{"id":"court_ctb_3548_3","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":3548,"sub_number":3,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION | -------------------------------------------","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| ---------------------------------------------------------------- |          | x           |                         |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-------------|-------------------------|\n| In re:                                                           |          | :<br>:      | Chapter 11              |\n| 1<br>HO WAN KWOK,<br>et al.,                                     |          | :<br>:      | Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |\n|                                                                  | Debtors. | :<br>:<br>: | (Jointly Administered)  |\n| ---------------------------------------------------------------- |          | x           |                         |\n\n## **REPLY IN SUPPORT OF CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE'S MOTION FOR ORDER TO PROTECT AND PRESERVE EVIDENCE AND PROPERTY OF ESTATE**\n\nLuc A. Despins, in his capacity as the chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") for the estate (the \"Estate\") of Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"), hereby submits his reply (this \"Reply\") in support of his motion seeking an order directing Microsoft Corporation (\"Microsoft\") to preserve property of the Estate, *i.e.*, the Microsoft Domains. (*Emergency Mot. Of Chapter 11 Trustee for Order to Protect and Preserve Evidence and Property of Estate* [ECF No. 3305] (\"Trustee's Motion\").) [2](#page-0-1)\n\nMicrosoft opposes the Trustee's Motion, claiming that (1) this Court lacks jurisdiction over Microsoft; and (2) the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. (\"SCA\"), prevents it from complying with an order to preserve the Microsoft Domains. (*Microsoft's Opp. to Trustee's Motion* [Dkt. No. 3353] (\"Microsoft's Opposition\").) This Court, however, plainly has jurisdiction to order Microsoft to preserve the Microsoft Domains given Microsoft's control over this Estate property. In addition, while the SCA may restrict Microsoft from *disclosing* data under certain\n\n<span id=\"page-0-0\"></span><sup>1</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and the Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\n<span id=\"page-0-1\"></span><sup>2</sup> Capitalized terms not expressly defined herein adopt the definitions ascribed to them in the Trustee's Motion.\n\ncircumstances, Microsoft does not point to any provision of the SCA that prohibits it from complying with a court order to simply *preserve* data pending further proceedings—which is the only relief that the Trustee seeks at this time. Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth herein, the Court should grant the Trustee's Motion and overrule Microsoft's Opposition.\n\n### **THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER MICROSOFT**\n\n1. The Bankruptcy Court has jurisdiction over Microsoft, because Microsoft is asserting control over the Microsoft Domains, which are property of the Estate[.](#page-1-0) 3 The Bankruptcy Court has \"exclusive jurisdiction … of all the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of the commencement of such case, and of property of the estate.