{"id":"court_ctb_392_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":392,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION In re:","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\nIn re:\n\nHO WAN KWOK<sup>1</sup>\n\nChapter 11 Case No.\n\n22-50073 (JAM)\n\nDebtor.\n\nMay 18, 2022\n\n# **PACIFIC ALLIANCE ASIA OPPORTUNITY FUND L.P.'S OMNIBUS REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS CHAPTER 11 CASE OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PARTIAL JOINDER TO UNITED STATES TRUSTEE'S MOTION FOR ORDER DIRECTING THE APPOINTMENT OF A CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE**\n\nPacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. (\"PAX\") respectfully submits this reply (\"Reply\") in support of its *Motion to Dismiss Chapter 11 Case or, in the Alternative, Partial Joinder to United States Trustee's Motion for Order Directing the Appointment of a Chapter 11 Trustee,* ECF No. 183 (the \"Dismissal Motion\")<sup>2</sup> and in response to the objections to the Dismissal Motion (collectively, the \"Objections\") submitted by certain parties (the \"Objectors\"), including the *Opposition of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors to Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.'S Motion to Dismiss Chapter 11 Case or, in the Alternative, Partial Joinder to United States Trustee's Motion for an Order Directing the Appointment of a Chapter 11 Trustee*, ECF No. 346 (the \"UCC Objection\"), the *Objection of Creditors Rui Ma, Zheng Wu and Weican Meng to the Motion of Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. for Dismissal of this Case or, in the Alternative, for Appointment of a Trustee*, ECF No. 347 (the \"Rui Ma Group Objection\")\n\n<sup>1</sup> The last four digits of the Debtor's taxpayer identification number are 9595.\n\n<sup>2</sup> Concurrently with the Dismissal Motion, PAX filed a limited objection to the *United States Trustee's Motion for an Order Directing the Appointment of an Examiner or, in the Alternative, Motion for Order Directing the Appointment of a Chapter 11 Trustee*, ECF No. 102 (the \"Examiner/Trustee Motion\"). Capitalized terms used but not defined herein shall have the meaning set forth in the Dismissal Motion. Citations to Exhibits 1 through 43 are attached to the Friedman Decl. All other exhibit citations are to the exhibits attached to the *Declaration of Peter Friedman in Further Support of PAX's Motion to Dismiss* (\"Friedman Reply Decl.\"), filed concurrently herewith.\n\nand the *Creditor Logan Cheng's Opposition to Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.'s Motion to Dismiss Chapter 11 Case*, ECF No. 348 (the \"Cheng Objection\").\n\n### **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\n1. Despite the Debtor's misuse of the bankruptcy process and contrived chapter 11 filing, the Objectors insist that this sham case must continue for their alleged benefit. With no business to reorganize, very few if any liquidated claims other than PAX's claim, and no direct means (or possible cost-effective method) to fund a case, there is no defensible reason to prolong the case on behalf of Kwok, who is anything but the proverbial \"honest but unfortunate debtor.\" Continuing the case because the Objectors hope that they can leverage PAX's collection efforts into their own payday is a wasteful alternative when the parties can easily be returned to their full prepetition rights and remedies without the estate incurring mounting administrative expenses and unfairly disadvantaging PAX. It bears special emphasis that PAX has more than \\$260 million in judgments. Other than a tiny sprinkling of other liquidated claims, the rest of the Debtor's purported constituents are either insiders or litigation claimants who do not have judgments and may never be creditors for *years*, if ever. And, this is not a mass tort or product case where past is prologue for litigation claimants, or where virtually all unliquidated claims have a common nucleus of facts. The unliquidated claims are from disparate plaintiffs who claim disparate injuries.\n\n2. Moreover, the arguments for forcing this case to continue are wrong on the law and the facts. First, Objectors complain that if Kwok's chapter 11 is dismissed—as it should be—they would be returned to the *status quo ante* in which their speculative claims would be unsatisfied and they and other creditors would need to wait to collect on any of their claims until after PAX is satisfied. This is not fully accurate—if other claimants against Kwok have rights outside of\n\nbankruptcy, those rights are not necessarily subordinate to PAX's rights. They are what they are. And, in any event, a return to the prepetition *status quo* is not a windfall to PAX, nor is it a detriment to the Objectors' rights, whatever they may be. PAX has been waiting for nearly 7 years to collect against Kwok for his failure to honor his personal guarantee. The Objectors want to take advantage of the bankruptcy process so that they can share in PAX's years-long collection efforts and delay PAX's satisfaction. Thus, if the Objectors succeed, it is *they* who will be jumping the line in this case, not PAX, who will be forced to wait even longer for other claimants to prove up their claims before fully realizing any recovery. Second, the number of claims that would \"compete\" with PAX for Kwok's assets is greatly exaggerated in the UCC Objection. In reality, the vast majority of asserted claims other than PAX's are either insider claims (such as the \\$22 million in claims scheduled for Golden Spring and Lamp Capital, each of which refused to provide any documentation for their purported claims), *de minimis* claims, as-yet unproven litigation claims, or claims arising from litigation that has either been dismissed or is dormant. Third, Kwok did not file this case because he was suffering from an inability to satisfy his debts as they come due or any other form of financial distress. Kwok did not file this case when PAX won summary judgment in its claim for over \\$116 million in February of 2021. He continued to spend millions of dollars litigating against PAX (and others). He did it to prevent the consequences of a contempt sanction (including potential imprisonment) for failing to bring the Lady May back to New York per Justice Ostrager's orders in the New York Action. Justice Ostrager's order required either Kwok or the \"registered owner\" of the Lady May to transfer the yacht to New York or else face consequences. We know from this case that they always could do that—because they did. And, Kwok states in his that he intends to satisfy the claims of his legitimate creditors in the future.\n\n3. Although no one disputes any more that cause exists for dismissal of this case under\n\nsection 1112 of the Bankruptcy Code, the Debtor's bad faith in filing this chapter 11 case confirms that dismissal is the right remedy. Kwok was clear he filed this case to evade a contempt order. And equally clear he wanted to re-litigate the merits of PAX's massive judgments against him. Kwok made extensive misrepresentations to the court in his schedules and other filings and the bogus DIP loan and proposals, which, as PAX noted from the outset was either a poisoned gift or a sham. And finally, when it became clear the Debtor could not gain tactical advantages from the bankruptcy court, the Debtor abruptly pulled the plug on his own case, blaming PAX (unsurprisingly), but also confirming that this chapter 11 case was never about an orderly liquidation or ensuring equal treatment for creditors. This case was always about PAX and Kwok's continued efforts to hinder, delay, and defraud PAX in collecting on its judgment.\n\n4. Moreover, an examiner and trustee are not good alternatives in light of the current circumstances and lack of funding. Counsel for the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the \"Committee\") tacitly acknowledges that the withdrawal of the Debtor's putative DIP loan makes it impossible for the case to continue in its current posture.<sup>3</sup> That is true, but notwithstanding Committee counsel's suggestion to the contrary, this is not a new or surprising development. The DIP loan (and plan) were always charades. The loan withdrawal simply confirms what PAX has stated from the beginning: the supposed offer to fund the case was never a real offer and there is no economically rational way for the case to remain in the Bankruptcy Court, whether through a trustee or through conversion. Indeed, the absence of any reasonable, committed form of financing dooms any effort to keep the bankruptcy process going in any form.<sup>4</sup>\n\n<sup>3</sup> UCC Objection at 33, n. 16.\n\n<sup>4</sup> A trustee, whether in chapter 7 or chapter 11, could ultimately result in expensive contingency fees for recovery of debtor assets, effectively mortgaging creditor recoveries for the sole purpose of keeping this case in bankruptcy court. PAX's share of the costs of such a non-consensual arrangement would be orders of magnitude greater than the share of any other creditor.\n\nConversion or appointment of a trustee just passes these fatal problems to a new party. It does nothing to solve them.\n\n5. Failure to dismiss will leave the Debtor with access to another forum and the tools of the Bankruptcy Code to continue to frustrate his creditors while imposing tremendous costs that will overwhelmingly harm PAX. Other courts have already indicated that they are done with his antics. This Court should respond likewise.\n\n### **ARGUMENT**\n\n### **I. DISMISSAL**\n\n### **A. Objectors' Concerns That Pax Is Attempting to \"Jump the Line\" Are Unavailing.**\n\n6. The Objectors' principal justification for opposing dismissal is the assertion that PAX will take all of the available assets in a \"race to the courthouse\" outside of bankruptcy. But none of the Objectors provides a shred evidence to support this view other than an inflated estimate of the number and amount of outstanding non-PAX claims. PAX will show at trial with specificity that it has by far the largest non-contingent claim via its judgments, and that the remaining purported claims are either from insiders or are speculative and should not be relied upon to prejudice PAX.