{"id":"court_ctb_3864_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":3864,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"REPLY","filed_date":"2006-01-12","title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION | -------------------------------------------","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"## **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| ------------------------------------------------------ | | x | |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|------------------|------------------------------|\n| In re: | | :
: | Chapter 11 |\n| HO WAN KWOK, et al.,1 | | :
: | Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |\n| Debtors.
----------------------------------------------------- | | :
:
: | (Jointly Administered) |\n| LUC A DESPINS, CHAPTER 11
TRUSTEE, | | :
: | |\n| v. | Plaintiff, | :
:
:
: | Adv. Proceeding No. 24-05187 |\n| WILDES & WEINBERG P.C., | | : | |\n| ------------------------------------------------------x | Defendant. | :
: | |\n\n#### **CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF SEALED MOTION OF CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE, PURSUANT TO BANKRUPTCY RULE 9019, REGARDING SETTLEMENT WITH WILDES & WEINBERG, P.C.**\n\n1 The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\n# **Table of Contents**\n\n| I. | G-Club Lacks Standing to Object to Settlement Motion 2 |\n|------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| II. | Trustee Has Identified Valid and Important Basis to Seal Settlement Agreement 4 |\n| a. | Harm to Estate Justifies Sealing Settlement Agreement 4 |\n| b. | G-Club Cites Cases Declining to Seal to Protect Non-Debtor Defendants 8 |\n| c. | Court Has Discretion to Seal Settlement Agreement Even if not \"Commercial
Information\" 11 |\n| III. | Court Has Sufficient Information to Approve Settlement Agreement 13 |\n| IV. | Court Should Approve Motion to Limit Notice 15 |\n\n#### **TABLE OF AUTHORITIES**\n\n#### **Page(s)**\n\n#### **Cases**\n\n| Geltzer v. Andersen Worldwide, S.C.,
No. 05 CIV. 3339 (GEL), 2007 WL 273526 8 |\n|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| In re 50-Off Stores, Inc.,
213 B.R. 646 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1997) 4, 5 |\n| In re A C & S Inc.,
775 F. App'x 78 (3d Cir. 2019) 11 |\n| In re Alterra Healthcare Corp.,
353 B.R. 66 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) 6, 8 |\n| In re Anthracite Cap., Inc.,
492 B.R. 162 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) 10 |\n| In re Bennett Funding Grp., Inc.,
226 B.R. 331 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1998) 11 |\n| In re Bertsos,
No. 97-34158 (AMN), 2022 WL 4690333 2 |\n| In re Ditech Holding Corp.,
No. 19-10412 (JLG), 2019 WL 32946848, 9 |\n| In re EPIC Associates V,
54 B.R. 445 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985) 11 |\n| In re Farmland Industries, Inc.,
290 B.R. 364 (W.D. Mo. 2003) 4, 5 |\n| In re Gibbs,
2017 WL 6506324 (Bankr. D. Hawaii 2017) 8, 9 |\n| In re Global Crossing Ltd.,
295 B.R. 720 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) 4, 11 |\n| In re Hemple,
295 B.R. 200 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2003) 12, 13, 14 |\n| In re Micron Devices, LLC,
No. 20-23359-LMI, 2021 WL 2021468 3 |\n\n| In re Motions Seeking Access to 2019 Statements,
585 B.R. 733 (D. Del. 2018), aff'd sub nom. 11 |\n|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| In re Oldco M. Corp.,
466 B.R. 234 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) 8, 9, 10 |\n| In re Pursuit Holdings (NY), LLC,
No. 18-12738 (MG), 2019 WL 1220928 13 |\n| In re Quigley Co., Inc.,
437 B.R. 102 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) 8, 9, 10 |\n| In re Stone Barn Manhattan LLC,
405 B.R. 68 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) 13 |\n| In re Teligent, Inc.,
640 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2011)2 |\n| In re Thomas,
583 B.R. 385 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2018) 8, 9, 10 |\n| In re VoIP Guardian Partners I, LLC,
No. 2:19-BK-12607-BR, 2024 WL 3520151 2 |\n| In re Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
No. MC 17-204-GLT, 2019 WL 642850 8, 9 |\n| Statutes |\n| Bankr. Code Ch. 11 1, 4, 5, 8, 9, 12 |\n| Bankr. Code § 107 3, 4, 5, 11, 14 |\n| Rules |\n| Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9018 4 |\n| Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019 1, 5, 13 |\n\nLuc A. Despins, in his capacity as the chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") appointed in the chapter 11 case of Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"), by and through his undersigned counsel, hereby files this reply (the \"Reply\") (i) in support of the *Sealed Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee, Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019, Regarding Settlement with Wildes & Weinberg, P.C.* [ECF No. 3559] (the \"9019 Motion\")2 and (ii) in response to the limited objection filed by G Club Operations LLC (\"G-Club\").3 In support of this Reply, the Trustee respectfully states as follows:\n\n#### **Reply**\n\n1. The Settlement Agreement has been shared, in full, with the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors and the United States Trustee (the \"UST\"). The redacted version of the 9019 Motion (which refers to, but does not include a copy of, the Settlement Agreement) was served on over two-hundred and fifty parties and has been publicly available since it was filed on the public docket almost three months ago on September 19, 2024. In that time, the Trustee received only two responsive pleadings: the G-Club Objection and the UST's limited objection.4\n\n2. The UST (which reviewed the Settlement Agreement in full) filed its limited objection only to address whether the Settlement Agreement should be sealed, an issue of systemic importance to the UST. After discussions with the Trustee leading to a revised Proposed Order granting the 9019 Motion, the UST has withdrawn its limited objection—leaving G-Club as the only objecting party, with its objection based on its argument that the terms of Settlement Agreement must be made public.5\n\n2 The Settlement Motion was also filed at Docket No. 14 on the docket of the Adversary Proceeding. Unless otherwise noted, all docket references are to the docket of the main case, Case No. 22-50073. Capitalized terms used but not otherwise defined herein shall have the meaning given to such terms in the 9019 Motion. 3\n\n*See* Docket No. 3633 (the \"G-Club Objection\"). 4\n\n*See* Docket No. 3641. 5\n\nConcurrently herewith, the Trustee has filed his *Notice of Filing of Revised Proposed Order Approving, Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019, Sealed Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee Regarding Settlement with Wildes & Weinberg, P.C.* reflecting the terms of the agreement with the UST, which provides that the Trustee shall have\n\n3. G-Club's objection is meritless and should be dismissed on multiple grounds. Initially, G-Club has no standing to object to the 9019 Motion because G-Club is merely a defendant in litigation brought by the Trustee and has no legally protected interest in the 9019 Motion. In any event, G-Club's objection fails on the merits because the Trustee validly seeks to seal the Settlement Agreement to protect the estate—not to protect the settlement counterparty or other non-debtors, as was the situation in the cases that G-Club cites. This distinction is critical: because, while the estate has no interest in protecting a non-debtor defendant in that defendant's own, unrelated, litigation, the estate does have a strong interest in preserving the value of estate claims against similarly-situated current and future avoidance action defendants (such as G-Club), which will directly impact recoveries and distributions to creditors.\n\n#### **I. G-Club Lacks Standing to Object to Settlement Motion**\n\n4. \"A party has standing to object to a motion pursuant to [Bankruptcy Rule] 9019 if they are directly and adversely affected pecuniarily by the challenged order of the bankruptcy court.\" *In re Bertsos*, No. 97-34158 (AMN), 2022 WL 4690333, at \\*3 (Bankr. D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2022). Creditors—who \"have a claim against the bankruptcy estate or an expectation of a distribution from its assets\"—satisfy this rule. *Id.* at \\*6. Would-be objectors who are not creditors can only satisfy this standing requirement if they have a \"legally protected interest that an order approving the compromise might directly and adversely affect pecuniarily.\" *Id.* (putative objectors who were \"not creditors\" did \"not have standing to object to the Trustee's motion to compromise\"). *See also In re Teligent, Inc.*, 640 F.3d 53, 61 (2d Cir. 2011) (noncreditor had no legally protected interest and \"could not have appeared before the bankruptcy court to challenge the settlement agreement\"); *In re VoIP Guardian Partners I, LLC*, No. 2:19-\n\nuntil 180 days from the date of entry of an order approving the 9019 Motion to publicize the terms of the Settlement Agreement.\n\nBK-12607-BR, 2024 WL 3520151, at \\*3 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. July 24, 2024) (affirming bankruptcy court's ruling that putative objectors lacked standing where, among other things, \"Appellants are not creditors of the estate and will not be impacted by the receipt, or lack thereof, of funds into the estate\"); *In re Micron Devices, LLC*, No. 20-23359-LMI, 2021 WL 2021468, at \\*15 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. May 20, 2021) (\"Cobalt Capital, LLC is not a creditor of the estate, and has no standing to object to the 9019 Motion\").\n\n5. G-Club has not filed a proof of claim against the Debtor and is not in line for a distribution from the estate. G Club is, instead, an entity that played a central role in the massive fraudulent scheme for which the Debtor was criminally convicted, and an entity the Trustee has alleged is and always has been the Debtor's alter ego, meaning that every dollar it spends in opposing the Trustee's efforts in this chapter 11 case is a dollar less that the estate may potentially be able to distribute to creditors. The Trustee has learned through recent discovery, including a Rule 2004 deposition, that although G-Club recently appointed a nominal third-party manager (FFP (BVI) Limited) to oversee its actions, the real party making all major decisions for G-Club is Haoran He, a close associate of the Debtor who played an integral role in the Debtor's fraudulent activities, such as by signing loan agreements for the benefit of the Debtor's shell companies and his son, including to facilitate the purchase of a Ferrari.6\n\n6. For these reasons, the Court should be highly skeptical of G Club's motivations in filing its objection to the Rule 9019 Motion, which objection is essentially being funded with estate assets to the extent G Club is the Debtor's alter ego. At best, G Club is a defendant in\n\n6 The Director Services Agreement for G-Club governing FFP (BVI) Limited's appointment provides that Mr. He must authorize, in writing, major decisions such as the commencement or settlement of litigation and the filing of \"statements\" in litigation. Based on the Trustee's deposition of G-Club's representative, it is questionable whether Mr. He validly authorized the filing of the objection to the 9019 Motion.