{"id":"court_ctb_3985_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":3985,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"UNKNOWN","filed_date":"2025-01-21","title":"1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTIC","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION IN RE: . Chapter 11 . Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) HO WAN KWOK, *et al., .* . (Jointly Administered) Debtors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEEE FOR THE . No. 24-05005 (JAM) ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . AGORA LAB, INC., . . Defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05006 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . Courtroom 123 . Brien McMahon Federal Building AMAZON WEB SERVICES, . 915 Lafayette Boulevard INC., . Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604 . Defendant. . Wednesday, January 15, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12:55 p.m. - Cont'd - Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 1 of 125\n\n 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05010 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . DIRECT PERSUASION, LLC, . . Defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05015 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . FOX NEWS NETWORK, LLC, . . Defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05031 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . ARRI AMERICAS, INC., . . Defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - Cont'd - Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 2 of 125\n\n 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05044 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . TERIS-PHOENIX, LLC, . . Defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05047 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . PHILLIPS NIZER, LLP, . . Defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05048 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . MARK GUNDERSON, . . Defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - Cont'd - Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 3 of 125\n\n 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05055 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . 270 W. 39th Street . Co., LLC, . . Defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05056 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . FFP (BVI) LIMITED, . . Defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05057 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . AMAZON.COM, INC., HING . CHI NGOK, ALEX . HADJICHARALAMBOUS, . CHUNGUANG HAN, and MEI . GUO, . . Defendants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - Cont'd - Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 4 of 125\n\n 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05058 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . ANTHEM HEALTH PLANS, . INC., . . Defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05059 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . FEDERAL EXPRESS . CORPORATION, . . Defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05063 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . DJD CREATIVE, LLC, . . Defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - Cont'd - Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 5 of 125\n\n 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05069 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . B&H FOTO & ELECTRONICS . CORP., HING CHI NGOK, . ALEX HADJICHARALAMBOUS, . and CHUNGUANG HAN, . . Defendants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05077 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY, . . Defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05082 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . OHTZAR SHLOMO SOLOMON . TREASURE, LLC, . . Defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - Cont'd - Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 6 of 125\n\n 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05092 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . ZETA GLOBAL CORP., . . Defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05100 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . GROCYBER, LLC, . . Defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05108 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN . TECHNOLOGY, LLC, . . Defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - Cont'd - Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 7 of 125\n\n 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05110 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . AARON MITCHELL, . . Defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05112 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . EMPIRE BLUE CROSS BLUE . SHIELD and ANTHEM . HEALTHCHOICE ASSURANCE, . INC., . . Defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05114 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . MODSQUAD, INC., . . Defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - Cont'd - Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 8 of 125\n\n 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05115 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . CLOUDFARE, INC., . . Defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05120 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . 3 COLUMBUS CIRCLE, LLC, . . Defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05122 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . INDIUM SOFTWARE, INC., . . Defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - Cont'd - Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 9 of 125\n\n 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05128 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . MILLER MOTORCARS, INC., . . Defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05130 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . ON THE SPOT HOME . IMPROVEMENT, INC., . . Defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05134 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . V.X. CERDA & . ASSOCIATES, P.A., . . Defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - Cont'd - Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 10 of 125\n\n 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05135 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . LIBERTY JET MANAGEMENT . CORP., . . Defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05138 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . TARGET ENTERPRISES, LLC, . . Defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05141 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . FLAT RATE MOVERS, LTD., . . Defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - Cont'd - Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 11 of 125\n\n 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05147 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . JAMESTOWN ASSOCIATES, . LLC, . . Defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05162 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . NARDELLO & CO., LLC, . . Defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05168 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . THE FRANCIS FIRM PLLC, . . Defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - Cont'd - Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 12 of 125\n\n 13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05186 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . BERKELEY ROWE LIMITED, . . Defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05196 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . MORVILLO ABRAMOWITZ GRAND . IASON & ANELLO, P.C., . . Defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05199 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . LAWALL & MITCHELL, LLC, . and AARON MITCHELL, . . Defendants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - Cont'd - Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 13 of 125\n\n 14 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05202 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . CLAYMAN ROSENBERG . KIRSHNER & LINDER, LLP, . . Defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05204 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . G4S SECURITY SYSTEMS . (HONG KONG) LTD., . . Defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05208 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . ZEISLER & ZEISLER, P.C., . . Defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - Cont'd - Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 14 of 125\n\n 15 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05211 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . PUTNAM'S LANDSCAPING, . LLC, . . Defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05219 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . JASON MILLER, . . Defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05222 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . SEDGWICK REALTY CORP., . . Defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - Cont'd - Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 15 of 125\n\n 16 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 . LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05225 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . CIRRUS DESIGN . CORPORATION, and QIANG . GUO, . . Defendants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05226 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . ACASS CANADA, LTD., . . Defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER . Adversary Proceeding 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE . No. 24-05229 (JAM) OF HO WAN KWOK, . . Plaintiff, . . v. . . MARCUM, LLP, . . Defendant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE JULIE A. MANNING UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 16 of 125\n\n| | Case 22-50073 | Doc 3985 | Filed 01/21/25 | Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 | Page 17 of |\n|----|---------------|----------|----------------|-------------------------------------------------------|------------|\n| | | | 125 | | 17 |\n| 1 | | | | APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL | |\n| 2 | | | | Luc A. Despins | |\n| 3 | | | | Paul Hastings LLP
200 Park Avenue | |\n| 4 | | | | New York, NY 10166 | |\n| 5 | | | | Rowena A. Moffett
Brenner, Saltzman & Wallman, LLP | |\n| 6 | | | | 271 Whitney Avenue
New Haven, CT 06511 | |\n| 7 | | | | Benjamin D. Feder
Kelley Drye & Warren LLP | |\n| 8 | | | | Canterbury Green
201 Broad Street | |\n| 9 | | | | Stamford, CT 06901 | |\n| 10 | | | | Nicholas A. Bassett
Paul Hastings, LLP | |\n| 11 | | | | 2050 M Street NW | |\n| 12 | | | | Washington, DC 20036 | |\n| 13 | | | | Patrick R. Linsey
Neubert Pepe & Monteith, P.C. | |\n| 14 | | | | 195 Church St
13th Fl | |\n| 15 | | | | New Haven, CT 06510 | |\n| 16 | | | | Stuart M. Sarnoff
O'Melveny & Myers LLP | |\n| 17 | | | | 1301 Avenue of the Americas
Ste 1700 | |\n| 18 | | | | New York, NY 10019 | |\n| 19 | | | | Eric S. Goldstein
Shipman & Goodwin LLP | |\n| 20 | | | | One Constitution Plaza
Hartford, CT 06103 | |\n| 21 | | | | Brian T. Peterson | |\n| 22 | | | | K&L Gates LLP
925 4th Ave Suite 2900 | |\n| 23 | | | | Seattle, WA 98104 | |\n| 24 | | | | Darryl S. Laddin
Arnall Golden Gregory LLP | |\n| 25 | | | | 171 17th Street, NW, Suite 2100
Atlanta, GA 30363 | |\n| | | | | | |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
Doc 3985 | Filed 01/21/25
Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 | Page 18 of | |\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|------------|--|\n| | | 125 | 18 | |\n| 1 | | APPEARANCES (CONTINUED) | | |\n| 2 | | Jeffrey M. Sklarz | | |\n| 3 | | Green & Sklarz LLC
One Audubon Street | | |\n| 4 | | 3rd Floor
New Haven, CT 06511 | | |\n| 5 | | Stephen M. Kindseth
Zeisler & Zeisler | | |\n| 6 | | 10 Middle Street
15th Floor | | |\n| 7 | | Bridgeport, CT 06604 | | |\n| 8 | | | | |\n| 9 | | | | |\n| 10 | | | | |\n| 11 | | | | |\n| 12 | | | | |\n| 13 | | | | |\n| 14 | | | | |\n| 15 | | | | |\n| 16 | | | | |\n| 17 | | | | |\n| 18 | | | | |\n| 19 | (APPEARANCES CONTINUED) | | | |\n| 20 | Audio Operator: | Electronically recorded | | |\n| 21 | Transcription Company: | Reliable
The Nemours Building | | |\n| 22 | | 1007 N. Orange Street, Suite 110
Wilmington, Delaware 19801 | | |\n| 23 | | Telephone: (302)654-8080
Email:
8 | | |\n| 24 | Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording, | | | |\n| 25 | | transcript produced by transcription service. | | |\n| | | | | |\n| | | | | |\n\n 19 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 INDEX MOTIONS: PAGE Matter No. 3857 Order Scheduling Hearing on Motions to Dismiss and Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings. 5 Court's Ruling: -- Matter No. 17 Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding Filed by Jeffrey M. Sklarz on behalf of FFP (BVI) Limited, Defendant Court's Ruling: Matter No. 19 Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding Filed by Jeffrey M. Sklarz on behalf of Aaron Mitchell, Defendant Court's Ruling: Matter No. 16 Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding Filed by Jeffrey M. Sklarz on behalf of V.X. Cerda & Associates P.A., Defendant Court's Ruling: Matter No. 15 Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding Filed by Jeffrey M. Sklarz on behalf of The Francis Firm PLLC, Defendant Court's Ruling: Matter No. 35 Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding Filed by Jeffrey M. Sklarz on behalf of Berkeley Rowe Limited, Defendant Court's Ruling: Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 19 of 125\n\n| | Case 22-50073 | Doc 3985 | Filed 01/21/25
125 | Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 | Page 20 of | | |\n|----|------------------|-----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|------|--|\n| | | | | | | 20 | |\n| 1 | | | | INDEX | | | |\n| 2 | MOTIONS: | | | | | PAGE | |\n| 3 | Matter | | | | | | |\n| 4 | No. 11 | | Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding Filed
by Jeffrey M. Sklarz on behalf of Weddle Law
PPLC, Defendant | | | | |\n| 5 | | | Court's Ruling: | | | | |\n| 6 | Matter
No. 21 | | | | | | |\n| 7 | | | | Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding Filed | | | |\n| 8 | | | by Jeffrey M. Sklarz on behalf of Lawall &
Mitchell, LLC, Aaron Mitchell, Defendants | | | | |\n| 9 | | | Court's Ruling: | | | | |\n| 10 | Matter
No. 19 | | | | | | |\n| 11 | | | Amended Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding
Filed by Michelle Amanda Antao on behalf of
G4S Security Systems (Hong Kong) Ltd.,
Defendant | | | | |\n| 12 | | | | | | | |\n| 13 | | | Court's Ruling: | | | | |\n| 14 | Matter | | | | | | |\n| 15 | No. 26 | | Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding re
Second Amended Complaint Filed by Jeffrey M.
Sklarz on behalf of ACASS Canada LTD., | | | | |\n| 16 | | Defendant | | | | | |\n| 17 | | | Court's Ruling: | | | | |\n| 18 | Matter
No. 19 | | | | | | |\n| 19 | | | | Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding Filed
by Patrick Tomasiewicz on behalf of Liberty
Jet Management Corp., Defendant | | | |\n| 20 | | | | | | | |\n| 21 | | | Court's Ruling: | | | | |\n| 22 | Matter
No. 17 | | Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on Claim
I of Complaint Filed by Nicholas A. Bassett on
behalf of Luc A. Despins, Plaintiff | | | | |\n| 23 | | | | | | | |\n| 24 | | | Court's Ruling: | | | | |\n| 25 | | | Transcriptionist's Certificate | | | 125 | |\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 21 of 125\n\n| 1 | (Proceedings commenced at 10:17 a.m.) |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | THE DEPUTY:
Okay.
Case Number 22-50073, Ho Wan |\n| 3 | Kwok -- excuse me -- Adversary Number 24-0506, Despins v FFP |\n| 4 | BVI Ltd.; Adversary 24-5110, Despins v Mitchell; Adversary |\n| 5 | 24-5168, Despins v The Francis Firm PLLC; Adversary 24-5186, |\n| 6 | Despins v Berkeley Rowe Limited; Adversary 24-5188, Despins v |\n| 7 | Weddle Law, PLLC; Adversary 24-5199, Despins v Lawall & |\n| 8 | Mitchell LLC, et al.; Adversary 24-5204, Despins v G4S |\n| 9 | Security Systems Hong Kong, Ltd.; Adversary 24-50 -- sorry -- |\n| 10 | 24-5226, Despins v ACASS Canada, Ltd.; Adversary 24-5135, |\n| 11 | Despins v Liberty Jet Management Corp.; Adversary 24-5208, |\n| 12 | Despins v Zeisler & Zeisler P.C. |\n| 13 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Good morning. |\n| 14 | If we could have appearances for the record, |\n| 15 | beginning with the Chapter 11 Trustee, please. |\n| 16 | MR. DESPINS:
Good morning, Your Honor. |\n| 17 | Luc Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee.
I believe that |\n| 18 | one of the matters may have been left off, which is 5134, |\n| 19 | Despins v Serta & Associates. |\n| 20 | THE COURT:
That may be. |\n| 21 | Good morning. |\n| 22 | MS. MOFFET:
Good morning, Your Honor. |\n| 23 | THE COURT:
Counsel, would you mind coming |\n| 24 | forward, just because we can't hear you unless the microphone |\n| 25 | picks up your voice for recording purposes.
Thank you. |\n| | |\n\n 22 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MS. MOFFETT: Yes, Your Honor. I just wanted to note another adversary proceeding that I believe was left off: 5 -- 24-5196, Despins v Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello P.C. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. MS. MOFFETT: Thank you, Your Honor. THE DEPUTY: So, I'm sorry, I did not get the attorney's name, please? MS. MOFFETT: Oh, I'm sorry. My apologies. THE COURT: That's okay. MS. MOFFETT: Rowena Moffett, on behalf of the adversary defendant I just mentioned. THE COURT: Thank you very much. I think we have, maybe, other counsel that might want to come forward? MR. LINSEY: I think, Your Honor -- THE COURT: Just hold on a second, Attorney Linsey. MR. LINSEY: Sure. THE COURT: I'll just hear from counsel first and then we'll go from there. MR. FEDER: Yes, good morning, Your Honor. Benjamin Feder of Kelley, Drye & Warren, appearing on behalf of Indium Software, in the matter of Despins v Indium Software, Number 24-05122. Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 22 of 125\n\n 23 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 THE COURT: I don't think that matter was on this calendar. UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (Indiscernible.) THE COURT: Yeah. You're party to the joint brief, Counsel, your client, correct? MR. FEDER: Correct. THE COURT: Yeah, correct. And I think Attorney Moffett's client is, as well. So, we're not calling all the adversary proceedings that are parties to the joint brief. What we did at the status conference last week, and I'm not sure if either of you were participating in that conference, we took a list of all the parties that have agreed to be part of the joint brief, and that's part of the record. But as far as today is concerned, for -- we put the joint brief as one matter and then the other adversaries that are called are not joint brief Defendants, okay? MR. FEDER: Understood. Thank you. THE COURT: So it's not your -- it's a little - it's a little confusing, obviously. There's hundreds of adversary proceedings. And so the other matters that are on the calendar that are motions to dismiss or motions to dismiss for judgment on the pleadings, are parties who are not joint Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 23 of 125\n\n 24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Defendants to the joint brief -- MR. FEDER: Okay. Thank you. THE COURT: -- and weren't subject to mediation, essentially. MR. FEDER: Thank you for clarifying, Your Honor. THE COURT: Yes, believe me, I understand, okay. So, thank you, though, both of you, and just so you know, you are part of the argument today and your clients are part of the list of the joint Defendants and you all signed on to the joint brief. MR. FEDER: Okay. Thank you, thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. All right. Go ahead, Attorney Bassett. MR. BASSETT: Yes, good afternoon -- sorry -- good morning, Your Honor. Nick Bassett from Paul Hastings, counsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee. THE COURT: Good morning. MR. LINSEY: Good morning, Your Honor. Patrick Linsey, Neubert Pepe & Monteith, counsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee. THE COURT: Good morning. MR. SARNOFF: Good morning, Your Honor. Stuart Sarnoff of O'Melveny Myers, on behalf of Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 24 of 125\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 25 of\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\n4\n\n5\n\n6\n\n7\n\n8\n\n9\n\n10\n\n12\n\n 25 creditor PAX. THE COURT: Good morning. MR. GOLDSTEIN: Good morning, Your Honor. Eric Goldstein from Shipman & Goodwin, on behalf of: Anthem Health Assurance, Inc.; Anthem Health Plans, Inc.; Cedric Realty Corp.; Direct Persuasion LLC; On the Spot Home Improvement, Inc.; and Federal Express Corporation. THE COURT: Good morning. MR. PETERSON: Good morning, Your Honor. Brian Peterson, K&L Gates, on behalf of 125\n\n11 Amazon.com, Inc. and the Amazon Web Services, Inc.\n\nTHE COURT: Good morning.\n\n13 14 15 16 MR. LADDIN: Good morning, Your Honor. Darryl Laddin of Arnall Golden Gregory, on behalf of American Express Company, one of the joint Defendants. THE COURT: Good morning.\n\n17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 You don't have to note your appearance if you're one of the joint Defendants, but that's fine. Thank you. The reason I say that, Counsel, the only reason I say that is we talked about who was going to make the argument on behalf of the joint Defendants and yesterday, as I requested, and it was done and I appreciate that. There was a document filed that Attorney Goldstein and Attorney Peterson are going to be making the arguments on behalf of the joint Defendants.\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 26 of 125\n\n| 1 | One of the reasons I did what I did last week with |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | the attendance was to make sure that all of the Defendants, |\n| 3 | including your client, was part of the record.
And by |\n| 4 | signing on to the joint brief, we will make certain that if a |\n| 5 | transcript is required and requested, that all of the parties |\n| 6 | that are parties to the joint brief, and their counsel, will |\n| 7 | be listed as part of that proceeding. |\n| 8 | MR. LADDIN:
Thank you, Your Honor. |\n| 9 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Thank you. |\n| 10 | MR. SKLARZ:
Good morning, Your Honor. |\n| 11 | Jeffrey Sklarz, Green & Sklarz, for various non |\n| 12 | joint Defendants, as listed in the report filed by the |\n| 13 | trustee.
I won't go through all of my Defendants at this |\n| 14 | time. |\n| 15 | THE COURT:
Thank you. |\n| 16 | MR. SKLARZ:
Thank you. |\n| 17 | MR. KINDSETH:
Good morning, Your Honor. |\n| 18 | THE COURT:
Good morning. |\n| 19 | MR. KINDSETH:
Stephen Kindseth, Zeisler & |\n| 20 | Zeisler, for Zeisler & Zeisler. |\n| 21 | THE COURT:
Good morning. |\n| 22 | So, when we had our status conference last week, |\n| 23 | we talked about the arguments that are going to be made |\n| 24 | today, time limits on arguments, and Attorney Sklarz and |\n| 25 | Attorney Kindseth were the two non-joint Defendants' counsel |\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 27 of 125\n\n 27 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 who I allowed, because everybody made their statements last week, to also make arguments at this hearing. So the way that we will proceed is the way we discussed last week, that the joint Defendants will make their arguments, with regard to the issues that the joint Defendants put forth for the Court back in September of last year. I actually looked back and saw if I had -- and I did have, Attorney Goldstein, the document that you had submitted to the Court at that time, that was the list of the issues that the joint Defendants had agreed to argue. And I wanted to just make sure that the language that was in the order that was issued back after that status conference, that set forth the four issues was the same and it is actually the same. I don't think there's any deviation from the language that your -- you submitted on behalf of all of the joint Defendants. So I did go back and check that. Obviously, as you all know, there are many, many issues in all of these adversaries, but I did go back and make sure that we, in the order, clarified -- not clarified -- excuse me, that's the incorrect word -- included the four issues that -- and it's based -- it seems, to me, to be verbatim of the -- that the joint Defendants asked the Court to consider as legal issues in connection with the motions to dismiss or motions for judgment on the pleadings. So, again, I appreciate that yesterday, a document\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 28 of 125\n\n 28 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 was filed that said that Attorney Peterson would address Issues 1 and 3 and Attorney Goldstein would address Issues 2 and 4. And that's how we would proceed. I believe, but I will listen to any opinions to the contrary, that given the four issues that the joint Defendants put before the Court, that we should take them in order, unless, somehow, Attorney Goldstein or Attorney Peterson, you want to argue -- and I think Attorney Peterson, you're 1 and 3, and Attorney Goldstein is 2 and 4. MR. GOLDSTEIN: Thank you, Your Honor. Eric Goldstein. The way that Attorney Peterson and I tried to organize it so to have a, not a broken-up, disjointed presentation, is if we could, have him do Issue 1 and 3 and then pass to me to do 2 and 4. We think we can do that in a way that flows and makes sense and builds on each other and it doesn't break up with us having to switch to the podium, if that's okay? THE COURT: That's fine. But I will watch your time, right, on each issue, because we did talk about -- because I gave you 15 minutes per issue and I gave the trustee half an hour to respond. MR. GOLDSTEIN: Understood. THE COURT: So, if you're going to do that, Attorney Peterson, that's fine, but I will watch the clock,\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 29 of 125\n\n29\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 okay, and I need you to be -- the issues that the joint Defendants put together are four separate issues and you may argue that 1 and 3 are connected. Well, I think they're all connected, quite frankly, so I'm not going to necessarily agree that you can be arguing about 1 and 3 at the same time or if you do that, I might not, you know, take all of that into consideration. These are four legal issues that the joint Defendants prepared and requested and that request was met by the Court, to address as legal issues, okay. So, if either of you have any questions about that, just -- this would be the time to ask them. MR. GOLDSTEIN: The only clarifying question, Your Honor, is to the extent that I take less than 15 minutes on one of the issues, does that extra time get allotted to my issues? THE COURT: I'm not sure. We'll have to see how that goes; how about that? MR. GOLDSTEIN: Okay. All right. Fair enough, Your Honor. THE COURT: I don't have any lights or anything, so I don't know that that -- but I understand your question and we'll see how that goes. MR. GOLDSTEIN: Okay. THE COURT: Okay. All right.\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 30 of 125\n\n 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Then, Trustee Despins, is there any questions that you have before we begin? MR. DESPINS: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Then, Attorney Peterson, please proceed with Issues 1 and 3. Oh, and may I say something, too, before anybody starts. I think you probably noticed, we don't need to talk about standards on motions to dismiss and motions for judgments on the pleadings. This is just talking about the legal issues, okay. I did say that originally in the order, but I want the record to be clear that no one is disputing the legal standards with regards to motions to dismiss and motions for judgment on the pleadings, okay. MR. GOLDSTEIN: I understand. THE COURT: All right. So -- MR. GOLDSTEIN: And I appreciate any guidance, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. So it's 10:30, please proceed. MR. PETERSON: Again, Your Honor, Brian Peterson, K&L Gates, on behalf of Amazon.com, Inc. and Amazon Web Services, Inc. So, as we just discussed, I'll be addressing Issues 1 and 3. The first issue is whether the trustee can avoid an initial transfer by a nondebtor entity. Your Honor,\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 31 of 125\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 the joint Defendants filed their omnibus motion to dismiss because we have a fundamental disagreement with the trustee regarding the scope of his avoidance action powers. We believe that the trustee's claims under 548, 549, and 544 fail as a matter of law because they seek the avoidance of transfers made by nondebtor entities.\n\n7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 We believe that the trustee's approach in these alter ego -- in these avoidance action adversaries, Your Honor, is overreaching and is not consistent with the Bankruptcy Code. Now, I do want to address one point that the trustee makes in his brief, Your Honor, and that is, if you were to rule in the Joint Defendants' favor, you would somehow deprive the trustee of his recourse to remedy a fraud.\n\n15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 We don't believe that's accurate, Your Honor. The trustee has recourse against the alter-ego entities themselves and their assets. The trustee also has recourse against the principals of the alter-egos, to the extent they aided and abetted any fraud, but more fundamentally, Your Honor, the trustee's duty in this case is not to remedy a fraud; the trustee's duty is to administer the bankruptcy estate of Kwok in a manner that complies with the directives of the Bankruptcy Code.\n\n24 25 So, as we often do, let's start with the plain language of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 548 provides that a\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 32 of 125\n\n1 2 3 4 trustee may avoid a transfer of an interest of the debtor and property; similarly, Section 549 allows the trustee to avoid a transfer of property of the debtor -- property of the debtor.\n\n5 6 7 8 Now, 5 -- excuse me -- a transfer of an interest or property of the estate. Property of the estate is defined as legal or equity interests of the debtor and property, as of the commencement of the case.\n\n9 10 11 In turn, the debtor, under the Code, is defined as an entity or a person that is subject to a case under you Title 11.\n\n12 13 14 15 16 544 reads the same and references, specifically, the debtor. It allows -- gives the trustee the rights of a hypothetical lien creditor and grants the trustee the ability to avoid a transfer of property of the debtor, that is avoidable by a hypothetical creditor of the debtor.\n\n17 18 19 20 The trustee's attempt to avoid transfers made by nondebtor entities is important because it deprives the Joint Defendants of their statutory defenses, including the subsequent transfer of good faith to funds.\n\n21 22 23 24 25 Now, Your Honor, what is the basis for the trustee to make this distinction and overlook the plain language of the Bankruptcy Code. It's the trustee's position that the alter-ego entities and the debtor are one in the same; that the alter-ego determinations that this Court made convert\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 33 of 125\n\n33\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 those entities into debtors under the Code. And that's what we have a disagreement about, Your Honor. We disagree that the effect of those alter-ego determinations was to convert them into debtors under the Code. And to that point, Your Honor, we don't believe that we're asking you, in any way, to overrule any prior decision you made, with respect to the nondebtor transferors and whether or not they may be alter-egos. The narrower issue before this Court that we're here to address, and the issues that we have raised, is the effect of those alter-ego determinations. And the effect is not to grant the trustee avoidance action powers, with respect to transfers made by those nondebtor entities. That brings us to Question 2, which is: What is the effect of the alter-ego or reverse veil-piercing determination under applicable law? THE COURT: You mean -- it's actually Issue 3 -- MR. PETERSON: Oh, yeah. It's -- THE COURT: -- just to be clear, for the -- MR. PETERSON: Yes, it is Issue 3. THE COURT: -- your second argument, but just to be clear for the record, okay. Thank you. MR. PETERSON: Yes, thank you. THE COURT: Go ahead. MR. PETERSON: Thank you, Your Honor.\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 34 of 125\n\n| 1 | As a matter of law, the alter-ego determinations |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | does not give the trustee standing to avoid transfers of |\n| 3 | nondebtors.
