{"id":"court_ctb_3713_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":3713,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"MOTION","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n) ) ) ) ) ) ) )\n\nIn re:\n\nHO WAN KWOK, *et al*.,[1](#page-0-0)\n\nChapter 11\n\nCase No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\nDebtors.\n\n(Jointly Administered)\n\n# **JOINT DEFENDANTS' OMNIBUS MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS**\n\n1 The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and the Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\n# **TABLE OF CONTENTS**\n\n| | | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 1 | |\n|----|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|\n| | | BACKGROUND 4 | |\n| | | LEGAL ARGUMENT 7 | |\n| A. | | Trustee's Avoidance Claims Fail as a Matter of Delaware Law, Because Reverse
Veil-Piercing Is Not Permitted If It Will Result in Significant Prejudice to
Unknowing Third-Party Creditors of the Purported Alter Ego Entity. 7 | |\n| B. | | The Trustee's Avoidance Claims under 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 548, and 549 Also Fail as a
Matter of Law Because Delaware Law Only Recognizes the Vicarious Liability
Theory of Reverse Veil-Piercing. 11 | |\n| | 1. | None of the Cases Cited by the Trustee Constitute the Adoption of the
Identity Theory of Alter Ego Doctrine under Delaware Law. 14 | |\n| | 2. | This Court's Prior Alter Ego Rulings Fail to Cite Delaware Law for Identity
Theory. 16 | |\n| | 3. | The Trustee Seeks Substantive Consolidation Without Alleging Substantive
Consolidation. 18 | |\n| C. | | The Trustee's Section 549 Claims Fail as a Matter of Law Because the Trustee
Cannot Use the Alter Ego Doctrine on a Nunc Pro Tunc
Basis. 20 | |\n| | 1. | To Establish a Claim under 11 U.S.C. § 549, the Trustee Must Allege
and Prove That Property of the Bankruptcy Estate Was Transferred Afte
the Commencement of the Debtors' Bankruptcy Cases. 20 | |\n| | 2. | Applying the Alter Ego Doctrine Retroactively Is Nunc Pro Tunc Relief. 21 | |\n| | 3. | The Supreme Court's Decision in Acevedo
Precludes Nunc Pro Tunc
Alter
Ego Relief in these Adversary Proceedings. 25 | |\n| | 4. | State Law Does Not Recognize the Nunc Pro Tunc Use of the Alter Ego
Doctrine in This Manner. 28 | |\n| D. | | The Trustee's Sections 544 and 548 Claims Fail as a Matter of Law Because the
Transfers, When Made, Were Not from the Debtor's Property. 29 | |\n| E. | | This Court's Prior Decisions Are Not Binding on the Joint Defendants Because
They Do Not Constitute Law of the Case or Collateral Estoppel. 30 | |\n| | 1. | Collateral Estoppel (or Issue Preclusion) Does Not Apply. 30 | |\n| | 2. | The Law of the Case Doctrine Does Not Apply. 33 | |\n\n| CONCLUSION
35 |\n|------------------|\n|------------------|\n\n## **TABLE OF AUTHORITIES**\n\n| Cases
Page(s) | |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|\n| Ackerman v. Schultz (In re Schultz),
250 B.R. 22 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2000) 33, 34 | |\n| Adams v. Bostick (In re Bostick),
400 B.R. 348 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2009) 18 | |\n| Alzheimer's Found. of Am., Inc. v. Alzheimer's Disease & Related Disorders
Ass'n., Inc.,
No. 10 Civ. 3314, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 199601 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2014)35 | |\n| Arizona v. California,
530 U.S. 392 (2000) 31 | |\n| ASARCO LLC v. America's Mining Corp.,
382 B.R. 49 (S.D. Tex. 2007) 15 | |\n| In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd.,
860 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1988)19, 22 | |\n| In re Auto-Train Corp., Inc.,
810 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 22, 23 | |\n| Bauer v. General Elec. Capital Corp. (In re Oncology Assocs. of Ocean Cnty.,
LLC), 510 B.R. 463 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2014) 23, 24 | |\n| In re Bauman,
535 B.R. 289 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2015) 20 | |\n| BFI Waste Sys. of N. Am., LLC v. Shaw Env't & Infrastructure, Inc.,
No. 4:09CV1379 HEA, 2010 WL 5647118 (E.D. Mo. July 30, 2010),
amended on reconsideration, No. 409CV1379HEA, 2010 WL 4622519 (E.D.
Mo. Nov. 5, 2010) 12 | |\n| Boscarino v. Vachhani (In re Vachhani),
No. 18-02009, 2019 WL 303078 (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 22, 2019) 21 | |\n| Buechner v. Farbenfabriken Bayer Aktiengesellschaft,
38 Del. Ch. 490, 154 A.2d 684 (1959)16 | |\n| Butner v. U.S.,
440 U.S. 48 (1979) 17 | |\n| C.F. Trust, Inc. v. First Flight L.P.,
580 S.E.2d 806 (Va. 2003)8 | |\n\n| Cerrato v. BAC Home Loans Servicing (In re Cerrato),
504 B.R. 23 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2014)17 |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| Connolly v. Englewood Post No. 322 Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United
States, Inc. (In re Phillips),
139 P.3d 639 (Colo. 2006)8 |\n| Corrado v. N.Y. Unified Court Sys.,
163 F. Supp. 3d 1 (E.D.N.Y. 2016)
35 |\n| Covey v. Casey's General Stores, Inc. (In re Duckworth),
No. 11-8104, 2012 WL 4434681 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 2012)
28, 29 |\n| Deckelbaum v. Cooter, Mangold, Tompert & Chapman, PLLC,
275 B.R. 737 (Bankr. D. Md. 2001)
14 |\n| In re Donghia, Inc.,
No. 20-30487 (JJT), 2020 WL 2465503 (Bankr. D. Conn. May 12, 2020)26 |\n| Elmaliach v. Bank of China Ltd.,
No. 09 CIV. 2130 (PGG), 2010 WL 1172829 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2010)34 |\n| Equitable Trust Co. v. Gallagher,
34 Del. Ch. 76, 99 A.2d 490 (1951)16 |\n| Evangelista v. Silver (In re Silver),
647 B.R. 897 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2022)11, 14 |\n| Fed. Aviation Admin. v. Gull Air, Inc. (In re Gull Air, Inc.),
890 F.2d 1255 (1st Cir. 1989)17 |\n| Geltzer v. Soshkin (In re Brizinova),
588 B.R. 311 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2018)34, 35 |\n| Giuliano v. Shorenstein Co., LLC (In re Sunset Aviation, Inc.),
468 B.R. 641 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011)24 |\n| Grimmett v. McCloskey (In re Wardle),
No. S-03-01467, 2006 WL 6811026 (9th Cir. B.A.P. Jan. 31, 2006)14 |\n| Harrison v. Soroof Int'l, Inc.,
320 F. Supp. 3d 602 (D. Del. 2018)11 |\n| Jennings v. City of N.Y.,
No. 22 Civ. 1885, 2023 WL 8462739 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2023)
35 |\n| Lawler v. RepublicBank Dallas (In re Lawler),
53 B.R. 166 (N.D. Tex. 1985)28, 29 |\n\n| Majestic Star Casino, LLC v. Barden Dev., Inc. (In re Majestic Star Casino,
LLC),
716 F.3d 736 (3d Cir. 2013)17 | |\n|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|\n| Manichaean Capital, LLC v. Exela Techs., Inc.,
251 A.3d 694 (Del. Ch. 2021)3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13 | |\n| Martin v. D. B. Martin Co.,
10 Del. Ch. 211, 88 A. 612, 102 A. 373 (1913)16 | |\n| Multnomah Cty. v. Rudolph (In re Rudolph),
166 B.R. 440 (D. Or. 1994)
17 | |\n| NetJets Aviation, Inc. v. LHC Commc'ns, LLC,
537 F.3d 168 (2d Cir. 2008)12 | |\n| In re NETtel Corp., Inc.,
No. 02–10122, 2007 WL 2119029 (Bankr. D.D.C. Jul. 20, 2007)35 | |\n| Matter of New Ctr. Hosp.,
187 B.R. 560 (E.D. Mich. 1995)22 | |\n| Novak v. Univ. of Miami (In re Demitrus),
586 B.R. 88 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2018)
30 | |\n| Orshan v. Anker,
550 F. Supp. 538 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)
34 | |\n| Otto Candies, LLC v. KPMG, LLP,
2020 WL 4917596 (Del. Ch. Aug. 21, 2020)
12 | |\n| In re Owens Corning,
419 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 2005)19, 21 | |\n| Parker v. Titan Mining (US) Corp. (In re Star Mountain Res., Inc.),
No. 2:18-BK-01594-DPC, 2020 WL 6821721 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Sept. 30,
2020)
14 | |\n| Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,
439 U.S. 322 (1979)31 | |\n| Pauley Petroleum Inc. v. Cont'l Oil Co.,
43 Del. Ch. 516 (1968)
12, 15, 16 | |\n| Pavers & Rd. Builders Dist. Council Welfare Fund v. Core Contracting of N.Y.,
LLC,
536 B.R. 48 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2015)11 | |\n\n| In re PCH Assocs.,
949 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1991)34 |\n|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| In re Pearlman,
462 B.R. 849 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012)
27 |\n| People v. Bilsky,
95 N.Y.2d 172 (2000)34 |\n| Roman Cath. Archdiocese of San Juan, Puerto Rico v. Acevedo Feliciano,
589 U.S. 57 (2020)25, 26, 27 |\n| RS Air, LLC v. NetJets Aviation, Inc. (In re RS Air, LLC),
651 B.R. 538 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2023)12 |\n| Schwab v. Shelly Enters. (In re Clearview Builders, Inc.),
405 B.R. 144 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2009)
19 |\n| Searcy v. Knight (In re American Int'l Refinery),
402 B.R. 728 (Bankr. W.D. La. 2008)14, 15 |\n| Smith v. Richels (In re Richels),
163 B.R. 760 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1994)14 |\n| Speeney v. Rutgers,
369 F. App'x 357 (3d Cir. 2010)
34 |\n| Spradlin v. Beads and Steeds Inns, LLC (In re Howland),
674 F. App'x 482 (6th Cir. 2017)
11, 12, 13, 19 |\n| Spring Real Estate, LLC v. Echo/RT Holdings, LLC,
No. 7994–VCN, 2016 WL 769586 (Del. Ch. Feb. 18, 2016)15 |\n| Stevenson v. William Noble Rare Jewels, L.P. (In re DuMouchelle),
No. 19-54531, 2023 WL 8100234 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Nov. 21, 2023)11, 14 |\n| Stillwater Liquidating LLC v. Net Five at Palm Pointe, LLC (In re Stillwater Asset
Backed Offshore Fund Ltd.),
559 BR 563 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016)12, 19, 20, 30 |\n| In re Telles,
No. 8-20-70325-REG, 2020 WL 2121254 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2020)26 |\n| The City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC,
645 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2011)18 |\n| In re Torres,
No. 21-20483 (JJT), 2021 WL 2189515 (Bankr. D. Conn. May 28, 2021)26 |\n\n| United States v. Dexter,
165 F.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 1999)
35 |\n|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| United States v. Pulliam,
No. 3:21-CR-00156 (KAD), 2024 WL 1142004 (D. Conn. Mar. 15, 2024)34 |\n| Washington v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.,
740 F. App'x 730 (2d Cir. 2018)
31 |\n| Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co.,
304 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2002)34 |\n| Wilson v. Thorn Energy, LLC,
787 F. Supp. 2d 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)12 |\n| In re Zvoch,
618 B.R. 734 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2020)26 |\n| Statutes, Rules & Regulations |\n| 11 U.S.C. § 10527 |\n| 11 U.S.C. § 10830 |\n| 11 U.S.C. § 30327 |\n| 11 U.S.C. § 36323, 27 |\n| 11 U.S.C. § 52334 |\n| 11 U.S.C. § 54117, 21 |\n| 11 U.S.C. § 54217 |\n| 11 U.S.C. § 5442, 13, 20, 30 |\n| 11 U.S.C. §
5482, 5, 29, 30 |\n| 11 U.S.C. § 5492, 5, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29 |\n| 11 U.S.C. § 55028, 29 |\n| 11 U.S.C. § 72734 |\n| Fed. R. Bankr. P. 70121 |\n| Fed. R. Civ. P. 121 |\n\n# **Other Authorities**\n\n| 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
¶ 541.01 (16th ed. 2024)17 | |\n|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|--|\n| 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
¶ 541.02 (16th ed. 2024)21 | |\n| 5
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
§ 1100.06 (L. King ed. 15th ed. 1988)22 | |\n| 1 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations
(Perm.Ed.), § 4116 | |\n| Restatement (Second) of Judgments31 | |\n\nThe thirty-eight (38) adversary proceeding defendants identified on the attached Exhibit A (the \"Joint Defendants\") submit this memorandum in support of each of the individual motions to dismiss or motions for judgment on the pleadings (collectively, the \"Motion\")[2](#page-9-3) filed in their respective, non-stayed adversary proceedings (the \"Joint Defendant Adversaries\") and claims brought therein by plaintiff Luc A. Despins, as chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") for the estate of Debtor Ho Won Kwok (the \"Debtor\").\n\n#### **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\nEarlier this year, the Trustee commenced a massive litigation campaign against the Joint Defendants and more than 200 others, most of which were unsuspecting third-party providers of goods and services having only arms-length business dealings with a collection of non-debtor entities (the \"Non-Debtor Transferors\")[3](#page-9-4) without notice of the Debtor's bankruptcy. The Trustee attempts to selectively exercise avoidance action powers on behalf of the Non-Debtor Transferors as if they were debtors but without administering their estates or complying with all aspects of title 11 of the United States Code (the \"Bankruptcy Code\") or applicable state law, resulting in extreme injustice to the Joint Defendants. The Court has previously granted the Trustee's requests for alter ego determinations, but it did not determine the *legal effect* of the alter ego determinations on third-party recipients of transfers. Moreover, because the Joint Defendants were not parties to the\n\n2 On September 6, 2024, a subset of the Joint Defendants filed a joint request for a status conference, which occurred on September 24, 2024. On September 25, 2024, this Court entered its *Order Further Amending Avoidance Action Procedures Order and Scheduling Joint Briefing of Motions to Dismiss and Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings* (Dkt. No. 3577), authorizing the Joint Defendants to file this omnibus memorandum of law. In that order, the Court excused the parties from briefing the standard for a motion to dismiss or motion for judgment on the pleadings. In accordance with the Court's order, the Joint Defendants submit this brief in support of their motions to dismiss under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7012 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and./or 12(b)(6) for those that did not answer the complaints and in support of motions for judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) for those that did. In accordance with the Court's order, the Joint Defendants reserve all other arguments and defenses not raised herein.\n\n3 The specific Non-Debtor Transferors are identified in Exhibit A hereto and consist of the following entities: Lamp Capital LLC, Golden Spring (New York) Ltd., HCHK Technologies, Inc., HCHK Property Management, Inc., Greenwich Land LLC, and Lexington Property & Staffing, Inc.\n\nAlter Ego Adversaries (as defined below) the Court did not have the opportunity to consider fully the extreme prejudice that could befall innocent creditors that had arm's length business dealings with the purported alter egos.\n\nFor the first time, the legal effect of the alter ego rulings—*i.e.*, whether they give the Trustee standing to sue the Joint Defendants for transfers made by the Non-Debtor Transferors is now squarely before the Court. In suing the Joint Defendants, the Trustee has far exceeded the scope of his authorized avoidance action powers. The Trustee improperly claims the ability to avoid transfers made by *non-debtor alter ego entities* on the erroneous theory that an alter ego determination by this Court transforms the property of such Non-Debtor Transferors into property of this bankruptcy estate, and on a retroactive basis not supported by any applicable legal authority. The Trustee's overreaching position, which has mired this Court and numerous innocent parties in costly litigation, is contrary to the Bankruptcy Code, Delaware law and other reported decisions, and it is fundamentally unfair to the Joint Defendants.\n\nBy way of illustration (and without limitation), the extreme nature of the Trustee's position is demonstrated by the fact that the Joint Defendants' research has not found *a single reported decision holding that a trustee may, absent substantive consolidation, avoid a post-petition transfer made by a non-debtor, alter ego entity under 11 U.S.C. § 549*. Yet, the Trustee has used his unsupported legal theory to sue the Joint Defendants for millions of dollars, claiming that they are strictly liable for transfers occurring before this Court made any alter ego determinations concerning the Non-Debtor Transferors.\n\nThe Court should grant the Motion because the Trustee lacks standing to avoid initial transfers made by non-debtors such as the Non-Debtor Transferors. Sections 544, 548, and 549 of the Bankruptcy Code and related applicable fraudulent transfer law permit the avoidance of initial\n\ntransfers made by debtors only. Delaware law provides that an alter ego determination imposes vicarious liability on the alter egos of the Debtor; it does not make the Non-Debtor Transferors and the Debtor *one and the same*. To the extent that the Court has previously relied on *Manichaean Capital, LLC v. Exela Techs., Inc.*, 251 A.3d 694 (Del. Ch. 2021) to reach the opposite conclusion, it is respectfully submitted that the Court read the *Manichaean* decision too broadly. In *Manichaean*, the court considered whether the plaintiffs could use reverse veil-piercing to *enforce their judgment* against the judgment debtor's wholly owned subsidiaries. Importantly, the court did not conclude the entities were one and the same for all purposes. Even in *Manichaean*, the Delaware court mentions numerous times that reverse veil-piercing should be permitted only if it does not result in prejudice to innocent and unknowing third-party creditors of the alter ego entity, and favorably cites cases from other jurisdictions in accord. The Trustee violates this principle by attempting to use the equitable remedy of reverse veil-piercing to reach into the pockets of hundreds of counterparties who had arms-length business dealings with the purported alter ego entities.\n\nEven if the Trustee were correct as to the meaning of the alter ego determination and the application of *Manichaean*, the Trustee cannot, as a matter of law, retroactively apply such determination so as to time travel and pretend that all transfers ever made by the Non-Debtor Transferors were transfers made by the Debtor and (for post-petition transfers) subject to Bankruptcy Court approval. Indeed, modern Supreme Court precedent rejects this form of substantive retroactive or *nunc pro tunc* relief, and there is no state decisional law to support such extreme relief. The handful of courts to consider whether state law alter ego doctrine can be used retroactively in conjunction with the unique powers provided to a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code to attack transfers to third parties have rejected its use as inequitable.\n\nWhile the Trustee will claim that this Court's previous decisions are preclusive on all issues as to the Joint Defendants, he is mistaken. Because the Joint Defendants and the precise issues at play here were not squarely before the Court in the Alter Ego Adversaries, this brief is the first opportunity to actually litigate the issue of whether the alter ego rulings confer standing on the Trustee to sue the Joint Defendants. In any event, the discretionary doctrines of collateral estoppel and law of the case are plainly not applicable. Those doctrines do not apply to default judgments, nor can they apply to the Joint Defendants, who received no notice of and were not parties to the Alter Ego Adversaries.\n\nFor the reasons set forth below, the Court should grant the Motion and dismiss the Joint Defendant Adversaries with prejudice.\n\n#### **BACKGROUND**\n\n1. On February 15, 2022 (the \"Petition Date\"), the Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. (Dkt. No. 1.) [4](#page-12-1) There are only three debtors in these jointly administered chapter 11 cases: the Debtor, Genever Holdings LLC, and Genever Holdings Corporation (collectively, the \"Debtors\"). With one exception,[5](#page-12-2) the Joint Defendants were not identified in the Debtors' schedules or included on the creditor mailing matrices in this case. (*See, e.g.*, Debtors' Schedules, Dkt. Nos. 1157, 78, 4; Amended List of Creditors for Ho Won Kwok, Dkt. No. 1043; and Amended List of Creditors for Genever Holdings Corporation, Dkt. No. 1163.)\n\n2. On June 15, 2022, this Court entered its *Memorandum of Decision and Order Denying Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice and Granting Joinder to Motion for Appointment of*\n\n4 Unless otherwise indicated, references to Dkt. Nos. are references to the main bankruptcy case docket.\n\n5 Clayman Rosenberg Kirshner & Linder LLP appears in Schedule F at Dkt. No. 78 and Exhibit A at Dkt. No. 1043.\n\n*Chapter 11 Trustee*. (Dkt. No. 465.) On July 8, 2022, the Court entered an order appointing Luc A. Despins as the Trustee. (*See* Dkt. No. 523.)\n\n3. On January 20, 2023, the claims agent filed an Affidavit of Service with respect to the Bar Date Notice and Publication Notice. (*See* Dkt. No. 1360.) The Joint Defendants are not on the service list. [6](#page-13-2) (*See id*.) On January 17, 2023, the Trustee filed an affidavit of publication of the notice of the bar date for filing proofs of claim. (*See* Dkt. No. 1336.) The notice only references the Debtors to these proceedings. It does not reference any of the Non-Debtor Transferors.\n\n4. Earlier this year, the Trustee commenced a far-reaching litigation campaign of more than 270 adversary proceedings, seeking to avoid allegedly fraudulent transfers under 11 U.S.C. §§ 544 and 548, and applicable state fraudulent transfer law, as well as post-petition transfers under 11 U.S.C. § 549 made by the Non-Debtor Transferors. The Trustee's litigation targets include entities that had business relationships and provided goods or services to the Non-Debtor Transferors. The Joint Defendants include numerous legitimate third-party providers of goods and services, including landscapers, landlords, movers, IT providers, and retailers, as well as wellknown companies, such as Amazon Web Services, Inc., Amazon.com, Inc., Apple, Inc., American Express Company, [7](#page-13-3) Anthem Health Plans Inc., Cloudflare, Inc., Federal Express Corporation, Fox News Network, LLC, Hilton Management, LLC, and Meta Platforms Inc.\n\n5. The Trustee alleges, in many of the Joint Defendant Adversaries, that the alleged transfers by the Non-Debtor Transferors were made in furtherance of a self-concealing shell game orchestrated by the Debtor to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. In many instances, however, the complaints do not allege with any factual specificity the relationship between the Non-Debtor\n\n6 The exception is Clayman Rosenberg Kirshner & Linder LLP.\n\n7 American Express Company is a holding company, and itself is not an issuer of credit cards.\n\nTransferor and the Debtor, or how the transfers furthered the Debtor's shell game.[8](#page-14-0)\n\n6. The Alter Ego Adversaries were commenced in 2022 and 2023, before the Joint Defendant Adversaries were commenced. In those adversaries, the Trustee has obtained determinations that the Non-Debtor Transferors are and always were alter egos of the Debtor. With respect to all but two, the Trustee obtained default judgments against the Non-Debtor Transferors. A summary of the actions in which the Trustee has obtained an alter ego determination is set forth below (collectively, the \"Alter Ego Adversaries\").\n\n| Case Caption | Alleged Alter Ego Entity | Current Status |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| Despins v. HK International
Funds Investments (USA)
Limited, LLC, et al., No. 22-
05003 (\"HK USA\") | •
HK International Funds
Investments (USA) Limited,
LLC | •
Summary judgment in
favor of the Trustee
(Dkt. No. 221)
•
Affirmed on appeal
(Dkt. No. 260)
•
Appeal to Second
Circuit Court of
Appeals pending (Dkt.
No. 264) |\n| Despins v. Golden Spring (New
York) Ltd. et al., No. 23-05018
(\"Golden Spring\") | •
Golden Spring (New York) Ltd.
•
China Golden Spring Group
(Hong Kong) Limited | •
Default judgment
(Dkt. No. 35) |\n| Despins v. Lamp Capital LLC, et
al., No. 23- 05023 (\"Lamp
Capital\") | •
Lamp Capital LLC
•
Infinity Treasury Management
Inc.
•
Hudson Diamond NY LLC
•
Leading Shine NY Ltd. | •
Default judgment
(Dkt. No. 66) against
Lamp Capital LLC
and Infinity Treasury
Management with
appeal pending (Dkt.
No. 68).
•
Summary judgment
pending with respect
to Hudson Diamond
NY LLC and Leading
Shine NY Ltd. (Dkt.
No. 97). |\n\n8 Complaints against numerous Joint Defendants rely on boilerplate, non-specific assertions such as: \"The Transfers at issue in this Complaint were made with the intent to hinder, delay, and/or defraud the Debtor's creditors inasmuch as they were all made through the Debtor's alter-ego shell companies operated as part of the Debtor's shell game.\" (*See, e.g., Despins v. Amazon Web Services, Inc.*, Adv. Pro. No. 24-05006, Dkt. No. 4 ¶ 31).\n\n| Despins v. HCHK Techs, Inc., et
al., No. 23-05013 (\"HCHK\") | •
HCHK Technologies, Inc.
•
HCHK Property Management,
Inc.
•
Lexington Property and Staffing,
Inc. | •
Default judgment
(Dkt. No. 290)
•
Appeal pending (Dkt.
No. 298) |\n|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC,
et al., No. 23-05005
(\"Greenwich\") | •
Greenwich Land, LLC | •
Summary judgment in
favor of the Trustee
(Dkt. No. 133)
•
Appeal pending (Dkt.
