{"id":"court_ctb_346_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":346,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"UNKNOWN","filed_date":"2022-05-11","title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION | ___________________________________________","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| _______________________________________________
In re
Ho Wan Kwok, | | : Chapter 11 | |\n|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--|\n| | | :
: Case No. 22-50073
(JAM) | |\n| | Debtor.1 | :
: | |\n| | ________________________________________________: | : | |\n| Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P., | | :
: | |\n| | Movant | :
: | |\n| v. | | :
: | |\n| Ho Wan Kwok, | | :
: | |\n| | Respondent.
________________________________________________: | :
: | |\n\n# **OPPOSITION OF THE OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED CREDITORS TO PACIFIC ALLIANCE ASIA OPPORTUNITY FUND L.P.'S MOTION TO DISMISS CHAPTER 11 CASE OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PARTIAL JOINDER TO UNITED STATES TRUSTEE'S MOTION FOR AN ORDER DIRECTING THE APPOINTMENT OF A CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE**\n\n1 The Debtor is known by the following names: Guo Wengui; Miles Guo; Miles Kwok; and Ho Wan Kwok.\n\n# **Table of Contents**\n\n| | Page |\n|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|\n| PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
1 | |\n| RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY
3 | |\n| ARGUMENT7 | |\n| I. DISMISSAL OF THE CASE IS NOT
WARRENTED UNDER
11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)7 | |\n| A.
Misuse of the Bankruptcy System Is Not An Independent Ground for
Dismissal Outside the Involuntary Bankruptcy Case Context and, In Any
Event, This Case Is Not a
Misuse of the Bankruptcy System
8 | |\n| B.
Bad Faith Cannot be Established as a Ground for Dismissal
15 | |\n| C.
Section 1112(b)(4) Does Not Support Dismissal23 | |\n| D.
Gross Mismanagement Within the Meaning of Section 1112(b)(4)(b)
Cannot Be Established
25 | |\n| E.
The \"Unusual Circumstances\" Exception in Section 1112(b)(2) Should
Preclude Dismissal26 | |\n| F.
Even if the Court Finds Cause to Dismiss or Convert, Neither Form of
Relief Should be Granted Because the
Appointment of an Examiner
Would Be in the Best Interests of Creditors and the Estate28 | |\n| II.
PAX'S JOINDER IN THE UNITED STATES TRUSTEE'S MOTION
FOR A
CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE30 | |\n| III.
JOINDER IN OBJECTON OF CREDITORS32 | |\n| CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………………………33 | |\n\n## **TABLE OF AUTHORITIES**\n\n**Cases**\n\n#### **Page(s)**\n\n| In re 167 West 133rd Street Housing Development
Fund Corp.,
Case No. 18-12043 (JLG), 2018 WL 4637460 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25,
2018)
15, 16 |\n|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| In re 412 Boardwalk, Inc.,
520 B.R. 126 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2014)
25 |\n| Adams v. Marwil (In re Bayou Group, LLC),
564 F.3d 541 (2d Cir. 2009)29, 30 |\n| In re AMC Realty Corp.,
270 B.R. 132 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001)15 |\n| American National Bank of Austin v. MortgageAmerica Corp. (In re
MortgageAmerica Corp.),
714 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1983)
10 |\n| In re
Artisanal 2015, LLC,
Case No. 17-12319 (JLG), 2017 WL 5125545 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2017)8, 16, 21 |\n| Berman, Trustee for Estate of Michael S. Goldberg, LLC v. LaBonte,
622 B.R. 503 (D. Conn. 2020)20 |\n| In re C–TC 9th Avenue Partnership,
113 F.3d 1304 (2d Cir.1997)18, 19 |\n| Canadian Pacific Forest Products Limited v. J.D. Irving Limited
(In re Gibson
Group, Inc.),
66 F.3d 1436 (6th Cir. 1995)
13 |\n| Cunard Steamship Company Limited v. Salen Reefer Services AG,
773 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1985)10 |\n| Daly v. Deptula (In re Carrozzella & Richardson),
255 B.R. 267 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2000)
16 |\n| In re David X. Manners Company Inc.,
Case No. 15-51490 (JTT), 2018 WL 1057140 (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 23,
2018)
13 |\n| Davis v. M&M Developer, LLC (In re MBM Entertainment, LLC),
531 B.R. 363 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015)15 |\n\n| In re East End Development, LLC,
491 B.R. 633 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2013)15 | |\n|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|\n| In re Express Grain Terminals, LLC,
Case No.: 21-11832-SDM, 2022 WL 1051097 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. Apr. 7,
2022)
27 | |\n| In re First Connecticut Consulting Group, Inc.,
Case No. 02–50852 (JJT), Case No. 02–51167 (JJT), 2018 WL 2121531
(Bankr. D. Conn. May 7, 2018)
26 | |\n| Florida Dept. of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc.,
554 U.S. 33, 126 S.Ct. 2326, 171 L.Ed.2d 203 (2008)22 | |\n| In re Ford Steel, LLC,
629 B.R. 871 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. 2021)
26 | |\n| In re Friedman's, Inc.,
356 B.R. 766 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2006)17 | |\n| In re Gabriel Techs. Corp.,
Case No. No. 13–30340 (DM), 2013 WL 2318581 (Bankr.N.D.Cal. May 28,
2013), appeal dismissed, 2013 WL 4672785 (N.D. Cal. Aug 30, 2013)24 | |\n| In re General Growth Properties, Inc.,
409 B.R. 43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009)16 | |\n| In re Johns-Manville Corp.,
36 B.R. 727 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (Lifland, J.), appeal denied 39 B.R. 234
(S.D.N.Y. 1984),
reargument denied 39 B.R. 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1984),
mandamus denied 749 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1984)11 | |\n| Kalb, Voorhis & Co. v. American Financial Corp.,
8 F.3d 130 (2d Cir.1993)20 | |\n| Keene Corp. v. Coleman
(In re Keene Corp.),
164 B.R. 844
20 | |\n| In re LightSquared Inc.,
513 B.R. 56 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2014)23 | |\n| In re Meier,
Bankruptcy No. 14-bk-10105, Adv. No. 14-ap-237, 2014 WL 5426763
(Bankr. Oct. 21, 2014)
17, 18 | |\n| In re Miller,
496 B.R. 469 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2013)
24 | |\n\n| In re New Towne Development, LLC,
404 B.R. 140 (Bankr. M.D. La. 2009)27, 28, 29 | |\n|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|\n| NLRB v. Martin Arsham Sewing Co.,
873 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1989)
10 | |\n| In re Norwest Company,
LLC, Case No. 20-10990 (MEW), 2020 WL 6927661 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov.
20, 2020)
25 | |\n| In re Purdue
Pharma, L.P.,
633 B.R. 53 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2021), vacated on other grounds 635 B.R. 26
(S.D.N.Y. 2021), appeal pending Nos. 22-85, 22-110 (2d Cir. Jan. 18, 2022)
(argued April 28, 2022)23 | |\n| In re Rent-A-Wreck of America, Inc.,
580 B.R. 364 (Bankr. D. Del. 2018)12, 13 | |\n| In re Residential Capital, LLC,
474
B.R. 112 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012)32 | |\n| Sapphire Development v. McKay,
549 B.R. 556 (D. Conn. 2016)16 | |\n| In re Slettleland,
260 B.R. 657 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001)18 | |\n| In re Soundview Elite, Ltd.,
503 B.R. 571 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014)17 | |\n| St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Pepsico, Inc.,
884 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1989)20 | |\n| In re StatePark Building Group, Ltd.,
316 B.R. 466 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2004)15 | |\n| In re STN Enterprises,
779 F.2d 901 (2d Cir.1985)13 | |\n| In re Sundale, Ltd.,
400 B.R. 890 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009)25 | |\n| Swiatkowski v. Citibank,
745 F.Supp.2d 150 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), aff'd 446 Fed. Appx. 360 (2d Cir. 2011)12 | |\n| In re The 1031 Tax Group, LLC,
374 B.R. 78 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007)26, 30 | |\n\n| In re TMT Procurement Corp.,
534 B.R. 912 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2015)
29 |\n|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| Toibb v. Radloff,
501 U.S. 157, 111 S.Ct. 2197, 115 L.Ed.2d 145 (1991)22 |\n| Tronox Worldwide LLC v. Kerr-McGee Corp. (In re Tronax Inc.),
855 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2017)20 |\n| In re Wally
Findlay Galleries (New York), Inc.,
36 B.R. 849 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984)14 |\n| Wilk Auslander LLP v. Murray (In re Murray),
900 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2018)8, 9, 10 |\n| In re Zamora-Quezada,
622 B.R. 865 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
2017)
25 |\n| Statutes |\n| 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)8 |\n| 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)
17 |\n| 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)30 |\n| 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1)32 |\n| 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)7 |\n| 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1), (2)8 |\n| 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)
8, 15, 23 |\n| 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(B)25 |\n| 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c)(2) and (3)
3 |\n| 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d)3 |\n| 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(a)(10)23 |\n| 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii)
23 |\n| 28 U.S.C. § 15116 |\n\nThe Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the \"Committee\") of the above-named Debtor and Debtor in Possession, Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\" or \"Kwok\"), hereby submits this Opposition to Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.'s (\"PAX\") Motion to Dismiss Chapter 11 Case or, in the Alternative, Partial Joinder to United States Trustee's Motion for an Order Directing the Appointment of a Chapter 11 Trustee, filed on April 6, 2022 (the \"Dismissal Motion\").\n\nIn support of its Opposition, the Committee respectfully represents as follows:\n\n### **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\n1. Whether the result of blind rage, denial, or myopic self-interest, PAX seeks to dismiss this chapter 11 case by mischaracterizing it as simply a two-party dispute between PAX and the Debtor (Dismissal Motion at ¶¶47-51) in which PAX is the only legitimate creditor2 , and in a startling display of missing the forest from the trees, stridently proclaims that dismissal would involve zero \"risk of creditors overrunning the debtor and precluding their equal treatment\" (Dismissal Motion ¶46 ). By its own account, however, in the event of a dismissal of this case, PAX itself would be the overrunning creditor which seeks to preclude equal treatment among all creditors by allowing it to complete its judgment enforcement actions against: (i) the Lady May (Dismissal Motion at 32, CTC Factor 3); (ii) the Debtor's interest in the Sherry-Netherland apartment (*see* Declaration of Peter Friedman in Support of Dismissal Motion,\n\n2 According to PAX, \"[t]his chapter 11 case will not help any legitimate unsecured creditors but will materially prejudice the largest unsecured creditor with a major claim\" (Dismissal Motion at 33, *Syndicom* Factor 3).\n\nhereinafter \"Friedman Dec.,\" Exhibits 30, 31); and (iii) Kwok's \"hidden assets\" that PAX was \"on the cusp of reaching\" before this case was filed (Dismissal Motion at 32). 3\n\n2. While misperceiving itself to be the only creditor whose rights should be taken into account in this case, PAX ignores that its status as a judgment creditor is only the result of having won the race to the courthouse ahead of what it dismisses as mere \"unliquidated\" or \"*de minimis*\" claims that are still in litigation (Dismissal Motion at 33, *Syndicom* Factor 2). Indeed, while the Debtor has listed a total of 159 unsecured creditors on his Schedule F with claims totaling \\$373,803,498.09 (of which PAX was listed with a claim of \\$254,000), 72 of those claims were listed with an \"[u]nknown\" amount because they were in \"[l]itigation\" (ECF No. 78 at 19-23). Thus, once the 72 creditors with \"unliquidated\" claims have an opportunity to file proofs of claim, there is little question that the unsecured claims pool in this case will substantially increase.\n\n3. Just because their claims have not yet gone to judgment, the creditors which the Debtor lists as holding claims in \"unknown\" amounts are no less aggrieved or entitled to consideration in this case than is PAX – perhaps more so, because their claims are based on personal, as opposed to corporate harm. Moreover, inasmuch as a proof of claim deadline has yet to be established in this case, the creditors with so-called \"unliquidated\" claims that, according to PAX, should stand aside while it proceeds to realize upon all of the Debtor's assets, have not yet had an opportunity to file and fully articulate the bases and amounts of their claims. Once that occurs, and as mentioned above, it is likely that the \\$373 million in unsecured claims scheduled by the Debtor will be much greater, as will be the inequity in dismissing this case.\n\n3 Ironically, these judgment enforcement actions, if allowed to take place while other creditors are forced to sit idly by, are precisely the type of actions that the remedy of an involuntary bankruptcy is designed to guard against.\n\n4. While the Debtor has no doubt engaged in contemptuous conduct and financial chicanery prior to effectively being forced to file for chapter 11 relief, he has resigned himself to a full investigation by creditors to determine and establish the scope and extent of his assets, and the chapter 11 process will provide a centralized forum in which to resolve claims, ensure equality of distribution among creditors and prevent a race of diligence outside of bankruptcy that only PAX will win.\n\n5. For these reasons, and as more fully set forth below, this chapter 11 case most assuredly should not be dismissed, but rather retained to allow the Committee to complete its investigation, seek asset recoveries with derivative standing if there is a colorable basis to do so, and negotiate with the Debtor and PAX with the prospect that upon expiration of the Debtor's exclusive period on June 17, 2022, 4 the Committee, PAX or any other party in interest may file its own plan of reorganization.\n\n### **RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY**\n\n6. On February 15, 2022 (the \"Petition Date\"), the Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11, Title 11 of the United States Code (the \"Bankruptcy Code\"). Since that time, the Debtor has remained a debtor-in-possession pursuant to §§1107 and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code.