{"id":"court_ctb_3446_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":3446,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"UNKNOWN","filed_date":"2024-08-21","title":"1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTIC","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION IN RE: . Chapter 11 . Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) HO WAN KWOK, et al., . . (Jointly Administered) Debtors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . GENEVER HOLDINGS LLC and . Adversary Proceeding LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 . No. 23-05002 (JAM) TRUSTEE, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . HO WAN KWOK, HING CHI NGOK, . QIANG GUO, AND MEI GUO, . . Defendants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LUC A. DESPINS, et al., . Adversary Proceeding . No. 23-05017 (JAM) Plaintiffs, . . v. . Courtroom 123 . Brien McMahon Federal Building TAURUS FUND, LLC, et al., . 915 Lafayette Boulevard . Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604 Defendants. . . Tuesday, August 13, 2024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1:12 p.m. TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE JULIE A. MANNING UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE (Continued) Case 22-50073 Doc 3446 Filed 08/21/24 Entered 08/21/24 10:22:10 Page 1 of 96\n\n| | Case 22-50073 | Doc 3446 | Filed 08/21/24 | | | | | Entered 08/21/24 10:22:10 | Page 2 of 96 | |\n|----|---------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|--|---------------------------------------------|------------------------------|--------------|---|\n| | | | | | | | | | | 2 |\n| | | | | | | | | | | |\n| 1 | | APPEARANCES: | | | | | | | | |\n| 2 | | For the Chapter 11
Trustee:
Patrick Linsey, Esquire | | | | | | | | |\n| 3 | | | | | NEUBERT PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C.
195 Church Street | | | | | |\n| 4 | | | | | 13th Floor | | | New Haven, Connecticut 06510 | | |\n| 5 | | | | -and- | | | | | | |\n| 6 | | | | | | | | Luc A. Despins, Esquire | | |\n| 7 | | | | | Shlomo Maza, Esquire
PAUL HASTINGS, LLP | | | | | |\n| 8 | | | | | | | 200 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10166 | | | |\n| 9 | | | | | | | | Nicholas A. Bassett, Esquire | | |\n| 10 | | | | | 2050 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036 | | | | | |\n| 11 | | | | | | | | | | |\n| 12 | | For the U.S. Trustee: | | | | | | Holley L. Claiborn, Esquire | | |\n| 13 | | | | OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRUSTEE
The Giaimo Federal Building
150 Court Street, Room 302 | | | | | | |\n| 14 | | | | | New Haven, Connecticut 06510 | | | | | |\n| 15 | | | | | | | | | | |\n| 16 | | | | | | | | | | |\n| 17 | | | | | | | | | | |\n| 18 | | | | | | | | | | |\n| 19 | | (APPEARANCES CONTINUED) | | | | | | | | |\n| 20 | | Audio Operator: | | | | | | Electronically recorded | | |\n| 21 | | Transcription Company: | | | Reliable | | | | | |\n| 22 | | | | The Nemours Building
1007 N. Orange Street, Suite 110 | | | | | | |\n| 23 | | | Wilmington, Delaware 19801
Telephone: (302)654-8080
Email:
gmatthews@reliable-co.com | | | | | | | |\n| 24 | | | | | | | | | | |\n| 25 | | | Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording,
transcript produced by transcription service. | | | | | | | |\n| | | | | | | | | | | |\n| | | | | | | | | | | |\n| | | | | | | | | | | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3446 Filed 08/21/24 Entered 08/21/24 10:22:10 Page 3 of 96\n\n 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 APPEARANCES (CONTINUED): For Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund: Annecca H. Smith, Esquire ROBINSON & COLE, LLP 280 Trumbull Street Hartford, Connecticut 06103 -and- Stuart M. Sarnoff, Esquire O'MELVENY & MYERS, LLP Times Square Tower 7 Times Square New York, New York 10036 For the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors: Kristin B. Mayhew, Esquire PULLMAN & COMLEY, LLC 850 Main Street 8th Floor Bridgeport, Connecticut 06601 For G Club Operations, Weddle Law PLLC, FFP BVI Limited, Ogier, and Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman, LLP: Jeffrey M. Sklarz, Esquire GREEN & SKLARZ, LLC One Audubon Street 3rd Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06511 For Yankwitt, LLP; Ganfer Shore Leeds & Zauderer, LLP; Brune Law, P.C.; and Petrillo Klein + Boxer, LLP: Anthony J. Proscia, Esquire KAUFMAN DOLOWICH, LLP 40 Exchange Place 20th Floor New York, New York 10005\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3446 Filed 08/21/24 Entered 08/21/24 10:22:10 Page 4 of 96\n\n| | | | 4 |\n|----|----------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|---|\n| 1 | APPEARANCES (CONTINUED): | | |\n| 2 | For Meta | | |\n| 3 | Platforms, Inc.,
and Apple, Inc.: | Jin Yan, Esquire | |\n| 4 | | ARENTFOX SCHIFF, LLP
1717 K Street NW | |\n| 5 | | Washington DC 20006 | |\n| 6 | For Hing Chi Ngok and
Greenwich Land, LLC | Austin D. Kim, Esquire | |\n| 7 | | MEISTER SEELIG & FEIN, LLP
125 Park Avenue | |\n| 8 | | 7th Floor
New York, New York 10017 | |\n| 9 | For Morvillo | | |\n| 10 | Abramowitz Grand
Iason & Anello, P.C: | Rowena A. Moffett, Esquire | |\n| 11 | | BRENNER, SALTZMAN & WALLMAN, LLP
271 Whitney Avenue | |\n| 12 | | New Haven, Connecticut 06511 | |\n| 13 | | | |\n| 14 | | | |\n| 15 | | | |\n| 16 | | | |\n| 17 | | | |\n| 18 | | | |\n| 19 | | | |\n| 20 | | | |\n| 21 | | | |\n| 22 | | | |\n| 23 | | | |\n| 24 | | | |\n| 25 | | | |\n| | | | |\n| | | | |\n\n 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 INDEX MOTIONS: PAGE In re: Ho Wan Kwok, et al. Main Case no. 22-050073 (JAM) Matter No. 1: Motion to Extend Time to Extend Deadline to File Avoidance Actions (First Supplemental Motion) to 02/15/2025 (RE: 3329) 14 Court's Ruling: 80 Matter No. 2: Amended Emergency Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee, Pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Section 363(b), for Entry of Order Authorizing Trustee to Fund Maintenance of Mahwah Mansion and for Related Relief (RE: 3381) 81 Court's Ruling: 86 Genever Holdings LLC and Luc A. Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee v Ho Wan Kwok, Hing Chi Ngok, Qiang Guo, and Mei Guo Adversary Case No. 23-05002 (JAM) Matter No. 3: Pretrial Conference Hearing 89 Court's Ruling: 90 Luc A. Despins, et al. v Taurus Fund, LLC, et al. Adversary Case No. 23-05017 (JAM) Matter No. 4: Status Conference 90 Court's Ruling: 94 Case 22-50073 Doc 3446 Filed 08/21/24 Entered 08/21/24 10:22:10 Page 5 of 96\n\n| | Case 22-50073 | Doc 3446 | Filed 08/21/24 | Entered 08/21/24 10:22:10 | Page 6 of 96 |\n|----|---------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------|\n| | | | | | 6 |\n| 1 | | | | INDEX | |\n| 2 | | | | | |\n| 3 | | WITNESSES CALLED
BY THE TRUSTEE: | | | PAGE |\n| 4 | | LUC A. DESPINS | | | |\n| 5 | | | | Direct examination by Mr. Bassett | 18 |\n| 6 | | | Cross-examination by Mr. Yan | | 30 |\n| 7 | | | Cross-examination by Mr. Sklarz | | 34 |\n| 8 | | | | | |\n| 9 | | | Transcriptionist's Certificate | | 96 |\n| 10 | | | | | |\n| 11 | | | | | |\n| 12 | | | | | |\n| 13 | | | | | |\n| 14 | | | | | |\n| 15 | | | | | |\n| 16 | | | | | |\n| 17 | | | | | |\n| 18 | | | | | |\n| 19 | | | | | |\n| 20 | | | | | |\n| 21 | | | | | |\n| 22 | | | | | |\n| 23 | | | | | |\n| 24 | | | | | |\n| 25 | | | | | |\n| | | | | | |\n| | | | | | |\n| | | | | | |\n\n 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 (Proceedings commenced at 1:12 p.m.) THE CLERK: Case Number 22-50073, Ho Wan Kwok; Adversary 23-50002, Genever Holdings, LLC, et al. v Kwok, et al., and Adversary 23-05017 Despins, et al., v Taurus Fund LLC, et al. THE COURT: Okay. Good afternoon. If we could have appearances for the record, please, starting with the Chapter 11 Trustee. Trustee Despins? (No verbal response) THE COURT: Is he frozen? Maybe. THE CLERK: No. THE COURT: Okay. They can't hear me? Apparently, they can't hear me. THE CLERK: Trustee Despins? (No verbal response) THE CLERK: Oh, you know what? I'm sorry, I'll call him. I'm sorry, Judge. THE COURT: So I think we have to start all over again, because I don't think that was recording or anyone could hear us. THE CLERK: Yes. Case Number -- the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut is now in session after recess. Judge -- the Honorable Julie Manning is presiding. Case 22-50073 Doc 3446 Filed 08/21/24 Entered 08/21/24 10:22:10 Page 7 of 96\n\n 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 THE COURT: Good afternoon, everyone. There are matters on the calendar beginning at 1:00 p.m., so I ask the courtroom deputy to please call the calendar. THE CLERK: Case Number 22-50073, Ho Wan Kwok; Adversary 23-05002, Genever Holdings, LLC, et al. v Kwok, et al.; and Adversary 23-05017, Despins, et al. v Taurus Fund, LLC, et al. THE COURT: Good afternoon. I'm going to take appearances to the record. We are on remote. This was supposed to be a remote hearing, which was not evidentiary. Whether it will be or not, we will see, because I don't conduct evidentiary hearings remotely. But when everyone notes their appearance, I'd like to make sure that whoever is noting their appearance, notes whether they have actually filed a notice of appearance in the case or in the adversary proceeding, because if you have not done so, you will need to do so. So, in any event, we will start with the Chapter 11 Trustee. MR. DESPINS: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Luc Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee. MR. BASSETT: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Nick Bassett from Paul Hastings, on behalf of the Chapter 11 Trustee. MR. MAZA: Good afternoon, Shlomo Maza of Paul Case 22-50073 Doc 3446 Filed 08/21/24 Entered 08/21/24 10:22:10 Page 8 of 96\n\n 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Hastings, as well. MR. LINSEY: Good afternoon, Your Honor -- THE COURT: I'm sorry, sir. I couldn't hear what you said. Let's go back to the gentleman who just spoke, please. MR. MAZA: Shlomo Maza with Paul Hastings for the trustee, as well. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. MAZA: Sorry, Your Honor. THE COURT: Sorry, I could not hear you. I apologize. MR. LINSEY: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Patrick Linsey of Neubert Pepe & Monteith for the trustee, and trustee's counsel do have appearances entered. THE COURT: Thank you. MS. CLAIBORN: Good afternoon. Holley Claiborn for the U.S. Trustee. MR. SARNOFF: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Stuart Sarnoff, O'Melveny & Myers, on behalf of creditor PAX in the main case. I'm not sure if I filed a notice of appearance in the adversary proceeding that's under discussion today, but I don't expect to be participating. THE COURT: Thank you. I don't think you need a file a notice in the adversary proceeding unless you choose to, but you do need to Case 22-50073 Doc 3446 Filed 08/21/24 Entered 08/21/24 10:22:10 Page 9 of 96\n\n 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 have an appearance in the main case, which you already do and have for some time, so thank you. MR. SARNOFF: Thank you. MS. SMITH: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Annecca Smith of Robinson & Cole, Connecticut counsel to creditor PAX. MS. MAYHEW: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Kristin Mayhew, Pullman & Comley, on behalf of the Creditors Committee. I have an appearance in the main case, but I do not believe we have an appearance in the adversary proceeding. MR. SKLARZ: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Jeffrey Sklarz of Green & Sklarz, for certain objecting parties. I have an appearance in the main case, as well as the applicable adversaries where some of the objections were filed. Also online is my associate Michelle Antao. I don't recall if she has an appearance, and she won't be arguing. But if she doesn't, we'll get an appearance for her in the main case. I'll also note that my client, one of my clients, Justin Weddle of Weddle Law is also viewing proceedings; he is a party to one of the adversaries, or his law firm is a party to one of the adversaries. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. There is no hearing in the adversary proceedings Case 22-50073 Doc 3446 Filed 08/21/24 Entered 08/21/24 10:22:10 Page 10 of 96\n\n 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 today, though, just so the record is clear. MR. SKLARZ: Understood, Your Honor. MR. YAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Jin Yan on behalf of Meta Platforms, Inc. and Apple, Inc. We do have appearances on in the adversary cases. I don't recall if we have appearances in the main bankruptcy case. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. MR. PROSCIA: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Anthony Proscia from Kaufman Dolowich. We represent four law firms in the related adversary proceedings. We will not be speaking; we're just monitoring for the today. THE COURT: What related adversary proceeding are you speaking of, Counsel? MR. PROSCIA: Sure. It's the adversary proceedings against Yankwitt, against Ganfer Shore, against Brune Law, and against Petrillo Klein. THE COURT: You're going to have to spell every one of those, Counsel. Our record is only kept by audio and if the person who, then, creates the transcript can't understand -- and that's not your fault. It's not your fault; it's just the way it is -- you know, then there's a lot of blanks in the transcript. So I'm going to ask you, if you would, please, spell all the names of the Defendants you just named in adversary proceedings. MR. PROSCIA: Sure, Your Honor. Case 22-50073 Doc 3446 Filed 08/21/24 Entered 08/21/24 10:22:10 Page 11 of 96\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 The first law firm is Yankwitt, which Y-a-n-k-w-it-t. The second law firm is Ganfer Shore, G-a-n-f-e-r S-h-or-e. The third law firm is Brune Law, B-r-u-n-e. The fourth one is Petrillo Klein, P-e-t-r-i-l-l-o K-l-e-i-n. THE COURT: Thank you. MR. KIM: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Austin Kim from Meister Seelig & Fein, and we have an appearance in both, the main proceeding and adversary proceeding on behalf of the Greenwich Land Defendants, that's Hing Chi Ngok and Greenwich Land, LLC. THE COURT: Thank you. MS. MOFFETT: Your Honor, Rowena Moffett from Brenner Saltzman & Wallman. I represent another of the adversary Defendants, a law firm called Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello, spelled M-o-r-v-i-l-l-o A-b-r-a-m-o-wi-t-z G-r-a-n-d I-a-s-o-n & A-n-e-l-l-o, P.C. THE COURT: Thank you. Have I taken everyone's appearance for the record, then? (No verbal response) THE COURT: Okay. The first -- I'm not sure, Trustee Despins, how you want to proceed, but I would just note that the matters on the calendar today, the first two matters, the first motion -- first supplemental motion to extend deadline and the amended emergency motion authorizing\n\n| 1 | funding, were filed in the main case, as they should be, |\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | because that's relief that's related to the estate as a |\n| 3 | whole.
The two final matters on the calendar are really with |\n| 4 | regard to a pretrial conference in a specific adversary |\n| 5 | proceeding, 23-05002, and then a request for a status |\n| 6 | conference in another adversary proceeding, 23-05017. |\n| 7 | Trustee Despins, I do not know how you intend to proceeding, |\n| 8 | but I will hear from you with regard to your intentions. |\n| 9 | MR. DESPINS:
Yes, and first, a clarification.
I |\n| 10 | thought we also had a motion in with Mahwah adversary |\n| 11 | proceeding to authorize us to spend money to maintain, maybe |\n| 12 | even you covered that, but there's a hearing on that today, I |\n| 13 | believe to authorize us to spend money to pay taxes and |\n| 14 | security services and all of that, I believe.
That should be |\n| 15 | on the agenda for today. |\n| 16 | THE COURT:
You may be correct about that.
I'll |\n| 17 | take a look at that. |\n| 18 | MR. DESPINS:
Okay. |\n| 19 | THE COURT:
I see what you're saying.
You filed |\n| 20 | an emergency motion that we -- yes, I understand what you're |\n| 21 | saying.
Okay.
I'll take a look while you're speaking. |\n| 22 | MR. DESPINS:
But, in any event, Your Honor, I |\n| 23 | think that given the number of people on the phone that are |\n| 24 | here for the, what I refer to as the August 15th extension |\n| 25 | motion, it probably makes sense to cover that first so that |\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 the people are free to stay on for the rest, but at least they don't have to; otherwise, they'll have to stay on for everything and there'll be nothing productive and (indiscernible). So, I would recommend starting with the August 15th extension motion. THE COURT: Go right ahead, which is just for the record, ECF 3329. MR. DESPINS: Mr. Bassett is handling that motion, Your Honor. THE COURT: Mr. Bassett, you're on -- there you go -- you were on mute, but please proceed. MR. BASSETT: My apologies. Good afternoon, Your Honor. Again, for the record, it's Nick Bassett from Paul Hastings on behalf of the Chapter 11 Trustee. To address Your Honor's question at the outset, we did intend, obviously, with the Court's permission, to have a very limited evidentiary presentation today and it is certainly our apologies for assuming we would be able to do that via Zoom. I think the reason we had proceeded in that manner is because at the hearing on this motion that occurred in February, it was done remotely and we did have the trustee provide some testimony. I realize now in thinking back on that particular\n\n25\n\nhearing, that I think we did that one remotely due to\n\n1 2 3 unanticipated weather issues. So maybe there was an exception made to the Court's general policy in that instance.\n\n4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Be that as it may, Your Honor, again, obviously, we're at the Court's mercy, but subject to your permission, we did intend to have the trustee present limited testimony. I think most of the record that we would rely on in support of the motion is the record indicates, which we would ask the Court to take judicial notice, so I don't think the evidentiary presentation would be long, but that was our intention, Your Honor.\n\n12 13 14 15 16 17 18 THE COURT: Well, the only reason I raise the issue is because there's going -- if Trustee Despins testifies, then there's going to be five different lawyers that are going to cross-examine him, is that what we're going to do, because there's a number of objections filed to this motion, so I would assume all those lawyers are going to want to cross-examine him.\n\n19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MR. BASSETT: I can't speak for him, Your Honor. I would note that I think each of those parties, or at least some of those parties, reserved the right expressly in their objections to cross-examine the trustee to the extent he testified. I don't know if they intend to or not. As I said, the testimony will be limited. I would expect 10 or so minutes, which I would hope you would cabin\n\n1 2 and eliminate the scope of their cross, but, again, I can't speak for the opposing parties' counsel.\n\n3 4 THE COURT: I understand you can't speak for them; I'm not suggesting you should.\n\n5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 But I'm saying I am virtually certain that they're going to want to cross-examine him, so then we're going to have direct examination and cross-examination remotely and the courtroom deputy has to then swear the parties in remotely. The courtroom deputy is not on a camera. You know, there are issues with that; that's why I don't do that unless it's determined in advance and there's a reason for it. Because, as you know, the Federal Rules of Evidence still require in-court hearings for testimony.\n\n14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 In any event, if that's how we're going to proceed, we'll see how we do, but I do think that, you know, it is necessary to understand that there's no reason why if testimony and exhibits are going to be introduced, why parties can't be here in the courtroom or work out an arrangement in advance so the Court is aware of what's happening. And that's what I would say with regard to that. MR. BASSETT: Understood, Your Honor. I will take the blame for not having dealt with this appropriately in advance. THE COURT: All right. Well, let's see how things proceed, so go right ahead.\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Are you calling Trustee Despins as a witness right now? MR. BASSETT: So, Your Honor, we would. I think the ladies of the jury Calloway to proceed would be for us to complete our limited evidentiary presentation, which really will only consist of the trustee testifying and the Court can, obviously, take notice of other filings in the record, which we refer to in our papers and they refer to, again, in argument, but it's really just the trustee taking the stand, which I think would be the appropriate way to proceed right now. THE COURT: Okay. Given what I've stated for the record, the courtroom deputy does not have a camera, so I am going to have to say for the record that I am sitting next to the courtroom deputy. I can see her. She is going to swear in the witness, Trustee Despins, and then we will have to go from there, okay. So I'm going to ask -- Trustee Despins, are ready to be sworn in? MR. DESPINS: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. So as if we can pretend we're in the courtroom and, Attorney Bassett just called you to the witness stand. So, now, we need to turn this over to the courtroom deputy, whose duty it is to swear in the witness. THE CLERK: Thank you.\n\n 18 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Attorney Despins, please raise your right hand. THE COURT: We can't see your right hand, Trustee Despins. We need to see it. MR. DESPINS: Sorry, Your Honor. THE COURT: The other way. MR. DESPINS: Yes. THE CLERK: Okay. MR. DESPINS: Hold on a second. I don't know why that's not -- okay. That's my right hand. THE COURT: Okay. MR. DESPINS: Yes. THE CLERK: Okay. LUC A. DESPINS, TRUSTEE'S WITNESS, SWORN THE WITNESS: I do. THE CLERK: State your name and address for the record, your business address, of course. THE WITNESS: Luc Despins, 200 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10166. THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Bassett, you may proceed. MR. BASSETT: Thank you, Your Honor. DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. BASSETT: Q Trustee Despins, you understand we are here today on the trustee's motion to extend avoidance action deadlines; is that right? Case 22-50073 Doc 3446 Filed 08/21/24 Entered 08/21/24 10:22:10 Page 18 of 96\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 3446
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I do. |\n| 2 | Q
Now, this is the second motion, such motion you have |\n| 3 | filed in this case; is that right? |\n| 4 | A
That's correct. |\n| 5 | Q
Now, do you recall, Trustee Despins, testifying at the |\n| 6 | hearing on the first motion, which I believe was on |\n| 7 | February 13th of this year? |\n| 8 | A
Yes, I do. |\n| 9 | Q
And have you reviewed that testimony, again, in |\n| 10 | anticipation of your testimony today? |\n| 11 | A
Yes, I have. |\n| 12 | Q
Was that testimony that you gave them, Trustee Despins, |\n| 13 | true and accurate to the best of your recollection? |\n| 14 | A
It was. |\n| 15 | Q
Okay.
So what I'd like to do today is just briefly ask |\n| 16 | some questions about events that have happened and transpired |\n| 17 | since you last testified in February of 2024. |\n| 18 | Now, Trustee Despins, can you just generally describe |\n| 19 | what you have been doing in your investigation in this |\n| 20 | Chapter 11 case since we've last had that hearing in February |\n| 21 | of this year? |\n| 22 | A
A number of things.
First, continuing to review |\n| 23 | documents we have received, analyzing them, bank account |\n| 24 | statements, et cetera, with the help of Kroll.
Then, we also |\n| 25 | sought what we call \"follow-up 2004 discovery\" for a limited |\n| | |\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 3446
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Page 20 of 96 |\n|---------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | 20 |\n| | |\n| 1 | number of parties to advance our investigation. |\n| 2 | Q
Okay.
When you say Rule 2004 discovery, how many |\n| 3 | additional Rule 2004 motions that you recall, have you filed |\n| 4 | since the hearing in February? |\n| 5 | A
Four. |\n| 6 | Q
And do you know how many additional parties, or |\n| 7 | discovery targets, if you will, that those motions covered? |\n| 8 | A
47. |\n| 9 | Q
And do you have a general sense of approximately how |\n| 10 | many documents were obtained through those Rule 2004 motions |\n| 11 | from those parties? |\n| 12 | A
Just from those parties with the new 2004, around 700 |\n| 13 | documents. |\n| 14 | Q
Okay.
Now, in addition to the 2004 discovery that you |\n| 15 | just described, have you and your team obtained additional |\n| 16 | documents by other means or from other sources? |\n| 17 | A
Yes.
The first source is pursuing the existing 2004, |\n| 18 | the ones that were existing before (indiscernible) to obtain |\n| 19 | more information from the targets of that investigation. |\n| 20 | Nobody ever produces all of their documents on the |\n| 21 | first go-around, so we have to pursue this case.
It was |\n| 22 | mostly Mr. Linsey's firm that did this.
So that was one |\n| 23 | source of a very voluminous source of documents that we |\n| 24 | received. |\n| 25 | In addition to that, we obtained access to documents |\n| | |\n\n| 1 | that were in a warehouse in Jersey and, also, they were |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | iPhones and the like, computers, in that facility that we |\n| 3 | obtained and we analyzed.
So that's, generally, the |\n| 4 | additional work that was done in terms of obtaining |\n| 5 | documents. |\n| 6 | Q
And do you have a ballpark sense of the volume of |\n| 7 | documents that we're talking about when you pull together |\n| 8 | these additional sources with the 2004 discovery that you |\n| 9 | described? |\n| 10 | A
Well, putting aside the 700 documents that exist for |\n| 11 | the new -- for 2004, there would be in excess of 20,000 |\n| 12 | documents from the sources I've described, which is the |\n| 13 | previous, the initially previously granted 2004, the New |\n| 14 | Jersey warehouse, and the computers, and the iPhones that we |\n| 15 | found in that facility. |\n| 16 | Q
Now, what is your team, if anything, doing with this |\n| 17 | documents as you receive them? |\n| 18 | A
Well, not to go into a lot of details, but, basically, |\n| 19 | we have a software program that allows us to search by name, |\n| 20 | so they're downloaded to that so everyone can actually search |\n| 21 | a specific term.
Then, they're also given, that access is |\n| 22 | given to the Kroll team so they can also look at that, and |\n| 23 | that gives them a lead as to new bank accounts and the like. |\n| 24 | So there's a whole process that goes on, that's still |\n| 25 | ongoing, as to those documents. |\n| | |\n\n| 1 | Q
So you mentioned Kroll and their bank account analysis, |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | which was a topic that came up at the hearing in February. |\n| 3 | Can you talk more about the additional work, any |\n| 4 | additional discoveries that the Kroll team has made, with |\n| 5 | respect to bank accounts since February? |\n| 6 | A
Yeah, as I described when I testified, you know, these |\n| 7 | bank accounts, they're really almost the only key documents |\n| 8 | we have, or at least documents that we're sure of their |\n| 9 | authenticity because they come from banks.
And every time |\n| 10 | you look at a bank account, there's dozens, if not hundreds |\n| 11 | of transfers that lead you to other bank accounts, and that's |\n| 12 | what Kroll does. |\n| 13 | So what they did is that through this additional |\n| 14 | discovery that Mr. Linsey's firm produced, we're able to -- |\n| 15 | they were able to identify 200 additional bank accounts that |\n| 16 | they started analyzing and are still analyzing at this stage. |\n| 17 | Q
And do you have a ballpark sense at all as to how many |\n| 18 | transfers within those accounts have been analyzed? |\n| 19 | A
Not precisely.
