{"id":"court_ctb_3374_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":3374,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT In re:","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"## **IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\nIn re:\n\nHO WAN KWOK, *et al.*,\n\nDebtors.[1](#page-0-0)\n\nChapter 11\n\nCase No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n(Jointly Administered)\n\nAugust 6, 2024\n\n# **G CLUB OPERATIONS, LLC'S OBJECTION AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION OF CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE TO EXTEND AUGUST 15, 2024 DEADLINE FOR TRUSTEE TO FILE AVOIDANCE ACTIONS**\n\nG Club Operations, LLC (\"G Club\") respectfully objects to, and files this memorandum of law in opposition to, the *First Supplemental Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee to Extend August 15, 2024 Deadline For Trustee To File Avoidance Actions* (ECF No. 3329,[2](#page-0-1) the \"Second Extension Motion\"), filed by Luc A. Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee (the \"Trustee\"), seeking a further six month extension of time following the Court's granting of the Trustee's *Motion for Entry of Order Extending Deadline for Trustee to File Avoidance Actions Under Bankruptcy Code Sections, 108, 546(a), and 549* (Main Case ECF No. 2509, the \"First Extension Motion\"). Over the objections of several parties, including G Club (ECF No. 2563, the \"First Extension Objection\"), the Court granted this extension. ECF No. 2921 (the \"Ruling\"). G Club then appealed the Ruling, and the appeal is pending before the District Court. *See In re: Ho Wan Kwok*, Civil Action No. 3:23-cv-01514-KAD (the \"Pending Appeal\").\n\nFor the following reasons, the Court should deny the Second Extension Motion.\n\n<span id=\"page-0-0\"></span><sup>1</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595) (the \"Debtor\"), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and the Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\n<span id=\"page-0-1\"></span><sup>2</sup> All ECF references are to entries in the Bankruptcy Case, Case No. 22-50073, unless otherwise stated.\n\n#### **I. INTRODUCTION**\n\nOn February 15, 2024, the Court granted the Trustee's request to extend the statute of limitations to August 15, 2024, based on its view that Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b) provided authority to do so: \"[t]he Court concludes for these reasons that Rule 9006(b) could provide a mechanism to extend the statutes of limitation set forth by sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d).\" Ruling at 12. The Court further concluded that, at that time, the Trustee has shown sufficient cause for the sixmonth extension the Trustee chose to seek, relying largely on *IBT Int'l, Inc. v. N. (In re Int'l Admin. Servs.)*, 408 F.3d 689 (11th Cir. 2005). Ruling at 8, 17-18.\n\nThe Court should deny the Trustee's new motion for a six-month extension (amounting to a total 150 percent increase in Congress's two-year statute of limitations) for three reasons. First, the Supreme Court's recent ruling in *Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P.*, 144 S. Ct. 2071, 2083, 219 L. Ed. 2d 721, 740 (2024), has made clear that unless the Bankruptcy Code provides a *statutory basis* for extraordinary relief, courts cannot craft what amounts to a \"work around\" based on policy reasons and generalized provisions: \"[b]oth sides of this policy debate may have their points. But, in the end, we are the wrong audience for them. As the people's elected representatives, Members of Congress enjoy the power, consistent with the Constitution, to make policy judgments about the proper scope of a bankruptcy discharge.\" Similarly, courts, without specific and clear authority, cannot change statues of limitations on, effectively, equitable grounds. Moreover, unlike the debtor in *Purdue*, the Trustee cannot identify any Bankruptcy Code provision that affords any possible relief, and must rely on a Bankruptcy Rule instead. A rule cannot override a statute. In short, *Purdue* demonstrates that the Court is (and was, in February 2024) without authority to grant the Trustee's requested extensions of the statute of limitations.