\n\n4 Under 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c)(2) and (3), a debtor's exclusive period within which to file a plan is, initially, on or before the 120th day from the petition date or, if a plan is filed within that period, the debtor has an additional 60 days (from the 120th day) within which to solicit votes on a plan before another party in interest may file a plan. Here, the Debtor filed what he called a \"Proposed Chapter 11 Plan\" on April 10, 2022 (ECF No. 197) (the \"Plan\"), but without a disclosure statement in contravention of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3016(b). Thus, arguably, the Debtor might have an additional 60 days from June 17, 2022 within which to solicit votes on the Plan before the Committee or another party interest could file their own plan, but the Committee would intend to seek to terminate that additional \"exclusive\" period under 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d). Notably, under the proposed Interim DIP Order filed with the Court on May 3, 2022 (ECF No. 315), the Committee may seek to terminate the Debtor's exclusive period after the initial 120 days from the Petition Date (Interim DIP Order ¶6(c)).\n\n7. No trustee or examiner has yet been appointed in the Debtor's bankruptcy case, although on March 19, 2022, the United States Trustee (\"UST\") filed a Motion for Order Directing Appointment of an Examiner, or in the alternative, Motion for Order Directing the Appointment of a Chapter 11 Trustee (the \"Examiner/Trustee Motion\").\n\n8. Oppositions to the Examiner/Trustee Motion have been filed by the Committee, Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund, L.P. (\"PAX\"), and creditors Rui Ma and Weican Meng. The Examiner/Trustee Motion has been continued for hearing to May 25, 2022, the same date as the hearing on the Dismissal Motion.\n\n9. On March 21, 2022, the Committee was officially appointed by the United States Trustee and on March 28, 2022, selected Pullman & Comley, LLC (\"P&C\") as its counsel.5\n\n10. On March 1, 2022, Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. (\"PAX\") filed its Motion of Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. for Entry of an Order Confirming the Inapplicability of the Automatic Stay or, in the Alternative, Relief from the Automatic Stay Pursuant to Section 362(d)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code (ECF No. 57) (the \"PAX Lift Stay Motion\").\n\n11. On March 15, 2022, the Debtor filed its Objection to the PAX Motion, to which PAX filed a Reply on March 18, 2022 (ECF No. 98) (the \"PAX Reply\"). On March 28, 2022, the Debtor filed a Supplemental Objection to the PAX Motion (the \"Debtor Supp. Obj.\"), and on April 6, 2022, the Committee filed its Position Statement in limited support of the PAX Motion.\n\n12. By the PAX Lift Stay Motion, PAX sought to return to its litigation against the Debtor in New York Supreme Court for purposes of compelling the Debtor to return to U.S.\n\n5 On April 29, 2022, this Court entered an order authorizing the retention and employment of P&C as counsel to the Committee.\n\njurisdiction a yacht known as the *Lady May*, which the Debtor and/or the registered owners of the Lady May had been ordered not to remove, but did remove, from the New York court's jurisdiction well over one year ago (PAX Lift Stay Motion, Ex. B, Declaration of Peter Friedman, hereinafter the \"Friedman Lift Stay Motion Dec.,\" ¶2, Ex. 1, February 9, 2022 Decision and Order of Judge Barry R. Ostrager, the \"February 9, 2022 Decision,\" at 2).\n\n13. For his contemptuous conduct in failing to return the *Lady May*, the Debtor was ordered to pay a contempt fine to PAX in the amount of \\$134,000,000 within five days of service of Judge Ostrager's Final Order of Civil Contempt, failing which the court would \"exercise its full authority under New York Judiciary Law § 753\" (Friedman Lift Stay Dec., Ex. 5). The Debtor filed his voluntary chapter 11 petition the day before the contempt fine was due to be paid.\n\n14. Notwithstanding Judge Ostrager's finding that the Debtor not only controls, but \"has much more than a beneficial interest in the Lady May,\" as it \"appears he provided the funds to purchase it and he is the person who principally enjoys the use of the yacht\" (February 9, 2022 Decision at 8), the Debtor continues to maintain that the *Lady May* is owned by an entity known as HK International Funds Investment (USA) Limited, LLC (\"HK USA\"), which is owned by his daughter, Mei Guo.\n\n15. After a series of hearings on the PAX Lift Stay Motion, it was resolved by an extensively negotiated Stipulated Order Compelling HK International Funds Investment (USA) Limited, LLC to Transport and Deliver That Certain Yacht, the \"Lady May\" (ECF No. 299) (the \"Boat Delivery Order\"). In summary, pursuant to the Boat Delivery Order, HK posted \\$37 million in cash with U.S. Bank as escrow agent to secure the return of the Lady May to this jurisdiction by July 15, 2022.\n\n16. On March 20, 2022, the Debtor filed his Declaration in Support of Chapter 11 Case and Certain Motions (ECF No. 107) (\"Kwok Dec.\"). In his declaration, the Debtor represents that among the purposes for filing his chapter 11 case were \"to … (b) afford stakeholders an efficient opportunity to investigate [his] assets, liabilities, and financial affairs, given what [he] perceive[d] to be misunderstandings in that regard; [and] (c) establish what assets are estate property and, in turn, available for distribution to holders of allowed claims\" (Kwok Dec. ¶3).\n\n17. On March 22, 2022, the Debtor filed a Motion for Entry of Interim and Final DIP Orders (I) Authorizing the Debtor to Obtain Unsecured, Subordinated Postpetition Financing, and (II) Scheduling Interim and Final Hearings, and (III) Granting Related Relief (the \"DIP Motion\").\n\n18. By the DIP Motion and the loan for which it seeks court approval (the \"DIP Loan\"), the Debtor and his son, Qiang Guo (the \"Son\"), through the Son's company, Golden Spring (New York), Ltd., 6 proposed a postpetition loan to the Debtor of up to \\$8 million to fund professional fees and other administrative expenses to be incurred in this case. Objections to the DIP Motion were filed by the UST, PAX, the Committee and creditors, Rui Ma and Weican Meng. An evidentiary hearing on the DIP Motion and the objections thereto was held on April 27, 2022.\n\n19. As directed by the Court, and after negotiations among the parties, the Debtor filed a substantially diluted proposed Interim DIP Order with a reduction in the amount to be borrowed, along with a budget, on May 3, 2022, and on May 4, 2002, the Court held a further\n\n6 As the proposed Interim DIP Order reflects, any approval of the borrowing would be without prejudice to the rights of the Committee or any creditor to seek a finding that Golden Spring is the alter ego of the Debtor or that its corporate veil should be pierced.\n\nhearing on the DIP Motion. The matter is currently under advisement. The revised Interim DIP Order provides funding for the Committee's professionals of up to \\$2 million, on an interim basis through May 2022, to investigate and bring claims against insiders of the Debtor and other third parties and for any other purposes consistent with the Committee's statutory powers and duties. The borrowing is to be subordinate in priority to the claims of unsecured creditors and administrative expenses. As a result, if the DIP loan is approved, there should be no accruing administrative expenses as a result of the fees of case professionals.\n\n20. While the case has proceeded apace, the Committee has filed motions for authorization to take Rule 2004 examinations of, and issue subpoenas for document production, to: (i) Gettr USA, Inc, by motion filed on April 25, 2022 (ECF No. 252); (ii) Golden Spring, by motion filed on April 29, 2022 (ECF No. 297); and (iii) HK USA, by motion filed on April 29, 2022 (ECF No. 295). On May 4, 2022, the Court entered an Order Authorizing Rule 2004 Examination of Grettr USA, Inc. by its CEO, Jason Miller.\n\n21. On May 4, 2022, the Committee also filed applications to retain and employ Dundon Advisers LLC as its financial advisor (ECF No. 321) and Gregory A. Coleman of Coleman Worldwide Advisors LLC as its fraud investigation consultant. The Committee is poised to conduct a thorough investigation into the Debtor's assets, financial affairs and possible estate causes of action.\n\n### **ARGUMENT**\n\n# **I. DISMISSAL OF THE CASE IS NOT WARRANTED UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)**\n\n22. PAX has moved to dismiss this case under 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b). That section provides as follows:\n\n(b)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) and subsection (c), on request of a party in interest, and after notice and a hearing, the court shall convert a case under this chapter to a case under chapter 7 or dismiss a case under this chapter, whichever is in the best interests of creditors and the estate, for cause unless the court determines that the appointment under [section 1104\\(a\\)](http)#co_pp_8b3b0000958a4) of a trustee or an examiner is in the best interests of creditors and the estate.\n\n(2) The court may not convert a case under this chapter to a case under chapter 7 or dismiss a case under this chapter if the court finds and specifically identifies unusual circumstances establishing that converting or dismissing the case is not in the best interests of creditors and the estate, and the debtor or any other party in interest establishes that--\n\n(A) there is a reasonable likelihood that a plan will be confirmed within the timeframes established in [sections 1121\\(e\\)](http)#co_pp_7fdd00001ca15) and [1129\\(e\\)](http)#co_pp_7fdd00001ca15) of this title, or if such sections do not apply, within a reasonable period of time; and\n\n(B) the grounds for converting or dismissing the case include an act or omission of the debtor other than under paragraph (4)(A)--\n\n(i) for which there exists a reasonable justification for the act or omission; and\n\n(ii) that will be cured within a reasonable period of time fixed by the court.\n\n11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1), (2). Non-exclusive grounds for cause are set forth in 11 U.S.C. §\n\n1112(b)(4).\n\n# **A. Misuse of the Bankruptcy System Is Not An Independent Ground for Dismissal Outside the Involuntary Bankruptcy Case Context and, In Any Event, This Case Is Not a Misuse of the Bankruptcy System**\n\n23. PAX cites two decisions for the proposition that misuse of the Bankruptcy Code\n\nis \"cause\" for dismissal of a bankruptcy case: *Wilk Auslander LLP v. Murray* (*In re Murray*), 900\n\nF.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2018) and *Taberna Preferrd Funding IV, Ltd. v. Opportunities II Ltd.* (*In re*\n\n*Taberna Preferred Funding IV, Ltd.*). Both of these decisions addressed cause for dismissal in\n\nthe context of cases that were the subject of involuntary petitions under 11 U.S.C. § 303(b).\n\nPAX cites no decision which has applied \"misuse of the Bankruptcy Code,\" *unconnected with*\n\n*\"bad faith*,\" to a voluntary chapter 11 case. 7\n\n7 It is well recognized that \"[t]he rationale for dismissing a case in bad faith 'is that if a petition is not filed in good faith, it is an abuse of judicial process or of the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court'.\" *In re Artisanal 2015, LLC*, Case No. 17-12319 (JLG), 2017 WL 5125545, at \\*8 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2017) (quoting *In re Kingston Square Assoc.,* 214 B.R. 713, 724 (Bankr.\n\n24. As these cases make clear, whether an \"involuntary petition\" is being used by petitioning creditors as an \"[i]nappropriate use of the Bankruptcy Code,\" *Murray*, 900 F.3d at 60, involves considerations that, if applied here, actually support the voluntary chapter 11 filing in this case. In *Murray*, for example, the Second Circuit held it was an inappropriate use of the Bankruptcy Code for a single creditor to file an involuntary petition as a collection device to force a sale of property the debtor owned jointly with his non-debtor spouse when adequate state law remedies existed. *Id.* at 57, 62-63.\n\n25. The Second Circuit emphasized, however, that a completely permissible use of an involuntary bankruptcy petition would be to, as it aptly put it, \"help ensure the orderly and fair distribution of an estate by giving creditors an alternative to watching nervously as assets are depleted, either by the debtor *or by rival creditors who beat them to the courthouse*.\" *Id.* at 59 (emphasis added). When viewed in its proper context, therefore, *Murray* supports the continuation of the Debtor's chapter 11 case because without this bankruptcy proceeding, PAX, as a \"rival creditor\" that beat every other creditor of the Debtor to the courthouse, was poised to complete its judgment enforcement proceedings against the *Lady May* and the Sherry Netherland apartment, and was on the \"cusp of reaching Kwok's hidden assets\" (Dismissal Motion at 32), when this case was filed. This case can now properly prevent PAX from relegating other creditors to \"watching nervously\" as the Debtor's assets are depleted by PAX as a rival creditor that beat them to the courthouse.\n\n26. To the same effect is the decision in *Taberna. Taberna* involved the filing of an involuntary petition under chapter 11 by three holders of senior classes of notes and was opposed by the debtor and five holders of junior classes of notes. *Taberna*, 594 B.R. at 580. The\n\nS.D.N.Y. 1997)). Thus, \"abuse\" or as PAX calls it, \"misuse\" of the bankruptcy process is already\n\nevidence clearly established that the petitioning creditors were using the involuntary proceeding to liquidate collateral solely for their benefit, at the expense of other noteholders, and to rewrite the terms of an indenture agreement to which the petitioning creditors and junior noteholders were parties and that \"independently establishe[d] the parties' agreement as to liquidation.\" *Id.* at 603, 604-05.\n\n27. As in *Murray*, the court in *Taberna* stressed that it is an entirely appropriate use of the bankruptcy process \"to guard against other creditors obtaining an unfair and disproportionate share of the alleged debtor's assets,\" and that a bankruptcy filing that is used \"to achieve objectives that benefit all creditors is consistent with the Bankruptcy Code's goal to secure equal distribution among creditors.\" *Id.* at 601 (internal quotation and citation omitted).\n\n28. Indeed, the Second Circuit and other courts have made clear that the \"guiding premise of the Bankruptcy Code … is the equality of distribution of assets among creditors,\" *Cunard Steamship Company Limited v. Salen Reefer Services AG*, 773 F.2d 452, 459 (2d Cir. 1985), with the added admonition that \"'[t]he road to equity is not a race to the courthouse for the swiftest'.\" *Id.* (quoting *Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd. v. FDIC*, 536 F.2d 509, 513 (2d Cir. 1976)). *See also NLRB v. Martin Arsham Sewing Co.*, 873 F.2d 884, 887 (6th Cir. 1989) (\"[t]hese characteristics of bankruptcy – the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court, the stay of creditors' piecemeal actions to collect the property of the debtor's estate, and the detailed order of distribution of the debtor's assets – protect equal treatment for all creditors and avoid the incoherent dismemberment of the debtor which would occur under a 'first-come-first-served' scheme\"); *American National Bank of Austin v. MortgageAmerica Corp.