No. 137). |\n\n7. The Non-Debtor Transferors are Delaware entities.[9](#page-15-2)\n\n8. This Court's rulings allowing reverse veil-piercing against the Non-Debtor Transferors did not consider the effect of the alter ego determinations on the Joint Defendants. The defendants in the Alter Ego Adversaries were limited to the above-referenced Non-Debtor Transferors. Accordingly, the Court's rulings did not consider whether the Trustee could use the alter ego determinations to then harness the avoidance powers provided under Chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code against non-parties to those proceedings.\n\n# **LEGAL ARGUMENT**\n\n# **A. Trustee's Avoidance Claims Fail as a Matter of Delaware Law, Because Reverse Veil-Piercing Is Not Permitted If It Will Result in Significant Prejudice to Unknowing Third-Party Creditors of the Purported Alter Ego Entity.**\n\nReverse veil-piercing permits a downstream alter ego affiliate to be held liable for the debts of its upstream parent. On the threshold issue of whether such reverse veil-piercing is permitted under controlling Delaware law, the initial question is whether the Court's prior reverse veilpiercing rulings can be applied against the Joint Defendants, if such application would result in\n\n9 According to the Trustee's own allegations the Non-Debtor Transferors are Delaware entities. *See* Complaint ¶ 8, Dkt. No. 1, Adv. Pro. No. 23-5018 (Golden Spring (New York) Ltd.); Complaint ¶ 8, Dkt. No. 1, Adv. Pro. No. 23- 05005 (Greenwich Land LLC); Complaint ¶¶ 9–11, Dkt. No. 1, Adv. Pro. No. 23-5013 (HCHK Technologies, Inc., HCHK Property Management, Inc., and Lexington Property & Staffing, Inc.); Complaint ¶ 8, Dkt. No. 1, Adv. Pro. No. 23-5023 (Lamp Capital LLC).\n\nsignificant prejudice to unknowing third parties, such as the Joint Defendants, who were simply conducting arms-length business with the purported alter ego entities. *See Manichaean,* 251 A.3d at 710. As noted in Part E below, this specific question has not yet been before the Court, and the Court's prior rulings cannot be preclusive on this issue. The Trustee's allegations fail to meet the stringent test for reverse veil-piercing under Delaware law because the relief sought prejudices innocent third-party creditors.\n\nThe court in *Manichaean* discussed at length, and stressed repeatedly in its opinion, that reverse veil-piercing—even on a going-forward basis only—should only be permitted in \"limited circumstances\" and with \"circumscribed execution.\" *Id.* at 710. The court also favorably cited cases from other jurisdictions on this issue, *id.* at 711–13, adopted the reasoning of those decisions, mentioned several times that reverse veil-piercing should be permitted only if it does not prejudice innocent and unknowing third-party creditors of the alter ego entity, and concluded as follows:\n\nOnly in cases alleging egregious facts, *coupled with the lack of real and substantial prejudice to third parties*, should the court *even consider* utilizing the reverse veil-piercing doctrine.\n\n. . . Applying this framework, Delaware courts will be well-equipped to handle the varying concerns courts and commentators have rightfully expressed regarding reverse veil-piercing. The expectations of third-party creditors and investors will be well-protected.\n\n*Id.* at 714–15 (emphasis added); *see also, id.* at 711 (\"Courts declining to allow reverse veilpiercing have relied primarily, and understandably, on a desire to protect innocent parties.\"); *C.F. Trust, Inc. v. First Flight L.P.*, 580 S.E.2d 806, 811 (Va. 2003) (plaintiff seeking reverse veilpiercing must also demonstrate that reverse veil-piercing will not cause harm to \"innocent secured and unsecured creditors\"); *Connolly v. Englewood Post No. 322 Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, Inc. (In re Phillips)*, 139 P.3d 639, 646 (Colo. 2006) (holding that before authorizing reverse veil-piercing, court must consider whether innocent creditors would be prejudiced as result of such piercing). In the process of making its ruling, the court in *Manichaean* specifically considered whether reverse veil-piercing would cause prejudice to innocent third-party creditors, and determined on the issues and facts before the court that it would not. *Manichaean,* 251 A.3d at 718 (\"There is no basis in the Complaint to infer that reverse veil-piercing will cause harm to innocent third-party creditors.\").\n\nThis Court's prior orders allowing reverse veil-piercing in the Alter Ego Adversaries mentioned in passing that prejudice to innocent third-party creditors is a factor to be considered (*see, e.g.*, Adv. Pro. No. 22-05003, Dkt. No. 221, pp. 18–19), but never specifically discussed the effect of such a ruling on innocent third-party creditors, largely because the Trustee did not present that specific issue to the Court. In the Alter Ego Adversaries, the named defendants were the purported alter ego entities themselves and certain insiders, not third-party creditors of those entities. For example, in the Court's order in Adv. Pro. No. 22-05003 (Dkt. No. 221) finding HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited LLC to be the alter ego of the individual Debtor, the target entity's only assets were two yachts, and the order referenced nothing in the record suggesting that vendors providing maintenance services on the yachts had not been paid, nor that the Trustee would seek to use the order to claw such payments back from those vendors. (*See id.*, p. 28 [\"[R]everse veil-piercing will also not harm the legitimate expectations of HK USA's creditors. The Court has already allowed payment of the operation, maintenance, and management expenses of the Lady May.\"].)\n\nSimilarly, in the Court's rulings holding the HCHK Entities to be alter egos of the Debtor (Adv. Pro. No. 23-05013, Dkt. Nos. 290, 297), the Court stated that \"[i]n considering whether to reverse pierce the corporate veil, courts consider 'the traditional factors Delaware courts consider when reviewing a traditional veil-piercing claim . . . as well as additional factors reflecting the\n\nconcern that creditors and other stakeholders of the entity might have their legitimate expectations thwarted.'\" (Dkt. No. 290, p. 12). But those orders did not discuss resulting prejudice to thirdparty creditors, or even the \"additional factors,\" beyond the standard alter ego analysis required under *Manichaean* to be considered to justify a reverse veil-piercing ruling. This likely is because the Trustee's complaint in that case affirmatively alleged that, to the best of his understanding at the time, \"HCHK Technologies' financial creditors consist *exclusively* of multiple unnamed individuals,\" understood to be investors who are Chinese dissidents \"whose names are being withheld for confidentiality purposes.\" (Adv. Pro. No. 23-05013, Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 34 (emphasis added)); *see also*, same allegation as to HCHK Property, *id.* ¶ 37.)\n\nIn sum, this Court has never actually ruled on the issue of reverse veil-piercing in the context of prejudice to third-party creditors, like the Joint Defendants. The Court's prior reverse veil-piercing rulings impacted only the alter ego entities themselves by imposing vicarious liability on those entities for the Debtor's debts, which is one thing. But a ruling that substantially prejudices unknowing third parties by requiring them to disgorge large sums of money that were paid to them in exchange for the provision of goods and services to the alter ego entities—*a question that is before the Court in these cases for the very first time*—is something else altogether and, under the express holding of the court in *Manichaean*, *is expressly not permitted under Delaware law*.\n\nGiven that under *Manichaean* the absence of any significant prejudice to innocent thirdparty creditors is a *mandatory* requirement before the application of reverse veil-piercing, it follows that the Trustee's causes of action in these cases fail to state viable claims as a matter of Delaware law. To be sure, the Trustee has not even purported to explain how prejudice to the Joint Defendants can be avoided when the entire purpose of his adversaries is to claw millions of dollars\n\nof payments back from them. Based on *Manichaean* and other authorities, the Trustee's use of the alter ego determination plainly is not permissible as a matter of law\n\n# **B. The Trustee's Avoidance Claims under 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 548, and 549 Also Fail as a Matter of Law Because Delaware Law Only Recognizes the Vicarious Liability Theory of Reverse Veil-Piercing.**\n\nEven if the Trustee's complaints can be viewed as stating a claim for reverse veil-piercing under Delaware law, the piercing of the Non-Debtor Transferors' corporate form does not consolidate their assets into the Debtor. The Court has ruled that the Non-Debtor Transferors are alter egos[10](#page-19-6) of the Debtor, but this only renders their current assets available for recovery of claims against the Debtor. Because Delaware law applies the \"vicarious liability\" theory of alter ego, property of an alter ego of the Debtor does not automatically become property of the estate. *See Pavers & Rd. Builders Dist. Council Welfare Fund v. Core Contracting of N.Y., LLC*, 536 B.R. 48, 51 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2015) (\"Just because two entities are *alter egos* does not make them both debtors under the Bankruptcy Code. It simply means they are liable for each other's debts.\").\n\nThe consequences of an alter ego finding vary depending on whether the state in question recognizes the \"identity theory\" or the \"vicarious liability theory.\" *See Spradlin v. Beads and Steeds Inns, LLC (In re Howland)*, 674 F. App'x 482, 486 (6th Cir. 2017) (describing \"identity\" theory and \"vicarious liability\" theory); *accord Stevenson v. William Noble Rare Jewels, L.P. (In re DuMouchelle)*, No. 19-54531, 2023 WL 8100234, at \\*7 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Nov. 21, 2023), *report and recommendation adopted*, No. 2:21-CV-12087, 2024 WL 3948772 (E.D. Mich. May 21, 2024); *Evangelista v. Silver (In re Silver)*, 647 B.R. 897, 909–10 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2022). Under the identity theory, \"piercing the corporate veil expands the debtor's estate to include the\n\n10 \"Delaware courts use the terms 'piercing the corporate veil' and 'alter ego' theory interchangeably.\" *Harrison v. Soroof Int'l, Inc.*, 320 F. Supp. 3d 602, 609 n. 4 (D. Del. 2018).\n\nproperty of its alter ego by deeming a corporation and its alter ego to be a single entity.\" *Howland*, 674 F. App'x at 486 (internal quotations omitted). Under the vicarious liability theory, however, alter ego doctrine simply \"shift[s] liability from the debtor to its alter ego\" and \"does not create assets for or in the corporation.\" *Id.* (internal quotations omitted).\n\nDelaware law, which is applicable here, falls squarely within the vicarious liability theory of the alter ego doctrine. *Otto Candies, LLC v. KPMG, LLP*, 2020 WL 4917596, at \\*9 (Del. Ch. Aug. 21, 2020) (stating that the veil-piercing or alter ego doctrine is a path to vicarious liability in Delaware). An alter ego finding under Delaware law results in the alter ego being responsible for the debts of another, *not* a consolidation of assets. *See, e.g.*, *RS Air, LLC v. NetJets Aviation, Inc. (In re RS Air, LLC)*, 651 B.R. 538, 545 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2023) (holding under Delaware law that \"[a]lthough the alter ego doctrine requires a showing that the two entities 'operated as a single economic entity,' . . . the result is not to deem the entities the same, but to hold one liable for the other's debts . . .\" [internal citations omitted]); *NetJets Aviation, Inc. v. LHC Commc'ns, LLC*, 537 F.3d 168, 176 (2d Cir. 2008) (recognizing that, under Delaware law, \"the distinction between the entity and its owner 'may be disregarded' to require an owner to answer for the entity's debts\") (citing *Pauley Petroleum Inc. v. Cont'l Oil Co.*, 43 Del. Ch. 516, 521 (1968)); *Wilson v. Thorn Energy, LLC*, 787 F. Supp. 2d 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (same); *BFI Waste Sys. of N. Am., LLC v. Shaw Env't & Infrastructure, Inc.,* No. 4:09CV1379 HEA, 2010 WL 5647118, at \\*5 (E.D. Mo. July 30, 2010), *amended on reconsideration*, No. 409CV1379HEA, 2010 WL 4622519 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 5, 2010) (observing that under Delaware law in certain circumstances, \"the alter ego doctrine allows for piercing the corporate veil so that *liability* can be placed on a parent corporation\" (emphasis added)); *see also Stillwater Liquidating LLC v. Net Five at Palm Pointe, LLC (In re Stillwater Asset Backed Offshore Fund Ltd.)*, 559 BR 563, 586-87 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016) (rejecting alter ego theory to selectively pool assets of Delaware entity with debtor entity for purposes of creating causes of action under 11 U.S.C. § 544 and stating that court \"knows of no support for the idea that alter ego theories can be used in this selective and self-serving way\").\n\nAs the court explained in *Manichaean*, \"[a]t its most basic level, reverse veil-piercing involves the imposition of liability on a business organization for the liabilities of its owners.\" 251 A.3d at 710. Even \"outsider\" reverse veil-piercing, which is how the Trustee describes his alter ego claims against the Non-Debtor Transferors, means that \"an outside third party, frequently a creditor, urges a court to render a company liable on a judgment against its member.\" *Id*. (internal quotations and citations omitted). In other words, Delaware applies alter ego liability as a form of vicarious liability, not a merger of identities or substantive consolidation.\n\nHere, even if the Non-Debtor Transferors are deemed vicariously liable for the Debtor's obligations, they are not the Debtor and their assets are not property of the Debtor's estate. This is fatal to the Trustee's avoidance claims and mandates dismissal. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in *Howland* is directly on point. In that case, the trustee sought to avoid a prepetition transfer of real estate by the debtors'limited liability company, Meadow Lake Horse Park, LLC (\"Meadow Lake\"), to a third-party buyer. 674 Fed. App'x. at 483–84. The trustee asserted that the property at issue was property of the debtors on the basis of reverse veil-piercing the corporate form of Meadow Lake to its owners, the debtors. *Id*. at 484. Meadow Lake was a Kentucky limited liability company, and, accordingly, the court applied Kentucky law to determine whether piercing Meadow Lake's corporate form would make Meadow Lake's property the debtors' property. *Id*. at 485–86. Because Kentucky, like Delaware, follows the vicarious liability theory, this \"dooms the trustee's fraudulent transfer claims against [the buyer] under a veil piercing theory.\" *Id*. at 487. The court reasoned that under the \"vicarious liability approach, . . . veil piercing does not give the pierced entity (*i.e.*, the debtor) an interest in the alter ego's assets . . . .\" *Id*. Accordingly, the court dismissed the trustee's avoidance claim. *Id*.\n\nSimilarly, in *In re Wardle*, the Ninth Circuit BAP determined that the trustee did not have standing to pursue chapter 5 avoidance action claims of a non-debtor entity, stating that an \"alter ego determination will not somehow transmogrify [the alleged alter ego's] funds into property of debtors' estate\" and that \"[u]nless and until [the entity] is a debtor, either by a filed bankruptcy petition or by substantive consolidation, there is no corporate bankruptcy estate and, thus, the trustee cannot pursue § 547 and § 548 actions in its name.\" *Grimmett v. McCloskey (In re Wardle)*, No. S-03-01467, 2006 WL 6811026 (9th Cir. B.A.P. Jan. 31, 2006) (applying Nevada reverse veilpiercing law); *accord Silver*, 647 B.R. at 909–10 (rejecting fraudulent transfer claims based on transfers from debtor's alter ego company formed under Michigan law, which applies vicarious liability approach); *DuMouchelle*, 2023 WL 8100234, at \\*7 (same).\n\nUnder Delaware law, the Court's determination that the Non-Debtor Transferors were alter egos of the Debtor means only that the Non-Debtor Transferors are vicariously liable for the Debtor's obligations to his creditors. It does not mean that the Non-Debtor Transferors' assets are or were the Debtor's assets and thus subject to avoidance under Chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code.\n\n### **1. None of the Cases Cited by the Trustee Constitute the Adoption of the Identity Theory of Alter Ego Doctrine under Delaware Law.**\n\nIn pending proceedings before this Court, the Trustee has cited the following cases to support his erroneous position that Delaware follows the identity theory: *Deckelbaum v. Cooter, Mangold, Tompert & Chapman, PLLC,* 275 B.R. 737, 742 (Bankr. D. Md. 2001); *Smith v. Richels (In re Richels)*, 163 B.R. 760, 763 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1994); *Searcy v. Knight (In re American Int'l Refinery)*, 402 B.R. 728, 748 (Bankr. W.D. La. 2008); *Parker v. Titan Mining (US) Corp. (In re Star Mountain Res., Inc.)*, No. 2:18-BK-01594-DPC, 2020 WL 6821721, at \\*5 (Bankr. D. Ariz.\n\nSept. 30, 2020). Although these cases do apply the identity theory of alter ego, none of them rely upon Delaware law in doing so.\n\nThe Trustee also may attempt to rely on *Spring Real Estate, LLC v. Echo/RT Holdings, LLC*, No. 7994–VCN, 2016 WL 769586, \\*3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 18, 2016). The *Spring Real Estate* court, discussing alter ego as the exception to insulated liability, states, *in dicta*, \"where the subsidiary is a mere alter ego of the parent to the extent that the Court may engage in 'reverse veilpiercing,' the Court may treat the assets of the subsidiary as those of the parent for purposes of a trustee's standing to void allegedly fraudulent transfers of such assets.\" *Id.* (citing *In re American Int'l Refinery*, 402 B.R. at 742–46). The authority for the proposition cited to in *American Int'l Refinery*, however, is *not Delaware law*. *American Int'l Refinery* was decided by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Louisiana and explicitly applied Nevada law, which follows the identity theory. 402 B.R. at 742–46. In any event, the *Spring Real Estate* court dismissed the avoidance claim asserted by the trustee of a parent company with respect to transfers made by its subsidiary company, which reduced the value of the parent's equity interests in the subsidiary. *Spring Real Estate*, 2016 WL 769586, \\*3.\n\nOther cases that may appear to justify the use of the identity theory also fail to represent Delaware law as to the impact of an alter ego determination. The court in *ASARCO LLC v. America's Mining Corp.*, 382 B.R. 49, 66 (S.D. Tex. 2007), purports to apply Delaware law in determining that a complaint contained sufficient allegations to plead a claim for alter ego. Specifically, the *ASARCO* court miscited *Pauley Petroleum, Inc. v. Cont'l Oil Co.*, 239 A.2d 629, 633 (Del. Ch. 1968), as Delaware law for the proposition of identity theory.\n\nIn *Pauley Petroleum*, however, a Delaware company sued another Delaware company to compel it to exercise control over its wholly owned Mexican subsidiary and stop the Mexican subsidiary from prosecuting litigation in Mexico. The case did not involve an attempt to collapse entities for purposes of defining property of a bankruptcy estate. In fact, the *Pauley* court's comment did not relate to any matter that was at issue in the lawsuit, and the apparent identity theory language does not derive from the law cited in *Pauley*. Specifically, *Pauley* relied on the following authorities for this point, none of which supports the adoption of the identity theory: 1 *Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations* (Perm.Ed.), § 41 (discussing various elements to alter ego and extension of \"liability\" to alter ego entity); *Martin v. D. B. Martin Co*., 10 Del. Ch. 211, 88 A. 612, 102 A. 373 (1913) (holding that, in discovery dispute, holding company could be compelled to produce books and records of its subsidiary companies); *Equitable Trust Co. v. Gallagher*, 34 Del. Ch. 76, 99 A.2d 490, 493–94 (1951) (holding that enforceable contract to assign shares of stock to decedent in exchange for her relinquishment of rights to shares held in trust when defendant repeatedly admitted that he was trustee of the corporation); *Buechner v. Farbenfabriken Bayer Aktiengesellschaft*, 38 Del. Ch. 490, 154 A.2d 684, 687 (1959) (holding that \"creditor of the parent corporation may not, in the absence of fraud, disregard the separate existence of a subsidiary corporation and look directly to specific assets of a subsidiary for satisfaction of his claim against the parent\").\n\nIn short, Delaware has not subscribed to the identity theory of alter ego, and any cases indicating that it may do so fail to cite any Delaware law as controlling authority.\n\n## **2. This Court's Prior Alter Ego Rulings Fail to Cite Delaware Law for Identity Theory.**\n\nThis Court has made certain rulings concerning the purported identity effect of alter ego; however, the Court has not cited any applicable Delaware law in support thereof. In related proceedings, the Court relied on a combination of Delaware cases applying vicarious liability theory of alter ego and summarily citing sections 541 and 542 of the Bankruptcy Code to hold that\n\n16\n\nthe Non-Debtor Transferors' property becomes property of the estate. Yet, the cases the Court cites do not adopt the identity theory. And nothing in sections 541 or 542 of the Bankruptcy Code expands property of the estate to non-debtors through application of vicarious liability.\n\nSection 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Code defines \"property of the estate\" as \"all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.\" 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). The Bankruptcy Code does not, however, define a debtor's legal or equitable interests. Rather, \"a debtor's property interests are created and defined by state law.\" *Cerrato v. BAC Home Loans Servicing (In re Cerrato)*, 504 B.R. 23, 29 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2014) (*citing Butner v. U.S.*, 440 U.S. 48 (1979)). A bankruptcy filing does not create new property interests or enhance those existing state law property interests. *See Majestic Star Casino, LLC v. Barden Dev., Inc. (In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC)*, 716 F.3d 736, 751 (3d Cir. 2013) (\"'However, '[f]iling for bankruptcy does not create new property rights or value where there previously were none.'\"); *Fed. Aviation Admin. v. Gull Air, Inc. (In re Gull Air, Inc.)*, 890 F.2d 1255, 1261–62 (1st Cir. 1989); *Multnomah Cty. v. Rudolph (In re Rudolph)*, 166 B.R. 440, 443–44 (D. Or. 1994); 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 541.01 (16th ed. 2024) (\"[T]he estate can only succeed to the same property interest that the debtor possesses, not a greater interest.\"). Section 542 of the Bankruptcy Code simply provides for the turnover of property of the estate to the trustee. Section 542 does not expand the definition of property of the estate under section 541.\n\nAs an example, in a decision related to HK USA[11](#page-25-7) the Court held as follows:\n\nAlter ego and/or piercing the corporate veil as sought by the Second Counterclaim renders one entity liable for the debts of another individual or entity. *Tronox*, 549 B.R. at 44 (\"Under Delaware law, veil piercing is a doctrine of equity. . . . Veil piercing is thus not a purely independent cause of action. Instead, piercing the corporate veil effectively amounts to the imposition of joint and several liability\n\n11 *Despins v. HK Int'l Funds Invs. (USA) Limited, LLC, et al.*, Adv. Pro. No. 22-05003 (JAM) (the \"HK USA Adversary\"), Dkt. No. 222, *Memorandum of Decision and Order Granting Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Second Counterclaim*, p. 25, May 18, 2023.\n\nbetween a direct actor and its corporate affiliate for some underlying wrong committed by the direct actor.\") In conjunction with sections 541 and 542, alter ego thus accomplishes the transfer of assets into the bankruptcy estate.\n\nThe Court cited Delaware law correctly for alter ego veil-piercing, making HK USA liable for the obligations of the Debtor, but did not discuss how this claim of vicarious liability mutates \"in conjunction with 541 and 542\" to become assets of the Debtor. However, Delaware law stops at the imposition of vicarious liability of HK USA.\n\nAs a further example, in the HCHK Adversary,[12](#page-26-3) the Court parsed the facts pled in the Trustee's complaint in consideration of a default judgment against the HCHK Entities (as defined in the HCHK Adversary) and granted a default judgment in favor of the Trustee as follows:\n\nTherefore, with respect to the First Claim, the Trustee is entitled to default judgment that the HCHK Entities are the alter egos of the Individual Debtor. *Micaklis Pawn*, 645 F.3d at 137; *Bostick*, 400 B.R. at 354–55. On this basis, the Trustee is entitled to default judgment that the property of the HCHK Entities is property of the Estate and that the property of the HCHK Entities be turned over to the Estate via delivery to the Trustee. 11 U.S.C. §§ 541, 542; *Micaklis Pawn*, 645 F.3d at 137; *Bostick*, 400 B.R. at 354–55.\n\nHowever, both *The City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop*, *LLC*, 645 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2011) and\n\n*Adams v. Bostick (In re Bostick)*, 400 B.R. 348 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2009) deal with the standard for\n\na default judgment, and neither discusses alter ego. The inclusion of references to sections 541\n\nand 542 does not create rights in property of the estate. Again, the cited authority to impose identity\n\ntheory alter ego does not reference any supporting Delaware legal authority.