{"id":"court_ctb_3633_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":3633,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"MOTION","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION IN RE:","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"### **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\nIN RE:\n\nHO WAN KWOK, et al.,\n\nChapter 11\n\nCase No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n*Debtors*. [1](#page-0-0) (Jointly Administered)\n\nOctober 3, 2024\n\n## **LIMITED OBJECTION OF G CLUB OPERATIONS LLC TO (1) TRUSTEE'S MOTION TO LIMIT NOTICE OF MOTIONS REGARDING MEDIATED/AVOIDANCE CLAIM SETTLEMENTS AND (2) MOTION TO APPROVE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WITH WILDES & WEINBERG, P.C. PURSUANT TO FED. R. BANKR. P 9019**\n\nG Club Operations LLC (\"G Club\") respectfully objects, on a limited basis, to (1) the *Motion to Limit Notice of Motions Regarding Mediated/Avoidance Claim Settlements* (ECF No. 3565, the \"Motion to Limit\") and (2) *Motion to Compromise Controversy with Wildes & Weinberg, P.C.* (ECF No. 3559, \"9019 Motion,\" and collectively referred to with the Motion to Limit, the \"Pending Motions\"),[2](#page-0-1) filed by Luc A. Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee (the \"Trustee\"). For the reasons set forth below, the Pending Motions should be denied *unless* the Trustee complies with binding Second Circuit precedent and files unredacted versions of the 9019 Motion and proposed Settlement Agreement.[3](#page-0-2)\n\n<span id=\"page-0-0\"></span><sup>1</sup> The Debtors in the main Chapter 11 case are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and the Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok.\n\n<span id=\"page-0-1\"></span><sup>2</sup> All docket references are to the Main Bankruptcy Case unless otherwise stated.\n\n<span id=\"page-0-2\"></span><sup>3</sup> Capitalized terms not defined in this objection have the meanings ascribed to them in the Pending Motions.\n\n#### **INTRODUCTION**\n\n1. The Trustee seeks Court approval of a redacted 9019 Motion omitting the essential terms of the proposed settlement, the most notable being the amount the defendant is paying to settle the case. The Trustee states he has also filed the related Settlement Agreement under seal. However, Bankruptcy Code § 107, 11 U.S.C. § 107 (the \"Bankruptcy Code\") limits the types of records that can be hidden from the public to \"a trade secret or confidential research, development, or commercial information\" or \"scandalous or defamatory\" materials. Bankruptcy Code § 107(b).\n\n2. It is well settled that the amount of a settlement or \"litigation strategy\" must be disclosed and is *not* \"confidential… commercial information\" or otherwise protected by § 107(b). *In re Oldco M Corp.*, 466 B.R. 234, 238 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (rejecting trustee's claim to hide the amount of the settlement as: \"the only reason given for sealing the settlement was that public disclosure would undercut the settling defendant's leverage in negotiating with other claimants*.*\"); *Togut v. Deutsche Bank AG (In re Anthracite Capital, Inc.)*, 492 B.R. 162, 173 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) (\"Likewise, providing third parties with a litigation advantage in outside actions does not justify sealing a court document.\")\n\n3. Moreover, the Local Rules of the District of Connecticut, and Second Circuit precedent, require highly detailed factual findings to seal \"judicial documents\" from the public. *See* D. Conn. L. R. Civ. P. 5(e). The Trustee has not requested any such finding from the Court. Indeed, the Court's prior orders contemplated the Trustee filing a proper motion to seal, which was not done here. Stated differently, the Trustee just redacted settlement terms from the 9019 Motion and did not file a motion to seal or otherwise comply with Local Rules.\n\n4. For these reasons, the Trustee cannot proceed with his Pending Motions or, alternatively, the Court should deny them.\n\n## **FACTS AND BACKGROUND**[4](#page-2-0)\n\n5. On September 19, 2024, the Trustee filed the 9019 Motion but redacted certain information including the settlement amount (9019 Motion at ¶¶ 10, 13(a), 13(c), 13(d)) and filed a copy of the proposed Settlement Agreement (9019 Motion at Exhibit B) under seal. No motion to seal was filed. Rather, the Trustee stated why he believed the Settlement Agreement should be sealed within the 9019 Motion. The Trustee's only given reasons were to protect his settlement leverage in future cases as disclosure of settlement terms would be allegedly harmful to the Estate. 9019 Motion at p. 7, ¶ 21.