\n\nsimilar litigation that seeks a leg up in its litigation with the Trustee.7 It has not identified any legally protected pecuniary interest that might be adversely affected if the Court grants the 9019 Motion and enters the Proposed Order. Because the Settlement Agreement has no impact on G-Club's wallet, G-Club has no standing to object to the 9019 Motion.\n\n#### **II. Trustee Has Identified Valid and Important Basis to Seal Settlement Agreement**\n\n7. The Trustee has explained that disclosing the settlement terms will harm the estate by prejudicing the Trustee's position in hundreds of pending adversary proceedings asserting similar claims against other defendants. G-Club does not dispute the factual sufficiency of the Trustee's representation to this Court that disclosure of the terms of the settlement is likely to harm the estate. Instead, G-Club argues that this harm is legally insufficient because settlement terms are not protected information. But there is ample support in the caselaw for the proposition that a court could, and should, seal information where its release would harm the estate and reduce distributions to creditors. In this *specific factual context*, the settlement terms are \"commercial information\" protected by section 107(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. The authority G-Club marshals is not to the contrary, as those cases deal with very different facts.\n\n#### **a. Harm to Estate Justifies Sealing Settlement Agreement**\n\n8. Multiple courts have sealed information where doing otherwise would undermine the bankruptcy trustee's efforts to maximize the value of the estate and distributions to creditors. In *In re Farmland Indus., Inc.*, 290 B.R. 364 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2003), the debtors asked the court to seal certain documents, as well as the courtroom itself, in connection with their debtor in possession financing. The court held that publicizing the information in question would impair the \"paramount goal in the sale of assets in a bankruptcy proceeding,\" which is to \"obtain the\n\n7 G-Club's counsel notably represents numerous other avoidance action defendants, who, like G Club, would no doubt like to use knowledge of the Trustee's settlement with Wildes & Weinberg for tactical advantage.\n\nbest price possible for the ultimate benefit of the unsecured creditors of the bankruptcy estate.\" *Id.* at 369. \"[P]rohibiting these disclosures [wa]s necessary to protect the bankruptcy estate.\" *Id*. As one court has explained, the \"teaching of *Farmland Industries* is that the commercial information that is entitled to protection under Code section 107(b) and Bankruptcy Rule 9018 *must be viewed from the practical perspective of damage to the estate or its creditors*.\" *In re Global Crossing Ltd.*, 295 B.R. 720, 725 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (emphasis added).\n\n9. This estate-focused perspective also applies to a trustee's ability to maximize the value of the estate's litigation claims. In *In re 50-Off Stores, Inc.*, 213 B.R. 646 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1997), the debtor moved to retain litigation counsel, and two defendants in other pending litigation asked the court to unseal the record of the hearing on that motion. The court noted that the disclosure requirements of bankruptcy create a difficult choice for a debtor as, \"absent special protection on the part of the court, the record of such a hearing is public, available for transcription by anyone, *including the target defendants!*\" *Id.* at 655 (emphasis in original). Fortunately, explained the court, section 107(b) of the Bankruptcy Code \"affords a bankruptcy judge some authority to prevent just such an obvious injustice.\" *Id*. According to the court, the work product a debtor must disclose to justify retaining litigation counsel is \"certainly\" the type of confidential research or commercial information protected by section 107(b). *Id*. Protecting this information allowed the court to \"discharge its obligation\" (*i.e.*, ensuring that the debtor's judgement was sound) \"without, in the process, causing substantial injury to the very asset (*i.e.*, the lawsuit) that the debtor was trying to pursue.\" *Id.* at 656.\n\n10. Here, as well, Rule 9019 obligates the Trustee to disclose the Settlement Agreement to the Court and requires that the Court consider whether the Trustee's decision to enter into the settlement was appropriate. As both *Farmland Industries* and *50-Off* recognize, it\n\nwould be an injustice, and contrary to the paramount goal of the Bankruptcy Code, if in doing so the Trustee was also required to prejudice the very asset (his hundreds of litigation claims) that he is pursuing on behalf of Kwok's creditors and victims. Nor should the Court ignore the very practical reality that the only objecting party is not a creditor—but *is a defendant* in currently pending litigation with the Trustee.\n\n11. The impact (or lack thereof) on the estate and its creditors similarly underpins *In re Alterra Healthcare Corp.*, 353 B.R. 66 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006). In that case, the reorganized debtor asked the court to seal settlements with various tort claimants. The debtor argued that other tort claimants, who had not yet settled, would use these settlements as leverage to obtain higher settlements in their cases. This, the debtor argued, would reduce the value of the estate, as it would reduce the amount available to non-tort general unsecured creditors. *Id.* at 76. The court was \"unpersuaded\" by this argument, as (i) the debtor's insurance company would cover much of any payment to tort claimants and (ii) the debtor had, under the plan, set aside a \\$32 million reserve for these unresolved tort claimants. *Id*. It was, therefore, factually \"unclear if the release of this information will impact the other creditors of the Reorganized Debtor.\" *Id*.\n\n12. The facts here are very different, undercutting G-Club's reliance on *Alterra*. No insurance company is on the hook for Kwok's debts. Nor is there a pot of cash segregated for the benefit Kwok's general unsecured creditors. Accordingly, while the settlements in *Alterra* had no impact on other creditors, that is not the case here, as every dollar the Trustee does not collect directly reduces the recovery to all creditors—especially considering that this chapter 11 case is based on litigation, with no source of value or recovery other than what the Trustee recovers through his investigation and litigation efforts.8\n\n8 This is another basis to distinguish *Alterra*. In *Alterra*, the debtor argued that unsealing the settlement agreement would enable one group of creditors to obtain higher recoveries that, otherwise, would be distributed\n\n13. In short, there is ample authority to seal a settlement agreement where its publication would endanger recoveries to general unsecured creditors. And, in fact, bankruptcy courts routinely seal settlement documents.9 Indeed, courts have even approved mediation and settlement procedures in which settlements are finalized without any court approval. For example, in *GT Advanced Technologies*, the court approved procedures for the expedited resolution of secured, priority, and administrative expense claims. Pursuant to these approved procedures, the court allowed the debtors and the claimants to pick a mediator without court approval and enter into a binding agreement without court approval. The court did require that, after each mediation, the mediator file a report indicating whether a settlement was reached—but the court did not require that the terms of any settlement be filed.10\n\n14. Here, the Court has already approved a mediation program, supervised by Judge Tancredi, a sitting United States Bankruptcy Judge. Those mediation procedures explicitly contemplate that settlement agreements could be filed under seal if the Trustee believes that public disclosure would harm the estate—as demonstrated above, this harm to the estate is sufficient basis for sealing. Moreover, any settlement agreement that the Trustee believes should be sealed is still available, in full, to the UST, counsel for the Committee, and, of course, Judge Tancredi.\n\nto another group. Sealing the settlement, then, would have required the court to pick one group of creditors over another, but would not have benefitted the estate as a whole. The court, properly, declined to pit one group of creditors against another. Here, though, the Trustee seeks to protect his ability to maximize recoveries for *all* creditors. 9\n\n*See, e.g.*, *In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., et al.*, Case No. 02-41729 (REG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2006) (ECF No. 9290); *In re Capmark Financial Group Inc., et al.*, Case No. 09-13684 (CSS) (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 15, 2010) (ECF No. 1911); *In re Lyondell Chem. Co., et al.*, Case No. 09-10023 (REG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4,\n\n2013) (ECF No. 7229). Copies of these orders are attached as **Exhibit 1** hereto. 10 *See In re GT Advanced Techs., Inc.* ¶ 21, Case No. 14-11916 (Bankr. D. N.H. Dec. 17, 2015) (ECF 2777), attached as **Exhibit 2** hereto.\n\n#### **b. G-Club Cites Cases Declining to Seal to Protect** *Non-Debtor* **Defendants**\n\n15. G-Club argues that prejudice to creditor recoveries is legally insufficient to justify sealing the Settlement Agreement, and that the Trustee's explanation that sealing is necessary to prevent prejudice to the Trustee's litigation strategy \"has been rejected as insufficient as a matter of law.\"11 In support, G-Club points to several cases declining to seal settlement amounts.\n\n16. But the cases cited by G-Club (and others like them) have in common a specific set of circumstances, not present here. In those case, the proffered justification for the proposed sealing was that the *settling, non-debtor, defendant* demanded it and/or sealing was requested to protect the litigation position of the *settling, non-debtor, defendant*. G-Club is correct that courts have rejected these justifications, as bankruptcy courts will not give in to \"no seal/no deal\" pressure imposed by a defendant, nor will they seal settlement terms to protect the litigation interests of *non-debtors* in their other litigation with *other non-debtors*.\n\n17. This distinction between sealing a settlement (i) to protect a non-debtor defendant or (ii) to protect the estate (as the Trustee seeks to do here) is highlighted by the District Court's opinion in *Geltzer v. Andersen Worldwide, S.C.*, No. 05 CIV. 3339 (GEL), 2007 WL 273526 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2007), cited by G-Club. In this influential and widely cited opinion,12 the chapter 7 trustee settled with the accounting firm Arthur Andersen, which was already defunct and facing significant litigation at the time of the settlement. Requesting that the court seal the terms of the agreement, the trustee argued that \"public disclosure of the Settlement Amount would enable other claimants against Andersen to determine how much Andersen is currently willing, and able, to pay in respect of the Trustee's claim, thereby potentially undercutting\n\n11 G-Club Obj. ¶ 25.