\n\n# **3. The Trustee Seeks Substantive Consolidation Without Alleging Substantive Consolidation.**\n\nIn truth, although he has not sought this relief, the Trustee's alter ego theory is a circumventive attempt to substantively consolidate the Non-Debtor Transferors and their assets\n\n12 *Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc., HCHK Prop. Mgmt., Inc., et. al.*, Adv. Pro. No. 23-05013 (JAM) (the \"HCHK Adversary\"), Dkt. No. 290, *Memorandum of Decision and Order Granting Motion for Default Judgment*, p. 19, June 14, 2024.\n\nwith the Debtor's estate. But an alter ego finding is not equivalent to substantive consolidation. *See Howland*, 674 Fed. App'x at 487–88 (\"Although similar in some ways to veil piercing, substantive consolidation is a distinct concept unique to bankruptcy law.\"). Unlike an alter ego finding under the vicarious liability theory, substantive consolidation \"treats separate legal entities as if they were merged into a single survivor left with all the cumulative assets *and liabilities* . . . . The result is that claims of creditors against separate debtors morph to claims against the consolidated survivor.\" *In re Owens Corning*, 419 F.3d 195, 205 (3d Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted) (emphasis added).\n\nSubstantive consolidation of the Non-Debtor Transferors with the Debtor's estate, to the extent it is even allowed in this Circuit,[13](#page-27-4) requires the Trustee to provide parties in interest with notice and an opportunity to be heard to ensure that creditors receive due process. *See Schwab v. Shelly Enters. (In re Clearview Builders, Inc.*), 405 B.R. 144, 148 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2009) (\"Substantive consolidation is such an extreme remedy impacting both party and creditor alike that it can only be preceded by such specificity and notice as to guarantee the due process right to be heard of all parties in interest.\"). It would be absurd to allow the Trustee to back into such extreme relief without providing the requisite due process for interested parties and meeting the stringent test for substantive consolidation given the havoc that it can wreak on innocent creditors. *See In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd.*, 860 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1988) (requiring that \"creditors dealt with the entities as a single economic unit\" or that \"the affairs of the debtors are so entangled that consolidation will benefit all creditors\"). Indeed, the Trustee does not allege a claim for substantive consolidation, nor has he sought this relief, because he cannot meet the requirements of this test.\n\n13 *Stillwater*, 559 B.R. at 586 (noting split among courts on whether non-debtor can be substantively consolidated with debtor and calling such relief \"unusual\").\n\nEven the extreme remedy of substantive consolidation cannot be used offensively to disadvantage a group of interested parties. *In re Bauman*, 535 B.R. 289, 300 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2015). Thus, the Trustee's alter ego end-run in the Joint Defendant Adversaries cannot achieve that same end under a less stringent standard. *Cf. Stillwater*, 559 B.R. at 586–88 (rejecting use of alter ego as run around for substantive consolidation to create § 544 standing).\n\n# **C. The Trustee's Section 549 Claims Fail as a Matter of Law Because the Trustee Cannot Use the Alter Ego Doctrine on a** *Nunc Pro Tunc* **Basis.**\n\nEven assuming, *arguendo*, that Delaware employed the identity theory of veil-piercing, the Trustee's section 549 claims still fail as a matter of law because such substantive relief cannot be provided on a retroactive or *nunc pro tunc* basis. Putting aside that there are no reported decisions in Delaware employing alter ego relief on a retroactive or *nunc pro tunc* basis, the handful of courts to consider the use of the alter ego doctrine in this retroactive manner reject it outright, and the U.S. Supreme Court recently shut the door on such retroactive relief.\n\n# **1. To Establish a Claim under 11 U.S.C. § 549, the Trustee Must Allege and Prove That Property of the Bankruptcy Estate Was Transferred After the Commencement of the Debtors' Bankruptcy Cases.**\n\nTo avoid a post-petition transfer under section 549, the Trustee must, *inter alia*, allege that (i) the property transferred post-petition by the Non-Debtor Transferors to the Joint Defendants was property of the Debtor's bankruptcy estate and (ii) the property was transferred after the commencement of the case. *See* 11 U.S.C. § 549(a). With regard to these two prongs, the Trustee's allegations appear to be that the Non-Debtor Transferors' property was property of the Debtor's estate on the Petition Date because the Non-Debtor Transferors are alter egos of the Debtor and, thus, any transfers after the Petition Date by the Non-Debtor Transferors were transfers of the Debtor after the commencement of the case.[14](#page-29-4) However, \"[u]nder [11 U.S.C. §] 541(a), and with a few enumerated exceptions, the bankruptcy estate consists of all of the *debtor's* legal and equitable property interest that existed *as of the commencement of the case*, that is, as of the time that the bankruptcy petition, voluntary or involuntary, is filed.\" 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, *supra*, ¶ 541.02, p. 541–12 (emphasis in original). If the transferred property was not property of the estate, it is not subject to a § 549 claim. *See, e.g.*, *Boscarino v. Vachhani (In re Vachhani)*, No. 18- 02009, 2019 WL 303078, at \\*5 (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 22, 2019)*.*\n\nHere, as of the Petition Date, there was no order or judgment disregarding the corporate form of the Non-Debtor Transferors. Thus, the Trustee's theory of avoidance under section 549 hinges on rewriting the factual circumstances that existed on the Petition Date by disregarding the corporate form of the Non-Debtor Transferors retroactively to the Petition Date and consolidating their assets with the Debtor. Both state and federal law disallow this theory.\n\n## **2. Applying the Alter Ego Doctrine Retroactively Is** *Nunc Pro Tunc* **Relief.**\n\nAs noted above, the nature of the alter ego relief sought by the Trustee is akin to the equitable remedy of substantive consolidation.[15](#page-29-5) The Second Circuit described substantive consolidation as an extreme remedy that \"usually results in, *inter alia*, pooling of assets of, and\n\n14 *See, e.g.,* Complaint ¶ 16, Dkt. No.1, Adv. Pro. No. 24-05112, *Despins v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield*.\n\n15 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has contrasted these types of remedies as follows:\n\n"Piercing the corporate veil makes shareholders liable for corporate wrongs. Equitable subordination places bad-acting creditors behind other creditors when distributions are made. Turnover and fraudulent transfer bring back to the transferor debtor assets improperly transferred to another (often an affiliate). Substantive consolidation goes in a direction different (and in most cases further) than any of these remedies; it is not limited to shareholders, it affects distribution to innocent creditors, and it mandates more than the return of specific assets to the predecessor owner. It brings all the assets of a group of entities into a single survivor. Indeed, it merges liabilities as well. \"The result,\" to repeat, \"is that claims of creditors against separate debtors morph to claims against the consolidated survivor.\"\n\n*In re Owens Corning*, 419 F.3d at 206. Like the substantive consolidation described in *Owens Corning*, the Trustee's alter ego theory here seeks to bring all the assets of a group of entities (the Non-Debtor Transferors) into a single survivor (the Debtor).\n\nclaims against, the two entities; satisfying liabilities from the resultant common fund; eliminating inter-company claims; and combining the creditors of the two companies for purposes of voting on reorganization plans.\" *Augie/Restivo*, 860 F.2d at 518 (citing 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1100.06, at 1100–32 n.1 (L. King ed. 15th ed. 1988)). It is \"to 'be used sparingly.'\" *Id*.\n\nHistorically, bankruptcy courts have, on occasion, ordered substantive consolidation *nunc pro tunc*. Because substantive consolidation is an extreme remedy that should be used sparingly, an even more searching inquiry is required when it is sought on a *nunc pro tunc* basis. *See, e.g.*, *In re Auto-Train Corp., Inc.*, 810 F.2d 270, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (observing that \"additional and slightly different balancing process\" must be invoked \"before using its equitable *nunc pro tunc* powers to give a consolidation order retroactive effect\"); *Matter of New Ctr. Hosp.*, 187 B.R. 560, 572 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (reversing substantive consolidation *nunc pro tunc* when more searching analysis of impact on creditors was not performed).\n\nIn *Auto-Train*, 810 F.2d at 276, the court observed that such closer scrutiny was required due to the impact of creditor exposure in avoidance actions. In particular, the court held that *nunc pro tunc* consolidation could wreak havoc on creditors' expectations for preference exposure by altering the 90-day lookback period solely \"on the basis of a bankruptcy filing by their debtor's apparently distinct affiliate.\" *Id*. The court explained the potentially disastrous impact of altering the facts by issuing such *nunc pro tunc* relief as follows:\n\nWere bankruptcy courts permitted to consolidate entities *nunc pro tunc* without regard to transferees' reliance on an entity's apparent separateness, a sign of weakness in any member of a family of corporations would lead creditors to descend on each member, strong or weak, to claim their pound of flesh. Such a rule would also sharpen people's natural reluctance to extend credit to any affiliate of a financially troubled corporation. This in turn would imperil the ability of financially sound affiliates to continue operations and help the more troubled ones out of their predicament.\n\n*Id*. at 277.\n\nThe *Auto-Train* court's concerns are even more grave for section 549 claims. While preference claims are subject to defenses to protect trade creditors under section 547(c), similar defenses are not available under section 549, which compels debtors and their counterparties to obtain court approval when entering into certain transactions. If substantive consolidation is applied retroactively to the petition date, any transfers made by the non-debtor after its affiliate's petition date would be subject to avoidance as though the non-debtor was in bankruptcy. This recharacterization of the historical facts and circumstances creates an unknowing risk for creditors that deal with the non-debtor after the petition date. Moreover, it robs them of the opportunity to have obtained court orders clarifying whether the transactions that they were being asked to engage in were approved by the bankruptcy court or within the ordinary course of business under 11 U.S.C. § 363(b). Indeed, the absurdity of the Trustee's position is made even more clear by the fact that Congress carved out from avoidance post-involuntary petition \"gap period\" transfers that were made in exchange for value, *notwithstanding any notice or knowledge of the case that the transferee has*. *See* 11 U.S.C. § 549(b). Under the Trustee's view of the Bankruptcy Code, counterparties who deal with an entity subject to an involuntary bankruptcy petition have more protection than the Joint Defendants here, who were dealing with non-debtors that were not subject to any bankruptcy proceeding whatsoever.\n\nThese concerns were on display in *Bauer v. General Elec. Capital Corp. (In re Oncology Assocs. of Ocean Cnty., LLC)*, 510 B.R. 463 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2014). In that case, the debtor, Oncology Associates of Ocean County, LLC (\"OAOC\"), filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 11 and a trustee was appointed about ten months later. *Id*. at 465. Arising out of a concern of assets being diverted to affiliates, the trustee obtained an order to substantively consolidate the estates of two affiliated companies, including Modern Radiation and Oncology of Ocean County, LLC (\"Modern\"), which had not filed for bankruptcy until about a year after OAOC. *Id*. at 465 n.1. The trustee commenced avoidance litigation against two defendants, in which he sought to avoid transfers from Modern to the defendants that were made after OAOC's petition date, but before Modern's petition date, under 11 U.S.C. § 549. *Id*. at 466–68.\n\nThe court dismissed the trustee's section 549 claims because the transfers were made prior to Modern's petition date and the court rejected the trustee's attempt to use the earlier petition date of OAOC for purposes of applying section 549. *Id*. at 468. The court held that the transferor was not in bankruptcy at the time of the transfers, and, thus, the transferred property was not property of the estate. *Id*. The court rightfully observed: \"Quite simply, on the date the transfers occurred, Modern was not in bankruptcy and its assets were not property of the bankruptcy estate. One wonders how any attorney could have counseled the transferees as to risks associated with postpetition transfers where the transferor was **not** in bankruptcy.\" *Id*. (emphasis in original).\n\nSimilarly, in *Giuliano v. Shorenstein Co., LLC (In re Sunset Aviation, Inc.)*, 468 B.R. 641 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011), the court held that substantive consolidation, which was not entered *nunc pro tunc*, did not automatically apply retroactively to alter the petition dates of three debtoraffiliates to the earliest possible date for purposes of prosecuting avoidance claims under, *inter alia*, section 549. *Id.* at 643, 645–49. Thus, the court dismissed the trustee's section 549 claim because the transfers were made prior to the transferor's bankruptcy filing. *Id.* at 645–51.\n\nHere, as noted above, the Trustee does not assert a substantive consolidation claim; yet, his alter ego theory necessitates consolidating all the Non-Debtor Transferors' assets into the Debtor, almost identical to the relief afforded in substantive consolidation. The substantive consolidation case law instructs that whether or not that relief is granted *nunc pro tunc* will determine the viability of section 549 claims, as well as other avoidance claims. Thus, the only way for the Trustee to assert a viable claim under section 549 is for the alter ego determination to be *nunc pro tunc* to the Petition Date. As described below, whether viewed under state or federal law there is no support for the retroactive application of the alter ego doctrine in these circumstances.\n\n# **3. The Supreme Court's Decision in** *Acevedo* **Precludes** *Nunc Pro Tunc* **Alter Ego Relief in these Adversary Proceedings.**\n\nThe Supreme Court's decision in *Roman Cath. Archdiocese of San Juan, Puerto Rico v. Acevedo Feliciano*, 589 U.S. 57 (2020), precludes this type of retroactive relief because it substantively alters the rights of non-debtors by creating new facts that did not exist before or on the petition date. In *Acevedo*, a case was removed from a Puerto Rican court to federal district court based on the bankruptcy filing of a party. 589 U.S. at 63. After the dismissal of the party's bankruptcy case, the federal district court remanded the litigation to the Puerto Rican court on a *nunc pro tunc* basis back to the date of the bankruptcy's dismissal; however, the Puerto Rican court had entered various orders after the dismissal of the bankruptcy and before the remand order was entered. *Id.* The Supreme Court held that the Puerto Rican court lacked jurisdiction to enter any orders once the case had been removed to federal court and emphasized that any post-removal actions taken by the court were void. *Id.* at 63–64. Most importantly, the Supreme Court held that remanding the case *nunc pro tunc* to the date of the bankruptcy dismissal was improper. *Id.* at 65. In clarifying the appropriate use of *nunc pro tunc* orders, the Supreme Court held that \"[n]unc pro tunc orders are not some Orwellian vehicle for revisionist history—creating 'facts' that never occurred in fact\" resulting in a substantive alteration of the legal landscape—but rather are limited to correcting inadvertent procedural errors. *Id.* (alteration in original) (\"Such a decree presupposes a decree allowed, or ordered, but not entered, through inadvertence of the court.\"). Simply put, the Supreme Court held that a court cannot use *nunc pro tunc* orders to \"make the record what it is not.\" *Id*.\n\nSince *Acevedo*, courts are careful not to use *nunc pro tunc* orders as a tool for rewriting history or substantively altering the legal landscape, reserving their use for correcting the record to match what happened or should have happened procedurally. For example, in *In re Torres*, No. 21-20483 (JJT), 2021 WL 2189515, at \\*3 (Bankr. D. Conn. May 28, 2021), the Court held that *Acevedo* barred the debtors' request to retroactively amend their petition to make the requisite certification under section 362(l)(1) to prevent the applicability of section 362(b)(22) to continue the stay of eviction proceedings. Similarly, in *In re Donghia, Inc.*, No. 20-30487 (JJT), 2020 WL 2465503, at \\*3 (Bankr. D. Conn. May 12, 2020), the Court, applying *Acevedo,* denied the trustee's request to reject a lease retroactively to the petition date, which would relieve the estate of significant post-petition rent obligations, because the trustee failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances warranting such relief. Other courts outside of this District hold similarly. *See*, *e.g.*, *In re Telles*, No. 8-20-70325-REG, 2020 WL 2121254, at \\*5 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2020) (denying, under *Acevedo*, *nunc pro tunc* stay relief to validate a foreclosure sale that occurred in violation of automatic stay); *In re Zvoch*, 618 B.R. 734, 740 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2020) (doubting that court could approve post-petition lending in Chapter 13 case *nunc pro tunc* in light of *Acevedo*).\n\nAfter *Acevedo*, courts must be vigilant to not use this equitable power to create \"'facts' that never occurred in fact\" resulting in a substantive alteration of the legal landscape. *Acevedo*, 589 U.S. at 65. Here, the relief sought by the Trustee in his complaint fundamentally seeks to create facts that never occurred, the result of which is to alter substantially the legal landscape. When the challenged transfers allegedly occurred, the property transferred belonged to the Non-Debtor Transferors, and on each of those dates, the Non-Debtor Transferors were not debtors in bankruptcy. The Trustee seeks to alter these two key facts. By changing those two key facts, the legal landscape is fundamentally altered prejudicially for the Joint Defendants for the reasons described herein. This is impermissible under *Acevedo*. The unavailability of such retroactive relief is fatal to the Trustee's section 549 claims.\n\nFinally, even if *Acevedo* is read narrowly as solely barring *nunc pro tunc* relief to retroactively create jurisdiction, the Trustee's section 549 claims still fail as a matter of law. By seeking to consolidate a non-debtor's assets into the Debtor's estate retroactive to the Petition Date, the Court is in essence being asked to extend its *in rem* jurisdiction over assets for a period of time when they belonged to non-debtors. Just as the *Acevedo* court held that a state court's jurisdiction could not be created by virtue of *nunc pro tunc* relief from a federal court, it stands to reason that a bankruptcy court cannot retroactively give itself jurisdiction over assets that were not within its jurisdictional purview on the petition date. Indeed, *nunc pro tunc* relief would be drawn from a bankruptcy court's equitable power under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), but even before *Acevedo*, courts held that this equitable power does not give the court \"unfettered power\" to \"drag unwilling nondebtors that never chose to file bankruptcy into a bankruptcy forum\" because it \"circumvents the stringent procedures and protections relating to involuntary bankruptcy cases imposed by § 303 of the Bankruptcy Code.\" *In re Pearlman*, 462 B.R. 849, 854 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012).\n\nHere, using alter ego liability to consolidate the assets of the Non-Debtor Transferors into the Debtor retroactive to the Petition Date would be an extreme form of revisionist history. It would take assets that were not part of the Debtor's bankruptcy estate on the Petition Date and, more than two years later, recategorize them as part of the bankruptcy estate. Given the restrictions placed on the use of property of the estate under 11 U.S.C. §§ 363 and 549, this is far more than fixing a clerical or procedural error. Accordingly, even read in its narrowest interpretation, *Acevedo* precludes this Court from using the alter ego doctrine retroactively to consolidate the assets of the Non-Debtor Transferors with the Debtor's estate as of the Petition Date.\n\n## **4. State Law Does Not Recognize the** *Nunc Pro Tunc* **Use of the Alter Ego Doctrine in This Manner.**\n\nThe Joint Defendants have not identified a single reported decision under Delaware law to support the retroactive application of the alter ego doctrine. On the other hand, the handful of courts to address the propriety of using state law to give alter ego retroactive effect to create substantive rights under the Bankruptcy Code have rejected such use in no uncertain terms.\n\nFor example, in *Covey v. Casey's General Stores, Inc. (In re Duckworth)*, No. 11-8104, 2012 WL 4434681 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 2012), the trustee brought a section 549 claim against a retailer, Casey's, which received payments from non-debtor Power Trading, the individual debtor's Indiana limited liability company, after the debtor's petition date. *Id*. at \\*1–2. The trustee's section 549 claim was premised on Power Trading being the debtor's alter ego, and, thus, the transferred funds being property of the estate retroactive to the petition date. *Id*. at \\*3, 5. The court observed that the trustee could have pursued Casey's as a mediate transferee of fraudulent transfers from the debtor to Power Trading, but did not do so, ostensibly to prevent Casey's from having access to the good faith and value defense under 11 U.S.C. § 550(b)(1). *Id*. at \\*5. Ultimately, the court rejected the trustee's \"creative attempt\" to use the alter ego doctrine retroactively to avoid payments made to Casey's. *Id*. at \\*8–9. The court pointed out that the trustee asserted \"that the alter ego doctrine may be used to recreate a different set of facts, to rewrite history so to speak, for a purpose cognizable only under bankruptcy law, with no state law corollary: to [bring a section 549 claim while depriving] a defendant of the statutory good faith transferee defense provided by section 550(b)(1).\" *Id*. at \\*8. The court rejected this use of retroactive alter ego as \"a gross overextension of the alter ego doctrine far beyond its identifiable state law parameters and purposes.\" *Id*.\n\nSimilarly, in *Lawler v. RepublicBank Dallas (In re Lawler)*, 53 B.R. 166, 168–70 (N.D.\n\nTex. 1985), the court rejected the debtor's retroactive use of the alter ego doctrine to avoid a foreclosure sale of property titled in the name of the debtor's alter ego after the debtor's bankruptcy filing. In *Lawler*, the debtor had an involuntary petition filed against him in 1976; a few months later the mortgage lender on property co-owned by a trust created by the debtor conducted a foreclosure sale. In 1979, the bankruptcy court found that the trust was the alter ego of the debtor retroactive to its inception. *Id*. at 168 n.2. The district court, however, rejected the use of the alter ego doctrine to avoid the foreclosure sale on the basis of a \"decree entered three years after the facts at issue here\" because it \"would be a travesty\" that would work an injustice on the foreclosing mortgagee. *Id*. at 169–70.\n\nIn short, the Trustee's use of the alter ego doctrine years after the fact to create section 549 liability finds no support in any reported decision in Delaware and has been rejected by the few courts to address the issue. This Court should similarly reject the Trustee's attempt to use an equitable doctrine to play \"gotcha\" with the Joint Defendants.[16](#page-37-6)\n\n# **D. The Trustee's Sections 544 and 548 Claims Fail as a Matter of Law Because the Transfers, When Made, Were Not from the Debtor's Property.**\n\nEven if Delaware followed the identity theory, which it does not, the Trustee's fraudulent transfer claims fail as a matter of law because the alter ego doctrine cannot be applied *nunc pro tunc* for the reasons set forth in Part C above. That is, at the time the challenged pre-petition transfers were made, they were made by the Non-Debtor Transferors and not from any interest of the Debtor in *his* property.\n\nSection 548(a)(1) provides for the avoidance of fraudulent transfers of \"interests of the\n\n16 This does not leave the Trustee without a remedy. He could, of course, seek to recover any alleged transfers from the Debtor to the Non-Debtor Transferees against the Joint Defendants as immediate transferees. *See* 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(2); *see also In re Duckworth*, 2012 WL 4434681, at \\*5. Indeed, this would comport with Congress's carefully selected balance to protect unsuspecting creditors by providing a good faith and value defense. 