\" 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e).\n\n2. Microsoft admits that the Trustee's Motion implicates the automatic stay under section 362(a)(3) and notes the Court's broad authority under section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code (Microsoft's Opposition at 2) but contends the Court's authority should not extend to Microsoft. This ignores that which \"has long been established, and confirmed by the United States Supreme Court … that '[b]ankruptcy jurisdiction, at its core, is *in rem*.'\" *Geron v. Peebler (In re Pali Holdings, Inc.)*, 488 B.R. 841, 851 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting *Central Virginia Community College v. Katz*, 546 U.S. 356, 362, 126 S. Ct. 990, 163 L. Ed. 2d 945 (2006); *accord Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood*, 541 U.S. 440, 448, 124 S. Ct. 1905, 158 L. Ed. 2d 764 (2004) (\"*Hood*\")). \"A bankruptcy court's *in rem* jurisdiction permits it to 'determin[e] all claims that anyone ... has to the property or thing in question.'\" *In re Pari Holdings, Inc.*, 488 B.R. at 851 (quoting *Hood*, 541 U.S. at 448, in turn quoting 16 *Moore's Federal Practice* § 108.70[1] (3d ed.\n\n<span id=\"page-1-0\"></span><sup>3</sup> The Trustee discovered the Microsoft Domains upon review of documents and computer equipment that were produced to the Trustee in discovery and/or are property of the Estate, and the circumstances of their discovery reflect that these domains were utilized by the Debtor's agents who facilitated the Debtor's shell game, including through his Golden Spring and Lamp Capital alter egos. The names of these domains also correspond to the names of two of the Debtor's alter egos, Golden Spring and Lamp Capital.\n\n2004)).\n\n3. Thus, the Court plainly has jurisdiction over Microsoft, as it is an entity presently asserting control over property of the Estate, for the purpose of directing the preservation of the Microsoft Domains pending further proceedings in the Chapter 11 Case.[4](#page-2-0)\n\n### **SCA DOES NOT BAR PRESERVATION OF PROPERTY OF ESTATE**\n\n4. Microsoft claims that the SCA prevents it \"from implementing the requested relief\" in the Trustee's Motion. (Microsoft's Opposition at 3.) Not so.\n\n5. It is evident from Microsoft's reliance upon SCA provisions and decisional authority addressing the disclosure of data, not its preservation, that Microsoft misapprehends the Trustee's Motion, *which seeks the preservation of data, not its disclosure*. As a result of this misapprehension, Microsoft's SCA argument, which is founded upon the proposition that the SCA prohibits Microsoft from disclosing data, is essentially a *non sequitur* that cannot justify denial of the Trustee's Motion.\n\n6. At bottom, Microsoft does not present any points or authorities supporting the proposition that the SCA prohibits it from complying with an order by this Court to preserve the Microsoft Domains. Microsoft, rather, presents three disparate contentions regarding the restrictions imposed upon it by the SCA. (*Id.