<sup>5</sup> The cases cited by the Objectors on this point, in particular those involving involuntary bankruptcies, are universally distinguishable because they each involved multiple creditors waiting to be paid. Here, Kwok's creditors—other than PAX and perhaps one other much\n\n<sup>5</sup> The non-PAX \"claims\" touted by the Committee appear dramatically overstated. Few, if any, are liquidated. There is no indication any judgments were imminent. To the contrary, many litigation claims are associated with cases that have already been dismissed or are inactive. *See, e.g.*, *Beijing Zhong Xian Wei Ye Stainless Decoration Center et al. v. Wengui Guo et al.*, Case No. 653176/2017 (N.Y. Sup. 2017), Dkt. No. 1, Summons and Complaint (seeking over \\$30,000,000) and Dkt. No. 69 (dismissing all causes of action*); Zheng Wu & Yang Lan v. Guo Wengui*, Index No. 152123/2018 (N.Y. Sup. 2018), Dkt. No. 1 (seeking \\$10,000,000) and Dkt. No. 46 (order for settlement mediation). As PAX will show, other claims have been long dormant. And, \\$22,000,000 in purported claims are scheduled as owed to the Debtor's insiders (including Golden Spring)—none of whom opposed dismissal.\n\nsmaller creditor—either have no current right to be paid or were not actively engaged in trying to collect.<sup>6</sup>\n\n7. PAX has been willing to litigate against Kwok to pursue full payment of amounts owed, but he simply has refused to pay. If Kwok's petition is to believed—listing \\$3,850 in assets—he has been equally as insolvent since February 2021, when the New York State Court issued a \\$116 million judgement in PAX's favor, as he was on the eve of his chapter 11 filing. The only possible explanation for the timing of the filing was to avoid incarceration if he failed to pay the more-than \\$130 million in contempt fines that were coming due, demonstrating that Kwok sought refuge in this Court from imprisonment, not because he truly lacked the ability to pay creditors or needed an orderly liquidation of contested assets.<sup>7</sup> The Debtor, who notably experienced no material change in financial circumstances whatsoever during the pendency of the case, all but admits this upon consenting to dismissal with the following parting words: \"Postdismissal, the Debtor intends to satisfy his legitimate debts.\"<sup>8</sup>\n\n8. Prior to the Petition Date, none of the Objectors attempted to file an involuntary bankruptcy.<sup>9</sup> Yet now the Objectors essentially want to commence a pseudo-involuntary\n\n<sup>6</sup> *See Schedule F: Creditors Who Have Unsecured Claims*, ECF 78, at 19–21.\n\n<sup>7</sup> *See* Final Contempt Order. Indeed, at least since January 2019, Kwok has denied having *any* assets to his name. *See* Friedman Reply Decl. Ex. 45, Kwok Deposition Transcript Excerpts, at 100–01, *Guo v. Guo*, Case No. 18-cv-01064-TSE-IDD (E.D. Va. January 23, 2019) (Kwok testifying that his \"net worth\" is \"[n]egative\" and that \"[i]n reality, under the law\" he has \"no\" assets). Yet he continued to pay virtually all other obligations and waited until 2022 to file the instant case.\n\n<sup>8</sup> *Debtor's Consent to Dismissal of Case*, ECF No. 344, at 4.\n\n<sup>9</sup> Relief in connection with an involuntary filing is only available where the \"debtor is generally not paying such debtor's debts as such debts become due unless such debts are the subject of a bona fide dispute as to liability or amount[.]\" 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1). Nowhere in the Kwok Declaration or in any other document is there any credible evidence of Kwok's failure to pay amounts due, other than in connection with his disputes with PAX and perhaps one other comparatively miniscule judgment creditor. Given his frequent use of professionals and other services, Kwok likely incurred and paid a substantial amount in obligations on a regular basis. *See*, *e.g.*, *Global Notes and Statements of Limitations, Methodology, and Disclaimers Regarding the Debtor's Schedules of Assets and Liabilities and Statement of Financial Affairs*, ECF 77, at 15, 21; *Supplement to the February 2022 Monthly Operating Report*, ECF 120-1.\n\nbankruptcy by contesting dismissal against the consent of the Debtor and upon the motion of PAX, which has more than \\$260 million in judgments against the Debtor.\n\n9. Courts have generally deferred to debtors that wish to dismiss the case even where creditors express concern that there is insufficient value to go around, with one court noting that \"it is beyond a bankruptcy court's powers to guarantee that the results that all creditors achieve outside of the bankruptcy court will be on a par with one another . . . If the bankruptcy court were required to give such guarantees, it could never dismiss a case under § 1112(b).\" *In re OptInRealBig.com, LLC*, 345 B.R. 277, 287 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2006). *See also In re Mazzocone*, 183 B.R. 402, 412–13 (Bankr. E.D.Pa. 1995), *aff'd*, 200 B.R. 568 (E.D.Pa. 1996) (holding that \"a creditor should not be permitted to prolong or sustain a case merely to take advantage of benefits bankruptcy offers to creditors.\"); *In re Hosp. Assocs. of Tappan Zee, Ltd.*, 102 B.R. 369, 370 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (giving weight to judgment of debtor in determining dismissal in best interest of the estate, notwithstanding creditor objection on grounds that debtor was unable to pay all creditors in full).<sup>10</sup>\n\n10. The Objectors paint PAX as attempting to \"jump the line\" and leave innocent creditors \"holding the bag.\" But *the Objectors* are trying to jump to the front of the line—the Objectors have no absolute right to recover alongside other creditors prior to obtaining a judgment on their claims. They want to improperly accelerate their claims to share in the fruits of PAX's labors, which involved the investment of millions of dollars in legal fees in enforcing its judgment.\n\n<sup>10</sup> The decision to dismiss a bankruptcy case under section 1112(b) of the Bankruptcy Code is a discretionary ruling, reviewed by appellate courts for abuse of discretion. *See Sterling v. 1279 St. John's Place, LLC (In re Sterling)*, 737 F. App'x 52, 53 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order) (\"Discretionary rulings of a bankruptcy court are reviewed for abuse of discretion.\"); *In re Taylor*, 97-CV-5967, 1997 WL 642559, at \\*1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 1997) (reviewing bankruptcy court's dismissal under abuse of discretion standard).\n\n11. Given Kwok's improper motives for filing this case and his abusive behavior during it, PAX should be entitled to exercise its rights under the priority scheme provided for under applicable nonbankruptcy law, which would typically involve a form of the \"first in time, first in right\" rule.<sup>11</sup> Though the Bankruptcy Code does allow unmatured debts to share with matured debts, this priority scheme is not anathema to the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code. For example, in a hypothetical world where PAX had obtained proceeds of Kwok's assets prior to the Petition Date, it would have had every right to keep them under applicable bankruptcy law.<sup>12</sup>\n\n12. Parties with only speculative or otherwise contingent claims should not be permitted to accelerate the maturity of their claims through a *sub silentio* involuntary bankruptcy, which would provide an inequitable enhancement of their underlying rights. By attempting to hijack the bankruptcy case, the Objectors conveniently avoid the safeguards and requirements of the Bankruptcy Code for involuntary filings and also contravene the temporal priority system set forth by Congress, state legislatures, and the common law. They become the parties decried in the case from which the UCC Objection so heavily quotes, using this case as \"a debt collection remedy that is more potent in bankruptcy than the equivalent right under nonbankruptcy law.\"<sup>13</sup> If the Objectors succeed, they would delay PAX's ability to execute on its statutorily prescribed right to collect its judgment, potentially for years, even though PAX provided the roadmap to Kwok's assets to all other creditors.<sup>14</sup> The Objectors should not benefit from Kwok's misconduct to the detriment of PAX.\n\n<sup>11</sup> *See, e.g.*, The Law of Debtors and Creditors § 6:46, Collection of Unsecured Debts. PAX is not obligated to prove that Kwok's empire offers future judgment creditors no risk of default. Any contingent creditor without a liquidated right to payment in the real world must take the risk until a judgment is obtained (assuming it ever is). <sup>12</sup> Even if obtained within the 90-day preference window, PAX would have a viable defense that receipt of value was not preferential where the Kwok can pay 100% of all claims—a preference action must show the transfer provides a better total distribution to the creditor in a hypothetical chapter 7 liquidation. *See* 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5). <sup>13</sup> *In re Murray*, 543 B.R. 484, 498 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016).\n\n<sup>14</sup> This further ignores the millions of dollars in postpetition, postjudgment interest that PAX would be entitled to during this time.\n\n13. In trying to defend their right to commandeer the Debtor's chapter 11 case notwithstanding other unsecured creditors' general lack of any *bona fide* right to payment, the UCC Objection likens Kwok's case to a mass tort case like *Purdue Pharma* or *LTL Management*. 15 It is an understatement to say these are far-fetched comparisons. A quick read through the \"first day declaration\" of any one of these cases, followed by comparison to the Kwok Declaration filed in this case, vividly highlights stark disparities: the mass tort bankruptcies reflect voluminous cases across myriad jurisdictions in which the same issues are tried repeatedly, leading to disparate, inefficient outcomes among creditors with similar claims harmed by the same debtor conduct. The Kwok Declaration, on the other hand, only briefly mentions the number of cases outstanding against him, none of which have any apparent common nucleus of fact that would lend itself to centralization, and contains no facts indicative of an inability to handle the litigation against him. Nor does the Kwok Declaration contain any account of judgment liens, attachment proceedings or other collection efforts.