* (*In re MortgageAmerica Corp.*), 714 F.2d 1266, 1274 (5th Cir. 1983) (\"one of the 'prime bankruptcy\n\nbaked into \"bad faith\" as a ground for dismissal.\n\npolicies' that pervades virtually every provision of the Code is that of 'equality of distribution among creditors,' and, conversely, one the principal bankruptcy *bêtes noires* the 'race of diligence of creditors to dismember the debtor' before its assets are exhausted\") (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 178 *reprinted in* 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.News 5963, 6138).\n\n29. While PAX maintains that the principal purposes of the Debtor's chapter 11 are to relitigate the February 9, 2022 Decision, with its findings that the Debtor has \"the beneficial interest\" in the *Lady May*, and to avoid incarceration, the Committee preliminarily notes that in the words of one well-respected bankruptcy jurist: a bankruptcy \"filing triggers the springing into existence of important constituencies which, along with the debtor, must be protected by a reorganization court. Accordingly, the intense focus on the debtor's motives in filing is misplaced.\" *In re Johns-Manville Corp.*, 36 B.R. 727, 737 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (Lifland, J.), *appeal denied* 39 B.R. 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), *reargument denied* 39 B.R. 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), *mandamus denied* 749 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1984).\n\n30. The sagacious observations of Judge Lifland aside, to the extent that one of the Debtor's purposes in filing for chapter 11 relief was to avoid incarceration, the need for incarceration has now been mooted by the Boat Delivery Order and thus, the essential purpose of further enforcing Judge Ostrager's final order of contempt (Friedman Dec., Ex. 39) (the \"Final Contempt Order\") – to get the *Lady May* back in U.S. jurisdiction – has thereby been vindicated. And although the Debtor has appealed the Final Contempt Order, that maneuver should do little to interfere with marshalling the Debtor's interest in the *Lady May* into this bankruptcy estate. That is because the preclusion principles (res judicata*,* collateral estoppel and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine) that were fulsomely developed in the PAX Reply (ECF No. 98) and in the\n\nCommittee's position statement in limited support of the PAX Motion (ECF No. 167) can be asserted to conclusively determine the estate's interest in the Lady May in the context of HK USA's adversary proceeding, which seeks such a determination (Adv. Pro. No. 22-5003) (the \"Boat Adversary Proceeding\"). 8\n\n31. PAX's second premise that there is an improper use of chapter 11 in this case is because the case supposedly \"does not provide value to creditors that would be lost outside of bankruptcy\" (PAX Motion ¶44). This proposition is absurd. What would be lost to the creditors – other than PAX – is the centralized proceedings before this Court that provide jurisdiction over all of the Debtor's property, wherever located, and that can be used to investigate and recover estate assets for the benefit of all creditors.\n\n32. The decision cited by PAX, *In re Rent-A-Wreck of America, Inc.*, 580 B.R. 364, 373 (Bankr. D. Del. 2018), is not to the contrary and does not support PAX's contention in the slightest. The statement in *Rent-A-Wreck* quoted by PAX was that a bankruptcy case must \"seek to create or preserve some value that would otherwise be lost – not merely distributed to a different stakeholder – outside of bankruptcy\" (PAX Motion ¶44). This statement was not meant to say that if a chapter 11 case is filed to distribute a debtor's assets equally among all creditors, it has no bankruptcy purpose if outside of bankruptcy those same assets with the same value would be available for the taking by one of the stakeholder creditors.\n\n8 Although PAX has not claimed a lien against the *Lady May* and has not been named as an estate representative to defend the Boat Adversary Proceeding, it was confusingly named as a defendant in the Boat Adversary Proceeding. The Committee contends that it, not PAX, is the appropriate estate representative to advance the estate's interest in the *Lady May* in the Boat Adversary Proceeding and intends to seek to intervene therein. It is further noted that \"[a] court may dismiss a claim on res judicata or collateral estoppel grounds on a motion to dismiss, a motion for judgment on the pleadings, or a motion for summary judgment.\" *Swiatkowski v. Citibank*, 745 F.Supp.2d 150, 168 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), *aff'd* 446 Fed. Appx. 360 (2d Cir. 2011).\n\n33. In *Rent-A-*Wreck, the bankruptcy court found that the debtors were solvent, *id.* at 377, and that the purpose of their chapter 11 filing was to redistribute value from a creditor (former founder, David Schwartz), who was found in prepetition litigation to have \"an impliedin-fact royalty and fee-free franchise agreement to run a Rent-A-Wreck in Los Angeles,\" *id.* at 370, to the debtors' shareholder, by seeking to reject Mr. Schwartz's franchise agreement. *Id.* at 383 (and stating that \"[t]he good faith inquiry, therefore, is 'particularly sensitive' where 'the petition seeks to distribute value directly from a creditor to a company's shareholders'\") (quoting *In re Integrated Telecom Express, Inc.,* 384 F.3d 108, 129 (3d Cir. 2004)). That principle simply has nothing to do with this case.\n\n34. PAX's other contention is that this case should be dismissed because the Debtor disclaims he has an interest in the *Lady May*, the Sherry Netherland apartment or any other assets, but adopting the Debtor's position as to what assets are his is a strawman argument. If, as it appears, the Debtor is unwilling to pursue these or any other assets that are found to belong to him, the well-settled doctrine of derivative standing would enable the Committee, or any single creditor for that matter, to pursue such claims of the Debtor as an estate representative if it is found that the Debtor is unjustifiably failing to pursue them. *In re STN Enterprises*, 779 F.2d 901, 904 (2d Cir.1985); *Canadian Pacific Forest Products Limited v. J.D. Irving Limited* (*In re Gibson Group, Inc*.), 66 F.3d 1436 (6th Cir. 1995) (single creditor can be conferred derivative standing); *In re David X. Manners Company Inc*., Case No. 15-51490 (JTT), 2018 WL 1057140, at \\*2 (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 23, 2018) (setting forth elements of derivative standing).\n\n35. PAX contends that the Debtor's express intention to pay all allowed claims in full in the context of this case must mean that the Debtor is engaging in forum shopping by using this chapter 11 case in which to pay claims (Dismissal Motion ¶45). What PAX overlooks is that\n\nnegotiating with 72 or so litigation creditors in piecemeal fashion on liability and damages outside of bankruptcy, while PAX proceeds to realize on all the Debtor's assets – whether the Debtor agrees they are his or not – is not realistically comparable to the results that chapter 11, as a collective proceeding, is designed and has the potential to achieve. In any event, its use certainly does not suggest forum-shopping. And PAX's suggestion that \"there is no risk of creditors overrunning the debtor and precluding their unequal treatment\" ((Dismissal Motion ¶46) is specious. As detailed *infra.*, PAX would be the \"overrunning creditor\" that would seize all of the Debtor's assets, hidden or otherwise, and leave all other creditors holding the bag.\n\n36. PAX's contention that this chapter 11 case is simply a two-party dispute that \"has nothing to do with collective action or multiple parties\" (Dismissal Motion ¶47) defies reality. As set forth *infra.* at ¶¶ 2, 3, at least 72 creditors listed on the Debtor's schedules with unknown amounts have not had the opportunity to file proofs of claim. Once they do, the proofs of claim will supersede how the claims were scheduled, Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3003(c)(4), and they will constitute \"prima facie evidence of the validity and amount of the claim[s].\" Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(f).9 To call this case a two-party dispute simply because most of the non-insider claims have not been finalized by a judgment is to call into question the legitimacy of cases like Johns-\n\n9 In this respect, the Debtor's chapter 11 case is distinguishable from the case in *Wally Findlay Galleries.* In that case, there was no suggestion that there were any creditors other than a single noteholder and the debtor's landlord. The noteholder received a money judgment and the landlord received a judgment of ejectment prior to the chapter 11 filing. *In re Wally Findlay Galleries (New York), Inc.*, 36 B.R. 849, 850-51 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984). Here, the Debtor has legitimate unsecured creditors other than PAX and the Debtor's appeal of the PAX's judgment can easily go forward and be resolved quickly once relief from the automatic stay is granted for purposes of liquidating the claim. As PAX notes, the appeal has been fully briefed and argued and is simply awaiting disposition by the New York Appellate Division, First Department (Dismissal Motion ¶17). Or alternatively, the claim can be conclusively determined in the context of the claims allowance process.\n\nManville, Purdue Pharma, LTL Management and the host of other chapter 11 cases that have been used to address unliquidated tort claims without successful challenge.\n\n37. In further support of dismissal, PAX suggests that the only \"prejudice\" to the Debtor from dismissing the case is that he will not be permitted to perpetuate his ongoing shell game before this Court, but will instead have to answer to Judge Ostrager – where, coincidentally, PAX is the only creditor. In view of the panoply of rights and remedies that are available to creditors in this chapter 11 case, such as the Rule 2004 process and the services of a financial advisor and fraud investigation consultant that will be funded with a subordinated DIP loan if it is approved, to suggest that this Court and this case will enable Kwok \"to perpetuate his ongoing shell game before this Court,\" is mystifying and, more to the point, simply not accurate.\n\n### **B. Bad Faith Cannot be Established as a Ground for Dismissal**\n\n38. Although not an enumerated ground for dismissal or conversion under 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4), bad faith is well recognized as \"cause\" to dismiss or convert a chapter 11 case. But as a ground for dismissal \"the concept of [a] bad faith filing should be used sparingly to avoid denying bankruptcy relief to statutorily eligible debtors, except in extraordinary circumstances.\" *In re AMC Realty Corp.*, 270 B.R. 132, 141 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001). *See also In re StatePark Building Group, Ltd.*, 316 B.R. 466, 476 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2004) (\"[t]o find bad faith, the court must find that the facts surrounding the filing of the petition are particularly egregious\"). As a result, most courts in the Second Circuit hold that both subjective and objective bad faith need to be shown before the case can be dismissed on bad faith grounds. *In re 167 West 133rd Street Housing Development Fund Corp*., Case No. 18-12043 (JLG), 2018 WL 4637460, at \\*8 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2018); *Davis v. M&M Developer, LLC* (*In re MBM Entertainment, LLC*), 531 B.R. 363, 408 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015), *subsequent determination* 2015 WL 3877285 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2015) (determination of prejudgment interest); *In re East End Development,*\n\n*LLC*, 491 B.R. 633, 641 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2013); *In re General Growth Properties, Inc.*, 409 B.R. 43, 56 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). *Compare Sapphire Development v. McKay*, 549 B.R. 556, 567 (D. Conn. 2016) (finding that subjective bad faith alone is sufficient for dismissal).10\n\n39. In order to dismiss a chapter 11 case for bad faith, the moving party bears the burden of establishing that \"it is clear that on the filing date there was no reasonable likelihood that the debtor intended to reorganize and no reasonable probability that it would eventually emerge from bankruptcy proceedings.\" *In re Artisanal 2015, LLC*, Case No. 17-12319 (JLG), 2017 WL 5125545, at \\*8 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2017) (quoting *Baker v. Latham Sparrowbush Assocs*. (*In re Cohoes Indus. Terminal, Inc*.), 931 F.2d 222, 227 (2d Cir. 1991)). *See also 167 West 133rd Street Housing Development Fund,* at \\*8. If that burden is met, \"a rebuttable presumption of bad faith arises and the burden shifts to the debtor 'to establish good and sufficient reasons why the relief should not be granted.\" *Id.* (internal quotation and citation omitted).\n\n#### **(i) Subjective Bad Faith**\n\n40. PAX's claim that Kwok subjectively commenced this case in bad faith boils down to the argument that by filing for chapter 11 relief, Kwok sought to forestall contempt sanctions, including possible imprisonment, and to relitigate cases he previously lost, and that he has no personal assets, business, employees or operations and no legitimate unsecured creditors except for PAX (Dismissal Motion ¶¶57-59).\n\n10 The District Court's decision in *Sapphire* is not binding on this Court and should not be followed as it goes against the weight of authority in this Circuit. *Daly v. Deptula* (*In re Carrozzella & Richardson*), 255 B.R. 267, 272 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2000) (\"[i]t is widely accepted that the decision of one district court judge is not binding on another district judge, even within the same district [citation omitted]. Logically then, a judge of the bankruptcy court—a unit of the district court, 28 U.S.C. § 151—is not bound by the decision of a single district court judge\"). PAX itself acknowledges the requirement of establishing both subjective and objective bad faith (Dismissal Motion ¶56).\n\n41. While the timing of Kwok's chapter 11 filing suggests that one of the purposes of the filing was to avoid having to pay a \\$134 million contempt fine to PAX or suffer possible imprisonment, the desire to invoke the stay itself is not sufficient for bad faith. \"Rather, the debtor must intend to obtain the benefit of the automatic stay for an improper purpose, such as merely to frustrate the rights of creditors rather than to reorganize or have an orderly liquidation.\" *In re Soundview Elite, Ltd.*, 503 B.R. 571, 580 n. 18 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014).\n\n42. What PAX overlooks is that a contempt fine based on a debtor's wrongdoing, which has the effect of harming general unsecured creditors, may be subject to equitable subordination in chapter 11 under 11 U.S.C. § 510(c). *See In re Friedman's, Inc.