马科先生：\n\n当然明白，法官大人。而且，该项转让是否可以撤销，并不是针对 Wang 女士的对抗诉讼中的争点。争点是，受托人是否有权要求作为转让人的 Wang 女士承担制裁和损害赔偿；因此，对破产自动停止的知悉必须在一定程度上成为考量因素。藐视法庭命令中的认定——\n\n法庭：\n\n是的，但不是完全成为考量因素。\n\n马科先生：\n\n藐视法庭命令中的认定认为，没有充分证据证明 Kwok 先生曾向 Wang 女士交付告知部分解决命令的信函，或曾就股票向 Wang 女士作出任何行为。\n\n法庭：\n\n我认为那封信与部分解决命令完全没有关系。这是我的记忆。我的记忆是，Despins 先生当时正试图提出一个解决方案，我认为在记录中曾与 Kwok 先生的律师讨论过一封信的事情。\n\n为处理该问题而寄往英国的信函——我有一点困惑，因为我认为这两者根本没有关联。部分解决涉及公司治理裁定。至于郭先生（Ho Wan Kwok）在英国提起的诉讼，其中Ace Decade和Dawn State为原告，这是我的记忆，或者无论如何——也许它们不被称为“原告”——而是申请人；他曾在宣誓后表示，他拥有Ace Decade。因此，我不认为你所说它们有关联是正确的，好吗。\n\nMACCO先生（马科）：明白，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：那么你的观点是什么？\n\nMACCO先生：仅为澄清，Wang女士（王女士）在英国。英国正就Ace Decade进行诉讼，但Wang女士目前被关押在布鲁克林的MDC。就我所知，在此之前的所有相关期间，她都在纽约。因此，寄往英国的信函，我不确定是否就是藐视法庭命令所提及的信函，但那是我的理解；如有不正确之处，我表示歉意。法官阁下，最后总结一下，并就占用法庭过多时间表示歉意。\n\n法庭：不，这正是我们在这里的原因；我们在这里就是为了这场听证会。\n\nMACCO先生：我认为，若要在本案中认定损害赔偿，并可能施加制裁，必须作出如下认定：第一，Wang女士已获知自动中止。第二，我认为，部分解决裁定若试图约束Wang女士，认定Ace Decade的股份属于债务人破产财产，则该裁定并未被适当送达给Wang女士，以便她出庭、抗辩或以其他方式就此陈述意见。因此，我认为，部分解决裁定若试图在未给予Wang女士正当程序的情况下取得她的财产，即违反宪法。此外，就向Wang女士提供的其他文件，即藐视法庭命令或部分解决裁定而言，我认为她不具备足够认知，以构成对破产自动中止的故意违反，前提是Ace Decade股份的转让被认定为违反破产自动中止。\n\n我没有进一步意见，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：好的。谢谢。Bassett律师？\n\nBASSETT先生（巴塞特）：法官阁下，我可以使用讲台吗？\n\n法庭：当然可以。\n\nBASSETT先生：谢谢。再次说明记录在案，Paul Hastings（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所）的Nick Bassett（尼克·巴塞特）代表第11章受托人出庭。\n\n法官阁下，我们经常在实体争论的中途切入论点；我认为，在本案中，退一步向法庭说明本诉状所寻求救济的大致情况或历史会有所帮助。坦率地说，就本对抗程序中所涉的这份诉状而言，相较于受托人提出的许多其他诉状，就本第11章案件而言，这份诉状几乎是您所能见到的最简单的诉状。\n\n事情确实如此简单。2022年11月17日，本法庭作出了我们刚刚讨论过的部分解决裁定，明确认定Ace Decade及其所有权属于破产财产，并且从未属于、目前也不属于被告Yvette Wang（伊薇特·王）的财产。