{"id":"court_ctb_3906_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":3906,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"TRANSCRIPT","filed_date":"2024-12-16","title":"1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTIC","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION IN RE: . Chapter 11 . Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) HO WAN KWOK, et al., . . (Jointly Administered) Debtors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LUC A. DESPINS, et al., . Adversary Proceeding . No. 23-05017 (JAM) Plaintiffs, . . v. . . TAURUS FUND, LLC, et al., . . Defendants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 . Adversary Proceeding TRUSTEE, . No. 23-05023 (JAM) . Plaintiff, . . v. . . LAMP CAPITAL LLC et al . . . Defendants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 . Adversary Proceeding TRUSTEE, . No. 24-05187 (JAM) . Plaintiff, . . v. . Courtroom 123 . Brien McMahon Federal Building WILDES & WEINBERG, P.C. . 915 Lafayette Boulevard . Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604 . Defendants. . Tuesday, December 10, 2024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1:08 p.m. Case 22-50073 Doc 3906 Filed 12/16/24 Entered 12/16/24 11:54:31 Page 1 of 86\n\n 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE JULIE A. MANNING UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE Audio Operator: Electronically recorded Transcription Company: Reliable The Nemours Building 1007 N. Orange Street, Suite 110 Wilmington, Delaware 19801 Telephone: (302)654-8080 Email: gmatthews@reliable-co.com Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording, transcript produced by transcription service. APPEARANCES: For the Chapter 11 Trustee: Patrick Linsey, Esquire NEUBERT PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 -and- Luc A. Despins, Esquire PAUL HASTINGS, LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 Nicholas A. Bassett, Esquire Doug Barron, Esquire 2050 M Street, NW Washington, DC 20036 For Taurus Fund LLC, Taurus Fund Management, and Scott Barnett: Michael T. Conway, Esquire LAZARE POTTER GIACOVAS & MOYLE, LLP 747 Third Avenue, 16th Floor Fifth Floor New York, New York 10017 Case 22-50073 Doc 3906 Filed 12/16/24 Entered 12/16/24 11:54:31 Page 2 of 86\n\n```\n 3\n 1\n 2\n 3\n 4\n 5\n 6\n 7\n 8\n 9\n 10\n 11\n 12\n 13\n 14\n 15\n 16\n 17\n 18\n 19\n 20\n 21\n 22\n 23\n 24\n 25\n For the U.S. Trustee: Holley Claiborn, Esquire\n The Giaimo Federal Building\n 150 Court Street, Room 302\n New Haven, Connecticut 06510\n For G-Club International\n Limited and G-Club Jeffrey Sklarz, Esquire\n Operations: GREEN & SKLARZ LLC\n One Audubon Street, Third Floor\n Hew Haven, Connecticut 06511\n For Hing Chi Ngok,\n Mei Guo, Hudson Diamond\n New York, Gypsy Mei\n Food Services, Leading\n Shine New York, and\n Hudson Diamond Holdings: Steven Kindseth, Esquire\n Zeisler & Zeisler\n 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor\n Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3906 Filed 12/16/24 Entered 12/16/24 11:54:31 Page 3 of 86\n```\n 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 INDEX MOTIONS: PAGE Matter No. 3849: Ho Wan Kwok Case No. 22-50073 Application to Employ Peter Shaw as Barrister in United Kingdom Filed by Luc A. Despins on behalf of Luc A. Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee Matter No. 3559: Ho Wan Kwok Case No. 22-50073 Sealed Motion to Compromise Filed by Patrick R. Linsey on behalf of Luc A. Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee Matter No. 14: Despins v. Wildes & Weinberg, P.C. Case No. 24-05187 Sealed Motion to Compromise Filed by Patrick R. Linsey on behalf of Luc A. Despins, Plaintiff Matter No. 3855: Ho Wan Kwok Case 22-50073 Application to Employ (Compass New Jersey, LLC) as Real Property Broker for Sale of Mahwah Mansion Filed by Luc A. Despins on behalf of Luc A. Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee Transcriptionist's' Certificate Case 22-50073 Doc 3906 Filed 12/16/24 Entered 12/16/24 11:54:31 Page 4 of 86\n\n 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 (Proceedings commenced at 1:08 p.m.) THE COURT: Okay. And so there are people in the waiting room? Okay. There's Trustee Despins. Is there anyone else that's participating remotely or just Trustee Despins? All right. So then if you could please call the calendar, please. THE CLERK: Okay. Case Number 22-50073, Ho Wan Kwok. THE COURT: Good afternoon. If we could have appearances for the record, please. THE CLERK: Did you want me to call -- THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry. I cut you off. I apologize. THE CLERK: It's okay. THE COURT: I'm ahead of myself. THE CLERK: Okay. THE COURT: Go ahead. THE CLERK: Also, we have 24-5187, Despins versus Wildes & Weinberg, P.C.; 23-5017, Despins versus Taurus Fund LLC, et al; and 23-5023, Despins versus Lamp Capital LLC -- LLC, et al. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much. THE CLERK: You're welcome. THE COURT: If we could have appearances for the Case 22-50073 Doc 3906 Filed 12/16/24 Entered 12/16/24 11:54:31 Page 5 of 86\n\n 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 record, please, starting with the Chapter 11 Trustee. MR. DESPINS: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Luc Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee, and thank you for allowing me to appear remotely. THE COURT: Good afternoon, and you're welcome. MR. BASSETT: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Nick Bassett from Paul Hastings, counsel to the Chapter 11 Trustee. Today, I'm joined by my colleague, Douglass Barron, also from Paul Hastings. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. LINSEY: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Patrick Linsey of Neubert, Pepe, & Monteith for the Chapter 11 Trustee. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MS. CLAIBORN: Good afternoon. Holley Claiborn for the U.S. Trustee. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. KINDSETH: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Stephen Kindseth, Zeisler & Zeisler, with respect to Adversary Proceeding Number 23-50234 Mei Guo, Hudson Diamond, New York, and Leading Shine, New York (phonetic). THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. CONWAY: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Michael Conway, Lazare Potter Giacovas & Moyle. I'm here on behalf of Taurus Fund LLC. Case 22-50073 Doc 3906 Filed 12/16/24 Entered 12/16/24 11:54:31 Page 6 of 86\n\n 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. SKLARZ: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Jeffrey Sklarz for G Club Operations LLC. THE COURT: Good afternoon. Has everyone noted their appearance that wishes to note their appearance? Okay. Thank you. Then we have several matters on the calendar today, some in the main case, some in the adversaries. Trustee Despins, how would you like to proceed this afternoon? MR. DESPINS: I think probably it makes sense to start with the two professional retention applications and - and Mr. Linsey will handle these. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Go ahead, Attorney Linsey. MR. LINSEY: May I approach, Your Honor? THE COURT: Yes. Thank you. MR. LINSEY: Thank you. Patrick Linsey for the Chapter 11 Trustee. If it's all right with Your Honor, I'll start with the application to employ Peter Shaw as barrister. THE COURT: Go right ahead. MR. LINSEY: That's ECF number 3855. This application is to retain Peter Shaw as barrister in the United Kingdom. Mr. Shaw will act under the instruction of the Trustee's UK counsel, Palace Partners. Mr. Shaw's leading barrister in the United Kingdom who bears the Case 22-50073 Doc 3906 Filed 12/16/24 Entered 12/16/24 11:54:31 Page 7 of 86\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 distinction King's Counsel. As the Court is aware, the Trustee is already employing a barrister in the UK by the name of Paul Wright (phonetic). Paul Wright will continue to work cooperatively with Mr. Shaw. Mr. Wright is a more junior barrister. Mr. Shaw is a more senior barrister. However, they work in the same chambers, and they have experience working together cooperatively. The Trustee is determined that he requires a King's Counsel to represent him in connection with certain litigation matters that are ongoing in the United Kingdom, including the administration proceedings of Hamilton Capital Hamilton Capital Holding, Limited. The application in the order provide that Mr. Shaw will charge his ordinary hourly rates and will bill the state -- the estate for out-of-pocket expenses. Mr. Shaw will submit fee applications under Section 330 in accordance to the normal process. There are no objections that have been filed with respect to this application. The U.S. Trustee filed a statement of no objection, which is at Docket Number 3859. And I'm happy to answer any questions the Court may have. THE COURT: I don't -- I do not have any questions at this point in time. Thank you. Attorney Claiborn? MS. CLAIBORN: Your Honor, I have nothing to add. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Does anyone else\n\n 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 wish to be heard on the application to employ Peter Shaw as a barrister in the United Kingdom? I'm just looking at the proposed order, Attorney Linsey. Attorney Claiborn, you -- the Office of the United States Trustee reviewed the proposed order; is that correct? MS. CLAIBORN: I did. I can't say that I recall looking at it -- THE COURT: Okay. But you didn't have -- MS. CLAIBORN: -- in the last 24 hours. THE COURT: -- any comments? MS. CLAIBORN: No, I did not then. THE COURT: Okay. Give me one moment then, please. I don't think I have any comments either, but I want to make sure I don't. All right. I've reviewed the application and the information submitted with the application and the proposed order granting the application for the Trustee to employ retain and employ Peter Shaw as barrister in the United Kingdom. I note that no one has filed any written objections to the application, and there is no one participating in this hearing that is objecting to the application. The Office of the United States Trustee filed a statement of no objection. And I -- the reasons for the retention are set forth in the application. And the Court understands the Case 22-50073 Doc 3906 Filed 12/16/24 Entered 12/16/24 11:54:31 Page 9 of 86\n\n1 2 3 4 reason why the Trustee is seeking to employ the barrister in the United Kingdom. For all those reasons, the application to employ is granted, and the proposed order attached to the application can enter.\n\n5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 MR. LINSEY: Thank you, Your Honor. That brings us to the Trustee's application to employ Compass New Jersey LLC, which is at ECF Number 3855 in the Chapter 11 case and ECF Number 154 in the Taurus Fund LLC adversary proceeding. The Trustee has moved for authority to employ a broker for the sale of the Mahwah Mansion. The Trustee has selected Compass New Jersey LLC, which is an affiliate of Compass, Inc. to act in this capacity. The Court will recall and is familiar that Compass, Inc. acted as broker with respect to the successful sale of the Debtor's former residence in Greenwich, Connecticut.\n\n16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 The Mahwah Mansion was purchased for \\$26 million. In light of the property's substantial value, it's important to the Trustee to ensure that an experienced and highly qualified broker is engaged. The Trustee interviewed Compass New Jersey, as well as several other potential brokers with all of which had expertise in the luxury real estate market and determined that Compass New Jersey was best suited to market and sell the property.\n\n24 25 In selecting Compass New Jersey, the Trustee consulted with counsel for Taurus Fund and its codefendants,\n\n1 2 3 as contemplated under the Court's order authorizing the Trustee to undertake the sale of the mansion. I understand that such counsel, Mr. Conway, is here today.\n\n4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Compass New Jersey and its five listing agents, each of whom has submitted a declaration in support of the application, are experienced and have a proven track record in New Jersey selling luxury properties and in the Tri-State Area selling ultra luxury properties. Compass is the largest residential real estate broker in the country by sales volume for the last three runnings and is currently marketing approximately 190 other properties in New Jersey.\n\n12 13 14 15 16 17 18 The listing agents for this project together have more than 50 years of experience in the Tri-State Area, and each specializes in the marketing of single family homes. They have sold several dozens of million-dollar properties. And the aggregate number was -- it surprised me; it was a big one -- together have closed more than \\$2 billion in residential sales.\n\n19 20 21 22 23 24 25 The broker services in this engagement will include preparing for the marketing of the Mahwah Mansion, which the broker's already doing, promoting the Mahwah Mansion and actively marketing it, including by executing that marketing campaign, advertising, public relations, and undertaking digital outreach, and then managing the sale process for the Mahwah Mansion under the supervision of the\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Trustee. As set forth in the application and the engagement agreement, which is attached to the application at Exhibit B, the broker will be compensated with -- with a fee of 4.5 percent of the sale price of the Mahwah Mansion. And -- and I'll explain a little bit further how that works. The agreement provides -- the broker is to share 2 percent of this fee with any buyer's broker. However, if the buyer is not represented by a broker, Compass's fee will then be reduced to 3 percent of the sale price. Cost of marketing the property, unless approved by the Trustee in writing, will be borne by the broker. The agreement's term runs through January 2nd, 2026. I do want to note one detail. Under certain limited circumstances, namely the Trustee's cancellation of the engagement prior to the expiration date or the -- there is one potential buyer that is carved out from the -- the scope of this engagement because the Trustee had been contacted by this buyer independently of the broker. So if the -- if the property is to be sold to that buyer or if the engagement is cancelled prior to the expiration of the term, then the estate will be responsible for the broker's reasonable document -- reasonable documented out-of-pocket expenses. After the Trustee filed this application -- THE COURT: What does that mean in, insofar as\n\n 13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 that somebody has to justify those expenses, right? I mean, is that going to be before the Court, or is it just going to be a payment made to that broker? MR. LINSEY: Your Honor, the U.S. Trustee had the same question. THE COURT: Okay. MR. LINSEY: And we engaged with the U.S. Trustee after filing the retention application and have filed an amended proposed order that provides that an application shall be submitted to the Court to request reimbursement -- THE COURT: Okay. MR. LINSEY: -- of -- of any fees. THE COURT: Thank you. MR. LINSEY: And that application is at ECF number 3869. THE COURT: The order? That revised order? MR. LINSEY: The revised order. I apologize. THE COURT: Right. That's -- okay. MR. LINSEY: The Trustee understands that the U.S. Trustee does not object to the application being granted by entering the revised proposed order. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. I'm holding the revised proposed order because I think it was filed yesterday. So Attorney Claiborn? MS. CLAIBORN: Yes, Your Honor. The revised order Case 22-50073 Doc 3906 Filed 12/16/24 Entered 12/16/24 11:54:31 Page 13 of 86\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 contains a change to Paragraph 4 to provide that mechanism for the approval of expenses, should they be requested, and allows for an objection to those expenses. And so with that change, the U.S. Trustee is fine and has no objection to the approval of the employment of Compass. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Does anyone else wish to be heard on the application to employ the broker for the sale of the Mahwah Mansion and related relief? Okay. Hearing nothing from anyone in the Courtroom and there being no written objections to the application and no one's participating in this hearing today that's objecting. I'm looking at this revised proposed order. I just need a moment, please. All right. The only thing I would ask the Courtroom deputy to do with regard -- the proposed order is 3869. Okay? THE CLERK: Yes. THE COURT: The only thing I would ask you to do on Page 3, right before the -- right above, it is hereby ordered that, it says, and at a hearing held before this court, but it just doesn't have the date. So add -- if you would please add today's date. THE CLERK: Okay. THE COURT: December 10, 2024.\n\nTHE CLERK: Yes.\n\n1\n\n25\n\n2 3 4 THE COURT: I've reviewed the application. I understand the reason the Trustee is seeking to employ the brokers for the sale of the Mahwah Mansion.\n\n5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 As I noted, no one has filed any written objection to the application. There is no one participating in this hearing today or that's in the Courtroom today that's objecting to the relief sought. The United States Trustee's Office made some comments to a revised proposed order, which appears at ECF Number 3869, which I have now reviewed. And that order appears to be fine to the Court. So for all those reasons, the application to employees granted in the proposed order that is at 3869 can enter.\n\n14 15 MR. LINSEY: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you.\n\n16 17 So how -- what -- what are we proceeding with next, Trustee Despins?\n\n18 19 20 21 22 23 24 MR. DESPINS: The -- what I refer to as the sealing issue, with -- with -- you know, the background for that is -- is the Wildes & Weinberg settlement agreement, but really the -- that nobody is really questioning that -- that settlement issues. The sealing issue is we have reach a resolution with U.S. Trustee, but Mr. Bassett will handle this matter, Your Honor.\n\nTHE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Mr. Bassett?\n\n 16 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 MR. BASSETT: May I approach, Your Honor? THE COURT: Yes. Thank you. MR. BASSETT: Thank you. So Your Honor, the motion before the Court, as the Trustee indicated is the Trustee's motion pursuant to Rule 9019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure to approve the Trustee's settlement with Wildes & Weinberg. That appears at ECF 3559. Your Honor, this is a settlement that the Trustee reached with the Wildes & Weinberg firm after extensive negotiations. The claims asserted against Wildes & Weinberg are similar to those that are asserted against many, many other Defendants, either Defendants who have actually, been the subject of a filed adversary complaint or other parties who the Trustee has tolling agreements against. As the Court is aware -- I can't recall the full count off the top of my head, but I think we are around 200 or so adversary proceedings that assert similar types of claims. The settlement agreement, as proposed by the Trustee is submitted under seal. The reason for that is - is obvious in the Trustee's view, and also, a very important Case 22-50073 Doc 3906 Filed 12/16/24 Entered 12/16/24 11:54:31 Page 16 of 86\n\n24 25 the midst of litigation, either actively with other parties, mediating with other parties, or may soon be in litigation\n\nreason, which is that, as I said, the Trustee has -- is in\n\n1 2 3 with other parties who are going to be the subject of, you know, the exact same types of claims involving the exact same types of issues.\n\n4 5 6 7 8 9 And to the extent that the Trustee has to reveal at this time where he is settling with certain parties, that is going to have a very obvious impact on the Trustee's ability to maximize value for the estate in his negotiation - - negotiations with and litigation against other similarly situated Defendants.\n\n10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Now, Your Honor, there is only one objection, that remains to the motion. That is the objection filed by G Club Operations. Nobody -- no other party in the case objects. The United States Trustee had filed an objection. That objection has been resolved pursuant to the terms of a revised proposed order, which I will highlight for the Court. The other -- other key constituents in the case, including the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, are on board and supportive of the settlement.\n\n19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Your Honor, the -- the G Club objection relates only to one aspect of the settlement, as the Trustee indicated, which is the Trustee's request to have the settlement submitted under seal. The U.S. Trustee, as I said, submitted an objection on similar grounds, but that objection has been resolved, and that is pursuant to the revised proposed order that we submitted with the Court on\n\n1 December 5th, which appears at Docket 3865.\n\n2 3 4 5 6 The immaterial part, Your Honor -- a new provision was added to the proposed order -- this is Paragraph 5 - which states that, the although the settlement agreement may be filed under seal, the Trustee shall have and I'm just reading from the language:\n\n7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 The Trustee shall have until 180 days after the entry of the order to file a notice, which settlement notice shall refer to the docket numbers and dates of the original motion on this order, attach and unredacted copy of the settlement agreement, and contain certain information regarding the settlement agreement, including the parties, the settlement amount, and other information as set out in Paragraph 5 of the revised proposed order.\n\n15 16 17 18 19 With -- with that change, Your Honor, the U.S. Trustee is supportive of the settlement. Obviously, I will let the U.S. Trustee speak for itself to the extent that I have that wrong, and then therefore the only remaining objection is the objection filed by G Club Operations.\n\n20 21 22 23 24 Your Honor, the G Club Operations objection should be overruled in our view. This is true for several reasons, the first of which is G Club has no legitimate pecuniary interest in this settlement for -- from -- to support its objection.\n\n25\n\nAlthough G Club and its counsel may sometimes wish\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 it to be the case, they have not been appointed the protector of the integrity of the bankruptcy process. There are other parties to do that, in particular the U.S. Trustee. To have a valid basis to object to the settlement, G Club Operations has to show that it has a pecuniary interest in the outcome of that motion, for example, as a Creditor of the estate. G Club is not a Creditor of the estate.\n\n8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 I think if one takes a step back and looks at the role that G Club and Attorney Sklarz are playing in this case more generally, it becomes clear what likely is motivating the request to have this settlement not filed under seal. G Club obviously is a Defendant in a number of other adversary proceedings. Attorney Sklarz represents a host of other defendants and avoidance actions very similar to the Wildes & Weinberg action.\n\n16 17 18 19 20 21 And I would imagine that any of those Defendants in those actions would love to understand where the Trustee is settling with other Defendants because it obviously gives them leverage in negotiations and allows them to -- it gives them an advantage going forward, whether it's in negotiations or in litigation.\n\n22 23 24 25 What -- what I want to point out, which is sort of ironic about the objection, too, Your Honor, is that to have for -- for one to have a legitimate interest in objecting to a 9019 motion as a purported Creditor, one would presumably\n\n1 2 3 4 5 want to evaluate the settlement to determine if the estate is settling at too low of a figure. Because if one does have a claim and has a pecuniary interest in the bankruptcy estate, they would want to make sure that the Trustee is, in fact, maximizing value.\n\n6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 What's ironic about that here, I think, and exposes the true motivation of G Club, is that G Club and all the other avoidance action Defendants represented by Attorney Sklarz have taken the position throughout this case that the Trustee's alter ego claims and that the Trustee's avoidance action claims are meritless. They've objected to them. They believe they don't comply with applicable law. They believe those claims are not viable.\n\n14 15 16 17 18 19 So from their standpoint, any settlement that the Trustee has reached with Wildes & Weinberg above zero should be a windfall from the perspective of a Creditor of the estate. So they, by definition, don't actually need to see the settlement information in order to evaluate whether to object to the quantum of the settlement being reached.\n\n20 21 22 23 24 25 In addition, Your Honor, the -- the arguments that have been made about Section 107 and the Court's authority are not to seal the agreement, those arguments likewise should be overruled, in large part in the papers. The cases that G Club has cited to are cases where settlement agreements were proposed to the Court to be filed under seal\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 for the purpose of protecting a party other than the bankruptcy estate. So, for example, where, the -- the settling party had said, look, we're in negotiations with a bunch of other litigants, or we're subject to ongoing litigation with other parties, and if our settlement with the Trustee in the bankruptcy case is revealed publicly, that could affect our, the non-Debtors, leverage and interest in those other ongoing litigations.\n\n9 10 11 12 13 And what courts have said in that situation is that is not a legitimate basis from the perspective of the bankruptcy estate to seal the settlement. Here, Your Honor, there's a very clear purpose that is in the best interest of the bankruptcy estate, and that is to help maximize value.\n\n14 15 16 17 18 If the Trustee is forced to file publicly all the settlements that he reaches with parties in his avoidance actions, that will undoubtedly have a negative impact on his ability to maximize value in all of his remaining, ongoing adversary proceedings, and those that he has not yet filed.\n\n19 20 21 22 23 So I'm happy to answer questions, happy to discuss any of the issues in further detail, Your Honor, but from the Trustee's perspective, sealing the settlement agreement is appropriate, and we believe G Club's -- G Club's objection should be overruled.\n\nThank you, Your Honor.\n\n24\n\n25\n\nTHE COURT: Thank you. Attorney Claiborn, I just\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3906 Filed 12/16/24 Entered 12/16/24 11:54:31 Page 22 of 86\n\n22\n\n| 1 | want to ask you about -- before I hear from Attorney Sklarz |\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | about the issue of the United -- the United States Trustee |\n| 3 | had and -- and its resolution from your perspective, please. |\n| 4 | MS. CLAIBORN:
Your Honor, the U.S. Trustee -- |\n| 5 | THE COURT:
What's going on with this thing? |\n| 6 | MS. CLAIBORN:
-- remains opposed to the permanent |\n| 7 | sealing of settlement agreements.
We are sensitive to the |\n| 8 | issues in the case, and the U.S. Trustee has agreed that when |\n| 9 | we reach the six-month mark following the approval of a |\n| 10 | settlement agreement, that it will be made public.
And the |\n| 11 | mechanism of the notice provision we put into the new order |\n| 12 | does direct the parties in the right place and the right time |\n| 13 | to find the information that they are currently being |\n| 14 | deprived of. |\n| 15 | They also -- the expectation is that going |\n| 16 | forward, this mechanism will be the model on which future |\n| 17 | motions will be predicated, and future motions to compromise |\n| 18 | and settle with parties will include within those motions |\n| 19 | notifications to parties that the sealing is only temporary |\n| 20 | and lasts six months.
And after that, they can see it on the |\n| 21 | docket, and they'll be alerted to how they can find it on the |\n| 22 | docket. |\n| 23 | So based on -- on those comments, the U.S. Trustee |\n| 24 | is prepared to accept the proposed order that has been filed |\n| | |\n\n25 at ECF 3865.\n\n| 1 | THE COURT:
I have a question about what you've |\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | said.