<sup>16</sup> With no evidence currently in the record (and with Kwok having consented to dismissal, no prospect of such evidence being introduced by the Debtor), it falls on the Objectors to come up with a factual basis for the Debtor be in bankruptcy notwithstanding his consent to dismissal. Yet they have provided nothing other than unfounded, conclusory statements about PAX \"jumping ahead\" of other creditors.\n\n## **B. Misuse of the Bankruptcy Code Is a Valid Independent Basis for Dismissal.**\n\n14. Contrary to the UCC Objection's assertions, misuse of the Bankruptcy Code is indeed an independent \"unenumerated cause\" for dismissal that goes back to the early years of the Bankruptcy Code. Though dismissal for an \"unenumerated cause\" in most cases means \"bad\n\n<sup>15</sup> UCC Objection at 15 (referring to \"Purdue Pharma [and] LTL Management [as among] the host of other chapter 11 cases that have been used to address unliquidated tort claims without successful challenge\"); 23 (citing *In re Purdue Pharma, L.P.*, 633 B.R. 53, 70 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2021)).\n\n<sup>16</sup> *See* Kwok Declaration at 14–19.\n\nfaith,\" it can by definition be any just cause, and courts have recognized \"misuse of the Bankruptcy Code\" as one such cause.<sup>17</sup> At least one prominent bankruptcy jurist, retired Judge Robert E. Gerber of the Southern District of New York, reserved \"bad faith\" for the most egregious cases (which would include this case), but still allowed for dismissal where the debtor's filing is improper but does not reach the standard for bad faith.<sup>18</sup> Here, the best description of the Debtor's efforts to circumvent the rule of law is his \"misuse of the bankruptcy code,\" and the Debtor's case should be dismissed on that basis even if his filing does not reach the level of \"bad faith\" (though, as set forth below and in the Dismissal Motion, it does).\n\n15. It is irrelevant that some of the cases cited in the Dismissal Motion on this point involved involuntary bankruptcies.<sup>19</sup> These cases interpreted section 1112, which is the same standard for dismissal for any chapter 11 case. Moreover, the UCC Objection is incorrect that the Dismissal Objection cites no other cases for this point, conveniently ignoring the citation to *In re Head*, which is the specific internal citation referred to in the Dismissal Motion's citation to the *Murray* case. *In re Head*, which was not an involuntary bankruptcy or a case was dismissed on \"bad faith\" grounds, was cited for the proposition that \"unenumerated cause\" included \"use of the Code for purposes other than those for which it was intended,\" which had been \"a repeating theme since the earliest days of the Code.\"<sup>20</sup> A cursory search of \"misuse\" of bankruptcy in any case law\n\n<sup>17</sup> *See, e.g.*, *In re Murray*, 900 F.3d 53, 60–61 (2d Cir. 2018) (\"We need not, however, classify misuse of the Bankruptcy Code as bad faith in order to accept it as cause to dismiss . . . .\"). *See also In re 347 Linden LLC*, Case No. 11-civ.-1990, 2011 Dist. LEXIS 78843, at \\*4 (E.D.N.Y. July 20, 2011) (\"The bankruptcy court may dismiss a Chapter 11 [petition] for any reason cognizable to the equity power and conscience of the court as constituting an abuse of the bankruptcy reorganization process.\") (internal citations omitted).\n\n<sup>18</sup> *See, e.g.*, *In re Century/ML Cable Venture*, 294 B.R. 9, 34–35, n. 41 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (J. Gerber); *In re Pleasant E. Assocs.*, 286 B.R. 509, 517 n.34 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002).\n\n<sup>19</sup> The UCC Objection responds to this \"unenumerated cause\" by veering off into the rationale for involuntary bankruptcy filings, which is entirely irrelevant. An involuntary filing ensures equal treatment among creditors *where the debtor cannot pay debts as they come due*. *See* 11 U.S.C. § 303(h). As noted above, there is no credible evidence this was ever the case.\n\n<sup>20</sup> *In re Murray*, 543 B.R. 484, 489 n.24 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016) (citing *In re Head*, 223 B.R. 648, 653–54 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1998)).\n\ndatabase would have found plenty of examples of cause for dismissal under section 1112 being described in exactly this way.<sup>21</sup>\n\n16. The Debtors' actions in the case have continued to exhibit the true purpose of the\n\nfiling, which is self-evidently an improper use of the Bankruptcy Code. For example:\n\n- the Debtor's family office offered to provide a subordinated DIP loan designed at first to exercise control over the case, later to provide funding for professional fees vastly disproportionate to the costs of the case, and designed to let the Debtor's family control the case;\n- the Debtor filed schedules that were replete with incomplete, false, and contradictory information;<sup>22</sup>\n- the Debtor filed a plan that on its face was infeasible that perpetuated the charade that the Lady May was not owned by the Debtor, despite an order from the New York Court to the contrary, and that conditioned creditors' access to the Lady May on the granting of extensive non-debtor releases for insiders, which would violate of the best interests of creditors test of section 1129(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code by stripping creditors of the value of avoidance or turnover actions—the main assets of the Debtor's estate;\n- the Debtor and his daughter cooked up an adversary proceeding in this Court to attack the New York Court's rulings regarding the Lady May (naming PAX as a defendant and forcing PAX to expend even more resources);\n- the Debtor served improper and irrelevant discovery requests on PAX, which attempted to relitigate various matters that were already established in the New\n\n<sup>21</sup> *See, e.g.*, *In re Kestel*, 99 F. 3d 146 (4th Cir. 1996) (\"Congress has made it clear within the Bankruptcy Code itself that *misuse of the bankruptcy process* should not be countenanced. [. . .] general phrases such as 'for cause' provide broad coverage for *unenumerated instances of misuse*.\") (emphasis added). *See also In re Brookdale Gardens Ass'n*, No. 09-41305 (NLW), 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1643, at \\*1 (Bankr. D.N.J. May 20, 2010) (noting debtor's \"misuse\" of chapter 11 and prior ruling that dismissal for cause under section 1112(b) would have been equally appropriate as dismissal of involuntary bankruptcy under section 305).\n\n<sup>22</sup> For example, Kwok omitted key assets from his financial disclosures and filed Monthly Operating Reports devoid of any meaningful detail. *See* Dismissal Motion ¶ 30; *see generally Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.'s Response in Opposition to Debtor's Motion to Extend Time to File Schedules of Assets and Liabilities and Statements of Financial Affairs*, ECF 50; Examiner/Trustee Motion at 1–19; *Monthly Operating Report (Period Ending February 28, 2022)*, ECF 120; *Monthly Operating Report (Period Ending March 31, 2022)*, ECF 242. Additionally, Kwok stated under penalty of perjury on March 9, 2022, that he had not paid or agreed to pay anyone \"who is NOT an attorney to help [him] fill out bankruptcy forms.\" *Official Form 106Dec*, ECF 79. But the Debtor's own application to retain Verdolino & Lowey, P.C. (\"V&L\") sought an order \"authorizing him to retain and employ V&L, *as of March 3, 2022*\" to conduct work on, among other things, \"the Statement of Financial Affairs and the Schedules\"—which were filed on March 9, 2022. *Debtor's Application for Authorization to Retain and Employ Verdolino & Lowey, P.C. as Financial Advisors*, ECF 90, at 2–3 (emphasis added). Kwok continually states whatever he thinks suits him best, even in statements to the Court under penalty of perjury.\n\nYork Action and removed the New York Action to attack the validity of Justice Ostrager's rulings and undermine them; and\n\n the Debtor abruptly consented to dismissal of this chapter 11 case,<sup>23</sup> having achieved nothing other than hindering and delaying PAX's recoveries and causing creditors to incur substantial professional fees.\n\n17. Thus, Kwok has only ever been interested in getting one more bite at the proverbial apple in its quest to delay PAX in collecting its judgment and to undermine the New York Court's orders. This is clear misuse of the bankruptcy system.\n\n18. The Objectors suggest that the Debtor's behavior can be ignored because the Final Contempt Order issued by the New York Court is now moot. Not so; the Final Contempt Order is for the payment of the \\$134 million fine that must be paid to PAX, not merely the return of the boat.<sup>24</sup> It is not for the Objectors to say whether the Debtor has somehow fulfilled his obligation to the rule of law—the boat has not yet been delivered and the Debtor has still not paid the fine imposed.\n\n19. As a proper use of bankruptcy, the Objectors point to the Debtor's stated goal of providing a centralized forum for resolving disputes over the Debtor's property.<sup>25</sup> Kwok filed his petition to centralize exactly one dispute: his dispute with PAX. That is the only case on which he sought a removal petition—none of his other cases were brought to the Bankruptcy Court, even though the PAX case made the least sense to remove because it was already post-judgment.<sup>26</sup> Additionally, Kwok promised to make creditors whole (betraying the fact that he controlled the assets to do so)<sup>27</sup> and did not oppose creditor Rui Ma's motion to lift the automatic stay to go back\n\n<sup>23</sup> *See Debtor's Consent to Dismissal of Case*, ECF No. 344.\n\n<sup>24</sup> *See* Ex. 39. The fine continues to accrue if the Lady May has still not been returned by a date certain. *See id.* at 2. <sup>25</sup> *See* UCC Objection at 3; Rui Ma Group Objection at 23.