It's thousands and thousands, but I |\n| 20 | would hesitate to give a precise number. |\n| 21 | Q
And how long does it take Kroll to go through this sort |\n| 22 | of exercise? |\n| 23 | MR. SKLARZ:
Objection; hearsay. |\n| 24 | He's asking what somebody else is not in court is |\n| 25 | doing. |\n| | |\n\n 23 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MR. BASSETT: Your Honor, the trustee -- THE COURT: So, hold on a second. Attorney Sklarz, I didn't hear you, so you're going to have to do that again. MR. SKLARZ: I'm sorry. THE COURT: That's not your fault. MR. SKLARZ: Objection. THE COURT: That's not your fault. I'm just saying that's one of the downsides to remote, right. I can't hear you when you start to talk, so I'm going to ask you to do that again, please. MR. SKLARZ: Fair enough, Your Honor. My objection is on account of hearsay. The trustee is testifying about what Kroll, who is a party not in court today, is doing, so it's hearsay. THE COURT: Do you have a responses, Attorney Bassett? MR. BASSETT: Your Honor -- yes, Your Honor. I don't understand how the question calls for hearsay. The trustee has retained Kroll as his advisor in this case; he's testified about that at length, including at the last hearing. The trustee, obviously, has firsthand knowledge of how long it has taken Kroll, at his direction, to perform certain tasks. MR. SKLARZ: That is classic hearsay. Kroll isn't Case 22-50073 Doc 3446 Filed 08/21/24 Entered 08/21/24 10:22:10 Page 23 of 96\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 3446
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Page 24 of 96 |\n|---------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | 24 |\n| 1 | here. |\n| 2 | THE COURT:
I'm going to overrule the objection, |\n| 3 | but give the testimony whatever weight I think is |\n| 4 | appropriate. |\n| 5 | So please continue. |\n| 6 | BY MR. BASSETT: |\n| 7 | Q
So approximately how long, Trustee Despins, does it |\n| 8 | take Kroll to perform the type of bank account analysis that |\n| 9 | you just described? |\n| 10 | A
It's impossible to give a precise, you know, number of |\n| 11 | days answer to that because it depends on how many transfers |\n| 12 | are in the accounts.
But as to those 200, there are still -- |\n| 13 | that analysis is still ongoing, because as I said, every |\n| 14 | account opens the door to another account and that analysis |\n| 15 | is still ongoing.
It's not the same degree that it was going |\n| 16 | on, let's say, in January or February, but it's still |\n| 17 | ongoing, as we speak. |\n| 18 | Q
Now, Trustee Despins, you're aware that the debtors' |\n| 19 | criminal trial has taken place in the United States District |\n| 20 | Court for the Southern District of New York, correct? |\n| 21 | A
Correct, yes. |\n| 22 | Q
And do you recall, approximately, when that trial |\n| 23 | started? |\n| 24 | A
In late May; May 22nd, something along those lines. |\n| 25 | Q
And, approximately, when it concluded? |\n| | |\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 3446
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Page 25 of 96 |\n|---------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | 25 |\n| 1 | A
In mid-July; July 16th or 17th. |\n| 2 | Q
And did your team monitor that trial as it was |\n| 3 | transpiring? |\n| 4 | A
Yes, we did, either through attendance when there were |\n| 5 | key witnesses that could be key to our case and we wanted to |\n| 6 | gauge their credibility as a witness or by reading |\n| 7 | transcripts when they were routine witnesses like FBI |\n| 8 | testimony where, like, we didn't need to be there for that. |\n| 9 | Q
And so how, if at all, was the criminal trial relevant |\n| 10 | to your investigation in this case? |\n| 11 | A
Incredibly relevant.
As I said, testified before, the |\n| 12 | government has better tools than we do.
They have all sorts |\n| 13 | of ways of getting information. |\n| 14 | And what could be learned through that trial, |\n| 15 | basically, is it just opened up a whole new dimension as to a |\n| 16 | number of the things that we've been analyzing. |\n| 17 | Q
And do you know, Trustee Despins, approximately how |\n| 18 | many witnesses there were in the criminal trial altogether? |\n| 19 | A
The government had over 30 and the Defendant has |\n| 20 | something like 8 or 10.
Not more than 10. |\n| 21 | Q
And do you have a ballpark sense for how many exhibits |\n| 22 | were introduced into evidence during the criminal trial? |\n| 23 | A
There's thousands.
My memory was 2900 and something, |\n| 24 | so thousands of exhibits. |\n| 25 | Q
And do you have access to those exhibits? |\n\n| 1 | A
No. |\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | Before trial begins, in theory, when the government |\n| 3 | uses an exhibit, it's supposed to post them promptly, but as |\n| 4 | of today, there's still hundreds of exhibits that have not |\n| 5 | been downloaded so that we can have access to them.
So we |\n| 6 | did not have access to them before -- most of them.
Some of |\n| 7 | them we did, but most of them, we did not have access.
Since |\n| 8 | they were posted, we've had access, but that's not the |\n| 9 | complete list.
There's hundreds of exhibits that, for some |\n| 10 | reason, have not been posted yet.
Of course, we've been |\n| 11 | following up with the government to make sure they do post |\n| 12 | them promptly. |\n| 13 | Q
And what is your team doing with the exhibits from the |\n| 14 | criminal trial, if they are able to access them? |\n| 15 | A
Same routine as putting this on our software database, |\n| 16 | giving it to Kroll, because there are references to bank |\n| 17 | accounts.
There's actually analysis of bank transfers in |\n| 18 | government exhibits.
So we're feeding all of that to them so |\n| 19 | they can update their analysis. |\n| 20 | Q
Now, Trustee Despins, are you aware that this Court |\n| 21 | entered an order staying certain litigation and certain |\n| 22 | litigation activities, including depositions, during the |\n| 23 | pendency of the criminal trial? |\n| 24 | A
Yes, I am. |\n| 25 | Q
How, if at all, did that stay impact your investigation |\n\n| | 27 |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | progress over the last few months? |\n| 2 | A
Well, there was an absolute prohibition on depositions |\n| 3 | during that time period, so -- obviously, there are a number |\n| 4 | of witnesses that we were about to depose that, in fact, were |\n| 5 | potentially going to be testifying at the criminal trial and, |\n| 6 | therefore, we could not depose until, you know, last week or |\n| 7 | something like that.
So, clearly, it had a major impact on |\n| 8 | our ability to depose the key witnesses. |\n| 9 | Q
Now, that stay was granted, pursuant to a motion that |\n| 10 | you filed; is that right? |\n| 11 | A
That's correct. |\n| 12 | Q
Why did you file that motion? |\n| 13 | A
Two reasons.
The first one is that the debtor was |\n| 14 | filing a renewed motion before the criminal court to stay the |\n| 15 | entire bankruptcy case, so, obviously, we did not want that |\n| 16 | to happen; that would have been a disaster and, therefore, |\n| 17 | that was part of the reason.
But the other part of the |\n| 18 | reason is that the witnesses that we were scheduling for |\n| 19 | depositions were saying, Hey, I'm going to be a witness or, |\n| 20 | I'm talking with the Government, and I will complain to them |\n| 21 | that you're trying to depose us.
And, of course, the impact |\n| 22 | of that would have -- could have been that the government |\n| 23 | would have said, Well, actually, we think the bankruptcy case |\n| 24 | should be stayed completely. |\n| 25 | And that's why we filed this motion, which was kind of |\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 (indiscernible), in attempt that we were still able to get documents, but no depositions, so that we would not interfere with the criminal trial or the witnesses that could or have appeared at the criminal trial. Q Now, since February 15th of 2024, have you filed any additional avoidance actions? A Yes. Q Approximately how many? A We filed four, but we're about to file, or we're in the process -- they're just appearing on the docket today -- of filing an additional 30 or so. Q And how are you deciding when to file these complaints? A As soon as we're ready to file them, in the sense that we have enough information to file them and we've verified all the information to the best of our ability. We're not holding anything back. We're filing all the ones that we can right now and that's how we have decided, if we have enough information. That process is led mostly by Mr. Linsey's firm, but, you know, I'm involved with reviewing the complaints. But, basically, we file them when we have enough information to go ahead. Q Trustee Despins, you testified in February about some of the obstruction that had occurred at the hands of the debtor and others in this case, do you recall that testimony? A Yes.\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Q Now, that obstruction that you talked about then, has that continued to affect your investigation in your view? A Sure, because as I said, the only reliable source we have are bank accounts, but that doesn't show you the full picture; it just shows you transfers. We have no books and records. You know, the debtor testified many times he didn't have an iPhone. And now, of course, we know he had an iPhone, because that came out in the criminal trial; he had many iPhones, but with data. And, obviously, the inability to have books and records to tie all of this makes this case, I would say, unprecedented in terms of the amount of work that needs to be done to tie everything together. MR. BASSETT: No further questions, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Does anyone wish to cross-examine Trustee Despins? MR. YAN: Your Honor, I have just a few questions for Trustee Despins. THE COURT: Okay. Would you just -- I can see you, but would you please state your name for the record, again, and who you represent, because, again, as I said at the beginning of the hearing, we only have audio for our transcripts, so it would be helpful to make the record as clear as possible. Thank you. MR. YAN: Sure. My name is Jin Yan, J-i-n, last\n\n 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 name, Y-a-n. I represent Apple, Inc. and Meta Platforms, Inc. CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. YAN: Q Trustee Despins -- THE COURT: Go right ahead. I'm sorry, I didn't mean -- MR. YAN: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: -- to speak over you. I apologize. But you may proceed. MR. YAN: Thank you, Your Honor. BY MR. YAN: Q Trustee Despins, you testified earlier that you issued four new 2004 (indiscernible) targeting 47 parties. Did I state that correctly? A That's correct. Q Was Apple one of those targets? A I don't recall. Q Do you recall if Meta was one of those targets? A I don't recall. Q What actions have you taken, specifically, to investigate additional avoidance claims against Apple or Meta? A There's -- they're part of, meaning that we searched, generally, for all transfers through these bank accounts that Case 22-50073 Doc 3446 Filed 08/21/24 Entered 08/21/24 10:22:10 Page 30 of 96\n\n| 31 |\n|----|\n|----|\n\n| 1 | we keep getting these 200 additional bank accounts, so if | |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|--|\n| 2 | Meta or Apple appears in there, we're going to pursue that. | |\n| 3 | So that's part of the analysis. | |\n| 4 | But we don't go -- our analysis is not Defendants | |\n| 5 | targeted, in the sense that we are looking for transfers, | |\n| 6 | because we have this running clock that we're trying to | |\n| 7 | comply with and, therefore, we're looking at all transfers. | |\n| 8 | And if it happens that Meta or Apple is on that list, | |\n| 9 | then we will chase that. | |\n| 10 | Q
Trustee Despins, you're aware that you've already sued | |\n| 11 | Apple, correct? | |\n| 12 | A
Correct. | |\n| 13 | Q
And you're also aware that you've already sued Meta, | |\n| 14 | right? | |\n| 15 | A
Correct. | |\n| 16 | Q
Have you identified any additional claims, other than | |\n| 17 | the ones in your current lawsuit against Meta? | |\n| 18 | A
There are some smaller claims that we found, but not -- | |\n| 19 | nothing material, you know, in the thousands of dollars, not | |\n| 20 | in the hundreds of thousands of dollars.
So, at this time, | |\n| 21 | the answer would be, no, nothing material. | |\n| 22 | Q
What about against Apple? | |\n| 23 | A
Same answer. | |\n| 24 | Q
And you said the additional claims that you found that | |\n| 25 | are not material, are those already asserted in the claims in | |\n| | | |\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 3446
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I don't think so.
I think these would be added to |\n| 3 | that, but, again, not in -- it wouldn't move the dial in a |\n| 4 | material way. |\n| 5 | Q
Do you intend to serve those claims against Apple or |\n| 6 | Meta? |\n| 7 | A
I need to talk to counsel about that.
You know, |\n| 8 | (indiscernible) litigation, so I need to confer with them to |\n| 9 | decide whether it's worth doing that. |\n| 10 | Q
Okay.
And when did you identify those additional |\n| 11 | claims that are not part of the existing lawsuits? |\n| 12 | A
I don't know when.
Obviously after February 15th, but |\n| 13 | when between February 15th and now, I couldn't say. |\n| 14 | Q
Can you explain why you haven't sought to amend your |\n| 15 | existing lawsuit to add those claims? |\n| 16 | A
Because Apple and Meta is not the only thing we're |\n| 17 | focusing on.
We're focusing on, you know, more than 300 |\n| 18 | Defendants and now we're adding another 50 or so and 30, plus |\n| 19 | another potential 20, so that's 50.
So, we -- I understand |\n| 20 | from your perspective, you're concerned about those two only, |\n| 21 | but there are a lot of balls in the air and we go to the most |\n| 22 | material and the most critical aspects first. |\n| 23 | And that's why I said I'm aware of additional |\n| 24 | transfers, but I don't think they move the dial and certainly |\n| 25 | not in the way that we would put everything to the side and |\n| | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3446 Filed 08/21/24 Entered 08/21/24 10:22:10 Page 33 of 96\n\n 33 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 amend to add the, at this time, to amend to add these amounts that are not material. If we find something that's really material, then we would, obviously, amend it as quickly as we can. So there's no strategy vis-a-vis, Apple or Meta; it's a global strategy of dealing with hundreds of Defendants and we go to the most pressing, you know, because there's a limited number of hours in the day. MR. YAN: I have no further questions. Thank you, Trustee Despins. THE COURT: Thank you. Does anyone else wish to cross-examine Trustee Despins? MR. SKLARZ: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Attorney Sklarz, will you just, again, state your name for the record and who you represent, because we need that for the record, please. Thank you. MR. SKLARZ: Yes, Jeffrey Sklarz and for purposes of this hearing, my clients are G Club; FFP (BVI) Limited, which is sued in Adversary Proceeding 24-506 -- 5056; Ogier, 24 -- sued in Adversary 24-05012; Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman, sued in Adversary 24-05014; and Weddle Law, sued in Adversary 24-05188. // //\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 3446
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Page 34 of 96 |\n|---------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | 34 |\n| 1 | CROSS-EXAMINATION |\n| 2 | BY MR. SKLARZ: |\n| 3 | Q
Trustee Despins, you indicated that you received |\n| 4 | additional information, which, much like the proverbial |\n| 5 | Russian nesting doll, every time you open one layer, you get |\n| 6 | more and more. |\n| 7 | Is that fair to say? |\n| 8 | A
As a general characterization, yes. |\n| 9 | Q
Okay.
So to the extent you continue to get more and |\n| 10 | more information, are you indicating there's a possibility |\n| 11 | that your investigation could go on, effectively, in |\n| 12 | perpetuity for years and years and years? |\n| 13 | A
No, at one point, we need to, you know, wrap up this |\n| 14 | case and move on to other things in our lives and that's the |\n| 15 | intent here.
From our point of view, we're not at that stage |\n| 16 | yet, but, clearly, the goal is to get to that stage so that |\n| 17 | we can move on.
We have to balance that desire of leaving |\n| 18 | potential targets, you know, without a claim, so, that's, |\n| 19 | really, the balancing act there. |\n| 20 | Q
And you also indicated earlier, I believe, that you had |\n| 21 | moved to stay your own pursuit of cases based on the criminal |\n| 22 | proceeding. |\n| 23 | Did I understand that correctly? |\n| 24 | A
No, we did that in the past. |\n| 25 | Q
You did that in the past? |\n| | |\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 3446
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Yes. |\n| 2 | Q
And there were pending discovery examinations, I |\n| 3 | believe you said, that were stayed as a result of your |\n| 4 | motion, correct? |\n| 5 | A
Correct. |\n| 6 | Q
And some of those folks you were going to take exams of |\n| 7 | were witnesses in the criminal proceeding, correct? |\n| 8 | A
I said witnesses or could have been witnesses so, the |\n| 9 | government had to decide to use them.
Now, they would be in |\n| 10 | one of those two categories. |\n| 11 | Q
Okay.
So, you -- and no one opposed your motion to |\n| 12 | stay; is that the testimony? |\n| 13 | A
I don't think anybody did; that's right. |\n| 14 | Q
So you self-stayed cases for your own reasons; that's |\n| 15 | fair to say? |\n| 16 | A
No. |\n| 17 | Q
You self-stayed the case for other people's reasons? |\n| 18 | A
No, we filed a motion, but it was not in a vacuum; it's |\n| 19 | not just for our own reasons. |\n| 20 | It's that because we were attempting to depose people |\n| 21 | who said, Wait a minute, I'm a witness or I've been asked to |\n| 22 | be a witness in a criminal trial and they were going to |\n| 23 | complain about it, what we were trying to do, to the DOJ, |\n| 24 | that's when we decided we needed to halt this during the |\n| 25 | duration of the trial.
So, we did that on our own, but it |\n| | |\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 3446
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Page 36 of 96 |\n|---------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | 36 |\n| | |\n| 1 | was taking into account a number of factors, including not |\n| 2 | interfering with a criminal proceeding. |\n| 3 | Q
Have you coordinated witness testimony with the |\n| 4 | government? |\n| 5 | A
Never. |\n| 6 | MR. BASSETT:
Objection; irrelevant. |\n| 7 | THE COURT:
Sustained.
So we'll strike that from |\n| 8 | the record, that answer. |\n| 9 | BY MR. SKLARZ: |\n| 10 | Q
In terms of my clients who've objected today, G Club, |\n| 11 | FFP, Ogier, Pillsbury Winthrop, and Weddle Law, they were all |\n| 12 | sued prior to the February extension order; is that correct? |\n| 13 | A
Well, I know about G Club for sure, on both, on alter |\n| 14 | ego and what we would call a precautionary transfer |\n| 15 | complaint.
Ogier, I know, as well.
Pillsbury, yes. |\n| 16 | The other entity you mentioned, I'm sorry, I don't recall |\n| 17 | them. |\n| 18 | Q
Okay.
With respect to all of those entities, are there |\n| 19 | any other claims you discovered between February and today |\n| 20 | that you're intending to bring? |\n| 21 | A
I want to be careful, because, remember, as to G Club, |\n| 22 | our first cause of action is to seek alter-ego or alter |\n| 23 | (indiscernible) ruling.
The fraudulent transfer would only |\n| 24 | be if we don't succeed in that and, therefore, there has been |\n| 25 | no focus on the fraudulent transfer claims against G Club, |\n| | |\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 because we first want to try to obtain a ruling of alter-ego. So, you know, I cannot say that there's not more in terms of fraudulent transfer, because that's not our focus against G Club. As to the other entities, I really hesitate in giving you a definite answer, because there's 280 Defendants, so I don't know each one of them. But nothing comes to mind in terms of, oh, there's another (indiscernible) against (indiscernible) or something like that. Nothing comes to mind along those lines. Q So as you sit here today, you're not aware of any additional claims that could be brought -- let's put G Club aside and we'll go through it one by one -- as you sit here today, you're not aware of any additional claims that could be brought against FFP? A Against, there's 280 Defendants, so I can't -- I don't know, so I hesitate to give you an answer that there's definitely not. I (indiscernible). Q So, the question, again, as to Ogier, as you sit here today, are you aware of any additional claims against Ogier? A None that are material or that have been brought to my attention. I want to be clear, there's -- you know, Mr. Linsey's firm is running that process, generally, and so they may be reviewing and finding additional transfers and they don't\n\n 38 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 bring every dollar to my attention until it's time to file an amended complaint. So I have not been approached by them to file an amended complaint at this time against (indiscernible). THE COURT: Attorney Sklarz, before you continue, I just want to make sure that the record is clear. The two parties you just asked about, the first was FFP; is that correct? MR. SKLARZ: Correct, Your Honor. Yes. THE COURT: And the second was Ogier; is that correct? MR. SKLARZ: Ogier is O-g-i-e-r. THE COURT: Okay. That's -- we do need to do that, unfortunately, for the record, so I may have to ask you to -- I mean, now that you've said those two, that's very helpful. MR. SKLARZ: Sure. THE COURT: If you talk about other Defendants that you represent, I would ask you to please spell their names for the record. MR. SKLARZ: No problem, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you. BY MR. SKLARZ: Q So the next Defendant would be Pillsbury Winthrop, P-il-l-s-b-u-r-y W-i-n-t-h-r-o-p. It's a New York law firm. Case 22-50073 Doc 3446 Filed 08/21/24 Entered 08/21/24 10:22:10 Page 38 of 96\n\n| | | 39 |\n|----|---|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | | Are you aware of any additional claims against |\n| 2 | | Pillsbury? |\n| 3 | A | Again, I -- what I'm aware of is nobody has asked me to |\n| 4 | | sign off on an amended complaint being filed.
That's the |\n| 5 | | best information I can give you at this stage. |\n| 6 | Q | With respect to Weddle Law, W-e-d-d-l-e, are you aware |\n| 7 | | of any additional claims against Weddle Law? |\n| 8 | A | I would give you the same answer; there's no current |\n| 9 | | plan, to my knowledge, to file an amended complaint asserting |\n| 10 | | additional claims. |\n| 11 | Q | Thank you. |\n| 12 | | Now, you mentioned the debtor, post-February has |\n| 13 | | continued to obstruct your getting books and records. |\n| 14 | | Is that -- did I understand your testimony correctly? |\n| 15 | A | I think the question that was asked was whether the |\n| 16 | | obstruction by the debtor affected us, continued to affect us |\n| 17 | | post-February and the answer was yes. |\n| 18 | Q | Okay.
So let's break it down a little bit. |\n| 19 | | Has the debtor obstructed you in your investigation |\n| 20 | | since the February extension order came out? |\n| 21 | A | Well, every day that they're not producing their books |\n| 22 | | and records, they're obstructing us; that's one way of |\n| 23 | | looking at it. |\n| 24 | Q | What -- |\n| 25 | A | Not when -- sorry. |\n| | | |\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 3446
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Page 40 of 96 |\n|---------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | 40 |\n| 1 | Q
What precisely has the debtor himself done?
He's been |\n| 2 | sitting in jail, correct? |\n| 3 | A
Correct. |\n| | |\n| 4 | Q
What has he done since the February extension order, |\n| 5 | which, just for reference, is dated -- it's ECF 2921 -- |\n| 6 | dated, February 15, 2024.
What, since February 15th, 2024, |\n| 7 | has the debtor done to obstruct your investigation, other |\n| 8 | than not cooperating when you asked him to? |\n| 9 | A
He's continued to fail to produce his books and |\n| 10 | records. |\n| 11 | Q
Okay.
Now, you have obtained various books and |\n| 12 | records, correct, related to debtor entities? |\n| 13 | Strike that question.
Let me ask again. |\n| 14 | You have obtained various books and records from both, |\n| 15 | the debtor and entities that you claim are controlled by the |\n| 16 | debtor; is that fair to say? |\n| 17 | A
No, I wouldn't say that there's any books and records |\n| 18 | from the debtor and as to other entities, what qualifies as |\n| 19 | books and records is unclear.
We did obtain business |\n| 20 | documents from other entities, yes. |\n| 21 | Q
So, for example, with respect to -- there were a number |\n| 22 | of entities that have the letters HGHK preceding them, you |\n| 23 | obtained books and records from certain HK -- HGHK entities, |\n| 24 | like HGHK Technologies; is that correct? |\n| 25 | A
I hesitate to say books and records.
We obtained |\n| | |\n\n| | 41 |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | documentation from them showing transactions.
Whether these |\n| 2 | were really accurate, complete books and records, I could not |\n| 3 | say.
I actually would not say that. |\n| 4 | Q
Okay.
There was a gentleman, a receiver appointed in |\n| 5 | an action by the name of Hofmeister, H-o-f-m-e-i-s-t-e-r, do |\n| 6 | you remember him? |\n| 7 | A
Yes, I do. |\n| 8 | Q
And there was a settlement entered into, whereby he |\n| 9 | turned over or gave access to you, with respect to the |\n| 10 | entities that he was appointed receiver over, do you recall |\n| 11 | that? |\n| 12 | A
He gave me access to what? |\n| 13 | Q
I'm asking, did he give you access to information? |\n| 14 | A
He gave us access to information that he had received, |\n| 15 | yes. |\n| 16 | Q
Okay.
And you entered into a settlement that was |\n| 17 | approved by this Court with Mr. Hofmeister; is that right? |\n| 18 | A
That's correct. |\n| 19 | Q
What did you get from Mr. Hofmeister? |\n| 20 | A
A series of documents purporting to show some |\n| 21 | transfers, some payments, but I don't think there were |\n| 22 | balance sheets.
Nothing that was pass muster, in terms of a |\n| 23 | true accounting. |\n| 24 | Q
And -- |\n| 25 | A
We got what he got from Mr. Kwok's associates.