*) Not one of these contentions suggests, let alone establishes, that the SCA prohibits Microsoft from *preserving* the Microsoft Domains pending further proceedings in compliance with a court order.\n\n7. *First*, Microsoft contends that the SCA prevents it from \"taking any action at the request of a third-party, including the Trustee.\" *Microsoft's Opposition, at 3*. The Trustee does not \"request\" anything from Microsoft. The Trustee has moved this Court for an order directing\n\n<span id=\"page-2-0\"></span><sup>4</sup> Upon preservation of the Microsoft Domains, the Trustee intends to commence an action to compel the turnover of the domains to the Trustee as Estate property under sections 541 and 542 of the Bankruptcy Code.\n\nMicrosoft to preserve the Microsoft Domains. This Court is not a \"third-party\" and its orders are not \"requests.\" Any action Microsoft takes in response to an order from this Court directing preservation of the Microsoft Domains would be pursuant to court order, not \"the request of a third-party.\"[5](#page-3-0)\n\n8. *Second*, Microsoft contends that the SCA prevents it from \"disclosing any information regarding its customer accounts.\" (*Id.*) As stated previously, the Trustee seeks an order directing Microsoft to preserve, not disclose, the Microsoft Domains. Preservation is not disclosure. Microsoft knows this[.](#page-3-1) 6\n\n9. *Third*, Microsoft contends that the SCA \"prohibits\" it from \"taking the action sought by the Trustee even if such a request is accompanied by a subpoena.\" *Id., at 4*. In support of the foregoing proposition, Microsoft cites several state and federal judicial decisions. All cited decisions address the SCA in the context of a disclosure, not preservation, and thus do not support the proposition that the SCA prohibits preservation. [7](#page-3-2) In fact, with one exception, the decisional authority cited in Microsoft's Opposition does not allude to preservation in the SCA context. The single exception is *Facebook, Inc. v. Superior Ct.*, 4 Cal. 5th 1245 (2018), where the court observes\n\n<span id=\"page-3-0\"></span><sup>5</sup> Microsoft cites to 18 U.S.C. § 2707 in support of the proposition that both Microsoft and the Trustee could be subject to \"serious civil and criminal penalties.\" But § 2707, which creates a private right of action for violation of the SCA, provides that \"[a] good faith reliance on . . .a court warrant or order . . . is a *complete defense* to *any civil or criminal action* brought under this chapter or any other law.\" (Emphasis added.) 18 U.S.C. § 2707(e)(1).\n\n<span id=\"page-3-1\"></span><sup>6</sup> Microsoft complains that the Trustee's Motion \"foreshadows the Trustee's intent to 'establish the right to inspect or obtain the preserved evidence as soon as possible,'\" which it suggests could run afoul of the SCA. (*Id.* at 3.) In doing so, Microsoft (a) tacitly admits that the Trustee is not seeking disclosure of anything now; and (b) misapprehends the basis upon which the Trustee will assert rights in future proceedings, which will compel turnover of the Microsoft Domains under sections 541 and 542 of the Bankruptcy Code. As such, rather than compelling disclosure of a third party's data, future proceedings will confirm that the Estate owns this digital property and the Trustee's rights to administer it. So, again, the SCA will not be implicated.