\n\n12 *Geltzer* is cited by *Thomas*, *Ditech*, *Oldco*, *Quigley*, *Gibbs*, *Anthracite Capital*, and *Wells Fargo*, all discussed below, as well as *Alterra Healthcare*, discussed above.\n\nAndersen's negotiating leverage with such claimants.\" 2007 WL 273526, at \\*4.\n\n18. The court rejected this argument, explaining that there \"is no discernable public interest, *or interest of the bankruptcy estates*, in preserving Andersen's 'leverage' as against other parties who have sued it,\" and that the trustee had not offered \"any authority to support its implicit proposition that protecting the bargaining position of the *defendant in other, unrelated cases*, is even a proper consideration of a court being asked to approve a settlement in a given case.\" *Id*. (emphasis added).\n\n19. G-Club also cites *In re Ditech Holding Corp.*, No. 19-10412 (JLG), 2019 WL 3294684 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2019). The debtor there also impermissibly focused on the potential harm to the non-debtor defendant. As the court explained, \"[i]n essence, the Debtors contend that [Bank of America] will be placed at competitive disadvantage if the Court unseals the redacted information because they will lose leverage in future negotiations with counterparties to other mortgage loans servicing agreements.\" *Id.* at \\*9. Rejecting this argument, the court noted that *Geltzer*'s \"rationale applie[d] equally\" to Bank of America, as there was \"no discernable public interest or interests of the Debtors in preserving BANA's leverage in negotiations with other parties.\" 2019 WL 3294684, at \\* 9.\n\n20. This pattern repeated itself in *In re Gibbs*, No. 11-03070, 2017 WL 6506324 (Bankr. D. Haw. Dec. 19, 2017), in which Bank of America was again the settling party and the trustee and Bank of America asked the court to seal a settlement because Bank of America \"worrie[d] that, if the settlement amount in this case is disclosed, other parties claiming that [the bank] engaged in wrongful foreclosure conduct will demand similar amounts.\" 2017 WL 6506324, at \\*2. The court denied the sealing request, as settlements should not be sealed to protect a defendant's \"negotiating leverage in litigation with other parties.\" *Id*.\n\n21. Another bank, Wells Fargo, fared no better when it tried to maintain its litigation leverage as a non-debtor defendant. In *In re Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.*, No. MC 17-204-GLT, 2019 WL 642850 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2019), Wells Fargo was facing similar claims in seventy-seven adversary proceedings with different debtors; having settled with eighteen of those debtors (who shared counsel), the bank, the settling debtors, and the chapter 13 trustee sought to seal the terms of the agreement. Declining to seal the agreement, the court explained that the \"sole articulated basis for sealing the Settlement Agreement [was] to avoid establishing a threshold with respect to any amounts Wells Fargo may agree to pay in order to settle similar litigation with other parties.\" 2019 WL 642850, at \\*1 (internal quotation marks omitted).\n\n22. Other cases cited by G-Club (*In re Quigley Co., Inc.*, 437 B.R. 102 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010), *In Oldco M Corp.*, 466 B.R. 234 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012), and *In re Thomas*, 583 B.R. 385 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2018)) all fit this pattern as well.\n\n23. *Quigley* was an asbestos case, and a group of law firms had entered into prepetition agreements to settle the claims of approximately 175,000 claimants. The law firms later moved to seal these settlements, arguing that releasing this information \"could prejudice Counsel for Tort Claimants' ongoing litigation and settlement discussions with other defendants.\" 437 B.R. at 151-52. In other words, a group of non-debtor law firms was concerned about the law firms' other litigation on behalf of non-debtor claimants against non-debtor defendants; the court held this was not a basis to seal the agreement.13 And in *In re Oldco M Corp.*, 466 B.R. 234 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012), the court declined to seal a settlement where the \"only reason given for sealing the settlement was that public disclosure would undercut the *settling defendant's*\n\n13 Also important to the court's consideration in *Quigley* was that the pre-petition settlements at issue were \"part of a strategy, conceived and executed in bad faith, to manipulate the vote.\" *Quigley*, 437 B.R. at 154. Those considerations are not present here.\n\n*leverage in negotiating with other claimants*.\" *Id.* at 238 (emphasis added). Lastly, in *In re Thomas*, 583 B.R. 385 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2018), the court noted that the parties offered only \"broad statements regarding their desire for confidentiality\" and \"essentially tell the Court there will be no settlement in the adversary proceeding if the terms of the settlement are not kept confidential.\" *Id.* at 391-92.\n\n24. In sum, \"providing *third parties* with a litigation advantage in *outside actions* does not justify sealing a court document.\" *In re Anthracite Cap., Inc.*, 492 B.R. 162, 173 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) (emphasis added). Here, however, the Trustee's purpose is not to protect a settling counterparty. Sealing is necessary to maintain the Trustee's ability to negotiate and settle hundreds of pending adversary proceedings with other defendants, all to protect the *estate*. And, as demonstrated above, the caselaw supports the rule that harm to the estate (as opposed to harm to a non-debtor defendant) is grounds for sealing.\n\n#### **c. Court Has Discretion to Seal Settlement Agreement Even if not \"Commercial Information\"**\n\n25. When \"viewed from the practical perspective of damage to the estate or its creditors,\" as the caselaw requires, *Global Crossing*, 295 B.R. at 725, the Settlement Agreement is confidential research or commercial information under section 107(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. As such, protecting the information is mandatory. But even if it was not, the Court still has the authority to seal the Settlement Agreement. *See In re Bennett Funding Grp., Inc.*, 226 B.R. 331, 336 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1998) (\"If it is determined that the information sought to be disclosed fits into any of the specified categories, the Court has no discretion in denying access to it … If the information does not represent trade secrets or confidential research, development or commercial information, then whether to permit access to the information is a matter left to the Court's discretion.\"); *see also In re Motions Seeking Access to 2019 Statements*, 585 B.R. 733, 747 (D.\n\nDel. 2018), *aff'd sub nom. In re A C & S Inc.*, 775 F. App'x 78 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing *Bennet Funding* in support of holding that \"Bankruptcy Court had authority\" to enter sealing order on \"multiple bases,\" including \"discretionary authority under § 107(b)\"); *In re EPIC Associates V*, 54 B.R. 445, 450 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985) (customer list was commercial information under section 107(b) and \"[i]n addition and equally as important, this Court feels, under the circumstances of this case, that it must exercise the inherent supervisory power that holds over its own records and files\").\n\n26. In exercising this discretion, the Court should be guided by the factors identified in *In re Hemple*, 295 B.R. 200, 202 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2003), which lists ten factors a court should consider in determining whether to seal a settlement agreement.14 Particularly relevant here, those factors include (i) the necessity of the settlement to the viability of the bankruptcy case, (ii) whether creditors have objected to the proposed settlement, (iii) whether creditors will benefit from the settlement even without knowing the specific terms; (iv) whether the debtor will be harmed if the agreement is not sealed, (v) whose interests are being protected by sealing the agreement, and (vi) whether the document needs to be kept under seal permanently.\n\n27. G-Club—which is not a creditor but is a defendant in other pending litigation—is the only party objecting to the 9019 Motion. The Settlement Agreement will directly benefit\n\n14 The ten factors, as identified in full by *Hemple*, are: (1) the necessity of the settlement to the viability of the bankruptcy case; (2) whether the confidentiality provision is truly essential to the settlement, i.e., whether the settlement would be withdrawn if the confidential provision were not honored; (3) whether the creditors have been notified of the request for approval of the settlement without disclosure of the amount or terms of settlement, and, if so, whether any objection was interposed; (4) if there has been an objection to the request to file the agreement under seal, whether the objection demonstrates harm to the public's need to know; (5) whether the creditors will clearly benefit from the settlement notwithstanding a lack of access to the specific terms of that settlement; (6) whether the debtor will suffer irreparable harm if the settlement agreement is not filed under seal; (7) whether the parties would be able to keep the terms of the settlement confidential in the absence of a bankruptcy filing; (8) whose interests are being protected by allowing the filing of the settlement agreement under seal and whether there is any negative impact either on the estate or in the treatment of other interested parties in the case;(9) what is the likelihood of other parties actually obtaining the details of the agreement if it is not filed under seal; and (10) whether the document needs to be kept under seal permanently or some shorter time period could suffice. *In re Hemple*, 295 B.R. at 202.\n\ncreditors even if they do not have access to the specific terms, and the parties that do have access (including the Committee, a fiduciary to the estate) have not objected. In fact, the Mediator's Report, which is publicly available, states Judge Tancredi's belief that the economics and terms of the Settlement Agreement are fair, reasonable, and in the best interest of the Debtor's chapter 11 estate—which also helps ensure that sealing the agreement does not harm the public's need to know, another *Hemple* factor.\n\n28. Perhaps most importantly and as discussed above at length, the interests being protected are those of the estate and its creditors, not the settlement counterparty, and disclosure of the specific terms of the Settlement Agreement is likely to cause significant harm to the estate. Further, while this specific Settlement Agreement is not vital to the overall bankruptcy case, the Trustee's ability to maximize the estate's avoidance actions is absolutely critical, as this is a litigation case, with no source of value or recovery other than what the Trustee recovers through his investigation and litigation efforts. Finally, *Hemple* directs consideration of the duration of the seal and, as agreed with the UST, the Trustee will have until 180 days after entry of the Proposed Order to publicize its terms.