\n\n6. On September 19, 2024, the Trustee also filed the Motion to Limit, seeking to serve the redacted 9019 Motion.\n\n7. The Court has set a hearing on the Motion to Limit for October 8, 2024. ECF No.\n\n3581.\n\n8. Previously, the Court had established a mediation program that contemplated the\n\nTrustee filing documents under seal when appropriate:\n\nw. If the Mediator's Report indicates that the Mediation Proceedings resulted in a settlement and the settlement requires approval of the Court, the Trustee shall file a motion requesting such approval within thirty (30) days of the issuance of the Mediator's Report. *The Trustee may submit a motion seeking such approval under seal (with access limited to the Trustee, the relevant Avoidance Defendant, the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, and the United States Trustee) to the extent the Trustee believes that public disclosure of the settlement terms would harm the estate and/or would implicate commercially sensitive or otherwise confidential information public disclosure of which would prejudice parties to the settlement. Where a motion is filed under seal, the Trustee shall file on the public docket a copy of the motion that redacts any commercially sensitive or otherwise confidential information.*\n\nECF No. 3163 (the \"Mediation Procedures Order\") at p. 10, ¶ 2(w). (Emphasis added.)\n\n<span id=\"page-2-0\"></span><sup>4</sup> G Club only sets forth facts specifically relevant to the Pending Motions.\n\n9. The Mediation Procedures Order was later amended in ECF No 3465 at p. 2, ¶\n\n2(v), to include as follows:\n\nv. Within thirty (30) days of the issuance of a Pre-Litigation Settlement Report, the Trustee shall file a motion requesting the Court's approval of the Pre-Litigation Settlement and attaching the Pre-Litigation Settlement Report. *Such motion and Pre-Litigation Settlement Report may be filed under seal, upon notice to counsel for the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors and the United States Trustee, if the Trustee believes that public disclosure of the settlement terms would harm the Estate and/or would implicate commercially sensitive or otherwise confidential information disclosure of which would prejudice the Consent Mediation Parties***.** As to any motion filed under seal, the Trustee shall file on the public docket a copy of the motion that redacts any commercially sensitive or otherwise confidential information.\n\n10. A plain reading of these two provisions clearly contemplates the Trustee complying with Bankruptcy Code § 107, the Local Rules concerning sealing of documents, as well as other legal requirements as further set forth below.\n\n### **LAW AND ARGUMENT**\n\n### **A. Legal Standard under Bankruptcy Code § 107 for Not Disclosing Judicial Documents**\n\n11. \"In the bankruptcy context, courts across the country have held that settlement terms (including settlement amount) are not confidential 'commercial information' that is subject to seal under § 107(b)(1).\" *In re Thomas*, 583 B.R. 385, 392 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2018) (collecting cases).\n\n12. This is because: \"[t]here is a strong presumption and public policy in favor of public access to court records.\" *In re Borders Grp., Inc*., 462 B.R. 42, 46 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011). Bankruptcy Code §107(a) \"codifies the public's common law right to inspect and copy judicial records and creates a presumption that all documents filed in a bankruptcy case are accessible to the public and subject to examination by the public at reasonable times without charge. 11 U.S.C.\n\n§ 107(a); *Video Software Dealers Assoc. v. Orion Pictures Corp. (In re Orion Pictures Corp.*), 21 F.3d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1994); *see also Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns*, 435 U.S. 589, 597, 98 S. Ct. 1306, 55 L. Ed. 2d 570 (1978) ('It is clear that the courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents.') (citations omitted).\" *Togut,* 492 B.R. at 170.\n\n13. Bankruptcy Code § 107 states, in relevant part:\n\n(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) and subject to section 112, a paper filed in a case under this title and the dockets of a bankruptcy court are public records and open to examination by an entity at reasonable times without charge.\n\n(b) On the request of a party in interest the bankruptcy court shall… protect an entity with respect to… confidential… commercial information[] or… protect a person with respect to scandalous or defamatory matter contained in a paper….