\n\n<span id=\"page-3-2\"></span>*<sup>7</sup> See Suzlon Energy Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp.*, 671 F.3d 726, 727 (9th Cir. 2011) (framing factual predicate as plaintiff having \"demanded that Microsoft . . . produce documents from the Microsoft Hotmail email account\" of a foreign citizen; preservation not at issue); *Theofel v. Farey-Jones*, 359 F.3d 1066, 1071–72 (9th Cir. 2004) (reciting facts that internet service provider inadvertently disclosed e-mail communications in response to civil subpoena; preservation not at issue); *In re Irish Bank Resol. Corp. Ltd. (in Special Liquidation)*, 559 B.R. 627, 632 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016) (denying turnover motion; preservation not at issue).\n\nthat preservation was \"not discussed in the parties' briefs,\" \"may require consideration of remand,\" and that the \"record before us . . . contains no preservation order; no mention of such an order appears in the briefs; and the superior court docket for each case, as to which we have taken judicial notice, reflects no such order.\" *Facebook, Inc. v. Superior Ct.*, 4 Cal. 5th 1245, 1291 n.47 (2018).\n\n10. Microsoft's claim that \"the relief sought by the Trustee would violate the SCA\" is without merit and should be rejected. (Microsoft's Opposition at 4.)\n\n#### **RELIEF IS ESSENTIAL TO PRESERVE PROPERTY OF ESTATE**\n\n11. Finally, while Microsoft argues the Trustee should pursue the Microsoft Domains by other means, the alternative Microsoft proposes is illusory. Microsoft suggests that the Trustee should \"identify the 'global administrator' and assume access through that/those individual/s.\" (Microsoft Opposition at 4.) However, when the Trustee asked Microsoft to identify the administrator(s) of the domains prior to filing the Trustee's Motion, Microsoft declined to do so.\n\n12. Even if Microsoft were to identify the individual(s), and the Trustee were to commence proceedings against them, it is very likely that they would respond by simply ignoring the proceedings and deleting the emails and other data contained on the Microsoft Domains, *i.e.*, by destroying the very property the Trustee seeks to preserve by the Trustee's Motion.\n\n13. Again, Microsoft knows this. The Trustee's counsel repeatedly explained to Microsoft in advance of filing the Trustee's Motion that the Trustee's investigation of the Debtor's financial affairs has been met with extraordinary obstruction and misconduct by the Debtor and his associates. (*See, e.g., Mem. of Decision and Order Granting in Part Mot. to Extend Deadlines* [Dkt. No. 2921] at 15 (noting eight orders holding the Debtor, his daughter, and associated entities \"in contempt for failure to turn over assets and discovery abuse\" and that the \"noncompliance with this Court's orders .. is extraordinary\").)\n\n14. The relief requested in the Trustee's Motion represents the only avenue to ensure that property of the Estate is preserved pending further proceedings. The relief is reasonable, narrowly tailored, and necessary, and Microsoft has shown no basis to oppose it. The Trustee's Motion should be granted.