\n\n#### **III. Court Has Sufficient Information to Approve Settlement Agreement**\n\n29. As G-Club acknowledges, a court approving a settlement under Rule 9019 \"need not conduct a mini-trial\" but, rather, \"only need be apprised of the facts that are necessary to enable it to evaluate the settlement and make a considered and independent judgment about the settlement.\"15 Here, the Court has more than sufficient information to make this judgment. The Court, of course, has access to the full terms of the Settlement Agreement. In exercising its independent judgment, the Court is also permitted to \"take into consideration the opinions\" of\n\n15 G-Club Obj. ¶ 21 (citations omitted).\n\nother parties to the case. *In re Pursuit Holdings (NY), LLC*, No. 18-12738 (MG), 2019 WL 1220928, at \\*7 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2019). Here, multiple fiduciaries (the Committee and the Trustee) and the Court-appointed mediator, Judge Tancredi, all believe that the Settlement Agreement is in the best interests of the estate and is a valid exercise of the Trustee's business judgment. *See In re Stone Barn Manhattan LLC*, 405 B.R. 68, 75 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (\"Although approval of a settlement rests in the Court's sound discretion …the debtor's business judgment should not be ignored.\").\n\n30. Nonetheless, G-Club asserts that the Court's assessment of the 9019 Motion and the underlying Settlement Agreement \"must occur in open court, like any other adjudication.\"16 G-Club, relatedly, seeks to reserve its right to object to the 9019 Motion on the merits \"once it is it unsealed/unredacted and G Club can evaluate the proposed settlement.\"17 But to make this argument is to rebut it. The Trustee does not dispute that, just like any other adjudication, there is a presumption that the 9019 Motion will be heard in open court. But, also just like any other adjudication, there are exceptions to that presumption. If G-Club was correct, no Rule 9019 motion could ever be heard unless all parties have reviewed all terms of the proposed settlement. This would mean that section 107 of the Bankruptcy Code does not apply to settlement agreements, even though it plainly does. The law is clear that a court can approve a settlement agreement even if there is a party that has not been granted access to all terms.18 And this is so even if the party denied access to the full terms of the agreement has standing and would have a defensible basis to object to a proposed settlement—neither of which can be said for G-Club.\n\n16 G-Club Obj. ¶ 23.\n\n17 G-Club Obj. ¶ 31.\n\n18 As noted above, one the *Hemple* factors is \"whether the creditors will clearly benefit from the settlement *notwithstanding a lack of access to the specific terms of that settlement*.\" 295 B.R. at 202 (emphasis added).\n\n31. As explained above, G-Club has no standing. Furthermore, G-Club is a defendant in pending litigation with the Trustee in which the Trustee has asserted claims like those asserted against Wildes & Weinberg; G-Club has taken the position that those claims are meritless—or, stated otherwise, worthless. G-Club, therefore, would have no defensible basis to object to the settlement, as, even if G-Club were a creditor impacted by the Trustee's total recoveries, any amount recovered by the Trustee from Wildes & Weinberg is more than G-Club believes the Trustee would get in litigation—which means that, from G-Club's perspective, the settlement *must* be a good deal for the estate. G-Club's review of the Settlement Agreement may inform its strategy in litigation with the Trustee, but would have no impact on the Court's assessment of the reasonableness of the Settlement Agreement. G-Club's objection should be overruled.\n\n#### **IV. Court Should Approve Motion to Limit Notice**\n\n32. G-Club also takes issue with the Trustee's motion to limit service of the 9019 Motion [ECF No. 3565]. As an initial matter, the Court has already granted that motion.19 But even if the Court were inclined to consider G-Club's objection, that motion is unrelated to the sealing issue discussed in G-Club's objection and herein. G-Club does not object to the adequacy of the universe of proposed recipients, but rather to the contents of the proposed service (*i.e.*, G-Club asserts that that all service recipients should receive the full, unredacted, Settlement Agreement).\n\n33. As discussed at length, the Trustee disagrees. Regardless, if the Court determines that the Settlement Agreement cannot be sealed at all, the Trustee will serve the unredacted version on all Notice Parties (as defined in the motion to limit service).\n\n19 *See* Docket No. 3685.\n\nWHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the Trustee respectfully requests that the Court\n\ngrant the 9019 Motion and any other relief as the Court considers proper.\n\nDated: December 5, 2024 LUC A. DESPINS, New York, New York CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE\n\nBy: */s/ Douglass Barron*\n\nDouglass Barron (admitted *pro hac vice*) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6079 douglassbarron@paulhastings.com\n\n*and*\n\nNicholas A. Bassett (admitted *pro hac vice*) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C., 20036 (202) 551-1902 nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n *and*\n\nPatrick R. Linsey (ct29437) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 781-2847 plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n*Counsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee*\n\n| UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
BRIDGEPORT DIVISION
---------------------------------------------------------------- | | | |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|\n| In re:
HO WAN KWOK, et al.,20 | | x
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LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11
TRUSTEE,
v.
WILDES & WEINBERG, P.C.,
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Defendant. | x
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Adv. Proceeding No. 24-05187
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x | |\n\n#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nThe undersigned hereby certifies that on December 5, 2024, the foregoing Reply was electronically filed. Notice of this filing was sent to the United States Trustee, counsel for the Debtor, counsel for the Committee, via email to Wildes & Weinberg, P.C. at michael@wildeslaw.com, and by e-mail to all parties to the above-captioned chapter 11 case by operation of the Court's electronic filing (\"CM/ECF\") system or by mail to anyone unable to\n\n20 The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202), and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and the Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\naccept electronic filing as indicated on the Notice of Electronic Filing21. Parties may access this\n\nfiling through the Court's CM/ECF system.\n\nDated: December 5, 2024 New York, New York\n\n> By: */s/ Douglass Barron* Douglass Barron (admitted *pro hac vice*) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6079 douglassbarron@paulhastings.com\n\n*Counsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee*\n\n21 If after business hours, on the next business day.\n\n## **Exhibit 1**\n\n)\n\n)\n\n)\n\n)\n\n#### UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\nIn re )\n\nAdelphia Communications Corporation, et al., )\n\nDebtors. )\n\nChapter 11 Cases\n\nCase No. 02-41729 (REG)\n\nJointly Administered\n\n## **ORDER AUTHORIZING DEBTORS TO FILE UNDER SEAL DEBTORS' MOTION FOR ORDER PURSUANT TO BANKRUPTCY RULE 9019 APPROVING SETTLEMENT WITH THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES**\n\nUpon the motion dated January 12, 2006 (including exhibits thereto, the \"Motion\") of the above captioned debtors and debtors in possession (collectively, the \"Debtors\"), for entry of an order, pursuant to sections 105(a) and 107(b) of chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States Code (the \"Bankruptcy Code\") and Rule 9018 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the \"Bankruptcy Rules\") authorizing the Debtors to file, under seal, a motion approving and authorizing a settlement agreement by and among Adelphia Communications Corporation, Century-TCI California, L.P., Buenavision Telecommunications, Inc., and the City of Los Angeles, California (the \"Settlement Motion\"); and it appearing that appropriate notice of the Motion was provided; and it appearing that the relief requested in the Motion is in the best interest of the Debtors, their creditors and all parties in interest; and after due deliberation and due and sufficient cause appearing therefor, it is\n\nORDERED, that the Motion is granted; and it is further\n\nORDERED, that capitalized terms used but not defined herein have the meaning given to them in the Motion; and it is further\n\n#### 02-41729-shl Doc 9290 Filed 01/12/06 Entered 01/12/06 16:49:58 Main Document Pg 2 of 2 Case 22-50073 Doc 3864 Filed 12/05/24 Entered 12/05/24 18:43:51 Page 25 of 38\n\nORDERED, that pursuant to section 107(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rule 9018, the Debtors are authorized to file the Settlement Motion under seal; and it is further\n\nORDERED, that the Settlement Motion shall remain confidential and shall be served on and made available only to: (a) counsel to the City; (b) the Office of the United States Trustee for the Southern District of New York; (c) counsel to the Official Committee of Equity Security Holders; (d) counsel to the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors; (e) counsel for the agents for the Debtors' prepetition and postpetition lenders; (f) counsel to the Purchasers; and (g) such other parties as may be agreed to by the Debtors, and shall not be made available to the general public; and it is further\n\nORDERED, that any pleadings filed in these cases that reference or disclose any of the information contained in the Settlement Motion shall be filed under seal and served only on those parties authorized to receive the Settlement Motion; and it is further\n\nORDERED, that this Court shall retain jurisdiction to hear and decide any dispute related to or arising from this Order.\n\nDated: New York, New York January 12, 2006\n\n> *s/: Robert E. Gerber* HONORABLE ROBERT E. GERBER UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 3864 Filed 12/05/24 Entered 12/05/24 18:43:51 Page 26 of 38 Case 09-13684-CSS Doc 1911 Filed 10/15/10 Page 1 of 3\n\n| In re | Chapter 11 |\n|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|\n| CAPMARK FINANCIAL GROUP INC., et al., : | |\n| Debtors. | Jointly Administered |\n| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | |\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 3864 Filed 12/05/24 Entered 12/05/24 18:43:51 Page 27 of 38 Case 09-13684-CSS Doc 1911 Filed 10/15/10 Page 2 of 3\n\n09-10023-mg Doc 7229 Filed 11/04/13 Entered 11/04/13 11:19:13 Main Document Pg 1 of 2 Case 22-50073 Doc 3864 Filed 12/05/24 Entered 12/05/24 18:43:51 Page 29 of 38\n\n| UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK | | |\n|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|---------------------------------------|\n| -------------------------------------------------------------------x