\n\nSecond, even if the Court had authority to extend the statute of limitations, the Trustee has not offered any compelling new reasons as to why a further extension is required, instead relying largely on the same facts upon which the Court already granted an extension, as well as descriptions of the Trustee's extensive work *in already-filed cases*, which have no bearing on the application, and the claim there is a large volume of information which increases \"almost daily\" and that the Trustee learned additional information during Mr. Kwok's criminal trial. Second Extension Motion at 18, ¶ 24. Third, as previously argued, a case-by-case evaluation of the applicability of equitable tolling is the proper vehicle for the Trustee to preserve claims that could not, for valid reasons, be brought within the applicable statute of limitations, not a blanket prospective extension of the statute of limitations based on largely recycled and inapposite facts. Ruling at 20.\n\n#### **II. ARGUMENT**\n\n#### **A. The Trustee Cannot Change Congressionally Created Statues of Limitations**\n\nThe Trustee asks this Court to judicially extend the Bankruptcy Code § 546(a) to permit for a prospective extension of statutes of limitations. As previously argued in the First Extension Objection at 4-6, Bankruptcy Code § 546 does not contain any text that allows for this relief. In its Ruling the Court disagreed with G Club. In *Purdue*, the Supreme Court held that the catchall provision of Bankruptcy Code § 1123 does not permit non-consensual releases of non-debtors: \"nothing in those paragraphs authorizes a plan to extinguish claims against third parties, like the Sacklers, without the consent of the affected claimants, like the opioid victims.\" *Purdue*, 219 L. Ed. 2d at 733. The Supreme Court further explained that a general statutory provision cannot provide *more rights* than a specific statute: \"[t]he catchall's text underscores the point. Congress could have said in paragraph (6) that 'everything not expressly prohibited is permitted.' But it did\n\nnot. Instead, Congress set out a detailed list of powers, followed by a catchall that it qualified with the term 'appropriate.'\" *Id.* at 734.\n\nApplying *Purdue* here, nothing in Bankruptcy Code authorizes a bankruptcy court to extend a statute of limitations under Chapter 5 of Title 11. The Constitution reserves to Congress the ability to legislate bankruptcy laws, which power Congress has exercised in setting the statute of limitations. *See* U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 4 1 (\"All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives… The Congress shall have Power… To establish… uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.\"). Thus, unless the Trustee can identify a specific provision of the Bankruptcy Code that allows the Court to judicially extend the statute of limitations in Bankruptcy Code § 546(a), the relief sought cannot be granted.\n\nHowever, the Trustee cites no Bankruptcy Code provision (because there is none), and cites a Bankruptcy Rule, which does not have the effect of a statute. Rather, the Rules Enabling Act specifically cabins their reach: \"Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.\" 28 U.S.C. § 2075. \"The statute requires that procedural rules be consistent with bankruptcy law as contained in titles 11 and 28 of the United States Code. In the event of inconsistency between the statute and the rules, the statute controls.\" 9 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1001.01 (16th Ed. 2024).[3](#page-3-0) When a statute is clear – in this case the Bankruptcy Code contains no authority for bankruptcy courts to extend statutes of limitations – \"forsaking the plain meaning of a provision of the Bankruptcy Code solely because that meaning conflicts with a bankruptcy rule\n\n<span id=\"page-3-0\"></span><sup>3</sup> The Trustee's motion affects substantive rights. *See* ECF No. 26 at 7 (notice filed on docket of this proceeding stating \"Your rights may be affected.\"); *see Gabelli v. SEC*, 568 U.S. 442, 448 (2013) (emphasizing \"the basic policies of all limitations provisions: repose, elimination of stale claims, and certainty about a plaintiff's opportunity for recovery and a defendant's potential liabilities\" and noting that \"[w]e have deemed them vital to the welfare of society\" (internal quotation marks omitted)).\n\nwould run afoul of 28 U.S.C. § 2075.\" *Term Loan Holder Comm. v. Ozer Grp., L.L.C. (In re The Caldor Corp.)