{"id":"court_ctb_3078_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":3078,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2024-04-05","title":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT | IN RE: KWOK,<br>Debtors","summary_zh":"判决备忘录 —— Ho Wan Kwok 破产案（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo），CTB 22-50073 ECF #3078（2024-04-05立案）。联邦地区法院作出判决，维持破产法院对 Mei Guo、HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC 及其代理律师的民事藐视法庭裁定，并维持判处其向第 11 章受托人 Luc A. Despins 支付 83,370.26 美元律师费作为证据开示制裁。","summary_en":"Memorandum of decision — In re Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo / Guo Wengui), CTB 22-50073 ECF #3078 (filed 2024-04-05). The U.S. District Court affirmed Bankruptcy Court orders holding Mei Guo, HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC, and their counsel in contempt and awarding $83,370.26 in attorneys' fees to Chapter 11 Trustee Luc A. Despins as a discovery sanction.","body_en":"#### **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\n| IN RE: KWOK,<br>Debtors                                                                                                                            | )<br>BANKR. NO. 22-50073 (JAM)<br>)<br>Chapter 11<br>)         |\n|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| MEI GUO, HK INTERNATIONAL<br>FUNDS INVESTMENTS (USA)<br>LIMITED, LLC, LEE VARTAN, ESQ.,<br>and CHIESA SHAHINIAN &<br>GIANTOMASI PC,<br>Appellants, | )<br>CIVIL NO. 3:23-CV-375 (KAD)<br>)<br>)<br>)<br>)<br>)<br>) |\n| v.<br>LUC A. DESPINS,<br>Trustee-Appellee.                                                                                                         | )<br>)<br>)<br>APRIL 5, 2024<br>)<br>)<br>)                    |\n\n#### **MEMORANDUM OF DECISION**\n\nKari A. Dooley, United States District Judge:\n\n Pending before the Court are the consolidated appeals<sup>1</sup> of Mei Guo and HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC (the \"HK Parties\"), and their counsel, Attorney Lee Vartan and Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC (collectively, \"Appellants\"), challenging orders of the Bankruptcy Court holding the HK Parties in contempt and awarding fees as a sanction to be paid to the Chapter 11 Trustee, Luc A. Despins (\"Appellee\")*. See In re Kwok*, No. 22-50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Mar. 10, 2023), ECF No. 1537; *In re Kwok*, No. 22-50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Apr. 21, 2023), ECF No. 1693. For the reasons set forth below, the orders of the Bankruptcy Court are AFFIRMED.\n\n#### **Facts and Procedural History**\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Court previously consolidated this appeal with *In re Kwok*, 3:23-cv-575 (KAD) upon Appellants' motion on May 23, 2023. *See* ECF No. 20.\n\n The Court assumes the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts and repeats only those necessary for deciding the instant appeal. Ms. Guo is the owner of HK USA.<sup>2</sup> On August 17, 2022, the Trustee served a Rule 2004 subpoena on the HK Parties seeking, *inter alia*, their financial information. On September 2, 2022, the HK Parties objected to the twenty-one document requests in the subpoena because they sought information unrelated to the debtor or the debtor's estate. Specifically, as to fourteen of those requests, the HK Parties asserted that they would \"neither search for nor produce documents responsive to this Request for Production as propounded.\" Following the objection, Ms. Guo met with her counsel, which at the time was solely Zeisler & Zeisler (\"Zeisler\"), to search for responsive documents on behalf of herself and HK USA. Zeisler met and conferred with counsel to the Trustee while the search was ongoing, during which Zeisler informed the Trustee that the HK Parties would not have many responsive documents. HK USA and Ms. Guo produced 372 documents and 19 documents, respectively, to the Trustee in September 2022. Ms. Guo maintained her objection to producing information related to her individual income and assets and only produced documents related to assets over which disputes over ownership presently existed, such as ownership of the Lady May yacht.\n\n On October 28, 2022, the Trustee filed a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 and 37 and Bankruptcy Rules 2004 and 9016 to compel the HK Parties' compliance with the subpoena.<sup>3</sup> The HK Parties objected to the motion to compel on November 14, 2022 on the grounds that there was no evidence that their search efforts were insufficient or that they had responsive documents in their possession, and that they had not refused to search for responsive documents. The Bankruptcy\n\n<sup>2</sup> The issue regarding the ownership of HK USA is the subject of a separate appeal, *see In re Kwok*, 3:23-cv-458 (KAD), but for the purposes of this appeal, the Court accepts this proposition as accurate. 3\n\nThe motion to compel also sought compliance from people and entities who are not at issue in this appeal.\n\nCourt held a hearing on the Trustee's motion to compel and the HK Parties' objection on November 30, 2022.\n\nOn January 13, 2023, Attorney Vartan and other members of Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC entered appearances on behalf of the HK Parties.\n\n On January 20, 2023, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order compelling production which granted the motion to compel in part. The Bankruptcy Court directed the HK Parties to produce to\n\nthe Trustee the following by 5:00PM on January 31, 2023:\n\n(i) documents responsive to the Trustee's requests, except as to the documents that concern the Lady May, dated June 1, 2014, or later, unless a particular request specifies a different time period and such time period does not begin before June 1, 2014; (ii) documents responsive to the Trustee's requests, except as the documents concern the Lady May, as to both assets the Debtor acknowledges he owns and assets that allegedly belong to persons or entities other than the Debtor, including without limitation his family members, including Mei Guo herself, and associated entities, including HK (USA) itself; and (iii) documents responsive to the Trustee's requests that are within their custody, possession, or control, except as to the documents [that] concern the Lady May, including without limitation documents in the files of their current or former counsel and other agents and advisors, unless such documents have already been produced by their current or former counsel and other agents and advisors but without consideration of any potential future production by their current or former counsel and other agents and advisors.\n\n*In re Kwok*, No. 22-50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 20, 2023), ECF No. 1353 at 4 (hereinafter,\n\n\"Order Compelling Production\"). Thereafter, the HK Parties began to take steps to comply with the Order Compelling Production, including searching for hard copy records and inventorying electronic records. Attorney Vartan reiterated to the Trustee that they did not believe there would be a significant number of documents responsive to the subpoena that were not already produced but that the HK Parties needed additional time to review and produce. Also on January 20, 2023, the Trustee took Ms. Guo's deposition, at which Attorney Vartan was present.