\n\n随后，不到两个月后的2023年1月3日，两名被告，即Wang被告和作为受让人的另一名被告，通过促使Yvette Wang对Ace Decade表面上名义持有的所有权转让给位于瑞士的Hao被告（音译），违反了自动中止。\n\n基于这些简单事实，受托人在诉状中寻求三项诉因。第一项请求宣告该股份转让因违反自动中止而自始无效。第二项请求依据《破产法》§ 362(k)，判令两名被告因违反自动中止承担损害赔偿责任。第三项诉因请求就同一违反自动中止的行为，对两名被告施加制裁，包括惩罚性损害赔偿。\n\n基于这些简单事实的对抗程序，本应能够在本法庭迅速解决。对我们而言显而易见的是，Wang被告不希望发生这种情况，因此才提交了今天法庭审理的驳回动议；在我看来，该动议只能被视为拖延策略。因为我认为，很明显这些论点均毫无根据，也很明显所提出的论点并非适宜在驳回动议中提出的论点；该动议中唯一的问题是，受托人是否已达到其最低起诉主张负担，而他显然已经达到。\n\n现在，我首先想指出，驳回动议——我认为法庭也在某种程度上承认这一点——甚至没有质疑诉状中的第一项诉因。因此，Wang被告并未主张本案不存在对自动中止的违反，也因此并未寻求驳回请求宣告该转让自始无效的诉因。她仅寻求驳回另外两项罪名项，即请求判令其承担损害赔偿或制裁的罪名项。因此，无论本驳回动议的结果如何，该项核心请求，即确保作出该转让无效的认定，仍将继续进行。\n\n如我所言，Wang被告仅请求驳回诉状中的第2项和第3项罪名项；他们所提出的所有论点实际上均未指出任何请求缺陷，至多只是宽容地说提出了一些事实问题，可在诉讼继续进行时予以考虑。法庭已听取的、且确实构成被告论点核心的问题是，Wang被告是否已获知法庭关于Ace Decade股份属于破产财产的认定。\n\n而她主张，诉状中没有指称该股份属于破产财产。这显然与诉状中的明确指称相矛盾；诉状援引并详细讨论了部分解决裁定及其认定，即如我先前所述，Ace Decade属于破产财产，而非Wang被告的财产。\n\n然而，她随后主张，该裁定因其在裁定作出前未获通知而不知何故无效。这在法律上无关紧要，在事实层面也不属实。这在法律上无关紧要，因为如我们在书面文件中所主张，不要求世上每个人均须获知法庭关于某项财产属于破产财产的认定，才受该裁定约束。若法律如此规定，将完全无法操作，并会导致荒谬结果，也会使第11章程序根本无法正常运作。\n\n我们在反对驳回动议的意见书中援引的案件之一，是In re Motors Liquidation Company案。这是2018年纽约南区（Southern District of New York）的一宗案件，后经第二巡回法院确认；该案讨论了案件既判原则如何在破产案件的对抗程序和争议事项中适用。该案中，法庭称：\n\n“案件既判原则并不取决于某一程序的所有当事人是否参加了对法律问题的先前解决。破产法庭也无须在每次新当事人加入破产程序时，重新审理同一问题。”\n\n这就是法律，而且合情合理，因为否则，每当新当事人试图介入并重新审视法庭先前的裁定时，重新审理问题将无法操作。\n\n但如我所言，法官阁下，结合诉状指称和本案历史来看，这也是一个在事实层面错误的论点。首先，指出房间里的大象，您没有听到辩护律师说Wang被告事实上未获知部分解决裁定和自动中止。我认为，她当然获知了；诉状以及本案中法庭可予司法认知的周边情形，都极其明确地表明了这一点。\n\n首先，诉状第38段——顺便说一下，法官阁下，当我们讨论驳回动议时，您显然必须退一步，记住我们所适用的标准。根据Iqbal，标准是：受托人是否作出了足够的指称，使其有权根据诉状中的请求获得救济具有合理可能性？\n\n要满足该标准，只需诉状中的指称允许法庭推断出原告证明所必需事实的存在即可。在本案中，我们基于诸多理由轻易达到了这一标准。首先，诉状第38段明确、直接地指称，Wang被告促成Ace Decade转让的行为是故意的，并且她当时事先知晓自动中止。