What -- what is the -- how did you arrive at a 180 |\n| 3 | days as somehow being the proper time frame?
There are |\n| 4 | hundreds of adversary proceedings pending, right?
So -- |\n| 5 | MS. CLAIBORN:
There are.
It was a consensual |\n| 6 | resolution reached with the U.S. Trustee and the Chapter 11 |\n| 7 | Trustee.
Certainly, the U.S. Trustee's position was that you |\n| 8 | cannot have sealing in perpetuity.
It's not appropriate. |\n| 9 | And this was an attempt to balance the -- the issues in the |\n| 10 | case and yet preserve transparency on some level for |\n| 11 | Creditors and others who wish to monitor what's happening. |\n| 12 | I don't think I can provide Your Honor with any |\n| 13 | more of an explanation than that. |\n| 14 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Thank you. |\n| 15 | MR. DESPINS:
But, Your Honor, I -- I -- if I may, |\n| 16 | Your Honor, I -- I could, with your permission, some -- some |\n| 17 | put some color on that if you want to. |\n| 18 | THE COURT:
Go right ahead. |\n| 19 | MR. DESPINS:
So I had the discussion with U.S. |\n| 20 | Trustee with Mr. Harrington (phonetic) and -- and basically |\n| 21 | from my perspective, I would like to have permanent sealing |\n| 22 | so -- but that -- that was not in the cards to the U.S. |\n| 23 | Trustee.
And the thinking is that hopefully in six months, |\n| 24 | we will have -- and this may be wishful thinking, but we have |\n| 25 | had made a lot of progress in settling, and we're settling |\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 those -- a bunch of those every two/three days or so. So each of them will have a six-month period. So it's not today, six months for everyone. It's everyone will have a rolling six months. And hopefully by then, the release of information will not have the same damaging effect that it would have today because the others will have -- we will have settled with over the next six months or so. So that's the hope, the thinking. That's where the six months -- you know, how we ended up at six months. THE COURT: Well, as you probably can understand, I'm not necessarily aware, unless a motion to compromise is filed, about settlements. So I don't know how many cases have settled. This maybe is only the second, or is it the first that's come forward -- MS. CLAIBORN: I think this is the first one of the -- THE COURT: -- with a compromise? MS. CLAIBORN: -- avoidance. Yes. THE COURT: This is the first one? MS. CLAIBORN: Of the avoidance. There is - there were -- MR. DESPINS: Yeah. MS. CLAIBORN: -- earlier settlements at the beginning of this case for different issues and different\n\n 25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 concepts, but this is the first of the -- THE COURT: The settlement of the actual -- MS. CLAIBORN: -- avoidance actions. THE COURT: -- claims asserted. MR. DESPINS: That's true, Your Honor, because we go through this process, right, where Judge Tancredi is involved in the settlement process and issues a -- it's not a ruling because he's not acting as a judge, but it issues a some -- some kind of statement that he said that he believes that the summons is within the range of reasonableness under 9019. And then that's presented to Your Honor. You're right; it's the first one. There are, I would say, a number of others, but not a majority to -- just to give you a sense -- not a majority of the charges that are pending. And a lot of those are settlements of actions that we've never brought, like we -- that we entered into a (inaudible) agreement with the counterparty, and we're settling with them before an action is brought. THE COURT: Okay. I understand. All right. Attorney Sklarz, do you wish to be heard? MR. SKLARZ: Thank you, Your Honor. The -- the First Amendment guarantees public access to -- to the Court's docket and judicial records. The Second Circuit case of Mirlis versus Greer is binding on this. We've cited in our Case 22-50073 Doc 3906 Filed 12/16/24 Entered 12/16/24 11:54:31 Page 25 of 86\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 briefs as well as Local Rule 5. To seal any judicial document, which a 9019 motion is, the Court must make very particular findings in accordance with LOCAL RULE 5 and, Bankruptcy Code Section 107. With respect to standing -- that is an argument raised by Attorney Bassett -- that is a red herring. The public has an absolute right to court -- court records subject to the -- the Court's sealing powers under 107. There is absolutely no case that is cited in the briefing that permits sealing of settlement agreements. The one case that allegedly supports the Trustee's position In Re Farmland is not a 9019 case. It had to do with a sale motion. Other circuits including the -- in addition to the Second Circuit and Mirlis, have held that the public has an absolute right to look at court documents in Doe versus Public Citizen, which is a Fourth Circuit case, 749 F.3d 246, and the Seventh Circuit Bond versus Utreras, U-T -- THE COURT: You've got to go back. Okay? MR. SKLARZ: I'm sorry. THE COURT: Because I can't keep up with that. You have to just go a little more slowly on that. MR. SKLARZ: I apologize, Your Honor. THE COURT: That's okay. Okay. Doe versus what? MR. SKLARZ: Doe versus Public Citizen, 749 F.3d\n\n1 2 246, and that's the Fourth Circuit, and Bond versus Utreras, U-T-R-E-R-A-S, 585 F.3d 1061.\n\n3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Again, this is not controversial. I think the - in their briefing, the Trustee says, yes, you typically do get a right to look at court records. They're saying they are super special -- they have a super special case. The Michael Goldberg case was a big Ponzi scheme case, hundreds of adversary proceedings. None of those were -- none of those settlement motions were filed under seal. That's pending in front of this case.\n\n11 12 13 14 15 16 This is a highly, highly unusual request. We've cited a number of cases from within the Second Circuit as to why this is not allowed. It doesn't meet the requirements of 107. This -- there is not a special rule for sealing settlement agreements because the Trustee wants to settle - seal a settlement agreement.\n\n17 18 19 20 21 22 The Local Rule -- Local Rule 5 requires again - this is a gatekeeping function of the -- of the Court to afford the effect of the First Amendment. Any such order sealing a judicial document shall include particularized findings demonstrating that the sealing is supported by clear and compelling reasons and is narrowly tailored.\n\n23 24 25 So there was no evidence put on to meet Rule 5. They -- essentially, the argument is we don't want to -- we think G Club or any other litigation counterparty could have\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 a litigation advantage if they know this. Well, that -- that issue has been endlessly litigated in the cases we cite in the brief, and every court to address this issue has said that is not a reason to seal a document. Section 107 says the reasons for sealing a document. And the only -- and the only reason to seal a document is commercial -- it -- it's -- it's either disparaging. And that's why in Mirlis, the -- the Second\n\n9 10 11 Circuit sealed -- or -- or denied a Gadfly's efforts to obtain video depositions related to a sex abuse case. So that was appropriate for sealing.\n\n12 13 14 15 16 17 But the -- but that's an entirely different situation. The only possible exception under 107 would be comer commercially sensitive information. And -- and the cases, as we cite in our brief and as the Trustee concedes in his brief, generally say, settlement information is not commercially sensitive.\n\n18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 The Hempel (phonetic) -- another case cited by the Trustee, Hempel, which is cite -- which is cited on Page 12 of the reply brief indicates that the Court should follow the Hempel standard. Well, Hempel denied sealing. The court held, in this case, the Trustee has not demonstrated that filing the settlement agreement falls within the articulated exceptions to the Bankruptcy Code General rules and denied and denied the motion.\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 There's just no legal support for the Trustee's position. There's no factual support for the Trustee's position. This is just a settlement in a bankruptcy case like happens every day in every bankruptcy quarter around the country from small cases to mega cases. And you -- you just don't see Trustees seeking to do this because it's not allowed. Again, for -- we first look to the First Amendment. We then look to Rule -- I'm sorry -- Code Set 11 U.S.C. 107. We then look to Mirlis, which is a binding Second Circuit authority, and then we look to our Local Rule 5. And none of the standards have been met. The -- the fact that -- any -- any citizen could bring this bring -- this motion. Anyone -- I could bring this as Jeffrey Sklarz on my own. I -- citizens have a public right to see the judicial docket, and that's -- and that's what G Club is -- is standing up for here. And that -- that's my presentation, Your Honor. If you have any questions, happy to answer. THE COURT: Thank you. No, I do not -- MR. SKLARZ: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: -- have any questions. Thank you. Any reply, Attorney Bassett? MR. BASSETT: Yes, Your Honor, just briefly. So, first of all, on the standing point, I -- I would submit that\n\n1 2 3 4 G Club absolutely lacks standing to assert the objection that it's asserting. G Club is, according to Attorney Sklarz, I guess, trying to advance the public interest generally. G Club does not have standing to do that.\n\n5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 G Club has standing in this case to advance its own interests, of which it has none. It has no interest in the subject matter underlying the motion before the Court for the reasons I articulated. It's not a Creditor. Its interest could not possibly be affected by whether or not the settlement that the Trustee has reached is fair and reasonable in terms of the level at which the Trustee has agreed to settle.\n\n13 14 15 16 17 18 19 The only plausible explanation, which Attorney Sklarz, of course, did not address, but it is so obvious as to why they want to see the settlement agreement, is because they want to use it to their advantage. Attorney Sklarz is the, by far, I think, the -- the one attorney who has the most engagements in this case, including with avoidance action Defendants.\n\n20 21 22 23 24 25 All those Defendants would love nothing more than to -- than to disrupt the Trustee's litigation process and its attempt to negotiate settlements. And by understanding where the Trustee is settling agreements and using that as a benchmark and using that as leverage in their negotiations. That's what's going on here. There's no attempt\n\n1 2 3 to just advance the public interest generally and ensure the integrity of the process. The U.S. Trustee has weighed in, and we have resolved the U.S. Trustee's objection.\n\n4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 As to the -- as to the merits of the request for sealing, Your Honor, Attorney Sklarz references the First Amendment. Look, there's no dispute. The case law is clear. The Court does have discretion to authorize the sealing of settlement agreements; it has discretion to authorize the sealing of proceedings before this Court. It has that ability when necessary to protect the interests of the Chapter 11 estate.\n\n12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 We cited cases, Your Honor, where this has happened. It's not uncommon. We cited the 5050 Offshore's case, not a 9019 case, but a case where the hearing was sealed because the discussion was about a motion, I believe, to retain litigation counsel, and the subject matter of that hearing would have revealed issues related to the strategy of the litigation to potential defendants, which would obviously prejudice the estate. Therefore, the Court authorized sealing.\n\n21 22 23 24 25 Your Honor, there are numerous examples of courts sealing settlement agreements specifically. We've cited these -- and -- and this has happened in cases that I've been involved in, that the Trustee has been involved in. We cite these in Footnote 9 of our reply brief, Your Honor, the\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Adelphia case, the Cap Mart (phonetic) case, the Lyondell case (phonetic), Footnote 10, GT Advanced Technologies case. Your Honor, it is common for courts to impose whole processes, whether it's mediation or avoidance action procedures or otherwise, that is part of that process involve a mechanism for the Trustee, or whoever is a litigation Trustee, whoever it might be, to file settlements under seal in order to protect the integrity of that process and to maximize the value for the estate that can be generated as part of those litigation processes. The other thing I would point out, Your Honor, in this case is, you know, what -- what one should look at and consider and what the Court should consider in determining whether or not is appropriate to seal the 9019 motion is whether there is sufficient indicia of the reasonableness of the settlement and whether there are things that people who might maybe evaluating the settlement can point to determine whether it has -- whether -- whether it's reasonable. And in that regard, Your Honor, I think it is highly significant that the Court has put in place the mediation process overseen by Judge Tancredi. And pursuant to that process, Judge Tancredi has reviewed this settlement, just like he'll review every other settlements, and determine or not that the settlement is reasonable in his view in the best interest of the estate. He has done that here. The\n\n1 2 U.S. Trustee has seen the settlement and knows what the settlement amount is, as has the committee.\n\n3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Your Honor, those are the parties who have a vested interest in acting out for the overall constituents of this bankruptcy case, the committee, the U.S. Trustee, not G Club. Both those parties are fine with the proposal before the Court as modified by the revised proposed order and have no other objection to the settlement. Your Honor, for all those reasons, we think it is critical for this motion to be granted, including the request to have the agreement kept under seal. Thank you.\n\n12 13 THE COURT: Thank you. Any response, Attorney Sklarz?\n\n14 15 16 17 18 19 MR. SKLARZ: The cases cited by the Trustee are located on Page 7 of their brief Footnote 9 and 10, and they're all non-substantive orders. They don't have any law. There's no support. I'm not sure how they amount to anything. The 50-Off case says -- and this is -- I'm reading -- this is 213 B.R. 646 on page 545:\n\n20 21 22 23 24 25 Similarly, the Court's order sealing the record does not bar the movements from seeking anything they may legitimately obtain via discovery. In other words, there's another mechanism to get the information they're seeking. There is no such -- accessing the Court document -- a docket cannot occur by discovery. It occurs through PACER.\n\n| G Club is a member of the public and has a right |\n|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| to see the -- see the docket.
Anyone -- anyone can bring a |\n| motion like -- like this or oppose the sealing of the -- of - |\n| - of a document.
This goes beyond a specific issue.
And, |\n| again, Rule 5 applies, Section 107 applies, Mirlis applies, |\n| and the First Amendment applies, and the Trustee has not |\n| complied with any of them.
Thank you. |\n| THE COURT:
Okay.
Thank you.
All right.
With |\n| regard to the motion -- actually, motions, right?
I mean, |\n| one was filed in the main case, and one was filed in the |\n| adversary.
So in the main case, it's 3559.
And in the |\n| adversary, it's Adversary 2405187.
And it's ECF 14.
The |\n| Court will take those motions under advisement. |\n| MR. SKLARZ:
Your Honor, I don't have any matters |\n| before the Court.
May I be excused? |\n| THE COURT:
Yes.
Thank you. |\n| MR. SKLARZ:
Thank you, Your Honor. |\n| THE COURT:
So we are now proceeding to the motion |\n| for summary judgment?
Is that the next matter, Trustee |\n| Despins? |\n| MR. DESPINS:
That's correct.
Mr. Bassett will |\n| handle that.
Thank you, Your Honor. |\n| THE COURT:
Okay.
Thank you. |\n| MR. BASSETT:
Your Honor, can I approach? |\n| THE COURT:
Yes, certainly. |\n| |\n\n1 2 3 MR. BASSETT: Your Honor, again, for the record, Nick Bassett from Paul Hastings on behalf of the Chapter 11 Trustee.\n\n4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 So, Your Honor, we're here today on the Trustee's motion for summary judgment, that two shell companies nominally owned by the Debtor's daughter -- that's Hudson Diamond New York, LLC, which I'll refer to generally as Hudson Diamond or maybe Hudson Diamond New York, and Leading Shine New York Limited, which I will likely refer to as Leading Shine, are alter egos of the Debtor, and each of those entities and its assets are equitably owned by the Debtor.\n\n13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Now, Your Honor, as I've often said at hearings like this one before the Court, it seems like we've been here before. And the reason I said that is because on numerous occasions in this case, we have re-argued issues that are either the same or similar to issues that we've already argued in the past in contested matters and adversary proceedings.\n\n20 21 22 23 24 25 I'm going to make that same comment again today, Your Honor. But I will tell you that this time I really mean it because here we are dealing with a situation where the very same Defendants in this very same adversary proceeding have already raised, and the Court has rejected, the very same arguments they are making today.\n\n1 2 3 4 Each of the moving Defendants filed either a motion to dismiss or a motion to vacate a default judgment, raising arguments similar to the motion to dismiss, in this adversary proceeding.\n\n5 6 7 8 9 10 Those motions raise the exact same arguments, namely and specifically, the argument that the Trustee lacks standing to pursue his alter ego and beneficial ownership claims under Section 544 of the bankruptcy code or otherwise. And the Court, after holding a hearing, overruled those arguments.\n\n11 12 13 14 15 16 17 In addition, the Court has already decided these same issues against Defendant Mei Guo in another adversary proceeding on I think two or maybe three occasions in that adversary proceeding. That's in the HK USA adversary proceeding where the Court denied Mei Guo's motion to dismiss, and then granted summary judgment in favor of the Trustee's subsequently.\n\n18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 So, today, Your Honor, Defendants are here taking what is at least their fourth bite at the apple. And that's not to mention that the Court has, of course, decided these same issues, including the Section 544 standing issue and a host of other adversary proceedings involving other Defendants while the Defendants in this adversary proceeding and their counsel have been highly involved in the case during that entire time.\n\n| 1 | So, Your Honor, I -- at some point -- I mean, |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | we'll -- we'll keep coming back here; we'll keep having these |\n| 3 | arguments, but at some point, enough is enough.
The |\n| 4 | Defendants have tried.
They've made the best arguments they |\n| 5 | think they can make, unless they're conceding today that they |\n| 6 | didn't do the job they wanted to do previously, and they |\n| 7 | failed.
And -- and the Court should reaffirm its prior |\n| 8 | rulings, and -- and we should all move on. |\n| 9 | Now, Your Honor -- and I -- and I'll re-argue the |\n| 10 | issues.
I'm happy to do it.
I'll respond to specific |\n| 11 | statements that the Defendants have made in their papers. |\n| 12 | But I felt compelled to say that at the outset. |\n| 13 | Now, on a motion for summary judgment, which is |\n| 14 | why we're here, Your Honor, you would think that the thrust |\n| 15 | of such a motion, instead of re-arguing legal issues that |\n| 16 | have already been decided by the Court, you would think that |\n| 17 | the Defendants would contend that the Trustee has not |\n| 18 | satisfied the Rule 56 standard, that the Trustee has failed |\n| 19 | to demonstrate that there is no genuine dispute of material |\n| 20 | fact on -- on the claims that he has asserted, namely his |\n| 21 | alter ego and his beneficial ownership claims. |\n| 22 | Notably, Your Honor, the Defendants here do not |\n| 23 | make that argument at all.