\n\n On February 10, 2023, the Trustee filed a motion for an order to show cause why the HK Parties should not be held in contempt for their failure to comply with the Order Compelling\n\nProduction. That same day, the HK Parties filed an untimely motion for extension of time to comply with the Order Compelling Production, wherein they requested an additional thirty days to collect and produce the documents. Therein, the HK Parties indicated that they would begin to produce the documents in the next week and would provide additional documents on a rolling basis. The HK Parties specifically indicated that: they had begun \"taking steps to comply with the Order Compelling Production\"; through counsel, they had explained to the Trustee that it would be \"costly and time sensitive\" to confirm they did not possess \"a significant number of documents responsive to the Subpoenas\"; and Ms. Guo needed to search electronic documents for responsive records and then have them translated for review and production. The motion for extension of time did not raise any issues or concerns related to the meaning or directives contained in the Order Compelling Production.\n\n On February 13, 2023, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order: (1) directing the HK Parties to show cause why they should not be held in contempt, (2) scheduling a hearing for March 7, 2023, and (3) requiring the HK Parties to \"file a sworn declaration on the docket of this case detailing full compliance with the Order Compelling Production or, failing that, describing in detail the efforts taken to comply\" by 5:00PM on March 6, 2023.<sup>4</sup> The Bankruptcy Court further advised that the \"HK Parties must file prior to the hearing proof of their compliance or diligent attempt to comply with the Order Compelling Production. The HK Parties and the Trustee are encouraged, however, to work out a consent order establishing deadlines for production, in which case the hearing may not need to be held.\"\n\n<sup>4</sup> In the Order finding the HK Parties in contempt and sanctioning Appellants, the Bankruptcy Court explained that the February 13, 2023 Order was issued, in part, in reliance upon the HK Parties' representations that production was soon to begin and would be made on a rolling basis. *See In re Kwok*, No. 22-50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Mar. 10, 2023), ECF No. 1537 at 5. Neither representation turned out to be accurate, which the Bankruptcy Court found to be at best, a material misrepresentation, or at worst, a deliberate falsehood.\n\n On March 6, 2023, the Trustee filed an opposition to the HK Parties' Motion for Extension of time, and therein represented that, despite their indication that they would be producing documents on a rolling basis, the HK Parties had not produced any additional documents. Thereafter, at approximately 8:15PM, three hours past the deadline set by the Bankruptcy Court, Attorney Vartan filed a declaration on the docket on behalf of the HK Parties wherein he chronicled their compliance with the Order Compelling Production purportedly as required by the Bankruptcy Court's February 13, 2023 Order. Specifically, Attorney Vartan explained that on February 20, 2023, counsel searched Ms. Guo's email, including the accounts she used for HK USA, as well as her phone and messaging applications, but cautioned that Ms. Guo had few documents to produce because she did not have access to materials that pre-dated her arrival in the United States in 2017 and that because of her experience being detained by the Chinese Communist Party, she does not regularly maintain electronic documents or communications due to fear of monitoring or hacking. At approximately 8:30PM on March 6, 2023, the HK Parties also made a supplemental production of eleven documents to the Trustee pursuant to the subpoena. The Bankruptcy Court denied the motion for extension of time at a hearing held on March 7, 2023, during which the Bankruptcy Court also heard the parties on the Order to Show Cause.\n\n On March 10, 2023, the Bankruptcy Court held the HK Parties in contempt and sanctioned the HK Parties and Attorney Vartan and his firm pursuant to the Bankruptcy Court's inherent contempt powers and Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(1) & (b)(2). In so doing, the Bankruptcy Court did not credit Attorney Vartan's declaration, because it had come from counsel and not the HK Parties as had been ordered.<sup>5</sup> Further, the declaration was silent as to HK USA's efforts to comply with the\n\n<sup>5</sup> The Bankruptcy Court also observed, and rightly so, that it was not required to consider the Vartan Declaration at all insofar as it was not timely filed. *See In re Kwok*, No. 22-50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Mar. 10, 2023), ECF No. 1537 at 14.\n\nOrder Compelling Production and did not specify what electronic documents or devices were in Ms. Guo's custody, possession, and control. Neither did the Bankruptcy Court credit the declaration that the two email accounts that Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC accessed were designed solely for communicating with counsel. The Bankruptcy Court also found that the search terms were either poorly chosen or designed to avoid identifying responsive documents and, lastly, rejected the representation that Ms. Guo had limited access to her own bank accounts.\n\n The Bankruptcy Court held Appellants jointly and severally liable and by way of sanction awarded reasonable attorneys' fees and costs to the Trustee for his efforts to secure compliance with the subpoena and for prosecuting the motion to compel. The Bankruptcy Court ordered the Trustee to submit his fees and costs application by March 24, 2023 and that the HK Parties purge their contempt by March 14, 2023.\n\n On March 13, 2023, Ms. Guo and HK USA filed separate declarations, repeating the representations made by Attorney Vartan in his March 6, 2023 declaration. On April 10, 2023, after two extensions, the Trustee filed his fee application. On April 21, 2023, the Bankruptcy Court entered the sanctions order and awarded Appellee \\$83,370.36. On April 28, 2023, Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration of the sanctions order, to include the amount of the fees awarded, which was denied.\n\n Appellants filed a timely appeal. On June 6, 2023, Appellants filed a motion to stay pending appeal the Sanctions Order, *see* ECF No. 28, which this Court granted, absent objection, on June 30, 2023. *See* ECF No. 29.\n\n#### **Standard of Review**\n\n District courts have jurisdiction to hear appeals from \"final judgments, orders, and decrees . . . of bankruptcy judges.\" 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). The orders holding the HK Parties in contempt and\n\nsetting a sanctions amount against Appellants constitute final orders for the purposes of § 158(a). *See In re Fugazy Express, Inc.*, 982 F.2d 769, 775–76 (2d Cir. 1992); *Lothian Oil (USA), Inc. v. Sokol*, 526 F. Appx. 105, 107–08 (2d Cir. 2013).\n\n \"A bankruptcy court's award of sanctions, including findings of contempt, are reviewed for abuse of discretion.\" *In re Gravel*, 6 F.4th 503, 511 (2d Cir. 2021). A bankruptcy court \"abuses its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.\" *Id.* (quoting *In re Kalikow*, 602 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 2010)). A bankruptcy court's contempt power is \"narrowly circumscribed\" and therefore review of such an order \"is more exacting than under the ordinary abuse-of-discretion standard.\" *Id.* (quoting *Perez v. Danbury Hosp.*, 347 F.3d 419, 423 (2d Cir. 2003)). \"The bankruptcy court's factual determinations are reviewed for clear error. . . . Questions of law and interpretation of an order underlying a contempt finding are reviewed *de novo*.\" *Id.* (internal citation omitted).\n\n#### **Discussion**\n\n On appeal, Appellants challenge the Bankruptcy Court's Contempt and Sanctions orders as an abuse of direction because (1) the Order Compelling Production and the Order to Show Cause were vague and ambiguous, (2) the HK Parties complied or attempted to diligently comply with the Order Compelling Production, and (3) Appellants were given no opportunity to respond to the Trustee's fee request. The Court addresses each argument in turn.