As we have set forth in our briefing, Your |\n| 4 | Honor, at most, what that alter-ego determination does is it |\n| 5 | results in vicarious liability against those alter-egos. |\n| 6 | And we cited multiple decisions for this |\n| 7 | conclusion: In re Stillwater, 559 B.R. 563; that's a |\n| 8 | bankruptcy decision out of the Southern District of New York. |\n| 9 | The Court rejected the alter-ego theory to selectively pool |\n| 10 | assets of the Delaware entity with the debtor entity for |\n| 11 | purposes of creating causes of action under 544. |\n| 12 | And the Court specifically stated it knows of no |\n| 13 | support for the idea that alter-ego theories can be used in |\n| 14 | this selective and self-serving way. |\n| 15 | That issue came before the Court on a Ms. Convoy's |\n| 16 | and the Court granted the motion to dismiss.
Similarly, |\n| 17 | in -- In re Wardle, the Ninth Circuit BAP decision, the Court |\n| 18 | determined that -- |\n| 19 | THE COURT:
Can you spell the name of that case, |\n| 20 | please, the one that you just noted. |\n| 21 | MR. PETERSON:
The one I -- |\n| 22 | THE COURT:
Wardle. |\n| 23 | MR. PETERSON:
Wardle? |\n| 24 | In re Wardle, it's W-a-r-d-l-e. |\n| 25 | THE COURT:
Thank you. |\n| | |\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 35 of 125\n\n35\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 MR. PETERSON: The BAP determined that the trustee did not have standing to pursue Chapter 5 avoidance action claims against a nondebtor -- or brought through a nondebtor entity, stating: \"An alter-ego determination will not somehow transmogrify the alleged alter-ego's funds into property of the debtor's estate.\" The Court noted: \"That unless there's substantive consolidation or a bankruptcy petition filed by that nondebtor, there's no corporate bankruptcy estate and, therefore, the trustee cannot pursue 547 and 548 actions in the nondebtor's name.\" We cited additional decisions, Your Honor, for the same proposition: In re Silver and In re Dumouchelle. And those are both bankruptcy decisions out of Michigan. THE COURT: I apologize. Would you spell for the record, the second of the two Michigan cases. Like, silver, we've got, but ... MR. PETERSON: Yep, Dumouchelle. It's D-u-m-o-uc-h-e-l-l-e. THE COURT: Thank you. MR. PETERSON: And in that decision, the Court rejected fraudulent transfer claims based on transfers from the Debtor's alter-ego company formed under Michigan law, which applied the vicarious liability approach to alter-ego.\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 36 of 125\n\n36\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 Your Honor, as stated in the court, in the Pavers, which is a District Court case out of the Eastern District of New York, just because two entities are alter-egos does not make them both debtors under the Bankruptcy Code. It simply means they are liable for each other's debts. That's at page 51 of the decision.\n\n7 8 9 10 11 12 Your Honor, the Joint Defendants do acknowledge that some courts have recognized the \"identity theory,\" and in, In re Howland, the Sixth Circuit described how this distinction between vicarious liability and identity theory can be relevant to the determination of whether alter-ego confers standing on a trustee.\n\n13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 There, the Court granted the Defendants motion for judgment on the pleadings and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. And the basis for the Court's ruling was that, and its conclusion that an individual debtor, a trustee of an individual debtor, could not avoid under 548, the transfer made by a nondebtor alter-ego under a veil-piercing theory is because the Court applied Kentucky law and it determined that Kentucky law is a vicarious liability state.\n\n21 22 23 Importantly, Your Honor, Delaware law, we believe, applies a vicarious liability approach to alter-ego; in other words, Delaware is not an identity theory state.\n\n24 25 Before the hearing, Your Honor, in preparation for this argument, we did discover that the Delaware Chancery\n\n 37 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Court issued opinion -- an opinion in the middle of December, just a month ago. It's Gracey v Albawardi. THE COURT: All right. Hold on one second -- MR. PETERSON: Uh-huh. THE COURT: -- because that isn't in any of the papers, then, correct? MR. PETERSON: Correct. THE COURT: All right. So would you please spell the names for the record. MR. PETERSON: Yeah, and we also have -- we have copies of the case and we've already -- THE COURT: Thank you. MR. PETERSON: -- provided them to opposing counsel. If I may approach, please? THE COURT: Yes, please. But, again, when you have a chance, Attorney Peterson, if you could just spell the name of the case for the record, please, since this is not in any of the briefs. MR. PETERSON: Sure. It's Gracey, G-r-a-c-e-y v Albawardi, A-l-b-a-w-a-r-d-i. And the Westlaw citation is 2024 WL 5116368. Why do we think this decision is important and why are we addressing it with you right now at this hearing? Well, it's the Delaware Court's most recent Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 37 of 125\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 38 of 125\n\n38\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 description of the effect of a reverse veil-piercing. In that decision, the Court considered the Plaintiff's request for declaratory judgment, that certain entities were alteregos of Albawardi. In describing the request, the Court said that Gracey sought reverse veil-piercing, which the Court described as, quote, \"The imposition of liability on a business uh organization for the liabilities of its owners.\" And that statement is at the end of page 4. Thus -- THE COURT: What page, I'm sorry? MR. PETERSON: 4. THE COURT: 4? MR. PETERSON: That's the Westlaw page. THE COURT: Uh-huh. MR. PETERSON: So, Your Honor, we're citing that decision as the most recent description of the effect of veil-piercing under Delaware law, which we believe supports our position that an alter-ego determination results in vicarious liability. We also -- THE COURT: So, may I just -- I just wanted to follow what you said about the Gracey -- MR. PETERSON: Sure. THE COURT: -- because, obviously, I haven't seen\n\n 39 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 it until now, which is absolutely fine. MR. PETERSON: Uh-huh. THE COURT: I think what you're reading is, am I correct, you're reading a paragraph that starts with the number A -- with the number -- the letter A, alter-ego theory liability, and it says: \"And in Count 1 of the amended petition --\" MR. PETERSON: Uh-huh. THE COURT: -- \"Gracey seeks declaratory judgment that Dial and Dial subsidiaries --\" I don't even know if I'm saying that properly, even -- \"are alter-ego of Albawardi, and, therefore, liable to her for all monies due and owing under the judgment.\" MR. PETERSON: Uh-huh. THE COURT: And, then, I think this is the sentence that you were just referring to, but I want to make sure that it's the sentence, that is: \"Gracey seeks reverse veil-piercing -- quote, the imposition of a liability on a business organization for the liabilities of its owners.\" MR. PETERSON: Correct. THE COURT: Okay. So the Court is just stating what the cause of action is in that paragraph, correct? MR. PETERSON: We believe, Your Honor, the Court is describing what the reverse veil-piercing is. Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 39 of 125\n\n 40 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 THE COURT: Well, what is Footnote 58, apparently? Let's see, I don't know. MR. PETERSON: That's a citation to Manichaean. THE COURT: Well, it cites to Manichaean, 58, right? MR. PETERSON: Uh-huh. THE COURT: And then it says: \"As noted from the organizational chart above,\" which of course I haven't looked at yet, but it's there, apparently, \"the Dial entities are ultimately held through trusts. See super notes 24, 25. Even if Gracey's claim were stronger, I would hesitate to veil-pierce since any financial benefit Albawardi derived from the Dial entities would seem to be as a trust beneficiary, not as an owner of the Dial entities. I need not grapple with these complexities in any event, because Gracey's claim is non-viable. So, I don't know if it's really -- implement not sure yet, because I haven't read the whole case. MR. PETERSON: Okay. THE COURT: But I'm not sure if the quote that you're taking that from case, from the Gracey case actually says what the status of reverse veil-piercing is. It cites to Manichaean Capital -- MR. PETERSON: Yeah. Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 40 of 125\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 41 of 125\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 THE COURT: -- which talks about reverse veilpiercing and which finds that reverse veil-piercing is a viable claim. That's what Manichaean Capital says. MR. PETERSON: I understand your point, Your Honor, which is, you know, ultimately, in Gracey, it looks like the Court did not allow the alter-ego claim to go forward, right. So, did the Court really need to make a legal determination as to what the effect of veil-piercing would be in that particular case, right? Now, Your Honor, we believe that's the same as Manichaean. In Manichaean, the Plaintiffs in that case actually sought to enforce a judgment or a charging order -- THE COURT: A charging order, right. MR. PETERSON: -- against the alter-ego. And the Plaintiff wasn't seeking a determination that the entities were one in the same for all purposes. So any supportive statement in Manichaean was actually *dicta* in that case, too. So, if --\n\n20 21 22 23 24 25 THE COURT: But in Manichaean, the Court, the Delaware Chancery Court was dealing specifically with Delaware statutes, with regard to how the shareholders could bring a cause of action for value of their shares under a statute created by Delaware Legislature in order to avoid the, essentially, stopping of a merger; isn't that true? And\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 42 of 125\n\n42\n\n1 2 that's what happened in Manichaean Capital, that the shareholder got its charging order --\n\nMR. PETERSON: Uh-huh.\n\n3\n\n6\n\n4 5 THE COURT: -- the company wouldn't -- the company against whom they got the charging order wouldn't pay.\n\nMR. PETERSON: Uh-huh.\n\n7 8 9 10 11 12 THE COURT: That company was merged into another company and they brought another cause of action, asserting both, the alter-ego or reverse veil-piercing, both, to the merged company and to the subsidiaries that were still in existence from the company that merged from the new company. MR. PETERSON: Uh-huh.\n\n13 14 15 16 17 18 19 THE COURT: So, I -- but under Delaware, under that case, they're not talking about things being held in trust. They're talking about corporate entities and merger issues and specific Delaware statutes that deal with the manner, the only manner in which, according to Manichaean Capital, anyway, that shareholder could assert that they were not being paid the value of their shares upon the merger.\n\n20 21 22 23 24 25 MR. PETERSON: I think in both instances, and the reason, you know, our position, the Joint Defendants' position with respect to both decisions, is in expressing alter-ego and the relief sought, the Court's articulation of that was in a description of that relief as a form of vicarious liability, both in Manichaean, and in Gracey.\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 43 of 125\n\n43\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 And understanding there could be limitations with Gracey in terms of if the claim was not viable; ultimately, that's what the Court determined. But if we're going to look to Delaware law to see how you courts have described alterego, they have not described them as -- alter-ego theory as an identity theory; instead, they described it as vicarious liability and the way they've articulated it. THE COURT: But I don't -- you -- I haven't ready copies of Gracey, but I didn't think they used the words \"vicarious liability\" in Manichaean Capital. And I could be\n\n11 wrong, Counsel, so please correct me.\n\n12 13 14 MR. PETERSON: Well, I was planning on addressing Manichaean later, but I'll address it now. So, at its most basic level -- this is the quote from the decision:\n\n15 16 17 \"Reverse veil-piercing involves the imposition of liability on a business organization for the liabilities of its owners.\"\n\n18 19 That, Your Honor, that quote right there, that's vicarious liability.\n\n20 21 Now, what the trustee relies on is the second, later sentence:\n\n22 23 24 25 \"In the parent subsidiary context, where the subsidiaries and their alter-ego, the parent, the Court will treat the assets of the subsidiary as those of the parent.\" We think that that sentence is taken out of\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 44 of 125\n\n1 2 3 4 context. It's talking about the parent subsidiary scenario and we believe that it's -- the Court is merely saying the parent can look to the assets of the sub to satisfy the liability.\n\n5 6 7 8 9 In Manichaean, plaintiff's claim for reverse veilpiercing, according to Court, sought to quote, \"Hold source HOV Holdings' subsidiary liable for its debts.\" That's at page 700 of the decision. So they didn't seek consolidation of the two entities for all purposes.\n\n10 11 12 13 14 And so given the scenario, given the posture of the case, any statement that the trustee is relying on, Your Honor, is *dicta*. That issue wasn't before the Court. The Court was determining whether it could hold an entity vicariously liable.\n\n15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 In addition, it's contradicted. That *dicta* was contradicted by the Court's prior citation, Footnote 84. And there, they cite Sky Cable, a quote there that says, Reverse veil-piercing attached is just liability to the entity for a judgment against the individuals who hold an ownership interest in the entity. For all of those reasons -- THE COURT: Footnote 84? MR. PETERSON: Footnote 84.\n\n24 25 THE COURT: Go ahead. I just wanted to make sure I got you properly.\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 45 of 125\n\n| 1 | MR. PETERSON:
One more point on man chemo, right, |\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | is the Court, for the favorable quote that we believe is just |\n| 3 | a straight sentence that the trustee takes out of context, |\n| 4 | the Court cites to Spring Real Estate.
Spring Real Estate, |\n| 5 | we believe, doesn't carry weight.
Spring Real Estate relied |\n| 6 | on American International Refinery, and in that case, the |\n| 7 | Court applied Nevada law, not Delaware law, and Nevada law, |\n| 8 | more clearly, adopts the identity theory of alter-ego. |\n| 9 | So, I'll go back to our previous discussion.
We |\n| 10 | talked about Gracey and the effect of the alter-ego |\n| 11 | determination.
Your Honor, the Joint Defendants believe that |\n| 12 | RS Air, the Ninth Circuit BAP decision from 2023, speaks |\n| 13 | directly to the issue. |\n| 14 | THE COURT:
Would you spell that, again, I |\n| 15 | apologize.
But it's helpful for the record. |\n| 16 | MR. PETERSON:
Sure, Your Honor. |\n| 17 | RS Air, LLC V NetJets Aviation, Inc. at 651 B.R. |\n| 18 | 538. |\n| 19 | THE COURT:
Thank you. |\n| 20 | MR. PETERSON:
Why is RS Air important? |\n| 21 | RS Air is important because it's a BAP-level |\n| 22 | decision and it's the most recent bankruptcy decision |\n| 23 | discussing the effect of alter-ego under Delaware law.
Ninth |\n| 24 | Circuit BAP determined the contours of the alter-ego doctrine |\n| 25 | under Delaware law and the context of determining whether |\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 46 of 125\n\n| | 46 |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | certain creditors violated the discharge injunction by filing |\n| 2 | a State Court action against the debtor's alleged alter-egos. |\n| 3 | The Court said: |\n| 4 | \"Although the alter-ego doctrine requires a |\n| 5 | showing that the two entities operated as a single economic |\n| 6 | entity, the result is not to deem the entities the same, but |\n| 7 | to hold one liable for the other's debts.\" |\n| 8 | So, what is the Court saying in RS Air?
The Court |\n| 9 | is saying in RS Air, that even if you have a nondebtor |\n| 10 | determination -- a determination that a nondebtor is an |\n| 11 | alter-ego, that alter-ego doesn't get the benefit of the |\n| 12 | discharge injunction.
It doesn't magically become a debtor |\n| 13 | entity. |\n| 14 | For the same reason, Your Honor, we don't believe |\n| 15 | that the trustee should be able to argue that these nondebtor |\n| 16 | entities in this case magically become debtors and, |\n| 17 | therefore, he has standing to assert alter-ego actions |\n| 18 | against the Joint Defendants. |\n| 19 | Additional decisions, Your Honor, that we cited to |\n| 20 | support our conclusion, statements in Otto Candies and |\n| 21 | NetJets Aviation v LHC Communications; that's a Second |\n| 22 | Circuit decision stating that under Delaware law, the |\n| 23 | distinction between the entity and its owner may be |\n| 24 | disregarded and require an owner to answer for the entity's |\n| 25 | debts. |\n| | |\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 47 of 125\n\n 47 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Wilson v Thorn Energy and BFI Waste Systems of America, LLC [sic] v Shaw Environmental & Infrastructure, Inc.; all of those cases talked about the alter-ego determination allows for a veil-piercing to hold another entity vicariously liable for one's debts. Now, Your Honor, I think that the trustee knows that the weight of these decisions, Wardle, RS Air, In re Stillwater, and especially in the bankruptcy context, all lead and should lead this Court to the conclusion that he does not have standing to pursue transfers made by nondebtor entities. And I see in the briefing, really, two arguments. One is, well, federal common law should apply, not State law. And the other is the trustee relies on additional authority, but we think, Your Honor, is hardly distinguishable, is *dicta*, or applies non-Delaware law, like, invalid law. And, first, Your Honor, I want to talk about this\n\n18 19 20 21 assertion that somehow federal common law applies. We start with Butner. The property interests are created and defined by state law and unless some federal interest requires a different result.\n\n22 23 24 25 More importantly, what if courts said in the context of alter-ego claims, they've held that state law governs, In re 10th Avenue Distributors [sic]. It is clear that the contours of the alter-ego cause of action are to be\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 48 of 125\n\n48\n\n1 determined with reference to state law.\n\n2 3 4 5 6 McElroy v FirstEnergy Corp. -- that's a Third Circuit case -- the Court said the same. The only federal common law that could support the trustee's theory in this case is substantive consolidation and that's not the claim that the trustee has chosen to pursue.\n\n7 8 9 The trustee fails to cite a single case in which the Court has concluded that federal common law applies to the alter-ego doctrine. And Duckworth really sums it up:\n\n10 11 12 13 \"Piercing the corporate veil is a state law, common, equitable remedy that has nothing to do with federal bankruptcy law. And it goes without saying, it is never applied by State Court's in a bankruptcy context.\"\n\n14 15 16 17 18 Now, the Court or the trustee, Your Honor, has relied on statements and certain decisions saying, once a state law interest is determined under non-bankruptcy law, federal law determines whether such interests constitute property of the estate.\n\n19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Your Honor, that just means you look to the state law first to determine the existence and the extent of a property interest and then you look to the Bankruptcy Code and bankruptcy law to determine whether some contrary, whether the Bankruptcy Code mandates a different result. By way of example, 541 is broadly worded, but it also, specifically, carves out certain property from property of\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 49 of 125\n\n49\n\n1 2 the estate: retirement account funds, college savings funds are not included as property of the estate.\n\n3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Section 552 of the Bankruptcy Code allows the debtor to exempt property from the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy filing itself doesn't create new property interests or enhance existing state law interests. All of the decisions the trustee cites to, or many of them -- In re Ground Round, In re Chardon, In re Nejberger, Nicole Gas Production, Commodore Business Machines, and others, none of those cases were alter-ego cases. And in all of those cases, the Court actually looked to state law to determine the scope of the estate's interests in property.\n\n13 14 15 16 Now, next, Your Honor, the trustee says that as a consequence of alter-ego, even under state law, that there is this merger of entities. And we believe, Your Honor, that's incorrect. Because if you reach that conclusion --\n\n17 18 19 THE COURT: Would you repeat? I'm sorry, I didn't hear exactly what you said. If you would say that again, I'm sorry.\n\nMR. PETERSON: Sure.\n\n20\n\n21 22 23 24 25 Your Honor, in addition to arguing making the federal law a common law argument, the trustee also says even under state law, the results of the alter-ego determination is to make the alter-egos one in the same with the debtor. We disagree and we believe, Your Honor, if you\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 50 of 125\n\n50\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 were to side with the trustee on that issue, you would have to disagree. All of the authorities we have cited in our brief, especially the authorities that specifically discuss the alter-ego determination in the context of bankruptcy. That's In re Wardle. It's In re RS Air. It's In re Stillwater. It's Duckworth, as well. All of these decisions make it clear that the consequence of the alter-ego is not to magically transmogrify property of a nondebtor into property of the estate. We discussed Manichaean; that's a case that the trustee relies on. In addition, the trustee cites to In re Blatstein, a Third Circuit decision. The Court never ruled on the effect of alter-ego in that decision. In re Palmieri is another case that the trustee cites to. This -- the Court's statement in that case was pure *dicta*. The Court said that if the trustee eventually prevails on its claim, that will lead to the conclusion that the debtor owned its home when it was transferred to his girlfriend's company. In addition, the Court never provided any citation for that statement that the trustee relies on. In re American International Refinery, as I mentioned previously, I think, Your Honor, that case does not control. It applied Nevada alter-ego law, which clearly adopts the identity theory.\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 51 of 125\n\n| 1 | ASARCO.
ASARCO, Your Honor, involved a suit |\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | against an insider parent company of the debtor and the Court |\n| 3 | in that case, we believe, Your Honor, got it wrong.
They |\n| 4 | cited to Polly Petroleum as Delaware law, but Polly Petroleum |\n| 5 | is a 1968 case.
It didn't concern avoidance actions and it |\n| 6 | involved a Delaware entity suing another entity to exercise |\n| 7 | control over a Mexican subsidiary to stop it from prosecuting |\n| 8 | litigation. |\n| 9 | I also didn't have any support for the statement |\n| 10 | that the trustee relied on in that decision, so it was dicta. |\n| 11 | In addition, the transfer at issue was by the debtor's |\n| 12 | subsidiary or the immediate parent.
So all these -- the |\n| 13 | companies involved were closely related. |\n| 14 | Insiders were affiliates of each other and the |\n| 15 | Court addressed the argument that this was effectively |\n| 16 | substantive consolidation and said that there was no risk to |\n| 17 | the subsidiary's creditors in the case.
So we think it was |\n| 18 | wrongly decided under applying and wrongly applied Delaware |\n| 19 | law, but it's also distinguishable for a number of reasons. |\n| 20 | THE COURT:
I'm going to give you two more |\n| 21 | minutes. |\n| 22 | MR. PETERSON:
Okay.
Two more minutes.
I'll uh |\n| 23 | go to my concluding thoughts, Your Honor. |\n| 24 | The trustee's avoidance action powers are limited |\n| 25 | to transfers by a debtor of their interest in property.