仅此一点就已足够。\n\nWang被告抱怨我们没有指称有关其获知情况的细节。为满足我们的起诉主张负担，并无必要如此做，但我们仍然如此做了。具体而言，我们指称，2023年11月15日，受托人的律师通过电子邮件向Alex Lipman（亚历克斯·利普曼）先生发送了一份拟议部分解决裁定的副本；受托人了解到，Lipman先生曾在先前某一时期，甚至可能在当时，担任Wang女士的律师。\n\n现在，辩护律师称，Lipman先生是在一宗无关刑事案件中担任Wang女士的律师。即便如此，我认为，仅凭该项指称的基础，至少可以合理地认为，Wang女士是通过一名当时或此前曾担任其律师的人获知部分解决裁定的。\n\n此外，这也是法庭提到、而Wang被告甚至在其驳回动议或答复状中均未提及的内容，辩护律师对此也不熟悉；我们在诉状中具体指称，2022年11月16日，受托人的律师向Ace Decade送达了部分解决裁定的副本，并由其在英属维尔京群岛的注册代理人Trident Trust Company（三叉戟信托公司）代收。\n\nWang被告自称既是Ace Decade的名义所有人，也是其实益所有人。若她事实上是Ace Decade的所有人，她绝对会因我们向该公司在英属维尔京群岛的注册代理人送达而获得通知。至少，因该送达而认定她已获通知，远不止具有合理可能性。\n\n除这些指称之外，法官阁下，我们当然还有本案的事实背景。如法庭先前所承认，Wang女士当然并不陌生于本第11章案件。我相信，她曾于2022年4月就DIP融资动议接受证言录取，当时她担任Golden Spring（黄金泉）的代表。显然，任何在破产案件中接受证言录取的人，都知悉该破产案件的存在。\n\n阁下，我最后想指出的是，现在，无论是在律师今天所作的陈述中，还是在驳回动议中，都有这样的说法：嗯，Wang 女士（王雁）未获送达藐视法庭动议，而该动议最终导致了部分解决裁定。其含义是，她本应获得该动议的送达。但这种说法歪曲并忽视了提交藐视法庭动议的相关经过，以及当时向受托人所作的陈述。\n\n在受托人提交该动议之前，事实上，直至我认为是在该动议听证会前几天，正如法院所确认的，债务人根据其在英国提交的文件，曾宣誓称其为 Ace Decade（艾斯十年）的所有人。但不仅如此，且律师未予承认的是，被告 Yvette Wang（王雁）签署了在英国提交的诉讼请求详情表，其中载有该项陈述。直至藐视法庭动议听证会前夕，债务人才突然间，显然为避免受托人取得对 Ace Decade 股份的控制权，称：“哦，不，我的雇员／助理、现为刑事案件共同被告的 Yvette Wang，才是该股份的实际所有人。”因此，我们不可能、也没有理由向她送达藐视法庭动议，或如律师在其书面陈述中所建议的那样，提起对抗程序以取得该股份的所有权。这完全没有必要，因为债务人和被告 Yvette Wang 均曾向我们表示债务人拥有该股份。因此，阁下，基于所有这些理由，我们认为，驳回动议中提出的任何论点显然均无依据。它们实际上并未指出受托人诉状中任何正当的主张瑕疵，因此，我们请求驳回该驳回动议。谢谢。\n\n法院：谢谢。律师，有何回应？\n\nMacco 先生（马科先生）：简要回应一下，阁下。关于向 Alex Lipman（亚历克斯·利普曼）发送该电子邮件的时间，存在一些疑问。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 3055\n提交于 03/28/24\n录入于 03/28/24 09:22:13\n\n受托人的律师刚刚表示，根据诉状，该邮件于 2023 年 11 月发送。这远在——\n\nBassett 先生（巴塞特先生）：我的意思是 2022 年 11 月，阁下。这是我的错误。\n\nMacco 先生：阁下，但诉状确实写的是 2023 年 11 月，这引发了与此不同的其他问题。