\n\n#### **The Bankruptcy Court Did Not Err in Issuing the Contempt Order**\n\n Appellants challenge the Bankruptcy Court's finding that its Order Compelling Production was clear and unambiguous. Specifically, Appellants contend that the Order failed to include instruction as to *how* to conduct their search for responsive documents<sup>6</sup> and was ambiguous insofar\n\n<sup>6</sup> This argument is waived on appeal because it was not raised in the Bankruptcy Court, and thus, the Bankruptcy Court had no opportunity to consider such an argument when deciding whether to hold the HK Parties in contempt*.*\n\nas it failed to specify what \"agents\" or \"advisors\" the HK Parties were required to consult in searching for responsive documents. Appellants also argue that the Order to Show Cause was vague or ambiguous as to whether a declaration from the HK Parties was required or whether Attorney Vartan's declaration was sufficient to detail the HK Parties' compliance with the Order Compelling Production. Appellee argues that both the Order Compelling Production and the Order to Show Cause were clear and unambiguous and contends that Appellants fail to demonstrate (or seriously argue) that the Bankruptcy Court's factual findings were clearly erroneous.\n\nA bankruptcy court may hold a party in contempt for violating the court's injunction only \"if there is *no fair ground of doubt* as to whether the order barred the [party]'s conduct.\" *Taggart v. Lorenzen*, 139 S. Ct. 1795, 1799 (2019). \"In particular, a contempt order is warranted only where the party has notice of the order, the order is clear and unambiguous, and the proof of noncompliance is clear and convincing.\" *In re Gravel*, 6 F.4th at 512.<sup>7</sup>\n\n#### *\"Agents\" and \"Advisors\" is Clear and Unambiguous*\n\n The Court first concludes that the direction that the HK Parties produce documents in the \"files of their current or former counsel and other agents and advisors\" is clear and unambiguous. In so concluding, the Court notes that Appellants do not explain how \"agents\" or \"advisors\" are vague terms or how such vagueness interfered with their ability to comply with the Order Compelling Production; rather, Appellants merely assert that the Bankruptcy Court should not have ruled against them in the Contempt Order on this issue.\n\n*See Millea v. Metro-N. R. Co.*, 658 F.3d 154, 163 (2d Cir. 2011) (\"Arguments raised for the first time on appeal are deemed waived.\"); *In re Markus*, 78 F.4th 554, 570 n.9 (2d Cir. 2023) (same); *In re Gordon*, 577 B.R. 38, 47 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (\"[A]ny arguments not raised in the bankruptcy court are considered waived; unless such waiver results in manifest injustice, the new arguments will not be considered on appeal.\"). The Court does not address this argument further because waiver does not result in manifest injustice to Appellants.\n\n<sup>7</sup> There is no dispute here that Appellants had notice of all orders at issue in this appeal.\n\n The Court first observes that at no point prior to the hearing on the Order to Show Cause did the Appellants raise any concern as to the meaning of the terms \"agents or \"advisors.\" Only when faced with a possible contempt sanction did they, for the first time, profess to not understand the scope of their obligations. For this reason, the Bankruptcy Court viewed this argument with appropriate skepticism. Indeed, Appellants' eleventh-hour assertion undermines their argument on appeal that these terms are vague and ambiguous.\n\nNonetheless, the terms \"agents\" or \"advisors\" are broad categories utilized to cover a large swath of potential people and entities who may have had responsive documents. That does not mean that the terms are vague or ambiguous, and in the context of this case, no contrary conclusion could be fairly reached. *See United States v. Christie Industries, Inc.*, 465 F.2d 1002, 1007 (3d Cir. 1972) (language of an injunction must be read in light of surrounding circumstances) (citing *John B. Stetson Co. v. Stephen L. Stetson Co.*, 128 F.2d 981, 983 (2d Cir. 1942)); *Town of Islip v. Eastern Air Airlines*, 793 F.2d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1986) (\"[A] party to an action is not permitted to maintain, a studied ignorance of the terms of a decree in order to postpone compliance and preclude a finding of contempt.\").\n\nFirst, the text of the Order Compelling Production excludes from the documents to be produced (1) documents concerning the Lady May that may be in the possession of \"current and former counsel and other agents and advisors\" and (2) documents that \"have already been produced by their current or former counsel and other agents and advisors.\" Second, as the Bankruptcy Court noted, the litigation history leading to the entry of the Order Compelling Production—particularly the January 20, 2023 deposition of Ms. Guo—makes clear that the intent of the order was to compel the production of responsive documents from entities within Ms. Guo's control that may have been unknown to her at the time of the deposition. *See* A-0009. *Cf. Gucci America, Inc. v. Weixing Li*,\n\n768 F.3d 122, 143–44 (2d Cir. 2014) (reversing finding of contempt for bank's failure to produce documents related to defendants named in a subsequent pleading where subpoena sought documents from \"Defendants\" because the subpoena did \"not define 'Defendants' in an openended fashion to include all newly-named defendants in the case\"). The breadth of the statement \"current and former counsel and other agents and advisors\" aligns with the purpose of the subpoena, *i.e.*, to assist the Trustee in identifying and finding potential assets of the bankruptcy estate, which had revealed itself to be a Herculean task indeed given the attempts to thwart those efforts by Appellants. For example, the Order Compelling Production was only sought after the HK Parties, in their initial objections to the subpoena, refused to search for or provide any documents that were not related to known assets. *See* A-0107 (\"Ms. Guo Objects to instruction number 12 to the extent that it purports to require Ms. Guo to undertake an investigation or analysis to ascertain the identity of all affiliates of the as defined Entities. Ms. Guo will not undertake such an investigation or analysis and *limits her response to the Trustee's Requests for Production to entities and affiliates known to her*.\") (emphasis added); A-0130 (same as to HK USA). Moreover, as the Bankruptcy Court noted, the text of the Order Compelling Production was crafted after extensive argument by both the Trustee and counsel for the HK Parties, Zeisler, who raised no issue as to what the Order Compelling Production required their clients to do. Indeed, as observed above, it was not until Attorney Vartan appeared for the HK Parties, and after the HK Parties were on clear notice that they risked being held in contempt and sanctioned, did the HK Parties raise an ambiguity argument as to what \"agents\" and \"advisors\" included. With this context, there is no fair ground of doubt as to the meaning of \"documents in the files of their current or former counsel and other agents and advisors.\" Having so concluded, the Bankruptcy Court was well within its\n\ndiscretion to reject this after-the-fact attempt to justify non-compliance with the Court's Order Compelling Production.\n\n#### *The Order to Show Cause Was Clear and Unambiguous*\n\n The Court next concludes that the Order to Show Cause, directing \"the HK Parties [to] file a sworn declaration on the docket of this case detailing full compliance with the Order Compelling Production or, failing that, describing in detail the efforts taken to comply,\" was clear and unambiguous. Appellants argue that it was not clear whether the HK Parties, and not counsel on behalf of the HK Parties, had to file the sworn declaration. The Court disagrees.