This |\n| | |\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 52 of 125\n\n1 2 3 4 is the plain language of 548, 549, and 544. The trustee has chosen strategically to assert that nondebtor entities or alter-egos of Kwok and claims that this means that they are debtors, themselves.\n\n5 6 7 8 9 10 That's not the case. We're deprived of our defenses. If you were to rule in the trustee's favor. And it rejects and is in appear sit with Wardle, RS Air, Stillwater, Pavers, In re Silver, In re Duckworth, all of the bankruptcy decisions that discuss the issue, which we think Your Honor should focus on.\n\n11 12 13 14 15 16 Your Honor, the only decision, as far as the Joint Defendants can tell where a Court applying Delaware law specifically ruled that veil-piercing confers avoidance action standing on the trustee, is the ASARCO decision that I just discussed. That's one. One case. That's it. And we believe Your Honor should reject that case.\n\n17 18 19 20 21 22 In addition, the trustee doesn't cite a single indication authorizing the trustee to avoid a 549 claim made by a nondebtor under a veil-piercing theory under Delaware law. We put that in brief, in our brief, opening brief in bold and there wasn't a specific response in the trustee's brief to that argument.\n\n23 24 25 We think you should rely on RS Air, Stillwater, and rule that the trustee has failed to state a claim for relief against the Joint Defendants.\n\n 53 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 THE COURT: Thank you. MR. PETERSON: Good morning -- we're still morning, Your Honor. THE COURT: Good morning. MR. PETERSON: So, I'm going to take Issues 2 and 4. Just as a shorthand, when I -- I'm going to use in my presentation the phrase \"nondebtor transferors,\" which is referencing the handful of entities that are alleged to have made transfers to the Joint Defendants. So, rather than spelling them out each time, I'm just going to use that as a shorthand. THE COURT: Go right ahead. MR. PETERSON: Okay. So, Issue 2. Whether applicable law allows to reverse veil-piercing or alter ego determinations, I'm going to jump right into the Manichaean decision that Your Honor was discussing with Attorney Peterson. That case wrestled with whether or not Delaware would recognize a reverse veil-piercing claim and ultimately concluded that, quote, \"In limited circumstances and in circumscribed execution, it would.\" The Court reached that conclusion by first can value-maximizing the courts that have rejected it. And they -- the Manichaean courts framed that, the courts that do reject it as, you know, the concern was that it would, quote, facilitate harm through judicial decree to innocent shareholders and third-party creditors. Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 53 of 125\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 54 of 125\n\n54\n\n1 2 3 And the Manichaean Court characterized that concern as well-founded. It was a serious concern in allowing the reverse veil-piercing.\n\n4 5 6 7 8 9 10 The Court, then, continued in its analysis to look at some of the other Court's decisions that have tried to navigate this issue and recognize that there are some court decisions out in the country where they say, Well, we'll allow it. We'll allow reverse veil-piercing in certain, limited instances, where those risks to third parties don't exist.\n\n11 12 13 For example, the Manichaean Court looked to the CF Trust, Inc. v First Flight case, which is a Virginia Supreme Court decision, which allowed the reverse veil-piercing.\n\n14 15 16 17 But the mean chemical Court, as they put it, they said it required a claimant to, quote, demonstrate that reverse veil-piercing will not cause harm to innocent investors or innocent secured and unsecured creditors.\n\n18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Taking a lead from that latter line of cases, the Chancery Court said out of frame worked, a carefully circumscribed reverse veil-piercing doctrine. In doing that, the Chancery Court warned that if appropriate standards were not applied, reverse veil-piercing can, quote, threaten innocent third-party creditors and shareholders and lead to a host of unpredictable outcomes for those constituents -- for these constituencies; page 714.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 55 of 125\n\n55\n\n1 2 3 4 5 Thus, the Chancery Court held, also at page 714: \"Only in cases alleging egregious facts, coupled with the lack of real and substantial prejudice to third parties, should the Court even consider utilizing the reverse veil-piercing doctrine.\"\n\n6 7 8 9 10 So, it's your view that under the Manichaean Court's circumscribed test or framework for reverse veilpiercing, that it's a pleading requirement that there not be real and substantial prejudice to third parties, such as the target entity creditors.\n\n11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Noting parenthetically, that in that Gracey decision that Attorney Peterson was discussing, that very recent Delaware Chancery Court case, among the numerous pleading deficiencies that the Court identified there, one of the issues that they cropped up was the risk of harm to third parties. In that instance, the Court -- and I know Your Honor hasn't looked at it and will, but when you get there, the Court talked about the fact that these subsidiaries, that they wanted to pierce the veil into, where it involved in decades' worth of real estate transactions, which raised the specter of harm to third parties, as well as the ultimate ownership involved people, other than the Defendant, so that there could be impacts on the ultimate ownership through the trust to these beneficiaries, who are other than the Defendant.\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 56 of 125\n\n 56 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 So, again, it was identified as one, as among many pleading deficiencies identified in the case. So, turning to our case for the cases against the Joint Defendants, the trustee is using the reverse veilpiercing doctrine to create initial transferee avoidance liability against the Joint Defendants. We don't believe that's allowed and consistent with the test set forth in Manichaean, which says that you can only use the doctrine when you're not trying to prejudice third parties. So there's no allegations that third parties of the nondebtor transferors will not suffer real and substantial prejudice by use of reverse veil-piercing to create avoidance liability here, nor could there be. On the\n\n14 15 16 very face of these claims that they're intended to create millions of dollars of avoidance liability to the Joint Defendants.\n\n17 18 19 20 21 22 23 In addition, there's a more nuanced issue, which again, Attorney Peterson touched on, which is that by trying to use the veil-piercing doctrine to create initial transferee liability, you're cutting off a subsequent transferee defense that would be available if the claims were being brought against the Joint Defendants as, subsequently, transferees under 550.\n\n24 25 So, I want to just address some of the responses that the trustee has made to this interpretation of\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 57 of 125\n\n 57 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Manichaean. So, in the opposition, the trustee argues that harm to third-party creditors is just a factor, it's part of a balancing test and it's not dispositive. Not even -- what I think about it is a gating issue. But that's not what the Court said in Manichaean; rather, as noted just a second ago, they said only in cases alleging lack of real substantial prejudice creditors, should the Court even consider utilizing the doctrine. The support for the trustee's position that it's a factor as part of a balancing test, right, where they cite to In re Petters Company, Inc. and Sky Cable, LLC -- and it's Petters with two Ts, for the transcript -- that that - those cases stand for the proposition that it's a factor in a balancing test. Well, those decisions were years before\n\n16 17 18 19 20 Manichaean, right, and those were a bankruptcy decision from Minnesota, a Fourth Circuit decision, where they were just trying to divine what the Delaware Supreme Court might one day say, because the Delaware Supreme Court hadn't said what the reverse veil-piercing test would be.\n\n21 22 And in Petters, in addition to Delaware law, they were also applying Minnesota law.\n\n23 24 25 But we now know the answer. We know the answer because they said it in Manichaean, right, about what the test is. And I guess if you step into the thinking in\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 58 of 125\n\n58\n\n1 2 3 4 5 Manichaean, they cite to In re Phillips in that decision, which is a Colorado Supreme Court case, 130 -- it's a Colorado Supreme Court case, which held that the reverse veil-piercing may only be employed when an equitable result would be achieved.\n\n6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 And the Colorado Supreme Court said, when innocent shareholders or creditors would be prejudiced by outside reverse veil-piercing, an equitable result is not achieved. And, note, that was one of lines of cases that Manichaean kind of adopted its framework on where they recognize the threat, they recognize the risk, but still said, Okay, as long as we can isolate and know that that risk isn't going to occur, well, then, we can allow the reverse veil-piercing doctrine to go forward.\n\n15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 The other arguments that were raised by the trustee is that it was -- that it's premature, right, it's premature at this stage of the case. Well, we view it, and I think Manichaean lays it out, but it's an element to be pled, right. It's a gating issue, whether or not you get to reverse veil-piercing and it should be allegedly. It should be alleged under Rule 11 for facts sufficient to give rise to a recognizable claim that's joint before we have to incur the costs of litigation beyond the pleading stage, and they have not done so.\n\n25\n\nThe other argument that's made is that, well, you\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 59 of 125\n\n59\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 know, the Joint Defendants are not going to suffer any harm here because they could file claims under 502(h). Well, that's -- they're not offering that they'll be able to refund all the money, plus interest to account for the time value. And we all know that the timing of any recovery is likely years' away and the quantum, wholly uncertain. So, just monetarily, that's not a satisfactory response to the real prejudice that the Joint Defendants would fair.\n\n9 10 11 12 13 14 And then there's that more subtle issue, right, which is we're being -- by trying to use alter-ego to create initial transferee liability, we, then, would be losing the carefully-balanced defenses that Congress set out in 550 for subsequent transfers, where we'd be able to talk about good faith and value as a defense.\n\n15 16 17 18 19 So, you know, the allegations of real and substantial prejudice to third parties is a gating issue under Delaware law, for the imposition of the equitable doctrine of reverse veil-piercing against the Joint Defendants.\n\n20 21 22 23 24 25 The complaints against the Joint Defendants do not allege the absence of real and substantial prejudice, and they can't, because the whole idea is to impose prejudice on the trade creditors by making them targets of these initial transferee alter-ego claims and taking away their 550 defenses as a subsequent transferee. So, on this ground\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 60 of 125\n\n60\n\n1 2 alone, we think the motions submitted by the Joint Defendants should be granted.\n\n3 4 5 6 7 8 9 And with that, I'm going to pivot to Issue 4. Okay. So Issue 4 is whether a determination of reverse veilpiercing on -- or alter-ego may be applied retroactively. And when I am addressing this issue, I'm just going to assume for the sake of argument, right, that let's say they can allege a viable, reverse veil-piercing claim under Delaware law and let's assume Delaware is identity theory, okay.\n\n10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Well, even so, the alter-ego doctrine can't be applied retroactively to allow the trustee to assert these initial transferee avoidance claims against the Joint Defendants. They're trying to treat transfers from nondebtor transferors, as (indiscernible) the debtor, even though these occurred years before any rulings just regarding their corporate form. That is, what the trustee is trying to do here is merge the nondebtor transferor's assets, right, into one unified estate with the debtor retroactive to the petition date for these 549 claims, and retroactive back to further in time for these fraudulent transfer claims.\n\n21 22 23 And from that unified set of assets, claims would be paid of creditors, including the Joint Defendants' 502(h) claims against this unified estate.\n\n24 25 Well, in my mind, what that is, in essence, is substantive consolidation. And I think the case law, because\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 61 of 125\n\n1 2 3 4 5 the result is the same, right. You're pooling assets and pooling liabilities into one unified estate. Because the outcome is the same, I think the case law governing substantive consolidation retroactively, *nunc pro tunc*, is helpful to look at, right. It provides us some guideposts.\n\n6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 And that's really -- we could start with the DC Circuit's seminal decision in Auto-Train, where it observed that, in addition to the very difficult tests that have been set out in, you know, in Augustino and in Auto-Train and in other cases for substantive consolidation, you need to take an additional and slightly different balancing test to avoid havoc that you would wreak on creditors by retroactively changing what a petition date would be.\n\n14 15 16 17 18 So, in Auto-Train, the facts are, you know, we should revisit it because there's analogies to this case. So, in Auto-Train, the debtor filed in September 1980 and its subsidiary, Railway Services Company, had made transfers to Midland Ross in June and July of 1980.\n\n19 20 21 22 In November 1980, the trustee for Auto-Train obtained a substantive consolidation order, substantively consolidating Railway into Auto-Train's bankruptcy case and did so *nunc pro tunc*, back to September 8th, 1980.\n\n23 24 25 So, what does that do? That makes the transfers to Midland Ross into the preference period. So Midland Ross challenged on appeal the proprietary of using *nunc pro tunc*\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 62 of 125\n\nsubstantive consolidation to create this avoidance liability under 547. And the trustee in Auto-Train asserted that the *nunc pro tunc* order, just like the trustee here, quote: \"Merely caused the record to reflect a fact that already existed; namely, that Railway had no existence\n\n7 separate from Auto-Train.\"\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\n4\n\n5\n\n6\n\n8 9 The D.C. Circuit rejected that argument and it explained that, quote -- and this is at page 276:\n\n10 11 12 13 14 15 \"Even if the Bankruptcy Court's finding on this issue sufficed for purposes of consolidation, they do not justify putting a *nunc pro tunc* spin on the order. Here, in fact, we believe that the *nunc pro tunc* feature prejudices Midland Ross in a manner contrary to the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.\"\n\n16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 The Court went on to, then, explain that the problem with the trustee's position is that it requires transferees to disgorge solely on the basis of a bankruptcy filing by their -- the debtors' apparently distinctive affiliate, which undermines some of the Code's core policies, right. Those core policies were to incentivize creditors to continue to deal with troubled entities, right; the financially distressed entities or affiliates of financiallydistressed entities and not have a rush to the courthouse, right, to try to get at their assets because if there's a\n\n 63 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 fear. That they wouldn't be able to pay. So the argument that the D.C. Circuit rejected in Auto-Train is the argument that we're hearing today, but it's just being done under the banner of alter-ego, right; we're just changing the names. But the clash with the policies of the Code are even more stark; particularly, even these 549 claims, and I want to talk about that. So you're running, still, headlong into that same issue, which is you're disincentivizing creditors from dealing with nondebtor affiliates, you know, and this rush to the courthouse. But it also clashes with specific parts of the Code. If the -- it robs the Joint Defendants of that ability to have come before this Court and obtained an order under 363 that, well, what, with the transactions that they had were being asked to engage in were approved or ordinary course, and if they didn't get such relief from this Court, they could have stopped U.S. Trustee doing business and not exposed themselves to risking liability. In addition, you've got the subsequent transferee defenses, which are now being removed, but that's not all. If you look at 549(b), which is a protection for creditors who deal with the debtor during a gap period, between an involuntary filing and order for relief, 549(b) says, Look,\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 64 of 125\n\n64\n\n1 2 3 4 those transferees, they're not going to have any risk. They won't have any liability, even if they know of the involuntary case, for the transfers, manufactured that they're giving value.\n\n5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 So the Bankruptcy Court clearly offers protections to creditors that dealt with the debtor. They knew this is a debtor, subject to an involuntary case, but under the trustee's view, the Joint Defendants, who are not alleged to have any notice if Mr. Kwok's bankruptcy case or connections between the nondebtor transferors and Mr. Kwok, they have liability under 549 and they have no such protections that would be offered to, you know, if the transferees knew of a case of involuntary.\n\n14 15 16 17 18 19 Finally, unlike Midland Ross and Auto-Train, which it would have had a robust set of defenses under 547(c), those similar types of defenses don't exist under 549. So, the concern that was dug up in Auto-Train, which that the D.C. Circuit rejected, is apparent here. It's just under the banner of alter-ego.\n\n20 21 22 23 24 25 And, utility, you find the transferees, the Joint Defendants' are in an impossible situation, right, in the sense that they would have no way of knowing that the entity that they're dealing with is really, actually, an entity in bankruptcy. And this is an observation that Judge Kaplan made in the Oncology Associates of Ocean County case. That\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 65 of 125\n\n65\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 was a case where a 549 whose claim was brought based on a transfer of a nondebtor affiliate and the transfer was made between the affiliate's bankruptcy filing and a substantive consolidation order. So the transfer happened between those two dates and the substantive consolidation order wasn't *nunc pro tunc* in the case. And Judge Kaplan, you know, in rejecting the 549 claim, pointedly observed that, quote: \"One wonders how any attorney could counsel the transferees to the risks associated with post-petition transfers, where the transferor wasn't in bankruptcy.\" So, what's the response we get to this from the trustee? Well, the trustee says, you know, this is a strong man argument because alter-ego is different. And for this proposition, the trustee cites to In re Star Mountain Resources, which does have a discussion of differences between substantive consolidation and alter-ego in its usual sense. But Star Mountain goes on to explain that in Star Mountain, importantly, it was a Nevada case, so they applied that identity theory. They explained in Footnote 86, as follows: \"An alter-ego claim has a different effect in the bankruptcy context than in the traditional civil trial setting, where a specific creditor brings a judgment against\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 66 of 125\n\n1 2 3 4 the alleged alter-ego. An alter-ego finding in bankruptcy is more similar to substantive consolidation, bringing the assets of the alter-ego into the debtor's estate to be shared collectively with the debtor's creditors.\"\n\n5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 And then the Court went on at page 7 of the decision to just characterize the ultimate relief in that case, where using alter-ego with Nevada law as being similar to substantive consolidation. The only distinction that the Court made in Star Mountain was that it said that trying to do substantive consolidation after you've confirmed a plan, you have to cut off the rights there. So you can't do substantive consolidation after you've confirmed a plan, but alter-ego can live on; you can preserve that. That was the only difference.\n\n15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 So if the result is the same, why apply a different set of rules, right; the two equitable doctrines being used to achieve the same purpose, to me, it does not make any sense. And, in fact, if you accept that, we could just slap the label \"alter-ego\" on this equitable relief and you disregard the protections that would have been afforded if you were using the substantive consolidation doctrine. Well, then, nobody is going to use substantive consolidation; you'd just always use alter-ego because it'll be easier. So -- but let's not stop there. Let's look at,\n\nnow, the alter-ego cases and there's not a lot of them. This\n\n25\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 67 of 125\n\n67\n\n1 2 3 4 5 is fairly novel, but there are a few. And the few that there are, there's none, not a single one in this country that allows a finding that a nondebtor as an alter-ego retroactively create 549 liability. There's not one, I've looked.\n\n6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 So, let's start with the Duckworth adversaries, which Mr. Peterson talked about. And it's worth a quick dip into the facts in Duckworth. So the debtor, who was a grain for farmer, right, and he had a significant secured bank debt that was secured by his crops. And what the guy did is he, leading up to the year or so before his filing, he created a column of LLCs to defraud his creditor. He created these LLCs to use them to trade grain -- to sell his crops or to sell his grains, without freeing it of the bank's liens to keep the proceeds.\n\n16 17 18 19 20 And then, having done that, in the weeks before filing Chapter 7, he took the money from those LLCs, created a new LLC called \"Power Trading,\" put the money into there, filed Chapter 7, and then used the money in Power Trading to pay for his personable expenses post-petition.\n\n21 22 23 24 Okay. So in the first adversary proceeding against Casey's General Store, the trustee sought to avoid about 70 post-petition transfers that went from Power Trading to Casey's General Stores.\n\n25\n\nLike the trustee here, the Duckworth trustee's\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 68 of 125\n\n68\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 theory uh no the 549 liability was premised on the use of the alter-ego doctrine to write to combine the assets of Power Trading with those of the debtor. And so, because Power Trading was in Indiana, a limited liability company, the Bankruptcy Court started its analysis using Indiana principles governing alter-ego. And it framed out why this was happening, you know, why was the trustee using a state law equitable remedy to assert a 549 claim, as opposed to doing a 548 claim against the subsequent transferee. And reason was to strip Casey's of its subsequent transferee defenses under 550, right, which the Court refused to do.\n\n12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Now, I want to pause here for a second because the trustee tries to distinguish Duckworth by saying that, well, there were no facts in that case that would cause the Court to disregard the Corporate Forum of Power Trading or that the trustee didn't dispute that Power Trading was a validly formed, under state law, and thus, couldn't prove an alterego on that ground.\n\n19 20 21 22 23 24 25 I think that's a wrong reading. First, the reference to power trading existing and being formed under state law, it's just that; it was formed under state law, just like every single one of the nondebtor transferors. They were formed under state law. They made them register to do business in the state. They submitted their filings with the Secretary of State. Like, that's what the Court is\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 69 of 125\n\n1 2 3 referencing there. And that no decision at the time of the transfers had rendered, to me, to strip them of their Corporate Forum.\n\n4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Second, the Court acknowledged at page 7 and Footnote 12 of that decision, and we actually pulled up the judgment and attached it as Exhibit A to our reply, that, in fact, the Corporate Forum of Power Trading had been disregarded, because the remaining assets in the bank account that he had put into Power Trading were brought back in. They were turned over to the estate at a prior -- not in the same adversary proceeding; in a different one.\n\n12 13 14 15 16 17 18 So -- and it really wasn't a close call, right. THE WITNESS: That this was an alter-ego. I mean, Duckworth conceded he had full dominion and control. He was using it to pay his personal living expenses. It was to use to provide asset protection and hide his assets, and he ultimately entered a guilty plea and it's a lot of similarities to what we're dealing with here.\n\n19 20 21 22 23 So, the problem that the Court had in Duckworth was taking that doctrine, that equitable doctrine to create 549 liability, it was extending it. It had no problem bringing the assets from Power Trading into the estate. It was extending it to create this 549 liability.\n\n24 25 And I just want to put a few parts from the Court's decision at page 8, which are telling. First, the\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 70 of 125\n\n| 1 | Court says, You've got to approach -- you've got to prove, |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | when you're using alter-ego with a Bankruptcy Court-type |\n| 3 | claim like this -- let me just queue up the quote: |\n| 4 | \"As such, extreme caution is warranted when a |\n| 5 | Bankruptcy Court is asked it apply the remedy in the context |\n| 6 | of a bankruptcy cause of action, such as that created |\n| 7 | by 549.\" |\n| 8 | Then two sentence later, the Court says: |\n| 9 | \"Here, the trustee contends that the alter-ego |\n| 10 | doctrine may be used to recreate a different set of facts, to |\n| 11 | rewrite history, so to speak, for a purpose cognizable only |\n| 12 | under the bankruptcy law.
No state law corollary to deprive |\n| 13 | a Defendant of the statutory good faith transferring defense, |\n| 14 | provided by Section 550(b)(1). |\n| 15 | In this Court's view, adopting the trustee's |\n| 16 | theory will constitute a gross overextension of the alter-ego |\n| 17 | doctrine, far beyond its identifiable state law parameters |\n| 18 | and purposes.\" |\n| 19 | The Duckworth Court had a chance to think about |\n| 20 | this and reconsider its decision, because seven months later, |\n| 21 | there was another adversary proceeding that came up for |\n| 22 | decision in Big Al's Speakeasy, which was another trade |\n| 23 | creditor that the debtor had been spending money from the |\n| 24 | Power Trading account with. |\n| 25 | But the Duckworth Court, and this is a 2013 |\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 71 of 125\n\n71\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 decision, again, refused to reconsider its decision; again, rejected the use of the alter-ego doctrine and went on to explain that you can't use an equitable remedy to strip people of their statutory rights, which is exactly what the trustee was trying to do, expunge a 550 defense. And observing that no Federal Court has permitted this doctrine, the doctrine of alter-ego to be used for that purpose.\n\n8 9 10 11 The Court also rejected the fact that it could be justified on the basis that they would be bringing in assets to benefit creditors, that that wasn't a reason to strip people of their rights to a subsequent transferee defense.\n\n12 13 14 15 So again, this is what's happening here: same thing. And as Duckworth observed and as we hope this Court would observe, is that it should remain an unprecedented legal theory.\n\n16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Beyond that case, there's also the Lawler case, which we also cite in our brief, which I'll just touch on very briefly. That is not an avoidance action case, but it was whether or not -- what happened in that case is that there was a bankruptcy filing. About eight months later, a mortgagee went to foreclose and sale property that was owned by the Debtor's brother in a Family Trust and that foreclosure sale went forward.\n\n24 25 But, then, a few years later, the Bankruptcy Court held that a trust that owns half that property was an alter-\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 72 of 125\n\n72\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ego of the debtor since its conception. And on the strength of that ruling, the debtor, then, brought claims saying, Well, look, we need to avoid that foreclosure sale because it was selling property that was -- it violated the stay because if the trust is me, is the debtor, that's -- I have an ownership interest and the foreclosure sale violated the stay. But the Court refused to do so on the basis that today's would work an injustice against the foreclosing mortgagee, who's entitled to rely on the separateness of the trust at the time. So the last things I draw, at least, from Duckworth and Lawler are quite simple, right. The equitable doctrine of alter-ego cannot be used to retroactively create liability under the Bankruptcy Code against non-insider creditors. And so, my fault, my time -- THE COURT: No, you still have time. MR. GOLDSTEIN: All right. I only need to address a couple of other things, then, real quickly about with the trustee's argument in my few minutes that remain. One, they say that, well, look, an alter-ego finding, you're an alter-ego for forever, right. If you're an alter-ego now, you've always been an alter-ego and there's no *nunc pro tunc*y thing about this. Well, one, I don't think\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 73 of 125\n\n73\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 that that's inconsistent with Auto-Train, inconsistent with Duckworth, inconsistent with Lawler. But the citation for that is in Adler, this Adler decision. It was a Bankruptcy Court decision of the Eastern District of New York in 2013. That was a 720 -- THE COURT: Is Adler, A-d-l-e-r? MR. GOLDSTEIN: Yes. Sorry. I'm sorry, A-d-l-er. THE COURT: No, no, that's fine. Go ahead. MR. GOLDSTEIN: That was a 727 case. So the issue there was that the debtor had us quote five or so closing of corporations and that were ultimately determined to be the debtor's alter-ego. But the legal issue at play there didn't impact third parties; it impacted the debtor. And if the debtor was using its closely-held companies for shenanigans, that violated 727. That was the legal issue at play, there. Second, I mean, there are some statements in Adler that other courts have taken issue with. And that was, there was a decision from the District Court for the Eastern District of New York, which was cited by Mr. Peterson, the Pavers case, which is 536 B.R. 48, which disagreed with such a broad view of the alter-ego concept and said, quote: \"Just because two entities are alter-ego doesn't make them both debtors under the Bankruptcy Code; it simply\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 74 of 125\n\n74\n\n1 2 3 means they're liable for liable for each other's debts. If the nondebtor wants the protection, it needs to file its own petition.\"\n\n4 5 6 7 8 So, I think, one, Adler comes up in extraordinarily different circumstances. It didn't even involve third parties; it just involved the debtor and a 727 case. And some of its broad language has been criticized by the District Court in the Eastern District of New York.\n\n9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 So the other cases cried by the trustee do not disturb the conclusion that you can't use alter-ego to marry together with this initial transferee avoidance liability theory. First off, as we've said, there's not a single case in this country where a Court condoned the trustee's use of alter-ego to create, after-the-fact 549 liability against a non-insider. And, second, of all the cases they've cited, there is only one case that is even arguably against a noninsider, arguably, and I'll get to why it's arguable.\n\n18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 The rest of them all are insider cases; it's transfers to the spouse, the girlfriend, the best friend. It's shenanigans like that. And this distinction between insider versus non-insiders is crucial. See, it's the protection of the non-insider third-party creditors that kind of animates the Court's rulings in Auto-Train, Duckworth, and Lawler. There, they're trying to protect the trade creditors' reliance interests that they were dealing with\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 75 of 125\n\n1 2 distinct, nondebtor entities, right, that that should be protected.\n\n3 4 5 6 On the other hand, that's not true if you're dealing with an insider who's either involved in the scheme prepetition or certainly knew about the debtor being in bankruptcy post-petition.\n\n7 8 9 10 11 The reason I say, \"arguably, about the one case that they say is against non-insiders, that's the American International Refinery case. Just two quick points about that and I'm going to, then, conclude, just to be mindful of my time.\n\n12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 One -- the first issue on that, that that's not a 549 case. That is only a 548 case. There's some stray references in the Court's decision to Sections 547 and -549, but the transfer that was being challenged there was only a prepetition transfer. There's -- the impact of the postpetition transfer that's discussed in that case was expressly approved by the Bankruptcy Court, so that is not a 549 case. It is a fraudulent transfer case.\n\n20 21 22 23 24 25 Second, there's a little bit less of an arm'slength relationship with the transferee there, but long story short, the transferee there, what they wound up doing is they became partners. They bought the stock owned by the debtor subsidiary, who they said was an alter-ego of the debtor. That subsidiary owns 100 percent of an entity that had gas\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 76 of 125\n\n76\n\n1 2 3 4 5 interests in Kazakhstan. They sold 85 percent to the transferee bridge and kept 15 percent. So the two of them remain partners in the venture and the transferee was supposed to have gotten a bunch of financing to support the venture.\n\n6 7 8 9 And, secondarily, they hired the CEO, the president of the debtor to come onboard after about a year after the fact. So, whether they were truly arm's-length is questionable. So, I'm going to conclude there.\n\n10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 There's a through-line in the decisions surrounding reverse veil-piercing and Manichaean retroactive substantive consolidation in Auto-Train, and their retroactive application of the alter-ego doctrine to create an additional transferee avoidance in Duckworth. That is - these extraordinarily and sparingly used equitable remedies cannot be used to prejudice third parties and there are reasonable expectations of dealing with separate and distinct entities. And they certainly cannot doze through in a manner that's contrary to the (indiscernible) policies, such as undermining the incentive to continue to transact with distressed companies or even their affiliates, or in a manner to strip these third parties of their rights they would have under the Code: seek a comfort order under 363; have a subsequent transferee defense under 550.\n\nBecause there's no allegations the Joint\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 77 of 125\n\n| 1 | Defendants were insiders.
There's no allegation that they |\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | were anything more than trade creditors who sold goods and |\n| 3 | services to the nondebtor transferors. |\n| 4 | The trustee should not be able to employ the |\n| 5 | alter-ego finding retroactively to create an additional |\n| 6 | transfer of liability.
And on that ground, we believe the |\n| 7 | motion should also be dismissed. |\n| 8 | So, I went about a minute over and I appreciate |\n| 9 | your indulgence.
Thank you. |\n| 10 | THE COURT:
Thank you very much. |\n| 11 | Attorney Sklarz? |\n| 12 | MR. SKLARZ:
Good morning, Your Honor.
Jeffrey |\n| 13 | Sklarz. |\n| 14 | THE COURT:
Good morning. |\n| 15 | MR. SKLARZ:
The extraordinary relief that the |\n| 16 | trustee is seeking is certainly not typically; essentially, |\n| 17 | it amounts to a request to amend the 2022 bankruptcy |\n| 18 | petitions to include new debtors that have never filed |\n| 19 | bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Code. |\n| 20 | This is not typical retroactive relief.
In prior |\n| 21 | hearings, Your Honor has mentioned, well, you enter a |\n| 22 | judgment on a breach of contract action today, but it relates |\n| 23 | to a breach in 2017.