He |\n| | |\n\n 42 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 didn't prepare any books and records. He just gave us what they gave him. Q So Mr. Kwok's associates turned over information to Mr. Hofmeister, who then turned it over to you? A They gave some information, yes, that's correct. Yes. Q And did Mr. Hofmeister obstruct your investigation? A Sorry, did he obstruct our investigation? No. Q Let me just have a moment. (Pause) MR. SKLARZ: Thank you, Trustee. I don't have further questions at this time. THE WITNESS: Thank you. THE COURT: Thank you. Does anyone else wish to cross-examine Trustee Despins? (No verbal response) THE COURT: All right. Hearing nothing, Attorney Bassett, do you have any redirect? MR. BASSETT: No redirect, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Trustee Despins. Your testimony is concluded. You're excused as a witness. (Witness excused) THE COURT: I know you're going to continue to be at the hearing, but you're excused as a witness. Case 22-50073 Doc 3446 Filed 08/21/24 Entered 08/21/24 10:22:10 Page 42 of 96\n\n 43 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MR. DESPINS: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you. Attorney Bassett, did you wish to proceed, continue? MR. BASSETT: Yes, Your Honor, thank you. THE COURT: You're welcome. MR. BASSETT: Again, for the record, Nick Bassett from Paul Hastings on behalf of the Chapter 11 Trustee. Your Honor, that -- in addition, as I said before, in addition to Trustee Despins' testimony, we believe that the record generally in this Chapter 11 case and the related adversary proceedings is highly relevant to the motion before the Court today, as it was to the motion before the Court back in February and the Court can, then, you know, take judicial notice of that docket and of that record. So, you know, coupling the record before - coupling the record in this case with Trustee Despins' testimony, that concludes our evidence in support of the motion. And with that, I would propose proceeding to argument. I'm happy to do that, Your Honor. THE COURT: Go right ahead. MR. BASSETT: Thank you very much. So, Your Honor, I'll try to be brief in my remarks, because I don't think there is really any new ground to cover that we did not already cover when we had the Case 22-50073 Doc 3446 Filed 08/21/24 Entered 08/21/24 10:22:10 Page 43 of 96\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 hearing back in February on the first motion to extend the trustee's time to file avoidance actions. The Court, in that order, which was issued on February 15th, 2024, and is at ECF 2921, the Court reached two main conclusions. First, it granted the trustee's request for an extension of his deadline to file avoidance actions from February 15th, 2024, through August 15th, 2024, under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9006(b). Second, the Court determined in that order that it disagreed and denied the trustee's requests for equitable tolling on the statute of limitations deadline; however, it expressly did so without prejudice to the trustee's ability to raise equitable tolling in response to any argument that a particular adversary Defendant may raise as to the statute of limitations in the future.\n\n15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Your Honor, there is no reason, based on either the passage of time, the intervening facts and circumstances that have occurred since February, or anything in the objections that the Court has received, that would militate in favor of any other outcome that's different from what the Court already concluded back in February. I do want to emphasize that the trustee absolutely intends to argue equitable tolling at the appropriate time if a Defendant raises a statute of limitations issue in an adversary proceeding, but we respect the Court's ruling as to that and will reserve all rights accordingly.\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Your Honor, I'll spend the balance of my time just responding to the particular arguments that certain of the objecting parties have raised. Again, in my view, there is nothing new. I think the arguments generally fall into two buckets. The first is the objecting parties reiterate arguments they made previously that the Court should not be able to use Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9006(b) to extend the deadline for filing avoidance actions. And then the second argument is one that's really based on the factual record, with parties taxes the position that nothing has occurred or that there were no facts in the record that would justify extending the deadline to file avoidance actions further.\n\n14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 On the first of those arguments, on 9006(b), Your Honor, again, I think it's already been decided. The Court carefully analyzed this issue and the relevant case law in its first extension order. The Court, after conducting that analysis, ultimately concluded correctly that limitations periods are generally not substantive and, therefore, the Court has the power to use Rule 9006(b) to extend the limitations period set forth in 546(a), based on principles of equity.\n\n23 24 25 In reaching that decision, the Court expressly considered and declined to follow contrary case law, including, specifically, Judge Tancredi's decision in the In\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 re Walnut Hill case, which the objecting parties continue to rely upon. The Court also specifically noted in his decision, which granted the trustee's request to extend the deadline for filing avoidance actions to August 15th, 2024, that, (indiscernible) for the order, but which date may be further extended upon notice and a hearing, and that's why we're here today, Your Honor, to have a further hearing on extending that deadline through February of 2015 [sic].\n\n9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Everything the Court decided in its prior order on this issue, Your Honor, remains correct today and it should not be disturbed. The only argument that certain of the objecting parties attempt to characterize as a new argument is an argument based on the Supreme Court's recent decision in the Purdue Pharma case, but nothing about that decision, Your Honor, impacts the Court's analysis.\n\n16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 In Purdue, the Supreme Court concluded that bankruptcy courts -- the Bankruptcy Court in that case could not prove the nonconsensual, third-party release because Congress had not authorized such releases under the Bankruptcy Code and it undeniably would have affected the substantive rights of parties who held claims against other parties. It's important to note, and there's an entire section of the Court's opinion at the end where the Court is very clear to caution the narrowness of its holding.\n\n25\n\nAnd the Court said, quote, \"As important as the\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 question we decide today are the ones we do not decide.\" The Court then concluded, quote, \"Consigning ourselves to the question presented, we hold only that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize the release and injunction that, as part of a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11, effectively seeks to discharge claims against a nondebtor without the consent of the affected claimants.\"\n\n8 9 10 11 So, Your Honor, the decision to the issue before the Court today obviously does not involve nonconsensual third-party releases and, therefore, in our view, Purdue has no bearing on the Court's decision.\n\n12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Now, to the extent and notwithstanding the Court's very careful attempt to clarify the narrowness of its holding, Purdue can be said to stand for broader principles. At most, I would submit it could stand for the proposition that bankruptcy courts are not allowed to use their equitable powers in a way that affects substantive rights in a manner that is inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code.\n\n19 20 21 22 23 And, again, the Court addressed this issue and already decided it, and we make this point in our reply brief, the point being that the statute of limitations here are not substantive, therefore, the Court is not modifying substantive rights.\n\n24 25 Now, if the Defendants' broad ruling of Purdue are correct, the implications of that would be far broader than\n\n1 2 3 4 5 they suggest, because as I read their objection, they're effectively saying that a Court could never use equitable powers to effect statutes of limitation, would that would apply to equitable tolling, as well. That also applies outside of the bankruptcy context.\n\n6 7 8 9 10 11 12 I don't think there's any possible reasonable reading of the Purdue case, which could be said that -- where the Supreme Court could have been said to have intended to do away with equitable tolling of statutes of limitations, like, that's a far too broad reading of that decision and I think that it certainly was not intended to be -- that it was not intended to have that effect.\n\n13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Your Honor, aside from the 9006(b) arguments and the Purdue overlay, as I'll call it, the only other argument that the objectors really make is that, in their view, the circumstances don't justify an extension of time. Your Honor, I would submit based on the testimony that the trustee gave today, based on the record in this case, and based on the testimony that he gave back in February, the record amply supports the limited, further extension that the trustee is seeking.\n\n22 23 24 25 And you can tell from the cross-examination today one of the points that the objectors are making is that, Well, this obstruction, this all occurred at the beginning of the case and the debtor has been in prison. He hasn't been\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 actively obstructing the trustee's investigation since, but that's just not true, because the obstruction that occurred and the unique and extraordinary cases of this case are that we have a debtor and we have an individual associated with the debtor who has never cooperated with the trustee's investigation. They've never provided the books and records that ordinarily should be provided in any case. That continues to impede the trustee's investigation. All the issues arising out of that lack of cooperation does not magically disappear after February 15th of this year, Your Honor.\n\n12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 And the trustee testified about the diligent efforts that he is continuing to undertake. He testified about thousands of documents that his team has received from 2004 investigations, from a warehouse belonging to Golden Spring that his team obtained access to, to the thousands of exhibits in a criminal trial, all of which he does not even have access to yet. He talked about his team's process for going through those documents as diligently as they can.\n\n20 21 22 23 24 The trustee also talked about his monitoring of the criminal trial more generally and the relevance that has to his investigation. He talked about the bank account analysis being undertaken by Kroll, which was the subject of extensive testimony back in February.\n\n25\n\nYour Honor, all of that is ongoing. All of it\n\n1 2 takes time. All of it continues to be affected by the unique and extraordinary circumstances of this case.\n\n3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 The last point I will address, Your Honor, as to the trustee's diligence with his investigation is the argument that (indiscernible) surrounding the motion to stay the bankruptcy case. Your Honor, that was a motion that the trustee presented. You heard from him today the reasons why it was filed. The Court granted that motion. In doing so, I'd submit that the Court found that that motion was in the best interests of the estate. Other parties, including the objectors who are here today, had the opportunity to object to that if they thought it was not appropriate.\n\n13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 And, again, Your Honor, the trustee had very good reasons for doing that. The potential consequences of not proceeding in that manner would have been to fight with the debtor about a global stay of the bankruptcy case, which would have been a disaster if the trustee had been unable to continue to do any of his work during the pendency of the criminal trial, that would have been a disaster and, therefore, he made the recent decision to file that motion and it was granted by the Court.\n\n22 23 24 25 The last argument I'll briefly address, Your Honor, is the argument by Meta and Apple, where they say that, again, there's no evidence that they, themselves, are done anything to obstruct the trustee's investigation. And\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 on that, Your Honor, I would just simply point the Court to the decision already issued in the first extension order at paragraph 14, where the Court said, quote, \"The bankruptcy case presents a rather different (indiscernible) on equitable tolling and the typical situation, it would have been debtors' conduct, rather than the Defendants' conduct, which invokes equitable tolling. In some senses, this is unfair to the Defendant.\"\n\n9 10 11 And the Court cited cases in support of that, including the Fundamental Long Term Care case from the Middle District of Florida Bankruptcy Court, cited in this opinion.\n\n12 13 14 15 16 17 So, Your Honor, the point is not whether a particular individual, avoidance action Defendant obstructed the trustee's investigation; it is whether or not there has been an obstruction, generally, that has prevented the trustee from being able to complete his investigation within the time that ordinarily exists under the Bankruptcy Code.\n\n18 19 20 21 22 So, Your Honor, for all those reasons, we would respectfully request that the Court grant an extension of the deadline to file avoidance actions by another six months through February 15th, 2025. Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you.\n\n23 24 25 And who wishes to go, to proceed first with their objection? We have counsel for -- we have Attorney Yan, Attorney Sklarz. Is anyone else going to be making an\n\n 52 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 argument, in objection to the motion? MR. KIM: Your Honor, there's also an objection filed by the Greenwich Land Defendants, so I'll reserve until the end and if the -- THE COURT: Oh, yes. MR. KIM: -- and if Mr. Yan and Mr. Sklarz cover all the ground, then I have no need to retread. THE COURT: Thank you, Attorney Kim. I just missed -- I misplaced your objection for a second, there. I apologize. All right. So, Attorney Sklarz, Attorney Yan, who would like to proceed first? MR. SKLARZ: By all means, go ahead, Attorney Yan. MR. YAN: Thank you. Thank you, Your Honor. As Your Honor noted in her prior order granting the trustee's requested extension, an (indiscernible) concern under Rule 9006(b) is prejudice to the Defendant. Now, I'll say that we disagree with the Court's analysis, but I don't think we need to retread on 9006(b) arguments. Here, we have a case where we're differently situated from some of the other Defendants that are going to be Defendants and potential Defendants that might be affected by the order that the trustee's asking the Court to enter. And we're differently situated because Meta and Apple have Case 22-50073 Doc 3446 Filed 08/21/24 Entered 08/21/24 10:22:10 Page 52 of 96\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 3446
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Page 53 of 96 |\n|---------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | 53 |\n| | |\n| 1 | already been sued; they were sued before the prior extension |\n| 2 | that was granted.
And in those cases, we have spent the |\n| 3 | money and expense to move to dismiss and filed a number of |\n| 4 | other things. |\n| 5 | And so, we're differently situated than those |\n| 6 | people who don't even though that they're targets and haven't |\n| 7 | had to do anything yet. |\n| 8 | UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:
(Indiscernible.) |\n| 9 | MR. YAN:
I'm sorry, go ahead. |\n| 10 | The other thing is kind of related to that is, |\n| 11 | here, we've come before the Court and we've objected to it |\n| 12 | and I don't see how we're differently situated from some of |\n| 13 | the other Defendants or parties that have been carved out of |\n| 14 | the last order, such as UBS and Sotheby's, who also filed |\n| 15 | objections and were carved out. |\n| 16 | Here, as you've heard the trustee say, he has |\n| 17 | identified potential, additional claims against Meta and |\n| 18 | Apple that he says are non-material, but it's been six |\n| 19 | months.
He filed it before the last extension and he hasn't |\n| 20 | done anything with those claims.
We don't know.
He hasn't |\n| 21 | said whether he needs additional time beyond the six-month |\n| 22 | extension already, another six months to file anything |\n| 23 | additional against Apple. |\n| 24 | And there's a fundamental fairness point where the |\n| 25 | trustee gets to reserve all of his arguments, with respect to |\n| | |\n\n| 1 | equitable tolling and all of the (indiscernible) arguments |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | and on top of that, he gets this order saying, Yeah, he can |\n| 3 | timely file in another six months; whereas, we are prejudiced |\n| 4 | because we can't make that argument anymore after this order. |\n| 5 | And so why does he get belts-and-suspenders and we, who have |\n| 6 | done nothing wrong, we get cut off at the knees, with respect |\n| 7 | to our arguments relating to why the trustee's claims are |\n| 8 | time-barred. |\n| 9 | And so for those reasons we would just ask that -- |\n| 10 | THE COURT:
Wait.
May I stop you just right there |\n| 11 | for one second so I make sure I understand your argument? |\n| 12 | MR. YAN:
Sure. |\n| 13 | THE COURT:
When you say you get cut off at the |\n| 14 | knees on his equitable tolling argument, is that the point |\n| 15 | that you're making, Counsel?
I just want to make sure I |\n| 16 | understand. |\n| 17 | MR. YAN:
Not the equitable tolling argument. |\n| 18 | I'm just saying he gets to make his equitable -- |\n| 19 | if we -- if he makes an equitable tolling argument -- we'll |\n| 20 | get to that -- I don't think the order affects that, but he |\n| 21 | will already have an advantage in that he can wave the order |\n| 22 | around and say, If we make an argument that his claims are |\n| 23 | time-barred, he can say, Well, look, I have an order from the |\n| 24 | judge saying that that argument no longer flies, with respect |\n| 25 | to you. |\n\n2\n\n25\n\n55\n\n THE COURT: Well, I don't think it's true. MR. YAN: So, I'm just --\n\n3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 THE COURT: I don't think that's what the order says. So maybe I need you to point me in that direction, because I believe what the order says is that there's an extension of time granted under these very specific and unusual circumstances of these complex, consolidated, administratively consolidated Chapter 11 cases and adversary proceedings and that I was not going to prospectively order that the trustee can assert equitable tolling.\n\n11 12 13 14 15 I believe the order says that the trustee can assert equitable tolling when someone raises it in a motion to dismiss or another pleading. And so I don't see how that cuts you off at the knees at all, so I would like to make sure I'm not missing your point.\n\n16 17 18 MR. YAN: Sure. I guess my point, Your Honor, is why does he need that? He can always make an equitable tolling argument because his rights are preserved.\n\n19 20 21 22 23 24 THE COURT: What does he need what, though; I didn't give him what he wanted, so I don't know what you're -- I guess that's what I'm struggling with. I didn't give him what he wanted in the original order. I didn't say that he prospectively has the right to assert equitable tolling; I didn't say that.\n\nI said that under the cases that all the parties\n\n| 1 | cited, the application of equitable tolling does not come |\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | into play or does not become an issue unless and until it's |\n| 3 | raised in connection with a motion to dismiss the case |\n| 4 | because the statute of limitations has passed.
That's what |\n| 5 | the order says. |\n| 6 | MR. YAN:
Understood.
Understood, Your Honor. |\n| 7 | And my point is, why does he need more than that? |\n| 8 | He can -- that argument is preserved.
If he can make that -- |\n| 9 | THE COURT:
I don't know that he does need more |\n| 10 | than that. |\n| 11 | MR. YAN:
That's my point, Your Honor, why does he |\n| 12 | need this additional order? |\n| 13 | THE COURT:
Well, that's time.
Time is different |\n| 14 | from equitable tolling, Counsel.
He's asking for additional |\n| 15 | time. |\n| 16 | I didn't -- he's asking for an additional time to |\n| 17 | commence causes of action, okay.
I didn't hear Attorney |\n| 18 | Bassett -- but maybe I missed it and that's why I'm stopping |\n| 19 | to ask these questions -- I didn't hear Attorney Bassett, and |\n| 20 | I don't think I read in the papers, but maybe I'm -- you |\n| 21 | know, I could have missed it, because as you can, I'm sure, |\n| 22 | appreciate, there are a lot of papers filed in this case and |\n| 23 | in the adversary proceedings, but I didn't hear Attorney |\n| 24 | Bassett ask me to prospectively order from this point forward |\n| 25 | that equitable tolling, the trustee is entitled to assert |\n\n 57 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 that. I didn't hear him. Attorney Bassett, did you ask me to do that, because if you did, I missed it. MR. BASSETT: I did not, Your Honor; in fact, the Court has already ruled on that issue. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. So, that's my question to you, Attorney Yan. The only issue that I see and is right now in the papers is, the trustee is asking for an extension of time to commence causes of action. I've ruled on the issue of equitable tolling. So I'm a little confused as to your statement that somehow you've been -- and I apologize -- I think the words were that you're cut off at the knees. I don't see how you are. So, please explain to me. I don't want you to not tell me. I'm just not sure that I understand your argument. MR. YAN: Sure, Your Honor. And I think this -- let me go back to the argument. I think the point I was really trying to make is we're differently situated because he doesn't need more time; he's already asserted claims against us, so I don't think it's equitable for him to get additional time to add on to claims that he's already asserted against us. THE COURT: Well, don't you think the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will address that? If he tries to Case 22-50073 Doc 3446 Filed 08/21/24 Entered 08/21/24 10:22:10 Page 57 of 96\n\n| 1 | add on claims or bring a new cause of action, you can do |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | whatever you need to do, if he even does that. |\n| 3 | And I think you asked him -- and I understand why |\n| 4 | you did -- were there any additional claims against Apple and |\n| 5 | metal -- Meta, excuse me -- and his answer was \"not material |\n| 6 | claims that he could think of\" and that was the answer I |\n| 7 | heard. |\n| 8 | But the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will deal |\n| 9 | with it one way or another; either he'll move to amend the |\n| 10 | complaint that was, as you already admitted, was filed before |\n| 11 | the expiration of the statute under the applicable statutes |\n| 12 | or he'll file a new cause of action.
And in either case, |\n| 13 | you're going to either oppose the motion to amend or you're |\n| 14 | going to move to dismiss.
And that's how the Federal Rules |\n| 15 | of Civil Procedure work, right? |\n| 16 | I mean, I guess I'm a little confused by your |\n| 17 | argument, because you -- I agree with you, though, that you |\n| 18 | are differently situated insofar as your clients were sued |\n| 19 | before any applicable statute ran.
So, from that |\n| 20 | perspective, I think whatever happens, happens and the |\n| 21 | Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will -- do apply and you and |\n| 22 | the trustee will assert whatever arguments you have under the |\n| 23 | applicable Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and then the |\n| 24 | Court will address those accordingly. |\n| 25 | MR. YAN:
I think that makes sense if he's going |\n| | |\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 to assert them in the same case. What we're concerned about, and what we didn't see in the papers or hear from the trustee is that they intend to assert civil litigation. So, eight months down the line, does he intend to file a new claim against us? We don't know, and so we want to preserve our right to object to that.\n\n7 8 9 10 11 12 13 THE COURT: Well, I think you vaccinate right. I don't see how you would -- my prior order does preserve that right for you, in my opinion. Maybe I'm wrong, but it says that the trustee is not entitled to prospective, equitable tolling and that issue will come up, if at all, when a party raises and files a motion to dismiss, asserting that a statute of limitations has passed.\n\nMR. YAN: Understood, Your Honor.\n\n14\n\n15 16 17 18 THE COURT: So, I don't see how your right isn't preserved. But that doesn't mean I'm right, Counsel; I'm just telling you, that's the Court's perspective. You can do with that what you feel is appropriate.\n\n19 20 21 22 23 24 25 But the prior order was very -- I tried to be very clear in a very short amount of time to say that the trustee's right to bring causes of action was extended because I felt and I found and held that Rule 9006 did not bar that extension because those statutes were statutes of repose, which did not affect substantive rights of parties. And I found that, based upon many things, including the\n\n```\n 60\n```\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Supreme Court case of Young, in which Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, said that those statutes are not substantive statutes; they don't affect substantive rights. So, in any event, what I'm saying to you is, I understand what you're saying, but I believe you are protected. You may think otherwise, and I completely respect that, but that is the reason why I proceed -- the decision says what it says. MR. YAN: Understood, Your Honor. THE COURT: I didn't foreclose on any Defendant from asserting that there was some kind of statute of limitations issue. MR. YAN: Understood, Your Honor. And then that, perhaps, is the issue where we didn't see that level of protection that you just articulated, which is why we asked to just be carved out from the ambit of the order. THE COURT: So, what you're saying is you would like me to rule -- and I just want to make sure -- with regard to Apple and Meta that if there's an extension granted, it doesn't apply to them? MR. YAN: That's correct, Your Honor. THE COURT: Well, if I agreed with you, which I don't know that I will, but I would not agree with you with regard to the existing causes of action being amended. Now,\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3446 Filed 08/21/24 Entered 08/21/24 10:22:10 Page 61 of 96\n\n 61 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 that doesn't mean you couldn't oppose amendment, but, obviously, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow for amendments to an existing cause of action. They allow to it up until after trial. So, with regard to that issue, the only issue that I think, then, I would decide with regard to Meta and Apple are whether Meta and Apple are carved out from any new causes of action. That's what I would decide. MR. YAN: I think your articulation is exactly right, Your Honor. I agree with that. THE COURT: Okay. Great. I appreciate that. I didn't mean to cut you off, so if there's more that you want to argue, please do. I just wanted to be -- I wanted to make sure I understood what you were arguing. MR. YAN: No, we appreciate that, Your Honor, and that's all that I have. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Attorney Sklarz, did you wish to proceed next? MR. SKLARZ: Yes, please, Your Honor. Your Honor, in nearly 40 years of an unbroken line of cases, running from Northern Pipeline to Granfinanciera to Stern to Purdue, cited just a few months ago, our Supreme Court has held that unless the Bankruptcy Code clearly permits relief, Bankruptcy Courts cannot fashion substantive relief based on either gap-fillers or a lack of Congress\n\n1 saying that they can't be done.\n\n2 3 4 5 6 7 So in Purdue, there's nothing in 1123 that says Bankruptcy Courts can't authorize nonconsensual third-party releases. But the Supreme Court was still clear that they're not allowed because of the Code silence and allowing such relief would countermand specific provisions of the Code, namely, Section 1141 and the discharge provisions.\n\n8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Here, and, certainly in light of Your Honor's ruling, Purdue came out afterward, but in light of Purdue, and analyzed against that backdrop, the applicable section that provides the statute of limitations, Section 546, says it's two years. It is silent on whether you can or cannot extend it. There's nothing in the Bankruptcy Code that says you can extend it or you can't extend it.\n\n15 16 17 18 19 So the trustee looks to Rule 9006 and refers to what they're requesting under 9006, listed on page 5 of their reply brief -- I'm sorry, paragraph 5 of their reply brief as a \"equitable extension.\" This is definitely not an equitable extension.\n\n20 21 22 23 24 25 As Your Honor just discussed with Attorney Yan, equity, as to statutes of limitation, we know of three main extending doctrines of statutes of limitations: equitable tolling, fraudulent concealment, and the discovery rule. What this is, very specifically, is the use of a rule, not a statute, but we'll just say a provision, not a\n\n1 2 3 4 5 common law provision, not something that exists in the equitable ether, but a written rule that has general application to extend a statute of limitations, 546, that have a specific statement. So this is precisely what Purdue warns against.\n\n6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Again, the dissent in Purdue makes exactly the same observations as the trustee. Over 40 times, the dissent refers to equitable relief or some variance of the word \"equity\" and their argument is the releases and the settlement payments solve those problems and ensure fair and equitable recovery for the opioid victims. It's certainly a good argument, but it wasn't the majority.\n\n13 14 15 The majority says otherwise. It says, faced with so many marks against its interpretation of the law, plan proponents in the dissent resort to a policy argument.\n\n16 17 18 19 20 21 22 That is exactly what occurs here. It's a policy argument saying that because of all these other things, other than what is written down, that the statute can be extended. The trustee's request for an equitable extension has to fail for exactly the reasons stated in Purdue. The Code provides absolutely no mechanism for a prospective extension of a written-down statutes of limitations.\n\n23 24 25 And I think in light of Purdue and now specific it was, it's important that I briefly just turn to three of the Court's main holdings in the February ruling. I don't want\n\n| 1 | to -- Your Honor ruled and I just -- I think in the context |\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | of Purdue, it's a little bit different.
So the three main |\n| 3 | rulings as to why, as I understand it, Your Honor ruled |\n| 4 | that 9006 applies is the Rules Enabling Act doesn't apply to |\n| 5 | stop 9006 from applying because of traditional principles of |\n| 6 | equity.
In light of Purdue, it is unclear.
So that's number |\n| 7 | one.
Number two, statutes of limitations are procedural, and |\n| 8 | that's subject to the Bankruptcy Rules.
And third, the |\n| 9 | statutes of limitations provisions of the Code come into |\n| 10 | existence, only once a Title 11 case is filed. |\n| 11 | Turning back -- let me expand on that a little |\n| 12 | bit.
So, turning back to the Rules Enabling Act question. |\n| 13 | Essentially, the Rules Enabling Act and the jurisprudence |\n| 14 | thereunder says, as long as there isn't something specific |\n| 15 | that says you can't -- you can't do it, you can apply this -- |\n| 16 | you can apply traditional tolling doctrines.
Traditional |\n| 17 | tolling doctrines, as we discussed, are equitable tolling, |\n| 18 | discovery rule, and fraudulent concealment. |\n| 19 | Using Rule 9006 to prospectively extend the |\n| 20 | statute, in other words, as Your Honor explained, an |\n| 21 | extension of time to commence causes of action are different |\n| 22 | than equitable tolling.
I agree 100 percent.
This has |\n| 23 | nothing to do with equity. |\n| 24 | This has to do with, can you graft on an extension |\n| 25 | provision that is written nowhere in the Code by gap-filling |\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 with the Rules? In light of Purdue, is it unclear how an arguably equitable approach can be applied to pull gap-filler from the Rules and apply here. There's no argument that there's a right to equitable tolling at this time; that argument has been reserved, as we just discussed. There's no argument that there's been a prospective, fraudulent concealment, or discovery rule violations, or some other traditional, common law tolling doctrine. The trustee cites 9006. He doesn't cite equity to support his 9006 argument. Turning to the question of whether statutes of limitations are procedural or substantive. I apologize, I don't -- so, first, we cite -- and I'll just refer to the G Club brief, because that's in the main case. The arguments that we submitted in our briefing in the four adversaries are essentially the same, just the structure is a little bit different. On page 6 of G Club, we cite to the Second Circuit's ruling in Enterprise Mortgage, which explains that substantive and procedural for how the rights affect somebody in the case is a different analysis than whether something is substantive or procedural for choice of law purposes, which is where that substantive, procedural analysis comes from. We briefed this in our case.\n\nAnd then Enterprise Mortgage, the Second Circuit\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 explains that procedural versus substantive, you have to look at it through the eyes of the Defendant. So, here, the Defendant, my clients, or anybody else who hasn't been sued or who doesn't even know they're going to be sued -- perhaps anybody else in the room, we don't know -- the -- from their eyes, the two years has passed. So they -- to them, to that unsued party as of today, they're -- that is a substantive, not a procedural right under Enterprise Mortgage.\n\n9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 And then we also cite the case of Aetna Life - and the citation there is 391 F.3d 401, and that's on page, mainly on page 6 of our brief in G Club -- that case applied the Sarbanes-Oxley (indiscernible) was -- looking at the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, but it also references a Supreme Court case of Landgraf and it explains that the resurrection of previously time-barred claims has an impermissible, retroactive effect extending the statute of limitations retroactively, increasing the Defendant's liability for past conduct.\n\n19 20 21 22 23 24 Now, there, there was a law -- the question was whether the law was retroactively applied. Here, the law can't be retroactively applied. There's been no change in the law. What there is, is a gap-filler provision, 9006, to extend the statute of limitations prospectively. If Congress can't do it with an act and not make\n\nit specific, we can't do it otherwise. That is exactly what\n\n| 1 | Purdue says. |\n|----|------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | Finally, whether 546 is subject to tolling because |\n| 3 | it doesn't come into existence until it's a Title 11 case is |\n| 4 | filed; again, under that the Court has ruled.
Your Honor |\n| 5 | applied IDB (phonetic) over Butcher, but again, I think we |\n| 6 | need to view those cases now in light of Purdue.
And it |\n| 7 | appears in my view that the Purdue case says that is not the |\n| 8 | analysis, that the Butcher analysis should be applied. |\n| 9 | And we cited -- |\n| 10 | THE COURT:
But the Purdue case doesn't say |\n| 11 | anywhere in it that the Butcher analysis should be applied -- |\n| 12 | MR. SKLARZ:
Oh, no, no, no, no. |\n| 13 | THE COURT:
-- and, in fact, in Butcher, all the |\n| 14 | courts in Butcher in the circuit in Butcher don't follow |\n| 15 | Butcher.
If Purdue says that, please tell me, because I |\n| 16 | don't believe that it says anything at all about Butcher.
It |\n| 17 | never mentions it. |\n| 18 | MR. SKLARZ:
Oh, I agree, Purdue doesn't cite |\n| 19 | Butcher. |\n| 20 | THE COURT:
Okay. |\n| 21 | MR. SKLARZ:
What it does is apply a similar |\n| 22 | analysis, which is textual.
You read the text.
The text is |\n| 23 | clear.