\n\n<sup>26</sup> *See* Ex. 1; Friedman Reply Decl., Ex. 44, Notice of Removal, *PAX v. Kwok*, Index No. 652077/2017, (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), Dkt. No. 1195 (March 15, 2022).\n\n<sup>27</sup> *See, e.g.*, Dismissal Motion at 26, n. 107.\n\nto state court to prosecute that case—a telling choice.<sup>28</sup> Kwok brought this case to avoid the New York Court and for no other reason.\n\n20. In arguing that the Debtor is not misusing the bankruptcy system, the UCC Objection contests the claim that the bankruptcy allows Kwok \"to perpetuate his ongoing shell game before this Court,\" saying it is \"mystifying and, more to the point, simply not accurate.\"<sup>29</sup> Although a chapter 11 case can allow for an investigation, that ground has already been covered in the New York Court (i.e., Justice Ostrager's court). Continuing this chapter 11 case will make PAX go through the same thing again. There are surely various additional ways for Kwok to continue to hide his assets. With the benefit of the automatic stay, and Kwok's right to participate in a bankruptcy proceeding as a party in interest (even if displaced as a debtor in possession), Kwok can create all kinds of mischief.\n\n### **C. The Debtor's Bad Faith Requires Dismissal.**\n\n21. The Objectors argue that the \"desire to invoke the stay itself [to evade contempt] is not sufficient\" for dismissal \"for bad faith.\"<sup>30</sup> But the very case quotation cited for this proposition indicates that the debtor \"must intend to obtain the benefit of the automatic stay for an improper purpose . . . .\"<sup>31</sup> Here, as explained above, Kwok's purpose was to evade a court order designed to ensure the dignity of law and order and the court system, which is improper and has nothing to do with equality of treatment of creditors.\n\n22. In arguing that the Debtor did not have subjective bad faith in filing this case, the UCC Objection claims that the contempt claim payable to PAX can be equitably subordinated.\n\n<sup>28</sup> *See Motion of Rui Ma for Relief from the Automatic Stay to Allow Pending State Court Litigation to Proceed*, ECF 206; *Notice of Contested Matter Response Date*, ECF 206-3 (setting an April 26, 2022 response date). <sup>29</sup> UCC Objection at 15.\n\n<sup>30</sup> *Id.* at 17.\n\n<sup>31</sup> UCC Objection at 17 (quoting *In re Soundview Elite, Ltd.*, 503 B.R. 571, 580 n. 18 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014)).\n\nBut this argument is irrelevant—the availability of equitable subordination does not somehow cure the bankruptcy filing as the court considers \"cause\" under Bankruptcy Code section 1112. Moreover, it is simply incorrect. Courts within the Second Circuit require inequitable conduct by the creditor to subordinate the claim,<sup>32</sup> none of which has even been alleged of PAX here. The rationale for no-fault equitable subordination of penalty claims is inapplicable here subordination would be perverse where the claim involves an affront to the dignity of the judicial system rather than an ordinary punitive claim.<sup>33</sup> And finally, any discussion of subordination is premature where no creditor even has an allowed claim yet.\n\n23. The UCC Objection cites to *In re Meier* to suggest that the Court should ignore the Debtor's purpose for filing and behavior in the chapter 11 case, stating that the key test for whether a case should be dismissed for bad faith is \"whether the debtor has proposed or can propose a legally and economically feasible plan of reorganization or whether the case and possible plan can otherwise serve a valid reorganization purpose.\"<sup>34</sup>\n\n24. *Meier*'s facts are distinguishable, and Kwok's case easily meets its standard for dismissal. *Meier* involved a true reorganization where a clear purpose was served by keeping the case going: the court found that the debtor would provide more to creditors through a chapter 11\n\n<sup>32</sup> *See Kelleran v. Andrijevic*, 825 F.2d 692, 697 (2d Cir. 1987) (\"Under the doctrine of equitable subordination, for instance, a bankruptcy court may subordinate a particular claim if it finds that the creditor's claim, while not lacking a lawful basis nonetheless results from inequitable behavior on the part of that creditor.\"); *see also Harris v. I.R.S.*, 82 A.F.T.R.2d 98-5931 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y.) (\"The court holds that before it can equitably subordinate a claim there must be some proof of the creditor's inequitable behavior since the Second Circuit's determination on that point has not been overturned*.\"); In re Rockville Orthopedic Assocs*., P.C., 377 B.R. 438, 445 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2007) (\"The court concludes that the conduct complained of does not constitute the \"inequitable conduct\" necessary to support a claim for equitable subordination\"); *In re Mr. R's Prepared Foods, Inc.*, 251 B.R. 24, 29 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2000) (requiring inequitable conduct).\n\n<sup>33</sup> The Objectors cite to no case in which no-fault equitable subordination has ever been applied to such a claim. <sup>34</sup> UCC Objection at 17–18.\n\nplan, which was not a liquidation like the case here.<sup>35</sup> Unlike *Meier*, there is no \"reorganizational purpose\" here, as there is nothing to reorganize and there is no apparent financial distress.\n\n25. Additionally, confirmation of a plan here is practically impossible, unlike *Meier*. There is no committed plan funding in light of the Debtor's withdrawal of the proposed DIP financing while the estate is burdened with large professional fee expenses as well as an impending claim by PAX for substantial contribution for its efforts to obtain return of the Lady May. PAX holds a large non-dischargeable claim,<sup>36</sup> making any plan likely infeasible on its face if the Objector's view of the Debtor's ability to satisfy debts is to be believed.<sup>37</sup> And contrary to the Objectors' arguments, confirmation would be impossible without the consent of PAX. The separate classification of PAX proposed in the UCC Objection for cram-down purposes would be a blatant instance of gerrymandering that is universally prohibited in the case law.<sup>38</sup> Indeed, a case on all fours with the case here held exactly that.<sup>39</sup> To the extent materially disparate treatment is afforded to PAX, it would also be a clear instance of unfair discrimination.<sup>40</sup> The only instances of permissible separate classification and/or disparate treatment of this sort are cases of trade\n\n36 As noted on the record and in various pleadings submitted to the Court, PAX intends to submit a nondischargeability complaint on account of its contempt claim, the nature of which courts have held is nondischargeable as a matter of law on multiple grounds. *See, e.g.*, *Buffalo Gyn Womenservices, Inc. v. Behn (In re Behn)*, 242 B.R. 229, 237-40 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1999); *In re Marini*, 28 B.R. 262, 265 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983). <sup>37</sup> *In re Hamilton*, 803 F. App'x 123, 125 (9th Cir. 2020) (denying confirmation where large non-dischargeable judgment and interest thereon made proposed plan infeasible under section 1129(a)(11)).\n\n<sup>35</sup> *In re Meier*, Bankr. No. 14-bk-10105, 2014 WL 5426763 at \\*5 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2014) (no bad faith where bankruptcy filing \"appear[ed] to have a proper reorganizational purpose\").\n\n<sup>38</sup> *See, e.g.*, *In re Bos. Post Rd. Ltd. P'ship*, 154 B.R. 617, 622 (D. Conn. 1993) (collecting cases); *In re One Times Square Assoc. Ltd. P'ship*, 165 B.R. 773, 776 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (\"[S]ubstantially similar claims [must] be classified together unless there exists some reason, other than gerrymandering, for separating them.\").\n\n<sup>39</sup> *See In re Save Our Springs (S.O.S.) Alliance, Inc.*, 388 B.R. 202, 233 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2008), *aff'd*, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121177 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2009), *aff'd sub nom. Save Our Springs Alliance, Inc. v. WSI (II)-COS, L.L.C.*, 632 F.3d 168 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that judgment creditor's claim could not be separately classified from other general unsecured claims where creditor would have controlled the voting outcome given the size of its claim and there was no business justification for the separation).\n\n<sup>40</sup> *See In re Johns-Manville Corp.*, 68 B.R. 618, 636 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986), *aff'd sub nom. In re Johns-Manville Corp.*, 78 B.R. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), *aff'd sub nom. Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp.*, 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that \"a plan proponent may not segregate two similar claims or groups of claims into separate classes and provide disparate treatment for those classes\" under section 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code governing cram-down).\n\ncreditors or other types of general unsecured creditors that have some business value to the reorganized debtor.<sup>41</sup> Here no such rationale is possible given Kwok has no business and is not reorganizing. The idea that the major non-insider creditor (by a large margin, even taking into account the hyperbolic accounting of unsecured creditors in the UCC Objection) could be disenfranchised for no reasonable purpose is absurd on its face. The Debtor's lack of prospects to confirm any chapter 11 plan not only establishes objective futility, but it also provides a factor indicative of subjective bad faith. *Sapphire Dev., LLC v. McKay*, 549 B.R. 556, 557 (D. Conn. 2016) (stating that \"the objectively assessed chances of the debtor's emerging from bankruptcy may provide one indication of the debtor's subjective intent in filing for bankruptcy protection\").