*, 303 F.3d 161, 170 (2d Cir. 2002) (concerning the right to intervene and interpreting Bankruptcy Code § 1109(b) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 and holding a court rule cannot override a clear statute); s*ee also Law v. Siegal*, 571 U.S. 415, 424-25 (2014) (no general equitable bankruptcy power to deny statutorily created bankruptcy exemptions based on alleged bad faith conduct).\n\nWithout the ability to reference a statute authorizing him to obtain an extension of a statute of limitations, the Trustee's motion must be denied. Like the plan proponent in *Purdue*, the Trustee seeks to use a generalized \"catchall\" rule. Here, Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b) is a general rule providing for enlargement of time, for cause, for anything not specifically prohibited by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(c) or (d). The only statute subsection (b) references is 11 U.S.C. § 1116(3) (related to small business cases). If Congress wanted courts to be able to extend statutes of limitations, Congress would have granted that power. Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code, or anywhere else in the United States Code, affords courts the power to extend the statute of limitations set forth in Bankruptcy Code § 546(a). Applying *Purdue*, the \"catchall\" of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b) does not afford authority for a bankruptcy court to override Bankruptcy Code § 546, which contains a specific statute of limitation. Stated differently, the Trustee asks the Court to do precisely what the Supreme Court said was impossible.\n\nSecond, a Bankruptcy Rule cannot provide authority for a court to change a statute. 28 U.S.C. § 2075, which authorized the Supreme Court to promulgate the Bankruptcy Rules, specifically states: \"[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.\" 28 U.S.C. § 2075 is clear:\n\n> Because Bankruptcy Rule 9006(a) does not extend or limit the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts, *see* 28 U.S.C. § 2075, it does not alter our conclusion that a complaint must be filed within two years from the date of the trustee's appointment. The two-year\n\nlimitations period begins to run on the date of the trustee's appointment and expires twenty-four months later, irrespective of whether the last day falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday. Like the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Bankruptcy Rules govern procedural matters after a proceeding has been timely commenced. Jurisdiction must arise from section 546(a) without reference to Bankruptcy Rule 9006(a).\n\n*In re Butcher*, 829 F.2d 596, 600-01 (6th Cir. 1987). Thus, to invoke Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006, the Trustee would first have to commence an action.[4](#page-5-0) *In re Cramer*, 636 B.R. 830, 833 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2022) (rejecting the *IBT* ruling and holding: \"this approach deprives future defendants of constitutional due process of law because they receive no notice of the relief in advance and no opportunity to contest whether or not equitable tolling is warranted.\"); *In re Randolph Hosp., Inc.*, 2022 Bankr. LEXIS 3712, at \\*4 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2022) (no prospective tolling of § 546 statute of limitations).\n\nThe term \"substantive rights,\" does not mean a distinction between a \"procedural\" and \"substantive\" matter as in a choice-of-law analysis. In *Enter. Mortg. Acceptance Co., LLC, Sec. Litig. v. Enter. Mortg. Acceptance Co.*, 391 F.3d 401, 409 (2d Cir. 2004), as amended (Jan. 7, 2005), the Second Circuit addressed this issue holding: \"[b]ecause in different contexts, a statute of limitations may fairly be described as either procedural or substantive, we decline plaintiffs' invitation to designate all statutes of limitations 'procedural' and thereby hold that any revised statute of limitations shall have retroactive effect unless Congress has clearly indicated otherwise.\" Therefore, the Second Circuit refused to revive a lawsuit under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: \"in the\n\n<span id=\"page-5-0\"></span><sup>4</sup> The *Butcher* Court applied the statute of limitations in Bankruptcy Code § 546(a) as it was drafted in 1982. In 1994, Bankruptcy Code § 546(a) was amended to provide that its statute of limitation requires that an action be commenced by the later of (a) two-years of the entry of an order for relief (in this case, the day the voluntary petition was filed by the Debtor) or (b) one-year from the appointment of a trustee, if appointed within with two-years of case commencement. There is no dispute that the two-year period described in Bankruptcy Code § 546(a) expired on February 15, 2024. Regardless, the analysis undertaken by the Sixth Circuit is correct: Bankruptcy Rule 9006(a) cannot be used to extend the statute of limitations in Bankruptcy Code § 546(a).