{"id":"court_ctb_3803_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":3803,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"MEMORANDUM","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION | -------------------------------------------","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| ------------------------------------------------------ | x |\n|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|\n| In re: | :
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Chapter 11 |\n| HO WAN KWOK, et al.,1 | :
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Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |\n| Debtors. | :
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(Jointly Administered)
: |\n| ------------------------------------------------------x | |\n\n## **CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE'S OBJECTION TO JOINT DEFENDANTS' OMNIBUS MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS**\n\n1 The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\n# **Table of Contents**\n\n| | PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 1 | |\n|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|\n| | OBJECTION 4 | |\n| I. | Law of the Case Defeats the Joint Motion 4 | |\n| II. | Joint Defendants' Alleged \"Innocence\" Does Not Preclude Reverse Veil-Piercing 6 | |\n| a. | Joint Defendants' Alleged \"Innocence\" and Purported Potential Harm Are Premature Issues
of Fact 7 | |\n| b. | Reverse Veil-Piercing Implicates a Balancing Test Aimed to Prevent Fraud 8 | |\n| | III. Assets of Alter Ego Entities Are Estate Property 10 | |\n| a. | Property of Estate Is Matter of Federal Bankruptcy Law, Not State Law 11 | |\n| b. | Delaware Does Not Follow Vicarious Liability Theory of Alter Ego Law 19 | |\n| c. | Court Has Already Rejected Joint Defendants' Illusory Distinction 22 | |\n| | IV. Trustee Is Not Seeking, And Does Not Need, Nunc Pro Tunc Relief, As Debtor Always
Owned Assets of Alter Ego Entities 23 | |\n\n### **TABLE OF AUTHORITIES**\n\n#### **Cases**\n\n| In re 477 W. 142nd St. Hous., Dev. Fund Corp.,
No. 15-12178 (SHL), 2020 WL 3067733 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2020) 5 | |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|\n| In re 10th Ave. Rec. Distributors, Inc.,
97 B.R. 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) 15 | |\n| In re Adler,
494 B.R. 43 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2013) 17, 18, 27, 28 | |\n| In re Am. Int'l Refinery,
402 B.R. 728 (Bankr. W.D. La. 2008) 20, 21, 22, 25 | |\n| In re Am. Way Serv. Corp.,
229 B.R. 496 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999) 29 | |\n| Aramony v. United Way of Am.,
254 F.3d 403 (2d Cir. 2001)5 | |\n| In re Autobacs Strauss, Inc.,
473 B.R. 525 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012) 28 | |\n| In re Blatstein,
192 F.3d 88 (3d Cir. 1999)15, 18 | |\n| In re Burgess,
234 B.R. 793 (D. Nev. 1999) 13 | |\n| Butner v. U.S.,
440 U.S. 48 (1979) 12, 13 | |\n| In re Chardon, LLC,
519 B.R. 211 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014) 12 | |\n| In re Commodore Business Machines, Inc.,
180 B.R. 72 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) 13 | |\n| In re Concepcion,
No. 13-09126, 2017 WL 1076325 (Bankr. D.P.R. Mar. 21, 2017) 16 | |\n| In re Deckelbaum v. Cooter, Mangold, Tompert & Chapman, P.L.L.C.,
275 B.R. 737 (D. Md. 2001) 16, 18, 26 | |\n\n| In re Duckworth,
No. 10-83603, 2012 WL 4434681 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 2012) 26, 27 | |\n|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|\n| In re Fisher,
296 Fed. App'x 494 (6th Cir. 2008) 25, 26 | |\n| In re Harman,
512 B.R. 321 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2014) 24 | |\n| In re Harry C. Partridge Jr. & Sons, Inc.,
112 B.R. 593 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) 16 | |\n| In re Howland,
674 F. App'x 482 (6th Cir. 2017) 19 | |\n| Krakowski v. Am. Airlines, Inc.,
610 B.R. 714 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) 5 | |\n| Manichaean Cap., LLC v. Exela Techs., Inc.,
251 A.3d 694 (Del. Ch. 2021) passim | |\n| In re Mass,
178 B.R. 626 (M.D. Pa. 1995) 8, 9, 10 | |\n| In re Moise,
575 B.R. 191 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2017) 6 | |\n| In re Motors Liquidation Co.,
590 B.R. 39 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) 5, 6 | |\n| In re N.S. Garrott & Sons,
772 F.2d 462 (8th Cir. 1985) 13 | |\n| In re Nejberger,
934 F.2d 1300 (3d Cir. 1991)13 | |\n| Newman & Schwartz v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co.,
102 F.3d 660 (2d Cir. 1996)7 | |\n| Nicole Gas Prod., Ltd.,
916 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2019) 13 | |\n| In re Nordlicht,
115 F.4th 90 (2d Cir. 2024) 15 | |\n| In re Palmieri,
651 B.R. 349 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2023) passim | |\n\n| Pauley Petroleum, Inc. v. Cont'l Oil Co.,
239 A.2d 629 (Del. Ch. 1968)21 |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| Pavers & Rd. Builders Dist. Council Welfare Fund v. Core Contracting of N.Y.,
LLC,
536 B.R. 48 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2015) 17, 19 |\n| In re Pearlman,
462 B.R. 849 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012) 16 |\n| Pescatore v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.,
97 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 1996)5 |\n| In re Petters Co., Inc.,
561 B.R. 738 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2016) 9, 10 |\n| In re Player's Poker Club, Inc.,
636 B.R. 811 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2022) 27 |\n| Roman Cath. Archdiocese of San Juan, Puerto Rico v. Acevedo Feliciano,
589 U.S. 57 (2020) 27 |\n| In re RS Air, LLC,
651 B.R. 538 19, 23 |\n| In re Schultz,
250 B.R. 22 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2000) 6 |\n| In re Schuster,
132 B.R. 604 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991) 10, 28 |\n| Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC,
603 B.R. 682 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019) 6 |\n| In re Silver,
647 B.R. 897 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2022) 19 |\n| Sky Cable, LLC v. DIRECTV, Inc.,
886 F.3d 375 (4th Cir. 2018) 9 |\n| Spring Real Est., LLC v. Echo/RT Holdings, LLC,
No. CV 7994-VCN, 2016 WL 769586 (Del. Ch. Feb. 18, 2016) 20, 21 |\n| St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. PepsiCo, Inc.,
884 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1989)15 |\n| In re Star Mountain Res., Inc.,
No. 2:18-BK-01594-DPC, 2022 WL 2294175 (Bankr. D. Ariz. June 22, 2022) 14, 15, 18, 29 |\n\n| Stern v. Marshall,
564 U.S. 462, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 180 L. Ed. 2d 475 (2011) 18 |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| In re Terwilliger's Catering Plus, Inc.,
911 F.2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1990) 13 |\n| In re The Ground Round, Inc.,
482 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2007) 12 |\n| In re Wardle,
No. ADV.S-03-01467, 2006 WL 6811026 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Jan. 31, 2006) 19 |\n| Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif,
575 U.S. 665, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 191 L. Ed. 2d 911 (2015) 18 |\n| In re Yerushalmi,
487 B.R. 98 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2012) 14, 15, 18 |\n| Statutes |\n| 11 U.S.C. § 502(h) 8 |\n| 11 U.S.C. § 541 passim |\n| 11 U.S.C. § 542 11, 16, 19 |\n| 11 U.S.C. § 544 1 |\n| 11 U.S.C. § 548 1, 21 |\n| 11 U.S.C. § 549 1, 24, 25, 26 |\n\nLuc A. Despins, in his capacity as the chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") appointed in the chapter 11 case of Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"), by and through his undersigned counsel, hereby files this objection (the \"Objection\") to the *Joint Defendants' Omnibus Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss or For Judgment on the Pleadings* [Docket No. 3713] (the \"Joint Motion\").2 In support of this Objection, the Trustee respectfully states as follows:\n\n### **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\n1. This Court has already ruled that the Alter Ego Entities3 are alter egos of the Debtor and that their assets are, and always were, property of the Debtor—which makes those assets property of the estate. In addition, it is black-letter law that the Trustee's avoidance actions under sections 544, 548, and 549 of the Bankruptcy Code allow the Trustee to avoid and recover transfers of property of the estate. The Joint Defendants dispute none of this.\n\n2. Instead, the Joint Defendants assemble a variety of procedural and legal theories to attack the rulings the Court has already made. Procedurally, they claim that the Court's prior rulings do not preclude them from re-litigating the issues the Court decided in those rulings because they occurred in adversary proceedings to which the Joint Defendants were not named parties. But courts, including this one, have repeatedly affirmed that the law of the case doctrine applies across adversary proceedings brought under the umbrella of the same bankruptcy case especially where the precluded parties had notice that the legal questions at issue would be litigated. Here, the Joint Defendants were on notice that the Trustee was asserting alter ego status for the Alter Ego Entities and chose not to seek intervention in those proceedings.\n\n2 Capitalized terms used but not otherwise defined herein shall have the meaning given to such terms in the Joint Motion.\n\n3 For the purposes of the Joint Motion and this Objection, the \"Alter Ego Entities\" are, collectively, (i) Lamp Capital LLC, (ii) Golden Spring (New York) Ltd., (iii) HCHK Technologies, Inc., (iv) HCHK Property Management, Inc., (v) Lexington Property & Staffing, Inc., and (vi) Greenwich Land LLC.\n\n3. Even if the Court were to address the merits of the Joint Defendants' arguments, those arguments should be rejected. The Joint Defendants rely on three primary legal theories, each of which is fatally flawed.\n\n4. First, they assert that the Court's earlier rulings were mistaken because Delaware law precludes reverse veil piercing that could harm potentially innocent third-party creditors. This argument fails on multiple levels. For one, the Joint Defendants' purported \"innocence\" is a question of fact that does not appear on the face of the Trustee's complaints and therefore cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss or a motion for judgment on the pleadings. In any event, Delaware law does not provide that the potential harm to third parties is a dispositive factor on a reverse veil-piercing claim. Instead, it is just one of the factors courts consider, and it carries less weight in a bankruptcy context, where the entire creditor body must be treated equally and the Joint Defendants are able to assert claims against the estate. The most important factor in the veil-piercing analysis is not the potential harm to innocent third parties, but rather the abuse of the corporate form. Here, that abuse is extreme, as the Debtor has used countless shell companies to harm literally thousands of creditors and victims and to hide unfathomable wealth. The Joint Defendants would have this Court rule that it is without recourse to address this simply because those shell companies did business with potentially innocent third parties. Delaware law does not countenance, let alone require, such a result.\n\n5. Second, the Joint Defendants attack the Court's prior rulings based on their argument that even if Delaware law does permit reverse veil-piercing of the Alter Ego Entities, it would only impose \"vicarious liability\" on those entities and would not make their assets property of the estate. This, they say, would defeat the Trustee's avoidance actions because transfers at issue would not have involved \"property of the estate.\" This argument is flawed at\n\nthe outset because Delaware's underlying theory of alter ego law does not control what is, and is not, property of the estate under section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code. In determining what constitutes property of the estate, a bankruptcy court will look to the characteristics of an asset as determined by state law but will not be bound by the state law's characterization of the asset; whether the asset's *characteristics* ultimately result in a ruling that the asset is \"property of the estate\" is a matter of federal law. Stated simply, state law determines whether the Alter Ego Entities are alter egos of the Debtor. But, once that determination has been made, bankruptcy law determines whether the assets of the Alter Ego Entities are property of the estate.4\n\n6. In any event, the Joint Defendants are wrong in asserting that Delaware adopts the so-called \"vicarious liability\" theory of alter ego law. As shown below, Delaware courts, including the Delaware Supreme Court, have repeatedly endorsed what the Joint Defendants call the \"identity theory\" of alter ego law, which does merge the assets (and, indeed, the very entities) when one entity is the alter ego of another. For this reason, courts applying Delaware law have consistently upheld fraudulent transfer claims based on alter ego status.