\n\n\"[I]f the information fits any of the specified categories, the court is required to protect a requesting interested party and has no discretion to deny the application.\" *Orion Pictures*, 21 F.3d at 27.\n\n14. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9018 implements Bankruptcy Code § 107 and allows the Court to seal documents when appropriate. \"Bankruptcy Rule 9018 does not expand a bankruptcy court's ability to limit access to papers filed beyond the powers conferred in § 107, nor does it provide a separate basis for relief.\" *Togut*, 492 B.R. at 171. \"A court's ability to limit the public's right to accessremains an extraordinary measure that is warranted only under rare circumstances as 'public monitoring is an essential feature of democratic control.'\" *Geltzer v. Andersen Worldwide, S.C.*, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6794, at \\*7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2007) (citing *United States v. Amodeo*, 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1995)); *Togut*, 492 B.R. at 171.\n\n15. \"Inherent in the language of § 107(b) is the requirement that the party requesting the extraordinary relief provide the court with specific factual and legal authority demonstrating\n\nthat a particular document at issue is properly classified as 'confidential' or 'scandalous.'\" *Id*. (internal citations omitted).\n\n16. Second Circuit authority confirms this. In *Mirlis v. Greer*, 952 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2020), the Second Circuit revisited the issue of what documents constitute \"judicial documents\"[5](#page-5-0) (subject to public inspection and open courts protections) and \"discovery material\" (not subject to the same presumptions of public inspection). The Second Circuit held: \"[i]n determining the proper weight to accord an asserted privacy interest, a court should consider both the degree to which the subject matter is traditionally considered private rather than public, as well as the nature and degree of the injury to which the party resisting disclosure would be subjected were the privacy interest not protected.\" 952 F.3d at 61.[6](#page-5-1)\n\n17. As set forth in *Mirlis,* judicial documents, such as the 9019 Motion and Settlement Agreement – the documents the Court must rely on to analyze and approve a proposed compromise under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019(a) – cannot be sealed, without meeting a strict standard. \"The general and deeply rooted rule is that the presumptive right of access is afforded 'strong weight' when applied to documents that play a central role in determining litigants' substantive rights—conduct at the heart of Article III. As this Court has observed many times, such access is critical as it enables the public to monitor the actions of the courts and juries to ensure a measure of accountability and bolster confidence in the administration of justice.\" *Mirlis*, 952 F.3d at 60 (internal citations and punctuation omitted).\n\n<span id=\"page-5-0\"></span><sup>5</sup> Courts have used the term \"judicial records\" as well as \"judicial documents,\" both of which mean the same thing in the context of papers filed with a court that require adjudication. The case law explains the difference between \"judicial documents\" (the term used in this brief because that is the term the District of Connecticut's Local Rules use; *See* D. Conn. L. R. Civ. P. 5(e)) and other materials.\n\n<span id=\"page-5-1\"></span><sup>6</sup> Holding that a gadfly's \"motives in obtaining, and intent in releasing, the video erodes against the weight due that presumption here. So, too, do [the deponent's] countervailing privacy interests as a minor victim of sexual abuse perpetrated by a trusted religious figure in the community.\" *Mirlis*, 952 F.3d at 67.\n\n18. D. Conn. L. R. Civ. P. 5(e)(3) specifically incorporates the *Mirlis* requirements and\n\nsets forth the procedure that courts and parties must follow to have judicial documents sealed:\n\nEvery document used by parties moving for or opposing an adjudication by the Court, other than trial or hearing exhibits, shall be filed with the Court. No judicial document shall be filed under seal, except upon entry of an order of the Court either acting sua sponte or specifically granting a request to seal that document. *Any such order sealing a judicial document shall include particularized findings demonstrating that sealing is supported by clear and compelling reasons and is narrowly tailored to serve those reasons.