\n\n26. In discussing the *C-TC* and *Syndicom* factors for subjective bad faith, the Objections focus on one or two factors—whether there is a single asset or whether the bankruptcy filing is an outgrowth of a two-party dispute, ignoring the fact that nearly all of the factors militate in favor of a bad faith finding, as set forth in the Dismissal Motion. PAX can stipulate it believes the Debtor has more than one asset<sup>42</sup> and more than one creditor (in fact PAX has stated as much many times)—these facts are relatively meaningless in the scheme of the factors. Of course, courts are in no way limited to dismissing single-asset real estate cases for bad faith. Although true that there are other contingent litigation claimants, virtually none of those cases have been reduced to judgment, there is no evidence any are imminently to be reduced to judgment and, most importantly, none of them have caused Kwok any financial distress, which is the reason behind the \"two-party dispute\" factor, i.e., that the *financial condition* of the debtor is the result of a two-\n\n<sup>41</sup> *See, e.g.*, *In re Aegerion Pharm.*, 605 B.R. 22, 31–32 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019).\n\n<sup>42</sup> Contrary to the UCC Objection's bizarre attempt to ascribe to PAX the notion that the Debtor has a single asset, *see* UCC Objection at 27, PAX's Dismissal Motion indicated the opposite, but noted that dismissal was also warranted based on the facts put forth *by the Debtor* in the Kwok Declaration to justify his chapter 11 filing *i.e.*, that he had little to no assets. *See, e.g.*, Dismissal Motion 31 (stating that \"*Kwok* asserts\" that he only has limited assets) (emphasis added).\n\nparty dispute.<sup>43</sup> No other creditor other than PAX has had any remotely material impact on the Debtor's financial condition—as noted in the Dismissal Motion and elsewhere herein, the Court can readily conclude that the Debtor's bankruptcy filing was a result of PAX and PAX alone.\n\n27. Contrary to the UCC Objection's selective quotations from the case law, a debtor's purpose in filing need not have been *solely* to relitigate prior judgment for such to be a reason to dismiss for bad faith.<sup>44</sup> First, any debtor can feign one purpose when its true primary purpose is obviously another—as noted herein and in the Dismissal Motion, relitigating PAX's judgments, trying to stay out of jail and trying to obtain leverage over PAX really *were* the primary purposes of the Debtor's filing. Second, the UCC Objection incorrectly frames the intent to re-litigate as a matter of the \"bad faith\" inquiry, but it is equally relevant to other \"unenumerated causes\" as bases for dismissal, such as misuse of the bankruptcy system, which is a far more open ended standard in the discretion of the Court.<sup>45</sup>\n\n28. The UCC Objection also cavalierly suggests that the re-litigation can be \"easily\" avoided by relying on preclusion principles, which ignores the great burden already imposed on PAX in this case, not least by improper discovery requests and various other proceedings.<sup>46</sup> Of\n\n<sup>45</sup> *See supra* note 17.\n\n<sup>46</sup> UCC Objection at 25.\n\n*<sup>43</sup> C-TC 9th Ave. P'ship v. Norton Co. (In re C-TC 9th Ave. P-Ship)*, 113 F.3d 1304, 1311 (2d Cir. 1997) (considering whether \"the debtor's *financial condition*\" is a result of a \"two-party dispute\") (emphasis added). *See also In re Syndicom Corp.*, 268 B.R. 26, 52–53 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001) (considering whether other creditors not party to the two-party dispute were causing financial distress). Notably, these factors presume that a case can be dismissed where there are other creditors that could have to wait for judgment outside of bankruptcy. <sup>44</sup> In the seminal *C-TC* case, the Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the lower courts' dismissal of a case where the \"*main* purpose\" was to relitigate. *In re C-TC 9th Ave. P-Ship*, 113 F.3d 1304, 1311 (2d Cir. 1997) (emphasis added). The UCC Objection cites to *In re Slettleland*, 260 B.R. 657, 661-62 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001) and *In re Cohoes Industrial Terminal, Inc.*, 931 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1991) for the proposition that any intent to reorganize, however minimal, is sufficient to save a filing otherwise filed in bad faith. But these cases stand for no such thing. They clearly say that each debtor must have at least \"*some* intent\" as a *minimum* condition for a case to have been properly filed. *In re Cohoes Indus. Terminal*, 931 F.2d 222, 228 (2d Cir. 1991) (emphasis added). Each of the cases cited by the Objectors require an intent to reorganize, something Kwok does not (and cannot) have here, given there is no business to do so. Even if the mere possibility of an orderly liquidation could somehow qualify as \"intent,\" that cannot cure the filing.\n\ncourse, no Objector cites any case in which a court has declined to dismiss a case filed in bad faith simply because a creditor had other legal protections against re-litigation.\n\n29. In discussing the *Rent-A-Wreck* decision, the UCC Objection severely misstates the argument of the Dismissal Motion.<sup>47</sup> PAX does not dismiss the idea that there are theoretical cases in which a \"centralization\" could provide value to a debtor's estate—indeed, in the very next sentence after citing the *Rent-A-Wreck* case, the Dismissal Motion states exactly that. But PAX has demonstrated that no such value is created by remaining in bankruptcy here, as required by the principle expressed in *Rent-A-Wreck*. PAX vehemently disagrees with the UCC Objection's statement that the *Rent-A-Wreck* principle \"has nothing to do with this case\" because remaining in bankruptcy should never be value destructive as it would be here.<sup>48</sup>\n\n30. Finally, as a general matter, the Objectors completely disregard the mountain of cases (many cited in the Dismissal Motion or in other pleadings filed in this case) in which similar cases were dismissed under Bankruptcy Code section 1112 for the debtor's bad faith. *See, e.g.*, *In re D&G Constr. Dean Gonzalez, LLC*, 635 B.R. 232, 240 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2021) (dismissing case where bankruptcy process is used \"merely as a platform to delay the lawful exercise of state law rights and attack final orders of other courts. . . .\"); *In re Mutty*, No. 04-10634, 2004 WL 2647705, at \\*7 (Bankr. D. Vt. Nov. 19, 2004) (dismissing case for failure to file accurate schedules with good faith and candor); *In re Wally Findlay Galleries (New York) Inc.*, 36 B.R. 849, 851 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 1984) (dismissing case where case was filed immediately after an adverse ruling in the underlying litigation in attempt to avoid the consequences of that ruling).<sup>49</sup>\n\n<sup>47</sup> *See* UCC Objection at 18–19; Dismissal Motion at 25–26 (citing *In re Rent-A-Wreck of America, Inc.*, 580 B.R. 364, 373 (Bankr. D. Del. 2018)).\n\n<sup>48</sup> UCC Objection at 19.\n\n<sup>49</sup> The UCC Objection fails to distinguish the *Wally Findlay Galleries* case in arguing that \"there was no suggestion that there were any creditors other than\" the two creditors in the case. UCC Objection at 20, n. 9. The lack of any indication of other creditors resulted from that fact's *complete irrelevance*. It is to absurd to suggest that an operating business in chapter 11 would have *only* those two creditors, or that a bad faith filing only results when if\n\n*See also In re Reg 'l Evangelical All. of Churches, Inc.*, 592 B.R. 375, 389 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2018) (holding that where bankruptcy was essentially an attempt to thwart a creditor's recovery in statecourt litigation dismissal is in the best interests of creditors and the estate because it allowed creditor to \"seek the remedy to which it was entitled\" under applicable nonbankruptcy law \"without having to litigate the bankruptcy roadblocks which Debtor would erect if this case were not dismissed.\").\n\n31. For their part, the Objections offer no case remotely similar to Kwok's in which a court chose not to dismiss a case.\n\n## **D. The Debtor's Estate Continues to Suffer Substantial/Continuing Loss, Requiring Dismissal Under Section 1112(b)(4)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code.**\n\n32. The Objectors appear to only superficially dispute that that Kwok operates at a substantial and continual loss—no Objector provides any evidence that Kwok's estate is in stasis or increasing. PAX's hope is to prove that Kwok owns at least the Lady May (a depreciating, floating asset) and an apartment at the Sherry Netherland, which was purchased for \\$67.5 million but has been publicly listed for sale at \\$38.5 million.<sup>50</sup>\n\n33. Principally, this cause for dismissal was made more salient due to Kwok's false and misleading disclosures that he had no income or assets, but even without crediting the Debtor's misrepresentations, Kwok necessarily incurs expenses and any income at present is funneled outside of the estate within his empire of shell companies and sham family transactions.<sup>51</sup> While\n\nthe debtor intends to stymie *all* creditors with a judgment. Dismissal occurs when the motive is to avoid a state court judgment, which each of the mentioned creditors had obtained.\n\n<sup>50</sup> The StreetEasy listing for the Sherry-Netherland residence is attached to the Friedman Reply Decl. as Ex. 46. <sup>51</sup> The Objectors are incorrect in arguing that accrual of administrative expenses such as professional fees does not constitute continuing loss. *See Loop Corp. v. United States Trustee*, 379 F.3d 511, 516 (3d Cir. 2004) (\"In the context of a debtor who has ceased business operations and liquidated virtually all of its assets, any negative cash flow—including that resulting only from administrative expenses—[. . .] is enough to satisfy the first element of § [1112(b)(4)(A)].\" (citations omitted)); *In re Sakon*, 617 B.R. 7, 15 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2020) (where the estate has no hope of rehabilitation, no value to preserve in an operating business, and minimal income, \"[t]he losses need not\n\ncreditors may be entitled to the fruits of those assets, the income is not clearly accruing to the estate at present, and Kwok cannot be allowed to hide those assets and income and yet still claim that his estate is benefitting from the chapter 11 case. In Kwok's world, he incurs all the expenses whereas any benefit to the estate's assets accrues to non-debtor family and affiliates.