\n\nabsence of clear congressional intent favoring such a result, we decline to apply Section 804 of Sarbanes-Oxley retroactively to revive plaintiffs' stale securities fraud claims.\"\n\nIn its prior Ruling, the Court rejected arguments that the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2075, and Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 preclude the Trustee's relief holding that until a Title 11 case is filed, no rights under the Bankruptcy Code exist: \"[u]nless an order for relief enters in a bankruptcy case, which orders have been entered in each of these jointly administered Chapter 11 cases, these sections have no effect. 11 U.S.C. §§ 108(a), 546(a), 549(d). Similarly, adversary proceedings depend upon a related bankruptcy case existing.\" Ruling at 11. However, the Court's Ruling predated *Purdue*. Given the clear holding in *Purdue*, it cannot be that bankruptcy courts can override statutorily prescribed time frames, when the Bankruptcy Code does not affirmatively authorize such action. As nothing in the Bankruptcy Code confers such power on the courts, the Trustee's request must fail.\n\nMoreover, many other courts have held as G Club argues. *In re Fox*, 370 B.R. 639, 645 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007) (\"Rules do not create substantive law. The fact that Interim Rule 1007(b)(4) indicates that it applies to debtors 'in' a chapter 7 case does not enhance the position of the UST. This Court will not apply the words of a rule to contradict and supercede the unambiguous words of a statute. To do such would violate principles of federalism….\"); *In re Moore*, 359 B.R. 665, 675 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2006) (\"Application of Rule 9006(a) to § 109(h)(1), thereby eliminating the day the credit counseling briefing is obtained as a day on which one can file for bankruptcy relief, would impermissibly abridge an individual's substantive right to file bankruptcy, in derogation of 28 U.S.C. § 2075.\"); *Duran v. Amercredit Fin. (In re Duran)*, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44925, at \\*7 (D. Colo. Nov. 1, 2005) (\"Bankruptcy Rule 4001(a)(3) properly cannot be read to stay the termination of an automatic stay beyond the thirty day stay duration mandated by\n\n§ 362(e).\"), *aff'd Duran v. Americredit Fin. Servs. (In re Duran)*, 483 F.3d 653, 654 (10th Cir. 2007); *In re Barnes*, 308 B.R. 77, (Bankr. D. Colo. 2004) (\"As noted above, this Court believes the language in 11 U.S.C. § 1121(e) is plain and clear in its prohibition of extending the 160-day plan filing deadline when a debtor makes the small business election. The Court therefore cannot use its broad 11 U.S.C. § 105 powers to contravene that deadline.\" The court also declined to use Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b) to extend the deadline holding: \"Bankruptcy Rules cannot override substantive provisions provided in the Bankruptcy Code and \"any conflict between the Bankruptcy Code and the Bankruptcy Rules must be settled in favor of the Code.\" *E.g., In re Pacific Atlantic Trading Co.*, 33 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1994).\").\n\nPreviously, the Court also disagreed with Judge Tancredi's decision in *Walnut Hill*, which held: \"Rule 9006(b) only applies to deadlines set by these rules or by a notice given thereunder[,][sic] or by order of court. Nowhere in the Rule does it mention statutory deadlines.\" 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 1589, at \\*2. Judge Tancredi reviewed precedent on this topic and drew from, among others, Judge Krechevsky's holding in *In re Damach, Inc.,* 235 B.R. 727, 731 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1999), which similarly ruled that Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006 does not serve as authority to extend statutes of limitations prospectively. Following 28 U.S.C. § 2075, Judge Tancredi explained that \"Congress has dictated that the Bankruptcy Rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right. Where the Rules and Code are inconsistent, the statutory Code controls.