\n\n至于我们不需要在当事人知悉程序后重新就相关事项进行诉讼这一说法，虽然这当然属实，但应当获得通知的并非每一个获悉情况的当事人，而是可能持有所有权权益、并可能由法院确定的当事人。\n\n此外，最后，至于——不是最后——进一步而言，针对受托人所称被告应当提出某种主张，说明她未获通知，具体而言，这类主张不适用于本类动议，也无论如何不能予以考虑，因为其将超出案卷记录范围。\n\n法院：那么，让我们退一步，看看什么是适当的。这是一项以未提出可获救济的请求为由提出的驳回动议，对吗？\n\nMacco 先生：对。\n\n法院：因此，标准是我必须将所有指控视为真实，对吗？\n\nMacco 先生：对，阁下。\n\n法院：那么，如何——我希望你告诉我，首先，我确实审阅了你们的动议，而你们并不争议——你们提出了几项说法。你们未请求驳回第 1 项罪名项，但请求驳回第 2 项和第 3 项罪名项；然后，在你们拟议的命令中——而且，据我记忆，诉状中的罪名项不止三项。接着，你们请求法院就第 2 项和第 3 项准许该动议，然后驳回全部诉状。我不知道我怎么可能这样做。\n\nMacco 先生：阁下，我相信其写的是驳回——如果不是，那是指就 Wang 女士而言驳回全部诉状。撤销转让的诉请是针对该转让的受让人 Hao 先生（郝）或 Hao 先生提出的。\n\n法院：嗯，但你们的拟议命令并非如此表述。不过无论如何——\n\nMacco 先生：嗯，我道歉。那是一处文字错误。\n\n法院：你尚未回答的是——你一直说受托人尚未证明。受托人无需证明任何事项。他只需提出主张。那么，该主张为何不具有合理可信性？现在，该诉状表面上如何存在瑕疵，因为其在第 1 项罪名项中主张该转让违反自动中止？这并非只是复述法条，而那正是法院准许驳回动议的理由之一，即有人只是提出一项法条。但他并没有这样做。这不是该诉状所做的。因此，其为何陈述不足？而且，如果其陈述不足，你们为何未提出要求作出更明确陈述的动议？我是说，其如何陈述不足？我难以看出为何应当准许你们的动议。\n\n你们在审判时可能是对的。我不知道。但我们现在并不处于那个阶段。我们处于驳回动议阶段，而我必须认定所提出的全部指控均为真实。你们说他尚未证明。他无需证明任何事项。\n\n那么，它如何存在瑕疵？请告诉我它如何存在瑕疵，因为我难以被你们的论点说服。\n\nMacco 先生：阁下，不重复陈述的话——\n\n法院：嗯，你必须重复陈述，因为我正在要求你这样做。\n\nMacco 先生：当我说“证明”时，我的意思是“以具体事实充分陈述”，对此我表示道歉——\n\n法院：嗯，它无需以具体事实充分陈述。这不是《规则》第 9 条的问题。如果她拥有一股股票，并且明知存在案件和自动中止而转让该股票，那么——如果该行为违反自动中止，该转让即为无效。这就是法律规定，也是诉状所称。\n\n那么，如何——你们的职责、你们的负担，是告诉我该诉状未提出可获救济的请求，因此它如何提出请求——它如何未提出可获救济的请求？\n\n我并不是说我将准许它。我们尚未到那一步。\n\nMacco 先生：阁下，只是——它表明她因发送给 Alex Lipman 的电子邮件而获得通知。\n\n法院：嗯，它表明她因许多理由获得通知，而不仅仅是因为发送给 Alex Lipman 的电子邮件。Ace Decade 曾获送达你一直谈到的那项命令，即你认为其权利未就该股份得到适当保护的依据，尽管该公司是通过其在英属维尔京群岛的送达代理人获得送达。我记得所有这些。我的意思是，我手头没有——我不能告诉你——我可以逐一查找送达证明，因为我们在本案中已经审阅过这些事项，对吗。存在——这些问题已在本主案中出现过——并非在本对抗程序中——而是在本主案中不止一次出现。\n\n在本案主案中有 3,000 多项案卷记录，律师。已经发生了很多事情。