\n\n## **E. The Debtor's Gross Mismanagement of the Estate Requires Dismissal Under Section 1112(b)(4)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code.**\n\n34. The Objectors argue that PAX is focused on only prepetition instances of mismanagement, but PAX does not focus on prepetition conduct at all in the Dismissal Motion everything PAX discussed, including Kwok's *continued* refusal to move the Lady May—occurred postpetition.<sup>52</sup> Aside from the Lady May, the Dismissal Motion noted misrepresentations to the court and continued failure to marshal other assets for the benefit of creditors during the pendency of the case, each of which were occurring after the Petition Date. But gross mismanagement is not at all limited to \"ineptitude\" as the UCC Objection suggests by citing to a non-binding South Florida case. Gross mismanagement, as set forth in the Dismissal Motion, is about acting as a fiduciary, where Kwok has demonstrably failed.<sup>53</sup> Indeed, it is clear that Kwok's use of resources is entirely for his own benefit and that of his family and shell entities, not for the benefit of creditors, as required of a fiduciary of the estate.\n\n# **F. Section 1112(b)(2)'s Unusual Circumstances Exception Does Not Justify Non-Dismissal.**\n\n35. The Objectors argue that \"unusual circumstances\" preclude dismissal.<sup>54</sup> This case is \"unusual\", but the fact that it is not run-of-the-mill does not shield it from dismissal. First,\n\nbe large—'[a]ll that need be found is that the estate is suffering some diminution in value.'\" (quoting *In re Taub*, 427 B.R. 208, 231 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2010)).\n\n<sup>52</sup> The Dismissal Motion also covered cause for appointment of the trustee, in which case mismanagement is a factor that considers both prepetition and postpetition conduct.\n\n<sup>53</sup> *See* Dismissal Motion at 36–38.\n\n<sup>54</sup> UCC Objection at 9.\n\nsection 1112(b)(2) this provision is expressly not applicable to cause for dismissal where there is substantial and continuing loss under section 1112(b)(4)(A). Second, the provision requires a reasonable likelihood that a plan could be confirmed in a reasonable time, which, as set forth above, is a practical impossibility given the lack of funding and the requirement of PAX's consent. Third, section 1112(b)(2) requires that there be \"reasonable justification\" for Kwok's *behavior* that serves as the basis for dismissal, which would include his bad faith. The UCC Objection completely misreads the statute to mean that the filing itself must have a justification, pointing to preventing PAX from collecting on its judgment as the justification. But the filing itself is not what must be justified—it is the bad acts themselves that give rise to the bad faith.<sup>55</sup> The Objectors concede the behavior has been contemptible and provide no justification for it. Finally, as noted above, the Final Contempt Order has not been mooted, contrary to the claims of the Objectors.\n\n### **II. EXAMINER**\n\n36. Although an examiner never made sense for the reasons PAX previously articulated in the its objection to the Examiner/Trustee Motion, without funding to pay an examiner, invoking section 1104 for an examiner should be off the table. Based on the current motions before the Court, dismissal, conversion, or appointment of a trustee are the only options, and dismissal is far and away the best option for all stakeholders.\n\n## **III. TRUSTEE**\n\n37. If the Court does not dismiss the case, then a trustee must be appointed. Justice Ostrager's opinions in the New York Action demonstrate Kwok's wrongful behavior, and the intense acrimony among the parties is evident from the record. Conflicts among Kwok and his\n\n<sup>55</sup> *See* 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(2)(B) (providing unusual circumstances exception where, inter alia, the grounds for converting or dismissing the case include an act or omission of the debtor . . . for which there exists a reasonable justification *for the act or omission*\") (emphasis added).\n\naffiliates' counsel are rife,<sup>56</sup> and Kwok has disclaimed any interest in playing a role as a chapter 11 fiduciary. The UCC Objection's argument against a trustee is based on the existence of DIP financing and in reliance on Kwok's representation that his family would come to the rescue to build consensus. Neither of these is on the table. Of course, appointing a trustee will not resolve the lack of funding that has doomed this case as originally envisioned by the Debtor and the Committee. Indeed, if contingency counsel is required by a trustee for funding purposes, its fees alone may outweigh the entirety of allowed claims other than PAX. Hence, as PAX will more fully address in its forthcoming pleading, dismissal is the correct remedy.\n\nDated: May 18, 2022 New York, New York\n\n## **Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.**\n\n*By: /s/ Patrick M. Birney* Patrick M. Birney (CT No. 19875) Annecca H. Smith (CT No. 31148) **ROBINSON & COLE LLP**  280 Trumbull Street Hartford, CT 06103 Telephone: (860) 275-8275 Facsimile: (860) 275-8299 E-mail: pbirney@rc.com asmith@rc.com\n\n-and-\n\nPeter Friedman Stuart M. Sarnoff **O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP**  Seven Times Square New York, NY 10036 Telephone: (212) 326-2000 Facsimile: (212) 326-2061 Email: pfriedman@omm.com ssarnoff@omm.com\n\n<sup>56</sup> *See Complaint for Declaratory Relief*, ECF No. 204, *HK Int'l Funds Invs. (USA) Ltd., LLC v. Kwok* (April 11, 2022).\n\n# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI hereby certify that on May 18, 2022, a copy of the foregoing was filed electronically through the Court's CM/ECF System. Notice of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties receiving notice by operation of the court's electronic filing system. Parties in interest may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF System.\n\n /s/ *Patrick M. Birney*  Patrick M. Birney","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院布里奇波特分部\n\n关于：\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）1\n\n第11章案件编号\n\n22-50073 (JAM)\n\n债务人。\n\nMay 18, 2022\n\nPACIFIC ALLIANCE ASIA OPPORTUNITY FUND L.P.（太盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙企业）支持驳回第11章案件动议，或作为备选方案部分加入美国受托人请求裁定指派第11章受托人动议的综合答复\n\nPacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（“PAX”）谨提交本答复（“答复”），以支持其《驳回第11章案件动议，或作为备选方案部分加入美国受托人请求裁定指派第11章受托人动议》，ECF No. 183（“驳回动议”）2，并答复若干当事人（“异议方”）就驳回动议（统称“异议”）提出的异议，包括《无担保债权人官方委员会反对Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.驳回第11章案件动议，或作为备选方案部分加入美国受托人请求裁定指派第11章受托人动议的意见》，ECF No. 346（“UCC异议”）、《债权人Rui Ma（马睿）、Zheng Wu（吴征）及Weican Meng（孟卫灿）反对Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.提出的驳回本案动议，或作为备选方案指派受托人动议的意见》，ECF No. 347（“Rui Ma集团异议”）\n\n1 债务人纳税人识别号的后四位数字为9595。\n\n2 PAX在提交驳回动议的同时，对《美国受托人请求裁定指派审查员，或作为备选方案请求裁定指派第11章受托人动议》，ECF No. 102（“审查员/受托人动议”）提出了有限异议。本文所用但未定义的首字母大写术语，具有驳回动议中规定的含义。对证据1至43的引用均附于Friedman声明。所有其他证据引用均指随本文件同时提交的、支持PAX驳回动议的Peter Friedman（彼得·弗里德曼）进一步声明（“Friedman答复声明”）所附证据。\n\n以及债权人Logan Cheng（程龙）反对Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.驳回第11章案件动议的意见，ECF No. 348（“Cheng异议”）。\n\n初步陈述\n\n1. 尽管债务人滥用破产程序并人为设计第11章申报，异议方仍坚持本虚假案件必须为其所谓利益而继续进行。不存在可重组的业务，除PAX的债权外几乎没有任何已确定债权，也没有直接方式（或任何可能具有成本效益的方式）为案件提供资金，因此没有任何可辩护理由为郭文贵延长本案；他绝非那种俗称的“诚实但不幸的债务人”。由于异议方希望将PAX的追偿努力转化为其自身的获偿机会而继续本案，是一种浪费性的替代方案；各方可以轻易恢复至申请破产前的全部权利和救济，而无需使破产财产承担不断增加的管理费用，亦无需不公平地使PAX处于不利地位。尤其应强调的是，PAX拥有超过$260 million的判决。除极少数其他已确定债权外，债务人其余所谓利益相关方要么是内部人，要么是尚未取得判决、且即使最终成为债权人也可能需经数年的诉讼请求人。而且，这并非一宗大规模侵权或产品案件，在此类案件中，既往情况可预示诉讼请求人的结果，或几乎所有未确定债权均具有共同事实核心。未确定债权来自主张不同损害的不同原告。\n\n2. 此外，强迫本案继续进行的论点在法律和事实层面均属错误。首先，异议方抱怨称，如郭文贵的第11章案件被驳回——理应如此——其将恢复至现状，即其推测性债权将无法获得清偿，且其及其他债权人须待PAX获得清偿后方能就任何债权进行追偿。这并不完全准确——如针对郭文贵的其他请求人享有破产程序之外的权利，则该等权利未必从属于PAX的权利。其权利为何即为何。而且，无论如何，恢复申请破产前的现状并非给予PAX的意外利益，也不损害异议方可能享有的任何权利。PAX因郭文贵未履行其个人担保，已等待近7年向其追偿。异议方希望利用破产程序，以便分享PAX历经数年的追偿努力，并延迟PAX获得清偿。因此，如异议方成功，则在本案中插队的将是他们，而非PAX；PAX将被迫等待更久，直至其他请求人证明其债权，方能实现任何全面追偿。其次，在UCC异议中，与PAX“竞争”郭文贵资产的债权数量被严重夸大。实际上，除PAX外，绝大多数主张的债权要么是内部人债权（例如列入Golden Spring（戈尔登斯普林）和Lamp Capital（兰普资本）名下的各$22 million债权，两者均拒绝就其所谓债权提供任何文件），要么是微不足道的债权、尚未经证明的诉讼债权，或源于已被驳回或处于停滞状态的诉讼的债权。第三，郭文贵提交本案并非因为其无力在债务到期时偿付，或因任何其他形式的财务困境。郭文贵并未在PAX于February of 2021就其超过$116 million的债权获得简易判决时提交本案。他继续花费数百万美元与PAX（及其他方）进行诉讼。他这样做是为避免因未能依Ostrager法官在纽约案件中的命令将Lady May带回纽约而受到藐视法庭制裁（包括可能被监禁）的后果。Ostrager法官的命令要求郭文贵或Lady May的“登记所有人”将该游艇转移至纽约，否则将面临后果。我们从本案得知，他们一直能够这样做——因为他们确实这样做了。而且，郭文贵在其陈述中称，他意图在未来清偿其合法债权人的债权。\n\n3. 尽管现已无人再争议根据《破产法典》第1112条存在驳回本案的事由，债务人以恶意提交本第11章案件进一步确认驳回是适当的救济。郭文贵明确表示，他提交本案是为规避一项藐视法庭命令。同样明确的是，他希望重新就PAX针对其作出的巨额判决的是非进行诉讼。郭文贵在其清单及其他提交文件中作出广泛失实陈述，并就虚假的DIP贷款及方案作出失实陈述；如PAX从一开始即指出的，该等贷款及方案要么是有害的馈赠，要么是一场骗局。最后，当债务人显然无法从破产法院获得策略性优势时，债务人突然终止其自身案件，将责任归咎于PAX（不足为奇），但也确认本第11章案件从来不是为了有序清算或确保债权人得到平等对待。本案一直关乎PAX以及郭文贵持续阻挠、拖延并欺诈PAX执行其判决的努力。\n\n4. 此外，鉴于目前情形及缺乏资金，审查员和受托人并非良好替代方案。无担保债权人官方委员会（“委员会”）的律师默示承认，撤回债务人所谓的DIP贷款，使本案无法以当前状态继续进行。3 这一点属实，但尽管委员会律师作出相反暗示，这并非新的或令人意外的发展。DIP贷款（及方案）始终是骗局。撤回贷款仅确认PAX从一开始即已陈述的内容：所谓为本案提供资金的提议从来不是真正的提议，而且无论通过受托人还是通过转换程序，本案均不存在任何经济上合理的方式继续留在破产法院。事实上，缺乏任何合理且已承诺的融资形式，注定任何以任何形式维持破产程序的努力都将失败。4\n\n3 UCC异议第33页，注16。\n\n4 无论是第7章还是第11章受托人，最终均可能导致为追收债务人资产支付高额风险代理费，实际上为仅仅将本案留在破产法院这一目的而抵押债权人的追偿款。PAX在此类非经同意安排中分担的成本，将比任何其他债权人的分担额高出数个数量级。\n\n转换程序或指派受托人只会将这些致命问题转移给新的当事人。其并不能解决这些问题。\n\n5. 未能驳回本案将使债务人得以利用另一法院和《破产法典》的工具继续挫败其债权人，同时施加将压倒性损害PAX的巨大成本。其他法院已经表明，其已不愿再容忍其伎俩。本院亦应作出同样回应。\n\n论证\n\nI. 驳回\n\nA. 异议方关于PAX试图“插队”的担忧不能成立。\n\n6. 异议方反对驳回的主要理由是声称，PAX将在破产程序之外的“争先恐后起诉”中取得所有可用资产。但除对未偿非PAX债权数量及金额的夸大估计外，异议方均未提供任何丝毫证据支持该观点。PAX将在审判中具体证明，其通过判决拥有远远最大的非附条件债权，且其余所谓债权要么来自内部人，要么具有推测性，不应被用以损害PAX。5 异议方就此援引的案件，尤其是涉及非自愿破产的案件，均可加以区分，因为每一案件均涉及多名等待获偿的债权人。在本案中，郭文贵的债权人——除PAX以及可能一名规模小得多的其他债权人外——要么目前无权获得清偿，要么并未积极尝试追偿。6\n\n7. PAX（PAX）一直愿意通过诉讼向 Kwok（郭文贵）追讨所欠款项的全额，但其始终拒绝付款。如果 Kwok 的申请书所载内容可信——列明其资产为 $3,850——那么自 2021 年 2 月纽约州法院作出有利于 PAX 的 $116 million 判决以来，他便一直同其提交 chapter 11 申请前夕一样资不抵债。提交申请的时机唯一可能的解释，是为了避免因未支付即将到期的超过 $130 million 藐视法庭罚款而遭到监禁，这表明 Kwok 是为逃避监禁而到本法院寻求庇护，而非因为其确实无力偿还债权人或需要对有争议资产进行有序清算。7 值得注意的是，债务人在本案审理期间财务状况完全未发生实质变化；其同意驳回案件时以如下临别之语，几乎承认了这一点：“驳回后，债务人拟清偿其合法债务。”