11 U.S.C. § 550(b).\n\ndebtor in property\" made \"within 2 years before the date of the filing of the petition . . . .\" Similarly, 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) authorizes a trustee to \"avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property\" to the extent it is voidable under applicable law. Any viable state law avoidance claim needs to be in existence on the petition date for it to be enforced by a trustee. *See* 11 U.S.C. § 108(a). To the extent that the underlying property being transferred was not property of the debtor, it is not subject to avoidance under 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b)(1) or 548(a)(1). *See Novak v. Univ. of Miami (In re Demitrus)*, 586 B.R. 88, 94 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2018) (dismissing trustee's sections 544 and 548 fraudulent transfer claims where alleged transfers did not constitute property of the debtor); *cf*. *Stillwater*, 559 B.R. at 586 (dismissing fraudulent transfer claims because transfers from alleged alter ego were not transfers from debtor's property).\n\nHere, as discussed above in Part C, an alter ego determination cannot be given retroactive effect to create avoidance claims under state or federal law. Accordingly, at the time the challenged pre-petition transfers were made by the Non-Debtor Transferors, the property being transferred was that of the Non-Debtor Transferors—not that of the Debtor. Thus, each of these transfers are not avoidable as fraudulent transfers under section 544(b)(1) or section 548(a)(1) and the Trustee's claim must be dismissed.\n\n### **E. This Court's Prior Decisions Are Not Binding on the Joint Defendants Because They Do Not Constitute Law of the Case or Collateral Estoppel.**\n\n#### **1. Collateral Estoppel (or Issue Preclusion) Does Not Apply.**\n\nThe judgments entered in the Alter Ego Adversaries have no preclusive effect on the Joint Defendants because (i) all but two of the judgments were entered on default, (ii) the identical issues were not litigated, and (iii) in all circumstances the Joint Defendants did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the relevant issues. As the Supreme Court has found, \"[i]t is the general rule that issue preclusion attaches only 'when an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and\n\ndetermined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment.'\" *Arizona v. California*, 530 U.S. 392, 414 (2000) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27, p.250 (1982)). \"In the case of a judgment entered by . . . default, none of the issues is actually litigated.\" *Id.*\n\nHere, because the Court entered a finding of alter ego liability by default, (*see, e.g.*, Adv. Proc. No. 23-5013, Dkt. No. 297) in all but two of the Alter Ego Adversaries, none of the underlying factual or legal issues for alter-ego was ever litigated.[17](#page-39-4) In addition, the Joint Defendants are not parties to any of the Alter Ego Adversaries. Accordingly, even if the specific issues outlined in this brief were determined in the Alter Ego Adversaries (which they were not, *supra*), those judgments do not have preclusive effect in the Joint Defendant Adversaries.\n\nThe doctrine of collateral estoppel bars re-litigation of a legal or factual issue that a court previously decided in strictly limited situations[18](#page-39-5) where:\n\n(1) the issues in both proceedings are *identical*,\n\n(2) the issue in the prior proceeding was *actually litigated* and actually decided,\n\n(3) there was [a] *full and fair opportunity to litigate* in the prior proceeding, and\n\n(4) the *issue previously litigated was necessary* to support a valid and final judgment on the merits.\n\n*Washington v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.*, 740 F. App'x 730, 732 (2d Cir. 2018) (emphasis added).\n\nThe doctrine is inapplicable here for the following independent reasons.\n\nFirst, as set forth above, the judgments entered on default in the Alter Ego Adversaries were\n\nnot actually litigated according to binding Supreme Court precedent, and, thus, are not issue\n\n17 One exception to this is Adv. Proc. No. 23-5005 (*Greenwich Land*), in which the Court granted the Trustee's Motion for Summary Judgment. *See* Adv. Proc. No. 23-5005, Dkt. No. 133. This brief addresses *Greenwich Land's* findings.\n\n18 Even in these limited situations, the doctrine is discretionary. *Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore*, 439 U.S. 322, 324 (1979). \"[W]here the application of offensive estoppel would be unfair to a defendant, a trial judge in the exercise of his discretion should not allow the use of offensive collateral estoppel.\" *Id*. Here, the Joint Defendants are third parties. The Trustee does not allege that they had any special relationship with the Non-Debtor Transferors, and the Trustee's own allegations show that the Joint Defendants dealt with the Non-Debtor Transferors well before the Trustee even commenced the Alter Ego Adversary Proceedings.\n\npreclusive.\n\nSecond, the legal issues in the Joint Defendants Adversaries are not identical to those determined in the Alter Ego Adversaries. The Motion herein seeks a determination on whether the Trustee can exercise avoidance powers under Chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code, which was clearly not at issue in the Alter Ego Adversaries. In addition, for the reasons described in Part A above, which are incorporated herein, Delaware law requires an assessment of the prejudicial effect of reverse veil-piercing on third party creditors, like the Joint Defendants, which did not occur.\n\nThird, even assuming, *arguendo*, that the issues in the Alter Ego Adversaries were identical to the issues raised in these proceedings, and the parties actually litigated such issues, the Joint Defendants did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate them—until now, of course. The Trustee does not, nor could he, allege that the Joint Defendants were parties to the Alter Ego Adversaries, had notice of them at the time he filed his complaints commencing those proceedings, or had any reason to believe that he would use judgments in those proceedings to assert avoidance action powers over the purported alter egos.\n\nThere are also no allegations in the complaints in the Joint Defendant Adversaries that the Joint Defendants even had notice of the Debtor's chapter 11 case or the alleged relationship between the Debtor and the Non-Debtor Transferors. Indeed, the record in these cases would not support such allegations. For example, the Joint Defendants have not been included on any creditor matrix filed in this case. (*See* Dkt. Nos. 5, 1043, 1163.)[19](#page-40-0) Nor were the Joint Defendants served with any dispositive motions in the Alter Ego Adversaries. *See, e.g.*, Adv. Pro. No. 23-5013, Dkt.\n\n19 As discussed *supra*, the lone exception relates to Clayman Rosenberg Kirshner & Linder LLP. Notice of Genever Holdings Corp.'s chapter 11 case (22-50542), filed on October 12, 2022, was not served on any of the Joint Defendants (*see* Case No. 22-50542, Dkt. No. 7) and it appears that no creditor's matrix was ever filed in that case. While the U.S. Trustee served the notice of § 341 meeting for Genever Holdings Corp. on creditors, none of the Joint Defendants were listed. (Dkt. No. 1066.) The creditor's matrix in Genever Holdings LLC's chapter 11 case (22-50592), filed on October 12, 2022, does not list any of the Joint Defendants (Case No. 22-50592, Dkt. No. 1).\n\nNo. 110, *Trustee's Cross Motion for Default* (ECF notice only); Dkt. No. 273, *Trustee's Certificate of Service of Motion for Entry of Default Judgment*. In sum, the Joint Defendants were not parties to the Alter Ego Adversaries and did not have any opportunity to even seek to participate in those proceedings.\n\nIn *Greenwich Land*, the defendants argued that the Court could not grant summary judgment on the issues in dispute because (among other arguments) the Trustee had failed to join necessary parties to the adversary proceeding. In response, the Court found that it \"can 'accord complete relief among *existing parties*' and none of the persons and entities named by the Greenwich Parties 'claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that *disposing of the action in the person's absence may . . . impair or impede that person's ability to protect the interest*; or . . . leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest.'\" Adv. Proc. No. 23-5005, Dkt. No. 133, p. 6 (emphasis added). If the Court were to find that the issues addressed in this brief were already determined in *Greenwich Land*, it would contradict its own determination in *Greenwich Land* that uninvolved parties would not have their rights prejudiced by the ruling in that case.\n\nAccordingly, collateral estoppel does not apply to the issues raised herein.\n\n#### **2. The Law of the Case Doctrine Does Not Apply.**\n\nThe discretionary law of the case doctrine provides \"that a decision at one stage of a litigation can, in the Court's discretion, be determined to be binding precedent in following stages of the same litigation or to different lawsuits *between the parties*.\" *Ackerman v. Schultz (In re Schultz)*, 250 B.R. 22, 35 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2000) (emphasis added). Both the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and numerous district courts within this circuit have repeatedly held that, while in some\n\ninstances the law of the case doctrine can be applied in different lawsuits, it may only be applied between the same parties. *See*, *e.g.*, *In re PCH Assocs.*, 949 F.2d 585, 592 (2d Cir. 1991) (\"While the doctrine is ordinarily applied in later stages of the same lawsuit, it also has application to different lawsuits between *the same parties*\" [emphasis added]); *Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co.,* 304 F.3d 200, 219 (2d Cir. 2002) (applying doctrine only when \"the parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the initial determination\") (quoting *People v. Bilsky*, 95 N.Y.2d 172, 17 (2000)); *United States v. Pulliam*, No. 3:21-CR-00156 (KAD), 2024 WL 1142004, at \\*1 (D. Conn. Mar. 15, 2024) (same); *accord Elmaliach v. Bank of China Ltd*., No. 09 CIV. 2130 (PGG), 2010 WL 1172829, at \\*4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2010); *Orshan v. Anker*, 550 F. Supp. 538, 540 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).\n\nThe case of *In re Schultz* illustrates the limitations of the law of the case doctrine. In *Schulz*, the trustee brought*, inter alia*, a fraudulent conveyance claims against the debtor and his wife. *Id*. at 26. The defendants asserted that the court's rulings in another creditor's prior actions against the debtor under 11 U.S.C. §§ 727 and 523 barred the trustee's avoidance claim based on the law of the case. *Id.* at 33–34. The court rejected application of the doctrine, however, because \"[t]his is not the same litigation or a different litigation between the same parties.\" *Id.* at 35.\n\nLikewise, in *Geltzer v. Soshkin (In re Brizinova)*, 588 B.R. 311, 322 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2018), the trustee opposed a defendant's motion to dismiss based in part on the law of the case doctrine, arguing that defendant made claims substantially similar to that of the debtors in a previous adversary proceeding. The court rejected the trustee's argument, in part because the defendant was not the same party as the debtors, and applying the law of the case to the later proceeding \"would deprive [defendant] of the most fundamental component of due process, the opportunity to be heard.\" *Id.* at 324; *accord Speeney v. Rutgers*, 369 F. App'x 357, 360–61 (3d Cir. 2010) (doctrine did not bar parties that lacked opportunity to litigate merits of claims in previous matter); *United States v. Dexter*, 165 F.3d 1120, 1124 (7th Cir. 1999) (doctrine cannot be used to \"preclude[] a party from raising an argument that it had no prior opportunity to raise.\"); *Jennings v. City of N.Y*., No. 22 Civ. 1885, 2023 WL 8462739, at \\*3–5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2023); *Corrado v. N.Y. Unified Court Sys*., 163 F. Supp. 3d 1, 17–18 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (\"[A] party joined in an action after a ruling has been made should be free to reargue the matter without the constraints of law-of-the-case analysis.\"); *Alzheimer's Found. of Am., Inc. v. Alzheimer's Disease & Related Disorders Ass'n., Inc.,* No. 10 Civ. 3314, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 199601, at \\*11–12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2014); *In re NETtel Corp., Inc.*, No. 02–10122, 2007 WL 2119029, at \\*1 (Bankr. D.D.C. Jul. 20, 2007) (law of the case doctrine did not apply to adversary proceeding because such proceeding involved different parties as previous adversary proceeding).\n\nAs in the above cited cases, the Joint Defendants here were not parties to the Alter Ego Adversaries. This Court should not allow the Trustee to use the law of the case doctrine to bar the Joint Defendants from defending themselves in the Joint Defendant Adversaries, thereby depriving them \"of the most fundamental component of due process, the opportunity to be heard.\" *Brizinova*, 588 B.R. at 324.\n\n#### **CONCLUSION**\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant the Joint Defendants' Motions to dismiss or enter judgment on the pleadings in favor of the Joint Defendants, as applicable, in each of the Joint Defendant Adversaries with prejudice, and grant such other relief as justice requires.\n\nDated: October 18, 2024\n\n# THE JOINT DEFENDANTS\n\n| By: /s/ Jeffrey Hellman
Jeffrey Hellman (ct04102)
LAW OFFICES OF JEFFREY HELLMAN,
LLC
195 Church Street, 10th Floor
Tel: 203-691-8762
New Haven, CT 06510
Email: jeff@jeffhellmanlaw.com
Counsel for Ohtzar Shlomo Solomon
Treasure LLC
and Jason Miller | By: /s/ Eric S. Goldstein
Eric S. Goldstein (ct27195)
SHIPMAN &
GOODWIN LLP
One Constitution Plaza
Hartford, CT 06103
Tel: (860) 251-5059
Email: egoldstein@goodwin.com
Counsel for Anthem HealthChoice Assurance,
Inc. dba Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield;
Anthem Health Plans, Inc.; Sedgwick Realty
Corp.; and Direct Persuasion LLC |\n|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| By: /s/ Scott M. Charmoy
Scott M. Charmoy (ct15889)
CHARMOY &
CHARMOY,
LLC
1465 Post Road, Suite 100
Westport, CT 06680
Tel: (203) 255-8100
Email: scottcharmoy@charmoy.com
Counsel for Putnam's Landscaping LLC | By: /s/ Eric S. Goldstein
Eric S. Goldstein (ct27195)
Nicole M. Lapenta (ct31639)
SHIPMAN &
GOODWIN LLP
One Constitution Plaza
Hartford, CT 06103
Tel: (860) 251-5059
Email: egoldstein@goodwin.com
nlapenta@goodwin.com
-and
By: /s/ Michael A. Siedband
Michael A. Siedband (pro hac vice)
FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION
3620 Hacks Cross Road, Bldg. B
Memphis, TN 38104
Tel: (901) 355-2075
Email: michael.siedband@fedex.com
Counsel for Federal Express Corporation |\n\n| By: /s/ Rowena A. Moffett
Rowena A. Moffett (ct19811)
BRENNER,
SALTZMAN &
WALLMAN LLP
271 Whitney Avenue
New Haven, CT 06511
Tel: (203) 772-2600
Email: rmoffett@bswlaw.com
Counsel for Morvillo Abramowitz Grand
Iason & Anello PC | By: /s/ Michael T. Conway
Michael T. Conway (ct26750)
LAZARE POTTER GIACOVAS &
MOYLE LLP
747 Third Avenue, 16th Floor
New York, NY 10017
Tel: (917) 242-1597
Email: mconway@lpgmlaw.com
Counsel for Arri Americas Inc. |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| By: /s/ | By: /s/ Ross G. Fingold |\n| Louis J. Martocchio III | Ross G. Fingold (ct05452) |\n| Louis J. Martocchio III (ct31149) | STOKESBURY & |\n| MARTOCCHIO & | FINGOLD, |\n| OLIVEIRA LLC | LLC |\n| 191 Main Street | 10 Waterside Drive, Suite 204 |\n| Southington, CT 06489 | Farmington, CT 06032 |\n| Tel: (860) 621-9700 | Tel: (860) 606-1709 |\n| Email: lou@mo-lawfirm.com | Email: rfingold@lawssf.com |\n| -and | -and |\n| Bret L. Strong (pro hac vice) | Sabrina L. Streusand (pro hac vice) |\n| Zachary W. Doninger (pro hac vice) | STREUSAND, |\n| THE STRONG FIRM, | LANDON, |\n| P.C. | OZBURN & |\n| Two Hughes Landing | LEMMON, |\n| 1790 Hughes Landing, Suite 200 | LLP |\n| The Woodlands, TX 77380 | 1801 S MoPac Expressway, Suite 320 |\n| Tel: (281) 367-1222 | Austin, TX 787046 |\n| Email: bstrong@thestrongfirm.com | Tel: (512) 236-9901 |\n| zdoninger@thestrongfirm.com | Email: streusand@slollp.com |\n| Counsel for DJD Creative, LLC | Counsel for Cloudflare, Inc. |\n| By: /s/ Richard J. Bernard | By: /s/ Benjamin D. Feder |\n| Richard J. Bernard (ct413177) | Benjamin D. Feder (ct443211) |\n| FAEGRE DRINKER BIDDLE & | Eric R. Wilson (ct443553) |\n| REATH LLP | KELLEY DRYE & |\n| 1177 Avenue of the Americas | WARREN LLP |\n| New York, NY 10036 | Canterbury Green |\n| Tel: (212) 248-3140 | 201 Broad Street |\n| Email: richard.bernard@faegredrinker.com | Stamford, CT 06901 |\n\n| | Tel: (203) 324-1400 |\n|-----------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|\n| -and | Email: ewilson@kelleydrye.com |\n| | bfeder@kelleydrye.com |\n| Josh Peterson | |\n| FAEGRE DRINKER BIDDLE &
REATH LLP | -and- |\n| 2200 Wells Fargo Center | |\n| 90 S. 7th Street | Richard J. Reding (pro hac vice) |\n| Minneapolis, MN 55402 | ASK
LLP |\n| Tel: (612) 766-7000 | 2600 Eagan Woods Drive, Suite 400 |\n| Email: josh.peterson@faegredrinker.com | St. Paul, MN 55121 |\n| | Tel: (651) 406-9665 |\n| -and | Email: rreding@askllp.com |\n| | |\n| Jaclyn C. Marasco
FAEGRE DRINKER BIDDLE &
REATH LLP | -and- |\n| 222 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1400 | Edward E. Neiger (pro hac vice) |\n| Wilmington, DE 19801 | ASK
LLP |\n| Tel: (302) 467-4200 | 60 East 42nd Street, 46th Floor |\n| Email: jaclyn.marasco@faegredrinker.com | New York, NY 10165 |\n| | Tel: (212) 267-7342 |\n| Counsel to Cirrus Design Corporation | Email: eneiger@askllp.com |\n| | |\n| | Counsel to Indium Software, Inc. |\n| | |\n| | |\n| By: /s/ John F. Carberry | By: /s/ David J. Kozlowski |\n| /s/ Kara A. Zarchin | David J. Kozlowski (ct28240) |\n| John F. Carberry (ct02881) | MORRISON COHEN LLP |\n| Kara A. Zarchin (ct30783) | 909 Third Avenue |\n| CUMMINGS &
LOCKWOOD LLC | New York, NY 10022 |\n| Six Landmark Square | Tel: (212) 735-8825 |\n| Stamford, CT 06901 | Email: dkozlowski@morrisoncohen.com |\n| Tel: (203) 351-4280 | |\n| | |\n| Email: jcarberry@cl-law.com | -and |\n| kzarchin@cl-law.com | |\n| | Jeffrey Rhodes (pro hac vice) |\n| Counsel for Target Enterprises, LLC | TAYMAN LANE CHAVERRI LLP |\n| and Jamestown Associates, LLC | 2001 L Street NW, Suite 500 |\n| | Washington, DC 20036 |\n| | Tel: (202) 921-4080 |\n| | Email: jrhodes@tlclawfirm.com |\n\n| | Counsel to Mark Gundersen |\n|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| By: /s/
Eric Seltzer
Eric Seltzer
(ct01224)
GILBRIDE,
TUSA,
LAST &
SPELLANE LLC
31 Brookside Drive
Greenwich, CT 06830
Tel: (203) 622-9360
Email: ehs@gtlslaw.com
Counsel for Miller Motorcars Inc. | By: /s/ Robert E. Kaelin
Robert E. Kaelin (ct11631)
MURTHA CULLINA LLP
280 Trumbull Street, 12th Floor
Hartford, CT 06103
Tel: (860) 240-6000
Email: rkaelin@murthalaw.com
-and
By:
/s/ Matthew A. Pesce
Matthew A. Pesce (ct31208)
MURTHA CULLINA LLP
107 Elm Street
Four Stamford Plaza, 11th Floor
Stamford, CT 06902
Tel: (203) 653-5400
Email: mpesce@murthalaw.com
Counsel for 3 Columbus Circle, LLC, Phillips
Nizer LLP,
and
ModSquad, Inc. |\n| By: /s/ Robert N. Sensale
Robert N. Sensale (ct10556)
BERSHTEIN,
VOLPE &
MCKEON P.C.
900 Chapel Street, 11th Floor
New Haven, CT 06510
Telephone: (203) 777-5800
Email: rns@bvmlaw.com
Counsel for 270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC | By: /s/ Lindsay C. Stone
Lindsay C. Stone (ct31140)
Benjamin Gilbert
(pro hac vice)
SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER &
HAMPTON
LLP
30 Rockefeller Plaza, 39th Floor
New York, NY 10112
Tel: (212) 653-8700
Email: lstone@sheppardmullin.com
bogilbert@sheppardmullin.com
-and
By: /s/
Alan H. Martin
Alan H. Martin (pro hac vice)
SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER &
HAMPTON |\n\n| | LLP
650 Town Center Drive, 10th Floor |\n|----------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Costa Mesa, CA 92626 |\n| | Tel: (714) 513-5100 |\n| | Email: amartin@sheppardmullin.com |\n| | |\n| | Counsel to Agora Lab, Inc. |\n| | |\n| By: /s/ Matthew D. Valauri | By: /s/ Bonnie C. Mangan |\n| Matthew D. Valauri (ct30193) | Bonnie C. Mangan (ct03759) |\n| WILSON ELSER MOSKOWITZ EDELMAN &
DICKER LLP | LAW OFFICE OF BONNIE C.
MANGAN,
P.C.
Westview Office Park |\n| 1010 Washington Boulevard | 1050 Sullivan Avenue, A3 |\n| Stamford, CT 06901 | South Windsor, CT 06074 |\n| Tel: (203) 388-2433 | Tel: (860) 644-4204 |\n| Email: matthew.valauri@wilsonelser.com | Email: bonnie.mangan@manganlaw.com |\n| | |\n| Counsel for Clayman Rosenberg Kirschner
& Linder LLP | -and |\n| | Sari B. Placona (pro hac vice) |\n| | MCMANIMON,
SCOTLAND &
BAUMANN,
LLC |\n| | 75 Livingston Avenue, Second Floor |\n| | Roseland, NJ 07068 |\n| | Tel: (973) 721-5030 |\n| | Email: splacona@msbnj.com |\n| | |\n| | Counsel for McManimon, Scotland & |\n| | Baumann, LLC |\n| | |\n| | |\n| By: /s/ Tracy Ellis Williams
Tracy Ellis Williams (ct25137) | By: /s/ Eric S. Goldstein
Eric S. Goldstein (ct27195) |\n| | |\n| SHIPMAN &
GOODWIN LLP
300 Atlantic Street, 3rd Floor | SHIPMAN &
GOODWIN LLP
One Constitution Plaza |\n| Stamford, CT 06901 | Hartford, CT 06103 |\n| Tel: (203) 324-8136 | Tel: (860) 251-5059 |\n| Email: tewilliams@goodwin.com | Email: egoldstein@goodwin.com |\n| | |\n| -and- | -and |\n| Scott M. Kessler (pro hac vice) | Justin S. Baumgartner (pro hac vice) |\n| AKERMAN LLP | BECKER LLC |\n\n| 1251 Avenue of the Americas, 37th Floor
New York, NY 10020
Tel: (212) 880-3800
Email: scott.kessler@akerman.com
Counsel for B&H Foto & Electronics Corp. | 354 Eisenhower Parkway
Plaza Two, Suite 1500
Livingston, NJ 07039
Tel: (973) 422-1100
Email: jbaumgartner@becker.legal
Counsel for On the Spot Home Improvement,
Inc. |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| By: /s/ Nicholas P. Vegliante
Nicholas P. Vegliante (ct28449)
COHN BIRNBAUM &
SHEA P.C.
CityPlace II, 15th Floor
185 Asylum Street
Hartford, CT 06103
Tel: (860) 493-2200
Email: nvegliante@cbshealaw.com
Counsel for GroCyber, LLC | By: /s/ Henry P. Baer, Jr.
Henry P. Baer, Jr. (ct27781)
Eilis Meagher
(ct31160)
FINN DIXON &
HERLING,
LLP
Six Landmark Square
Stamford, CT 06901
Tel. (203) 325-5000
Email: hbaer@fdh.com
emeagher@fdh.com
Counsel for Nardello & Co., LLC |\n| By: /s/ Henry P. Baer, Jr.
Henry P. Baer, Jr. (ct27781)
FINN DIXON &
HERLING,
LLP
Six Landmark Square
Stamford, CT 06901
Tel. (203) 325-5000
Email: hbaer@fdh.com
-and
Steven G. Mintz (pro hac vice)
Barry M. Kazan (pro hac vice)
MINTZ &
GOLD LLP
600 Third Avenue, 25th Floor
New York, NY 10016
Tel. (212) 696-4848
Email: mintz@mintzandgold.com
kazan@mintzandgold.com | By: /s/ Henry P. Baer, Jr.
Henry P. Baer, Jr. (ct27781)
Eilis Meagher
(ct31160)
FINN DIXON &
HERLING,
LLP
Six Landmark Square
Stamford, CT 06901
Tel. (203) 325-5000
Email: hbaer@fdh.com
emeagher@fdh.com
-and
Andrea M. Chase (pro hac vice)
SPENCER FANE LLP
1000 Walnut, Suite 1400
Kansas City, MO 64106
Tel. (816) 292-8279
Email: achase@spencerfane.com
Counsel for Teris-Phoenix, LLC |\n\n| Counsel for Marcum LLP and Fox News
Network, LLC | |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| By: /s/ Ilan Markus
Ilan Markus (ct26345)
BARCLAY DAMON LLP
545 Long Wharf Drive, 9th Floor
New Haven, CT 06511
Tel: (203) 672-2661
Email: imarkus@barclaydamon.com | By: /s/ John J. Clarke
John J. Clarke, Jr. (ct31251)
DLA
PIPER LLP
1251 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10020
Tel: (212) 335-4500
Email: john.clarke@us.dlapiper.com |\n| Counsel for Conservative Campaign
Technology LLC | -and
C. Kevin Kobbe (pro hac vice)
DLA
PIPER LLP
650 South Exeter Street, Suite 1100
Baltimore, MD 21202
Tel: (410) 580-4189
Email: kevin.kobbe@us.dlapiper.com
Counsel for Zeta Global Corp. |\n| By: /s/ James J. Costello, Jr.
James J. Costello, Jr. (ct309468)
NORRIS MCLAUGHLIN,
P.A.
400 Crossing Boulevard, 8th Floor
Bridgewater, NJ 08807-5933
Tel: (908) 252-4315
Email: jjcostellojr@norris-law.com
Counsel for Flat Rate Movers, Ltd. | By: /s/ Ronald I. Chorches
Ronald I. Chorches (ct08720)
LAW OFFICES OF RONALD I.
CHORCHES,
LLC
82 Wolcott Hill Road, Suite 203
Wethersfield, CT 06109
Tel: (860) 563-3955
Email: ronchorcheslaw@sbcglobal.net
-and
By: /s/ Darryl S. Laddin
Darryl S. Laddin (pro hac vice)
Frank N. White (pro hac vice)
ARNALL GOLDEN GREGORY LLP
171 17th Street, N.W. Suite 1200
Atlanta, GA 30363-1031
Tel: (404) 873-8500
Email: darryl.laddin@agg.com
frank.white@agg.com |\n\n| | Counsel for American Express |\n|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|\n| By: /s/ Lindsay Sampson Bishop
Lindsay Sampson Bishop (ct29990)
K&L
GATES LLP
1 Congress Street
Boston, MA 02114
Tel: (617) 261-3100
Email: lindsay.bishop@klgates.com | |\n| -and
By: /s/ Brian T. Peterson
Brian T. Peterson (pro hac vice)
Ruby A. Nagamine (pro hac vice)
K&L
GATES LLP
925 Fourth Avenue, Suite 2900
Seattle, WA 98104
Tel: (206) 623-7580
Email: brian.peterson@klgates.com
ruby.nagamine@klgates.com | [intentionally left blank] |\n| Counsel for Amazon Web Services, Inc. and
Amazon.com, Inc. | |\n\n# **EXHIBIT A**\n\n| | | Entity Name, State of Formation,
and
Type of Transfer | | | | | | | | | | | | |\n|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|---|--------------------------------------------------|-----|-----------------------------------------|-----|---------------------------------------------------|-----|------------------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------|-----|\n| | | | Lamp Capital
LLC
(Del.) | | Golden
Spring
(New
York) Ltd.
(Del.) | | HCHK
Technologies,
Inc.
(Del.) | | HCHK
Property
Management,
Inc.
(Del.) | | Greenwich
Land
LLC
(Del.) | | Lexington
Property
&
Staffing, Inc.