\n\n The Order to Show Cause, by its plain language in the second paragraph, defines the HK Parties as HK USA and Ms. Guo. *See In re Kwok*, 22-50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2023), ECF No. 1455 at 1. And it would have been a completely unreasonable interpretation of \"HK Parties\" to include counsel for the HK Parties. It was the parties who were subject to the subpoena and the Order Compelling Production and whose unrelenting intransigence over many months in complying with the subpoena and the Order Compelling Production gave rise to the motion for contempt in the first instance. Any suggestion or argument that an affidavit from counsel would be sufficient to satisfy the Bankruptcy Court's obvious concerns regarding their clients' conduct is unsupportable on this record.\n\n Appellants note that the Trustee and the Bankruptcy Court did not raise an issue with the subsequent declarations sworn by HK USA and Ms. Guo, which largely mirror Attorney Vartan's declaration, and that this evinces a mere misunderstanding over the form of the declaration required, thus precluding a finding of contempt. This argument misses the point. Whether subsequent efforts to cure the contempt were or were not met with objection does not have any bearing on the whether the contempt occurred in the first instance. Again, Appellants' argument\n\nfails to acknowledge the preceding months of effort and litigation by the Trustee to secure the HK Parties' compliance with the subpoena. As the Supreme Court recently emphasized, a party's bad faith and \"record of continuing and persistent violations and persistent contumacy justifie[s] placing the burden of any uncertainty in the decree . . . on [the] shoulders of the party who violated the court order.\" *Taggart*, 139 S. Ct. at 1802 (internal quotation marks omitted). As discussed, the subpoena sought information from the HK Parties, not counsel. The Order Compelling Production required the HK Parties, not their counsel, to produce documents. It was therefore the HK Parties, not counsel, that risked a contempt finding. To the extent that any ambiguity could be located in the Order to Show Cause, the circumstances leading to the Order to Show Cause, after the Order Compelling Production was not complied with, makes evident that a declaration from counsel (and not the parties who would be under threat of perjury) was insufficient to comply with the Bankruptcy Court's order. *See, e.g.*, *Carnrite v. Granada Hospital Group, Inc.*, 175 F.R.D. 439, 448–449 (W.D.N.Y.1997) (in the summary judgment context, \"[a]n attorney's affidavit not based on personal knowledge is an impermissible substitute for the personal knowledge of a party.\") (citing *United States v. Bosurgi*, 530 F.2d 1105, 1111 (2d Cir. 1976)). The Court concludes that there is no fair ground of doubt as to the meaning of the Order to Show Cause that \"the HK Parties . . . file a sworn declaration on the docket\" and what was required of the HK Parties to comply.\n\n#### *Proof of Noncompliance is Clear and Convincing*\n\n Appellants argue that the HK Parties took significant steps to comply with the Order Compelling Production and the Order to Show Cause, as detailed in Attorney Vartan's declaration, and that the Bankruptcy Court categorically dismissed these efforts. Appellee contends that Appellants fails to meaningfully address or challenge the Bankruptcy Court's numerous factual findings that the HK Parties did not diligently attempt to comply with the Order Compelling\n\nProduction and the Order to Show Cause in a reasonable manner. The Court concludes that the Bankruptcy Court's findings as to the HK Parties' noncompliance is amply supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record.\n\n*In re Markus*, 78 F.4th 554 (2d Cir. 2023) is instructive. In that case, after a pattern of not complying with discovery obligations, a subpoena requesting over twenty categories of documents from the debtor was issued to her attorney. The subpoena requested \"all documents that [the debtor], or any of [her] present or former agents, attorneys, assigns, consultants, employees, and/or successors possess, control or can access in the ordinary course of business.\" *Id.* at 559. The attorney made no effort to obtain responsive documents and instead moved to quash the subpoena. The attorney \"represented to the bankruptcy court that he would comply, but he ultimately made no production, asserting that he had no responsive documents in his possession.\" *Id.* Thereafter, the bankruptcy court denied the motion to quash the subpoena and ordered the attorney to communicate with his client and her agents to obtain and produce responsive documents to the extent they were with his client's \"possession, custody, or control\" and required the attorney and his client to complete production of all responsible documents \"to the extent the documents are in their possession, custody, or control.\" *Id.* at 559–60. The attorney produced no documents by the deadline, objecting to the request as exceeding the scope of allowable discovery, and argued for the first time that he understood the scope of the subpoena to be territorially limited. *Id.* at 560. Even though the production order directed the attorney to immediately communicate with his client and her agents, \"it was apparent that [he] had not done so, as he did not know—'one way or the other'—whether they had any responsive documents.\" *Id.* The Second Circuit concluded that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning the attorney. *Id.* at 566.\n\n Likewise, here. The subpoenas were served in August 2022. The HK Parties largely objected to the subpoena and produced some discovery in September 2022. In late October 2022, after unsuccessful meet and confers, the Trustee filed a motion to compel. The HK Parties objected, stating that they were not in possession of responsive documents. The Bankruptcy Court held a hearing with the parties in November 2022 on the motion to compel. The Order Compelling Production was issued on January 20, 2023, giving the HK Parties ample time to search for responsive documents in the interim. The deadline for compliance with the Order Compelling Production passed and the HK Parties still failed to turn over any documents, at which point Attorney Vartan represented that they would \"begin\" production on a rolling basis and requested an extension of time. The Bankruptcy Court issued an Order to Show Cause, wherein it set another deadline of March 6, 2023 by 5:00PM for the HK Parties to comply, \"an extension of over a month from the deadline set by the Order Compelling Production and almost seven months since the Subpoenas were served.\" *In re Kwok*, No. 22-50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Mar. 10, 2023), ECF No. 1537 at 19. Finally, a few hours *after* the deadline set in the Order to Show Cause, the HK Parties did finally turn over eleven more documents—which demonstrates the inaccurate nature of the assertion that the HK Parties were not in possession of responsive documents.\n\nAttorney Vartan also filed a declaration purporting to detail the HK Parties' compliance with the Order to Show Cause, but, as detailed by the Bankruptcy Court: (1) it was not a declaration of Ms. Guo or HK USA; (2) the declaration stated nothing about HK USA's attempt to comply; (3) the declaration did not make clear what electronic documents or devices were in Ms. Guo's custody, possession, or control; (4) the declaration took at face value the representation that Ms. Guo only maintains three email accounts; (5) the search terms were poorly chosen or designed to avoid discovery; (6) the declaration does not explain why Ms. Guo's communications with her\n\nfamily were \"atypical\" and does not detail Ms. Guo's communications with current or former counsel and other agents and advisors; (7) the declaration does not detail the nature of the hard copy documents Ms. Guo retained or any search of such documents; (8) the declaration's statements as to Ms. Guo's bank accounts were insufficient; and (9) the declaration states nothing about the search for or production of documents under her control but in the possession of her current or former counsel and other agents and advisors, which was expressly directed in the Order Compelling Production.