\n\n7. Third, the Joint Defendants assert that even if the Court was correct that reverse veil piercing is available, and even if the Court was correct that the consequence of the Court's earlier alter ego rulings is that the Alter Ego Entities' assets are property of the estate, that consequence can only apply prospectively, from the date of those alter ego rulings. Any other outcome, they argue, would be impermissible *nunc pro tunc* relief. But the Court's prior rulings did not rely on *nunc pro tunc* relief, and neither do the Trustee's avoidance actions. *Nunc pro tunc* is a legal fiction that, in essence, rewrites history and, therefore, is appropriate only in\n\n4 Also flawed is the Joint Defendants' argument that the relief the Trustee seeks can only be obtained in bankruptcy via substantive consolidation. The Trustee is not seeking substantive consolidation at this time because the relief he seeks is available through a reverse veil-piercing claim.\n\nlimited circumstances. An alter ego ruling, however, does the exact opposite. As courts have repeatedly explained, an alter ego ruling enforces the *legal truth* that the pierced entity is, *and always was*, indistinguishable from the dominant entity or person. The alter ego doctrine does not *create* a legal fiction; it *undoes* a legal fiction.\n\n8. For all these reasons, and those discussed below, the Court should reaffirm its prior holdings, reject the Joint Defendants' arguments, and deny their Motion.\n\n#### **OBJECTION**\n\n9. The Joint Defendants argue that (i) neither collateral estoppel nor law of the case applies to the Court's prior rulings regarding the Alter Ego Entities; (ii) Delaware law precludes reverse veil piercing as applied to the Alter Ego Entities; (iii) the Trustee's avoidance actions fail because, under Delaware law, the assets of an alter ego (here, the Alter Ego Entities) are not treated as the assets of the dominant entity or person (here, the Debtor), and the Trustee is not seeking substantive consolidation; and (iv) even if the Alter Ego Entities' are treated as the Debtor's assets, such treatment applies only a prospective basis. These arguments are either wrong or irrelevant, or both.\n\n### **I. Law of the Case Defeats the Joint Motion**\n\n10. The Court has already ruled that (i) Delaware law allows reverse veil piercing of the Alter Ego Entities and (ii) the assets of the Alter Ego Entities are, and always were, property of the estate. The law of the case doctrine now precludes their arguments to the contrary.5\n\n11. Law of the case is a discretionary rule providing that, when a court issues a decision, \"that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the\n\n5 The Joint Defendants also spend almost four pages arguing that they are not collaterally estopped from asserting their various arguments. *See* Joint Mot. at 30-33. This discussion is irrelevant, as the Trustee has not asserted collateral estoppel or issue preclusion.\n\nsame case.\" *Pescatore v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.*, 97 F.3d 1, 7 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting *DiLaura v. Power Auth.*, 982 F.2d 73, 76 (2d Cir.1992)). The doctrine \"developed to maintain consistency and avoid reconsideration of matters once decided during the course of a single continuing lawsuit.\" *In re 477 W. 142nd St. Hous., Dev. Fund Corp.*, No. 15-12178 (SHL), 2020 WL 3067733, at \\*12 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2020) (quoting *In re PCH Assoc.*, 949 F.2d 585, 592 (2d Cir. 1991)). Courts apply law of the case when their prior decisions either expressly resolved an issue or necessarily resolved it by implication. *See Aramony v. United Way of Am.*, 254 F.3d 403, 410 (2d Cir. 2001).\n\n12. The Joint Defendants focus on the fact that they were not parties to the Alter Ego Adversaries. But courts in the Second Circuit have repeatedly held that, in bankruptcy, the law of the-case doctrine applies to different adversary proceedings filed within the same main case. Indeed, this Court has already ruled that \"it is not essential to law of the case that the parties before the court were involved in the previous litigation.\"6 *See also In re Motors Liquidation Co.*, 590 B.R. 39, 62 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (\"[C]ourts have held that the law-of-the-case doctrine applies to different adversary proceedings filed within the same main bankruptcy case.\") (quotation marks omitted); *Krakowski v. Am. Airlines, Inc.*, 610 B.R. 714, 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2019), *aff'd sub nom. In re AMR Corp.*, 834 F. App'x 660 (2d Cir. 2021) (\"Although *Krakowski I* is, of course, a different adversary proceeding than the one now before the court, '[c]ourts have held that the law-of-the-case doctrine applies to different adversary proceedings filed within the same main bankruptcy case.\"); *In re Moise*, 575 B.R. 191, 205 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2017) (same); *Sec.*\n\n6 *Memorandum of Decision and Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment*, at 20 (Adv. Proc. No. 23-5005, July 2, 2024) [Docket No. 133].\n\n*Inv. Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC*, 603 B.R. 682 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019) (applying law of the case from prior rulings against new parties making same arguments).\n\n13. *Motors Liquidation* is particularly instructive because, in that case, the court specifically held that one of the defendants—the only one who plausibly had not been involved in the broader bankruptcy case—was still bound by law of the case because, even though she did not participate in the prior proceeding, she had notice that the issue she wished to litigate would be litigated in the prior proceeding. *Motors Liquidation*, 590 B.R. at 66-67. The Joint Defendants here were similarly on notice that the alter ego rulings they now wish to challenge were being litigated in the Alter Ego Adversaries, which were identified in the respective complaints served on the Joint Defendants, yet they chose not to seek to intervene in those proceedings.7 The Joint Defendants are, therefore, bound by the Court's prior rulings.8\n\n### **II. Joint Defendants' Alleged \"Innocence\" Does Not Preclude Reverse Veil-Piercing**\n\n14. The Joint Defendants argue that Delaware law imposes an absolute limitation on reverse veil piercing, prohibiting application of the doctrine if doing so would harm \"innocent third-party creditors.\"9 This argument is premature and, in any event, wrong on the law.\n\n7 There are six Alter Ego Entities. The Court entered its alter ego ruling regarding HCHK Technologies, Inc., HCHK Property Management, Inc., Lexington Property & Staffing, Inc., on June 24, 2024, *see Amended Default Judgment and Permanent Injunction* (Adv. Proc. No. 23-05013, June 24, 2024) [Docket No. 297], and entered its ruling regarding Greenwich Land LLC on July 2, 2024, *see Summary Judgment* (Adv. Proc. No. 23- 05005, July 2, 2024) [Docket No. 134]. The complaints naming the Joint Defendants were all filed between February 9-14, 2024, months before these alter ego rulings, and they each referenced, and made clear that the Trustee's avoidance actions were predicated on, ownership of the assets of the Alter Ego Entities as sought in the relevant underlying Alter Ego Adversary. Furthermore, any Joint Defendant that reviewed the dockets in those adversary proceedings would have understood that the Trustee was asserting that the relevant entity's assets were, and always were, property of the Debtor. Moreover, the Joint Defendants' own exhibit demonstrates that **35 of the 38** of the Joint Defendants received transfers from at least one of HCHK Technologies, Inc., HCHK Property Management, Inc., Lexington Property & Staffing, Inc., or Greenwich Land LLC.\n\n8 The *Motors Liquidation* court specifically addressed, and rejected, the defendant's reliance on *In re Schultz*, 250 B.R. 22 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2000), which the Joint Defendants also cite. *See* Joint Mot. at 33-34.\n\n9 Joint Mot. at 10.\n\n### **a. Joint Defendants' Alleged \"Innocence\" and Purported Potential Harm Are Premature Issues of Fact**\n\n15. In deciding a motion to dismiss or a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court's review is limited to the allegations contained on the face of the pleadings. *See Newman & Schwartz v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co.,* 102 F.3d 660, 662 (2d Cir. 1996) (reversing grant of motion to dismiss where \"district court improperly relied upon information outside of the four corners of N & S's complaint\"). The court's decision in *Manichaean Cap., LLC v. Exela Techs., Inc.*, 251 A.3d 694, 710 (Del. Ch. 2021), is instructive. There, the defendants, which included an entity above the dominating entity and the alleged alter ego entities, argued that the alleged alter ego entities—the indirect subsidiaries of the dominating parent entity—were the \"primary obligors on certain debt\" above the level of the dominating parent entity, and \"those debt holders [of the entity above the dominating parent entity] will be prejudiced if [the dominant entity's] judgment creditors can hold those subsidiaries liable.\" *Manichaean*, 251 A.3d at 718. The court rejected this argument, holding there was \"no basis in the Complaint to infer that reverse veilpiercing will cause harm to innocent third-party creditors,\" and that, at the motion to dismiss stage, the court's \"analysis is confined to the 'four corners' of that pleading\" (*i.e.*, the complaint). *Id*. Here, any assertion that the Joint Defendants are \"innocent\" is an issue of fact residing outside the four corners of the complaints, and, thus, it is irrelevant at this stage.10\n\n16. Also not subject to consideration at this time is the extent to which the Joint Defendants will be harmed, if at all, by the Trustee's claims, even assuming the Joint Defendants are \"innocent.\" While the Trustee seeks to recover funds from the Joint Defendants (specifically, the payments they received from the Debtor's alter egos), they will not necessarily suffer harm in\n\n10 To be clear, the Trustee does not concede that the Joint Defendants were \"innocent\" in receiving the transfers at issue in the complaints, and the Trustee reserves all rights in response to such arguments.\n\nthe amount of such recovery, because the Joint Defendants would have the opportunity following a successful avoidance action to assert claims against the Debtor's estate under section 502(h) of the Bankruptcy Code. *See* 11 U.S.C. § 502(h) (\"A claim rising from the recovery of property under section . . . 550 . . . of this title shall be determined, and shall be allowed under subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section, or disallowed under subsection (d) or (e) of this section, the same as if such claim had arisen before the date of the filing of the petition\").11\n\n17. By seeking to dismiss the Trustee's claims now, and thereby avoid the need to ever potentially assert section 502(h) claims, the Joint Defendants seek to elevate themselves above all other creditors just because they (allegedly) had no notice they were dealing with a sham entity. But courts have rejected this very argument, especially in bankruptcy. In *In re Mass*, 178 B.R. 626 (M.D. Pa. 1995), the defendant argued that \"piercing the corporate veil in this case is inappropriate because it is an 'innocent' third party harmed by transferring the accounts funds to the debtors' estate.\" *Id*. at 630. Affirming the bankruptcy court, the district court rejected this argument, explaining that the bankruptcy court's order aided \"all creditors of the bankruptcy estate\" and the defendant \"should not enjoy a preferential treatment as the only business creditor to have contracted with a sham corporation.\" *Id*. at 630-31.\n\n#### **b. Reverse Veil-Piercing Implicates a Balancing Test Aimed to Prevent Fraud**\n\n18. Even assuming that the Joint Defendants are \"innocent\" parties who will be harmed by reverse veil-piercing, and that it would be appropriate for the Court to consider such an argument at this stage, the Trustee's claims remain valid. When reviewing a reverse veil-\n\n11 To be clear, long before the Joint Defendants raised their purported fairness concerns, the Trustee advised the Court, at the February 27, 2024, status conference, that the bar date would need to be re-opened at a later date to give additional parties (including creditors of alter ego entities) the ability to assert claims against the estate. *See* Feb. 27, 2024 Hr'g Tr. at 22:7-22. A copy of the relevant excerpts of the February 27, 2024 Hearing Transcript is attached hereto as **Exhibit 1**.\n\npiercing claim, a court applying Delaware law will consider several factors to determine whether the corporate form is being used \"to perpetuate fraud or an injustice.\" *Manichaean*, 251 A.3d at 714-15. The \"extent to which the reverse pierce will harm innocent third-party creditors of the entity the plaintiff seeks to reach\" is only one of those factors. *Id.* at 715. It is not, as the Joint Defendants allege, a dispositive factor that overrides all other considerations.\n\n19. The Court of Chancery's decision in *Manichaean* is explicit on this point, explaining that \"[t]he risks that reverse veil-piercing may be used as a blunt instrument to harm innocent parties, and to disrupt the expectations of arms-length bargaining, while real, do not, in [the court's] view, justify the rejection of reverse veil-piercing outright.\" *Id.* at 712. Reverse veil piercing under Delaware law, therefore, views the impact on third parties as one factor in a balancing test. *See In re Petters Co., Inc.*, 561 B.R. 738, 754 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2016) (analyzing Delaware and Minnesota law and concluding \"impact on creditors which would result from piercing the corporate veil … does not on its face outweigh the other equitable considerations implicated by the alleged facts\"). In fact, the single most important factor is whether the corporate form is being used improperly. *See Sky Cable, LLC v. DIRECTV, Inc.