(Del.) | |\n| No. | Defendant | Adv. No. | 544/
549
548 | | 544/
548 | 549 | 544/
548 | 549 | 544/
548 | 549 | 544/
548 | 549 | 544/
548 | 549 |\n| 1 | Ohtzar Shlomo Solomon Treasure LLC | 24-05082 | | | | | | | | x | | | | |\n| 2 | Anthem HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. dba
Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield | 24-05112 | | x | | x | | x | | | | | | |\n| 3 | Anthem Health Plans, Inc. | 24-05058 | | | | | | | | x | | | | |\n| 4 | Sedgwick Realty Corp. | 24-05222 | | x | | | | | | | | | | |\n| 5 | Federal Express Corporation | 24-05059 | | | | | | | | | | | | x |\n| 6 | Putnam's Landscaping, LLC | 24-05211 | x | x | | | | | | x | x | x | | |\n| 7 | Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason &
Anello PC | 24-05196 | | | | | | | | x | | | | x |\n| 8 | Arri Americas Inc. | 23-05031 | | | | | | | | x | | | | |\n| 9 | Direct Persuasion LLC | 24-05010 | | | | | x | | | | | | | |\n\n| 10 | DJD Creative LLC | 24-05063 | | | x | | | | | |\n|----|---------------------------------------------|----------|---|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|\n| 11 | Cloudflare, Inc. | 24-05115 | | x | x | | | | x | x |\n| 12 | Cirrus Design Corporation | 24-05225 | x | | x | | | | | |\n| 13 | Indium Software, Inc. | 24-05122 | | | x | x | | | x | |\n| 14 | Target Enterprises, LLC | 24-05138 | | | x | | | | | |\n| 15 | Jamestown Associates, LLC | 24-05147 | | | x | | | | | |\n| 16 | Mark Gundersen | 24-05048 | | | x | | | | | |\n| 17 | 3 Columbus Circle, LLC | 24-05120 | | | | | x | | | |\n| 18 | ModSquad, Inc. | 24-05114 | | | x | | | | | |\n| 19 | Miller Motorcars Inc. | 24-05128 | x | | | | | | | |\n| 20 | 270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC | 24-05055 | | | | | | | | x |\n| 21 | Agora Lab, Inc. | 24-05005 | | x | x | | | | x | x |\n| 22 | Clayman Rosenberg Kirschner & Linder
LLP | 24-05202 | | | | x | | | | |\n| 23 | McManimon, Scotland & Baumann, LLC | 24-05194 | | | | x | | | | |\n| 24 | American Express | 24-05077 | | | | x | x | | | |\n\n| 25 | Amazon Web Services, Inc. | 24-05006 | | | | | x | x | | | | x | x |\n|----|--------------------------------------|----------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n| 26 | Amazon.com, Inc. | 24-05057 | | | x | x | x | | | x | x | | |\n| 27 | Flat Rate Movers, Ltd. | 24-05141 | | | | x | | | | | | | |\n| 28 | Jason Miller | 24-05219 | | | | | x | | | | | x | |\n| 29 | On the Spot Home Improvement, Inc. | 24-05130 | | | | | | | x | | | | |\n| 30 | Teris-Phoenix, LLC | 24-05044 | | | | | | | | | | | x |\n| 31 | Nardello & Co., LLC | 24-05162 | x | | | | | | | | | x | |\n| 32 | Marcum LLP | 24-05229 | | | | | x | x | | | | x | x |\n| 33 | Fox News Network, LLC | 24-05015 | | | | | x | | | | | | |\n| 34 | Phillips Nizer LLP | 24-05047 | x | x | | | | | | | | | x |\n| 35 | Zeta Global Corp. | 24-05092 | | | | | x | | | | | | |\n| 36 | GroCyber, LLC | 24-05100 | | | | | x | | | | | | |\n| 37 | Conservative Campaign Technology LLC | 24-05108 | | | | | x | | | | | | |\n| 38 | B&H Foto and Electronics, Corp. | 24-05069 | | | x | x | x | x | | x | x | x | |\n\n#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI hereby certify that on October 18, 2024, a copy of the foregoing was filed electronically and served by first class mail, postage prepaid and/or via email on anyone unable to accept electronic filing. Notice of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties by operation of the Court's electronic filing system or by First Class mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as indicated on the Notice of Electronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF System.\n\n> /s/ Eric S. Goldstein Eric S. Goldstein","body_zh":"美国破产法院\n康涅狄格区\n布里奇波特分部\n\n) ) ) ) ) ) ) )\n\n关于：\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等人，[1]\n\n第11章\n\n案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n\n债务人。\n\n（联合管理）\n共同被告支持驳回动议或就诉状作出判决动议的综合法律备忘录\n\n1 本第11章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（又名 Guo Wengui、Miles Guo 和 Miles Kwok，以及其他众多别名）（税务识别号码后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（吉尼弗控股有限责任公司）（税务识别号码后四位：8202）以及 Genever Holdings Corporation（吉尼弗控股公司）。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 和 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为：Paul Hastings LLP，200 Park Avenue，New York, NY 10166，c/o Luc A. Despins，作为 Ho Wan Kwok 遗产的受托人（仅为通知和通信之目的）。\n\n目录\n\n初步陈述 1\n\n背景 4\n\n法律论证 7\n\nA. 根据特拉华州法律，受托人的撤销权主张在法律上不能成立，因为如反向揭开公司面纱将对所称另一自我实体的不知情第三方债权人造成重大损害，则不允许反向揭开公司面纱。 7\n\nB. 受托人依据 11 U.S.C. §§ 544、548 和 549 提出的撤销权主张在法律上亦不能成立，因为特拉华州法律仅承认反向揭开公司面纱的替代责任理论。 11\n\n1. 受托人援引的任何案件均不构成特拉华州法律对另一我原则身份认同理论的采纳。 14\n\n2. 本院先前关于另一我的裁决未援引特拉华州法律以支持身份认同理论。 16\n\n3. 受托人在未主张实质合并的情况下寻求实质合并。 18\n\nC. 受托人依据第549条提出的主张在法律上不能成立，因为受托人不得以追溯既往方式适用另一我原则。 20\n\n1. 为确立依据 11 U.S.C. § 549 提出的主张，受托人必须主张并证明，在债务人的破产案件开始后，破产财产已被转移。 20\n\n2. 追溯适用另一我原则属于追溯既往救济。 21\n\n3. 最高法院在 Acevedo 一案中的裁决排除了在这些对抗程序中给予追溯既往的另一我救济。 25\n\n4. 州法不承认以此种方式追溯既往地适用另一我原则。 28\n\nD. 受托人依据第544条和第548条提出的主张在法律上不能成立，因为转移发生时并非来自债务人的财产。 29\n\nE. 本院先前的裁决对共同被告不具约束力，因为该等裁决既不构成案件既判原则，也不构成争点排除。 30\n\n1. 争点排除（或问题排除）不适用。 30\n\n2. 案件既判原则不适用。 33\n\n结论\n\n引证依据目录\n\n判例\n\n页码\n\nAckerman v. Schultz (In re Schultz),\n250 B.R. 22 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2000) 33, 34\n\nAdams v. Bostick (In re Bostick),\n400 B.R. 348 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2009) 18\n\nAlzheimer's Found. of Am., Inc. v. Alzheimer's Disease & Related Disorders Ass'n., Inc.,\nNo. 10 Civ. 3314, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 199601 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2014)35\n\nArizona v. California,\n530 U.S. 392 (2000) 31\n\nASARCO LLC v. America's Mining Corp.,\n382 B.R. 49 (S.D. Tex. 2007) 15\n\nIn re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd.,\n860 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1988)19, 22\n\nIn re Auto-Train Corp., Inc.,\n810 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 22, 23\n\nBauer v. General Elec. Capital Corp. (In re Oncology Assocs. of Ocean Cnty., LLC),\n510 B.R. 463 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2014) 23, 24\n\nIn re Bauman,\n535 B.R. 289 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2015) 20\n\nBFI Waste Sys. of N. Am., LLC v. Shaw Env't & Infrastructure, Inc.,\nNo. 4:09CV1379 HEA, 2010 WL 5647118 (E.D. Mo. July 30, 2010), amended on reconsideration, No. 409CV1379HEA, 2010 WL 4622519 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 5, 2010) 12\n\nBoscarino v. Vachhani (In re Vachhani),\nNo. 18-02009, 2019 WL 303078 (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 22, 2019) 21\n\nBuechner v. Farbenfabriken Bayer Aktiengesellschaft,\n38 Del. Ch. 490, 154 A.2d 684 (1959)16\n\nButner v. U.S.,\n440 U.S. 48 (1979) 17\n\nC.F. Trust, Inc. v. First Flight L.P.,\n580 S.E.2d 806 (Va. 2003)8\n\nCerrato v. BAC Home Loans Servicing (In re Cerrato),\n504 B.R. 23 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2014)17\n\nConnolly v. Englewood Post No. 322 Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, Inc. (In re Phillips),\n139 P.3d 639 (Colo. 2006)8\n\nCorrado v. N.Y. Unified Court Sys.,\n163 F. Supp. 3d 1 (E.D.N.Y. 2016)\n\nCovey v. Casey's General Stores, Inc. (In re Duckworth),\nNo. 11-8104, 2012 WL 4434681 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 2012) 28, 29\n\nDeckelbaum v. Cooter, Mangold, Tompert & Chapman, PLLC,\n275 B.R. 737 (Bankr. D. Md. 2001)\n\nIn re Donghia, Inc.,\nNo. 20-30487 (JJT), 2020 WL 2465503 (Bankr. D. Conn. May 12, 2020)26\n\nElmaliach v. Bank of China Ltd.,\nNo. 09 CIV. 2130 (PGG), 2010 WL 1172829 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2010)34\n\nEquitable Trust Co. v. Gallagher,\n34 Del. Ch. 76, 99 A.2d 490 (1951)16\n\nEvangelista v. Silver (In re Silver),\n647 B.R. 897 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2022)11, 14\n\nFed. Aviation Admin. v. Gull Air, Inc. (In re Gull Air, Inc.),\n890 F.2d 1255 (1st Cir. 1989)17\n\nGeltzer v. Soshkin (In re Brizinova),\n588 B.R. 311 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2018)34, 35\n\nGiuliano v. Shorenstein Co., LLC (In re Sunset Aviation, Inc.),\n468 B.R. 641 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011)24\n\nGrimmett v. McCloskey (In re Wardle),\nNo. S-03-01467, 2006 WL 6811026 (9th Cir. B.A.P. Jan. 31, 2006)14\n\nHarrison v. Soroof Int'l, Inc.,\n320 F. Supp. 3d 602 (D. Del. 2018)11\n\nJennings v. City of N.Y.,\nNo. 22 Civ. 1885, 2023 WL 8462739 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2023)\n\nLawler v. RepublicBank Dallas (In re Lawler),\n53 B.R. 166 (N.D. Tex. 1985)28, 29\n\nMajestic Star Casino, LLC v. Barden Dev., Inc. (In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC),\n716 F.3d 736 (3d Cir. 2013)17\n\nManichaean Capital, LLC v. Exela Techs., Inc.,\n251 A.3d 694 (Del. Ch. 2021)3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13\n\nMartin v. D. B. Martin Co.,\n10 Del. Ch. 211, 88 A. 612, 102 A. 373 (1913)16\n\nMultnomah Cty. v. Rudolph (In re Rudolph),\n166 B.R. 440 (D. Or. 1994)\n\nNetJets Aviation, Inc. v. LHC Commc'ns, LLC,\n537 F.3d 168 (2d Cir. 2008)12\n\nIn re NETtel Corp., Inc.,\nNo. 02–10122, 2007 WL 2119029 (Bankr. D.D.C. Jul. 20, 2007)35\n\nMatter of New Ctr. Hosp.,\n187 B.R. 560 (E.D. Mich. 1995)22\n\nNovak v. Univ. of Miami (In re Demitrus),\n586 B.R. 88 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2018)\n\nOrshan v. Anker,\n550 F. Supp. 538 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)\n\nOtto Candies, LLC v. KPMG, LLP,\n2020 WL 4917596 (Del. Ch. Aug. 21, 2020)\n\nIn re Owens Corning,\n419 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 2005)19, 21\n\nParker v. Titan Mining (US) Corp. (In re Star Mountain Res., Inc.),\nNo. 2:18-BK-01594-DPC, 2020 WL 6821721 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2020)\n\nParklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,\n439 U.S. 322 (1979)31\n\nPauley Petroleum Inc. v. Cont'l Oil Co.,\n43 Del. Ch. 516 (1968) 12, 15, 16\n\nPavers & Rd. Builders Dist. Council Welfare Fund v. Core Contracting of N.Y., LLC,\n536 B.R. 48 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2015)11\n\nIn re PCH Assocs.,\n949 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1991)34\n\nIn re Pearlman,\n462 B.R. 849 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012)\n\nPeople v. Bilsky,\n95 N.Y.2d 172 (2000)34\n\nRoman Cath. Archdiocese of San Juan, Puerto Rico v. Acevedo Feliciano,\n589 U.S. 57 (2020)25, 26, 27\n\nRS Air, LLC v. NetJets Aviation, Inc. (In re RS Air, LLC),\n651 B.R. 538 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2023)12\n\nSchwab v. Shelly Enters. (In re Clearview Builders, Inc.),\n405 B.R. 144 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2009)\n\nSearcy v. Knight (In re American Int'l Refinery),\n402 B.R. 728 (Bankr. W.D. La. 2008)14, 15\n\nSmith v. Richels (In re Richels),\n163 B.R. 760 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1994)14\n\nSpeeney v. Rutgers,\n369 F. App'x 357 (3d Cir. 2010)\n\nSpradlin v. Beads and Steeds Inns, LLC (In re Howland),\n674 F. App'x 482 (6th Cir. 2017) 11, 12, 13, 19\n\nSpring Real Estate, LLC v. Echo/RT Holdings, LLC,\nNo. 7994–VCN, 2016 WL 769586 (Del. Ch. Feb. 18, 2016)15\n\nStevenson v. William Noble Rare Jewels, L.P. (In re DuMouchelle),\nNo. 19-54531, 2023 WL 8100234 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Nov. 21, 2023)11, 14\n\nStillwater Liquidating LLC v. Net Five at Palm Pointe, LLC (In re Stillwater Asset Backed Offshore Fund Ltd.),\n559 BR 563 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016)12, 19, 20, 30\n\nIn re Telles,\nNo. 8-20-70325-REG, 2020 WL 2121254 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2020)26\n\nThe City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC,\n645 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2011)18\n\nIn re Torres,\nNo. 21-20483 (JJT), 2021 WL 2189515 (Bankr. D. Conn. May 28, 2021)26\n\nUnited States v. Dexter,\n165 F.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 1999)\n\nUnited States v. Pulliam,\nNo. 3:21-CR-00156 (KAD), 2024 WL 1142004 (D. Conn. Mar. 15, 2024)34\n\nWashington v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.,\n740 F. App'x 730 (2d Cir. 2018)\n\nWesterbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co.,\n304 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2002)34\n\nWilson v. Thorn Energy, LLC,\n787 F. Supp. 2d 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)12\n\nIn re Zvoch,\n618 B.R. 734 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2020)26\n\n法条、规则及规章\n\n11 U.S.C. § 10527\n\n11 U.S.C. § 10830\n\n11 U.S.C. § 30327\n\n11 U.S.C. § 36323, 27\n\n11 U.S.C. § 52334\n\n11 U.S.C. § 54117, 21\n\n11 U.S.C. § 54217\n\n11 U.S.C. § 5442, 13, 20, 30\n\n11 U.S.C. § 5482, 5, 29, 30\n\n11 U.S.C. § 5492, 5, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29\n\n11 U.S.C. § 55028, 29\n\n11 U.S.C. § 72734\n\nFed. R. Bankr. P. 70121\n\nFed. R. Civ. P. 121\n\n其他权威资料\n\n5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY\n¶ 541.01 (16th ed. 2024)17\n\n5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY\n¶ 541.02 (16th ed. 2024)21\n\nCOLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY\n§ 1100.06 (L. King ed. 15th ed. 1988)22\n\n1 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations\n(Perm.Ed.), § 4116\n\nRestatement (Second) of Judgments31\n\n附件 A 所列的三十八（38）名对抗程序被告（以下简称“共同被告”）提交本备忘录，以支持其各自在各自未被中止的对抗程序（以下简称“共同被告对抗程序”）中提出的驳回动议或就诉状作出判决动议（统称“本动议”）[2]，并支持原告 Luc A. Despins（吕克·A·德斯平斯）作为债务人 Ho Won Kwok（郭文贵）遗产的第11章受托人（以下简称“受托人”）在该等程序中提出的主张。\n\n初步陈述\n\n今年早些时候，受托人对共同被告及其他200余人发起了大规模诉讼，其中大多数是不知情的第三方货物和服务供应商，其仅与一组非债务人实体（以下简称“非债务人转让人”）[3]存在公平交易的商业往来，且并不知悉债务人的破产。受托人试图选择性地代表非债务人转让人行使撤销权，如同其为债务人一般，但并未管理其遗产，亦未遵守《美国法典》第11编（以下简称“破产法”）或适用州法的各项要求，致使共同被告遭受极端不公。本院先前已准许受托人关于另一我认定的请求，但并未确定该等另一我认定对第三方受让人的法律效力。此外，由于共同被告并非该等程序的当事人，\n\n2 2024年9月6日，部分共同被告提交了联合状态会议请求，该会议于2024年9月24日举行。2024年9月25日，本院作出其《进一步修订撤销权程序命令并安排就驳回动议及就诉状作出判决动议提交联合书面意见的命令》(Dkt. No. 3577)，授权共同被告提交本综合法律备忘录。在该命令中，本院免除了各方就驳回动议或就诉状作出判决动议之标准进行书面论证的义务。依照本院命令，对于未就起诉状提交答辩的共同被告，共同被告依据 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7012 和 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) 和/或 12(b)(6) 提交本书面意见以支持其驳回动议；对于已提交答辩者，则依据 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) 提交本书面意见以支持其就诉状作出判决的动议。依照本院命令，共同被告保留所有未在本文提出的其他论点和抗辩。\n\n3 特定的非债务人转让人（Non-Debtor Transferors）载于本文件附件A，包括下列实体：Lamp Capital LLC（兰普资本有限责任公司）、Golden Spring (New York) Ltd.（金泉〈纽约〉有限公司）、HCHK Technologies, Inc.（HCHK科技公司）、HCHK Property Management, Inc.（HCHK物业管理公司）、Greenwich Land LLC（格林尼治土地有限责任公司）以及 Lexington Property & Staffing, Inc.（列克星敦物业与人事公司）。\n\n在“替身实体对抗程序”（Alter Ego Adversaries，定义见下文）中，本院并无机会充分考虑，与所称替身实体存在独立交易商业往来的无辜债权人可能遭受的严重不利影响。\n\n替身实体裁定的法律效力——即该等裁定是否赋予受托人（Trustee）对非债务人转让人作出的转让起诉联合被告（Joint Defendants）的诉讼资格——现首次明确地提交本院审理。受托人在起诉联合被告时，已远远超出其获授权的撤销诉讼权力范围。受托人不当地声称有权撤销非债务人替身实体作出的转让，其错误理论是，本院作出的替身实体认定会将该等非债务人转让人的财产转化为本破产财产的一部分，并且可追溯适用，而任何适用的法律依据均不支持该等追溯适用。受托人的过度主张使本院及众多无辜当事人陷入代价高昂的诉讼，这一立场违反《破产法典》、特拉华州法律及其他已报道判决，并且对联合被告构成根本性不公平。\n\n作为示例（并非限制），受托人立场的极端性可由以下事实说明：联合被告的研究未发现任何一项已报道判决认定，在未进行实质合并的情况下，受托人可依据 11 U.S.C. § 549 撤销非债务人替身实体在申请破产后作出的转让。然而，受托人援引其毫无法律依据的理论，就数百万美元起诉联合被告，主张其对在本院就非债务人转让人作出任何替身实体认定之前发生的转让承担严格责任。\n\n本院应准许本动议，因为受托人无权撤销由非债务人（如非债务人转让人）作出的初始转让。《破产法典》第 544、548 和 549 条及相关适用的欺诈性转让法律，仅允许撤销债务人作出的初始转让。特拉华州法律规定，替身实体认定使债务人的替身实体承担替代责任；该认定并不使非债务人转让人与债务人成为同一实体。若本院此前依赖 Manichaean Capital, LLC v. Exela Techs., Inc., 251 A.3d 694 (Del. Ch. 2021) 得出相反结论，谨此主张，本院对 Manichaean 判决的解读过于宽泛。在 Manichaean 一案中，法院审理原告是否可通过反向揭开公司面纱，以对判决债务人全资拥有的子公司执行其判决。重要的是，该法院并未认定各实体在一切目的下均为同一实体。即使在 Manichaean 一案中，特拉华州法院也多次提及，只有在不会对替身实体不知情的无辜第三方债权人造成不利影响时，才应允许反向揭开公司面纱，并赞同援引其他司法辖区的一致判例。受托人试图运用反向揭开公司面纱这一衡平法救济，从与所称替身实体存在独立交易商业往来的数百名相对方处追索资金，从而违反了该原则。\n\n即使受托人关于替身实体认定的含义及 Manichaean 的适用是正确的，受托人依法也不能追溯适用该等认定，以便进行时间倒流，并假定非债务人转让人曾作出的所有转让均为债务人作出的转让，且（对于申请破产后的转让）须经破产法院批准。事实上，现代最高法院判例否定此类实质性追溯或 nunc pro tunc 救济，且没有任何州判例法支持此类极端救济。少数审理过州法替身实体理论能否追溯适用，并与《破产法典》赋予债务人攻击向第三方转让的特殊权力结合使用的法院，均因其不具衡平性而拒绝适用该理论。\n\n尽管受托人将主张，本院先前的裁判对联合被告的所有争点均具有排除效力，但其主张有误。由于联合被告及本案涉及的确切争点在替身实体对抗程序中并未明确提交本院审理，本书状是首次实际就替身实体裁定是否赋予受托人起诉联合被告的诉讼资格进行诉讼的机会。无论如何，禁止反言及案件既判力的酌定性原则显然不适用。该等原则不适用于缺席判决，亦不能适用于联合被告；联合被告未收到替身实体对抗程序的通知，且并非该等程序的当事人。\n\n基于下述理由，本院应准许本动议，并驳回针对联合被告的对抗程序，且不得再次提起。\n\n背景\n\n1. 2022年2月15日（“申请日”），债务人根据《破产法典》第 11 章自愿提出救济申请。（Dkt. No. 1。）