因此，我要对你说的是，这不仅仅关乎一封发送给 Alex Lipman 的电子邮件；即使确实如此，那又怎样？这——他正在提出一项可获救济的请求。你们可能证明某些不同事实，但《规则》12(b)(6) 中何处规定，你们可以说，嗯，他当时不是她的律师？嗯，我面前没有任何证据能证明任何一种说法。这不是证据审查。这是，该诉状是否提出可获救济的请求——而你们并未——你们并未请求驳回第 1 项罪名项。嗯，第 1 项罪名项整体上就是——即存在违反自动中止的行为。如果我必须将第 2 项和第 3 项中所提出的指控视为真实，那么我不知道你们如何获胜。我不知道你们如何能在驳回动议中成功，因为即使你们在第 2 项和第 3 项上获胜，第 1 项罪名项仍然存在。第 1 项罪名项仍然存在。它是违反自动中止。但第 2 项和第 3 项是事实问题；不是法律问题。你们提出的是事实问题。你们说，嗯，不能认定藐视法庭，因为她未获送达该动议。不能作出这一认定，因为她不知道自动中止。\n\n为了同意你们的意见，我必须作出事实认定。在驳回动议中，我无需作出事实认定。这正是其便利之处，对吗？我无需这样做。我只需认定，诉状如所陈述，提出了一项可获救济的请求。而我认定其确实如此。我不会就此撰写冗长的裁定，因为没有必要。我的意思是，我没有必要就该诉状是否提出可获救济的请求撰写冗长的裁定。\n\n当你们提出 12(b)(6) 动议时，你们知道，必须能够就法律提出论证，说明这里什么都没有。你们的法律论点是她未获通知。她不受——Bassett 先生拥有法律依据，说明无论她是否未获通知都无关紧要，因为如果你违反自动中止，你就是违反自动中止。仅此而已。\n\n至于你们是否会进入损害赔偿部分，可能会，但那是事实调查。你们不能——我不能在驳回动议中作出该项认定。我没有任何事实，除所陈述的事实外；如果我将其全部视为真实，那么你们的客户可能须对损害赔偿负责。\n\n所以，这就是我询问你们的原因。如果你们还有其他要告诉我的，请告诉我，但我就是看不出来。我看不出为何应当准许该驳回动议；事实上，我认为应当驳回。但我正在给予你们机会，提出任何你们希望提出的其余论点。但很明显，你们并未请求驳回作为其他罪名项基础的第一项罪名项。所以我只是——我不理解这一点。\n\nMacco 先生：我没有进一步意见，阁下。\n\n法院：好的。谢谢。Bassett 先生，您还有其他意见吗？\n\nBassett 先生：我没有，阁下。\n\n法院：好的。\n\nBassett 先生：但我认为受托人——\n\n法院：是，我将——我只想为记录明确说明。我已审阅驳回动议。我已审阅受托人的答复及其对驳回动议的异议。我已审阅原告——抱歉——被告就受托人对驳回动议的反对意见所作的答复。根据适用于对抗程序的《规则》7012 所适用的《联邦民事诉讼规则》12(b)，法院在确定 12(b) 项下驳回动议时必须适用的标准是，该诉状是否提出了一项具有合理可信性的、可获救济的诉因。基于受托人反对意见中所述理由，以及我对本案整体——而不仅仅是本对抗程序——所审阅的内容，以及适用于驳回动议的判例法，第 2 项和第 3 项罪名项中的请求，即驳回动议所针对的唯一罪名项，均提出了可获救济的请求。\n\n正如我已向被告方律师、即动议提出方所说明的那样，这并不意味着我们已经进行了审判。我们并未进行审判。现在的问题是，诉状中的这些诉因是否能够成立，而我认定它们能够成立。并且，根据《规则》，现在提出要求作出更明确陈述的动议已经太晚，因为你本应在提出驳回动议之前提出该动议，而你没有这样做，所以现在你将必须提交答辩状。\n\n因此，基于记录中所述理由，驳回动议被驳回；根据一般诉状规则，我认为你只有14天时间提交答辩状。我的意思是，我会再核实一下，但我认为程序就是这样进行的。\n\n哦，我看的不是正确的规定。请给我一点时间，我来查看。\n\n（暂停）\n\n法庭：如果法院驳回该动议——这是7000(12)(a)——如果法院驳回该动议，或者将对该动议的处置推迟至审判时，答辩性诉状应在收到法院行动通知后14天内送达。