*, 356 B.R. 766, 774-778 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2006) (based on totality of circumstances court equitably subordinated valid penalty claim under state law to claims of general unsecured creditors). 11 Even if it is not, filing a chapter 11 case to prevent a single creditor from dismembering the debtor's assets and to subject the debtor's financial affairs and potential assets to the scrutiny and investigation of all creditors, as the Debtor is purporting to do (Kwok Dec. ¶3), is not bad faith of the type necessary to support dismissal.\n\n43. A case in point is *In re Meier*, Bankruptcy No. 14-bk-10105, Adv. No. 14-ap-237, 2014 WL 5426763 (Bankr. Oct. 21, 2014). There, a creditor who was the recipient of a \\$10 million jury verdict for punitive damages sought to dismiss the judgment debtor's chapter 11 case, which was commenced before the court had determined compensatory damages or entered a final judgment. *Id.* at \\*1. While recognizing the multi-factor test in the Seventh Circuit that is\n\n11 PAX's Judgment against the Debtor has already afforded it 15% interest on the principal amount owed from and after December 31, *2010* (over 10 years of interest at an exorbitant rate) and then 9% postjudgment interest from and after February 3, 2021. Under the Judgment, PAX's interest claim exceeds the principal amount owed by about \\$24 million (Friedman Dec., Ex. 1).\n\nsimilar to the test set forth in *In re C–TC 9th Avenue Partnership*, 113 F.3d 1304 (2d Cir.1997), the court espoused that the \"'key test' of good faith\" is \"whether the debtor has proposed or can propose a legally and economically feasible plan of reorganization or whether the case and possible plan can otherwise serve a valid reorganization purpose.\" *Id.* at \\*2.\n\n44. To that point, the court found such a valid purpose on the basis that \"[r]easoned decision making should be favored over piecemeal dismemberment as creditors engage in a race to collect assets,\" and that \"[f]iling to forestall a citation lien can be a legitimate use of the Bankruptcy Code because it replaces the race to the courthouse with a collective proceeding.\" *Id.* at \\*3. In denying dismissal, the court reasoned that the moving creditor's \"insistence that he be paid ahead of other creditors is not a reason to dismiss the bankruptcy case, *id.* at \\*4, and that \"Meier's bankruptcy filing is not shown to have been in bad faith because he appears to have a proper reorganizational purpose: creditors have the prospect of recovery in a collective proceeding in bankruptcy instead of from a race to the courthouse outside of bankruptcy.\" *Id.* at \\*5. Similarly, here, PAX's insistence that it be allowed to continue its race to collect the Debtor's assets ahead of other creditors by dismissing this case should not be permitted to prevail.\n\n45. As for the Debtor's purported purpose of filing chapter 11 to relitigate the Final Contempt Order, the Committee agrees that this would not be a proper purpose of filing chapter 11. But in order to satisfy the subjective element of the bad faith inquiry, the moving party must show that the debtor filed chapter 11 with \"intent to use the bankruptcy process *solely* as a means to delay, frustrate and relitigate State court issues,\" *In re Slettleland*, 260 B.R. 657, 661-62 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing *In re C–TC 9th Avenue Partnership*, 113 F.3d 1304 (2d Cir.1997)) (emphasis added), and without any intent to reorganize. *Id.* at 661 (citing *In re*\n\n*Cohoes Industrial Terminal, Inc.*, 931 F.2d 222 (2d Cir.1991) for the proposition that a case \"not filed in bad faith if the debtor had 'some intention of reorganizing'\"). PAX has not established that relitigating state court issues was the Debtor's sole intent in commencing this case. And in any event, even if relitigating the Final Contempt Order was one of the Debtor's purposes, it is a futile one that is easily avoided by moving to dismiss the Boat Adversary Proceeding, or for summary judgment, based on the preclusion principles that have been well-developed in prior pleadings. *See supra.* ¶30.\n\n46. PAX's analysis of the *C-TC* factors, while neatly packaged into a two-page chart, is replete with inaccuracies. First, this case most definitely is not a case with a single asset. There is, at a minimum, the *Lady May*, or the estate's rightful claim to it, and the Debtor's equity interest in the Sherry Netherlands apartment held through Genever Holdings Corp.(\"Genever BVI\"), which was the subject of PAX's turnover proceeding in New York Supreme Court and its veil-piercing claims against Genever Holdings, LLC (\"Genever NY\") and Genever BVI at the time of the Debtor's chapter 11 filing (Dismissal Motion ¶¶ 6, 16, 22). PAX also has veil piercing or alter ego claims pending in the British Virgin Islands against Genever BVI, Bravo Luck Limited, Kwok and his son, Qiang Guo. 12 There are other possible veil piercing or alter ego claims against family members or their purported companies, such as the one PAX suggests exists against Golden Spring (Dismissal Motion ¶21). In addition, the Committee has only recently been able to start its investigation into other hidden assets the Debtor may have.\n\n12 These claims are more fully described in the Second Amended and Restated Settlement Agreement filed in the chapter 11 case of Genever NY, Case No. 20-12411 (JLG) (the \"Genever Chapter 11 Case\") (ECF No. 165-2) (the \"Genever Settlement Agreement\"). The Genever Settlement Agreement describes these claims at ¶1d as the \"BVI Litigation,\" and ¶7b provides that any party may proceed with the BVI Litigation.\n\n47. It is well established that causes of action held by a debtor's estate are property of the estate. *Berman, Trustee for Estate of Michael S. Goldberg, LLC v. LaBonte*, 622 B.R. 503,\n\n527 (D. Conn. 2020). These include veil piercing claims of the type asserted by PAX. *See*\n\n*Kalb, Voorhis & Co. v. American Financial Corp.,* 8 F.3d 130, 132 (2d Cir.1993). *See also St.*\n\n*Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Pepsico, Inc.*, 884 F.2d 688, 701 (2d Cir. 1989) (\"Congress\n\nintended to protect all creditors by making the trustee the proper person to assert claims against\n\nthe debtor. This reasoning extends to common claims against the debtor's alter ego or others who\n\nhave misused the debtor's property in some fashion\"); *Keene Corp. v. Coleman* (*In re Keene*\n\n*Corp*.), 164 B.R. 844, 852 (Bnkr.S.D.N.Y.1994) (\"the trustee has standing to assert claims based\n\nupon piercing the corporate veil or alter ego liability, and creditors are precluded from pursuing\n\nthose claims until they have been abandoned\"). As aptly explained by the Second Circuit:\n\nevery creditor in bankruptcy has an individual claim (set forth in a proof of claim) against the debtor, whether it be in tort (as here), contract, or otherwise. But often there are claims against third parties that wrongfully deplete the debtor's assets. Individual creditors may wish to bring claims against those third parties to seek compensation for harms done to them by the debtor and secondary harms done to them by the third parties in wrongfully diverting assets of the debtor that would be used to pay the claims of the individual creditor. The fact that an individual creditor may seek to do so does not make those secondary claims particular to the creditor, for it overlooks the obvious: *Every creditor has a similar claim for the diversion of assets of the debtor's estate. Those claims are general—they are not tied to the harm done to the creditor by the debtor, but rather are based on an injury to the debtor's estate that creates a secondary harm to all creditors regardless of the nature of their underlying claim against the debtor*.\n\n*Tronox Worldwide LLC v. Kerr-McGee Corp.* (*In re Tronax Inc.*), 855 F.3d 84, 103-04 (2d Cir.\n\n2017) (emphasis added). *See also Trustees of Plumbers Local Union No 1 Welfare Fund,* Civ.\n\nNo. 17-CV-2846-DLI-SJB, 2018 WL 3635049, at \\*1, 11-12 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2018) (creditor's claim that non-debtor entities, denominated as \"Enobrac,\" were alter egos of the debtor, MJM Plumbing, Inc., alleged harm common to all creditors of MJM and thus trustee was proper person to \"assert … common claims against the debtor's alter ego,\" and stating that \"[i]f MJM has been hiding assets with Enobrac or using Enobrac to avoid contractual or other obligations, then Enobrac's assets may be used to satisfy obligations of all creditors\").\n\n48. As a result of the foregoing, describing this case as if it were a single-asset real estate case or as one where the only assets are Kwok's business suits, a dog and speculative litigation claims (Dismissal Motion at 33, *CT-C* Factor 7) is completely inaccurate. And comparing PAX's \"targeting of the *Lady May*\" and the Residence (Sherry Netherland apartment) in the Genever Chapter 11 Case to an \"Asset Subject to Foreclosure\" (Dismissal Motion at 32, *CT-C* Factor 3) adds insult to injury. In truth, these assets were not subject to foreclosure or enforcement of any lien held by PAX at the time the chapter 11 petition was filed, but they will no doubt be confiscated by PAX to the exclusion of other creditors if this case is dismissed.\n\n49. Even more off base is PAX's contention that there are no legitimate creditors in this case other than PAX (Dismissal Motion at 32, *CT-C* Factor 2, *CT-C* Factor 4; Dismissal Motion at 33, *Syndicom* Factor 3). The 72 or so unliquidated litigation claims that are listed on Kwok's Schedule F are creditors who are just as \"legitimate\" as PAX, and when they all are given an opportunity to file proofs of claim, the amounts of their claims, combined with the other claims the Debtor listed with liquidated amounts, will likely exceed the amount of PAX's claims.\n\n### **(ii) Objective Futility**\n\n50. Even if subjective bad faith can be established, the moving party must also demonstrate \"that the Debtor's reorganization efforts would be objectively futile….\" *In re Artisanal 2015, LLC*, Case No. 17-12319 (JLG), 2017 WL 5125545, at \\*12 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2017). A court \"'should reach the conclusion that the Debtor has no demonstrable ability to reorganize only upon the strongest evidentiary showing'.\" *Id.* at \\*10 (quoting *In re*\n\n*RCM Global Long Term Capital Appreciation Fund, Ltd.*, 200 B.R. 514, 520 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996)). Such a showing cannot be made here.\n\n51. This case is not objectively futile. Preliminarily, there is little question that an individual, even one with few non-exempt assets (including a single litigation claim), is eligible for relief under chapter 11. *Toibb v. Radloff*, 501 U.S. 157, 158, 163, 111 S.Ct. 2197, 2198, 2200, 115 L.Ed.2d 145 (1991). And chapter 11 is also legitimately used for liquidations. *Florida Dept. of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc.*, 554 U.S. 33, 37 n. 2, 126 S.Ct. 2326, 2330, n. 2, 171 L.Ed.2d 203 (2008).\n\n52. PAX's characterization of this case as one where \"Kwok's stated goal is to account for his (alleged \\$3,850 worth of) assets\" is demonstrably false. An entirely legitimate and constructive part of this case is to investigate, uncover and marshal for all creditors the assets Kwok is known to have (the *Lady May* and the Sherry Netherland apartment) and those assets that are yet to be discovered or established as property of the estate. In that process, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that the parties will be able to negotiate a plan that would work for all constituents, whether that might involve \"contributions\" from family members or their companies or other sources.\n\n53. Moreover, Kwok is not the only constituent in this case that may seek to confirm a chapter 11 plan of reorganization. Once exclusivity is terminated, the Committee or any other party in interest may file a plan. And PAX's contention that \"its assent will be necessary for any successful plan\" (Dismissal ¶61) is not correct. A plan that would be entirely confirmable, but that would not require PAX's consent, is a form of liquidating plan that would marshal for creditors in the form of a liquidating trust all assets of the Debtor, including causes of action respecting known assets of the Debtor (the *Lady May* and the Sherry Netherland apartment) and\n\nalter ego and veil piercing claims, and once they are liquidated, provide a distribution to creditors on a *pro rata* basis.\n\n54. Under such a plan, PAX's claim could be separately classified from the claims of other unsecured creditors, as PAX has made it abundantly clear that its interests and goals are different than other unsecured creditors, which PAX believes are insignificant or illegitimate. *See e.g. In re Purdue Pharma, L.P.,* 633 B.R. 53, 70 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2021) (\"[a] plan proponent has the right under the Bankruptcy Code to classify similar claims in separate classes if there is a reasonable basis to do so\"), *vacated on other grounds* 635 B.R. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 2021), *appeal pending* Nos. 22-85, 22-110 (2d Cir. Jan. 18, 2022) (argued April 28, 2022); *In re LightSquared Inc.*, 513 B.R. 56, 83 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2014) (\"the separate classification of otherwise substantially similar claims and interests is appropriate so long as the plan proponent can articulate a 'reasonable' (or 'rational') justification for separate classification\"). The class of unsecured claims without PAX, if it votes to accept the plan, would constitute the impaired, accepting class required by 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10). As long as the plan provides that the Debtor will not receive or retain any property, which it would not, PAX could be crammed down under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).\n\n55. Contrary to PAX's contention, it cannot be shown that there is no demonstrable ability for a reorganization in this case.\n\n#### **C. Section 1112(b)(4) Does Not Support Dismissal**\n\n56. Section 1112(b)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that cause exists to convert or dismiss a chapter 11 case if there is \"substantial or continuing loss to or diminution of the estate and the absence of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation.\" 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4).\n\n57. PAX argues there is a \"continuing loss\" to the estate because \"every penny of cash that comes into the estate is either a gift or loan from the assets of family members for\n\npurposes of funding administrative expenses\" (Dismissal Motion ¶65). PAX overlooks, however, that the monthly living expenses that are being funded by Golden Spring are not loans and thus there is no accrual of administrative expenses as a result of those advances.13\n\n58. While the Debtor's March Monthly Operating Report reflects \\$1,276,267 in postpetition payables, this amount obviously represents the accrued, but yet to be allowed professional fees of the Debtor. To the extent the proposed DIP loan is approved and the professional fees are allowed, the fees will be paid from a loan that will be subordinate to administrative expenses and prepetition unsecured claim. That is not in any sense a substantial or continuing loss to or diminution of the estate.