\n\n Appellants only take issue with the Bankruptcy Court's finding that the search terms were insufficient to produce responsive documents and make the same argument to this Court that they made to the Bankruptcy Court: that they substantially complied because Ms. Guo does not use email or other online applications because of her concerns over hacking. Appellants do not, and perhaps cannot, refute with citation to the record evidence or otherwise challenge the breadth of factual findings made by the Bankruptcy Court in deciding to hold the HK Parties in contempt.\n\nIt is abundantly clear upon review of the record that the Bankruptcy Court issued its finding that the HK Parties were in contempt of court only after many months of hinderance and delay on the part of the HK Parties and after the HK Parties had been given ample opportunity to change course and correct their misconduct. Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court's factual findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence and the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion by finding the HK Parties in contempt. *See, e.g.*, *In re Dunne*, No. 3:17-cv-1399 (MPS), 2018 WL 4654698, at \\*7 (D. Conn. Sept. 27, 2018) (finding no abuse of discretion by bankruptcy court in finding debtor in contempt for failure to comply with subpoena and subsequent court orders where factual basis for the contempt order was supported by clear and convincing evidence to include emails and debtor's testimony which demonstrated debtor's noncompliance with \"subpoena but\n\nalso strongly indicated that [debtor's] court-ordered certification of compliance was false or at least misleading\"); *Gesualdi v. Hardin Contracting Inc.*, No. 09-cv-0683 (SJF)(AKT), 2016 WL 2654068, at \\*2 (E.D.N.Y. May 6, 2016) (finding non-party in contempt where plaintiffs \"have submitted clear and convincing proof that [non-party] has failed, without adequate excuse, to obey the subpoena . . . and this Court's various orders related to it, all of which were clear and unambiguous\"). Accordingly, because the record supports a finding by clear and convincing evidence as to the HK Parties' \"deliberate and repeated failure to comply with the bankruptcy court's orders, . . . the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in determining that civil contempt sanctions were appropriate and in imposing them against\" the HK Parties. *In re Markus*, 78 F.4th at 568.\n\n#### **The Bankruptcy Court Did Not Err in Issuing the Sanctions Order**\n\n Appellants also argue that the Bankruptcy Court erred in sanctioning them pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 37(b)(2) because the HK Parties complied with the underlying orders and that there is no basis on the record to suggest that Attorney Vartan and his firm made a material misrepresentation such that they should also be sanctioned pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(c). As discussed above, the Court has concluded that the HK Parties did not comply with the underlying orders. The Court does not further address this aspect of Appellants' argument.\n\nThe Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion when issuing the Sanctions Order. \"Where the Bankruptcy Court finds sanctionable conduct, it has broad discretion in fashioning a sanction appropriate to the circumstances.\" *In re Martin*, 208 B.R. 807, 811 (N.D.N.Y. 1997), *aff'd sub nom. Martin v. Schaap Moving Sys., Inc.*, 152 F.3d 919 (2d Cir. 1998). Appellants merely repeat the arguments they made to the Bankruptcy Court without explaining why the Bankruptcy Court's Sanctions order was an abuse of discretion.\n\nHaving already concluded that the Bankruptcy Court's finding that the HK Parties did not comply with either the Order Compelling Production nor the Order to Show Cause was amply supported by clear and convincing evidence and that the finding of contempt based thereupon was not an abuse of discretion, the Court likewise concludes that the Bankruptcy Court was well within its discretion in finding that the conduct of both the HK Parties and Attorney Vartan and his firm was sanctionable. In addition to the discussion above regarding the Bankruptcy Court's determination not to credit Attorney Vartan's declaration in light of its numerous deficiencies, the Court observes that the Bankruptcy Court's decision was made in no small part because of the affirmative misrepresentations and actions by Attorney Vartan and his firm when seeking an extension of time to comply with the Order Compelling Production. *See In re Kwok*, No. 22-50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Mar. 10, 2023), ECF No. 1537 at 23 (finding that Attorney Vartan and his firm, at best, made a material misrepresentation that they would proceed with production, or at worst, knowingly made false statements, *i.e.* lied, to the Court in the motion for extension of time, and that such was \"part of a pattern of unacceptable, obstructionist behavior\" of Attorney Vartan and his firm.). Indeed, the Bankruptcy Court relied upon the representations of counsel in crafting the Order to Show Cause. *Compare* A-0208 (stating that \"Ms. Guo and HK USA would begin producing documents as early as next week and would continue to produce documents on a rolling basis\"), *with In re Kwok*, 22-50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2023), ECF No. 1455 at 2 (\"Based on the representations of counsel for the HK Parties in the Motion for Extension of Time, the Court expects that the HK Parties will be producing documents to the Trustee on a rolling basis during the ongoing mediation\"). Yet, despite this representation, it is undisputed that no documents were produced as promised, nor were documents produced on a rolling basis while the parties' mediation was ongoing. Notwithstanding, and of significant concern to the Bankruptcy Court,\n\nAttorney Vartan maintained that no misrepresentation had been made, prompting the Bankruptcy Court to warn Attorney Vartan that he could be subject to Rule 11 sanctions for his misconduct. *See In re Kwok*, No. 22-50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Mar. 10, 2023), ECF No. 1537 at 24. And as Ms. Guo's deposition testimony illustrates—which was taken the same day the Order Compelling Production was issued and twenty-one days before the motion for extension of time was filed—it was clear that, at the very least, Ms. Guo possessed responsive documents which had not yet been turned over. *See* A-00852 (\"A: I have an NDA with every single one of my crew. Q: Have you produced all of those documents? A: I don't recall. Q: Do you have any NDAs with any crew member prior to May 28, 2021? A: I think so. Q: I'll represent to you that your counsel has not produced any such documents.\"). On this record, it was not an abuse of discretion to sanction Attorney Vartan and his firm.\n\n#### *Due Process*\n\nThe Court also rejects the argument that the Sanctions Order was entered without due process. To be clear: Appellants do not dispute that they were afforded due process insofar as they had adequate notice that sanctions would be imposed. Rather, Appellants take issue with not being afforded the traditional twenty-one days to object to the Trustee's fee request after the Bankruptcy Court concluded that fees as a sanction would be appropriate under the circumstances. Appellee argues that the rule relied upon as affording Appellants twenty-one days to respond to the fee request is not applicable. The Court need not reach this issue as it is clear that no due process violation occurred.