They paid lip service to it at |\n| 24 | one point, but they don't dispute virtually any of the facts |\n| 25 | set forth in the Trustee's statement of undisputed facts. |\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 And if you look at their counter statement of facts in their brief at Page 3, it is two sentences long. There was legitimately no dispute of fact with a few minor evidentiary objections which I can address at the appropriate time. But there is virtually no dispute whatsoever about the facts underlying the Trustee's claims.\n\n7 8 9 10 11 12 13 And despite the fact that those -- that the record is -- is largely uncontested, I do want to briefly start there with walking the Court through the factual record submitted by the Trustee that supports his request for summary judgment under Rule 56. And then after that, I will address some of the moving Defendant's recycled legal arguments.\n\n14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 What the evidence shows, Your Honor -- and this is all thoroughly set forth in the Trustee's Statement of Undisputed Facts, and the numerous exhibits cited in that statement -- is that these Defendants, Hudson Diamond New York and Leading Shine, although they are nominally owned by the Debtor's daughter, just like many other shell companies throughout this case including HK USA, another shell company owned by the Debtor's daughter, these entities are really shell companies owned and controlled at all relevant times and acting at the direction of the Debtor.\n\n24 25 I'll briefly run through some of the salient facts starting with Hudson Diamond. And, Your Honor, really the\n\n1 2 3 4 5 record shows from beginning to end, from formation of the company through whatever it has done in its existence, every step of the way, it has been controlled by the Debtor or his agents, and then used to support the Debtor's personal interests.\n\n6 7 8 9 10 11 Hudson Diamond was formed on May 30th, 2018. When it was formed, it was formed with the assistance of Hodgson Russ, which is the Debtor's personal counsel. The evidence in the record shows that Hodgson Russ took direction from Yvette Wang, the Debtor's agent and his criminal coconspirator.\n\n12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Also notable, Your Honor, is that actually at the inception of -- of Hudson Diamonds forming in at the conception of its formation on May 30th, 2018, its sole member at that time was actually a different entity. Today, it is Hudson Diamond Holdings, LLC. In 2018, the sole member was Hudson Diamond Holding Inc., a BVI entity. That BVI entity was owned solely by the Debtor's son, Mileson or Chang Guo. That's also in the Statement of Undisputed Facts.\n\n20 21 22 23 24 25 In January 2019, Hudson Diamond and the BVI transferred its membership interest in Hudson Diamond New York to Hudson Diamond Holdings, LLC, which is the current holding company owned by the Debtor's daughter, Mei Guo. So original structure, Hudson Diamond New York, Holding Company, Mileson. Current structure after 2019, Hudson Diamond New\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 York, Holding Company, Mei Guo. Went from the son to the daughter. Again Hodgson Russ, the Debtor's personal counsel, assisted with the transfer of the interest in Hudson Diamond New York from one entity to the other in 2019. And, Your Honor, in both internal Hodgson Russ emails and in emails with Yvette Wang, the Debtor in those emails is referred to as the \"Principal.\" After its formation, what did Hudson Diamond New York do? Well, it set up shop at 162 East 64th Street in Manhattan. The Debtor's well-known address for himself, which he listed on his petition, the address used by his Attorney Aaron Mitchell, the address used by other entities that this Court has found to be the Debtor's alter egos, Greenwich Land, Golden Spring, and many others. Hudson Diamond was managed by the Debtor's agents, specifically Yvette Wang, Max Kradner -- Krasner (phonetic), and Daniel Podaski (phonetic), all of whom the Court is very familiar with, at various times served as officers and/or account signatories for Hudson Diamond. The evidence in the record, which we've cited to in our Statement of Undisputed Facts, shows that these people, that Ms. Wang, Mr. Krasner, and Mr. Podaski, refer to the Debtor as the \"Boss\" or the \"Principal.\" What, if anything, did Hudson Diamond do? Well,\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 one thing it did is, first of all, Yvette Wang opened bank accounts on behalf of Hudson Diamond, and then used those accounts to pursue the debtor's interests, in particular, by purchasing real estate for the debtor. Not just any real estate, but the Taconic Road property which this Court has already found to be the Debtor's personal home, and which the Trustee, now owns and I believe has sold.\n\n8 9 10 11 Yvette Wang signed the agreement for the purchase of that property with the real estate broker on behalf of Hudson Diamond. That agreement, part of the record, says Miles Guo in a stamp at the corner.\n\n12 13 14 15 16 17 What else did Hudson Diamond do, Your Honor? Hudson Diamond was -- it received funding from other Debtor controlled shell companies, including ACA Capital Group and Saraca. It also transferred funds that it received to other -- to either the Debtor's family members or to other Debtorcontrolled entities.\n\n18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 For example, in 2019, \\$600,000 transferred to the Debtor's wife. Also in 2019, a \\$1,000,000 transferred to Mei Guo. During an approximately 14-month period it transferred more than \\$16 million to Golden Spring. During the second half of 2021, it sent more than \\$17 million to Lamp Capital. And during an 11-month period from 2019 through 2020, it transferred more than \\$4.5 million to Greenwich Land. Your Honor, all of the evidence in the record\n\n1 2 3 4 demonstrates that Hudson Diamond existed for no other purpose than to be managed and controlled by the Debtors and his - by the Debtor and his agents and to serve the Debtor's purposes, including by funding his interests.\n\n5 6 7 8 9 10 Your Honor, I want to stress again that there is no contrary evidence whatsoever in in the record. And perhaps that's not surprising because the Defendants, in particular Mei Guo, who purports to be the ultimate owner of these entities, has no ability to put on that evidence. And this is where her Fifth Amendment invocation comes in.\n\n11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Now, Defendants take issue with the Court's ability to consider that, but again, we're not asking the Court -- this is the same as in the Greenwich Land adversary proceeding. We're not asking the Court to draw a negative inference; we're simply pointing out that when a defendant when a litigant has taken the Fifth Amendment in response to an issue, they're not going to be capable of reversing course and offering testimony to support their position to the contrary.\n\n20 21 22 23 24 That's the point, Your Honor. She's asserted - she's taken the Fifth Amendment. She couldn't present evidence to the contrary, but it doesn't matter because she hasn't. The record before the Court is the Trustee's evidence, and no evidence from the other side.\n\n25\n\nBriefly on Leading Shine, Your Honor. Leading\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Shine's story is very similar to that of Hudson Diamond and so many of the other shell companies of the Debtor. Again, from it's from inception all the way through. Leading Shine was established on January 2nd, 2019. The Debtor's accounting firm this time, Janover LLC, assisted with the formation of Leading Shine, taking direction from the Debtor's agent, Max Krasner.\n\n8 9 10 11 12 Again, like with Hudson Diamond, Yvette Wang played an integral role. She, as set forth in our Statement of Undisputed Facts, opened bank accounts on behalf of Leading Shine, and she is listed as the owner, in fact, of Leading Shine's bank accounts.\n\n13 14 15 16 17 18 Leading Shine was funded by Debtor-controlled entities just like Hudson Diamond. For example, it received \\$6 million from ACA Capital, \\$350,000 from Golden Spring, \\$900,000 from Saraca Media Group. What did it do with those funds? Of course, it again engaged in facilitating transfers to other Debtor-controlled entities and to his relatives.\n\n19 20 21 22 23 On July 3rd, 2019, Leading Shine transferred \\$57,000 to the Debtor's son. In another one-year period, it transferred more than \\$5.4 million to Golden Spring. In August and September of 2020 Leading Shine transferred a total of \\$450,000 to Greenwich Land.\n\n24 25 Your Honor, that's -- that's only some of the evidence that we have set forth in our Statement of\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Undisputed Facts because I'm trying to be somewhat concise in my remarks. The last point I want to make, Your Honor, is if the Court needed any other evidence of the fact that Defendant Mei Guo does not actually serve as the beneficial owner and controller of Leading Shine, it need look no further than what happened when Leading Shine, as the Court will recall, I think it was in January of 2024, filed a motion to vacate the default in this case.\n\n9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 And the -- and Leading Shine's counsel had told the Court at that time that the reason Leading Shine had been unable to file a timely answer was because his client, Ms. Guo, could not determine whether or not she owned Leading Shine. And the Court astutely recognized in its order in response to that motion that one cannot have it both ways. One cannot take the position that they beneficially own and control an entity when they're claiming that they have no idea if they do or not. And that's where we are, Your Honor. So I think there should be no dispute based on the record before the Court that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the substance of the Trustee's claims. I\n\n21 22 don't -- I don't think the Defendants have made any legitimate argument to the contrary.\n\n23 24 25 So what we're left with are the recycled legal arguments that this Court has heard time and time again. The argument that they put at the forefront of their papers and\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 spend approximately seven pages on is the argument that the Trustee lacks standing under Section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code to pursue these claims, and they say that if the Trustee lacks standing under Section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code, then the Trustee could only pursue the claims under Section 541, and if the Trustee pursues the claims under Section 541, the in pari delicto and Wagoner Rule defenses would bar the Trustee's claims.\n\n9 10 11 12 13 So again, just to level set, at the outset, the Court has already decided this issue three times in this adversary proceeding. It's decided the issue numerous times in other adversary proceedings including HK USA, Greenwich Land, and the HCHK adversary proceeding.\n\n14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 In deciding the issue in those adversary proceedings, the Court recognized that Section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code -- and now I'm actually quoting from the Court's decision in the motion to dismiss in this case -- it says, while Section 544(a) provide the motion to dismiss order, Section 544(a) provides a Bankruptcy Trustee with general powers to assert certain rights and powers of certain classes of hypothetical creditors.\n\n22 23 24 25 Your Honor then went on to say, the limiting principle of Section 544(a) is that the rights and powers must be those the creditors at large could bring, rather than the particularized claims belonging to particular creditors.\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 The Court then further recognized that alter ego and beneficial ownership claims are, in fact, generalized claims that could be brought by any hypothetical creditor, in contexts such as, for example, post-judgment proceedings where a hypothetical creditor seeks assets upon which to execute its judgment.\n\n7 8 9 10 11 12 Based on that reasoning, with citation to cases such as Judge Tancredi's decision in the Titan Real Estate Ventures case, and to the Second Circuit decision in Saint Paul Fire and Marine v. PepsiCo, the Court appropriately concluded that the Trustee has standing to pursue his claims under Section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.\n\n13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 So in their opposition brief, despite having the opportunity to have made these arguments previously, and despite the Court having overruled them in the manner that I just described, the Defendants argue forcefully across seven pages that the Trustee's veil-piercing claims, I should say reverse veil-piercing claims, cannot be pursued under Section 544(a), because in Defendants' view those claims are more appropriately considered property of the estate under Section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. They highlight that and bold it numerous times in their seven pages.\n\n23 24 25 What the Defendants failed to recognize, Your Honor, is that even if they are correct in that assertion, they still lose. Because the reason, if it's true, that\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 these claims are property of the estate under Section 541(a), the reason the claims would be considered property of the estate under Section 541(a) is because they are general claims of creditors that inure to the benefit of all the Debtor's creditors equally. And in this regard, Your Honor, the Second\n\n7 8 9 Circuit's decision in August of 2024, in the In Re Nordlicht case, which we cite in our papers, is particularly instructive.\n\n10 11 12 13 14 15 Now, that case involves circumstances that are remarkably similar to ours. There was an individual Chapter 11 Debtor who was accused of using shell cubbies to hide his assets to keep him from -- keep those assets from creditors. And I saw this in the decision, I just wanted to quote it because it's almost eerie in some ways.\n\n16 17 18 19 20 21 22 This is the way the claims were described, or the Debtor scheme that underlie the claims was described. Said, quote, to allow him to claim poverty to creditors while controlling substantial assets, the Debtor has adopted a specific modus operandi in his financial arrangements. First, the Debtor organizes a shell company with his wife, who has nominal ownership and control.\n\n23 24 25 Second, notwithstanding his ownership, notwithstanding wife's ownership and name, the Debtor, in fact, controls and dominates the shell company, directing or\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 participating in substantially all financial decisions for it. Third, any funds or interests in the shell company are extracted to accounts held by the Debtor's wife or another closely affiliated party such as a family-owned LLC or trust. By conducting his affairs in this way, the Debtor enjoys all the benefits of owning very significant assets while telling creditors they are not his. Sounds like we're describing Mr. Kwok. Now, what happened in that case, Your Honor, is a creditor of the Debtor had pursued a reverse veil-piercing claim against some of these alter ego entities in state court. And then after the Debtor filed for bankruptcy and a Chapter 11 Trustee was appointed, the Trustee said, hey, that claim that was asserted in state court is actually a claim of the estate that I have the sole ability to prosecute and settle. And the Trustee, in fact, entered into a settlement to settle that claim with the alter ego shell companies and other parties involved. So the issue for the Bankruptcy Court, which was the Southern District of New York, Judge Drain, at the District Court in the Second Circuit, and they all agreed, was whether or not that claim, that reverse veil-piercing claim, was, in fact, a claim that the Trustee had the\n\n1 exclusive authority to settle.\n\n2 3 4 5 6 7 8 The Court found that it was, and the basis for that decision was that the claims according to the Second Circuit were, quote, general claims of creditors, and not specific claims of particular creditors. The claims as observed by the Second Circuit are capable of increasing the basket of assets that could be used to satisfy any and all liabilities owed by the Debtor.\n\n9 10 11 12 13 And on that basis, the Court found that under Section 541, those claims, which are general claims of creditors, not claims that the Debtor himself would have been able to assert pre-petition, but claims of creditors, those claims become property of the estate under Section 541(a).\n\n14 15 16 17 18 19 20 And what's important about that analysis, Your Honor, is that because those are creditor claims that become property of the estate, they are not subject to the Wagoner Rule or to the in pari delicto defense. In fact, Your Honor already recognized that on two occasions, both in the UK - the HK USA motion to dismiss decision, and in the motion to dismiss decision in this case.\n\n21 22 23 24 25 In the HK USA decision page 15 footnote 6, the Court was observing how prior to Nordlicht, there was - there were case law in other circuits, including specifically the Third Circuit, that went through this exact same analysis, where the Third Circuit had found that a reverse\n\n| | 50 |\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | veil-piercing claim was property of the estate because it was |\n| 2 | a general claim that could be asserted by creditors. |\n| 3 | And what the Court observed is if we were in the |\n| 4 | Second Circuit, there would be, quote, a different basis for |\n| 5 | largely the same result in the Second Circuit.
And the point |\n| 6 | there was that you'd get to the same place.
You still would |\n| 7 | not have a Wagoner defense or an in pari delicto defense. |\n| 8 | It's just a different way of getting there, it's either |\n| 9 | through that 541 route that I just described, or through |\n| 10 | Section 544(a).
Either way, because we're talking about |\n| 11 | creditor claims, those defenses do not apply. |\n| 12 | The Court recognized the same thing in the motion |\n| 13 | to dismiss decision in this case.
I am missing the page |\n| 14 | reference, but it is a -- what the Court said was, again, |\n| 15 | citing to the Third Circuit authority that I just mentioned, |\n| 16 | that, quote, in the Third Circuit, bankruptcy trustees can |\n| 17 | bring alter ego and beneficial ownership claims under Section |\n| 18 | 541 as generalized claims of creditors, not as claims of the |\n| 19 | Debtor, which would also avoid the Wagoner doctrine. |\n| 20 | So, Your Honor, even if the Defendants are correct |\n| 21 | that these are 541 claims, they're still not subject to the |\n| 22 | defenses that they seek to assert for the reasons Your Honor |\n| 23 | already recognized.
And Your Honor's decision is consistent |\n| 24 | with another case, In Re Harmon.
It's 529 B.R. 352.
This is |\n\nBankruptcy Northern District of Georgia 2015, that is\n\n1 squarely on point.\n\n2 3 4 5 6 7 The Court, in that case, was dealing with alter ego claims that could have been brought by the Debtor's creditors outside of bankruptcy, but inside of bankruptcy could only be brought by the Trustee, because it found that they were part -- they were property of the standard of Section 541.\n\n8 9 10 11 12 And what the Court said was, quote, the defense of in pari delicto is not applicable here. As discussed above, binding Eleventh Circuit precedent informs that the Trustee has authority under Section 541 to bring alter ego claims, which could be brought by the Debtor's creditors.\n\n13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 The Court went on to say because the Trustee stands in the shoes of creditors whose claims are unable to proceed because of the bankruptcy, it would be inequitable to prevent creditors from asserting their claims due to the existence of the bankruptcy while simultaneously imputing the Debtor's alleged conduct on the Trustee. The doctrine of in pari delicto would not apply to the Debtor's creditors, therefore it should not apply to the Trustee.\n\n21 22 23 24 25 So Your Honor, the Defendants lose either way. They lose if these are claims that are brought under Section 544(a), they lose if their claims are brought under Section 541. They also lose for a third reason, which is that even if there were claims under Section 541, to which the Wagoner\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Rule and the in pari delicto doctrine might apply, then they would lose because the insider exception to the in pari delicto and Wagoner Rule would apply in this situation as it has in past situations in the same Chapter 11 case. Your Honor, I've been speaking for a while, so I'm going to go through some of the other arguments more briefly. Again, I think the Section 544 argument was the focal point of their papers, and I wanted to make sure I addressed that at some length.\n\n10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 They also argue, Your Honor, that the Trustee's alter ego claim cannot be asserted and must fail because alter ego under New York law is a remedy and not a substantive claim. Again, I'd point the Court to the Nordlicht case. That argument was made there. The Second Circuit's response to that was, quote, the contention that alter ego theories of liability are not claims under New York State law at all, but remedies is baseless. Under New York law, one can assert alter ego as a claim, as the Trustee has done here.\n\n20 21 22 23 24 25 Your Honor, they also argue that the Trustee's claims, for beneficial ownership of assets fail, because under the nominee doctrine, they say the Trustee has to identify each asset with specificity and explain his ownership over that asset. It's an ironic argument to make in a scenario where the only assets that have been identified\n\n2\n\n3\n\nthat these entities have are bank accounts, which the Trustee has shown extensive evidence of the Debtor's ownership and control over.\n\n53\n\n4 5 6 7 8 9 So, I don't really understand where that argument is coming from, but I think it can be projected on that basis. Your Honor, the Defendants also argue that the relief the Trustee seeks should not be granted on a nunc pro tunc basis. We've addressed this argument time and time again as well.\n\n10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 By my count, the Court has rejected this argument and granted the Trustee, has issued orders that as a result of the Trustee's alter ego rulings, the assets of the alter egos are and always have been the property of the estate. The Court has issued that ruling in the HCHK adversary proceeding, and the -- or in the, sorry, the HK USA adversary proceeding, the Golden Spring adversary proceeding, the Lamp Capital adversary proceeding, the Greenwich Land adversary proceeding, and the HCHK adversary proceeding.\n\n19 20 21 22 23 The argument that the Defendants make here is that, according to them, the only way nunc pro tunc relief can be granted is to, quote, correct a clerical mistake or a ministerial defect, and then they accuse the Trustee of seeking to rewrite history.\n\n24 25 Your Honor, what we're doing is the exact opposite. And in fact, we're not seeking nunc pro tunc\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 relief at all. What we are seeking is to prevent history from being rewritten by the Debtor and those who aided the Debtor in perpetuating his long running fraudulent shell game. The reality, economically and substantively, has always been that the Trustee beneficially owned and\n\n7 8 9 10 11 controlled Hudson Diamond and Leading Shine and their assets. The declaratory judgment that we're seeking, the order that we're seeking, is simply affirming that reality. We're not trying to rewrite history; we're trying to prevent it from being rewritten by the Debtor.\n\n12 13 14 15 Therefore, Your Honor, not only is that entirely appropriate to do, but it is also not seeking nunc pro tunc relief at all. So all the cases they cite about that are completely inapposite.\n\n16 17 18 19 20 I would also point the Court to numerous cases that we cited on this topic and another brief filed in this case, the joint briefing in the avoidance actions that's on the main docket at ECF 3803. Extensive discussion of that issue there.\n\n21 22 23 24 25 Your Honor, another argument that Defendants make is that Delaware law follows the identity -- or sorry, follows the vicarious liability theory of liability and not the identity theory. So according to the Defendants, all the Trustee's alter ego ruling would do is make these Defendants'\n\n1 2 3 assets available to satisfy claims of the Debtor's creditors, but would not actually render the assets property of the estate.\n\n4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 That, too, has been thoroughly briefed elsewhere, including in the other briefing that I just referenced. Your Honor, it's also an issue the Court has decided on multiple occasions, including specifically in the HK USA proceeding against Mei Guo, where the Court said in that order, quote, in conjunctions with -- in conjunction with Sections 541 and 542, alter ego accomplishes the transfer of assets into the bankruptcy estate, end quote. Again, that's against Mei Guo, who's a defendant here, binding on her. No question. The issue has been decided and settled.\n\n14 15 16 17 18 19 20 To the extent -- you know what, Your Honor, I'm going to skip to last couple of arguments to speed this up. Your Honor, I think -- I think that actually covers the landscape. I'm happy to drill down either on the issue of the identity theory versus the vicarious liability theory, or any of these other arguments that the Defendants make.\n\n21 22 23 24 But in closing, I just want to, again, stress that there is no dispute, let alone a material dispute or a genuine dispute about the relevant facts in this case. I think they are almost entirely agreed upon.\n\n25\n\nThe only issue is whether the Court should revisit\n\n| 1 | and reverse itself on decisions that it already made on the |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | legal issues that the Defendants raise in response to the |\n| 3 | motion for summary judgment.
For the reasons that I've |\n| 4 | articulated and as we have set forth in our papers, we do not |\n| 5 | think there's any basis for the Court to do that, and |\n| 6 | therefore, we would ask for our motion to be granted.
I'm |\n| 7 | happy to answer any questions the Court may have. |\n| 8 | THE COURT:
Thank you, I do not have any questions |\n| 9 | at this time.
Thank you. |\n| 10 | MR. BASSETT:
Thank you, Your Honor. |\n| 11 | THE COURT:
Attorney Kindseth. |\n| 12 | MR. KINDSETH:
Thank you, Your Honor.
Steven |\n| 13 | Kindseth, Zeisler & Zeisler for Mei Guo, Leading Shine New |\n| 14 | York, and Hudson Diamond New York. |\n| 15 | Your Honor, first and foremost, these issues |\n| 16 | largely have been fully briefed, and I'm not going to try to |\n| 17 | regurgitate the arguments in the briefing, and as counsel |\n| 18 | pointed out, this Court has considered and decided these |\n| 19 | issues on multiple occasions.
Arguments were made in favor |\n| 20 | of summary judgment, we opposed summary judgment, and we |\n| 21 | believe it is appropriate that summary judgment be denied for |\n| 22 | the reasons set forth in our briefing. |\n| 23 | I would also acknowledge, Your Honor, with respect |\n| 24 | to the legal issues that you've decided in this adversary |\n| 25 | proceeding, those are obviously law of the case.
And the |\n| | |\n\n| 1 | Court has the discretion not to reconsider the prior |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | decisions of this Court, in which we respect.
But for the |\n| 3 | reasons set forth in our briefing, we are asking the Court as |\n| 4 | to some discrete legal issues to reconsider those decisions. |\n| 5 | Before I get into argument, I'll also point out, |\n| 6 | Your Honor, as Your Honor is aware, many of these issues have |\n| 7 | been briefed on an omnibus basis pursuant to this Court's |\n| 8 | order, and those briefs have been filed.
I have the docket |\n| 9 | numbers for Your Honor, if you want them to -- I don't think |\n| 10 | it's necessary. |\n| 11 | THE COURT:
I don't need the docket numbers. |\n| 12 | Thank you. |\n| 13 | MR. KINDSETH:
Okay.
And those are going to be |\n| 14 | argued on January 15th, and -- |\n| 15 | THE COURT:
Those are all in avoidance actions, |\n| 16 | though, Attorney Kindseth.
This isn't an avoidance action. |\n| 17 | Those issues are -- you can argue that they're the same, but |\n| 18 | summary judgment is based upon the facts.
And the facts of |\n| 19 | those cases are that those are avoidance actions.
This case |\n| 20 | is about alter ego. |\n| 21 | MR. KINDSETH:
Correct.
The similarity -- there |\n| 22 | is distinctions, of course, Your Honor.
The similarity is |\n| 23 | that, as Attorney Bassett pointed out, we're relying upon |\n| 24 | legal arguments largely.
And some of those legal arguments |\n| 25 | are identical. |\n\n| 1 | And so actually just to be clear, Your Honor, the |\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | Trustee incorporates by reference arguments made in his |\n| 3 | briefing with respect to the omnibus briefing into the |\n| 4 | proceeding here today.
And so I just wanted to point that |\n| 5 | out to this Court.
Considering the extensive briefing, I'm |\n| 6 | going to limit my comments to a couple points, Your Honor. |\n| 7 | First, with respect to standing, again, Your Honor |\n| 8 | has decided this issue.
Your Honor decided that the Trustee |\n| 9 | had standing under 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, the strong |\n| 10 | arm statute.
And I would like to point out in asking the |\n| 11 | Court to reconsider that, I'm not rearguing it, I'm just |\n| 12 | pointing out the -- |\n| 13 | THE COURT:
How do you ask a court to reconsider a |\n| 14 | ruling in opposition to summary judgment?
Wouldn't you have |\n| 15 | to file a motion for reconsideration? |\n| 16 | MR. KINDSETH:
Well, the Trustee's argument that |\n| 17 | he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there |\n| 18 | are no genuine issues of material fact rely upon the |\n| 19 | argument.
And this Court can incorporate its prior argument, |\n| 20 | but the argument that the Trustee needs to incorporate is |\n| 21 | that the Trustee has standing. |\n| 22 | And if Your Honor applies law of the case, we |\n| 23 | respect that.
We are simply pointing out that Picard v. |\n| 24 | JPMorgan Chase limited the PepsiCo decision based upon the |\n| 25 | alleged claim constituting property of the estate rather than |\n| | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3906 Filed 12/16/24 Entered 12/16/24 11:54:31 Page 59 of 86\n\n59\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 relying upon the strong-arm powers under 544(a). And because of that, we are arguing that the Trustee does not have the authority under 544(a) to bring generalized claims of creditors. Similarly, with respect to the -- THE COURT: What about with the Second Circuit case that was -- the decision that was issued after decisions of this Court in August of this year that addressed all these issues? What about that decision? MR. KINDSETH: Correct. I'm going to address that next, Your Honor. THE COURT: Go right ahead. MR. KINDSETH: And because that is new, the parties did not -- or we did not brief that issue. THE COURT: Well, I'm not sure it's -- that decision is new. MR. KINDSETH: Yep. THE COURT: But the issues are the same. MR. KINDSETH: And Your Honor, the distinction in Nordlicht, Nordlicht held that fraudulent conveyance and alter ego claims constitute property of the estate that could be sold pursuant to Section 363 and also settled by the Trustee. So once again, Your Honor, we have, cases that are being cited to rely upon, to establish the Trustee's power\n\n1 2 3 under 544(a), the strong-arm statute, when those cases are actually saying that the claim at issue constitutes property of the estate.\n\n4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 And Your Honor, specifically, in Your Honor's decisions, and there's been multiple decisions, where Your Honor said that the Wagoner Rule and in pari delicto did not need to be considered because those applied to arguments that the Trustee has standing because it's property of the estate. And Your Honor circumvented that issue, rightful -- I mean, the reasoning made sense because Your Honor was saying under 544(a), the Trustee could exercise his strong-arm powers to pursue the claim. And so Your Honor's basis was to reject the issue of it constituting property of the estate and focusing on 544(a).\n\n15 16 17 18 19 When PepsiCo, JPMorgan Chase, Picard, and Nordlicht all say that the claim constitutes -- the claim constitutes property of the estate. And so our argument to Your Honor, with respect to in response to law of the case and asking respectfully to --\n\n20 21 22 THE COURT: But they -- it says that they are claims of -- they're general claims that can be asserted by creditors.\n\nMR. KINDSETH: Yes.\n\n23\n\n24 25 THE COURT: Not a specific claim asserted by a specific creditor.\n\n| 1 | MR. KINDSETH:
Correct.
So, and this has been our |\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | point.
So generalized claims of creditors -- and in fact, it |\n| 3 | seems as though the Trustee is stepping back from the |\n| 4 | argument that the claim can be brought under 544(a) and seems |\n| 5 | to be arguing that now, notwithstanding the Court's numerous |\n| 6 | prior decisions, the Trustee could bring the claim under |\n| 7 | 544(a), it sounds like the Trustee is now arguing that the |\n| 8 | claim constitutes property of the estate. |\n| 9 | And so and I would also point out, Your Honor, |\n| 10 | that this is the first time in this adversary proceeding at |\n| 11 | oral argument that the Trustee is now arguing that the |\n| 12 | Trustee has standing because the claim is property of the |\n| 13 | estate.
Now, arguments in response, but -- |\n| 14 | THE COURT:
I don't think that's what he argued, |\n| 15 | but you can go right ahead. |\n| 16 | MR. KINDSETH:
Okay.
So, and, Your Honor, if the |\n| 17 | Trustee's not making that argument, then we'll just live with |\n| 18 | 544(a) in the Court's prior decision.
And we are asking the |\n| 19 | Court to reconsider the prior decision based upon our |\n| 20 | explanation and the Second Circuit's decision in JPMorgan |\n| 21 | Chase and the decision in Nordlicht, which again did not rely |\n| 22 | upon strong-arm powers under 544(a). |\n| 23 | Expanding on the point with respect to the |\n| 24 | Nordlicht and the arguments made today, the Trustee has |\n| 25 | argued today that the Wagoner rule and in pari delicto do not |\n\n1 apply. Well, that issue hasn't been briefed.\n\n2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 We haven't been arguing that these claims, and the Trustee has not relied upon the argument that these claims constitute property of the estate. And so summary judgment should not be granted based upon a legal argument raised for the first time at oral argument, which the parties have not even briefed, based upon a standing argument, which hasn't been the Trustee's standing argument throughout this case or any of the other cases.\n\n10 11 12 13 14 15 And so I'm -- I was prepared to just simply stand with the consequence of this Court's prior decision on that the Trustee's standing is under 544. We respectfully disagree. We pointed out the reasons why in our brief, and we would ask the Court to reconsider that decision based on its discretion under law of the case.\n\n16 17 18 19 And we think that the Court should not hold that the Trustee has standing under 544(a) to pursue the causes of action that have been brought in this case. That's the first point.\n\n20 21 22 23 24 25 And the second point I'd like to bring to the Court's attention is with respect to the alter ego claim under New York law. Nordlicht specifically acknowledges that alter ego is not a cause of action under New York law. And, therefore, the claim asserted by the Trustee, upon which it is seeking summary judgment, is not a valid cause of action\n\n| | 63 |\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | upon which judgment can enter, and therefore, summary |\n| 2 | judgment should be denied. |\n| 3 | What Nordlicht held for very specific purposes, |\n| 4 | whether a claim can be sold under 363, is that the alter ego |\n| 5 | claim is a claim under the Bankruptcy Code.