\n\n59. Even if professional fees are not allowed to be paid by the DIP loan, the mere accrual of professional fees does not constitute a continuing loss to the estate. *See In re Miller*, 496 B.R. 469, 479 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2013) (\"the accrual of liabilities such as professional fees and/or taxes are not the same as the incurring of actual out-of-pocket losses, such as the dissipation of assets that diminishes the estate.\") (internal quotation and citation omitted). *See also In re Gabriel Techs. Corp.*, Case No. No. 13–30340 (DM), 2013 WL 2318581, at \\*3 (Bankr.N.D.Cal. May 28, 2013) (\"[p]erhaps from an accounting perspective (profit and loss), such accruals [professional fees and Delaware state taxes] would constitute such losses. But the accrual of liabilities are not the same as the incurring of actual out-of-pocket losses, such as the dissipation of assets that diminishes the estate. Leaving the Debtors in possession of the chapter 11 estate is not risking some ever-diminishing pool of assets\"), *appeal dismissed,* 2013 WL 4672785 (N.D. Cal. Aug 30, 2013).\n\n13 The Debtor's Monthly Operating Report for the period ending February 28, 2022 (ECF No. 120) reflects that \\$161,323 in disbursements were made on the Debtor's behalf. It is believed that some\n\n60. Moreover, in this case, there are significant assets that eclipse the amount of accrued professional fees. While the Debtor disputes the assets are his, that does not make it so. Judge Ostrager's finding concerning the Debtor's interest in the *Lady May* should result in its becoming an asset of the estate based on res judicata, collateral estoppel or Rooker-Feldman grounds. And there is a substantial prospect of the same result with respect to the Sherry Netherland apartment. These assets are worth many multiples of the accruing professional fees.\n\n### **D. Gross Mismanagement Within the Meaning of Section 1112(b)(4)(b) Cannot Be Established**\n\n61. The determination of \"gross mismanagement\" under 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(B) is confined to postpetition conduct only. *In re Zamora-Quezada*, 622 B.R. 865, 886 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2017) (\"t]o determine whether a debtor has engaged in gross mismanagement of the estate, the Court must look at the debtor's post-petition conduct only\"). *Accord In re 412 Boardwalk, Inc.*, 520 B.R. 126, 135-36 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2014). PAX's citation to what occurred with the *Lady May* prepetition is therefore not relevant to gross mismanagement under § 1112(b)(4)(B), and the extensive efforts made by all parties to negotiate the consensual Boat Delivery Order demonstrate that Kwok and all interested parties are endeavoring to secure its return postpetition.\n\n62. \"Gross mismanagement suggests some extreme ineptitude\" on the part of the debtor in possession, *In re Sundale, Ltd.,* 400 B.R. 890, 907 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009), and \"contemplates the presentation of actual proof of gross mismanagement, not merely a statement of suspicions or of a desire for further investigation.\" *In re Norwest Company,* LLC, Case No. 20-10990 (MEW), 2020 WL 6927661, at \\*2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2020). While the Committee does not condone the Debtor's patently unreasonable positions that he owns no assets\n\nportion of that amount was used to pay the Debtor's living expenses, but none of the disbursements was recorded as a loan or postpetition payable.\n\nand, in particular, has no interest in the *Lady May* or the Sherry Netherland apartment, the Debtor has at least not failed to disclose the disputes with respect to those assets, and has arranged to fund an investigation into what is believed will show his substantial wealth. While this investigation would be funded by one of the potential targets of recovery for this estate – Golden Spring – the funding is without prejudice to pursuing Golden Spring for estate recoveries. For these reasons, the Committee does not believe that \"gross mismanagement\" can be established.\n\n# **E. The \"Unusual Circumstances\" Exception in Section 1112(b)(2) Should Preclude Dismissal**\n\n63. Section 1112(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the court may not\n\nconvert or dismiss a chapter 11 case \"if the court finds and specifically identifies unusual circumstances establishing that converting or dismissing the case is not in the best interests of creditors and the estate, and the debtor or any other party in interest establishes that –\":\n\n(A) there is a reasonable likelihood that a plan will be confirmed within the timeframes established in sections 1121(e) and 1129(e) of this title, or if such sections do not apply, within a reasonable period of time; and (B) the grounds for converting or dismissing the case include an act or omission of the debtor other than under paragraph (4)(A)-- (i) for which there exists a reasonable justification for the act or omission; and (ii) that will be cured within a reasonable period of time fixed by the court.\n\n11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(2). A court has \"wide discretion\" to determine if \"unusual circumstances\"\n\nexist. *In re The 1031 Tax Group, LLC*, 374 B.R. 78, 93 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007). *See also In re*\n\n*First Connecticut Consulting Group, Inc.*, Case No. 02–50852 (JJT), Case No. 02–51167 (JJT),\n\n2018 WL 2121531, \\*4 (Bankr. D. Conn. May 7, 2018) (\"[t]he statute makes clear that courts\n\nenjoy significant discretion in determining whether unusual circumstances are present\").\n\n64. \"The phrase 'unusual circumstances' is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, but the word 'unusual' contemplates facts that are not common to chapter 11 cases generally.\" *In re* *Ford Steel, LLC*, 629 B.R. 871, 883 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2021) (internal quotation and citation omitted). This may include taking into account \"'the likely consequences of remaining in chapter 11 or converting the case to chapter 7 and consider[ing] what the likely consequences would be in the end result under each chapter [and] if the likely outcome for creditors will be vastly superior under chapter 11, courts find unusual circumstances under § 1112(b)(2)'.\" *In re Express Grain Terminals, LLC*, Case No.: 21-11832-SDM, 2022 WL 1051097, at \\*9 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. Apr. 7, 2022) (quoting *In re Korn,* 523 B.R. 453, 468 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2014)). It also may include considering whether dismissal of the case would allow a single creditor to foreclose on the debtor's assets, thereby \"reduc[ing] the likelihood of payment of legitimate unsecured creditors' claims.\" *In re New Towne Development, LLC*, 404 B.R. 140, 148 (Bankr. M.D. La. 2009).\n\n65. The Debtor's case certainly has facts that are not common to chapter 11 cases generally. The circumstances leading to the chapter 11 filing, the \"family\" assets which would appear to belong to the Debtor, the 100% equity interest the Debtor holds in a multi-million dollar apartment on Fifth Avenue in New York, the finding of a beneficial interest of the Debtor in a \\$37 million yacht, and the various alter ego or veil piercing claims that exist, all serve to establish a lack of commonality with other chapter 11 cases. And similar to the situation in *New Towne Development*, dismissal would enable PAX to marshal all of the Debtor's assets to satisfy its claims only (including a \\$134 million contempt fine that may be subject to equitable subordination).\n\n66. As to the reasonable likelihood of a plan being confirmed within a reasonable time, the Committee submits that since the case is still in its early stages and thus far has been overtaken with litigation over non-plan matters, it is simply not possible to conclude there is no\n\nreasonable prospect for an effective reorganization. *See New Towne Development*, 404 B.R. at 147 (\"[i]t is not possible at this early stage to conclude that New Towne has no reasonable prospect for an effective reorganization\").\n\n67. As to the element required to be established under § 1112(b)(2)(B), the Committee does not believe that grounds for converting or dismissing the case have been established, but if such grounds (other than under § 1112(b)(4)(A)) are determined by the Court to exist, there is a reasonable justification for the chapter 11 filing in that it prevented PAX from continuing its quest to realize upon the Debtor's assets to satisfy its claims – and its claims only.\n\n68. In terms of the cure that is required by § 1112(b)(2)(B)(ii), the Boat Delivery Order should be considered curative of any motive in filing to avoid the consequences of contempt in the New York Supreme Court action. The Boat Delivery Order has effectively secured the *Lady May's* return by putting \\$37 million in cash on the line if it is not returned in good working condition by July 15, 2022. And as PAX has acknowledged by its consent to the Boat Delivery Order, imprisonment of the Debtor was not its primary goal. Thus, imprisonment or other sanctions that might have been meted out by Judge Ostrager must be ruled out as a necessary \"cure\" under § 1112(b)(2)(B)(ii).\n\n69. To the extent the Court finds that a motive to relitigate matters with PAX would be a ground for dismissal, it is easily cured by asserting res judicata, collateral estoppel and/or the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to conclusively determine the Debtor's interest in the *Lady May* in the context of the Boat Adversary Proceeding. *See supra.* ¶30 and n. 8.\n\n**F. Even if the Court Finds Cause to Dismiss or Convert, Neither Form of Relief Should be Granted Because the Appointment of an Examiner Would Be in the Best Interests of Creditors and the Estate**\n\n70. Section 1112(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provides, in pertinent part, that \"the court shall convert … or dismiss a case under this chapter, whichever is in the best interest of\n\ncreditors and the estate, for cause, *unless the court determines that the appointment of … of a trustee or an examiner is in the best interest of the estate*.\" 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1) (emphasis added).\n\n71. \"If the parties disagree on conversion, dismissal or appointment of trustee or examiner, the court should evaluate and choose the alternative that would be most advantageous to the parties and the estate as a whole.\" 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1112.04[7], at 1112-48 (Richard Levin & Henry Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2021). This determination should include an assessment of \"'the interests of *all* creditors.'\" *Id.* at n. 157 (quoting *Rollex Corp. v. Associated Materials, Inc.* (*In re Superior Siding & Window, Inc.*), 14 F.3d 240, 243 (4 th Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original)).\n\n72. Here, if the court finds that cause does exist for conversion or dismissal, it is submitted that the appointment of an examiner would be the most advantageous remedy for the parties and the estate as a whole, because an examiner could work hand-in-hand with the Committee to investigate potential claims and recoveries against third parties and the lawsuits the Debtor claims are valuable assets. *See e.g. In re TMT Procurement Corp.*, 534 B.R. 912, 921-22 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2015) (finding cause for conversion or dismissal but appointing examiner instead to investigate lawsuits). An examiner would also be a less costly, but equally effective, form of relief than would the appointment of a chapter 11 trustee, inasmuch as the level of estate administration and professional fees would be substantially less14 and, at this point\n\n14 In considering the appointment of a chapter 11 trustee, the \"bankruptcy court must bear in mind that the appointment of a trustee may impose a substantial financial burden on a hard pressed debtor seeking relief under the Bankruptcy Code, by incurring the expenditure of substantial administrative expenses caused by further delay in the bankruptcy proceedings.\" *Adams v. Marwil* (*In re Bayou Group, LLC*), 564 F.3d 541, 546-47 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotations and citation omitted).\n\nin the case, the only assets to administer are essentially causes of action15 which the Committee can handle if the Debtor will continue to unjustifiably fail to pursue them.\n\n# **II. PAX'S JOINDER IN THE UNITED STATES TRUSTEE'S MOTION FOR A CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE**\n\n73. Preliminarily, the Committee notes that the current Scheduling Order issued by the Court (ECF No. 274) is with respect to the Dismissal Motion alone, and does not, *e.g.*, provide for the filing of witness or exhibit lists as would be necessary for proceedings to adjudicate the separate contested matter that was initiated by the UST's Examiner/Trustee Motion (which, by the Dismissal Motion, PAX seeks, in the alternative, to \"join\"). Such a separate proceeding would be necessary as the appointment of a chapter 11 trustee is an \"extraordinary\" remedy and carries \"the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that the appointment of a trustee is warranted.\" *Adams v. Marwil* (*In re Bayou Group, LLC*), 564 F.3d 541, 546 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation and citation omitted).\n\n74. If the Court were to take up the Examiner/Trustee Motion on the same schedule as the Dismissal Motion, the Committee is of the position that the appointment of a trustee is not warranted at this time.\n\n75. The determination of whether \"cause\" exists to appoint a chapter 11 trustee under the 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) is a factual determination. *In re The 1031 Tax Group, LLC*, 374 B.R. 78, 86 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007). \"[A] court is given wide latitude in determining whether the challenged conduct rises to the level of 'cause'.\" *Id.* The substantial financial burden and delay inherent in appointing a chapter 11 trustee must be considered. *Bayou Group*¸ 564 F.3d at 546- 47.\n\n15 These would include the estate's claim to ownership of the *Lady May*, the Sherry Netherland apartment\n\n76. The Committee does not believe that cause exists for the appointment of a trustee *at this time*, notwithstanding the Debtor's conflicts of interest and other \"cause\" alleged to exist by PAX. There are adequate procedural and substantive safeguards in place to ameliorate these conflicts by the investigatory process that is underway by the Committee and the doctrine of derivative standing that is available if it is established that colorable claims exist which the Debtor is unjustifiably failing to pursue.