\n\nThe Second Circuit has explained that \"[a]lthough a party facing compensatory sanctions is not necessarily entitled to an evidentiary hearing with respect to the amount of proposed sanctions, . . . due process requires, at a minimum, that: (1) the party seeking to be compensated\n\nprovide competent evidence, such as a sworn affidavit, of its claimed attorney's fees and expenses; and (2) the party facing sanctions have an opportunity to challenge the accuracy of such submissions and the reasonableness of the requested fees and expenses.\" *Mackler Productions, Inc. v. Cohen*, 225 F.3d 136, 146 (2d Cir. 2000).\n\nFor example, the U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit held that a bankruptcy court erred by not affording a party facing sanctions \"an opportunity to object to the amount of attorney's fees awarded to [the] Trustee.\" *In re Badea*, 2019 WL 1070838, at \\*6 (9th Cir. B.A.P. Cir. Mar. 5, 2019). In *Badea*, although the bankruptcy court indicated to the debtor that he would have an opportunity to object to the reasonableness of the attorney's fees, the bankruptcy court entered the fee order without providing \"a procedure for opposing the reasonableness and calculation of the sanction\" and \"made no findings to support that the fees were reasonable.\" *Id.* Here, the Bankruptcy Court approved Appellee's fee application before Appellants objected to the reasonableness of the fees sought.<sup>8</sup>\n\n Whether the award, at the time it was issued, violated Appellants' due process rights, this Court need not decide. After the award was issued, Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration, wherein they were able to advance, and did advance, a number of challenges to the amount of the fee award. Indeed, Appellants made the same arguments to the Bankruptcy Court as they do here as to the reasonableness of the fees sought. The Bankruptcy Court considered and rejected Appellants' arguments. Thereafter, Appellants sought a stay pending appeal of their obligation to pay the fee to Appellee, making identical arguments as to the reasonableness of the fees. The\n\n<sup>8</sup> The Court cannot say definitively that Appellants did not have the opportunity to be heard in the constitutional sense. The award was issued eleven days after the request was submitted, during which time Appellants could have filed an objection. Because the Court recognizes that Appellants believed they would be given twenty-one days to object and no alternative briefing schedule had been ordered to suggest otherwise, the Court looks beyond this issue to determine the due process question.\n\nBankruptcy Court again considered Appellants' arguments and rejected them. Thus, although giving Appellants either the traditional twenty-one days to respond to the fee application, or setting a specific briefing schedule for a response might be the better practice, the Court cannot conclude that the purported denial, *see supra* n.8, of the opportunity to object to the fee application violated Appellants' due process rights when the Bankruptcy Court considered and rejected Appellants' arguments as to the amount and reasonableness of Appellee's fees on the motion for reconsideration as well as the motion to stay pending appeal. The Bankruptcy Court had before it a fee application fully supported by sworn affidavits and other evidence, was intimately familiar with the nature and scope of Appellee's work and efforts in securing compliance with the subpoena, and made the requisite findings as to the amount of fees sought and the reasonableness of counsels' hourly rates.\n\nFurther, remand at this juncture to direct the Bankruptcy Court to re-assess the proper amount of fees in light of Appellants' arguments would be a waste of judicial resources. Appellants provide no argument as to why the Bankruptcy Court would reach a different conclusion on remand from this Court than it already did when it considered and rejected Appellants' identical arguments in denying the motion for reconsideration and the motion to stay pending appeal.\n\n#### *Fee Amount*\n\nThe Bankruptcy Court's award of fees will not be reversed by the district court absent an abuse of discretion. *See In re JLM, Inc.*, 210 B.R. 19, 23 (2d. Cir. B.A.P. 1997); *In re Raytech Corp.*, 241 B.R. 785, 788 (D. Conn. 1999). An abuse of discretion occurs where the Bankruptcy Court (1) fails to apply the proper legal standard or follows improper procedures in determining the award or (2) bases its award on findings of fact that are clearly erroneous. *In re JLM*, 210 B.R. at 23. \"Bankruptcy courts enjoy wide discretion in determining reasonable fee awards.\" *Id.*\n\nIn determining the amount of compensation an attorney should receive, the Court should consider \"the nature, the extent, and the value of such services, taking into account all relevant factors including\" the time spent, the rate charged for such services, whether the services were necessary or beneficial at the time they were rendered, whether the services were performed within a reasonable amount of time, and whether the compensation is reasonable based on the \"customary compensation charged by comparably skilled practitioners.\" 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3).\n\nUpon review of the full appellate record, the orders and memoranda of decision of the Bankruptcy Court, the parties' arguments to this Court, and the statutory factors outlined above, it is clear that the Bankruptcy Court applied the correct legal standard and that the findings supporting the sanctions order are not clearly erroneous. To the contrary, the Court finds no error in the Bankruptcy Court's conclusions concerning the reasonableness of the attorney's fees awarded, especially in light of the complexity of the underlying bankruptcy proceeding and the protracted discovery dispute that precipitated the Sanctions order. Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion in granting the Special Fee Application in the amount of \\$83,370.26.\n\n#### **Conclusion**\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, the Court AFFIRMS the orders of the Bankruptcy Court holding the HK Parties in contempt and awarding fees to Appellee as an appropriate sanction against Appellants. The stay previously entered at ECF No. 29 is hereby lifted. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter Judgment in favor of Appellee and close this case.\n\n**SO ORDERED** at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 5th day of April 2024.\n\n */s/ Kari A. Dooley*  KARI A. DOOLEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格联邦地区法院\n\n关于：KWOK（郭文贵），\n债务人　)\n破产案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n)\n第 11 章\n)\n\nMEI GUO（郭美）、HK INTERNATIONAL\nFUNDS INVESTMENTS (USA)\nLIMITED, LLC（香港国际基金投资〈美国〉有限责任公司）、LEE VARTAN, ESQ.（李·瓦尔坦律师），\n以及 CHIESA SHAHINIAN &\nGIANTOMASI PC（基耶萨·沙希尼安和贾恩托马西专业公司），\n上诉人，　)\n民事案号 3:23-CV-375 (KAD)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n诉\nLUC A. DESPINS（卢克·A·德斯潘），\n受托人—被上诉人。　)\n)\n)\n2024年4月5日\n)\n)\n)\n裁决备忘录\n\nKari A. Dooley（卡丽·A·杜利），美国地区法官：\n\n本院待审的是 Mei Guo（郭美）及 HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC（香港国际基金投资〈美国〉有限责任公司）（“HK 各方”）及其律师 Lee Vartan 律师和 Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC（基耶萨·沙希尼安和贾恩托马西专业公司）（合称“上诉人”）提出的合并上诉1；该上诉质疑破产法院作出的命令，该等命令认定 HK 各方藐视法庭，并裁定将律师费作为制裁支付给第 11 章受托人 Luc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯潘）（“被上诉人”）。见 In re Kwok, No. 22-50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Mar. 10, 2023), ECF No. 1537；In re Kwok, No. 22-50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Apr. 21, 2023), ECF No. 1693。基于下述理由，维持破产法院的命令。\n\n事实和程序经过\n\n1 本院此前于 2023年5月23日根据上诉人的动议，将本上诉与 In re Kwok, 3:23-cv-575 (KAD) 合并。见 ECF No. 20。\n\n本院假定各方熟悉基础事实，仅重述裁决本次上诉所必需的事实。Guo 女士系 HK USA 的所有人。2 2022年8月17日，受托人向 HK 各方送达了依据 Rule 2004 发出的传票，请求取得包括其财务信息在内的资料。2022年9月2日，HK 各方对传票中的二十一项文件请求提出异议，理由是该等请求寻求与债务人或债务人财产无关的信息。具体而言，对于其中十四项请求，HK 各方主张，其“既不会搜索，亦不会提供按其提出方式对本文件出示请求作出回应的文件。”提出异议后，Guo 女士与其律师会面；当时其律师仅为 Zeisler & Zeisler（蔡斯勒与蔡斯勒律师事务所），以代表其本人和 HK USA 搜索回应性文件。