And so the Court |\n| 6 | held that it could be sold and settled. |\n| 7 | What's critical, Your Honor, also about Nordlicht, |\n| 8 | is that the Second Circuit recognized that the alter ego |\n| 9 | theory is a claim under the Bankruptcy Code, but it's |\n| 10 | actually a claim within a claim.
And the claim within a |\n| 11 | claim is under New York law, first and foremost, that there's |\n| 12 | liability and then they're based upon that claim, in |\n| 13 | conjunction with the alter ego claim, that liability could be |\n| 14 | imposed upon the alter ego.
And so -- |\n| 15 | THE COURT:
Where exactly in the decision does it |\n| 16 | say what you just said, Attorney Kindseth? |\n| 17 | MR. KINDSETH:
Can I get the case, please? |\n| 18 | THE COURT:
Yes. |\n| 19 | MR. KINDSETH:
So I have the Lexis number, Your |\n| 20 | Honor.
The printed version that I have does not have the |\n| 21 | reported number.
I'm not sure what -- do you have a Westlaw |\n| 22 | or Lexis version?
I can say where -- |\n| 23 | THE COURT:
I don't have any version in front of |\n| 24 | me right now. |\n| 25 | MR. KINDSETH:
So it's in the -- |\n| | |\n\n 64 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 THE COURT: But you're telling me that this case says something that my recollection of looking at it, it doesn't say. So I'm asking you to tell me where in the case -- MR. KINDSETH: It's head note 22 -- THE COURT: Well, head note 22 doesn't help me. I want the language from the decision. MR. KINDSETH: It says before a court or jury can decide whether to impose liability on an entity or individual's alter ego, it must first be persuaded that liability ought to be imposed on the entity or individual in the first place. And -- THE COURT: But it doesn't say that liability is imposed. It says -- you just read. It says it ought to consider whether it ought to be. Those are two different things. You said that liability has to be established. MR. KINDSETH: It clearly states that it's not - that alter ego is not a cause of action. THE COURT: No, I don't think it does. MR. KINDSETH: It says that -- what Nordlicht says is it's not a remedy. But it acknowledges that under New York law -- THE COURT: Can somebody just give me the cite, please, of the case -- MR. KINDSETH: Sorry. The cite of the case is 115 Case 22-50073 Doc 3906 Filed 12/16/24 Entered 12/16/24 11:54:31 Page 64 of 86\n\n 65 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 F.4th 90. THE COURT: All right. Give me a second, please. 115 F.4th what? MR. KINDSETH: 115 F.4th. 90. THE COURT: So you cited to head note 22. So I'm reading in the reported decision from the West decision that appears in a book, 115 F.4th 90, page 105. Head notes 20 to 22. Personal claims, on the other hand, are claims for injury that are particular to the creditor, In Re Tronox and in which other creditors generally have no interest. In Re Emoral, citing board of Trustees of Teamsters Local 863 Pension Fund versus Foodtown, Third Circuit 2022 2002. Personal claims, therefore, are in the legal or equitable interest only of the creditor, Board of Trustees of Teamsters Local 833. Creditors are exclusively entitled to pursue personal claims, and the bankruptcy Trustee is precluded from doing so, Hirsch versus Arthur Andersen Second Circuit 95. The distinction between general and personal claims promotes the orderly distribution of assets in bankruptcy by funneling all asset recovery litigation through a single plaintiff, the Trustee, In Re Wilton Armetale Inc., Third Circuit 2020. Now going on, in distinguishing general claims from personal claims, labels are not conclusive since Case 22-50073 Doc 3906 Filed 12/16/24 Entered 12/16/24 11:54:31 Page 65 of 86\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 plaintiffs often try but are not permitted to plead around the bankruptcy. Instead, we inquire into whether the factual origins of the injury, more importantly, into the nature of the claims asserted. For this analysis, we look to estate law applicable to each claim. That goes through this whole thing. It doesn't say under New York law it's not a claim. That's not what it says. MR. KINDSETH: Unfortunately, there's the head notes are not in line to what I have. There must be -- Lexis must have its own set of head notes. THE COURT: What footnote are you -- headnote are you talking about? Where are you in the case? Give me a page number. MR. KINDSETH: I have a Lexis number of 36. It's right -- it's in Section C, alter ego, reversed veil-piercing theory of liability. At the very end of Section C, before Section D starts, so there's the holding, right before Section D -- THE COURT: I'm not there yet. So because I don't know where you are because I'm at Westlaw. MR. KINDSETH: I apologize. I have a pre-reported decision printout. My apologies, Your Honor. THE COURT: I have -- are you at the Stadtmauer's reverse veil-piercing claim as general? Because that's what\n\n| it says.
The Stadtmauer's reverse veil-piercing claim is a |\n|-----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| general claim under New York law.
Because we observed in |\n| Tronox claims on allegations of a general failure to adhere |\n| to corporate formalities and abuse of corporate form |\n| generally qualify as general claims if they are capable of |\n| increasing the basket of assets that would be used to satisfy |\n| any and all liabilities owed by the Debtor.
That is the case |\n| here.
That's what they say. |\n| MR. KINDSETH:
Correct.
And we don't dispute |\n| that. |\n| THE COURT:
Then what's your -- what's your point? |\n| I don't understand your point at all.
Because if you don't |\n| dispute that, then it's a general claim that the Trustee can |\n| bring on behalf of all the creditors, whether it's property |\n| of the estate or not.
So what -- it doesn't even -- your |\n| point -- I don't understand the point you're making. |\n| MR. KINDSETH:
The Court had previously held that |\n| it is a generalized claim that can be pursued under 544(a). |\n| THE COURT:
Okay. |\n| MR. KINDSETH:
That's law of the case.
That |\n| argument -- and we dispute that argument but it's law of the |\n| case.
And the Court has discretion -- |\n| THE COURT:
Well, I think it's more than law of |\n| the case.
I think it's binding law in the Second Circuit at |\n| this point.
But go ahead. |\n| |\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 3906
Filed 12/16/24
Entered 12/16/24 11:54:31
Page 68 of 86 |\n|---------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | 68 |\n| 1 | MR. KINDSETH:
Okay, so we respectfully ask the |\n| 2 | Court to look at JPMorgan Chase, and -- |\n| 3 | THE COURT:
That was cited -- that was decided |\n| 4 | before Nordlicht. |\n| 5 | MR. KINDSETH:
Correct.
And Nordlicht does not |\n| 6 | rely upon 544(a).
So, Judge, I'm trying to be -- |\n| 7 | THE COURT:
Because it didn't have to.
But it |\n| 8 | still raised the -- it still went through the analysis of |\n| 9 | whether or not it's a general claim that's available to be |\n| 10 | prosecuted and pursued only by a Trustee.
And that's what |\n| 11 | the -- that's what the case found. |\n| 12 | It found that the reverse veil-piercing claim |\n| 13 | under New York law, which is what you're arguing, is a |\n| 14 | general claim and that the only proper party to bring that |\n| 15 | claim is the Trustee.
That's what they're saying.
That's -- |\n| 16 | I'm reading the Second Circuit opinion.
That's what it says. |\n| 17 | MR. KINDSETH:
Your Honor, if I may, there's two |\n| 18 | options to the Trustee.
One is to argue under 544(a).
The |\n| 19 | other is to argue that it's property of the estate.
They're |\n| 20 | different arguments entirely.
Okay? |\n| 21 | So just step by step, Judge, 544(a) or -- |\n| 22 | THE COURT:
I understand.
I understand.
You |\n| 23 | don't have to go through it.
I don't agree with you. |\n| 24 | MR. KINDSETH:
Okay.
So we've been -- this entire |\n| 25 | case, all the avoidance actions, alter ego arguments have all |\n| | |\n\n 69 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 been premised upon -- THE COURT: The avoidance actions are different than the alter ego actions. You keep trying to make them the same. MR. KINDSETH: But they depend upon -- since all the transferors were alleged alter egos, then it -- there's the predicate argument that the alter egos actually constitute property of the estate and therefore their transfers may be avoided. And so the same issue exists in those avoidance actions as they do in the other proceedings. And so, the question is, is the Trustee entitled to standing under 544(a) exercising strong strong-arm powers or is the Trustee standing in the shoes of the Debtor because these claims are property of the estate? And the reason why the Court and the Trustee originally did not want to -- or the Trustee did not want to argue and the Court held that these were not property of the estate claims is because of Wagoner and in pari delicto and other arguments and holdings that the Second Circuit has held. And so, for quite some time, we've been -- the Court has been sustaining the Trustee's actions and alter ego arguments based on 544(a). And so -- and I had no intention of going into this issue at this length because the Court has decided it and decided it many, many times, and it's law of Case 22-50073 Doc 3906 Filed 12/16/24 Entered 12/16/24 11:54:31 Page 69 of 86\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 the case in 544(a) is the Court's holding the Trustees is proceeding under 544(a) under strong-arm powers. Fine. And we said you should reconsider that based upon JPMorgan Chase. Now, what the Trustee seems to be arguing is, well, just now it's the Trustee saying, oh, no. It's property of the estate and Wagoner Rule and in pari delicto don't apply. THE COURT: I don't think that's what he's saying. MR. KINDSETH: Okay. Well, then you know what? THE COURT: He didn't say that. He made three or four different arguments in response to what you've argued about standing. MR. KINDSETH: Okay. So, Your Honor, I believe -- I I'm confident Your Honor understands the point that I'm making. If Your Honor is going to stand by 544(a), so be it, but not -- THE COURT: And when we -- and the argument was that the claims were claims under 541, property of the estate. And we made a finding, or the decision says it doesn't matter whether it was 544 or 541. This Trustee still has standing. And that's the point. MR. KINDSETH: I don't, respectfully, Your Honor, my recollection of the Court's decision -- THE COURT: Well, you -- then fine. You go find it, because I think you're wrong.\n\n 71 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MR. KINDSETH: Okay. So -- THE COURT: And you should have -- if you think that, then -- MR. KINDSETH: Well, I wasn't interested -- THE COURT: -- I'm not going to spend a lot of time on this. We have gone through this. What's your argument? Nordlicht says that they're general claims, that the only person that can bring those claims is the Trustee. That's what it says. Tell me where it doesn't say that. MR. KINDSETH: It says -- it says there are generalized claims that are -- constitute property of the estate. THE COURT: No. That's not all that it says. It says there are general claims, and the only proper plaintiff is the Trustee. That's what it says. I just read it. MR. KINDSETH: The -- correct. I agree with that. And the issue then, if the -- if the Trustee's bringing this claim based upon the fact that it's allegedly property of the estate, so now the question is, does the Wagoner Rule or in pari delicto preclude the Trustee from making that argument? That in fact -- THE COURT: No, it doesn't preclude the Trustee from making any argument. It's only if you have a valid defense under those doctrines. That's the issue. MR. KINDSETH: And you know what? That argument Case 22-50073 Doc 3906 Filed 12/16/24 Entered 12/16/24 11:54:31 Page 71 of 86\n\n| 1 | | | | has never been made. | |\n|---|--|--|--|----------------------|--|\n|---|--|--|--|----------------------|--|\n\n2 3 4 5 6 7 THE COURT: It's been made 12 times. I've gone through the Wagoner and in -- every single time, we've gone through it. We've gone through it every single time. I can't -- I mean, that's fine. If you think it hasn't been made, then I don't know what to tell you, because it's been made.\n\n8 9 10 11 12 13 MR. KINDSETH: Okay. I would point out, in conjunction with the motion for summary judgment, there was no argument in the motion for summary judgment with respect to the claim constituting property of the estate and the inapplicability of the Wagoner Rule or in pari delicto. And so, we argue -- in fact, we argue that 544\n\n14 15 does not provide the Trustee with standing. And so, Your Honor, I --\n\n16 17 18 19 20 21 22 THE COURT: You've already started by saying you're asking the Court to reconsider all its rulings. So now you're making an argument, too, that you've already made because you're saying, you know, Judge, we made these arguments already, but you didn't agree with us, so we're going to make them again. And we now ask you to reconsider that ruling.\n\n23 24 25 And then in the interim, there's been a Second Circuit decision, which this Court is bound by, that says that the claims are general claims that can be brought only\n\n 73 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 by the plaintiff, Trustee. That's what it says. MR. KINDSETH: But not based on 544(a). THE COURT: Okay. So then, even if I agree with you, which -- then I can let them bring it under something else according to the Second Circuit. And in our motion - in the motion to dismiss, they were asserted under 541. If you -- if you want to go back to what happened, they were estate claims. They were property of the estate. And we said in the decision, it doesn't matter whether it's 541 or 544. You don't have a defense to that on standing. That's what we said. It doesn't matter. So, you know, who has standing then, Attorney Kindseth, if it isn't the Trustee? MR. KINDSETH: The creditors would have standing - - THE COURT: What creditors? MR. KINDSETH: Whatever creditor -- THE COURT: Who creditor? What creditor? No. No. MR. KINDSETH: Whatever creditor -- THE COURT: No. It has to be a specific creditor, if you're right, Attorney Kindseth. So who's the -- who's the specific creditor? MR. KINDSETH: PAX. THE COURT: PAX? PAX already brought all those Case 22-50073 Doc 3906 Filed 12/16/24 Entered 12/16/24 11:54:31 Page 73 of 86\n\n 74 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 claims in state court. MR. KINDSETH: And you asked me who has standing. PAX has standing -- THE COURT: No. I didn't ask you who was standing. I said, who's the right creditor? Who's the - you said all creditors. I said, no, no. What creditor? What creditor? You need to explain. You need to identify. You need to say to me there's only one creditor that can bring this cause of action. And if there's more than one, then your argument fails. MR. KINDSETH: Okay. THE COURT: So, PAX -- your answer is PAX is the only creditor that can bring an alter ego action against these entities? MR. KINDSETH: So I understand your point, Your Honor. THE COURT: That's -- I have a question pending. Is that your answer? MR. KINDSETH: No. That's not the only one. It is a -- THE COURT: Okay. Then you lose. MR. KINDSETH: Okay. So, Your Honor -- THE COURT: On that issue. MR. KINDSETH: I agree. It is a generalized claim. Case 22-50073 Doc 3906 Filed 12/16/24 Entered 12/16/24 11:54:31 Page 74 of 86\n\n 75 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 THE COURT: Okay. So then let's move on. What are your other arguments? MR. KINDSETH: Can I make one -- THE COURT: Yes? Go ahead. You can make one. MR. KINDSETH: One point. If even if it's a generalized claim, it's subject to the Wagoner Rule and in pari delicto. That's my only point, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Let's move on to your next argument. MR. KINDSETH: Thank you, Your Honor. With respect to the alter ego claim under New York, I was pointing out about Nordlicht acknowledging that it's not a cause of action under New York law and said it's a claim under the Bankruptcy Code, and, therefore, my argument is that the Trustee has brought it as an independent cause of action. It's not an independent cause of action under New York law. With respect to equitable ownership and the nominee doctrine, Your Honor, as held by the Second Circuit in Ahmed, it merely identifying, you know, a series of assets or grouping of assets is insufficient, that the Nominee doctrine and equitable ownership require an asset by asset analysis. There must be a nexus between all the factors necessary to establish equitable ownership and the actual transfer of funds into the account. So, our argument with respect to the equitable Case 22-50073 Doc 3906 Filed 12/16/24 Entered 12/16/24 11:54:31 Page 75 of 86\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 ownership and the nominee doctrine, Your Honor, is it's not sufficient to just point at accounts. There has to be some showing of the interrelationship between the factors necessary to establish equitable ownership and the particular transfers to show that this particular transfer, in fact, the Debtor was the owner considering these factors.\n\n7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 You can't just point at an account, and it was, as pointed out by counsel, there were significant transfers into the account. There's not some sweeping principle that says, well, then everything in the account is equitably owned by the Debtor. There must be a showing based on the Second Circuit's decision, as to each particular transfer establishing that, in fact, the true owner of that transfer was the Debtor.\n\n15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Highlighting this point, Your Honor, while the Trustee's -- apparently concedes this as he has to, the Second Circuit's decision at Ahmed concerning the asset by asset analysis that's required, the proposed order accompanying the motion for summary judgment asks this Court to make a sweeping determination that all assets owned by these entities are equitably owned, or were equitably owned by the Debtor and therefore are property of the estate, which is directly antithetical to the Second Circuit decision in Ahmed.\n\n25\n\nYour Honor, for these reasons, we're arguing and\n\n1 2 3 4 believe that summary judgment is not appropriate. Again, we've briefed these issues extensively. Your Honor is very familiar with these issues, and we stand by the briefs that we have filed. Thank you, Your Honor.\n\n5 6 7 8 9 THE COURT: All right. The only other thing I want to say to you is, with regard to the Nordlicht case. The Court -- the Second Circuit in this decision goes through, an entire section of this decision starting on page 109 of the West Reporter. The official reporter.\n\n10 11 12 13 14 15 Says as an alternate theory, the Stadtmauers argue that New York law does not classify alter ego theories of liabilities as claims at all, but as remedies. They based their argument on an apparent inconsistency in Tronox's reasoning, which was pointed out and discussed by United States Bankruptcy Judge Wiles in In Re Stage Presence.\n\n16 17 18 19 20 21 22 While recognizing that he was bound by Tronox, Judge Wiles observed that the New York Court of Appeals has made clear that under New York law, an alter ego or veilpiercing argument is not a separate, standalone cause of action. Instead, piercing the corporate veil or awarding alter ego relief is a remedy that a plaintiff may pursue. And then it -- they continue.\n\n23 24 25 Trading alter ego and veil-piercing theories purely as remedies, however, seems inconsistent with the case law that addresses the issue of whether an alter ego claim\n\n1 2 3 4 5 belongs to individual creditors as opposed to a bankruptcy trustee. If alter ego theories and veil-piercing theories are not standalone claims at all and instead are just remedies for other claims, then it is difficult to see how they could belong exclusively to a bankruptcy estate.\n\n6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 I understand the theory under which a claim may be brought, but I know of no theory under which a remedy belongs exclusively to an estate. The Second Circuit then concludes this entire discussion by saying, therefore, to the extent that New York law anywhere states or implies that an alter ego theory of liability is a remedy, that notion is trumped by the Bankruptcy Code. See BFP Resolution Trust Corp. Where the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code text in itself is clear, its operation is unimpeded by contrary state law. That's what the Second Circuit says.\n\n16 17 18 So I just want to make the record clear that your argument about it being a remedy as opposed to a claim has been soundly rejected by the Second Circuit.\n\n19 20 MR. KINDSETH: Correct, Your Honor. And I would --\n\n21 22 THE COURT: So then why are you making the argument?\n\n23 24 25 MR. KINDSETH: So, Your Honor, there's a - there's a cause of action. There's a claim under the Bankruptcy Code. And there's a remedy. Okay? So --\n\n 79 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 THE COURT: I just told you that there isn't a remedy. MR. KINDSETH: There's not a remedy. THE COURT: There isn't a remedy. That's what the Second Circuit just said. It's not a remedy. MR. KINDSETH: So putting aside alter ego, just for purposes of this discussion -- THE COURT: The whole -- the whole -- this is what the whole summary judgment is about. MR. KINDSETH: Your Honor, can I make a point, please? THE COURT: Yes, you can. But you can make a - you have to make a point that's a valid one, and not one that's designed to delay or not supported by the law. And there's a Second Circuit case that was issued less than three months ago that is completely against everything that you're arguing and that I'm bound to follow. So you go ahead and make your argument. But I'm not going to let you make more argument because it's now 3 o'clock, and we're going over -- you're talking in circles, and you're ignoring what is binding case law. MR. KINDSETH: We're not arguing that it's a remedy. THE COURT: You just did. MR. KINDSETH: No. I'm saying it's not a cause of Case 22-50073 Doc 3906 Filed 12/16/24 Entered 12/16/24 11:54:31 Page 79 of 86\n\n 80 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 action. Judge, it's not a cause of -- THE COURT: What is it then? An air balloon? MR. KINDSETH: Actually, what the Second Circuit held in Nordlicht is that it's a claim under the Bankruptcy Code that could be sold and settled. It's not a -- THE COURT: Then if it's a claim, it's a cause of action. MR. KINDSETH: That's not what the Second Circuit held, Your Honor. THE COURT: How could a claim not be a cause of action? Mr. Kindseth, a claim is a right to a payment, isn't it? Isn't that what the Bankruptcy Code defines a claim as? I think it does. Shall we look at 101? MR. KINDSETH: Your Honor -- THE COURT: So if it's a right to a payment, there's a cause of action associated with that right to the payment. Because if someone doesn't pay it, there's a right for someone to sue to get paid. MR. KINDSETH: Your Honor, as I interpret Nordlicht, and I appreciate you permitting me to say this, the Second Circuit said it may not be a cause of action under New York law, but it's a claim under the Bankruptcy Code, and therefore it can be settled. It's not a remedy. It's not a remedy. It may not be an independent cause of action, but it's a claim that may be settled and sold. That's how I read Case 22-50073 Doc 3906 Filed 12/16/24 Entered 12/16/24 11:54:31 Page 80 of 86\n\n| 1 | the decision. | | | | |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|--|--|--|--|\n| 2 | THE COURT:
The term \"claim\" means a right to | | | | |\n| 3 | payment, whether or not such right is reduced to a judgment, | | | | |\n| 4 | liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, | | | | |\n| 5 | unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, | | | | |\n| 6 | or unsecured, or a right to an equitable remedy for a breach | | | | |\n| 7 | of performance if such breach gives right to a right of | | | | |\n| 8 | payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is | | | | |\n| 9 | reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, | | | | |\n| 10 | disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured. | | | | |\n| 11 | So if it's a right to payment, Mr. Kindseth, then | | | | |\n| 12 | there's a cause of action associated with that claim. | | | | |\n| 13 | MR. KINDSETH:
Thank you, Your Honor. | | | | |\n| 14 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Thank you. | | | | |\n| 15 | Mr. Bassett, is there anything you'd like to add? | | | | |\n| 16 | MR. BASSETT:
very briefly, Your Honor, may I | | | | |\n| 17 | approach? | | | | |\n| 18 | THE COURT:
Yes. | | | | |\n| 19 | MR. BASSETT:
Just a few very, very brief points, | | | | |\n| 20 | just by way of clarifying the record on some of the arguments | | | | |\n| 21 | that Attorney Kindseth raised. | | | | |\n| 22 | In discussing the 544/541 issue, counsel suggested | | | | |\n| 23 | that this is a new argument or a new theory that we are sort | | | | |\n| 24 | of pivoting to midstream that has not been the subject of any | | | | |\n| 25 | arguments or causes of action that the Trustee has pursued | | | | |\n| | | | | | |\n\n| 1 | previously in this case.
That's just completely not true. |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | In this adversary proceeding, as in every other |\n| 3 | alter ego adversary proceeding we have filed in this case, we |\n| 4 | have pursued our claims under both Section 541 and Section |\n| 5 | 544.
In fact, the Court will recall a ruling in the HK USA |\n| 6 | adversary proceeding, went through an analysis of both of |\n| 7 | those.