In re: | : | |\n| LYONDELL CHEMICAL COMPANY, et al., | :
: | Chapter 11
Case No. 09-10023 (REG) |\n| Reorganized Debtors. | :
: | Jointly Administered |\n| -------------------------------------------------------------------x | | |\n\n### ORDER GRANTING REORGANIZED DEBTORS' MOTION FOR ENTRY OF AN ORDER (A) AUTHORIZING THE REORGANIZED DEBTORS TO FILE UNDER SEAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS WITH FREDERICK ROYSTER AND SCOTT MILLER AND (B) AUTHORIZING LIMITED SERVICE OF MOTION SEEKING APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS UNDER BANKRUPTCY RULE 9019\n\nUpon consideration of the motion of Lyondell Chemical Company and certain of its affiliated entities, as the reorganized debtors in the above cases (collectively, the \"**Reorganized Debtors**\") for entry of an order (a) pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 107(b)(1) and rule 9018 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, authorizing the Reorganized Debtors to file under seal their settlement agreements with claimants Frederick Royster and Scott Miller in connection with the Reorganized Debtors' motion seeking approval of the settlement agreements under Rule 9019, and (b) pursuant to Rule 9007, authorizing limited service of the Reorganized Debtors' motion seeking approval of the Royster and Miller settlement agreements under Rule 9019, all as described more fully in the motion; and this Court having jurisdiction to consider the motion and the relief requested therein pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334; and consideration of the motion and the relief requested therein being a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b); and venue being proper before this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409; and it appearing that no other notice need be provided at this time; and the relief requested being in the best interests of the Reorganized Debtors, the Debtors and their estates and creditors; and this Court having reviewed the motion and having determined that the legal and factual bases set forth in the motion establish just cause for the relief granted herein; and upon due deliberation and sufficient cause appearing therefor; it is hereby\n\n#### 09-10023-mg Doc 7229 Filed 11/04/13 Entered 11/04/13 11:19:13 Main Document Pg 2 of 2 Case 22-50073 Doc 3864 Filed 12/05/24 Entered 12/05/24 18:43:51 Page 30 of 38\n\nORDERED that the motion is granted as set forth herein; and it is further\n\nORDERED that the settlement agreements may be filed under seal with this Court; and it is further\n\nORDERED that any motion filed by the Reorganized Debtors seeking approval of the settlement agreements may be redacted to remove any material quoted from and any dollar amounts contained in the settlement agreements; and it is further\n\nORDERED that the Reorganized Debtors are authorized pursuant to Rule 9007 to serve any motion filed by the Reorganized Debtors seeking approval of the settlement agreements on a limited service list consisting of (a) the claimants, (b) the Creditor Representative and (c) the U.S. Trustee; and it is further\n\nORDERED that this Order shall be effective and enforceable immediately upon entry; and it is further\n\nORDERED that this Order is without prejudice to the rights of any party in interest or the United States Trustee for the Southern District of New York to seek to declassify and make public any portion of the material filed under seal.\n\nDated: New York, New York\n\n*November 4, 2013* UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE *s/ Robert E. Gerber*\n\n## **Exhibit 2**\n\n## **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE**\n\n| ---------------------------------------------------------------
x | |\n|----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|\n| : | Chapter 11 |\n| :
In re: | |\n| : | Case No. 14-11916 (HJB) |\n| GT ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES INC., et al.,
: | |\n| : | Jointly Administered |\n| Debtors.1
: | |\n| : | |\n| ---------------------------------------------------------------
x | |\n\n#### **ORDER APPROVING PROCEDURES FOR THE EXPEDITED ADJUDICATION AND RESOLUTION OF SECURED CLAIMS, ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSE CLAIMS, AND OTHER PRIORITY CLAIMS, AND MEDIATION OF SUCH CLAIMS**\n\nUpon the motion (the \"Motion\")2 of GT Advanced Technologies Inc. (\"GT\") and its affiliated debtors as debtors in possession (collectively, \"GTAT\" or the \"Debtors\") for entry of an order (the \"Order\") approving procedures for adjudicating secured claims, administrative expense claims, and other priority claims (each, a \"Senior Claim\") on an expedited basis (the \"Senior Claims Resolution Procedures\") and procedures for the mediation of such Senior Claims, and this Court having jurisdiction to consider the Motion and the relief requested therein in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334; and consideration of the Motion and the relief requested therein being a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157; and venue being proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409; and due and proper notice of the Motion being adequate and appropriate under the particular circumstances; and the Court having determined that the legal and factual bases set forth in the Motion establish just cause for the\n\n 1 The Debtors, along with the last four digits of each debtor's tax identification number, as applicable, are: GT Advanced Technologies Inc. (6749), GTAT Corporation (1760), GT Advanced Equipment Holding LLC (8329), GT Equipment Holdings, Inc. (0040), Lindbergh Acquisition Corp. (5073), GT Sapphire Systems Holding LLC (4417), GT Advanced Cz LLC (9815), GT Sapphire Systems Group LLC (5126), and GT Advanced Technologies Limited (1721). The Debtors' corporate headquarters are located at 243 Daniel Webster Highway, Merrimack, NH 03054.\n\n2 Capitalized terms used but not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings set forth in the Motion.\n\nrelief granted herein; and upon all of the proceedings had before the Court; after due deliberation and sufficient cause appearing therefor, it is hereby\n\n#### ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that:\n\n1. The Motion is GRANTED as set forth herein.\n\n2. Any and all objections and responses to the Motion or the relief requested therein that have not been withdrawn, waived, resolved, or settled as set forth herein or set forth in a stipulation presented to the Bankruptcy Court, and all reservations of rights included therein, are hereby overruled in all respects and denied.\n\n3. The Senior Claims Resolution Procedures apply to all Senior Claims that are not already allowed by a final order of the Court, but only if the Debtors notify the Senior Creditor that its Senior Claim is subject to the Senior Claims Resolution Procedures as set forth herein. The Debtors may provide such notification either (a) at the time of filing an objection to a Senior Claim or (b) by filing a separate notice after an objection to a Senior Claim has been filed (including for objections to Senior Claims that have already been filed). Any such notification shall include all legal and factual bases for the Debtors' objection to the Senior Claim; all documents upon which the Debtors intend to rely in Court in opposition to the objected Senior Claim; and a copy of this Order.\n\n4. Senior Creditors are required to respond to each objection to a Senior Claim that is subject to the Senior Claims Resolution Procedures (a \"Senior Claim Objection\") no later than 21 calendar days after the filing and service of such Senior Claim Objection.\n\n5. Each response to a Senior Claim Objection must include: (a) all legal and factual bases for the Senior Claim subject to the Senior Claim Objection; and (b) all documentation upon which the Senior Creditor intends to rely in Court in support of its Senior Claim that is the subject of the Senior Claim Objection.\n\n6. With regard to any Senior Claim for which a Senior Claim Objection has been filed, a hearing will be conducted with no less than 30 calendar days' advance notice; provided, however, that the Debtors reserve their right to request any such hearing on a more expedited basis and any party in interest reserves its right to object to the hearing occurring on a more expedited basis.\n\n7. The Debtors and each Senior Creditor may require each other to respond to requests for production of documents, interrogatories, and requests for admission (collectively, \"Discovery Requests\") no later than 21 calendar days after service of such Discovery Request upon the party subject to the request.\n\n8. The Debtors and each Senior Creditor may require each other to participate in one deposition under Rule 30(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, if the party requesting the deposition schedules that deposition at least 21 calendar days after requesting the deposition.\n\n9. Nothing in this Order shall be construed as requiring the application of the Senior Claims Resolution Procedures to any objection to claims or proofs of claim that were previously filed with the Court, or that may be filed in the future, in accordance with the Bankruptcy Rules and other orders of the Court governing objections to claims.\n\n10. Subject to Paragraph 9 above, and except as set forth below, all Senior Claims are subject to mandatory, non-binding mediation (\"Mediation\") if the Debtors notify the Senior Creditor that its Senior Claim is subject to the Mediation process; provided, however, that any such Senior Creditor with a Senior Claim in an amount of \\$50,000 or less (or who elects to reduce its Senior Claim to \\$50,000) may opt out of the Mediation by filing a notice of such optout with the Bankruptcy Court no later than 21 calendar days after the Debtors notify the Senior Creditor that its Senior Claim is subject to the Mediation process.\n\n11. The Debtors may elect at any time to withdraw their notice that a Senior Claim is subject to the Mediation process.\n\n12. Unless the Senior Creditor opts out of Mediation in accordance with paragraph 10 above, for Senior Claims in amounts of \\$50,000 or less (or reduced to \\$50,000), the Mediation may occur telephonically, provided that the Senior Creditor may attend the Mediation in person if such Senior Creditor desires. For Senior Claims in amounts of more than \\$50,000, the Mediation shall occur in person. The Mediations held in person will occur in a designated space or courtroom at the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Hampshire in Manchester, New Hampshire; the Central Division of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts in Worcester, Massachusetts; the Western Division of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts in Springfield, Massachusetts; or such other locations as may be agreed to between the Debtors, the Senior Creditor, and the mediator.3\n\n13. To initiate a Mediation of a Senior Claim, the Debtors shall provide notice to the Senior Creditor at least 30 calendar days before the Mediation, which notice (the \"Mediation Notice\") shall include: (a) information about the Claim and the Senior Creditor subject to the Mediation process; (b) a list of at least two proposed mediators, from which the Senior Creditor shall choose one; and (c) the date and time of the proposed Mediation.