*, 886 F.3d 375, 387 (4th Cir. 2018) (\"[I]n Delaware, disregarding the corporate fiction *can always be done* if necessary to prevent fraud or chicanery\") (quotation marks omitted); *see also Petters*, 561 B.R. at 752 (\"Delaware is a chartering jurisdiction, and therefore has strong policy reasons to prevent Delaware corporations from being used as vehicles for fraud.\").\n\n20. If reverse veil-piercing were not available whenever a third party might suffer harm from its application, the doctrine would become ineffective against the very wrongs it is designed to remedy. As noted above , in *In re Mass*, the district court focused on this very concern, holding that piercing the veil aided \"all creditors of the bankruptcy estate,\" and noting\n\nthe defendant \"should not enjoy a preferential treatment as the only business creditor to have contracted with a sham corporation.\" *Mass*, 178 B.R. at 630-31. As another court explained, failure to employ reverse veil piercing would \"seriously upset\" the \"balance of remedies between Debtor and his creditors\" and allow the debtor \"to shelter a past transfer of personal resources into an artificial entity,\" which would \"allow a legal fiction—the facade of the family corporation—to triumph over substance.\" *In re Schuster*, 132 B.R. 604, 612 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991).\n\n21. *The Joint Defendants here seek this same inequitable result by asking the Court to effectively bless the Debtor's worldwide fraudulent scheme that harmed hundreds (if not thousands) of creditors and victims, allowing the Debtor and his family to live a truly extravagant lifestyle***.** The Joint Defendants do not deny, nor can they, that the Debtor perpetuated his scheme through rampant abuse of the corporate form—indeed the Debtor's wellestablished maze of hundreds of shell companies, including Delaware entities, was a focal point of the criminal trial that led to his conviction on federal fraud charges. Instead, the Joint Defendants ask the Court to believe that Delaware law is without any recourse for such an extreme abuse of the corporate form and would sanction a global fraud of this nature merely because some potentially innocent third parties did business with the Alter Ego Entities. This is simply not the law, as \"Delaware will not countenance the use of the corporate form as a means to facilitate fraud or injustice.\" *Manichaean*, 251 A.3d at 713. Accordingly, the Joint Defendants' argument must be rejected.\n\n### **III. Assets of Alter Ego Entities Are Estate Property**\n\n22. The Joint Defendants' argument that a chapter 11 trustee cannot avoid transfers made by a debtor's alter ego rests on their jurisprudential theory dividing alter ego law into two\n\nschools of thought: the \"vicarious liability\" theory and the \"identity\" theory. In this dichotomy, according to the Joint Defendants, assets of an alter ego are treated as the assets of the dominant entity or person only in those states that subscribe to the identity theory. In states that adopt the vicarious liability theory, they say, an alter ego ruling only imposes vicarious liability on the dominant entity or person and has no impact on ownership of the pierced entity's assets. According to the Joint Defendants, Delaware follows the vicarious liability approach.\n\n23. This argument fails for two reasons. First, the rigid distinction the Joint Defendants rely on is both illusory and inconsequential, especially in bankruptcy court, where the assets of an alter ego are treated as property of the estate *as a matter of bankruptcy law*. Second, even if the distinction existed and was important, Delaware law follows the identity theory, not the vicarious liability theory.\n\n### **a. Property of Estate Is Matter of Federal Bankruptcy Law, Not State Law**\n\n24. As the Joint Defendants acknowledge, this Court has already explained that once there is an alter ego or veil piercing ruling, \"[i]n conjunction with sections 541 and 542, alter ego thus accomplishes the transfer of assets into the bankruptcy estate.\"12 The Joint Defendants challenge this ruling, asserting that the Court failed to \"discuss how this claim of vicarious liability mutates 'in conjunction with 541 and 542' to become assets of the Debtor.\"13 Attempting to bolster their challenge, they cite a series of cases, including *Butner v. U.S.*, 440 U.S. 48 (1979), for the proposition that property interests are created and defined by state law.\n\n12 Joint Mot. at 18 (quoting *Memorandum of Decision and Order Granting Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Second Counterclaim*, at 25 (Adv. Pro. No. 22-05003, May 18, 2023) [Docket No. 222]).\n\n13 *Id*. As explained above, this ruling is law of the case, and the Joint Defendants cannot now challenge that ruling simply because they believe the Court did not sufficiently explain its prior ruling.\n\nThey further argue that, therefore, the consequence of a bankruptcy court's alter ego ruling is also governed by state law.\n\n25. The Joint Defendants fundamentally misunderstand *Butner* and fail to understand that what constitutes property of the estate \"is a matter of federal law,\" and bankruptcy courts applying federal law are not bound by the \"label that state law affixes to a particular interest.\" *In re The Ground Round, Inc.*, 482 F.3d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 2007) (as modified) (liquor license was property of the estate notwithstanding state law characterization as privilege, not property); *see also In re Chardon, LLC,* 519 B.R. 211, 217 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014) (what constitutes property of the debtor \"is a matter of federal bankruptcy law regardless of how the state characterizes the actual legal ownership of the property\") (quoting *Matter of Pentell*, 777 F.2d 1281, 1284 n.2 (7th Cir. 1985)).\n\n26. This is entirely consistent with *Butner*, in which the Supreme Court famously declared that \"[p]roperty interests are created and defined by state law.\" *Butner*, 440 U.S. at 55. As the Sixth Circuit has explained, and as *Butner* instructs, the \"nature and extent of property rights in bankruptcy are determined by the underlying substantive law.\" *Nicole Gas Prod., Ltd.*, 916 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). But \"once that determination is made, federal bankruptcy law dictates to what extent that interest is property of the estate for purposes of § 541.\" *Id.* (cleaned up). *See also In re Nejberger*, 934 F.2d 1300, 1302 (3d Cir. 1991) (\"while state law creates legal interests and defines their incidents, the ultimate question whether an interest thus created and defined falls within a category stated by a Federal statute, requires an interpretation of that statute, which is a Federal question\") (as modified).\n\n27. Accordingly, a bankruptcy court looks to the *characteristics* of an asset as determined by state law but is not bound by how state law *characterizes* that asset; whether its\n\nstate law *characteristics* ultimately result in *characterization* as \"property of the estate\" is a matter of federal law. Applied here, Delaware law determines whether the Alter Ego Entities are alter egos of the Debtor. But, once that determination has been made, bankruptcy law determines whether the assets of the Alter Ego Entities are property of the estate. *See In re Commodore Business Machines, Inc.*, 180 B.R. 72, 78 n.8 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) (\"Once the nature and extent of debtor's interest in the property is determined, federal bankruptcy law dictates the extent to which the property is property of the estate.\"). Other courts have held similarly. *See, e.g.*, *In re Terwilliger's Catering Plus, Inc.*, 911 F.2d 1168, 1172 (6th Cir. 1990) (\"While the nature and extent of the debtor's interest are determined by state law once that determination is made, federal bankruptcy law dictates to what extent that interest is property of the estate.\") (internal quotations omitted); *In re N.S. Garrott & Sons*, 772 F.2d 462, 466 (8th Cir. 1985) (\"The nature and extent of the debtor's interest in property are determined by state law. [] Property rights under section 541 are defined by state law. *Butner v. United States*, 440 U.S. 48, 55, 99 S.Ct. 914, 918, 59 L.Ed.2d 136 (1979). However, once that determination is made, federal bankruptcy law dictates to what extent that interest is property of the estate.\"); *In re Burgess*, 234 B.R. 793, 797 (D. Nev. 1999) (\"[W]hile state law creates the right, federal law determines whether it is 'property' for purposes of the federal bankruptcy laws, tax laws, etc.\").\n\n28. *In re Yerushalmi*, 487 B.R. 98 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2012) is on point. In that case, the trustee asserted that a specific trust (the \"QPRT\") was the debtor's alter ego. Pointing to state law, the defendants argued that the alter ego claim was barred by New York's statute of limitations. *Id.* at 107. The court explained that addressing the limitations defense required it to \"examine the nature of the Trustee's claim under section 541.\" *Id.* at 107-08. The trustee was not suing to \"hold the QPRT liable for the obligations of the Debtor,\" *id*., but instead sought \"a\n\ndeclaratory judgment that the QPRT is the alter ego of the Debtor. The consequence of such a determination would be that the Trustee is entitled to demand turnover of the assets held by the QPRT because those assets are property of the estate under section 541.\" *Id.* at 108. Because the \"Trustee's action [was] equitable in nature\" and brought under section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, state law limitations periods did not apply: \"The facts of this case—that is, a bankruptcy trustee seeking to recover estate assets on an alter ego theory—are distinguishable from nonbankruptcy alter ego cases pursued by and for the benefit of individual creditors seeking to hold an alter ego liable for the obligations of another.\" *Id*.\n\n29. *In re Star Mountain Res., Inc.*, No. 2:18-BK-01594-DPC, 2022 WL 2294175 (Bankr. D. Ariz. June 22, 2022) (subsequent history omitted), also distinguishes between alter ego claims outside of bankruptcy and those brought by brought by a bankruptcy trustee. \"An alter ego claim has a different effect in the bankruptcy context than in the traditional civil trial setting, where a specific creditor brings a judgment against the alleged alter ego. An alter ego finding in bankruptcy is more similar to substantive consolidation, bringing the assets of the alter ego into the debtor's estate to be shared collectively with the debtor's creditors.\" *Id.* at \\*7, n.86.14 *Star Mountain* and *In re Yerushalmi*, therefore, expressly reject the Joint Defendants' invocation of state law as governing the consequences of an alter ego ruling.\n\n14 This does not mean, as the Joint Defendants argue, that the \"nature of the alter ego relief sought by the Trustee is akin to the equitable remedy of substantive consolidation\" and that the body of law governing substantive consolidation, therefore, governs the Trustee's avoidance actions against the Joint Defendants. Joint Mot. at 21. To the contrary, the *Star Mountain* court also explained that \"substantive consolidation is distinguishable from state law alter ego claims\" and \"the analysis for substantive consolidation is more involved than the analysis for an alter ego finding.\" 2022 WL 2294175, at \\*7. In other words (i) an alter ego claim brought by a bankruptcy trustee has an effect similar to substantive consolidation, but (ii) it is not governed by the same legal standards. In any event, the Trustee believes that he could meet the substantive consolidation standard if he ever sought such relief.\n\n30. Other courts have also held—as this Court did—that the consequence of an alter ego determination is that the assets of the alter ego are considered property of the estate. For example, in *In re Blatstein* certain creditors (joined by the trustee) had commenced an adversary proceeding asking \"the bankruptcy court to reverse pierce the veils of [certain] corporations so as to bring their assets into the bankruptcy estates.\" *In re Blatstein*, 192 F.3d 88, 92 (3d Cir. 1999). On appeal, the Third Circuit held that it had jurisdiction because \"[f]irst and foremost, this appeal concerns identifying assets of Blatstein's estate.\" *Id.* at 95. The court explained that a determination that \"the Blatsteins' corporations are his alter ego, *would result in the inclusion in his bankruptcy estate of substantial assets*.\" *Id.* (emphasis added). In *In re 10th Ave. Rec. Distributors, Inc.*, 97 B.R. 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), the trustee sought a declaratory judgment that the \"alleged separate corporate existence of Bate and 10th Avenue should be disregarded, and their assets and liabilities are to be considered assets and liabilities of the estate of 10th Avenue.\" *Id.* at 164. The court held that the trustee had standing to assert this claim, as the \"trustee's alter ego cause of action here is *without doubt an attempt to collect property of the estate*.\" *Id.* at 166 (emphasis added).15 Even the Joint Defendants' own cases agree, explaining that \"by piercing the corporate veil, the party proves that the two entities legally are the same, not two different entities. Therefore, they are not really debtor and non-debtor, but one.