The text applies. |\n| 24 | And then we cited additional cases in our brief in |\n| 25 | that regard, more than we cited in the previous brief, using |\n| | |\n\n 68 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 other provisions of the Code. I'm sorry, Your Honor? THE COURT: No, I don't have anything. Go ahead. MR. SKLARZ: Okay. So -- if I may just have one moment, Your Honor? THE COURT: Certainly. MR. SKLARZ: I just need to check if I have anything else. (Pause) MR. SKLARZ: Just turning briefly to the factual argument justification. Regardless of whether Your Honor agrees with me or agrees with the trustee, I think we can all agree prospectively extending statutes of limitations is very unusual. It's already been done once in this case. Your Honor found, as Your Honor noted, on very specific facts that that extraordinary relief was probative. If Your Honor disagrees with me on the Purdue argument and the arguments we've set forth, I still believe that they cannot meet the burden Your Honor imposed upon them under Your Honor's February ruling. There's no longer extraordinary that Mr. Kwok did or did not do anything; in fact, on examination, we know a lot of information has been turned over. It may not have been turned over as quickly as the trustee had hoped, but that is not some kind of obstruction. Case 22-50073 Doc 3446 Filed 08/21/24 Entered 08/21/24 10:22:10 Page 68 of 96\n\n1 2 3 4 For example, the trustee said the government hasn't turned over the information. Is that obstruction by the government, of not turning over information? Of course not.\n\n5 6 7 On cross-examination, the trustee indicated that more information occurs daily. That is true in almost every financial fraud investigation.\n\n8 9 10 11 12 13 14 There were -- Your Honor found extraordinary facts the first time. We have to look at what's occurred since then. And we have not heard anything today that is of the nature of extraordinary. There was no further protesting or other actions that Mr. Kwok's retainers took. There was no lack of funds, which was the major reason the last time around, to toll the statute.\n\n15 16 17 18 19 20 21 THE COURT: Well, I just want to stop you there. I don't even think there was any mention of protesting in the prior ruling and I'm not sure that there was any mention of a lack of funds, other than that was an argument made by the objecting parties that somehow that should persuade the Court that the trustee didn't act diligently because he didn't have funds to retain a forensic accountant.\n\n22 23 24 25 So, just to be clear, when you say the factual basis and that the trustee can't meet its burden, the argument about the protesting, I don't even think that was mentioned. I could be wrong, though; it could have been\n\n 70 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 mentioned in the order. MR. SKLARZ: I -- THE COURT: But with regard to the funding, the lack of funding, that was a claim that was raised by the objecting parties to try to establish for the Court or persuade the Court that the trustee did not act diligently and I found just the opposite, in fact. I found that it was clear to the Court that the trustee has been more than reasonably diligent. So I don't think the argument about funds and/or protesting is persuasive. MR. SKLARZ: And that's my -- I'm not saying it is; what I'm saying is those facts do not exist today. And I recall Kwok's examining the trustee on the lack of funds. What he indicated, as I recall, and we could do back to the record, is that he did not hire a forensic accountant because his firm didn't want to share payments pari passu with the forensic accountant, so he deferred hiring. But we make -- THE COURT: No, that wasn't the testimony at all; in fact, the testimony was that he didn't hire the accountant because the forensic accountant wanted to be paid -- MR. SKLARZ: Right. THE COURT: -- and there weren't funds in the estate to pay the forensic accountant and the forensic Case 22-50073 Doc 3446 Filed 08/21/24 Entered 08/21/24 10:22:10 Page 70 of 96\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 accountant didn't want to take the risk that the forensic accountant would have to share with all the other administrative claimants in an insolvent estate. That was - that's my recollection of the testimony. MR. SKLARZ: I suppose I have a different recollection, but -- THE COURT: Oh, you could be right, but I'm just saying that's my recollection. MR. SKLARZ: -- it probably doesn't matter. It's written down for a reason -- THE COURT: Right. MR. SKLARZ: -- and my point is it's not terribly relevant right now. What the trustee presented today was, I have a lot of work to do and it's hard and there's lots of it. And I have great sympathy that there is a lot of work to do, but what we're talking about is meeting the standards Your Honor set in the ruling, which is extraordinary circumstances. I guess the first time is if it happened. The second time is a coincidence. If we get to a third time, perhaps that's a mode of operation. I don't know when extraordinary stops becoming extraordinary. But, certainly, we're -- I'm not sure why we're now adding a full year under the trustee's motion to what Congress said should be the statute of limitations of two years.\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 So I don't think that even if Your Honor reaches the factual issue, it rises to the level of extraordinary as Your Honor ruled in your prior (indiscernible). But, Your Honor, I'm happy to answer any questions; otherwise, that concludes my presentation. THE COURT: Thank you. I do not have any questions at the moment, Attorney Sklarz, thank you. Attorney Kim, did you wish to be heard? MR. KIM: Thank you, Your Honor. Austin Kim for the Greenwich Land Defendants. Just a few finer points to pick up on what Attorney Yan had mentioned. You know, what's -- from our position, what's going on here is the trustee is seeking to obtain the relief of equitable tolling without having to seek it, one, and then, two, with equitable tolling is done on a case-by-case basis, because it is factually dependent, what the trustee is seeking is an omnibus order that sort of avoids the trustee having to establish on a case-by-case basis, why they should effectively obtain the relief of equitable tolling. So, with equitable tolling, you know, it's a caseby-case, fact-specific analysis. What the trustee is seeking is essentially a six-month equitable toll the first time around and now they're seeking a second, six-month equitable toll the second time around, based, essentially, on the same facts.\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 And so, you know, the constitute did provide some testimony as to what, you know, additional efforts have been made since February, but the bulk of what the trustee has put forth as to why an additional six months is necessary are facts that existed a year ago, or facts that already existed six months ago. So, I'm not here to doubt the diligence of the trustee in, you know, the efforts made to do the investigation, but it's not just confined to the trustee's diligence; it's the, so what? What has come out since February that is so extraordinary that the Court should exercise its discretion to grant to extend the statute of limitations by another 25 percent on an omnibus basis without the trustee demonstrating what's new.\n\n14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 Vague statements of, Well, we have received 400 documents or 700 documents or 20,000 documents, that's great, but so what, right? We don't know when these documents were received, you know, where the progress is, and I just think it's inequitable to allow the trustee to continue to, on a piecemeal basis, obtain equitable tolling relief across the board and as to, you know, frankly, parties that are not here or who haven't been named yet or based on some speculation that there could be something there.\n\n23 24 25 So, on that basis, we do stand by our initial objection that, you know, we do disagree with the Court's prior ruling that, you know, the statute of limitations, 546,\n\n4\n\n5\n\n74\n\n1 2 can be extended for the same reasons that my prior colleagues have mentioned, and we rest there.\n\n THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Attorney Bassett, do you have any reply? MR. BASSETT: Yes, Your Honor, briefly.\n\n6 7 8 9 10 11 12 So, I'll start by responding to some of Attorney Sklarz's arguments, which I think almost exclusively for the first half of his presentation focused on the Purdue case. And, look, I understand, Your Honor, the inclination to cease upon a high-profile ruling of the Supreme Court and sort of turn that into something significant to this motion, but I really just do not think it is.\n\n13 14 15 16 17 18 Purdue could not be a more different case than this case, as much as Attorney Sklarz tries to characterize it otherwise. Purdue dealt with giving a discharge to a nondebtor; an issue that's fundamental to the Bankruptcy Code and I would submit (indiscernible) whether one talks about these issues.\n\n19 20 21 22 23 24 25 In this case, the Court has been asked to extend the statute of limitations, which it has found is procedural, non-substantive. There should not be a wider gulf between those scenarios, Purdue on the one hand and what the Court is confronted with in the context of this motion. That also needs to be considered in the context of what the Supreme Court specifically said about the narrowness of its decision.\n\n1 2 3 It was very careful to say that it was talking about thirdparty releases and their permissibility on a nonconsensual scenario in that case.\n\n4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 And what I think Attorney Sklarz did not say, because he could not say, or maybe he will come back and argue this down the line if we do have a dispute about equitable tolling, but if you take his argument to its logical extension, he's basically saying the Supreme Court, in a Purdue decision about nonconsensual third-party releases intended to say that equitable tolling of a statute of limitation as set forth in a statute of Congress is never permissible. That's the logical extension of what he's saying. He talks about the dissent and the equitable arguments that the Supreme Court's majority did not consider. That's essentially where he is taking that argument. And I submit there is no logical reading of the Purdue decision that could be read that broadly, Your Honor.\n\n18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Now, as to the facts -- and just to round out, Your Honor, the 9006(b) and all the legal arguments surrounding whether or not the Court has the authority to extend the deadline, nothing else is new. The Court's analysis, its decision was correct. No intervening cases have been issued. There's no other reason as to why that analysis should be revisited and, therefore, we would ask that the same order, again, be entered.\n\n1 2 3 4 5 As to the factual arguments that the parties have raised, Attorney Sklarz, as to the (indiscernible) Attorney Kim, I believe, as well, had -- I think the way Attorney Sklarz characterized it is the circumstances of this case are, quote, no longer extraordinary.\n\n6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Your Honor, I'm not sure what that means. The circumstances of this case are either extraordinary or they are not and I don't think anyone could, with a straight face, take the position that this case is anything but incredibly extraordinary based on the level of obstruction the trustee has faced from the beginning of the case, based on the fact that this is a debtor who purported to file bankruptcy in this case with, I think, 3,000 or some odd dollars in cash to his name, despite having lived the life of a billionaire. He's had to peel back every layer of the onion to try to figure out where the shell companies, where these assets were really held and whose names are they nominally held. Where are the bank accounts and other transactions located that explain the true nature of the debtors' financial affairs?\n\n20 21 22 23 24 25 The debtor has never cooperated. He never provided books and records and that continues to affect the trustee's investigation today. This case is, and always has been extraordinary. That did not stop on February 15th. The fallacy in the objectors' arguments is that all the obstruction, all the unique circumstances of this case\n\n1 2 3 necessarily could have been overcome in the six months that have occurred since February 15th until now, but as the trustee has testified, that just hasn't been the case.\n\n4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 And the inquiry, Your Honor, for extending the statute of limitations in the context of the order that the Court issued is whether the trustee has been diligent. And Your Honor found that he has been. I think the testimony today only demonstrates that that diligence has continued. The trustee has said that he's filing complaints as soon as he possibly can. He and his team are diligently working to pursue additional 2004 targets. They are viewing documents from the criminal case: twenty-plus-thousand documents that the trustee and his team are going through. The Kroll team is continuing to analyze bank accounts, all of which should have been provided if they were -- if this were a normal case where the debtor is cooperating, he'd provide access to his books and records.\n\n18 19 20 21 22 23 But the trustee is continuing to do all of those things. He's testified clearly that he's been diligent in his efforts and, Your Honor, I think that factual record, again, together with the context of this case from the beginning, amply supports the further extension that the trustee is seeking.\n\n24 25 Subject to any questions the Court may have, I don't have any further remarks at this time. Thank you, Your 2 3 THE COURT: Thank you. I do not have any questions.\n\n4 5 6 7 Anything further, Attorney Yan? Attorney Sklarz? Or -- did I lose everybody? Oh, no, Attorney Sklarz is still there. Or Attorney Kim, that you'd like to state for the record?\n\n8 9 10 11 12 13 MR. SKLARZ: Only, Your Honor, I don't know if you want me to submit -- I don't know that it's necessary, but I certainly will -- of any of the prior transcripts references that we discussed during my argument related to what the trustee was doing back at the inception of the case. THE COURT: That is not necessary, from my\n\n14 perspective, thank you.\n\n15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 MR. SKLARZ: And just very briefly, I never made the argument that Purdue removes equitable tolling; to the contrary, I said that the trustee's argument is not equitable in nature. It's made on the basis of a rule and doesn't invoke the Court's equitable, true equitable jurisdiction, which would be invoked through common law doctrines, such as equitable tolling. So, I just want to make sure that that is clear.\n\n23 Thank you, Your Honor.\n\n24 THE COURT: Thank you.\n\n25 Anyone else wish to be heard any further?\n\n 79 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MR. KIM: Your Honor, I would just be remiss (indiscernible) to mention one point -- THE COURT: Attorney Kim, I'm just going to stop you for a second, just so it's clear that it's you that's speaking. So, Attorney Kim, you go right ahead. MR. KIM: Yes, Austin Kim for the Greenwich Land Defendants. I apologize, Your Honor. THE COURT: No, that's okay. MR. KIM: Austin Kim for the Greenwich Land Defendants. The one last point that I wanted to raise is that the bulk of what the trustee has presented are vague claims of obstruction or of concealment, but those are precisely why the equitable doctrines of equitable tolling or fraudulent concealment, those doctrines already exist. So the trustee is totally protected if, for example, some of the 700 documents or whatever documents do uncover some basis for an additional adversary proceeding after the 15th of August. So the trustee does not need the Court's additional order, basically granting him a six-month reprieve from having to justify an equitable toll for any particular case because they have it for every case, brought or not brought. So, we would just say that as a matter of equity to the objectors and for individuals who are not yet here, Case 22-50073 Doc 3446 Filed 08/21/24 Entered 08/21/24 10:22:10 Page 79 of 96\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 that there's no need for the trustee to get the additional sort of protection of not having to establish their burden based on some claim of obstruction, because that same argument that was raised in February is the same argument being raised today. I mean, it'll probably be raised against next February.\n\n7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 At a certain point -- I'm not saying this case is going to last forever -- but at a certain point, I think the two-year statute of limitations was made for a particular reason. They've already received a 25 percent extension. Now, they're seeking a 50 percent extension. At a certain point, you know, I think that the Court should hold the trustee to its tasks and let him know, Hey, you already have these rights if you can show that that was, in fact, observe instruction that caused a delay and having the information to bring the adversary proceeding, instead of prospectively saying, Well, you know, we think there's obstruction and we're looking at information and Kroll is spending some time digging around.\n\n20 21 22 I think it's insufficient to justify a cause basis for essentially granting them equitable tolling on an omnibus basis, and that's all I have, Your Honor.\n\n23 24 25 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. All right. With regard to the motion for extension of time, the first supplemental motion to extend\n\n 81 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 deadline to file avoidance actions, ECF 3329, I will take the matter under advisement and rule accordingly. Thank you all very much. Now, we'll move to the mentioned emergency motion for order authorizing funding to maintain the Mahwah Mansion. And parties who were here on the first matter, if you do not want to stay, you are absolutely excused, but you're also welcome to stay throughout the entire hearing. Thank you. UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Thank you, Your Honor. MR. LINSEY: Thank you, Your Honor. I'll be addressing the amended emergency motion. This is Patrick Linsey for the Chapter 11 Trustee. THE COURT: Yes. MR. LINSEY: The amended emergency motion was filed in the main case, but addresses facts that are at issue in the Taurus Fund LLC adversary proceeding 23-5017. That adversary proceeding was filed against Taurus Fund and its co-defendants involving a \\$26-and-a-half-million mansion in Mahwah New Jersey, which the debtor purchased in December of 2021. Since the Court entered a preliminary injunction in that adversary proceeding and until the debtors' criminal trial, the Defendants have been funding security and other expenses for the Mahwah Mansion. These expenses are\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 substantial. The Mahwah Mansion is approximately 50,000 square feet in interior size and has approximately 12 and a half acres of grounds. The cost of the security services for the Mahwah Mansion is approximately \\$14,200 a week. The cost of the real estate taxes for the property, which the Defendants have also been funding, is approximately \\$70,000 per quarter.\n\n8 9 10 11 12 The trustee expects there will be other expenses, as well (indiscernible) and the like. It's important for the value of the Mahwah Mansion to be preserved for the benefit of the estate, hence the trustee's motion requesting authority under the Bankruptcy Code to fund these expenses.\n\n13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 The Court has already found in its ruling on the preliminary injunction that it is administer likely than not that the debtor is the beneficial owner of and controls the Mahwah Mansion. The Court also noted in the preliminary injunction that for a period of time, the debtor had made the Mahwah Mansion available to other individuals and entities, such that it was frequented by third parties. This highlights the importance that security be maintained in light of the threat of damage by people who had previously frequented the property.\n\n23 24 25 The preliminary injunction, as the Court is aware, requires that the Defendants employ the security services. Following the debtors' criminal trial, Taurus Fund informed\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 the manager of the security services that Taurus Fund would no longer be providing funding. While the trustee believes that Taurus Fund is violating a preliminary injunction, it is important that the value of this property is preserved in light of the trustee's expectation that through the adversary proceeding, the mansion will be confirmed by judgment of the Court to be property of the estate. In fact, from the evidence from the debtors' criminal trial, the trustee's case that this is property of the estate is even stronger now than it was when the Court\n\n11 12 entered the preliminary injunction order and made those findings there.\n\n13 14 15 16 17 One additional thing I neglected to mention, what we know from proceedings in the Mahwah adversary proceeding is that the Mahwah Mansion is presently not insured, which, again, is further reason that measures need to be taken to ensure that the property is secured.\n\n18 19 20 21 22 23 The trustee's motion requests authority under Section 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code to use property of the estate to pay expenses of the Mahwah Mansion up to a cap of \\$300,000. We're seeking this relief because we don't yet have that judgment saying this is property of the estate. The trustee is hopeful that the \\$300,000 cap will\n\n24 25 provide adequate funding for any expenses over the period of time necessary to obtain judgment as to ownership of the\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 property. To the extent the cap requires adjustment, there's a mechanism built into the proposed order to do that. To be clear and for the purpose of the record, we're filing a 363(b) motion because the property is not, by the Court's ruling yet, property of the estate; however, once that ruling enters, the trustee understands that we would no longer need to be under the relief sought in this order under 363(b), because at that point, the payments to maintain the property would be ordinary course. The motion also provides that the trustee does not obtain judgment in the adversary proceeding to the extent that, or to the effect, rather, that the Mahwah Mansion is property of the estate, that the estate will then have a claim against Taurus Fund in the amount of the expenses advanced to be secured by the value of the Mahwah Mansion. This is because right now, Taurus Fund is obligated under the preliminary injunction to be funding expenses. It's not doing so. And under a hypothetical scenario, just to be clear, we don't think it's going to come to pass, but under a hypothetical scenario where the estate's claims do not prevail, Taurus Fund would have been unjustly enriched by the estate's funding of these expenses.\n\n23 24 25 The trustee would also note that the relief he is seeking does not reveal the Defendants of their obligations under the preliminary injunction; again, this motion is one\n\n1 2 3 4 5 of practicality. Your Honor can enter further orders and we may proceed with further orders in regards to those matters, but from a practical perspective, the trustee has an obligation to preserve the value for the estate and that's what we're doing by this motion.\n\n6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Yesterday, Taurus Fund filed a response to the motion consenting to the relief requested by the trustee, as provided in the proposed order that's at ECF 3392. Since filing the motion, the trustee has consulted with counsel for the United States Trustee, who suggested that terms in the proposed order that rely on incorporated definition be expressly defined in the proposed order and the trustee agrees that makes sense.\n\n14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 So what the trustee would propose to do, to the extent the Court is inclined to grant the motion, is that we submit a revised proposed order that expressly defines the capitalized terms for which definitions are incorporated. That we note that the Taurus Fund filed a response saying that it does not object to the relief sought in the order. And that we say, explicitly, that there was a hearing today. We can submit that order -- the trustee can submit that order, certainly, by tomorrow, if not by later today,\n\n23 24 25 and can send it to the courtroom deputy with the Mahwah Defendants and the U.S. Trustee CCed, in the Court would prefer we submit it otherwise.\n\n 86 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 With that, I'm happy to answer any questions that the Court may have. THE COURT: I do not have any questions at this time, thank you. MR. LINSEY: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Does anyone else wish to be heard on this motion? (No verbal response) THE COURT: Attorney Claiborn, do you agree with what Attorney Linsey said, with regard to the proposed order? MS. CLAIBORN: Yes, Your Honor. And the U.S. Trustee has no objection to the motion. THE COURT: Okay. I have looked at the proposed order -- does anybody else wish to be heard? I'm sorry, I don't want to cut anyone off? (No verbal response) THE COURT: Okay. I had looked at the proposed order and I understand that you're going to be making some changes, Attorney Linsey, assuming I'm going to grant the motion. I think the changes that you've just stated are fine. I find that no one has filed any written objection to your motion. The Taurus Fund did file something yesterday, I belief it was yesterday, that says they do not object to the motion, but they object to certain language in what it Case 22-50073 Doc 3446 Filed 08/21/24 Entered 08/21/24 10:22:10 Page 86 of 96\n\n1 2 believes is a mischaracterization of the Taurus Fund's behavior set forth in the motion.\n\n| 3 | I think under the very specific circumstances of |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 4 | this case and the issues related to the Mahwah Mansion that |\n| 5 | have been brought to the Court's attention, both in the main |\n| 6 | case and in the adversary proceeding that the trustee has |\n| 7 | commenced against the Taurus Fund and related Defendants, |\n| 8 | that the relief sought is reasonable and necessary under the |\n| 9 | circumstances.
We've gone through the issues in the |\n| 10 | adversary proceeding, including the fact that there is no |\n| 11 | insurance at the property and that the security firm was |\n| 12 | retained as part of a preliminary injunction order.
I know |\n| 13 | that the trustee is not pressing any issues with the |\n| 14 | preliminary injunction at this time. |\n| | |\n\n15 16 17 18 19 For all those reasons, the amended motion for order is granted and, Attorney Linsey, you'll have the order in by tomorrow or the next day? I just need to give a date to the Clerk's Office so that they will be on the lookout for it.\n\n20 21 MR. LINSEY: We'll have it in by tomorrow, Your Honor.\n\nTHE COURT: Thank you.\n\n22\n\n23 24 25 And you can just submit it to the courtroom deputy email box for Bridgeport. You do not need to docket it on the case docket.\n\n| 1 | So the motion is granted and the revised proposed |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | order will be submitted on or before August 14th. |\n| 3 | MR. LINSEY:
Thank you, Your Honor. |\n| 4 | THE COURT:
Thank you. |\n| 5 | Now, with regard to the two -- now, Trustee |\n| 6 | Despins, I forget now, and I apologize.
I think I've been |\n| 7 | sitting here for a few hours, but you had said something at |\n| 8 | the beginning that you thought there was something that |\n| 9 | needed to be on the calendar and now I can't recall what that |\n| 10 | was, because this was the Mahwah Mansion issue. |\n| 11 | Was there something else? |\n| 12 | MR. DESPINS:
Well, no.
There's the status |\n| 13 | conference on -- |\n| 14 | THE COURT:
Right, the status conference.
Yeah, |\n| 15 | that's fair. |\n| 16 | MR. DESPINS:
-- the scheduling. |\n| 17 | THE COURT:
That's the fourth matter on the |\n| 18 | calendar. |\n| 19 | There are two other -- the status conference was |\n| 20 | granted; it is on the calendar. |\n| 21 | But let's just take a moment with regard to the |\n| 22 | Genever adversary proceeding versus Kwok; that's been |\n| 23 | continued a few times before, but it was not continued today. |\n| 24 | MR. DESPINS:
Yeah. |\n| 25 | THE COURT:
Did you anticipate oh did you plan to |\n| | |\n\n 89 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 go forward with this matter? MR. DESPINS: No, we dropped the ball, Your Honor, on that. We should have extended that, as well. So we'll make sure that that happens. So, that should not go forward. We apologize for that. THE COURT: That's fine. So you're going to be filing a motion to set a new -- to adjourn the pretrial conference to a new date in the future? MR. DESPINS: Correct, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. So we're just going to note that the conference was held, but that the Plaintiff will be submitting, I suppose, a motion or something -- will be submitting -- what did you file last time, was it an actual motion? I think it might have been, yeah, a motion to -- MR. DESPINS: A consent, yeah. THE COURT: -- adjourn hearing upon consent. MR. DESPINS: Yeah. THE COURT: So I think you'll be submitting another motion and suggest an adjourned pretrial conference date, okay? MR. DESPINS: Yes, Your Honor. (Pause) THE COURT: All right. So the pretrial conference Case 22-50073 Doc 3446 Filed 08/21/24 Entered 08/21/24 10:22:10 Page 89 of 96\n\n 90 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 was held, but it will be adjourned, again, to a date to be determined, okay? MR. DESPINS: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. So the last matter on the calendar is the status conference, so go right -- in the - with regard to the Taurus Fund adversary proceeding. So go right ahead, Trustee Despins. MR. DESPINS: Mr. Bassett will handle that, Your Honor. Thank you. THE COURT: Okay. MR. BASSETT: Your Honor, yes, again, Nick Bassett from Paul Hastings, on behalf of the Chapter 11 Trustee. Your Honor, it's a bit of an odd situation to be in for a status conference. We, as the Court will recall, we outlined this in our request for the status conference, the order saying various litigation, including the Mahwah adversary proceeding provided that upon the conclusion of the criminal trial, the debtor could file a notice indicating his intent to resume the adversary proceeding, following which the parties had seven days to confer about a proposed schedule. We sent our proposed schedule to Attorney Conway, counsel for the Defendants. He confirmed receipt, but did not give us his position on the schedule. We followed up with him prior to the seven-day deadline to request a status Case 22-50073 Doc 3446 Filed 08/21/24 Entered 08/21/24 10:22:10 Page 90 of 96\n\n1 2 3 conference and still did not hear anything, so we then requested the status conference. We've still not heard from him.\n\n4 5 6 7 8 All we have heard is that he sent a response to the other motion that we just finished discussing, stating that he was occupied today and, therefore, would not be attending the hearing. So we are having a status conference with only one of the parties present.\n\n9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 From the trustee's perspective, Your Honor, our intent, which we have expressed to the Defendants' counsel is to move forward with summary judgment in the adversary proceeding as expeditiously as possible. We have undertaken some discovery. We have also very intently followed the criminal trial and gathered additional information from that trial that we would intend to use in support of summary judgment. We see no delay in moving ahead in that -- we see no reason to delay moving ahead in that direction and we've received no opposition, no response at all, from counsel to the Defendants.\n\n20 21 22 23 24 25 So, that's what we intend to do. I think what we had said in the, in what we filed that requested the status conference, Your Honor, that we had anticipated filing our motion by the 19th and then giving the Defendants two weeks to respond and then we'd reply in a week. I think what we may do, and we can submit a proposed scheduling order, but\n\n| 1 | out of respect for colleagues on me team that are working on |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | that motion, we may need a couple of extra days, so I think |\n| 3 | we would just propose a schedule that says we will file the |\n| 4 | motion and there'll be a 14-day response deadline and then |\n| 5 | a 7-day reply deadline. |\n| 6 | That's how we intend to proceed -- |\n| 7 | THE COURT:
No, I think were usually give a 21-day |\n| 8 | response deadline, though, on motions; that's the District |\n| 9 | Court's Local Rule. |\n| 10 | MR. BASSETT:
That's fine, Your Honor. |\n| 11 | THE COURT:
Okay. |\n| 12 | MR. BASSETT:
We had proposed to Defense counsel |\n| 13 | moving quickly under the circumstances, given the funding and |\n| 14 | other issues, but we're happy to do 21 days. |\n| 15 | The only other point I wanted to make, just so the |\n| 16 | Court is aware, although we did not hear back from counsel |\n| 17 | regarding our request for, regarding our proposed schedule, |\n| 18 | we did get notice that they filed a motion to withdraw the |\n| 19 | reference -- |\n| 20 | THE COURT:
Yeah, I saw that. |\n| 21 | MR. BASSETT:
-- Friday night. |\n| 22 | THE COURT:
And it's been transmitted to the |\n| 23 | District Court.