\n\n14. Any Senior Creditor who receives a Mediation Notice may, but is not required to, send to the Debtors at least 21 calendar days prior to the Mediation a good faith, binding offer to settle the Senior Claim that is the subject of the Mediation Notice at an amount less than the filed\n\n3 Reservations for space at the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Hampshire should be made with Courtroom Deputy Maureen Shambo at (603) 222-2685. Reservations for space at the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central or Western Divisions of the District of Massachusetts should be made with Courtroom Deputy Stephen Reynolds at (413) 785-6909.\n\nSenior Claim. The Debtors are authorized to accept and be bound by the offer, provided counsel for the Official Unsecured Creditors Committee consents to such settlement.\n\n15. Any (i) former United States Bankruptcy Judge and/or (ii) disinterested person jointly selected by the Debtors and the Senior Creditor is hereby authorized and appointed to serve as a mediator without further order of this Court. The Debtors shall schedule the Mediations at a time and date to be determined by the Debtors after consultation with the mediators and the subject Senior Creditors.\n\n16. Each Mediation must be attended by: (a) one attorney and/or a representative of the Debtors with decision-making authority; and (b) one attorney and/or a representative of the Senior Creditor with decision-making authority. Representatives of the Exit Lenders and GTAT's DIP lenders may not attend the Mediation sessions; however, the Debtors and their representatives may consult with them separately during the Mediation sessions. One attorney for the Official Unsecured Creditors Committee may also attend each Mediation session.\n\n17. Each of the Senior Creditors and GTAT may submit to the mediator a mediation statement of up to 5 pages (excluding exhibits) as well as copies of GTAT's Senior Claim Objection or the Senior Creditor's response thereto, and any historical documents supporting the Debtors' Senior Claim Objection or the Senior Creditor's response thereto. Mediation statements must be submitted no later than seven calendar days before the commencement of the Mediation.\n\n18. All aspects of the Mediation will be confidential and subject to Federal Rule of Evidence 408, and no written submission will be filed with the Court (except for the opt-out notice described in paragraph 10 above).\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 3864 Filed 12/05/24 Entered 12/05/24 18:43:51 Page 37 of 38 Case: 14-11916-CJP Doc #: 2777 Filed: 12/17/15 Desc: Main Document Page 6 of 7\n\n19. If the Debtors, the Senior Creditor, and counsel for the Official Unsecured Creditors Committee each consent, an agreement arising from a successful Mediation shall be binding with respect to such Senior Creditor's Senior Claim without further order of the Court.\n\n20. GTAT is authorized to pay any costs or fees billed by the mediators in connection with their performance of the Mediations upon application to, and approval by, the Court, such applications to be submitted in a form substantially similar to the requirements set forth in New Hampshire Local Bankruptcy Rules 2016-1(e) and (f). Notwithstanding the foregoing, a mediator shall not be required to submit a separate application for each Mediation.\n\n21. Following the Mediation, each mediator shall file a report with the Court indicating whether a settlement was reached as to each Senior Claim that was subject to the Mediation process.\n\n22. The stay provided for in Bankruptcy Rules 6004(h) is hereby waived, and this Order shall be effective immediately upon its entry.\n\n23. The time periods set forth in this Order shall be calculated in accordance with Bankruptcy Rule 9006(a), unless otherwise provided herein. To the extent that the time periods set forth in this Order vary from those provided in Bankruptcy Rule 9006(a), they are modified, upon good cause shown, pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9006(c).\n\n24. The requirement set forth in Local Rule 7102(b)(2) that any motion filed shall have an accompanying memorandum of law is waived.\n\n25. The provisions of this Order shall not apply to any Senior Claims that may have been filed by Intego GmbH, MT Systems, Inc., or DCM Tech Corporation.\n\n26. The Court retains exclusive jurisdiction with respect to all matters arising from or\n\nrelated to the implementation of this Order.\n\nDated: December 17, 2015 Manchester, NH\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_ /s/ Henry J. Boroff\n\nHONORABLE HENRY J. BOROFF UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE","body_zh":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION（美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院布里奇波特分院）\n\n------------------------------------------------------ x\n\n关于： ：\n： 第11章\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等人，1 ：\n： Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。\n\n： （合并管理）\nLUC A DESPINS（卢克·A·德斯平斯），第11章\n受托人， ：\n\n诉 原告， ：\n：\n：\n： Adv. Proceeding No. 24-05187\nWILDES & WEINBERG P.C.（威尔兹与温伯格专业公司）， ：\n------------------------------------------------------x 被告。 ：\n\n第11章受托人根据《破产程序规则》9019就与 WILDES & WEINBERG, P.C. 达成和解所提密封动议的支持性答复\n\n1 本第11章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（又称 Guo Wengui、Miles Guo 和 Miles Kwok，以及众多其他别名）（税务识别号码后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（Genever控股有限责任公司）（税务识别号码后四位：8202）及 Genever Holdings Corporation（Genever控股公司）。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 及 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为 Paul Hastings LLP（普衡律师事务所），200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166，收件人：Luc A. Despins，作为 Ho Wan Kwok 遗产的受托人（仅为通知和通信之目的）。\n\n目录\n\nI. G-Club 不具有对和解动议提出异议的资格 2\n\nII. 受托人已指出密封和解协议的有效且重要依据 4\na. 对遗产造成的损害足以证明密封和解协议具有正当性 4\nb. G-Club 援引的案件拒绝为保护非债务人被告而予以密封 8\nc. 即使并非“商业信息”，法院仍有酌处权密封和解协议 11\n\nIII. 法院拥有足够信息以批准和解协议 13\n\nIV. 法院应批准限制通知的动议 15\n\n判例索引\n页码\n判例\n\nGeltzer v. Andersen Worldwide, S.C.,\nNo. 05 CIV. 3339 (GEL), 2007 WL 273526 8\n\nIn re 50-Off Stores, Inc.,\n213 B.R. 646 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1997) 4, 5\n\nIn re A C & S Inc.,\n775 F. App'x 78 (3d Cir. 2019) 11\n\nIn re Alterra Healthcare Corp.,\n353 B.R. 66 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) 6, 8\n\nIn re Anthracite Cap., Inc.,\n492 B.R. 162 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) 10\n\nIn re Bennett Funding Grp., Inc.,\n226 B.R. 331 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1998) 11\n\nIn re Bertsos,\nNo. 97-34158 (AMN), 2022 WL 4690333 2\n\nIn re Ditech Holding Corp.,\nNo. 19-10412 (JLG), 2019 WL 32946848, 9\n\nIn re EPIC Associates V,\n54 B.R. 445 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985) 11\n\nIn re Farmland Industries, Inc.,\n290 B.R. 364 (W.D. Mo. 2003) 4, 5\n\nIn re Gibbs,\n2017 WL 6506324 (Bankr. D. Hawaii 2017) 8, 9\n\nIn re Global Crossing Ltd.,\n295 B.R. 720 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) 4, 11\n\nIn re Hemple,\n295 B.R. 200 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2003) 12, 13, 14\n\nIn re Micron Devices, LLC,\nNo. 20-23359-LMI, 2021 WL 2021468 3\n\nIn re Motions Seeking Access to 2019 Statements,\n585 B.R. 733 (D. Del. 2018), aff'd sub nom. 11\n\nIn re Oldco M. Corp.,\n466 B.R. 234 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) 8, 9, 10\n\nIn re Pursuit Holdings (NY), LLC,\nNo. 18-12738 (MG), 2019 WL 1220928 13\n\nIn re Quigley Co., Inc.,\n437 B.R. 102 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) 8, 9, 10\n\nIn re Stone Barn Manhattan LLC,\n405 B.R. 68 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) 13\n\nIn re Teligent, Inc.,\n640 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2011)2\n\nIn re Thomas,\n583 B.R. 385 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2018) 8, 9, 10\n\nIn re VoIP Guardian Partners I, LLC,\nNo. 2:19-BK-12607-BR, 2024 WL 3520151 2\n\nIn re Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,\nNo. MC 17-204-GLT, 2019 WL 642850 8, 9\n\n法规\n\n《破产法典》第11章 1, 4, 5, 8, 9, 12\n\n《破产法典》第107条 3, 4, 5, 11, 14\n\n规则\n\nFed. R. Bankr. P. 9018 4\n\nFed. R. Bankr. P. 9019 1, 5, 13\n\nLuc A. Despins，以其作为在 Ho Wan Kwok（下称“债务人”）第11章案件中获任命的第11章受托人（下称“受托人”）的身份，经由其下列签署的律师，特此提交本答复（下称“答复”），以（i）支持第11章受托人根据《破产程序规则》9019就与 Wildes & Weinberg, P.C. 达成和解所提密封动议 [ECF No. 3559]（下称“9019动议”）2，以及（ii）回应 G Club Operations LLC（G-Club运营有限责任公司，下称“G-Club”）提出的有限异议。3 为支持本答复，受托人谨陈述如下：\n\n答复\n\n1. 和解协议已完整地与无担保债权人正式委员会和 United States Trustee（美国受托人，下称“UST”）共享。9019动议的删节版本（其提及但未附具和解协议副本）已送达逾二百五十名当事人，并自其于 September 19, 2024 在公开案卷上提交以来，已公开可得近三个月。在此期间，受托人仅收到两份回应性书状：G-Club 异议和 UST 的有限异议。4\n\n2. UST（其已完整审阅和解协议）提出其有限异议，仅为处理和解协议是否应予密封的问题，该问题对 UST 具有制度性重要意义。在与受托人讨论后形成一项准予9019动议的经修订拟议命令，UST 已撤回其有限异议——使 G-Club 成为唯一提出异议的当事人，其异议基于其主张和解协议的条款必须公开。5\n\n2 和解动议亦作为对抗程序案卷中的 Docket No. 14 提交。除非另有说明，所有案卷引用均指主案 Case No. 22-50073 的案卷。本文所使用但未另行定义的首字母大写术语，应具有9019动议赋予该等术语的含义。\n\n3 见 Docket No. 3633（下称“G-Club 异议”）。\n\n4 见 Docket No. 3641。\n\n5 与此同时，受托人已提交其《根据《破产程序规则》9019批准第11章受托人就与 Wildes & Weinberg, P.C. 达成和解所提密封动议的经修订拟议命令提交通知》，反映其与 UST 所达成协议的条款；该协议规定，受托人应自批准9019动议的命令录入之日起180 days内公开和解协议的条款。\n\n3. G-Club 的异议毫无根据，应基于多项理由予以驳回。首先，G-Club 不具有对9019动议提出异议的资格，因为 G-Club 仅为受托人提起的诉讼中的一名被告，且对9019动议不享有受法律保护的利益。无论如何，G-Club 的异议在实体上亦不能成立，因为受托人寻求密封和解协议，系为保护遗产——而非为保护和解相对方或其他非债务人；而 G-Club 援引的案件中的情形正是后者。这一区别至关重要：因为，尽管遗产对在该非债务人被告自身不相关诉讼中保护其并无利益，遗产对保全其针对处境相似的当前及未来撤销诉讼被告（如 G-Club）的遗产请求权价值具有强烈利益，这将直接影响对债权人的追偿和分配。\n\nI. G-Club 不具有对和解动议提出异议的资格\n\n4. “如当事人因破产法院被质疑的命令而在金钱上直接且不利地受到影响，其即具有根据[《破产程序规则》] 9019对动议提出异议的资格。”In re Bertsos, No. 97-34158 (AMN), 2022 WL 4690333, at *3 (Bankr. D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2022)。债权人——即“对破产遗产享有债权或预期从其资产中获得分配”的人——符合该规则。Id. at *6。并非债权人的拟议异议人，只有在其拥有“和解批准命令可能在金钱上直接且不利影响的受法律保护的利益”时，方可满足此资格要求。Id.（拟议异议人“并非债权人”，故“无资格对受托人的和解动议提出异议”）。另见 In re Teligent, Inc., 640 F.3d 53, 61 (2d Cir. 2011)（非债权人不具有受法律保护的利益，且“本不可能出庭于破产法院质疑和解协议”）；In re VoIP Guardian Partners I, LLC, No. 2:19-BK-12607-BR, 2024 WL 3520151, at *3 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. July 24, 2024)（维持破产法院关于拟议异议人不具有资格的裁定，其中包括“上诉人不是遗产债权人，且不会因资金进入或未进入遗产而受到影响”）；In re Micron Devices, LLC, No. 20-23359-LMI, 2021 WL 2021468, at *15 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. May 20, 2021)（“Cobalt Capital, LLC 不是遗产债权人，且无资格对9019动议提出异议。”）。\n\n5. G-Club 并未针对债务人提交债权证明，亦无权从遗产中获得分配。相反，G Club 是在债务人因此被刑事定罪的大规模欺诈计划中发挥核心作用的实体，且受托人主张其现在及历来均为债务人的另一个自我，这意味着其为反对受托人在本第11章案件中的努力所花费的每一美元，均会使遗产可能向债权人分配的金额减少一美元。受托人通过近期证据开示，包括一次 Rule 2004 证词录取，得知尽管 G-Club 最近任命了一名名义上的第三方管理人 FFP (BVI) Limited（FFP（英属维尔京群岛）有限公司）监督其行动，但为 G-Club 作出所有重大决定的真正当事人是 Haoran He（何浩然），即债务人的密切关联人；其在债务人的欺诈活动中发挥了不可或缺的作用，例如为债务人的空壳公司及其儿子的利益签署贷款协议，包括为购买一辆 Ferrari（法拉利）提供便利。6\n\n6. 基于这些理由，法院应高度怀疑 G Club 提出其针对 Rule 9019 动议的异议的动机；在 G Club 为债务人的另一个自我的范围内，该异议实质上正由遗产资产资助。充其量，G Club 是类似诉讼中的一名被告，试图在其与受托人的诉讼中取得先机。7 其未指出任何若法院准予9019动议并录入拟议命令，可能受到不利影响的受法律保护的金钱利益。由于和解协议对 G-Club 的财产并无影响，G-Club 无资格对9019动议提出异议。\n\n6. G-Club 的《董事服务协议》就 FFP (BVI) Limited 的任命作出规定，该协议规定，He 先生必须以书面形式授权重大决定，例如提起或和解诉讼，以及在诉讼中提交“陈述”。