\n\n77. It is noted that the primary or preferred form of relief requested by the UST in the Examiner/Trustee Motion is the appointment of an examiner. To the extent the Court finds cause for dismissal or conversion and that the exception contained in § 1112(b)(2) has not been satisfied, the Committee favors the appointment of an examiner. But absent these findings, an examiner is not mandatorily required in this case if the Court does not appoint a trustee.\n\n78. Section 1104(c) of the Bankruptcy Code requires the court to appoint an examiner if it does not appoint a trustee, \"to conduct such examination of the debtor as is appropriate..., if (1) such appointment is in the best interests of creditors … and other interests of the estate; or (2) the debtor's fixed liquidated unsecured debts, other than debts for goods, services or taxes, or owing to an insider, exceed \\$5,000,000.\" 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c).\n\n79. It has been held that based upon the \"as is appropriate\" language in 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c), \"the facts and circumstances of the case may permit a bankruptcy court to deny the request for appointment of an examiner even in cases with more than \\$5 million in fixed debts.\" *In re Residential Capital, LLC*, 474 B.R. 112, 121 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012). This reading would also apply to an examiner appointment that is requested pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1). *Id.* at 117.\n\nand the alter ego and veil piercing claims heretofore discussed.\n\n80. Although the *ResCap* court concluded that the appointment of an examiner was warranted in that particular case, the Committee submits it would be appropriate to withhold such an appointment here while it is given the opportunity with its highly qualified financial advisor and fraud investigation consultant to conduct an investigation. This would allow for substantial cost savings to the estate without sacrificing the extent or quality of the investigation.\n\n## **III. JOINDER IN OBJECTON OF CREDITORS RUI MA, ZHENG WU AND WEICAN MENG**\n\n81. The Committee joins in and adopts by reference the Objection of Creditors Rui Ma, Zheng Wu and Weican Meng to the Dismissal Motion.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 346 Filed 05/11/22 Entered 05/11/22 20:37:45 Page 39 of 40\n\n### **CONCLUSION**\n\n**WHEREFORE**, the Committee respectfully requests that the Court deny the Dismissal\n\nMotion and grant such other or further relief as it may deem just, equitable and proper.16\n\nDated: Bridgeport, Connecticut May 11, 2022\n\n# **OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED CREDITORS OF HO WAN KWOK**\n\nBy: */s/Irve J. Goldman* Irve J. Goldman Jonathan A. Kaplan Pullman & Comley, LLC 850 Main Street, 8th Floor PO Box 7006 Bridgeport, CT 06601-7006 (203) 330-2213 [igoldman@pullcom.com](mailto:igoldman@pullcom.com)\n\nIts Attorneys\n\n16 Just as this Opposition was in the process of being finalized, the Debtor filed the Debtor's Consent to Dismissal of Case (ECF No. 344) and his Withdrawal of the DIP Motion (ECF No. 345). The Committee was given no prior notice of these filings. Despite the Debtor's consent to dismissal, the Committee's opposition to the dismissal as set forth herein remains. At a very minimum, conversion of the case, as opposed to dismissal, must now be given serious consideration. As set forth herein, this case is not just a two-party dispute. Other parties' rights must be considered by the Court, which the Committee looks forward to addressing at the hearing on the Dismissal Motion.\n\n### **CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE**\n\nI Irve J. Goldman, herby certify that on May 11, 2022, the foregoing Opposition Of The Official Committee Of Unsecured Creditors To Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.'S Motion To Dismiss Chapter 11 Case Or, In The Alternative, Partial Joinder To United States Trustee's Motion For An Order Directing The Appointment Of A Chapter 11 Trustee was filed via the Court's CM/ECF electronic filing system (\"CM/ECF\"), which sent notice to all parties receiving notification through CM/ECF.\n\n> */s/ Irve J. Goldman* Irve J. Goldman","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格联邦地区破产法院布里奇波特分庭\n\n关于\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）：第 11 章\n\n：案号 22-50073\n(JAM)\n债务人。1：\n\n________________________________________________：：\nPacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙企业）：\n\n动议提出人：\n\n诉：\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）：\n\n被申请人。\n________________________________________________：：\n\n无担保债权人官方委员会对 PACIFIC ALLIANCE ASIA OPPORTUNITY FUND L.P. 提出的驳回第 11 章案件动议，或作为备选方案，对美国受托人提出的要求指定第 11 章受托人的命令之动议的部分加入之反对意见\n\n1 债务人还使用以下姓名：Guo Wengui；Miles Guo；Miles Kwok；以及 Ho Wan Kwok。\n目录\n\n页码\n\n初步陈述\n\n相关程序经过\n\n论证 7\n一、根据\n11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)，不应驳回本案 7\nA.\n在非自愿破产案件情形之外，滥用破产制度并非\n驳回案件的独立依据；并且无论如何，本案并非\n滥用破产制度\n\nB.\n不能以恶意作为驳回案件的依据\n\nC.\n第 1112(b)(4) 条不支持驳回案件 23\nD.\n不能证明存在第 1112(b)(4)(b) 条所称的严重管理不善\n\nE.\n第 1112(b)(2) 条中的“特殊情形”例外应当\n排除驳回案件 26\nF.\n即使法院认定存在驳回或转换案件的事由，也不应\n授予任何一种救济，因为指定一名审查员\n最符合债权人及破产财产的利益 28\n二、\nPAX 加入美国受托人提出的\n要求指定第 11 章受托人的动议 30\n三、\n加入债权人的异议 32\n结论…………………………………………………………………………………33\n引证目录\n\n判例\n页码\n\nIn re 167 West 133rd Street Housing Development\nFund Corp.,\nCase No. 18-12043 (JLG), 2018 WL 4637460 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25,\n2018)\n15, 16\n\nIn re 412 Boardwalk, Inc.,\n520 B.R. 126 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2014)\n\nAdams v. Marwil (In re Bayou Group, LLC),\n564 F.3d 541 (2d Cir. 2009)29, 30\nIn re AMC Realty Corp.,\n270 B.R. 132 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001)15\nAmerican National Bank of Austin v. MortgageAmerica Corp. (In re\nMortgageAmerica Corp.),\n714 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1983)\n\nIn re\nArtisanal 2015, LLC,\nCase No. 17-12319 (JLG), 2017 WL 5125545 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2017)8, 16, 21\nBerman, Trustee for Estate of Michael S. Goldberg, LLC v. LaBonte,\n622 B.R. 503 (D. Conn. 2020)20\nIn re C–TC 9th Avenue Partnership,\n113 F.3d 1304 (2d Cir.1997)18, 19\nCanadian Pacific Forest Products Limited v. J.D. Irving Limited\n(In re Gibson\nGroup, Inc.),\n66 F.3d 1436 (6th Cir. 1995)\n\nCunard Steamship Company Limited v. Salen Reefer Services AG,\n773 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1985)10\nDaly v. Deptula (In re Carrozzella & Richardson),\n255 B.R. 267 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2000)\n\nIn re David X. Manners Company Inc.,\nCase No. 15-51490 (JTT), 2018 WL 1057140 (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 23,\n2018)\n\nDavis v. M&M Developer, LLC (In re MBM Entertainment, LLC),\n531 B.R. 363 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015)15\n\nIn re East End Development, LLC,\n491 B.R. 633 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2013)15\n\nIn re Express Grain Terminals, LLC,\nCase No.: 21-11832-SDM, 2022 WL 1051097 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. Apr. 7,\n2022)\n\nIn re First Connecticut Consulting Group, Inc.,\nCase No. 02–50852 (JJT), Case No. 02–51167 (JJT), 2018 WL 2121531\n(Bankr. D. Conn. May 7, 2018)\n\nFlorida Dept. of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc.,\n554 U.S. 33, 126 S.Ct. 2326, 171 L.Ed.2d 203 (2008)22\nIn re Ford Steel, LLC,\n629 B.R. 871 (Bankr.\nS.D. Tex. 2021)\n\nIn re Friedman's, Inc.,\n356 B.R. 766 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2006)17\nIn re Gabriel Techs. Corp.,\nCase No. No. 13–30340 (DM), 2013 WL 2318581 (Bankr.N.D.Cal. May 28,\n2013), appeal dismissed, 2013 WL 4672785 (N.D. Cal. Aug 30, 2013)24\nIn re General Growth Properties, Inc.,\n409 B.R. 43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009)16\nIn re Johns-Manville Corp.,\n36 B.R. 727 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (Lifland, J.), appeal denied 39 B.R. 234\n(S.D.N.Y. 1984),\nreargument denied 39 B.R. 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1984),\nmandamus denied 749 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1984)11\nKalb, Voorhis & Co. v. American Financial Corp.,\n8 F.3d 130 (2d Cir.1993)20\nKeene Corp. v. Coleman\n(In re Keene Corp.),\n164 B.R. 844\n\nIn re LightSquared Inc.,\n513 B.R. 56 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2014)23\nIn re Meier,\nBankruptcy No. 14-bk-10105, Adv. No. 14-ap-237, 2014 WL 5426763\n(Bankr. Oct. 21, 2014)\n17, 18\nIn re Miller,\n496 B.R. 469 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2013)\nIn re New Towne Development, LLC,\n404 B.R. 140 (Bankr. M.D. La. 2009)27, 28, 29\n\nNLRB v. Martin Arsham Sewing Co.,\n873 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1989)\n\nIn re Norwest Company,\nLLC, Case No. 20-10990 (MEW), 2020 WL 6927661 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov.\n20, 2020)\n\nIn re Purdue\nPharma, L.P.,\n633 B.R. 53 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2021), vacated on other grounds 635 B.R. 26\n(S.D.N.Y. 2021), appeal pending Nos. 22-85, 22-110 (2d Cir. Jan. 18, 2022)\n(argued April 28, 2022)23\nIn re Rent-A-Wreck of America, Inc.,\n580 B.R. 364 (Bankr. D. Del. 2018)12, 13\nIn re Residential Capital, LLC,\n\nB.R. 112 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012)32\nSapphire Development v. McKay,\n549 B.R. 556 (D. Conn. 2016)16\nIn re Slettleland,\n260 B.R. 657 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001)18\nIn re Soundview Elite, Ltd.,\n503 B.R. 571 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014)17\nSt. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Pepsico, Inc.,\n884 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1989)20\nIn re StatePark Building Group, Ltd.,\n316 B.R. 466 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2004)15\nIn re STN Enterprises,\n779 F.2d 901 (2d Cir.1985)13\nIn re Sundale, Ltd.,\n400 B.R. 890 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009)25\nSwiatkowski v. Citibank,\n745 F.Supp.2d 150 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), aff'd 446 Fed. Appx. 360 (2d Cir. 2011)12\nIn re The 1031 Tax Group, LLC,\n374 B.R. 78 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007)26, 30\n\nIn re TMT Procurement Corp.,\n534 B.R. 912 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2015)\nToibb v. Radloff,\n501 U.S. 157, 111 S.Ct. 2197, 115 L.Ed.2d 145 (1991)22\nTronox Worldwide LLC v. Kerr-McGee Corp. (In re Tronax Inc.),\n855 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2017)20\nIn re Wally\nFindlay Galleries (New York), Inc.,\n36 B.R. 849 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984)14\nWilk Auslander LLP v. Murray (In re Murray),\n900 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2018)8, 9, 10\nIn re Zamora-Quezada,\n622 B.R. 865 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.\n2017)\n\n法规\n11 U.S.C. § 303(b)8\n11 U.S.C. § 510(c)\n\n11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)30\n11 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1)32\n11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)7\n11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1), (2)8\n11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)\n8, 15, 23\n11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(B)25\n11 U.S.C. § 1121(c)(2) and (3)\n\n11 U.S.C. § 1121(d)3\n11 U.S.C.\n§ 1129(a)(10)23\n11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii)\n\n28 U.S.C. § 15116\n\n上述债务人及占有中债务人 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（以下简称“债务人”或“Kwok”）的无担保债权人官方委员会（以下简称“委员会”），特此提交本反对意见，以反对 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（以下简称“PAX”）于 April 6, 2022 提出的驳回第 11 章案件动议，或作为备选方案，对美国受托人提出的要求指定第 11 章受托人的命令之动议的部分加入（以下简称“驳回动议”）。\n\n为支持其反对意见，委员会谨陈述如下：\n\n初步陈述\n\n1. 无论是出于盲目的愤怒、否认还是短视的自身利益，PAX 均试图通过将本第 11 章案件歪曲为仅是 PAX 与债务人之间的双方争议（驳回动议第 ¶¶47-51 段）而予以驳回，并称 PAX 是唯一合法的债权人2；且其令人震惊地只见树木、不见森林，声称驳回案件将不会带来任何“债权人压倒债务人并妨碍其获得平等对待”的“风险”（驳回动议第 ¶46 段）。然而，根据其自身说法，如本案被驳回，PAX 本身将成为压倒其他债权人的债权人，试图通过允许其完成针对下列财产的判决执行行动，排除所有债权人之间的平等对待：(i) Lady May（驳回动议第 32 页，CTC 因素 3）；(ii) 债务人对 Sherry-Netherland 公寓的权益（见为支持驳回动议而提交的 Peter Friedman（彼得·弗里德曼）声明，\n\n2. 根据 PAX 的说法，“本第 11 章案件不会帮助任何合法的无担保债权人，却会实质性地损害拥有重大债权的最大无担保债权人”（驳回动议第 33 页，Syndicom 因素 3）。\n\n下称“Friedman 声明”，证据 30、31）；以及 (iii) 在本案提交前 PAX“即将取得”的 Kwok 的“隐匿资产”（驳回动议第 32 页）。3\n\n2. PAX 错误地认为其是本案中唯一应当受到考虑的债权人，却忽视其作为判决债权人的地位，仅是其在诉讼竞赛中先于其所贬称为仍在诉讼中的、仅属“未确定”或“微不足道”债权的债权人到达法院的结果（驳回动议第 33 页，Syndicom 因素 2）。事实上，债务人在其附表 F 中列明共 159 名无担保债权人，债权总额为 \\$373,803,498.09（其中 PAX 被列为拥有 \\$254,000 的债权），其中 72 项债权因处于“[l]itigation”中而被列为“[u]nknown”金额（ECF No. 78 第 19-23 页）。因此，一旦这 72 名拥有“未确定”债权的债权人有机会提交债权证明，本案中的无担保债权池无疑将大幅增加。\n\n3. 仅因其债权尚未形成判决，债务人列为持有“未知”金额债权的债权人，并不比 PAX 更少受到损害或更不应在本案中获得考量——或许更应如此，因为其债权基于人身而非公司所受的损害。此外，鉴于本案尚未确定提交债权证明的截止日期，依 PAX 所言应在其继续实现债务人全部资产时置身事外的、所谓拥有“未确定”债权的债权人，尚未有机会提交并充分阐述其债权的依据和金额。一旦发生上述情况，如上所述，债务人列明的 \\$373 million 无担保债权很可能将大得多，驳回本案所造成的不公平也将更为严重。\n\n3 具有讽刺意味的是，如允许在其他债权人被迫袖手旁观时进行这些判决执行行动，这些行动正是非自愿破产救济旨在防止的那类行动。\n\n4. 尽管债务人在实际上被迫申请第 11 章救济之前，毫无疑问曾从事令人蔑视的行为和财务欺诈手段，但他已接受由债权人进行全面调查，以确定并查明其资产的范围和程度；而第 11 章程序将提供一个集中审理的平台，以解决债权、确保债权人之间的平等分配，并防止破产程序外的勤勉竞赛——只有 PAX 会在该竞赛中获胜。\n\n5. 基于上述理由，以及如下文更充分阐述，本第 11 章案件显然不应被驳回，而应予保留，以允许委员会完成其调查；如存在有合理依据的理由，则以派生诉讼资格寻求资产追回；并与债务人和 PAX 进行谈判，同时预期在债务人的专属期间于 June 17, 2022 届满后，4 委员会、PAX 或任何其他利害关系方均可提交其自己的重整计划。\n\n相关程序经过\n\n6. 于 February 15, 2022（以下简称“申请日”），债务人根据《美国法典》第 11 编第 11 章（以下简称“破产法典”）提交了自愿申请，寻求救济。自此，债务人一直依照破产法典 §§1107 和 1108 作为占有中债务人。\n\n4 根据 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c)(2) 和 (3)，债务人提交计划的专属期限最初为自申请日后第 120 天当日或之前；或者，如在该期限内提交了计划，则债务人在第 120 天起另有 60 天时间可就该计划征求表决，此后其他利害关系方方可提交计划。在本案中，债务人于 April 10, 2022 提交了其称为“拟议第 11 章计划”的文件（ECF No. 197）（以下简称“计划”），但未附披露说明书，违反了 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3016(b)。因此，可以说，债务人可能自 June 17, 2022 起另有 60 天时间可就该计划征求表决，在委员会或其他利害关系方可提交其自身计划之前；但委员会拟根据 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d) 寻求终止该额外的“专属”期限。值得注意的是，根据于 May 3, 2022 向本院提交的拟议临时 DIP 命令（ECF No. 315），委员会可在自申请日开始的最初 120 天后寻求终止债务人的专属期限（临时 DIP 命令 ¶6(c)）。\n\n7 债务人的破产案件中尚未指定受托人或审查员，尽管 United States Trustee（美国受托人，以下简称“UST”）于 March 19, 2022 提交了要求指定审查员的命令动议，或备选地，要求指定第 11 章受托人的命令动议（以下简称“审查员/受托人动议”）。\n\n8 委员会、Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund, L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙企业，以下简称“PAX”）以及债权人 Rui Ma（马睿）和 Weican Meng（孟维灿）均已提交对审查员/受托人动议的反对意见。审查员/受托人动议的听证已延期至 May 25, 2022，与撤销动议的听证日期相同。\n\n9 于 March 21, 2022，委员会由美国受托人正式指定，并于 March 28, 2022 选定 Pullman & Comley, LLC（普尔曼与康利律师事务所，以下简称“P&C”）担任其法律顾问。5\n\n10 于 March 1, 2022，Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙企业，以下简称“PAX”）提交了 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. 要求作出命令确认自动停止不适用的动议，或备选地，根据《破产法》第 362(d)(2) 条解除自动停止的动议（ECF No. 57）（以下简称“PAX 解除停止动议”）。\n\n11 于 March 15, 2022，债务人提交了对 PAX 动议的异议；PAX 于 March 18, 2022 提交了答复（ECF No. 98）（以下简称“PAX 答复”）。于 March 28, 2022，债务人提交了对 PAX 动议的补充异议（以下简称“债务人补充异议”）；于 April 6, 2022，委员会提交了立场声明，在有限范围内支持 PAX 动议。\n\n12 通过 PAX 解除停止动议，PAX 寻求恢复其在 New York Supreme Court（纽约州最高法院）对债务人提起的诉讼，以迫使债务人将一艘名为 Lady May（“Lady May”号）的游艇返还至美国司法管辖范围；债务人和/或 Lady May 的登记所有人此前曾被命令不得将该游艇移出纽约法院的司法管辖范围，但一年多以前仍将其移出该司法管辖范围（PAX 解除停止动议，Ex. B，Peter Friedman（彼得·弗里德曼）的声明，以下简称“弗里德曼解除停止动议声明”，¶2，Ex. 1，Judge Barry R. Ostrager（巴里·R·奥斯特拉格法官）于 February 9, 2022 作出的判决及命令，以下简称“February 9, 2022 判决”，at 2）。