在搜索进行期间，蔡斯勒与蔡斯勒律师事务所与受托人的律师会商，并在此期间告知受托人，HK 各方不会有很多回应性文件。HK USA 和 Guo 女士于 2022年9月分别向受托人提交了 372 份文件和 19 份文件。Guo 女士坚持其反对提供与其个人收入和资产有关的信息，并且仅提交了与目前存在所有权争议的资产有关的文件，例如 Lady May 游艇的所有权。\n\n2 关于 HK USA 所有权的问题是另一上诉的标的，见 In re Kwok, 3:23-cv-458 (KAD)，但就本上诉而言，本院接受该主张为准确。\n\n2022年10月28日，受托人依据 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 和 37 以及 Bankruptcy Rules 2004 和 9016 提出动议，要求强制 HK 各方遵守传票。3 HK 各方于 2022年11月14日反对该强制动议，理由是没有证据表明其搜索工作不足，或其占有回应性文件，且其并未拒绝搜索回应性文件。破产法院于 2022年11月30日就受托人的强制动议和 HK 各方的异议举行听证。\n\n3 该强制动议还要求本上诉未涉及的人员和实体遵守传票。\n\n2023年1月13日，Vartan 律师及 Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC 的其他成员代表 HK 各方提交了出庭代理声明。\n\n2023年1月20日，破产法院作出强制出示命令，部分准许了强制动议。破产法院指示 HK 各方在 2023年1月31日 5:00PM 前向受托人提交以下文件：\n\n(i) 对受托人请求具有回应性的文件，但涉及 Lady May 的文件除外；文件日期须为 2014年6月1日或之后，除非某一特定请求规定了不同的期间，且该期间不早于 2014年6月1日开始；(ii) 对受托人请求具有回应性的文件，但涉及 Lady May 的文件除外；该等文件既包括债务人承认其拥有的资产，也包括据称属于债务人以外的人员或实体的资产，包括但不限于其家庭成员，包括 Mei Guo 本人，以及关联实体，包括 HK (USA) 本身；以及 (iii) 处于其保管、占有或控制之下、对受托人请求具有回应性的文件，但涉及 Lady May 的文件除外，包括但不限于其现任或前任律师及其他代理人和顾问档案中的文件，除非该等文件已由其现任或前任律师及其他代理人和顾问提交，但不考虑其现任或前任律师及其他代理人和顾问未来可能作出的任何提交。\n\nIn re Kwok, No. 22-50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 20, 2023), ECF No. 1353 at 4（下称“强制出示命令”）。此后，HK 各方开始采取措施遵守强制出示命令，包括搜索纸质记录和编列电子记录清单。Vartan 律师向受托人重申，他们不认为会有大量尚未提交、对传票具有回应性的文件，但 HK 各方需要额外时间审查和提交文件。同于 2023年1月20日，受托人对 Guo 女士进行了证言录取，Vartan 律师在场。\n\n2023年2月10日，受托人提出命令说明理由动议，要求 HK 各方说明为何不应因未遵守强制出示命令而被认定藐视法庭。同日，HK 各方提出逾期的延期动议以遵守强制出示命令，要求额外三十日收集并提交文件。其中，HK 各方表示，其将在下周开始提交文件，并将持续分批提供补充文件。HK 各方具体表示：其已开始“采取措施遵守强制出示命令”；其通过律师向受托人解释，确认其并未持有“大量对传票具有回应性的文件”将会“成本高昂且时间紧迫”；且 Guo 女士需要搜索电子文件以寻找回应性记录，然后将其翻译以供审查和提交。延期动议未提出与强制出示命令所载含义或指示有关的任何问题或疑虑。\n\n2023年2月13日，破产法院作出命令：(1) 指示 HK 各方说明为何不应被认定藐视法庭，(2) 安排于 2023年3月7日举行听证，以及 (3) 要求 HK 各方在 2023年3月6日 5:00PM 前“在本案案卷中提交经宣誓声明，详细说明其已完全遵守强制出示命令，或者如未能如此，则详细说明为遵守该命令所作的努力。”4 破产法院进一步告知，“HK 各方必须在听证前提交其遵守强制出示命令或勤勉尝试遵守该命令的证据。然而，鼓励 HK 各方和受托人协商达成一项设定提交期限的同意命令；在此情况下，可能无需举行听证。”\n\n4 在认定 HK 各方藐视法庭并制裁上诉人的命令中，破产法院解释称，作出 2023年2月13日命令的部分依据，是 HK 各方作出的陈述，即文件提交即将开始，并将持续分批进行。见 In re Kwok, No. 22-50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Mar. 10, 2023), ECF No. 1537 at 5。两项陈述均被证明不准确；破产法院认定，这至多构成重大虚假陈述，最严重则构成故意虚假陈述。\n\n2023年3月6日，受托人对 HK 各方的延期动议提出反对，其中表示，尽管 HK 各方称将持续分批提交文件，但其并未提交任何额外文件。此后，大约在 8:15PM，即超过破产法院设定期限三小时后，Vartan 律师代表 HK 各方在案卷中提交声明，其中记述了其据称按破产法院 2023年2月13日命令所要求对强制出示命令的遵守情况。具体而言，Vartan 律师解释称，律师于 2023年2月20日搜索了 Guo 女士的电子邮件，包括其为 HK USA 使用的账户，以及其手机和通信应用程序，但提醒称 Guo 女士可提交的文件很少，因为她无法取得其于 2017 年抵达美国前的资料，并且由于其曾被中国共产党拘留的经历，她因害怕受到监控或黑客攻击而不定期保存电子文件或通信记录。大约于 2023年3月6日 8:30PM，HK 各方还根据传票向受托人补充提交了十一份文件。破产法院在 2023年3月7日举行的听证中驳回延期动议，并在该听证中听取了各方就说明理由命令提出的陈述。\n\n2023年3月10日，破产法院依据其固有的藐视法庭权力以及 Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(1) & (b)(2)，认定 HK 各方藐视法庭，并制裁 HK 各方、Vartan 律师及其律师事务所。作出该裁定时，破产法院未采信 Vartan 律师的声明，因为该声明来自律师而非按命令要求的 HK 各方。5 此外，该声明未说明 HK USA 为遵守强制出示命令所作的努力，也未具体说明哪些电子文件或设备处于 Guo 女士的保管、占有和控制之下。破产法院亦未采信如下声明，即 Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC 所访问的两个电子邮件账户仅用于与律师通信。破产法院还认定，搜索词要么选择不当，要么旨在避免识别回应性文件；最后，驳回了 Guo 女士对其本人银行账户的访问有限这一陈述。\n\n5 破产法院还正确地指出，由于 Vartan 声明未及时提交，其根本无需考虑该声明。见 In re Kwok, No. 22-50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Mar. 10, 2023), ECF No. 1537 at 14。\n\n破产法院认定上诉人承担连带责任，并作为制裁，裁定受托人就其为确保遵守传票以及推进强制动议所作努力获得合理律师费和费用。破产法院命令受托人于 2023年3月24日之前提交其律师费和费用申请，并命令 HK 各方于 2023年3月14日之前消除其藐视法庭状态。\n\n2023年3月13日，Guo 女士和 HK USA 分别提交声明，重复了 Vartan 律师在其 2023年3月6日声明中作出的陈述。经两次延期后，受托人于 2023年4月10日提交其费用申请。2023年4月21日，破产法院作出制裁命令，裁定被上诉人获得 $83,370.36。2023年4月28日，上诉人提出重新考虑制裁命令的动议，包括重新考虑所裁定律师费金额；该动议被驳回。\n\n上诉人及时提起上诉。2023年6月6日，上诉人提交了一项请求在上诉期间暂缓执行制裁命令的动议，见 ECF No. 28；本院于2023年6月30日，在无人提出异议的情况下准予该动议。见 ECF No. 29。\n\n审查标准\n\n地区法院有权审理针对“破产法官作出的终局判决、命令和裁定……的上诉”。28 U.S.C. § 158(a)。认定 HK 当事方藐视法庭的命令，以及针对上诉人确定制裁金额的命令，就 § 158(a) 而言构成终局命令。见 In re Fugazy Express, Inc., 982 F.2d 769, 775–76 (2d Cir. 1992); Lothian Oil (USA), Inc. v. Sokol, 526 F. Appx. 105, 107–08 (2d Cir. 2013)。\n\n“破产法院作出的制裁裁决，包括藐视法庭认定，均按滥用裁量权标准进行审查。”In re Gravel, 6 F.4th 503, 511 (2d Cir. 2021)。破产法院“如其裁定基于对法律的错误理解，或对证据作出明显错误的评估，即属滥用裁量权。”Id. (quoting In re Kalikow, 602 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 2010))。破产法院的藐视法庭权力“受到严格限制”，因此对此类命令的审查“比通常的滥用裁量权标准更为严格”。Id. (quoting Perez v. Danbury Hosp., 347 F.3d 419, 423 (2d Cir. 2003))。“破产法院的事实认定按明显错误标准审查。……法律问题以及对作为藐视法庭认定基础的命令之解释，按重新审查标准审查。”Id. (internal citation omitted)。\n\n讨论\n\n在上诉中，上诉人主张破产法院作出的藐视法庭命令和制裁命令构成滥用裁量权，理由是：(1) 强制提交命令和说明理由命令含糊不清；(2) HK 当事方已遵守或曾勤勉尝试遵守强制提交命令；以及 (3) 上诉人未获机会回应受托人的费用请求。本院依次审理各项论点。\n\n破产法院作出藐视法庭命令并无错误\n\n上诉人质疑破产法院关于其强制提交命令明确且无歧义的认定。具体而言，上诉人主张，该命令未就如何搜寻回应性文件提供指示6，且因其未明确 HK 当事方在搜寻回应性文件时必须咨询哪些“代理人”或“顾问”而存在歧义。上诉人还主张，说明理由命令对于是否要求 HK 当事方提交声明，或 Vartan 律师（瓦尔坦律师）的声明是否足以详细说明 HK 当事方遵守强制提交命令的情况，表述含糊不清。被上诉人主张，强制提交命令和说明理由命令均明确且无歧义，并称上诉人未能证明（或认真主张）破产法院的事实认定存在明显错误。\n\n6 该论点在上诉中视为放弃，因为其未在破产法院提出，故破产法院在决定是否认定 HK 当事方藐视法庭时没有机会审议该论点。\n\n破产法院仅可在“对于该命令是否禁止了[当事人]的行为不存在任何合理疑义”的情况下，因一方违反法院禁令而认定其藐视法庭。Taggart v. Lorenzen, 139 S. Ct. 1795, 1799 (2019)。“尤其是，只有在当事人知悉该命令、该命令明确且无歧义，并且不遵守命令的证据清楚且令人信服时，才有理由作出藐视法庭命令。”In re Gravel, 6 F.4th at 512.7\n\n“代理人”和“顾问”明确且无歧义\n\n本院首先认定，要求 HK 当事方提交其“现任或前任律师及其他代理人和顾问所持有的文件”这一指示明确且无歧义。作出该认定时，本院注意到，上诉人并未说明“代理人”或“顾问”何以属于含糊术语，或此种含糊何以妨碍其遵守强制提交命令；相反，上诉人仅主张，破产法院不应在就该问题作出的藐视法庭命令中对其作出不利裁定。\n\nSee Millea v. Metro-N. R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 163 (2d Cir. 2011) (“首次在上诉中提出的论点视为放弃。”); In re Markus, 78 F.4th 554, 570 n.9 (2d Cir. 2023) (同上); In re Gordon, 577 B.R. 38, 47 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (“任何未在破产法院提出的论点均视为放弃；除非此种放弃导致明显不公，否则上诉中将不审议新论点。”)。本院不再进一步审理该论点，因为视为放弃不会给上诉人造成明显不公。\n\n7 此处不存在争议的是，上诉人知悉本次上诉所涉的全部命令。\n\n本院首先注意到，在就说明理由命令举行听证会之前的任何时候，上诉人均未对“代理人”或“顾问”术语的含义提出任何疑虑。只有在面临可能的藐视法庭制裁时，他们才首次声称不理解其义务范围。因此，破产法院对该论点持有适当的怀疑态度。事实上，上诉人在最后关头提出的主张削弱了其在上诉中关于这些术语含糊不清的论点。\n\n尽管如此，“代理人”或“顾问”系用于涵盖可能持有回应性文件的大量潜在个人和实体的宽泛类别。这并不意味着这些术语含糊不清，并且在本案情形下，无法合理得出相反结论。See United States v. Christie Industries, Inc., 465 F.2d 1002, 1007 (3d Cir. 1972)（禁令的措辞必须结合周围情形理解）(citing John B. Stetson Co. v. Stephen L. Stetson Co., 128 F.2d 981, 983 (2d Cir. 1942)); Town of Islip v. Eastern Air Airlines, 793 F.2d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1986)（“诉讼当事人不得故意不了解判决条款，以延迟履行并排除藐视法庭认定。”）。\n\n首先，强制提交命令的文本将以下文件排除在应提交文件之外：(1) 可能由“现任和前任律师及其他代理人和顾问”持有的、有关 Lady May 的文件；以及 (2) “已由其现任或前任律师及其他代理人和顾问提交”的文件。其次，正如破产法院指出，导致作出强制提交命令的诉讼历史——特别是 2023年1月20日对 Guo 女士（郭女士）的证言录取——清楚表明，该命令意在强制提交 Guo 女士控制下的实体所持有的回应性文件，而这些文件在证言录取时可能尚不为其所知。See A-0009. Cf. Gucci America, Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, 143–44 (2d Cir. 2014)（因传票要求提供“被告”的文件，而传票“并未以开放式方式界定‘被告’，以包括本案中所有新列名的被告”，故撤销银行未提交与后续诉状中列名被告有关文件的藐视法庭认定）。关于“现任和前任律师及其他代理人和顾问”的表述之广度，符合该传票的目的，即协助受托人识别和寻找破产财产的潜在资产；鉴于上诉人为阻挠该等努力所作的尝试，此项工作确实已显现为一项艰巨任务。例如，只有在 HK 当事方最初对传票提出异议时拒绝搜寻或提供任何与已知资产无关的文件之后，才请求作出强制提交命令。See A-0107（“Guo 女士反对第12号指示，因该指示意图要求 Guo 女士进行调查或分析，以确定所定义实体全部关联方的身份。Guo 女士不会进行该等调查或分析，并将其对受托人提交请求的回应限于其已知的实体和关联方。”）(emphasis added); A-0130（就 HK USA 而言同上）。此外，正如破产法院指出，强制提交命令的文本是在受托人与 HK 当事方律师 Zeisler（蔡斯勒律师）进行广泛辩论后拟定的；后者未就强制提交命令要求其当事人采取何种行动提出任何问题。事实上，如上所述，直至 Vartan 律师代表 HK 当事方出庭，且在 HK 当事方已明确知悉其面临被认定藐视法庭及受制裁的风险之后，HK 当事方才就“代理人”和“顾问”包括何人提出含糊性论点。结合该背景，对于“其现任或前任律师及其他代理人和顾问所持有的文件”的含义不存在任何合理疑义。作出该认定后，破产法院完全可在其裁量范围内，驳回这种事后试图为不遵守本院强制提交命令辩解的做法。\n\n说明理由命令明确且无歧义\n\n本院继而认定，说明理由命令指示“HK 当事方在本案案卷中提交经宣誓的声明，详细说明已完全遵守强制提交命令，或者如未完全遵守，则详细说明为遵守该命令所作的努力”，其表述明确且无歧义。上诉人主张，尚不明确是否必须由 HK 当事方，而非代表 HK 当事方的律师，提交经宣誓的声明。本院不同意。\n\n说明理由命令在第二段中依其明确文字，将 HK 当事方界定为 HK USA 和 Guo 女士。See In re Kwok, 22-50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2023), ECF No. 1455 at 1。将“HK 当事方”解释为包括 HK 当事方的律师，将是完全不合理的。受传票和强制提交命令约束的是当事方；正是其数月来在遵守传票和强制提交命令方面始终不妥协，最初导致提出藐视法庭动议。任何认为律师的宣誓书足以满足破产法院对其当事人行为所明显持有的关切之主张或论点，均无法由本案记录支持。\n\n上诉人指出，受托人和破产法院并未对随后由 HK USA 和 Guo 女士宣誓作出的声明提出异议，这些声明在很大程度上与 Vartan 律师的声明相同；并称这表明仅是对所要求声明形式的误解，因而排除了藐视法庭认定。该论点未切中要害。随后为补救藐视法庭所作的努力是否遭到异议，与最初是否发生藐视法庭毫无关系。上诉人再次提出的论点\n\n未承认受托人为促使香港当事方（HK Parties）遵守传票而在此前数月中所作的努力和进行的诉讼。正如最高法院最近强调，当事人的恶意以及“持续且反复违反规定以及持续藐视法庭的记录，足以使判决中任何不确定性的负担……由违反法院命令的一方承担。”Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1802（省略内部引号）。如前所述，传票向香港当事方而非其律师索取信息。强制提交命令（Order Compelling Production）要求香港当事方而非其律师提交文件。