\" *Walnut Hill,* Bankr. 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 1589, at \\*2 (cleaned up). *See* Ruling at 13-14 (distinguishing *Walnut Hill*, *Cramer*, *Randolph Hospit.* and other cases supporting the objectors' positions).\n\nIt is respectfully submitted that given the Supreme Court's ruling in *Purdue*, the Trustee's prior reliance on *IBT* and *In re Fundamental Long Term Care, Inc.*, 501 B.R. 784, 788 (Bankr.\n\nM.D. Fla. 2013), can longer continue. In *IBT*, the Eleventh Circuit *did not* analyze the Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006 issue: \"[w]hile we think a bankruptcy court has the discretion to extend the filing period for an adversary proceeding, that resolution is only the tip of the iceberg.\" *Id.* at 699. This statement does not cite any supporting statute or case. In fact, Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006 is referenced only *four times* in the decision, 28 U.S.C. § 2075 is *not* cited, and there is no discussion concerning the interplay between the Bankruptcy Rules and the Bankruptcy Code. In *Fundamental Long Term Care* the parties appear to have assumed Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006 could provide authority to extend a statute of limitation to bring an avoidance action, obviating any need for the court to opine on the issue. 501 B.R. at 788.\n\nAgain, *Purdue* is clear: unless the Bankruptcy Code allows a remedy and provides specific limits on rights, bankruptcy courts cannot use the absence of a specific prohibitions as a \"gap filler\" to enter extra-statutory relief. Bankruptcy Code § 546 contains a specific two-year statute of limitation; nothing affords bankruptcy courts the ability prospectively extend it. *Purdue* prohibits the use of a \"catchall\" provision, such as Fed. R. Civ. P. 9006(b), as authority to grant an extension of time. Consequently, the Court should deny the Second Extension Motion.\n\n#### **C. Reservation of Rights to Cross Examine and Challenge the Trustee's Evidence**\n\nAs set forth above, the law does not permit a prospective general extension, regardless of the facts. But even if it did, under the standard applied by this Court in the Ruling, the Second Extension Motion fails to present facts that meet that standard's requirement of specific and extraordinary facts. Thus, in the event the Court rejectsthe above legal arguments, G Club reserves the right to cross-examine witnesses and otherwise challenge any evidence offered by the Trustee concerning a showing of \"good cause\" for the requested extension. Ruling at 20.\n\nWithin his Second Extension Motion, the Trustee has not offered facts that meet the\n\nstandards for a new extension under the Ruling. Most specifically, the Trustee has not identified anything new since February 2024 that has undermined his ability to complete his investigation, other than receiving more information and Mr. Kwok's criminal trial. Second Extension Motion at 12-18, ¶¶ 13-18. Based on the proffer by the Trustee, \"more of the same\" does not meet the high bar required for a further extension: \"The Court determines that on the very specific and extraordinary facts and circumstances of these jointly administered Chapter 11 cases, cause exists to extend the statutes of limitation.\" Ruling at 12-13. It cannot be that the same alleged facts are repeatedly \"extraordinary,\" which means: \"going beyond what is usual, regular, or customary.\" Merriam-Webster Dictionary, available at: http dictionary/extraordinary (visited Aug. 6, 2024).\n\nIn addition, most of the facts set forth in the motion relate to matters that pre-dated the Ruling (and, thus, were cured by the Ruling's grant of the Trustee's requested relief), pending cases (which have no bearing on any need for a prospective extension of the statute of limitations, since those cases have already been filed), or self-inflicted delays. Thus, for example, the Trustee heavily relies on the stay *the Trustee sought* of matters that might affect the criminal case. The stay was not imposed on the Trustee over his objection, and he repeatedly has stated that it was not necessary. Moreover, the pendency of the criminal case, and the likelihood that the Trustee's wide-ranging Rule 2004 and discovery efforts might involve the same witnesses in the criminal case are facts that were well-known to the Trustee when he requested until August 15, 2024, to file actions. Those same facts, or the Trustee's decision to stay his own efforts (some before and others a mere five weeks after obtaining his requested extension of the statute of limitations) do not present the extraordinary facts that this Court stated justified extending the time to August 15, 2024. The request for an extension beyond August 15, 2024, should be denied.