\n\n## **RELIEF SHOULD ENTER AGAINST GOOGLE UPON DEFAULT**\n\n15. Consistent with the Certificate of Service appended to the Trustee's Motion, the Trustee caused Google to be served with a copy of the Trustee's Motion in hand at its registered agent for services as follows on July 12, 2024:\n\nCorporation Service Company Goodwin Square 225 Asylum Street, 20th Floor Hartford, CT, 06103\n\n16. Corporate records maintained by the Connecticut Secretary of the State confirm that this is the registered agent for service for Google in the State of Connecticut[.](#page-5-0)<sup>8</sup>\n\n17. In addition, the Trustee's Motion was sent to Google (and specifically to its legal department) by email on July 11, 2024, at [google-legal-support@google.com,](mailto:google-legal-support@google.com) an email address through which Google has previously corresponded with the Trustee's counsel concerning Bankruptcy Rule 2004 discovery in the Debtor's Chapter 11 Case.\n\n18. Because Google has not responded to the Trustee's Motion, the relief sought against Google as set forth in the Proposed Order, *i.e.*, preservation of the Google Accounts and any data they contain, should enter upon default.\n\n[*Remainder of page intentionally left blank*]\n\n<span id=\"page-5-0\"></span><sup>8</sup> These records are searchable here: http\n\nWHEREFORE, the Court should grant the Trustee's Motion, overrule Microsoft's Opposition,\n\nand grant such other and further relief as is just and proper.\n\nNew Haven, Connecticut\n\nDated: August 16, 2024 LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE\n\nBy: */s/ Patrick R. Linsey* Dennis M. Carnelli (ct30050) Patrick R. Linsey (ct29437) Douglas S. Skalka (ct00616) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 821-2000 [dcarnelli@npmlaw.com](mailto:dcarnelli@npmlaw.com) [plinsey@npmlaw.com](mailto:plinsey@npmlaw.com) [dskalka@npmlaw.com](mailto:dskalka@npmlaw.com)\n\n# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| ---------------------------------------------------------------- |          | x           |                         |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-------------|-------------------------|\n| In re:                                                           |          | :<br>:      | Chapter 11              |\n| 1<br>HO WAN KWOK,<br>et al.,                                     |          | :<br>:<br>: | Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |\n|                                                                  | Debtors. | :<br>:      | (Jointly Administered)  |\n| ---------------------------------------------------------------- |          | x           |                         |\n\n## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nThe undersigned hereby certifies that on August 16, 2024, the foregoing Reply Memorandum was filed electronically under seal. In addition, the Reply Memorandum was served electronically upon counsel for Microsoft Corporation, as follows:\n\nMatthew J. Schenker Fox Rotschild 101 Park Ave., 17th Fl. New York, NY 01078 T: (212) 905-2308 F: (212) 692-0940 [mschenker@foxrothschild.com](mailto:mschenker@foxrothschild.com)\n\nMaria A. Milano David P. Papiez Fox Rotschild 1001 Fourth Ave., Ste. 4400 T: (206) 624-3600 F: (206) 