I think it might have been transmitted |\n| 24 | today. |\n| 25 | MR. BASSETT:
Correct, Your Honor. |\n| | |\n\n| 1 | Okay.
I just wanted to make sure the Court was | | | | | |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|\n| 2 | aware of that.
And, obviously, in our view, if there's | | | | | |\n| 3 | summary judgment briefing before Your Honor and that leads to | | | | | |\n| 4 | the decision that would be reviewed by the Appellate Court, | | | | | |\n| 5 | in any event, so we'll deal with the motion to withdraw the | | | | | |\n| 6 | reference as we need to, but we don't see that as, you know, | | | | | |\n| 7 | creating any issue with respect to how we proceed before Your | | | | | |\n| 8 | Honor. | | | | | |\n| 9 | THE COURT:
I understand.
Mr. Conway may | | | | | |\n| 10 | disagree, but I'm sure we'll do that in his papers or not. | | | | | |\n| 11 | So we'll see how things proceed. | | | | | |\n| 12 | MR. DESPINS:
Your Honor, if I may?
Luc Despins, | | | | | |\n| 13 | Chapter 11 Trustee. | | | | | |\n| 14 | On the 21 days, can we -- because I have the | | | | | |\n| 15 | feeling that we're not going to hear from Mr. Conway again. | | | | | |\n| 16 | I could be wrong, but -- | | | | | |\n| 17 | THE COURT:
You can ask for the time to be | | | | | |\n| 18 | shortened; yes, in your scheduling, you can ask for that. | | | | | |\n| 19 | MR. DESPINS:
Or that if he intends to file | | | | | |\n| 20 | something, then he should have his 21 days, but if he's not | | | | | |\n| 21 | going to do it, I don't want to wait 21 days for nothing. | | | | | |\n| 22 | THE COURT:
Well, I -- | | | | | |\n| 23 | MR. DESPINS:
So I can't promise -- | | | | | |\n| 24 | THE COURT:
Under the District Court Local Rules | | | | | |\n| 25 | it's 21 days so, if you want a shorter time, you'll have to | | | | | |\n\n 94 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ask for it. MR. DESPINS: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you. Attorney Bassett, is there anything else, then, we can do this afternoon with regard to this status conference? MR. BASSETT: No, Your Honor. Thank you very much. THE COURT: Okay. I'm not going to schedule another status conference at this point. You will just take whatever action you think is appropriate, including, as you mentioned, the likelihood of proceeding forward with summary judgment, okay? MR. BASSETT: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Then, with regard to -- we have now addressed everything that is on today's calendar, but as we often do at the end of hearings when there are several matters, I ask the trustee or any parties, are there any other issues that the parties wish to discuss with the Court? MR. DESPINS: The only point, Your Honor -- thank you, Luc Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee -- is that we may need, and I don't know that yet, assistance in terms of getting title to Greenwich Land transferred in my name as trustee; to put insurance on, I need to have an insurable interest. We're working on that, the technical aspects of that, but we Case 22-50073 Doc 3446 Filed 08/21/24 Entered 08/21/24 10:22:10 Page 94 of 96\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3446 Filed 08/21/24 Entered 08/21/24 10:22:10 Page 95 of 96\n\n 95 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 may need, like, a court order that directs, you know, like, the Town (indiscernible) or something like that, but we hope to avoid all of that. And we are working on a stipulation with the Greenwich Land Defendants where, I think everything has been agreed to, where there'll be a transfer of possession on August 20th. So, if anything happens, it will need to be between now and August 20th, but hopefully, we won't. We'll just be submitting to Your Honor a stipulated or a consent order. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Anyone else -- MR. DESPINS: Thank you. THE COURT: -- wish to be heard on any matters this afternoon? (No verbal response) THE COURT: All right. Well, thank you, all. That concludes today's hearings and those were the last matters on today's calendar, so Court is adjourned. COUNSEL: Thank you, Your Honor. THE CLERK: Court is adjourned. Excuse me. (Proceedings concluded at 3:24 p.m.)\n\n| Case 22-50073 | | Doc 3446 | Filed 08/21/24 | Entered 08/21/24 10:22:10 | Page 96 of 96 | |\n|---------------|------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------|--|\n| | | | | | 96 | |\n| 1 | CERTIFICATION | | | | | |\n| 2 | I certify that the foregoing is a correct | | | | | |\n| 3 | transcript from the electronic sound recording of the | | | | | |\n| 4 | proceedings in the above-entitled matter to the best of my | | | | | |\n| 5 | knowledge and ability. | | | | | |\n| 6 | | | | | | |\n| 7 | | /s/ William J. Garling | | | August 19, 2024 | |\n| 8 | | | William J. Garling, CET-543 | | | |\n| 9 | | | Certified Court Transcriptionist | | | |\n| 10 | | For Reliable | | | | |\n| 11 | | | | | | |\n| 12 | | | | | | |\n| 13 | | | | | | |\n| 14 | | | | | | |\n| 15 | | | | | | |\n| 16 | | | | | | |\n| 17 | | | | | | |\n| 18 | | | | | | |\n| 19 | | | | | | |\n| 20
21 | | | | | | |\n| 22 | | | | | | |\n| 23 | | | | | | |\n| 24 | | | | | | |\n| 25 | | | | | | |\n| | | | | | | |\n| | | | | | | |\n| | | | | | | |","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院\n布里奇波特分院\n\n关于： 第11章\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）等， 案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n\n债务人。 （合并管理）\n\nGenever Holdings LLC（Genever Holdings有限责任公司）及 对抗性诉讼\nLuc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯），第11章 案号：23-05002 (JAM)\n受托人，\n\n原告，\n\n诉\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）、Hing Chi Ngok（岳庆芝）、\nQiang Guo（郭强）及 Mei Guo（郭美），\n\n被告。\n\nLuc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯）等， 对抗性诉讼\n 案号：23-05017 (JAM)\n原告，\n\n诉 123号法庭\n 布莱恩·麦克马洪联邦大楼\nTaurus Fund, LLC（Taurus Fund有限责任公司）等， 915 Lafayette Boulevard\n Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604\n被告。 2024年8月13日，星期二\n\n 下午1:12\n\n美国联邦破产法官 JULIE A. MANNING（朱莉·A·曼宁）阁下面前听证会记录\n（续）\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3446 Filed 08/21/24 Entered 08/21/24 10:22:10 Page 1 of 96\n\n出庭人员：\n\n代表第11章\n受托人：\nPatrick Linsey, Esquire（帕特里克·林赛律师）\nNEUBERT PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C.\n195 Church Street\n13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510\n\n-及-\n\nLuc A. Despins, Esquire（卢克·A·德斯平斯律师）\nShlomo Maza, Esquire（什洛莫·马扎律师）\nPAUL HASTINGS, LLP\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, New York 10166\n\nNicholas A. Bassett, Esquire（尼古拉斯·A·巴塞特律师）\n2050 M Street, NW\nWashington, DC 20036\n\n代表美国受托人：Holley L. Claiborn, Esquire（霍莉·L·克莱伯恩律师）\nOFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRUSTEE\nThe Giaimo Federal Building\n150 Court Street, Room 302\nNew Haven, Connecticut 06510\n\n（出庭人员续）\n\n音频操作员：电子录音\n\n记录誊写公司：Reliable\nThe Nemours Building\n1007 N. Orange Street, Suite 110\nWilmington, Delaware 19801\n电话：(302)654-8080\n电子邮箱：\ngmatthews@reliable-co.com\n\n程序通过电子录音记录，\n记录由誊写服务机构制作。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3446 Filed 08/21/24 Entered 08/21/24 10:22:10 Page 2 of 96\n\n出庭人员（续）：\n\n代表 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金）：\nAnnecca H. Smith, Esquire（安妮卡·H·史密斯律师）\nROBINSON & COLE, LLP\n280 Trumbull Street\nHartford, Connecticut 06103\n\n-及-\n\nStuart M. Sarnoff, Esquire（斯图尔特·M·萨尔诺夫律师）\nO'MELVENY & MYERS, LLP\nTimes Square Tower\n7 Times Square\nNew York, New York 10036\n\n代表无担保债权人正式委员会：\nKristin B. Mayhew, Esquire（克里斯汀·B·梅休律师）\nPULLMAN & COMLEY, LLC\n850 Main Street\n8th Floor\nBridgeport, Connecticut 06601\n\n代表 G Club Operations、Weddle Law PLLC、FFP BVI Limited、Ogier 及 Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman, LLP：\nJeffrey M. Sklarz, Esquire（杰弗里·M·斯克拉茨律师）\nGREEN & SKLARZ, LLC\nOne Audubon Street\n3rd Floor\nNew Haven, Connecticut 06511\n\n代表 Yankwitt, LLP；Ganfer Shore Leeds & Zauderer, LLP；Brune Law, P.C.；及 Petrillo Klein + Boxer, LLP：\nAnthony J. Proscia, Esquire（安东尼·J·普罗夏律师）\nKAUFMAN DOLOWICH, LLP\n40 Exchange Place\n20th Floor\nNew York, New York 10005\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3446 Filed 08/21/24 Entered 08/21/24 10:22:10 Page 3 of 96\n\n出庭人员（续）：\n\n代表 Meta\nPlatforms, Inc.（Meta Platforms公司）\n及 Apple, Inc.（苹果公司）：Jin Yan, Esquire（金燕律师）\nARENTFOX SCHIFF, LLP\n1717 K Street NW\nWashington DC 20006\n\n代表 Hing Chi Ngok（岳庆芝）及\nGreenwich Land, LLC（格林尼治土地有限责任公司）：Austin D. Kim, Esquire（奥斯汀·D·金律师）\nMEISTER SEELIG & FEIN, LLP\n125 Park Avenue\n7th Floor\nNew York, New York 10017\n\n代表 Morvillo\nAbramowitz Grand\nIason & Anello, P.C.：Rowena A. Moffett, Esquire（罗威娜·A·莫菲特律师）\nBRENNER, SALTZMAN & WALLMAN, LLP\n271 Whitney Avenue\nNew Haven, Connecticut 06511\n\n动议目录： 页码\n\n关于 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）等\n主案案号：22-050073 (JAM)\n\n事项第1项：将提交撤销诉讼的截止期限延长至 02/15/2025 的延长期限动议（第一次补充动议）（关于：3329） 14\n\n法院裁定： 80\n\n事项第2项：第11章受托人根据《破产法》第363(b)条提出的修正紧急动议，请求作出裁定，授权受托人为维护 Mahwah Mansion（马瓦宅邸）提供资金，并请求相关救济（关于：3381） 81\n\n法院裁定： 86\n\nGenever Holdings LLC（Genever Holdings有限责任公司）及 Luc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯），第11章受托人 诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）、Hing Chi Ngok（岳庆芝）、Qiang Guo（郭强）及 Mei Guo（郭美）\n\n对抗性案件案号：23-05002 (JAM)\n\n事项第3项：审前会议听证会 89\n\n法院裁定： 90\n\nLuc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯）等 诉 Taurus Fund, LLC（Taurus Fund有限责任公司）等\n\n对抗性案件案号：23-05017 (JAM)\n\n事项第4项：状态会议 90\n\n法院裁定： 94\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3446 Filed 08/21/24 Entered 08/21/24 10:22:10 Page 4 of 96\n\n目录\n\n受托人传唤的证人： 页码\n\nLUC A. DESPINS（卢克·A·德斯平斯）\n\nBassett先生直接询问 18\n\nYan先生交叉询问 30\n\nSklarz先生交叉询问 34\n\n誊写员证明书 96\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3446 Filed 08/21/24 Entered 08/21/24 10:22:10 Page 5 of 96\n\n（程序于下午1:12开始。）\n\n法庭书记员：案号22-50073，Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）；对抗性案件23-50002，Genever Holdings, LLC等诉 Kwok 等；以及对抗性案件23-05017，Despins 等诉 Taurus Fund LLC 等。\n\n本院：好的。下午好。请为记录说明出庭情况，先从第11章受托人开始。Despins受托人？\n\n（无口头回应）\n\n本院：他卡住了吗？也许是。\n\n法庭书记员：没有。\n\n本院：好的。他们听不到我说话？显然，他们听不到我说话。\n\n法庭书记员：Despins受托人？\n\n（无口头回应）\n\n法庭书记员：哦，您知道吗？抱歉，我给他打电话。抱歉，法官阁下。\n\n本院：因此，我认为我们必须从头再开始，因为我认为刚才没有录音，或者没有人能听到我们。\n\n法庭书记员：是。案号——康涅狄格州联邦破产法院现于休庭后开庭。法官——尊敬的 Julie Manning（朱莉·曼宁）法官正在主持。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3446 Filed 08/21/24 Entered 08/21/24 10:22:10 Page 7 of 96\n\n本院：各位下午好。日程表上有自下午1:00开始的事项，因此我请法庭书记员宣读日程表。\n\n法庭书记员：案号22-50073，Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）；对抗性案件23-05002，Genever Holdings, LLC等诉 Kwok 等；以及对抗性案件23-05017，Despins 等诉 Taurus Fund, LLC 等。\n\n本院：下午好。我将记录出庭情况。我们正在远程进行。这原本应是一场非证据性远程听证会。是否仍将如此，我们拭目以待，因为我不远程进行证据听证会。但是，所有人在说明出庭情况时，我希望确保每一位说明出庭情况的人均说明其是否确已在本案或对抗性程序中提交出庭通知，因为如尚未提交，您将需要提交。因此，无论如何，我们先从第11章受托人开始。\n\nDESPINS先生：法官阁下，下午好。Luc Despins（卢克·德斯平斯），第11章受托人。\n\nBASSETT先生：法官阁下，下午好。Nick Bassett（尼克·巴塞特），来自 Paul Hastings，代表第11章受托人。\n\nMAZA先生：下午好，Shlomo Maza（什洛莫·马扎），同样来自 Paul\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3446 Filed 08/21/24 Entered 08/21/24 10:22:10 Page 8 of 96\n\nHastings。\n\nLINSEY先生：法官阁下，下午好——\n\n本院：抱歉，先生。我没有听清您说什么。请回到刚才发言的那位先生。\n\nMAZA先生：Shlomo Maza（什洛莫·马扎），来自 Paul Hastings，同样代表受托人。\n\n本院：下午好。\n\nMAZA先生：抱歉，法官阁下。\n\n本院：抱歉，我没有听清您说话。我道歉。\n\nLINSEY先生：法官阁下，下午好。Patrick Linsey（帕特里克·林赛），来自 Neubert Pepe & Monteith，代表受托人，且受托人的律师已登记出庭。\n\n本院：谢谢。\n\nCLAIBORN女士：下午好。Holley Claiborn（霍莉·克莱伯恩），代表美国受托人。\n\nSARNOFF先生：法官阁下，下午好。Stuart Sarnoff（斯图尔特·萨尔诺夫），O'Melveny & Myers，代表主案债权人 PAX。我不确定我是否已在今日讨论的对抗性程序中提交出庭通知，但我预计不会参与。\n\n本院：谢谢。我认为您无需在对抗性程序中提交出庭通知，除非您选择这样做，但您确实需要在主案中登记出庭，而您已经登记出庭并且已有一段时间了，所以谢谢。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3446 Filed 08/21/24 Entered 08/21/24 10:22:10 Page 9 of 96\n\nSARNOFF先生：谢谢。\n\nSMITH女士：法官阁下，下午好。Annecca Smith（安妮卡·史密斯），Robinson & Cole，代表债权人 PAX 的康涅狄格州律师。\n\nMAYHEW女士：法官阁下，下午好。Kristin Mayhew（克里斯汀·梅休），Pullman & Comley，代表债权人委员会。我在主案中已登记出庭，但我认为我们没有在对抗性程序中登记出庭。\n\nSKLARZ先生：法官阁下，下午好。Jeffrey Sklarz（杰弗里·斯克拉茨），Green & Sklarz，代表某些提出异议的当事人。我已在主案中登记出庭，并在提出部分异议的相关对抗性程序中登记出庭。我的同事 Michelle Antao（米歇尔·安唐）也在线。我不记得她是否已登记出庭，她也不会进行辩论。但如果她尚未登记，我们将为她在主案中登记出庭。我还要说明，我的一位当事人，Weddle Law 的 Justin Weddle（贾斯汀·韦德尔），也正在观看程序；他是其中一项对抗性程序的当事人，或者说他的律师事务所是其中一项对抗性程序的当事人。\n\n本院：好的。谢谢。不过，为使记录清楚，今日对抗性程序中没有听证会。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3446 Filed 08/21/24 Entered 08/21/24 10:22:10 Page 10 of 96\n\nSKLARZ先生：明白，法官阁下。\n\nYAN先生：法官阁下，下午好。Jin Yan（金燕），代表 Meta Platforms, Inc.（Meta Platforms公司）及 Apple, Inc.（苹果公司）。我们确实已在对抗性案件中登记出庭。我不记得我们是否已在主破产案中登记出庭。\n\n本院：好的。谢谢。\n\nPROSCIA先生：法官阁下，下午好。Anthony Proscia（安东尼·普罗夏），来自 Kaufman Dolowich。我们代表相关对抗性程序中的四家律师事务所。我们不会发言；我们只是今日进行旁听。\n\n本院：律师，您所说的是哪一项相关对抗性程序？\n\nPROSCIA先生：当然。是针对 Yankwitt、针对 Ganfer Shore、针对 Brune Law 以及针对 Petrillo Klein 的对抗性程序。\n\n本院：律师，您将不得不逐一拼写这些名称。我们的记录仅通过音频保存，因此，如果之后制作记录文本的人无法理解——而这不是您的过错。这不是您的过错；情况就是如此——那么，记录文本中会有许多空白。因此，我请您，如方便，请拼写您刚才在对抗性程序中提到的所有被告名称。\n\nPROSCIA先生：当然，法官阁下。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3446 Filed 08/21/24 Entered 08/21/24 10:22:10 Page 11 of 96\n\n第一家律师事务所是 Yankwitt（扬克维特律师事务所），拼作 Y-a-n-k-w-i-t-t。第二家律师事务所是 Ganfer Shore（甘弗·肖尔律师事务所），拼作 G-a-n-f-e-r S-h-o-r-e。第三家律师事务所是 Brune Law（布鲁恩律师事务所），拼作 B-r-u-n-e。第四家是 Petrillo Klein（彼得里洛·克莱因律师事务所），拼作 P-e-t-r-i-l-l-o K-l-e-i-n。法庭：谢谢。KIM 先生：下午好，法官阁下。