This is more akin to you enter an order |\n| 24 | today, but find everybody in contempt for violating that |\n| 25 | order because they should have known about it back in 2017. |\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 78 of 125\n\n78\n\n1 2 3 4 5 The trustee seeks to turn back time. In the briefing in my clients' cases, we refer to this as the \"time travel theory\" to effectively amend all the bankruptcy petitions to include all of the nondebtor transferors, as if there were dozens of petitions filed then.\n\n6 7 8 9 10 11 Only Mr. Kwok and shortly thereafter, the Genever Company filed bankruptcy. There is not a single nondebtor transferor that has a bankruptcy petition, bankruptcy schedules, statement of financial affairs. There's been no 341 meeting or any of the other protections afforded to creditors or parties in interest under the Bankruptcy Code.\n\n12 13 14 15 16 17 And as Counsel has said, as the Supreme Court has said, as innumerable courts have said, as Your Honor has said, we start with the Code. There are two sections ensure the Bankruptcy Code that govern petitions: 301 and 303. 301 is involuntary; it is voluntary petitions. You file one. There is no petition for these entities.\n\n18 19 20 21 22 23 If the trustee has always been the trustee of these entities, as he claims, where's the petition? Where's the schedules? Where's the identification of the assets of each of the entities? If the trustee has always been the trustee of these supposed debtors, he hasn't done any of the requirements under the Bankruptcy Code.\n\n24 25 The other option is -- is an involuntary case under 303. There, it's a very reticulated scheme. First,\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 79 of 125\n\n79\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 you file an involuntary petition, alleging that a debtor should be in bankruptcy and there is a process and, in fact, under 303 and related statutes, how creditors are treated during the gap period is of particular concern, as noted by counsel. The trustee simply cannot rewrite the petitions to say everybody knows they've always been in bankruptcy. That is precisely the opposite of what Auto-Train permits. Recasting the claims as anything other than substantive consolidation, is a facade. For example, if all the debtors, if all the\n\n12 13 14 15 nondebtor transferors were, in fact, debtors as of 2022, why did the trustee need to file hundreds of applications for Rule 2004 exams? He should have just gotten the documents from his constituents.\n\n16 17 18 If he already controlled the entities, he didn't need to do any of that. He didn't need to file the omnibus alter-ego case.\n\n19 20 21 22 23 24 25 There's no provision that affords the relief under the Bankruptcy Code that the trustee seeks. As stated, the trustee lacks standing. The joint Defendants have argued this. I won't go through it again, other than to note that it has been said over and over again, and I think very well in the Picard v JPMorgan case, 464 B.R. 84, 92. It is settled law that that precludes the trustee from, quote,\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 80 of 125\n\n1 2 3 effectively stepping into the shoes of Mr. Kwok's actual creditors, for purposes of pursuing the common law claims against the debtors.\n\n4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 It's because if Kwok -- Kwok can't sue himself for being an alter-ego. It wouldn't make sense. It's not an asset of the bankruptcy estate. It's not -- there's no standing under 541 for these types of claims. The only basis would be under 544, and as Counsel said, that doesn't work. Further, Your Honor, given how the trustee seeks to reorder the assets and the capital structures of the nondebtor transferors, policy considerations are of great concern. And this was well-stated in the Manichaean decision where the Delaware Court of Chancery really struggles over this remedy.\n\n15 16 17 18 19 20 And as an initial note, what's odd about this case and makes it completely different than any other alter-ego, alleged alter-ego case that I've been involved in or I've seen in the briefing, the misconduct by the bad actor, Mr. Kwok, augments his estate. So he stole from the alteregos.\n\n21 22 23 24 25 The complaints the trustee filed say he used these alter-egos, these nondebtor transferors, so enrich himself. He bought Ferraris. He bought homes. He took money and brought it and used it for his personal use. That is an augmentation of the estate.\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 81 of 125\n\n1 2 In Mankassian (phonetic) or Manichaean -- I apologize, I always mispronounce this case --\n\n3 4 THE COURT: I'm not exactly sure what the exact pronunciation is, either.\n\n5 6 7 MR. GOLDSTEIN: -- as well as Gracey and any of the other reverse veil-piercing cases, it's the opposite. There's a diminution in the estate.\n\n8 9 10 11 In the Mankassian, the debtor entity that the - what was the subject of the minority oppression rights, the buyer schemed to make money bypass that target acquisition vehicle so that it didn't have to pay the Plaintiffs.\n\n12 13 14 15 16 Here, if money is recovered from the nondebtor entity creditors which, for the most part, are ordinary course transferees or my clients are ordinary course transferees or law firms, then that's benefiting someone who never received any benefit of those services.\n\n17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 There was -- there would be a further augmentation of the Kwok estate at a time when there's already been money, allegedly, stolen from these nondebtor transferors by Mr. Kwok. So it's multiple dipping. There's no connection between the harm and the remedy; it's an inversion. It would further diminish an estate that was already diminished by Mr. Kwok. His estate is better off having committed the fraud. He can't -- the trustee can't, then, double-dip that way.\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 82 of 125\n\n82\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Again, going back to the specific Code, with respect to the 549 claims, it speaks specifically to transfers of the estate. It doesn't -- and to have an estate, you need a bankruptcy. So, going back to my initial argument, no petition, no estate, no bankruptcy. You can't spin the world back and say, Hey, we really did file all these petitions. They've never filed a petition.\n\n8 9 10 And, finally, Your Honor, the trustee is not the Department of Justice. The trustee has no roving commission to do whatever he views his brand of justice is.\n\n11 12 13 His sole dictate under the Bankruptcy Code is to administer the estate, which is in Chapter 11, and to recover for the benefit of creditors of that estate.\n\n14 15 16 17 Victims of the alleged misconduct of Mr. Kwok will be dealt with through restitution and the Department of Justice. And there's money that has been seized and that will be dealt with through the civil forfeiture process.\n\n18 19 20 21 22 23 24 To be clear, no trustee has ever attempted to bring the types of claims that have been brought here. The type -- and certainly not on a massive scale. Allowing retroactive rearrangement of the capital structure of the northern transferors without regard to creditor and ugh stakeholder rights would be unprecedented and not allowed. As Counsel pointed out, there has to be specific\n\nallegations of a lack of harm. That is not in there.\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 83 of 125\n\n| 1 | There's -- it could not be in the pleadings.
There's no |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | basis for the trustee to make those claims. |\n| 3 | The trustee seeks to invert and pervert the law, |\n| 4 | which should not be allowed.
For these reasons, the motions |\n| 5 | to dismiss for my client should be granted.
Thank you. |\n| 6 | THE COURT:
Thank you. |\n| 7 | MR. KINDSETH:
Good morning, Your Honor. |\n| 8 | Stephen Kindseth, Zeisler & Zeisler, for Zeisler & |\n| 9 | Zeisler.
As to the four issues, Your Honor, I don't have |\n| 10 | anything to add.
We support and embrace the arguments of |\n| 11 | counsel for the Joint Defendants and Attorney Sklarz. |\n| 12 | THE COURT:
Okay. |\n| 13 | MR. KINDSETH:
But thank you very much for |\n| 14 | providing me with an opportunity to make an argument -- |\n| 15 | THE COURT:
Thank you. |\n| 16 | MR. KINDSETH:
-- if I had one to add. |\n| 17 | THE COURT:
Thank you.
I appreciate it. |\n| 18 | All right.
Attorney Bassett, your reply? |\n| 19 | MR. BASSETT:
Your Honor, may I approach? |\n| 20 | THE COURT:
Yes, please. |\n| 21 | MR. BASSETT:
Good morning, Your Honor. |\n| 22 | Again, Nick Bassett for the record, from Paul |\n| 23 | Hastings, counsel to the Chapter 11 Trustee. |\n| 24 | Your Honor, I'll try to fit my argument, |\n| 25 | obviously, within my allotted time.
There's a lot of points |\n| | |\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 84 of 125\n\n84\n\n1 2 to respond to. And I'm also, obviously, happy to answer any questions that the Court may have.\n\n3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Your Honor, in the arguments from counsel today, and you saw in the papers, as well, you heard a lot about the equities involved in this case and in the adversary proceedings that the trustee has filed. That's not particularly surprising because, of course, the Bankruptcy Court is a court of equity. But, but in that vein, I think it is very important to take a step back and look at how the equities really weigh in this case.\n\n11 12 13 14 15 16 Now, the Defendants have done an admirable job of trying to play victim and tell the Court all the reasons why they feel they would be prejudiced by the relief that the trustee seeks. But, Your Honor, the result that the Defendants ask this Court to reach would be the very opposite of an equitable result.\n\n17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Now, to level set, this bankruptcy case and its thousands of docket entries, with which this Court and the parties are very familiar, is all about Mr. Kwok's fraudulent years-long scheme to file for bankruptcy, contending to have zero assets, after hiding all of his assets that he does own in a web of shell companies. And, Your Honor, the scale of that fraud perpetuated by Mr. Kwok is truly massive; in fact, I don't think it's going out on a limb at all, to say that there's never been a bankruptcy case quite like this one, at\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 85 of 125\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 least not of this magnitude, where you have an individual debtor who is, in reality, a billionaire, living the most lavish lifestyle one could imagine, who then files for bankruptcy, claiming to own, essentially, nothing, because he had operated his life and his affairs in a way where he tucked all of his wealth into shell companies under his control.\n\n8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Now, what the Defendants ask of this Court to do practically, by denying the trustee's avoidance claims, is to legitimize Kwok's years-long fraudulent scheme by holding that his shell companies were, in fact, truly separate companies, such that when they transferred assets to the Defendants, those transfers were not transfers of Kwok's assets.\n\n15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Stated differently, in the Defendant's world, any individual who operates their affairs the way Kwok did, could file for a bankruptcy, claiming to have no assets, despite that person being a billionaire. And then the trustee in that bankruptcy case could never assert avoidance claims against anyone, because the transfers that took place prior to the bankruptcy or thereafter, were, according to them, not transfers by the debtor, but, rather, transfers by his separate shell companies.\n\n24 25 Your Honor, as applied to this case, where they're trying to eviscerate the trustee's ability to even pursue\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 86 of 125\n\n86\n\n1 2 3 4 5 avoidance claims because Mr. Kwok had no assets, is a truly absurd outcome that is fundamentally at odds with the Bankruptcy Code. Now, Attorney Peterson mentioned that the result they seek is noted trying to deprive the trustee of remedies, but that's exactly what they're trying to do.\n\n6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 The cause of action that the trustee is pursuing are causes of action that are consistent with the reality in which Mr. Kwok operated. He had all of his assets in shell companies and then those shell companies conducted his affairs. They made transfers to parties. They did other things. And the only way, consistent with that reality for the trustee to pursue his claims and to pursue his rights under the Bankruptcy Code, is to pursue transfers of those assets, consistent with the economic reality that they were transfers of Mr. Kwok's assets.\n\n16 17 18 19 Now, Your Honor, I'll Attorney Kim through the various arguments that Counsel had made on the four issues this we're here to discuss today and explain why the Defendants are wrong on each one of them.\n\n20 21 22 23 24 25 Now, there was a lot of discussion about the Manichaean case and the Defendants used that case and other authorities to contend that the trustee's alter-ego claims must fail, and by extension, his fraudulent transfer and Section 549 claims must fail, because the Defendants are, equity holder allegedly quote, unquote, inconsistent third\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 87 of 125\n\n87\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 parties who had no involvement in or knowledge of Mr. Kwok's fraud. Your Honor, there are several problems with this argument. First, and I'm not going to get law of the case because I know that's an argument that the Court does not want to hear, but law of the case or not, as a matter of precedent, this Court has already issued rulings, finding that Lamp Capital, Golden Spring, Greenwich Land, and the HGHK entities are the debtors' alter-egos. We submit those rulings were correct and they should not be disturbed. Second, the Defendants are wrong in their description of how alleged harm to third parties factors into the alter-ego analysis under Delaware law. Now, the Defendants seem to contend, based on their reading of Manichaean and other cases, that an alterego finding under Delaware law is unavailable, if there will be a single, quote, unquote, innocent person, who could be harmed by that outcome. But that is fundamentally not the law. If you look at what the cases say, the law focuses on the overall equities of the situation, not whether a single party will be harmed, and, in particular, the doctrine is focused on preventing fraud, just like that which occurred here. Now, to discuss Manichaean, the Defendants, of course, seize on language in Manichaean where the Chancery\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 88 of 125\n\n| 1 | Court said that it would, you know, only even consider |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | reverse veil-piercing if there's a lack of real prejudice, |\n| 3 | real and sustainable prejudice to third parties.
But they |\n| 4 | are selective in how they quote the case, because they ignore |\n| 5 | critical other language from the Chancery Court that provides |\n| 6 | additional context to what the Court really meant in issuing |\n| 7 | its ruling, describing the availability of reverse veil |\n| 8 | piercing under Delaware law. |\n| 9 | Specifically, the Chancery Court said: |\n| 10 | \"The risks that reverse veil-piercing may be used |\n| 11 | as a blunt instrument to harm innocent parties and to disrupt |\n| 12 | the expectations of arm's-length arbiting, while real, do |\n| 13 | not, in my view, justify the rejection of reverse veil |\n| 14 | piercing outright; rather, the recognition of the risks |\n| 15 | creates an opportunity to manage them and do so in a manner |\n| 16 | that serves the interests of equity. |\n| 17 | The Court also stated that without reverse veil |\n| 18 | piercing, quote: |\n| 19 | \"Fraudulent members of the company could hide |\n| 20 | assets in plain sight to avoid paying a judgment, which would |\n| 21 | be, quote, an unacceptable outcome.\" |\n| 22 | Again, I think that's exactly what we're dealing |\n| 23 | with here with Mr. Kwok. |\n| 24 | And, finally, the Court said, quote: |\n| 25 | \"Fundamentally, reverse veil-piercing, like |\n| | |\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 89 of 125\n\n1 2 3 traditional veil-piercing, is rooted in equity and the Court must consider all relevant factors to reach an equitable result.\"\n\n4 5 6 7 8 9 10 In summary, Manichaean stands for the proposition that under Delaware law, reverse veil-piercing can and should be used to prevent someone like Mr. Kwok from using his shell companies to carry out a fraudulent scheme and to achieve an overall, equitable result for the parties. That is exactly what we are trying to do with our avoidance claims in this case.\n\n11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Now, Your Honor -- with our alter-ego claims in this case -- now, Your Honor, there are, to be sure, that support the same result from other jurisdictions by framing the alter-ego analysis as a balancing test that's specifically designed to prevent fraudulent schemes from being upheld and recognized, even if other creditors or certain parties could potentially be harmed by that.\n\n18 19 20 The In re Mass case that we cite in our papers is instructive. That's at 178 B.R. 626. It's a Middle District of Pennsylvania case.\n\n21 22 23 24 25 In that case, debtors' shareholders moved for turnover of funds deposited in a bank account of their wholly-owned corporation on a reverse veil-piercing theory under Pennsylvania law, alleging that the corporation was the alter-ego of the shareholders and, therefore, they were\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 90 of 125\n\n90\n\nentitled to turn over the monies in the account.\n\n1\n\n2 3 4 5 6 The Court granted that motion over the objection of the creditor who did business with the alter-ego, arguing that it would be harmed by that result. In doing so, the Court noted that reverse veil-piercing in that instance, rather than harming third parties would, quote:\n\n7 8 9 10 11 Aid all creditors of the bankruptcy estate and that the business creditor Defendant who objected to the relief is a -- should not enjoy preferential treatment, simply because that party happened to contract with a sham corporation.\n\n12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 In other words, in a situation like this, where there are parties who -- and I'll get to whether or not these Defendants are even actually harmed -- but it resulted -- the trustee seeks to believe they are not, but even if they were, the relief that the trustee is seeking is simply to put them on equal footing with all other creditors of the debtor, to not give them preferential treatment and not allow them, Your Honor, to benefit from the years-long scheme that Kwok had perpetuated by asking the Court to uphold that scheme and allow their -- the monies that they received from Kwok shell companies to not be subject to the avoidance provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.\n\n24 25 It furthers the fundamental principle underlying bankruptcy that all of the debtors' assets should be gathered\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 91 of 125\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 and distributed for ratable distribution to his creditors. Your Honor, there are other cases, as well, that we cite in our brief that talked about reverse veil-piercing designed to achieve an overall equitable result, which I won't repeat here. One of them is the In re Schuster case. Another is the Petters Co. case. But I want now to turn -- THE COURT: Can you -- I'm not -- can you just spell those for the record, please. MR. PETERSON: Sure. Schuster is S-c-h-u-s-t-e-r. And Petters Co. is P-e-t-t-e-r-s. THE COURT: All right. MR. PETERSON: Now, Your Honor, I want to address another point that the Defendants raised on multiple occasions, which is that in their view, if it is true that Delaware law prevents reverse veil-piercing in a situation where innocent parties may be harmed by that outcome, they contend that, then, that somehow transforms that issue into a pleading requirement, such that the trustee must have affirmatively plead in his complaint that no party could possibly be harmed by the results that he seeks. Again, that's not the law, but even if it were the law, it's certainly not a pleading requirement. And I find it ironic that the Defendants rely exclusively on Manichaean\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 92 of 125\n\n| 1 | to support that argument.
If you look at what happened in |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | Manichaean, Your Honor, and this is at page 718 of that |\n| 3 | decision, the Court specifically held that it is not a |\n| 4 | pleading requirement, because in that case when the Court |\n| 5 | analyzed the alter-ego factors and ultimately determined that |\n| 6 | reverse veil-piercing was appropriate, it noted that a party |\n| 7 | had document forward and made an argument about harm. |\n| 8 | And the Court rejected it at that stage saying, |\n| 9 | quote: |\n| 10 | \"To be clear, factual allegations related to the |\n| 11 | alleged alter-ego's third-party creditors are not in the |\n| 12 | complaint.
And for now, at least, my analysis is conformed |\n| 13 | to the four corners of the pleading.\" |\n| 14 | So Manichaean stands for the exact opposite |\n| 15 | proposition on that issue, Your Honor. |\n| 16 | But, finally, even if there were a pleading |\n| 17 | requirement, even if the innocence of parties who might be |\n| 18 | harmed by reverse veil-piercing, even if that were all |\n| 19 | relevant under Delaware law, which it is not, allowing the |\n| 20 | trustee to pursue avoidance claims against these Defendants |\n| 21 | in bankruptcy cases does not mean that they will be quote, |\n| 22 | unquote, harmed by the alter-ego ruling. |\n| 23 | As this Court well knows, and as the Defendants |\n| 24 | and their counsel well know, innocent -- quote, unquote, |\n| 25 | innocent parties are unknowingly affected by bankruptcy all |\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 93 of 125\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 the time, especially through preference and avoidance actions. Now, this may be unfortunate for parties in that position, but that is, unfortunately, just the way bankruptcy works, because, again, it is part of the fundamental process of ensuring a ratable distribution of assets for a debtor's creditors and treating all of those creditors equally. This can be seen through some easy examples in the Code, Your Honor. For example, the law is clear that on a Section 548 fraudulent transfer claim, the Court looks only to the debtor/transferor's intent in determining whether the transfer is fraudulent and it doesn't matter whether the transferee acted with fraudulent intent. The transferee could be innocent. It would not affect the viability of a 548 claim by a trustee or a debtor-in-possession. The same is true for a Section 549 claim, Your Honor. The Code says nothing about the transferee who received a 549 claim needing to have known that it received an unauthorized transfer from a debtor in bankruptcy. There's no knowledge requirement. There's no requirement that the transferee not be innocent; all that matters is that the transfer occurred post-petition and was unauthorized. So, here, Your Honor, the Defendants, we would submit, are not being harmed at all, at least not in the\n\n25 context of the way is that bankruptcy works. They are simply\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 94 of 125\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 subject to the same avoidance provisions of the Bankruptcy Code as any other party. To the extent they have defenses that they want to raise to the trustee's claims, such as a value defense under Section 548(c) or otherwise, they can offer those defenses, but it does not mean that the trustee's claims are defective.\n\n7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Last point, Your Honor, on this issue is I would note that any harm they allege, at least potential economic harm that they allege, is entirely premature, because to the extent the Defendants end up needing to pay a judgment to the trustee on account of the trustee's fraudulent transfer or post-petition transfer claims, they have the right to assert a claim under Section 502(a) to the Bankruptcy Code.\n\n14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Now, I agree with Counsel, we're not saying -- I'm not standing here today saying that all creditors, including these avoidance Defendants, to the extent they assert claims, are going to be paid whole on their claims in this case; creditor recovery levels obviously remain to be determined. My point is that their harm argument is, at least, (A), premature, and (B), this is consistent with the derivative in Manichaean that innocent parties who might be in some way affected by an alter-ego ruling should, when a Court issues that ruling, have some way to manage their risk, consistent with equity.\n\n25\n\nThe Bankruptcy Code provides for that. It\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 95 of 125\n\n1 2 3 provides for that through defenses they can assert under the Bankruptcy Code. It provides to that through a Section 502(a) claim, Your Honor.\n\n4 5 6 7 8 9 Your Honor, I next want to address, and I realize I don't have a whole lot of time left, but I want to make sure I address the other arguments. Now, the Defendants spent a lot of time talking about the consequences of alterego and whether or not that results in the alter-ego's assets becoming property of the debtor.\n\n10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Again, the Court decided this issue. We think its prior rulings are precedential, you know, separate and apart from law of the case, which we're not talking about today. And in any event, though, this argument, Your Honor, fails on its merits for two reasons. First, as we discussed in our papers, the question of whether or not an alter-ego ruling results in the assets becoming property of the estate is fundamentally a question of federal bankruptcy law, not state law.\n\n19 20 21 22 23 Second, even if state law applies, and there is this distinction that Defendants' claim exists between the so-called vicarious liability theory and the identity theory, we made the clause clear that Delaware follows the identity theory.\n\n24 25 Now, on the federal v state law distinction, Your Honor, we cite cases in our brief. These are at pages --\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 96 of 125\n\n96\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 sorry -- paragraphs 25 through 27 of our objection. Numerous courts have explained this general concept that, while -- and that is wholly consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Butner -- that while the nature and extent of property rights in bankruptcy are, in the first instance, determined by the state substantive law. Once that determination is made, federal bankruptcy law, namely, Section a 41 of the Bankruptcy Code, dictates to what extent that interest becomes property of the estate. Again, I would point the Court to the cases assembled at paragraphs 25 through 27 of our objection that stand for that general proposition. And, Your Honor, I think it's important to recognize that, you know, this notion that federal law controls on the property of the estate issue makes perfect sense because defining what constitutes property of the estate is absolutely fundamental to the bankruptcy process. And I'd point the Court to the comments that Justice Roberts made in his dissent in the Wellness case, which is cited at Footnote 17 of our objection, where he said: \"The defining property of the estate is the quote, unquote, necessary starting point of every bankruptcy case and it is, quote, inescapable central to the restructuring of the debtor-creditor relationship and in his view, therefore,\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 97 of 125\n\n1 2 the Bankruptcy Court has jurisdiction, core jurisdiction to consider alter-ego claims.\"\n\n3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Now, courts have taken this principle about the fundamental nature of the property of the estate questions to bankruptcy to heart when analyzing alter-ego claims. Courts have found, despite what defense counsel may claim, that in bankruptcy, an alter-ego claim brings property into the estate even if that same claim outside of bankruptcy is more often used by creditors to render one entity liable for another's debts.\n\n11 12 13 14 15 16 So there's two steps. Under state law, is there a viable, reverse veil-piercing or alter-ego theory? The second step, in bankruptcy is, if so, what is the effect of that? That makes sense, Your Honor, because the claim in bankruptcy, as it is here, is asserted under Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code.\n\n17 18 19 Now, a decision that's instructive Your Honor, is the Yerushalmi case that we cite in our papers. I'll spell that one. That's Y-e-r-u-s-h-a-l-m-i, that's 487 B.R. 98.\n\n20 21 22 23 24 25 In that case, Your Honor, Chapter 7 Trustee sought a declaratory judgment that a certain trust was really an alter-ego of the debtor seeking turnover of its assets. The Bankruptcy Court first determined whether the entity was an alter-ego under state law, which in this case was New York law; however, the Court later found that the effect of that\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 98 of 125\n\n 98 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 alter-ego ruling buzz an issue of bankruptcy law. And the reason this mattered and the reason it came up in that case was because the Defendant there changed the trustee's alter-ego claim by contending that the state law statute of limitations had applied. The Court rejected that argument because it found that the cause of action was being brought under Section 541 and 542 of the Bankruptcy Code. In the course of reaching its ruling, the Court explained that, quote: \"The facts of this case, that is, a bankruptcy trustee seeking to recover estate assets on an alter-ego theory, are distinguishable from non-bankruptcy alter-ego\n\n14 15 16 cases pursued by and for the benefit of an individual creditor's seeking to hold an alter-ego liable for the obligations of another.\"\n\n17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Your Honor, that's exactly the situation here. This is not a non-bankruptcy alter-ego cause of action being brought by one of Mr. Kwok's creditors outside of bankruptcy; this is the trustee seeking to use the alter-ego doctrine as a means to, consistent with economic reality and consistent with the way the debtor had operated his affairs, issue a ruling that his, the assets that he kept at his shell companies were, in fact, his own assets and, therefore, are assets that are property of the estate.\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 99 of 125\n\n99\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Your Honor, another case that I won't discuss in detail now that said the exact same thing about the effective alter-ego being different in bankruptcy compared to outside of bankruptcy is the Star Mountain case, which we cite in our brief. In addition to those cases, Your Honor, we cited a number of other decisions; these are at paragraphs 30 to 34 of our objection that talk about alter-ego theories in bankruptcy and the fact that they would augment the estate and result in the assets of the alter-ego becoming property of the estate. I will list these cases out. I won't discuss them in detail, but the point, Your Honor, is that in none of\n\n13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 these cases, where the Court is focused on this so-called distinction between the identity theory and the vicarious liability theory, they, instead, were issuing a determination about the effect of the alter-ego decision under bankruptcy law, not under the claimed nuanced distinctions that the Defendants want the Court to recognize under state law. That's the In re Blatstein case, Your Honor, that we cite in our papers; the 10th Ave. Record Distributors case; In re Pearlman; In re Concepcion; In re Deckelbaum; In re Palmieri; and In re Adler, Your Honor. All cases that refer to the result of an alter-ego finding being that the assets become property of the estate.\n\n25\n\nYour Honor, on the question of, even if there is\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 100 of 125\n\n100\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 this distinction of the identity theory versus the vicarious liability theory and that's relevant in bankruptcy, we submit the law is very clear that in Delaware, the identity theory controls. Your Honor, I point the Court to the Spring Real Estate decision. There's been a lot of discussion about that case.\n\n7 8 9 10 11 12 13 The Defendants claim that the Court's pronouncement in that case about the effect of an alter-ego ruling under Delaware law was *dicta*. But, Your Honor, *dicta* or not, it is a pronouncement by the Chancery Court as to its view of the result of an alter-ego theory, not only under Delaware law, but in relation to a bankruptcy case. And they have cited no law to the contrary.\n\nThe Court said in that case, quote:\n\n14\n\n15 16 17 18 19 \"Where there is a mere alter-ego of the parent to the extent that the Court may engage in reverse veilpiercing, the Court may treat assets of the subsidiary as those of the parent for purposes of a trustee standing to void allegedly fraudulent transfers of assets.\"\n\n20 21 22 23 24 25 Your Honor, that is exactly on point. And while the Defendants claim that the Court there cited Nevada law for that proposition, Your Honor, the Court was applying Delaware law, and to the extent that it cited a Nevada case, it cited that Nevada case because it felt that Nevada law was consistent with the Delaware law and/or to agree with the\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 101 of 125\n\n| 1 | trustee that the effect of an alter-ego claim in bankruptcy |\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | is different than it is outside of bankruptcy. |\n| 3 | I would also note, Your Honor, that Manichaean, |\n| 4 | the Court that -- the decision that the Defendants rely on so |\n| 5 | heavily, cited approvingly to the Spring Real Estate case for |\n| 6 | that same exactly proposition.
I would say, Your Honor, at a |\n| 7 | minimum, I think what the Manichaean decision makes clear is |\n| 8 | to the extent there's any, you know, distinction between the |\n| 9 | vicarious liability theory and the identity theory, I think |\n| 10 | what Manichaean actually shows is that either that |\n| 11 | distinction really does not exist or that in Delaware, the |\n| 12 | effect is both.
And, again, that can be seen by the language |\n| 13 | that Defense counsel cited in Manichaean at page 710, where |\n| 14 | the Court, in two senses, back-to-back, stated the issue in |\n| 15 | both ways.