* A statute mandating or permitting the non-disclosure of a class of documents (e.g., personnel files, health care records, or records of administrative proceedings) provides sufficient authority to support an order sealing such documents. A judge may seal a Court order, including an order to seal documents and the related findings, when sealing a Court order meets the standard for sealing a judicial document. No document shall be sealed merely by stipulation of the parties. *A confidentiality order or protective order entered by the Court to govern discovery shall not qualify as an order to seal documents for purposes of this rule.* Any document filed under seal in the absence of a Court order to seal it is subject to unsealing without prior notice to the parties.\n\n(Emphasis added). [7](#page-6-0)\n\n- **B. The Trustee Has Not Complied with Bankruptcy Code § 107, the Local Rules, or Second Circuit Precedent to Present Evidence to Meet the High Burden for Sealing or Redacting \"Judicial Records\" such as the Settlement Agreement or 9019 Motion**\n- 19. Having made no attempt to comply with Bankruptcy Code § 107, D. Conn. L. R.\n\nCiv. P. 5(b)(3), or *Mirlis*, the Trustee cannot proceed with his 9019 Motion or Motion to Limit.\n\nThe Trustee has not sufficiently supported why the 9019 Motion has been redacted, or the\n\nSettlement Agreement filed under seal, with appropriate evidence meeting the requisite legal\n\nstandards.\n\n20. For a trustee to obtain approval of a compromise under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019(a)\n\n<span id=\"page-6-0\"></span><sup>7</sup> G Club notes that numerous documents and orders have been sealed in this case. It is not clear whether the *Mirlis*  standards were considered in those matters or not.\n\nthe:\n\nSupreme Court mandated that a bankruptcy court, in considering whether to approve a settlement or compromise, should \"apprise [itself] of all facts necessary for an intelligent and objective opinion of the probabilities of ultimate success should the claim be litigated. Further, the judge should form an educated estimate of the complexity, expense, and likely duration of such litigation, the possible difficulties in collecting on any judgment which might be obtained, and all other factors relevant to a full and fair assessment of the wisdom of the proposed compromise.\n\n10 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 9019.02 (16th Ed. 2024) (*citing Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry v. Anderson*, 390 U.S. 414, 424, 88 S. Ct. 1157, 1163–64, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1, 9–10 (1968)).\n\n21. Apply *Protective* and its progeny, the Second Circuit and courts within the Circuit have held that a court assessing the proposed settlement must determine that it is fair, equitable, and in the best interests of the estate before it may approve it. *Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.*, 156 B.R. 414, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), *aff'd*, 17 F.3d 600 (2d Cir. 1994). In doing so, the Court \"need not conduct an independent investigation into the reasonableness of the settlement but must only 'canvass the issues and see whether the settlement falls below the lowest point in the range of reasonableness.'\" *In re Adelphia Communications Corp*., 327 B.R. 143, 159 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 2005) (quoting *In re W.T. Grant Co.*, 699 F.2d 599, 608 (2d Cir. 1983)). The Court need not conduct a mini-trial but rather \"only need be apprised of those facts that are necessary to enable it to evaluate the settlement and make a considered and independent judgment about the settlement.\" *Adelphia*, 327 B.R. at 159.\n\n22. The factors to be considered when approving a proposed bankruptcy settlement are: (1) the balance between the litigation's possibility of success and the settlement's future benefits; (2) the likelihood of complex and protracted litigation, with its attendant expense, inconvenience,\n\nand delay, including the difficulty in collecting on the judgment; (3) the paramount interests of the creditors, including each affected class's relative benefits and the degree to which creditors either do not object to or affirmatively support the proposed settlement; (4) whether other parties in interest support the settlement; (5) the competency and experience of counsel supporting, and the experience and knowledge of the bankruptcy court judge reviewing, the settlement; (6) the nature and breadth of releases to be obtained by officers and directors; and (7) the extent to which the settlement is the product of arm's length bargaining (all said factors, the \"*Iridium* Factors\"). *In re Iridium Operating LLC*, 478 F.3d 452, 462 (2d (Cir. 2007) (internal citations and punctuation omitted); *In re Speer*, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13468, at \\*2 (D. Conn. Jan. 29, 2018).