389-1078 [mamilano@foxrothschild.com](mailto:mamilano@foxrothschild.com) [dpapiez@foxrothschild.com](mailto:dpapiez@foxrothschild.com)\n\n<span id=\"page-7-0\"></span><sup>1</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and the Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\nFurther, the foregoing Reply Memorandum was sent to Google LLC by email on August\n\n16, 2024, and on August 19, 2024, the Reply Memorandum will be sent via Federal Express\n\novernight delivery to Google LLC, as follows:\n\nGoogle LLC c/o Corporation Service Company Goodwin Square 225 Asylum Street, 20th Floor Hartford, CT, 06103 google-legal-support@google.com\n\nNew Haven, Connecticut\n\n### Dated: August 16, 2024 LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE\n\nBy: */s/* Dennis M. Carnelli Dennis M. Carnelli (ct30050) Patrick R. Linsey (ct29437) Douglas S. Skalka (ct00616) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 821-2000 [dcarnelli@npmlaw.com](mailto:dcarnelli@npmlaw.com) [plinsey@npmlaw.com](mailto:plinsey@npmlaw.com) [dskalka@npmlaw.com](mailto:dskalka@npmlaw.com)","body_zh":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION（美国康涅狄格州破产法院布里奇波特分部）\n\n----------------------------------------------------------------　x\n\n关于：\n第 11 章\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，\n案件编号：22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。\n\n（合并审理）\n----------------------------------------------------------------　x\n支持第 11 章受托人关于保护和保全证据及破产财产命令动议的答复\n\nLuc A. Despins 以 Ho Wan Kwok（债务人）破产财产（以下简称“破产财产”）第 11 章受托人（以下简称“受托人”）的身份，特此提交其答复（以下简称“本答复”），以支持其申请指令 Microsoft Corporation（微软公司，以下简称“Microsoft”）保全破产财产（即微软域名）命令的动议。（《第 11 章受托人关于保护和保全证据及破产财产命令的紧急动议》[ECF No. 3305]（以下简称“受托人动议”）。）[2]\n\nMicrosoft 反对受托人动议，声称：(1) 本法院对 Microsoft 缺乏管辖权；以及 (2)《存储通信法》（Stored Communications Act），18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq.（以下简称“SCA”），阻止其遵从保全微软域名的命令。（《Microsoft 对受托人动议的反对意见》[Dkt. No. 3353]（以下简称“Microsoft 反对意见”）。）然而，鉴于 Microsoft 对该破产财产具有控制权，本法院显而易见拥有命令 Microsoft 保全微软域名的管辖权。此外，尽管 SCA 在某些情况下可能会限制 Microsoft 披露数据，\n\n1 这些第 11 章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（又名郭文贵、Miles Guo 和 Miles Kwok，以及诸多其他化名）（税务识别号后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（税务识别号后四位：8202）以及 Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 和 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为 Paul Hastings LLP（普衡律师事务所）, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins（转交 Luc A. Despins），作为 Ho Wan Kwok 破产财产受托人（仅用于接收通知和通信之目的）。\n\n2 本文中未明确定义的首字母大写术语均采用受托人动议中所赋予的定义。\n\n但 Microsoft 未能指出 SCA 中有任何条款禁止其遵从法院命令在进一步诉讼前仅仅保全数据——而这正是受托人目前所寻求的唯一救济。因此，基于本文所述理由，法院应当准许受托人动议，并驳回 Microsoft 反对意见。\n\n本法院对 MICROSOFT 拥有管辖权\n\n1. 破产法院对 Microsoft 拥有管辖权，因为 Microsoft 正对属于破产财产的微软域名行使控制权[。] 3 破产法院拥有“对截至该案件开始时债务人的所有财产（无论位于何处）以及破产财产的专属管辖权”。28 U.S.C. § 1334(e)。\n\n2. Microsoft 承认受托人动议涉及第 362(a)(3) 条项下的自动中止，并注意到法院在《破产法典》（Bankruptcy Code）第 105 条项下的广泛权力（Microsoft 反对意见第 2 页），但主张法院的权力不应延伸至 Microsoft。这忽视了“早已确立并经美国最高法院确认的原则……即‘破产管辖权在核心上是对物管辖权’”。Geron 诉 Peebler（In re Pali Holdings, Inc. 案），488 B.R. 841, 851 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013)（引用 Central Virginia Community College 诉 Katz，546 U.S. 356, 362, 126 S. Ct. 990, 163 L. Ed. 2d 945 (2006)；同见 Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. 