It found that we had standing to pursue the claim |\n| 8 | under Section 544(a), the Court also analyzed the issue under |\n| 9 | Section 541, and found that the insider exception to in pari |\n| 10 | delicto applied. |\n| 11 | What I would submit has changed, and what we are |\n| 12 | now pointing out to the Court, in light of the Nordlicht |\n| 13 | ruling, is that if you go down the Section 541 path, you can |\n| 14 | then assert what Nordlicht says is that the claim can be |\n| 15 | asserted as a general claim of creditors. |\n| 16 | And to address Attorney Kindseth's other point, |\n| 17 | which he says at that point you have to consider whether or |\n| 18 | not in pari delicto and Wagoner would apply, again, Your |\n| 19 | Honor has already decided that twice. |\n| 20 | Your Honor considered that possibility in her |\n| 21 | motion to dismiss in the HK USA case and in the motion to |\n| 22 | dismiss decision in this case, both times, the Court |\n| 23 | recognizing that if a cause of action is pursued under |\n| 24 | Section 541 because it is a generalized claim of creditors, |\n| 25 | then in pari delicto and Wagoner would not apply. |\n| | |\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 It's also exactly what I cited to the Court in the Harmon case that I read out during my opening argument from Georgia. The Court there squarely addressed that issue and said in that case, in that situation, obviously, those claims are not barred by in pari delicto or the Wagoner Rule because any other result would be extraordinarily inequitable.\n\n7 8 9 10 11 It would mean that a creditor can't pursue the claim on its own, the claim becomes part of a Chapter 11 estate, and then the Trustee is not able to pursue the claim because of the in pari delicto and Wagoner doctrine. That makes zero sense. And therefore that's just a nonissue.\n\n12 13 14 Under Nordlicht, if the claims are property of the estate as generalized claims, in pari delicto and Wagoner do not apply.\n\n15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 The other comment I want to just briefly respond to or address is the most recent one that we were talking about. I think the Court read the exact right language from Nordlicht, where there was the discussion of Tronox and the other cases, where it's very clear from that discussion of Tronox that the issue the Court was focused on in response to the argument made in that case was whether or not an alter ego claim can be considered a cause of action. That's exactly the language quoted from Tronox.\n\n24 25 And then as Your Honor went through and read the rest of it, the Court said in bankruptcy, it wouldn't make\n\n1 2 sense to say that an alter ego claim cannot exist as a standalone cause of action.\n\n3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Now, what Attorney Kindseth is trying to say is that an alter ego claim generally is used outside of bankruptcy to supplement or serve as a companion to another claim. So if outside of bankruptcy, a creditor brought a breach of contract claim against a party, and then, in order to satisfy that judgment, sought to pierce the corporate veil, that alter ego claim would be tacked on.\n\n10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 That is completely irrelevant and unnecessary bankruptcy as Nordlicht pointed out. The reason being, the Trustee stands in the shoes of all the thousands of creditors of the estate. All of those creditors of the estate have claims. They've all asserted claims. PAX has asserted a claim. Other creditors have asserted claims. To the extent it's necessary to have a predicate claim to which alter ego or reverse veil-piercing attaches, it is those claims.\n\n18 19 20 21 So in bankruptcy, the Trustee absolutely has, as the Nordlicht Court recognized, can pursue alter ego as a claim. We're talking about bankruptcy. We're not talking about outside of bankruptcy.\n\n22 23 24 25 Your Honor, there were some other points I was going to respond to, but in the interest of time, I think we have it covered. Again, we respectfully would request that our motion be granted, and thank you very, very much for your\n\n| 1 | Court's time and patience -- for Your Honor's time and | | | | | |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|\n| 2 | patience.
Thank you. | | | | | |\n| 3 | THE COURT:
Thank you. | | | | | |\n| 4 | Attorney Kindseth, would you like to respond? | | | | | |\n| 5 | MR. KINDSETH:
Nothing further, Your Honor. | | | | | |\n| 6 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Thank you.
Okay.
With regard | | | | | |\n| 7 | to the motion for summary judgment in the adversary 23-05023 | | | | | |\n| 8 | that is pending before the Court, the Court will take the | | | | | |\n| 9 | matter under advisement and will rule accordingly. | | | | | |\n| 10 | Is there any further business that we need to | | | | | |\n| 11 | address this afternoon?
I think we've taken care of | | | | | |\n| 12 | everything on the calendar.
Is that correct? | | | | | |\n| 13 | MR. DESPINS:
That's correct, Your Honor. | | | | | |\n| 14 | THE COURT:
All right.
Thank you.
Then, there | | | | | |\n| 15 | being no further hearings on the calendar this afternoon, | | | | | |\n| 16 | thank you all.
Court is adjourned. | | | | | |\n| 17 | (Proceedings concluded at 3:07 p.m.) | | | | | |\n| 18 | | | | | | |\n| 19 | | | | | | |\n| 20 | | | | | | |\n| 21 | | | | | | |\n| 22 | | | | | | |\n| 23 | | | | | | |\n| 24 | | | | | | |\n| 25 | | | | | | |\n| | | | | | | |\n| | | | | | | |\n\n| Case 22-50073 | | Doc 3906 | Filed 12/16/24 | Entered 12/16/24 11:54:31 | | Page 86 of 86 | |\n|---------------|------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|--|-------------------|--|\n| | | | | | | 86 | |\n| 1 | CERTIFICATION | | | | | | |\n| 2 | I certify that the foregoing is a correct | | | | | | |\n| 3 | | | | transcript from the electronic sound recording of the | | | |\n| 4 | proceedings in the above-entitled matter to the best of my | | | | | | |\n| 5 | knowledge and ability. | | | | | | |\n| 6 | | | | | | | |\n| 7 | | /s/ Wendy K. Sawyer | | | | December 12, 2024 | |\n| 8 | | WENDY K. SAWYER, CDLT | | | | | |\n| 9 | | | Certified Court Transcriptionist | | | | |\n| 10 | | For Reliable | | | | | |\n| 11 | | | | | | | |\n| 12 | | | | | | | |\n| 13 | | | | | | | |\n| 14 | | | | | | | |\n| 15 | | | | | | | |\n| 16 | | | | | | | |\n| 17 | | | | | | | |\n| 18 | | | | | | | |\n| 19 | | | | | | | |\n| 20 | | | | | | | |\n| 21 | | | | | | | |\n| 22
23 | | | | | | | |\n| 24 | | | | | | | |\n| 25 | | | | | | | |\n| | | | | | | | |\n| | | | | | | | |\n| | | | | | | | |","body_zh":"美国破产法院（UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT）\n康涅狄格州联邦地区（DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT）\n布里奇波特分院（BRIDGEPORT DIVISION）\n\n关于：\n第11章\n案号：22-50073 (JAM)\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）等人，\n（合并管理）\n债务人。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS等人，\n对抗程序\n案号：23-05017 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nTAURUS FUND, LLC等人，\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，第11章受托人，\n对抗程序\n案号：23-05023 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nLAMP CAPITAL LLC等人，\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，第11章受托人，\n对抗程序\n案号：24-05187 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nWILDES & WEINBERG, P.C.，\n123号法庭\nBrien McMahon Federal Building\n915 Lafayette Boulevard\nBridgeport, Connecticut 06604\n被告。\n2024年12月10日，星期二\n下午1:08\n\n案号22-50073，文件3906，提交于12/16/24，录入于12/16/24 11:54:31，第1页，共86页\n\n在尊敬的JULIE A. MANNING美国破产法院法官主持下的听证会记录\n\n音频操作员：电子录音\n\n速记公司：Reliable\nThe Nemours Building\n1007 N. Orange Street, Suite 110\nWilmington, Delaware 19801\n电话：(302)654-8080\n电子邮件：gmatthews@reliable-co.com\n\n程序由电子录音记录，记录文本由速记服务机构制作。\n\n出庭人员：\n\n代表第11章受托人：\nPatrick Linsey，律师\nNEUBERT PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C.\n195 Church Street\n13th Floor\nNew Haven, Connecticut 06510\n\n以及\n\nLuc A. Despins，律师\nPAUL HASTINGS, LLP\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, New York 10166\n\nNicholas A. Bassett，律师\nDoug Barron，律师\n2050 M Street, NW\nWashington, DC 20036\n\n代表Taurus Fund LLC、Taurus Fund Management及Scott Barnett：\nMichael T. Conway，律师\nLAZARE POTTER GIACOVAS & MOYLE, LLP\n747 Third Avenue, 16th Floor\nFifth Floor\nNew York, New York 10017\n\n案号22-50073，文件3906，提交于12/16/24，录入于12/16/24 11:54:31，第2页，共86页\n\n代表美国受托人：\nHolley Claiborn，律师\nThe Giaimo Federal Building\n150 Court Street, Room 302\nNew Haven, Connecticut 06510\n\n代表G-Club International Limited及G-Club Operations：\nJeffrey Sklarz，律师\nGREEN & SKLARZ LLC\nOne Audubon Street, Third Floor\nHew Haven, Connecticut 06511\n\n代表Hing Chi Ngok、Mei Guo、Hudson Diamond New York、Gypsy Mei Food Services、Leading Shine New York及Hudson Diamond Holdings：\nSteven Kindseth，律师\nZeisler & Zeisler\n10 Middle Street, 15th Floor\nBridgeport, Connecticut 06604\n\n案号22-50073，文件3906，提交于12/16/24，录入于12/16/24 11:54:31，第3页，共86页\n\n目录\n\n动议： 页码\n\n事项编号3849：Ho Wan Kwok\n案号22-50073\n由Luc A. Despins代表第11章受托人Luc A. Despins提交的申请，申请聘任Peter Shaw担任英国出庭律师\n\n事项编号3559：Ho Wan Kwok\n案号22-50073\n由Patrick R. Linsey代表第11章受托人Luc A. Despins提交的密封和解动议\n\n事项编号14：Despins诉Wildes & Weinberg, P.C.\n案号24-05187\n由Patrick R. Linsey代表原告Luc A. Despins提交的密封和解动议\n\n事项编号3855：Ho Wan Kwok\n案号22-50073\n由Luc A. Despins代表第11章受托人Luc A. Despins提交的申请，申请聘任Compass New Jersey, LLC担任出售Mahwah Mansion的不动产经纪人\n\n速记员证明\n\n案号22-50073，文件3906，提交于12/16/24，录入于12/16/24 11:54:31，第4页，共86页\n\n（程序于下午1:08开始。）\n\n法庭：好的。那么等候室里有人吗？好的。Despins受托人在。是否还有其他远程参与者，还是只有Despins受托人？好的。那么，请宣读日程。\n\n书记员：好的。案号22-50073，Ho Wan Kwok。\n\n法庭：下午好。请各方为记录出庭。\n\n书记员：您是否希望我宣读——\n\n法庭：哦，抱歉。我打断您了。我致歉。\n\n书记员：没关系。\n\n法庭：我操之过急了。\n\n书记员：好的。\n\n法庭：继续。\n\n书记员：好的。此外，还有24-5187，Despins诉Wildes & Weinberg, P.C.；23-5017，Despins诉Taurus Fund LLC等；以及23-5023，Despins诉Lamp Capital LLC——LLC等。\n\n法庭：好的。非常感谢。\n\n书记员：不客气。\n\n法庭：请各方为记录出庭，首先由第11章受托人开始。\n\n案号22-50073，文件3906，提交于12/16/24，录入于12/16/24 11:54:31，第5页，共86页\n\nDESPINS先生：下午好，法官阁下。Luc Despins，第11章受托人，感谢您允许我远程出庭。\n\n法庭：下午好，不客气。\n\nBASSETT先生：下午好，法官阁下。Nick Bassett，来自Paul Hastings，担任第11章受托人的律师。今天与我一同出庭的是我的同事Douglass Barron，同样来自Paul Hastings。\n\n法庭：下午好。\n\nLINSEY先生：下午好，法官阁下。Patrick Linsey，来自Neubert, Pepe, & Monteith，代表第11章受托人。\n\n法庭：下午好。\n\nCLAIBORN女士：下午好。Holley Claiborn，代表美国受托人。\n\n法庭：下午好。\n\nKINDSETH先生：下午好，法官阁下。Stephen Kindseth，Zeisler & Zeisler，就对抗程序案号23-50234中的Mei Guo、Hudson Diamond、New York及Leading Shine、New York（按发音记录）出庭。\n\n法庭：下午好。\n\nCONWAY先生：下午好，法官阁下。Michael Conway，Lazare Potter Giacovas & Moyle。我代表Taurus Fund LLC出庭。\n\n案号22-50073，文件3906，提交于12/16/24，录入于12/16/24 11:54:31，第6页，共86页\n\n法庭：下午好。\n\nSKLARZ先生：下午好，法官阁下。Jeffrey Sklarz，代表G Club Operations LLC。\n\n法庭：下午好。所有希望登记出庭的人员是否都已登记出庭？好的。谢谢。那么，今天日程上有若干事项，一些属于主案，一些属于对抗程序。Despins受托人，您希望今天下午如何进行？\n\nDESPINS先生：我认为，可能适宜先处理两项聘任专业人员的申请，Linsey先生将处理这些事项。\n\n法庭：好的。谢谢。Linsey律师，请继续。\n\nLINSEY先生：法官阁下，我可以走近吗？\n\n法庭：可以。谢谢。\n\nLINSEY先生：谢谢。Patrick Linsey，代表第11章受托人。如果法官阁下认为合适，我将先说明申请聘任Peter Shaw担任出庭律师一事。\n\n法庭：请继续。\n\nLINSEY先生：这是ECF编号3855。该申请是为在英国聘任Peter Shaw担任出庭律师。Shaw先生将依照受托人的英国律师Palace Partners的指示行事。Shaw先生是英国首席出庭律师，具有御用大律师这一称号。如法庭所知，受托人已在英国聘任了一名名为Paul Wright（按发音记录）的出庭律师。Paul Wright将继续与Shaw先生合作。Wright先生是较初级的出庭律师。Shaw先生是较资深的出庭律师。不过，他们在同一律师事务所执业，并且具有合作工作的经验。受托人确定，就英国正在进行的某些诉讼事项，包括Hamilton Capital Holding, Limited的管理程序，他需要由一名御用大律师代理。申请和命令规定，Shaw先生将按其通常的小时费率收费，并将向破产财团收取实际支出费用。Shaw先生将依照第330条的通常程序提交费用申请。尚未就该申请提出任何异议。美国受托人已提交无异议声明，载于案卷编号3859。如法庭有任何问题，我愿予回答。\n\n法庭：目前我没有任何问题。谢谢。Claiborn律师？\n\nCLAIBORN女士：法官阁下，我没有补充。\n\n法庭：好的。谢谢。是否还有其他人希望就申请聘任Peter Shaw担任英国出庭律师一事发表意见？Linsey律师，我正在查看拟议命令。Claiborn律师，您——美国受托人办公室审阅了拟议命令；正确吗？\n\nCLAIBORN女士：我审阅过。我不能说我记得自己曾查看过它——\n\n法庭：好的。但您没有——\n\nCLAIBORN女士：——在过去24小时内。\n\n法庭：——任何意见？\n\nCLAIBORN女士：没有，当时没有。\n\n法庭：好的。请稍候片刻。我认为我也没有任何意见，但我想确保确实如此。好的。我已审阅该申请、随申请提交的信息，以及准许受托人聘任Peter Shaw担任英国出庭律师的拟议命令。我注意到，没有人就该申请提交书面异议，并且没有参与本次听证会的人反对该申请。美国受托人办公室已提交无异议声明。并且，我——聘任理由已载于申请中。法庭理解受托人寻求聘任该英国出庭律师的理由。基于所有上述理由，准予该聘任申请，并可录入随申请附具的拟议命令。\n\nLINSEY先生：谢谢，法官阁下。接下来是受托人申请聘任Compass New Jersey LLC，该申请在第11章案件中的ECF编号为3855，在Taurus Fund LLC对抗程序中的ECF编号为154。