\n\n23. This assessment must occur in open court, like any other adjudication. D. Conn. L. R. Civ. P. 5(e). Because the Trustee seeks to obscure the record through sealing and redaction in violation of the controlling statutes, rules and precedent, his Pending Motions should be denied.\n\n24. Here, the Trustee proffers two reasons to seal the Settlement Agreement and redact the 9019 Motion: (a) disclosure \"would harm the Estate and/or [b] would implicate commercially sensitive or otherwise confidential information.\" Mediation Procedures Order at p. 10, ¶ 2(w). First, \"harm to the Estate\" in and of itself is not identified under Bankruptcy Code § 107 as a reason to seal judicial documents. As *Mirlis* and D. Conn. L. R. Civ. P. 5(e) make clear \"harm\" is a prerequisite to sealing under § 107(b), but not a reason itself for allowing a judicial document to be sealed. The Trustee must meet the stringent requirements necessary for the extraordinary measure of limiting the public's right to access judicial documents*. See Geltzer*, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6794, at \\*7 .\n\n25. The second reason the Trustee advances for sealing the Settlement Agreement and redacting the 9019 Motion – alleged prejudice to the Trustee's litigation strategy – has been\n\nrejected as insufficient as a matter of law. [8](#page-9-0) \"[T]he amount of the settlement is the critical factor in the Court's ability to assess whether the settlement should be approved. It therefore follows that it is also the critical factor in the ability of the public to monitor the appropriateness of the Court's decision… The sealing request here thus goes to the very core of the constitutionally-embedded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings.\" *Togut*, 492 B.R. at 173 (citing *Geltzer v. Andersen Worldwide, S.C.*, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6794, at \\*1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2007)); *In re Ditech Holding Corp.*, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 2271, at \\*33 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2019) (\"That rationale [in *Genzler*] applies equally in this case. Based on the record of this Motion, there is no discernable public interest or interests of the Debtors in preserving BANA's leverage in negotiations with other parties with respect to different mortgage loan servicing agreements.\")\n\n26. A bankruptcy court confronted this precise issue in *In re Quigley Co.*, 437 B.R.\n\n102, 154 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) and denied a motion to seal a 9019 motion on account of the\n\nlitigation strategy being \"commercially sensitive\":\n\nThe sealing movants' concern about leverage in future settlement negotiations is similarly unworthy of protection under § 107(b)(1). Their bargaining leverage in future unrelated cases is not 'commercial information.' Furthermore, their expressed concern over their bargaining power is speculative, but even if it were not, countervailing considerations dictate the need for disclosure… Thus, they knew or should have suspected that their settlements might become an issue in the anticipated bankruptcy case. The public has the right to know how much they\n\n<span id=\"page-9-0\"></span><sup>8</sup> The 9019 Motion states in relevant part:\n\nThe terms of the settlement constitute commercially sensitive information, because, among other things, their disclosure would prejudice the Trustee's ability to resolve similar claims against other defendants and potential defendants; and the terms are otherwise confidential because the Settlement Agreement negotiated by the Parties provides for their confidentiality to be maintained. This is one of many settlements that the Trustee will propose to the Court for approval. Meanwhile, the Trustee is litigating and/or negotiating to resolve avoidance claims against hundreds of other transferees. *It would be extremely prejudicial to the Estate to publicly file the settlement terms and thus reveal the Trustee's strategy and settlement tolerance to other defendants and potential defendants.*\n\n<sup>9019</sup> Motion at p. 7, ¶ 21 (emphasis added).\n\nwere paid to vote in favor of the Quigley's plans.\n\nHence, if a bankruptcy trustee wants to settle a case, he cannot expect to keep the 9019 motion or the key settlement terms secret to help his litigation strategy.