8\n\n8. 在申请日之前，异议方均未尝试提出非自愿破产申请。9 然而，现在异议方实质上希望在债务人同意且 PAX 提出动议的情况下，通过反对驳回而启动一种拟制的非自愿破产程序；PAX 对债务人享有超过 $260 million 的判决债权。\n\n6 见附表 F：持有无担保债权的债权人，ECF 78，第 19–21 页。\n\n7 见最终藐视法庭裁定。事实上，至少自 2019 年 1 月以来，Kwok 一直否认其名下拥有任何资产。见 Friedman 答复声明附件 45，Kwok 证言笔录摘录，第 100–01 页，Guo v. Guo, Case No. 18-cv-01064-TSE-IDD (E.D. Va. January 23, 2019)（Kwok 作证称，其“净资产”为“[n]egative”，且“[i]n reality, under the law”其“没有”资产）。然而，他仍持续偿还几乎所有其他债务，并直至 2022 年才提交本案。\n\n8 债务人同意驳回案件，ECF No. 344，第 4 页。\n\n9 只有在“债务人通常未在债务到期时偿还其债务，除非该等债务就责任或金额存在善意争议[。]”的情况下，方可获得与非自愿申请有关的救济。11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1)。Kwok 声明或任何其他文件中，均没有任何可信证据表明 Kwok 未支付到期款项，除与 PAX 的争议以及或许另一名判决债权额相对微不足道的债权人有关的款项外。鉴于其频繁使用专业人士及其他服务，Kwok 很可能经常发生并支付大量债务。见，例如，Global Notes and Statements of Limitations, Methodology, and Disclaimers Regarding the Debtor's Schedules of Assets and Liabilities and Statement of Financial Affairs，ECF 77，第 15、21 页；2022 年 2 月月度经营报告补充文件，ECF 120-1。\n\n9. 即使债权人表示担忧，认为可供分配的价值不足，法院通常仍会尊重希望驳回案件的债务人；一法院指出，“保证所有债权人在破产法院外所实现的结果彼此相当……超出了破产法院的权限。如果要求破产法院作出此类保证，其将永远无法根据 § 1112(b) 驳回案件。”In re OptInRealBig.com, LLC, 345 B.R. 277, 287 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2006)。另见 In re Mazzocone, 183 B.R. 402, 412–13 (Bankr. E.D.Pa. 1995), aff'd, 200 B.R. 568 (E.D.Pa. 1996)（认定“不得允许债权人仅为利用破产向债权人提供的利益而拖延或维持案件。”）；In re Hosp. Assocs. of Tappan Zee, Ltd., 102 B.R. 369, 370 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989)（在确定驳回是否最符合财产利益时，重视债务人的判断，尽管债权人以债务人无法足额清偿所有债权人为由提出异议）。10\n\n10. 异议方将 PAX 描绘为试图“插队”并让无辜债权人“承担后果”。但异议方正试图插到队伍最前面——在其债权获得判决之前，异议方并无与其他债权人一同受偿的绝对权利。他们希望不当地加速其债权，以分享 PAX 劳动的成果；PAX 为执行其判决投入了数百万美元的律师费。\n\n10. 根据《破产法典》第 1112(b) 条作出驳回破产案件的决定，属于裁量性裁判，上诉法院按滥用裁量权标准进行审查。见 Sterling v. 1279 St. John's Place, LLC (In re Sterling), 737 F. App'x 52, 53 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order)（“破产法院的裁量性裁判按滥用裁量权标准审查。”）；In re Taylor, 97-CV-5967, 1997 WL 642559, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 1997)（按滥用裁量权标准审查破产法院的驳回决定）。\n\n11. 鉴于 Kwok 提交本案时的不当动机及其在本案期间的滥用行为，PAX 应有权行使适用的非破产法规定的优先顺位制度下的权利，该制度通常涉及“时间在先，权利在先”规则的一种形式。11 尽管《破产法典》确实允许未到期债务与已到期债务一同受偿，但该优先顺位制度并不违背《破产法典》的宗旨。例如，在假设的情形下，如 PAX 在申请日之前已取得 Kwok 资产的收益，其将有充分权利根据适用破产法保留该等收益。12\n\n12. 仅持有推测性或其他或有债权的当事人，不应被允许通过默示的非自愿破产程序加速其债权到期；这将对其基础权利构成不公平的强化。异议方试图劫持本破产案件，既方便地规避了《破产法典》对非自愿申请规定的保障措施和要求，也违反了国会、州立法机关和普通法设定的时间优先顺位制度。他们成为 UCC Objection（无担保债权人委员会异议）所大量引用案件中谴责的当事人，将本案用作“在破产中比非破产法下同等权利更有力的债务追收救济”。13 如果异议方成功，即使 PAX 已向所有其他债权人提供了通向 Kwok 资产的路线图，他们仍将可能使 PAX 执行其法定判决收款权利的能力延迟数年。14 异议方不应以损害 PAX 为代价从 Kwok 的不当行为中获益。\n\n11 见，例如，The Law of Debtors and Creditors § 6:46，Collection of Unsecured Debts。PAX 没有义务证明 Kwok 的商业帝国不会使未来判决债权人面临任何违约风险。现实世界中任何未享有已确定付款权利的或有债权人，均必须承担风险直至获得判决（假设其最终能够获得）。12 即使在 90 天优先受偿期间内取得，若 Kwok 能够支付全部债权的 100%，PAX 仍可提出有效抗辩，主张其取得价值并非优先受偿——优先受偿之诉必须证明，该转让使债权人在假设的 chapter 7 清算中获得更优的总分配。见 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5)。13 In re Murray, 543 B.R. 484, 498 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016)。\n\n14 这还忽视了 PAX 在此期间有权获得的数百万美元申请后、判决后利息。\n\n13. 为试图维护其在其他无担保债权人通常缺乏任何善意付款权利的情况下仍可夺取债务人 chapter 11 案件的权利，UCC Objection 将 Kwok 的案件比作 Purdue Pharma 或 LTL Management 等大规模侵权案件。15 说这些是牵强附会的比较都算是轻描淡写。快速阅读其中任何案件的“首日声明”，再与本案提交的 Kwok 声明比较，即可鲜明地看出巨大差异：大规模侵权破产案反映了跨越众多司法辖区的大量案件，其中相同问题被反复审理，导致因同一债务人行为受损且提出类似债权的债权人之间产生不一致、低效的结果。另一方面，Kwok 声明仅简要提及针对他的未决案件数量，其中没有任何案件显然具有适于集中处理的共同事实核心，且未包含任何表明无法应对针对他的诉讼的事实。Kwok 声明亦未载明任何判决留置权、扣押程序或其他追收努力。16 在目前案卷中没有任何证据（且 Kwok 已同意驳回，债务人也不存在提交此类证据的可能性）的情况下，异议方有责任提出事实依据，说明为何债务人在其同意驳回的情况下仍应处于破产程序中。然而，他们除就 PAX“抢在”其他债权人之前作出毫无根据、结论性的陈述外，未提供任何内容。\n\nB. 滥用《破产法典》是驳回的有效独立依据。\n\n14. 与 UCC Objection 的主张相反，滥用《破产法典》确实是独立的、可追溯至《破产法典》早期年代的“未列举事由”，可作为驳回依据。尽管在大多数案件中，以“未列举事由”驳回意味着“恶意”，但根据定义，它可以是任何正当事由，且法院已承认“滥用《破产法典”是其中一种事由。17 至少有一位著名破产法法官，即 Southern District of New York（纽约南区）退休法官 Robert E. Gerber（罗伯特·E·格伯），将“恶意”保留给最为恶劣的案件（其中包括本案），但仍允许在债务人提交申请不当却未达到恶意标准时予以驳回。18 在此，对债务人规避法治行为的最佳描述是其“滥用破产法典”，即使其提交申请未达到“恶意”程度，债务人的案件也应据此驳回（尽管如下文及 Dismissal Motion（驳回动议）所述，其确已达到该程度）。\n\n15. Dismissal Motion 就此问题所引用的一些案件涉及非自愿破产，这一事实无关紧要。19 这些案件解释的是第 1112 条，该条是任何 chapter 11 案件驳回所适用的相同标准。此外，UCC Objection 错误地声称 Dismissal Objection（驳回异议）未就此问题引用其他案件，且方便地忽略了对 In re Head 的引用；该案正是 Dismissal Motion 引用 Murray 案时所指的具体内部引证。In re Head 并非非自愿破产，也并非以“恶意”为由驳回的案件；引用该案是为说明“未列举事由”包括“将法典用于并非其预定用途的目的”，而这“自法典最早期以来一直是反复出现的主题”。20 对任何判例法中破产“滥用”的粗略检索\n\n17 见，例如，In re Murray, 900 F.3d 53, 60–61 (2d Cir. 2018)（“然而，我们无需将滥用《破产法典》归类为恶意，便可接受其作为驳回事由……。”）。另见 In re 347 Linden LLC, Case No. 11-civ.-1990, 2011 Dist. LEXIS 78843, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 20, 2011)（“破产法院可基于法院衡平权及良知所认可的任何理由，认为其构成对破产重组程序的滥用，而驳回 Chapter 11 [申请]。”）（省略内部引证）。\n\n18 例如，参见 In re Century/ML Cable Venture, 294 B.R. 9, 34–35, n. 41 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (J. Gerber)；In re Pleasant E. Assocs., 286 B.R. 509, 517 n.34 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002)。\n\n19 UCC异议书通过转而讨论非自愿破产申请的理由来回应这一“未列举事由”，而该理由完全无关。非自愿申请可在债务人无法于债务到期时偿付债务的情况下确保债权人之间获得平等对待。参见 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)。如上所述，没有可信证据表明情况曾如此。\n\n20 In re Murray, 543 B.R. 484, 489 n.24 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016)（引述 In re Head, 223 B.R. 648, 653–54 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1998)）。\n\n数据库本可找到大量将第1112条项下的驳回事由以完全相同方式描述的例子。21\n\n16. 债务人在本案中的行为继续显示出该申请的真实目的，而该目的显然是对《破产法典》的不当利用。例如：债务人的家族办公室曾提出提供一笔次级DIP贷款，该贷款起初旨在控制本案，后来旨在为与本案成本严重不相称的专业费用提供资金，并旨在让债务人的家族控制本案；债务人提交的清单充斥着不完整、虚假和相互矛盾的信息；22 债务人提交了一项表面上不可行的计划，该计划延续了Lady May号并非由债务人所有的假象，尽管纽约法院（New York Court）已有相反裁定，并且该计划以向内部人士给予广泛的非债务人免责为条件，作为债权人获得Lady May号的前提，这将通过剥夺债权人对回避或返还诉讼——债务人破产财产的主要资产——的价值，而违反《破产法典》第1129(a)(7)条规定的债权人最佳利益测试；债务人及其女儿在本院炮制了一项对抗程序，以攻击纽约法院关于Lady May号的裁决（将PAX列为被告，并迫使PAX投入更多资源）；债务人向PAX送达了不当且无关的证据开示请求，试图就已在纽约诉讼（New York Action）中确定的各种事项重新诉讼，并将纽约诉讼移送，以攻击Ostrager法官（奥斯特拉格法官）裁决的有效性并削弱该等裁决；以及债务人突然同意驳回本第11章案件，23 除阻碍和拖延PAX的追偿并导致债权人产生巨额专业费用外，未取得任何成果。\n\n21 例如，参见 In re Kestel, 99 F. 3d 146 (4th Cir. 1996)（“国会已在《破产法典》本身中明确表示，不应容忍对破产程序的滥用。[. . .] 诸如‘因事由’之类的一般性措辞，为未列举的滥用情形提供了广泛涵盖。”）（强调系后加）。另参见 In re Brookdale Gardens Ass'n, No. 09-41305 (NLW), 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1643, at \\*1 (Bankr. D.N.J. May 20, 2010)（指出债务人对第11章的“滥用”，以及先前裁定认为，根据第1112(b)条以有事由为由驳回案件，与根据第305条驳回非自愿破产申请同样适当）。\n\n22 例如，Kwok（郭文贵）在其财务披露中遗漏了关键资产，并提交了缺乏任何实质性细节的月度经营报告。参见 Dismissal Motion ¶ 30；参见 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机遇基金有限合伙企业）反对债务人延长提交资产和负债清单及财务状况说明期限之动议的答复，ECF 50；Examiner/Trustee Motion at 1–19；Monthly Operating Report (Period Ending February 28, 2022), ECF 120；Monthly Operating Report (Period Ending March 31, 2022), ECF 242。此外，Kwok于2022年3月9日在伪证处罚的约束下声明，他未曾向任何“非为帮助[其]填写破产表格的律师”之人支付或同意支付任何款项。Official Form 106Dec, ECF 79。但债务人自己申请聘用Verdolino & Lowey, P.C.（维尔多利诺与洛伊专业公司）（“V&L”）的申请，请求作出裁定，“授权其自2022年3月3日起保留及聘用V&L”，以从事包括“财务状况说明和清单”在内的工作——该等文件于2022年3月9日提交。Debtor's Application for Authorization to Retain and Employ Verdolino & Lowey, P.C. as Financial Advisors, ECF 90, at 2–3（强调系后加）。Kwok不断陈述其自认为最符合自身利益的任何内容，即使是在向本院作出的受伪证处罚约束的陈述中亦然。\n\n17. 因此，Kwok始终只想再获得一次机会，以拖延PAX收取其判决款项，并削弱纽约法院的命令。这是对破产制度的明显滥用。\n\n18. 异议人主张，由于纽约法院作出的最终藐视法庭裁定现已失去实际意义，债务人的行为可以被忽略。并非如此；该最终藐视法庭裁定要求支付必须向PAX支付的 \\$134 million 罚款，而非仅仅返还该船只。24 债务人是否以某种方式履行了其遵守法治的义务，并非由异议人说了算——该船只尚未交付，债务人也仍未支付所处的罚款。\n\n19. 作为正当使用破产程序的例证，异议人指出债务人所称的目标，即提供一个集中审理的法庭以解决有关债务人财产的争议。25 Kwok提交其申请，正是为了集中处理一项争议：其与PAX的争议。这是其唯一寻求移送申请的案件——其其他案件均未被提交至破产法院（Bankruptcy Court），尽管PAX案件最不适合移送，因为其已经处于判决后阶段。26 此外，Kwok承诺使债权人得到全额清偿（这暴露出其控制着足以做到这一点的资产），27 且未反对债权人Rui Ma（马蕊）解除自动中止、返回州法院继续进行该案件的动议——这是一个意味深长的选择。28 Kwok将本案带至本院是为了规避纽约法院，别无他因。\n\n23 参见 Debtor's Consent to Dismissal of Case, ECF No. 344。\n\n24 参见 Ex. 39。若Lady May号至某一确定日期仍未归还，罚款将继续累积。参见 id. at 2。\n\n25 参见 UCC Objection at 3；Rui Ma Group Objection at 23。\n\n26 参见 Ex. 1；Friedman Reply Decl., Ex. 44, Notice of Removal, PAX v. Kwok, Index No. 652077/2017, (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), Dkt. No. 1195 (March 15, 2022)。\n\n27 例如，参见 Dismissal Motion at 26, n. 107。\n\n28 参见 Motion of Rui Ma for Relief from the Automatic Stay to Allow Pending State Court Litigation to Proceed, ECF 206；Notice of Contested Matter Response Date, ECF 206-3（设定2022年4月26日为答复日期）。\n\n20. UCC异议书在主张债务人并未滥用破产制度时，对破产程序允许Kwok“在本院前延续其持续的障眼法”这一主张提出异议，称其“令人费解，而且更重要的是，根本不准确。”29 虽然第11章案件可允许进行调查，但该项工作已在纽约法院（即Ostrager法官的法院）中完成。继续本第11章案件将使PAX再次经历同样的事情。Kwok当然还有多种其他方式继续隐藏其资产。凭借自动中止的利益，以及Kwok作为利害关系当事人参与破产程序的权利（即使其被解除占有中的债务人地位），Kwok可以制造各种麻烦。\n\nC. 债务人的恶意要求驳回本案。\n\n21. 异议人主张，“仅仅希望援引中止本身［以规避藐视法庭］”不足以构成以“恶意”为由予以驳回的理由。30 但为支持这一主张所引用的判例原文表明，债务人“必须意图为不当目的而获得自动中止的利益……”。31 如上所述，Kwok的目的在于规避一项旨在确保法治和法院体系尊严的法院命令，这一目的不当，且与债权人受到平等对待毫无关系。\n\n22. UCC异议书在主张债务人提交本案时不存在主观恶意时，声称应付给PAX的藐视法庭债权可以衡平居次。但该论点无关紧要——在法院根据《破产法典》第1112条审查“事由”时，衡平居次的可得性并不能以某种方式补救该破产申请。此外，该论点根本不正确。第二巡回区内的法院要求债权人存在不衡平行为，方可使该债权居次，32 而此处甚至从未指称PAX存在任何该等行为。对罚金债权实施无过错衡平居次的理由在此不适用；如该债权涉及对司法制度尊严的冒犯，而非普通惩罚性债权，则居次将是荒谬的。33 最后，在尚无任何债权人拥有经认可债权的情况下，任何关于居次的讨论均为时过早。\n\n29 UCC Objection at 15。\n\n30 Id. at 17。\n\n31 UCC Objection at 17（引述 In re Soundview Elite, Ltd., 503 B.R. 571, 580 n. 18 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014)）。\n\n23. UCC异议书援引 In re Meier，主张本院应忽略债务人提交申请的目的及其在第11章案件中的行为，并称，判断案件是否应因恶意而被驳回的关键标准是“债务人是否已经提出或能够提出在法律和经济上可行的重整计划，或者案件及可能的计划是否能够以其他方式服务于有效的重整目的。”34\n\n24. Meier的事实可予区分，且Kwok的案件轻易符合其驳回标准。Meier涉及真正的重整，继续进行该案件具有明确目的：法院认定，债务人可通过一项第11章计划向债权人提供更多利益，而该计划并非如本案一样的清算。35 与Meier不同，此处不存在“重整目的”，因为没有任何可供重整的内容，也不存在明显的财务困境。\n\n32 参见 Kelleran v. Andrijevic, 825 F.2d 692, 697 (2d Cir. 1987)（“例如，根据衡平居次原则，如破产法院认定债权人的债权虽不缺乏合法依据，但仍源于该债权人的不衡平行为，则可使某一特定债权居次。”）；另参见 Harris v. I.R.S., 82 A.F.T.R.2d 98-5931 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y.)（“本院认为，在对债权进行衡平居次之前，必须有债权人不衡平行为的某种证据，因为第二巡回区对此问题的裁定尚未被推翻。”）；In re Rockville Orthopedic Assocs., P.C., 377 B.R. 438, 445 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2007)（“本院认定，被投诉的行为不构成支持衡平居次请求所必需的‘不衡平行为’”）；In re Mr. R's Prepared Foods, Inc., 251 B.R. 24, 29 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2000)（要求存在不衡平行为）。\n\n33 异议人未援引任何曾将无过错衡平居次适用于此类债权的判例。\n\n34 UCC Objection at 17–18。\n\n25. 此外，与 Meier 案不同，本案中确认一项计划在实践中是不可能的。鉴于债务人撤回拟议的 DIP 融资，且破产财产负担着高额专业费用支出以及 PAX 就其为取得 Lady May 返还所作努力而提出的大额贡献请求，现不存在已落实的计划融资。PAX 持有一项大额不得免除的债权，36 若应采信异议方关于债务人清偿债务能力的观点，则任何计划表面上都很可能不可行。37 而且，与异议方的论点相反，未经 PAX 同意，确认将不可能实现。为强制批准目的而在 UCC 异议书中提议对 PAX 进行单独分类，将是判例法普遍禁止的明显不当分类操纵实例。38 事实上，一宗与本案完全相同的案件恰恰作出了如此认定。39 如给予 PAX 实质上差异化的待遇，也将是明显的不公平歧视实例。40 此类允许单独分类和/或差异化待遇的唯一情形，是对重整后债务人具有某种商业价值的贸易\n\n36 如庭审记录及向法院提交的各项诉状所述，PAX 拟就其藐视法庭请求提出不得免除债务之诉，而法院已基于多项理由认定该等请求的性质依法不得免除。