受托人请求授权聘任一名经纪人出售Mahwah Mansion。受托人已选择Compass New Jersey LLC，其为Compass, Inc.的关联公司，担任该职务。法庭将会记得并且知悉，Compass, Inc.曾就成功出售债务人位于康涅狄格州格林尼治的原住所担任经纪人。\n\nMahwah Mansion的购置价格为$26 million。鉴于该不动产价值重大，对受托人而言，确保聘任一名经验丰富且高度合格的经纪人至关重要。受托人面谈了Compass New Jersey以及若干其他潜在经纪人，所有该等经纪人均具有豪华房地产市场的专业经验，并确定Compass New Jersey最适宜负责该不动产的营销和出售。\n\n在选择Compass New Jersey时，受托人与Taurus Fund及其共同被告的律师进行了协商，正如法庭授权受托人进行该豪宅出售的命令所设想。我理解，该律师Conway先生今日在场。\n\nCompass New Jersey及其五名房源代理人均已提交声明支持该申请，具有丰富经验，并在新泽西州出售豪华不动产以及在三州地区出售超豪华不动产方面拥有经验证明的业绩记录。Compass在过去三个年度中按销售额计算为美国最大的住宅房地产经纪商，目前正在营销新泽西州约190处其他不动产。\n\n该项目的挂牌代理人合计在三州地区拥有超过50年的经验，且每位均专长于独栋住宅的营销。他们已售出数十处价值数百万美元的房产。其合计数额令我感到惊讶；这是一个很大的数额——他们合计完成了超过$2 billion的住宅销售交易。\n\n本次委聘中的经纪服务将包括为Mahwah Mansion（马瓦庄园）的营销作准备工作——该经纪目前已经在进行该工作——推广Mahwah Mansion并积极开展其营销，包括执行该营销活动、广告、公关及开展数字推广，然后在受托人的监督下管理Mahwah Mansion的出售程序。正如申请书及作为申请书附件B附上的委聘协议所述，经纪将获得Mahwah Mansion出售价格4.5 percent的佣金报酬。并且——我将进一步说明其运作方式。该协议规定，经纪须与任何买方经纪分享该佣金中的2 percent。然而，如买方未由经纪代表，Compass（康帕斯）的佣金将降至出售价格的3 percent。除非经受托人书面批准，房产的营销成本将由经纪承担。该协议期限至January 2nd, 2026。我确实想指出一个细节。在某些有限情形下，即受托人在到期日前取消委聘，或者——有一名潜在买方被排除在本次委聘范围之外，因为该买方曾独立于经纪与受托人联系。因此，如该房产出售给该买方，或在期限届满前取消委聘，则破产财产将负责经纪合理且有文件证明的实际支出费用。在受托人提交该申请后——法庭：这意味着什么，就\n\n而言，是否有人必须证明这些费用是合理的，对吗？我的意思是，这是否将提交法庭审理，还是仅向该经纪付款？林西律师：法官阁下，美国受托人提出了同样的问题。法庭：好的。林西律师：我们在提交聘任申请后与美国受托人进行了沟通，并已提交经修订的拟议命令，其中规定应向法庭提交申请以请求偿付——法庭：好的。林西律师：——任何费用。法庭：谢谢。林西律师：该申请载于ECF number 3869。法庭：该命令？那份经修订的命令？林西律师：经修订的命令。抱歉。法庭：对。那——好的。林西律师：受托人理解，美国受托人不反对通过签发经修订的拟议命令而批准该申请。法庭：好的。谢谢。我正在审阅经修订的拟议命令，因为我认为它是昨天提交的。那么，Claiborn律师？克莱伯恩女士：是的，法官阁下。经修订的命令 Case 22-50073 Doc 3906 Filed 12/16/24 Entered 12/16/24 11:54:31 Page 13 of 86\n\n载有对第4段的修改，以规定在请求报销费用时对该等费用进行批准的机制，并允许对该等费用提出异议。因此，作出该项修改后，美国受托人表示可以，并且不反对批准聘用Compass。法庭：好的。谢谢。是否还有任何人希望就聘用经纪出售Mahwah Mansion及相关救济的申请发表意见？好的。法庭内无人发言，且无人就该申请提交书面异议，今天参与本次听证的人员中也无人提出异议。我正在审阅这份经修订的拟议命令。请稍候。好的。关于——拟议命令为3869——我只需要法庭书记员做一件事。好的？书记员：是。法庭：我只要求你在第3页、就在“兹命令”之前、上方的位置处理一件事；那里写着“并在本法庭举行的听证会上”，但没有日期。因此，请加上今天的日期。书记员：好的。法庭：December 10, 2024。\n\n书记员：是。\n法庭：我已审阅该申请。我理解受托人为出售Mahwah Mansion寻求聘用经纪的理由。\n\n如我所指出，尚无人对该申请提交任何书面异议。今天参加本次听证的人或今天在法庭内的人均无人反对所请求的救济。United States Trustee's Office（美国受托人办公室）对一份经修订的拟议命令提出了一些意见，该命令载于ECF Number 3869，我现已审阅。该命令看来可为法庭接受。因此，基于上述所有理由，批准聘用的申请获准，载于3869的拟议命令可以签发。\n\n林西律师：谢谢，法官阁下。法庭：谢谢。\n\n那么——我们接下来进行什么，Despins受托人？\n\n德斯平斯先生：我所称的——密封问题，关于——该问题的背景是Wildes & Weinberg（怀尔德斯与温伯格）和解协议，但实际上——没有人真正质疑该和解问题。我们已就密封问题与美国受托人达成解决方案，但Bassett先生将处理此事，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：好的。谢谢。Bassett先生？\n\n巴塞特先生：法官阁下，我可以上前吗？法庭：可以。谢谢。巴塞特先生：谢谢。因此，法官阁下，如受托人所述，提交法庭审理的动议是受托人依据Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure（联邦破产程序规则）Rule 9019提出的动议，请求批准受托人与Wildes & Weinberg达成的和解。该动议载于ECF 3559。法官阁下，这是受托人与Wildes & Weinberg律师事务所经广泛谈判后达成的和解。针对Wildes & Weinberg提出的请求权，与针对许多其他被告提出的请求权类似；这些被告或者实际上已成为已提交对抗程序起诉状的对象，或者是受托人与其签有时效中止协议的其他当事人。正如法庭所知——我一时想不起完整数目，但我认为我们大约有200件左右对抗程序提出了类似类型的请求权。受托人提出的和解协议系密封提交。其原因——依受托人之见——显而易见，并且也是一个极其重要的 Case 22-50073 Doc 3906 Filed 12/16/24 Entered 12/16/24 11:54:31 Page 16 of 86\n\n原因，即如我所述，受托人正处于诉讼之中，或者正在与其他当事人积极诉讼、与其他当事人进行调解，或者可能很快将与其他当事人进入诉讼\n\n而这些其他当事人将成为——您知道——涉及完全相同类型请求权及完全相同类型争议的对象。\n\n并且，如受托人此时必须披露其与某些当事人达成和解的数额，这将对受托人在与其他处境相似的被告进行谈判以及对其提起诉讼时最大化破产财产价值的能力产生非常明显的影响。\n\n现在，法官阁下，针对该动议仅剩一项异议。即G Club Operations（G Club运营公司）提交的异议。没有——本案中没有其他当事人提出异议。美国受托人此前已提交异议。该异议已根据一份经修订的拟议命令的条款得到解决，我将向法庭说明该命令。案件中的其他——其他主要利益相关方，包括Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors（无担保债权人正式委员会），均支持该和解。\n\n法官阁下，正如受托人所述，G Club的异议仅涉及和解的一个方面，即受托人请求将和解协议密封提交。正如我所述，美国受托人以类似理由提交了异议，但该异议已经解决，依据的是我们于December 5th向法庭提交的经修订拟议命令，该命令载于Docket 3865。\n\n重要部分是，法官阁下——拟议命令中增加了一项新规定——即第5段——该段规定，尽管和解协议可以密封提交，受托人应当——我只是照读其措辞：\n\n受托人应在命令签发后180 days内提交一份通知，该和解通知应援引原始动议及本命令的案卷编号和日期，附上和解协议的未删节副本，并载明有关和解协议的某些信息，包括当事人、和解金额及经修订拟议命令第5段所规定的其他信息。\n\n作出该项修改后，法官阁下，美国受托人支持该和解。当然，如我对此有误，我将让美国受托人自行说明，因此，唯一剩余的异议即G Club Operations提交的异议。\n\n法官阁下，我们认为，应驳回G Club Operations的异议。理由有数项，第一项是G Club没有支持其异议的、与该和解有关的任何正当金钱利益。尽管G Club及其律师有时可能希望\n\n情况如此，但他们并未被任命为破产程序完整性的保护人。还有其他当事人负责该职责，尤其是美国受托人。为具备对该和解提出异议的有效依据，G Club Operations必须证明其对该动议的结果具有金钱利益，例如作为破产财产的债权人。G Club不是破产财产的债权人。\n\n我认为，如果退一步审视G Club和Sklarz律师在本案中更广泛地所起的作用，就会清楚地看出，要求该和解不得密封提交的可能动机是什么。G Club显然是其他数项对抗程序中的被告。Sklarz律师代表大量其他被告处理与Wildes & Weinberg诉讼非常相似的撤销诉讼。\n\n我可以想见，任何这些诉讼中的被告都希望了解受托人与其他被告以何种数额达成和解，因为这显然会在谈判中给予他们筹码，并使他们在后续程序中取得优势，无论是在谈判中还是在诉讼中。\n\n法官阁下，我想指出的是，该异议也有某种讽刺之处：如某人作为声称的债权人，对9019动议的异议具有正当利益，那么该人推定会希望评估该和解，以确定破产财产是否以过低数额达成和解。因为如果某人确有请求权并对破产财产具有金钱利益，他们就会希望确保受托人确实在最大化价值。\n\n我认为，这其中具有讽刺意味之处，也暴露了 G Club（G俱乐部）的真实动机：在本案过程中，G Club 以及由 Sklarz 律师（斯克拉兹律师）代理的所有其他撤销权诉讼被告，始终主张受托人的替身实体主张和撤销权诉讼主张毫无依据。他们对此提出了异议。他们认为这些主张不符合适用法律。他们认为这些主张不可成立。\n\n因此，从他们的立场来看，受托人与 Wildes & Weinberg（怀尔兹与温伯格律师事务所）达成的任何金额高于零的和解，对于破产财产的债权人而言都应当是一笔意外收益。因此，按定义而言，他们实际上并不需要查阅和解信息，即可评估是否应对所达成和解的金额提出异议。\n\n此外，法官阁下，就 Section 107 以及法院无权对该协议予以密封所提出的论点，也应当被驳回，这一点在书面文件中已大体说明。G Club 所援引的案件，均涉及向法院申请将和解协议密封提交，\n\n其目的在于保护破产财产以外的一方。因此，例如，和解一方曾表示：看，我们正在与其他许多诉讼当事人进行谈判，或者我们正与其他方进行持续诉讼；如果我们与破产案件受托人达成的和解被公开披露，可能会影响我们这些非债务人在其他持续诉讼中的谈判筹码和利益。\n\n法院在该种情形下所认为的是，从破产财产的角度而言，这并非密封和解协议的正当依据。而在本案中，法官阁下，存在一项明确且最符合破产财产利益的目的，即有助于最大化价值。\n\n如果受托人被迫公开提交其与撤销权诉讼各方达成的所有和解协议，这无疑将对其在所有尚未终结的对抗程序以及尚未提起的程序中最大化价值的能力产生不利影响。\n\n法官阁下，我很乐意回答问题，也很乐意进一步讨论任何问题；但从受托人的角度来看，密封该和解协议是适当的，我们认为应当驳回 G Club 的异议。\n\n谢谢您，法官阁下。\n法庭：谢谢。Claiborn 律师（克莱伯恩律师），在我听取 Sklarz 律师就美国——美国受托人所提出的问题及其从您角度看如何解决的意见之前，我想先向您询问此事。\n\nClaiborn 女士：\n法官阁下，美国受托人——\n\n法庭：\n这件事现在进展如何？\n\nClaiborn 女士：\n——仍反对永久密封和解协议。我们注意到本案中的问题，美国受托人已同意，在和解协议获批准满六个月时，将其公开。我们在新命令中纳入的通知条款机制，确实会引导各方在恰当地点和恰当时间找到他们目前无法获得的信息。\n\n此外，预期今后该机制将成为未来动议的范本，未来提出的与各方妥协和和解的动议将包含对各方的通知，即密封仅为临时性措施，期限为六个月。此后，他们可在案卷记录中查阅，并将获告知如何在案卷记录中找到该文件。\n\n因此，根据上述意见，美国受托人准备接受已作为 ECF 3865 提交的拟议命令。\n\n法庭：\n我对您刚才所说的有一个问题。你们是如何得出 180 天是适当期限这一结论的？目前有数百宗对抗程序尚未审结，对吗？那么——\n\nClaiborn 女士：\n确实如此。这是美国受托人与 Chapter 11 受托人（第11章受托人）达成的协商解决方案。当然，美国受托人的立场是，不得永久密封。这并不适当。这是一次尝试，旨在平衡本案中的问题，同时在一定程度上为希望监督进展的债权人及其他人保留透明度。\n\n除此之外，我想我无法向法官阁下提供更多解释。\n\n法庭：\n好的。谢谢。\n\nDespìns 先生（德斯平斯先生）：\n但是，法官阁下，如果允许的话，法官阁下，我可以在此基础上补充一些说明，如果您希望如此。\n\n法庭：\n请讲。\n\nDespìns 先生：\n因此，我曾与美国受托人及 Harrington 先生（哈灵顿先生，音译）讨论此事。基本上，从我的角度而言，我希望永久密封，但美国受托人不会接受这一点。其考虑是，希望在六个月内——这或许是一厢情愿，但我们在达成和解方面已经取得了很大进展，我们大约每两三天就会就其中若干事项达成和解。因此，每一项都会有六个月期限。并非从今天起对所有人均为六个月，而是每一项均有滚动计算的六个月期限。希望届时，信息披露不会产生其在今天会产生的同等损害效果，因为在接下来的大约六个月内，我们将与其他方达成和解。这就是希望所在，也是考虑所在。这就是六个月期限——也就是说，我们如何最终确定六个月的原因。\n\n法庭：\n如您大概能够理解，除非提交妥协动议，否则我未必会知悉和解情况。因此，我不知道已有多少案件达成和解。这或许只是提交到我面前的第二项，或者是第一项——\n\nClaiborn 女士：\n我认为这是其中第一项——\n\n法庭：\n——附带妥协请求的案件？\n\nClaiborn 女士：\n——撤销权事项。是的。\n\n法庭：\n这是第一项？\n\nClaiborn 女士：\n在撤销权事项中是第一项。此前有——\n\nDespìns 先生：\n是。\n\nClaiborn 女士：\n——本案初期曾就不同问题和不同概念达成较早的和解，但这是第一项——\n\n法庭：\n实际提出的——\n\nClaiborn 女士：\n——撤销权诉讼的和解。\n\n法庭：\n——主张的和解。\n\nDespìns 先生：\n确实如此，法官阁下，因为我们要经过这一程序，对吗？Tancredi 法官（坦克雷迪法官）参与和解程序，并出具一份——这不是裁定，因为他并非以法官身份行事——某种说明，表示他认为该和解处于 9019 规定的合理范围之内。随后将其提交给法官阁下。您说得对，这是第一项。我会说还有若干其他事项，但并非大多数尚未审结的主张。为了让您了解情况——并非大多数。而且其中许多是我们从未提起诉讼的事项的和解，例如，我们与对方当事人订立了一项（听不清）协议，并在提起诉讼前与其和解。\n\n法庭：\n好的。我明白了。好的。Sklarz 律师，您希望发言吗？\n\nSklarz 先生：\n谢谢您，法官阁下。第一修正案保障公众查阅法院案卷和司法记录的权利。Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）在 Mirlis v. Greer（米尔利斯诉格里尔案）中的判决对此具有约束力。我们在书面意见中援引了该案，以及 Local Rule 5（地方法则第5条）。要密封任何司法文件——9019 动议即属此类文件——法院必须依照 LOCAL RULE 5 及 Bankruptcy Code Section 107（《破产法典》第107条）作出非常具体的认定。关于诉讼资格——这是 Bassett 律师（巴塞特律师）提出的论点——那是一个转移焦点的论点。公众享有查阅法院记录的绝对权利，但须受法院根据 107 条行使的密封权力限制。书面意见中没有援引任何允许密封和解协议的案件。所谓支持受托人立场的 In Re Farmland（法姆兰德案）并非 9019 案件，而是涉及出售动议。除第二巡回上诉法院及 Mirlis 案外，其他巡回上诉法院也认为，公众在 Doe v. Public Citizen（多伊诉公众公民案）中享有查阅法院文件的绝对权利；该案是 Fourth Circuit（第四巡回上诉法院）的案件，749 F.3d 246；以及 Seventh Circuit（第七巡回上诉法院）的 Bond v. Utreras（邦德诉乌特雷拉斯案），U-T-R-E-R-A-S——\n\n法庭：\n您得回过头说，好吗？因为我跟不上。您必须说得稍微慢一点。\n\nSklarz 先生：\n抱歉，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：\n没关系。好的。Doe 诉什么？\n\nSklarz 先生：\nDoe v. Public Citizen，749 F.3d 246，这是第四巡回上诉法院的案件；以及 Bond v. Utreras，U-T-R-E-R-A-S，585 F.3d 1061。\n\n再次说明，这并无争议。我认为——在其书面意见中，受托人表示，是的，通常确实享有查阅法院记录的权利。他们主张自己非常特殊——他们有一个非常特殊的案件。Michael Goldberg（迈克尔·戈德堡）案件是一起大型庞氏骗局案件，涉及数百宗对抗程序。其中没有任何和解动议是以密封方式提交的。该案正在本案审理法院审理。\n\n这是一项极其、极其不寻常的请求。我们援引了第二巡回上诉法院辖区内的多起案件，说明为何这是不允许的。它不符合 107 条的要求。并不存在一项特别规则，允许仅因受托人希望和解——密封和解协议——而密封和解协议。\n\n地方法则——地方法则第5条再次要求——这是法院为落实第一修正案效力所承担的把关职能。任何密封司法文件的命令均应包括具体认定，证明密封有明确且令人信服的理由支持，并且经过严格限定。\n\n因此，没有提交任何证据以满足第5条的要求。他们——实质上，论点是我们不希望——我们认为，如果 G Club 或任何其他诉讼相对方知道此事，可能会获得诉讼优势。好吧，该问题已在我们书面意见援引的案件中被反复审理，而每一家处理过该问题的法院均认为，这不是密封文件的理由。Section 107 规定了密封文件的理由。唯一——唯一密封文件的理由是商业——它——它要么是诽谤性的。这就是为什么在 Mirlis 案中，第二巡回上诉法院密封了——或者说，驳回了一名爱挑错者获取与性虐待案件有关的视频证言的请求。因此，在该案中密封是适当的。\n\n但是——但那是完全不同的情形。107 条项下唯一可能的例外是商业敏感信息。而且，如我们在书面意见中援引的案件以及受托人在其书面意见中承认的那样，通常认为和解信息并非商业敏感信息。\n\nHempel（亨佩尔，音译）——受托人援引的另一案件，Hempel 案，该案被——被援引于答辩状第 12 页，表明法院应当遵循 Hempel 标准。可是，Hempel 案驳回了密封请求。该法院裁定，在本案中，受托人未能证明提交和解协议属于《破产法典》一般规则所列明的例外情形，并驳回了该动议。\n\n受托人的立场没有任何法律依据。受托人的立场没有任何事实依据。这不过是一宗破产案件中的和解，全国各地的每一个破产法院每天都会发生这样的和解，从小型案件到大型案件皆是如此。您——您不会看到受托人试图这样做，因为这是不被允许的。再次说明，我们首先看《第一修正案》。随后看规则——抱歉——《破产法典》第107条，11 U.S.C. § 107。然后看Mirlis（米尔利斯案），这是具有约束力的第二巡回区判例，之后看本院地方法规第5条。而其中没有任何一项标准得到满足。任何——任何公民都可以提出这项——这项动议。任何人——我可以作为Jeffrey Sklarz（杰弗里·斯克拉兹）自行提出这项动议。公民有权查阅司法案卷，而这——这正是G Club（G俱乐部）在此所维护的权利。这——这就是我的陈述，法官阁下。如有任何问题，我乐意回答。法庭：谢谢。不，我没有——斯克拉兹先生：谢谢，法官阁下。法庭：——任何问题。谢谢。巴西特律师（Attorney Bassett），您有任何答复吗？巴西特先生：有，法官阁下，仅简要说明。首先，关于原告资格问题，我——我主张，\n\nG Club绝对不具备提出其所提出异议的原告资格。根据斯克拉兹律师所言，我想，G Club正试图笼统地促进公共利益。G Club并不具备这样做的原告资格。\n\nG Club在本案中有资格维护其自身利益，而它并无任何此类利益。基于我所阐述的理由，它对本院审理动议所涉的标的并无利益。它不是债权人。无论受托人达成的和解在受托人同意和解的金额水平上是否公平合理，其利益都不可能受到影响。\n\n唯一合理的解释——斯克拉兹律师当然没有提及——但他们为何想查看和解协议，实在显而易见：因为他们想将其用于自身利益。斯克拉兹律师，我认为，迄今为止是在本案中受聘次数最多的一名律师，其中包括受聘代理撤销权诉讼被告。\n\n所有这些被告最希望的莫过于——莫过于扰乱受托人的诉讼程序及其协商和解的努力。通过了解受托人以何种条件达成和解，并将其用作基准及其谈判中的筹码。这就是这里正在发生的事情。不存在任何试图\n\n笼统促进公共利益并确保程序完整性的行为。美国受托人已发表意见，我们也已解决美国受托人的异议。\n\n至于——至于封存请求的实体理由，法官阁下，斯克拉兹律师提到了《第一修正案》。请看，并无争议。判例法很明确。法院确有酌处权批准封存和解协议；法院有酌处权批准封存本院的诉讼程序。为保护第11章破产财产的利益所必需时，法院具备该项权限。\n\n法官阁下，我们引用了一些发生过这种情况的案件。这并不罕见。我们引用了5050 Offshore案，该案并非9019案件，但该案的听证被封存，因为讨论的是一项——我相信是——聘请诉讼律师的动议，而该听证的标的会向潜在被告披露与诉讼策略有关的问题，这显然会损害破产财产。因此，法院批准了封存。\n\n法官阁下，有大量法院专门封存和解协议的例子。我们引用了这些——并且——这也发生在我参与过的案件以及受托人参与过的案件中。法官阁下，我们在答辩状脚注9中引用了这些案件，即Adelphia（阿德尔菲亚）案、Cap Mart（卡普·马特，音译）案、Lyondell（利安德尔，音译）案；脚注10中的GT Advanced Technologies（GT先进技术）案。法官阁下，法院通常会建立完整的程序，无论是调解、撤销权诉讼程序或其他程序，其中该程序的一部分涉及一种机制，允许受托人或任何担任诉讼受托人的人，无论其为何人，为了保护该程序的完整性并最大限度提高作为该等诉讼程序一部分能够为破产财产创造的价值，而密封提交和解协议。法官阁下，我还想指出，本案中，您知道，应当审视和考虑的事项，以及法院在决定封存9019动议是否适当时应当考虑的事项，是是否存在足够迹象表明该和解具有合理性，以及可能评估该和解的人是否能够指出某些事项，以确定该和解是否——是否——是否合理。在这方面，法官阁下，我认为，法院已建立由Tancredi法官（坦克雷迪法官）监督的调解程序，这一点极其重要。根据该程序，坦克雷迪法官已审查本和解，如同他将审查其他每一项和解一样，并已确定本和解在他看来是否合理且符合破产财产的最佳利益。他在此已作出该项确定。美国\n\n受托人已看过该和解，并知悉和解金额，委员会也是如此。\n\n法官阁下，这些才是对维护本破产案件全体利害关系人具有既得利益的当事方，即委员会和美国受托人，而非G Club。该两方均认可经修订拟议命令修改后的本院前述提议，且对该和解没有其他异议。法官阁下，基于所有这些理由，我们认为批准该动议至关重要，其中包括要求将该协议继续置于密封状态。谢谢。\n\n法庭：谢谢。斯克拉兹律师，您有任何回应吗？\n\n斯克拉兹先生：受托人引用的案件位于其书状第7页的脚注9和10，而且它们都是非实体性命令。它们没有任何法律依据。没有任何支持。我不确定它们如何能够构成任何依据。50-Off案指出——而且这是——我正在宣读——这是213 B.R. 646，第545页：\n\n同样，法院封存记录的命令并不妨碍申请方通过证据开示寻求其可能合法获得的任何信息。换言之，获取其所寻求的信息另有一种机制。此处不存在这种机制——查阅法院文件——案卷不能通过证据开示获得查阅，而是通过PACER进行。\n\nG Club是公众的一员，并有权查阅——查阅案卷。任何人——任何人都可以提出像——像这样的动议，或反对封存——封存某份文件。这超出了某一具体问题。而且，再次说明，规则第5条适用，第107条适用，Mirlis案适用，《第一修正案》也适用，而受托人没有遵守其中任何一项。谢谢。\n\n法庭：好的。谢谢。好。关于该动议——实际上是数项动议，对吗？我的意思是，一项在主案中提交，另一项在对抗程序中提交。因此，主案中的是3559。在对抗程序中，是对抗程序2405187，ECF 14。法院将对这些动议保留裁定。\n\n斯克拉兹先生：法官阁下，我在法院面前没有其他事项。可以准许我离席吗？\n\n法庭：可以。谢谢。\n\n斯克拉兹先生：谢谢，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：那么，我们现在进行简易判决动议？这是下一项事项吗，Despins受托人（Trustee Despins）？\n\n德斯平斯先生：是的。将由巴西特先生处理。谢谢，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：好的。谢谢。\n\n巴西特先生：法官阁下，我可以上前吗？\n\n法庭：可以，当然可以。\n\n巴西特先生：法官阁下，再次为记录起见，我是Paul Hastings（宝盛律师事务所）的Nick Bassett（尼克·巴西特），代表第11章受托人。\n\n因此，法官阁下，我们今天在此审理受托人的简易判决动议，即由债务人女儿名义持有的两家空壳公司——Hudson Diamond New York, LLC（哈德逊钻石纽约有限责任公司），我通常将其称为Hudson Diamond或Hudson Diamond New York，以及Leading Shine New York Limited（领晟纽约有限公司），我很可能将其称为Leading Shine——是债务人的另一自我，并且上述每一实体及其资产在衡平法上均归债务人所有。\n\n现在，法官阁下，正如我此前常在本院此类听证会上所说，似乎我们以前来过这里。我这样说的原因是，在本案中多次，我们重新辩论了与我们此前已在争议事项和对抗程序中辩论过的问题相同或相似的问题。\n\n法官阁下，今天我还要再次作出同样的评论。但我要告诉您，这次我确实是这个意思，因为我们目前面对的情况是：在这一完全相同的对抗程序中，完全相同的被告已经提出，而法院已经驳回了，他们今天正在提出的完全相同的论点。\n\n每一名提出动议的被告均在本对抗程序中提出了驳回动议或撤销缺席判决动议，并提出了与驳回动议类似的论点。\n\n这些动议提出了完全相同的论点，即具体而言，受托人缺乏依据《破产法典》第544条或其他规定追究其关于另一自我及实益所有权请求的原告资格。法院在举行听证后，驳回了这些论点。\n\n此外，法院已在另一对抗程序中，就同样的问题对被告Mei Guo（郭梅）作出裁定，我认为在该对抗程序中作出过两次或可能三次裁定。