It first said, quote: |\n| 16 | \"At its most basic level, reverse veil-piercing |\n| 17 | involves the imposition of liability on a business |\n| 18 | organization for the liabilities of its owners.\" |\n| 19 | And the very next sentence, it said in the parent |\n| 20 | subsidiary context: |\n| 21 | \"Whether the subsidiary is a mere alter-ego of the |\n| 22 | parent, where the subsidiary is a mere alter-ego of the |\n| 23 | parent, the Court will treat the assets of the subsidiary as |\n| 24 | those of the parent.\" |\n| 25 | So Manichaean, itself, makes clear, Your Honor, |\n| | |\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 102 of 125\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\nthat this rigid distinction that the Defendants asked the Court to recognize is not one that courts in Delaware have actually, themselves, recognized in their decisions.\n\n102\n\n4 5 6 7 8 Your Honor, I know I'm short on time, but the last argument that I do want to make sure I address is this retroactivity argument. Your Honor, I want to put to rest any notion that the trustee is actually seeking *nunc pro tunc* relief from the Court. The trustee is not.\n\n9 10 11 12 13 14 15 And I think in the Court's comments in September at the hearing were exactly correct that the way to look at this is if the Court were, for example, asked to rule whether a contract was breached five years ago and the Court rules that it was, then that's what happened. The Court is not granting *nunc pro tunc* relief; it is simply adjudicating the issue put before it.\n\n16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 And I would point the Court to the In re Adler case that we cite, and that's at page 58 of the decision, Your Honor, where the Court noted -- and that was a Court dealing with New York law -- but I think for purposes of discussing how an alter-ego claim works, it is instructive. And what the Court said is that the alter-ego finding comes into effect and establishes the relative rights of the alterego and the controlling party, quote:\n\n24 25 \"At the moment in time at which the factual elements for alter-ego are satisfied.\"\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 103 of 125\n\n| 1 | So, that's exactly what the Court has found and |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | that's what we're asking the Court to, again, reiterate today |\n| 3 | in these adversary proceedings, is that these entities, these |\n| 4 | transferor entities were always Mr. Kwok's alter-egos from |\n| 5 | the beginning of time.
It's not that they became his alter |\n| 6 | egos after the bankruptcy.
It's not that they became his |\n| 7 | alter-egos at any other point in time.
They were always his |\n| 8 | alter-egos and, therefore, their assets were always |\n| 9 | Mr. Kwok's assets. |\n| 10 | That is the issue we're asking the Court to |\n| 11 | adjudicate, based on the facts that we are putting forward. |\n| 12 | It's not nunc pro tunc relief at all. |\n| 13 | On the issue of retroactive relief, Your Honor, |\n| 14 | the Defendants noted that they don't think there's been a |\n| 15 | single case cited where a Court has used an alter-ego theory |\n| 16 | to allow Section 549, post-petition fraudulent transfer |\n| 17 | claims to proceed.
There are at least a few examples of |\n| 18 | that, Your Honor.
The In re Schuster case that I already |\n| 19 | cited is such an example, where the Court allowed -- where |\n| 20 | the Court said that Section 549 claims could go forward, |\n| 21 | following an alter-ego finding. |\n| 22 | The In re Deckelbaum case that I cited is another |\n| 23 | case.
We cite the In re Harman case from the Bankruptcy |\n| 24 | Court, for the Northern District of Georgia, in our papers. |\n| 25 | That's another case where that happened.
And, also, as |\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 104 of 125\n\n104\n\n1 2 3 Counsel acknowledged, the American International Refinery indication is, yet, another example, as is the -- so that - sorry.\n\n4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Those are the examples of 549 cases, Your Honor, and those are in addition to the cases that we cite where courts like the Spring Real Estate case, In re Palmieri, and others have held that an alter-ego finding certainly allows the pursuit of fraudulent transfer claims based on transfers of assets made by those alter-egos prior to the alter-ego finding. Again, no discussion of *nunc pro tunc* relief in those cases because it was simply not necessary.\n\n12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 Just two more completing points before I wrap up, Your Honor. First, I want be to make sure I address the Duckworth cases that the Defendants rely on so heavily. Those cases are distinguishable for a number of reasons. First of all, Duckworth, that was a Chapter 7 case out of Illinois, applying Indiana law. It involved a Chapter 11 debtor who transferred certain assets to his shell company's bank account just before his bankruptcy and then right after the bankruptcy, those shell companies, then, made transfers to third parties who ended up becoming Defendants in the avoidance action.\n\n23 24 25 Now, the Court ended up rejecting the trustee's claim as the Defendants described, but the decision and its reasoning is inapposite here for at least four reasons.\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 105 of 125\n\n105\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 First of all, the Court, in that case, declined to apply the alter-ego doctrine in the first place. It noted that the applicable state law, as I said, was Indiana law and the Court predicted that the Indiana Supreme Court would not even apply the doctrine. Obviously, that's not the case here. Delaware recognizes the trustee's alter-ego claims.\n\n7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Second, Your Honor, the Court declined to apply alter-ego to permit the Section 549 claims to proceed in that case, in part, because the only parties who had found to be harmed by the alter-ego relationship were secured creditors who had not even benefited from the trustee's pursuit of the claims. So there was no real benefit to constituents of the estate by the trustee successfully pursuing the claims; again, not the case here. All the debtors' creditors will benefit from the trustee's avoidance claims, should they be successful.\n\n17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Third, Your Honor, and this is critical and the Defense counsel spent a lot of time on this, the Court felt that in that case, it was very clear that the trustee was using alter-ego as a litigation tactic to try to get around the defenses that the Defendants would otherwise have as subsequent transferees under Section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code. But that was highly dependent on the facts of That case, Your Honor.\n\n25\n\nIn that case, as I said, right before the debtor\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 106 of 125\n\n106\n\n1 2 3 4 5 filed for bankruptcy, he took money from his account, transferred it into the bank accounts of his shell company, and then after the bankruptcy, those shell companies further transferred the funds to certain third parties who became Defendants.\n\n6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Under those circumstances, the Court observed that consistent with that factual record and that factual reality, the Court thought the trustee should have asserted 548 claims, based on the prepetition transfer by the debtor to the shell company and then sought to obtain relief, if at all, from the Defendants through a subsequent transferee claim and then the Defendants could assert their Section 550 defenses.\n\n14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 But, Your Honor, that is absolutely not even close to what happened here. That is not our facts. There is absolutely no record to support that that is how the trustee is trying to use his alter-ego and avoidance claims in this case. This is not a situation where Mr. Kwok sat around with a bunch of money in a bank account and divvied it outed to his shell companies before the bankruptcy and then we decided rather than suing the shell companies and then these Defendants as subsequent transferees, we would just try to collapse it and pursue Section 549 claims. That's not it at all, because that's not how Kwok\n\n25 operated; Kwok operated his affairs by keeping all of his\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 107 of 125\n\n107\n\n| 1 | assets with these shell companies and then using them as he |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | saw fit to pursue his own personal ends. |\n| 3 | And so, Your Honor, the way we are pursuing our |\n| 4 | claims, just, it fits that reality and it is the -- it's |\n| 5 | really the -- it wouldn't make sense to pursue the claims in |\n| 6 | the way that the Court in Duckworth suggested, because that's |\n| 7 | not what happened here.
The transferees, the holders of the |\n| 8 | assets were the Kwok shell companies; they were his assets |\n| 9 | and that's why we are pursuing these claims as transferors of |\n| 10 | assets of the estate. |\n\n11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 The last reason that Duckworth is distinguishable, Your Honor, because -- and this is sort of similar total last point that I made -- is that the Court emphasized that the trustee was seeking to use alter-ego in a selected way. And if you look at the 2013 decision, the second decision from that case, this is at page 6 of the opinion, the Court emphasized the fact that the trustee was not seeking alterego for all purposes. He was seeking it, specifically and solely, for the purpose of pursuing those avoidance claims; again, not the case here, Your Honor.\n\n21 22 23 24 25 The trustee has pursued alter-ego claims against these entities to establish that they are and always have been, consistent with reality, alter-egos of Mr. Kwok that were used to hold and hide his assets from his creditors. And a consequence of that, Your Honor, unlike in the\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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125 |\n|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | 108 |\n| 1 | Duckworth case, is that all other creditors of those entities |\n| | |\n| 2 | will have the opportunity to assert claims.
We've made this |\n| 3 | point in the past. |\n| 4 | All consequences of the alter-ego ruling follow |\n| 5 | from the Court's orders, not simply -- it's not simply a |\n| 6 | litigation tactic or vehicle by the trustee. |\n| 7 | The last point -- |\n| 8 | THE COURT:
I'm going to have you wrap up, okay, |\n| 9 | to be fair. |\n| 10 | MR. BASSETT:
Yes, Your Honor. |\n| 11 | The last point I'll make is just on the |\n| 12 | relationship between the claims that the trustee is seeking |\n| 13 | and substantive consolidation.
Your Honor, the relief that |\n| 14 | the trustee seeks may, in fact, and I would agree, does, seek |\n| 15 | a result that is similar to substantive consolidation, but |\n| 16 | the doctrines are not the same and they can and do coexist. |\n| 17 | On this point, I would refer the Court to the Star |\n| 18 | Mountain case.
There, there was a confirmation order in |\n| 19 | place that specifically precluded substantive consolidation. |\n| 20 | The trustee, the litigation trustee, after confirmation, |\n| 21 | sought to pursue alter-ego claims and the question was |\n| 22 | raised:
Well, can the trustee pursue those claims in light |\n| 23 | of the confirmation order? |\n| 24 | And the Court said, Yes, the trustee could pursue |\n| 25 | the claims because, although alter-ego sought a result |\n| | |\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 109 of\n\n125\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 similar to substantive consolidation, it is, in fact, a different legal doctrine and, in particular, substantive consolidation is not one that is predicated solely on demonstrating that a debtor had used other entities to effectuate fraud. It's based on creditor expectations and hopeless entanglement.\n\n7 8 9 10 And because of the standards that apply to subcon, it makes sense in many instances for courts to take a step back and consider whether a subcon result should apply retroactively, or *nunc pro tunc*, to the petition date.\n\n11 12 13 14 15 16 But here, Your Honor, we're not seeking subcon; we're seeking a ruling, as I described before, from this Court simply recognizing the economic reality of how Mr. Kwok operated. He has always held his assets with shell companies and he's done that for the purpose of keeping all of his wealth outside the reach of his creditors.\n\n17 18 19 20 21 We think for the Court to issue the relief that the Defendants are asking the Court to issue would effectively bless that fraudulent fiction and result in significant prejudice to the estate and to the debtor's creditors, Your Honor.\n\n22 23 And with that, I have nothing further unless the Court has questions.\n\n24 25 THE COURT: I do not have any questions, thank you.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 110 of 125\n\n| 1 | What I will do is I will take a short recess and I |\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | will allow the Joint Defendants and the trustee, one, you can |\n| 3 | reply; two, Attorney Bassett, and Attorney Bassett, you can |\n| 4 | reply to their reply.
One final, short argument, here, I'm |\n| 5 | going to allow you to do. |\n| 6 | I'm probably not going to give you more than 10 |\n| 7 | minutes apiece and you will have to decide who you want to |\n| 8 | have argue that, okay.
And what I'll do now is I will take a |\n| 9 | recess and I'll be back at 12:35 and then I'll give the Joint |\n| 10 | Defendants 10 minutes and the trustee 10 minutes and then we |\n| 11 | will conclude the hearing. |\n| 12 | Does anyone have any questions? |\n| 13 | (No verbal response) |\n| 14 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Thank you. |\n| 15 | Then, court is in recess until 12:35. |\n| 16 | THE DEPUTY:
All rise. |\n| 17 | The court is in recess until 12:35. |\n| 18 | (Recess taken at 12:25 p.m.) |\n| 19 | (Proceedings resumed at 12:37 p.m.) |\n| 20 | THE DEPUTY:
All rise. |\n| 21 | The court is in session after recess. |\n| 22 | THE COURT:
Please be seated.
Thank you. |\n| 23 | Well, I don't know if everybody is here yet, but |\n| 24 | that's okay, they'll come back, I hope.
Maybe they decided |\n| 25 | to leave? |\n\n 111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 (Laughter) THE COURT: No, I'm only kidding; I know they were outside talking, but maybe somebody could get them. Oh, here they come. Here they come. (Pause) MR. GOLDSTEIN: Apologies, Your Honor. This is one of the things that happens when you have a lot of cooks in the soup. (Laughter) THE COURT: Not a problem. MR. GOLDSTEIN: Thank you for your indulgence. THE COURT: I just wanted to make sure you didn't leave. (Laughter) MR. GOLDSTEIN: And miss this? No. THE COURT: No. So, Attorney Peterson and Attorney Goldstein, which of the two of you will make the concluding argument? MR. GOLDSTEIN: I guess I drew the short straw, yet again, so... THE COURT: Go right ahead, then; please proceed. MR. GOLDSTEIN: Okay. All right. A few points, Your Honor, just targeted. I don't even think I'm going to take my 10 minutes -- famous last words, but I think that's where I'm going to land. Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 111 of 125\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 112 of 125\n\n112\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 The point we made on the 549 cases was, and I didn't hear when Attorney Bassett was saying it, but he may have said it and I maybe missed it, was that we said it's not a non-insider 549 case that we're trying, right. So, Harman, Schuster, both involved the debtor and their spouse. I think Deckelbaum, I think, was one of the cases they cited, also, was actually the law firm that was setting up the entities post-petition that's kind of involved in it. American International, which I addressed\n\n10 11 12 initially, which was also a set, I think, cited, also, was they never dealt with 549. The transparent issue in that case was a prepetition transfer, so we'll leave that there.\n\n13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 You know, in Duckworth they were trying to distinguish Duckworth. One of the grounds was the fact that, oh, well, there was only -- the only party who would benefit would be the secured creditor. But, you know, reading -- if you read the Duckworth decision, the Duckworth Court says - and I lost my page when I was coming in, but I had it -- the Court says after discussing that issue, the fact that, potentially, the party to benefit would be the secured creditor. It goes on and says -- and this is at page 4 - the more serious problem with the trustee's actions, concerns the overbroad application of the alter-ego doctrine. So, I don't think you can just discount the analysis.\n\n25\n\nThe other issue raised in trying to distinguish\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 113 of 125\n\n113\n\n1 2 3 4 5 Duckworth was that the -- I think, if I remember hearing Attorney Bassett right -- was that saying, well, you know, this is just -- the debtor deposited money in Power Trading and then Power Trading, you know, made these payments to the trade creditor.\n\n6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 The scheme was a little bit more involved than that, right. The money went to these two LLCs, which he used to defraud his creditor, to shield his money, even by using them to take the proceeds to the grain sales. The debtor withdrew the money from that account, and as I read the Court's decision, and Your Honor can read it, as well, he then deposited the money in Power Trading. So, he was trying to keep the money in the LLCs in a very similar fashion that was alleged here.\n\n15 16 Let me see if there's anything else in Duckworth that I was going to say.\n\n17 (Pause)\n\n18 19 MR. GOLDSTEIN: Yeah, I think that covers the waterfront there.\n\n20 21 22 23 24 25 There was a reference to the In re Mass case, M-as-s, and I just wanted to address that very quickly, about that there's not a harm for having to return funds based on reverse veil-piercing. See, that was a turnover case; that was an instance where a judgment creditor, who -- the judgment creditor had a judgment against the entity and it\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 114 of 125\n\n114\n\n1 also had a guaranty debt against the debtor.\n\n2 3 4 5 6 7 Post-petition, that judgment creditor, then, seized the funds in an account that was called a \"DIP account,\" a debtor-in-possession account. So it was -- it didn't even involve any avoidance claims. You don't have that 550 issue overlay; it was a 542 turnover claim, so it's a different type of claim here.\n\n8 9 10 11 Moreover, you have this issue of a creditor who had to have known of the bankruptcy and then seized an account that was titled the \"debtor-in-possession account.\" So, I think it's distinguishable on its facts there.\n\n12 13 14 15 16 17 18 You know, I think -- just two concluding points. There's an argument that if you allow -- if you, Your Honor, determines to have the protections that we've discussed in Manichaean for third-party creditors, the protections in Auto-Train, the protections in Duckworth, in Lawler, that you're somehow, we'd be somehow, essentially, like, letting Mr. Kwok get away with what he did or blessing his fraud.\n\n19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Again, you know, not so. There are other remedies. They could have pursued an involuntary petition. They could have pursued claims as a subsequent transferee, but it's also a reflection of the balancing, right, it's ultimately a reflection of a balancing, a balancing of trying to, you know, through avoidance powers and the like to recover assets to benefit creditors.\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 115 of 125\n\n115\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 But it's also not to harm, you know, third parties in their reasonable expectations, that the entity that they're dealing with are distinct. And it gets to the same, that concern in Auto-Train, like, you know, when we start upsetting the apple cart, particularly on a 549 claim, which you can't, you know, innocent creditors can talk about risk with 547 and 548, because you have defenses. You have ordinary course, or 547, subsequent new value; 548, you have the 548(c) defense. 549 is a whole different animal, right. You have much less.\n\n11 12 13 14 15 16 17 But it's that balance, right. It's the balancing of those harms. And then, finally, in conclusion, you know, I think what it was telling was kind of at the end, right, where Attorney Bassett said, look, at the end of the day, this is kind of the same result as substantive consolidation, right. That's what we're doing; we're consolidating assets, consolidating liabilities.\n\n18 19 20 21 22 23 24 So, again, I'll end with one of the -- where I mentioned in my presentation, which is how do you impose two equitable doctrines, right, substantive consolidation and alter-ego, but you're doing it in such a different way, where it's the same fact pattern. It's the same concerns that were at issue in Auto-Train, whether the Court hesitated in doing it *nunc pro tunc* to the prejudice of Midland Ross.\n\n25\n\nIt just makes no sense where you employ the two\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 116 of 125\n\n116\n\n1 2 3 equitable doctrines in such a distinct manner. And unless my colleagues -- you know, okay. They're saying that I finished, so thank you very much.\"\n\nTHE COURT: Okay. Thank you.\n\nAttorney Bassett?\n\n4\n\n5\n\n6 7 MR. BASSETT: Again, Your Honor, for the record, Nick Bassett, counsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee.\n\n8 9 10 11 12 13 Your Honor, just a few concluding points. First of all, to respond to Attorney Goldstein's comments about the Section 549 cases that I mentioned during my presentation, his points that he just made was that they don't believe any of those cases involved non-insiders. So that all of those cases involve 549 claims against insiders.\n\n14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 I would challenge the Court to review those cases and to find anywhere in those cases that distinguish between insiders and non-insiders. That was not at all the basis for the decisions by those courts. The basis for the decision by those courts was simply that they recognized that there was an alter-ego finding. The consequence of that alter-ego finding was that the alter-ego's assets were always assets of the estate. And the transfers of the assets that occurred, occurred after the petition date, full stop.\n\n23 24 25 I'd challenge the Court to look at Section 549 and find any distinction in Section 549 between claims to insiders and claims to non-insiders. It doesn't exist.\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 117 of 125\n\n117\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Conversely, I would make the point that the Defendants have not cited a single case like this one, where a debtor -- there may be other cases where debtors have had alter-egos and courts have dealt with those in a variety of different manners. This case, and I stressed this at the outset of my presentation and I'll stress it again, I would submit is unlike any other case in the history of Chapter 11 bankruptcy, at least on this scale. We're talking about a billionaire who filed for bankruptcy, saying he had zero assets, because every single one of the assets that he had, that he used to live his lavish lifestyle, that he used to conduct his affairs, was tucked into a shell company. The consequence of the ruling there, asking the Court to make would be in that situation, that's tough. The trustee cannot pursue a single avoidance claim because every transfer of every asset that occurred prior to the bankruptcy and after the petition date, was not a transfer by the debtor of his assets; it was a transfer by this fictional shell company that Mr. Kwok created. That would be an incredibly unjust result that is inconsistent with economic and practical reality, and inconsistent with the law. Your Honor, I'll respond to the balancing point that Attorney Goldstein concluded with. I think I tried to\n\n25 and you look at what the courts say, it is a balance of all\n\nbe very clear in my presentation, if you look at Manichaean\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 118 of 125\n\n118\n\n1 the factors. We're not disputing that.\n\n2 3 4 5 6 What we are disputing is this notion that there's a requirement in the law that there cannot even be a possibility of harm to any party before the Court can issue an alter-ego ruling. That's fundamentally not what the case law says.\n\n7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 I also need to emphasize, again, that this whole argument shouldn't even be being raised right now because there's not a pleading issue. To the extent they want a to come forward later and say, you know what, we're innocent. We had no idea, and, by the way, I do not conceded that all these Defendants were, in fact, innocent. I didn't know about these transfers that they received from Mr. Kwok, but to the extent they want to make that argument, they can come forward and make that argument later as an affirmative defense. As Manichaean, the case that they say the Court should follow said, that is not a pleading issue.\n\n18 19 20 21 22 23 In addition, Your Honor, on this whole idea of balance, I don't see any better way to balance the harms and benefits of the ruling that the trustee is seeking by relying on the Bankruptcy Code. I think that's why so many cases have said an alter-ego claim operates differently in bankruptcy.\n\n24 25 In bankruptcy, you have inherent protections built in by the Bankruptcy Code. These parties can pursue defenses\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 119 of\n\n125\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 that they have. They're not completely being deprived of defenses. They may wish that they were being sued as subsequent transferees, even though that's not the way the facts point out here, but they had defenses of a subsequent transferee. But they have other defenses under the Bankruptcy Code.\n\n7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 They can also assert claims, as I said, against the estate; that's the whole point. That's how this works. People affected by Mr. Kwok's fraud, who have been harmed in the wake of his years-long fraudulent scheme, all have recourse under the Bankruptcy Code. The Bankruptcy Code first requires us to collect assets and distribute them in a ratable way, which is why we were pursuing these avoidance actions and then the parties who end up having to repay the estate could have its claim under Section 502(h) of the Bankruptcy Code for recourse. That's the balance. The Code builds that in.\n\n18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 So, Your Honor, we think the case law that we've cited fully supports the relief that we're asking the Court to enter and we also think that that relief needs to be entered, understanding that this is being done in the context of a very unique case, unlike any other in history where a debtor simply did nothing, other than hide his assets in shell companies. It's unlike any other case and the result should be consent with the reality of how Mr. Kwok has\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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125 |\n|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | 120 |\n| 1 | operated for many, many years. |\n| 2 | Thank you, Your Honor. |\n| 3 | THE COURT:
Thank you. |\n| | |\n| 4 | All right.
I have listened, obviously, to the |\n| 5 | parties.
There were some issues that were raised today in a |\n| 6 | case, or two, raised today that I have not reviewed, |\n| 7 | including the Gracey case that was presented today, which is |\n| 8 | fine, and I will review that.
I will review, obviously, all |\n| 9 | of the submissions again, in light of the oral arguments made |\n| 10 | today. |\n| 11 | The hope is that, you know, obviously, I will rule |\n| 12 | sooner as opposed to later.
It will take some time.
I'll |\n| 13 | have to go through all these issues.
But a decision will |\n| 14 | enter. |\n| 15 | With regard to the record of this hearing, as I |\n| 16 | said at the start, what the Court will do is make sure that |\n| 17 | the record of the hearing -- and I'm looking to the courtroom |\n| 18 | deputy now -- will have a list of all the Joint Defendants, |\n| 19 | but what we'll do is we'll indicate who argued today for the |\n| 20 | Joint Defendants and then for the specific Defendants, and |\n| 21 | then who argued for the trustee, and then following that will |\n| 22 | most likely be the list of the remaining Joint Defendants |\n| 23 | that joined the brief, okay. |\n| 24 | And then, because I'm -- the transcriber isn't |\n| 25 | going to understand it if we don't do it in that manner and |\n| | |\n\n 121 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 we want the transcriber to obviously understand it, and we'll go from there. Does anyone have any questions? MR. SKLARZ: Your Honor, just for logistically on behalf of my clients who have quote, unquote, non-joint issues -- THE COURT: Right. MR. SKLARZ: -- during the status conference, Your Honor, I indicated we would schedule argument that was later. THE COURT: Right. MR. SKLARZ: Would you expect -- and, again, I apologize for putting you on the spot -- would you want that argument to occur prior to your issuing a decision? THE COURT: I don't think that that will happen. MR. SKLARZ: Fair enough. THE COURT: I think that those arguments will happen after I issue a decision on the issues in the joint brief. MR. SKLARZ: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: I can't say that with certainty, but that's what I believe. I don't think you're putting me on the spot; you're asking me a question. And my answer is, I believe that these issues will be decided first and then with regard to other Defendants, who are not Joint Defendants, but have pending motions to Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 121 of 125\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 122 of 125\n\n| 1 | dismiss, those will all have to be scheduled in some way, |\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | |\n| 2 | shape, or form, and I believe that that scheduling will not |\n| 3 | happen, or whatever is going to happen with those matters, |\n| 4 | will not happen until after this decision is rendered. |\n| 5 | So, for example, could an order come out in your |\n| 6 | cases that say, There's going to be a hearing on the motion |\n| 7 | to dismiss on whatever date -- we'll just pick a date -- |\n| 8 | March 31st.
That could happen, but I would probably schedule |\n| 9 | that date thinking that I will have rendered a decision on |\n| 10 | all of these issues first. |\n| 11 | Does that make sense? |\n| 12 | MR. SKLARZ:
It does. |\n| 13 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Thank you. |\n| 14 | MR. GOLDSTEIN:
Your Honor, Eric Goldstein. |\n| 15 | I got one question from the Joint Defendants group |\n| 16 | about just the logistics.
We're rendering a decision on what |\n| 17 | we just did and the work that we've done today. |\n| 18 | Would it happen in the main case or would it |\n| 19 | happen in the adversary? |\n| 20 | THE COURT:
Well, you know, like we've done in the |\n| 21 | past is, the issues -- not in the past -- what we've done in |\n| 22 | connection with the joint brief is there was an orders issued |\n| 23 | in the main case, a brief filed in the main case, but then |\n| 24 | there was a filing made in every corresponding adversary |\n| 25 | proceeding. |\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 123 of 125\n\n| 1 | Who's going to make that filing?
I don't know.
I |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | mean, you know, sitting here right now, whether the trustee |\n| 3 | is going to do it, whether the Clerk's Office is going to do |\n| 4 | it, however we're going -- I don't know.
But there will |\n| 5 | be -- there has to be something in every adversary |\n| 6 | proceeding, okay, because in order for the record of each |\n| 7 | adversary proceeding to be complete. |\n| 8 | Now, will that relate you back to the main case? |\n| 9 | I don't know.
Sitting here, I don't know, but we'll figure |\n| 10 | that out. |\n| 11 | MR. GOLDSTEIN:
Fair enough. |\n| 12 | Thank you, Your Honor. |\n| 13 | THE COURT:
All right.
Thank you. |\n| 14 | Anyone else have any questions? |\n| 15 | Okay.
Well, I do appreciate the thorough briefing |\n| 16 | and the oral arguments of the parties.