\n\n27. As further explained by the Southern District of New Yor: \"the amount of the settlement is the critical factor in the Court's ability to assess whether the settlement should be approved. It therefore follows that it is also the critical factor in the ability of the public to monitor the appropriateness of the Court's decision. The parties' stipulation of settlement is the central document \"presented to the court to invoke its power[]\" to approve the settlement, and the size of the settlement is the critical term in that document.\" (internal citation omitted) Geltzer, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6794, at \\*13-14. \"Indeed, other courts have held that settlement amounts do not fall into any of the § 107 protected categories and cannot be sealed.\" *In re Dillahunt*, 2022 Bankr. LEXIS 3591, at \\*13 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Dec. 15, 2022) (collecting cases\n\n28. In sum, even if the Trustee filed a proper sealing motion, or made any attempt to comply with the Local Rules, or *Mirlis*, it is not at all clear how he could meet the requisite standard. A settlement amount or the Trustee's litigation strategy are not subject to sealing under Bankruptcy Code § 107 as a matter of law.\n\n29. For the Court to properly assess the proposed settlement within the confines of Bankruptcy Code §107 and D. Conn. L. R. Civ. P. 5(e) the legally operative judicial documents on which the Trustee relies, cannot be sealed or redacted. Therefore, the Court should deny the Trustee the right to proceed with his 9019 Motion under seal or in any redacted format.\n\n#### **CONCLUSION**\n\n30. For the above stated reasons, the Court should deny the Pending Motions, unless the 9019 Motion is filed without redactions and with an unsealed settlement agreement and\n\nproperly presented for adjudication.\n\n### **RESERVATION OF RIGHTS**\n\n31. G Club reserves its right to further object to the 9019 Motion once it is unsealed/unredacted and G Club can evaluate the proposed settlement.\n\n### G CLUB OPERATIONS LLC\n\nBy: /s/ Jeffrey M. Sklarz Jeffrey M. Sklarz (ct20938) Kellianne Baranowsky (ct26684) Michelle Amanda Antao (ct31715) Green & Sklarz LLC One Audubon Street, Third Floor New Haven, CT 06511 (203) 285-8545 Fax: (203) 823-4546 [jsklarz@gs-lawfirm.com](mailto:jsklarz@gs-lawfirm.com) [kbaranowsky@gs-lawfirm.com](mailto:kbaranowsky@gs-lawfirm.com) [mantao@gs-lawfirm.com](mailto:mantao@gs-lawfirm.com)\n\n# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI hereby certify that on October 3, 2024, a copy of the foregoing was served via CM/ECF.\n\nParties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF system.\n\n/s/ Jeffrey M. Sklarz","body_zh":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION（美国康涅狄格区破产法院布里奇波特分院）\n\n关于：\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）等，\n\n第 11 章\n\n案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n\n债务人。[1]（合并审理）\n\n2024年10月3日\nG CLUB OPERATIONS LLC 对 (1) 受托人关于限制送达调解/撤销权诉求和解动议通知的动议 及 (2) 依据《联邦破产诉讼程序规则》第 9019 条关于批准与 WILDES & WEINBERG, P.C. 和解协议的动议 之有限异议\n\nG Club Operations LLC（“G Club”）就第 11 章受托人 Luc A. Despins（“受托人”）提交的 (1)《关于限制送达调解/撤销权诉求和解动议通知的动议》（ECF No. 3565，“限制动议”）及 (2)《关于与 Wildes & Weinberg, P.C. 和解争议的动议》（ECF No. 3559，“9019 动议”，并与限制动议合称为“待决动议”）[2]，恭敬地提出有限异议。基于下述理由，除非受托人遵循具有约束力的第二巡回法院先例并提交 9019 动议及拟定和解协议的未涂改版本[3]，否则待决动议应予驳回。\n\n1 第 11 章主案中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵，又名 Miles Guo、Miles Kwok）（纳税人识别号后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（纳税人识别号后四位：8202）及 Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 及 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为：Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok。\n\n2 除非另有说明，所有案卷索引均指破产主案。\n\n3 本异议中未予定义的首字母大写术语，其含义与待决动议中所赋予的含义相同。\n引言\n\n1. 受托人请求法院批准一份隐去拟定和解主要条款的涂改版 9019 动议，其中最引人注目的是被告为和解案件所支付的金额。受托人声称其亦已将相关和解协议密封提交。然而，《美国法典》第 11 编第 107 条（即《破产法典》第 107 条，“《破产法典》”）将可向公众隐瞒的记录类型限定为“商业秘密或保密的研究、开发或商业信息”或“诽谤性或令人反感的”材料。《破产法典》§ 107(b)。\n\n2. 判例已确立，和解金额或“诉讼策略”必须公开，且不属于“保密……商业信息”，亦不受 § 107(b) 的保护。In re Oldco M Corp., 466 B.R. 234, 238 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012)（驳回受托人隐瞒和解金额的诉求，指出：“密封和解协议的唯一理由是公开披露会削弱和解被告在与其他索赔人谈判中的筹码”）；Togut v. Deutsche Bank AG (In re Anthracite Capital, Inc.), 492 B.R. 162, 173 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013)（“同样，为第三方在外部诉讼中提供诉讼优势并不能成为密封法院文书的正当理由。”）\n\n3. 此外，《康涅狄格区地方法院地方规则》以及第二巡回法院先例要求，对公众密封“司法文书”必须具备高度详尽的事实认定。参见 D. Conn. L. R. Civ. P. 5(e)。受托人并未向法院请求作出任何此类认定。事实上，法院先前的裁定已预设受托人应提交正式的密封动议，而受托人在本案中并未这样做。换言之，受托人仅仅是从 9019 动议中涂改了和解条款，并未提交密封动议，亦未以其他方式遵守地方规则。\n\n4. 基于上述理由，受托人不得推进其待决动议，或者法院应予驳回。\n事实与背景[4]\n\n5. 2024年9月19日，受托人提交了 9019 动议，但涂改了包括和解金额在内的若干信息（9019 动议第 10、13(a)、13(c)、13(d) 段），并以密封方式提交了拟定和解协议的副本（9019 动议附件 B）。受托人并未提交密封动议，而是在 9019 动议内部陈述了其认为和解协议应当密封的理由。受托人给出的唯一理由是保护其在未来案件中的和解筹码，声称披露和解条款会对破产财产造成损害。9019 动议第 7 页第 21 段。\n\n6. 2024年9月19日，受托人亦提交了限制动议，请求送达涂改后的 9019 动议。\n\n7. 法院已将限制动议的听证会定于2024年10月8日举行。ECF No. 3581。