基于受托人对 G-Club 代表的证词录取，He 先生是否有效授权提交针对9019动议的异议，存在疑问。\n\nII. 受托人已指出密封和解协议的有效且重要依据\n\n7. 受托人已说明，披露和解条款将因损害受托人在数百起待决对抗程序中针对其他被告提出类似请求的立场而损害遗产。G-Club 并不质疑受托人向本法院作出的陈述在事实上的充分性，即披露和解条款可能损害遗产。相反，G-Club 主张该损害在法律上并不充分，因为和解条款并非受保护信息。但判例法充分支持以下主张：如信息披露将损害遗产并减少对债权人的分配，法院可以且应当将该信息密封。在这一特定事实背景下，和解条款属于《破产法典》第107(b)条所保护的“商业信息”。G-Club 所援引的权威并非相反结论，因为该等案件处理的是极为不同的事实。\n\na. 对遗产造成的损害足以证明密封和解协议具有正当性\n\n8. 多家法院在不予密封将损害破产受托人为最大化破产财产价值及向债权人分配款项所作努力的情况下，对信息予以密封。在 In re Farmland Indus., Inc.（法姆兰工业公司重整案）, 290 B.R. 364 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2003) 中，债务人就其占有中的债务人融资请求法院对若干文件以及法庭本身予以密封。法院认为，公开有关信息将损害“破产程序中出售资产的首要目标”，即“为破产财产的无担保债权人的最终利益获得尽可能高的价格。”Id. at 369。“禁止这些披露对于保护破产财产是必要的。”Id. 正如一家法院所解释，“Farmland Industries 的启示是，根据《法典》第 107(b) 条和《破产规则》第 9018 条应受保护的商业信息，必须从对破产财产或其债权人造成损害的实际角度加以审视。”In re Global Crossing Ltd.（环球电讯有限公司重整案）, 295 B.R. 720, 725 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (emphasis added).\n\n7 G-Club（G俱乐部）的律师尤其代理了众多其他撤销诉讼被告；与 G-Club 一样，这些被告无疑希望利用其对受托人与 Wildes & Weinberg（怀尔兹与温伯格律师事务所）和解的了解，以取得策略上的优势。\n\n9. 这种以破产财产为重点的视角同样适用于受托人最大化破产财产诉讼请求价值的能力。在 In re 50-Off Stores, Inc.（50-Off 商店公司重整案）, 213 B.R. 646 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1997) 中，债务人提出动议请求聘任诉讼律师，而其他未决诉讼中的两名被告请求法院解除对该动议听证记录的密封。法院指出，破产程序的披露要求使债务人面临艰难选择，因为“如无法院提供特别保护，该等听证会记录即为公开记录，任何人均可获取记录文本，包括目标被告！”Id. at 655 (emphasis in original). 法院解释称，幸运的是，《破产法典》第 107(b) 条“赋予破产法官一定权限，以防止如此明显的不公正。”Id. 法院认为，债务人为证明聘任诉讼律师具有正当性而必须披露的工作成果，“当然”属于第 107(b) 条保护的机密研究或商业信息类型。Id. 对该信息的保护使法院能够“履行其义务”（即确保债务人的判断是合理的），“而不会在此过程中对债务人试图追求的资产本身（即该诉讼）造成实质性损害。”Id. at 656.\n\n10. 在本案中同样如此，规则 9019 要求受托人向法院披露《和解协议》，并要求法院审查受托人达成和解的决定是否适当。正如 Farmland Industries 和 50-Off 所认可的，如果受托人还被要求损害其代表 Kwok（郭文贵）的债权人和受害人所追求的资产本身（其数百项诉讼请求），那将构成不公正，并违背《破产法典》的首要目标。法院也不应忽视这一极为现实的事实：唯一提出异议的一方并非债权人，而是目前正与受托人进行未决诉讼的一名被告。\n\n11. 对破产财产及其债权人的影响（或缺乏影响）同样构成 In re Alterra Healthcare Corp.（阿尔特拉医疗保健公司重整案）, 353 B.R. 66 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) 的基础。在该案中，重整后的债务人请求法院对其与各侵权请求权人的和解予以密封。债务人主张，尚未达成和解的其他侵权请求权人会将这些和解作为筹码，以在其案件中获得更高的和解金额。债务人主张，这将降低破产财产的价值，因为这将减少可供非侵权一般无担保债权人取得的金额。Id. at 76。法院对该论点“不予信服”，因为：(i) 债务人的保险公司将承担向侵权请求权人支付的款项中的很大部分；且 (ii) 债务人已根据计划为这些未决侵权请求权人预留了 \\$32 million 储备金。Id. 因此，在事实层面，“尚不清楚该信息的公开是否会影响重整后债务人的其他债权人。”Id.\n\n12. 本案事实截然不同，从而削弱了 G-Club 对 Alterra 的援引。没有保险公司对 Kwok 的债务承担责任。也没有一笔为 Kwok 的一般无担保债权人的利益而单独划拨的现金资金。因此，尽管 Alterra 中的和解对其他债权人没有影响，但本案并非如此，因为受托人未能收回的每一美元都会直接减少所有债权人的受偿——尤其考虑到本第 11 章案件以诉讼为基础，除受托人通过其调查和诉讼努力所收回的价值外，没有任何其他价值或受偿来源。8\n\n8 这也是区分 Alterra 的另一项依据。在 Alterra 中，债务人主张，解除对和解协议的密封将使一组债权人获得更高受偿，而该等受偿原本会分配给另一组债权人。因此，对和解予以密封将要求法院在一组债权人与另一组债权人之间作出取舍，但不会使整个破产财产受益。法院恰当地拒绝让一组债权人与另一组债权人相互对立。然而，在本案中，受托人寻求保护其为所有债权人最大化收回金额的能力。\n\n13. 简言之，在和解协议的公开将危及一般无担保债权人受偿的情况下，有充分依据对该和解协议予以密封。而且，破产法院通常会对和解文件予以密封。9 实际上，法院甚至批准过无需任何法院批准即可最终达成和解的调解和和解程序。例如，在 GT Advanced Technologies（GT先进技术公司）案中，法院批准了快速解决有担保请求权、优先请求权和管理费用请求权的程序。根据该等获批准程序，法院允许债务人与请求权人无需法院批准即可选定调解员，并无需法院批准即可订立具有约束力的协议。法院确实要求调解员在每次调解后提交报告，说明是否达成和解——但法院并未要求提交任何和解的条款。10\n\n14. 本案中，法院已批准一项由现任美国破产法官 Tancredi（坦克雷迪）法官监督的调解计划。该调解程序明确设想，如受托人认为公开披露将损害破产财产，则可密封提交和解协议——如上所示，对破产财产的这种损害是予以密封的充分依据。此外，受托人认为应予密封的任何和解协议，仍可由 UST、委员会律师以及当然还有 Tancredi 法官完整查阅。\n\n9 See, e.g., In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., et al., Case No. 02-41729 (REG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2006) (ECF No. 9290); In re Capmark Financial Group Inc., et al., Case No. 09-13684 (CSS) (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 15, 2010) (ECF No. 1911); In re Lyondell Chem. Co., et al., Case No. 09-10023 (REG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2013) (ECF No. 7229). 这些命令的副本作为本文件的附件 1 附后。\n\n10 See In re GT Advanced Techs., Inc. ¶ 21, Case No. 14-11916 (Bankr. D. N.H. Dec. 17, 2015) (ECF 2777), attached as Exhibit 2 hereto.\n\nb. G-Club 援引拒绝为保护非债务人被告而予以密封的案件\n\n15. G-Club 主张，对债权人受偿造成不利影响在法律上不足以证明密封《和解协议》具有正当性，并主张受托人关于为防止对受托人诉讼策略造成不利影响而必须密封的解释“已被认定在法律上不充分。”11 为支持其主张，G-Club 援引了数个拒绝对和解金额予以密封的案件。\n\n16. 但是，G-Club 援引的案件（以及其他类似案件）具有一组本案不存在的特定情形。在那些案件中，拟议密封所提出的理由是，达成和解的非债务人被告要求密封，及/或请求密封是为保护达成和解的非债务人被告的诉讼地位。G-Club 正确指出，法院已驳回这些理由，因为破产法院不会屈从于被告施加的“没有密封就没有交易”的压力，也不会为保护非债务人在其与其他非债务人的其他诉讼中的诉讼利益而密封和解条款。\n\n17. 为保护非债务人被告而密封和解，与为保护破产财产而密封和解（如受托人在本案中所寻求的）之间的这种区别，体现在 G-Club 援引的地区法院在 Geltzer v. Andersen Worldwide, S.C., No. 05 CIV. 3339 (GEL), 2007 WL 273526 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2007) 中的意见中。在这一具有影响力且被广泛援引的意见中，第 7 章受托人与会计师事务所 Arthur Andersen（安达信）达成和解；该事务所在和解时已不复存在，并面临重大诉讼。受托人请求法院密封协议条款，并主张“公开披露和解金额将使针对 Andersen 的其他请求权人能够确定 Andersen 目前愿意并能够就受托人请求权支付的金额，从而可能削弱 Andersen 对该等请求权人的谈判筹码。”2007 WL 273526, at \\*4.\n\n11 G-Club Obj. ¶ 25.\n\n12 Geltzer 被下文讨论的 Thomas、Ditech、Oldco、Quigley、Gibbs、Anthracite Capital 和 Wells Fargo 援引，也被上文讨论的 Alterra Healthcare 援引。\n\n18. 法院驳回了该论点，解释称，在维护 Andersen 对其他起诉其当事人的“筹码”方面，“不存在可辨识的公共利益或破产财产利益”，且受托人未提出“任何依据以支持其隐含命题，即保护被告在其他无关案件中的议价地位，甚至是被请求批准某一案件和解的法院应当考虑的适当事项。”Id. (emphasis added).\n\n19. G-Club 还援引 In re Ditech Holding Corp.（迪泰克控股公司重整案）, No. 19-10412 (JLG), 2019 WL 3294684 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2019)。该案债务人同样不当地侧重于对非债务人被告可能造成的损害。正如法院所解释，“实质上，债务人主张，如法院解除对经删节信息的密封，[Bank of America（美国银行）] 将处于竞争劣势，因为其将在未来与其他抵押贷款服务协议相对方的谈判中失去筹码。”Id. at \\*9。法院驳回该论点，并指出 Geltzer 的“理由同样适用”于 Bank of America，因为“在维护 BANA 与其他方谈判中的筹码方面，不存在可辨识的公共利益或债务人利益。”2019 WL 3294684, at \\* 9.\n\n20. 这一模式在 In re Gibbs（吉布斯重整案）, No. 11-03070, 2017 WL 6506324 (Bankr. D. Haw. Dec. 19, 2017) 中再次出现；其中 Bank of America 再次为和解一方，受托人与 Bank of America 请求法院密封一项和解，理由是 Bank of America“担心，如披露本案和解金额，其他主张[该银行]从事不当止赎行为的当事人将要求获得类似金额。”2017 WL 6506324, at \\*2。法院驳回了密封请求，因为不应为保护被告“在与其他当事人的诉讼中的谈判筹码”而对和解予以密封。Id.\n\n21. 另一家银行，Wells Fargo（富国银行），在其作为非债务人被告试图维持其诉讼优势时，结果同样不佳。在 In re Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. MC 17-204-GLT, 2019 WL 642850 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2019) 一案中，Wells Fargo 在涉及不同债务人的七十七宗对抗程序中面临类似请求；在与其中十八名债务人（其共用代理律师）达成和解后，该银行、达成和解的债务人以及第13章受托人请求封存协议条款。法院拒绝封存该协议，并解释称，“所明确提出的唯一封存《和解协议》的理由[是]避免就 Wells Fargo 为与其他方的类似诉讼达成和解可能同意支付的任何金额设定基准。”2019 WL 642850, at \\*1（省略内部引号）。\n\n22. G-Club（G-Club）援引的其他案件（In re Quigley Co., Inc., 437 B.R. 102 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010)、In Oldco M Corp., 466 B.R. 234 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) 和 In re Thomas, 583 B.R. 385 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2018)）也均符合这一模式。\n\n23. Quigley 是一宗石棉案件，一组律师事务所已订立破产申请前协议，以和解约175,000名请求权人的索赔。该等律师事务所其后提出动议，请求封存这些和解协议，主张披露该信息“可能损害侵权索赔人代理律师与其他被告之间正在进行的诉讼和和解讨论。”437 B.R. at 151-52。换言之，一组非债务人律师事务所担心这些律师事务所代表非债务人请求权人针对非债务人被告进行的其他诉讼；法院裁定，这并非封存该协议的理由。13 在 In re Oldco M Corp., 466 B.R. 234 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) 一案中，法院拒绝封存一项和解协议，其中“给出的封存和解协议的唯一理由是，公开披露将削弱达成和解的被告与其他请求权人谈判时的筹码。”Id. at 238（强调部分为原文所加）。最后，在 In re Thomas, 583 B.R. 385 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2018) 一案中，法院指出，当事人仅提出“关于其希望保密的宽泛陈述”，并且“实质上告诉法院，若和解条款未被保密，对抗程序中将不会达成和解。”Id. at 391-92。\n\n13 对 Quigley 案中法院考量同样重要的是，所涉破产申请前和解是“作为一项为操纵表决而以恶意构思和实施的策略的一部分。”Quigley, 437 B.R. at 154。此类考量在本案中并不存在。\n\n24. 总而言之，“向第三方提供其在外部诉讼中的诉讼优势，并不能证明封存法院文件具有正当性。”In re Anthracite Cap., Inc., 492 B.R. 162, 173 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013)（强调部分为原文所加）。然而，在本案中，受托人的目的并非保护和解相对方。为维持受托人与其他被告就数百宗待决对抗程序进行谈判和达成和解的能力，封存是必要的，且均旨在保护破产财产。而且，如上所示，判例法支持如下规则：对破产财产的损害（而非对非债务人被告的损害）构成封存理由。\n\nc. 即使不属于“商业信息”，法院仍有裁量权封存和解协议\n\n25. 如判例法所要求，从“对破产财产或其债权人造成损害的实际视角”审视，Global Crossing, 295 B.R. at 725，《和解协议》属于《破产法》第107(b)条项下的机密研究或商业信息。因此，保护该信息是强制性的。但即使并非如此，法院仍有权封存《和解协议》。见 In re Bennett Funding Grp., Inc., 226 B.R. 331, 336 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1998)（“若认定拟披露的信息属于任何规定类别，法院对于拒绝他人查阅该信息并无裁量权……若该信息并非商业秘密或机密研究、开发或商业信息，则是否允许查阅该信息属于法院裁量决定的事项。”）；另见 In re Motions Seeking Access to 2019 Statements, 585 B.R. 733, 747 (D. Del. 2018), aff'd sub nom. In re A C & S Inc., 775 F. App'x 78 (3d Cir. 2019)（援引 Bennet Funding 以支持如下裁定：“破产法院有权”基于“多项依据”作出封存命令，包括“依据 § 107(b) 的自由裁量权”）；In re EPIC Associates V, 54 B.R. 445, 450 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985)（客户名单属于第107(b)条项下的商业信息，且“此外，同样重要的是，本院认为，根据本案情形，其必须行使其对自身记录和档案享有的固有监督权。”）。\n\n26. 在行使该裁量权时，法院应受 In re Hemple, 295 B.R. 200, 202 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2003) 所列因素的指引；该案列举了法院在决定是否封存和解协议时应考虑的十项因素。14 与本案尤其相关的因素包括：(i) 和解对于破产案件存续的必要性，(ii) 债权人是否反对拟议和解，(iii) 即使不知道具体条款，债权人是否仍将从和解中受益；(iv) 若协议不被封存，债务人是否将受到损害，(v) 封存协议所保护的是谁的利益，以及 (vi) 该文件是否需要被永久封存。\n\n14 Hemple 完整列明的十项因素为：(1) 和解对于破产案件存续的必要性；(2) 保密条款是否确实是和解所必不可少的，即若不遵守保密条款，和解是否会被撤回；(3) 债权人是否已获通知，在不披露和解金额或条款的情况下请求批准和解，以及若已获通知，是否有人提出异议；(4) 若有人反对请求以密封方式提交协议，该异议是否表明会损害公众知情的需要；(5) 尽管无法查阅该和解的具体条款，债权人是否仍将明确从和解中受益；(6) 若和解协议未以密封方式提交，债务人是否将遭受不可弥补的损害；(7) 若不存在破产申请，当事人是否能够对和解条款保密；(8) 允许以密封方式提交和解协议所保护的是谁的利益，以及是否会对破产财产或案件中其他利害关系人的待遇造成任何负面影响；(9) 若不以密封方式提交，其他当事人实际获得协议细节的可能性有多大；以及 (10) 该文件是否需要被永久封存，或者较短期间是否已足够。In re Hemple, 295 B.R. at 202。\n\n27. G-Club——其并非债权人，而是其他待决诉讼中的被告——是唯一反对9019动议的当事人。即使债权人无法查阅具体条款，《和解协议》仍将直接使其受益，而有权查阅条款的当事人（包括作为破产财产受托人的委员会）并未提出异议。事实上，公开可得的调解员报告载明，Tancredi 法官（坦克雷迪法官）认为，《和解协议》的经济条件和条款公平、合理，并最符合债务人第11章破产财产的利益——这也有助于确保封存该协议不会损害公众知情的需要，而这也是另一项 Hemple 因素。\n\n28. 或许最重要的是，如上文已详述，受到保护的是破产财产及其债权人的利益，而非和解相对方的利益，披露《和解协议》的具体条款很可能对破产财产造成重大损害。此外，尽管这一具体《和解协议》对于整体破产案件并非至关重要，受托人最大化破产财产撤销权诉讼的能力却绝对关键，因为本案是一宗诉讼案件，除受托人通过其调查和诉讼努力所获得的价值或回收外，不存在其他价值或回收来源。最后，Hemple 要求考虑封存期限，且如与 UST 达成的协议，受托人将在拟议命令作出后180日内公开其条款。\n\nIII. 法院有充分信息批准和解协议\n\n29. 如 G-Club 所承认，根据 Rule 9019 批准和解的法院“无需进行小型审判”，而是“仅需获悉使其能够评估和解并就和解作出审慎且独立判断所必需的事实。”15 本案中，法院拥有作出该判断所需的充分信息。当然，法院可查阅《和解协议》的全部条款。在行使独立判断时，法院亦获准“考虑”案件其他当事人的“意见”。In re Pursuit Holdings (NY), LLC, No. 18-12738 (MG), 2019 WL 1220928, at \\*7 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2019)。本案中，多名受托人（委员会和受托人）以及法院指定的调解员 Tancredi 法官均认为，《和解协议》符合破产财产的最佳利益，并且是受托人商业判断的有效行使。见 In re Stone Barn Manhattan LLC, 405 B.R. 68, 75 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009)（“尽管批准和解属于法院的适当裁量……但不应忽视债务人的商业判断。”）。\n\n15 G-Club Obj. ¶ 21（引文略）。\n\n30. 尽管如此，G-Club 主张，法院对9019动议及其所依据《和解协议》的评估“必须如同任何其他裁判一样，在公开法庭中进行。”16 与此相关，G-Club 请求保留其在“其被解除封存/取消涂黑且 G Club 能够评估拟议和解”后，就9019动议的实体理由提出异议的权利。17 但提出该论点本身即足以反驳该论点。受托人并不争议，与任何其他裁判一样，9019动议将在公开法庭审理具有推定性。但与任何其他裁判一样，该推定也存在例外。若 G-Club 正确，则除非所有当事人均已审阅拟议和解的全部条款，否则任何 Rule 9019 动议均不得审理。这将意味着《破产法》第107条不适用于和解协议，尽管其显然适用。法律明确，即使存在一方未获准查阅全部条款，法院仍可批准和解协议。18 即使未获准查阅协议全部条款的一方具有诉讼资格，且有可辩护的理由反对拟议和解，亦是如此——而 G-Club 两者均不具备。\n\n16 G-Club Obj. ¶ 23。\n\n17 G-Club Obj. ¶ 31。\n\n18 如上所述，Hemple 因素之一是“尽管无法查阅该和解的具体条款，债权人是否仍将明确从和解中受益。”295 B.R. at 202（强调部分为原文所加）。\n\n31. 如上所述，G-Club不具备诉讼资格。此外，G-Club是与受托人尚在审理的诉讼中的被告，受托人在该诉讼中主张了与其针对Wildes & Weinberg, P.C.（怀尔兹与温伯格专业公司）所主张的类似请求权；G-Club的立场是，该等请求权毫无根据——换言之，毫无价值。因此，G-Club没有任何可辩护的依据对和解提出异议，因为即使G-Club是受托人总追回款项所影响的债权人，受托人从Wildes & Weinberg追回的任何金额也高于G-Club认为受托人可在诉讼中获得的金额——这意味着，从G-Club的角度看，该和解对财产应属一项有利交易。G-Club对《和解协议》的审阅可能会影响其与受托人诉讼中的策略，但不会影响法院对《和解协议》合理性的评估。应驳回G-Club的异议。\n\nIV. 法院应批准限制送达的动议\n\n32. G-Club亦对受托人限制送达9019动议的动议[ECF No. 3565]提出异议。首先，法院已经批准该动议。19 但是，即使法院倾向于审议G-Club的异议，该动议亦与G-Club异议及本文件中讨论的密封问题无关。G-Club并不反对拟议收件人范围的充分性，而是反对拟议送达的内容（即，G-Club主张所有送达收件人均应收到完整、未经删节的《和解协议》）。\n\n33. 如前文详述，受托人不同意。无论如何，如法院认定《和解协议》完全不能密封，受托人将向所有通知当事人（定义见限制送达动议）送达未经删节的版本。\n\n19 参见Docket No. 3685。\n\n因此，基于上述理由，受托人谨请求法院\n\n批准9019动议以及法院认为适当的任何其他救济。\n\n日期：December 5, 2024\n纽约州纽约市\nLUC A. DESPINS（卢克·A·德斯潘斯）\n第11章受托人\n\n签署人：/s/ Douglass Barron\n\nDouglass Barron（道格拉斯·巴伦，获准pro hac vice出庭）\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所）\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, New York 10166\n(212) 318-6079\ndouglassbarron@paulhastings.com\n\n以及\n\nNicholas A. Bassett（尼古拉斯·A·巴塞特，获准pro hac vice出庭）\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP\n2050 M Street NW\nWashington, D.C., 20036\n(202) 551-1902\nnicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n以及\n\nPatrick R. Linsey（帕特里克·R·林赛，ct29437）\nNEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C.