{"id":"court_ctb_3373_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":3373,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"MOTION","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION In re HO WAN KWOK, *et al.*, Chapter 11","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"### **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n---------------------------------------------------------x\n\nIn re HO WAN KWOK, *et al.*, Chapter 11\n\nCase No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n(Jointly Administered)\n\n Debtor. ---------------------------------------------------------x\n\n# **OBJECTION TO THE CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE'S FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION OF CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE TO EXTEND AUGUST 15, 2024 DEADLINE FOR TRUSTEE TO FILE AVOIDANCE ACTIONS (ECF 3329)**\n\nHing Chi Ngok (\"Ms. Guo\"), by her undersigned counsel, respectfully files this objection (the \"Objection\") to the Chapter 11 Trustee's First Supplemental Motion to Extend August 15, 2024 Deadline for the Trustee to File Avoidance Actions (ECF 3329) (\"Second Motion to Extend\"), and in support thereof respectfully states as follows:\n\n# **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\n1. While couched as a motion to extend a deadline and this time without mentioning equitable tolling which the Bankruptcy Court previously denied, the Trustee still asks the Court to judicially extend statutes of limitations set by Congress. No authority exists for the Court to do so. Casting his request as an extension of a deadline set by the Bankruptcy does not change the fact that the Trustee seeks to alter the statute of limitations, including because the August 15, 2024 deadline set by the Bankruptcy Court was effectively itself an extension of the statute of limitations.\n\n2. The Trustee also asks this Court to reject Judge Tancredi's well-reasoned decision in *In re: Walnut Hill, Inc.*, 2018 WL 2672242 (Bankr. D.Conn. June 1, 2018), in favor of inapplicable non-circuit cases, and grant the premature and extraordinary relief to equitably toll and extend Trustee's time to commence avoidance actions against unnamed individuals and entities.\n\n3. Although Mrs. Guo does not believe the Trustee has any basis to bring any avoidance claims against her, to the extent the Trustee intends to do so in the future, the Tolling Motion should be denied for the reasons set forth by Judge Tancredi in *Walnut Hill*.\n\n4. In *Walnut Hill*, the Court (Judge Tancredi) considered whether Rule 9006(b) is a vehicle to preemptively and prospectively extend the Trustee's statute of limitations to commence an avoidance action under the Bankruptcy Code. *See Walnut Hill*, 2018 WL 2672242 \\*2 (\"The plain language of Rule 9006(b) prohibits this Court from enlarging the Section 546(a) statute of limitations.\"); *see also In re Damach, Inc.*, 235 B.R. 727, 731 (Bankr. D.Conn. 1999) (Krechevsky, J.) (Rule 9006(b) does not \"permit[] a court to extend a time limitation set by Congress in a statute\"). The Court should adopt the reasoning and decisions issued by Judge Tancredi and Judge Krechevsky and deny the Tolling Motion in its entirety.\n\n5. The bar against prospectively applying the doctrine of equitable tolling is wellestablished in this District. *Walnut Hill*, 2018 WL 2672242 \\*2 (\"It is wholly premature and procedurally flawed to address equitable tolling outside the context of an evidentiary hearing on the facts and circumstances to be proven in the adversary proceeding against specific defendants, once a statute of limitations defense has been asserted\"). The Trustee's request to issue a broad extension as to all prospective actions as to all prospective defendants is \"premature and procedurally flawed.\" *Walnut Hill*, 2018 WL 2672242 \\*2.