我是 Meister Seelig & Fein（迈斯特·西利格与费因律师事务所）的 Austin Kim（奥斯汀·金）。我们代表 Greenwich Land 被告方，即 Hing Chi Ngok（兴志·吴）和 Greenwich Land, LLC（格林尼治土地有限责任公司），在主程序和对立程序中均已出庭。法庭：谢谢。MOFFETT 女士：法官阁下，我是 Brenner Saltzman & Wallman（布伦纳·萨尔茨曼与沃尔曼律师事务所）的 Rowena Moffett（罗威娜·莫菲特）。我代表另一名对立程序被告，即一家名为 Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello, P.C.（莫维洛·阿布拉莫维茨·格兰德·艾森与阿内洛专业公司）的律师事务所，拼作 M-o-r-v-i-l-l-o A-b-r-a-m-o-w-i-t-z G-r-a-n-d I-a-s-o-n & A-n-e-l-l-o，P.C.。法庭：谢谢。那么，我是否已记录了所有人的出庭情况？（无人作口头回应）法庭：好的。首先——受托人 Despins（德斯平斯），我不确定您打算如何进行，但我想指出，今天日程表上的事项，前两项事项，即第一项动议——第一项延长截止日期的补充动议，以及经修正的授权资金紧急动议，均已在主案件中提交，这本应如此，\n\n因为该等救济涉及整个破产财产。\n\n日程表上的最后两项事项，实际上涉及特定对立程序 23-05002 中的一次审前会议，以及另一对立程序 23-05017 中要求召开一次状态会议的请求。受托人 Despins，我不知道您打算如何进行，但我将听取您关于您意图的陈述。\n\nDESPINS 先生：是的，首先需要澄清一点。我原以为，在 Mahwah 对立程序中，我们还有一项动议，请求授权我们支出资金以维持——或许您已经提到了这一点——但我相信今天就该事项有一次听证会，以授权我们支出资金支付税款、安保服务以及所有这些费用。我相信这应当列入今天的议程。\n\n法庭：您对此可能是正确的。我会看一下。\n\nDESPINS 先生：好的。\n\n法庭：我明白您的意思了。您提交了一项紧急动议，我们——是的，我明白您的意思。好的。您发言时我会查看。\n\nDESPINS 先生：但是，无论如何，法官阁下，我认为，考虑到有许多人通过电话出席参加我所称的 August 15th 延长期限动议，或许先处理该事项是合理的，这样大家可以自由选择是否继续留在线上参加其余事项，但至少不必如此；否则，他们将不得不全程留在线上，而不会有任何成效，并且（听不清）。因此，我建议先处理 August 15th 延长期限动议。\n\n法庭：请开始。为记录在案，该动议为 ECF 3329。\n\nDESPINS 先生：Bassett 先生正在处理该动议，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：Bassett 先生，您在线——好了——您刚才处于静音状态，但请继续。\n\nBASSETT 先生：抱歉。下午好，法官阁下。再次为记录在案，我是 Paul Hastings（普衡律师事务所）的 Nick Bassett（尼克·巴塞特），代表 Chapter 11 受托人。就法官阁下一开始提出的问题而言，显然，经法庭许可，我们原本确实打算今天进行非常有限的证据陈述；我们当然对此前假定能够通过 Zoom 进行该项陈述表示歉意。我认为，我们以该方式推进的原因是，在 February 就该动议举行的听证会上，是远程进行的，而且我们确实让受托人提供了一些证词。我现在回想起那次特定听证会，认为我们当时之所以远程进行，是由于未预料到的天气问题。因此，在该情形中，法庭的一般政策或许作出了例外。\n\n尽管如此，法官阁下，显然我们仍听凭法庭裁量，但经您许可，我们本打算让受托人提供有限证词。我认为，我们将援引以支持该动议的大部分记录，均如案卷所示，我们将请求法庭对其进行司法认知，因此我认为该证据陈述不会很长，但这就是我们的意图，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：嗯，我提出这个问题的唯一原因是，如果受托人 Despins 作证，那么将会有五名不同的律师对他进行交叉询问吗？这就是我们要做的吗？因为已对该动议提出若干异议，所以我假定所有这些律师都会希望对他进行交叉询问。\n\nBASSETT 先生：我不能代表他们发言，法官阁下。我想指出，我认为每一方，或至少其中一些当事方，均在其异议中明确保留了在受托人作证时对其进行交叉询问的权利。我不知道他们是否打算这样做。正如我所说，证词将是有限的。我预计约为 10 分钟，并希望您会限制并缩小其交叉询问范围，但同样地，我不能代表对方当事人的律师发言。\n\n法庭：我明白您不能代表他们发言；我并不是在暗示您应当如此。\n\n但我是说，我几乎确信他们会希望对他进行交叉询问，那么我们就将远程进行直接询问和交叉询问，法庭书记员随后还必须远程让当事人宣誓。法庭书记员没有摄像头。您知道，这存在问题；这就是为什么除非事先确定并且有理由，否则我不会这样做。因为，如您所知，联邦证据规则仍然要求就证词举行法庭内听证。\n\n无论如何，如果我们将以这种方式进行，那就看看情况如何，但我确实认为，您知道，必须理解的是，如果要引入证词和证物，当事人没有理由不能到法庭出席，或者事先作出安排，使法庭了解正在发生什么。这就是我就此要说的。\n\nBASSETT 先生：明白，法官阁下。对于未能事先妥善处理此事，我愿意承担责任。\n\n法庭：好的。那么，看看进展如何，请继续。\n\n您现在是否要传唤受托人 Despins 作为证人？\n\nBASSETT 先生：是的，法官阁下，我们要这样做。我认为，对我们而言，合乎逻辑的进行方式是完成我们有限的证据陈述，其实际上只包括受托人作证；法庭显然可以对案卷中的其他提交文件予以认知，我们在书面文件中引用了这些文件，并且同样会在辩论中引用，但实际上只是由受托人出庭作证，我认为这将是目前适当的进行方式。\n\n法庭：好的。鉴于我已为记录在案所作的陈述，法庭书记员没有摄像头，因此我必须为记录在案说明，我正坐在法庭书记员旁边。我能看见她。她将让证人、受托人 Despins 宣誓，然后我们将不得不从那里继续进行，好吗？那么我要问——受托人 Despins，您准备好宣誓了吗？\n\nDESPINS 先生：是的，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：好的。那么，仿佛我们可以假定自己身处法庭，而 Bassett 律师刚刚传唤您到证人席。现在，我们需要将此交给法庭书记员，她的职责是让证人宣誓。\n\n书记员：谢谢。\n\nDespins 律师，请举起您的右手。\n\n法庭：我们看不见您的右手，受托人 Despins。我们需要看见它。\n\nDESPINS 先生：抱歉，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：换一个方向。\n\nDESPINS 先生：是。\n\n书记员：好的。\n\nDESPINS 先生：请稍等一下。我不知道为什么那不是——好的。那是我的右手。\n\n法庭：好的。\n\nDESPINS 先生：是。\n\n书记员：好的。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS（吕克·A·德斯平斯），受托人方证人，已宣誓。\n\n证人：我宣誓。\n\n书记员：请为记录在案陈述您的姓名和地址，当然是您的营业地址。\n\n证人：Luc Despins，200 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10166。\n\n法庭：好的。Bassett 先生，您可以继续。\n\nBASSETT 先生：谢谢，法官阁下。\n\n由 BASSETT 先生进行直接询问：\n\n问：受托人 Despins，您明白我们今天在此是就受托人延长撤销权诉讼截止期限的动议进行审理，对吗？\n\n答：是的。\n\n问：那么，这是您在本案中提交的第二项此类动议，对吗？\n\n答：正确。\n\n问：那么，受托人 Despins，您是否记得在第一项动议的听证会上作证，我相信该听证会是在本年 February 13th 举行的？\n\n答：是的，我记得。\n\n问：并且，您是否为准备今天的证词再次审阅了该证词？\n\n答：是的，我审阅了。\n\n问：受托人 Despins，据您所记得，您当时所作的该证词是否真实、准确？\n\n答：是的。\n\n问：好的。因此，我今天想做的只是简要询问一些自您于 2024 年 February 上次作证以来已经发生和进展的事件。那么，受托人 Despins，您能否概括说明，自我们本年 February 上次举行听证以来，您在本 Chapter 11 案件中的调查工作一直在做什么？\n\n答：很多事情。首先，我们在继续审阅已收到的文件，对其进行分析，包括银行账户对账单等，并在 Kroll（科尔）协助下开展工作。然后，我们还针对有限数量的当事方寻求了我们称为“后续 2004 取证”的措施，以推进我们的调查。\n\n问：好的。当您说 Rule 2004 取证时，据您记得，自 February 听证会以来，您已提交了多少项额外的 Rule 2004 动议？\n\n答：四项。\n\n问：您是否知道这些动议涵盖了多少额外当事方，或者说取证对象？\n\n答：47 个。\n\n问：您是否大致了解，通过那些 Rule 2004 动议从那些当事方获得了约多少文件？\n\n答：仅来自那些当事方、通过新的 2004 程序获得的文件，约为 700 份。\n\n问：好的。那么，除了您刚才所述的 2004 取证外，您和您的团队是否还通过其他方式或其他来源取得了额外文件？\n\n答：是的。第一个来源是继续推进现有的 2004 程序，即在（听不清）之前已有的程序，以从该调查的对象处获得更多信息。没有人会在第一次就提供其全部文件，因此我们必须继续推进本案。这主要是 Linsey 先生的律师事务所所做的。因此，这是我们收到的大量文件的一个来源。除此之外，我们还获得了存放在 Jersey 一处仓库中的文件的查阅权限，而且它们还被\n\n2 我们取得并分析的该设施内的 iPhone 及类似设备、计算机。\n\n3 因此，就获取文件而言，这大体上就是所完成的额外工作。\n\n6 问 当您将这些额外来源与您所述的 2004 证据开示相结合时，您是否大致了解我们所谈及的文件数量？\n\n10 答 嗯，撇开新的——2004 的 700 份文件不谈，来自我所述来源的文件将超过 20,000 份，这些来源包括先前最初获准的 2004、New Jersey（新泽西州）仓库，以及我们在该设施中发现的计算机和 iPhone。\n\n16 问 贵团队在收到这些文件后，有没有对其进行任何处理？\n\n18 答 嗯，不详述太多细节，但基本上，我们有一个软件程序，使我们能够按姓名搜索，因此这些文件被下载到该程序中，以便每个人实际上都可以搜索特定术语。随后，Kroll 团队也被授予该访问权限，以便他们也可以查看，这为他们提供了有关新银行账户及类似事项的线索。因此，围绕这些文件有一整套仍在进行中的流程。\n\n1 问 那么，您提到了 Kroll 及其银行账户分析，这也是二月份听证会上提出的一个议题。您能否进一步谈谈自二月份以来，Kroll 团队就银行账户所进行的额外工作及所发现的任何新增事项？\n\n6 答 是的，正如我作证时所述，这些银行账户确实几乎是我们仅有的关键文件，或者至少是我们确信其真实性的文件，因为它们来自银行。每当您查看一个银行账户时，都会有数十笔、甚至数百笔转账引向其他银行账户，而这正是 Kroll 所做的工作。\n\n13 因此，他们通过 Linsey 先生（Mr. Linsey）律所提供的这项额外证据开示，得以——他们得以识别出 200 个额外银行账户，并已开始分析且目前仍在分析这些账户。\n\n17 问 您是否大致知道，对这些账户内多少笔转账进行了分析？\n\n19 答 不确切。数以千计，但我不愿给出确切数字。\n\n21 问 Kroll 完成此类工作通常需要多长时间？\n\n23 SKLARZ 律师（MR. SKLARZ）：反对；传闻证据。他在询问不在法庭的他人正在做什么。\n\nBASSETT 律师（MR. BASSETT）：法官阁下，受托人——\n\n法庭：那么，请等一下。Sklarz 律师，我没有听清您说的话，因此您得再说一遍。\n\nSKLARZ 律师：抱歉。\n\n法庭：这不是您的错。\n\nSKLARZ 律师：反对。\n\n法庭：这不是您的错。我只是说，这是远程方式的缺点之一，对吧。您一开始说话时我听不见，因此请您再说一遍。\n\nSKLARZ 律师：可以，法官阁下。我的反对理由是传闻证据。受托人正在就 Kroll——其并非今日出庭的当事人——所做的事情作证，因此这是传闻证据。\n\n法庭：Bassett 律师，您有回应吗？\n\nBASSETT 律师：法官阁下——是的，法官阁下。我不明白该问题如何要求传闻证据。受托人在本案中聘请 Kroll 作为其顾问；他已就此作了充分证言，包括在上次听证会上。显然，受托人对 Kroll 在其指示下完成某些任务所需时间具有第一手知识。\n\nSKLARZ 律师：那是典型的传闻证据。Kroll 并不在场。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 3446\n提交于 08/21/24\n录入于 08/21/24 10:22:10\n\n1 法庭：我将驳回该反对意见，但将对该证言给予我认为适当的权重。\n\n5 请继续。\n\n6 BASSETT 律师继续询问：\n\n7 问 那么，Despins 受托人（Trustee Despins），Kroll 完成您刚才所述类型的银行账户分析大约需要多长时间？\n\n10 答 不可能就此给出确切的、以天数计的答案，因为这取决于账户中有多少笔转账。但就那 200 个账户而言，仍然——该分析仍在进行中，因为如我所说，每个账户都会打开通往另一个账户的大门，而该分析仍在进行中。它并非像一月或二月时那样以同等程度进行，但截至我们目前发言时，仍在进行中。\n\n18 问 Despins 受托人，您知道债务人的刑事审判已在 United States District Court for the Southern District of New York（纽约南区联邦地区法院）进行，对吗？\n\n21 答 对，是的。\n\n22 问 您是否记得该审判大约何时开始？\n\n24 答 五月下旬；5月22日，诸如此类。\n\n25 问 其大约何时结束？\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 3446\n提交于 08/21/24\n录入于 08/21/24 10:22:10\n\n1 答 七月中旬；7月16日或17日。\n\n2 问 贵团队是否在该审判进行期间对其进行了监测？\n\n4 答 是的，我们进行了监测；对于可能对本案至关重要、且我们希望评估其作为证人的可信度的关键证人，我们会出席；对于诸如 FBI 证言这类常规证人，我们则阅读庭审记录，因为我们不需要亲自到场。\n\n9 问 那么，刑事审判与您在本案中的调查有何关联（如有）？\n\n11 答 极为相关。正如我此前作证所述，政府拥有比我们更好的工具。他们有各种获取信息的方式。\n\n14 而通过该审判能够获知的内容，基本上为我们正在分析的许多事项打开了一个全新的维度。\n\n17 问 Despins 受托人，您是否知道刑事审判中总共有多少名证人？\n\n19 答 政府方有超过 30 名，被告方大约有 8 或 10 名。不超过 10 名。\n\n21 问 您是否大致知道刑事审判期间有多少件证物被提交作为证据？\n\n23 答 有数千件。我的记忆是 2900 多件，因此有数千件证物。\n\n25 问 您是否能够取得这些证物？\n\n1 答 不能。\n\n2 在审判开始前，理论上，当政府使用一件证物时，其应当及时公布该证物，但截至今日，仍有数百件证物尚未下载，以供我们取得。因此，我们在此前无法取得它们——大部分无法取得。我们取得了一部分，但大部分没有取得。自其被公布后，我们便可取得，但这不是完整清单。由于某种原因，仍有数百件证物尚未公布。当然，我们一直在跟进政府方，以确保其及时公布这些证物。\n\n13 问 如果贵团队能够取得刑事审判中的证物，贵团队会如何处理？\n\n15 答 与将这些资料放入我们的软件数据库、交给 Kroll 的惯例相同，因为其中提及银行账户。政府方证物中实际上还包含对银行转账的分析。因此，我们正将所有这些资料提供给他们，以便他们更新其分析。\n\n20 问 Despins 受托人，您是否知道本法庭已作出命令，在刑事审判待决期间中止某些诉讼及某些诉讼活动，包括证言录取？\n\n24 答 是，我知道。\n\n25 问 该中止在过去数月中对您的调查进展有何影响（如有）？\n\n2 答 在该期间内，证言录取被绝对禁止，因此——显然，有许多我们原本即将进行证言录取的证人，实际上可能会在刑事审判中作证，因此，我们直到上周或诸如此类的时间才可以对其进行证言录取。因此，显然，这对我们对关键证人进行证言录取的能力产生了重大影响。\n\n9 问 该中止是根据您提交的一项动议而获准的，对吗？\n\n11 答 正确。\n\n12 问 您为何提交该动议？\n\n13 答 有两个理由。第一个理由是，债务人正在向刑事法庭提交一项再次提出的动议，要求中止整个破产案件，因此，显然，我们不希望这种情况发生；那将是一场灾难，因此这是原因的一部分。另一个理由是，我们正在安排进行证言录取的证人说：“嘿，我将成为证人”，或者，“我正在与政府方交谈，我会向他们投诉你们正试图对我们进行证言录取。”当然，这可能造成的影响是，政府方会说：“嗯，实际上，我们认为整个破产案件应被完全中止。”这就是我们提交该动议的原因，该动议有点——（听不清），旨在使我们仍能取得文件，但不进行证言录取，从而不会干扰刑事审判或可能已在刑事审判中出庭的证人。\n\n问 自 2024 年 2 月 15 日以来，您是否提交了任何额外的撤销行动？\n\n答 是。\n\n问 大约多少项？\n\n答 我们提交了四项，但我们即将提交，或者正在提交——它们今天才刚出现在案卷上——另外约 30 项。\n\n问 您如何决定何时提交这些起诉状？\n\n答 一旦我们准备好提交它们，也就是说，一旦我们有足够信息可以提交，并且我们已尽最大能力核实所有信息。我们没有扣留任何内容。我们正在提交目前所有能够提交的案件，而这就是我们的决定方式，即我们是否有足够信息。该过程主要由 Linsey 先生的律所主导，但我参与审阅起诉状。不过，基本上，我们在有足够信息继续推进时便提交。\n\n问 Despins 受托人，您在二月份就本案中债务人及其他人所造成的一些妨碍行为作过证，您记得该证言吗？\n\n答 记得。\n\n问 那么，依您看来，您当时谈及的妨碍行为是否仍在影响您的调查？\n\n答 当然，因为如我所说，我们唯一可靠的来源是银行账户，但那并未向您展示全貌；它只展示转账。我们没有账簿和记录。债务人多次作证称他没有 iPhone。而现在，当然，我们知道他有 iPhone，因为这在刑事审判中披露了；他有许多 iPhone，且其中有数据。显然，无法取得账簿和记录来将所有这些事项相互关联，使得本案——我会说——就将一切关联起来所需完成的工作量而言前所未有。\n\nBASSETT 律师：没有其他问题了，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：好的。谢谢。有人希望对 Despins 受托人进行交叉询问吗？\n\nYAN 律师（MR. YAN）：法官阁下，我只有几个问题要问 Despins 受托人。\n\n法庭：好的。您能否——我能看到您，但请您再次为记录说明您的姓名和您所代表的一方，因为，正如我在听证会开始时所说，我们的庭审记录只有音频，所以尽可能使记录清楚会很有帮助。谢谢。\n\nYAN 律师：当然可以。我的名字是 Jin Yan（闫进），J-i-n，姓氏是——\n\n30 我的姓名是 Y-a-n。我代表 Apple, Inc.（苹果公司）和 Meta Platforms, Inc.（元平台公司）。\n\n闫先生交叉询问：\n\n问 受托人 Despins（受托人德斯平斯）——\n\n法庭：请开始。抱歉，我无意——\n\n闫先生：谢谢您，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：——打断您说话。我表示歉意。不过您可以继续。\n\n闫先生：谢谢您，法官阁下。\n\n闫先生询问：\n\n问 受托人 Despins，您此前作证称，您发出了四份新的 2004（无法辨识）文书，针对 47 方。我的表述正确吗？\n\n答 正确。\n\n问 Apple 是这些对象之一吗？\n\n答 我不记得。\n\n问 您记得 Meta 是否是这些对象之一吗？\n\n答 我不记得。\n\n问 您具体采取了哪些行动，以调查针对 Apple 或 Meta 的其他可撤销权主张？\n\n答 有——它们属于，也就是说，我们总体上检索了通过这些银行账户的所有转账，因为我们不断收到这 200 个新增银行账户，所以如果 Meta 或 Apple 出现在其中，我们将予以追查。这是分析的一部分。\n\n但是我们不会——我们的分析并非以被告为目标，意思是我们正在查找转账，因为我们有一个持续运行的时钟需要遵守，因此我们审查所有转账。如果 Meta 或 Apple 恰好在该名单上，那么我们会追查。\n\n问 受托人 Despins，您知道您已经起诉 Apple，对吗？\n\n答 对。\n\n问 您也知道您已经起诉 Meta，对吧？\n\n答 对。\n\n问 除您目前针对 Meta 的诉讼中的主张外，您是否发现了任何其他主张？\n\n答 我们发现了一些较小的主张，但没有——没有任何实质性的主张，您知道，金额为数千美元，而非数十万美元。因此，目前的答案是，没有任何实质性的主张。\n\n问 针对 Apple 的情况呢？\n\n答 答案相同。\n\n问 您说您发现的那些并不实质的额外主张，它们是否已经在已提起的诉讼中的主张里提出？\n\n答 我认为没有。我认为这些会被加入其中，但同样，它不会以实质性的方式改变局面。\n\n问 您是否打算向 Apple 或 Meta 送达这些主张？\n\n答 我需要与律师讨论此事。您知道，（无法辨识）诉讼，所以我需要与他们协商，以决定是否值得这样做。\n\n问 好的。您何时发现了那些不属于现有诉讼的额外主张？\n\n答 我不知道是什么时候。显然是在 February 15th 之后，但在 February 15th 和现在之间的何时，我无法说明。\n\n问 您能解释一下为何您尚未寻求修改现有诉讼以增加这些主张吗？\n\n答 因为 Apple 和 Meta 不是我们唯一关注的事项。我们关注的是 300 多名被告，现在我们又增加了大约 50 名和 30 名，另加可能的 20 名，所以是 50 名。因此，我理解从您的角度看，您只关心那两方，但有很多事项同时进行，我们首先处理最实质性和最紧迫的方面。\n\n这就是为什么我说我知道有额外转账，但我认为它们不会改变局面，当然也不会以一种使我们搁置一切、目前为了加入这些并不实质的金额而修改诉讼的方式改变局面。如果我们发现确实实质性的事项，那么我们显然会尽快修改。因此，针对 Apple 或 Meta 并无任何策略；这是处理数百名被告的总体策略，我们处理最紧迫的事项，您知道，因为一天中的工作时间有限。\n\n闫先生：我没有进一步问题。谢谢您，受托人 Despins。\n\n法庭：谢谢。还有其他人希望交叉询问受托人 Despins 吗？\n\nSklarz 先生：是的，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：Sklarz 律师，请您再次说明您的姓名以及您代表谁，以便记入记录，可以吗？谢谢。\n\nSklarz 先生：是的，Jeffrey Sklarz（杰弗里·斯克拉兹）；就本次听证而言，我的当事人为 G Club、FFP (BVI) Limited（FFP（英属维尔京群岛）有限公司），其在对抗程序 24-506 -- 5056 中被起诉；Ogier（奥杰），在对抗程序 24-05012 中被起诉；Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman（皮尔斯伯里·温思罗普·肖·皮特曼），在对抗程序 24-05014 中被起诉；以及 Weddle Law（韦德尔律师事务所），在对抗程序 24-05188 中被起诉。// //\n\n交叉询问\n\nSklarz 先生询问：\n\n问 受托人 Despins，您表示您收到了额外信息，这就像俗话所说的俄罗斯套娃一样，每打开一层，您就会得到越来越多的信息。这样说公平吗？\n\n答 作为总体描述，是的。\n\n问 好的。那么，只要您持续得到越来越多的信息，您是否表示，您的调查有可能事实上持续数年又数年又数年，近乎永无止境？\n\n答 不会。在某个时点，我们需要，您知道，结束这个案件，并继续我们生活中的其他事情，这就是本案的意图。从我们的角度来看，我们尚未到达那个阶段，但显然目标是达到那个阶段，以便我们能够继续前进。我们必须在这一意愿与不让潜在对象，您知道，在没有主张的情况下被搁置之间取得平衡，所以这实际上是其中的权衡。\n\n问 而且我相信，您此前还表示，您已基于刑事程序提出动议，暂停您自己对案件的推进。我理解得对吗？\n\n答 不，我们过去这样做过。\n\n问 您过去这样做过？\n\n答 是。\n\n问 我相信您说过，有待进行的证据开示询问因您的动议而被暂停，对吗？\n\n答 对。\n\n问 而您原本要对其中一些人进行询问，他们是刑事程序中的证人，对吗？\n\n答 我说过是证人，或者可能成为证人，因此政府必须决定是否使用他们。现在，他们会属于这两类中的一类。\n\n问 好的。那么，您——没有人反对您的暂停动议；这是您的证言吗？\n\n答 我认为没有人反对；对。\n\n问 因此，您出于自己的理由自行暂停了案件；这样说公平吗？\n\n答 不。\n\n问 您出于其他人的理由自行暂停了案件？\n\n答 不，我们提出了一项动议，但并非在真空中提出；并不只是出于我们自己的理由。\n\n这是因为我们试图对一些人进行证言录取，而他们说，等一下，我是证人，或者我被要求成为刑事审判中的证人，他们本来会就我们试图做的事情向 DOJ（美国司法部）提出异议，这时我们决定需要在审判期间暂停此事。因此，我们确实自行这样做了，但这是考虑到多项因素，包括不干扰刑事程序。\n\n问 您是否与政府协调过证人证言？\n\n答 从未。\n\nBassett 先生：异议；无关。\n\n法庭：异议成立。因此，我们将把该答复从记录中删除。\n\nSklarz 先生询问：\n\n问 就今天提出异议的我的当事人而言，G Club、FFP、Ogier、Pillsbury Winthrop 和 Weddle Law，它们均是在 February 延期命令之前被起诉的；对吗？\n\n答 嗯，我确定知道 G Club，在两个方面，即替身实体以及我们所称的预防性转让起诉状。Ogier，我也知道。Pillsbury，是的。您提到的另一实体，很抱歉，我不记得它们。\n\n问 好的。就所有这些实体而言，您在 February 至今期间是否发现了任何您打算提出的其他主张？\n\n答 我想谨慎回答，因为请记住，就 G Club 而言，我们的第一项诉因是寻求替身实体或替身（无法辨识）裁决。只有在我们未能成功时，才会涉及欺诈性转让。因此，我们并未将重点放在针对 G Club 的欺诈性转让主张上，因为我们首先希望尝试获得替身实体裁决。因此，您知道，我不能说在欺诈性转让方面没有更多事项，因为那不是我们针对 G Club 的重点。\n\n至于其他实体，我确实不愿给您一个明确答案，因为有 280 名被告，所以我并不了解其中每一名。但我没有想到有诸如针对（无法辨识）的另一项（无法辨识）之类的事情。没有想到这类事情。\n\n问 那么，按照您今天在此作证时的了解，您并不知道可以提出任何额外主张——我们先把 G Club 放在一边，然后逐一讨论——按照您今天在此作证时的了解，您并不知道可以针对 FFP 提出任何额外主张？\n\n答 针对——有 280 名被告，所以我不能——我不知道，因此我不愿向您答复肯定没有。我（无法辨识）。\n\n问 那么，再问一次，就 Ogier 而言，按照您今天在此作证时的了解，您是否知道有任何针对 Ogier 的额外主张？\n\n答 没有任何实质性的主张，也没有任何被提请我注意的主张。我想说明，有——您知道，Linsey 先生（林赛先生）的律师事务所总体上在推进该程序，因此他们可能正在审查并发现额外转账，而他们并不\n\n在提交修正起诉书之前，将每一美元都告知我。因此，截至目前，他们尚未就针对（无法辨认）的修正起诉书与我接洽。法庭：Sklarz（斯克拉茨）律师，在您继续之前，我想确保记录清楚。您刚才询问的两方中，第一方是 FFP；对吗？斯克拉茨先生：正确，法官阁下。是。法庭：第二方是 Ogier（奥吉尔）；对吗？斯克拉茨先生：Ogier 拼作 O-g-i-e-r。法庭：好的。很遗憾，为了记录，我们确实需要这样做，因此我可能需要请您——我的意思是，既然您已经说出了这两个名称，这非常有帮助。斯克拉茨先生：当然。法庭：如果您提及您所代理的其他被告，我请您为记录拼出其名称。斯克拉茨先生：没问题，法官阁下。法庭：谢谢。由斯克拉茨先生询问：问：那么下一位被告是 Pillsbury Winthrop（普博温思罗普），拼作 P-i-l-l-s-b-u-r-y W-i-n-t-h-r-o-p。这是一家纽约律师事务所。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 3446\n提交日期 08/21/24\n录入日期 08/21/24 10:22:10\n第 38 页，共 96 页\n\n问：您是否知悉针对 Pillsbury 的任何额外请求？\n\n答：再次说明，我所知的是，没有人要求我批准提交修正起诉书。这是我在现阶段能够向您提供的最佳信息。\n\n问：关于 Weddle Law（韦德尔律师事务所），拼作 W-e-d-d-l-e，您是否知悉针对 Weddle Law 的任何额外请求？\n\n答：我会给您同样的回答；据我所知，目前没有提交主张额外请求的修正起诉书的计划。\n\n问：谢谢。现在，您提到债务人在二月之后持续阻碍您取得账簿和记录。是这样吗——我是否正确理解了您的证词？\n\n答：我认为所问的问题是，债务人的阻碍是否影响我们，并在二月之后继续影响我们，答案是肯定的。\n\n问：好的。那么我们稍微分解一下。自二月延期命令作出以来，债务人是否在您的调查中阻碍了您？\n\n答：嗯，每一天他们未提交其账簿和记录，他们就在阻碍我们；这是一种看法。\n\n问：什么——\n\n答：不是在——抱歉。