诉 Hood，541 U.S. 440, 448, 124 S. Ct. 1905, 158 L. Ed. 2d 764 (2004)（以下简称“Hood 案”））。“破产法院的对物管辖权使其能够‘裁决任何人……对涉案财产或标的物提出的所有权利主张’”。In re Pari Holdings, Inc. 案，488 B.R. at 851（引用 Hood 案，541 U.S. at 448，转引自 16 Moore's Federal Practice § 108.70[1]（第 3 版\n\n3 受托人在审查证据开示中向受托人出示的及/或属于破产财产的文件和计算机设备后发现了微软域名，且其发现情况表明这些域名曾被协助债务人进行诈骗把戏的代理人所使用，包括通过其 Golden Spring（源泉资本）和 Lamp Capital（亮剑资本）等第二自我（alter egos）。这些域名的名称也与债务人的两个第二自我 Golden Spring 和 Lamp Capital 的名称相符。\n\n2004 年））。\n\n3. 因此，鉴于 Microsoft 是一家目前对破产财产行使控制权的主体，法院显而易见对其拥有管辖权，以指令在第 11 章案件的进一步诉讼前保全微软域名。[4]\n\nSCA 不禁止保全破产财产\n\n4. Microsoft 声称 SCA 阻止其“执行”受托人动议中“所请求的救济”。（Microsoft 反对意见第 3 页。）事实并非如此。\n\n5. 从 Microsoft 依赖于涉及数据披露而非数据保全的 SCA 条款和裁判先例可以明显看出，Microsoft 误解了受托人动议，该动议寻求的是保全数据，而非披露数据。由于这种误解，Microsoft 建立在“SCA 禁止 Microsoft 披露数据”这一命题之上的 SCA 主张，本质上是一个不能成为驳回受托人动议理由的不相干结论。\n\n6. 归根结底，Microsoft 未能提出任何支持“SCA 禁止其遵从本法院保全微软域名的命令”这一命题的论点或权威依据。相反，Microsoft 提出了关于 SCA 对其所施加限制的三项风马牛不相及的主张。（同上。）这些主张中没有一项表明、更谈不上证明 SCA 禁止 Microsoft 遵从法院命令在进一步诉讼前保全微软域名。\n\n7. 首先，Microsoft 主张 SCA 阻止其“应第三方（包括受托人）的请求采取任何行动”。Microsoft 反对意见第 3 页。受托人并未向 Microsoft“请求”任何事项。受托人已向本法院提出动议，申请下达指令\n\n4 在保全微软域名后，受托人拟根据《破产法典》第 541 条和第 542 条提起诉讼，强制将这些域名作为破产财产移交给受托人。\n\nMicrosoft 保全微软域名的命令。本法院不是“第三方”，其命令也不是“请求”。Microsoft 响应本法院指令保全微软域名的命令所采取的任何行动，都将是依据法院命令，而非“应第三方的请求”。[5]\n\n8. 其次，Microsoft 主张 SCA 阻止其“披露关于其客户账户的任何信息”。（同上。）如前所述，受托人寻求的是指令 Microsoft 保全而非披露微软域名的命令。保全不是披露。Microsoft 对此心知肚明[。] 6\n\n9. 第三，Microsoft 主张 SCA“禁止”其“采取受托人所寻求的行动，即使该请求附有传票亦然”。同上，第 4 页。为了支持上述命题，Microsoft 引用了数项州和联邦司法判决。所有被引用的判决都是在披露而非保全的背景下论及 SCA，因此不支持“SCA 禁止保全”这一命题。[7] 事实上，除了一项判决外，Microsoft 反对意见中引用的裁判先例在 SCA 背景下完全没有提及保全。唯一的例外是 Facebook, Inc. 诉 Superior Ct. 案，4 Cal. 5th 1245 (2018)，该法院在该案中指出\n\n5 Microsoft 引用了 18 U.S.C. § 2707 来支持 Microsoft 和受托人都可能面临“严重民事和刑事处罚”的主张。但设立侵犯 SCA 私人诉权的 § 2707 规定，“善意信赖……法院令状或命令……是对根据本章或任何其他法律提起的任何民事或刑事诉讼的完全抗辩理由”。（强调为后加。）18 U.S.C. § 2707(e)(1)。\n\n6 Microsoft 抱怨受托人动议“预示了受托人意图‘尽快确立检查或获取所保全证据的权利’”，并暗示这可能会违反 SCA。（同上，第 3 页。）在此过程中，Microsoft (a) 默示承认受托人目前并未寻求披露任何内容；且 (b) 误解了受托人将在未来诉讼中主张权利的依据，该诉讼将根据《破产法典》第 541 条和第 542 条强制移交微软域名。因此，未来的诉讼将确认破产财产拥有该数字财产以及受托人管理该财产的权利，而非强制披露第三方的数据。因此，SCA 同样不会受到牵涉。\n\n7 参见 Suzlon Energy Ltd. 诉 Microsoft Corp. 案，671 F.3d 726, 727 (9th Cir. 2011)（将事实前提表述为原告“要求 Microsoft……出示来自一名外国公民的 Microsoft Hotmail 电子邮件账户的文件”；不涉及保全问题）；Theofel 诉 Farey-Jones 案，359 F.3d 1066, 1071–72 (9th Cir. 2004)（叙述互联网服务提供商在响应民事传票时疏忽披露电子邮件通信的事实；不涉及保全问题）；In re Irish Bank Resol. Corp. Ltd. (in Special Liquidation) 案，559 B.R. 627, 632 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016)（驳回财产移交动议；不涉及保全问题）。\n\n保全问题“在当事人的书面意见中未予讨论”，“可能需要考虑发回重审”，并且“我们面前的案卷记录……不包含保全命令；书面意见中未提及此类命令；且我们已对其进行司法认知的各案高级法院案件诉讼记录表亦未反映存在此类命令”。Facebook, Inc. 诉 Superior Ct. 案，4 Cal. 5th 1245, 1291 n.47 (2018)。\n\n10. Microsoft 声称“受托人所寻求的救济将违反 SCA”毫无根据，应予驳回。（Microsoft 反对意见第 4 页。）\n\n救济对于保全破产财产至关重要\n\n11. 最后，尽管 Microsoft 主张受托人应通过其他途径获取微软域名，但 Microsoft 提议的替代方案是不切实际的。Microsoft 建议受托人应“识别‘全局管理员’并通过该个人/那些个人获取访问权限”。（Microsoft 反对意见第 4 页。）然而，在提交受托人动议之前，当受托人要求 Microsoft 识别域名的管理员时，Microsoft 拒绝照办。\n\n12. 即使 Microsoft 识别出该个人（或那些个人），且受托人对他们提起诉讼，他们极有可能做出的反应就是直接无视诉讼程序，并删除微软域名中包含的电子邮件及其他数据，即销毁受托人通过受托人动议所寻求保全的财产本身。\n\n13. 同样，Microsoft 对此心知肚明。受托人的代理律师在提交受托人动议之前曾向 Microsoft 反复解释，受托人对债务人财务状况的调查一直遭遇债务人及其关联人员的极度阻挠和不当行为。（例如，参见《关于部分准许延长截止日期动议的判决备忘录及命令》[Dkt. No. 2921] 第 15 页（指出有八项命令裁定债务人、其女儿及关联实体“因未能移交资产和滥用证据开示而构成藐视法庭”，且“对本法院命令的拒不遵从……是极其恶劣的”）。）