该程序是HK USA（香港美国）对抗程序，法院在该程序中驳回了郭梅的驳回动议，随后作出了有利于受托人的简易判决。\n\n因此，法官阁下，今天被告至少是第四次试图再次争辩同一问题。这还不包括，在本对抗程序中的被告及其律师在整个期间均高度参与本案的同时，法院当然已在涉及其他被告的众多其他对抗程序中裁决了同样的问题，包括第544条原告资格问题以及其他一系列问题。\n\n因此，法官阁下，我——在某个时候——我的意思是，\n\n我们会——我们会不断回到这里；我们会不断进行这些辩论，但到某个时候，已经够了。被告方已经尝试过了。他们已经提出了他们认为能够提出的最佳论点，除非他们今天承认，他们此前没有完成他们想要完成的工作，并且失败了。法院应当重申其先前的裁定，而我们都应当继续推进。\n\n现在，法官阁下——我——我会重新论证这些争点。我很乐意这样做。我会回应被告方在其书面文件中作出的具体陈述。但我觉得有必要在一开始就说明这一点。\n\n现在，就本案的简易判决动议而言——这正是我们今天在此的原因，法官阁下——人们本会认为，此类动议的重点不应是重新论证法院已经裁决过的法律争点；人们本会认为，被告方会主张受托人未满足 Rule 56 标准，即受托人未能证明其所提出的主张不存在任何实质性事实的真实争议，亦即其关于另我和受益所有权的主张。\n\n值得注意的是，法官阁下，本案被告方完全没有提出这一论点。他们曾在某一处形式上提及这一点，但他们实际上并未对受托人无争议事实陈述中列出的几乎任何事实提出异议。\n\n如果您查看其书面陈述第 3 页中的反驳性事实陈述，您会发现其仅有两句话。除了一些可以在适当时候处理的轻微证据异议外，确实不存在事实争议。但对于受托人主张所依据的事实，几乎完全不存在任何争议。\n\n尽管案卷记录——尽管该记录——在很大程度上不存在争议，我确实想先简要地带领法院审阅受托人提交的、支持其根据 Rule 56 请求简易判决的事实记录。之后，我将回应提出动议的被告方提出的一些重复的法律论点。\n\n法官阁下，证据所显示的——这一切均已在受托人的无争议事实陈述及该陈述所援引的众多证据附件中充分列明——是，这些被告方，Hudson Diamond New York（哈德逊钻石纽约公司）和 Leading Shine（领先光辉公司），虽然名义上由债务人的女儿所有，但与本案中许多其他空壳公司一样，包括另一家由债务人女儿所有的空壳公司 HK USA（HK USA 美国公司），这些实体实际上均为在所有相关期间由债务人所有和控制、并依债务人指示行事的空壳公司。\n\n我将从 Hudson Diamond 开始，简要说明一些突出事实。而且，法官阁下，实际上——\n\n记录自始至终显示，从该公司成立到其存续期间所作的一切行为，其每一步均由债务人或其代理人控制，随后被用于支持债务人的个人利益。\n\nHudson Diamond 于 May 30th, 2018 成立。成立时，其是在 Hodgson Russ（霍奇森·拉斯律师事务所）的协助下成立的，该律师事务所是债务人的个人法律顾问。案卷中的证据显示，Hodgson Russ 接受债务人代理人及其刑事共谋者 Yvette Wang（伊薇特·王）的指示。\n\n同样值得注意的是，法官阁下，实际上在 Hudson Diamond 于 May 30th, 2018 成立之初，其当时的唯一成员实际上是另一实体。如今，该实体为 Hudson Diamond Holdings, LLC（哈德逊钻石控股有限责任公司）。2018 年，其唯一成员是 Hudson Diamond Holding Inc.（哈德逊钻石控股公司），一家 BVI 实体。该 BVI 实体完全由债务人的儿子 Mileson or Chang Guo（迈尔森或常·郭）所有。这一点也载于无争议事实陈述。\n\nIn January 2019，Hudson Diamond 和该 BVI 实体将其在 Hudson Diamond New York 中的成员权益转让给 Hudson Diamond Holdings, LLC，即目前由债务人女儿 Mei Guo（梅·郭）所有的控股公司。因此，原有结构为：Hudson Diamond New York，控股公司，Mileson。2019 年之后的现有结构为：Hudson Diamond New York，控股公司，Mei Guo。由儿子转为女儿。债务人的个人法律顾问 Hodgson Russ 再次协助于 2019 年将 Hudson Diamond New York 的权益从一个实体转让给另一个实体。而且，法官阁下，在 Hodgson Russ 的内部电子邮件以及其与 Yvette Wang 的电子邮件中，债务人在这些电子邮件中被称为“Principal”。Hudson Diamond New York 成立后做了什么？嗯，\n\n它所做的一件事首先是，Yvette Wang 代表 Hudson Diamond 开设银行账户，然后使用这些账户追求债务人的利益，特别是为债务人购买房地产。不是任何房地产，而是 Taconic Road property（塔科尼克路房产）；法院已经认定该房产是债务人的个人住宅，而受托人现已拥有该房产，并且我相信已经将其出售。\n\nYvette Wang 代表 Hudson Diamond 与房地产经纪人签署了购买该房产的协议。该协议是案卷的一部分，其角落的印章写有 Miles Guo。\n\nHudson Diamond 还做了什么，法官阁下？Hudson Diamond 曾——其从其他由债务人控制的空壳公司获得资金，包括 ACA Capital Group（ACA 资本集团）和 Saraca（萨拉卡）。其还将收到的资金转移给债务人的家庭成员或其他由债务人控制的实体。\n\n例如，在 2019 年，$600,000 被转给债务人的妻子。同样在 2019 年，$1,000,000 被转给 Mei Guo。在大约 14 个月期间，其向 Golden Spring（金泉）转移了超过 $16 million。在 2021 年下半年，其向 Lamp Capital（蓝普资本）发送了超过 $17 million。在从 2019 年至 2020 年的 11 个月期间，其向 Greenwich Land（格林尼治地产）转移了超过 $4.5 million。法官阁下，案卷中的全部证据——\n\n表明 Hudson Diamond 存在的唯一目的，是由债务人及其代理人管理和控制，并为债务人的目的服务，包括为其利益提供资金。\n\n法官阁下，我想再次强调，案卷中完全不存在相反证据。也许这并不令人意外，因为被告方——特别是自称为这些实体最终所有人的 Mei Guo——无能力提出该等证据。这正是她援引第五修正案的问题所在。\n\n现在，被告方质疑法院考虑这一点的权力，但再次说明，我们并未请求法院——这与 Greenwich Land 对立诉讼程序中的情形相同——作出不利推断；我们只是指出，当一名被告方、一名诉讼当事人就某一问题援引第五修正案时，其将无法改变立场并提供证词，以支持与此相反的立场。\n\n这就是关键，法官阁下。她已经主张——她已经援引第五修正案。她无法提出相反证据，但这并不重要，因为她没有提出。法院面前的记录是受托人的证据，而另一方没有任何证据。简要谈及 Leading Shine，法官阁下。Leading Shine 的情况——\n\n与 Hudson Diamond 及债务人的许多其他空壳公司的情况非常相似。同样，从成立之初一直到后来。Leading Shine 于 January 2nd, 2019 设立。债务人的会计师事务所 Janover LLC（Janover 有限责任公司）此次协助设立 Leading Shine，并接受债务人代理人 Max Krasner（马克斯·克拉斯纳）的指示。\n\n同样，与 Hudson Diamond 一样，Yvette Wang 发挥了不可或缺的作用。如我们的无争议事实陈述所载，她代表 Leading Shine 开设银行账户，并且事实上被列为 Leading Shine 银行账户的所有人。\n\nLeading Shine 与 Hudson Diamond 一样，获得由债务人控制的实体提供的资金。例如，其从 ACA Capital 收到 $6 million，从 Golden Spring 收到 $350,000，从 Saraca Media Group（萨拉卡媒体集团）收到 $900,000。其用这些资金做了什么？当然，其再次从事协助向其他由债务人控制的实体及其亲属转移资金的活动。\n\nOn July 3rd, 2019，Leading Shine 向债务人的儿子转移 $57,000。在另一段一年期间，其向 Golden Spring 转移了超过 $5.4 million。In August and September of 2020，Leading Shine 向 Greenwich Land 共转移 $450,000。\n\n法官阁下，这只是我们在无争议事实陈述中列明的部分证据，因为我正努力使我的陈述尽可能简洁。我想说明的最后一点，法官阁下，是，如果法院需要任何其他证据证明被告 Mei Guo 实际上并不担任 Leading Shine 的受益所有人和控制人，那么只需查看 Leading Shine——如法院将会记得，我认为是在 January of 2024——在本案中提出撤销缺席裁定动议时发生的情况。\n\n当时，Leading Shine 的律师向法院表示，Leading Shine 未能及时提交答辩状的原因是，其客户 Guo 女士无法确定她是否拥有 Leading Shine。法院在回应该动议的命令中敏锐地认识到，一个人不能两面兼顾。当其声称根本不知道自己是否受益所有并控制某实体时，就不能同时主张其受益所有并控制该实体。这就是我们目前所处的情况，法官阁下。因此，我认为，根据法院面前的记录，不应对受托人主张的实质内容不存在任何实质性事实的真实争议存有异议。我——\n\n我不——我不认为被告方提出了任何与此相反的正当论点。\n\n因此，剩下的是法院已一再听取的重复法律论点。他们在其书面文件中置于首要位置并——\n\n用了大约七页篇幅论述的论点是：受托人依据《破产法典》第544条不具备提起这些主张的诉讼资格；他们称，如果受托人依据《破产法典》第544条不具备诉讼资格，那么受托人只能依据第541条提起这些主张；而如果受托人依据第541条提起这些主张，则同等过错（in pari delicto）和 Wagoner Rule（Wagoner 规则）抗辩将阻却受托人的主张。\n\n因此，再次说明，为校准起点，法院已经在本对立诉讼程序中三次裁决了这一问题。法院还在包括 HK USA、Greenwich Land 以及 HCHK 对立诉讼程序在内的其他对立诉讼程序中多次裁决了这一问题。\n\n在裁决该等对抗程序中的争议时，法院确认，《破产法典》第 544(a) 条——我现在实际上是在引用法院在本案驳回动议裁定中的表述——其中称，第 544(a) 条赋予破产受托人一般性权力，以主张某些假设债权人类别的特定权利和权力。\n\n法官阁下随后指出，第 544(a) 条的限制性原则在于，该等权利和权力必须是全体债权人均可主张的权利和权力，而非属于特定债权人的个别化主张。\n\n法院继而确认，另我和受益所有权主张实际上属于一般性主张，任何假设债权人均可提出，例如，在假设债权人寻求可供执行其判决的资产的判决后程序中。\n\n基于该推理，并援引包括 Tancredi 法官在 Titan Real Estate Ventures 案中的裁定以及 Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）在 Saint Paul Fire and Marine v. PepsiCo 案中的裁决在内的判例，法院适当地得出结论：受托人有资格依据《破产法典》第 544(a) 条追诉其主张。\n\n因此，尽管被告此前已有机会提出这些论点，且尽管法院已按我刚才所述的方式驳回了这些论点，但被告在其反对意见书中用了整整七页篇幅强烈主张，受托人的刺破公司面纱主张——我应当说，是反向刺破公司面纱主张——不能依据第 544(a) 条提出，因为在被告看来，这些主张更适宜被视为依据《破产法典》第 544(a) 条属于破产财产。他们在其七页篇幅中多次突出并加粗了这一点。\n\n法官阁下，被告未能认识到的是，即使他们在该项断言上是正确的，他们仍然败诉。因为，如果这些主张确实是依据第 541(a) 条属于破产财产，那么这些主张之所以会被视为依据第 541(a) 条属于破产财产，是因为它们是债权人的一般性主张，平等地惠及债务人的所有债权人。在这方面，法官阁下，Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）于 2024 年 8 月在 In Re Nordlicht 案中作出的裁决——我们在书面材料中引用了该案——尤其具有指导意义。\n\n该案涉及与本案极为相似的情形。有一名个人 Chapter 11（第 11 章）债务人，被指控利用空壳公司隐藏其资产，以使该等资产免受债权人追索。我在该裁决中看到这段表述，想引用它，因为在某些方面几乎令人不寒而栗。\n\n对这些主张的描述，或者说对构成这些主张基础的债务人计划的描述如下。其称，为使其能够向债权人声称贫困，同时控制大量资产，债务人在其财务安排中采用了一种特定的运作模式。第一，债务人与其妻子设立一家空壳公司，其妻子名义上拥有并控制该公司。\n\n第二，尽管其妻子拥有该公司并以其妻子名义登记，债务人事实上控制并支配该空壳公司，指挥或参与该公司几乎所有财务决策。第三，空壳公司中的任何资金或权益均被抽取至债务人妻子或其他密切关联方持有的账户，例如家族所有的 LLC 或信托。债务人以此方式处理其事务，在向债权人声称资产并不属于自己的同时，享有拥有极其重大资产的所有利益。这听起来像是在描述 Kwok 先生（郭文贵）。法官阁下，该案中发生的情况是，债务人的一名债权人在州法院对其中一些另我实体提出了反向刺破公司面纱主张。随后，在债务人申请破产并指定 Chapter 11（第 11 章）受托人后，受托人表示，州法院中提出的该项主张实际上是破产财产的主张，只有他有权起诉和和解该主张。事实上，受托人与另我空壳公司及其他涉案方达成和解，以解决该主张。因此，由 Southern District of New York（纽约南区）破产法院的 Drain 法官、地区法院以及 Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）审理的问题是，该项主张，即反向刺破公司面纱主张，是否实际上属于受托人享有专属和解权的主张。\n\n法院认定确实如此，该裁决的依据是，依 Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）所述，该等主张是“债权人的一般性主张，而非特定债权人的具体主张”。正如 Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）所指出的，该等主张能够增加可用于清偿债务人所欠任何及全部债务的资产池。\n\n基于此，法院认定，根据第 541 条，该等属于债权人一般性主张的主张——并非债务人在申请破产前本可提出的主张，而是债权人的主张——依据第 541(a) 条成为破产财产。\n\n法官阁下，该项分析的重要之处在于，由于该等债权人主张成为破产财产，它们不受 Wagoner Rule（Wagoner 规则）或 in pari delicto（同等过错）抗辩的限制。事实上，法官阁下已经在两次裁定中确认了这一点，即在 HK USA 驳回动议裁定中以及在本案驳回动议裁定中。\n\n在 HK USA 裁定第 15 页脚注 6 中，法院指出，在 Nordlicht 案之前，其他巡回区——特别是 Third Circuit（第三巡回上诉法院）——已有判例进行了完全相同的分析；Third Circuit（第三巡回上诉法院）认定，反向刺破公司面纱主张属于破产财产，因为它是可由债权人提出的一般性主张。法院指出，如果我们是在 Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院），则会有“在 Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）得出大体相同结果的不同依据”。其要点在于，你会得出相同结论。你仍然不会有 Wagoner 抗辩或 in pari delicto 抗辩。只是得出该结论的路径不同：要么通过我刚刚所述的第 541 条路径，要么通过第 544(a) 条。无论哪种方式，因为我们讨论的是债权人主张，这些抗辩均不适用。法院在本案驳回动议裁定中确认了同一点。我没有页码引注，但法院再次援引我刚刚提到的 Third Circuit（第三巡回上诉法院）判例称：“在 Third Circuit（第三巡回上诉法院），破产受托人可依据第 541 条将另我和受益所有权主张作为债权人的一般性主张提出，而非作为债务人的主张提出，这同样可避免适用 Wagoner 原则。”因此，法官阁下，即使被告关于这些是第 541 条主张的说法正确，它们仍不受其试图主张的抗辩约束，理由正是法官阁下已经确认的理由。法官阁下的裁定也与另一案件 In Re Harmon 一致。该案载于 529 B.R. 352。这是 Bankruptcy Northern District of Georgia（佐治亚州北区破产法院）2015 年的案件，与本案直接相关。\n\n该案中，法院审理的是债务人的债权人在破产程序外本可提出、但在破产程序内只能由受托人提出的另我主张，因为法院认定其是依据第 541 条属于破产财产。\n\n法院称：“in pari delicto 抗辩在此不适用。如上所述，具有约束力的 Eleventh Circuit（第十一巡回上诉法院）先例表明，受托人有权依据第 541 条提出债务人债权人本可提出的另我主张。”\n\n法院继而称，由于受托人代位于其主张因破产而无法继续进行的债权人，如果一方面因破产的存在而阻止债权人主张其权利，另一方面又将债务人被指称的行为归责于受托人，这将是不公平的。in pari delicto 原则不适用于债务人的债权人，因此也不应适用于受托人。\n\n因此，法官阁下，被告无论如何都败诉。如果这些是依据第 544(a) 条提出的主张，他们败诉；如果其主张是依据第 541 条提出，他们也败诉。他们还因第三个理由而败诉，即即使存在第 541 条下可能适用 Wagoner Rule（Wagoner 规则）和 in pari delicto 原则的主张，他们仍会败诉，因为在此情形下，in pari delicto 和 Wagoner Rule（Wagoner 规则）的内部人例外应予适用，正如其已在同一 Chapter 11（第 11 章）案件的先前情形中适用一样。法官阁下，我已经讲了一段时间，因此我将更简要地说明其他论点。再次强调，我认为第 544 条论点是其书面材料的核心，我希望确保对此作出较为充分的回应。\n\n他们还主张，法官阁下，受托人的另我主张不能提出且必须失败，因为依纽约法，另我是救济而非实体性主张。再次，我请法院注意 Nordlicht 案。该论点在该案中也曾提出。Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）对此的回应是：“认为另我责任理论根本不是纽约州法下的主张，而只是救济的主张，毫无根据。依纽约法，可以将另我作为一项主张提出，正如本案受托人所做的那样。”\n\n法官阁下，他们还主张，受托人关于资产受益所有权的主张不能成立，因为依被提名人原则，他们称受托人必须逐项具体识别每项资产，并说明其对该资产的所有权。在这样一种情形中提出这一论点颇具讽刺意味，因为已被识别出的这些实体所拥有的唯一资产是银行账户，而受托人已就债务人对这些账户的所有权和控制权提出了大量证据。\n\n因此，我并不真正理解该论点从何而来，但我认为可以基于此予以驳回。法官阁下，被告还主张，受托人寻求的救济不应以 nunc pro tunc（追溯）方式授予。我们也一再回应过这一论点。\n\n据我统计，法院已驳回该论点，并已作出命令，认定由于受托人的另我裁定，另我实体的资产现在是且一直都是破产财产。法院已在 HK USA 对抗程序、Golden Spring 对抗程序、Lamp Capital 对抗程序、Greenwich Land 对抗程序和 HCHK 对抗程序中作出该项裁定。\n\n被告在此提出的论点是，依其所称，授予 nunc pro tunc 救济的唯一方式是“纠正书记性错误或事务性缺陷”，随后他们指控受托人试图改写历史。\n\n法官阁下，我们所做的恰恰相反。事实上，我们并未寻求 nunc pro tunc\n\n我们所寻求的根本不是追溯性救济。我们所寻求的是防止债务人及协助债务人延续其长期欺诈骗局的人改写历史。无论从经济实质还是实质内容来看，现实始终是受托人实益拥有并\n\n控制 Hudson Diamond（哈德逊钻石）和 Leading Shine（领耀）及其资产。我们所寻求的确认判决、所寻求的命令，只是确认这一现实。我们并非试图改写历史；我们是试图阻止债务人改写历史。\n\n因此，法官阁下，这样做不仅完全适当，而且根本不是寻求追溯性救济。因此，他们援引的所有有关该问题的判例均完全不适用。\n\n我还请法院注意我们就该问题所援引的众多判例，以及本案提交的另一份书面陈述，即主案卷中 ECF 3803 所载撤销权诉讼的联合书面陈述。该文书对该问题作了广泛讨论。\n\n法官阁下，被告提出的另一项论点是，特拉华州法律遵循的是替代责任理论，而非同一性理论。因此，依被告所言，受托人的另我裁定所能产生的全部效果，只是使这些被告的\n\n资产可用于清偿债务人债权人的请求权，而不会实际使该等资产成为破产财产。\n\n该问题也已在其他地方得到充分书面论述，包括我刚才提到的其他书面陈述中。法官阁下，这也是法院已多次裁决的问题，包括在针对 Mei Guo（郭美）的 HK USA 程序中，法院在该命令中明确表示：“结合第 541 条和第 542 条，另我理论实现将资产转入破产财产。”引文结束。再次说明，该命令是针对郭美作出的，她也是本案被告，对她具有约束力。毫无疑问。该问题已经裁决并确定。\n\n至于——这样吧，法官阁下，为加快进程，我将跳到最后几个论点。法官阁下，我认为——我认为这实际上已涵盖整体情况。我愿意进一步详细说明同一性理论与替代责任理论的问题，或被告提出的任何其他论点。\n\n但在结束时，我想再次强调，对于本案相关事实，并不存在争议，更遑论实质性争议或真实争议。我认为各方几乎完全一致。唯一的问题是，法院是否应当重新审议并推翻其已就被告为回应简易判决动议所提出法律问题作出的决定。\n\n基于我已阐述的理由以及我们在书面材料中所列理由，我们认为法院没有任何依据这样做，因此，我们请求准许我们的动议。\n\n我愿意回答法院可能提出的任何问题。\n\n法院：\n\n谢谢，我目前没有任何问题。谢谢。\n\nBASSETT 先生（巴塞特先生）：\n\n谢谢，法官阁下。\n\n法院：\n\nKindseth 律师（金德塞斯律师）。\n\nKINDSETH 先生（金德塞斯先生）：\n\n谢谢，法官阁下。Steven Kindseth（史蒂文·金德塞斯），Zeisler & Zeisler（赛斯勒律师事务所），代理郭美、Leading Shine New York（领耀纽约）和 Hudson Diamond New York（哈德逊钻石纽约）。\n\n法官阁下，首要的是，这些问题在很大程度上已经获得充分书面论述，我不会试图重复书面材料中的论点；并且如对方律师所指出，本法院已多次审议并裁决这些问题。对方曾提出支持简易判决的论点，我们反对简易判决，并且我们认为，基于我们书面材料中列明的理由，应当驳回简易判决。\n\n我还承认，法官阁下，就您在本对抗程序中已裁决的法律问题而言，这些显然构成案件法律原则。法院有酌处权不重新审议本法院先前的决定，我们对此表示尊重。但基于我们书面材料中列明的理由，我们请求法院就若干具体法律问题重新审议这些决定。\n\n在我开始论证之前，我还要指出，法官阁下，如您所知，根据本法院的命令，其中许多问题已被综合书面论述，且该等书面陈述已经提交。如果您需要，我有案卷编号——我认为没有必要。\n\n法院：\n\n我不需要案卷编号。谢谢。\n\nKINDSETH 先生：\n\n好的。并且那些事项将于 January 15th 进行辩论，而且——\n\n法院：\n\n不过，Kindseth 律师，那些都是撤销权诉讼。本案不是撤销权诉讼。那些问题——你可以主张它们相同，但简易判决是基于事实作出的。而那些案件的事实是，它们属于撤销权诉讼。本案涉及另我问题。\n\nKINDSETH 先生：\n\n正确。相似之处——当然存在区别，法官阁下。相似之处在于，如 Bassett 律师指出，我们主要依赖法律论点。其中一些法律论点是相同的。\n\n实际上，为明确起见，法官阁下，受托人通过援引，将其就综合书面陈述提出的论点纳入今日的本程序。因此，我只是想向本法院指出这一点。鉴于已进行了广泛书面论述，我将把我的意见限于几点，法官阁下。\n\n第一，关于诉讼资格，法官阁下已再次裁决过这一问题。法官阁下裁定，受托人根据《破产法典》第 544(a) 条，即强力条款，具有诉讼资格。我想指出的是，在请求法院重新审议该问题时，我并非重新争辩该问题，我只是指出——\n\n法院：\n\n你如何在反对简易判决时请求法院重新审议一项裁定？你是否必须提交重新审议动议？\n\nKINDSETH 先生：\n\n嗯，受托人主张其有权依法获得判决，因为不存在任何真实的实质性事实争议，而该主张依赖于该论点。本法院可以纳入其先前的论点，但受托人需要纳入的论点是受托人具有诉讼资格。\n\n如果法官阁下适用案件法律原则，我们表示尊重。我们只是指出，Picard v. JPMorgan Chase 基于被主张的请求权构成破产财产这一点，对 PepsiCo 判决作出了限制，而不是\n\n依赖第 544(a) 条下的强力权力。因此，我们主张受托人无权根据第 544(a) 条提出债权人的一般性请求权。同样，关于——\n\n法院：\n\n那么，在今年 August 本法院作出决定之后发布、并处理了所有这些问题的 Second Circuit（第二巡回法院）判决呢？该判决如何？\n\nKINDSETH 先生：\n\n正确。我接下来将讨论该问题，法官阁下。\n\n法院：\n\n请继续。\n\nKINDSETH 先生：\n\n并且由于该判决是新的，各方没有——或者说，我们没有就该问题进行书面论述。\n\n法院：\n\n嗯，我不确定该判决是否是新的。\n\nKINDSETH 先生：\n\n是的。\n\n法院：\n\n但问题是相同的。\n\nKINDSETH 先生：\n\n并且，法官阁下，Nordlicht 的区别在于，Nordlicht 认定欺诈性转让和另我请求权构成破产财产，可以依据第 363 条出售，也可以由受托人和解。因此，法官阁下，我们再次看到，所援引以确立受托人根据第 544(a) 条，即强力条款所享有权力的判例，实际上是在说争议中的请求权构成破产财产。\n\n而且，法官阁下，具体而言，在法官阁下作出的多项决定中，法官阁下表示无需考虑 Wagoner Rule（Wagoner 规则）和 in pari delicto（同等过错原则），因为它们适用于受托人因请求权属于破产财产而具有诉讼资格的论点。法官阁下回避了该问题——正确地说，我的意思是，该推理是合理的，因为法官阁下认为，根据第 544(a) 条，受托人可以行使其强力权力追究该请求权。因此，法官阁下的依据是拒绝考虑该请求权是否构成破产财产的问题，而侧重于第 544(a) 条。\n\n而 PepsiCo、JPMorgan Chase、Picard 和 Nordlicht 都表示，该请求权构成——该请求权构成破产财产。因此，就回应案件法律原则并恭请法院重新审议而言，我们向法官阁下提出的论点是——\n\n法院：\n\n但它们说的是，这些是债权人可以提出的一般性请求权。