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 3446\n提交日期 08/21/24\n录入日期 08/21/24 10:22:10\n\n问：债务人本人究竟做了什么？他一直被关押在监狱中，对吗？\n\n答：正确。\n\n问：自二月延期命令以来，他做了什么——仅供参考，该命令日期为 ECF 2921 所载的 February 15, 2024——自 February 15th, 2024 以来，除在您要求他配合时不予配合以外，债务人做了什么来阻碍您的调查？\n\n答：他持续未提交其账簿和记录。\n\n问：好的。现在，您已取得各种账簿和记录，对吗，涉及债务人实体？\n\n撤回该问题。让我再问一次。您已从债务人以及您主张由债务人控制的实体两者取得各种账簿和记录；这样说公平吗？\n\n答：不，我不会说有任何来自债务人的账簿和记录；至于其他实体，何者构成账簿和记录尚不清楚。我们确实从其他实体取得了商业文件，是的。\n\n问：例如，关于——有若干实体的名称前带有 HGHK 字母，您从某些 HK——HGHK 实体，如 HGHK Technologies，取得了账簿和记录；对吗？\n\n答：我不愿称其为账簿和记录。我们从他们那里取得了显示交易的文件。这些是否确为准确、完整的账簿和记录，我无法说。我实际上不会这样说。\n\n问：好的。有一位先生，名为 Hofmeister（霍夫迈斯特），拼作 H-o-f-m-e-i-s-t-e-r，他是在一项诉讼中被指定的接管人，您记得他吗？\n\n答：是的，我记得。\n\n问：并且达成了一项和解，据此，就他被指定为接管人的实体而言，他向您移交或提供了查阅权限，您记得吗？\n\n答：他向我提供了什么的查阅权限？\n\n问：我问的是，他是否让您查阅信息？\n\n答：是的，他让我们查阅了他收到的信息。\n\n问：好的。您与霍夫迈斯特先生达成了一项经本法庭批准的和解；对吗？\n\n答：正确。\n\n问：您从霍夫迈斯特先生那里得到了什么？\n\n答：一系列声称显示某些转让、某些付款的文件，但我认为其中没有资产负债表。就真实核算而言，没有任何能够经受审查的材料。\n\n问：而且——\n\n答：我们得到的是他从 Kwok（郭文贵）先生的关联人那里得到的东西。他没有编制任何账簿和记录。他只是把他们给他的东西给了我们。\n\n问：所以，郭先生的关联人向霍夫迈斯特先生移交了信息，后者再将其移交给您？\n\n答：他们提供了一些信息，是的，正确。是。\n\n问：霍夫迈斯特先生是否阻碍了您的调查？\n\n答：抱歉，他是否阻碍了我们的调查？没有。\n\n问：请稍等一下。\n\n（暂停）\n\n斯克拉茨先生：谢谢，受托人。我目前没有进一步问题。\n\n证人：谢谢。\n\n法庭：谢谢。还有其他人希望交叉询问 Despins（德斯潘）受托人吗？\n\n（无口头回应）\n\n法庭：好的。既然没有听到回应，Bassett（巴塞特）律师，您是否有复询？\n\n巴塞特先生：没有复询，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：好的。谢谢您，德斯潘受托人。您的证词已经结束。您作为证人可以退席。\n\n（证人退席）\n\n法庭：我知道您将继续参加听证会，但您作为证人可以退席。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 3446\n提交日期 08/21/24\n录入日期 08/21/24 10:22:10\n第 42 页，共 96 页\n\nDespins 先生：谢谢，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：谢谢。巴塞特律师，您希望继续进行吗？\n\n巴塞特先生：是的，法官阁下，谢谢。\n\n法庭：不客气。\n\n巴塞特先生：再次为记录说明，我是 Paul Hastings（普衡律师事务所）的 Nick Bassett（尼克·巴塞特），代表第 11 章受托人。法官阁下，如我先前所述，除德斯潘受托人的证词外，我们认为，本第 11 章案件及相关对抗诉讼中的整体记录，与今日提交法庭审理的动议高度相关，如同其与法庭二月份审理的动议相关一样；因此，法庭可以对该案卷和该记录予以司法认知。因此，将本案记录与德斯潘受托人的证词结合起来，我们支持该动议的证据即告结束。基于此，我建议进入辩论阶段。我很乐意这样做，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：请继续。\n\n巴塞特先生：非常感谢。法官阁下，我会尽量简短陈述，因为我认为实际上没有任何我们在二月份就第一次延长受托人提起撤销诉讼期限的动议举行听证时尚未涉及的新问题。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 3446\n提交日期 08/21/24\n录入日期 08/21/24 10:22:10\n第 43 页，共 96 页\n\n法庭在该裁定中，即于 February 15th, 2024 作出并载于 ECF 2921 的裁定中，得出了两项主要结论。第一，法庭根据《联邦破产程序规则》9006(b)，批准受托人将其提起撤销诉讼的期限从 February 15th, 2024 延长至 August 15th, 2024 的请求。第二，法庭在该裁定中认定其不同意并驳回受托人就诉讼时效期限提出衡平法中止的请求；但是，法庭明确作出该决定时并不妨碍受托人在未来回应某一特定对抗诉讼被告就诉讼时效提出的任何主张时提出衡平法中止。\n\n法官阁下，无论是基于时间的经过、二月份以来发生的中间事实和情势，还是法庭收到的任何异议，均没有理由支持作出与法庭二月份已经得出的结论不同的任何结果。我确实想强调，如果被告在对抗诉讼中提出诉讼时效问题，受托人绝对打算在适当时候主张衡平法中止，但我们尊重法庭就此作出的裁决，并将相应保留一切权利。\n\n法官阁下，我将用剩余时间仅回应某些提出异议的当事人所提出的具体论点。再次说明，依我看，没有任何新内容。我认为这些论点大体分为两类。第一类是，提出异议的当事人重申其先前提出的论点，即法庭不应能够使用《联邦破产程序规则》9006(b)延长提起撤销诉讼的期限。第二类论点实际上基于事实记录，有些当事人采取的立场是，没有发生任何事情，或者记录中不存在任何事实足以证明进一步延长提起撤销诉讼的期限是正当的。\n\n关于第一类论点，即 9006(b)，法官阁下，再次说明，我认为这已经作出决定。法庭在其第一次延期裁定中认真分析了该问题及相关判例法。法庭在进行该分析后，最终正确地认定，时效期间通常并非实体性规定，因此法庭有权基于衡平原则，使用规则 9006(b) 延长 546(a) 规定的时效期间。\n\n在作出该决定时，法庭明确审议并拒绝遵循相反的判例法，包括具体而言，Tancredi（坦克雷迪）法官在 In re Walnut Hill（沃尔纳特山案）中作出的决定，提出异议的当事人仍继续依赖该决定。法庭还在其批准受托人将提起撤销诉讼的期限延长至 August 15th, 2024 的裁定中具体指出，（无法辨认）该裁定，但该日期可经通知和听证后进一步延长，这就是我们今天在此的原因，法官阁下，即就将该期限进一步延长至 February of 2015 [sic] 举行听证。\n\n法官阁下，法庭在其先前裁定中就该问题所作的一切决定，今日仍然正确，不应受到扰动。某些提出异议的当事人试图描述为新论点的唯一论点，是基于最高法院近期在 Purdue Pharma（普渡制药）案中所作决定的论点，但该决定中没有任何内容影响法庭的分析。\n\n在 Purdue 案中，最高法院认定，破产法院——该案中的破产法院——不能批准非自愿的第三方免责，因为国会并未根据《破产法典》授权此类免责，而且这无疑会影响对其他当事人享有债权的当事人的实体权利。必须指出的是，法庭意见书末尾有整整一节，法庭在其中非常明确地警示其裁决的狭窄性。法庭称，引用：“与我们今天决定的问题同样重要的是我们未作决定的问题。”\n\n法庭随后认定，引用：“限于提交给我们的问题，我们仅认定，《破产法典》并未授权作为第 11 章重组计划一部分的免责和禁令，而该免责和禁令实际上旨在未经受影响债权人同意，即免除针对非债务人的债权。”\n\n因此，法官阁下，今日提交本院审理的问题显然并不涉及非自愿的第三方免责，因此，我们认为，Purdue（普渡）对本院的裁决没有影响。\n\n现在，尽管本院已非常谨慎地尝试明确其裁定的狭窄范围，但在一定程度上，Purdue 可被认为确立了更广泛的原则。我最多会主张，它可以确立如下命题：破产法院不得以与《破产法》不一致的方式运用其衡平权力，从而影响实体权利。\n\n再次，本院已审理并裁定了这一问题；我们在答辩状中亦提出了这一点，即，本案的时效规定并非实体性规定，因此，本院并未修改实体权利。\n\n现在，如果被告方对 Purdue 作出的宽泛解读是正确的，其影响将远比他们所称的更为广泛，因为按照我对其异议的理解，他们实际上是在说，本院永远不得运用衡平权力影响时效规定；这同样将适用于衡平法上的时效中止。这也适用于破产程序之外的情形。\n\n我认为，对 Purdue 案不存在任何合理的解读，能够认为——或认为最高法院意图——废除时效规定的衡平法时效中止；也就是说，这是对该裁决过于宽泛的解读，我认为其显然并非意图产生——并非意图具有该等效果。\n\n法官阁下，除 Rule 9006(b) 的论点以及我称之为 Purdue 的附加影响外，异议方实际提出的唯一其他论点是，依其观点，相关情形不足以证明延长期限具有正当性。法官阁下，我主张，根据受托人今日所作证言、根据本案记录，以及根据其于二月所作证言，记录充分支持受托人所请求的有限进一步延期。\n\n从今日的交叉询问中可以看出，异议方提出的一点是：好吧，这种妨碍行为全部发生在案件初期，而且债务人一直在服刑。此后他并未积极妨碍受托人的调查，但这并不属实，因为已经发生的妨碍行为以及本案独特且非常情形在于，我们有一名债务人，也有一名与债务人有关联的个人，他们从未配合受托人的调查。他们从未提供在任何案件中通常应当提供的账簿和记录。这持续妨碍受托人的调查。由该不合作所引起的所有问题，并不会在本年 2 月 15 日之后神奇地消失，法官阁下。\n\n受托人还就其持续进行的勤勉努力作证。他谈及其团队从 2004 调查中收到的数千份文件，谈及其团队获准进入的 Golden Spring（黄金泉）所属仓库，谈及刑事审判中的数千份证物，而他目前尚无法取得所有该等材料。他谈及其团队尽可能勤勉审阅这些文件的流程。\n\n受托人还更为概括地谈及其对刑事审判的监控，以及该审判与其调查的相关性。他谈及 Kroll（克罗尔）正在进行的银行账户分析，该事项曾于二月得到广泛证言的涉及。法官阁下，所有这些工作都在持续进行。所有这些都需要时间。所有这些仍然受到本案独特且非常情形的影响。\n\n法官阁下，关于受托人调查勤勉程度，我最后将回应的一点是围绕中止破产案件动议的论点（听不清）。法官阁下，该动议由受托人提出。您今日已听取其说明提交该动议的理由。本院批准了该动议。我主张，本院在此过程中认定，该动议符合破产财产的最佳利益。其他当事人，包括今日到庭的异议方，如认为该动议不当，均有机会提出异议。\n\n再次，法官阁下，受托人这样做有充分理由。若不以该方式进行，潜在后果将是就全面中止破产案件与债务人展开争执；如果受托人在刑事审判期间无法继续进行任何工作，这将是灾难。因此，他近期决定提交该动议，并获本院批准。\n\n法官阁下，我最后将简要回应的论点是 Meta（元）和 Apple（苹果）提出的论点，他们称，再次，没有证据显示他们自身曾采取任何行动妨碍受托人的调查。对此，法官阁下，我只想请本院参阅第一份延期命令第 14 段中已经作出的裁定，本院在其中称，引述：“本破产案件在衡平法上的时效中止方面呈现出相当不同的（听不清）情况；在典型情形中，引发衡平法时效中止的本应是债务人的行为，而非被告的行为。从某些意义上说，这对被告并不公平。”\n\n本院援引了若干判例支持该观点，包括本意见中所引用的佛罗里达中区破产法院（Middle District of Florida Bankruptcy Court（佛罗里达中区破产法院））的 Fundamental Long Term Care 案（Fundamental Long Term Care case（Fundamental Long Term Care 案））。\n\n因此，法官阁下，关键不在于某一特定避免权诉讼被告是否妨碍了受托人的调查；而在于，是否总体上存在妨碍行为，致使受托人无法在《破产法》通常规定的期限内完成其调查。\n\n因此，法官阁下，基于上述所有理由，我们恭请本院将提交避免权诉讼的期限再延长六个月，至 2025 年 2 月 15 日。谢谢，法官阁下。法庭：谢谢。\n\n谁希望先就其异议进行陈述？我们有——我们有 Yan 律师（Yan（严）律师）、Sklarz 律师（Sklarz（斯克拉兹）律师）。还有其他人将就该动议提出异议论证吗？\n\nKIM 先生（Kim（金）先生）：法官阁下，Greenwich Land 被告方（Greenwich Land Defendants（格林尼治地产被告方））也提出了异议，因此我将保留至最后；如果——\n\n法庭：哦，是的。\n\nKIM 先生：——如果 Yan 先生和 Sklarz 先生涵盖了全部论点，那么我无需重复。\n\n法庭：谢谢，Kim 律师。我刚才——一时没有找到您的异议书。对此我表示歉意。好的。那么，Sklarz 律师、Yan 律师，谁愿意先进行陈述？\n\nSKLARZ 先生：当然，请 Yan 律师先讲。\n\nYAN 先生：谢谢。谢谢，法官阁下。如法官阁下在先前批准受托人所请求延期的命令中所指出，Rule 9006(b) 下的一项（听不清）关切是对被告造成的损害。现在，我要说的是，我们不同意本院的分析，但我认为我们无需重复 Rule 9006(b) 的论点。在这里，我们的情况与其他一些将成为被告、并可能受受托人请求本院作出的命令影响的被告和潜在被告不同。我们的情况不同，是因为 Meta 和 Apple 已经被起诉；他们是在先前延期获准之前被起诉的。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 3446\n提交日期 08/21/24\n录入日期 08/21/24 10:22:10\n\nMeta 和 Apple 已经被起诉；他们是在先前延期获准之前被起诉的。在这些案件中，我们已经花费金钱和费用提出驳回动议，并提交了多项其他文件。\n\n因此，我们与那些甚至不知道自己是目标、且尚未被要求采取任何行动的人处境不同。\n\n身份不明的发言人：（听不清。）\n\nYAN 先生：抱歉，请继续。\n\n另一点与此有些关联，即，我们来到本院并提出了异议；我看不出我们与被排除在上一份命令之外的其他某些被告或当事人有何不同，例如 UBS（瑞银）和 Sotheby's（苏富比），他们也提出了异议并被排除在外。\n\n如您已听受托人所述，他已确定对 Meta 和 Apple 可能提出额外请求权；他称这些请求权并不重大，但已经过了六个月。他在上一次延期之前就已提出该等请求权，但他尚未就这些请求权采取任何行动。我们不知道。他未说明，除已经获得的六个月延期外，他是否还需要额外六个月时间，才能对 Apple 提交任何额外诉讼。\n\n这里还存在一个根本公平问题，即受托人可以保留其关于衡平法时效中止及所有（听不清）论点，而除此之外，他还获得了这项命令，说，是的，他可以在另外六个月内及时提交；而我们却受到损害，因为该命令作出后，我们无法再提出该论点。\n\n那么，他为什么可以获得双重保障，而我们这些没有做错任何事的人，却在有关受托人请求权已过时效的论点方面被彻底剥夺？\n\n因此，基于这些理由，我们只请求——\n\n法庭：等等。请允许我就在此打断您一下，以确保我理解您的论点？\n\nYAN 先生：当然。\n\n法庭：当您说，在其衡平法时效中止论点上你们被彻底剥夺时，这就是您提出的观点吗，律师？我只是想确保我理解。\n\nYAN 先生：不是衡平法时效中止论点。我只是说，他可以提出他的衡平——如果我们——如果他提出衡平法时效中止论点——我们稍后会谈到——我认为该命令并不影响这一点，但他已经会占有优势，因为他可以挥舞该命令并说，如果我们主张其请求权已过时效，他就可以说，好吧，看，我有法官的命令，说明就你们而言，该论点不再成立。\n\n法庭：嗯，我不认为这是真的。\n\nYAN 先生：所以，我只是——\n\n法庭：我不认为该命令是这样说的。因此，也许您需要向我指出该依据，因为我认为该命令所说的是，鉴于这些复杂、合并、行政合并的 Chapter 11 案件和对抗程序中非常具体且异常的情形，批准延期；而且我不会预先命令受托人可以主张衡平法时效中止。\n\n我认为该命令所说的是，当有人在驳回动议或其他诉状中提出该问题时，受托人可以主张衡平法时效中止。因此，我完全看不出这如何使你们被彻底剥夺，所以我想确保我没有遗漏您的观点。\n\nYAN 先生：当然。我想我的观点是，法官阁下，他为什么需要那个？因为他的权利得到保留，他始终可以提出衡平法时效中止论点。\n\n法庭：不过，他需要什么？我没有给予他所要求的东西，所以我不知道您——我想这正是我感到困惑之处。我在原命令中没有给予他所要求的东西。我没有说他预先享有主张衡平法时效中止的权利；我没有这样说。\n\n我说的是，根据各方所援引的判例，除非且直到在以诉讼时效已过为由提出的驳回案件动议中提出衡平法上的时效中止问题，否则衡平法上的时效中止的适用不会发挥作用，也不会成为争议问题。这正是该命令所说的内容。\n\n严律师：明白。明白，法官阁下。我的观点是，他为什么需要超过这些内容？他可以——该论点已被保留。如果他能够提出该——\n\n法庭：我不知道他是否确实需要超过这些内容。\n\n严律师：这正是我的观点，法官阁下，他为什么需要这项额外命令？\n\n法庭：嗯，那是时间问题。时间与衡平法上的时效中止不同，律师。他请求额外时间。我没有——他请求额外时间以提起诉因，好吗。我没有听到巴西特律师——但也许我漏听了，这就是我停下来提出这些问题的原因——我没有听到巴西特律师提出，而且我认为我在书面材料中也没有读到，但也许我——你知道，我可能漏掉了，因为如同我相信你能够理解的，本案及对抗程序中提交了大量书面材料，但我没有听到巴西特律师要求我前瞻性地命令，从现在起，受托人有权主张衡平法上的时效中止。我没有听到他这样请求。巴西特律师，你是否要求我这样做？因为如果你提出过，我漏掉了。\n\n巴西特律师：我没有，法官阁下；事实上，法庭已经就该问题作出裁决。\n\n法庭：好的。谢谢。因此，这就是我向严律师提出的问题。我目前在书面材料中所看到的唯一问题是，受托人请求延长期限以提起诉因。我已就衡平法上的时效中止问题作出裁决。因此，对于你所说的，不知为何你已经——我对此表示歉意——我想你使用的措辞是你被“从膝盖处截断了”。我看不出何以如此。因此，请向我解释。我不希望你不告诉我。我只是不能确定我理解了你的论点。\n\n严律师：当然，法官阁下。我认为这——让我回到该论点。我认为我真正想表达的是，我们的情形不同，因为他不需要更多时间；他已经对我们提出了请求权，因此我认为，让他获得额外时间以增添他已经对我们主张的请求权，并不符合衡平原则。\n\n法庭：嗯，你不认为《联邦民事诉讼规则》会处理这个问题吗？如果他试图增加请求权或提出新的诉因，你可以采取任何需要采取的行动，前提是他确实这样做。而且我认为你问过他——我理解你为什么这样做——是否对 Apple（苹果公司）和 Meta（Meta公司）存在任何额外请求权，而他的回答是“他能想到的并无实质性请求权”，这是我听到的回答。但《联邦民事诉讼规则》会以某种方式处理此事；要么他会提出动议修改起诉状，而如你已经承认的，该起诉状是在适用法定期间届满之前提交的；要么他会提出新的诉因。在任何一种情形下，你要么会反对修改动议，要么会提出驳回动议。这就是《联邦民事诉讼规则》的运作方式，对吗？我的意思是，我想我对你的论点有些困惑，不过，我同意你们的情形不同，因为你们的客户是在任何适用法定期间届满之前被起诉的。因此，从这个角度看，我认为无论发生什么就让它发生，《联邦民事诉讼规则》都——确实适用，而你和受托人将根据适用的《联邦民事诉讼规则》提出你们各自的任何论点，然后法庭将据此处理。\n\n严律师：如果他将在同一案件中主张这些请求权，我认为这有道理。我们所担心的是，而且我们没有在书面材料中看到或从受托人那里听到的是，他们打算提起民事诉讼。因此，八个月后，他是否打算对我们提出新的请求权？我们不知道，所以我们希望保留反对该事项的权利。\n\n法庭：嗯，我认为你说得完全正确。我看不出你为何会——依我看来，我之前的命令确实为你保留了该权利。也许我错了，但该命令说，受托人无权获得前瞻性的衡平法时效中止；如有该问题，将在一方提出并提交驳回动议、主张诉讼时效已过时出现。\n\n严律师：明白，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：因此，我看不出你的权利何以没有被保留。但这并不意味着我是对的，律师；我只是告诉你，这是法庭的看法。你可以自行决定采取你认为适当的行动。\n\n但是，之前的命令非常——我试图在很短的篇幅内非常明确地说明，受托人提起诉因的权利获得延长，因为我认为并裁定，《破产程序规则》9006并不禁止该延长，因为那些法定期间属于除斥期间法，并不影响当事人的实体权利。我作出该认定是基于多项因素，包括联邦最高法院在 Young 一案中的判决；在该案中，斯卡利亚大法官代表多数意见指出，那些法定期间并非实体性法规；它们不影响实体权利。因此，无论如何，我想对你说的是，我理解你所说的内容，但我相信你受到保护。你可能持不同看法，我完全尊重这一点，但这就是我作出——该裁决为何如此表述的原因。\n\n严律师：明白，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：我没有阻止任何被告主张存在某种诉讼时效问题。\n\n严律师：明白，法官阁下。而且，这或许正是我们没有看到您刚才所阐述的那种保护程度的问题所在，这也是我们请求仅将我们排除在该命令适用范围之外的原因。\n\n法庭：因此，你的意思是，你希望我裁定——我只是想确保——就 Apple 和 Meta 而言，如果批准延期，该延期不适用于它们？\n\n严律师：正是如此，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：嗯，如果我同意你的观点——我不知道我是否会同意——但我不会同意你关于修改现有诉因的观点。当然，这并不意味着你不能反对修改，但显然，《联邦民事诉讼规则》允许修改现有诉因。它们允许在审判结束后仍可修改。因此，就该问题而言，我认为，届时我将就 Meta 和 Apple 作出的唯一决定是，Meta 和 Apple 是否被排除在任何新诉因之外。这就是我会作出的决定。\n\n严律师：我认为您的表述完全正确，法官阁下。我同意这一点。\n\n法庭：好的。很好。我对此表示感谢。我无意打断你，所以如果你还有更多论点要陈述，请继续。我只是想——我想确保我理解了你所主张的内容。\n\n严律师：没有了，我们对此表示感谢，法官阁下，这就是我要说的全部内容。\n\n法庭：好的。谢谢。斯克拉兹律师，你希望接下来继续吗？\n\n斯克拉兹律师：是的，请允许，法官阁下。法官阁下，在从 Northern Pipeline（北方管道案）到 Granfinanciera（格兰芬西耶拉案）再到 Stern（斯特恩案）和数月前刚被援引的 Purdue（普渡案）的近40年一系列未曾中断的判例中，联邦最高法院始终裁定，除非《破产法典》明确允许救济，破产法院不能基于填补空白条款，或基于国会没有说这些事项不得实施，而创设实体性救济。\n\n因此，在 Purdue 一案中，《破产法典》第1123条没有任何内容规定破产法院不得授权非自愿的第三方免责。但联邦最高法院仍然明确指出，这种做法不被允许，因为法典的沉默以及允许此类救济将违背法典的具体规定，即第1141条和免责条款。\n\n在本案中，当然，鉴于法官阁下的裁定，Purdue 案是在此后作出的；但根据 Purdue 案，并在该背景下进行分析，规定诉讼时效的适用条款，即第546条，规定为两年。它没有说明你可以或不可以延长该期间。《破产法典》中没有任何内容规定你可以延长或不可以延长。\n\n因此，受托人援引《破产程序规则》9006，并将其根据9006所请求的内容——列于其答辩状第5页——抱歉，是其答辩状第5段——称为“衡平延期”。这绝对不是衡平延期。\n\n正如法官阁下刚才与严律师所讨论的，关于诉讼时效的衡平原则，我们知道诉讼时效延长的三项主要原则：衡平法上的时效中止、欺诈性隐瞒和发现规则。这里所涉事项，具体而言，是运用一项规则，而不是法规；但我们姑且称其为一项规定，而不是一项普通法规定，也不是存在于衡平原则虚无缥缈领域中的某种规定，而是一项具有普遍适用性的成文规则，以延长具有明确规定的诉讼时效，即第546条。因此，这正是 Purdue 案所警示的情形。\n\n再次，Purdue 案中的反对意见与受托人的看法完全相同。反对意见四十余次提到衡平救济或“衡平”一词的某种变体，其论点是，免责和和解付款解决了那些问题，并确保阿片类药物受害人获得公平且衡平的赔偿。这当然是一个很好的论点，但这并非多数意见。\n\n多数意见另有表述。其指出，面对如此多不利于其法律解释的迹象，反对意见中的方案支持者转而诉诸政策论点。\n\n本案中发生的正是这种情况。这是一项政策论点，主张由于所有这些未被写明的其他事项，法定期间可以被延长。受托人请求衡平延期，必须因 Purdue 案所述的完全相同理由而失败。《破产法典》绝对没有为对成文诉讼时效进行前瞻性延长提供任何机制。\n\n而且，我认为，鉴于 Purdue 案以及该案现在的具体程度，我简要转向法庭在二月裁定中的三项主要认定是重要的。我不想——法官阁下已经作出裁定，而我只是——我认为在该背景下\n\n鉴于 Purdue（普渡），情况略有不同。因此，据我理解，关于为何法官阁下裁定 9006 适用，主要有三项裁决。第一，《规则授权法》并不因传统衡平原则而阻止 9006 的适用；鉴于 Purdue，此点尚不明确。第二，时效期限属于程序性事项，因此受《破产程序规则》约束。第三，《法典》中的时效规定仅在 Title 11 案件被提起后才产生。\n\n回到这一点——请允许我稍作展开。因此，回到《规则授权法》的问题。实质上，《规则授权法》及其相关判例法指出，只要没有任何具体规定表明你不能——你不能这样做，你就可以适用这一点——你可以适用传统的中止时效原则。正如我们所讨论的，传统中止时效原则包括衡平中止、发现规则和欺诈性隐瞒。\n\n使用规则 9006 对法定时效作前瞻性延长，换言之，如法官阁下所解释的，延长提起诉讼请求的期限不同于衡平中止。我百分之百同意。这与衡平无关。\n\n这涉及的是，能否通过以《规则》填补空白，将一项《法典》中任何地方均未规定的延长期限条款嫁接进去？鉴于 Purdue，尚不明确能否采用一种可谓衡平的方法，从《规则》中抽取填补空白的规定并适用于此处。目前并无主张认为存在衡平中止的权利；正如我们刚才讨论的，该主张已被保留。也没有主张存在前瞻性的欺诈性隐瞒或发现规则违反，或者任何其他传统普通法中止时效原则。受托人援引 9006。他并未援引衡平来支持其关于 9006 的论点。转向时效期限是程序性还是实体性的问题。我很抱歉，我不——因此，首先，我们援引——我仅提及 G Club（G俱乐部）书状，因为该书状在主案中。我们在四个对抗程序的书状中提出的论点实质上相同，只是结构略有不同。在 G Club 的第 6 页，我们援引 Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）在 Enterprise Mortgage（企业抵押贷款）案中的裁决；该裁决说明，就权利如何影响案件中的某人而言的实体性和程序性，与就法律选择目的而言某事项是实体性还是程序性，是不同的分析；而后者正是该实体性、程序性分析的来源。我们已在本案的书状中论述了这一点。\n\n随后，Enterprise Mortgage 案中，第二巡回上诉法院说明，关于程序性与实体性的区分，必须从被告的角度审视。因此，在此处，被告、我的委托人，或者任何其他尚未被起诉或甚至不知道自己将被起诉的人——也许在座的其他任何人，我们不知道——从他们的角度看，两年期限已经届满。因此，对他们而言，对截至今日尚未被起诉的一方而言，根据 Enterprise Mortgage，这是一项实体性而非程序性权利。\n\n随后，我们还援引 Aetna Life（安泰人寿）案——其引证为 391 F.3d 401，主要见于我们 G Club 书状的第 6 页——该案适用了 Sarbanes-Oxley（萨班斯-奥克斯利）（听不清）——其审视的是《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》，但也提及 Supreme Court（联邦最高法院）的 Landgraf（兰德格拉夫）案，并说明，恢复先前已过时效的请求权具有不可允许的溯及效力，即追溯延长法定时效期限，从而增加被告对既往行为的责任。\n\n当时，存在一项法律——问题在于该法律是否被追溯适用。此处，该法律不能被追溯适用。法律并未发生变化。所存在的是一项填补空白的规定，即 9006，用于前瞻性延长法定时效。若国会不能通过一项法案且未作具体规定来做到这一点，我们也不能以其他方式做到。这正是 Purdue 所说的。\n\n最后，关于 546 是否因其直到 Title 11 案件被提起后才产生而受中止时效约束；同样，就此法院已经作出裁定。法官阁下适用了 IDB（语音拼写）而非 Butcher（布彻）案，但我认为，我们现在仍需结合 Purdue 审视这些案件。依我看来，Purdue 案似乎表明这并非正确的分析，而应适用 Butcher 案的分析。\n\n法庭：但 Purdue 案中没有任何地方说应当适用 Butcher 案的分析——\n\nSKLARZ 律师：哦，不，不，不，不。\n\n法庭：——事实上，在 Butcher 案中，Butcher 所在巡回区的所有法院都不遵循 Butcher。如果 Purdue 这样说，请告诉我，因为我不认为它对 Butcher 有任何论述。它从未提到过该案。\n\nSKLARZ 律师：哦，我同意，Purdue 没有援引 Butcher。\n\n法庭：好的。\n\nSKLARZ 律师：它所做的是适用类似的分析，即文本分析。你阅读文本。文本清楚。文本适用。\n\n随后，我们在书状中还援引了与此相关的其他案件，比我们在先前书状中援引的更多，涉及《法典》的其他规定。\n\nSKLARZ 律师：抱歉，法官阁下？\n\n法庭：不，我没有任何要说的。请继续。\n\nSKLARZ 律师：好的。那么——如果可以，请给我一点时间，法官阁下？\n\n法庭：当然可以。\n\nSKLARZ 律师：我只需要确认一下我是否还有其他内容。