\n\n5 于 April 29, 2022，本院作出命令，授权聘用 P&C 担任委员会的法律顾问。\n\n13 因债务人未能返还 Lady May 的藐视法庭行为，债务人被命令在送达奥斯特拉格法官《民事藐视法庭最终命令》后五日内向 PAX 支付 \\$134,000,000 的藐视法庭罚款；如未支付，法院将“依据 New York Judiciary Law § 753 行使其全部权力”（弗里德曼解除停止动议声明，Ex. 5）。债务人在该藐视法庭罚款到期支付前一日提交了其自愿第 11 章申请。\n\n14 尽管奥斯特拉格法官认定债务人不仅控制 Lady May，而且“对 Lady May 享有远超过受益权益的权益”，因为“看来是其提供了购买该游艇的资金，且其是主要享用该游艇的人”（February 9, 2022 判决 at 8），债务人仍坚持称，Lady May 由名为 HK International Funds Investment (USA) Limited, LLC（香港国际基金投资〈美国〉有限责任公司，以下简称“HK USA”）的实体所有，而该实体由其女儿 Mei Guo（郭美）所有。\n\n15 在就 PAX 解除停止动议进行一系列听证后，该事项通过经广泛协商达成的《命令 HK International Funds Investment (USA) Limited, LLC 运输并交付特定游艇“Lady May”号的协议命令》（ECF No. 299）（以下简称“游艇交付命令”）得到解决。简言之，根据游艇交付命令，HK 向 U.S. Bank（美国合众银行）作为托管代理人存入 \\$37 million 现金，以担保在 July 15, 2022 前将 Lady May 返还至本司法管辖范围。\n\n16 于 March 20, 2022，债务人提交了其支持第 11 章案件及若干动议的声明（ECF No. 107）（“Kwok 声明”）。债务人在其声明中陈述，提交其第 11 章案件的目的包括“……（b）鉴于[其]认为在该方面存在误解，给予利益相关者有效率的机会调查[其]资产、负债和财务事务；[以及]（c）确定哪些资产属于破产财产，并进而可供向获准债权持有人分配”（Kwok 声明 ¶3）。\n\n17 于 March 22, 2022，债务人提交了关于作出临时和最终 DIP 命令的动议：（I）授权债务人取得无担保、次级的申请后融资；（II）安排临时和最终听证；及（III）给予相关救济（以下简称“DIP 动议”）。\n\n18 通过 DIP 动议及其寻求法院批准的贷款（以下简称“DIP 贷款”），债务人及其儿子 Qiang Guo（郭强，以下简称“儿子”）通过儿子的公司 Golden Spring (New York), Ltd.（金泉〈纽约〉有限公司），6 提议向债务人提供最高达 \\$8 million 的申请后贷款，以支付本案将发生的专业费用及其他管理费用。UST、PAX、委员会以及债权人 Rui Ma 和 Weican Meng 均已对 DIP 动议提出异议。于 April 27, 2022，就 DIP 动议及其异议举行了证据听证。\n\n19 按照本院指示，并经各方协商后，债务人于 May 3, 2022 提交了一份实质上缩减的拟议临时 DIP 命令，其中降低了拟借款金额，并附有预算；于 May 4, 2002，本院就 DIP 动议举行了进一步听证。\n\n6 如拟议临时 DIP 命令所示，对该借款的任何批准均不影响委员会或任何债权人寻求认定 Golden Spring 是债务人的另一个自我，或应揭开其公司面纱的权利。\n\n该事项目前正在审议中。经修订的临时 DIP 命令规定，在截至 May 2022 的临时期间内，向委员会的专业人员提供最高达 \\$2 million 的资金，用于调查并对债务人的内部人及其他第三方提起请求权，以及用于符合委员会法定权力和职责的任何其他目的。该借款的优先顺位将低于无担保债权人的债权及管理费用。因此，如 DIP 贷款获批，则不应因案件专业人员的费用而产生持续累积的管理费用。\n\n20 尽管案件迅速推进，委员会已提交动议，寻求获授权对下列主体进行 Rule 2004 审查并发出文件出示传票：(i) Gettr USA, Inc.，动议于 April 25, 2022 提交（ECF No. 252）；(ii) Golden Spring，动议于 April 29, 2022 提交（ECF No. 297）；以及 (iii) HK USA，动议于 April 29, 2022 提交（ECF No. 295）。于 May 4, 2022，本院作出命令，授权通过其首席执行官 Jason Miller（杰森·米勒）对 Grettr USA, Inc. 进行 Rule 2004 审查。\n\n21 于 May 4, 2022，委员会还提交了申请，寻求聘用 Dundon Advisers LLC（邓登顾问有限责任公司）担任其财务顾问（ECF No. 321），并聘用 Coleman Worldwide Advisors LLC（科尔曼全球顾问有限责任公司）的 Gregory A. Coleman（格雷戈里·A·科尔曼）担任其欺诈调查顾问。委员会已准备就债务人的资产、财务事务及可能属于破产财产的诉因进行全面调查。\n\n论证\n\nI. 根据 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)，不应撤销本案\n\n22 PAX 已根据 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) 提出动议，要求撤销本案。该条规定如下：\n\n(b)(1) 除第 (2) 段和第 (c) 小节另有规定外，应利害关系方请求并经通知及听证后，法院应当为债权人和破产财产的最大利益，将本章项下案件转换为第 7 章项下案件，或撤销本章项下案件，以其中较符合债权人和破产财产利益者为准，但存在理由的；除非法院认定根据 [section 1104(a)] 指定受托人或审查员符合债权人和破产财产的最大利益。\n\n(2) 如法院认定并明确指出存在特殊情形，证明转换或撤销案件不符合债权人和破产财产的最大利益，且债务人或其他任何利害关系方证明如下情形，则法院不得将本章项下案件转换为第 7 章项下案件，或撤销本章项下案件：\n\n(A) 在本法典 [sections 1121(e)] 和 [1129(e)] 规定的期限内，或者如该等条款不适用，则在合理期限内，存在计划将获确认的合理可能性；以及\n\n(B) 转换或撤销案件的理由包括债务人在第 (4)(A) 段以外的作为或不作为：\n\n(i) 该作为或不作为具有合理正当理由；以及\n\n(ii) 该作为或不作为将在法院确定的合理期限内得到补救。\n\n11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1), (2)。构成理由的非排他性事由载于 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)。\n\nA. 在非自愿破产案件情形之外，滥用破产制度并非撤销案件的独立理由；无论如何，本案并非滥用破产制度\n\n23 PAX 援引两项判决，主张滥用《破产法典》是撤销破产案件的“理由”：Wilk Auslander LLP v. Murray (In re Murray), 900 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2018) 和 Taberna Preferrd Funding IV, Ltd. v. Opportunities II Ltd. (In re Taberna Preferred Funding IV, Ltd.)。这两项判决均处理了根据 11 U.S.C. § 303(b) 提交非自愿申请的案件中撤销案件的理由。PAX 未援引任何将与“恶意”无关的“滥用《破产法典”适用于自愿第 11 章案件的判决。7\n\n7 众所周知，“因恶意而撤销案件的理由是：‘如申请不是善意提交，即构成对司法程序或破产法院管辖权的滥用。’” In re Artisanal 2015, LLC, Case No. 17-12319 (JLG), 2017 WL 5125545, at *8 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2017)（引自 In re Kingston Square Assoc., 214 B.R. 713, 724 (Bankr.\n\n24 如这些案件所明确表明，申请债权人是否将“非自愿申请”用作“[不]适当使用《破产法典》”，Murray, 900 F.3d at 60，涉及的考量因素如适用于本案，实际上支持本案中自愿提交第 11 章申请。例如，在 Murray 一案中，Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）认定，在存在充分州法救济的情况下，单一债权人将非自愿申请作为催收工具，以迫使出售债务人与其非债务人配偶共同所有的财产，属于不适当使用《破产法典》。Id. at 57, 62-63.\n\n25. 然而，Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）强调，正如其恰当地表述，非自愿破产申请的一种完全正当的用途是，“通过向债权人提供一种替代方案，避免其紧张地看着资产被耗尽——无论是被债务人还是被抢先向法院提起诉讼的竞争债权人耗尽——从而帮助确保财产的有序和公平分配。”Id. at 59（强调系原文所加）。因此，在其适当语境下理解，Murray 支持继续进行债务人的 chapter 11 案件，因为若无本破产程序，PAX 作为一个比债务人的所有其他债权人均抢先向法院提起诉讼的“竞争债权人”，在本案提交时，已准备完成其针对 Lady May 和 Sherry Netherland 公寓的判决执行程序，并且正处于“取得 Kwok 隐藏资产的边缘”（Dismissal Motion at 32）。本案现可适当地防止 PAX 作为一个抢先向法院提起诉讼的竞争债权人，在债务人的资产被 PAX 耗尽时，将其他债权人置于“紧张观望”的境地。\n\n26. Taberna 中的裁决亦具有同样效力。Taberna 涉及三名高级类别票据持有人根据 chapter 11 提交非自愿申请，而债务人及五名次级类别票据持有人对此表示反对。Taberna, 594 B.R. at 580。S.D.N.Y. 1997)). 因此，对破产程序的“滥用”，或者如 PAX 所称的“误用”，已经被纳入作为驳回理由的“恶意”之中。证据明确表明，申请债权人正在利用该非自愿程序，仅为其自身利益而清算担保物，损害其他票据持有人的利益，并重写一份信托契约协议的条款；申请债权人和次级票据持有人均为该协议的当事方，且该协议“独立地确立了当事人就清算所达成的协议”。Id. at 603, 604-05。\n\n27. 与 Murray 一样，Taberna 法院强调，破产程序的一种完全适当的用途是“防止其他债权人取得被主张债务人资产中不公平且不成比例的份额”；以“实现惠及所有债权人的目标”为目的的破产申请，符合 Bankruptcy Code（破产法典）确保债权人之间平等分配的宗旨。Id. at 601（省略内部引文和引注）。\n\n28. 确实，Second Circuit 及其他法院已明确指出，“Bankruptcy Code 的指导性前提……是债权人之间资产分配的平等”，Cunard Steamship Company Limited v. Salen Reefer Services AG, 773 F.2d 452, 459 (2d Cir. 1985)，并进一步告诫：“‘通往公平之路，并非最快者抢先向法院提起诉讼的竞赛。’”Id.（引自 Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd. v. FDIC, 536 F.2d 509, 513 (2d Cir. 1976)）。另见 NLRB v. Martin Arsham Sewing Co., 873 F.2d 884, 887 (6th Cir. 1989)（“破产的这些特征——破产法院的专属管辖权、暂停债权人为收取债务人财产而采取的零星行动，以及债务人资产的详细分配顺序——保障所有债权人获得平等对待，并避免在‘先到先得’机制下将发生的对债务人的无序肢解”）；American National Bank of Austin v. MortgageAmerica Corp. (In re MortgageAmerica Corp.), 714 F.2d 1266, 1274 (5th Cir. 1983)（“几乎贯穿该法典每一条规定的‘主要破产政策’之一，是‘债权人之间分配平等’；反之，破产法最主要的弊害之一，是在资产耗尽之前，‘债权人为肢解债务人而展开的勤勉竞赛’”）（引自 H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 178 reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.News 5963, 6138）。\n\n29. 尽管 PAX 坚称，债务人 chapter 11 的主要目的，是重新审理 February 9, 2022 Decision（2022年2月9日裁决）中关于债务人对 Lady May 享有“受益权益”的认定，并避免被监禁，但委员会首先指出，如一位备受尊敬的破产法官所言：破产“申请触发重要利益相关方的产生，重整法院必须连同债务人一道保护这些利益相关方。因此，过度关注债务人提交申请的动机是错误的。”In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 727, 737 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (Lifland, J.), appeal denied 39 B.R. 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), reargument denied 39 B.R. 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), mandamus denied 749 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1984)。\n\n30. 撇开 Lifland 法官的睿智见解不谈，即使债务人申请 chapter 11 救济的目的之一是避免被监禁，Boat Delivery Order（船舶交付命令）现已使监禁的必要性不复存在，因此，进一步执行 Ostrager 法官最终藐视法庭命令（Friedman Dec., Ex. 39）（“Final Contempt Order（最终藐视法庭命令）”）的根本目的——使 Lady May 回到美国管辖范围内——也由此得以实现。并且，尽管债务人已对 Final Contempt Order 提起上诉，该举措不应对将债务人在 Lady May 中的权益归集至本破产财产造成实质干扰。这是因为，PAX Reply（ECF No. 98）和委员会就有限支持 PAX Motion（ECF No. 167）所提交的立场声明中已充分阐述的排除原则（既判力、禁止反言及 Rooker-Feldman doctrine），可在 HK USA 的对立程序中被援引，以终局确定破产财产对 Lady May 的权益；该程序寻求作出此项确定（Adv. Pro. No. 22-5003）（“Boat Adversary Proceeding（船舶对立程序）”）。8\n\n31. PAX 的第二项前提是，本案对 chapter 11 的使用不当，因为据称本案“并未向债权人提供在破产程序之外将会丧失的价值”（PAX Motion ¶44）。该主张荒谬。债权人——PAX 除外——将会失去的是本法院的集中程序；该程序对债务人的全部财产享有管辖权，无论其位于何处，并可用于调查及追回破产财产资产，以惠及所有债权人。\n\n32. PAX 所援引的裁决，In re Rent-A-Wreck of America, Inc., 580 B.R. 364, 373 (Bankr. D. Del. 2018)，并不相反，也丝毫不支持 PAX 的主张。PAX 所引述的 Rent-A-Wreck 表述为，破产案件必须“寻求创造或保全在破产程序之外原本会丧失的某些价值——而不仅仅是将其分配给不同的利益相关方”（PAX Motion ¶44）。该表述并非意在说明：若某一 chapter 11 案件是为在所有债权人之间平等分配债务人资产而提起，则在破产程序之外，相同价值的同一资产可由某一利益相关方债权人取得时，该案件便不具有破产目的。\n\n8 尽管 PAX 未对 Lady May 主张留置权，且未被指定为破产财产代表以抗辩 Boat Adversary Proceeding，但其令人困惑地被列为 Boat Adversary Proceeding 的被告。委员会主张，应由委员会而非 PAX 作为适当的破产财产代表，在 Boat Adversary Proceeding 中推进破产财产对 Lady May 的权益，并拟寻求介入该程序。还应注意，“法院可以基于既判力或禁止反言理由，在驳回动议、依诉状判决动议或简易判决动议中驳回一项请求。”Swiatkowski v. Citibank, 745 F.Supp.2d 150, 168 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), aff'd 446 Fed. Appx. 360 (2d Cir. 2011)。\n\n33. 在 Rent-A-Wreck 中，破产法院认定债务人具有偿付能力，id. at 377，且其提交 chapter 11 申请的目的，是通过寻求拒绝 Schwartz 先生的特许经营协议，将价值从一名债权人（前创始人 David Schwartz）重新分配给债务人的股东；在申请前诉讼中，Schwartz 被认定享有“一项默示的、免特许权使用费及免费用的特许经营协议，以在洛杉矶经营一家 Rent-A-Wreck”。Id. at 370, 383（并称，“因此，当‘申请寻求将价值直接从债权人分配给公司股东’时，对善意的审查‘尤其敏感’”）（引自 In re Integrated Telecom Express, Inc., 384 F.3d 108, 129 (3d Cir. 2004)）。该原则与本案毫无关系。\n\n34. PAX 的另一项主张是，本案应被驳回，因为债务人否认其对 Lady May、Sherry Netherland 公寓或任何其他资产享有权益；但采纳债务人关于哪些资产属于其所有的立场，是一种稻草人论证。如果，如表面所示，债务人不愿追索这些或任何其他被认定属于其所有的资产，则如认定债务人无正当理由地未追索该等资产，业已确立的衍生诉讼资格原则将使委员会，或就此而言任何单一债权人，能够作为破产财产代表追索债务人的该等请求权。In re STN Enterprises, 779 F.2d 901, 904 (2d Cir.1985); Canadian Pacific Forest Products Limited v. J.D. Irving Limited (In re Gibson Group, Inc.), 66 F.3d 1436 (6th Cir. 1995)（可授予单一债权人衍生诉讼资格）；In re David X. Manners Company Inc., Case No. 15-51490 (JTT), 2018 WL 1057140, at \\*2 (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 23, 2018)（列出衍生诉讼资格的要件）。\n\n35. PAX 主张，债务人在本案背景下明确表示将全额支付所有获准债权，必然意味着债务人通过利用本 chapter 11 案件支付债权而进行法院选择（Dismissal Motion ¶45）。PAX 忽略的是，在破产程序之外，就责任和损害赔偿与约 72 名诉讼债权人逐个进行谈判，同时 PAX 着手变现债务人的全部资产——无论债务人是否同意这些资产属于其所有——在现实上无法与 chapter 11 作为一项集体程序旨在并可能实现的结果相比。无论如何，其使用当然并不表明存在法院选择。并且，PAX 所称“债权人压倒债务人并排除其不平等对待的风险并不存在”（(Dismissal Motion ¶46)）是似是而非的。如后文详述，PAX 将是“压倒性债权人”，其将扣押债务人的全部资产，无论是隐藏的还是其他资产，并使所有其他债权人蒙受损失。\n\n36. PAX 主张，本 chapter 11 案件仅是一场双方争议，“与集体行动或多方当事人毫无关系”（Dismissal Motion ¶47），这与现实不符。如后文 ¶¶ 2、3 所述，债务人财产清单中列有至少 72 名金额不明的债权人，且他们尚未有机会提交债权证明。一旦其提交，债权证明将取代债权在财产清单中的列示方式，Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3003(c)(4)，并将构成“债权有效性和金额的初步证据”。Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(f)。9 仅仅因为大多数非内部人债权尚未由判决确定，便将本案称为双方争议，就是对诸如 Johns- 之类案件的正当性提出质疑。\n\n9 在这方面，债务人的第11章案件有别于 Wally Findlay Galleries 一案。在该案中，没有迹象表明除一名票据持有人和债务人的房东之外还存在任何其他债权人。票据持有人在第11章申请提交之前获得了一项金钱判决，房东则获得了一项驱逐判决。In re Wally Findlay Galleries (New York), Inc., 36 B.R. 849, 850-51 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984)。在本案中，除 PAX 外，债务人还有合法的无担保债权人；一旦为确定该债权金额之目的解除自动中止，债务人对 PAX 判决的上诉即可顺利继续进行并迅速得到解决。正如 PAX 所指出，该上诉已完成书面陈述和辩论，现仅待 New York Appellate Division, First Department（纽约上诉分庭第一部门）作出裁决（Dismissal Motion ¶17）。或者，该债权可在债权核定程序中得到最终确定。\n\nManville、Purdue Pharma、LTL Management 以及大量其他用于处理尚未确定金额的侵权债权且未受到成功挑战的第11章案件。\n\n37. 为进一步支持驳回，PAX 主张，对债务人驳回本案所造成的唯一“不利影响”是，他将不被允许在本院继续其持续进行的障眼法，而必须转而向 Judge Ostrager（奥斯特拉格法官）作出交代——恰好 PAX 在该处是唯一债权人。鉴于在本第11章案件中债权人可获得的各种权利和救济，例如 Rule 2004 程序，以及如获批准将由一笔次级 DIP 贷款提供资金的财务顾问和欺诈调查顾问服务，称本院和本案将使 Kwok（郭文贵）“能够在本院继续其持续进行的障眼法”，令人费解，而且更关键的是，根本不准确。\n\nB. 不得以恶意作为驳回理由\n\n38. 尽管恶意并非 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4) 规定的驳回或转换的列举理由，但其被广泛认可为驳回或转换第11章案件的“事由”。但作为驳回理由，“除非在特殊情形下，‘恶意提交申请’这一概念应谨慎适用，以避免剥夺法定合格债务人获得破产救济的权利。”In re AMC Realty Corp., 270 B.R. 132, 141 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001)。另见 In re StatePark Building Group, Ltd., 316 B.R. 466, 476 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2004)（“[t]o find bad faith, the court must find that the facts surrounding the filing of the petition are particularly egregious”）。因此，第二巡回区的大多数法院认为，只有同时证明主观恶意和客观恶意，案件方可基于恶意理由被驳回。In re 167 West 133rd Street Housing Development Fund Corp., Case No. 18-12043 (JLG), 2018 WL 4637460, at *8 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2018); Davis v. M&M Developer, LLC (In re MBM Entertainment, LLC), 531 B.R. 363, 408 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015), subsequent determination 2015 WL 3877285 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2015) (确定判决前利息); In re East End Development,\n\nLLC, 491 B.R. 633, 641 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2013); In re General Growth Properties, Inc., 409 B.R. 43, 56 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009)。比较 Sapphire Development v. McKay, 549 B.R. 556, 567 (D. Conn. 2016)（认定仅主观恶意即足以构成驳回理由）。10\n\n39. 为以恶意为由驳回第11章案件，提出动议的一方负有举证责任，证明“显然在申请提交之日，债务人既无任何合理可能意图重整，也无任何合理可能最终摆脱破产程序。”In re Artisanal 2015, LLC, Case No. 17-12319 (JLG), 2017 WL 5125545, at *8 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2017)（引述 Baker v. Latham Sparrowbush Assocs. (In re Cohoes Indus. Terminal, Inc.), 931 F.2d 222, 227 (2d Cir. 1991)）。另见 167 West 133rd Street Housing Development Fund, at *8。如该举证责任得到满足，“即产生恶意的可反驳推定，且举证责任转移至债务人，要求其‘证明为何不应给予该救济的充分且正当理由。’”Id.（省略内部引文和引用）。\n\n(i) 主观恶意\n\n40. PAX 关于 Kwok 主观上恶意启动本案的主张，归结为以下论点：Kwok 通过申请第11章救济，意图阻止藐视法庭制裁，包括可能的监禁，并重新审理其先前败诉的案件；且他没有个人资产、企业、雇员或经营活动，除 PAX 外没有合法的无担保债权人（Dismissal Motion ¶¶57-59）。\n\n10 Sapphire 一案中地区法院的裁决对本院不具有约束力，且不应予以遵循，因为其违反了本巡回区内占主导地位的权威意见。Daly v. Deptula (In re Carrozzella & Richardson), 255 B.R. 267, 272 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2000)（“[i]t is widely accepted that the decision of one district court judge is not binding on another district judge, even within the same district [citation omitted]. Logically then, a judge of the bankruptcy court—a unit of the district court, 28 U.S.C. § 151—is not bound by the decision of a single district court judge”）。PAX 自身亦承认需要同时证明主观恶意和客观恶意（Dismissal Motion ¶56）。\n\n41. 虽然 Kwok 提交第11章申请的时间表明，提交申请的目的之一是避免向 PAX 支付 $134 million 的藐视法庭罚款或遭受可能的监禁，但希望援引中止本身不足以构成恶意。“相反，债务人必须意图为不当目的取得自动中止的利益，例如仅为挫败债权人的权利，而非进行重整或有序清算。”In re Soundview Elite, Ltd., 503 B.R. 571, 580 n. 18 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014)。\n\n42. PAX 所忽视的是，基于债务人不当行为、且会损害普通无担保债权人的藐视法庭罚款，可能根据 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) 在第11章案件中被衡平居次。见 In re Friedman's, Inc., 356 B.R. 766, 774-778 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2006)（法院基于整体情形，将州法下有效的罚金债权衡平居次于普通无担保债权人的债权）。11 即便不是如此，为防止单一债权人肢解债务人的资产，并使债务人的财务事务和潜在资产接受所有债权人的审查和调查，而如债务人所称其正在做的那样（Kwok Dec. ¶3），提交第11章案件并非支持驳回所需类型的恶意。\n\n43. 一个恰当的例子是 In re Meier, Bankruptcy No. 14-bk-10105, Adv. No. 14-ap-237, 2014 WL 5426763 (Bankr. Oct. 21, 2014)。在该案中，一名因惩罚性赔偿而获得 $10 million 陪审团裁决的债权人，寻求驳回判决债务人的第11章案件；该案件在法院确定补偿性赔偿或作出终局判决之前启动。Id. at *1。尽管承认第七巡回区的多因素检验与 In re C–TC 9th Avenue Partnership, 113 F.3d 1304 (2d Cir.1997) 所列检验相似，法院主张，善意的“‘关键检验’”在于“债务人是否已经提出或能够提出一项在法律上和经济上可行的重整计划，或者案件及可能的计划是否能够以其他方式服务于有效的重整目的。”Id. at *2。\n\n11 PAX 对债务人的判决已使其自 December 31, 2010 起就所欠本金获得 15% 利息（以过高利率计算超过 10 年的利息），并自 February 3, 2021 起获得 9% 的判决后利息。根据该判决，PAX 的利息债权超过所欠本金约 $24 million（Friedman Dec., Ex. 1）。\n\n44. 就此而言，法院基于以下理由认定存在此种有效目的：“当债权人竞相收取资产时，应当优先采取审慎的决策，而非零散地肢解资产”；并且，“为阻止传唤留置权而提交申请可以是对《破产法典》的合法运用，因为其以集体程序取代了竞相向法院提起诉讼。”Id. at *3。在驳回驳回动议时，法院推理称，提出动议的债权人“坚持要求其先于其他债权人获得清偿，并非驳回破产案件的理由”，id. at *4，并称“未显示 Meier 的破产申请系恶意提交，因为其似乎具有正当的重整目的：债权人有希望在破产中的集体程序中获得受偿，而非在破产程序外竞相向法院提起诉讼。”Id. at *5。同样地，在本案中，PAX 坚持要求通过驳回本案而获准继续先于其他债权人竞相收取债务人资产的主张，不应被允许得逞。\n\n45. 关于债务人声称为重新审理 Final Contempt Order（终局藐视法庭命令）而提交第11章申请的目的，委员会同意，这并非提交第11章申请的正当目的。但为满足恶意审查的主观要件，提出动议的一方必须证明，债务人提交第11章申请时“意图仅将破产程序作为拖延、挫败和重新审理州法院争议的手段”，In re Slettleland, 260 B.R. 657, 661-62 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001)（引述 In re C–TC 9th Avenue Partnership, 113 F.3d 1304 (2d Cir.1997)）（着重号为原文所加），且无任何重整意图。Id. at 661（引述 In re Cohoes Industrial Terminal, Inc., 931 F.2d 222 (2d Cir.1991)，其主张若债务人具有“某种重整意图”，案件“并非恶意提交”）。PAX 未能证明，重新审理州法院争议是债务人启动本案的唯一意图。无论如何，即使重新审理 Final Contempt Order 是债务人的目的之一，这也是徒劳的目的；基于先前书状中已充分形成的排除原则，通过提出驳回 Boat Adversary Proceeding（Boat 对抗程序）的动议，或提出简易判决动议，即可轻易避免。见上文 ¶30。\n\n46. PAX 对 C-TC 因素的分析，尽管被整齐地编入一张两页图表，却充满不准确之处。首先，本案绝非单一资产案件。至少存在 Lady May，或破产财产对其享有的正当请求权，以及债务人通过 Genever Holdings Corp.（Genever BVI）持有的对 Sherry Netherlands 公寓的权益；该公寓在债务人提交第11章申请时，是 PAX 在 New York Supreme Court（纽约州最高法院）提起的交付程序及其针对 Genever Holdings, LLC（Genever NY）和 Genever BVI 的揭开公司面纱主张的标的（Dismissal Motion ¶¶ 6, 16, 22）。PAX 还在 British Virgin Islands（英属维尔京群岛）针对 Genever BVI、Bravo Luck Limited、Kwok 及其儿子 Qiang Guo（郭强）提出了待决的揭开公司面纱或另我主张。