所以，是的。\n\n因此，我将录入某种形式的命令；可能是，律师，一项电子命令，内容大致为：“驳回驳回动议的命令”，并说明今天举行了听证会。我已审阅你们提交的文件，确实如此。我已审阅受托人律师提交的文件，确实如此。我听取了你们的辩论。我整体审视了主要的第11章案件以及本对抗程序，并认定第2项和第3项罪名项陈述了一项可获救济的请求，因此，驳回动议被驳回。然后你们有14天时间，好吗。该命令是在今天下午还是明天上午录入，我不知道。我不能确定地说，但将会如此。\n\n好的。你们有什么问题吗？\n\nMACCO先生：没有，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：好的。谢谢。\n\n好的。Despins受托人，Bassett律师表示，你们想讨论与整个案件以及英国事项有关的问题；是这样吗？\n\nDESPINS先生：是的，这与本案有关，但不涉及该动议本身的是非曲直。不过，我只是想向法庭说明——因为我不确定我们是否已向您说明完整情况。我想我们可能已经说明了，但就我们目前所知，Ace Decade（艾斯十年）仅是一个拥有另一实体Dawn State（道恩州）的实体，而这些实体可能对UBS（瑞银集团）享有请求权。这是在英国程序中所作的主张。\n\n我们处于这一境地，是因为Kwok先生（郭文贵）也对UBS提出了请求。我们基本上必须介入该诉讼。我们在英国的情况是，我们已提出动议，请求中止该程序，理由是我们需要取得一项——我们相信本院已认定我们拥有那些股份并控制该公司，但有人在英国代表Ace Decade出庭称，不，其他人控制Ace Decade，因此，受托人，你无权代表Ace Decade或Dawn State发言。\n\n因此，我们已告知英国法院，请在我们就该问题获得最终解决之前中止UBS程序，这就是——这就是提起本对抗程序的原因。我提出这一点是因为这里存在时间问题。我们获得了为期六个月的中止令，该中止令于July 1st到期。现在，我们可以请求延长该中止令，但显然，对我们而言，重要的是显示案件进展，这就是为什么我们一直尽可能积极地推进此事，但我想确保法官阁下知悉获准的六个月中止令——\n\n法庭：实际上，我认为我并不知悉此事。\n\nDESPINS先生：好的。所以它——\n\n法庭：如果我曾经知悉，我也不记得了，所以抱歉。\n\nDESPINS先生：因此，该中止令于July 1st到期，显然，我们可以请求延长。在此期间，正在尝试向该名瑞士居民送达，你知道的，他是该转让的受让人。\n\n法庭：嗯哼。\n\nDESPINS先生：截至目前并不十分成功。这是一个复杂的程序，我们会继续跟进，但那件事——所以，那件事也仍在进行中。不过，我想确保法官阁下知悉，因为这使我们处于一种几乎不可能的境地：UBS称，我们将向原告追索费用，因为我们认为针对UBS的这项诉讼毫无依据。好的。我们听到了这一点，但我们没有能力和解该请求，因为UBS会说，哦，你想和解？好的。你有和解的权力吗？此外，我相信我的法院会告诉——或者我们的破产法院会告诉您，我们有该权力。是的，但有这些人在英国出庭称，你们无权这样做。这就是为什么我们需要作出解决，以便我们能够在该程序中作出取舍并继续推进。遗憾的是，这比本应有的更加复杂，因为——顺便说一句，此案被转让给瑞士的某人并非偶然，因为向瑞士的人送达是最复杂的——在最复杂的辖区之一进行送达——因此，这可能会造成延迟，等等，等等。\n\n但我想确保法官阁下知悉，在英国，目前的立场是告知法院，继续进行该诉讼毫无意义，因为对谁拥有该请求权存在争议。我们认为谁拥有该请求权非常明确，但我们需要对此作出最终裁定。谢谢，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：好的。