Obviously, everyone |\n| 17 | spent a great deal of time on these issues and have provided |\n| 18 | me with much to think about and to review in determining |\n| 19 | these issues, so I do appreciate that and I appreciate that |\n| 20 | although the parties obviously don't agree that you've -- on |\n| 21 | these issues that you've worked cooperatively, and I do |\n| 22 | appreciate that -- that makes the job a little easier from |\n| 23 | the Court's perspective. |\n| 24 | So, this is the last matter on today's calendar, |\n| 25 | so Court is adjourned. |\n| | |\n\n| | Case 22-50073 | Doc 3985 | Filed 01/21/25
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125 |\n| 1 | CERTIFICATION |\n| 2 | I certify that the foregoing is a correct |\n| 3 | transcript from the electronic sound recording of the |\n| 4 | proceedings in the above-entitled matter to the best of my |\n| 5 | knowledge and ability. |\n| 6 | |\n| 7 | /s/ William J. Garling
January 17, 2025 |\n| 8 | William J. Garling, CET-543 |\n| 9 | Certified Court Transcriptionist |\n| 10 | For Reliable |\n| 11 | |\n| 12 | |\n| 13 | |\n| 14 | |\n| 15 | |\n| 16 | |\n| 17 | |\n| 18 | |\n| 19 | |\n| 20 | |\n| 21 | |\n| 22 | |\n| 23 | |\n| 24 | |\n| 25 | |\n| | |\n| | |","body_zh":"美国破产法院\n康涅狄格联邦地区\n布里奇波特分院\n\n关于：\n第 11 章\n案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，\n（合并管理）\n债务人。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS（卢克·A·德斯潘斯），作为 HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对抗程序\n编号 24-05005 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nAGORA LAB, INC.（阿戈拉实验室公司），\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对抗程序\n编号 24-05006 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nAMAZON WEB SERVICES, INC.（亚马逊网络服务公司），\n被告。\n\n第 123 法庭\nBrien McMahon Federal Building（布赖恩·麦克马洪联邦大楼）\n915 Lafayette Boulevard\n康涅狄格州布里奇波特 06604\n2025年1月15日，星期三\n下午 12:55\n续\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 3985 于 01/21/25 提交，于 01/21/25 13:49:43 登记，第 1 页，共 125 页\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对抗程序\n编号 24-05010 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nDIRECT PERSUASION, LLC（直接说服有限责任公司），\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对抗程序\n编号 24-05015 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nFOX NEWS NETWORK, LLC（福克斯新闻网络有限责任公司），\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对抗程序\n编号 24-05031 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nARRI AMERICAS, INC.（阿莱美洲公司），\n被告。\n\n续\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 3985 于 01/21/25 提交，于 01/21/25 13:49:43 登记，第 2 页，共 125 页\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对抗程序\n编号 24-05044 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nTERIS-PHOENIX, LLC（特里斯—菲尼克斯有限责任公司），\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对抗程序\n编号 24-05047 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nPHILLIPS NIZER, LLP（菲利普斯·尼泽律师事务所），\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对抗程序\n编号 24-05048 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nMARK GUNDERSON（马克·冈德森），\n被告。\n\n续\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 3985 于 01/21/25 提交，于 01/21/25 13:49:43 登记，第 3 页，共 125 页\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对抗程序\n编号 24-05055 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\n270 W. 39th Street Co., LLC（西39街270号公司有限责任公司），\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对抗程序\n编号 24-05056 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nFFP (BVI) LIMITED，\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对抗程序\n编号 24-05057 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nAMAZON.COM, INC.（亚马逊公司）、HING CHI NGOK（伍庆玉）、ALEX HADJICHARALAMBOUS（亚历克斯·哈吉查拉兰博斯）、CHUNGUANG HAN（韩春光）及 MEI GUO（郭梅），\n被告。\n\n续\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 3985 于 01/21/25 提交，于 01/21/25 13:49:43 登记，第 4 页，共 125 页\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对抗程序\n编号 24-05058 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nANTHEM HEALTH PLANS, INC.（安森健康计划公司），\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对抗程序\n编号 24-05059 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nFEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION（联邦快递公司），\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对抗程序\n编号 24-05063 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nDJD CREATIVE, LLC（DJD 创意有限责任公司），\n被告。\n\n续\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 3985 于 01/21/25 提交，于 01/21/25 13:49:43 登记，第 5 页，共 125 页\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对抗程序\n编号 24-05069 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nB&H FOTO & ELECTRONICS CORP.（B&H 摄影与电子公司）、HING CHI NGOK、ALEX HADJICHARALAMBOUS及 CHUNGUANG HAN，\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对抗程序\n编号 24-05077 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nAMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY（美国运通公司），\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对抗程序\n编号 24-05082 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nOHTZAR SHLOMO SOLOMON TREASURE, LLC（奥察尔·什洛莫·所罗门珍宝有限责任公司），\n被告。\n\n续\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 3985 于 01/21/25 提交，于 01/21/25 13:49:43 登记，第 6 页，共 125 页\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对抗程序\n编号 24-05092 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nZETA GLOBAL CORP.（泽塔全球公司），\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对抗程序\n编号 24-05100 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nGROCYBER, LLC（格罗赛博有限责任公司），\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对抗程序\n编号 24-05108 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nCONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TECHNOLOGY, LLC（保守派竞选技术有限责任公司），\n被告。\n\n续\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 3985 于 01/21/25 提交，于 01/21/25 13:49:43 登记，第 7 页，共 125 页\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对抗程序\n编号 24-05110 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nAARON MITCHELL（亚伦·米切尔），\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对抗程序\n编号 24-05112 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nEMPIRE BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD（帝国蓝十字蓝盾）及 ANTHEM HEALTHCHOICE ASSURANCE, INC.（安森健康选择保险公司），\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对抗程序\n编号 24-05114 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nMODSQUAD, INC.（莫德斯夸德公司），\n被告。\n\n续\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 3985 于 01/21/25 提交，于 01/21/25 13:49:43 登记，第 8 页，共 125 页\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对抗程序\n编号 24-05115 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nCLOUDFARE, INC.（克劳德费尔公司），\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对抗程序\n编号 24-05120 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\n3 COLUMBUS CIRCLE, LLC（哥伦布圆环3号有限责任公司），\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对抗程序\n编号 24-05122 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nINDIUM SOFTWARE, INC.（铟软件公司），\n被告。\n\n续\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 3985 于 01/21/25 提交，于 01/21/25 13:49:43 登记，第 9 页，共 125 页\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对抗程序\n编号 24-05128 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nMILLER MOTORCARS, INC.（米勒汽车公司），\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对抗程序\n编号 24-05130 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nON THE SPOT HOME IMPROVEMENT, INC.（即时家居改造公司），\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对抗程序\n编号 24-05134 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nV.X. CERDA & ASSOCIATES, P.A.（V.X. 塞尔达及合伙人专业协会），\n被告。\n\n续\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 3985 于 01/21/25 提交，于 01/21/25 13:49:43 登记，第 10 页，共 125 页\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对抗程序\n编号 24-05135 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nLIBERTY JET MANAGEMENT CORP.（自由喷气机管理公司），\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对抗程序\n编号 24-05138 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nTARGET ENTERPRISES, LLC（目标企业有限责任公司），\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对抗程序\n编号 24-05141 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nFLAT RATE MOVERS, LTD.（统一费率搬家公司），\n被告。\n\n续\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 3985 于 01/21/25 提交，于 01/21/25 13:49:43 登记，第 11 页，共 125 页\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对抗程序\n编号 24-05147 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nJAMESTOWN ASSOCIATES, LLC（詹姆斯敦合伙人有限责任公司），\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对抗程序\n编号 24-05162 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nNARDELLO & CO., LLC（纳德洛公司有限责任公司），\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对抗程序\n编号 24-05168 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nTHE FRANCIS FIRM PLLC（弗朗西斯律师事务所职业有限责任公司），\n被告。\n\n续\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 3985 于 01/21/25 提交，于 01/21/25 13:49:43 登记，第 12 页，共 125 页\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对抗程序\n编号 24-05186 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nBERKELEY ROWE LIMITED（伯克利·罗有限责任公司），\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对抗程序\n编号 24-05196 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nMORVILLO ABRAMOWITZ GRAND IASON & ANELLO, P.C.（莫维洛·阿布拉莫维茨·格兰德·亚森及阿内洛专业公司），\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对抗程序\n编号 24-05199 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nLAWALL & MITCHELL, LLC（拉沃尔及米切尔有限责任公司）及 AARON MITCHELL，\n被告。\n\n续\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 3985 于 01/21/25 提交，于 01/21/25 13:49:43 登记，第 13 页，共 125 页\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对抗程序\n编号 24-05202 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nCLAYMAN ROSENBERG KIRSHNER & LINDER, LLP（克莱曼·罗森伯格·柯什纳及林德律师事务所），\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对抗程序\n编号 24-05204 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nG4S SECURITY SYSTEMS (HONG KONG) LTD.（G4S 安保系统〈香港〉有限公司），\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为 HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对抗程序\n编号 24-05208 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nZEISLER & ZEISLER, P.C.（蔡斯勒及蔡斯勒专业公司），\n被告。\n\n续\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 3985 于 01/21/25 提交，于 01/21/25 13:49:43 登记，第 14 页，共 125 页\n\n卢克·A·德斯平斯（Luc A. Despins），霍万·郭（Ho Wan Kwok）财产的第11章受托人\n对抗程序\n案号 24-05211 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\n普特南园林绿化有限责任公司（Putnam's Landscaping, LLC），\n被告。\n—续—\n\n卢克·A·德斯平斯，霍万·郭财产的第11章受托人\n对抗程序\n案号 24-05219 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\n贾森·米勒（Jason Miller），\n被告。\n\n卢克·A·德斯平斯，霍万·郭财产的第11章受托人\n对抗程序\n案号 24-05222 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\n塞奇威克房地产公司（Sedgwick Realty Corp.），\n被告。\n\n案件 22-50073 文档 3985 提交日期 01/21/25 录入日期 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 15 页，共 125 页\n\n卢克·A·德斯平斯，霍万·郭财产的第11章受托人\n对抗程序\n案号 24-05225 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\n卷云设计公司（Cirrus Design Corporation）及郭强（Qiang Guo），\n被告。\n\n卢克·A·德斯平斯，霍万·郭财产的第11章受托人\n对抗程序\n案号 24-05226 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\nACASS 加拿大有限公司（ACASS Canada, Ltd.），\n被告。\n\n卢克·A·德斯平斯，霍万·郭财产的第11章受托人\n对抗程序\n案号 24-05229 (JAM)\n原告，\n诉\n马库姆律师事务所（Marcum, LLP），\n被告。\n\n在尊敬的朱莉·A·曼宁（Julie A. Manning）法官——美国破产法官——面前举行听证会的庭审记录\n\n案件 22-50073 文档 3985 提交日期 01/21/25 录入日期 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 16 页，共 125 页\n\n案件 22-50073 文档 3985 提交日期 01/21/25 录入日期 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 17 页，共 125 页\n\n出庭律师\n\n卢克·A·德斯平斯\n保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所（Paul Hastings LLP）\n200 Park Avenue\n纽约州纽约市 10166\n\n罗维娜·A·莫菲特（Rowena A. Moffett）\n布伦纳、萨尔茨曼及沃尔曼律师事务所（Brenner, Saltzman & Wallman, LLP）\n271 Whitney Avenue\n康涅狄格州纽黑文市 06511\n\n本杰明·D·费德尔（Benjamin D. Feder）\n凯利·德莱及沃伦律师事务所（Kelley Drye & Warren LLP）\nCanterbury Green\n201 Broad Street\n康涅狄格州斯坦福德市 06901\n\n尼古拉斯·A·巴塞特（Nicholas A. Bassett）\n保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所（Paul Hastings, LLP）\n2050 M Street NW\n华盛顿哥伦比亚特区 20036\n\n帕特里克·R·林西（Patrick R. Linsey）\n诺伊伯特·佩佩及蒙蒂思律师事务所（Neubert Pepe & Monteith, P.C.）\n195 Church St\n13th Fl\n康涅狄格州纽黑文市 06510\n\n斯图尔特·M·萨诺夫（Stuart M. Sarnoff）\n奥梅尔韦尼及迈尔斯律师事务所（O'Melveny & Myers LLP）\n1301 Avenue of the Americas\nSte 1700\n纽约州纽约市 10019\n\n埃里克·S·戈尔茨坦（Eric S. Goldstein）\n希普曼及古德温律师事务所（Shipman & Goodwin LLP）\nOne Constitution Plaza\n康涅狄格州哈特福德市 06103\n\n布赖恩·T·彼得森（Brian T. Peterson）\nK&L Gates 律师事务所（K&L Gates LLP）\n925 4th Ave Suite 2900\n华盛顿州西雅图市 98104\n\n达里尔·S·拉丁（Darryl S. Laddin）\n阿诺尔·戈尔登·格雷戈里律师事务所（Arnall Golden Gregory LLP）\n171 17th Street, NW, Suite 2100\n佐治亚州亚特兰大市 30363\n\n案件 22-50073\n文档 3985 提交日期 01/21/25\n录入日期 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 18 页，共 125 页\n\n出庭人员（续）\n\n杰弗里·M·斯克拉兹（Jeffrey M. Sklarz）\n格林及斯克拉兹有限责任公司（Green & Sklarz LLC）\nOne Audubon Street\n3rd Floor\n康涅狄格州纽黑文市 06511\n\n斯蒂芬·M·金德塞思（Stephen M. Kindseth）\n蔡斯勒及蔡斯勒律师事务所（Zeisler & Zeisler）\n10 Middle Street\n15th Floor\n康涅狄格州布里奇波特市 06604\n\n出庭人员（续）\n\n音频操作员：电子录音\n\n记录誊写公司：Reliable\nThe Nemours Building\n1007 N. Orange Street, Suite 110\n特拉华州威尔明顿市 19801\n电话：(302)654-8080\n电子邮件：\n\n程序由电子录音记录，\n庭审记录由誊写服务机构制作。\n\n目录\n动议：页码\n\n事项编号 3857\n关于安排审理驳回动议及依诉状请求判决动议的听证会的命令。5\n法院裁定：—\n\n事项编号 17\n杰弗里·M·斯克拉兹代表被告 FFP（英属维尔京群岛）有限公司（FFP (BVI) Limited）提交的驳回对抗程序动议\n法院裁定：\n\n事项编号 19\n杰弗里·M·斯克拉兹代表被告阿伦·米切尔（Aaron Mitchell）提交的驳回对抗程序动议\n法院裁定：\n\n事项编号 16\n杰弗里·M·斯克拉兹代表被告 V.X. Cerda & Associates P.A. 提交的驳回对抗程序动议\n法院裁定：\n\n事项编号 15\n杰弗里·M·斯克拉兹代表被告弗朗西斯律师事务所 PLLC（The Francis Firm PLLC）提交的驳回对抗程序动议\n法院裁定：\n\n事项编号 35\n杰弗里·M·斯克拉兹代表被告伯克利·罗有限责任公司（Berkeley Rowe Limited）提交的驳回对抗程序动议\n法院裁定：\n\n案件 22-50073 文档 3985 提交日期 01/21/25 录入日期 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 19 页，共 125 页\n\n案件 22-50073 文档 3985 提交日期 01/21/25 录入日期 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 20 页，共 125 页\n\n目录\n动议：页码\n\n事项编号 11\n杰弗里·M·斯克拉兹代表被告韦德尔律师事务所 PPLC（Weddle Law PPLC）提交的驳回对抗程序动议\n法院裁定：\n\n事项编号 21\n杰弗里·M·斯克拉兹代表被告 Lawall & Mitchell, LLC 及阿伦·米切尔提交的驳回对抗程序动议\n法院裁定：\n\n事项编号 19\n米歇尔·阿曼达·安唐（Michelle Amanda Antao）代表被告 G4S 安全系统（香港）有限公司（G4S Security Systems (Hong Kong) Ltd.）提交的经修正驳回对抗程序动议\n法院裁定：\n\n事项编号 26\n杰弗里·M·斯克拉兹代表被告 ACASS 加拿大有限公司就第二次修正起诉状提交的驳回对抗程序动议\n法院裁定：\n\n事项编号 19\n帕特里克·托马谢维奇（Patrick Tomasiewicz）代表被告自由喷气管理公司（Liberty Jet Management Corp.）提交的驳回对抗程序动议\n法院裁定：\n\n事项编号 17\n尼古拉斯·A·巴塞特代表原告卢克·A·德斯平斯就起诉状第一项请求提交的依诉状请求判决动议\n法院裁定：\n\n誊写员证明书 125\n\n案件 22-50073 文档 3985 提交日期 01/21/25 录入日期 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 21 页，共 125 页\n\n（程序于上午 10:17 开始。）\n\n法警：\n好的。\n案件编号 22-50073，霍万·郭——抱歉——对抗程序编号 24-0506，德斯平斯诉 FFP BVI 有限公司；对抗程序 24-5110，德斯平斯诉米切尔；对抗程序 24-5168，德斯平斯诉弗朗西斯律师事务所 PLLC；对抗程序 24-5186，德斯平斯诉伯克利·罗有限责任公司；对抗程序 24-5188，德斯平斯诉韦德尔律师事务所 PLLC；对抗程序 24-5199，德斯平斯诉 Lawall & Mitchell LLC 等；对抗程序 24-5204，德斯平斯诉 G4S 安全系统香港有限公司；对抗程序 24-50——抱歉——24-5226，德斯平斯诉 ACASS 加拿大有限公司；对抗程序 24-5135，德斯平斯诉自由喷气管理公司；对抗程序 24-5208，德斯平斯诉蔡斯勒及蔡斯勒 P.C.\n\n法庭：\n好的。早上好。\n请第11章受托人首先出庭登记。\n\n德斯平斯先生：\n早上好，法官阁下。卢克·德斯平斯，第11章受托人。我相信可能遗漏了一项事项，即 5134，德斯平斯诉 Serta & Associates。\n\n法庭：\n可能是这样。早上好。\n\n莫菲特女士：\n早上好，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：\n律师，您介意上前吗？因为除非麦克风录到您的声音，否则我们听不见您说话，以供录音之用。谢谢。