\" *In re Pearlman*, 462 B.R. 849, 855 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012). *See also In re Harry C. Partridge Jr. & Sons, Inc.*, 112 B.R. 593, 594 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (denying motion to dismiss where trustee alleged\n\n15 *In re 10th Avenue* was recently cited approvingly by the Second Circuit in *In re Nordlicht*, 115 F.4th 90, 109 (2d Cir. 2024), which affirmed that alter ego claims can be brought by a bankruptcy trustee. *Nordlicht* also cited the Second Circuit's earlier ruling in *St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. PepsiCo, Inc.*, 884 F.2d 688, 701 (2d Cir. 1989)—which ruling also demonstrates that an alter ego's assets are property of the estate. *See St. Paul*, 884 F.2d at 695 (noting that \"should the bankruptcy plaintiffs prevail on their alter ego claim, this property *would become property of the estate*, insofar as Banner would be liable for CL's obligations\" (emphasis added)) and at 701 (alter ego claims \"are claims regarding the transfer of property *to* the estate\" and \"proceedings *having the effect of bringing property into the estate* of the debtor are core proceedings\" (emphasis added)).\n\n\"defendant corporation is the alter ego of the debtor corporations, with the result that the Broome Street property should be regarded as property of the debtors' estates for turnover purpose\"); *In re Concepcion*, No. 13-09126, 2017 WL 1076325, at \\*6 (Bankr. D.P.R. Mar. 21, 2017) (granting summary judgment on alter ego and ordering that \"assets of the trust revert to the Bankruptcy Estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541 and § 542\").\n\n31. *In re Deckelbaum v. Cooter, Mangold, Tompert & Chapman, P.L.L.C.*, 275 B.R. 737, 742 (D. Md. 2001), also points specifically to section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code. There, the court noted that three courts had already held that various entities were alter egos of the debtor, and, \"[u]nder the broad definition of estate property set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 541, the property of Dunhill, as Debtor's alter ego, should be treated as if it were in fact the property of Debtor's estate.\" *Id*. The court concluded that, therefore, transfers made by the alter ego were transfers of property of the estate. *Id*.\n\n32. In *In re Palmieri*, 651 B.R. 349 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2023), the trustee brought a fraudulent transfer claim asserting that a certain property was fraudulently transferred by the debtor. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the transfer was actually made by a non-debtor entity. *Id.* at 357. The court rejected this argument, noting that the defendants \"seem to ignore the crux of the complaint.\" *Id*. This was because the trustee alleged that the non-debtor entity that made the transfer was the debtor's alter ego \"and that, as such, the [property] never left the bankruptcy estate.\" *Id*. The court ultimately denied the motion to dismiss, holding the alleged facts were sufficient to state a claim. The court concluded by explaining that \"[i]f the Court ultimately finds in favor of the Trustee on his claim, the inescapable conclusion will be that the Debtor owned the [Property] when it was transferred to\n\n[the alleged alter ego] and that, as such, the property was a part of the bankruptcy estate at that time.\" *Id.* at 358.\n\n33. *In re Adler*, 494 B.R. 43 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2013) also addressed the consequences of an alter ego ruling. In that case, the bankruptcy court issued a \"Decision after Trial\" to determine \"the consequences of the Court's earlier determination that the Corporations are, and in fact always were, the Debtor's alter egos.\" *Id.* at 53. The court identified two consequences. First, because \"the Debtor and the alter ego Corporations were at all relevant times one and the same entity,\" the automatic stay applied. *Id*. Second, the court addressed the application of the debtor's disclosure requirements under the Bankruptcy Code in light of the alter ego ruling:\n\n[A]s a result of the alter ego finding, the Debtor's failure to disclose information regarding the assets and transactions of the Corporations was simultaneously a failure to disclose the assets and transactions of the Debtor. By definition, an alter ego corporation possesses no independent volition. Consequently, since the Debtor's Corporations were found to have been such prepetition alter egos, the Debtor always remained inseparable from those five corporate fictions. *The actions and property of the Corporations were thus the actions and property of the Debtor*, and it was incumbent upon the Debtor to disclose details regarding the Corporations' conduct, assets, and records in his individual bankruptcy case. *When he failed to do this and instead concealed the Corporations' assets, the Debtor improperly \"concealed\" his own assets*….\n\n*In re Adler*, 494 B.R. at 53 (emphasis added).16\n\n34. Notably, none of these cases (*Adler*, *Palmieri, Deckelbaum*, *Blatstein*, *10th*\n\n*Avenue*, *Star Mountain*, and *Yerushalmi*) makes any reference to any potential distinction between the identity and vicarious liability theories of alter ego law under the relevant state law applied by those courts. Instead, the consequence of an alter ego determination is to bring the\n\n16 The Joint Defendants cite to *Pavers & Rd. Builders Dist. Council Welfare Fund v. Core Contracting of N.Y., LLC*, 536 B.R. 48, 51 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2015), which disagreed with *Adler* and held that the automatic stay did not apply to an alter ego because the alter ego did not become a debtor. But *Pavers* does not cite section 541 or 542 of the Bankruptcy Code, does not cite any authority for its ruling, and does not address the significant body of case law to the contrary.\n\nassets of the alter ego into the estate as a matter of bankruptcy law, regardless of the label attached to the property by state law.\n\n35. This absence of any such discussion is particularly pronounced in the rulings related to the Supreme Court's opinion in *Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif*, 575 U.S. 665, 668, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1938, 191 L. Ed. 2d 911 (2015). In that case, the debtor, Sharif, was liable to Wellness for a large, prepetition, judgment. When Sharif filed for bankruptcy, Wellness commenced an adversary proceeding, count V of which \"sought a declaratory judgment that [a certain trust] was Sharif's alter ego and that its assets should therefore be treated as part of Sharif's bankruptcy estate.\" *Wellness*, 575 U.S. at 672. The bankruptcy court \"declared, as requested by count V of Wellness' complaint, that the assets supposedly held by the Trust were in fact property of Sharif's bankruptcy estate.\" *Id*. 17\n\n36. In sum, courts have treated the consequence of an alter ego ruling as one made under bankruptcy law, for which they routinely invoke sections 541 and 542 of the Bankruptcy Code. Persuasive Supreme Court authority supports this view. To the extent that the Joint Defendants have identified non-binding, out of circuit, authority holding otherwise,18 the Trustee respectfully submits that the Court should decline to follow those rulings.\n\n17 The defendant in *Wellness* appealed the issue of the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to issue a final judgment in the adversary proceeding, and that appeal eventually went to the Supreme Court. Although the majority in *Wellness* declined to address the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to resolve alter ego claims, Chief Justice Roberts (who had authored the majority opinion in *Stern v. Marshall*, 564 U.S. 462, 499, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2618, 180 L. Ed. 2d 475 (2011), authored a dissent that directly addressed that question. According to the Chief Justice, \"[d]efining what constitutes the estate is the necessary starting point of every bankruptcy; a court cannot divide up the estate without first knowing what's in it.\" *Id.* at 691-92. \"Identifying the property of the estate,\" he wrote, \"is therefore inescapably central to the restructuring of the debtor-creditor relationship.\" *Id.* at 692. In other words, what qualifies as property of the estate under section 541 is not simply a bankruptcy issue. It is the core issue of every bankruptcy case and stems directly from the bankruptcy itself. Certainly, then, the question of whether an alter ego determination results in assets becoming property of the estate is a federal question.\n\n18 The Joint Defendants rely heavily on the Sixth Circuit's unpublished decision in *In re Howland*, 674 F. App'x 482 (6th Cir. 2017) and subsequent cases from within that circuit (*In re DuMouchelle*, 2023 8100234 and *In re Silver*, 647 B.R. 897 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2022), as well as two cases from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for\n\n#### **b. Delaware Does Not Follow Vicarious Liability Theory of Alter Ego Law**\n\n37. Even if state law, not bankruptcy law, controls the question of whether the Alter Ego Entities' assets are property of the estate, the Joint Defendants are wrong that Delaware law rigidly follows the vicarious liability approach. Case law proves otherwise.\n\n38. For example, in *In re Palmieri*, discussed above, the trustee sought to avoid a transfer made by an entity that was, nominally, a non-debtor. The court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that if the trustee could successfully prove reverse veil piercing, the \"inescapable conclusion [would] be\" that the debtor owned the assets of the non-debtor. *Palmieri*, 651 B.R. at 358. Critically, the court specified that because the nominal non-debtor entity was a Delaware entity, \"Delaware law govern[ed] whether reverse veil-piercing is appropriate.\" *Id.* at 357. The court's ruling is consistent with the Trustee's position that once a bankruptcy court determines that the two entities at issue have the characteristics of alter ego under state law, the question of \"property of the estate\" is a bankruptcy law issue. Alternatively, it is also consistent with the Trustee's position that, even if state law controls, Delaware law does not strictly follow the vicarious liability theory of alter ego law.\n\n39. Moreover, contrary to the Joint Defendants' arguments, *Spring Real Est., LLC v. Echo/RT Holdings, LLC*, No. CV 7994-VCN, 2016 WL 769586, at \\*2 (Del. Ch. Feb. 18, 2016), also applies Delaware law. In that case, the trustee sought to avoid a transfer made by one of the debtor's wholly owned subsidiaries; the trustee brought two claims: one under Delaware's fraudulent transfer statute, the second under Illinois' fraudulent transfer statute. *Id.* at \\*2. The\n\nthe Ninth Circuit, *In re RS Air, LLC*, 651 B.R. 538 and *In re Wardle*, No. ADV.S-03-01467, 2006 WL 6811026 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Jan. 31, 2006). As noted above, the Joint Defendants also cite to *Pavers & Rd. Builders*, 536 B.R. 48, which, while in the Second Circuit, is not binding on this Court. To the extent these cases adopt the rigid distinction proposed by the Joint Defendants and hold that this state law issue overrides the federal question of \"what is property of the estate under section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code,\" the Trustee respectfully submits that they are wrongly decided.\n\ncourt held that, under principles of corporate separateness, the debtor owned the subsidiary but did not own its assets, precluding the fraudulent transfer claims. *Id.* at \\*3. The court explained that there is \"[o]ne exception\" to this rule: \"where the subsidiary is a mere alter ego of the parent to the extent that the Court may engage in 'reverse veil-veil piercing,' the Court may treat the assets of the subsidiary as those of the parent for purposes of a trustee's standing to void allegedly fraudulent transfers of such assets.\" *Id*.\n\n40. To support this proposition, the court cited *In re Am. Int'l Refinery*, 402 B.R. 728, 741 (Bankr. W.D. La. 2008) (\"*American International Refinery*\"). The Joint Defendants assert that because *American International Refinery* applied Nevada law, *Spring Real Estate* is not authority for Delaware law.19 This borders on the absurd. As noted, *Spring Real Estate* decided claims brought under Delaware and Illinois law; Nevada law had no relevance.20 Furthermore, the *Spring Real Estate* court denied the trustee's claims because the trustee did not allege that the subsidiary was the debtor's alter ego and, thus, failed to even invoke the \"one exception\" to corporate separateness that could have rescued its claims. In support of this conclusion, the court specifically cited \"*Delaware* public policy,\" which \"does not lightly disregard the separate legal existence of corporations.\" *Id.* at \\*3, n.35 (emphasis added). Accordingly, even a cursory reading of the opinion demonstrates that the court cited *American International Refinery* to support a proposition that the court believe existed under Delaware and Illinois law—*not* because the decision involved principles of Nevada law.\n\n41. To be sure, *American International Refinery* also supports the Trustee's position. The Joint Defendants correctly note that *American International Refinery* (i) applied Nevada law\n\n19 *See* Joint Mot. at 15.\n\n20 Indeed, the word \"Nevada\" does not even appear in the opinion.