\n\n6. The prospective relief the Trustee asks this Court to grant includes a global omnibus order \"that any party that has received notice, whether actual or constructive, of the Motion and did not object to the Motion has waived its right to assert a limitations period defense if ultimately\n\n2\n\nnamed in an action that is timely brought under the terms of this Order.\" ECF 3329, Exhibit 1. In other words, the Trustee asks this Court to place the burden on countless unnamed individuals and entities located anywhere in the world to engage counsel and participate in this proceeding based on the mere possibility that the Trustee may, one day, decide to bring an avoidance action against them. It is entirely premature for the Court to grant the Trustee global prospective relief based on potential defenses that may be raised in a hypothetical avoidance proceeding that the Trustee may one day pursue.\n\n7. As to Mrs. Guo, the burden is on the Trustee to act within the statute of limitations, and within the confines of a pending avoidance proceeding, after a statute of limitations defense is raised, to establish why their claim is saved by equitable tolling. As the Court held in *In re Walnut Hill*, \"Rule 9006(b) only applies to deadlines set by these or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court.\" *In re Walnut Hill*, 2018 WL 2672242, \\*2. Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) does not authorize extensions of statutory deadlines, like the applicable statutes of limitation.\n\n8. These principles, as outlined by other decisions in this District, apply to 11 U.S.C. § 549. Thus, Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) cannot be a basis for modifying the applicable statute of limitations.\n\n9. The Trustee's arguments are premature and could only be argued on a case-by-case basis in actually filed adversary proceedings, especially given the fact-specific nature of the inquiry. The Trustee's attempt for a blanket and sweeping order is therefore improper.\n\n10. At a minimum, and consistent with the Bankruptcy Court's prior ruling on the Trustee's first Motion for Entry of Order Extending Deadline for Trustee to File Avoidance Actions (ECF No. 2509), the Bankruptcy Court should deny the Trustee's proposed requested relief \"that any party that has received notice, whether actual or constructive, of the Motion and\n\n3\n\ndid not object to the Motion has waived its right to assert a limitations period defense if ultimately named in an action that is timely brought under the terms of this Order.\" ECF No. 3329 at 20; *see In re Kwok*, 2024 WL 666646, \\*9 (Feb. 15, 2024) (not including the Trustee's proposed waiver language and stating that \"[t]he Motion to Extend Deadlines is **DENIED IN PART** with respect to the request for prospective equitable tolling, without prejudice to the Trustee raising equitable tolling or other equitable arguments in response to a defense that an adversary proceeding commenced by the Trustee is time-barred\"). As the Bankruptcy Court previously found, even under an expansive reading of Rule 9006(b), the Trustee is not entitled to prospective relief. *Id*. Mrs. Guo objects to the Trustee's Proposed Order, which aside from the fact that the Trustee is not entitled to any portion being granted, he seeks draconian relief.\n\n11. The Bankruptcy Court does not have Constitutional authority to rule on this matter, as it involves private rights of action, which under *Stern v. Marshall*, 546 U.S. 462 (2011), can only be decided by the District Court.\n\n12. Mrs. Guo respectfully objects to any ruling by the Bankruptcy Court that should be made by the District Court and/or a jury, including, but not limited to, any rulings any party, jury, or court will rely upon to reach any decision that only an Article III Court or a jury can determine under the U.S. Constitution, *Stern v. Marshall* and its progeny, and other applicable law.