我明白了。谢谢。\n\n所以，如果该中止令持续至July，但可能获得延长，不过显然你必须获得UBS的同意；是这样吗？\n\nDESPINS先生：很可能如此，法官阁下。\n\n如果不是，坦白说，今天坐在这里，我不知道他们为什么不会同意，因为他们是被告。他们为什么会说不？但是，你知道，信不信由你，过去是Ace Decade和Dawn State反对中止。最终，他们同意了，但在三、四个月期间，他们一直主张不应准许中止。\n\n法庭：那么，正如我认为我在今天开始时所说，本案今天也排期举行审前会议，因为传票已经签发，所以有一次审前会议。现在，Wang女士（王女士）必须在命令录入后14天内提交答辩状。我看不出有什么理由不应遵守该期限。本对抗程序于December提起。现在已接近April。我只想看一下。请稍等一下。\n\n（暂停）\n\n法庭：传票于January 3rd送达。\n\n（暂停）\n\n法庭：所以，你们在做什么？大家都在做什么？你们现在不是有义务交换初步披露并推进事项吗，还是我们在做什么？除现已被驳回的驳回动议外，我们是否还在提出任何种类的终局性动议？我的意思是，如果我们需要——你知道，我需要了解你们的思考过程，也许你们双方需要就此讨论。也许你们现在尚未准备好讨论此事，这没关系，但——你们有14天时间提交答辩状，所以——请说。\n\nMACCO先生：法官阁下，我是Cooper Macco（库珀·马科），代表被告Wang女士。我仅代表王女士。本案还有其他被告，我相信受托人——\n\n法庭：我明白。\n\nMACCO先生：——表示尚未被送达。尽管我已准备在14天内提交答辩状，但我不确定在所有当事人均已完成传票送达之前，本案是否能够继续进行。此外，正如法庭所知——\n\n法庭：嗯，我认为他们已向所有当事人完成送达。本案中是否有传票尚未向某一当事人完成送达？\n\nMACCO先生：我的理解是，受托人刚才说他在向一名瑞士个人送达时遇到困难。\n\n法庭：那不是本案中的事项。\n\nMACCO先生：是本案中的事项。\n\n法庭：哦，是吗？这也是本案中的事项？\n\nBASSETT先生：另一名被告是受让人。\n\n法庭：哦，我明白了。抱歉，我把它和你们刚才谈论的事项混淆了。好的。\n\nMACCO先生：因此，尽管王女士已准备提交答辩状，但我认为，如果在缺少所有必要当事人的情况下继续进行，会存在一些问题。\n\n法庭：我相信《联邦民事诉讼规则》会为我们解决这个问题，但你仍须在14天内提交答辩状。\n\nMACCO先生：答辩状将会提交，法官阁下。\n\n然后，这又使我们回到另一个问题，即受托人已在单独的对抗程序中提出的问题：在May中旬将开始一场刑事审判，而我的——\n\n法庭：这对本案没有影响。\n\nMACCO先生：法官阁下，我的当事人是该刑事审判中的一名被告。\n\n法庭：我明白。这没有影响。你是否阅读了United States District Court for the Southern District of New York（纽约南区美国联邦地区法院）审判法官的裁判，该法官称没有理由中止破产案件，而且相关问题彼此独立，所以——\n\nMACCO先生：我读过，法官阁下，但我也读过受托人请求以同一理由中止另一对抗程序的动议。\n\n法庭：理由并不相同，所以我不同意这一点。\n\nMACCO先生：明白，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：好的。Bassett先生，你是否有任何补充？\n\nBASSETT先生：没有进一步意见，法官阁下。我只是想说，我认为我们接收并审阅答辩状，然后鉴于存在多名被告，自行评估可能的后续路径，并在必要时与律师协商，是有意义的。我们当然会这样做。\n\n法庭：我刚才错误地说的是，我把Despins受托人刚才所说的事项混淆了，但确实，在本对抗程序中，尚未向受让人送达——这就是问题所在——因为受让人在瑞士。