\n\n8. 此前，法院曾设立调解程序，该程序预设受托人在适当情况下密封提交文书：\n\nw. 若调解员报告表明调解程序达成了和解且该和解需经法院批准，受托人应在调解员报告出具后三十（30）日内提交请求该项批准的动议。若受托人认为公开披露和解条款会损害破产财产，且/或会涉及商业敏感或保密信息而该等信息的公开披露会损害和解各方的利益，则受托人可提交寻求该项批准的密封动议（查阅权限仅限于受托人、相关撤销权被告、无担保债权人官方委员会及美国受托人）。凡以密封方式提交动议的，受托人应在公开案卷中提交一份涂改了任何商业敏感或保密信息的动议副本。\n\nECF No. 3163（“调解程序裁定”）第 10 页第 2(w) 段。（强调为后加。）\n\n4 G Club 仅列出与待决动议具体相关的事实。\n\n9. 调解程序裁定随后在 ECF No 3465 第 2 页第 2(v) 段中被修订为包括以下内容：\n\nv. 在出具诉前和解报告后三十（30）日内，受托人应提交动议请求法院批准诉前和解并附上诉前和解报告。若受托人认为公开披露和解条款会损害破产财产，且/或会涉及商业敏感或保密信息而披露该等信息会损害同意调解各方的利益，则在通知无担保债权人官方委员会的法律顾问及美国受托人后，该动议及诉前和解报告可密封提交。对于任何密封提交的动议，受托人应在公开案卷中提交一份涂改了任何商业敏感或保密信息的动议副本。\n\n10. 对这两项规定的文义解读清楚地表明，其预设了受托人应遵守《破产法典》§ 107、关于文书密封的地方规则以及下文进一步阐述的其他法律要求。\n法律与论证\nA. 《破产法典》§ 107 项下不予披露司法文书的法定标准\n\n11. “在破产语境下，全国各地的法院均认定和解条款（包括和解金额）不属于根据 § 107(b)(1) 应予密封的保密‘商业信息’。”In re Thomas, 583 B.R. 385, 392 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2018)（汇总判例）。\n\n12. 这是因为：“存在支持公众查阅法院记录的强力推定和公共政策。”In re Borders Grp., Inc., 462 B.R. 42, 46 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011)。《破产法典》§ 107(a)“将公众查阅和复制司法记录的普通法权利成文化，并确立了一项推定，即在破产案件中提交的所有文书均可供公众查阅，并受公众在合理时间内免费检阅。11 U.S.C. § 107(a); Video Software Dealers Assoc. v. Orion Pictures Corp. (In re Orion Pictures Corp.), 21 F.3d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1994); 亦见 Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, 435 U.S. 589, 597, 98 S. Ct. 1306, 55 L. Ed. 2d 570 (1978)（‘显而易见，本国法院承认查阅和复制公共记录及文书（包括司法记录和文书）的一般权利。’）（引文省略）。”Togut, 492 B.R. at 170。\n\n13. 《破产法典》§ 107 在相关部分规定：\n\n(a) 除 (b) 款和 (c) 款另有规定并受第 112 条规制外，在本编项下案件中提交的文件以及破产法院的案卷均为公共记录，任何实体均可在合理时间内免费检阅。\n\n(b) 经利害关系方请求，破产法院应当……就……保密……商业信息保护实体[]，或……就文件中包含的诽谤性或令人反感的事项保护个人……。\n\n“如果该信息符合任何特定类别，法院必须对提出请求的利害关系方予以保护，且无裁量权驳回该申请。”Orion Pictures, 21 F.3d at 27。\n\n14. 《联邦破产诉讼程序规则》第 9018 条实施了《破产法典》§ 107，并允许法院在适当情况下密封文书。“《破产规则》第 9018 条并未在 § 107 赋予的权力之外扩大破产法院限制查阅所提交文件的能力，亦未提供单独的救济依据。”Togut, 492 B.R. at 171。“法院限制公众查阅权的权力仍然是一项非同寻常的措施，仅在极少数情况下方具正当性，因为‘公众监督是民主控制的基本特征’。”Geltzer v. Andersen Worldwide, S.C., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6794, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2007)（援引 United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1995)）; Togut, 492 B.R. at 171。\n\n15. “§ 107(b) 的条文用语内在地要求，请求该项非常救济的一方必须向法院提供具体的事实和法律依据，以证明争议中的特定文书被正当地归类为‘保密’或‘令人反感’。”同上（内部引文省略）。\n\n16. 第二巡回法院的先例确认了这一点。在 Mirlis v. Greer, 952 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2020) 一案中，第二巡回法院重新审视了何种文书构成“司法文书”[5]（受公众检阅和公开审理保护）以及何种文书属于“开示材料”（不受相同的公众检阅推定约束）的问题。第二巡回法院裁定：“在确定赋予所主张的隐私利益的适当权重时，法院应同时考虑该事项在传统上被视为私密而非公开的程度，以及若隐私利益未受保护，抗拒披露的一方将遭受的损害的性质和程度。”952 F.3d at 61。[6]\n\n17. 正如 Mirlis 案中所述，司法文书（例如 9019 动议和和解协议——即法院根据《联邦破产诉讼程序规则》第 9019(a) 条分析和批准拟定和解所必须依赖的文书）若不符合严格标准，则不得予以密封。“一般且根深蒂固的规则是，当推定查阅权适用于在确定诉讼当事人实体权利中起核心作用的文书——即属于第三条核心的行为——时，应赋予其‘强有力的权重’。正如本法院多次指出的那样，此类查阅至关重要，因为它使公众能够监督法院和陪审团的行为，以确保一定程度的问责制并增强对司法行政的信心。”Mirlis, 952 F.3d at 60（内部引文及标点省略）。\n\n5 法院曾使用过“司法记录”（judicial records）以及“司法文件”（judicial documents）这两个术语，在向法院提交的需要进行司法裁决的文件这一语境下，二者含义相同。判例法阐明了“司法文件”（本意见书之所以使用该术语，是因为District of Connecticut（康涅狄格区）的《地方民事诉讼规则》采用了该术语；参见 D. Conn. L. R. Civ. P. 5(e)）与其他材料之间的区别。\n\n6 裁定一名挑衅者的“获取视频的动机以及发布视频的意图，削弱了在此处应当赋予该推定的分量。同样削弱该推定分量的，还有[宣誓证人]作为一名遭受社区内备受信赖的宗教人物性虐待的未成年受害者，其所享有的相抗衡的隐私利益。”Mirlis 案，952 F.3d at 67。\n\n18. D. Conn. L. R. Civ. P. 5(e)(3) 明确纳入了 Mirlis 案的要求，并\n\n规定了法院及各方当事人若要封存司法文件所必须遵循的程序：\n\n当事人用于请求法院作出裁决或反对法院作出裁决的每一份文件（审判或听证证据除外），均应向法院归档提交。任何司法文件均不得封存归档，除非法院依职权（sua sponte）或明确准许封存该文件的申请而作出命令。任何此类封存司法文件的命令均应包含具体明确的认定，以证明封存具有明确且令人信服的理由支持，并且所采取的封存措施经过严格限定以服务于这些理由。强制要求或允许不公开某一类文件（例如人事档案、医疗保健记录或行政程序记录）的成文法，即构成支持封存此类文件之命令的充分依据。当封存法院命令符合封存司法文件的标准时，法官可以封存法院命令，包括封存文件的命令及相关认定。任何文件均不得仅凭当事人之间的约定予以封存。法院为规制证据开示而作出的保密命令或保护命令，就本规则而言，不得视为封存文件的命令。在没有法院封存命令的情况下封存归档的任何文件，均可在不事先通知当事人的情况下予以解封。\n\n（强调为后加）。[7]\n\n- B. 信托受托人（Trustee）未遵守《破产法典》（Bankruptcy Code）§ 107、地方法规或第二巡回法院先例，未能出示证据以达到封存或涂黑删节诸如和解协议（Settlement Agreement）或 9019 动议等“司法记录”的高证明标准\n- 19. 信托受托人根本未尝试遵守《破产法典》§ 107、D. Conn. L. R.\n\nCiv. P. 5(b)(3) 或 Mirlis 案的要求，因此不得继续推进其 9019 动议或限制通知动议（Motion to Limit）。\n\n信托受托人并未以符合必要法定标准的相应证据，充分支持为何对 9019 动议进行涂黑删节，\n\n或为何将和解协议封存归档。\n\n20. 信托受托人若要依据 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019(a) 获得和解方案的批准，\n\n7 G Club 指出，本案中已有大量文件和命令被封存。尚不清楚在那些事项中是否考虑了 Mirlis 案的标准。\n\n最高法院明确要求，破产法院在考虑是否批准一项和解或妥协方案时，应当：\n\n“充分了解形成对若诉诸诉讼最终胜诉之可能性进行明智且客观判断所必需的一切事实。此外，法官应当对该诉讼的复杂性、费用开支和可能持续的时间，对可能获得的任何判决在执行收取上的潜在困难，以及对全面公正评估拟议和解方案是否明智具有相关性的所有其他因素，形成合理的预估。”\n\n10 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 9019.02 (16th Ed. 2024)（援引 Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry v. Anderson 案，390 U.S. 414, 424, 88 S. Ct. 1157, 1163–64, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1, 9–10 (1968)）。\n\n21. 适用 Protective 案及其后继判例，Second Circuit（第二巡回法院）及该巡回区内的各法院均认定，评估拟议和解方案的法院在予以批准之前，必须认定该和解方案公平、合理且符合破产财团（estate）的最佳利益。