因此，面临被认定藐视法庭风险的是香港当事方，而非其律师。即使说明理由命令（Order to Show Cause）中存在任何可被认定的歧义，鉴于在强制提交命令未获遵守后作出说明理由命令的情形，显然，律师的声明（而非面临伪证风险的当事人的声明）不足以遵守破产法院（Bankruptcy Court）的命令。参见，例如，Carnrite v. Granada Hospital Group, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 439, 448–449 (W.D.N.Y.1997)（在简易判决情境中，“并非基于个人知情的律师宣誓书，不得替代当事人的个人知情。”）（援引 United States v. Bosurgi, 530 F.2d 1105, 1111 (2d Cir. 1976)）。本院认定，对于说明理由命令中“香港当事方……在案卷中提交经宣誓的声明”这一表述的含义，以及香港当事方为遵守该命令所须履行的事项，不存在任何公平的疑义。\n\n未遵守的证明清楚且令人信服\n\n上诉人主张，如 Vartan 律师（Attorney Vartan）的声明中详述，香港当事方已采取重大措施遵守强制提交命令和说明理由命令，而破产法院完全驳回了这些努力。被上诉人主张，上诉人未能实质性地回应或质疑破产法院作出的众多事实认定，即香港当事方未以合理方式勤勉地尝试遵守强制提交命令和说明理由命令。本院认定，案卷中清楚且令人信服的证据充分支持破产法院关于香港当事方未遵守命令的认定。\n\nIn re Markus, 78 F.4th 554 (2d Cir. 2023) 具有指导意义。在该案中，在一贯未遵守证据开示义务之后，向债务人律师发出了传票，要求提供二十余类文件。传票要求提供“[债务人]或[其]现任或前任代理人、律师、受让人、顾问、雇员和/或继承人持有、控制或在正常业务过程中可以取得的所有文件。”Id. at 559。该律师未努力取得任何回应性文件，而是提出动议请求撤销传票。该律师“向破产法院表示他将遵守，但他最终未提交任何文件，并声称其并未持有任何回应性文件。”Id. 此后，破产法院驳回了撤销传票的动议，并命令该律师与其客户及其代理人沟通，以取得并提交其客户“占有、保管或控制”范围内的回应性文件；同时要求该律师及其客户完成提交所有回应性文件，“但以该等文件处于其占有、保管或控制范围内为限。”Id. at 559–60。该律师未在截止日期前提交任何文件，反对该请求超出允许证据开示的范围，并首次主张其理解传票范围受地域限制。Id. at 560。尽管提交命令指示该律师立即与其客户及其代理人沟通，“显然，[他]并未如此行事，因为他不知道——‘无论如何’——他们是否持有任何回应性文件。”Id. 第二巡回上诉法院认定，破产法院对该律师实施制裁并未滥用其自由裁量权。Id. at 566。\n\n同样地，本案亦然。传票于 August 2022 送达。香港当事方在很大程度上对传票提出异议，并于 September 2022 提交了一些证据开示材料。October 2022 下旬，在协商未果后，受托人提出强制执行动议。香港当事方提出异议，称其并未占有回应性文件。破产法院于 November 2022 就强制执行动议与各方举行听证会。强制提交命令于 January 20, 2023 作出，使香港当事方有充足时间在此期间搜寻回应性文件。遵守强制提交命令的截止日期届满，而香港当事方仍未交出任何文件；此时，Vartan 律师表示其将开始以滚动方式提交文件，并请求延长期限。破产法院作出说明理由命令，设定另一截止日期，要求香港当事方于 March 6, 2023 by 5:00PM 前遵守，该期限“较强制提交命令所设截止日期延长一个多月，且距传票送达已近七个月。”In re Kwok, No. 22-50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Mar. 10, 2023), ECF No. 1537 at 19。最终，在说明理由命令设定的截止日期后数小时，香港当事方确实又交出了十一份文件——这表明香港当事方并未占有回应性文件的说法并不准确。\n\nVartan 律师还提交了一份声明，声称详述香港当事方对说明理由命令的遵守情况，但如破产法院详述：（1）该声明并非郭女士（Ms. Guo）或 HK USA（HK USA）的声明；（2）该声明未说明任何关于 HK USA 遵守命令的尝试；（3）该声明未明确说明哪些电子文件或设备处于郭女士的保管、占有或控制之下；（4）该声明不加质疑地接受了郭女士仅维持三个电子邮件账户的陈述；（5）检索词选择不当，或旨在规避证据开示；（6）该声明未解释为何郭女士与其家人的通信属于“非典型”通信，也未详述郭女士与现任或前任律师及其他代理人和顾问的通信；（7）该声明未详述郭女士保留的纸质文件的性质，或对该等文件进行的任何搜索；（8）该声明关于郭女士银行账户的陈述不足；以及（9）该声明未说明对处于其控制之下、但由其现任或前任律师及其他代理人和顾问占有的文件进行搜索或提交的情况，而强制提交命令已明确要求该等搜索或提交。\n\n上诉人仅对破产法院认定检索词不足以产生回应性文件提出异议，并向本院提出其在破产法院提出的同一论点：由于郭女士担心遭受黑客攻击，故其不使用电子邮件或其他在线应用程序，因此其已实质性遵守命令。上诉人未以案卷证据援引或其他方式反驳，也或许无法反驳破产法院在决定认定香港当事方藐视法庭时所作出的广泛事实认定。\n\n经审查案卷可明确看出，破产法院仅在香港当事方造成数月阻碍和拖延之后，并且在已给予香港当事方充分机会改变做法并纠正其不当行为之后，才作出认定香港当事方藐视法庭的裁定。因此，破产法院的事实认定有清楚且令人信服的证据支持，破产法院认定香港当事方藐视法庭并未滥用其自由裁量权。参见，例如，In re Dunne, No. 3:17-cv-1399 (MPS), 2018 WL 4654698, at \\*7 (D. Conn. Sept. 27, 2018)（认定破产法院因债务人未遵守传票及后续法院命令而认定其藐视法庭，并未滥用自由裁量权；藐视法庭命令的事实基础有清楚且令人信服的证据支持，包括电子邮件和债务人的证言，这些证据表明债务人未遵守“传票，而且强烈表明[债务人]经法院命令作出的遵守证明是虚假的，或至少具有误导性”）；Gesualdi v. Hardin Contracting Inc., No. 09-cv-0683 (SJF)(AKT), 2016 WL 2654068, at \\*2 (E.D.N.Y. May 6, 2016)（认定非当事人藐视法庭，其中原告“已提交清楚且令人信服的证明，证明[非当事人]未能在无充分理由的情况下遵守传票……以及本院与之相关的各项命令，所有该等命令均清楚且无歧义”）。因此，由于案卷以清楚且令人信服的证据支持香港当事方“故意且反复未遵守破产法院命令”的认定，“破产法院认定民事藐视法庭制裁适当并对”香港当事方施加该等制裁，并未滥用其自由裁量权。In re Markus, 78 F.4th at 568。\n\n破产法院作出制裁命令并无错误\n\n上诉人还主张，破产法院依据 Fed. R. Civ. P 37(b)(2) 对其实施制裁属错误，因为香港当事方已遵守基础命令，且案卷中没有依据表明 Vartan 律师及其律师事务所作出重大虚假陈述，因而也应依据 Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(c) 对其实施制裁。如上所述，本院已认定香港当事方未遵守基础命令。本院不再处理上诉人该项论点的这一方面。\n\n破产法院作出制裁命令（Sanctions Order）时并未滥用其自由裁量权。“当破产法院认定存在可予制裁的行为时，其对酌定适合具体情形的制裁措施享有广泛自由裁量权。”In re Martin, 208 B.R. 807, 811 (N.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd sub nom. Martin v. Schaap Moving Sys., Inc., 152 F.3d 919 (2d Cir. 1998)。上诉人仅重复其在破产法院提出的论点，并未说明为何破产法院的制裁命令构成滥用自由裁量权。\n\n本院既已认定，破产法院（Bankruptcy Court）关于HK各方（HK Parties）未遵守《强制提交命令》（Order Compelling Production）或《说明理由命令》（Order to Show Cause）的认定，已有明确且令人信服的证据充分支持，且据此作出的藐视法庭认定并未构成裁量权滥用，本院同样认定，破产法院认定HK各方及Vartan律师（Attorney Vartan）和其律师事务所的行为应受制裁，完全属于其裁量范围之内。除上述关于破产法院因Vartan律师声明存在诸多缺陷而决定不予采信的讨论外，本院注意到，破产法院作出该决定，在很大程度上还因为Vartan律师及其律师事务所在寻求延长遵守《强制提交命令》的期限时作出了积极的不实陈述并采取了相关行动。见 In re Kwok, No. 22-50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Mar. 10, 2023), ECF No. 1537 at 23（认定Vartan律师及其律师事务所，最轻而言，对其将开始进行提交作出了重大不实陈述；最重而言，则在延长期限动议中故意向法院作出虚假陈述，即对法院撒谎，并认定该等行为是Vartan律师及其律师事务所“不可接受的、阻挠性行为模式的一部分”。）。事实上，破产法院在制定《说明理由命令》时依赖了律师的陈述。比较 A-0208（称“Guo女士和HK USA将最早于下周开始提交文件，并将持续滚动提交文件”），与 In re Kwok, 22-50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2023), ECF No. 1455 at 2（“基于HK各方律师在延长期限动议中的陈述，法院预计HK各方将在持续进行的调解期间向受托人滚动提交文件”）。然而，尽管作出了该陈述，无争议的是，未按承诺提交任何文件，在双方调解持续进行期间也未滚动提交文件。尽管如此，并且令破产法院严重关切的是，\n\nVartan律师坚持称并未作出任何不实陈述，促使破产法院警告Vartan律师，其不当行为可能使其受到Rule 11制裁。见 In re Kwok, No. 22-50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Mar. 10, 2023), ECF No. 1537 at 24。而且，如Guo女士（Ms. Guo）的证言所示——该证言是在《强制提交命令》发布当日录取，且在提交延长期限动议前二十一日录取——显然，至少Guo女士持有尚未交出的相关文件。见 A-00852（“答：我与我的每一位工作人员都签有保密协议。问：您是否已经提交了所有这些文件？答：我不记得了。问：您是否在2021年5月28日之前与任何工作人员签有任何保密协议？答：我想是的。问：我向您陈述，您的律师尚未提交任何此类文件。”）。基于该记录，对Vartan律师及其律师事务所施加制裁并非裁量权滥用。\n\n正当程序\n\n本院亦驳回《制裁令》（Sanctions Order）未经正当程序即被作出的主张。为明确起见：上诉人（Appellants）并不争议其已获得正当程序，因为其已获充分通知将被施加制裁。相反，上诉人质疑的是，在破产法院认定在该等情形下以费用作为制裁适当之后，未给予其传统的二十一日期限以对受托人（Trustee）的费用请求提出异议。被上诉人（Appellee）主张，上诉人所援引、据称给予其二十一日回应费用请求期限的规则并不适用。本院无须处理该问题，因为显然并未发生任何正当程序侵害。\n\n第二巡回上诉法院（Second Circuit）已解释：“尽管面临补偿性制裁的一方未必有权就拟议制裁金额获得证据听证，……但正当程序至少要求：(1) 寻求获得补偿的一方提供其所主张律师费及开支的合格证据，例如经宣誓的宣誓书；以及(2) 面临制裁的一方有机会质疑该等提交材料的准确性以及所请求费用和开支的合理性。”Mackler Productions, Inc. v. Cohen, 225 F.3d 136, 146 (2d Cir. 2000).\n\n例如，第九巡回区美国破产上诉小组（U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit）裁定，破产法院未给予面临制裁的一方“对授予受托人的律师费金额提出异议的机会”，构成错误。In re Badea, 2019 WL 1070838, at *6 (9th Cir. B.A.P. Cir. Mar. 5, 2019)。在Badea案中，尽管破产法院向债务人表示其将有机会对律师费的合理性提出异议，但破产法院在未提供“反对制裁合理性及计算的程序”、且“未作出支持该等费用合理性的认定”的情况下即作出了费用命令。Id. 在本案中，破产法院在上诉人对所请求费用的合理性提出异议之前，即批准了被上诉人的费用申请。8\n\n本院无须裁定，该裁决在作出时是否侵犯了上诉人的正当程序权利。裁决作出后，上诉人提出复议动议，并在该动议中能够且确实就费用裁决金额提出了多项异议。事实上，上诉人就所请求费用的合理性向破产法院提出了与其在此所提出的相同论点。破产法院审议并驳回了上诉人的论点。此后，上诉人就其向被上诉人支付费用的义务申请上诉期间暂缓执行，并就费用合理性提出相同论点。\n\n8 本院不能明确认定上诉人未获得宪法意义上的陈述机会。该裁决是在请求提交后十一日作出的，在此期间上诉人本可以提出异议。鉴于本院认识到上诉人相信其将被给予二十一日提出异议，且未有任何替代性书面陈述时间表命令表明并非如此，本院超越该问题以审查正当程序问题。\n\n破产法院再次审议并驳回了上诉人的论点。因此，尽管给予上诉人传统的二十一日以回应费用申请，或为回应设定具体书面陈述时间表，可能是更佳做法，但当破产法院已在复议动议及上诉期间暂缓执行动议中审议并驳回上诉人就被上诉人费用金额及合理性提出的论点时，本院不能认定，参见上文注8，对提出费用申请异议机会的所谓剥夺侵犯了上诉人的正当程序权利。破产法院面前已有经宣誓的宣誓书及其他证据充分支持的费用申请，破产法院对被上诉人为确保遵守传票所开展工作和付出努力的性质及范围十分熟悉，并就所请求费用金额及律师小时费率的合理性作出了必要认定。\n\n此外，此时发回案件以指示破产法院根据上诉人的论点重新评估适当费用金额，将浪费司法资源。上诉人未提出任何论点说明，破产法院在本院发回重审后为何会得出与其在驳回复议动议及上诉期间暂缓执行动议时审议并驳回上诉人相同论点后所作结论不同的结论。\n\n费用金额\n\n除非存在裁量权滥用，地区法院不会撤销破产法院作出的费用裁决。见 In re JLM, Inc., 210 B.R. 19, 23 (2d. Cir. B.A.P. 1997); In re Raytech Corp., 241 B.R. 785, 788 (D. Conn. 1999)。如破产法院：(1) 未适用适当的法律标准，或在确定裁决时遵循不当程序；或(2) 基于明显错误的事实认定作出裁决，即构成裁量权滥用。In re JLM, 210 B.R. at 23。“破产法院在确定合理费用裁决时享有广泛裁量权。”Id.\n\n在确定律师应获得的报酬金额时，法院应考虑“该等服务的性质、范围及价值，并考虑包括”所花费时间、该等服务的收费标准、该等服务在提供时是否必要或有益、该等服务是否在合理时间内完成，以及基于“具有相当技能从业人员通常收取的报酬”，该报酬是否合理等所有相关因素。11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3).\n\n经审查完整的上诉记录、破产法院的命令和裁定备忘录、各方向本院提出的论点以及上述法定因素，显然破产法院适用了正确的法律标准，支持制裁令的认定亦不存在明显错误。相反，本院认为，破产法院关于所裁定律师费合理性的结论不存在错误，尤其考虑到基础破产程序的复杂性以及导致《制裁令》作出的长期证据开示争议。因此，破产法院准许金额为$83,370.26的特别费用申请（Special Fee Application）并未滥用裁量权。\n\n结论\n\n基于上述理由，本院确认破产法院认定HK各方藐视法庭，并向被上诉人裁定费用作为对上诉人的适当制裁的命令。此前于ECF No. 29作出的暂缓令现予解除。法院书记员（Clerk of the Court）应登记有利于被上诉人的判决书并结案。\n\n特此命令。本命令于2024年4月5日在康涅狄格州布里奇波特（Bridgeport, Connecticut）作出。\n\n/s/ Kari A. Dooley  KARI A. DOOLEY 美国地区法院法官","key_entities":["Guo","Je","Kwok","Despins","Chinese Communist Party"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":20,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":28,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":29,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":40,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1353,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1455,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1537,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1693,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":7079,"status":"published","published_at":"2024-04-05 00:00:00","created_at":"2024-04-05","updated_at":"2026-08-23 19:56:33"}