\n\nKINDSETH 先生：\n\n是的。\n\n法院：\n\n而非某一特定债权人提出的特定请求权。\n\nKINDSETH 先生：\n\n正确。因此，这一直是我们的观点。因此，债权人的一般性请求权——事实上，受托人似乎正在退回其关于该请求权可依据第 544(a) 条提出的论点，并且似乎主张，现在尽管法院作出众多先前决定，受托人可以根据第 544(a) 条提出该请求权，但听起来受托人现在主张该请求权构成破产财产。\n\n而且，我还想指出，法官阁下，这是本对抗程序中受托人首次在口头辩论中主张，受托人因该请求权属于破产财产而具有诉讼资格。现在，作为回应的论点，但是——\n\n法院：\n\n我认为这不是他所主张的，但你可以继续。\n\nKINDSETH 先生：\n\n好的。因此，法官阁下，如果受托人并未提出该论点，那么我们就只能接受第 544(a) 条和法院先前的决定。我们请求法院基于我们的说明以及 Second Circuit 在 JPMorgan Chase 中的判决和 Nordlicht 中的判决，重新审议先前的决定；该等判决再次并未依赖第 544(a) 条下的强力权力。\n\n就 Nordlicht 以及今日提出的论点进一步说明，受托人今日主张 Wagoner 规则和同等过错原则不适用。嗯，该问题尚未获得书面论述。\n\n我们一直没有主张这些请求权——受托人也未依赖这些请求权构成破产财产这一论点。因此，不应基于在口头辩论中首次提出、各方甚至尚未进行书面论述的法律论点，且基于并非受托人在本案或任何其他案件中一贯提出的诉讼资格论点，而准许简易判决。\n\n因此，我——我原本准备只是接受本法院先前关于受托人的诉讼资格依据第 544 条的决定所产生的结果。我们谨表示不同意。我们在书面材料中指出了理由，并请求法院根据案件法律原则下的酌处权重新审议该决定。\n\n我们认为，法院不应认定受托人有权根据第 544(a) 条追究本案提出的诉因。这是第一点。\n\n我想提请法院注意的第二点，是关于纽约州法下的另我主张。Nordlicht 承认，另我并非纽约州法下的诉因。因此，受托人据以请求简易判决的该项主张，并非可据以作出判决的有效诉因，因此应驳回简易判决动议。\n\nNordlicht 就非常具体的目的所作出的裁定，即某项主张是否可以根据 363 出售，是另我主张属于《破产法典》下的主张。因此，法院裁定该主张可以出售及和解。\n\n同样至关重要的是，法官阁下，Nordlicht 中，Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）认定，另我理论是《破产法典》下的一项主张，但它实际上是主张之中的一项主张。该主张之中的主张，首先依据纽约州法，是存在责任；继而基于该主张，并结合另我主张，可以将责任加诸另我。因此——\n\n法院：Kindseth 律师，你刚才所说的内容，判决书具体在何处这样说？\n\n金塞思先生：请给我案子，好吗？\n\n法院：可以。\n\n金塞思先生：法官阁下，我有 Lexis 编号。我手头的印刷版本没有已刊载的编号。我不确定——您有 Westlaw 或 Lexis 版本吗？我可以说明在哪里——\n\n法院：我现在手头没有任何版本。\n\n金塞思先生：所以，它是在——\n\n法院：但你告诉我，这个案件说了某些内容，而根据我查看该案的记忆，它并没有这样说。因此，我是在要求你告诉我，在该案的何处——\n\n金塞思先生：是在判例要旨 22——\n\n法院：嗯，判例要旨 22 对我没有帮助。我需要判决书中的文字。\n\n金塞思先生：其内容是，在法院或陪审团能够决定是否应将责任加诸某实体或个人的另我之前，必须首先确信，首先应当将责任加诸该实体或个人。并且——\n\n法院：但它并没有说责任已经被加诸。它说的是——你刚刚读了。它说的是，应当考虑是否应当加诸。这是两回事。你说必须先确定责任。\n\n金塞思先生：它明确指出，另我不是——另我不是诉因。\n\n法院：不，我认为它没有这样说。\n\n金塞思先生：它说的是——Nordlicht 所说的是，它不是一种救济。但它承认，根据纽约州法——\n\n法院：有人能否给我该案的引注，拜托——\n\n金塞思先生：抱歉。该案引注是 115 F.4th 90。\n\n法院：好的。请等一下。115 F.4th 的多少页？\n\n金塞思先生：115 F.4th 90。\n\n法院：所以你引的是判例要旨 22。因此，我正在阅读 West 正式判例汇编中刊载的判决书，115 F.4th 90，第 105 页，判例要旨 20 至 22。另一方面，个人主张是针对特定债权人的损害所提出的主张，In Re Tronox（特罗诺克斯案），其他债权人通常对此并无利益，In Re Emoral（埃莫拉尔案），援引 Board of Trustees of Teamsters Local 863 Pension Fund v. Foodtown（卡车司机地方工会 863 养老金基金受托人委员会诉 Foodtown〔食品城〕案），Third Circuit（第三巡回上诉法院）2022 2002。因此，个人主张中的法定或衡平法上的利益仅属于该债权人，Board of Trustees of Teamsters Local 833（卡车司机地方工会 833 受托人委员会）。债权人有专属权利追诉个人主张，而破产受托人不得如此行事，Hirsch v. Arthur Andersen（赫希诉 Arthur Andersen〔安达信〕案），Second Circuit 95。一般主张与个人主张之间的区分，通过将所有资产追回诉讼集中由单一原告即受托人提起，促进破产程序中资产的有序分配，In Re Wilton Armetale Inc.（威尔顿·阿梅塔尔公司案），Third Circuit 2020。再往下说，在区分一般主张和个人主张时，标签并非决定性的，因为原告经常试图但不被允许通过诉状规避破产程序。相反，我们审查损害的事实起源，更重要的是审查所主张权利的性质。就此分析而言，我们审视适用于每项主张的财产法。它通篇都在说这些内容。它没有说根据纽约州法这不是一项主张。这不是它所说的内容。\n\n金塞思先生：不幸的是，判例要旨与我手头的内容不一致。一定是——Lexis 一定有其自己的一套判例要旨。\n\n法院：你说的是哪个脚注——哪个判例要旨？你在该案的什么位置？给我页码。\n\n金塞思先生：我的 Lexis 编号是 36。就在——它在 C 节，即另我、反向揭开公司面纱的责任理论。就在 C 节末尾、D 节开始之前，所以裁定就在 D 节之前——\n\n法院：我还没有到那里。因此，因为我使用的是 Westlaw，我不知道你在哪里。\n\n金塞思先生：抱歉。我有一份判决刊载前版本的打印件。法官阁下，我很抱歉。\n\n法院：我有——你是在 Stadtmauer 的反向揭开公司面纱主张作为一般主张的部分吗？因为它就是这样说的。Stadtmauer 的反向揭开公司面纱主张是纽约州法下的一般主张。因为我们在 Tronox 中指出，基于普遍未遵守公司形式要件及滥用公司形式的指控所提出的主张，通常属于一般主张，只要其能够增加可用于清偿债务人所负任何及全部责任的资产池。本案即属如此。这就是他们所说的。\n\n金塞思先生：正确。我们不争议这一点。\n\n法院：那么你的——你的观点是什么？我完全不明白你的观点。因为如果你不争议这一点，那么它就是受托人可以代表全体债权人提出的一般主张，无论其是否属于破产财产。因此，这甚至——你的观点——我不明白你在提出什么观点。\n\n金塞思先生：法院此前已裁定，这是一项可根据 544(a) 追诉的一般性主张。\n\n法院：好的。\n\n金塞思先生：这已构成案件既判规则。该论点——我们争议该论点，但它是案件既判规则。而且法院有自由裁量权——\n\n法院：嗯，我认为这不只是案件既判规则。我认为此时它已是第二巡回上诉法院具有约束力的法律。但请继续。\n\n金塞思先生：好的，因此我们恭请法院审视 JPMorgan Chase（摩根大通），并且——\n\n法院：该案是在 Nordlicht 之前作出的。\n\n金塞思先生：正确。而 Nordlicht 并未依赖 544(a)。所以，法官，我正在试图——\n\n法院：因为它没有必要。但它仍然提出了——它仍然分析了这是否是一项只能由受托人提起和追诉的一般主张。这正是——该案所认定的内容。\n\n它认定，根据纽约州法的反向揭开公司面纱主张，也就是你所主张的，是一项一般主张，而且提出该主张的唯一适格当事人是受托人。这就是他们所说的。这就是——我正在阅读第二巡回上诉法院的意见书。这就是它所说的。\n\n金塞思先生：法官阁下，若允许，受托人有两个选择。其一是根据 544(a) 提出论点。其二是主张该等权利属于破产财产。这是完全不同的论点。好吗？\n\n所以，法官，逐步来说，544(a) 或者——\n\n法院：我明白。我明白。你不必讲下去。我不同意你。\n\n金塞思先生：好的。因此，我们一直——在整个案件中，所有撤销行动、另我论点，均以——为前提。\n\n法院：撤销行动与另我行动不同。你一直试图把它们说成相同。\n\n金塞思先生：但它们取决于——由于所有转让人均被主张为另我，因此——存在一个前提性论点，即另我实际上构成破产财产，因此它们的转让可以被撤销。因此，撤销行动中存在与其他程序中相同的问题。因此，问题是，受托人是否有权根据 544(a) 行使强制接管权而取得诉讼资格，还是因为这些主张属于破产财产，受托人是站在债务人的位置上？而法院及受托人最初不希望——或者说受托人不希望提出论点、法院又裁定这些并非属于破产财产的主张，原因在于 Wagoner 规则、不法行为抗辩以及第二巡回上诉法院已经作出的其他论点和裁定。因此，相当长一段时间以来，我们一直——法院一直基于 544(a) 支持受托人的行动和另我论点。因此——我本无意如此详尽地讨论这个问题，因为法院已对此作出裁定，而且已经多次作出裁定，并且在 544(a) 下这已构成案件既判规则，即法院裁定受托人是在 544(a) 下行使强制接管权进行诉讼。好。我们说，法院应基于 JPMorgan Chase 重新考虑这一点。现在，受托人似乎在主张的是，嗯，现在受托人说，哦，不，这是破产财产，而且 Wagoner 规则和不法行为抗辩并不适用。\n\n法院：我认为他不是这么说的。\n\n金塞思先生：好的。那么您知道吗？\n\n法院：他没有那么说。他针对你就诉讼资格提出的论点，作出了三四个不同的回应论点。\n\n金塞思先生：好的。因此，法官阁下，我相信——我确信法官阁下理解我所提出的观点。如果法官阁下要坚持 544(a)，那就如此，但不是——\n\n法院：而当我们——该论点是，这些主张是 541 下的主张，属于破产财产。我们作出了认定，或者该裁定称，无论是 544 还是 541 都无关紧要。该受托人仍具有诉讼资格。这才是重点。\n\n金塞思先生：恕我直言，法官阁下，我对法院裁定的记忆并非如此——\n\n法院：那么——好。你去找出来，因为我认为你错了。\n\n金德塞思律师：好的。那么—— 法庭：而且你本应当——如果你是这样认为的，那么—— 金德塞思律师：嗯，我并不关心—— 法庭：——我不会在这件事上花太多时间。我们已经讨论过了。你的论点是什么？Nordlicht（诺德利希特）称，这些是一般性请求，唯一能够提出这些请求的人是受托人。裁判就是这么说的。请告诉我，哪里没有这样说。 金德塞思律师：它说——它说存在一些一般性请求，这些请求——构成破产财产。 法庭：不。这并非它所说的全部。它说存在一般性请求，而唯一适格的原告是受托人。它就是这么说的。我刚刚读过。 金德塞思律师：这——没错。我同意这一点。那么问题是，如果——如果受托人基于该请求据称属于破产财产这一事实提出该请求，那么现在的问题是，Wagoner Rule（瓦格纳规则）或in pari delicto（同等不法抗辩）是否阻止受托人提出该论点？即，事实上—— 法庭：不，它并不阻止受托人提出任何论点。只有当你根据这些原则具有有效抗辩时才是如此。这才是问题所在。 金德塞思律师：你知道吗？该论点\n\n从未提出过。\n\n法庭：已经提出过12次了。我已经讨论过Wagoner和in——每一次，我们都讨论过。每一次，我们都讨论过。我不能——我是说，这没关系。如果你认为它没有被提出过，那么我不知道该怎么告诉你，因为它已经被提出过了。\n\n金德塞思律师：好的。我想指出，就简易判决动议而言，该简易判决动议中并未就该请求构成破产财产以及Wagoner Rule或in pari delicto不适用提出论点。因此，我们主张——事实上，我们主张，544并未赋予受托人诉讼资格。因此，法官阁下，我——\n\n法庭：你一开始就已经说，你要求本庭重新考虑其所有裁定。因此，现在你也在提出一个你已经提出过的论点，因为你是在说，法官，我们已经提出了这些论点，但您不同意我们，所以我们要再次提出。我们现在请求您重新考虑该裁定。\n\n与此同时，第二巡回上诉法院作出了一项本庭受其约束的判决，该判决称，这些请求是一般性请求，只能由原告，即受托人提出。这就是它所说的。 金德塞思律师：但并非基于544(a)。 法庭：好的。那么，即便我同意你的观点——那么，根据第二巡回上诉法院的判决，我也可以允许他们依据其他规定提出。在我们的动议——在驳回动议中，这些请求是依据541提出的。如果你——如果你想回顾当时发生的情况，它们是破产财产请求。它们是破产财产。我们在该判决中说，无论是541还是544都无关紧要。你对此并无关于诉讼资格的抗辩。这就是我们所说的。无关紧要。那么，金德塞思律师，如果不是受托人，谁有诉讼资格？ 金德塞思律师：债权人会有诉讼资格—— 法庭：什么债权人？ 金德塞思律师：任何债权人—— 法庭：哪个债权人？什么债权人？不。不。 金德塞思律师：任何债权人—— 法庭：不。如果你是对的，就必须是一个特定债权人，金德塞思律师。那么谁是——谁是该特定债权人？ 金德塞思律师：PAX。 法庭：PAX？PAX已经在州法院提出了所有那些\n\n请求。 金德塞思律师：而且您问我谁有诉讼资格。PAX有诉讼资格—— 法庭：不。我没有问你谁有诉讼资格。我说，哪个是适格债权人？哪个是——你说所有债权人。我说，不，不。哪个债权人？什么债权人？你需要解释。你需要指明。你需要告诉我，只有一个债权人可以提起该诉因。如果有不止一个，那么你的论点就不能成立。 金德塞思律师：好的。 法庭：那么，PAX——你的回答是，PAX是唯一可以针对这些实体提起替身责任诉讼的债权人？ 金德塞思律师：法官阁下，我理解您的意思。 法庭：这是——我有一个尚待回答的问题。这就是你的回答吗？ 金德塞思律师：不。这不是唯一的一个。它是一个—— 法庭：好的。那么你败诉了。 金德塞思律师：好的。那么，法官阁下—— 法庭：就该问题而言。 金德塞思律师：我同意。这是一项一般性请求。\n\n法庭：好的。那么我们继续。你的其他论点是什么？ 金德塞思律师：我可以提出一个—— 法庭：可以？请说。你可以提出一个。 金德塞思律师：一点。如果即便它是一项一般性请求，它仍受Wagoner Rule和in pari delicto的约束。这是我唯一的观点，法官阁下。 法庭：好的。继续你的下一个论点。 金德塞思律师：谢谢，法官阁下。就纽约法下的替身责任请求而言，我指出Nordlicht承认其并非纽约法下的诉因，并称其是《破产法典》下的请求，因此，我的论点是，受托人将其作为一项独立诉因提出。它并非纽约法下的独立诉因。就衡平所有权和名义持有人原则而言，法官阁下，正如第二巡回上诉法院在Ahmed（艾哈迈德）案中所判决的，仅仅识别一系列资产或一组资产是不足够的，名义持有人原则和衡平所有权要求逐项资产分析。确立衡平所有权所必需的所有因素与实际转入该账户的资金之间必须存在关联。因此，法官阁下，我们关于衡平\n\n所有权和名义持有人原则的论点是，仅仅指向账户并不足够。必须证明确立衡平所有权所需因素与特定转账之间的相互关系，以表明就该特定转账而言，考虑到这些因素，债务人事实上是所有人。\n\n你不能仅仅指向一个账户，而且，如律师所指出的，该账户存在大量转入资金。并不存在某种笼统原则称，那么账户中的一切都由债务人衡平所有。根据第二巡回上诉法院的判决，必须就每一笔特定转账作出证明，以确立该转账的真正所有人事实上是债务人。\n\n法官阁下，强调这一点的是，尽管受托人——显然如其必须承认的那样——承认Ahmed案中第二巡回上诉法院关于所要求的逐项资产分析的判决，但随简易判决动议附具的拟议命令却要求本庭作出一项笼统认定，即这些实体拥有的全部资产均由债务人衡平所有，或曾由债务人衡平所有，因而属于破产财产，这与第二巡回上诉法院在Ahmed案中的判决直接相悖。\n\n法官阁下，基于这些理由，我们主张并相信不宜作出简易判决。再次强调，我们已就这些问题进行了广泛书面陈述。法官阁下对这些问题非常熟悉，我们坚持我们已提交的书面文件。谢谢，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：好的。我唯一还想对你说的是，关于Nordlicht案。第二巡回上诉法院在该判决中，从《West Reporter》即官方判例汇编第109页开始，用该判决的完整一节进行了论述。\n\n其称，作为另一种理论，Stadtmauers（施塔特毛尔夫妇）主张，纽约法根本不将替身责任理论归类为请求，而是将其归类为救济。他们的论点基于Tronox（特罗诺克斯）案推理中表面上的不一致，该不一致已由美国破产法院法官Wiles（怀尔斯）在In Re Stage Presence（Stage Presence案）中指出并讨论。\n\nWiles法官在承认其受Tronox案约束的同时指出，纽约上诉法院已明确表明，根据纽约法，替身责任或刺破公司面纱的论点并非一项独立、自足的诉因。相反，刺破公司面纱或给予替身责任救济，是原告可以寻求的一种救济。然后它——他们接着说。\n\n然而，纯粹将替身责任和刺破公司面纱理论视为救济，似乎与处理替身责任请求究竟属于个别债权人还是破产受托人这一问题的判例法不一致。如果替身责任理论和刺破公司面纱理论根本不是独立请求，而只是其他请求的救济，那么就难以看出它们如何能够专属于破产财产。\n\n我理解一项请求可据以提出的理论，但我不知道有任何理论认为一项救济专属于破产财产。第二巡回上诉法院随后以如下表述结束整个讨论：因此，若纽约法在任何地方规定或暗示替身责任理论是一种救济，该观点即受《破产法典》排除。参见BFP Resolution Trust Corp.。当《破产法典》文本本身的含义明确时，其实施不受相反州法阻碍。这就是第二巡回上诉法院所说的。\n\n因此，我只是想明确记录，你关于其是救济而非请求的论点已被第二巡回上诉法院明确驳回。\n\n金德塞思律师：没错，法官阁下。而且我将——\n\n法庭：那么你为什么还要提出这个论点？\n\n金德塞思律师：那么，法官阁下，存在一项——存在《破产法典》下的诉因。存在一项请求。也存在一种救济。好的？所以——\n\n法庭：我刚才告诉你，并不存在救济。 金德塞思律师：不存在救济。 法庭：不存在救济。这正是第二巡回上诉法院刚刚所说的。它不是救济。 金德塞思律师：那么暂且不谈替身责任，仅为本讨论之目的—— 法庭：整个——整个——这就是整个简易判决所涉及的问题。 金德塞思律师：法官阁下，请允许我说明一点？ 法庭：可以。但你可以说明一点——你必须说明一个有效观点，而不是一个意在拖延或不受法律支持的观点。第二巡回上诉法院在不到三个月前作出了一项判决，它完全反对你所主张的一切，而且我受其约束，必须遵循。因此，你继续提出你的论点。但我不会允许你再作更多论证，因为现在已经3点了，我们超时了——你在兜圈子，而且你无视具有约束力的判例法。 金德塞思律师：我们并未主张它是一种救济。 法庭：你刚才就这样主张了。 金德塞思律师：不。我说的是，它不是一项诉因。\n\n诉因。法官阁下，它不是一项诉因——\n\n法庭：那么它是什么？一个气球？\n\nKINDSETH 先生：实际上，第二巡回法院在 Nordlicht 一案中裁定，它是《破产法》项下的一项可出售并可和解的请求权。它不是一项——\n\n法庭：那么如果它是一项请求权，它就是一项诉因。\n\nKINDSETH 先生：法官阁下，第二巡回法院并非如此裁定。\n\n法庭：一项请求权怎么会不是一项诉因？Kindseth 先生，请求权是一项获得付款的权利，不是吗？这不正是《破产法》对请求权的定义吗？我认为是。我们要看第 101 条吗？\n\nKINDSETH 先生：法官阁下——\n\n法庭：因此，如果它是一项获得付款的权利，便有一项与该获得付款权利相关的诉因。因为如果有人不付款，就有人有权提起诉讼以获得付款。\n\nKINDSETH 先生：法官阁下，依我对 Nordlicht 一案的理解，也感谢您允许我说明这一点，第二巡回法院表示，根据纽约州法律，它可能不是一项诉因，但它是《破产法》项下的一项请求权，因此可以和解。它不是一种救济。它不是一种救济。它可能不是一项独立诉因，但它是一项可以和解和出售的请求权。这是我对该裁定的理解。\n\n法庭：“请求权”一词是指获得付款的权利，无论该权利是否已化为判决书、已清算、未清算、确定、或有、到期、未到期、有争议、无争议、法定、衡平法上的、有担保或无担保，或者是因履行义务遭违约而产生获得付款权利的衡平法救济权利，无论该衡平法救济权利是否已化为判决书、确定、或有、到期、未到期、有争议、无争议、有担保或无担保。因此，如果它是一项获得付款的权利，Kindseth 先生，那么就有一项与该请求权相关的诉因。\n\nKINDSETH 先生：谢谢，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：好的。谢谢。Bassett 先生，您有什么要补充的吗？\n\nBASSETT 先生：法官阁下，非常简短地说，我可以上前吗？\n\n法庭：可以。\n\nBASSETT 先生：仅有几点非常、非常简短的说明，只是为了澄清记录中 Kindseth 律师提出的一些论点。\n\n在讨论 544/541 问题时，律师表示，这是一项新论点或新理论，是我们在诉讼中途转而提出的，此前并非受托人所提出的任何论点或所追究的任何诉因的主题。\n\n这完全不属实。\n\n在本对抗程序中，如同我们在本案中提起的所有其他另我对抗程序一样，我们一直依据 Section 541 和 Section 544 追究我们的请求权。事实上，法庭会记得在 HK USA 对抗程序中的一项裁定，其中分析了这两项规定。法庭认定我们有资格依据 Section 544(a) 追究该请求权；法庭还依据 Section 541 分析了该问题，并认定不法同谋原则的内部人例外适用。\n\n我想指出的是，鉴于 Nordlicht 裁定，现已改变的情况以及我们现在向法庭指出的是，如果沿着 Section 541 的路径进行，那么您便可主张 Nordlicht 所称的该请求权可作为债权人的一般性请求权提出。\n\n至于 Kindseth 律师的另一点，他称此时必须考虑不法同谋原则和 Wagoner 规则是否适用，法官阁下，您已经两次作出裁定。法官阁下在 HK USA 案的驳回动议以及本案的驳回动议裁定中均考虑过这种可能性；两次中，法庭均认识到，如果一项诉因因其属于债权人的一般性请求权而依据 Section 541 被追究，则不法同谋原则和 Wagoner 规则不适用。\n\n这也正是我在开庭陈述时向法庭援引的 Harmon 案中，从佐治亚州读出的内容。该案法庭直接处理了该问题，并表示，在该案中、在该情形下，显然，这些请求权不受不法同谋原则或 Wagoner 规则的阻却，因为任何其他结果都会极其不公平。\n\n这将意味着，债权人不能自行追究该请求权，该请求权成为 Chapter 11 破产财产的一部分，而后受托人又因不法同谋原则和 Wagoner 原则而无法追究该请求权。这毫无道理。因此，这根本不是一个问题。\n\n根据 Nordlicht，如果这些请求权作为一般性请求权属于破产财产，则不法同谋原则和 Wagoner 规则不适用。\n\n我想简要回应或处理的另一项意见，是我们刚才讨论的最新一项意见。我认为法庭读出了 Nordlicht 一案中完全正确的措辞，其中讨论了 Tronox 案及其他案件；从对 Tronox 案的讨论中可以非常清楚地看出，法庭针对该案中提出的论点所关注的问题，是另我请求权能否被视为一项诉因。这正是从 Tronox 案中引用的措辞。\n\n随后，当法官阁下继续审阅并读完其余部分时，法庭表示，在破产程序中，说另我请求权不能作为一项独立诉因存在，是没有道理的。\n\n现在，Kindseth 律师试图说的是，另我请求权通常在破产程序外被用作对另一项请求权的补充或附随请求。因此，如果在破产程序外，一名债权人对某一方提出违约请求权，之后为执行该判决书而寻求刺破公司面纱，则该另我请求权将被附加上去。\n\n正如 Nordlicht 所指出的，这在破产程序中完全无关且没有必要。原因在于，受托人代表破产财产中数千名债权人的地位。所有这些破产财产债权人都有请求权。他们都已提出请求权。PAX 已提出一项请求权。其他债权人也已提出请求权。如果有必要存在一项可供另我或反向刺破公司面纱所附着的基础请求权，那就是这些请求权。\n\n因此，在破产程序中，正如 Nordlicht 法庭所承认的，受托人绝对可以将另我作为一项请求权追究。我们谈论的是破产程序。我们谈论的不是破产程序外的情形。\n\n法官阁下，我原本还打算回应其他几点，但为节省时间，我认为我们已经涵盖了这些问题。再次，我们恭请准许我们的动议，并且非常、非常感谢法庭——感谢法官阁下的时间和耐心。谢谢。\n\n法庭：谢谢。Kindseth 律师，您想回应吗？\n\nKINDSETH 先生：没有进一步内容，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：好的。谢谢。好的。关于目前待法庭审理的对抗程序 23-05023 中的简易判决动议，法庭将对此事予以审议，并将相应作出裁定。\n\n今天下午还有其他需要处理的事项吗？我认为我们已经处理完日程表上的所有事项。对吗？\n\nDESPINS 先生：是的，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：好的。谢谢。那么，鉴于今天下午日程表上已无其他听证会，谢谢各位。现在休庭。\n\n（程序于下午 3:07 结束。）\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3906 Filed 12/16/24 Entered 12/16/24 11:54:31 Page 86 of 86\n\n证明\n\n兹证明，据本人所知及所能，前述内容是上述案件程序电子录音的准确笔录。\n\n/s/ Wendy K. Sawyer December 12, 2024\nWENDY K. SAWYER, CDLT\n认证法庭速录员\n代表 Reliable","key_entities":["Je","Despins","Guo","CIPA","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Paul Hastings","HCHK","Saraca","Miles Guo","Luc Despins"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":14,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3559,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3803,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3865,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":22074,"status":"published","published_at":"2024-12-16 00:00:00","created_at":"2024-12-16","updated_at":"2026-08-23 21:59:29"}