\n\nBASSETT先生：这是正确的，法官阁下。为明确起见，我还要附带说明，我必须与我的同事谈谈，他对我们正在进行的《海牙送达公约》送达程序更为了解。\n\nDESPINS先生：我熟悉该程序，法官阁下。送达的第一阶段已尝试但失败。现在，我们正通过瑞士主管机关办理，该机关需要自行实际执行送达，这需要时间。\n\n法庭：明白。但是，当我查看案卷时，我认为其他所有人都已——其他每一名被告，抱歉，我相信都已被送达。无论如何，这是我所看到的。\n\nBASSETT先生：这是正确的，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：好的。好吧，那么，我将在记录中注明的是\n\n预审会议已经举行。现阶段不会再安排进一步的预审会议；但是，正如各位应当知道且我相信确实知道的，任何一方均可随时请求召开案情会议或预审会议。法院是否会批准该请求，谁知道呢，但我确实认为——我认为，如果我们不在更早之前召开会议，则应当在今天——今天是几号，3月26日？——至5月期间的某个时候，以某种形式召开一次会议。如果发生什么情况，任何人都可以请求召开会议。因此，如果发生什么情况，我们再看会发生什么。现在，其他被告也没有提交任何答辩，是吗？他们什么也没有提交。DESPINS（德斯平斯）先生：是的，法官阁下。法院：那么，我会让你们依照《联邦民事诉讼规则》采取你们认为适当的任何行动；显然，你们有权这样做。我当然无需说明这一点。因此，我不确定今天下午是否还有其他事项可以处理。还有其他事项可以处理吗？DESPINS先生：没有，法官阁下。法院：好的。好。那么，正如我所指出的，将就驳回动议作出命令，驳回该驳回动议。\n\n关于储物单元的命令，我只需要\n\n再看一遍，但根据我坐在这里的审阅，\n\n看起来没有问题，我认为该命令将会签发。\n\n因此，感谢各位。这是我们\n\n今天最后一次开庭，因此现在休庭。\n\n书记员：全体起立。现在休庭。\n\n（庭审于下午2时19分结束。）\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3055 Filed 03/28/24 Entered 03/28/24 09:22:13 Page 57 of 57\n\n证明\n\n本人证明，据本人所知和能力所及，上述内容\n\n系对上述案件程序电子录音所作的正确\n\n文字记录。\n\n/s/ William J. Garling（威廉·J·加林） March 27, 2024\n\nWilliam J. Garling, CET-543（威廉·J·加林，CET-543）\n\n认证法庭文字记录员\n\n代表 Reliable","key_entities":["Despins","Kwok","Je","Ho Wan Kwok","Paul Hastings","CIPA","Luc Despins","Yanping Wang"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":40,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":44,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1110,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":15364,"status":"published","published_at":"2024-03-28 00:00:00","created_at":"2024-03-28","updated_at":"2026-08-23 21:42:10"}