\n\n（停顿）\n\nSKLARZ 律师：简要转向事实论证的正当性。无论法官阁下同意我还是同意受托人，我认为我们都可以同意，前瞻性延长法定时效是非常不寻常的。本案中已经这样做过一次。正如法官阁下所指出的，法官阁下基于极为具体的事实认定，该项非常救济具有证明力。如果法官阁下不同意我关于 Purdue 的论点及我们提出的论点，我仍认为他们无法满足法官阁下在二月裁决中对其施加的举证责任。已不再存在任何非常情形，表明 Kwok（郭文贵）先生做过或未做过任何事情；事实上，经询问，我们知道已有大量信息被交出。信息交出的速度或许不像受托人所希望的那样快，但那并不构成某种形式的妨碍。\n\n例如，受托人称政府尚未交出信息。政府未交出信息，这是否构成政府的妨碍？当然不是。\n\n在交叉询问中，受托人表示每天都会出现更多信息。这在几乎每一项金融欺诈调查中都是事实。\n\n此前，法官阁下认定存在非常事实。我们必须审视自那以后发生了什么。今天我们没有听到任何具有非常性质的事项。Kwok 先生受聘人员所作的抗议或其他行为没有进一步发生。也不存在资金不足——上次中止时效的主要理由。\n\n法庭：好的，我想在这里打断你。我甚至不认为先前裁决中提到过任何抗议，而且我不确定是否提到过资金不足，除非那是提出异议的当事人所作的一项论点，即这应以某种方式说服法院，认定受托人因没有资金聘请法务会计师而未勤勉行事。\n\n因此，为明确起见，当你提及事实基础以及受托人无法满足其举证责任时，关于抗议的论点，我甚至不认为曾被提及。不过，我可能错了；裁定中可能提到过。\n\nSKLARZ 律师：我——\n\n法庭：但就资金而言，资金不足是提出异议的当事人提出的一项主张，旨在向法院证明或说服法院，受托人未勤勉行事；而事实上，我作出了恰恰相反的认定。我认定，对法院而言很清楚的是，受托人已经尽到了超过合理程度的勤勉义务。因此，我不认为关于资金和／或抗议的论点具有说服力。\n\nSKLARZ 律师：而这正是我的——我并不是说它具有说服力；我要说的是，这些事实如今并不存在。我记得 Kwok 对受托人就资金不足进行了询问。据我记得，他表示，他没有聘请法务会计师，是因为其律所不愿与法务会计师按比例平等分配付款，所以他推迟了聘用。但是我们作出——\n\n法庭：不，那根本不是证词；事实上，证词是他没有聘请该会计师，因为该法务会计师希望获得报酬——\n\nSKLARZ 律师：对。\n\n法庭：——而破产财产中没有资金支付法务会计师，且该法务会计师不愿承担风险，即法务会计师将不得不在无力偿债的破产财产中与所有其他管理请求权人共同分配。这是——这是我对证词的记忆。\n\nSKLARZ 律师：我想我的记忆不同，但是——\n\n法庭：哦，你可能是对的，但我只是说这是我的记忆。\n\nSKLARZ 律师：——这可能并不重要。记录下来是有原因的——\n\n法庭：对。\n\nSKLARZ 律师：——而我的观点是，这在当前并非十分相关。受托人今天提出的是，我有很多工作要做，工作很困难，而且工作量很大。我非常同情确有大量工作要做，但我们所讨论的是满足法官阁下在裁决中设定的标准，即非常情形。我想，第一次发生时，它属于非常情形。第二次则是巧合。如果到了第三次，也许那就是一种运作模式。我不知道非常情形何时不再是非常情形。但是，当然，我们——我不确定为何我们现在要根据受托人的动议，在国会规定应为两年的法定时效上再增加整整一年。\n\n因此，我认为，即使法官阁下处理事实问题，其程度也没有达到法官阁下在先前的（听不清）中所裁定的非常程度。但是，法官阁下，我乐于回答任何问题；否则，我的陈述至此结束。\n\n法庭：谢谢。目前我没有任何问题，Sklarz 律师，谢谢。Kim 律师，您希望发言吗？\n\nKIM 律师：谢谢，法官阁下。Austin Kim（奥斯汀·金）代表 Greenwich Land Defendants（格林尼治土地被告）。仅就 Yan 律师提到的内容补充几点。您知道，从我们的立场看，此处正在发生的是，受托人试图在无需请求衡平中止救济的情况下获得该救济，第一；第二，衡平中止是逐案作出的，因为它取决于事实，而受托人寻求的是一项总括命令，某种程度上使受托人无需逐案证明为何其应实际获得衡平中止的救济。因此，就衡平中止而言，您知道，这是一项逐案、具体事实的分析。受托人寻求的实质上是第一次为期六个月的衡平中止，现在又基于实质上相同的事实，寻求第二次为期六个月的衡平中止。\n\n因此，受托人确实就自二月以来已作出的其他努力提供了一些证词，但受托人为说明为何需要额外六个月而提出的大部分事实，均是在一年前已经存在的事实，或是在六个月前已经存在的事实。因此，我并非要质疑受托人在开展调查方面所作努力的勤勉性，但问题并不局限于受托人的勤勉性；而是，这又如何？自二月以来出现了什么如此非同寻常的情况，以至于本院应当行使其裁量权，在受托人未证明新情况为何的情况下，以一揽子方式将时效再延长 25 percent。\n\n诸如“我们收到了 400 份文件、700 份文件或 20,000 份文件”之类的模糊陈述，这很好，但这又如何，对吗？我们不知道这些文件是在何时收到的，也不知道进展如何，而且我认为，允许受托人继续以零散方式获得全面的衡平时效中止救济，且该救济涉及坦率地说并未到庭或尚未被列名的当事人，或仅基于可能存在某些情况的推测，是不公平的。\n\n因此，基于该理由，我们坚持我们最初的异议，即我们不同意本院先前的裁定，即第 546 条时效可以基于我先前的同事们已经提到的同样理由予以延长，我们的意见至此。\n\n本院：好的。谢谢。Bassett 律师（巴塞特律师），您有任何答复吗？\nBASSETT 先生（巴塞特先生）：有，法官阁下，简要答复。\n\n首先，我将回应 Sklarz 律师（斯克拉兹律师）的部分论点，我认为在其陈述的前半部分，他几乎完全聚焦于 Purdue（普渡）案。并且，我理解，法官阁下，您倾向于抓住最高法院一项备受关注的裁决，并将其视为对本动议具有重大意义，但我确实不认为如此。\n\nPurdue 案与本案不可能有更大的不同，尽管 Sklarz 律师试图作出相反的描述。Purdue 案涉及给予非债务人免责；这是《破产法典》中的一个根本性问题，而且我认为（听不清），无论如何讨论这些问题。\n\n在本案中，请求本院延长时效，本院已认定该事项属于程序性而非实体性事项。Purdue 案一方与本院在本动议背景下面临的事项之间，不可能存在更大的鸿沟。还应当结合最高法院就其裁决范围狭窄性所作的明确说明来考虑这一点。\n\n最高法院非常谨慎地表示，其所讨论的是该案中非自愿情形下第三方免责的许可性。\n\n我认为 Sklarz 律师没有说、因为他无法这样说，或者如果我们确实就衡平时效中止发生争议，他日后或许会回来提出这一论点的是：如果将其论点推至其逻辑结论，他实际上是在说，最高法院在 Purdue 案中就非自愿第三方免责作出的裁决，意在表示，对国会制定法中规定的时效进行衡平时效中止永远不被允许。这是其所言的逻辑结论。他谈及异议意见以及最高法院多数意见未予考虑的衡平论点。这实质上就是他正将该论点引向的方向。我认为，对 Purdue 裁决不存在任何合乎逻辑的解读能够作出如此宽泛的理解，法官阁下。\n\n现在，关于事实——并且为了完整说明，法官阁下，关于 9006(b) 以及围绕本院是否有权延长期限的所有法律论点，没有任何新情况。本院的分析及裁定是正确的。没有作出任何介入性判例。不存在任何其他理由说明为何应重新审视该分析，因此，我们请求再次作出同样的命令。\n\n关于各方提出的事实论点，Sklarz 律师以及我相信 Kim 律师（金律师）也曾表示——我认为 Sklarz 律师对此的表述是，本案情形，引用原话，“不再非同寻常”。\n\n法官阁下，我不确定这是什么意思。本案情形要么是非同寻常的，要么不是；我认为没有人能够一本正经地主张，本案并非极其非同寻常，原因在于受托人自案件开始以来所面临的阻挠程度，原因还在于，这是一名声称在本案中申请破产的债务人，据我所知，其名下仅有 3,000 或若干美元现金，尽管他过着亿万富翁的生活。他不得不层层剥开，试图查明这些空壳公司、这些资产实际由何处持有，以及名义上登记在何人名下。说明债务人财务事务真实状况的银行账户和其他交易位于何处？\n\n债务人从未配合。他从未提供账簿和记录，这至今仍影响受托人的调查。本案现在是且一直是非同寻常的。这并未在 February 15th 停止。异议方论点的谬误在于，所有阻挠、本案所有独特情形必然能够在自 February 15th 至今已过去的六个月内得到克服，但正如受托人所证实的，事实并非如此。\n\n而且，法官阁下，在本院作出的命令背景下，延长时效所应审查的是受托人是否勤勉。本院已认定其勤勉。我认为今日的证词仅表明该勤勉性仍在持续。受托人表示，他会在可能的最早时间提交起诉状。他及其团队正勤勉地努力追查额外的 2004 审查对象。他们正在审阅刑事案件中的文件：受托人及其团队正在查阅二万多份文件。Kroll（克罗尔）团队持续分析银行账户；如果这是债务人配合的正常案件，所有这些本应已被提供，因为债务人会提供其账簿和记录的查阅权限。\n\n但受托人仍在继续从事所有这些工作。他已明确证明其努力一直勤勉，而且，法官阁下，我认为，该事实记录再次结合本案自始的背景，充分支持受托人所请求的进一步延长。\n\n如本院没有任何问题，我目前没有进一步陈述。谢谢您，法官阁下。\n\n本院：谢谢。我没有任何问题。\n\nYan 律师（颜律师）、Sklarz 律师，是否还有其他事项？或者——我失去所有人的连接了吗？哦，不，Sklarz 律师仍在线。或者 Kim 律师，您是否有任何希望记入记录的陈述？\n\nSKLARZ 先生（斯克拉兹先生）：仅此一点，法官阁下，我不知道您是否希望我提交——我不知道是否有此必要，但我当然会——我们在陈述中讨论的、关于受托人在案件启动之初所做事项的任何先前庭审记录引述。\n\n本院：从我的角度看，没有必要，谢谢。\n\nSKLARZ 先生：并且非常简要地说，我从未主张 Purdue 排除了衡平时效中止；恰恰相反，我说的是受托人的论点在性质上并非衡平性的。该论点是基于一项规则提出的，并未援引本院真正的衡平管辖权；后者将通过衡平时效中止等普通法原则予以援引。因此，我只是希望确保这一点明确。\n\n谢谢您，法官阁下。\n\n本院：谢谢。\n\n还有其他人希望进一步发言吗？\n\nKIM 先生（金先生）：法官阁下，如果我不提及一点，我将有所疏忽——\n本院：Kim 律师，我先打断您一下，只是为了明确现在发言的是您。因此，Kim 律师，请继续。\nKIM 先生：是的，我是代表 Greenwich Land Defendants（格林尼治土地被告）的 Austin Kim（奥斯汀·金）。抱歉，法官阁下。\n本院：不，没关系。\nKIM 先生：我是代表 Greenwich Land Defendants 的 Austin Kim。我要提出的最后一点是，受托人提出的大部分内容都是关于阻挠或隐瞒的模糊主张，但这正是衡平时效中止或欺诈性隐瞒等衡平原则已经存在的原因。因此，例如，若 700 份文件中的某些文件，或无论何种文件，在 August 15th 之后确实揭示了提起额外对抗程序的某些依据，受托人已获得充分保护。因此，受托人并不需要本院作出的额外命令，实质上给予其六个月的宽限，使其无须为任何特定案件证明衡平时效中止的正当性，因为他们对每个案件——无论已提起或尚未提起——均享有该等权利。因此，我们只是认为，出于对异议方以及尚未到庭的个人的衡平考虑，受托人没有必要获得额外的某种保护，即无需基于某项阻挠主张证明其负担，因为二月提出的同一论点就是今天提出的同一论点。我的意思是，该论点可能还会在明年二月被提出。\n\n在某个时候——我并不是说本案会永远持续下去——但在某个时候，我认为两年的时效期限是出于特定原因而设定的。他们已经获得了 25 percent 的延长。现在，他们正在寻求 50 percent 的延长。在某个时候，我认为本院应要求受托人履行其职责，并让其知道，嘿，如果你们能够证明确实是阻挠导致延误并妨碍获得提起对抗程序所需的信息，你们已经拥有这些权利，而不是预先说，好吧，我们认为存在阻挠，我们正在审查信息，Kroll 正花费一些时间进行调查。\n\n我认为，这不足以构成正当理由，从而实质上以一揽子方式给予他们衡平时效中止，这就是我的全部陈述，法官阁下。\n\n本院：好的。谢谢。好。关于延长期限动议，第一份补充延长动议\n\n关于提交撤销诉讼的截止日期，ECF 3329，我将对此事进行审议并作出相应裁定。非常感谢各位。现在，我们将转向上述关于授权提供资金以维持Mahwah Mansion（马瓦庄园）的紧急动议。对于出席第一项事项的各方，如不愿留下，完全可以离席；但也欢迎各位留至整个听证会结束。谢谢。\n\n身份不明的发言人：谢谢您，法官阁下。\n\nLINSEY先生：谢谢您，法官阁下。我将就经修正的紧急动议发言。我是代表第11章受托人的Patrick Linsey（帕特里克·林赛）。\n\n法庭：好的。\n\nLINSEY先生：经修正的紧急动议已在主案中提交，但涉及Taurus Fund LLC（金牛基金有限责任公司）对抗性诉讼程序23-5017中存在争议的事实。该对抗性诉讼程序系针对Taurus Fund及其共同被告提起，涉及位于新泽西州Mahwah的一座价值$26-and-a-half-million的庄园，该庄园由债务人于2021年12月购得。自法庭在该对抗性诉讼程序中作出临时禁令，直至债务人的刑事审判期间，被告一直为Mahwah Mansion的安保及其他费用提供资金。这些费用是\n\n巨额的。Mahwah Mansion的室内面积约为50,000平方英尺，土地面积约为12 and a half英亩。Mahwah Mansion的安保服务费用约为每周$14,200。被告亦一直在支付该房产的房地产税，约为每季度$70,000。\n\n受托人预计还会有其他费用，例如（听不清）等。为破产财产利益保全Mahwah Mansion的价值十分重要，因此受托人提出本动议，请求依据《破产法典》授权支付这些费用。\n\n法庭已在其就临时禁令作出的裁定中认定，更有可能的是债务人是Mahwah Mansion的受益所有人并控制该庄园。法庭还在临时禁令中指出，在一段时期内，债务人曾向其他个人和实体提供Mahwah Mansion供其使用，因此该庄园常有第三方出入。这凸显了维持安保的重要性，鉴于此前常到访该房产的人员可能造成损害的威胁。\n\n如法庭所知，临时禁令要求被告雇用安保服务。债务人的刑事审判结束后，Taurus Fund告知安保服务管理人，其将不再提供资金。尽管受托人认为Taurus Fund违反了临时禁令，但鉴于受托人预计将在该对抗性诉讼程序中获得法庭判决，确认该庄园属于破产财产，保全该房产的价值十分重要。事实上，根据债务人刑事审判中的证据，受托人关于该房产属于破产财产的主张现已比法庭作出临时禁令命令并在其中作出上述认定时更为有力。\n\n还有一点我遗漏了：我们从Mahwah对抗性诉讼程序中得知，Mahwah Mansion目前未投保；这同样进一步说明，必须采取措施确保该房产得到妥善保护。\n\n受托人动议请求依据《破产法典》第363(b)条授权使用破产财产，以支付Mahwah Mansion的费用，上限为$300,000。我们寻求该项救济，是因为我们尚未获得确认该房产属于破产财产的判决。受托人希望，$300,000的上限将为取得有关该房产所有权判决所需期间发生的任何费用提供充足资金。如有必要调整该上限，拟议命令中已设有相应机制。为明确起见并为记录之目的，我们提交第363(b)条动议，是因为根据法庭的裁定，该房产尚不属于破产财产；但是，一旦该裁定作出，受托人理解，我们将不再需要依据第363(b)条请求本命令所寻求的救济，因为届时维持该房产的付款将属于正常业务过程。该动议还规定，如受托人未能在对抗性诉讼程序中获得判决，确认或者更准确地说裁定Mahwah Mansion属于破产财产，则破产财产将就所垫付费用的数额，对Taurus Fund享有一项由Mahwah Mansion价值担保的债权。这是因为，目前Taurus Fund根据临时禁令负有为相关费用提供资金的义务，但其并未如此行事。并且，为明确起见，在一种假设情形下——我们并不认为这会发生——如破产财产的主张未获支持，Taurus Fund将因破产财产支付这些费用而获得不当得利。\n\n受托人还指出，其所请求的救济并不免除被告在临时禁令下的义务；再次说明，本动议出于实际需要。法官阁下可以作出进一步命令，我们也可以就这些事项继续申请进一步命令；但从实际角度而言，受托人有义务为破产财产保全价值，这正是我们通过本动议所做之事。\n\n昨天，Taurus Fund提交了对该动议的回应，同意受托人请求的救济，如ECF 3392所载拟议命令所规定。自提交该动议以来，受托人与美国受托人的律师进行了磋商，后者建议，拟议命令中依赖于纳入定义的条款，应在拟议命令中明确定义；受托人同意此举合理。\n\n因此，如法庭倾向于准许该动议，受托人拟采取的做法是提交经修订的拟议命令，明确定义其中纳入定义的大写术语；注明Taurus Fund已提交回应，表示其不反对命令中请求的救济；并明确说明今日举行了听证会。我们可以提交该命令——受托人当然可以最迟于明日提交，如非今日晚些时候——并将其发送至法庭书记员副官，抄送Mahwah被告及美国受托人，除非法庭希望我们以其他方式提交。\n\n对此，我很乐意回答法庭可能提出的任何问题。\n\n法庭：目前我没有任何问题，谢谢。\n\nLINSEY先生：谢谢您，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：还有其他人希望就该动议发表意见吗？\n\n（无人作口头回应）\n\n法庭：Claiborn律师（克莱伯恩律师），您是否同意Linsey律师就拟议命令所说的内容？\n\nCLAIBORN女士：是的，法官阁下。美国受托人不反对该动议。\n\n法庭：好的。我已审阅拟议命令——还有其他人希望发表意见吗？抱歉，我不想打断任何人。\n\n（无人作口头回应）\n\n法庭：好的。我已审阅拟议命令，我理解，如果我准许该动议，您将作出一些修改，Linsey律师。我认为您刚才所述的修改没有问题。我认定无人对您的动议提交书面异议。Taurus Fund确实在昨天提交了一份文件——我相信是昨天——其中称其不反对该动议，但反对其认为动议中对Taurus Fund行为的某些表述构成失实描述。\n\n鉴于本案的非常具体情形，以及已在主案和受托人针对Taurus Fund及相关被告提起的对抗性诉讼程序中提请法庭注意的、与Mahwah Mansion有关的问题，我认为所请求的救济在此情形下合理且必要。我们已审查对抗性诉讼程序中的问题，包括该房产未投保的事实，以及该安保公司是作为临时禁令命令的一部分而受聘。我知道受托人目前并未就临时禁令提出任何问题。\n\n基于上述所有理由，经修正的命令动议获准。Linsey律师，您将在明天或后天提交该命令吗？我需要向书记官办公室给出一个日期，以便他们留意该命令。\n\nLINSEY先生：我们将在明天提交，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：谢谢。\n\n您可以直接将其提交至Bridgeport法庭书记员副官的电子邮箱。无需将其登记在案件案卷中。\n\n因此，该动议获准，经修订的拟议命令应于8月14日或之前提交。\n\nLINSEY先生：谢谢您，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：谢谢。\n\n现在，关于那两项——受托人Despins（德斯平斯），我现在忘记了，很抱歉。我想我已经在这里坐了几个小时，但您一开始说过，您认为有某件事需要列入日程，现在我想不起那是什么了，因为这次是Mahwah Mansion事项。还有别的事项吗？\n\nDESPINS先生：嗯，没有。状态会议在——\n\n法庭：对，状态会议。是的，没错。\n\nDESPINS先生：——关于排期。\n\n法庭：那是日程上的第四项事项。\n\n还有另外两项——状态会议已获准；已列入日程。\n\n但让我们先就Genever（杰内弗）对Kwok（郭文贵）的对抗性诉讼程序谈一下；此前已延期数次，但今天未获延期。\n\nDESPINS先生：是的。\n\n法庭：您是否预计——哦，您是否计划继续处理该事项？\n\nDESPINS先生：没有，法官阁下，我们在这件事上疏忽了。我们本应也申请延期。我们将确保完成该事项。因此，该事项不应继续进行。我们对此表示歉意。\n\n法庭：没关系。那么，您将提交一项动议，确定新的——将审前会议延期至未来某一新日期？\n\nDESPINS先生：是的，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：好的。那么我们仅作记录，说明该会议已经举行，但原告将提交，我想，是一项动议或某种文件——将提交——您上次提交的是什么，是正式动议吗？我认为可能是，对，是一项动议，用于——\n\nDESPINS先生：一项同意申请，是的。\n\n法庭：——经同意延期听证会。\n\nDESPINS先生：是的。\n\n法庭：因此，我认为您将再提交一项动议，并建议延期后的审前会议日期，可以吗？\n\nDESPINS先生：是的，法官阁下。\n\n（暂停）\n\n法庭：好的。那么审前会议\n\n90 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 已举行，但将再次延期至一个待定日期，可以吗？\n\n德斯潘律师：谢谢您，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：好的。那么，日程表上的最后一项事项是关于 Taurus Fund（Taurus基金）对抗程序的状态会议。所以，请继续，德斯潘受托人。\n\n德斯潘律师：巴塞特先生将处理此事，法官阁下。谢谢您。\n\n法庭：好的。\n\n巴塞特律师：法官阁下，是的，再次说明，我是来自 Paul Hastings（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所）的 Nick Bassett（尼克·巴塞特），代表 Chapter 11 Trustee（第11章受托人）。法官阁下，对于状态会议而言，我们目前的处境有些不同寻常。如法庭所记得，我们在申请召开状态会议时已概述，相关命令规定，各项诉讼，包括 Mahwah adversary proceeding（马瓦对抗程序），在刑事审判结束后，债务人可以提交通知，表明其拟恢复该对抗程序；此后，各方有七天时间就拟议日程进行协商。我们已将拟议日程发送给代表被告的 Conway Attorney（康威律师）。他确认收悉，但未向我们说明其对该日程的立场。我们在七日期限届满前跟进，申请召开状态会议，但仍未收到任何消息，因此我们随后申请了状态会议。我们至今仍未收到他的任何消息。\n\n4 5 6 7 8 我们所收到的唯一消息是，他就我们刚刚讨论完的另一项动议提交了答复，称其今日事务繁忙，因此不会出席听证会。因此，只有一方当事人出席本次状态会议。\n\n9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 从受托人的角度来看，法官阁下，我们已向被告律师表达的意图是，尽可能迅速地在该对抗程序中推进简易判决。我们已进行了一些证据开示。我们还密切关注了刑事审判，并从该审判中收集了更多信息，拟将其用于支持简易判决。我们认为朝该方向推进不存在任何拖延；我们看不出有任何理由延迟朝该方向推进，而且我们未收到被告律师的任何反对意见，完全没有收到任何答复。\n\n20 21 22 23 24 25 因此，这就是我们的打算。我认为，法官阁下，我们在申请召开状态会议所提交的文件中曾表示，预计于19日提交我们的动议，随后给予被告两周时间答复，然后我们将在一周内回复。我认为我们可能会这样做，并且可以提交一份拟议排期命令，但是\n\n1 出于对正在处理该动议的我方团队同事的尊重，\n\n2 我们可能需要额外几天时间，因此我认为\n3 我们将仅提议一份日程，即我们将提交该\n4 动议，并设定14天的答复期限，随后\n5 设定7天的回复期限。\n6 这就是我们拟采取的做法——\n\n法庭：\n不，我认为我们通常会给予动议21天的\n8 答复期限；这是地区法院的地方法规。\n9\n\n巴塞特律师：\n这没有问题，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：\n好的。\n\n巴塞特律师：\n鉴于资金和\n13 其他问题等情形，我们曾向被告律师提议\n14 迅速推进，但我们乐意给予21天。\n15 我唯一想提出的另一点是，让\n16 法庭知悉，尽管我们没有收到律师就我们的请求、\n17 就我们拟议日程所作的回复，\n18 但我们收到通知称，他们已提交一项撤回移送的\n19 动议——\n\n法庭：\n是的，我看到了。\n\n巴塞特律师：\n——于周五晚上提交。\n\n法庭：\n而且该动议已转交至\n23 地区法院。我认为可能是在\n24 今天转交的。\n\n巴塞特律师：\n正确，法官阁下。\n\n1 好的。我只是想确保法庭\n\n2 知悉此事。而且，显然，在我们看来，如果在法官阁下面前进行\n3 简易判决书面陈述，并由此作出\n4 一项将由上诉法院审查的裁决，\n5 无论如何，我们将根据需要处理该项撤回移送的\n6 动议，但我们不认为该动议会，\n7 您知道，就我们如何在法官阁下面前推进而言，\n8 造成任何问题。\n\n法庭：\n我明白。康威先生可能\n10 不同意，但我相信他会在其书面文件中提出，或者不会提出。\n11 因此，我们将看看事情如何进展。\n\n德斯潘律师：\n法官阁下，我可以说几句吗？我是 Luc Despins（吕克·德斯潘），\n13 第11章受托人。\n\n14 关于21天，我们能否——因为我\n15 感觉我们不会再次收到康威先生的消息。\n16 我可能错了，但是——\n\n法庭：\n您可以请求缩短期限；是的，您可以在\n18 您的排期安排中提出该请求。\n\n德斯潘律师：\n或者，如果他打算提交\n20 某些文件，那么他应当享有其21天期限；但如果他\n21 不打算这么做，我不想白白等待21天。\n\n法庭：\n嗯，我——\n\n德斯潘律师：\n所以我不能保证——\n\n法庭：\n根据地区法院地方法规，\n25 期限是21天，因此，如果您希望缩短期限，您将必须\n\n94 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 提出申请。\n\n德斯潘律师：谢谢您，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：谢谢。巴塞特律师，那么，关于本次状态会议，今天下午我们还有其他可以处理的事项吗？\n\n巴塞特律师：没有，法官阁下。非常感谢您。\n\n法庭：好的。现阶段我不会再安排另一次状态会议。你们只需采取你们认为适当的任何行动，包括如您所提及的，很可能推进简易判决，可以吗？\n\n巴塞特律师：谢谢您，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：好的。那么，关于——我们现已处理完今日日程表上的所有事项，但如同我们在有数项事项的听证结束时经常所做的那样，我询问受托人或任何当事人，各方是否有其他希望与法庭讨论的问题？\n\n德斯潘律师：唯一一点，法官阁下——谢谢您，我是第11章受托人吕克·德斯潘——是我们可能需要，我目前尚不确定，获得协助将 Greenwich Land（格林尼治土地）的产权转移至我作为受托人的名下；为了投保，我需要具有可保利益。我们正在处理此事，处理其技术性问题，但我们\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 3446 提交于 08/21/24 登记于 08/21/24 10:22:10 第94页，共96页\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 3446 提交于 08/21/24 登记于 08/21/24 10:22:10 第95页，共96页\n\n95 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 可能需要，例如，一项法庭命令，指示，例如，某个镇（听不清）或类似机构采取行动，但我们希望避免这一切。我们正在与 Greenwich Land Defendants（格林尼治土地被告）就一项协议进行协商，我认为所有事项均已达成一致，将于8月20日移交占有。因此，如有任何事情发生，将需要在现在至8月20日期间发生，但希望不会有。我们将仅向法官阁下提交一项经协议或经同意的命令。\n\n法庭：好的。谢谢。还有其他人——\n\n德斯潘律师：谢谢。\n\n法庭：——希望就今天下午的任何事项发表意见吗？\n\n（无人作口头答复）\n\n法庭：好的。那么，谢谢各位。今日听证至此结束，这些是今日日程表上的最后事项，因此法庭休庭。\n\n律师：谢谢您，法官阁下。\n\n书记员：法庭休庭。请原谅。\n\n（程序于下午3:24结束。）\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 3446 提交于 08/21/24 登记于 08/21/24 10:22:10 第96页，共96页\n\n1 证明\n\n2 本人证明，据本人所知及能力所及，\n\n3 前述内容系根据\n\n4 上述案件程序的电子录音制作的准确\n\n5 记录。\n\n7 /s/ William J. Garling August 19, 2024\n\n8 William J. Garling（威廉·J·加林），CET-543\n\n9 认证法庭记录员\n\n10 代表 Reliable（可靠）","key_entities":["Despins","Je","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Paul Hastings","CIPA","Guo","Luc Despins"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":2921,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3329,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3392,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":25387,"status":"published","published_at":"2024-08-21 00:00:00","created_at":"2024-08-21","updated_at":"2026-08-23 22:18:09"}