\n\n莫菲特女士：\n是，法官阁下。我只是想指出，我相信还遗漏了另一宗对抗程序：5——24-5196，德斯平斯诉 Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello P.C.\n\n法庭：\n好的。谢谢。\n\n莫菲特女士：\n谢谢您，法官阁下。\n\n法警：\n那么，抱歉，请问我没有听到该律师的姓名？\n\n莫菲特女士：\n哦，抱歉。谨致歉意。\n\n法庭：\n没关系。\n\n莫菲特女士：\n罗维娜·莫菲特，代表我刚才提到的对抗程序被告。\n\n法庭：\n非常感谢。我想我们可能还有其他律师希望上前？\n\n林西先生：\n我想，法官阁下——\n\n法庭：\n稍等一下，林西律师。\n\n林西先生：\n当然。\n\n法庭：\n我先听取律师的陈述，然后我们再继续。\n\n费德尔先生：\n是，早上好，法官阁下。凯利、德莱及沃伦律师事务所的本杰明·费德尔，代表 Indium Software，就德斯平斯诉 Indium Software 一案出庭，案号 24-05122。\n\n案件 22-50073 文档 3985 提交日期 01/21/25 录入日期 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 22 页，共 125 页\n\n法庭：\n我认为该事项不在今天的日程上。\n\n身份不明的发言人：\n（听不清。）\n\n法庭：\n是的。律师，您的客户是联合书状的一方，对吗？\n\n费德尔先生：\n正确。\n\n法庭：\n是，正确。我想莫菲特律师的客户也是如此。因此，我们并非点名所有作为联合书状当事方的对抗程序。我们在上周的状态会议上所做的是——我不确定你们二位是否参加了那次会议——我们列出了一份所有同意成为联合书状一部分的当事人名单，该名单已载入记录。但就今天而言，我们将联合书状作为一个事项处理，而被点名的其他对抗程序并非联合书状被告，明白吗？\n\n费德尔先生：\n明白。谢谢。\n\n法庭：\n因此，这并不是您的——显然这有一点——有一点令人困惑。有数百宗对抗程序。因此，日程上其他关于驳回动议或为依诉状判决而提出的驳回动议的事项，涉及的是并非联合书状共同被告的当事人——\n\n案件 22-50073 文档 3985 提交日期 01/21/25 录入日期 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 23 页，共 125 页\n\n费德尔先生：\n好的。谢谢。\n\n法庭：\n——且实质上未受调解程序约束的当事人。\n\n费德尔先生：\n感谢您的澄清，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：\n是，请相信我，我理解，好的。因此，还是谢谢你们二位；另外，请知悉，你们是今天辩论的一部分，你们的客户也属于联合被告名单的一部分，并且你们均已签署加入联合书状。\n\n费德尔先生：\n好的。谢谢，谢谢您，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：\n好的。谢谢。好，请继续，巴塞特律师。\n\n巴塞特先生：\n是，下午好——抱歉——早上好，法官阁下。我是保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所的尼克·巴塞特，第11章受托人的律师。\n\n法庭：\n早上好。\n\n林西先生：\n早上好，法官阁下。我是诺伊伯特·佩佩及蒙蒂思律师事务所的帕特里克·林西，第11章受托人的律师。\n\n法庭：\n早上好。\n\n萨诺夫先生：\n早上好，法官阁下。我是奥梅尔韦尼及迈尔斯律师事务所的斯图尔特·萨诺夫，代表——\n\n案件 22-50073 文档 3985 提交日期 01/21/25 录入日期 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 24 页，共 125 页\n\n债权人 PAX。\n\n法庭：\n早上好。\n\n戈尔茨坦先生：\n早上好，法官阁下。我是希普曼及古德温律师事务所的埃里克·戈尔茨坦，代表：Anthem Health Assurance, Inc.；Anthem Health Plans, Inc.；Cedric Realty Corp.；Direct Persuasion LLC；On the Spot Home Improvement, Inc.；以及 Federal Express Corporation。\n\n法庭：\n早上好。\n\n彼得森先生：\n早上好，法官阁下。我是 K&L Gates 律师事务所的布赖恩·彼得森，代表 Amazon.com, Inc. 和 Amazon Web Services, Inc.\n\n法庭：\n早上好。\n\n拉丁先生：\n早上好，法官阁下。我是阿诺尔·戈尔登·格雷戈里律师事务所的达里尔·拉丁，代表联合被告之一 American Express Company。\n\n法庭：\n早上好。\n\n如果您是联合被告之一，您无需登记出庭，但这样也没关系。谢谢。我之所以这么说，律师，唯一的原因是我们讨论过由谁代表联合被告进行辩论，而昨天，按照我的要求，已经完成了，我对此表示感谢。已提交一份文件，说明戈尔茨坦律师和彼得森律师将代表联合被告进行辩论。\n\n案件 22-50073 文档 3985 提交日期 01/21/25 录入日期 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 26 页，共 125 页\n\n我上周如此处理的原因之一是——\n\n出席是为了确保所有被告，包括您的当事人，均被纳入记录。并且，通过签署加入联合书状，我们将确保，如需要并请求提供庭审记录，联合书状的所有当事人及其律师均将被列为该程序的一部分。\n\n拉丁律师：谢谢您，法官阁下。\n\n法院：好的。谢谢。\n\n斯克拉兹律师：早上好，法官阁下。\n\nJeffrey Sklarz（杰弗里·斯克拉兹），Green & Sklarz（格林与斯克拉兹律师事务所），代理受托人所提交报告中列明的若干未加入联合书状的被告。我此时不逐一列举我的所有被告。\n\n法院：谢谢。\n\n斯克拉兹律师：谢谢。\n\n金德塞斯律师：早上好，法官阁下。\n\n法院：早上好。\n\n金德塞斯律师：Stephen Kindseth（斯蒂芬·金德塞斯），Zeisler & Zeisler（蔡斯勒与蔡斯勒律师事务所），代理Zeisler & Zeisler。\n\n法院：早上好。\n\n那么，在我们上周举行的案情状态会议上，我们讨论了今天将提出的论点、论辩的时间限制，而斯克拉兹律师和金德塞斯律师是我允许也在本次听证会上提出论点的两位未加入联合书状的被告代理律师，因为每个人上周都已作了陈述。因此，我们将按照上周讨论的方式进行：加入联合书状的被告将就其于去年九月向本院提出的问题进行论辩。实际上，我回查了一下，看看我是否曾收到——我确实收到过，Goldstein律师——您当时向本院提交的文件，其中列明了加入联合书状的被告同意进行论辩的问题。我想确认，在那次案情状态会议后作出的命令中载明的四个问题所用语言是否相同；实际上是相同的。我认为，与您代表所有加入联合书状的被告所提交的文本并无任何偏离。因此，我确实回查并核对了。显然，如各位所知，所有这些对抗程序中存在许多、许多问题，但我确实回查，以确保我们在命令中澄清——不是澄清——抱歉，这个词不正确——纳入了四个问题；而且在我看来，其措辞似乎逐字照录了加入联合书状的被告请求本院就驳回动议或就诉状作出判决的动议所涉法律问题予以审议的内容。因此，再次感谢昨天提交了一份文件，称Peterson律师将处理问题1和3，而Goldstein律师将处理问题2和4。这也将是我们的进行方式。我认为——但我会听取任何相反意见——鉴于加入联合书状的被告向本院提出的四个问题，我们应当依次处理，除非Goldstein律师或Peterson律师希望以某种方式进行论辩——我认为Peterson律师，您处理1和3，而Goldstein律师处理2和4。\n\nGoldstein律师：谢谢您，法官阁下。Eric Goldstein（埃里克·戈尔茨坦）。Peterson律师和我试图安排的方式，是为了使陈述不至于支离破碎、缺乏连贯性；如果可以的话，由他处理问题1和3，然后交由我处理2和4。我们认为，我们可以以一种流畅、合理且彼此衔接的方式这样进行，而且无需我们为了换到讲台而打断陈述，如果可以的话？\n\n法院：可以。但我会关注你们在每个问题上的时间，对吧，因为我们确实讨论过——因为我给了你们每个问题15分钟，并给了受托人半小时作出回应。\n\nGoldstein律师：明白。\n\n法院：所以，如果你们要这样做，Peterson律师，也可以，但我会看着时间，好吗？我需要你们注意——加入联合书状的被告所整理的问题是四个独立问题，你们或许会主张1和3相互关联。坦率地说，我认为它们全都相互关联，因此我不一定会同意你们可以同时就1和3进行论辩；或者如果你们这样做，我可能不会将所有这些都纳入考虑。这是加入联合书状的被告所准备并请求本院处理的四个法律问题，而本院已准许该请求，将其作为法律问题处理，好吗？因此，如果你们任何一方对此有任何问题，现在就是提出问题的时候。\n\nGoldstein律师：唯一需要澄清的问题，法官阁下，是如果我就其中一个问题所用时间少于15分钟，那么额外时间是否会分配给我的其他问题？\n\n法院：我不确定。我们得看情况如何发展；这样如何？\n\nGoldstein律师：好的。好吧，法官阁下，这很公平。\n\n法院：我没有任何提示灯之类的东西，所以我不知道那个——但我明白你的问题，我们看看情况如何发展。\n\nGoldstein律师：好的。\n\n法院：好的。好吧。\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 3985 于 01/21/25 提交，于 01/21/25 13:49:43 登记，第 30 页，共 125 页\n\n那么，Despins受托人，开始之前您有什么问题吗？\n\nDespins先生：没有，法官阁下。\n\n法院：好的。那么，Peterson律师，请就问题1和3开始陈述。哦，在任何人开始之前，我也想说一件事。我想你们可能已经注意到，我们无需讨论驳回动议和就诉状作出判决的动议的审查标准。这只是讨论法律问题，好吗。我原本确实在命令中这样说过，但我希望记录清楚：没有人对有关驳回动议和就诉状作出判决的动议的法律标准提出异议，好吗。\n\nGoldstein律师：我明白。\n\n法院：好。那么——\n\nGoldstein律师：并且，法官阁下，我感谢您提供的任何指引。\n\n法院：好。那么，现在是10:30，请开始。\n\nPeterson先生：再次说明，法官阁下，Brian Peterson（布赖恩·彼得森），K&L Gates（凯安律师事务所），代表Amazon.com, Inc.（亚马逊公司）和Amazon Web Services, Inc.（亚马逊网络服务公司）。因此，如我们刚才所讨论，我将处理问题1和3。第一个问题是，受托人是否可以撤销由非债务人实体作出的初始转让。法官阁下，加入联合书状的被告提交了合并驳回动议，因为我们与受托人就其撤销诉讼权力的范围存在根本分歧。我们认为，受托人依据548、549和544提出的请求在法律上不能成立，因为其寻求撤销由非债务人实体作出的转让。\n\n我们认为，法官阁下，受托人在这些另我——这些撤销诉讼对抗程序中的做法过于扩张，且不符合《破产法典》。现在，法官阁下，我确实想回应受托人在其书状中提出的一点，即如果您作出有利于加入联合书状的被告的裁决，您将以某种方式剥夺受托人为补救欺诈行为而获得救济的途径。\n\n法官阁下，我们认为这并不准确。受托人可针对另我实体本身及其资产寻求救济。受托人还可针对另我的负责人寻求救济，只要他们教唆或协助了任何欺诈行为；但更根本地说，法官阁下，受托人在本案中的职责不是补救欺诈行为；受托人的职责是以符合《破产法典》指令的方式管理Kwok（郭文贵）的破产财产。\n\n因此，如我们经常所做，让我们从《破产法典》的明文开始。第548条规定，受托人可以撤销债务人在财产中的权益的转让；同样，第549条允许受托人撤销债务人财产的转让——债务人财产。\n\n现在，5——抱歉——是破产财产中的权益或财产的转让。破产财产被定义为，在案件开始时债务人在财产中享有的法定或衡平权益。\n\n反过来，根据该法典，债务人被定义为受《Title 11》项下案件约束的实体或个人。\n\n第544条的表述相同，并特别提及债务人。它允许——赋予受托人假设留置权债权人的权利，并赋予受托人撤销债务人财产转让的能力，而该等转让可由债务人的假设债权人予以撤销。\n\n受托人试图撤销由非债务人实体作出的转让这一点很重要，因为这剥夺了加入联合书状的被告的法定抗辩，包括对资金后续善意转让的抗辩。\n\n现在，法官阁下，受托人作出这种区分并忽视《破产法典》明文的依据是什么？受托人的立场是，另我实体与债务人实为同一；本院作出的另我认定使这些实体转变为该法典下的债务人。而这正是我们存在分歧之处，法官阁下。我们不同意这些另我认定的效力是使其转变为该法典下的债务人。就此而言，法官阁下，我们认为我们绝非在请求您推翻您先前就非债务人转让人以及其是否可能属于另我所作出的任何裁决。我们今日在此向本院提出并需处理的较狭窄问题，以及我们提出的问题，是这些另我认定的效力。而其效力并非赋予受托人就这些非债务人实体所作转让行使撤销诉讼权力。由此引出问题2，即：根据适用法律，另我或反向刺破公司面纱认定的效力是什么？\n\n法院：你的意思是——实际上是问题3——\n\nPeterson先生：哦，是的。它是——\n\n法院：——只是为了明确记录——\n\nPeterson先生：是的，它是问题3。\n\n法院：——这是你的第二项论点，但只是为了记录明确，好吗。谢谢。\n\nPeterson先生：是的，谢谢。\n\n法院：请继续。\n\nPeterson先生：谢谢您，法官阁下。\n\n作为法律问题，另我认定\n\n不赋予受托人撤销非债务人转让的诉讼资格。\n\n正如我们在书面陈述中所阐明的，法官阁下，至多而言，该另我认定的结果是对该等另我主体产生替代责任。\n\n我们援引了多项判决来支持这一结论：In re Stillwater, 559 B.R. 563；这是 Southern District of New York（纽约南区）的一项破产法院判决。\n\n法院否决了为依据第544条创设诉因而选择性地将特拉华实体的资产与债务人实体的资产合并的另我理论。\n\n法院特别表示，其不知道有任何依据支持以下观点：另我理论可以以这种选择性且自利的方式被使用。\n\n该问题因一项驳回动议而提交法院审理，法院准许了该驳回动议。\n\n同样，在 In re Wardle 中，即 Ninth Circuit BAP（第九巡回区破产上诉小组）的判决中，法院认定——\n\n法庭：请拼写一下您刚才提到的那个案件名称，好吗？\n\n彼得森先生：我刚才提到的那个——\n\n法庭：Wardle。\n\n彼得森先生：Wardle？\n\n彼得森先生：In re Wardle，拼写为 W-a-r-d-l-e。\n\n法庭：谢谢。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 3985 提交于 01/21/25 录入于 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 35 页，共 125 页\n\n彼得森先生：破产上诉小组认定，受托人无权对非债务人——或通过非债务人实体提起的——破产法第5章撤销诉讼请求主张诉讼资格，并表示：“另我认定不会以某种方式将被指称的另我主体的资金变成债务人破产财产的一部分。”法院指出：“除非存在实质合并，或该非债务人已提交破产申请，否则不存在公司破产财产，因此，受托人不能以非债务人的名义提起第547条和第548条诉讼。”法官阁下，我们还援引了其他判决来支持同一命题：In re Silver 和 In re Dumouchelle。这两项均为 Michigan（密歇根州）的破产法院判决。\n\n法庭：抱歉。请为记录拼写这两个密歇根州案件中第二个案件的名称。Silver 我们已经有了，但是……\n\n彼得森先生：好的，Dumouchelle。拼写为 D-u-m-o-u-c-h-e-l-l-e。\n\n法庭：谢谢。\n\n彼得森先生：在该判决中，法院驳回了基于从根据密歇根州法律设立的债务人另我公司转出的财产而提出的欺诈性转让请求；该州法律对另我适用替代责任方法。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 3985 提交于 01/21/25 录入于 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 36 页，共 125 页\n\n法官阁下，如 Pavers 一案中法院所述，该案是 Eastern District of New York（纽约东区）的一项地区法院判决，仅因两个实体互为另我，并不使二者均成为《破产法》下的债务人。这仅意味着它们对彼此的债务承担责任。该内容见该判决第51页。\n\n法官阁下，联合被告确实承认，一些法院认可“同一性理论”，并且在 In re Howland 中，Sixth Circuit（第六巡回区）说明了替代责任与同一性理论之间的这种区别如何与另我是否赋予受托人诉讼资格的认定有关。\n\n在该案中，法院准许被告提出的依诉状判决动议，第六巡回区予以维持。法院作出裁定并得出结论的依据是：个人债务人或个人债务人的受托人，不能依据第548条、以揭开公司面纱理论撤销由非债务人另我作出的转让；这是因为法院适用 Kentucky（肯塔基州）法律，并认定肯塔基州法律属于替代责任州。\n\n重要的是，法官阁下，我们认为 Delaware（特拉华州）法律对另我适用替代责任方法；换言之，特拉华州不是同一性理论州。\n\n在听证会之前，法官阁下，为准备本次辩论，我们发现 Delaware Chancery Court（特拉华州衡平法院）在十二月中旬，即一个月前，发布了一份意见书。这是 Gracey（格雷西）诉 Albawardi（阿尔巴瓦尔迪）案。\n\n法庭：好的。请稍等一下——\n\n彼得森先生：嗯。\n\n法庭：——因为该案没有载于任何书面材料中，对吗？\n\n彼得森先生：对。\n\n法庭：好的。那么请为记录拼写案件名称。\n\n彼得森先生：好的，我们也有——我们有该案副本，而且我们已经——\n\n法庭：谢谢。\n\n彼得森先生：——将其提供给对方律师。请问我可以走近吗？\n\n法庭：可以。但再次提醒，彼得森律师，您有机会时，请为记录拼写案件名称，因为该案不在任何书面陈述中。\n\n彼得森先生：当然。是 Gracey，G-r-a-c-e-y，诉 Albawardi，A-l-b-a-w-a-r-d-i。Westlaw 引注为 2024 WL 5116368。我们为何认为该判决重要，以及为何此时在本次听证会上向您提出该判决？这是特拉华州法院最新的——\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 3985 提交于 01/21/25 录入于 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 37 页，共 125 页\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 3985 提交于 01/21/25 录入于 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 38 页，共 125 页\n\n对反向揭开公司面纱效果的说明。在该判决中，法院审理了原告关于宣告某些实体为 Albawardi 的另我的请求。在描述该请求时，法院称 Gracey 寻求反向揭开公司面纱，法院将其描述为：“就所有者的责任，对企业组织施加责任。”该表述位于第4页末尾。因此——\n\n法庭：抱歉，是第几页？\n\n彼得森先生：4。\n\n法庭：4？\n\n彼得森先生：那是 Westlaw 页码。\n\n法庭：嗯。\n\n彼得森先生：因此，法官阁下，我们援引该判决，作为对特拉华州法律下揭开公司面纱效果的最新说明；我们认为，该说明支持我们的立场，即另我认定产生替代责任。我们还——\n\n法庭：那么，我可以——我只是想弄清您刚才关于 Gracey 的说法——\n\n彼得森先生：当然。\n\n法庭：——因为显然，我直到现在才看到它，这完全没有问题。\n\n彼得森先生：嗯。\n\n法庭：我认为您正在阅读的是，我说得对吗，您正在阅读一个以 A——以数字——字母 A 开头的段落，即“另我理论责任”，其中写道：“在修订申请的第1项罪名项中——”\n\n彼得森先生：嗯。\n\n法庭：——“Gracey 寻求宣告性判决，确认 Dial 及 Dial 子公司——”我甚至不知道我是否念对了——“是 Albawardi 的另我，因此就判决书项下到期应付的全部款项对她承担责任。”\n\n彼得森先生：嗯。\n\n法庭：然后，我认为这就是您刚才提到的那句话，但我想确认就是这句话，即：“Gracey 寻求反向揭开公司面纱——引文，即就所有者的责任，对企业组织施加责任。”\n\n彼得森先生：正确。\n\n法庭：好的。因此，法院在该段中仅是在说明诉因是什么，对吗？\n\n彼得森先生：我们认为，法官阁下，法院是在说明何为反向揭开公司面纱。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 3985 提交于 01/21/25 录入于 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 39 页，共 125 页\n\n法庭：那么，显然，脚注58是什么？让我们看看，我不知道。\n\n彼得森先生：那是对 Manichaean 的引注。\n\n法庭：嗯，它引注 Manichaean，第58号，对吗？\n\n彼得森先生：嗯。\n\n法庭：然后它写道：“如上文组织结构图所示，”当然我尚未查看，但显然在那里，“Dial 实体最终通过信托持有。见上文注释24、25。即使 Gracey 的请求更有力，我也会犹豫是否揭开公司面纱，因为 Albawardi 从 Dial 实体获得的任何财务利益似乎都将是作为信托受益人，而非作为 Dial 实体的所有者。无论如何，我无需处理这些复杂问题，因为 Gracey 的请求不可行。”所以，我不知道这是否真的是——我还不确定，因为我尚未读完整个案件。\n\n彼得森先生：好的。\n\n法庭：但我不确定您从该案，即 Gracey 案中摘取的引文，是否实际说明了反向揭开公司面纱的法律地位。它引注 Manichaean Capital——\n\n彼得森先生：是。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 3985 提交于 01/21/25 录入于 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 40 页，共 125 页\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 3985 提交于 01/21/25 录入于 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 41 页，共 125 页\n\n法庭：——该案讨论反向揭开公司面纱，并认定反向揭开公司面纱是一项可行的请求。这是 Manichaean Capital 所说的。\n\n彼得森先生：我理解您的观点，法官阁下，即，您知道，最终在 Gracey 案中，看来法院未允许另我请求继续进行，对吗。因此，法院在该具体案件中是否确实需要就揭开公司面纱的效果作出法律认定，对吗？现在，法官阁下，我们认为 Manichaean 案也是如此。在 Manichaean 案中，该案原告实际寻求对另我执行判决书或收费令——\n\n法庭：收费令，对。\n\n彼得森先生：——原告并未寻求认定这些实体在所有目的上均为同一实体。因此，Manichaean 案中的任何支持性表述实际上也是附带意见。所以，如果——\n\n法庭：但在 Manichaean 案中，特拉华州衡平法院具体处理的是特拉华州法规，即关于股东如何能够根据特拉华州立法机关制定的一项法规，就其股份价值提出诉因，以避免实质上阻止合并；这是真的吗？而且——\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 3985 提交于 01/21/25 录入于 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 42 页，共 125 页\n\n法庭：这就是 Manichaean Capital 中发生的事情，即股东取得了其收费令——\n\n彼得森先生：嗯。\n\n法庭：——他们取得收费令所针对的公司不付款。\n\n彼得森先生：嗯。\n\n法庭：该公司与另一家公司合并，他们又提起另一项诉讼，针对合并后的公司以及新公司中仍然存续、源自被合并公司的子公司，主张另我或反向揭开公司面纱，两者均有。\n\n彼得森先生：嗯。\n\n法庭：所以，我——但根据特拉华州法律，根据该案，他们讨论的不是以信托方式持有的事项。他们讨论的是公司实体、合并问题，以及特定的特拉华州法规；根据 Manichaean Capital 的说法，这是该股东在合并时主张其未获支付股份价值的方式，也是唯一方式。\n\n彼得森先生（MR. PETERSON）：我认为，在这两种情形中，而且你知道，我们的立场，即联合被告（Joint Defendants）就这两项裁决所持的立场，是，在表述另我关系及所请求的救济时，法院对其的阐述是将该救济描述为一种替代责任的形式，无论是在 Manichaean Capital（摩尼教资本）案中，还是在 Gracey（格雷西）案中。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 43 of 125\n\n并且我们理解，Gracey 案可能存在限制，若该项请求不可成立；最终，这正是法院所作出的认定。但是，如果我们要参照特拉华州法，考察贵法院如何描述另我关系，它们并未将其描述为——并未将另我理论描述为同一性理论；相反，它们将其描述为替代责任，并以此方式加以阐述。法院：但是我并不——您——我手头没有备好 Gracey 案的副本，但我不认为 Manichaean Capital 案中使用了“替代责任”一词。我可能错了，律师，请予以纠正。\n\n彼得森先生：嗯，我原计划稍后讨论 Manichaean Capital 案，但现在就讨论。因此，就其最基本的层面而言——这是该裁决中的引文：\n\n“反向刺破公司面纱，是指令商业组织就其所有者的债务承担责任。”\n\n法官阁下，该引文本身就是替代责任。\n\n现在，受托人所依赖的是后面的第二句话：\n\n“在母公司—子公司情形下，如子公司与其另我，即母公司，构成人格混同，法院将把子公司的资产视为母公司的资产。”我们认为，该句话脱离了语境。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 44 of 125\n\n它讨论的是母公司—子公司的情形，我们认为，法院仅仅是在说母公司可以就该子公司的资产主张权利，以清偿该责任。\n\n在 Manichaean Capital 案中，根据法院的说法，原告关于反向刺破公司面纱的请求旨在，引用原文，“使来源于 HOV Holdings（HOV控股公司）的子公司就其债务承担责任。”该内容见该裁决第700页。因此，他们并未寻求为所有目的将两个实体合并。\n\n因此，鉴于该情形及案件的程序状态，法官阁下，受托人所依赖的任何表述均属附带意见。该问题并未提交法院审理。法院当时是在确定其是否可以令某一实体承担替代责任。\n\n此外，该附带意见与法院先前的引述相矛盾，即脚注84。其中援引了 Sky Cable（天空有线电视）案，其中一段引文称，反向刺破公司面纱所附加的，仅是令该实体就对持有该实体所有权权益的个人作出的判决承担责任。基于所有这些理由——法院：脚注84？彼得森先生：脚注84。\n\n法院：请继续。我只是想确保我正确理解了您的意思。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 45 of 125\n\n彼得森先生：关于 Manichaean Capital 案，还有一点，即法院就我们认为只是受托人脱离语境引用的一句简单表述，援引了 Spring Real Estate（春季房地产）案。我们认为，Spring Real Estate 案不具有说服力。Spring Real Estate 案依赖于 American International Refinery（美国国际炼油厂）案，而在该案中，法院适用了内华达州法，而非特拉华州法；内华达州法更明确地采纳了另我的同一性理论。因此，我回到我们先前的讨论。我们讨论过 Gracey 案及另我认定的效力。法官阁下，联合被告认为，第九巡回区破产上诉审判庭（Ninth Circuit BAP）于2023年作出的 RS Air（RS航空）案裁决直接涉及该问题。\n\n法院：您能再拼写一遍吗？抱歉。但这对记录很有帮助。\n\n彼得森先生：当然可以，法官阁下。RS Air, LLC（RS航空有限责任公司）诉 NetJets Aviation, Inc.（NetJets航空公司）案，载于 651 B.R. 538。\n\n法院：谢谢。\n\n彼得森先生：为什么 RS Air 案很重要？\n\nRS Air 案之所以重要，是因为它是一项破产上诉审判庭层级的裁决，也是最新讨论特拉华州法下另我关系效力的破产裁决。第九巡回区破产上诉审判庭在确定某些债权人是否因对债务人被指称的另我提起州法院诉讼而违反解除债务禁令的背景下，确定了特拉华州法下另我原则的范围。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 46 of 125\n\n法院称：\n\n“尽管另我原则要求证明两个实体作为单一经济实体运营，但其结果并不是将该等实体视为同一实体，而是使其中一方对另一方的债务承担责任。”\n\n那么，法院在 RS Air 案中说了什么？法院在 RS Air 案中说，即使您作出一项非债务人认定——即认定某一非债务人为另我——该另我也不能享有解除债务禁令的利益。它并不会神奇地成为债务人实体。\n\n基于同一理由，法官阁下，我们不认为受托人应能够主张，本案中的这些非债务人实体神奇地成为债务人，因此，他有资格对联合被告主张另我诉讼。\n\n法官阁下，我们援引以支持我们结论的其他裁决，包括 Otto Candies（奥托糖果）案及 NetJets Aviation v. LHC Communications（NetJets航空公司诉LHC通信公司）案；后者是一项第二巡回区裁决，称根据特拉华州法，可以不考虑实体与其所有者之间的区别，并要求所有者对实体的债务承担责任。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 47 of 125\n\nWilson v. Thorn Energy（威尔逊诉索恩能源）案及 BFI Waste Systems of America, LLC [sic] v. Shaw Environmental & Infrastructure, Inc.（美国BFI废物处理系统有限责任公司[原文如此]诉肖环境与基础设施公司）案；所有这些案件均谈到，另我认定允许刺破公司面纱，使另一实体对某一实体的债务承担替代责任。现在，法官阁下，我认为受托人知道，这些裁决的分量——Wardle（沃德尔）案、RS Air 案、In re Stillwater（斯蒂尔沃特案）以及特别是在破产背景下的裁决——均导向并且应当导向本法院得出结论：他没有资格追索非债务人实体作出的转让。我在书面陈述中实际上看到两个论点。其一是，联邦普通法应当适用，而非州法。其二是，受托人依赖额外的权威依据，但我们认为，法官阁下，这些依据要么很容易区分，要么属于附带意见，要么适用非特拉华州法，例如内华达州法。首先，法官阁下，我想讨论这一关于联邦普通法以某种方式适用的主张。\n\n这一点始于 Butner（巴特纳）案。财产权益由州法创设和界定，除非某种联邦利益要求不同的结果。\n\n更重要的是，法院在另我请求的背景下是怎么说的？它们认定州法具有管辖作用，见 In re 10th Avenue Distributors [sic]（第十大道分销商案[原文如此]）。另我诉因的范围显然应参照州法确定。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 48 of 125\n\nMcElroy v. FirstEnergy Corp.（麦克尔罗伊诉第一能源公司）案——这是一项第三巡回区案件——法院作出了同样的表述。本案中唯一可能支持受托人理论的联邦普通法是实质性合并，但那并非受托人选择主张的请求。\n\n受托人未能援引任何一项法院认定联邦普通法适用于另我原则的案件。Duckworth（达克沃思）案确实概括了这一点：\n\n“刺破公司面纱是一项州法上的普通法衡平救济，与联邦破产法毫无关系。不言而喻，它从不由州法院在破产背景下适用。”\n\n现在，法院或受托人，法官阁下，依赖于某些表述及某些裁决，称一旦根据非破产法确定某项州法权益，联邦法即确定该等权益是否构成破产财产。\n\n法官阁下，这仅意味着，您首先参照州法确定财产权益的存在及范围，然后参照《破产法典》（Bankruptcy Code）及破产法，确定是否存在相反规定，是否《破产法典》要求得出不同结果。举例而言，541 的措辞广泛，但它也明确将某些财产排除在破产财产之外：退休账户资金、大学储蓄资金均不属于破产财产。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 49 of 125\n\n《破产法典》第552条允许债务人将财产从破产财产中豁免。破产申请本身并不创设新的财产权益，也不增强现有的州法权益。受托人援引的所有裁决，或其中许多裁决——In re Ground Round（格朗德朗案）、In re Chardon（沙东案）、In re Nejberger（内伊伯格案）、Nicole Gas Production（妮可天然气生产案）、Commodore Business Machines（康懋达商用机器案）及其他案件——均不是另我案件。而且，在所有这些案件中，法院实际上均参照州法确定破产财产在财产中的权益范围。\n\n接下来，法官阁下，受托人称，作为另我的结果，即便根据州法，也会出现这种实体合并。我们认为，法官阁下，这是错误的。因为如果您得出该结论——\n\n法院：您能重复一下吗？抱歉，我没有确切听到您说了什么。如果您能再说一遍，抱歉。\n\n彼得森先生：当然可以。\n\n法官阁下，除提出联邦法普通法论点外，受托人还称，即使根据州法，另我认定的结果也是使另我与债务人成为同一实体。