\n\nand (ii) expanded the estate to include assets owned by an alter ego. But the court also explained that its \"result is consistent with a recent decision in the ASARCO bankruptcy case.\" *Am. Int'l Refinery*, 402 B.R. at 746. *ASARCO*, explained *the American Internal Refinery* court, held that \"if SPH was ASARCO's alter ego, then, *under Delaware law*, SPH's holding of SPCC stock was 'an interest of ASARCO in property under state law,' and ASARCO could challenge the transfer under section 548.\" *Id.* at 746 (emphasis added). If, as the Joint Defendants contend, (i) state law controls, (ii) Delaware law strictly follows the vicarious liability theory, and (iii) Nevada law strictly follows the identity theory, then the court's citation to *ASARCO* makes no sense, as it would shed no light on Nevada law, which (according to the Joint Defendants) controlled the outcome in *American International Refinery*. 21 Clearly, then, *American International Refinery* holds that Delaware law and Nevada law both follow the identity theory of alter ego law.22\n\n42. Lastly, the Joint Defendants cite *Manichaean* for the proposition that,\"[a]t its most basic level, reverse veil-piercing involves the imposition of liability on a business organization for the liabilities of its owners.\"23 This, they claim, supports their contention that\n\n21 The Joint Defendants concede that *ASARCO* supports Delaware's adoption of the identity theory but seem to suggest that *ASARCO* was wrongly decided, as was the Delaware Supreme Court authority on which it relied. *ASARCO* relied on *Pauley Petroleum, Inc. v. Cont'l Oil Co.*, 239 A.2d 629 (Del. Ch. 1968), in which the Delaware Supreme Court held there is \"of course, no doubt that upon a proper showing corporate entities as between parent and subsidiary may be disregarded and the ultimate party in interest, the parent, be regarded in law and fact *as the sole party* in a particular transaction.\" *Id.* at 633 (emphasis added); *see also id.* (holding that there was \"no showing\" in the record to \"disregard corporate entities and *treat the two separate corporations as one*\") (emphasis added). Nonetheless, the Joint Defendants argue that this \"identity theory language does not derive from the law cited in *Pauley*.\" Joint Mot. at 16. In other words, the Joint Defendants ask this Court to disagree not only with *ASARCO*, but also with the Delaware Supreme Court. The Court should decline this invitation.\n\n22 *American International Refinery* is also consistent with the Trustee's position that whether an alter ego's assets are property of the estate is a question of federal law, regardless of the theory adopted by state law underlying the alter ego determination.\n\n23 Joint Mot. at 13.\n\nDelaware law applies the vicarious liability theory of alter ego law. But the Joint Defendants conveniently leave out the crucial context provided by the very next sentence. In full, the *Manichaean* court said:\n\nAt its most basic level, reverse veil-piercing involves the imposition of liability on a business organization for the liabilities of its owners. *In the parent/subsidiary context, where the subsidiary is a mere alter ego of the parent the Court will treat the assets of the subsidiary as those of the parent*.\n\n*Manichaean*, 251 A.3d at 710 (emphasis added) (as modified) (internal quotation marks and references omitted). It is clear, therefore, that under Delaware law reverse veil piercing imposes liability on the alter ego's owners—and does so by merging their assets into one.24\n\n43. In sum, the Joint Defendants argue that state alter ego law is rigidly divided between those states that adopt the identity theory of alter ego law and that those subscribe to the vicarious liability theory, and that Delaware is in the vicarious liability camp. But the case law demonstrates that, if anything,25 Delaware adopts the identity theory.\n\n# **c. Court Has Already Rejected Joint Defendants' Illusory Distinction**\n\n44. Finally, the distinction the Joint Defendants propose has already been rejected by this Court. In the US Bank interpleader action, litigated between the Trustee and HK USA, with respect to funds placed by HK USA in escrow with US Bank, HK USA argued that the Court's alter ego ruling did not give the Trustee control over HK USA, but rather only \"made HK USA's\n\n24 *Manichean*'s statement that \"the Court will treat the assets of the subsidiary as those of the parent,\" is a quote from *Spring Real Estate*, discussed at length above. *See* 251 A.3d at 710, n.85. The *Manichaean* court also explained that it was addressing \"whether and to what extent courts of Delaware should allow so-called reverse veil-piercing\" and that Delaware courts, including *Spring Real Estate*, had \"yet to accept or deny the claim.\" 251 A.3d at 710, n.83. *Manichaean*, therefore, further demonstrates that (contrary to the Joint Defendants' arguments) *Spring Real Estate* was concerned with Delaware law.\n\n25 Even if Delaware does not specifically follow the identity theory, it, at the very least, utilizes that theory in addition to the vicarious liability approach. And while some courts in other jurisdictions may focus on this distinction, the Joint Defendants cite no Delaware case that does so. In other words, Delaware either (i) follows the identity theory or (ii) does not recognize this distinction at all, and an alter ego determination under Delaware law can result in either merging of the entities' assets, imposition of liability, or both.\n\nassets available to satisfy claims of [the Debtor's] creditors.\" In support of this argument, HK USA cited *RS Air, LLC v. NetJets Aviation, Inc. (In re RS Air, LLC)*, 651 B.R. 538, 545 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2023)–which is also cited by the Joint Defendants.26\n\n45. The Court, though, rejected this argument, specifically explaining that (contrary to HK USA's argument), the Court's ruling that HK USA was the Debtor's alter ego specifically held that \"all property of HK USA at all relevant times to the present …constituted and constitute, as applicable, property of the [] Debtor's Chapter 11 estate.\"27\n\n46. The Joint Defendants' argument, relying on the same theory and the same caselaw, should be rejected here as well.\n\n# **IV. Trustee Is Not Seeking, And Does Not Need,** *Nunc Pro Tunc* **Relief, As Debtor Always Owned Assets of Alter Ego Entities**\n\n47. The Joint Defendants argue that even if \"Delaware employed the identity theory of veil-piercing, the Trustee's section 549 claims still fail as a matter of law because such substantive relief cannot be provided on a retroactive or *nunc pro tunc* basis.\"28 They further argue that an alter ego ruling can be given effect only after the court's \"order or judgment disregarding the corporate form of\" the debtor's alter ego.29 The law is to the contrary. As numerous courts have held, an alter ego ruling gives effect to the existing legal reality that the entity in question is, *and has always been*, indistinguishable from another person or entity, notwithstanding its nominal separateness. Utilizing this principle, courts have permitted\n\n26 *See HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC's Memorandum in Opposition to Chapter 11 Trustee's Motion for Summary Judgment*, ¶ 18 (Adv. Proc. No. 23-05012, July 6, 2023) [Docket No. 47].\n\n27 *See Memorandum of Decision and Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment*, ¶¶ 16-17 (Adv. Proc. No. 23-05012, Sept. 7, 2023) [Docket No. 57].\n\n28 Joint Mot. at 20. The Joint Defendants make the same argument with respect to the Trustee's fraudulent transfer claims. *See id*. at 29-30.\n\n29 *Id.* at 21.\n\nfraudulent and post-petition transfer claims to proceed following an alter ego ruling, without first finding that the ruling applied on a *nunc pro tunc* basis.\n\n48. For example, in *In re Harman*, 512 B.R. 321 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2014), the trustee sought to recover postpetition transfers made by a non-debtor trust. The court observed that, because the trustee adequately alleged \"that the Trust assets are, in fact, Debtor's assets, [the] Trustee has properly alleged that assets of the Trust on the petition date became property of the estate.\" *Id.* at 342-43. Combined with the fact that \"[n]o postpetition transfers of property [had] been authorized, whether from the Trust or otherwise,\" the court held that the trustee had adequately \"pleaded that any post-petition transfers of property from the Trust are avoidable under §549(a).\" *Id.* at 343. The court did not need to issue its ruling *nunc pro tunc*.\n\n49. *American International Refinery* is also directly on point, and applies to both section 549 claims and fraudulent transfer claims. There, the court held that assets of an alter ego are treated as property of the debtor. The Joint Defendants acknowledge as much, but argue that *American International Refinery* \"explicitly applied Nevada law, which follows the identity theory.\"30 As discussed above, *American International Refinery* supports the Trustee, not the Joint Defendants. Regardless, the Joint Defendants must also concede that *American International Refinery* held that, as a matter of law, the trustee's alter ego claims (if successful) would also support his avoidance actions. *See In re Am. Int'l Refinery*, 402 B.R. at 752 (alter ego claim was \"threshold requirement for [plaintiffs'] claims under sections 547-549\").\n\n50. Similarly, *In re Palmieri*, discussed above, allowed the trustee to move forward with his fraudulent transfer claims based on alter ego allegations brought under Delaware law. In that case, the debtor had transferred the subject property to the alleged alter ego in September\n\n30 Joint Mot. at 15.\n\n2005; the property was then transferred again in July 2014. When, years later, the debtor filed for bankruptcy in 2021 and the trustee sought to recover the property, the defendants argued that the 2014 transfer was not a transfer of property of the estate. Nonetheless, the court concluded that the trustee had sufficiently alleged that the non-debtor transferring entity that received the property in 2005 was, in fact, the debtor's alter ego. Therefore, the debtor owned the property between 2005 and 2014 and, \"as such, the property was a part of the bankruptcy estate *at that time*.\" *In re Palmieri*, 651 B.R. at 358 (emphasis added).\n\n51. *In re Fisher*, 296 Fed. App'x 494 (6th Cir. 2008), also involved the avoidance of transfers made by a non-debtor later adjudged to be an alter ego. There, the individual debtor filed his petition in April of 2003, and the trustee sought to avoid the January 2003 transfer of certain inventory from the debtor's alleged alter ego. The \"bankruptcy court found that because Fisher and FDP were the same entity, FDP's inventory belonged to Fisher such that the transfer to Brennan was a transfer of an interest in property of the debtor.\" *Id.* at 506.31 *See also Deckelbaum*, 275 B.R at 742 (transfers made prior to alter ego ruling were avoidable).\n\n52. The Joint Defendants do not cite a single case (and the Trustee is not aware of any) in which the court found that an alter ego's assets belonged to the debtor but, nevertheless, precluded the trustee from avoiding prior transfers of such assets.\n\n53. The Joint Defendants rely heavily on *In re Duckworth*, No. 10-83603, 2012 WL 4434681 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 2012),32 which denied the trustee's \"creative attempt to use the alter ego doctrine to entirely reconfigure the factual landscape.\" *Id.* at \\*5. But that case does not support the Joint Defendants. The *Duckworth* court rejected the trustee's alter ego argument\n\n31 *Fisher* also supports the Trustee's position that an alter ego determination results in a merger of the two entities and their assets.\n\n32 *See* Joint Mot. at 28.\n\nbecause the entities at issue \"were all properly created under state law and validly existing as separate entities\" and the trustee did \"not contend otherwise\" *id.* at \\*4; the trustee's theory, therefore, was not provable \"in the context of the undisputed facts\" present in *Duckworth*. *Id*. In other words, the court held that the trustee had failed to substantiate his alter ego allegations. The court did not, however, hold that an alter ego determination cannot, as a matter of law, support avoidance actions like those at issue here. Just the opposite, the court held that \"*[i]f the existence of the three entities is recognized*, then the transfer of funds from the Debtor occurred prepetition—no postpetition transfer of property of the estate would be at issue and section 549 would be inapplicable.\" *Id.* (emphasis added). The contrapositive is obvious: if the three entities had truly all been one then there would have been postpetition transfers.\n\n54. The Joint Defendants' reliance on *Duckworth* is flawed for another, more fundamental, reason. The court emphasized that, at \"the time of the transfers, a separate corporate entity existed and that is the entity that made\" the challenged transfers, and the trustee was attempting to use the alter ego doctrine \"to recreate a different set facts, to rewrite history so to speak.\" *Id.* at \\*8. This commentary makes sense in the context of that case where, as discussed, the \"undisputed facts\" did not support the trustee's alter ego allegations. But that is precisely why an alter ego determination would support the Trustee's claims here. As the court explained in *In re Adler*, an alter ego ruling means that the pierced entities \"are, *and in fact always were*, the Debtor's alter egos.