\n\n### **D. The Trustee's Reservation of Rights as to Equitable Tolling**\n\nThe Trustee does not seek to prospectively extend the time to file avoidance actions pursuant to a claim of equitable tolling. Second Extension Motion at 22, ¶ 35; Ruling at 21 (denying prospective extension of statute of limitations based on equitable tolling). G Club reserves all rights accordingly.\n\n#### **E. G Club Reserves All Rights as to its Appeal**\n\nPresently, G Club's opening brief in the Appeal is due August 28, 2024. G Club reserves all rights to prosecute said Appeal. Nothing herein constitutes a waiver of any of G Club's rights in the Appeal. G Club further incorporates by reference all arguments made in its First Extension Objection into this Objection.[5](#page-10-0)\n\n## **IV. CONCLUSION**\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny the Second Extension Motion.\n\n## **G CLUB OPERATION, LLC**\n\nBy: */s/ Jeffrey M. Sklarz* Jeffrey M. Sklarz (ct20938) Kellianne Baranowsky (ct26684) GREEN & SKLARZ LLC One Audubon St, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06511 (203) 285-8545 jsklarz@gs-lawfirm.com kbaranowsky@gs-lawfirm.com\n\n<span id=\"page-10-0\"></span><sup>5</sup> G Club has not restated arguments concerning the Court's authority to enter a final ruling in this case under *Stern*. First Extension Motion at 3-4. That issue is not impacted by *Purdue* and the issue is preserved for appeal.\n\n### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI hereby certify that on the date set forth below, a copy of the foregoing was served via CM/ECF. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF system.\n\nDate: August 6, 2024 /s/ Jeffrey M. Sklarz","body_zh":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT（美国康涅狄格区破产法院）\n\n关于：\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）等，\n\n债务人。[1]\n\n第11章\n\n案件编号：22-50073 (JAM)\n\n（合并审理）\n\n2024年8月6日\nG CLUB OPERATIONS, LLC 对第11章受托人关于延长受托人提起撤销权诉讼之2024年8月15日截止期限的第一次补充动议的异议及反对法律备忘录\n\nG Club Operations, LLC（“G Club”）谨对第11章受托人 Luc A. Despins（“受托人”）提交的《第11章受托人关于延长受托人提起撤销权诉讼之2024年8月15日截止期限的第一次补充动议》（ECF No. 3329，[2]“第二次延期动议”）提出异议，并提交本反对法律备忘录。该动议系在法院批准受托人的《根据破产法典第108条、第546(a)条和第549条延长受托人提起撤销权诉讼截止期限的令状签发动议》（主案 ECF No. 2509，“第一次延期动议”）之后，寻求进一步延长六个月的时间。在包括 G Club 在内的若干当事人提出异议（ECF No. 2563，“第一次延期异议”）的情况下，法院批准了该延期。ECF No. 2921（“裁决”）。随后 G Club 对该裁决提起上诉，该上诉目前正在 District Court（地区法院）审理中。参见 In re: Ho Wan Kwok, Civil Action No. 3:23-cv-01514-KAD（“未决上诉”）。\n\n基于以下理由，法院应驳回第二次延期动议。\n\n1 这些第11章案件中的债务人包括 Ho Wan Kwok（税务识别号后四位：9595）（“债务人”）、Genever Holdings LLC（税务识别号后四位：8202）以及 Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 和 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为 Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 转交 Luc A. Despins，作为 Ho Wan Kwok 破产财团受托人（仅用于接收通知和联络）。\n\n2 除非另有说明，所有 ECF 引用均指破产案件 Case No. 22-50073 中的记录项。\nI. 引言\n\n2024年2月15日，法院根据其认为 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)（《联邦破产诉讼程序规则》第9006(b)条）提供了相应权限的观点，批准了受托人将诉讼时效延长至2024年8月15日的请求：“出于这些理由，法院得出结论认为，Rule 9006(b) 可以提供一种机制来延长第108(a)条、第546(a)条和第549(d)条所规定的诉讼时效。”裁决第12页。法院进一步认定，在当时，受托人已为其选择寻求的六个月延期证明了充分的理由，该认定主要依据了 IBT Int'l, Inc. v. N. (In re Int'l Admin. Servs.), 408 F.3d 689 (11th Cir. 2005)。裁决第8、17-18页。\n\n法院应当基于三个理由驳回受托人关于延期六个月的新动议（这相当于将国会规定的两年诉讼时效总共增加了150%）。首先，Supreme Court（最高法院）最近在 Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071, 2083, 219 L. Ed. 2d 721, 740 (2024) 案中的裁决已明确表明，除非《破产法典》为非同寻常的救济提供成文法依据，否则法院不能基于政策考量和概括性条款炮制出实质上的“通融办法”：“这场政策争论的双方可能各有其道理。但是，归根结底，我们不是他们应当陈情的对象。作为人民选出的代表，国会议员享有符合宪法的权力，可就破产免责的适当范围作出政策判断。”同样，在缺乏明确具体授权的情况下，法院不能实质上基于衡平法理由变更诉讼时效。此外，与 Purdue 案中的债务人不同，受托人无法指出《破产法典》中任何能够提供任何可能救济的条款，而必须转而依赖某条《破产规则》。规则不能凌驾于成文法之上。简而言之，Purdue 案表明，法院无权（且在2024年2月时亦无权）批准受托人所请求的诉讼时效延期。\n\n其次，即使法院有权延长诉讼时效，受托人也未提出任何令人信服的新理由来解释为何需要进一步延期，而是主要依赖于法院据以批准此前延期的相同事实，以及受托人在已提起诉讼的案件中开展的大量工作的陈述（这些陈述与本申请无关），并声称存在“几乎每天”都在增加的海量信息，且受托人在 Kwok 先生的刑事审判期间获悉了更多信息。第二次延期动议第18页，第24段。第三，正如先前所主张的，受托人用于保全因正当理由而未能在适用诉讼时效内提起的请求权的适当途径，是对衡平法诉讼时效中止的适用性进行个案评估，而不是基于大部分重复使用且不相关的事实对诉讼时效进行一概而论的前瞻性延长。