[4] 在这些合并管理的第 11 章案件中，仅有三名债务人：债务人、Genever Holdings LLC（杰尼弗控股有限责任公司）以及 Genever Holdings Corporation（杰尼弗控股公司）（统称“债务人们”）。除一项例外外，[5] 联合被告未在债务人的财产清单中列明，也未被纳入本案债权人邮寄名册。（参见，例如，债务人财产清单，Dkt. Nos. 1157, 78, 4；Ho Won Kwok（郭文贵）的经修订债权人名单，Dkt. No. 1043；以及 Genever Holdings Corporation（杰尼弗控股公司）的经修订债权人名单，Dkt. No. 1163。）\n\n2. 2022年6月15日，本院作出《驳回动议而不妨碍再次提出及准许加入指定第 11 章受托人动议的决定备忘录及命令》。（Dkt. No. 465。）2022年7月8日，本院作出命令，指定 Luc A. Despins（吕克·A·德斯平斯）为受托人。（参见 Dkt. No. 523。）\n\n4 除非另有说明，对 Dkt. Nos. 的引用均指主破产案件的案卷编号。\n\n5 Clayman Rosenberg Kirshner & Linder LLP（克莱曼·罗森伯格·基什纳与林德律师事务所）载于 Dkt. No. 78 的附表F及 Dkt. No. 1043 的附件A。\n\n3. 2023年1月20日，债权申报代理人就申报截止日期通知及公告通知提交送达宣誓书。（参见 Dkt. No. 1360。）联合被告未列于送达名单中。[6]（参见同上。）2023年1月17日，受托人提交了关于债权证明申报截止日期通知的公告宣誓书。（参见 Dkt. No. 1336。）该通知仅提及本程序中的债务人，未提及任何非债务人转让人。\n\n4. 今年早些时候，受托人发起了一项范围广泛的诉讼行动，包括逾 270 起对抗程序，寻求依据 11 U.S.C. §§ 544 和 548 以及适用的州欺诈性转让法律，撤销据称具有欺诈性的转让，并撤销非债务人转让人依据 11 U.S.C. § 549 作出的申请破产后转让。受托人的诉讼对象包括与非债务人转让人存在商业关系并向其提供货物或服务的实体。联合被告包括众多合法的第三方货物和服务供应商，包括园林服务商、房东、搬家公司、信息技术供应商和零售商，以及知名公司，例如 Amazon Web Services, Inc.（亚马逊云计算服务公司）、Amazon.com, Inc.（亚马逊网站公司）、Apple, Inc.（苹果公司）、American Express Company（美国运通公司）、[7] Anthem Health Plans Inc.（安森健康计划公司）、Cloudflare, Inc.（云火公司）、Federal Express Corporation（联邦快递公司）、Fox News Network, LLC（福克斯新闻网络有限责任公司）、Hilton Management, LLC（希尔顿管理有限责任公司）以及 Meta Platforms Inc.（元平台公司）。\n\n5. 受托人在许多针对联合被告的对抗程序中主张，非债务人转让人所称的转让，是债务人为阻碍、拖延或欺诈债权人而策划的自我隐蔽式空壳游戏的一部分。然而，在许多情况下，起诉状并未以任何具体事实主张非债务人转让人与债务人之间的关系，或该等转让如何推进债务人的空壳游戏。[8]\n\n6 除 Clayman Rosenberg Kirshner & Linder LLP（克莱曼·罗森伯格·基什纳与林德律师事务所）外。\n\n7 American Express Company（美国运通公司）为控股公司，本身并非信用卡发行人。\n\n6. 替身实体对抗程序于 2022 年及 2023 年启动，早于针对联合被告的对抗程序。在该等对抗程序中，受托人已获得认定，即非债务人转让人现在及一直以来均为债务人的替身实体。除两者外，受托人均已取得针对非债务人转让人的缺席判决。受托人已获得替身实体认定的诉讼概述如下（统称“替身实体对抗程序”）。\n\n案件标题\n所称替身实体\n当前状态\n\nDespins v. HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC, et al., No. 22-05003 (“HK USA”)\nHK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC（HK国际基金投资〈美国〉有限责任公司）\n受托人胜诉的简易判决（Dkt. No. 221）\n上诉维持原判（Dkt. No. 260）\n向第二巡回上诉法院提出的上诉尚待审理（Dkt. No. 264）\n\nDespins v. Golden Spring (New York) Ltd. et al., No. 23-05018 (“Golden Spring”)\nGolden Spring (New York) Ltd.（金泉〈纽约〉有限公司）\nChina Golden Spring Group (Hong Kong) Limited（中国金泉集团〈香港〉有限公司）\n缺席判决（Dkt. No. 35）\n\nDespins v. Lamp Capital LLC, et al., No. 23-05023 (“Lamp Capital”)\nLamp Capital LLC（兰普资本有限责任公司）\nInfinity Treasury Management Inc.（无限财资管理公司）\nHudson Diamond NY LLC（哈德逊钻石纽约有限责任公司）\nLeading Shine NY Ltd.（领耀纽约有限公司）\n针对 Lamp Capital LLC 及 Infinity Treasury Management 作出的缺席判决，且上诉尚待审理（Dkt. No. 66；Dkt. No. 68）。\n关于 Hudson Diamond NY LLC 及 Leading Shine NY Ltd. 的简易判决尚待裁定。（Dkt. No. 97。）\n\n8 针对众多联合被告的起诉状均依赖于套话式、非具体的主张，例如：“本起诉状所涉转让均具有阻碍、拖延和/或欺诈债务人债权人的意图，因为该等转让均经由债务人的替身实体空壳公司作出，而该等公司作为债务人空壳游戏的一部分运营。”（参见，例如，Despins v. Amazon Web Services, Inc., Adv. Pro. No. 24-05006, Dkt. No. 4 ¶ 31。）\n\nDespins v. HCHK Techs, Inc., et al., No. 23-05013 (“HCHK”)\nHCHK Technologies, Inc.（HCHK科技公司）\nHCHK Property Management, Inc.（HCHK物业管理公司）\nLexington Property and Staffing, Inc.（列克星敦物业与人事公司）\n缺席判决（Dkt. No. 290）\n上诉尚待审理（Dkt. No. 298）\n\nDespins v. Greenwich Land, LLC, et al., No. 23-05005 (“Greenwich”)\nGreenwich Land, LLC（格林尼治土地有限责任公司）\n受托人胜诉的简易判决（Dkt. No. 133）\n上诉尚待审理（Dkt. No. 137）。\n\n7. 非债务人转让人为特拉华州实体。[9]\n\n8. 本院准许对非债务人转让人反向揭开公司面纱的裁定，并未考虑替身实体认定对联合被告的影响。替身实体对抗程序的被告仅限于上述非债务人转让人。因此，本院的裁定未考虑受托人是否可利用替身实体认定，继而对并非该等程序当事人的人行使《破产法典》第 5 章所规定的撤销权。\n\n法律论证\n\nA. 受托人的撤销请求依特拉华州法律不能成立，因为如反向揭开公司面纱将对所称替身实体不知情的第三方债权人造成重大不利影响，则不得允许反向揭开公司面纱。\n\n反向刺破公司面纱允许下游的另我关联方对其上游母公司的债务承担责任。关于适用的 Delaware law（特拉华州法）是否允许此类反向刺破公司面纱这一门槛问题，首先要问的是，如果对共同被告适用本院先前关于反向刺破公司面纱的裁定，且该适用将导致对不知情的第三方（如仅与所称另我实体进行独立交易的共同被告）造成重大不利影响，则本院先前的裁定能否适用于共同被告。参见 Manichaean，251 A.3d 第710页。如以下 E 部分所述，该具体问题此前尚未提交本院审理，本院先前的裁定对此问题不具有排除效力。受托人的指控未能满足 Delaware law（特拉华州法）下反向刺破公司面纱的严格检验标准，因为所请求的救济会损害无辜第三方债权人的利益。\n\n9 根据受托人自身的指控，非债务人转让人均为 Delaware（特拉华州）实体。参见 Complaint ¶ 8, Dkt. No. 1, Adv. Pro. No. 23-5018 (Golden Spring (New York) Ltd.（金泉〔纽约〕有限公司）); Complaint ¶ 8, Dkt. No. 1, Adv. Pro. No. 23- 05005 (Greenwich Land LLC（格林尼治土地有限责任公司）); Complaint ¶¶ 9–11, Dkt. No. 1, Adv. Pro. No. 23-5013 (HCHK Technologies, Inc.（HCHK 技术公司）, HCHK Property Management, Inc.（HCHK 物业管理公司）, and Lexington Property & Staffing, Inc.（列克星敦物业与人力配置公司）); Complaint ¶ 8, Dkt. No. 1, Adv. Pro. No. 23-5023 (Lamp Capital LLC（兰普资本有限责任公司）).\n\nManichaean 一案的法院对该问题进行了详尽讨论，并在其意见中反复强调，反向刺破公司面纱——即使仅具未来适用效力——也只应在“有限情形”下并以“受限执行”的方式予以允许。Id. 第710页。该法院还积极援引了其他司法辖区关于该问题的判例，id. 第711–13页，采纳了这些裁判的推理，多次提到只有在不损害另我实体无辜且不知情的第三方债权人的情况下，才应允许反向刺破公司面纱，并作出如下结论：\n\n只有在指称存在骇人事实，并且不存在对第三方造成真实且重大不利影响的案件中，法院才应考虑适用反向刺破公司面纱原则。\n\n……\n\n适用这一框架，Delaware（特拉华州）法院将能够妥善处理法院和评论者就反向刺破公司面纱所正当表达的各种关切。第三方债权人和投资者的期待将得到充分保护。\n\nId. 第714–15页（强调部分为后加）；另见，id. 第711页（“拒绝允许反向刺破公司面纱的法院，主要且可理解地是出于保护无辜当事人的意愿。”）；C.F. Trust, Inc. v. First Flight L.P., 580 S.E.2d 806, 811 (Va. 2003)（寻求反向刺破公司面纱的原告还必须证明，反向刺破公司面纱不会对“无辜的有担保和无担保债权人”造成损害）；Connolly v. Englewood Post No. 322 Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, Inc. (In re Phillips), 139 P.3d 639, 646 (Colo. 2006)（裁定在授权反向刺破公司面纱之前，法院必须考虑无辜债权人是否会因该等刺破而受到不利影响）。在作出裁定的过程中，Manichaean 一案的法院具体考虑了反向刺破公司面纱是否会对无辜第三方债权人造成不利影响，并根据提交该法院的问题和事实认定不会如此。Manichaean，251 A.3d 第718页（“起诉书中没有依据可推断反向刺破公司面纱将对无辜第三方债权人造成损害。”）。\n\n本院先前在另我对抗程序（Alter Ego Adversaries）中允许反向刺破公司面纱的命令，仅顺带提及对无辜第三方债权人的不利影响是应予考虑的因素（参见，例如，Adv. Pro. No. 22-05003, Dkt. No. 221, 第18–19页），但从未具体讨论该等裁定对无辜第三方债权人的影响，这主要是因为受托人未向本院提出该具体问题。在另我对抗程序中，具名被告是所称另我实体本身及某些内部人士，而非这些实体的第三方债权人。例如，在本院于 Adv. Pro. No. 22-05003 (Dkt. No. 221) 中认定 HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited LLC（香港国际基金投资〔美国〕有限责任公司）为个人债务人另我的命令中，目标实体仅有两艘游艇作为资产，该命令未提及记录中有任何内容表明向游艇提供维护服务的供应商未获付款，也未提及受托人将寻求利用该命令从这些供应商处追回该等付款。（参见 id.，第28页[“[R]everse veil-piercing 亦不会损害 HK USA 债权人的合法期待。本院已经允许支付 Lady May 的运营、维护和管理费用。”]。）\n\n同样，在本院认定 HCHK 实体为债务人另我的裁定中（Adv. Pro. No. 23-05013, Dkt. Nos. 290, 297），本院指出：“[i]n 考虑是否反向刺破公司面纱时，法院会考虑‘Delaware（特拉华州）法院审查传统刺破公司面纱请求时所考虑的传统因素……以及反映如下关切的额外因素：实体的债权人和其他利益相关方的合法期待可能会受到阻挠。’”（Dkt. No. 290, 第12页）。但是，除 Manichaean 要求为证明反向刺破公司面纱裁定正当性而考虑的标准另我分析之外，这些命令并未讨论对第三方债权人造成的相应不利影响，甚至未讨论“额外因素”。这可能是因为受托人在该案中的起诉书明确指称，据其当时所知，“HCHK Technologies 的金融债权人完全由多名未具名个人构成”，据理解这些个人是中国异议人士，“其姓名因保密目的而被隐去。”（Adv. Pro. No. 23-05013, Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 34（强调部分为后加））；另见，关于 HCHK Property 的相同指控，id. ¶ 37。）\n\n总之，本院从未实际就反向刺破公司面纱在对共同被告等第三方债权人造成不利影响的背景下作出裁定。本院先前关于反向刺破公司面纱的裁定，仅通过使另我实体对债务人的债务承担替代责任而影响该等另我实体本身，这是一回事。但是，要求不知情的第三方交出其因向另我实体提供商品和服务而获得支付的大额款项，从而对其造成重大不利影响的裁定——该问题在这些案件中首次提交本院审理——则完全是另一回事，而且根据 Manichaean 一案法院的明确裁定，Delaware law（特拉华州法）明确不允许如此。\n\n鉴于根据 Manichaean，在适用反向刺破公司面纱之前，不会对无辜第三方债权人造成任何重大不利影响乃是一项强制性要求，因此，受托人在这些案件中的诉因未能根据 Delaware law（特拉华州法）提出可成立的请求。诚然，受托人甚至没有试图解释，在其对抗程序的全部目的都是从共同被告处追回数百万美元付款的情况下，如何能够避免对共同被告造成不利影响。根据 Manichaean 及其他权威，受托人对另我认定的使用显然在法律上不被允许。\n\nB. 受托人根据 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 548, and 549 提出的撤销请求亦在法律上不能成立，因为 Delaware law（特拉华州法）仅承认反向刺破公司面纱的替代责任理论。\n\n即使受托人的起诉书可被视为根据 Delaware law（特拉华州法）提出了反向刺破公司面纱请求，刺破非债务人转让人的公司形式也不会将其资产并入债务人。本院已裁定非债务人转让人为债务人的另我[10]，但这仅使其现有资产可用于清偿针对债务人的请求。由于 Delaware law（特拉华州法）适用另我的“替代责任”理论，债务人另我的财产并不会自动成为破产财产。参见 Pavers & Rd. Builders Dist. Council Welfare Fund v. Core Contracting of N.Y., LLC, 536 B.R. 48, 51 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2015)（“仅因两个实体互为另我，并不意味着二者均为《破产法》下的债务人。这仅意味着它们对彼此的债务承担责任。”）。\n\n另我认定的后果因相关州承认“同一性理论”还是“替代责任理论”而异。参见 Spradlin v. Beads and Steeds Inns, LLC (In re Howland), 674 F. App'x 482, 486 (6th Cir. 2017)（说明“同一性”理论和“替代责任”理论）；accord Stevenson v. William Noble Rare Jewels, L.P. (In re DuMouchelle), No. 19-54531, 2023 WL 8100234, at *7 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Nov. 21, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:21-CV-12087, 2024 WL 3948772 (E.D. Mich. May 21, 2024); Evangelista v. Silver (In re Silver), 647 B.R. 897, 909–10 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2022)。根据同一性理论，“刺破公司面纱将债务人的破产财产范围扩大至包括其另我的财产，因为该理论将公司及其另我视为单一实体。”Howland，674 F. App'x 第486页（省略内部引文）。然而，根据替代责任理论，另我原则仅“将责任从债务人转移至其另我”，并且“不会为公司创造资产或在公司内创造资产。”Id.（省略内部引文）。\n\n适用于本案的 Delaware law（特拉华州法）明确属于另我原则的替代责任理论。Otto Candies, LLC v. KPMG, LLP, 2020 WL 4917596, at *9 (Del. Ch. Aug. 21, 2020)（指出刺破公司面纱或另我原则在 Delaware（特拉华州）是通向替代责任的路径）。根据 Delaware law（特拉华州法），另我认定的结果是另我对他方债务负责，而非资产合并。参见，例如，RS Air, LLC v. NetJets Aviation, Inc. (In re RS Air, LLC), 651 B.R. 538, 545 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2023)（根据 Delaware law（特拉华州法）裁定：“[a]lthough 另我原则要求证明两个实体‘作为单一经济实体运作’，……其结果并非将实体视为同一实体，而是使其中一方对另一方的债务承担责任……”［省略内部引文］）；NetJets Aviation, Inc. v. LHC Commc'ns, LLC, 537 F.3d 168, 176 (2d Cir. 2008)（承认根据 Delaware law（特拉华州法），可“忽略”实体与其所有人之间的区别，以要求所有人对实体债务负责）（引用 Pauley Petroleum Inc. v. Cont'l Oil Co., 43 Del. Ch. 516, 521 (1968)）；Wilson v. Thorn Energy, LLC, 787 F. Supp. 2d 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)（同上）；BFI Waste Sys. of N. Am., LLC v. Shaw Env't & Infrastructure, Inc., No. 4:09CV1379 HEA, 2010 WL 5647118, at *5 (E.D. Mo. July 30, 2010), amended on reconsideration, No. 409CV1379HEA, 2010 WL 4622519 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 5, 2010)（指出，根据 Delaware law（特拉华州法），在某些情形下，“另我原则允许刺破公司面纱，从而可将责任归于母公司”（强调部分为后加））；另见 Stillwater Liquidating LLC v. Net Five at Palm Pointe, LLC (In re Stillwater Asset Backed Offshore Fund Ltd.), 559 BR 563, 586-87 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016)（驳回为根据 11 U.S.C. § 544 创设诉因而选择性汇集 Delaware（特拉华州）实体与债务人实体资产的另我理论，并指出法院“并不知悉任何支持如下观点的依据：另我理论可以这种选择性且自利的方式使用”。）\n\n如 Manichaean 法院所解释：“在最基本的层面上，反向刺破公司面纱涉及使商业组织对其所有者的债务承担责任。”251 A.3d at 710。即使是“外部人”反向刺破公司面纱——这正是受托人对非债务人转让方提出的另我主张的描述方式——也意味着“外部第三方，通常为债权人，请求法院使一家公司对针对其成员作出的判决承担责任。”Id.（省略内部引文和引证）。换言之，Delaware（特拉华州）将另我责任适用为一种替代责任，而非身份合并或实质性合并。\n\n在本案中，即使非债务人转让方被视为对债务人的义务承担替代责任，其亦非债务人，其资产亦非债务人财产的一部分。这对受托人的撤销请求具有致命影响，并要求予以驳回。Howland 中 Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals（第六巡回上诉法院）的裁决与本案直接相关。在该案中，受托人寻求撤销债务人的有限责任公司 Meadow Lake Horse Park, LLC（梅多湖马术公园有限责任公司，下称“Meadow Lake”）在破产申请前向第三方买受人转让不动产的行为。674 Fed. App'x. at 483–84。受托人基于反向刺破 Meadow Lake 公司形式至其所有者即债务人的主张，声称争议财产属于债务人的财产。Id. at 484。Meadow Lake 是一家 Kentucky（肯塔基州）有限责任公司，因此，法院适用肯塔基州法律，以确定刺破 Meadow Lake 的公司形式是否会使 Meadow Lake 的财产成为债务人的财产。Id. at 485–86。由于肯塔基州与特拉华州相同，遵循替代责任理论，这“注定使受托人依据刺破公司面纱理论对[买受人]提出的欺诈性转让请求失败。”Id. at 487。法院推理认为，依“替代责任路径，……刺破公司面纱并不使被刺破实体（即债务人）取得对另我资产的权益……”Id.。因此，法院驳回了受托人的撤销请求。Id.。\n\n同样，在 In re Wardle 中，第九巡回破产上诉小组认定，受托人无资格追究非债务人实体的第5章撤销诉讼请求，并指出，“另我认定不会以某种方式将[被指称另我]的资金变为债务人财产的一部分”，且“除非且直至[该实体]成为债务人，无论是通过提交破产申请还是通过实质性合并，否则不存在公司破产财产，因此受托人不能以其名义提起 § 547 和 § 548 诉讼。”Grimmett v. McCloskey (In re Wardle), No. S-03-01467, 2006 WL 6811026 (9th Cir. B.A.P. Jan. 31, 2006)（适用 Nevada（内华达州）反向刺破公司面纱法）；accord Silver, 647 B.R. at 909–10（驳回基于从依 Michigan（密歇根州）法律设立的债务人另我公司转让财产而提出的欺诈性转让请求；该州适用替代责任路径）；DuMouchelle, 2023 WL 8100234, at *7（同上）。\n\n根据特拉华州法律，本院关于非债务人转让方为债务人另我的认定，仅意味着非债务人转让方对债务人对其债权人所负义务承担替代责任。这并不意味着非债务人转让方的资产是或曾是债务人的资产，因而可根据 Bankruptcy Code（《破产法》）第5章予以撤销。\n\n1．受托人援引的任何案件均不构成特拉华州法律下对另我原则同一性理论的采纳。\n\n在本院待决程序中，受托人为支持其关于特拉华州遵循同一性理论的错误立场，援引了以下案件：Deckelbaum v. Cooter, Mangold, Tompert & Chapman, PLLC, 275 B.R. 737, 742 (Bankr. D. Md. 2001); Smith v. Richels (In re Richels), 163 B.R. 760, 763 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1994); Searcy v. Knight (In re American Int'l Refinery), 402 B.R. 728, 748 (Bankr. W.D. La. 2008); Parker v. Titan Mining (US) Corp. (In re Star Mountain Res., Inc.), No. 2:18-BK-01594-DPC, 2020 WL 6821721, at *5 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2020)。尽管这些案件确实适用了另我的同一性理论，但其在如此处理时均未依赖特拉华州法律。\n\n受托人还可能试图依赖 Spring Real Estate, LLC v. Echo/RT Holdings, LLC, No. 7994–VCN, 2016 WL 769586, *3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 18, 2016)。Spring Real Estate 法院在讨论另我作为责任隔离的例外时，在附带意见中指出：“当子公司仅是母公司的另我，以至于法院可以进行‘反向刺破公司面纱’时，为确定受托人撤销据称欺诈性转让该等资产的诉讼资格，法院可以将子公司的资产视为母公司的资产。”Id.（援引 In re American Int'l Refinery, 402 B.R. at 742–46）。然而，American Int'l Refinery 所援引以支持该命题的依据并非特拉华州法律。American Int'l Refinery 由 U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Louisiana（美国路易斯安那西区破产法院）作出，并明确适用了遵循同一性理论的内华达州法律。402 B.R. at 742–46。无论如何，Spring Real Estate 法院驳回了母公司受托人就其子公司作出的转让所提出的撤销请求；该等转让降低了母公司在子公司中的股权权益价值。Spring Real Estate, 2016 WL 769586, *3。\n\n其他表面上可能证明使用同一性理论正当的案件，同样未反映特拉华州关于另我认定影响的法律。ASARCO LLC v. America's Mining Corp., 382 B.R. 49, 66 (S.D. Tex. 2007) 中的法院声称适用特拉华州法律，以认定一项诉状载有足以提出另我请求的指控。具体而言，ASARCO 法院错误援引 Pauley Petroleum, Inc. v. Cont'l Oil Co., 239 A.2d 629, 633 (Del. Ch. 1968)，将其作为支持同一性理论命题的特拉华州法律。\n\n然而，在 Pauley Petroleum 一案中，一家特拉华州公司起诉另一家特拉华州公司，要求其对其全资墨西哥子公司行使控制权，并阻止该墨西哥子公司在墨西哥进行诉讼。该案并未涉及为界定破产财产而试图合并实体。在事实上，Pauley 法院的评论与诉讼中争议的任何事项均无关，且表面上的同一性理论表述并非源自 Pauley 所援引的法律。具体而言，Pauley 就此观点援引了下列依据，但其中无一支持采纳同一性理论：1 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations (Perm.Ed.), § 41（讨论另我的各种要素及将“责任”延伸至另我实体）；Martin v. D. B. Martin Co., 10 Del. Ch. 211, 88 A. 612, 102 A. 373 (1913)（裁定在证据开示争议中，控股公司可被强制提交其子公司的账簿和记录）；Equitable Trust Co. v. Gallagher, 34 Del. Ch. 76, 99 A.2d 490, 493–94 (1951)（裁定当被告反复承认其为公司的受托人时，可执行将股票转让给被继承人以换取其放弃对信托持有股票之权利的合同）；Buechner v. Farbenfabriken Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, 38 Del. Ch. 490, 154 A.2d 684, 687 (1959)（裁定“除非存在欺诈，母公司债权人不得无视子公司的独立存在，并直接要求以子公司的特定资产清偿其对母公司的请求权”）。\n\n简言之，特拉华州并未采纳另我的同一性理论，而任何表明其可能如此行事的案件均未援引任何特拉华州法律作为控制性依据。\n\n2．本院先前关于另我的裁定未援引特拉华州法律支持同一性理论。\n\n本院曾就另我所称的同一性效力作出某些裁定；然而，本院并未援引任何适用的特拉华州法律予以支持。在相关程序中，本院结合适用另我替代责任理论的特拉华州案件，以及概括援引 Bankruptcy Code 第541条和第542条，认定非债务人转让方的财产成为破产财产的一部分。然而，本院援引的案件并未采纳同一性理论。《破产法》第541条或第542条的任何内容，也未通过适用替代责任将破产财产扩展至非债务人。\n\n《破产法》第541(a)条将“破产财产”界定为“在案件开始时债务人在财产中拥有的所有法定或衡平权益”。11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)。然而，《破产法》并未界定债务人的法定或衡平权益。相反，“债务人的财产权益由州法创设和界定。”Cerrato v. BAC Home Loans Servicing (In re Cerrato), 504 B.R. 23, 29 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2014)（援引 Butner v. U.S., 440 U.S. 48 (1979)）。提交破产申请不会创设新的财产权益，亦不会增强既有的州法财产权益。See Majestic Star Casino, LLC v. Barden Dev., Inc. (In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC), 716 F.3d 736, 751 (3d Cir. 2013)（“然而，‘申请破产不会在此前不存在财产权利或价值之处创设新的财产权利或价值。’”）；Fed. Aviation Admin. v. Gull Air, Inc. (In re Gull Air, Inc.), 890 F.2d 1255, 1261–62 (1st Cir. 1989); Multnomah Cty. v. Rudolph (In re Rudolph), 166 B.R. 440, 443–44 (D. Or. 1994); 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 541.01 (16th ed. 2024)（“[破产]财团只能承继债务人拥有的同一财产权益，而非更大的权益。”）。《破产法》第542条仅规定将破产财产移交受托人。第542条并未扩大第541条项下破产财产的定义。\n\n例如，在一项与 HK USA[11] 有关的裁定中，本院作出如下认定：\n\n第二项反诉所寻求的另我和／或刺破公司面纱，使一个实体对另一自然人或实体的债务承担责任。Tronox, 549 B.R. at 44（“根据特拉华州法律，刺破公司面纱是一项衡平法原则。……因此，刺破公司面纱并非纯粹独立的诉因。相反，刺破公司面纱实际上相当于就直接行为人所实施的某项基础性不法行为，使直接行为人及其公司关联方承担连带责任。”）结合第541条和第542条，另我因而实现将资产转入破产财产。\n\n11 Despins（德斯潘斯） v. HK Int'l Funds Invs. (USA) Limited, LLC, et al., Adv. Pro. No. 22-05003 (JAM)（“HK USA 对抗程序”）, Dkt. No. 222, 准许就第二项反诉作出部分简易判决动议的裁决备忘录及命令，第25页，May 18, 2023。\n\n本院就另我刺破公司面纱正确援引了特拉华州法律，使 HK USA 对债务人的义务承担责任，但并未讨论该替代责任主张如何“结合第541条和第542条”转化为债务人的资产。然而，特拉华州法律止于对 HK USA 施加替代责任。\n\n作为另一示例，在 HCHK 对抗程序中，[12]本院在考虑对 HCHK 实体（定义见 HCHK 对抗程序）作出缺席判决时，分析了受托人诉状中主张的事实，并作出有利于受托人的缺席判决如下：\n\n因此，就第一项请求而言，受托人有权获得缺席判决，认定 HCHK Entities（HCHK 实体）系 Individual Debtor（个体债务人）的另我。Micaklis Pawn, 645 F.3d at 137; Bostick, 400 B.R. at 354–55。基于此，受托人有权获得缺席判决，认定 HCHK Entities 的财产属于 Estate（破产财产），且 HCHK Entities 的财产应通过交付给受托人而移交至破产财产。11 U.S.C. §§ 541, 542; Micaklis Pawn, 645 F.3d at 137; Bostick, 400 B.R. at 354–55。\n\n然而，The City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC（纽约市诉 Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC（米卡利斯典当行有限责任公司））, 645 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2011) 和 Adams v. Bostick (In re Bostick), 400 B.R. 348 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2009) 均涉及缺席判决的标准，且均未讨论另我。对第 541 条和第 542 条的引用并不创设对破产财产中财产的权利。再次指出，被援引以适用同一性理论另我的权威并未援引任何支持性的 Delaware（特拉华州）法律权威。\n\n3. 受托人在未主张实质合并的情况下寻求实质合并。\n\n事实上，尽管其并未寻求该项救济，受托人的另我理论是一项规避性尝试，旨在将 Non-Debtor Transferors（非债务人转让人）及其资产与债务人的破产财产进行实质合并。\n\n12 Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc., HCHK Prop. Mgmt., Inc., et. al., Adv. Pro. No. 23-05013 (JAM) (the \"HCHK Adversary\"), Dkt. No. 290, Memorandum of Decision and Order Granting Motion for Default Judgment, p. 19, June 14, 2024.\n\n但另我的认定并不等同于实质合并。参见 Howland, 674 Fed. App'x at 487–88（“尽管在某些方面类似于刺破公司面纱，实质合并是破产法所独有的不同概念。”）。与基于替代责任理论作出的另我认定不同，实质合并“将独立法律实体视为仿佛合并为一个单一存续实体，该实体承继所有累积的资产和负债……结果是，债权人针对独立债务人的债权转化为针对合并后存续实体的债权。”In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 205 (3d Cir. 2005)（引文略）（强调系后加）。\n\n将 Non-Debtor Transferors 与债务人的破产财产进行实质合并，即使该巡回区允许这样做，[13]也要求受托人向利害关系方提供通知和陈述意见的机会，以确保债权人获得正当程序。