\" *Adler*, 494 B.R. at 53 (emphasis added). While the trustee in *Duckworth* relied on \"bare\" alter ego allegations to try to rewrite history, a true alter ego determination does exactly the opposite: it looks behind the veil to ensure that the present is consistent with the truth as it always was. Indeed, this Court has aptly observed as much, noting\n\nthat if (for instance) a court determines in 2017 that a contract was breached in 2015 \"that's not *nunc pro tunc*; that's the Court found that that [is what] happened.\"33\n\n55. This is also why the Joint Defendants are incorrect that retroactive application of an alter ego determination qualifies as *nunc pro tunc* relief.34 \"All *nunc pro tunc* relief, by its nature, engages in a legal fiction.\" *In re Player's Poker Club, Inc.*, 636 B.R. 811, 829 n.9 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2022). But an alter ego determination is not a legal fiction. Just the opposite, it is a doctrine designed to effectuate a legal truth: that the pierced entity is, *and always was*, indistinguishable from the dominant entity or person. The alter ego doctrine does not *create* a legal fiction; it *undoes* a legal fiction. *See In re Autobacs Strauss, Inc.*, 473 B.R. 525, 555 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012) (\"A subsidiary is an alter ego or instrumentality of a parent entity when the separate corporate identities are a fiction and the subsidiary is, in fact, being operated as a department of the parent.\") (internal quotation marks and references omitted) (as modified); *see also In re Adler*, 494 B.R. at 53 (\"By definition, an alter ego corporation possesses no independent volition. Consequently, since the Debtors' Corporations were found to have been such prepetition alter egos, the Debtor *always* remained inseparable from those five corporate fictions.\") (emphasis added). By contrast, implementing an alter ego determination only on a goforward basis would undermine the nature and purpose of the doctrine by allowing a fiction to\n\n33 Sept. 24, 2024 Hr'g Tr., at 29:6-7. A copy of the relevant excerpts of the September 24, 2024 Hearing Transcript is attached hereto as **Exhibit 2**.\n\n34 The Joint Defendants spend almost eight pages discussing the circumstances under which *nunc pro tunc* relief may, and may not, be utilized, including the Supreme Court's ruling in *Roman Cath. Archdiocese of San Juan, Puerto Rico v. Acevedo Feliciano*, 589 U.S. 57 (2020). *See* Joint Mot. at 25-27. This entire discussion is irrelevant, as the Trustee is not seeking *nunc pro tunc* relief. The Trustee has, in the past, argued that he is entitled to *nunc pro tunc* relief if necessary. For all the reasons discussed herein, however, the Trustee does not need *nunc pro tunc* relief to assert these avoidance actions because the Court's alter ego findings necessarily have retroactive effect. In any event, even if it were necessary for the Court to issue *nunc pro tunc* relief, it is appropriate in this case because it would not create new facts; rather, the record would be corrected to reflect the events that actually existed, as discussed herein. *See Acevedo Feliciano*, 589 U.S. at 65 (\"Federal courts may issue *nunc pro tunc* orders, . . . to 'reflect the reality' of what has already occurred[.]\").\n\nremain. *See In re Schuster*, 132 B.R. 604, 612 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991) (failure to apply alter ego doctrine where warranted would allow debtor \"to shelter a past transfer of personal resources into an artificial entity,\" which would \"allow[] a legal fiction—the facade of the family corporation—to triumph over substance\").\n\n56. Likely because they cannot challenge this truth, the Joint Defendants resort to subterfuge. First, they argue that \"the nature of the alter ego relief sought by the Trustee is akin to the equitable remedy of substantive consolidation.\"35 They then point to cases addressing whether a substantive consolidation ruling should be applied on a *nunc pro tunc* basis. But this is a bait and switch, designed to attack a strawman argument. Alter ego and substantive consolidation may be similar, but they are not the same nor are they governed by the same legal standards, and the Trustee has not asserted substantive consolidation.36 *See Star Mountain Res., Inc.*, 2022 WL 2294175, at \\*7 (\"While the factors underlying a claim for substantive consolidation and a claim for alter ego often overlap, substantive consolidation is distinguishable from state law alter ego claims.\"). \"Substantive consolidation is better thought of as an economic remedy, the primary goal being the equitable treatment of all creditors. Conversely, a state law alter ego claim is an equitable remedy focused on preventing fraud or injustice.\" *Id.* (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, although courts often discuss whether to apply substantive consolidation on a *nunc pro tunc* basis, the same inquiry is not necessary for an alter ego claim, which, as demonstrated above, necessarily has retroactive effect.\n\n35 Joint Mot. at 21.\n\n36 Nor, as discussed above, has the Trustee sought *nunc pro tunc* relief. Separately, and for the avoidance of doubt, the Trustee does not concede that substantive consolidation (or relief \"akin\" to substantive consolidation) cannot be given *nunc pro tunc* effect. *See, e.g.*, *In re Am. Way Serv. Corp.*, 229 B.R. 496, 526 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999) (\"A review of the consolidation orders convinces this judge that Judge Ray, in addition to consolidating the estates, intended that the consolidation would have *nunc pro tunc* effect.\"). The Trustee reserves all rights in that regard.\n\n57. For all these reasons, the Trustee has readily alleged viable alter ego claims under applicable law, and the effect of a ruling in his favor on those claims is to permit the Trustee to avoid past transfers by the alter egos. Accordingly, the Joint Motion must be denied.\n\n[*Remainder of page intentionally left blank.*]\n\nWHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the Trustee respectfully requests that the Court\n\ndeny the Joint Motion and grant any other relief as the Court considers proper.\n\nDated: November 8, 2024 LUC A. DESPINS, New York, New York CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE\n\nBy: */s/ Douglass Barron*\n\nDouglass Barron (admitted *pro hac vice*) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6079 douglassbarron@paulhastings.com\n\n*and*\n\nNicholas A. Bassett (admitted *pro hac vice*) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C., 20036 (202) 551-1902 nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n *and*\n\nPatrick R. Linsey (ct29437) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 781-2847 plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n*Counsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee*","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院布里奇波特分院\n\n------------------------------------------------------ x\n\n关于： :\n:\n第11章\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等人，1 :\n:\n案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。 :\n:\n（合并管理）\n:\n\n第11章受托人对共同被告支持驳回动议或依诉状判决动议的综合备忘录提出的异议\n\n1 本第11章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（又名 Guo Wengui、Miles Guo 和 Miles Kwok，以及众多其他别名）（税务识别号码后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（税务识别号码后四位：8202）以及 Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 和 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为 Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166，收件人为 Luc A. Despins，作为 Ho Wan Kwok 遗产的受托人（仅为通知和通信之目的）。\n\n目录\n\n初步陈述 1\n\n异议 4\nI. 案件既判规则驳回共同动议 4\nII. 共同被告所称的“无辜”并不排除反向揭开公司面纱 6\na. 共同被告所称的“无辜”及其声称的潜在损害，属于尚不成熟的事实争议\n7\nb. 反向揭开公司面纱涉及旨在防止欺诈的利益衡量测试 8\nIII. 另我实体的资产属于破产财产 10\na. 破产财产属于联邦破产法事项，而非州法事项 11\nb. 特拉华州不遵循另我法中的替代责任理论 19\nc. 法院已驳回共同被告提出的虚幻区别 22\nIV. 受托人并未寻求且无需追溯性救济，因为债务人始终拥有另我实体的资产\n23\n\n判例目录\n判例\n\nIn re 477 W. 142nd St. Hous., Dev. Fund Corp.,\nNo. 15-12178 (SHL), 2020 WL 3067733 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2020) 5\n\nIn re 10th Ave. Rec. Distributors, Inc.,\n97 B.R. 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) 15\n\nIn re Adler,\n494 B.R. 43 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2013) 17, 18, 27, 28\n\nIn re Am. Int'l Refinery,\n402 B.R. 728 (Bankr. W.D. La. 2008) 20, 21, 22, 25\n\nIn re Am. Way Serv. Corp.,\n229 B.R. 496 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999) 29\n\nAramony v. United Way of Am.,\n254 F.3d 403 (2d Cir. 2001)5\n\nIn re Autobacs Strauss, Inc.,\n473 B.R. 525 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012) 28\n\nIn re Blatstein,\n192 F.3d 88 (3d Cir. 1999)15, 18\n\nIn re Burgess,\n234 B.R. 793 (D. Nev. 1999) 13\n\nButner v. U.S.,\n440 U.S. 48 (1979) 12, 13\n\nIn re Chardon, LLC,\n519 B.R. 211 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014) 12\n\nIn re Commodore Business Machines, Inc.,\n180 B.R. 72 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) 13\n\nIn re Concepcion,\nNo. 13-09126, 2017 WL 1076325 (Bankr. D.P.R. Mar. 21, 2017) 16\n\nIn re Deckelbaum v. Cooter, Mangold, Tompert & Chapman, P.L.L.C.,\n275 B.R. 737 (D. Md. 2001) 16, 18, 26\n\nIn re Duckworth,\nNo. 10-83603, 2012 WL 4434681 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 2012) 26, 27\n\nIn re Fisher,\n296 Fed. App'x 494 (6th Cir. 2008) 25, 26\n\nIn re Harman,\n512 B.R. 321 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2014) 24\n\nIn re Harry C. Partridge Jr. & Sons, Inc.,\n112 B.R. 593 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) 16\n\nIn re Howland,\n674 F. App'x 482 (6th Cir. 2017) 19\n\nKrakowski v. Am. Airlines, Inc.,\n610 B.R. 714 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) 5\n\nManichaean Cap., LLC v. Exela Techs., Inc.,\n251 A.3d 694 (Del. Ch. 2021) passim\n\nIn re Mass,\n178 B.R. 626 (M.D. Pa. 1995) 8, 9, 10\n\nIn re Moise,\n575 B.R. 191 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2017) 6\n\nIn re Motors Liquidation Co.,\n590 B.R. 39 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) 5, 6\n\nIn re N.S. Garrott & Sons,\n772 F.2d 462 (8th Cir. 1985) 13\n\nIn re Nejberger,\n934 F.2d 1300 (3d Cir. 1991)13\n\nNewman & Schwartz v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co.,\n102 F.3d 660 (2d Cir. 1996)7\n\nNicole Gas Prod., Ltd.,\n916 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2019) 13\n\nIn re Nordlicht,\n115 F.4th 90 (2d Cir. 2024) 15\n\nIn re Palmieri,\n651 B.R. 349 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2023) passim\n\nPauley Petroleum, Inc. v. Cont'l Oil Co.,\n239 A.2d 629 (Del. Ch. 1968)21\n\nPavers & Rd. Builders Dist. Council Welfare Fund v. Core Contracting of N.Y.,\nLLC,\n536 B.R. 48 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2015) 17, 19\n\nIn re Pearlman,\n462 B.R. 849 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012) 16\n\nPescatore v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.,\n97 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 1996)5\n\nIn re Petters Co., Inc.,\n561 B.R. 738 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2016) 9, 10\n\nIn re Player's Poker Club, Inc.,\n636 B.R. 811 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2022) 27\n\nRoman Cath. Archdiocese of San Juan, Puerto Rico v. Acevedo Feliciano,\n589 U.S. 57 (2020) 27\n\nIn re RS Air, LLC,\n651 B.R. 538 19, 23\n\nIn re Schultz,\n250 B.R. 22 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2000) 6\n\nIn re Schuster,\n132 B.R. 604 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991) 10, 28\n\nSec. Inv. Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC,\n603 B.R. 682 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019) 6\n\nIn re Silver,\n647 B.R. 897 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2022) 19\n\nSky Cable, LLC v. DIRECTV, Inc.,\n886 F.3d 375 (4th Cir. 2018) 9\n\nSpring Real Est., LLC v. Echo/RT Holdings, LLC,\nNo. CV 7994-VCN, 2016 WL 769586 (Del. Ch. Feb. 18, 2016) 20, 21\n\nSt. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. PepsiCo, Inc.,\n884 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1989)15\n\nIn re Star Mountain Res., Inc.,\nNo. 2:18-BK-01594-DPC, 2022 WL 2294175 (Bankr. D. Ariz. June 22, 2022) 14, 15, 18, 29\n\nStern v. Marshall,\n564 U.S. 462, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 180 L. Ed. 2d 475 (2011) 18\n\nIn re Terwilliger's Catering Plus, Inc.,\n911 F.2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1990) 13\n\nIn re The Ground Round, Inc.,\n482 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2007) 12\n\nIn re Wardle,\nNo. ADV.S-03-01467, 2006 WL 6811026 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Jan. 31, 2006) 19\n\nWellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif,\n575 U.S. 665, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 191 L. Ed. 2d 911 (2015) 18\n\nIn re Yerushalmi,\n487 B.R. 98 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2012) 14, 15, 18\n\n法条\n11 U.S.C. § 502(h) 8\n11 U.S.C. § 541 passim\n11 U.S.C. § 542 11, 16, 19\n11 U.S.C. § 544 1\n11 U.S.C. § 548 1, 21\n11 U.S.C. § 549 1, 24, 25, 26\n\nLuc A. Despins 以其作为在 Ho Wan Kwok（以下简称“债务人”）第11章案件中获任命的第11章受托人（以下简称“受托人”）的身份，经由其下列签名律师，特此对《共同被告支持驳回动议或依诉状判决动议的综合备忘录》[Docket No. 3713]（以下简称“共同动议”）2 提出本异议（以下简称“本异议”）。为支持本异议，受托人谨陈述如下：\n\n初步陈述\n\n1. 本院已裁定，另我实体3 系债务人的另我，且其资产现为且始终为债务人的财产——因此该等资产属于破产财产。此外，根据破产法典第544、548和549条，受托人的撤销权诉讼允许受托人撤销并追回破产财产的转让，此乃明确法律规则。共同被告并未对其中任何一点提出异议。\n\n2. 相反，共同被告提出各种程序及法律理论，以攻击本院已经作出的裁定。在程序上，其主张，本院先前裁定并不禁止其重新审理本院在该等裁定中已经裁决的问题，因为该等裁定是在共同被告未被列名为当事人的对抗程序中作出的。