\n\n14. 受托人动议中所请求的救济是在等待进一步诉讼程序期间确保破产财产得到保全的唯一途径。该救济合理、量身定制且属必要，而 Microsoft（微软公司）并未说明任何反对理由。受托人的动议应予准许。\n应在 Google 缺席的情况下对其作出救济裁定\n\n15. 根据附于受托人动议之后的送达证明，受托人已于 2024年7月12日 将受托人动议的副本亲手送达至 Google（谷歌公司）的送达法定代理人，具体如下：\n\nCorporation Service Company Goodwin Square 225 Asylum Street, 20th Floor Hartford, CT, 06103\n\n16. 由 Connecticut Secretary of the State（康涅狄格州州务卿）保存的公司记录确认，此为 Google 在康涅狄格州的送达法定代理人[。]8\n\n17. 此外，受托人的动议已于 2024年7月11日 通过电子邮件发送至 Google（特别是其法律部门），邮箱地址为 [google-legal-support@google.com]，Google 此前曾通过该邮箱地址与受托人律师就债务人第 11 章案件中的破产规则 2004（Bankruptcy Rule 2004）证据开示进行过沟通。\n\n18. 鉴于 Google 尚未对受托人的动议作出回应，拟议裁定书中所载针对 Google 请求的救济（即保全 Google 账户及其包含的任何数据）应在 Google 缺席的情况下作出。\n\n[本页其余部分有意留白]\n\n8 这些记录可在此处检索：http\n\n综上所述，法院应准许受托人的动议，驳回 Microsoft 的反对意见，\n\n并准许公正和适当的其他及进一步救济。\n\n康涅狄格州纽黑文（New Haven, Connecticut）\n\n日期：2024年8月16日 LUC A. DESPINS，第 11 章受托人\n\n签署人：/s/ Patrick R. Linsey Dennis M. Carnelli (ct30050) Patrick R. Linsey (ct29437) Douglas S. Skalka (ct00616) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 821-2000 [dcarnelli@npmlaw.com] [plinsey@npmlaw.com] [dskalka@npmlaw.com]\nUNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION（美国康涅狄格区破产法院布里奇波特分院）\n\n---------------------------------------------------------------- x\n\n关于： :\n: 第 11 章\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）,\n等， :\n:\n: 案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。 :\n: （合并审理）\n---------------------------------------------------------------- x\n送达证明\n\n下述签署人特此证明，于 2024年8月16日，上述答辩备忘录已通过电子方式密封归档。此外，答辩备忘录已通过电子方式送达 Microsoft Corporation 的代理律师，具体如下：\n\nMatthew J. Schenker Fox Rotschild 101 Park Ave., 17th Fl. New York, NY 01078 电话：(212) 905-2308 传真：(212) 692-0940 [mschenker@foxrothschild.com]\n\nMaria A. Milano David P. Papiez Fox Rotschild 1001 Fourth Ave., Ste. 4400 电话：(206) 624-3600 传真：(206) 389-1078 [mamilano@foxrothschild.com] [dpapiez@foxrothschild.com]\n\n1 本第 11 章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（亦称为郭文贵、Miles Guo 和 Miles Kwok，以及其他众多化名）（纳税人识别号后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（纳税人识别号后四位：8202）及 Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 及 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为 Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok（仅用于通知与沟通目的）。\n\n此外，上述答辩备忘录已于 2024年8月16日 通过电子邮件发送给 Google LLC，并将在 2024年8月19日 通过联邦快递（Federal Express）次日达服务发送给 Google LLC，具体如下：\n\nGoogle LLC c/o Corporation Service Company Goodwin Square 225 Asylum Street, 20th Floor Hartford, CT, 06103 google-legal-support@google.com\n\n康涅狄格州纽黑文\n日期：2024年8月16日 LUC A. DESPINS，第 11 章受托人\n\n签署人：/s/ Dennis M. Carnelli Dennis M. Carnelli (ct30050) Patrick R. Linsey (ct29437) Douglas S. Skalka (ct00616) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 821-2000 [dcarnelli@npmlaw.com] [plinsey@npmlaw.com] [dskalka@npmlaw.com]","key_entities":["Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Despins","Guo","Miles Guo","Je","Paul Hastings"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":2921,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3305,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3353,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":2506,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 13:23:35"}