参见，例如，Buffalo Gyn Womenservices, Inc. v. Behn (In re Behn), 242 B.R. 229, 237-40 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1999)；In re Marini, 28 B.R. 262, 265 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983)。37 In re Hamilton, 803 F. App'x 123, 125 (9th Cir. 2020)（认定，大额不得免除的判决及其利息使拟议计划不符合第1129(a)(11)条规定的可行性要求，因而拒绝确认）。\n\n35 In re Meier, Bankr. No. 14-bk-10105, 2014 WL 5426763 at \\*5 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2014)（在破产申请“似乎具有适当的重整目的”时，不构成恶意）。\n\n38 参见，例如，In re Bos. Post Rd. Ltd. P'ship, 154 B.R. 617, 622 (D. Conn. 1993)（汇集判例）；In re One Times Square Assoc. Ltd. P'ship, 165 B.R. 773, 776 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994)（“实质相似的债权必须归入同一类别，除非存在除不当分类操纵以外的其他理由将其分开。”）。\n\n39 参见 In re Save Our Springs (S.O.S.) Alliance, Inc., 388 B.R. 202, 233 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2008), aff'd, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121177 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2009), aff'd sub nom. Save Our Springs Alliance, Inc. v. WSI (II)-COS, L.L.C., 632 F.3d 168 (5th Cir. 2011)（认定，在该债权人因其债权规模本可控制表决结果且不存在商业理由支持该等分离的情况下，判决债权人的债权不得与其他一般无担保债权单独分类）。\n\n40 参见 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 636 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd sub nom. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 78 B.R. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd sub nom. Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988)（认定，根据规制强制批准的《破产法典》第1129(b)条，“计划提出人不得将两项相似债权或两组相似债权分入不同类别，并对该等类别给予差异化待遇”）。\n\n债权人，或其他对重整后债务人具有某种商业价值的一般无担保债权人。41 本案中，不可能存在任何此类理由，因为 Kwok（郭文贵）没有经营业务，也未进行重整。认为主要非内部人债权人（即使考虑到 UCC 异议书中对无担保债权人作出的夸张核算，其债权规模仍遥遥领先）可以在毫无合理目的的情况下被剥夺表决权，这一想法表面上即属荒谬。债务人确认任何第11章计划毫无前景，不仅证明了客观上的徒劳，也构成表明主观恶意的一个因素。Sapphire Dev., LLC v. McKay, 549 B.R. 556, 557 (D. Conn. 2016)（指出，“对债务人脱离破产程序可能性的客观评估，可为债务人在申请破产保护时的主观意图提供一种指示”）。\n\n26. 在讨论关于主观恶意的 C-TC 和 Syndicom 因素时，异议书聚焦于一两个因素——是否存在单一资产，或者破产申请是否源于双方争议——却忽视了如驳回动议所述，几乎所有因素均支持作出恶意认定这一事实。PAX 可以承认其认为债务人拥有不止一项资产42，且拥有不止一名债权人（事实上，PAX 已多次作出此种陈述）——在该等因素的整体考量中，这些事实相对而言毫无意义。当然，法院绝不局限于以恶意为由驳回单一资产房地产案件。尽管确有其他或有诉讼请求权人，但几乎没有任何该等案件已转化为判决，没有证据表明其中任何案件即将转化为判决，并且最重要的是，其中没有任何案件给 Kwok 造成财务困境；这正是“双方法律争议”因素背后的原因，即债务人的财务状况是由双方\n\n41 参见，例如，In re Aegerion Pharm., 605 B.R. 22, 31–32 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019)。\n\n42 与 UCC 异议书试图荒谬地将债务人仅有一项资产的观点归于 PAX 相反，参见 UCC Objection at 27，PAX 的驳回动议表明了相反的观点，但指出，根据债务人在 Kwok 声明中为其第11章申请所陈述的事实，即其几乎没有资产或完全没有资产，驳回同样具有依据。参见，例如，Dismissal Motion 31（指出“Kwok 声称”其仅拥有有限资产）（强调为后加）。\n\n争议所致。43 除 PAX 外，没有其他债权人对债务人的财务状况产生过任何哪怕稍具实质性的影响——如驳回动议及本文其他部分所述，法院可以轻易认定，债务人的破产申请是由 PAX，且仅由 PAX 所致。\n\n27. 与 UCC 异议书从判例法中选择性引述的内容相反，债务人提出申请的目的无须完全是重新诉讼先前判决，方可据此以恶意为由驳回案件。44 第一，任何债务人都可以佯装一个目的，而其真正的主要目的显然是另一个——如本文及驳回动议所述，重新诉讼 PAX 的判决、试图避免入狱以及试图获得针对 PAX 的筹码，确实是债务人提出申请的主要目的。第二，UCC 异议书错误地将重新诉讼的意图界定为“恶意”审查的问题，但其对于作为驳回依据的其他“未列举事由”同样相关，例如滥用破产制度；后者是由法院酌情裁量的、范围宽广得多的标准。45\n\n28. UCC 异议书还轻率地提出，可通过依据既判力原则“轻易”避免重新诉讼，此说法忽视了本案已经给 PAX 施加的沉重负担，尤其是由不当证据开示请求及其他各类程序所造成的负担。46 当然，没有任何异议方援引任何案件，表明法院仅因债权人针对重新诉讼享有其他法律保护，便拒绝驳回一宗以恶意提出的案件。\n\n45 参见上文脚注17。\n\n46 UCC Objection at 25。\n\n43 C-TC 9th Ave. P'ship v. Norton Co. (In re C-TC 9th Ave. P-Ship), 113 F.3d 1304, 1311 (2d Cir. 1997)（考量“债务人的财务状况”是否系“双方法律争议”的结果）（强调为后加）。另参见 In re Syndicom Corp., 268 B.R. 26, 52–53 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001)（考量并非双方法律争议当事人的其他债权人是否正在造成财务困境）。值得注意的是，这些因素预设，在破产程序外可能必须等待取得判决的其他债权人存在时，案件仍可被驳回。44 在具有开创性的 C-TC 案中，第二巡回上诉法院维持了下级法院驳回案件的决定，该案的“主要目的”是重新诉讼。In re C-TC 9th Ave. P-Ship, 113 F.3d 1304, 1311 (2d Cir. 1997)（强调为后加）。UCC 异议书援引 In re Slettleland, 260 B.R. 657, 661-62 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001) 和 In re Cohoes Industrial Terminal, Inc., 931 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1991)，以主张任何重整意图，无论多么微弱，均足以挽救一项原本以恶意提出的申请。但这些案件绝无此意。它们明确指出，每一名债务人至少必须具有“某种意图”，这是案件得以适当提出的最低条件。In re Cohoes Indus. Terminal, 931 F.2d 222, 228 (2d Cir. 1991)（强调为后加）。异议方援引的每一案件均要求具有重整意图，而鉴于没有可供重整的业务，Kwok 在本案中不具有（且不可能具有）该等意图。即使有序清算的单纯可能性可以以某种方式构成“意图”，其也不能补救该项申请。\n\n29. 在讨论 Rent-A-Wreck 判决时，UCC 异议书严重歪曲了驳回动议的论点。47 PAX 并未否认存在理论上的案件，在该等案件中，“集中处理”可为债务人的破产财产提供价值——事实上，驳回动议在援引 Rent-A-Wreck 案后的紧接下一句即明确作此表述。但是，正如 Rent-A-Wreck 所表达的原则所要求，PAX 已证明，在本案中继续处于破产程序不会创造任何该等价值。PAX 强烈不同意 UCC 异议书所谓 Rent-A-Wreck 原则“与本案毫无关系”的说法，因为如本案的情形，继续处于破产程序绝不应造成价值毁损。48\n\n30. 最后，总体而言，异议方完全无视大量判例（其中许多已在驳回动议或本案提交的其他诉状中援引），在这些相似案件中，法院依据《破产法典》第1112条，以债务人恶意为由驳回案件。参见，例如，In re D&G Constr. Dean Gonzalez, LLC, 635 B.R. 232, 240 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2021)（在破产程序“仅被作为拖延合法行使州法权利并攻击其他法院终局命令的平台”时驳回案件）；In re Mutty, No. 04-10634, 2004 WL 2647705, at \\*7 (Bankr. D. Vt. Nov. 19, 2004)（因未以善意和坦诚提交准确的申报表而驳回案件）；In re Wally Findlay Galleries (New York) Inc., 36 B.R. 849, 851 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 1984)（在基础诉讼中作出不利裁定后立即提出案件，以试图规避该裁定后果时驳回案件）。49\n\n47 参见 UCC Objection at 18–19；Dismissal Motion at 25–26（援引 In re Rent-A-Wreck of America, Inc., 580 B.R. 364, 373 (Bankr. D. Del. 2018)）。\n\n48 UCC Objection at 19。\n\n49 UCC 异议书在主张“没有迹象表明除”该案中的两名债权人外还存在任何债权人时，未能区分 Wally Findlay Galleries 案。UCC Objection at 20, n. 9。没有任何其他债权人的迹象，源于该事实完全无关紧要。认为处于第11章程序中的经营企业仅会有该两名债权人，或者只有在……时才会构成恶意申请，荒谬至极。\n\n另参见 In re Reg 'l Evangelical All. of Churches, Inc., 592 B.R. 375, 389 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2018)（认定，破产实质上是试图阻挠债权人在州法院诉讼中获得救济时，驳回最符合债权人及破产财产的利益，因为这使债权人能够依据适用的非破产法“寻求其有权获得的救济”，“而无须应对若本案未被驳回债务人将设置的破产程序障碍”。）。\n\n31. 异议人方面并未提出任何与Kwok（郭文贵）案情近似、且法院选择不驳回案件的案例。\n\nD. 债务人的破产财产持续遭受重大/持续性损失，依《破产法》Section 1112(b)(4)(A)应予驳回。\n\n32. 异议人似乎仅是表面上对Kwok处于重大且持续亏损状态提出异议——没有任何异议人提供证据证明Kwok的破产财产处于停滞状态或正在增加。PAX希望证明Kwok至少拥有Lady May（一项贬值的浮动资产）以及Sherry Netherland（谢里-内德兰）的一套公寓；该公寓以\\$67.5 million购入，但已公开挂牌出售，价格为\\$38.5 million。50\n\n33. 主要而言，Kwok虚假且误导性地披露其没有收入或资产，使得该驳回理由更加突出；但即使不采信债务人的虚假陈述，Kwok亦必然产生费用，且目前的任何收入均通过其空壳公司帝国和虚假家庭交易被转移至破产财产之外。51 虽然债权人可能有权获得该等资产的收益，但该收入目前显然并未归入破产财产，且不得允许Kwok隐藏该等资产和收入，同时仍声称其破产财产正受益于第11章案件。在Kwok的世界里，其承担所有费用，而破产财产资产的任何收益则归于非债务人的家人和关联方。\n\n债务人意图以一项判决阻挠所有债权人。当动机是规避州法院判决时，案件即被驳回；上述各债权人均已取得该等判决。\n\n50 Sherry-Netherland住所的StreetEasy（StreetEasy）房源信息作为附件46附于Friedman Reply Decl.（Friedman答复声明）之后。\n\n51 异议人主张专业费用等行政费用的累积不构成持续性损失，此项主张并不正确。参见Loop Corp.（Loop公司） v. United States Trustee（美国受托人）, 379 F.3d 511, 516 (3d Cir. 2004)（“在债务人已停止经营并清算几乎所有资产的情形下，任何负现金流——包括仅因行政费用产生的负现金流——[. . .]均足以满足§ [1112(b)(4)(A)]的第一项要件。”（引文略））；In re Sakon（Sakon案）, 617 B.R. 7, 15 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2020)（在破产财产毫无重整希望、没有经营业务中可保留的价值且收入极少的情况下，“损失无需巨大——‘只需认定破产财产正在遭受某种价值减损即可。’”）（引自In re Taub（Taub案）, 427 B.R. 208, 231 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2010)）。\n\nE. 债务人对破产财产的严重管理不善，依《破产法》Section 1112(b)(4)(B)应予驳回。\n\n34. 异议人主张PAX仅关注申请前的管理不善事例，但PAX在驳回动议中根本未关注申请前行为——PAX讨论的一切事项，包括Kwok持续拒绝移动Lady May，均发生于申请后。52 除Lady May外，驳回动议还指出，在案件审理期间向法院作出虚假陈述，以及持续未能为债权人利益归集其他资产；上述每一项均发生于申请日之后。但严重管理不善绝不限于UCC Objection（无担保债权人委员会异议）援引一项不具约束力的南佛罗里达州案例所称的“无能”。如驳回动议所述，严重管理不善涉及履行受托责任，而Kwok显然未能履行该责任。53 事实上，显而易见的是，Kwok对资源的使用完全是为了其本人、其家人及空壳实体的利益，而非为了债权人的利益；后者乃破产财产受托责任人所应履行的义务。\n\nF. Section 1112(b)(2)关于异常情况的例外不足以证明不应驳回。\n\n35. 异议人主张，“异常情况”排除了驳回。54 本案确属“异常”，但其并非普通案件这一事实并不能使其免于被驳回。第一，section 1112(b)(2)明确规定，当依据section 1112(b)(4)(A)存在重大且持续性损失这一驳回事由时，该规定不适用。第二，该规定要求存在合理可能性，即能够在合理时间内确认一项计划；如上所述，鉴于缺乏资金以及须取得PAX同意，这在实践中不可能实现。第三，section 1112(b)(2)要求对构成驳回依据的Kwok行为存在“合理正当理由”，其中包括其恶意行为。UCC Objection完全误读了该法条，将其理解为提交申请本身必须具有正当理由，并指出阻止PAX执行其判决即为该正当理由。但必须获得正当理由的并非提交申请本身——而是导致恶意的那些不当行为本身。55 异议人承认该等行为令人不齿，却未为其提供任何正当理由。最后，如上所述，与异议人的主张相反，Final Contempt Order（终局藐视法庭命令）并未失去意义。\n\nII. 审查人\n\n36. 尽管基于PAX此前在其对Examiner/Trustee Motion（审查人/受托人动议）的异议中阐述的理由，任命审查人从来就不合理，但在没有资金支付审查人费用的情况下，援引section 1104任命审查人应不再予以考虑。根据目前提交本院的动议，驳回、转换或任命受托人是仅有的选项，而驳回无疑是对所有利益相关方最有利的选项。\n\nIII. 受托人\n\n37. 如本院不驳回本案，则必须任命受托人。Justice Ostrager（奥斯特拉格法官）在New York Action（纽约诉讼）中的意见表明了Kwok的不当行为，当事人之间的激烈敌意亦可从记录中清楚看出。Kwok与其关联方律师之间的利益冲突比比皆是，56 且Kwok已否认其有意担任第11章受托责任人。UCC Objection反对任命受托人的论点，基于存在DIP financing（债务人占有融资），并依赖Kwok关于其家人将出面协助形成共识的陈述。这两者均已不在考虑范围内。当然，任命受托人不会解决债务人和委员会最初设想的、已注定本案失败的资金缺乏问题。事实上，如受托人因融资目的需要风险代理律师，仅其费用就可能超过除PAX之外全部获准债权的总额。因此，正如PAX将在其即将提交的诉状中更充分说明的，驳回才是适当的救济。\n\n日期：May 18, 2022 New York, New York\n\nPacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙企业）\n\n签署人：/s/ Patrick M. Birney\n\nPatrick M. Birney（帕特里克·M·伯尼）(CT No. 19875)\n\nAnnecca H. Smith（安妮卡·H·史密斯）(CT No. 31148)\n\nROBINSON & COLE LLP（罗宾逊与科尔律师事务所）\n\n280 Trumbull Street\n\nHartford, CT 06103\n\n电话：(860) 275-8275\n\n传真：(860) 275-8299\n\n电子邮件：pbirney@rc.com\n\nasmith@rc.com\n\n-及-\n\nPeter Friedman（彼得·弗里德曼）\n\nStuart M. Sarnoff（斯图尔特·M·萨诺夫）\n\nO'MELVENY & MYERS LLP（奥美律师事务所）\n\nSeven Times Square\n\nNew York, NY 10036\n\n电话：(212) 326-2000\n\n传真：(212) 326-2061\n\n电子邮件：pfriedman@omm.com\n\nssarnoff@omm.com\n\n56 参见Complaint for Declaratory Relief（确认性救济诉状）, ECF No. 204, HK Int'l Funds Invs. (USA) Ltd., LLC（HK国际基金投资〔美国〕有限责任公司）v. Kwok（郭文贵）(April 11, 2022)。\n\n送达证明\n\n本人特此证明，于May 18, 2022，前述文件副本已通过本院CM/ECF System（CM/ECF系统）以电子方式提交。通过本院电子提交系统接收通知的所有当事人将通过电子邮件收到本次提交的通知。利害关系方可通过本院CM/ECF System查阅本次提交。\n\n/s/ Patrick M. Birney\n\nPatrick M. Birney（帕特里克·M·伯尼）","key_entities":["Je","Kwok","Guo","Murray","CIPA","Ho Wan Kwok"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":1,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":46,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":50,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":69,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":77,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":78,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":79,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":90,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":102,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":120,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":183,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":204,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":206,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":242,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":344,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":346,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":347,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":348,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1195,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":8825,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 20:43:05"}