裁决第20页。\nII. 论证\nA. 受托人不能变更国会创设的诉讼时效\n\n受托人请求本法院通过司法裁判扩大适用 Bankruptcy Code § 546(a)（《破产法典》第546(a)条），以允许对诉讼时效进行前瞻性延长。正如先前在第一次延期异议第4-6页中所主张的，《破产法典》第546条中不包含任何允许此类救济的文本。在其裁决中，法院未采纳 G Club 的观点。在 Purdue 案中，最高法院认定《破产法典》第1123条的兜底条款并不允许对非债务人进行非同意性的免责：“这些款项中没有任何内容授权重组计划在未经受影响的索赔人（如阿片类药物受害者）同意的情况下，消灭对第三方（如 Sackler 家族）的请求权。”Purdue, 219 L. Ed. 2d at 733。最高法院进一步解释称，概括性的成文法条款不能提供超出专门成文法的权利：“兜底条款的文本强调了这一点。国会本可以在第(6)款中规定‘凡未明确禁止的均属允许’。但国会并没有这样做。相反，国会列出了一份详细的权力清单，随后是一个以‘适当’一词作为限定的兜底条款。”同上，第734页。\n\n将 Purdue 案适用于本案，破产法典中没有任何内容授权破产法院延长 Title 11（第11编）第5章项下的诉讼时效。宪法将制定破产法律的权力保留给了国会，而国会已在设定诉讼时效时行使了该权力。参见 U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 4 1（“本宪法所授予的一切立法权力，均属于合众国国会，国会由参议院和众议院组成……国会有权……制定……贯穿全美国的统一的破产法律”）。因此，除非受托人能够指出《破产法典》中允许法院通过司法裁判延长《破产法典》第546(a)条中诉讼时效的具体条款，否则所寻求的救济不能予以准许。\n\n然而，受托人没有引用任何《破产法典》条款（因为根本不存在），而是引用了一条《破产规则》，而该规则并不具有成文法的效力。相反，Rules Enabling Act（《规则授权法》）明确限制了其适用范围：“此类规则不得削减、扩大或修改任何实体权利。”28 U.S.C. § 2075。“成文法要求程序规则必须与 United States Code（《美国法典》）第11编和第28编所包含的破产法保持一致。在成文法与规则发生冲突时，以成文法为准。”9 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1001.01 (16th Ed. 2024)。[3] 当成文法明确时——在本案中，《破产法典》未包含破产法院延长诉讼时效的任何授权——“仅仅因为某一《破产法典》条款的字面含义与破产规则相冲突而舍弃该字面含义，将违反 28 U.S.C. § 2075。”Term Loan Holder Comm. v. Ozer Grp., L.L.C. (In re The Caldor Corp.), 303 F.3d 161, 170 (2d Cir. 2002)（涉及参加诉讼的权利并解释《破产法典》第1109(b)条和 Fed. R. Civ. P. 24，认定法院规则不能凌驾于明确的成文法之上）；亦参见 Law v. Siegal, 571 U.S. 415, 424-25 (2014)（不存在基于所谓的恶意行为而拒绝给予法定破产豁免财产的普遍衡平法破产权力）。\n\n3 受托人的动议影响实体权利。参见 ECF No. 26 第7页（在本程序案卷中提交的通知称“您的权利可能会受到影响”）；参见 Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. 442, 448 (2013)（强调“所有时效条款的基本政策：休止、消除过时索赔，以及原告获得救济机会和被告潜在责任的确定性”，并指出“我们认为它们对社会福祉至关重要”[内部引文省略]）。\n\n由于无法指明授权其获得诉讼时效延长的成文法，受托人的动议必须予以驳回。如同 Purdue 案中的重组计划提出方一样，受托人试图使用一条概括性的“兜底”规则。在这里，Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b) 是一条通用规则，规定对于 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(c) 或 (d) 未明确禁止的任何事项，可基于正当理由延长宽限时间。第(b)款唯一引用的成文法是 11 U.S.C. § 1116(3)（涉及小型企业案件）。如果国会希望法院能够延长诉讼时效，国会本会授予该项权力。《破产法典》中，或《美国法典》其他任何地方，均未赋予法院延长《破产法典》第546(a)条所规定诉讼时效的权力。适用 Purdue 案，Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b) 的“兜底”条款并未赋予破产法院凌驾于包含明确诉讼时效的《破产法典》第546条之上的权力。换言之，受托人是在请求法院去做最高法院明确认定为不可能做到的事情。\n\n其次，《破产规则》不能为法院变更成文法提供依据。授权最高法院颁布《破产规则》的 28 U.S.C. § 2075 明确规定：“此类规则不得削减、扩大或修改任何实体权利。”28 U.S.C. § 2075 的规定十分明确：\n\n> 由于《破产规则》第9006(a)条并未扩大或限制破产法院的管辖权，参见 28 U.S.C. § 2075，因此它并不改变我们的结论，即诉状必须在受托人被任命之日起两年内提交。两年的\n\n时效期间自受托人被任命之日起开始计算，并在二十四个月后届满，无论最后一天是否适逢星期六、星期日或法定假日。与《联邦民事诉讼程序规则》一样，《破产规则》管辖诉讼程序及时启动之后的程序性事项。管辖权必须依据第546(a)条产生，而不得参照《破产规则》第9006(a)条。\n\nIn re Butcher, 829 F.2d 596, 600-01 (6th Cir. 1987)。因此，要援引 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006，受托人必须首先提起诉讼。[4] In re Cramer, 636 B.R. 830, 833 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2022)（不采纳 IBT 案的裁决并认定：“这种做法剥夺了未来被告获得宪法正当法律程序的权利，因为他们没有提前收到关于救济的通知，也没有机会对是否应当适用衡平法时效中止提出抗辩”）；In re Randolph Hosp., Inc., 2022 Bankr. LEXIS 3712, at *4 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2022)（不得对第546条的诉讼时效进行前瞻性中止）。\n\n“实质性权利”一词并不意味着法律适用分析中“程序性”事项与“实质性”事项之间的区分。在 Enter. Mortg. Acceptance Co., LLC, Sec. Litig. v. Enter. Mortg. Acceptance Co., 391 F.3d 401, 409 (2d Cir. 2004), as amended (Jan. 7, 2005) 一案中，Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）就该问题裁定：“由于在不同语境下，诉讼时效均可被合理地描述为程序性或实质性的，因此我们拒绝原告将所有诉讼时效均指定为‘程序性’的请求，并进而认定，除非国会明确作出相反表示，否则任何经修订的诉讼时效均不具有溯及力。”因此，第二巡回上诉法院拒绝依《Sarbanes-Oxley Act（萨班斯-奥克斯利法案）》恢复诉讼：“在\n\n4 Butcher 法院适用了 1982 年起草时的 Bankruptcy Code（《破产法典》）§ 546(a) 中的诉讼时效。1994 年，《破产法典》§ 546(a) 经修订规定，其诉讼时效要求诉讼必须在以下较晚日期之前提起：(a) 作出救济令之日起两年内（在本案中，即债务人提交自愿破产申请之日）；或 (b) 自受托人被任命之日起一年内（若受托人在案件启动后两年内被任命）。毫无争议的是，《破产法典》§ 546(a) 所述的两年期限已于 2024年2月15日 届满。无论如何，Sixth Circuit（第六巡回上诉法院）所作的分析是正确的：Bankruptcy Rule（《破产规则》）9006(a) 不能用于延长《破产法典》§ 546(a) 中的诉讼时效。\n\n缺乏倾向于该结果的明确国会意图的情况下，我们拒绝溯及适用《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》第 804 条来恢复原告已逾期的证券欺诈主张。”\n\n在其先前的裁定中，本法院驳回了 Rules Enabling Act（《规则授权法》）28 U.S.C. § 2075 以及 Fed. R. Civ. P. 6（《联邦民事诉讼规则》第 6 条）阻碍受托人获得救济的主张，认定在提交 Title 11（第 11 编）案件之前，不存在《破产法典》项下的权利：“除非破产案件中作出了救济令（这些合并审理的第 11 章案件中均已作出此类命令），否则这些条款均不发生效力。11 U.S.C. §§ 108(a), 546(a), 549(d)。同样，对席诉讼程序依赖于相关破产案件的存在。”裁定第 11 页。然而，本法院的裁定先于 Purdue 案作出。鉴于 Purdue 案中的明确判决，在《破产法典》未明确授权此类行为的情况下，破产法院绝不可能推翻法定规定的时限。由于《破产法典》中没有任何规定赋予法院此类权力，受托人的请求必须予以驳回。\n\n此外，许多其他法院也作出了与 G Club 主张相同的裁定。In re Fox, 370 B.R. 639, 645 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007)（“诉讼规则不创设实体法。Interim Rule（《临时规则》）1007(b)(4) 表明其适用于第 7 章案件‘中’的债务人这一事实，并不能增强 UST（美国受托人）的立场。