参见 Schwab v. Shelly Enters. (In re Clearview Builders, Inc.), 405 B.R. 144, 148 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2009)（“实质合并是一项影响当事人和债权人的极端救济，因此只能在具备足以保障所有利害关系方正当程序性陈述权的具体说明和通知之后实施。”）。在未向利害关系方提供必要的正当程序且未满足实质合并严格标准的情况下，允许受托人迂回取得此种极端救济将是荒谬的，鉴于该救济可能给无辜债权人造成严重损害。参见 In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd., 860 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1988)（要求“债权人将该等实体作为一个单一经济单位进行交易”，或“债务人的事务如此纠缠，以致合并将使所有债权人受益”）。事实上，受托人并未主张实质合并请求，也未寻求该项救济，因为其无法满足该项检验的要求。\n\n13 Stillwater, 559 B.R. at 586（指出法院对于非债务人能否与债务人进行实质合并存在分歧，并称此类救济为“不同寻常”）。\n\n即使是实质合并这一极端救济，也不得被攻击性地用于损害一组利害关系方。In re Bauman, 535 B.R. 289, 300 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2015)。因此，受托人在 Joint Defendant Adversaries（共同被告对抗程序）中以另我进行的迂回尝试，不能依据较不严格的标准实现相同目的。参见 Stillwater, 559 B.R. at 586–88（驳回将另我作为规避实质合并、以创设 § 544 诉讼资格的手段）。\n\nC. 受托人基于第 549 条提出的请求在法律上不能成立，因为受托人不能以追溯性方式适用另我原则。\n\n即使为论证起见，假定 Delaware 采用刺破公司面纱的同一性理论，受托人基于第 549 条提出的请求仍在法律上不能成立，因为此种实质性救济不能以追溯性或 nunc pro tunc（追溯）方式提供。且不论 Delaware 并无任何已报告判决以追溯性或 nunc pro tunc 方式适用另我救济，少数审议过以这种追溯方式适用另我原则的法院均断然予以否决，而 U.S. Supreme Court（美国联邦最高法院）最近亦关上了对此种追溯性救济的大门。\n\n1. 为确立根据 11 U.S.C. § 549 提出的请求，受托人必须主张并证明破产财产在债务人破产案件开始后被转让。\n\n为根据第 549 条撤销申请后转让，受托人必须，除其他事项外，主张：(i) Non-Debtor Transferors 在申请后向 Joint Defendants（共同被告）转让的财产属于债务人的破产财产；以及 (ii) 该财产是在案件开始后被转让。参见 11 U.S.C. § 549(a)。就这两个要件而言，受托人的主张似乎是，Non-Debtor Transferors 的财产在 Petition Date（申请日）属于债务人的破产财产，因为 Non-Debtor Transferors 是债务人的另我，因而，Non-Debtor Transferors 在申请日之后进行的任何转让均系案件开始后债务人的转让。[14]然而，“根据 [11 U.S.C. §] 541(a)，除少数列举的例外情形外，破产财产由在案件开始时，即在自愿或非自愿破产申请提交时，债务人已存在的所有法定和衡平财产权利构成。”5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra, ¶ 541.02, p. 541–12（原文强调）。若被转让的财产并非破产财产，则其不受 § 549 请求的约束。参见，例如，Boscarino v. Vachhani (In re Vachhani), No. 18- 02009, 2019 WL 303078, at *5 (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 22, 2019)。\n\n在此，截止申请日，并不存在无视 Non-Debtor Transferors 公司形式的命令或判决书。因此，受托人根据第 549 条提出的撤销理论，取决于通过追溯至申请日无视 Non-Debtor Transferors 的公司形式并将其资产与债务人合并，来改写申请日存在的事实情况。州法和联邦法均不允许该理论。\n\n2. 追溯性适用另我原则属于 nunc pro tunc 救济。\n\n如上所述，受托人所寻求的另我救济的性质类似于实质合并这一衡平法救济。[15]Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）将实质合并描述为一项极端救济，其“通常导致，除其他事项外，对两个实体的资产和债权进行汇集；从由此形成的共同资金中清偿负债；消除公司间债权；以及为就重整计划进行表决之目的合并两家公司债权人。”Augie/Restivo, 860 F.2d at 518（引用 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1100.06, at 1100–32 n.1 (L. King ed. 15th ed. 1988)）。该救济“‘应审慎使用。’”Id.\n\n14 See, e.g., Complaint ¶ 16, Dkt. No.1, Adv. Pro. No. 24-05112, Despins v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield.\n\n15 Third Circuit Court of Appeals（第三巡回上诉法院）对这些类型的救济作出如下对比：\n\n“刺破公司面纱使股东对公司的不法行为承担责任。衡平居次使行为不当的债权人在进行分配时排在其他债权人之后。交付和欺诈性转让使被不当转让给他方（通常为关联方）的资产回归转让方债务人。实质合并的方向不同于（且在大多数情形下比）任何这些救济更进一步；它不限于股东，它影响对无辜债权人的分配，并且其要求的不仅是将特定资产返还给原先所有人。它将一组实体的全部资产纳入一个单一存续实体。实际上，它也合并负债。“结果”，再次重申，“是债权人针对独立债务人的债权转化为针对合并后存续实体的债权。”\n\nIn re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d at 206。与 Owens Corning 所述的实质合并相同，受托人在此的另我理论寻求将一组实体（Non-Debtor Transferors）的全部资产纳入一个单一存续实体（债务人）。\n\n历史上，破产法院偶尔会以 nunc pro tunc 方式命令实质合并。由于实质合并是一项应审慎使用的极端救济，当其以 nunc pro tunc 方式被请求时，需要进行更为严格的审查。参见，例如，In re Auto-Train Corp., Inc., 810 F.2d 270, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1987)（指出，“在运用其衡平性 nunc pro tunc 权力使合并命令产生追溯效力之前”，必须适用“额外且略有不同的权衡程序”）；Matter of New Ctr. Hosp., 187 B.R. 560, 572 (E.D. Mich. 1995)（在未对债权人影响进行更严格分析时，撤销 nunc pro tunc 实质合并）。\n\n在 Auto-Train, 810 F.2d at 276 中，法院指出，鉴于撤销诉讼中债权人风险暴露的影响，需要进行此种更严格的审查。具体而言，法院认定，nunc pro tunc 合并可能仅基于“其债务人表面上独立的关联方提出破产申请”，通过改变 90 日期回溯期间而严重扰乱债权人对优先权风险暴露的预期。Id. 法院如下解释通过作出此种 nunc pro tunc 救济而改变事实可能产生的灾难性影响：\n\n如果允许破产法院在不考虑受让人对某实体表面独立性的信赖的情况下以 nunc pro tunc 方式合并实体，公司集团中任何成员出现疲弱迹象，都将导致债权人蜂拥向每一成员，无论其强弱，以索取其应得的一份。此种规则还会加剧人们天然不愿向财务困境公司的任何关联方提供信贷的倾向。这反过来将危及财务状况良好的关联方继续经营并帮助处境更为困难的关联方摆脱困境的能力。\n\nId. at 277.\n\nAuto-Train案法院对于第549条请求的担忧更为严重。尽管优先受偿请求受第547(c)条规定的抗辩保护，以保护贸易债权人，但第549条下不存在类似的抗辩；该条要求债务人及其交易相对方在进行某些交易时获得法院批准。如果实质合并被追溯适用于申请日，则非债务人在其关联方申请日之后作出的任何转让，均将如同该非债务人已处于破产程序中一样，受到撤销。这种对既往事实和情形的重新定性，使在申请日后与该非债务人交易的债权人面临其并不知情的风险。此外，这还剥夺了他们获得法院命令以明确其被要求参与的交易是否已获破产法院批准，或是否属于11 U.S.C. § 363(b)项下正常营业过程的机会。事实上，受托人立场的荒谬性因以下事实而更加明显：国会将以价值交换方式作出的非自愿破产申请后“空档期”转让排除在撤销范围之外，而不论受让人是否知悉或知道该案件。见11 U.S.C. § 549(b)。按照受托人对《破产法》的理解，与受到非自愿破产申请约束的实体交易的相对方，比本案共同被告（Joint Defendants）获得更多保护；而共同被告所交易的非债务人根本未受到任何破产程序约束。\n\n这些担忧在Bauer v. General Elec. Capital Corp. (In re Oncology Assocs. of Ocean Cnty., LLC), 510 B.R. 463 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2014)一案中得到了体现。在该案中，债务人Oncology Associates of Ocean County, LLC（“OAOC”）根据第11章提交自愿申请，约十个月后任命了一名受托人。Id. at 465。出于对资产被转移至关联方的担忧，受托人获得了一项命令，对两家关联公司的破产财产进行实质合并，其中包括Modern Radiation and Oncology of Ocean County, LLC（“Modern”）；Modern直至OAOC申请约一年后才申请破产。Id. at 465 n.1。受托人对两名被告提起撤销诉讼，请求根据11 U.S.C. § 549撤销Modern在OAOC申请日之后、但在Modern申请日之前向被告作出的转让。Id. at 466–68。\n\n法院驳回了受托人根据第549条提出的请求，因为该等转让发生在Modern的申请日之前；法院拒绝受托人试图为适用第549条之目的使用OAOC较早申请日的做法。Id. at 468。法院认定，转让人在作出转让时并未处于破产程序中，因此，被转让的财产并非破产财产。Id.。法院恰当地指出：“简言之，在转让发生之日，Modern并未处于破产程序中，其资产也并非破产财产。人们不禁要问，在转让人未处于破产程序中的情况下，任何律师如何能够就与申请后转让有关的风险向受让人提供意见。”Id.（原文强调）。\n\n同样，在Giuliano v. Shorenstein Co., LLC (In re Sunset Aviation, Inc.), 468 B.R. 641 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011)一案中，法院认定，未以nunc pro tunc方式作出的实质合并，并不会自动追溯适用，从而为依据包括第549条在内的规定提起撤销请求之目的，将三家债务人关联方的申请日变更为最早可能日期。Id. at 643, 645–49。因此，法院驳回了受托人根据第549条提出的请求，因为该等转让发生在转让人提交破产申请之前。Id. at 645–51。\n\n如上所述，受托人（Trustee）并未主张实质合并请求；然而，其另我（alter ego）理论必然要求将所有非债务人转让人（Non-Debtor Transferors）的资产合并至债务人（Debtor）名下，这与实质合并所给予的救济几乎相同。有关实质合并的判例法表明，该救济是否以nunc pro tunc方式给予，将决定第549条请求以及其他撤销请求能否成立。因此，受托人主张根据第549条可成立请求的唯一方式，是使另我认定追溯至申请日（Petition Date）。如下所述，无论从州法还是联邦法的角度看，在此等情形下均不存在支持追溯适用另我原则的依据。\n\n3. 最高法院在Acevedo案中的裁决排除了在这些对抗程序中给予nunc pro tunc另我救济。\n\n最高法院在Roman Cath. Archdiocese of San Juan, Puerto Rico v. Acevedo Feliciano, 589 U.S. 57 (2020)一案中的裁决排除了此类追溯性救济，因为该救济通过创造在申请日之前或当日并不存在的新事实，实质性改变了非债务人的权利。在Acevedo案中，基于一方当事人提交破产申请，一宗案件从波多黎各法院移送至联邦地区法院。589 U.S. at 63。在该当事人的破产案件被驳回后，联邦地区法院以nunc pro tunc方式将该诉讼发回波多黎各法院，并追溯至破产案件被驳回之日；然而，波多黎各法院在破产案件被驳回后、发回命令作出前已作出多项命令。Id.。最高法院认定，一旦案件被移送至联邦法院，波多黎各法院即无管辖权作出任何命令，并强调该法院在移送后采取的任何行动均属无效。Id. at 63–64。最重要的是，最高法院认定，以nunc pro tunc方式将案件发回并追溯至破产被驳回之日并不适当。Id. at 65。在澄清nunc pro tunc命令的适当用途时，最高法院认定，“[n]unc pro tunc命令并非某种奥威尔式的修正主义历史工具——用以创造事实上从未发生的‘事实’”，从而实质性改变法律格局；相反，其仅限于纠正非故意的程序性错误。Id.（原文修改）（“此类判令以一项本获准或被命令作出、但因法院疏忽而未被登记的判令为前提。”）。简言之，最高法院认定，法院不得使用nunc pro tunc命令来“使记录成为其本非所是的样子”。Id.。\n\n自Acevedo案以来，法院谨慎避免将nunc pro tunc命令作为改写历史或实质性改变法律格局的工具，而将其用途保留为纠正记录，使之与实际发生或程序上本应发生的情形相符。例如，在In re Torres, No. 21-20483 (JJT), 2021 WL 2189515, at *3 (Bankr. D. Conn. May 28, 2021)一案中，法院认定，Acevedo案禁止债务人追溯修改其申请书，以作出第362(l)(1)条所要求的证明，从而防止第362(b)(22)条适用并延续对驱逐程序的中止。类似地，在In re Donghia, Inc., No. 20-30487 (JJT), 2020 WL 2465503, at *3 (Bankr. D. Conn. May 12, 2020)一案中，法院适用Acevedo案，驳回受托人追溯至申请日拒绝租赁的请求；该请求将使破产财产免除数额巨大的申请后租金义务，因为受托人未能证明有特殊情形足以支持该救济。该地区以外的其他法院亦持相同观点。见，例如，In re Telles, No. 8-20-70325-REG, 2020 WL 2121254, at *5 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2020)（依Acevedo案驳回nunc pro tunc中止救济，以使一项违反自动中止而进行的止赎出售有效）；In re Zvoch, 618 B.R. 734, 740 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2020)（鉴于Acevedo案，对法院是否可在第13章案件中以nunc pro tunc方式批准申请后借贷表示怀疑）。\n\n在Acevedo案之后，法院必须警惕不得使用此种衡平权力创造“事实上从未发生的‘事实’”，从而实质性改变法律格局。Acevedo, 589 U.S. at 65。本案中，受托人在其起诉状中寻求的救济从根本上说是在寻求创造从未发生过的事实，其结果是实质性改变法律格局。在被质疑的转让据称发生时，被转让的财产属于非债务人转让人，且在每一该等日期，非债务人转让人均不是处于破产程序中的债务人。受托人寻求改变这两项关键事实。由于改变这两项关键事实，基于本文所述理由，法律格局将对共同被告造成根本性的不利改变。这在Acevedo案下是不允许的。无法获得此类追溯性救济，对受托人根据第549条提出的请求是致命的。\n\n最后，即使将Acevedo案狭义地理解为仅禁止以nunc pro tunc救济追溯创造管辖权，受托人根据第549条提出的请求仍然在法律上不能成立。通过寻求将非债务人的资产追溯至申请日合并入债务人的破产财产，实质上是在要求法院将其对物管辖权延伸至该等资产属于非债务人的期间。正如Acevedo案法院认定，州法院的管辖权不能因联邦法院给予nunc pro tunc救济而被创造，同理，破产法院不能追溯性地赋予自身对申请日不在其管辖范围内的资产的管辖权。事实上，nunc pro tunc救济将源自破产法院根据11 U.S.C. § 105(a)享有的衡平权力，但即使在Acevedo案之前，法院亦认定，该衡平权力并未赋予法院“无限制的权力”，以“将从未选择申请破产的不情愿非债务人拖入破产法庭”，因为这“规避了《破产法》第303条对非自愿破产案件规定的严格程序及保护措施”。In re Pearlman, 462 B.R. 849, 854 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012)。\n\n本案中，使用另我责任将非债务人转让人的资产追溯至申请日合并入债务人名下，将是一种极端形式的修正主义历史。它将把在申请日并不属于债务人破产财产的资产，在两年多后重新归类为破产财产的一部分。鉴于11 U.S.C. §§ 363 and 549对破产财产使用施加的限制，这远不只是纠正书记性或程序性错误。因此，即使按其最狭义的解释，Acevedo案亦排除本法院追溯适用另我原则，自申请日起将非债务人转让人的资产与债务人的破产财产合并。\n\n4. 州法不承认以此方式nunc pro tunc适用另我原则。\n\n共同被告未能找到任何一项依据特拉华州法作出的已报道裁决，以支持追溯适用另我原则。另一方面，少数审查过使用州法赋予另我原则追溯效力、从而在《破产法》下创设实体权利是否适当的法院，均毫不含糊地否定了此种适用。\n\n例如，在 Covey（科维） v. Casey's General Stores, Inc.（凯西综合商店公司） (In re Duckworth（达克沃思案）), No. 11-8104, 2012 WL 4434681 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 2012) 一案中，受托人依据第 549 条向零售商 Casey's 提出请求；该零售商在债务人提交破产申请日之后，从非债务人 Power Trading（鲍尔贸易公司）——该个人债务人在 Indiana（印第安纳州）设立的有限责任公司——收到了付款。Id. at \\*1–2. 受托人的第 549 条请求以前述 Power Trading 为债务人的另我为依据，因此主张所转让的资金自申请提交日起追溯性地属于破产财产。Id. at \\*3, 5. 法院指出，受托人本可将 Casey's 作为债务人向 Power Trading 进行欺诈性转让的中间受让人而追究，但其并未如此行事，表面上是为了防止 Casey's 援用 11 U.S.C. § 550(b)(1) 规定的善意且有对价抗辩。Id. at \\*5. 最终，法院驳回了受托人试图追溯性地适用另我原则以撤销向 Casey's 作出的付款这一“创造性尝试”。Id. at \\*8–9. 法院指出，受托人主张“另我原则可被用来重构一套不同的事实，换言之，改写历史，以实现仅可依破产法而非任何州法相应规定所认可的目的：即[提出第 549 条请求，同时剥夺]被告根据第 550(b)(1) 条享有的法定善意受让人抗辩。”Id. at \\*8. 法院驳回了这种对追溯性另我原则的使用，认为其“对另我原则的过度扩张，远远超出了该原则可识别的州法界限和目的”。Id.\n\n同样，在 Lawler（劳勒） v. RepublicBank Dallas（达拉斯共和银行） (In re Lawler（劳勒案）), 53 B.R. 166, 168–70 (N.D. Tex. 1985) 一案中，法院驳回了债务人追溯性适用另我原则、以撤销债务人提交破产申请后对登记在债务人另我名下财产进行的止赎拍卖的主张。在 Lawler 一案中，1976 年有人对债务人提出非自愿破产申请；数月后，由债务人设立的一个信托共同拥有之财产的抵押权贷款人进行了止赎拍卖。1979 年，破产法院认定该信托自其设立之日起追溯性地为债务人的另我。Id. at 168 n.2. 然而，地区法院拒绝基于“一项在此处所涉事实发生三年后作出的判令”而适用另我原则撤销该止赎拍卖，因为这“将是一场嘲弄”，并会对实施止赎的抵押权人造成不公。Id. at 169–70.\n\n简言之，受托人在事后数年适用另我原则以创设第 549 条责任，未获 Delaware（特拉华州）任何已报道判决的支持，并且已被少数审理过该问题的法院驳回。本院亦应驳回受托人试图利用一项衡平法原则对共同被告来一招“抓现行”的做法。[16]\n\nD. 受托人根据第 544 条和第 548 条提出的请求在法律上不能成立，因为转让作出时并非来自债务人的财产。\n\n即使 Delaware 遵循同一性理论——而其并不遵循——受托人的欺诈性转让请求仍在法律上不能成立，因为基于上文 C 部分所述理由，另我原则不能被追溯适用。也就是说，在受到质疑的申请前转让作出时，该等转让系由非债务人转让人作出，而非来自债务人在其财产中享有的任何利益。\n\n第 548(a)(1) 条规定，可撤销在“提交申请之日前 2 年内……作出的债务人对财产之利益”的欺诈性转让。\n\n16 这并不意味着受托人没有救济。当然，他可以向共同被告——作为直接受让人——请求追回任何被指称由债务人向非债务人受让人作出的转让。见 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(2); 另见 In re Duckworth, 2012 WL 4434681, at \\*5. 实际上，这将符合国会为通过规定善意且有对价抗辩来保护不知情债权人而审慎确立的平衡。11 U.S.C. § 550(b).\n\n同样，11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) 授权受托人在适用法律允许撤销的范围内，“撤销债务人对财产之利益的任何转让”。任何可成立的州法撤销请求，均须在申请提交日已经存在，受托人方可执行该请求。见 11 U.S.C. § 108(a). 如被转让的基础财产并非债务人的财产，则该财产不受 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b)(1) 或 548(a)(1) 规定的撤销。见 Novak（诺瓦克） v. Univ. of Miami（迈阿密大学） (In re Demitrus（德米特鲁斯案）), 586 B.R. 88, 94 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2018)（因被指称的转让不构成债务人财产而驳回受托人依据第 544 条和第 548 条提出的欺诈性转让请求）；参见 Stillwater, 559 B.R. at 586（因来自被指称另我的转让并非来自债务人财产的转让而驳回欺诈性转让请求）。\n\n如上文 C 部分所述，此处对另我的认定不能被赋予追溯效力，以根据州法或联邦法创设撤销请求。因此，在非债务人转让人作出受到质疑的申请前转让时，被转让的财产属于非债务人转让人，而非债务人。因此，这些转让中的每一项均不得依据第 544(b)(1) 条或第 548(a)(1) 条作为欺诈性转让予以撤销，且受托人的请求必须驳回。\n\nE. 本院先前的裁判对共同被告不具有约束力，因为其不构成案件法则或争点禁反言。\n\n1. 争点禁反言（或争点排除）不适用。\n\n在另我对抗程序中作出的判决对共同被告不具有排除效力，因为：(i) 除两项判决外，所有判决均为缺席判决；(ii) 相同争点未被审理；且 (iii) 在所有情况下，共同被告均未获得充分、公平的机会就相关争点进行诉讼。正如 Supreme Court（最高法院）所认定，“一般规则是，争点排除仅在‘某一事实或法律争点已由有效且终局的判决实际审理并确定，且该确定对判决至关重要’时附着。”Arizona（亚利桑那州） v. California（加利福尼亚州）, 530 U.S. 392, 414 (2000) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27, p.250 (1982)). “就由……缺席作出的判决而言，任何争点均未得到实际审理。”Id.\n\n在本案中，由于本院在除两起另我对抗程序之外的所有程序中均通过缺席认定另我责任（见，例如，Adv. Proc. No. 23-5013, Dkt. No. 297），故任何关于另我的基础事实或法律争点均从未得到审理。[17] 此外，共同被告并非任何另我对抗程序的当事人。因此，即使本书状中列明的具体争点曾在另我对抗程序中被确定——而其并未被确定，如上所述——该等判决亦不对共同被告对抗程序具有排除效力。\n\n争点禁反言原则在严格限定的情形中[18]禁止对法院先前裁定的法律或事实争点进行再次诉讼，该等情形为：\n\n(1) 两个程序中的争点相同，\n\n(2) 先前程序中的争点已被实际审理并实际裁定，\n\n(3) 先前程序中存在充分且公平的诉讼机会，以及\n\n(4) 先前审理的争点为支持一项有效且终局的实体判决所必需。\n\nWashington（华盛顿） v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.（纽约市教育局）, 740 F. App'x 730, 732 (2d Cir. 2018) (emphasis added).\n\n该原则因下列各项独立理由而不适用于本案。\n\n第一，如上所述，另我对抗程序中作出的缺席判决，根据具有约束力的最高法院判例，并未经过实际审理，因此不具有争点排除效力。\n\n17 其中一项例外是 Adv. Proc. No. 23-5005 (Greenwich Land（格林尼治地产）)，本院在该案中批准了受托人的简易判决动议。见 Adv. Proc. No. 23-5005, Dkt. No. 133. 本书状论及 Greenwich Land 的认定。\n\n18 即使在这些有限情形中，该原则亦属酌定适用。Parklane Hosiery Co.（帕克莱恩袜业公司） v. Shore（肖尔）, 439 U.S. 322, 324 (1979). “在攻击性禁反言的适用会对被告不公平的情况下，审判法官行使其裁量权时不应允许使用攻击性争点禁反言。”Id. 本案中，共同被告系第三方。受托人并未主张其与非债务人转让人存在任何特殊关系，并且受托人自身的主张表明，共同被告早在受托人开始另我对抗程序之前，便已与非债务人转让人进行交易。\n\n第二，共同被告对抗程序中的法律争点与另我对抗程序中确定的争点并不相同。本动议寻求确定受托人是否能够行使《破产法典》第 5 章规定的撤销权，而这显然并非另我对抗程序中的争点。此外，基于上文 A 部分所述并在此纳入的理由，Delaware 法要求评估反向揭开公司面纱对共同被告等第三方债权人的不利影响，而此前并未进行该项评估。\n\n第三，即使为论证起见，另我对抗程序中的争点与本程序提出的争点相同，且当事人实际就该等争点进行了诉讼，共同被告也未获得充分且公平的机会就其进行诉讼——当然，直至现在。受托人并未、也不可能主张，共同被告是另我对抗程序的当事人；在其提交启动该等程序的起诉状时，共同被告知悉该等程序；或共同被告有任何理由相信，他会使用该等程序中的判决，对被指称的另我行使撤销诉讼权。\n\n共同被告对抗程序中的起诉状亦未主张共同被告甚至知悉债务人的第 11 章案件，或债务人与非债务人转让人之间被指称的关系。实际上，这些案件的记录并不支持该等主张。例如，共同被告未被列入本案提交的任何债权人名单中。（见 Dkt. Nos. 5, 1043, 1163.）[19] 共同被告亦未获送达另我对抗程序中的任何终局性动议。见，例如，Adv. Pro. No. 23-5013, Dkt. No. 110, Trustee's Cross Motion for Default（仅 ECF 通知）；Dkt. No. 273, Trustee's Certificate of Service of Motion for Entry of Default Judgment。总之，共同被告并非另我对抗程序的当事人，且甚至没有任何机会寻求参与该等程序。\n\n19 如上所述，唯一例外涉及 Clayman Rosenberg Kirshner & Linder LLP（克莱曼、罗森伯格、基什纳与林德有限责任合伙律所）。2022 年 10 月 12 日提交的 Genever Holdings Corp.（赫内弗控股公司）第 11 章案件 (22-50542) 的通知，并未送达任何共同被告（见 Case No. 22-50542, Dkt. No. 7），且看来该案从未提交任何债权人名单。尽管 U.S. Trustee（美国受托人）向债权人送达了 Genever Holdings Corp. 的 § 341 会议通知，但其中未列出任何共同被告。（Dkt. No. 1066.）2022 年 10 月 12 日提交的 Genever Holdings LLC（赫内弗控股有限责任公司）第 11 章案件 (22-50592) 的债权人名单，亦未列出任何共同被告（Case No. 22-50592, Dkt. No. 1）。\n\n在 Greenwich Land（格林尼治土地案）中，被告主张，法院不能就争议事项作出简易判决，因为（除其他论点外）受托人未将必要当事人追加至该对抗程序。作为回应，法院认定其“可以‘在现有当事人之间给予完整救济’，且 Greenwich Parties（格林尼治各方）所列明的任何个人或实体均未‘主张与诉讼标的有关的利益，并且其处境使得在该人缺席的情况下处分该诉讼可能……损害或妨碍该人保护该利益的能力；或……使现有当事人因该利益而面临承担双重、多重或其他不一致义务的重大风险。’” Adv. Proc. No. 23-5005, Dkt. No. 133, p. 6（着重号为后加）。如果法院认定本书状所涉及的问题已在 Greenwich Land 中得到裁定，这将与其在 Greenwich Land 中作出的认定相矛盾，即未参与该案的当事人的权利不会因该案裁定而受到损害。\n\n因此，附带禁反言不适用于本案提出的问题。\n\n2. 案件既判法则不适用。\n\n具有裁量性的案件既判法则规定，“在诉讼的某一阶段作出的决定，可以由法院酌情认定为对同一诉讼后续阶段或当事人之间不同诉讼具有约束力的先例。” Ackerman v. Schultz (In re Schultz), 250 B.R. 22, 35 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2000)（着重号为后加）。第二巡回上诉法院及本巡回区内众多地区法院均一再裁定，尽管在某些情形下案件既判法则可适用于不同诉讼，但其仅可适用于相同当事人之间。参见，例如，In re PCH Assocs., 949 F.2d 585, 592 (2d Cir. 1991)（“尽管该法则通常适用于同一诉讼的后续阶段，但其亦适用于相同当事人之间的不同诉讼”［着重号为后加］）；Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co., 304 F.3d 200, 219 (2d Cir. 2002)（仅在“当事人曾获得充分且公平的机会就初始裁定进行诉讼”时适用该法则）（引自 People v. Bilsky, 95 N.Y.2d 172, 17 (2000)）；United States v. Pulliam, No. 3:21-CR-00156 (KAD), 2024 WL 1142004, at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 15, 2024)（同上）；另参见 Elmaliach v. Bank of China Ltd., No. 09 CIV. 2130 (PGG), 2010 WL 1172829, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2010)；Orshan v. Anker, 550 F. Supp. 538, 540 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)。\n\nIn re Schultz 一案说明了案件既判法则的限制。在 Schulz 案中，受托人除其他事项外，对债务人及其妻子提出了欺诈性转让请求。Id. at 26. 被告主张，法院在另一债权人此前依据 11 U.S.C. §§ 727 and 523 对债务人提起的诉讼中作出的裁定，基于案件既判法则阻却了受托人的撤销请求。Id. at 33–34. 然而，法院拒绝适用该法则，因为“[t]his is not the same litigation or a different litigation between the same parties.” Id. at 35.\n\n同样，在 Geltzer v. Soshkin (In re Brizinova), 588 B.R. 311, 322 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2018) 中，受托人反对被告基于案件既判法则等理由提出的驳回动议，主张被告所提出的请求与债务人在先前对抗程序中提出的请求实质上相似。法院驳回了受托人的论点，部分原因是被告并非与债务人相同的当事人，而且将案件既判法则适用于后续程序“将剥夺［被告］正当程序最基本的要素，即获得陈述意见的机会。” Id. at 324；另参见 Speeney v. Rutgers, 369 F. App'x 357, 360–61 (3d Cir. 2010)（该法则并未阻却未有机会就先前事项中请求的是非进行诉讼的当事人）；United States v. Dexter, 165 F.3d 1120, 1124 (7th Cir. 1999)（该法则不得用于“阻止一方当事人提出其此前没有机会提出的论点。”）；Jennings v. City of N.Y., No. 22 Civ. 1885, 2023 WL 8462739, at *3–5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2023)；Corrado v. N.Y. Unified Court Sys., 163 F. Supp. 3d 1, 17–18 (E.D.N.Y. 2016)（“[A] party joined in an action after a ruling has been made should be free to reargue the matter without the constraints of law-of-the-case analysis.”）；Alzheimer's Found. of Am., Inc. v. Alzheimer's Disease & Related Disorders Ass'n., Inc., No. 10 Civ. 3314, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 199601, at *11–12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2014)；In re NETtel Corp., Inc., No. 02–10122, 2007 WL 2119029, at *1 (Bankr. D.D.C. Jul. 20, 2007)（案件既判法则不适用于对抗程序，因为该程序涉及与先前对抗程序不同的当事人）。\n\n如上述所引案件一样，本案共同被告并非 Alter Ego Adversaries（另我对抗程序）的当事人。本法院不应允许受托人利用案件既判法则，阻却共同被告在 Joint Defendant Adversaries（共同被告对抗程序）中为自身辩护，从而剥夺其“正当程序最基本的要素，即获得陈述意见的机会。” Brizinova, 588 B.R. at 324.\n\n结论\n\n基于前述理由，法院应当在各项共同被告对抗程序中，视情况准许共同被告提出的驳回动议，或作出有利于共同被告的依诉状判决，并以有偏见方式驳回，且给予正义所要求的其他救济。