（纽伯特、佩佩与蒙蒂思专业公司）\n195 Church Street, 13th Floor\nNew Haven, Connecticut 06510\n(203) 781-2847\nplinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n第11章受托人的代理律师\n\nUNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT, DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT（美国破产法院康涅狄格州地区）\nBRIDGEPORT DIVISION（布里奇波特分院）\n\n关于：\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，20 x\n：\n：\n第11章\n：\n：\nCase No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。 ：\n：\n（合并管理）\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，第11章\n受托人，\n诉\nWILDES & WEINBERG, P.C.，\n---------------------------------------------------------------- 原告，\n被告。 x\n\nAdv. Proceeding No. 24-05187\n\nx\n送达证明\n\n下列签署人特此证明，前述答复已于December 5, 2024以电子方式提交。该提交的通知已通过电子邮件发送给United States Trustee（美国受托人）、债务人的代理律师、委员会的代理律师，通过电子邮件发送至Wildes & Weinberg, P.C.的michael@wildeslaw.com，并通过法院电子提交系统（“CM/ECF”）的运行，以电子邮件发送给上述标题第11章案件的所有当事人，或按《电子提交通知》21所示通过邮寄发送给任何无法\n\n20 本第11章案件中的债务人为Ho Wan Kwok（亦称Guo Wengui、Miles Guo及Miles Kwok，以及众多其他别名）（税务识别号码后四位数：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（税务识别号码后四位数：8202）及Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC及Genever Holdings Corporation的邮寄地址为Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166，收件人为Luc A. Despins，作为Ho Wan Kwok财产的受托人（仅为通知和通信之目的）。\n\n接受电子提交的人。各方可通过法院的CM/ECF系统查阅本提交文件。\n\n日期：December 5, 2024\n纽约州纽约市\n\n签署人：/s/ Douglass Barron\nDouglass Barron（道格拉斯·巴伦，获准pro hac vice出庭）\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, New York 10166\n(212) 318-6079\ndouglassbarron@paulhastings.com\n\n第11章受托人的代理律师\n\n21 如在营业时间后，则于下一个营业日。\n附件1\n\n)\n\n)\n\n)\n\n)\nUNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（美国破产法院纽约南区）\n\n关于 )\n\nAdelphia Communications Corporation（阿德尔菲亚通信公司）等， )\n\n债务人。 )\n\n第11章案件\n\nCase No. 02-41729 (REG)\n\n合并管理\n准许债务人密封提交债务人根据《破产程序规则》9019申请批准与City of Los Angeles（洛杉矶市）和解的动议的命令\n\n兹审议上述标题债务人及占有中的债务人（统称“债务人”）于January 12, 2006提出的动议（包括其附件，“动议”），该动议请求根据《美国法典》第11编第11章第105(a)及107(b)条（“破产法”）以及《联邦破产程序规则》（“破产程序规则”）第9018条作出命令，授权债务人密封提交一项动议，以批准和授权Adelphia Communications Corporation、Century-TCI California, L.P.、Buenavision Telecommunications, Inc.及California州City of Los Angeles之间的和解协议（“和解动议”）；且经认定已就该动议发出适当通知；且经认定该动议所请求的救济符合债务人、其债权人及所有利害关系方的最佳利益；且经适当审议并有正当且充分理由支持，现\n\n命令，批准该动议；并进一步\n\n命令，本命令中使用但未定义的首字母大写术语具有该动议赋予其的含义；并进一步\n02-41729-shl Doc 9290 Filed 01/12/06 Entered 01/12/06 16:49:58 Main Document Pg 2 of 2 Case 22-50073 Doc 3864 Filed 12/05/24 Entered 12/05/24 18:43:51 Page 25 of 38\n\n命令，根据《破产法》第107(b)条及《破产程序规则》第9018条，授权债务人密封提交和解动议；并进一步\n\n命令，和解动议应保持保密，并仅向以下各方送达及提供：(a) 市政府的代理律师；(b) United States Trustee for the Southern District of New York（纽约南区美国受托人办公室）；(c) Official Committee of Equity Security Holders（股权证券持有人正式委员会）的代理律师；(d) Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors（无担保债权人正式委员会）的代理律师；(e) 债务人破产申请前及破产申请后贷款人的代理人的代理律师；(f) 购买方的代理律师；及(g) 经债务人同意的其他当事人；且不得向公众提供；并进一步\n\n命令，在本案中提交的任何援引或披露和解动议所含任何信息的诉状，均应密封提交，并且仅向获授权接收和解动议的各方送达；并进一步\n\n命令，本法院保留审理和裁决与本命令有关或因本命令产生的任何争议的管辖权。\n\n日期：New York, New York January 12, 2006\n\n签署人：Robert E. Gerber（罗伯特·E·格伯）\nHONORABLE ROBERT E. GERBER\nUNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE（美国破产法官）\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3864 Filed 12/05/24 Entered 12/05/24 18:43:51 Page 26 of 38 Case 09-13684-CSS Doc 1911 Filed 10/15/10 Page 1 of 3\n\n关于 第11章\n\nCAPMARK FINANCIAL GROUP INC.（凯普马克金融集团公司）等， ：\n债务人。 合并管理\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3864 Filed 12/05/24 Entered 12/05/24 18:43:51 Page 27 of 38 Case 09-13684-CSS Doc 1911 Filed 10/15/10 Page 2 of 3\n\n09-10023-mg Doc 7229 Filed 11/04/13 Entered 11/04/13 11:19:13 Main Document Pg 1 of 2 Case 22-50073 Doc 3864 Filed 12/05/24 Entered 12/05/24 18:43:51 Page 29 of 38\n\nUNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（美国破产法院纽约南区）\n\n关于： ：\nLYONDELL CHEMICAL COMPANY（利安德尔化学公司）等， ：\n： 第11章\nCase No. 09-10023 (REG)\n重整后债务人。 ：\n： 合并管理\n\n准许重整后债务人申请作出命令的动议的命令，该命令为：(A) 授权重整后债务人密封提交与Frederick Royster（弗雷德里克·罗伊斯特）及Scott Miller（斯科特·米勒）达成的和解协议；以及(B) 授权对根据《破产程序规则》9019寻求批准和解协议的动议进行限制送达\n\n兹审议Lyondell Chemical Company及其若干关联实体作为上述案件中的重整后债务人（统称“重整后债务人”）申请作出命令的动议，该命令为：(a) 根据11 U.S.C. § 107(b)(1)及《联邦破产程序规则》第9018条，授权重整后债务人就其根据第9019条寻求批准和解协议的动议，密封提交其与申请人Frederick Royster及Scott Miller达成的和解协议；以及(b) 根据第9007条，授权对重整后债务人根据第9019条寻求批准Royster和Miller和解协议的动议进行限制送达，均如该动议中更充分所述；且本法院根据28 U.S.C. § 1334对审议该动议及其中请求的救济具有管辖权；且根据28 U.S.C. § 157(b)，对该动议及其中请求救济的审议构成核心程序；且根据28 U.S.C. §§ 1408及1409，本法院为适格审理地点；且经认定目前无需提供其他通知；且所请求的救济符合重整后债务人、债务人及其财产和债权人的最佳利益；且本法院已审阅该动议，并已认定该动议所载明的法律及事实依据确立了准予本命令所载救济的正当理由；且经适当审议并有充分理由支持；现特此\n\n命令，按本命令规定批准该动议；并进一步\n\n命令，可向本法院密封提交和解协议；并进一步\n\n命令，重整后债务人提交的任何寻求批准和解协议的动议，可予删节以删除从和解协议中引用的任何材料及其中载明的任何金额；并进一步\n\n命令，重整后债务人获授权根据第9007条，向由(a)申请人、(b)债权人代表及(c)美国受托人组成的限制送达名单送达重整后债务人提交的任何寻求批准和解协议的动议；并进一步\n\n命令，本命令应于录入后立即生效并可执行；并进一步\n\n命令，本命令不影响任何利害关系方或United States Trustee for the Southern District of New York就请求解密并公开任何密封提交材料部分内容的权利。\n\n日期：New York, New York\n\nNovember 4, 2013\nUNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE\n签署人：Robert E. Gerber\n附件2\nUNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE（美国破产法院新罕布什尔州地区）\n\nx\n\n： 第11章\n：\n关于：\n： Case No. 14-11916 (HJB)\nGT ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES INC.（GT先进技术公司）等，\n\n： 合并管理\n债务人。1\n\nx\n批准快速裁决和解决有担保债权、行政费用债权及其他优先债权，以及对该等债权进行调解的程序的命令\n\n根据 GT Advanced Technologies Inc.（GT先进技术公司，以下简称“GT”）及其关联的作为占有财产债务人的债务人（统称“GTAT”或“债务人”）提出的动议（下称“该动议”）2，请求作出一项命令（下称“该命令”），批准以加速方式裁定有担保债权、行政费用债权及其他优先权债权（各称“高级债权”）的程序（下称“高级债权解决程序”），以及对该等高级债权进行调解的程序；且本院依据 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334 对审理该动议及其中请求的救济具有管辖权；且依据 28 U.S.C. § 157，对该动议及其中请求的救济的审理构成核心程序；且依据 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409，本院为适格审判地；且在具体情形下，对该动议作出适当及充分通知属适当且恰当；且本院已确定，该动议中列明的法律及事实依据为授予本命令所规定救济确立了正当理由；且经本院审理的所有程序；经适当审议并认定存在充分理由，兹命令、裁定并判定如下：\n\n1 债务人及各债务人税务识别号码的最后四位数字（如适用）如下：GT Advanced Technologies Inc.（6749）、GTAT Corporation（GTAT公司）（1760）、GT Advanced Equipment Holding LLC（GT先进设备控股有限责任公司）（8329）、GT Equipment Holdings, Inc.（GT设备控股公司）（0040）、Lindbergh Acquisition Corp.（林德伯格收购公司）（5073）、GT Sapphire Systems Holding LLC（GT蓝宝石系统控股有限责任公司）（4417）、GT Advanced Cz LLC（GT Advanced Cz有限责任公司）（9815）、GT Sapphire Systems Group LLC（GT蓝宝石系统集团有限责任公司）（5126）以及 GT Advanced Technologies Limited（GT先进技术有限公司）（1721）。债务人的公司总部位于 243 Daniel Webster Highway, Merrimack, NH 03054。\n\n2 本文所使用但未另行定义的首字母大写术语，具有该动议中规定的含义。\n\n1. 按照本命令所述，准许该动议。\n\n2. 对该动议或其中所请求救济提出的任何及所有异议和答复，如未按本命令所述或按提交破产法院的协议中所述被撤回、放弃、解决或和解，以及其中包含的所有权利保留，均在各方面被驳回并否决。\n\n3. 高级债权解决程序适用于尚未经本院终局命令准许的所有高级债权，但仅在债务人按本命令所述通知高级债权人其高级债权受高级债权解决程序约束的情况下适用。债务人可于以下时间作出该等通知：(a) 对高级债权提出异议时；或 (b) 在对高级债权提出异议后提交单独通知时（包括对已经提出异议的高级债权）。任何该等通知均应包括：债务人对高级债权提出异议的所有法律及事实依据；债务人拟在本院就遭异议的高级债权提出反对时所依赖的所有文件；以及本命令副本。\n\n4. 高级债权人须于该等高级债权异议（下称“高级债权异议”）提交并送达后不迟于 21 个日历日内，对每项受高级债权解决程序约束的高级债权异议作出答复。\n\n5. 对高级债权异议的每项答复必须包括：(a) 受高级债权异议约束的高级债权的所有法律及事实依据；以及 (b) 高级债权人拟在本院支持作为高级债权异议对象的其高级债权时所依赖的全部文件。\n\n6. 对于已提出高级债权异议的任何高级债权，将在至少提前 30 个日历日通知后举行听证；但是，债务人保留请求以更快方式举行任何该等听证的权利，任何利害关系方保留对以更快方式举行听证提出异议的权利。\n\n7. 债务人及各高级债权人可要求对方在向受请求方送达该等请求后不迟于 21 个日历日内，对文件提交请求、书面质询及承认请求（统称“证据开示请求”）作出答复。\n\n8. 债务人及各高级债权人可要求对方依照 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure（联邦民事诉讼规则）Rule 30(b)(6) 参加一次证言录取，但提出证言录取请求的一方须将该证言录取安排在提出请求后至少 21 个日历日举行。\n\n9. 本命令的任何规定均不得解释为要求将高级债权解决程序适用于此前已向本院提交，或今后可能依据 Bankruptcy Rules（破产规则）及本院关于债权异议的其他命令向本院提交的任何债权异议或债权证明异议。\n\n10. 在遵守上文第 9 段的前提下，且除下文另有规定外，如债务人通知高级债权人其高级债权受调解程序约束，则所有高级债权均须接受强制性、非约束性调解（下称“调解”）；但是，任何高级债权金额为 \\$50,000 或以下（或选择将其高级债权减至 \\$50,000）的该等高级债权人，可于债务人通知该高级债权人其高级债权受调解程序约束后不迟于 21 个日历日内向破产法院提交选择不参加调解的通知，从而选择不参加调解。\n\n11. 债务人可随时选择撤回其关于某项高级债权受调解程序约束的通知。\n\n12. 除非高级债权人依照上文第 10 段选择不参加调解，对于金额为 \\$50,000 或以下（或减至 \\$50,000）的高级债权，调解可通过电话进行，但如该高级债权人希望，亦可亲自参加调解。对于金额超过 \\$50,000 的高级债权，调解应亲自进行。亲自进行的调解将在 United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Hampshire（新罕布什尔地区美国联邦破产法院）位于 New Hampshire（新罕布什尔州）Manchester（曼彻斯特）的指定场地或法庭、United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central Division of the District of Massachusetts（马萨诸塞地区美国联邦破产法院中央分区）位于 Massachusetts（马萨诸塞州）Worcester（伍斯特）的指定场地或法庭、United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western Division of the District of Massachusetts（马萨诸塞地区美国联邦破产法院西部分区）位于 Massachusetts（马萨诸塞州）Springfield（斯普林菲尔德）的指定场地或法庭，或债务人、高级债权人及调解员可能商定的其他地点举行。3\n\n13. 为启动对某项高级债权的调解，债务人应至少于调解前 30 个日历日向高级债权人发出通知，该通知（下称“调解通知”）应包括：(a) 有关受调解程序约束的债权及高级债权人的信息；(b) 至少两名拟议调解员名单，由高级债权人从中选择一名；以及 (c) 拟议调解的日期和时间。\n\n14. 收到调解通知的任何高级债权人可自行决定，但无义务，于调解前至少 21 个日历日向债务人发送一项善意且具有约束力的和解要约，以低于已申报高级债权的金额和解作为调解通知对象的高级债权。债务人获授权接受该要约并受其约束，但须经 Official Unsecured Creditors Committee（官方无担保债权人委员会）的律师同意该和解。\n\n3 对 United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Hampshire 的场地预约应通过 Courtroom Deputy Maureen Shambo（法庭书记员莫琳·尚博），电话 (603) 222-2685 办理。对 United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central or Western Divisions of the District of Massachusetts 的场地预约应通过 Courtroom Deputy Stephen Reynolds（法庭书记员斯蒂芬·雷诺兹），电话 (413) 785-6909 办理。\n\n15. 任何 (i) 前 United States Bankruptcy Judge（美国联邦破产法官）及/或 (ii) 由债务人与高级债权人共同选定的无利害关系人士，均获授权并被任命担任调解员，无需本院进一步命令。债务人应在与调解员及相关高级债权人协商后，于债务人确定的时间和日期安排调解。\n\n16. 每次调解必须由以下人员参加：(a) 一名具有决策权限的债务人律师及/或代表；以及 (b) 一名具有决策权限的高级债权人律师及/或代表。Exit Lenders（退出贷款人）及 GTAT 的 DIP 贷款人代表不得参加调解会议；但是，债务人及其代表可在调解会议期间另行与其协商。Official Unsecured Creditors Committee 的一名律师亦可参加每次调解会议。\n\n17. 各高级债权人及 GTAT 可向调解员提交不超过 5 页的调解陈述（不包括附件），以及 GTAT 的高级债权异议或高级债权人对此的答复副本，和支持债务人高级债权异议或高级债权人答复的任何历史文件。调解陈述必须不迟于调解开始前七个日历日提交。\n\n18. 调解的所有方面均应保密，并受 Federal Rule of Evidence 408（联邦证据规则第 408 条）约束，且不会向本院提交书面材料（上文第 10 段所述的选择不参加通知除外）。\n案件 22-50073，文书 3864，于 12/05/24 提交，于 12/05/24 18:43:51 录入，第 37 页，共 38 页；案件：14-11916-CJP，文书编号：2777，提交日期：12/17/15，说明：主文书，第 6 页，共 7 页\n\n19. 如债务人、高级债权人及 Official Unsecured Creditors Committee 的律师均同意，因成功调解达成的协议，无需本院进一步命令，即对该高级债权人的高级债权具有约束力。\n\n20. GTAT 获授权在向本院提出申请并经本院批准后，支付调解员就其进行调解所开具的任何成本或费用；该等申请应以与 New Hampshire Local Bankruptcy Rules（新罕布什尔地方破产规则）2016-1(e) 和 (f) 所列要求实质相似的形式提交。尽管有上述规定，调解员无需为每次调解单独提交申请。\n\n21. 调解结束后，各调解员应向本院提交报告，说明就受调解程序约束的每项高级债权是否达成和解。\n\n22. 兹放弃 Bankruptcy Rules 6004(h) 规定的暂缓期，本命令应于录入后立即生效。\n\n23. 除非本文另有规定，本命令规定的期限应依照 Bankruptcy Rule 9006(a) 计算。在本命令规定的期限与 Bankruptcy Rule 9006(a) 规定的期限不一致的范围内，该等期限应在表明正当理由后，依据 Bankruptcy Rule 9006(c) 予以修改。\n\n24. 兹放弃 Local Rule 7102(b)(2) 关于任何提交的动议均须附具法律备忘录的要求。\n\n25. 本命令的规定不适用于 Intego GmbH（英特戈有限公司）、MT Systems, Inc.（MT系统公司）或 DCM Tech Corporation（DCM技术公司）可能提出的任何高级债权。\n\n26. 本院对因执行本命令而产生或与执行本命令有关的所有事项保留专属管辖权。\n\n日期：December 17, 2015，Manchester, NH\n\n/s/ Henry J. Boroff（亨利·J. 博罗夫）\n\n尊敬的亨利·J. 博罗夫\n美国联邦破产法官","key_entities":["Je","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Despins","Paul Hastings","Guo","Miles Guo","CIPA"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":1911,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2777,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3559,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3565,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":7229,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":9290,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":9488,"status":"published","published_at":"2006-01-12 00:00:00","created_at":"2006-01-12","updated_at":"2026-08-23 21:07:19"}