但是，包括本院在内的各法院已反复确认，案件既判规则适用于在同一破产案件框架下提起的各对抗程序，尤其是在受禁止方已获通知相关法律问题将被诉讼的情况下。在本案中，共同被告已获通知，受托人正在主张另我实体具有另我地位，却选择不在该等程序中申请介入。\n\n2 本文中使用但未另行定义的首字母大写术语，应具有共同动议中赋予该等术语的含义。\n\n3 就共同动议及本异议而言，“另我实体”统称为：(i) Lamp Capital LLC，(ii) Golden Spring (New York) Ltd.，(iii) HCHK Technologies, Inc.，(iv) HCHK Property Management, Inc.，(v) Lexington Property & Staffing, Inc.，以及 (vi) Greenwich Land LLC。\n\n3. 即使本院审理共同被告论点的实体问题，该等论点亦应被驳回。共同被告依赖三项主要法律理论，而每一项均存在致命缺陷。\n\n4. 第一，其主张本院先前裁定有误，理由是特拉华州法律不允许可能损害潜在无辜第三方债权人的反向揭开公司面纱。该论点在多个层面上均不能成立。其一，共同被告所称的“无辜”属于事实问题，并未见于受托人起诉状的表面，因此不能在驳回动议或依诉状判决动议中裁定。无论如何，特拉华州法律并未规定，对第三方的潜在损害是反向揭开公司面纱请求中的决定性因素。相反，该因素仅是法院考量的因素之一，而且在破产情形中其权重较低；在该情形中，所有债权人必须获得平等对待，且共同被告能够对破产财产提出债权。揭开公司面纱分析中最重要的因素并非对无辜第三方的潜在损害，而是对公司形式的滥用。在本案中，该种滥用极为严重，因为债务人利用无数空壳公司损害了数以千计的债权人和受害人，并隐匿了难以想象的财富。共同被告意图让本院裁定，仅因该等空壳公司与潜在无辜第三方存在业务往来，本院便无权对此作出补救。特拉华州法律不容许，更遑论要求，出现此种结果。\n\n5. 第二，共同被告基于如下论点攻击本院先前裁定：即使特拉华州法律确实允许对另我实体反向揭开公司面纱，该做法也仅会使该等实体承担“替代责任”，而不会使其资产成为破产财产。其称，这将使受托人的撤销权诉讼无法成立，因为所涉转让将不涉及“破产财产”。该论点从一开始即存在缺陷，因为特拉华州另我法的基础理论，并不决定根据破产法典第541条何者属于或不属于破产财产。在确定何者构成破产财产时，破产法院将考察由州法确定的资产特征，但不受州法对该资产的定性约束；该资产的特征最终是否导致其被裁定为“破产财产”，属于联邦法事项。简言之，州法决定另我实体是否为债务人的另我。但是，一旦作出该项认定，破产法即决定另我实体的资产是否属于破产财产。4\n\n6. 无论如何，共同被告主张特拉华州采纳所谓另我法的“替代责任”理论，乃属错误。如以下所示，特拉华州法院，包括特拉华州最高法院，已反复认可共同被告所谓另我法的“同一性理论”；当一个实体为另一个实体的另我时，该理论确实会合并资产（事实上，也会合并实体本身）。因此，适用特拉华州法律的法院一贯维持基于另我地位提出的欺诈性转让请求。\n\n7. 第三，共同被告主张，即使本院关于可以进行反向揭开公司面纱的裁定正确，即使本院关于先前另我裁定的后果是另我实体的资产属于破产财产的裁定正确，该后果也只能自该等另我裁定作出之日起前瞻性适用。其主张，任何其他结果均会构成不被允许的追溯性救济。但是，本院先前裁定并未依赖追溯性救济，受托人的撤销权诉讼亦未依赖此种救济。追溯性救济是一种法律拟制，其实质上改写历史，因此仅在以下情形中才属适当：\n\n4 联合被告的另一项有瑕疵的论点是，受托人所寻求的救济只能通过破产程序中的实质合并获得。受托人目前并未寻求实质合并，因为其所寻求的救济可通过反向揭开公司面纱请求获得。\n\n有限情形。然而，另我裁定恰恰相反。正如法院反复解释的那样，另我裁定贯彻了一项法律事实：被揭开公司面纱的实体与支配实体或个人并无区别，且始终如此。另我理论并不创设法律拟制；它消除了法律拟制。\n\n8. 基于上述所有理由以及下文所述理由，本院应重申其先前裁定，驳回联合被告的论点，并否决其动议。\n\n异议\n\n9. 联合被告主张：(i) 争点排除和案件法则均不适用于本院先前关于另我实体的裁定；(ii) Delaware（特拉华州）法律禁止对另我实体适用反向揭开公司面纱；(iii) 受托人的撤销诉讼不能成立，因为根据特拉华州法律，另我实体（此处为另我实体）的资产不被视为支配实体或个人（此处为债务人）的资产，且受托人并未寻求实质合并；以及 (iv) 即使另我实体的资产被视为债务人的资产，此种处理也仅具有前瞻性效力。这些论点要么错误，要么无关，要么二者兼有。\n\n一、案件法则否定联合动议\n\n10. 本院已裁定：(i) 特拉华州法律允许对另我实体进行反向揭开公司面纱；以及 (ii) 另我实体的资产属于、且始终属于破产财产。本案法则现排除其提出相反论点。5\n\n11. 案件法则是一项酌定规则，规定当法院作出裁决时，“该裁决应在同一案件后续阶段继续支配同一争点。”Pescatore v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 97 F.3d 1, 7 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting DiLaura v. Power Auth., 982 F.2d 73, 76 (2d Cir.1992)). 该原则“旨在维持一致性，并避免在一项持续进行的诉讼过程中重新审议已经裁定的事项。”In re 477 W. 142nd St. Hous., Dev. Fund Corp., No. 15-12178 (SHL), 2020 WL 3067733, at \\*12 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2020) (quoting In re PCH Assoc., 949 F.2d 585, 592 (2d Cir. 1991)). 当其先前裁决明确解决某一争点，或必然通过隐含方式解决该争点时，法院适用案件法则。参见 Aramony v. United Way of Am., 254 F.3d 403, 410 (2d Cir. 2001)。\n\n5 联合被告还用了近四页篇幅主张，其并未因提出各项论点而受到争点排除。参见 Joint Mot. at 30-33. 该论述无关紧要，因为受托人并未主张争点排除或争点排除效力。\n\n12. 联合被告着重指出，其并非另我对抗程序的当事人。但第二巡回区内的法院一再认定，在破产案件中，案件法则适用于在同一主案中提起的不同对抗程序。事实上，本院已裁定，“在法院面前的当事人曾参与先前诉讼，并非适用案件法则的必要条件。”6 另见 In re Motors Liquidation Co., 590 B.R. 39, 62 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“[C]ourts have held that the law-of-the-case doctrine applies to different adversary proceedings filed within the same main bankruptcy case.”) (quotation marks omitted); Krakowski v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 610 B.R. 714, 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2019), aff'd sub nom. In re AMR Corp., 834 F. App'x 660 (2d Cir. 2021) (“Although Krakowski I is, of course, a different adversary proceeding than the one now before the court, '[c]ourts have held that the law-of-the-case doctrine applies to different adversary proceedings filed within the same main bankruptcy case.”); In re Moise, 575 B.R. 191, 205 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2017) (same); Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 603 B.R. 682 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019)（将先前裁定中的案件法则适用于提出相同论点的新当事人）。\n\n6 Memorandum of Decision and Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment, at 20 (Adv. Proc. No. 23-5005, July 2, 2024) [Docket No. 133].\n\n13. Motors Liquidation 尤具指导意义，因为在该案中，法院明确认定，其中一名被告——唯一可合理认为未参与更广泛破产案件的人——仍受案件法则约束，原因是尽管她未参与先前程序，但她知悉其希望诉讼的争点将在先前程序中进行诉讼。Motors Liquidation, 590 B.R. at 66-67. 本案联合被告同样知悉，其现欲质疑的另我裁定正在另我对抗程序中审理；向联合被告送达的各份起诉状均指明了该等程序，但其选择不申请介入该等程序。7 因此，联合被告受本院先前裁定约束。8\n\n二、联合被告所称“无辜”并不排除反向揭开公司面纱\n\n14. 联合被告主张，特拉华州法律对反向揭开公司面纱施加绝对限制，若适用该理论会损害“无辜的第三方债权人”，则禁止适用。9 该论点为时过早，而且无论如何，在法律上也是错误的。\n\n7 另我实体共有六个。本院于 June 24, 2024 就 HCHK Technologies, Inc., HCHK Property Management, Inc., Lexington Property & Staffing, Inc. 作出另我裁定，参见 Amended Default Judgment and Permanent Injunction (Adv. Proc. No. 23-05013, June 24, 2024) [Docket No. 297]；并于 July 2, 2024 就 Greenwich Land LLC 作出裁定，参见 Summary Judgment (Adv. Proc. No. 23- 05005, July 2, 2024) [Docket No. 134]。列名联合被告的起诉状均于 February 9-14, 2024 期间提交，早于该等另我裁定数月，且每份起诉状均提及并明确说明，受托人的撤销诉讼以相关基础另我对抗程序中所请求确认的对另我实体资产的所有权为前提。此外，任何查阅该等对抗程序案卷的联合被告，均会理解受托人主张相关实体的资产属于、且始终属于债务人的财产。而且，联合被告自己的证据表明，38名联合被告中有35名从 HCHK Technologies, Inc., HCHK Property Management, Inc., Lexington Property & Staffing, Inc. 或 Greenwich Land LLC 中至少一家收到了转让款项。\n\n8 Motors Liquidation 法院专门审查并驳回了被告对 In re Schultz, 250 B.R. 22 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2000) 的援引，联合被告亦援引该案。参见 Joint Mot. at 33-34.\n\n9 Joint Mot. at 10.\n\na. 联合被告所称“无辜”及其声称的潜在损害，均属为时过早的事实争点\n\n15. 在裁决驳回动议或基于诉状作出判决的动议时，法院的审查仅限于诉状表面所载的主张。参见 Newman & Schwartz v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 102 F.3d 660, 662 (2d Cir. 1996)（因“地区法院不当依赖 N & S 起诉状四角范围之外的信息”而撤销准许驳回动议的裁定）。Manichaean Cap., LLC v. Exela Techs., Inc., 251 A.3d 694, 710 (Del. Ch. 2021) 中的法院裁定具有指导意义。在该案中，被告包括位于支配实体之上的实体以及被指称的另我实体；其主张，被指称的另我实体——支配母实体的间接子公司——是支配母实体层级之上“某些债务的主要义务人”，而且“如果[支配实体]的判决债权人能够追究该等子公司的责任，[支配母实体之上实体]的债权人将受到损害。”Manichaean, 251 A.3d at 718. 法院驳回了该论点，认定“起诉状中没有依据可推断反向揭开公司面纱会对无辜第三方债权人造成损害”，且在驳回动议阶段，法院的“分析仅限于该诉状的‘四角范围’”（即起诉状）。Id. 本案中，任何关于联合被告“无辜”的主张均属于起诉状四角范围之外的事实争点，因此在本阶段无关紧要。10\n\n16. 同样，目前不应审议的还有联合被告即使确属“无辜”，其将因受托人的请求而受到何种程度的损害（如有）。尽管受托人寻求向联合被告追回款项（具体而言，即其从债务人的另我实体收到的付款），联合被告未必会在该等追回款项的数额上遭受损害，因为在撤销诉讼成功后，联合被告将有机会根据《破产法典》第 502(h) 条向债务人的破产财产提出请求权。参见 11 U.S.C. § 502(h) (“A claim rising from the recovery of property under section . . . 550 . . . of this title shall be determined, and shall be allowed under subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section, or disallowed under subsection (d) or (e) of this section, the same as if such claim had arisen before the date of the filing of the petition”).\n\n10 为明确起见，受托人并不承认联合被告在收取起诉状所涉转让款项时属于“无辜”，且受托人保留针对该等论点的一切权利。\n\n17. 联合被告现在寻求驳回受托人的请求，从而避免日后可能需要提出第 502(h) 条请求权，其意在仅因其（据称）未注意到其交易对象为虚假实体，便将自身置于所有其他债权人之上。但法院已驳回这一论点，尤其是在破产案件中。在 In re Mass, 178 B.R. 626 (M.D. Pa. 1995) 中，被告主张，“在本案中揭开公司面纱并不适当，因为其系因将账户资金转移至债务人破产财产而受损的‘无辜’第三方。”Id. at 630. 地区法院维持破产法院裁定，并驳回该论点，解释称，破产法院的命令有利于“破产财产的所有债权人”，而被告“不应作为唯一与虚假公司订约的商业债权人而享受优惠待遇。”Id. at 630-31.\n\nb. 反向揭开公司面纱涉及旨在防止欺诈的利益衡量检验\n\n18. 即使假定联合被告是将因反向揭开公司面纱而受到损害的“无辜”当事人，并且本院在本阶段审议此类论点属适当，受托人的请求仍然有效。在审查反向揭开公司面纱时，\n\n11 为明确起见，早在联合被告提出其所称公平性关切之前，受托人已在 February 27, 2024 状态会议上告知本院，需在日后重新开放申报截止日期，以使其他当事人（包括另我实体的债权人）能够向破产财产提出请求权。参见 Feb. 27, 2024 Hr'g Tr. at 22:7-22. February 27, 2024 Hearing Transcript 的相关摘录副本作为 Exhibit 1 附于本文件。\n\n就揭开公司面纱请求而言，适用 Delaware（特拉华州）法律的法院将考量若干因素，以确定公司形式是否被用来“延续欺诈或不公正”。Manichaean, 251 A.3d at 714-15。“反向揭开公司面纱将对原告试图追及的实体之无辜第三方债权人造成何种程度损害”仅是其中一个因素。Id. at 715。正如共同被告所称，该因素并非凌驾于所有其他考量之上的决定性因素。\n\n19. Court of Chancery（衡平法院）在 Manichaean 一案中的裁决就此明确指出：“反向揭开公司面纱可能被作为钝器使用，以损害无辜当事人并扰乱公平交易谈判的预期，这些风险虽属真实存在，但在[该法院]看来，并不足以证明应当彻底否定反向揭开公司面纱。”Id. at 712。因此，根据 Delaware（特拉华州）法律，反向揭开公司面纱将对第三方的影响视为平衡测试中的一个因素。See In re Petters Co., Inc., 561 B.R. 738, 754 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2016)（分析 Delaware（特拉华州）和 Minnesota（明尼苏达州）法律，并认定“揭开公司面纱将对债权人造成的影响……就其表面而言，并不超过所涉指称事实引起的其他衡平考量”）。事实上，最重要的单一因素是公司形式是否被不当使用。See Sky Cable, LLC v. DIRECTV, Inc., 886 F.3d 375, 387 (4th Cir. 2018)（“[在] Delaware（特拉华州），如为防止欺诈或欺骗行为所必需，始终可以不顾公司拟制”）（引号省略）；see also Petters, 561 B.R. at 752（“Delaware（特拉华州）是公司注册管辖区，因此有强有力的政策理由防止 Delaware（特拉华州）公司被用作实施欺诈的工具。”）。\n\n20. 如果只要第三方可能因适用反向揭开公司面纱而遭受损害，该救济便不可获得，则该原则对于其本旨在补救的违法行为将失去效力。如上所述，在 In re Mass 一案中，地区法院正是着眼于这一关切，认定揭开公司面纱有助于“破产财产的所有债权人”，并指出被告“不应作为唯一与虚假公司订约的商业债权人而享有优待”。Mass, 178 B.R. at 630-31。正如另一法院解释，如不采用反向揭开公司面纱，将“严重扰乱”债务人与其债权人之间的“救济平衡”，并使债务人得以“将过去转移至人为实体的个人资源予以庇护”，这将“使一种法律拟制——家族公司的表象——胜过实质”。In re Schuster, 132 B.R. 604, 612 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991)。\n\n21. 本案共同被告正试图通过请求本院实际上认可债务人损害数百名（甚至数千名）债权人与受害人的全球性欺诈计划，从而取得同样不公平的结果，并使债务人及其家人得以过上真正奢靡的生活。共同被告并未否认、也无法否认，债务人通过肆意滥用公司形式延续其计划——事实上，债务人由数百家空壳公司组成、包括 Delaware（特拉华州）实体在内的由来已久的迷宫式结构，是导致其因联邦欺诈指控被定罪的刑事审判的焦点。相反，共同被告请求本院相信，Delaware（特拉华州）法律对于如此极端滥用公司形式的行为毫无救济，并且仅因某些可能无辜的第三方与另我实体开展业务，便会认可此类全球性欺诈。这显然不是法律，因为“Delaware（特拉华州）不会容忍将公司形式作为便利欺诈或不公正的手段。”Manichaean, 251 A.3d at 713。因此，必须驳回共同被告的论点。\n\nIII. 另我实体的资产属于破产财产\n\n22. 共同被告关于 chapter 11 trustee（第11章受托人）不能撤销债务人另我所作转让的论点，建立在其将另我法划分为两大学派的法理理论之上：即“替代责任”理论和“同一性”理论。在该二分法中，共同被告认为，只有在遵循同一性理论的州，另我的资产才被视为支配实体或支配个人的资产。在采用替代责任理论的州，彼等称，另我裁定仅对支配实体或支配个人施加替代责任，而不影响被揭开公司面纱实体资产的所有权。共同被告认为，Delaware（特拉华州）遵循替代责任路径。\n\n23. 该论点基于两项理由而不能成立。第一，共同被告所依赖的严格区分既属虚幻，亦无关紧要，特别是在破产法院，因为作为破产法事项，另我的资产被视为破产财产。第二，即使该区分存在且具有重要性，Delaware（特拉华州）法律所遵循的也是同一性理论，而非替代责任理论。\n\na. 破产财产属于联邦破产法事项，而非州法事项\n\n24. 正如共同被告承认，本院已解释，一旦存在另我或揭开公司面纱裁定，“[与第541条和第542条结合，另我因此实现了将资产转入破产财产]。”12 共同被告质疑该裁定，主张本院未能“讨论该替代责任请求如何‘与第541条和第542条结合’而转变为债务人的资产。”13 为加强其质疑，彼等援引一系列案件，包括 Butner v. U.S., 440 U.S. 48 (1979)，以主张财产权益由州法创设和界定。彼等进一步主张，因此，破产法院作出的另我裁定之结果亦受州法管辖。\n\n12 Joint Mot. at 18（引自 Memorandum of Decision and Order Granting Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Second Counterclaim, at 25 (Adv. Pro. No. 22-05003, May 18, 2023) [Docket No. 222]）。\n\n13 Id. 如上所述，该裁定构成本案既判规则，共同被告现不能仅因其认为本院未充分解释先前裁定而质疑该裁定。\n\n25. 共同被告从根本上误解了 Butner，且未理解何者构成破产财产“属于联邦法事项”，以及适用联邦法的破产法院不受“州法赋予某一特定权益的标签”约束。In re The Ground Round, Inc., 482 F.3d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 2007) (as modified)（尽管州法将酒类许可证定性为特权而非财产，该许可证仍属破产财产）；see also In re Chardon, LLC, 519 B.R. 211, 217 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014)（何者构成债务人的财产“属于联邦破产法事项，无论州如何定性该财产的实际法定所有权”）（引自 Matter of Pentell, 777 F.2d 1281, 1284 n.2 (7th Cir. 1985)）。\n\n26. 这完全符合 Butner，在该案中，Supreme Court（最高法院）著名地宣告：“财产权益由州法创设和界定。”Butner, 440 U.S. at 55。正如 Sixth Circuit（第六巡回上诉法院）所解释，且如 Butner 所指示，破产中财产权利的“性质和范围由基础实体法确定”。Nicole Gas Prod., Ltd., 916 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up)。但“一旦作出该确定，联邦破产法即规定，为第541条之目的，该权益在何种程度上属于破产财产。”Id. (cleaned up)。See also In re Nejberger, 934 F.2d 1300, 1302 (3d Cir. 1991)（“尽管州法创设法定权益并界定其附随权利，但如此创设和界定的权益是否属于联邦法规所规定的某一类别这一最终问题，需要对该法规作出解释，而该问题属于联邦问题”）(as modified)。\n\n27. 因此，破产法院审视资产由州法确定的特征，但不受州法如何定性该资产的约束；其州法特征最终是否导致其被定性为“破产财产”，属于联邦法事项。适用于本案，Delaware（特拉华州）法律决定另我实体是否为债务人的另我。但是，一旦作出该确定，破产法即决定另我实体的资产是否属于破产财产。See In re Commodore Business Machines, Inc., 180 B.R. 72, 78 n.8 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995)（“一旦确定债务人对该财产之权益的性质和范围，联邦破产法即规定该财产在何种程度上属于破产财产。”）。其他法院亦作出类似裁定。See, e.g., In re Terwilliger's Catering Plus, Inc., 911 F.2d 1168, 1172 (6th Cir. 1990)（“尽管债务人权益的性质和范围由州法确定，但一旦作出该确定，联邦破产法即规定该权益在何种程度上属于破产财产。”）（内部引文省略）；In re N.S. Garrott & Sons, 772 F.2d 462, 466 (8th Cir. 1985)（“债务人对财产之权益的性质和范围由州法确定。[] 第541条下的财产权利由州法界定。Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55, 99 S.Ct. 914, 918, 59 L.Ed.2d 136 (1979)。但是，一旦作出该确定，联邦破产法即规定该权益在何种程度上属于破产财产。”）；In re Burgess, 234 B.R. 793, 797 (D. Nev. 1999)（“[尽管]州法创设该权利，联邦法决定其是否为联邦破产法、税法等目的下的‘财产’。”）。\n\n28. In re Yerushalmi, 487 B.R. 98 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2012) 与本案直接相关。在该案中，受托人主张一项特定信托（“QPRT”）是债务人的另我。被告援引州法，主张另我请求受 New York（纽约州）诉讼时效限制。Id. at 107。法院解释，处理时效抗辩要求其“审查受托人依据第541条提出的请求之性质”。Id. at 107-08。受托人并非起诉以“使 QPRT 对债务人的债务承担责任”，id.，而是请求“作出确认判决，认定 QPRT 是债务人的另我。该确定的结果将是，受托人有权要求交付 QPRT 持有的资产，因为这些资产依据第541条属于破产财产。”Id. at 108。由于“受托人的诉讼具有衡平性质”并依据 Bankruptcy Code（《破产法》）第541条提出，州法时效期间不适用：“本案事实——即破产受托人基于另我理论寻求收回破产财产——不同于由个别债权人为自身利益提起的非破产另我案件，后者寻求使另我对他人的债务承担责任。”Id.\n\n29. In re Star Mountain Res., Inc., No. 2:18-BK-01594-DPC, 2022 WL 2294175 (Bankr. D. Ariz. June 22, 2022) (subsequent history omitted)，亦区分破产外的另我请求与由破产受托人提出的另我请求。“另我请求在破产情境中具有不同于传统民事审判情境的效力，在传统民事审判情境中，特定债权人针对被指称的另我取得判决。破产中的另我认定更类似于实质合并，即将另我的资产纳入债务人的财产，以与债务人的债权人共同分享。”Id. at \\*7, n.86.14 因此，Star Mountain 和 In re Yerushalmi 明确否定共同被告援引州法以管辖另我裁定结果的主张。\n\n14 这并不意味着，如共同被告所主张，受托人所寻求的“另我救济的性质类似于实质合并这一衡平法救济”，因此，规制实质合并的法律体系也规制受托人针对共同被告提出的撤销权诉讼。共同动议，第21页。恰恰相反，Star Mountain法院还解释称，“实质合并不同于州法上的另我主张”，并且“实质合并的分析比作出另我认定的分析更为复杂”。2022 WL 2294175, at *7。换言之，(i) 破产受托人提出的另我主张具有与实质合并类似的效果，但(ii)其并不受相同法律标准的规制。无论如何，受托人认为，若其曾寻求该等救济，他能够满足实质合并标准。\n\n30. 其他法院也作出了与本院相同的裁定，即另我认定的后果是，另我的资产被视为破产财产。例如，在In re Blatstein一案中，某些债权人（受托人亦参加其中）提起了一项对抗程序，请求“破产法院反向刺破[某些]公司的面纱，以便将其资产纳入破产财产”。In re Blatstein, 192 F.3d 88, 92 (3d Cir. 1999)。在上诉中，第三巡回法院认定其具有管辖权，因为“[首要的是，本次上诉涉及确定Blatstein破产财产的资产]”。Id. at 95。法院解释称，认定“Blatstein夫妇的公司是其另我，将导致大量资产被纳入其破产财产”。Id.（强调添加）。在In re 10th Ave. Rec. Distributors, Inc., 97 B.R. 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)一案中，受托人寻求一项确认判决，认定“Bate和10th Avenue被主张的独立公司存续应予忽略，且其资产和负债应被视为10th Avenue破产财产的资产和负债”。Id. at 164。法院裁定，受托人有资格提出该项主张，因为“此处受托人的另我诉因毫无疑问是试图收取破产财产”。Id. at 166（强调添加）。15 即使共同被告援引的案件本身也同意这一点，并解释称，“通过刺破公司面纱，当事人证明该两个实体在法律上是同一实体，而非两个不同实体。因此，它们实际上并非债务人和非债务人，而是一个实体。”In re Pearlman, 462 B.R. 849, 855 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012)。另见In re Harry C. Partridge Jr. & Sons, Inc., 112 B.R. 593, 594 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990)（在受托人主张\n\n15 In re 10th Avenue近期获第二巡回法院在In re Nordlicht, 115 F.4th 90, 109 (2d Cir. 2024)一案中肯定性援引，该案确认另我主张可以由破产受托人提出。Nordlicht还援引了第二巡回法院先前在St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 884 F.2d 688, 701 (2d Cir. 1989)一案中的裁决——该裁决同样表明，另我的资产属于破产财产。见St. Paul, 884 F.2d at 695（指出“如果破产原告在其另我主张中胜诉，该财产将成为破产财产，因为Banner将对CL的债务承担责任”（强调添加））以及at 701（另我主张“是关于向破产财产转移财产的主张”，且“具有将财产纳入债务人破产财产效果的程序属于核心程序”（强调添加））。