Ionosphere Clubs, Inc. 案，156 B.R. 414, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)，后经 17 F.3d 600 (2d Cir. 1994) 维持原判。在进行此项评估时，法院“无需对和解的合理性展开独立调查，而只需‘审视争议要点并审查该和解是否跌破合理性范围的最低点’”。In re Adelphia Communications Corp. 案，327 B.R. 143, 159 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 2005)（引自 In re W.T. Grant Co. 案，699 F.2d 599, 608 (2d Cir. 1983)）。法院无需进行微型审判，而是“仅需了解使法院能够评估该和解并对和解作出经过深思熟虑且独立的判断所必需的事实”。Adelphia 案，327 B.R. at 159。\n\n22. 批准拟议的破产和解方案时应当考虑的因素包括：(1) 诉讼成功的可能性与和解带来的未来收益之间的平衡；(2) 发生复杂且旷日持久的诉讼的可能性，及其附带的费用、不便与迟延，包括在判决执行收取上的困难；(3) 债权人的首要利益，包括每个受影响类别的相对利益以及债权人不提出异议或明确支持拟议和解的程度；(4) 其他利害关系方是否支持该和解；(5) 支持和解的律师的能力与经验，以及审查和解的破产法院法官的经验与学识；(6) 高级职员与董事将获得的免责的性质与范围；以及 (7) 该和解在多大程度上属于公平交易磋商（arm's length bargaining）的产物（上述所有因素合称为“Iridium 因素”）。In re Iridium Operating LLC 案，478 F.3d 452, 462 (2d Cir. 2007)（内部引证与标点省略）；In re Speer 案，2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13468, at *2 (D. Conn. Jan. 29, 2018)。\n\n23. 与任何其他司法裁决一样，这一评估必须在公开法庭上进行。D. Conn. L. R. Civ. P. 5(e)。由于信托受托人试图通过违反主导性成文法、规则和先例的封存及涂黑删节手段来掩盖记录，其待决动议（Pending Motions）应当予以驳回。\n\n24. 在本案中，信托受托人提出封存和解协议及涂黑删节 9019 动议的两个理由：(a) 披露“将损害破产财团利益，及/或 [b] 将涉及商业敏感或在其他方面属于保密的信息”。《调解程序命令》（Mediation Procedures Order）第 10 页第 2(w) 段。首先，单纯的“对破产财团的损害”本身并未在《破产法典》§ 107 下被列为封存司法文件的理由。正如 Mirlis 案和 D. Conn. L. R. Civ. P. 5(e) 所阐明的那样，“损害”是 § 107(b) 项下封存的前提条件，但其本身并不是准许封存司法文件的理由。信托受托人必须符合采取限制公众查阅司法文件权利这一非同寻常措施所必需的严格要求。参见 Geltzer 案，2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6794, at *7。\n\n25. 信托受托人提出的封存和解协议及涂黑删节 9019 动议的第二个理由——声称对其诉讼策略造成损害——已作为法律认定被驳回为不充分。[8] “和解金额是法院评估是否应当批准和解的关键因素。由此顺理成章的是，它也是公众监督法院裁决是否恰当的关键因素……因此，此处的封存请求直接触及了司法程序中宪法所固有的公开性推定的最核心部分。”Togut 案，492 B.R. at 173（援引 Geltzer v. Andersen Worldwide, S.C. 案，2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6794, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2007)）；In re Ditech Holding Corp. 案，2019 Bankr. LEXIS 2271, at *33 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2019)（“该[Genzler 案中的]法理同样适用于本案。根据本动议的记录，在与其他当事人就不同的抵押贷款服务协议进行谈判时，保留 BANA 的谈判筹码并不存在任何可辨识的公共利益或债务人利益。”）\n\n26. 破产法院在 In re Quigley Co. 案，437 B.R.\n\n102, 154 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) 中面临过完全相同的问题，并以诉讼策略属于“商业敏感”为由\n\n驳回了封存 9019 动议的申请：\n\n封存动议提出方对在未来和解谈判中失去筹码的担忧，同样不值得在 § 107(b)(1) 项下获得保护。他们在未来无关案件中的谈判筹码不属于‘商业信息’。此外，他们对其谈判能力的担忧纯属推测，但即便不是推测，相互竞争的抗衡考量也决定了公开披露的必要性……因此，他们知晓或本应预料到他们的和解方案可能会成为预期的破产案件中的一个争议问题。公众有权知晓他们\n\n8 9019 动议在相关部分载明：\n\n和解条款构成商业敏感信息，因为除其他原因外，其披露将损害信托受托人解决针对其他被告及潜在被告的类似主张的能力；且这些条款在其他方面亦属保密，因为各方当事人经谈判达成的和解协议规定对其保密性予以维持。这是信托受托人将提请法院批准的众多和解方案之一。与此同时，信托受托人正在通过诉讼及/或谈判来解决针对数百名其他受让人的撤销权主张。公开归档提交和解条款从而向其他被告及潜在被告泄露信托受托人的策略及和解容忍度，将对破产财团造成极其严重的损害。\n\n9019 动议第 7 页第 21 段（强调为后加）。\n\n获得了多少报酬以投票赞成 Quigley 的计划。\n\n因此，如果破产受托人想要和解案件，就不能指望将 9019 动议或关键和解条款保密来助其诉讼策略。\n\n27. 正如 Southern District of New York（纽约南区）进一步阐释的那样：“和解金额是法院评估是否应当批准和解的关键因素。由此顺理成章的是，它也是公众监督法院裁决是否恰当的关键因素。当事人的和解协议是‘提交给法院以启动其权力’来批准和解的核心文件，而和解金额是该文件中最关键的条款。”（内部引证省略）Geltzer 案，2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6794, at *13-14。“确实，其他法院也已认定和解金额不属于 § 107 受保护的任何类别，且不得封存。”In re Dillahunt 案，2022 Bankr. LEXIS 3591, at *13 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Dec. 15, 2022)（汇总判例）\n\n28. 总之，即便信托受托人提交了合规的封存动议，或作出了任何遵守地方法规或 Mirlis 案要求的尝试，也根本看不出他如何能够达到所要求的标准。作为法律认定，和解金额或信托受托人的诉讼策略在《破产法典》§ 107 项下均不属于可封存的范围。\n\n29. 为使法院能够在《破产法典》§ 107 和 D. Conn. L. R. Civ. P. 5(e) 的约束范围内恰当地评估拟议的和解方案，信托受托人所依据的具有法律效力的司法文件不得封存或涂黑删节。因此，法院应剥夺信托受托人以封存或任何涂黑删节形式继续推进其 9019 动议的权利。\n\n结论\n\n30. 基于上述理由，法院应驳回待决动议，除非 9019 动议在未作涂黑删节且附带未封存的和解协议的情况下归档提交并\n\n正式提请司法裁决。\n\n权利保留\n\n31. 一旦 9019 Motion（9019动议）被解封/公开完整内容且 G Club 能够对拟议的和解方案进行评估，G Club 保留进一步提出异议的权利。\n\nG CLUB OPERATIONS LLC（G Club运营有限责任公司）\n\n签署人：/s/ Jeffrey M. Sklarz（杰弗里·M·斯克拉茨）\nJeffrey M. Sklarz（杰弗里·M·斯克拉茨）(ct20938)\nKellianne Baranowsky（凯莉安·巴拉诺夫斯基）(ct26684)\nMichelle Amanda Antao（米歇尔·阿曼达·安陶）(ct31715)\nGreen & Sklarz LLC（格林与斯克拉茨有限责任合伙）\nOne Audubon Street, Third Floor\nNew Haven, CT 06511\n(203) 285-8545\n传真：(203) 823-4546\n[jsklarz@gs-lawfirm.com]\n[kbaranowsky@gs-lawfirm.com]\n[mantao@gs-lawfirm.com]\n\n送达证明\n\n我特此证明，于 2024年10月3日，前述文书的副本已通过 CM/ECF 系统完成送达。\n\n各方当事人均可通过法院的 CM/ECF 系统查阅此份备案文件。\n\n/s/ Jeffrey M. Sklarz（杰弗里·M·斯克拉茨）","key_entities":["Je","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Guo","Despins","Miles Guo","Paul Hastings","CIPA"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":3163,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3465,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3559,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3565,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3581,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":3888,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 13:52:33"}