12 此外，还可能存在针对家庭成员或其声称所属公司的其他揭开公司面纱或另我主张，例如 PAX 所称针对 Golden Spring 存在的主张（Dismissal Motion ¶21）。另外，委员会只是最近才得以开始调查债务人可能拥有的其他隐藏资产。\n\n12 这些主张在 Genever NY 的第11章案件中提交的 Second Amended and Restated Settlement Agreement（第二次修订及重述和解协议）中有更完整的描述，Case No. 20-12411 (JLG)（“Genever Chapter 11 Case”）（ECF No. 165-2）（“Genever Settlement Agreement”）。Genever Settlement Agreement 在 ¶1d 中将这些主张描述为“BVI Litigation”，且 ¶7b 规定任何一方均可继续进行 BVI Litigation。\n\n47. 债务人破产财产持有的诉因属于破产财产，是一项已经确立的原则。Berman, Trustee for Estate of Michael S. Goldberg, LLC v. LaBonte, 622 B.R. 503,\n\n527（D. Conn. 2020）。这包括 PAX 所主张类型的揭开公司面纱请求。参见 Kalb, Voorhis & Co.（Kalb, Voorhis & Co.）v. American Financial Corp.（American Financial Corp.）, 8 F.3d 130, 132 (2d Cir.1993)。另见 St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co.（St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co.）v. Pepsico, Inc.（Pepsico, Inc.）, 884 F.2d 688, 701 (2d Cir. 1989)（“国会意在通过使受托人成为对债务人主张请求的适格主体，来保护所有债权人。该推理延伸至针对债务人的另一个自我或以某种方式滥用债务人财产的其他人的共同请求”）；Keene Corp.（Keene Corp.）v. Coleman（In re Keene Corp.）, 164 B.R. 844, 852 (Bnkr.S.D.N.Y.1994)（“受托人有资格基于揭开公司面纱或另一个自我责任主张请求，且债权人在该等请求被放弃之前不得追诉该等请求”）。正如 Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）恰当地解释：\n\n破产程序中的每一债权人均对债务人享有一项个人请求权（载于债权申报中），无论该请求权基于侵权（如本案）、合同或其他事由。然而，通常亦存在针对不当耗减债务人资产的第三方的请求。个别债权人可能希望针对该等第三方提出请求，以寻求就债务人对其造成的损害以及第三方不当转移本可用于偿付该个别债权人请求的债务人资产而对其造成的次生损害获得赔偿。个别债权人可能试图如此主张，并不使该等次生请求成为该债权人特有的请求，因为这忽略了显而易见的一点：每一债权人对债务人破产财产资产被转移均享有类似请求。该等请求具有一般性——它们并非与债务人对该债权人造成的损害相联系，而是基于对债务人破产财产造成的损害；该损害对所有债权人造成次生损害，而不论其对债务人所享有的基础请求的性质为何。\n\nTronox Worldwide LLC（Tronox Worldwide LLC）v. Kerr-McGee Corp.（Kerr-McGee Corp.）（In re Tronox Inc.）, 855 F.3d 84, 103-04 (2d Cir. 2017)（着重号为原文所加）。另见 Trustees of Plumbers Local Union No 1 Welfare Fund（Plumbers Local Union No 1 Welfare Fund 的受托人）, Civ. No. 17-CV-2846-DLI-SJB, 2018 WL 3635049, at \\*1, 11-12 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2018)（债权人关于被称为“Enobrac”的非债务实体是债务人 MJM Plumbing, Inc.（MJM Plumbing, Inc.）另一个自我的请求，主张的是 MJM 全体债权人共同遭受的损害，因此受托人是“针对债务人的另一个自我主张……共同请求”的适格主体，并指出，“[如] MJM 一直与 Enobrac 隐藏资产，或利用 Enobrac 规避合同或其他义务，则 Enobrac 的资产可用于清偿所有债权人的债务”）。\n\n48. 鉴于上述情况，将本案描述为仿佛其是一宗单一资产房地产案件，或者描述为唯一资产是 Kwok（郭文贵）的商务西装、一条狗和推测性的诉讼请求的案件（Dismissal Motion at 33, CT-C Factor 7），完全不准确。而将 PAX 在 Genever Chapter 11 Case 中对 Lady May（Lady May号）及 Residence（住所）（Sherry Netherland apartment（Sherry Netherland公寓））的“瞄准”比作“一项受止赎约束的资产”（Dismissal Motion at 32, CT-C Factor 3），更是雪上加霜。事实上，在提交 chapter 11 申请时，该等资产并不受 PAX 持有的任何留置权的止赎或执行约束；但如本案被驳回，PAX 无疑将排除其他债权人而没收该等资产。\n\n49. PAX 所称本案中除 PAX 外不存在其他合法债权人的主张（Dismissal Motion at 32, CT-C Factor 2, CT-C Factor 4; Dismissal Motion at 33, Syndicom Factor 3）更是毫无根据。Kwok 的 Schedule F 所列约 72 项未确定金额的诉讼请求所对应的债权人与 PAX 同样“合法”；当他们均获得提交债权申报的机会时，其请求金额与债务人列明具体金额的其他请求合计，很可能超过 PAX 请求的金额。\n\n(ii) 客观上的无效性\n\n50. 即使能够证明主观恶意，动议方还必须证明“债务人的重组努力在客观上将是无效的……”。In re Artisanal 2015, LLC, Case No. 17-12319 (JLG), 2017 WL 5125545, at \\*12 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2017)。法院“‘只有在最有力的证据证明下，方应得出债务人明显不具备重组能力的结论’”。Id. at \\*10（引自 In re RCM Global Long Term Capital Appreciation Fund, Ltd., 200 B.R. 514, 520 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996)）。本案无法作出此种证明。\n\n51. 本案在客观上并非无效。首先，毫无疑问，个人即使仅拥有少量非豁免资产（包括一项单独的诉讼请求），亦有资格根据 chapter 11 获得救济。Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 158, 163, 111 S.Ct. 2197, 2198, 2200, 115 L.Ed.2d 145 (1991)。而且，chapter 11 亦可合法用于清算。Florida Dept. of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 37 n. 2, 126 S.Ct. 2326, 2330, n. 2, 171 L.Ed.2d 203 (2008)。\n\n52. PAX 将本案描述为“Kwok 的既定目标是对其（据称价值 \\$3,850 的）资产进行清点”的说法显然不实。本案完全合法且具有建设性的一部分，是为全体债权人调查、发现并归集已知属于 Kwok 的资产（Lady May 和 Sherry Netherland 公寓），以及尚待发现或确定为破产财产的资产。在该过程中，当事人并非不可能就一项可对所有利益相关方有效的计划进行协商，无论该计划是否可能涉及家庭成员、其公司或其他来源的“出资”。\n\n53. 此外，Kwok 并非本案中唯一可能寻求确认 chapter 11 重组计划的利益相关方。一旦专属期终止，委员会或任何其他利害关系方均可提交计划。PAX 所称“任何成功的计划均需要其同意”（Dismissal ¶61）的主张也不正确。一种完全可以获得确认、但无需 PAX 同意的计划，是一种清算计划形式：该计划将以清算信托形式为债权人归集债务人的全部资产，包括有关债务人已知资产（Lady May 和 Sherry Netherland 公寓）的诉因，以及另一个自我和揭开公司面纱请求；并在该等资产清算后，按比例向债权人分配。\n\n54. 根据该等计划，PAX 的请求可以与其他无担保债权人的请求单独分类，因为 PAX 已明确表示，其利益和目标与其他无担保债权人不同；PAX 认为后者不重要或不合法。参见，例如 In re Purdue Pharma, L.P., 633 B.R. 53, 70 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2021)（“若存在合理依据，计划提出人有权根据 Bankruptcy Code（破产法）将相似请求分类至不同类别”），基于其他理由被撤销，635 B.R. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 2021)，上诉待决 Nos. 22-85, 22-110 (2d Cir. Jan. 18, 2022)（于 April 28, 2022 辩论）；In re LightSquared Inc., 513 B.R. 56, 83 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2014)（“只要计划提出人能够阐明单独分类的‘合理’（或‘理性’）理由，对其他方面实质相似的请求和权益进行单独分类即属适当”）。不包括 PAX 的无担保请求类别，如其投票接受该计划，即构成 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) 所要求的受损且接受计划的类别。只要计划规定债务人不会取得或保留任何财产——而其不会如此——即可依 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) 对 PAX 实施强制批准。\n\n55. 与 PAX 的主张相反，不能证明本案不存在明显的重组能力。\n\nC. Section 1112(b)(4)（第1112(b)(4)条）不支持驳回\n\n56. Bankruptcy Code（破产法）Section 1112(b)(4)（第1112(b)(4)条）规定，如存在“破产财产遭受重大或持续损失或贬损，且不存在合理的恢复可能性”，即存在将 chapter 11 案件转换或驳回的事由。11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)。\n\n57. PAX 主张，破产财产存在“持续损失”，因为“进入破产财产的每一分钱现金，要么是赠与，要么是来自家庭成员资产的贷款，目的在于支付管理费用”（Dismissal Motion ¶65）。然而，PAX 忽略了 Golden Spring（Golden Spring）正在资助的每月生活费用并非贷款，因此并不会因该等垫款而产生管理费用。13\n\n58. 虽然债务人三月份的 Monthly Operating Report（每月经营报告）反映有 \\$1,276,267 的申请后应付款项，但该金额显然代表债务人已累计但尚未获准的专业费用。在拟议 DIP loan（DIP贷款）获批且专业费用获准的范围内，该等费用将以一笔次于管理费用和申请前无担保请求的贷款支付。这绝非任何意义上的破产财产重大或持续损失或贬损。\n\n59. 即使专业费用未获准由 DIP 贷款支付，仅仅累计专业费用亦不构成对破产财产的持续损失。参见 In re Miller, 496 B.R. 469, 479 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2013)（“专业费用和/或税款等负债的累计，并不等同于实际现金支出的损失，例如导致破产财产缩水的资产耗散。”）（省略内部引文及援引）。另见 In re Gabriel Techs. Corp., Case No. No. 13–30340 (DM), 2013 WL 2318581, at \\*3 (Bankr.N.D.Cal. May 28, 2013)（“[或]许从会计角度（损益）看，该等累计[专业费用和 Delaware（特拉华州）州税]会构成此类损失。但负债的累计并不等同于实际现金支出的损失，例如导致破产财产缩水的资产耗散。让债务人继续占有 chapter 11 破产财产，并不会使某个不断缩水的资产池面临风险”），上诉被驳回，2013 WL 4672785 (N.D. Cal. Aug 30, 2013)。\n\n13 截至 February 28, 2022 期间债务人的 Monthly Operating Report（ECF No. 120）反映，代表债务人支付了 \\$161,323 的款项。据信，部分\n\n60. 此外，本案中存在价值远超累计专业费用的大量资产。尽管债务人对该等资产属于其本人提出异议，但这并不意味着事实如此。Ostrager 法官关于债务人对 Lady May 所享权益的认定，应基于既判力、争点排除或 Rooker-Feldman 原则，使其成为破产财产的资产。对于 Sherry Netherland 公寓，亦极有可能得出相同结果。该等资产价值为不断累计的专业费用的数倍。\n\nD. 无法证明存在 Section 1112(b)(4)(b)（第1112(b)(4)(b)条）意义上的严重管理不善\n\n61. 根据 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(B) 对“严重管理不善”的认定，仅限于申请后的行为。In re Zamora-Quezada, 622 B.R. 865, 886 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2017)（“为确定债务人是否对破产财产进行了严重管理不善，法院必须仅审查债务人在提交申请后的行为”）。同见 In re 412 Boardwalk, Inc., 520 B.R. 126, 135-36 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2014)。因此，PAX 援引 Lady May 在申请前发生的情况，与 § 1112(b)(4)(B) 下的严重管理不善无关；各方为协商达成一致的 Boat Delivery Order（船舶交付命令）所作出的广泛努力表明，Kwok 及所有利害关系方正在努力确保其在申请后返还。\n\n62. “严重管理不善表明占有中的债务人存在某种极端无能，”In re Sundale, Ltd.（森代尔有限公司）, 400 B.R. 890, 907 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.（佛罗里达州南区联邦破产法院） 2009)，并且“设想的是提交严重管理不善的实际证据，而不仅仅是对怀疑的陈述或要求进一步调查的愿望。”In re Norwest Company, LLC（诺斯韦斯特公司有限责任公司）, Case No. 20-10990 (MEW), 2020 WL 6927661, at *2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.（纽约南区联邦破产法院） Nov. 20, 2020)。尽管委员会并不认同债务人显然不合理的主张，即其不拥有任何资产\n\n该金额的一部分被用于支付债务人的生活费用，但没有任何一笔支出被记载为贷款或破产申请后应付款项。\n\n以及尤其是其对“梅夫人”号（Lady May）或雪莉·内瑟兰公寓（Sherry Netherland apartment）不享有任何权益，但债务人至少并未未披露与该等资产有关的争议，并且已安排为一项调查提供资金，该调查预计将显示其拥有大量财富。尽管该调查将由本破产财产的潜在追偿对象之一黄金泉（Golden Spring）提供资金，但该资金安排不妨碍就破产财产追偿向Golden Spring主张权利。基于上述理由，委员会认为无法证明存在“严重管理不善”。\n\nE. 第1112(b)(2)条中的“特殊情形”例外应排除驳回\n\n63. 《破产法典》第1112(b)(2)条规定，法院不得\n\n转换或驳回第11章案件，“如法院认定并具体指明存在特殊情形，证明转换或驳回案件不符合债权人和破产财产的最佳利益，并且债务人或任何其他利害关系方证明——”：\n\n(A) 在本法典第1121(e)条和第1129(e)条规定的期限内，计划获得确认具有合理可能性；或者，如该等条款不适用，则在合理期间内获得确认具有合理可能性；并且(B) 转换或驳回案件的理由包括债务人在第(4)(A)款以外的作为或不作为——(i) 对于该作为或不作为存在合理正当理由；并且(ii) 该作为或不作为将在法院确定的合理期间内得到补救。\n\n11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(2)。法院在确定是否存在“特殊情形”方面享有“广泛裁量权”。In re The 1031 Tax Group, LLC（1031税务集团有限责任公司）, 374 B.R. 78, 93 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007)。另见In re First Connecticut Consulting Group, Inc.（第一康涅狄格咨询集团公司）, Case No. 02–50852 (JJT), Case No. 02–51167 (JJT), 2018 WL 2121531, *4 (Bankr. D. Conn.（康涅狄格地区联邦破产法院） May 7, 2018)（“该法条明确规定，法院在确定是否存在特殊情形时享有重大裁量权”）。\n\n64. “‘特殊情形’一语并未在《破产法典》中界定，但‘特殊’一词设想的是通常并不见于第11章案件的事实。”In re Ford Steel, LLC（福特钢铁有限责任公司）, 629 B.R. 871, 883 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.（得克萨斯州南区联邦破产法院） 2021)（省略内部引文和援引）。这可能包括考虑“‘继续适用第11章或将案件转换为第7章的可能后果，并考虑在每一章下最终结果可能产生何种后果；[以及]如果第11章下债权人的可能结果将显著优于其他情形，法院即根据§ 1112(b)(2)认定存在特殊情形。’”In re Express Grain Terminals, LLC（快捷谷物码头有限责任公司）, Case No.: 21-11832-SDM, 2022 WL 1051097, at *9 (Bankr. N.D. Miss.（密西西比州北区联邦破产法院） Apr. 7, 2022)（引自In re Korn（科恩案）, 523 B.R. 453, 468 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.（宾夕法尼亚州东区联邦破产法院） 2014)）。这还可能包括考虑，驳回案件是否会允许单一债权人对债务人的资产进行止赎，从而“降低合法无担保债权人债权获得清偿的可能性。”In re New Towne Development, LLC（新城开发有限责任公司）, 404 B.R. 140, 148 (Bankr. M.D. La.（路易斯安那州中区联邦破产法院） 2009)。\n\n65. 债务人的案件当然具有通常并不见于第11章案件的事实。导致提交第11章申请的情形、表面上属于债务人的“家族”资产、债务人在纽约第五大道（Fifth Avenue）一套价值数百万美元的公寓中持有的100%股权权益、认定债务人对一艘价值$37 million的游艇享有实益权益，以及存在的各种替身实体或刺破公司面纱请求，均表明该案与其他第11章案件缺乏共性。并且，与New Towne Development中的情形类似，驳回将使PAX能够归集债务人的全部资产，以仅清偿其自身债权（包括可能受衡平法从属约束的$134 million藐视法庭罚款）。\n\n66. 关于计划在合理期间内获得确认的合理可能性，委员会主张，由于案件仍处于早期阶段，且迄今已被有关非计划事项的诉讼所占据，因此根本无法得出不存在\n\n有效重整的合理前景的结论。见New Towne Development, 404 B.R. at 147（“在这一早期阶段，无法得出New Towne不存在有效重整的合理前景的结论”）。\n\n67. 关于根据§ 1112(b)(2)(B)须证明的要件，委员会认为尚未证明存在转换或驳回案件的理由；但如法院认定存在该等理由（§ 1112(b)(4)(A)项下的理由除外），则提交第11章申请具有合理正当理由，因为该申请阻止了PAX继续谋求对债务人资产进行变现，以清偿其债权——且仅清偿其债权。\n\n68. 就§ 1112(b)(2)(B)(ii)所要求的补救而言，船舶交付命令（Boat Delivery Order）应被视为已补救任何为避免纽约州最高法院（New York Supreme Court）诉讼中藐视法庭后果而提交申请的动机。船舶交付命令通过规定，如“梅夫人”号未于July 15, 2022以良好工作状态返还，即有$37 million现金承担风险，从而实际上确保了其返还。并且，正如PAX同意船舶交付命令所承认的那样，监禁债务人并非其主要目标。因此，Ostrager法官（Judge Ostrager）可能施加的监禁或其他制裁，必须被排除在§ 1112(b)(2)(B)(ii)项下必要“补救”之外。\n\n69. 如法院认定重新诉讼与PAX有关事项的动机将构成驳回理由，则可通过在船舶对抗程序（Boat Adversary Proceeding）中主张既判力、争点排除和/或Rooker-Feldman doctrine（鲁克—费尔德曼原则），以最终确定债务人对“梅夫人”号的权益，从而轻易得到补救。见上文第30段及脚注8。\n\nF. 即使法院认定存在驳回或转换事由，也不应批准任何一种救济，因为指定审查员将最符合债权人和破产财产的利益\n\n70. 《破产法典》第1112(b)(1)条的相关部分规定，“法院应当转换……或驳回本章项下的案件，以最符合债权人和破产财产利益者为准，除非法院认定指定……管理人或审查员最符合破产财产的利益。”11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1)（强调部分为后加）。\n\n71. “如果各方对转换、驳回或指定管理人或审查员存在分歧，法院应评估并选择对各方及整个破产财产最有利的替代方案。”7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1112.04[7], at 1112-48 (Richard Levin & Henry Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2021)。该认定应包括评估“‘所有债权人的利益。’”Id. at n. 157（引自Rollex Corp.（罗莱克斯公司） v. Associated Materials, Inc.（联合材料公司） (In re Superior Siding & Window, Inc.（卓越墙板与窗户公司）), 14 F.3d 240, 243 (4th Cir. 1994)（原文强调））。\n\n72. 在本案中，如法院认定确实存在转换或驳回的事由，则委员会主张，指定审查员将是对各方及整个破产财产最有利的救济，因为审查员可与委员会密切合作，调查针对第三方的潜在请求和追偿，以及债务人主张为有价值资产的诉讼。参见例如In re TMT Procurement Corp.（TMT采购公司）, 534 B.R. 912, 921-22 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2015)（认定存在转换或驳回事由，但改为指定审查员调查诉讼）。审查员还将是一种比指定第11章管理人成本更低、但同样有效的救济形式，因为破产财产管理程度和专业费用将大幅减少14，并且，就本案目前而言，唯一需要管理的资产实质上是诉因15；如债务人继续无正当理由地不予追诉，委员会可以处理该等诉因。\n\n14 在考虑指定第11章管理人时，“破产法院必须牢记，指定管理人可能会因产生大量行政费用而给根据《破产法典》寻求救济、已承受沉重压力的债务人造成重大财务负担，而该等行政费用又是由破产程序进一步延误所致。”Adams v. Marwil（亚当斯诉马维尔） (In re Bayou Group, LLC（河口集团有限责任公司）), 564 F.3d 541, 546-47 (2d Cir. 2009)（省略内部引文和援引）。\n\n15 该等诉因将包括破产财产就“梅夫人”号及雪莉·内瑟兰公寓主张所有权的请求。\n\nII. PAX加入美国联邦受托人（United States Trustee）关于指定第11章管理人的动议\n\n73. 首先，委员会指出，法院作出的现行日程安排命令（Scheduling Order）（ECF No. 274）仅涉及驳回动议（Dismissal Motion），并未例如规定提交证人或证据清单；而该等清单对于裁决由美国联邦受托人的审查员/管理人动议（Examiner/Trustee Motion）启动的独立争议事项的程序而言是必要的，PAX通过驳回动议备选请求“加入”该动议。由于指定第11章管理人是一种“非常”救济，且“负有以明确且令人信服的证据证明指定管理人具有正当性的责任”，因此需要进行该独立程序。Adams v. Marwil (In re Bayou Group, LLC), 564 F.3d 541, 546 (2d Cir. 2009)（省略内部引文和援引）。\n\n74. 如果法院依照与驳回动议相同的日程审理审查员/管理人动议，委员会的立场是，目前并无指定管理人的正当理由。\n\n75. 是否存在根据11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)指定第11章管理人的“事由”，属于事实认定。In re The 1031 Tax Group, LLC, 374 B.R. 78, 86 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007)。“[A]法院在确定被质疑的行为是否达到‘事由’程度时享有广泛裁量。”Id. 必须考虑指定第11章管理人固有的重大财务负担和延误。Bayou Group, 564 F.3d at 546-47。\n\n76. 尽管债务人存在利益冲突以及PAX主张存在其他“事由”，委员会认为目前不存在指定管理人的事由。对于委员会正在进行的调查程序，以及在确定存在债务人无正当理由未予追诉的表面成立请求时可适用的派生资格原则，均已具备充分的程序和实体保障，以缓解该等利益冲突。\n\n77. 应注意，美国联邦受托人在审查员/管理人动议中请求的主要或优先救济形式是指定审查员。如法院认定存在驳回或转换事由，并认定§ 1112(b)(2)所载例外未获满足，委员会赞成指定审查员。但如不存在该等认定，若法院不指定管理人，本案并非必须指定审查员。\n\n78. 《破产法典》第 1104(c) 条要求法院在未指定受托人的情况下指定一名审查员，“对债务人进行适当的审查……，如果（1）该项指定最符合债权人……及遗产的其他利益；或（2）债务人的固定、已清算无担保债务，除因货物、服务或税款产生的债务，或欠付内部人的债务外，超过 \\$5,000,000。”11 U.S.C. § 1104(c)。\n\n79. 已有判决认为，根据 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c) 中“适当”的表述，“案件的事实和情形可允许破产法院即使在固定债务超过 \\$5 million 的案件中，亦驳回指定审查员的请求。”In re Residential Capital, LLC（瑞斯登舍尔资本有限责任公司）, 474 B.R. 112, 121 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012)。该解释亦适用于根据 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1) 提出的指定审查员请求。Id. at 117。\n\n以及前文讨论的另我和揭开公司面纱请求。\n\n80. 尽管 ResCap 法院认定在该特定案件中指定审查员具有必要性，委员会主张，在其有机会与其高度合格的财务顾问和欺诈调查顾问进行调查期间，此处暂不作出该项指定将属适当。如此可在不牺牲调查范围或质量的情况下，为遗产节省大量费用。\n\nIII. 加入债权人 Rui Ma（马蕊）、Zheng Wu（吴征）和 Weican Meng（孟伟灿）的异议\n\n81. 委员会加入并援引债权人 Rui Ma、Zheng Wu 和 Weican Meng 对驳回动议提出的异议。\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 346 提交于 05/11/22 录入于 05/11/22 20:37:45 第 39 页，共 40 页\n\n结论\n\n因此，委员会恭请法院驳回该驳回动议，并授予法院认为公正、衡平且适当的其他或进一步救济。16\n\n日期：Bridgeport（布里奇波特）, Connecticut（康涅狄格州） May 11, 2022\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）无担保债权人正式委员会\n\n签署人：/s/Irve J. Goldman\nIrve J. Goldman（欧文·J·戈德曼）\nJonathan A. Kaplan（乔纳森·A·卡普兰）\nPullman & Comley, LLC（普尔曼与康利有限责任公司）\n850 Main Street, 8th Floor\nPO Box 7006\nBridgeport, CT 06601-7006\n(203) 330-2213\n[igoldman@pullcom.com]\n\n其代理律师\n\n16 正当本异议书即将完成定稿时，债务人提交了债务人同意驳回案件书（ECF No. 344）及其撤回 DIP 动议书（ECF No. 345）。委员会未事先收到关于这些提交文件的任何通知。尽管债务人同意驳回，委员会仍维持如本文所述对驳回的异议。至少现在必须认真考虑将案件转换程序，而非驳回。正如本文所述，本案并非仅为双方之间的争议。其他当事人的权利亦必须由法院予以考虑，委员会期待在驳回动议听证会上就此向法院陈述。\n\n送达证明\n\n本人 Irve J. Goldman，特此证明，于 May 11, 2022，上述《HO WAN KWOK 无担保债权人正式委员会就 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙企业）要求驳回第 11 章案件的动议，或备选地，部分加入 United States Trustee（美国受托人）要求作出命令指示指定第 11 章受托人的动议所提交的异议书》已通过法院 CM/ECF 电子提交系统（“CM/ECF”）提交，该系统已向所有通过 CM/ECF 接收通知的当事人发送通知。\n\n/s/ Irve J. Goldman\nIrve J. Goldman（欧文·J·戈德曼）","key_entities":["Je","Kwok","Murray","Guo","Ho Wan Kwok","CIPA","Miles Guo","GETTR"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":57,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":78,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":98,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":107,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":120,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":165,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":167,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":197,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":252,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":274,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":295,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":297,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":299,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":315,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":321,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":344,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":345,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":12437,"status":"published","published_at":"2022-05-11 00:00:00","created_at":"2022-05-11","updated_at":"2026-08-23 21:36:05"}