本法院不会适用规则的字句去抵触和取代明确的成文法字句。这样做将违反联邦制原则……”）；In re Moore, 359 B.R. 665, 675 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2006)（“将规则 9006(a) 适用于 § 109(h)(1)，从而排除获得信用咨询简报之日作为可以申请破产救济的日期，将不可容许地削减个人申请破产的实质性权利，违反 28 U.S.C. § 2075。”）；Duran v. Amercredit Fin. (In re Duran), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44925, at *7 (D. Colo. Nov. 1, 2005)（“破产规则 4001(a)(3) 不能被正当地解释为将自动中止的终止延期至超过\n\n§ 362(e) 所强制规定的三十天中止期限。”），aff'd Duran v. Americredit Fin. Servs. (In re Duran), 483 F.3d 653, 654 (10th Cir. 2007)；In re Barnes, 308 B.R. 77, (Bankr. D. Colo. 2004)（“如上所述，本法院认为 11 U.S.C. § 1121(e) 中的措辞在禁止债务人选择小企业破产程序时延长 160 天的重整计划提交截止期限方面是简明且清晰的。因此，法院不能利用其广泛的 11 U.S.C. § 105 权力来违反该截止期限。”法院亦拒绝使用 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)（《联邦破产诉讼规则》第 9006(b) 条）来延长截止期限，判定：“破产规则不能推翻《破产法典》中规定的实质性条款”，并且“《破产法典》与破产规则之间的任何冲突都必须以偏向法典的方式解决。”例如，In re Pacific Atlantic Trading Co., 33 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1994)。）。\n\n此前，本法院亦不同意 Tancredi 法官在 Walnut Hill 案中的决定，该决定认定：“规则 9006(b) 仅适用于本规则或依其发出的通知[，][sic]或法院命令所设定的截止期限。规则中绝无任何地方提及法定截止期限。”2018 Bankr. LEXIS 1589, at *2。Tancredi 法官审查了该主题的先例，并借鉴了 Krechevsky 法官在 In re Damach, Inc., 235 B.R. 727, 731 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1999) 中的判定等判例，该判例同样裁定《联邦破产诉讼规则》第 9006 条不构成前瞻性延长诉讼时效的依据。遵循 28 U.S.C. § 2075，Tancredi 法官解释道，“国会已规定破产规则不得削减、扩大或修改任何实质性权利。在规则与法典不一致之处，以成文法法典为准。”Walnut Hill, Bankr. 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 1589, at *2（格式已清理）。见裁定第 13-14 页（区分了 Walnut Hill、Cramer、Randolph Hospit. 以及支持异议人立场的其他案件）。\n\n谨此提出，鉴于最高法院在 Purdue 案中的裁定，受托人此前对 IBT 以及 In re Fundamental Long Term Care, Inc., 501 B.R. 784, 788 (Bankr.\n\nM.D. Fla. 2013) 的依赖不能再继续下去。在 IBT 案中，Eleventh Circuit（第十一巡回上诉法院）并未分析《联邦破产诉讼规则》第 9006 条的问题：“虽然我们认为破产法院有权酌情延长对席诉讼程序的提交期限，但该决议仅是冰山一角。”同上，第 699 页。该陈述并未引用任何支持性的成文法或判例。事实上，《联邦破产诉讼规则》第 9006 条在判决中仅被提及四次，未引用 28 U.S.C. § 2075，且不存在关于破产规则与《破产法典》之间相互作用的讨论。在 Fundamental Long Term Care 案中，各方似乎假定《联邦破产诉讼规则》第 9006 条可以提供延长提起撤销权诉讼诉讼时效的授权，从而使法院无需就该问题发表意见。501 B.R. at 788。\n\n同样，Purdue 案是明确的：除非《破产法典》允许某种救济并对权利规定了具体限制，否则破产法院不能将缺乏具体禁止性规定作为“填补漏洞的工具”来作出成文法外的救济。《破产法典》§ 546 包含具体的两年诉讼时效；没有任何规定赋予破产法院前瞻性延长该时效的能力。Purdue 案禁止使用诸如 Fed. R. Civ. P. 9006(b) 等“兜底”条款作为批准延期的依据。因此，法院应驳回第二次延期动议。\n\nC. 对受托人的证据进行交叉询问和提出质证的权利保留\n\n如上所述，无论事实如何，法律都不允许前瞻性的一般延期。但即便允许，根据本法院在裁定中所适用的标准，第二次延期动议也未能提出符合该标准对具体且非常规事实要求的事实。因此，在法院驳回上述法律主张的情况下，G Club 保留对证人进行交叉询问以及以其他方式对受托人就所请求延期证明“正当理由”而提出的任何证据提出质证的权利。裁定第 20 页。\n\n在其第二次延期动议中，受托人并未提供符合\n\n裁定项下新延期标准的事实。最具体而言，受托人并未指明自 2024年2月 以来有任何削弱其完成调查能力的新情况，除了收到更多信息以及郭先生的刑事审判之外。第二次延期动议第 12-18 页，¶¶ 13-18。根据受托人的提请，“更多相同的情况”并不符合进一步延期所需的高门槛：“法院认定，在这些合并审理的第 11 章案件非常具体且非常规的事实和情况下，存在延长诉讼时效的正当理由。”裁定第 12-13 页。同样指称的事实不可能屡次构成“非常规的”，其含义为：“超出通常、常规或惯常的范围。”Merriam-Webster Dictionary（《韦氏词典》），见于：http dictionary/extraordinary（2024年8月6日 访问）。\n\n此外，动议中列出的大部分事实涉及早于裁定发生的事项（因此已被裁定批准受托人所请求的救济所补救）、未决案件（这些案件与前瞻性延长诉讼时效的任何需要无关，因为这些案件已经提起），或自行造成的延误。因此，例如，受托人严重依赖其所寻求的对可能影响刑事案件的事项的中止。该中止并非是在违背受托人反对意愿的情况下对其施加的，且他已反复声明该中止并非必要。此外，刑事案件的未决状态，以及受托人广泛的规则 2004 和证据开示工作可能涉及刑事案件中相同证人的可能性，这些事实在受托人请求延期至 2024年8月15日 以提起诉讼时就已为受托人所熟知。这些相同的事实，或者受托人决定中止自身工作的事实（部分发生在获得其所请求的诉讼时效延期之前，另一些则仅发生在获得延期五周后），并不构成维持本法院所述证明有正当理由延期至 2024年8月15日 的非常规事实。延期至 2024年8月15日 之后的请求应予以驳回。\n\nD. 受托人关于合理中止的权利保留\n\n受托人并非寻求依据合理中止的主张前瞻性地延长提起撤销权诉讼的期限。第二次延期动议第 22 页，¶ 35；裁定第 21 页（驳回基于合理中止前瞻性延长诉讼时效的请求）。G Club 据此保留所有权利。\n\nE. G Club 保留其上诉的所有权利\n\n目前，G Club 在上诉中的开庭案情摘要定于 2024年8月28日 提交。G Club 保留推进上述上诉的所有权利。本文件中的任何内容均不构成对 G Club 在上诉中任何权利的放弃。G Club 进一步将针对第一次延期的异议中所提出的所有主张通过援引并入本异议书中。[5]\n\nIV. 结论\n\n基于前述理由，法院应驳回第二次延期动议。\n\nG CLUB OPERATION, LLC\n\n签署人：/s/ Jeffrey M. Sklarz\nJeffrey M. Sklarz (ct20938)\nKellianne Baranowsky (ct26684)\nGREEN & SKLARZ LLC\nOne Audubon St, 3rd Floor\nNew Haven, CT 06511\n(203) 285-8545\njsklarz@gs-lawfirm.com\nkbaranowsky@gs-lawfirm.com\n\n5 G Club 未重述关于法院依 Stern 案在本案中作出终局裁定的权力的主张。第一次延期动议第 3-4 页。该问题不受 Purdue 案影响，且该问题已为上诉予以保留。\n\n送达证明\n\n我特此证明，在下述日期，前述文件的副本已通过 CM/ECF 送达。当事人可通过法院的 CM/ECF 系统查阅本份归档文件。\n\n日期：2024年8月6日\n/s/ Jeffrey M. Sklarz","key_entities":["Je","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Despins","Guo","Paul Hastings"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":26,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2509,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2563,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2921,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3329,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":3727,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 13:47:04"}