\n\n“被告公司是债务人公司的另我，因此，为移交之目的，Broome Street财产应被视为债务人破产财产的财产”时，驳回驳回动议）；In re Concepcion, No. 13-09126, 2017 WL 1076325, at *6 (Bankr. D.P.R. Mar. 21, 2017)（就另我作出简易判决，并命令“该信托的资产根据11 U.S.C. § 541和§ 542回归破产财产”）。\n\n31. In re Deckelbaum v. Cooter, Mangold, Tompert & Chapman, P.L.L.C., 275 B.R. 737, 742 (D. Md. 2001)一案也特别指向《破产法典》第541条。在该案中，法院指出，已有三家法院裁定多个实体为债务人的另我，并且“[根据11 U.S.C. § 541所规定的破产财产的宽泛定义，作为债务人另我的Dunhill的财产，应被视为实际上属于债务人破产财产的财产]”。Id. 因此，法院认定，另我作出的转让属于破产财产的转让。Id.\n\n32. 在In re Palmieri, 651 B.R. 349 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2023)一案中，受托人提出欺诈性转让主张，称某项财产被债务人欺诈性转让。被告提出驳回动议，主张该转让实际上是由非债务人实体作出的。Id. at 357。法院驳回了该主张，指出被告“似乎忽略了起诉状的核心”。Id. 原因在于，受托人主张作出转让的非债务人实体是债务人的另我，“因此，该[财产]从未离开破产财产”。Id. 法院最终驳回了驳回动议，认定所主张的事实足以构成一项请求。法院最后解释称，“[如果法院最终就受托人的主张作出有利于受托人的认定，不可避免的结论将是，债务人在将[该财产]转让给\n\n[被主张为另我的实体]时拥有该[财产]，并且因此，该财产当时属于破产财产的一部分。”Id. at 358。\n\n33. In re Adler, 494 B.R. 43 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2013)一案也涉及另我裁定的后果。在该案中，破产法院发布了一项“审判后裁决”，以确定“法院先前认定各公司是、且事实上一直是债务人的另我”所产生的后果。Id. at 53。法院确认了两项后果。第一，因为“债务人与作为另我的各公司在所有相关期间均为同一实体”，自动中止适用。Id. 第二，法院根据另我裁定，讨论了《破产法典》下债务人披露义务的适用：\n\n[A]由于作出了另我认定，债务人未披露有关各公司资产和交易的信息，同时即构成未披露债务人的资产和交易。根据定义，另我公司不具有独立意志。因此，既然债务人的各公司被认定在申请破产前即为该等另我，债务人便始终与那五个虚构的公司实体不可分离。各公司的行为和财产因而就是债务人的行为和财产，债务人有责任在其个人破产案件中披露有关各公司行为、资产和记录的详细情况。当其未如此行事，反而隐匿各公司的资产时，债务人不当地“隐匿”了其自己的资产……\n\nIn re Adler, 494 B.R. at 53（强调添加）。16\n\n34. 值得注意的是，这些案件（Adler、Palmieri、Deckelbaum、Blatstein、10th\n\nAvenue、Star Mountain和Yerushalmi）均未提及，依据这些法院所适用的相关州法，另我法的身份理论与替代责任理论之间可能存在的任何区别。相反，另我认定的后果是，作为破产法事项，将另我的\n\n16 共同被告援引Pavers & Rd. Builders Dist. Council Welfare Fund v. Core Contracting of N.Y., LLC, 536 B.R. 48, 51 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2015)，该案不同意Adler，并裁定自动中止不适用于另我，因为另我并未成为债务人。但Pavers既未援引《破产法典》第541条或第542条，也未援引任何支持其裁定的权威依据，且未处理大量相反判例法。\n\n资产纳入破产财产，而不论州法为该财产附加何种标签。\n\n35. 在与最高法院对Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 575 U.S. 665, 668, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1938, 191 L. Ed. 2d 911 (2015)一案意见相关的裁决中，完全没有此类讨论，这一点尤为明显。在该案中，债务人Sharif（沙里夫）对Wellness负有一项数额巨大的破产申请前判决债务。Sharif申请破产后，Wellness提起了一项对抗程序，其中第五项罪名项“请求作出确认判决，认定[某信托]是Sharif的另我，因此其资产应被视为Sharif破产财产的一部分”。Wellness, 575 U.S. at 672。破产法院“按照Wellness起诉状第五项罪名项的请求，宣告据称由该信托持有的资产事实上属于Sharif的破产财产”。Id. 17\n\n36. 总而言之，法院将另我裁定的后果视为依据破产法作出的认定，并为此惯常援引《破产法典》第541条和第542条。具有说服力的最高法院权威支持这一观点。就共同被告提出的、持相反观点的无约束力巡回区外权威而言，18 受托人谨请本院拒绝遵循该等裁定。\n\n17 Wellness案中的被告就破产法院在该对抗程序中作出终局判决的管辖权问题提出上诉，该上诉最终提交至最高法院。尽管Wellness案多数意见拒绝处理破产法院裁决另我主张的管辖权问题，首席大法官Roberts（罗伯茨）——其曾在Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 499, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2618, 180 L. Ed. 2d 475 (2011)一案中撰写多数意见——撰写了一份直接处理该问题的反对意见。首席大法官认为，“界定何者构成破产财产是每一宗破产案件的必要起点；法院必须先知道破产财产中有什么，才能对其进行分配。”Id. at 691-92。他写道，“确定破产财产”因此“不可避免地是债务人与债权人关系重组的核心”。Id. at 692。换言之，根据第541条，何者符合破产财产的条件并非仅仅是一个破产问题。它是每一宗破产案件的核心问题，并直接源于破产本身。因此，另我认定是否导致资产成为破产财产的问题，当然是一个联邦问题。\n\n18 共同被告严重依赖第六巡回法院在In re Howland, 674 F. App'x 482 (6th Cir. 2017)一案中未刊载的裁决，以及该巡回区内的后续案件（In re DuMouchelle, 2023 8100234和In re Silver, 647 B.R. 897 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2022)），以及破产上诉委员会的两个案件\n\nb. Delaware（特拉华州）不遵循另我法的替代责任理论\n\n37. 即使决定另我实体的资产是否属于破产财产的问题受州法而非破产法管辖，共同被告关于特拉华州法严格遵循替代责任路径的主张也是错误的。判例法证明并非如此。\n\n38. 例如，在上文讨论的 In re Palmieri（Palmieri案）中，受托人寻求撤销一项由名义上的非债务人实体作出的转让。法院驳回了被告的驳回动议，认为如果受托人能够成功证明反向揭开公司面纱，则“不可避免的结论[将]是”债务人拥有该非债务人的资产。Palmieri, 651 B.R. at 358。关键的是，法院明确指出，由于名义上的非债务人实体是特拉华州实体，“特拉华州法律管辖反向揭开公司面纱是否适当。”Id. at 357。该法院裁定与受托人的立场一致，即一旦破产法院认定争议中的两个实体根据州法具备另我实体的特征，“破产财产”问题即属于破产法问题。或者，该裁定也与受托人的立场一致，即使州法具有控制作用，特拉华州法律也并不严格遵循另我法的替代责任理论。\n\n39. 此外，与共同被告的论点相反，Spring Real Est., LLC v. Echo/RT Holdings, LLC, No. CV 7994-VCN, 2016 WL 769586, at \\*2 (Del. Ch. Feb. 18, 2016)，同样适用特拉华州法律。在该案中，受托人寻求撤销债务人一家全资子公司作出的转让；受托人提出两项请求：一项依据特拉华州欺诈性转让法，第二项依据伊利诺伊州欺诈性转让法。Id. at \\*2。该\n\n第九巡回区的 In re RS Air, LLC, 651 B.R. 538 和 In re Wardle, No. ADV.S-03-01467, 2006 WL 6811026 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Jan. 31, 2006)。如上所述，共同被告还援引 Pavers & Rd. Builders, 536 B.R. 48，该案虽位于第二巡回区，但对本院不具有约束力。就这些案件采纳共同被告提出的严格区分，并认为该州法问题优先于“《破产法典》第 541 条下何为破产财产”这一联邦问题而言，受托人谨陈，这些案件的裁判有误。\n\n法院认为，根据公司独立性原则，债务人拥有该子公司，但不拥有其资产，因此排除了欺诈性转让请求。Id. at \\*3。法院解释称，该规则存在“一项例外”：“当子公司仅是母公司的另我实体，以至于法院可以进行‘反向揭开公司面纱’时，法院可以为受托人撤销据称欺诈性转让该等资产的诉讼资格之目的，将子公司的资产视为母公司的资产。”Id.\n\n40. 为支持该命题，法院援引 In re Am. Int'l Refinery, 402 B.R. 728, 741 (Bankr. W.D. La. 2008)（“American International Refinery”）。共同被告主张，由于 American International Refinery 适用了内华达州法律，Spring Real Estate 不能作为特拉华州法律的依据。19 这近乎荒谬。如前所述，Spring Real Estate 裁决了依据特拉华州和伊利诺伊州法律提出的请求；内华达州法律毫无相关性。20 此外，Spring Real Estate 法院驳回受托人的请求，是因为受托人并未主张该子公司是债务人的另我实体，因而甚至未能援引本可挽救其请求的公司独立性“一项例外”。为支持这一结论，法院特别援引“特拉华州公共政策”，该政策“并不轻易无视公司的独立法律人格”。Id. at \\*3, n.35（着重号为后加）。因此，即使对该意见作粗略阅读，也可表明法院援引 American International Refinery 是为了支持该法院认为存在于特拉华州和伊利诺伊州法律下的一项命题，而非因为该裁定涉及内华达州法律原则。\n\n41. 诚然，American International Refinery 也支持受托人的立场。共同被告正确指出，American International Refinery (i) 适用了内华达州法律\n\n19 See Joint Mot. at 15.\n\n20 事实上，“Nevada”一词甚至没有出现在该意见中。\n\n且 (ii) 扩大破产财产范围，以包括由另我实体拥有的资产。但该法院还解释称，其“结果与 ASARCO 破产案件中近期的一项裁定一致”。Am. Int'l Refinery, 402 B.R. at 746。American Internal Refinery 法院解释，ASARCO 认定，“如果 SPH 是 ASARCO 的另我实体，则根据特拉华州法律，SPH 持有 SPCC 股票即构成‘根据州法 ASARCO 对财产享有的权益’，而 ASARCO 可以根据第 548 条对该转让提出异议。”Id. at 746（着重号为后加）。如果如共同被告所主张，(i) 州法具有控制作用，(ii) 特拉华州法律严格遵循替代责任理论，以及 (iii) 内华达州法律严格遵循同一性理论，那么法院对 ASARCO 的援引便毫无意义，因为它无法说明内华达州法律，而内华达州法律（根据共同被告的说法）控制 American International Refinery 的结果。21 因此，显然 American International Refinery 认为特拉华州法律和内华达州法律均遵循另我法的同一性理论。22\n\n42. 最后，共同被告援引 Manichaean，主张“从最基本的层面看，反向揭开公司面纱涉及令商业组织对其所有者的债务承担责任。”23 他们声称，这支持其关于\n\n21 共同被告承认 ASARCO 支持特拉华州采纳同一性理论，但似乎暗示 ASARCO 裁判有误，如同其所依据的特拉华州最高法院判例亦有误。ASARCO 援引 Pauley Petroleum, Inc. v. Cont'l Oil Co., 239 A.2d 629 (Del. Ch. 1968)，在该案中，特拉华州最高法院认为，“当然，毫无疑问，在适当举证的情况下，可忽略母公司与子公司之间的公司实体，并在法律和事实层面将最终利益相关方，即母公司，视为特定交易中的唯一当事人。”Id. at 633（着重号为后加）；另见 id.（认为记录中“没有证据表明”应当“忽略公司实体并将两家独立公司视为一体”）（着重号为后加）。尽管如此，共同被告主张，这种“同一性理论表述并非源自 Pauley 所援引的法律”。Joint Mot. at 16。换言之，共同被告要求本院不仅不同意 ASARCO，也不同意特拉华州最高法院。本院应拒绝这一请求。\n\n22 American International Refinery 同样与受托人的立场一致，即无论州法在另我实体认定基础上采纳何种理论，另我实体的资产是否属于破产财产均属于联邦法问题。\n\n23 Joint Mot. at 13.\n\n特拉华州法律适用另我法的替代责任理论的主张。但共同被告刻意遗漏了紧随其后的句子所提供的关键语境。Manichaean 法院完整表述如下：\n\n从最基本的层面看，反向揭开公司面纱涉及令商业组织对其所有者的债务承担责任。在母公司/子公司情形中，如子公司仅是母公司的另我实体，法院将把子公司的资产视为母公司的资产。\n\nManichaean, 251 A.3d at 710（着重号为后加）（经修改）（省略内部引号及引文）。因此，显而易见，根据特拉华州法律，反向揭开公司面纱令另我实体的所有者承担责任，并通过将其资产合并为一来实现这一点。24\n\n43. 总而言之，共同被告主张，州另我实体法被严格划分为采纳另我法同一性理论的州和采纳替代责任理论的州，且特拉华州属于替代责任阵营。但判例表明，即使有所不同，25 特拉华州采纳的是同一性理论。\nc. 本院已经驳回共同被告提出的虚幻区分\n\n44. 最后，共同被告提出的区分已被本院驳回。在受托人与 HK USA（HK USA）之间就 HK USA 存入 US Bank（美国银行）托管账户的资金进行诉讼的 US Bank 提存诉讼中，HK USA 主张，本院的另我实体裁定并未赋予受托人对 HK USA 的控制权，而只是“使 HK USA 的资产可用于清偿[债务人]债权人的请求。”为支持该论点，HK USA 援引 RS Air, LLC v. NetJets Aviation, Inc. (In re RS Air, LLC), 651 B.R. 538, 545 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2023)——共同被告也援引了该案。26\n\n45. 然而，本院驳回了该论点，并特别解释称，与 HK USA 的主张相反，本院认定 HK USA 是债务人的另我实体的裁定，明确认为“HK USA 的全部财产，在所有相关期间直至目前……均已构成并且视情况而定，构成[]债务人第 11 章破产财产的财产。”27\n\n46. 共同被告依赖同一理论和同一判例法提出的论点，在此也应予驳回。\nIV. 受托人并未寻求、亦不需要追溯生效救济，因为债务人始终拥有另我实体的资产\n\n47. 共同被告主张，即使“特拉华州采用揭开公司面纱的同一性理论，受托人依据第 549 条提出的请求仍然依法不能成立，因为该等实体性救济不能以追溯或 nunc pro tunc 方式提供。”28 他们进一步主张，另我实体裁定只能在法院作出“无视”债务人另我实体“公司形式的命令或判决书”之后才发生效力。29 法律规定恰恰相反。正如众多法院所认定，另我实体裁定赋予既存法律现实以效力：尽管名义上彼此独立，相关实体实际上是并且始终与另一人或实体不可区分。运用该原则，法院已允许\n\n26 See HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC's Memorandum in Opposition to Chapter 11 Trustee's Motion for Summary Judgment, ¶ 18 (Adv. Proc. No. 23-05012, July 6, 2023) [Docket No. 47].\n\n27 See Memorandum of Decision and Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment, ¶¶ 16-17 (Adv. Proc. No. 23-05012, Sept. 7, 2023) [Docket No. 57].\n\n28 Joint Mot. at 20. 共同被告就受托人的欺诈性转让请求提出相同论点。See id. at 29-30.\n\n29 Id. at 21.\n\n在另我实体裁定作出后继续审理欺诈性转让及申请提交后转让请求，而无需首先认定该裁定以 nunc pro tunc 方式适用。\n\n48. 例如，在 In re Harman, 512 B.R. 321 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2014) 一案中，受托人寻求追回由非债务人信托作出的破产申请提交后转移。法院指出，由于受托人充分主张“信托资产事实上属于债务人的资产，[该]受托人已适当地主张，申请日信托的资产成为破产财产。”Id. at 342-43. 结合“无论来自信托还是其他来源，均未有任何破产申请提交后的财产转移获得授权”这一事实，法院裁定，受托人已充分“主张信托作出的任何破产申请提交后财产转移均可根据 §549(a) 撤销。”Id. at 343. 法院无需追溯性（nunc pro tunc）作出其裁定。\n\n49. American International Refinery 也直接切中要害，并适用于第 549 条请求和欺诈性转移请求。该案中，法院裁定，另我（alter ego）的资产被视为债务人的财产。共同被告承认这一点，但辩称 American International Refinery“明确适用了遵循同一性理论的 Nevada law（内华达州法）。”30 如上所述，American International Refinery 支持受托人，而非共同被告。无论如何，共同被告还必须承认，American International Refinery 裁定，就法律而言，受托人的另我请求（如获成功）亦将支持其撤销之诉。见 In re Am. Int'l Refinery, 402 B.R. at 752（另我请求是“原告依据第 547-549 条提出请求的门槛要求”）。\n\n50. 同样地，上文讨论的 In re Palmieri 允许受托人基于依据 Delaware law（特拉华州法）提出的另我主张，继续推进其欺诈性转移请求。在该案中，债务人于 2005 年 9 月将涉案财产转移给被主张为另我的实体；该财产随后于 2014 年 7 月再次被转移。数年后，债务人于 2021 年申请破产，受托人寻求追回该财产时，被告辩称，2014 年的转移并非破产财产的转移。尽管如此，法院认定，受托人已充分主张，2005 年接收该财产的非债务人转让实体事实上是债务人的另我。因此，债务人在 2005 年至 2014 年间拥有该财产，并且“因此，该财产当时属于破产财产的一部分。”In re Palmieri, 651 B.R. at 358（着重强调）。\n\n30 Joint Mot. at 15.\n\n51. In re Fisher, 296 Fed. App'x 494 (6th Cir. 2008) 也涉及撤销由后来被裁定为另我的非债务人作出的转移。在该案中，个人债务人于 2003 年 4 月提交其破产申请，受托人寻求撤销于 2003 年 1 月由债务人被主张为另我的实体转移的某些存货。“破产法院认定，由于 Fisher（费舍尔）与 FDP 是同一实体，FDP 的存货属于 Fisher，因此向 Brennan（布伦南）作出的转移是对债务人财产权益的转移。”Id. at 506.31 另见 Deckelbaum, 275 B.R at 742（在另我裁定前作出的转移可予撤销）。\n\n52. 共同被告未援引任何一宗案件（且受托人不知道有任何此类案件），其中法院认定另我的资产属于债务人，但仍禁止受托人撤销该等资产先前的转移。\n\n53. 共同被告严重依赖 In re Duckworth, No. 10-83603, 2012 WL 4434681 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 2012),32 该案驳回了受托人“利用另我理论完全重构事实格局的创造性尝试。”Id. at \\*5. 但该案并不支持共同被告。Duckworth 法院驳回受托人的另我论点，\n\n31 Fisher 还支持受托人的立场，即另我认定导致两个实体及其资产合并。\n\n32 See Joint Mot. at 28.\n\n因为涉案实体“均根据州法适当设立，并作为独立实体有效存续”，且受托人“未作相反主张” id. at \\*4；因此，受托人的理论在 Duckworth 案中存在的“无争议事实背景下”无法得到证明。Id. 换言之，法院认定受托人未能证实其另我主张。然而，法院并未裁定，另我认定在法律上不能支持如本案所涉的撤销之诉。恰恰相反，法院裁定，“[如承认这三个实体的存在，则债务人的资金转移发生于破产申请提交前——不会涉及破产财产的任何破产申请提交后转移，第 549 条亦不适用。”Id.（着重强调）。逆否命题显而易见：如果这三个实体确实一直是同一个实体，则将会存在破产申请提交后的转移。\n\n54. 共同被告对 Duckworth 的依赖还因另一项更根本的理由而存在缺陷。法院强调，在“转移发生时，一个独立的公司实体存在，且该实体作出了”被质疑的转移，而受托人正试图利用另我理论“重塑一套不同的事实，可以说是改写历史。”Id. at \\*8. 这一评论在该案的背景下是合理的，因为如前所述，“无争议事实”并不支持受托人的另我主张。但这恰恰是为何另我认定会支持本案中受托人请求的原因。正如法院在 In re Adler 中所解释，另我裁定意味着被揭开公司面纱的实体“是且事实上一直是债务人的另我。”Adler, 494 B.R. at 53（着重强调）。Duckworth 案中的受托人依靠“空泛”的另我主张试图改写历史，而真正的另我认定所做的恰恰相反：它透过面纱审视，以确保现在与一贯存在的真相相一致。事实上，本院已恰当地作出同样的观察，并指出，\n\n即使（例如）法院于 2017 年认定一项合同于 2015 年被违约，“那不是 nunc pro tunc；那是法院认定那[就是]发生的事情。”33\n\n55. 这也是共同被告错误地认为另我认定的追溯适用构成 nunc pro tunc 救济的原因。34 “所有 nunc pro tunc 救济，就其性质而言，均涉及一种法律拟制。”In re Player's Poker Club, Inc., 636 B.R. 811, 829 n.9 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2022). 但另我认定并非法律拟制。恰恰相反，它是一项旨在实现法律真相的理论：被揭开公司面纱的实体与控制实体或个人不可区分，且一直如此。另我理论并不创设法律拟制；它消除了法律拟制。见 In re Autobacs Strauss, Inc., 473 B.R. 525, 555 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012)（“当独立的公司身份是一种拟制，而子公司事实上作为母公司的一个部门运营时，子公司即为母实体的另我或工具。”）（省略内部引号和引证）（经修正）；另见 In re Adler, 494 B.R. at 53（“根据定义，另我公司不具有独立意志。因此，既然债务人的公司被认定在破产申请提交前属于该等另我，债务人与该五个公司拟制始终不可分离。”）（着重强调）。相反，仅在将来适用另我认定，将会因允许一种拟制继续存在而破坏该理论的性质和目的。见 In re Schuster, 132 B.R. 604, 612 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991)（在应当适用时未适用另我理论，将允许债务人“将过去对个人资源的转移隐匿于一个人为实体之中”，这将“允许一种法律拟制——家族公司的表象——凌驾于实质之上”）。\n\n33 Sept. 24, 2024 Hr'g Tr., at 29:6-7. September 24, 2024 听证会笔录相关摘录的副本作为证据 2 随附于此。\n\n34 共同被告用近八页篇幅讨论 nunc pro tunc 救济可被及不可被利用的情形，包括 Supreme Court（美国联邦最高法院）在 Roman Cath. Archdiocese of San Juan, Puerto Rico v. Acevedo Feliciano, 589 U.S. 57 (2020) 中的裁定。见 Joint Mot. at 25-27. 整个讨论均无关紧要，因为受托人并未寻求 nunc pro tunc 救济。受托人过去曾主张，如有必要，其有权获得 nunc pro tunc 救济。然而，基于本文所讨论的全部理由，受托人无需 nunc pro tunc 救济即可提出这些撤销之诉，因为本院对另我的认定必然具有追溯效力。无论如何，即使本院有必要作出 nunc pro tunc 救济，其在本案中亦属适当，因为该救济不会创设新事实；相反，如本文所述，记录将被更正以反映实际存在的事件。见 Acevedo Feliciano, 589 U.S. at 65（“联邦法院可以作出 nunc pro tunc 命令，……以‘反映’已经发生之事的现实[。]”）。\n\n56. 共同被告可能因为无法质疑这一真相，便诉诸于掩饰。首先，其辩称，“受托人所寻求的另我救济的性质类似于实质合并这一衡平法救济。”35 随后，其援引讨论实质合并裁定是否应以 nunc pro tunc 为基础适用的案件。但这是偷换概念，旨在攻击一个稻草人论点。另我和实质合并可能相似，但二者并不相同，也不受相同法律标准管辖，且受托人并未主张实质合并。36 见 Star Mountain Res., Inc., 2022 WL 2294175, at \\*7（“尽管实质合并请求与另我请求所依据的因素经常重叠，实质合并可与州法另我请求相区分。”）。“实质合并最好被理解为一种经济救济，其主要目标是公平对待所有债权人。相反，州法另我请求是一种侧重于防止欺诈或不公正的衡平法救济。”Id.（省略脚注和内部引号）。因此，尽管法院经常讨论是否以 nunc pro tunc 为基础适用实质合并，但对于另我请求而言并无必要进行同样的审查；如上所示，该请求必然具有追溯效力。\n\n35 Joint Mot. at 21.\n\n36 如上所述，受托人亦未寻求 nunc pro tunc 救济。此外，为避免疑义，受托人并不承认实质合并（或“类似于”实质合并的救济）不得具有 nunc pro tunc 效力。见，例如，In re Am. Way Serv. Corp., 229 B.R. 496, 526 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999)（“对合并命令的审查使本法官确信，Ray 法官除合并破产财产外，还意图使该合并具有 nunc pro tunc 效力。”）。受托人保留与此相关的一切权利。\n\n57. 基于所有这些理由，受托人已轻易地根据适用法律主张了可成立的另我请求，而就该等请求作出有利于受托人的裁定，其效力在于允许受托人撤销另我过去作出的转移。因此，必须驳回共同动议。\n\n[本页其余部分故意留白。]\n\n因此，基于前述理由，受托人谨请求本院\n\n驳回共同动议，并给予本院认为适当的任何其他救济。\n\n日期：November 8, 2024 LUC A. DESPINS（卢克·A·德斯平斯），New York, New York CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE（第 11 章受托人）\n\n签署人：/s/ Douglass Barron\n\nDouglass Barron（道格拉斯·巴伦）（获准 pro hac vice） PAUL HASTINGS LLP（普衡律师事务所） 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6079 douglassbarron@paulhastings.com\n\n以及\n\nNicholas A. Bassett（尼古拉斯·A·巴塞特）（经准许特别出庭） PAUL HASTINGS LLP（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所） 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C., 20036 (202) 551-1902 nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n及\n\nPatrick R. Linsey（帕特里克·R·林赛）（ct29437） NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C.（纽伯特、佩佩及蒙泰思律师事务所） 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 781-2847 plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n第11章受托人的代理律师","key_entities":["HCHK","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Despins","Paul Hastings","Guo","RICO","Miles Guo","CIPA"],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":11764,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 21:35:12"}