\n\n日期：October 18, 2024\n共同被告\n\n签字人：/s/ Jeffrey Hellman\nJeffrey Hellman（杰弗里·赫尔曼）(ct04102)\nLAW OFFICES OF JEFFREY HELLMAN, LLC（杰弗里·赫尔曼律师事务所，有限责任公司）\n195 Church Street, 10th Floor\n电话：203-691-8762\nNew Haven, CT 06510\n电子邮件：jeff@jeffhellmanlaw.com\nOhtzar Shlomo Solomon Treasure LLC（奥扎尔·什洛莫·所罗门财宝有限责任公司）及 Jason Miller（杰森·米勒）的代理律师\n\n签字人：/s/ Eric S. Goldstein\nEric S. Goldstein（埃里克·S·戈德斯坦）(ct27195)\nSHIPMAN & GOODWIN LLP（希普曼与古德温律师事务所）\nOne Constitution Plaza\nHartford, CT 06103\n电话：(860) 251-5059\n电子邮件：egoldstein@goodwin.com\nAnthem HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. dba Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield（安泰健康选择保险公司，以帝国蓝十字蓝盾名义经营）；Anthem Health Plans, Inc.（安泰健康计划公司）；Sedgwick Realty Corp.（塞奇威克房地产公司）；以及 Direct Persuasion LLC（直接说服有限责任公司）的代理律师\n\n签字人：/s/ Scott M. Charmoy\nScott M. Charmoy（斯科特·M·查莫伊）(ct15889)\nCHARMOY & CHARMOY, LLC（查莫伊与查莫伊律师事务所，有限责任公司）\n1465 Post Road, Suite 100\nWestport, CT 06680\n电话：(203) 255-8100\n电子邮件：scottcharmoy@charmoy.com\nPutnam's Landscaping LLC（普特南园林绿化有限责任公司）的代理律师\n\n签字人：/s/ Eric S. Goldstein\nEric S. Goldstein（埃里克·S·戈德斯坦）(ct27195)\nNicole M. Lapenta（妮可·M·拉彭塔）(ct31639)\nSHIPMAN & GOODWIN LLP（希普曼与古德温律师事务所）\nOne Constitution Plaza\nHartford, CT 06103\n电话：(860) 251-5059\n电子邮件：egoldstein@goodwin.com\nnlapenta@goodwin.com\n以及\n签字人：/s/ Michael A. Siedband\nMichael A. Siedband（迈克尔·A·西德班德）(pro hac vice)\nFEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION（联邦快递公司）\n3620 Hacks Cross Road, Bldg. B\nMemphis, TN 38104\n电话：(901) 355-2075\n电子邮件：michael.siedband@fedex.com\nFederal Express Corporation（联邦快递公司）的代理律师\n\n签字人：/s/ Rowena A. Moffett\nRowena A. Moffett（罗韦娜·A·莫菲特）(ct19811)\nBRENNER, SALTZMAN & WALLMAN LLP（布伦纳、萨尔茨曼与沃尔曼律师事务所）\n271 Whitney Avenue\nNew Haven, CT 06511\n电话：(203) 772-2600\n电子邮件：rmoffett@bswlaw.com\nMorvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello PC（莫维洛·阿布拉莫维茨·格兰德·亚森与阿内洛专业公司）的代理律师\n\n签字人：/s/ Michael T. Conway\nMichael T. Conway（迈克尔·T·康威）(ct26750)\nLAZARE POTTER GIACOVAS & MOYLE LLP（拉扎尔·波特·贾科瓦斯与莫伊尔律师事务所）\n747 Third Avenue, 16th Floor\nNew York, NY 10017\n电话：(917) 242-1597\n电子邮件：mconway@lpgmlaw.com\nArri Americas Inc.（阿里美洲公司）的代理律师\n\n签字人：/s/\nLouis J. Martocchio III（路易斯·J·马托基奥三世）\nLouis J. Martocchio III（路易斯·J·马托基奥三世）(ct31149)\nMARTOCCHIO & OLIVEIRA LLC（马托基奥与奥利维拉有限责任公司）\n191 Main Street\nSouthington, CT 06489\n电话：(860) 621-9700\n电子邮件：lou@mo-lawfirm.com\n以及\nBret L. Strong（布雷特·L·斯特朗）(pro hac vice)\nZachary W. Doninger（扎卡里·W·多宁格）(pro hac vice)\nTHE STRONG FIRM, P.C.（斯特朗律师事务所，专业公司）\nTwo Hughes Landing\n1790 Hughes Landing, Suite 200\nThe Woodlands, TX 77380\n电话：(281) 367-1222\n电子邮件：bstrong@thestrongfirm.com\nzdoninger@thestrongfirm.com\nDJD Creative, LLC（DJD创意有限责任公司）的代理律师\n\n签字人：/s/ Ross G. Fingold\nRoss G. Fingold（罗斯·G·芬戈尔德）(ct05452)\nSTOKESBURY & FINGOLD, LLC（斯托克斯伯里与芬戈尔德有限责任公司）\n10 Waterside Drive, Suite 204\nFarmington, CT 06032\n电话：(860) 606-1709\n电子邮件：rfingold@lawssf.com\n以及\nSabrina L. Streusand（萨布丽娜·L·斯特鲁桑德）(pro hac vice)\nSTREUSAND, LANDON, OZBURN & LEMMON, LLP（斯特鲁桑德、兰登、奥兹本与莱蒙律师事务所）\n1801 S MoPac Expressway, Suite 320\nAustin, TX 787046\n电话：(512) 236-9901\n电子邮件：streusand@slollp.com\nCloudflare, Inc.（云途公司）的代理律师\n\n签字人：/s/ Richard J. Bernard\nRichard J. Bernard（理查德·J·伯纳德）(ct413177)\nFAEGRE DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP（费格雷·德林克·比德尔与里思律师事务所）\n1177 Avenue of the Americas\nNew York, NY 10036\n电话：(212) 248-3140\n电子邮件：richard.bernard@faegredrinker.com\n以及\nJosh Peterson（乔希·彼得森）\nFAEGRE DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP（费格雷·德林克·比德尔与里思律师事务所）\n2200 Wells Fargo Center\n90 S. 7th Street\nMinneapolis, MN 55402\n电话：(612) 766-7000\n电子邮件：josh.peterson@faegredrinker.com\n以及\nJaclyn C. Marasco（杰克琳·C·马拉斯科）\nFAEGRE DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP（费格雷·德林克·比德尔与里思律师事务所）\n222 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1400\nWilmington, DE 19801\n电话：(302) 467-4200\n电子邮件：jaclyn.marasco@faegredrinker.com\nCirrus Design Corporation（西锐设计公司）的代理律师\n\n签字人：/s/ Benjamin D. Feder\nBenjamin D. Feder（本杰明·D·费德）(ct443211)\nEric R. Wilson（埃里克·R·威尔逊）(ct443553)\nKELLEY DRYE & WARREN LLP（凯利·德赖与沃伦律师事务所）\nCanterbury Green\n201 Broad Street\nStamford, CT 06901\n电话：(203) 324-1400\n电子邮件：ewilson@kelleydrye.com\nbfeder@kelleydrye.com\n以及\nRichard J. Reding（理查德·J·雷丁）(pro hac vice)\nASK LLP（ASK律师事务所）\n2600 Eagan Woods Drive, Suite 400\nSt. Paul, MN 55121\n电话：(651) 406-9665\n电子邮件：rreding@askllp.com\n以及\nEdward E. Neiger（爱德华·E·奈格）(pro hac vice)\nASK LLP（ASK律师事务所）\n60 East 42nd Street, 46th Floor\nNew York, NY 10165\n电话：(212) 267-7342\n电子邮件：eneiger@askllp.com\nIndium Software, Inc.（铟软件公司）的代理律师\n\n签字人：/s/ John F. Carberry\n/s/ Kara A. Zarchin\nJohn F. Carberry（约翰·F·卡伯里）(ct02881)\nKara A. Zarchin（卡拉·A·扎钦）(ct30783)\nCUMMINGS & LOCKWOOD LLC（卡明斯与洛克伍德有限责任公司）\nSix Landmark Square\nStamford, CT 06901\n电话：(203) 351-4280\n电子邮件：jcarberry@cl-law.com\nkzarchin@cl-law.com\nTarget Enterprises, LLC（塔吉特企业有限责任公司）及 Jamestown Associates, LLC（詹姆斯敦联合有限责任公司）的代理律师\n\n签字人：/s/ David J. Kozlowski\nDavid J. Kozlowski（大卫·J·科兹洛夫斯基）(ct28240)\nMORRISON COHEN LLP（莫里森·科恩律师事务所）\n909 Third Avenue\nNew York, NY 10022\n电话：(212) 735-8825\n电子邮件：dkozlowski@morrisoncohen.com\n以及\nJeffrey Rhodes（杰弗里·罗兹）(pro hac vice)\nTAYMAN LANE CHAVERRI LLP（泰曼·莱恩·查韦里律师事务所）\n2001 L Street NW, Suite 500\nWashington, DC 20036\n电话：(202) 921-4080\n电子邮件：jrhodes@tlclawfirm.com\nMark Gundersen（马克·冈德森）的代理律师\n\n签字人：/s/\nEric Seltzer（埃里克·塞尔策）\nEric Seltzer（埃里克·塞尔策）\n(ct01224)\nGILBRIDE, TUSA, LAST & SPELLANE LLC（吉尔布赖德、图萨、拉斯特与斯佩兰有限责任公司）\n31 Brookside Drive\nGreenwich, CT 06830\n电话：(203) 622-9360\n电子邮件：ehs@gtlslaw.com\nMiller Motorcars Inc.（米勒汽车公司）的代理律师\n\n签字人：/s/ Robert E. Kaelin\nRobert E. Kaelin（罗伯特·E·凯林）(ct11631)\nMURTHA CULLINA LLP（默萨·库利纳律师事务所）\n280 Trumbull Street, 12th Floor\nHartford, CT 06103\n电话：(860) 240-6000\n电子邮件：rkaelin@murthalaw.com\n以及\n签字人：\n/s/ Matthew A. Pesce\nMatthew A. Pesce（马修·A·佩谢）(ct31208)\nMURTHA CULLINA LLP（默萨·库利纳律师事务所）\n107 Elm Street\nFour Stamford Plaza, 11th Floor\nStamford, CT 06902\n电话：(203) 653-5400\n电子邮件：mpesce@murthalaw.com\n3 Columbus Circle, LLC（哥伦布圆环3号有限责任公司）、Phillips Nizer LLP（菲利普斯·尼泽律师事务所）及 ModSquad, Inc.（莫德小队公司）的代理律师\n\n签字人：/s/ Robert N. Sensale\nRobert N. Sensale（罗伯特·N·森萨莱）(ct10556)\nBERSHTEIN, VOLPE & MCKEON P.C.（伯什泰因、沃尔普与麦基翁专业公司）\n900 Chapel Street, 11th Floor\nNew Haven, CT 06510\n电话：(203) 777-5800\n电子邮件：rns@bvmlaw.com\n270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC（西39街270号公司，有限责任公司）的代理律师\n\n签字人：/s/ Lindsay C. Stone\nLindsay C. Stone（林赛·C·斯通）(ct31140)\nBenjamin Gilbert（本杰明·吉尔伯特）\n(pro hac vice)\nSHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP（谢泼德·穆林·里希特与汉普顿律师事务所）\n30 Rockefeller Plaza, 39th Floor\nNew York, NY 10112\n电话：(212) 653-8700\n电子邮件：lstone@sheppardmullin.com\nbogilbert@sheppardmullin.com\n以及\n签字人：/s/\nAlan H. Martin（艾伦·H·马丁）\nAlan H. Martin（艾伦·H·马丁）(pro hac vice)\nSHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP（谢泼德·穆林·里希特与汉普顿律师事务所）\n650 Town Center Drive, 10th Floor\nCosta Mesa, CA 92626\n电话：(714) 513-5100\n电子邮件：amartin@sheppardmullin.com\nAgora Lab, Inc.（阿戈拉实验室公司）的代理律师\n\n签字人：/s/ Matthew D. Valauri\nMatthew D. Valauri（马修·D·瓦劳里）(ct30193)\nWILSON ELSER MOSKOWITZ EDELMAN & DICKER LLP（威尔逊·埃尔瑟·莫斯科维茨·埃德尔曼与迪克律师事务所）\nWestview Office Park\n1010 Washington Boulevard\nStamford, CT 06901\n电话：(203) 388-2433\n电子邮件：matthew.valauri@wilsonelser.com\nClayman Rosenberg Kirschner & Linder LLP（克莱曼·罗森伯格·基什纳与林德律师事务所）的代理律师\n\n签字人：/s/ Bonnie C. Mangan\nBonnie C. Mangan（邦妮·C·曼根）(ct03759)\nLAW OFFICE OF BONNIE C. MANGAN, P.C.（邦妮·C·曼根律师事务所，专业公司）\n1050 Sullivan Avenue, A3\nSouth Windsor, CT 06074\n电话：(860) 644-4204\n电子邮件：bonnie.mangan@manganlaw.com\n以及\nSari B. Placona（萨里·B·普拉科纳）(pro hac vice)\nMCMANIMON, SCOTLAND & BAUMANN, LLC（麦克马尼蒙、苏格兰与鲍曼有限责任公司）\n75 Livingston Avenue, Second Floor\nRoseland, NJ 07068\n电话：(973) 721-5030\n电子邮件：splacona@msbnj.com\nMcManimon, Scotland & Baumann, LLC（麦克马尼蒙、苏格兰与鲍曼有限责任公司）的代理律师\n\n签署人：/s/ Tracy Ellis Williams（特蕾西·埃利斯·威廉斯）\nTracy Ellis Williams（ct25137） 签署人：/s/ Eric S. Goldstein（埃里克·S·戈德斯坦）\nEric S. Goldstein（ct27195）\n\nSHIPMAN & GOODWIN LLP（希普曼与古德温律师事务所）\n300 Atlantic Street, 3rd Floor SHIPMAN & GOODWIN LLP（希普曼与古德温律师事务所）\nOne Constitution Plaza\nStamford, CT 06901 Hartford, CT 06103\n电话：(203) 324-8136 电话：(860) 251-5059\n电子邮箱：tewilliams@goodwin.com 电子邮箱：egoldstein@goodwin.com\n\n以及 以及\nScott M. Kessler（斯科特·M·凯斯勒）（临时获准出庭） Justin S. Baumgartner（贾斯汀·S·鲍姆加特纳）（临时获准出庭）\nAKERMAN LLP（阿克曼律师事务所） BECKER LLC（贝克律师事务所）\n\n1251 Avenue of the Americas, 37th Floor\nNew York, NY 10020\n电话：(212) 880-3800\n电子邮箱：scott.kessler@akerman.com\nB&H Foto & Electronics Corp.（B&H Foto & Electronics公司）的代理律师 354 Eisenhower Parkway\nPlaza Two, Suite 1500\nLivingston, NJ 07039\n电话：(973) 422-1100\n电子邮箱：jbaumgartner@becker.legal\nOn the Spot Home Improvement, Inc.（On the Spot Home Improvement公司）的代理律师\n\n签署人：/s/ Nicholas P. Vegliante（尼古拉斯·P·韦利安特）\nNicholas P. Vegliante（ct28449）\nCOHN BIRNBAUM & SHEA P.C.（科恩、伯恩鲍姆与谢律师事务所）\nCityPlace II, 15th Floor\n185 Asylum Street\nHartford, CT 06103\n电话：(860) 493-2200\n电子邮箱：nvegliante@cbshealaw.com\nGroCyber, LLC（GroCyber有限责任公司）的代理律师 签署人：/s/ Henry P. Baer, Jr.（小亨利·P·贝尔）\nHenry P. Baer, Jr.（ct27781）\nEilis Meagher（艾丽斯·米格）\n（ct31160）\nFINN DIXON & HERLING, LLP（芬恩、迪克森与赫林律师事务所）\nSix Landmark Square\nStamford, CT 06901\n电话：(203) 325-5000\n电子邮箱：hbaer@fdh.com\nemeagher@fdh.com\nNardello & Co., LLC（纳德洛公司有限责任公司）的代理律师\n\n签署人：/s/ Henry P. Baer, Jr.\nHenry P. Baer, Jr.（ct27781）\nFINN DIXON & HERLING, LLP\nSix Landmark Square\nStamford, CT 06901\n电话：(203) 325-5000\n电子邮箱：hbaer@fdh.com\n以及\nSteven G. Mintz（史蒂文·G·明茨）（临时获准出庭）\nBarry M. Kazan（巴里·M·卡赞）（临时获准出庭）\nMINTZ & GOLD LLP（明茨与戈尔德律师事务所）\n600 Third Avenue, 25th Floor\nNew York, NY 10016\n电话：(212) 696-4848\n电子邮箱：mintz@mintzandgold.com\nkazan@mintzandgold.com 签署人：/s/ Henry P. Baer, Jr.\nHenry P. Baer, Jr.（ct27781）\nEilis Meagher（艾丽斯·米格）\n（ct31160）\nFINN DIXON & HERLING, LLP\nSix Landmark Square\nStamford, CT 06901\n电话：(203) 325-5000\n电子邮箱：hbaer@fdh.com\nemeagher@fdh.com\n以及\nAndrea M. Chase（安德里亚·M·蔡斯）（临时获准出庭）\nSPENCER FANE LLP（斯宾塞·费恩律师事务所）\n1000 Walnut, Suite 1400\nKansas City, MO 64106\n电话：(816) 292-8279\n电子邮箱：achase@spencerfane.com\nTeris-Phoenix, LLC（特里斯-菲尼克斯有限责任公司）的代理律师\n\nMarcum LLP（马库姆律师事务所）和 Fox News Network, LLC（福克斯新闻网络有限责任公司）的代理律师\n\n签署人：/s/ Ilan Markus（伊兰·马库斯）\nIlan Markus（ct26345）\nBARCLAY DAMON LLP（巴克莱·达蒙律师事务所）\n545 Long Wharf Drive, 9th Floor\nNew Haven, CT 06511\n电话：(203) 672-2661\n电子邮箱：imarkus@barclaydamon.com 签署人：/s/ John J. Clarke（约翰·J·克拉克）\nJohn J. Clarke, Jr.（ct31251）\nDLA PIPER LLP（德杰律师事务所）\n1251 Avenue of the Americas\nNew York, NY 10020\n电话：(212) 335-4500\n电子邮箱：john.clarke@us.dlapiper.com\nConservative Campaign Technology LLC（保守派竞选技术有限责任公司）的代理律师 以及\nC. Kevin Kobbe（C·凯文·科比）（临时获准出庭）\nDLA PIPER LLP\n650 South Exeter Street, Suite 1100\nBaltimore, MD 21202\n电话：(410) 580-4189\n电子邮箱：kevin.kobbe@us.dlapiper.com\nZeta Global Corp.（泽塔环球公司）的代理律师\n\n签署人：/s/ James J. Costello, Jr.（小詹姆斯·J·科斯特洛）\nJames J. Costello, Jr.（ct309468）\nNORRIS MCLAUGHLIN, P.A.（诺里斯·麦克劳克林律师事务所）\n400 Crossing Boulevard, 8th Floor\nBridgewater, NJ 08807-5933\n电话：(908) 252-4315\n电子邮箱：jjcostellojr@norris-law.com\nFlat Rate Movers, Ltd.（固定费率搬家公司）的代理律师 签署人：/s/ Ronald I. Chorches（罗纳德·I·乔切斯）\nRonald I. Chorches（ct08720）\nLAW OFFICES OF RONALD I. CHORCHES, LLC（罗纳德·I·乔切斯律师事务所）\n82 Wolcott Hill Road, Suite 203\nWethersfield, CT 06109\n电话：(860) 563-3955\n电子邮箱：ronchorcheslaw@sbcglobal.net\n以及\n签署人：/s/ Darryl S. Laddin（达里尔·S·拉丁）\nDarryl S. Laddin（临时获准出庭）\nFrank N. White（弗兰克·N·怀特）（临时获准出庭）\nARNALL GOLDEN GREGORY LLP（阿诺尔·戈尔登·格雷戈里律师事务所）\n171 17th Street, N.W. Suite 1200\nAtlanta, GA 30363-1031\n电话：(404) 873-8500\n电子邮箱：darryl.laddin@agg.com\nfrank.white@agg.com\n\nAmerican Express（美国运通）的代理律师\n\n签署人：/s/ Lindsay Sampson Bishop（林赛·桑普森·毕晓普）\nLindsay Sampson Bishop（ct29990）\nK&L GATES LLP（凯爱律师事务所）\n1 Congress Street\nBoston, MA 02114\n电话：(617) 261-3100\n电子邮箱：lindsay.bishop@klgates.com\n以及\n签署人：/s/ Brian T. Peterson（布赖恩·T·彼得森）\nBrian T. Peterson（临时获准出庭）\nRuby A. Nagamine（露比·A·长峰）（临时获准出庭）\nK&L GATES LLP\n925 Fourth Avenue, Suite 2900\nSeattle, WA 98104\n电话：(206) 623-7580\n电子邮箱：brian.peterson@klgates.com\nruby.nagamine@klgates.com [故意留白]\nAmazon Web Services, Inc.（亚马逊网络服务公司）和 Amazon.com, Inc.（亚马逊网站公司）的代理律师\n\n附件 A\n\n实体名称、成立州\n及\n转让类型\n\nLamp Capital LLC（灯资本有限责任公司）\n（Del.） Golden Spring (New York) Ltd.（金泉〈纽约〉有限公司）\n（Del.） HCHK Technologies, Inc.（HCHK科技公司）\n（Del.） HCHK Property Management, Inc.（HCHK物业管理公司）\n（Del.） Greenwich Land LLC（格林尼治土地有限责任公司）\n（Del.） Lexington Property & Staffing, Inc.（列克星敦物业与人事服务公司）\n（Del.）\n\n编号 被告 对抗程序案号 544/\n548 544/\n548 549 544/\n548 549 544/\n548 549 544/\n548 549 544/\n548 549\n1 Ohtzar Shlomo Solomon Treasure LLC（奥扎尔·什洛莫·所罗门财富有限责任公司） 24-05082 x\n2 Anthem HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. dba Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield（安森健康选择保险公司，以帝国蓝十字蓝盾名义经营） 24-05112 x x x\n3 Anthem Health Plans, Inc.（安森健康计划公司） 24-05058 x\n4 Sedgwick Realty Corp.（塞奇威克房地产公司） 24-05222 x\n5 Federal Express Corporation（联邦快递公司） 24-05059 x\n6 Putnam's Landscaping, LLC（普特南园林绿化有限责任公司） 24-05211 x x x x x\n7 Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello PC（莫维略、阿布拉莫维茨、格兰德、艾森与阿内洛律师事务所） 24-05196 x x\n8 Arri Americas Inc.（阿莱美洲公司） 23-05031 x\n9 Direct Persuasion LLC（直接说服有限责任公司） 24-05010 x\n\n10 DJD Creative LLC（DJD创意有限责任公司） 24-05063 x\n\n11 Cloudflare, Inc.（云端防护公司） 24-05115 x x x x\n12 Cirrus Design Corporation（卷云设计公司） 24-05225 x x\n13 Indium Software, Inc.（铟软件公司） 24-05122 x x x\n14 Target Enterprises, LLC（目标企业有限责任公司） 24-05138 x\n15 Jamestown Associates, LLC（詹姆斯敦联合有限责任公司） 24-05147 x\n16 Mark Gundersen（马克·冈德森） 24-05048 x\n17 3 Columbus Circle, LLC（哥伦布圆环3号有限责任公司） 24-05120 x\n18 ModSquad, Inc.（模组团队公司） 24-05114 x\n19 Miller Motorcars Inc.（米勒汽车公司） 24-05128 x\n20 270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC（西39街270号公司有限责任公司） 24-05055 x\n21 Agora Lab, Inc.（阿戈拉实验室公司） 24-05005 x x x x\n22 Clayman Rosenberg Kirschner & Linder LLP（克莱曼、罗森伯格、基什纳与林德律师事务所） 24-05202 x\n23 McManimon, Scotland & Baumann, LLC（麦克马尼蒙、斯科特兰与鲍曼有限责任公司） 24-05194 x\n24 American Express 24-05077 x x\n\n25 Amazon Web Services, Inc. 24-05006 x x x x\n\n26 Amazon.com, Inc. 24-05057 x x x x x\n27 Flat Rate Movers, Ltd. 24-05141 x\n28 Jason Miller（杰森·米勒） 24-05219 x x\n29 On the Spot Home Improvement, Inc. 24-05130 x\n30 Teris-Phoenix, LLC 24-05044 x\n31 Nardello & Co., LLC 24-05162 x x\n32 Marcum LLP 24-05229 x x x x\n33 Fox News Network, LLC 24-05015 x\n34 Phillips Nizer LLP（菲利普斯·尼泽律师事务所） 24-05047 x x x\n35 Zeta Global Corp. 24-05092 x\n36 GroCyber, LLC 24-05100 x\n37 Conservative Campaign Technology LLC 24-05108 x\n38 B&H Foto and Electronics, Corp. 24-05069 x x x x x x x\n\n送达证明\n\n本人特此证明，于 October 18, 2024，上述文件副本已以电子方式提交，并通过预付邮资的一级邮件和/或电子邮件送达给无法接受电子提交的任何人。本次提交的通知将根据法院电子提交系统的运作通过电子邮件发送给所有当事人，或者，如《电子提交通知》所示，通过一级邮件发送给无法接受电子提交的任何人。当事人可通过法院的 CM/ECF System 查阅本次提交。\n\n/s/ Eric S. Goldstein\nEric S. Goldstein","key_entities":["Je","HCHK","Despins","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Guo","Torres","RICO","Miles Guo","Paul Hastings","CIPA"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":1,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":4,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":7,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":35,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":66,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":78,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":133,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":221,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":222,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":260,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":273,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":290,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":297,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":465,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":523,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1043,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1066,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1163,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1336,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1360,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3577,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":16856,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 22:09:54"}