\n\n#### Dated: August 6, 2024 **MEISTER SEELIG & FEIN PLLC**\n\nBy: */s/ Christopher J. Major*\n\nChristopher J. Major, Esq. Austin D. Kim, Esq. 125 Park Avenue, 7th Floor New York, NY 10017 Tel: (212) 655-3500 Email: cjm@msf-law.com adk@msf-law.com  *Attorneys for Defendants*\n\n## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI hereby certify that on the 6th day of August, 2024, I caused the foregoing to be filed and served on all appearing parties in the above-captioned case via the Court's Electronic Case Filing System.\n\n By: */s/ Christopher J. Major* Christopher J. Major, Esq.","body_zh":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION（美国康涅狄格区联邦破产法院布里奇波特分院）\n\n关于 HO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等人，第 11 章\n\n案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n\n（合并审理）\n\n债务人。---------------------------------------------------------x\n对第 11 章受托人请求延长受托人提起撤销权诉讼之 2024 年 8 月 15 日截止日期的第一份补充动议（ECF 3329）的异议\n\nHing Chi Ngok（岳庆芝）（“郭女士”），通过其下述署名律师，谨此对第 11 章受托人请求延长受托人提起撤销权诉讼之 2024 年 8 月 15 日截止日期的第一份补充动议（ECF 3329）（“第二次延期动议”）提出本异议（“本异议”），并为此谨陈述如下：\n初步陈述\n\n1. 尽管受托人将其请求包装为延长截止日期的动议，且此次未提及此前已被破产法院驳回的衡平法时效中止，但受托人仍在请求法院通过司法裁量延长由国会设定的诉讼时效。法院并无此项权力。将其请求说成是延长破产法院设定的截止日期，并不能改变受托人试图变更诉讼时效的事实，其原因还包括破产法院设定的 2024 年 8 月 15 日截止日期本身在实质上就是对诉讼时效的延长。\n\n2. 受托人还请求本法院摒弃 Tancredi（坦克雷迪）法官在 In re: Walnut Hill, Inc., 2018 WL 2672242 (Bankr. D.Conn. June 1, 2018) 一案中论证充分的裁决，转而采纳不适用的非本巡回区判例，并准予过早且非常规的救济，以衡平法中止时效并延长受托人对未具名个人和实体提起撤销权诉讼的期限。\n\n3. 尽管郭女士认为受托人没有任何依据对其提起任何撤销权主张，但在受托人将来拟提起此类诉讼的限度内，基于坦克雷迪法官在 Walnut Hill 案中阐明的理由，中止时效动议应予驳回。\n\n4. 在 Walnut Hill 案中，法院（坦克雷迪法官）审理了《破产诉讼规则》第 9006(b) 条是否可作为先发制人且具有前瞻性地延长受托人根据《破产法典》提起撤销权诉讼之时效的途径。参见 Walnut Hill, 2018 WL 2672242 *2（“第 9006(b) 条的文义明文禁止本法院扩大第 546(a) 条规定的诉讼时效。”）；亦见 In re Damach, Inc., 235 B.R. 727, 731 (Bankr. D.Conn. 1999)（Krechevsky（克雷切夫斯基）法官）（第 9006(b) 条并不“允许法院延长国会在成文法中设定的时间限制”）。本法院应采纳坦克雷迪法官和克雷切夫斯基法官所作出的论理与裁决，全盘驳回中止时效动议。\n\n5. 在本司法区，禁止前瞻性适用衡平法时效中止原则已是确立的规则。Walnut Hill, 2018 WL 2672242 *2（“在诉讼时效抗辩被提出后，若脱离针对特定被告的对抗性诉讼中待证事实与情况的证据听证会语境，去处理衡平法时效中止问题，完全为时尚早且存在程序缺陷”）。受托人请求针对所有预期的诉讼及所有预期的被告作出广泛延期的要求属于“过早且存在程序缺陷”。Walnut Hill, 2018 WL 2672242 *2。\n\n6. 受托人请求本法院准予的前瞻性救济包括一项全球统括命令，规定“任何收到本动议通知（无论是实际通知还是推定通知）且未对本动议提出异议的当事人，若最终在根据本命令条款及时提起的诉讼中被列为被告，则视为放弃主张诉讼时效期间抗辩的权利。”ECF 3329，附件 1。换言之，仅凭受托人某一天可能决定对其提起撤销权诉讼的虚无可能性，受托人便要求本法院将聘请律师并参与本程序的负担强加给遍布世界各地的无数未具名个人和实体。基于受托人某一天可能提起的假设性撤销权程序中可能提出的潜在抗辩，法院向受托人准予全球前瞻性救济完全为时尚早。\n\n7. 就郭女士而言，受托人有责任在诉讼时效期内行事，并在已提起的撤销权诉讼范围内，在诉讼时效抗辩被提出之后，确立为何其主张可通过衡平法时效中止得以保留。正如法院在 In re Walnut Hill 案中所裁定，“第 9006(b) 条仅适用于本规则或根据本规则给出的通知或法院命令所设定的截止日期。”In re Walnut Hill, 2018 WL 2672242, *2。《破产诉讼规则》第 9006(b) 条并未授权延长法定时限，例如适用的诉讼时效。\n\n8. 正如本司法区的其他裁决所概述，这些原则同样适用于 11 U.S.C. § 549。因此，《破产诉讼规则》第 9006(b) 条不能作为变更适用诉讼时效的依据。\n\n9. 受托人的论点为时尚早，且鉴于该项审查具有高度针对具体事实的性质，只能在实际提起的对抗性诉讼中逐案进行抗辩。因此，受托人企图获取一揽子统括命令是不当的。\n\n10. 退一步讲，并与破产法院此前对受托人提起的首份《请求作出延长受托人提起撤销权诉讼截止日期命令的动议》（ECF No. 2509）的裁决保持一致，破产法院应驳回受托人提议请求的如下救济：“任何收到本动议通知（无论是实际通知还是推定通知）且未对本动议提出异议的当事人，若最终在根据本命令条款及时提起的诉讼中被列为被告，则视为放弃主张诉讼时效期间抗辩的权利。”ECF No. 3329 第 20 页；参见 In re Kwok, 2024 WL 666646, *9 (Feb. 15, 2024)（未纳入受托人提议的放弃权利表述，并指出“关于前瞻性衡平法时效中止的请求，延长截止日期的动议被部分驳回，受托人有权在应对受托人提起的对抗性诉讼已过诉讼时效的抗辩时，提出衡平法时效中止或其他衡平法论点”）。正如破产法院此前认定的那样，即使对第 9006(b) 条作扩大解释，受托人也无权获得前瞻性救济。出处同上。郭女士反对受托人的拟议命令，除了受托人无权获得其中任何一部分准许这一事实外，受托人还在寻求严苛的救济。\n\n11. 破产法院缺乏对本事项作出裁决的宪法授权，因为本案涉及私人诉权，根据 Stern v. Marshall, 546 U.S. 462 (2011) 案，该诉权只能由地区法院审理裁决。\n\n12. 郭女士谨此对破产法院作出的本应由地区法院和/或陪审团作出的任何裁决提出异议，包括但不限于任何当事人、陪审团或法院将赖以作出根据《美国宪法》、Stern v. Marshall 案及其后续判例以及其他适用法律仅能由第三条法院或陪审团决定的任何决定的裁决。\n日期：2024 年 8 月 6 日 MEISTER SEELIG & FEIN PLLC（迈斯特西利格与费恩有限责任合伙律师事务所）\n\n签署人：/s/ Christopher J. Major（克里斯托弗·J·梅杰）\n\nChristopher J. Major（克里斯托弗·J·梅杰）律师 Austin D. Kim（奥斯汀·D·金）律师 125 Park Avenue, 7th Floor New York, NY 10017 电话：(212) 655-3500 电子邮箱：cjm@msf-law.com adk@msf-law.com 被告代理律师\n\n送达证明\n\n本人特此证明，于 2024 年 8 月 6 日，本人通过法院电子案件归档系统将上述文件提交归档并送达上述标题案件的所有出庭当事人。\n\n签署人：/s/ Christopher J. Major Christopher J. Major（克里斯托弗·J·梅杰）律师","key_entities":["Je","Guo","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","CIPA"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":2509,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3329,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":1245,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 12:47:27"}