我们不同意，而且我们认为，法官阁下，如果您——\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 50 of 125\n\n站在受托人一方处理该问题，您就必须不同意我们在书面陈述中援引的所有权威，尤其是那些专门在破产背景下讨论另我认定的权威。这些包括 In re Wardle（沃德尔案）、In re RS Air（RS航空案）、In re Stillwater（斯蒂尔沃特案）以及 Duckworth（达克沃思）案。所有这些裁决均明确表明，另我的后果并非神奇地将非债务人的财产变为破产财产。我们讨论过 Manichaean Capital 案；这是受托人所依赖的案件。此外，受托人援引 In re Blatstein（布拉特斯坦案），一项第三巡回区裁决。法院从未在该裁决中裁定另我的效力。In re Palmieri（帕尔米耶里案）是受托人援引的另一案件。该案中法院的表述纯属附带意见。法院称，如果受托人最终在其请求中胜诉，这将导致得出如下结论：债务人在将其住宅转让给其女友的公司时拥有该住宅。此外，法院从未为受托人所依赖的该项表述提供任何引文。正如我先前提到的，In re American International Refinery（美国国际炼油厂案），法官阁下，我认为该案不具有控制力。它适用了内华达州的另我法，而该法明确采纳同一性理论。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 51 of 125\n\nASARCO（阿萨尔科）。法官阁下，ASARCO 涉及一项诉讼。\n\n针对债务人的内部人母公司，而且我们认为，该案法院，法官阁下，作出了错误的裁决。他们援引 Polly Petroleum（波莉石油案）作为特拉华州法律，但 Polly Petroleum 是一宗 1968 年的案件。该案并不涉及撤销诉讼，并且涉及一家特拉华实体起诉另一实体，以行使对一家墨西哥子公司的控制权，阻止其继续进行诉讼。\n\n我也没有发现任何支持该裁决中受托人所依赖之陈述的依据，因此该陈述属于附带意见。\n\n此外，涉案转让是由债务人的子公司或直接母公司作出的。因此，所有这些——涉案公司之间关系密切。内部人彼此是关联方，法院审理了这实际上构成实质性合并的论点，并表示该案中不存在对子公司债权人的风险。因此，我们认为该案在适用特拉华州法律时作出了错误裁决且错误适用该法律，但基于若干理由，该案亦可予以区分。\n\n法庭：我再给你两分钟。\n\nPETERSON先生（彼得森）：好的。再给我两分钟。我将说明我的结论性意见，法官阁下。\n\n受托人的撤销诉讼权力仅限于债务人转让其在财产中的权益。这是 548、549 和 544 条的明确文本。受托人经过策略性选择，主张 Kwok（郭文贵）的非债务人实体或替身实体，并声称这意味着它们本身就是债务人。\n\n事实并非如此。如果您作出有利于受托人的裁决，我们将被剥夺抗辩权。而且，这与 Wardle、RS Air、Stillwater、Pavers、In re Silver、In re Duckworth，以及所有讨论该问题的破产法院裁决相冲突；我们认为法官阁下应当着重审查这些裁决。\n\n法官阁下，据共同被告所知，唯一一项适用特拉华州法律并明确裁定揭开公司面纱赋予受托人撤销诉讼主体资格的裁决，是我刚才讨论的 ASARCO 裁决。这是一项。仅此一案。就是这样。我们认为法官阁下应当驳回该案。\n\n此外，受托人未援引任何一项依据，授权受托人根据特拉华州法律下的揭开公司面纱理论，撤销由非债务人提出的 549 请求。我们已在简报中、在我们的开篇简报中以粗体列明该内容，而受托人的简报并未对该论点作出具体回应。\n\n我们认为，您应当依据 RS Air、Stillwater，并裁定受托人未能陈述针对共同被告的可获救济请求。\n\n法庭：谢谢。\n\nPETERSON先生（彼得森）：早上好——现在仍是上午，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：早上好。\n\nPETERSON先生：因此，我将讨论问题 2 和 4。为简便起见，在我的陈述中，我将使用“非债务人转让人”一语，指称被指控向共同被告作出转让的少数实体。因此，我不再每次都逐一列举它们，而仅将该词作为简称。\n\n法庭：请继续。\n\nPETERSON先生：好的。那么，问题 2：适用法律是否允许反向揭开公司面纱或替身实体认定，我将直接谈及法官阁下正在与 Peterson律师（彼得森）讨论的 Manichaean 裁决。该案审查特拉华州是否会承认反向揭开公司面纱请求，并最终得出结论称：“在有限情形下，并在受到严格限制的实施范围内，会承认。”法院首先考量了拒绝该理论的法院，以得出该结论。Manichaean 法院将拒绝该理论的法院所关注的问题概括为：该理论将“通过司法裁定便利对无辜股东及第三方债权人的损害”。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 3985 提交日期 01/21/25 登记日期 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 53 页，共 125 页\n\nManichaean 法院将该担忧描述为有充分依据。在允许反向揭开公司面纱时，这是一项严重担忧。\n\n随后，法院在分析中继续审查其他试图处理该问题的法院裁决，并承认全国各地存在一些法院裁决称：在某些有限情形下，如不存在对第三方的该等风险，我们将允许反向揭开公司面纱。\n\n例如，Manichaean 法院审查了 CF Trust, Inc. v First Flight 一案，该案是弗吉尼亚州最高法院的一项裁决，并允许反向揭开公司面纱。\n\n但正如 Manichaean 法院所述，该案要求请求人“证明反向揭开公司面纱不会对无辜投资者或无辜的有担保及无担保债权人造成损害”。\n\n借鉴后一系列案件，衡平法院制定了一项受到严格限制的反向揭开公司面纱原则。在此过程中，衡平法院警告称，如未适用适当标准，反向揭开公司面纱可能“威胁无辜第三方债权人和股东，并给这些相关方——这些群体带来一系列不可预测的结果”；第 714 页。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 3985 提交日期 01/21/25 登记日期 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 54 页，共 125 页\n\n因此，衡平法院还在第 714 页裁定：“只有在指称存在令人发指的事实，并且第三方不存在真实且实质性损害的案件中，法院才应当考虑适用反向揭开公司面纱原则。”\n\n因此，贵方的观点是，根据 Manichaean 法院对反向揭开公司面纱所确立的受严格限制的检验或框架，不得对第三方，例如目标实体的债权人，造成真实且实质性损害，是一项起诉陈述要求。\n\n顺便指出，在 Peterson律师所讨论的 Gracey 裁决中，即该项非常近期的特拉华州衡平法院裁决中，法院认定的众多起诉陈述缺陷之一，就是对第三方造成损害的风险。在该案中，法院——我知道法官阁下尚未审阅该案，但将会审阅——谈到了这样一个事实：他们想要揭开公司面纱的这些子公司涉及数十年的房地产交易，这引发了对第三方造成损害的可能性；并且，最终所有权涉及被告以外的人员，因此可能通过信托影响对这些受益人的最终所有权，而这些受益人并非被告。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 3985 提交日期 01/21/25 登记日期 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 55 页，共 125 页\n\n因此，再次强调，这被确定为该案认定的众多起诉陈述缺陷之一。现在转向本案中针对共同被告的请求，受托人正利用反向揭开公司面纱原则，为共同被告创设初始受让人撤销责任。我们认为这不被允许，也不符合 Manichaean 所确立的检验；该检验规定，只有在不试图损害第三方时，才可使用该原则。没有任何指称表明，通过在此使用反向揭开公司面纱来创设撤销责任，非债务人转让人的第三方不会遭受真实且实质性损害；也不可能作出此种指称。这些请求的表面目的就是要为共同被告创设数百万美元的撤销责任。\n\n此外，还有一个更为细致的问题，Peterson律师也再次提及，即通过试图利用揭开公司面纱原则创设初始受让人责任，贵方排除了如下后续受让人抗辩：若依照 550 条将请求作为针对共同被告后续受让人的请求提出，该抗辩本可适用。\n\n因此，我想仅回应受托人针对这一 Manichaean 解释所提出的若干答复。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 3985 提交日期 01/21/25 登记日期 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 56 页，共 125 页\n\n因此，在反对意见中，受托人主张，对第三方债权人的损害只是一个因素，是衡量检验的一部分，并非决定性因素。甚至——我认为其属于一个门槛问题。但这并非 Manichaean 法院所言；相反，如刚才所述，该法院表示，只有在指称债权人不存在真实且实质性损害的案件中，法院才应当考虑适用该原则。受托人主张其为衡量检验中的一个因素所依据的是 In re Petters Company, Inc. 和 Sky Cable, LLC——为便于记录，Petters 有两个 T——即这些案件支持其为衡量检验中的一个因素。可是，这些裁决均早于 Manichaean 多年，对吗？而且，它们分别是明尼苏达州的一项破产法院裁决和第四巡回法院的一项裁决，其中法院只是在试图推断特拉华州最高法院有朝一日可能作出何种表述，因为特拉华州最高法院当时尚未说明反向揭开公司面纱的检验应为何。\n\n在 Petters 一案中，除特拉华州法律外，法院还适用了明尼苏达州法律。\n\n但现在我们知道答案了。我们知道答案，因为 Manichaean 已经说明了检验为何，对吗？我想，如果您进入 Manichaean 的思路，该裁决引用了 In re Phillips，该案是科罗拉多州最高法院的一项案件，130——该案是科罗拉多州最高法院的一项案件，其裁定只有在能够实现衡平结果时，才可采用反向揭开公司面纱。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 3985 提交日期 01/21/25 登记日期 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 57 页，共 125 页\n\n科罗拉多州最高法院表示，当无辜股东或债权人将因外部反向揭开公司面纱而受到损害时，就无法实现衡平结果。并且请注意，这正是 Manichaean 在某种程度上据以采纳其框架的一系列案件之一；这些案件承认威胁，承认风险，但仍表示：好的，只要我们能够将该风险隔离，并确定该风险不会发生，那么，我们就可以允许反向揭开公司面纱原则继续适用。\n\n受托人提出的其他论点是，该问题为时过早，对吗，在本案的这一阶段为时过早。我们认为，并且我认为 Manichaean 已经说明，这是一项必须陈述的要件，对吗。这是能否适用反向揭开公司面纱的门槛问题，并且应当受到指称。应当依据 Rule 11 指称足以产生可识别请求的事实，且应在我们必须承担起诉陈述阶段之后的诉讼成本之前作出该等指称；而他们并未如此做。另一项论点是，嗯，你知道，共同被告在这里不会遭受任何损害，因为他们可以根据 502(h) 提出请求。可是，他们并未提出共同被告将能够获得返还全部款项加利息，以补偿时间价值。我们都知道，任何追偿的时间很可能还要数年，其金额则完全不确定。因此，仅从金钱角度而言，这并不是对共同被告将遭受的真实损害的令人满意回应。\n\n还有一个更为微妙的问题，对吧？即我们若试图通过另我来创设初始受让人责任，就会失去国会在 § 550 中为后续转让精心平衡的抗辩，在该项抗辩中，我们本可以就善意和对价提出抗辩。\n\n因此，针对共同被告适用反向揭开公司面纱这一衡平法原则时，第三方遭受真实且重大不利影响的指控，是特拉华州法下的一项门槛问题。\n\n针对共同被告的起诉状并未指称不存在真实且重大的不利影响，而且其无法作此指称，因为其整个构想就是通过使贸易债权人成为这些初始受让人另我请求的对象，并剥夺其作为后续受让人的 § 550 抗辩，从而将不利影响施加于贸易债权人。因此，仅基于这一理由，我们认为应当准许共同被告提出的动议。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 3985 提交于 01/21/25 登记于 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 60 页，共 125 页\n\n接下来，我将转向问题 4。好的。问题 4 是，对反向揭开公司面纱或另我的认定是否可以追溯适用。在论述这一问题时，我仅为论证起见假定，即假设他们可以根据特拉华州法主张一项可成立的反向揭开公司面纱请求，并假定特拉华州适用同一性理论，好的。\n\n即便如此，另我原则也不能追溯适用，以允许受托人对共同被告主张这些初始受让人撤销请求。他们试图将非债务人转让人作出的转让视为债务人的转让，尽管这些转让发生于针对其公司形式作出任何裁决之前数年。也就是说，受托人试图在此将非债务人转让人的资产并入一个与债务人统一的财产集合，对于这些 § 549 请求追溯至申请日，并对于这些欺诈性转让请求追溯至更早的时间。\n\n并且，来自该统一资产集合的债权人请求将得到清偿，其中包括共同被告针对该统一财产集合提出的 § 502(h) 请求。\n\n在我看来，其实质上就是实质合并。我认为，由于结果相同，对吧？你们将资产和负债汇集至一个统一的财产集合。由于结果相同，我认为考察规范实质合并追溯适用，即 nunc pro tunc 追溯适用的判例法是有帮助的，对吧？它为我们提供了一些指引。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 3985 提交于 01/21/25 登记于 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 61 页，共 125 页\n\n而且，这实际上——我们可以从 D.C. Circuit（哥伦比亚特区巡回上诉法院）在 Auto-Train（奥托-特雷恩）案中的开创性判决开始，该法院指出，除 Augustino（奥古斯蒂诺）案、Auto-Train 案及其他有关实质合并案件所提出的极为严格的检验标准外，为避免通过追溯改变申请日而对债权人造成严重混乱，还需要进行一项额外且略有不同的利益衡量。\n\n因此，在 Auto-Train 案中，相关事实是，我们应当重温一下，因为它与本案存在相似之处。在 Auto-Train 案中，债务人于 September 1980 提出申请，而其子公司 Railway Services Company（铁路服务公司）于 June 和 July of 1980 向 Midland Ross（米德兰·罗斯）作出了转让。\n\n在 November 1980，Auto-Train 的受托人取得了一项实质合并命令，将 Railway（铁路公司）实质合并至 Auto-Train 的破产案件中，并将该命令 nunc pro tunc 追溯至 September 8th, 1980。\n\n那么，这会产生什么结果？这使得向 Midland Ross 作出的转让落入偏颇清偿期间。因此，Midland Ross 在上诉中质疑通过 nunc pro tunc 实质合并来根据 § 547 创设该撤销责任的适当性。Auto-Train 案的受托人主张，该 nunc pro tunc 命令，如同本案受托人所主张的那样，引用原文：“仅使记录反映一项已经存在的事实；即 Railway 并无独立于 Auto-Train 的存在。”\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 3985 提交于 01/21/25 登记于 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 62 页，共 125 页\n\nD.C. Circuit 驳回了该论点，并解释道，引用原文——该内容见于第 276 页：\n\n“即使破产法院就该问题作出的认定足以满足合并目的，其也不足以证明对该命令附加 nunc pro tunc 的追溯效力。在本案中，我们认为，nunc pro tunc 的这一特征以违背《破产法典》宗旨的方式使 Midland Ross 受到不利影响。”\n\n法院继而解释，受托人立场的问题在于，它要求受让人仅因其——债务人表面上具有独立性的关联方提出破产申请，便返还所受财产；这破坏了《破产法典》的一些核心政策，对吧。这些核心政策是激励债权人继续与陷入困境的实体，亦即财务困境实体或财务困境实体的关联方进行交易，而不是争先恐后地向法院申请，对吧，试图取得其资产，因为担心其无法付款。因此，D.C. Circuit 在 Auto-Train 案中驳回的论点，就是我们今天听到的论点，只不过是以另我的名义提出，对吧；我们只是改变了名称。但其与《破产法典》政策的冲突更加鲜明；尤其是就这些 § 549 请求而言，我想谈谈这一点。因此，你们仍然直接面临同一问题，即你们正在削弱债权人与非债务人关联方交易的积极性，以及这种争先恐后向法院申请的现象。但它也与《破产法典》的具体条款相冲突。如果这样做，它就剥夺了共同被告本可到本院并根据 § 363 获得一项命令的机会，即确认其被要求参与的交易已经获准或属于日常经营活动；如果他们未能从本院获得此种救济，他们本可以停止与 U.S. Trustee（美国受托人）开展业务，而不使自己面临承担责任的风险。此外，你们还取消了后续受让人的抗辩，但这还不是全部。若看 § 549(b)，该条款为在非自愿申请与救济命令之间的空档期间与债务人进行交易的债权人提供保护，§ 549(b) 规定，看，那些受让人不会承担任何风险。即使他们知悉该非自愿案件，对于他们在提供对价的情况下取得的转让，他们也不会承担任何责任。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 3985 提交于 01/21/25 登记于 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 64 页，共 125 页\n\n因此，破产法院显然为与债务人进行交易的债权人提供保护。他们知道这是一个受非自愿案件约束的债务人，但按照受托人的观点，共同被告并未被指称知悉 Kwok 先生的破产案件，或知悉非债务人转让人与 Kwok 先生之间的联系，却要根据 § 549 承担责任；而他们并不享有本会提供给知悉非自愿案件的受让人的此类保护。\n\n最后，与 Midland Ross 和 Auto-Train 不同，后者本可根据 § 547(c) 提出一整套有力的抗辩，而 § 549 下不存在类似类型的抗辩。因此，Auto-Train 案中所揭示并由 D.C. Circuit 驳回的担忧，在此显而易见。它只不过是以另我的名义出现。\n\n而且，从实用性角度而言，作为受让人的共同被告处于一种不可能的境地，对吧，因为他们无法知道其交易对象这一实体实际上是一个处于破产中的实体。这是 Kaplan 法官在 Oncology Associates of Ocean County（大洋县肿瘤协会）案中所作的一项观察。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 3985 提交于 01/21/25 登记于 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 65 页，共 125 页\n\n该案是一项基于非债务人关联方转让而提出的 § 549 请求，该转让发生于关联方的破产申请与实质合并命令之间。因此，该转让发生在那两个日期之间，而该案中的实质合并命令并非 nunc pro tunc 追溯适用。Kaplan 法官在驳回 § 549 请求时一针见血地指出，引用原文：“如果转让人并未处于破产状态，任何律师如何能够就与申请日后转让相关的风险向受让人提供建议，实在令人疑惑。”那么，我们从受托人那里得到什么回应？受托人表示，这是一个稻草人论证，因为另我不同。为支持该主张，受托人援引 In re Star Mountain Resources（斯塔尔山资源案），该案确实讨论了通常意义上的实质合并与另我之间的差异。但 Star Mountain 进一步解释，在 Star Mountain 案中，重要的是，那是一起内华达州案件，因此其适用了同一性理论。其在脚注 86 中说明如下：“另我请求在破产情境下具有不同于传统民事审判情境的效果；在后者中，特定债权人针对被指称为另我的主体取得判决。破产中的另我认定更类似于实质合并，即将另我的资产纳入债务人的破产财产，以与债务人的债权人共同分享。”\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 3985 提交于 01/21/25 登记于 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 66 页，共 125 页\n\n其后，法院在该判决第 7 页中，仅将该案中依内华达州法运用另我所获得的最终救济描述为类似于实质合并。Star Mountain 案中法院作出的唯一区分是，其表示，在确认计划后试图进行实质合并，就必须切断相关权利。因此，确认计划后不能进行实质合并，但另我可以继续存在；你可以保留它。这是唯一的差异。\n\n因此，如果结果相同，为什么要适用不同的一套规则，对吧；两项衡平法原则被用来实现相同的目的，在我看来，这毫无意义。事实上，如果接受这种做法，我们就可以仅仅给这项衡平救济贴上“另我”的标签，而无视本应在适用实质合并原则时提供的保护。如此一来，就没有人会使用实质合并；你总会使用另我，因为它更容易。所以——但我们不要止步于此。现在，让我们看看另我案件，而这类案件并不多。这相当新颖，但也有少数几例。在这些少数案件中，没有任何一例，本国没有一例允许认定非债务人为另我，从而追溯创设 § 549 责任。没有一例，我查过。\n\n因此，我们先从 Peterson 先生谈到的 Duckworth（达克沃思案）对立诉讼开始。简要了解一下 Duckworth 案的事实是值得的。因此，该债务人是一名谷物农场主，对吧，他欠有一笔由其农作物担保的数额巨大的银行担保债务。此人在提交申请前约一年期间，设立了一系列有限责任公司，以欺诈其债权人。他设立这些有限责任公司，用其从事谷物交易——出售其农作物或谷物，而不解除银行对其设定的留置权，并保留所得款项。\n\n随后，在作出这些行为后，于提交第 7 章申请前数周，他从那些有限责任公司取出资金，设立了一家名为“Power Trading（动力贸易公司）”的新有限责任公司，将资金存入其中，提交第 7 章申请，然后在申请提交后使用 Power Trading 的资金支付其个人开支。\n\n好的。因此，在针对 Casey's General Store（凯西综合商店）的第一宗对立诉讼中，受托人寻求撤销约 70 笔从 Power Trading 转至 Casey's General Stores 的申请提交后转让。与本案受托人一样，Duckworth 案受托人关于第 549 条责任的理论——呃，不，是以运用替身实体原则，将 Power Trading 的资产与债务人的资产合并为前提。因此，由于 Power Trading 是一家印第安纳州有限责任公司，破产法院依据印第安纳州关于替身实体的原则开始分析。法院说明了为何会发生这种情况，即受托人为何运用州法上的衡平救济来主张第 549 条请求，而不是针对后续受让人依据第 548 条提出请求。原因是为了剥夺 Casey's 根据第 550 条享有的后续受让人抗辩，对吧，而法院拒绝这样做。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 3985 提交日期 01/21/25 登记日期 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 68 页，共 125 页\n\n现在，我想在这里暂停片刻，因为受托人试图区分 Duckworth 案，称该案中不存在会使法院无视 Power Trading 公司形式的事实，或者受托人并未争议 Power Trading 是依州法有效设立的，因此无法以该理由证明其为替身实体。\n\n我认为这是错误的理解。首先，提及 Power Trading 的存在及其依州法设立，仅此而已；它是依州法设立的，就像每一个非债务人转让人一样。它们都是依州法设立的。它们被要求登记以便在该州开展业务。它们向州务卿提交了备案文件。这就是法院在那里所指的内容。并且，在转让发生时，并不存在任何裁决已作出，以剥夺其公司形式。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 3985 提交日期 01/21/25 登记日期 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 69 页，共 125 页\n\n第二，法院在该裁决第 7 页及脚注 12 中承认——我们实际上调出了该判决书，并将其作为答复的附件 A 提交——事实上，Power Trading 的公司形式已被无视，因为他存入 Power Trading 的银行账户内剩余资产被追回。该等资产已在此前的一宗程序中移交给破产财产；不是在同一宗对立诉讼中，而是在另一宗诉讼中。\n\n因此——而且这确实不是一个难以判断的问题，对吧。证人：这构成替身实体。我的意思是，Duckworth 承认他拥有完全的支配和控制权。他用其支付个人生活开支。其用途是提供资产保护并隐藏其资产，而且他最终作出了有罪答辩，这与我们在本案中处理的情况有很多相似之处。\n\n因此，Duckworth 案法院面临的问题是，运用该项原则，即该项衡平原则，来创设第 549 条责任，这构成了扩张。法院对于将 Power Trading 的资产纳入破产财产并无异议。将其扩张用于创设第 549 条责任，才是问题所在。\n\n我只想提出法院在该裁决第 8 页的几处表述，这些表述很有说明性。首先，法院称，在将替身实体原则用于此类破产法院性质的请求时，你必须采取审慎态度——你必须予以证明。让我引用原文：\n\n“因此，当破产法院被要求在根据破产法产生的诉因，例如第 549 条所创设的诉因中适用该项救济时，必须极为谨慎。”\n\n随后两句话，法院称：\n\n“在此，受托人主张，替身实体原则可以用于重构一套不同的事实，换言之，改写历史，以实现仅在破产法下才可认定的目的。州法中不存在与之对应的规则，可剥夺被告依据第 550(b)(1)条享有的法定善意受让人抗辩。\n\n“本院认为，采纳受托人的理论将构成对替身实体原则的严重过度扩张，远远超出其可识别的州法界限和目的。”\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 3985 提交日期 01/21/25 登记日期 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 70 页，共 125 页\n\nDuckworth 案法院有机会思考这一问题并重新考虑其裁决，因为七个月后，另一宗涉及 Big Al's Speakeasy（大阿尔私酒吧）的对立诉讼提交裁决。该酒吧是另一名贸易债权人，债务人曾使用 Power Trading 账户中的资金向其付款。\n\n但是，Duckworth 案法院——这是 2013 年的裁决——再次拒绝重新考虑其裁决；再次拒绝运用替身实体原则，并进一步说明，不能运用衡平救济来剥夺他人的法定权利，而这正是受托人试图做的，即消除第 550 条抗辩。法院还指出，没有任何联邦法院允许将替身实体原则用于该目的。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 3985 提交日期 01/21/25 登记日期 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 71 页，共 125 页\n\n法院还否定了这样一种说法，即可以基于其将资产追回以使债权人受益而证明该做法正当；这并不是剥夺他人后续受让人抗辩权利的理由。\n\n因此，再次说明，这正是本案正在发生的事情：同样的事情。正如 Duckworth 案所指出的，也正如我们希望本院将会指出的，这应当仍然是一项前所未有的法律理论。\n\n除该案外，还有 Lawler（劳勒案），我们也在书面陈述中援引了该案，我只作非常简要的说明。该案不是一宗撤销诉讼，但其涉及的问题是——该案中发生的情况是，债务人提交了破产申请。约八个月后，一名抵押权人对债务人兄弟通过家族信托持有的财产进行止赎并出售，该止赎拍卖继续进行。\n\n但是，数年后，破产法院认定持有该财产一半权益的信托，自其设立之时起即为债务人的替身实体。基于该裁定，债务人随后提出主张称，好吧，看看，我们需要撤销该止赎拍卖，因为其出售的财产——如果该信托就是我，就是债务人，那么我就拥有所有权权益，该止赎拍卖违反了自动中止。可是，法院拒绝这样做，理由是现在这样做会对进行止赎的抵押权人造成不公，而该抵押权人有权依赖该信托在当时的独立性。因此，我至少从 Duckworth 案和 Lawler 案得出的最后几点结论相当简单，对吧。替身实体这一衡平原则不能用于追溯性地对非内部人债权人创设《破产法》下的责任。所以，是我的错，我的时间——法庭：不，你还有时间。Goldstein（戈德斯坦）先生：好的。那么，在我剩余的几分钟里，我只需要非常简要地回应受托人论点中的另外几件事情。第一，他们说，好吧，看看，一旦认定为替身实体，你就是永远的替身实体，对吧。如果你现在是替身实体，那么你一直都是替身实体，这没有任何追溯效力性质的问题。好吧，第一，我不认为这与 Auto-Train（奥托-特雷恩案）、Duckworth 案或 Lawler 案相矛盾。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 3985 提交日期 01/21/25 登记日期 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 72 页，共 125 页\n\n但其援引依据是 Adler（阿德勒案），即这项 Adler 裁决。这是纽约东区破产法院于 2013 年作出的裁决。那是一宗第 727 条案件——法庭：Adler，拼写是 A-d-l-e-r？Goldstein 先生：是的。抱歉。抱歉，是 A-d-l-er。法庭：不，不，没关系。请继续。Goldstein 先生：那是一宗第 727 条案件。因此，该案中的问题是，债务人拥有大约五家或更多最终被认定为债务人替身实体的密切持有公司。但该案所涉法律问题并未影响第三方；它影响的是债务人。如果债务人利用其密切持有公司进行不当操作，就违反了第 727 条。这就是该案所涉的法律问题。第二，我的意思是，Adler 案中有些表述受到其他法院的质疑。纽约东区联邦地区法院作出了一项裁决，Peterson 先生援引了该裁决，即 Pavers（铺路商案），载于 536 B.R. 48。该案不同意对替身实体概念作如此宽泛的理解，并称：\n\n“仅仅因为两个实体互为替身实体，并不意味着它们在《破产法》下均为债务人；这仅意味着它们对彼此的债务承担责任。如果非债务人想要获得保护，就需要自行提交申请。”\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 3985 提交日期 01/21/25 登记日期 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 73 页，共 125 页\n\n因此，我认为，第一，Adler 案出现在极为不同的情形中。它甚至不涉及第三方；它只涉及债务人和一宗第 727 条案件。而且，纽约东区联邦地区法院已批评其中的一些宽泛表述。\n\n因此，受托人援引的其他案件并不动摇以下结论：不能将替身实体原则与这一初始受让人撤销责任理论结合使用。首先，正如我们所说，在这个国家，没有一个案件中法院认可受托人运用替身实体原则，在事后对非内部人创设第 549 条责任。第二，在他们援引的所有案件中，只有一个案件甚至可以说是针对非内部人的；只是可以说而已，我会说明为何这只是可以说。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 3985 提交日期 01/21/25 登记日期 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 74 页，共 125 页\n\n其余案件全都是内部人案件；即向配偶、女友、最好的朋友作出的转让。是诸如此类的不当操作。而内部人与非内部人之间的这种区别至关重要。你看，对非内部人第三方债权人的保护，正是 Auto-Train 案、Duckworth 案和 Lawler 案裁决所依据的考量。在这些案件中，法院试图保护贸易债权人的信赖利益，即他们所交易的是独立、非债务人实体，这种信赖应当受到保护。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 3985 提交日期 01/21/25 登记日期 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 75 页，共 125 页\n\n另一方面，如果所涉的是内部人，且其要么参与了申请提交前的计划，要么至少在申请提交后知悉债务人处于破产程序中，情况就不同了。\n\n我之所以说他们所称唯一一个针对非内部人的案件“只是可以说”，是因为那是 American International Refinery（美国国际炼油厂案）。关于该案，我只说两点，然后我将结束，以便注意我的时间。\n\n其一——就该问题而言，那并非一宗549案件。那仅是一宗548案件。法院裁决中有一些对第547条和第549条的零星提及，但其中受到质疑的转让仅为申请破产前的转让。该案中所讨论的申请破产后转让所产生的影响，已获破产法院明确批准，因此那并非一宗549案件。这是一宗欺诈性转让案件。\n\n其二，该案中的受让人与相关方之间的独立交易关系略显不足，但长话短说，受让人最终成为了合伙人。他们购买了债务人子公司持有的股票，并称该子公司是债务人的另一个自我。该子公司拥有一家在哈萨克斯坦拥有天然气权益的实体100%的权益。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 76 of 125\n\n他们将其中85%出售给受让人Bridge，并保留15%。因此，双方仍为该项目的合伙人，而受让人本应获得大量融资以支持该项目。\n\n其次，在事后约一年，他们聘请债务人的首席执行官、总裁加入。因此，他们是否确实为独立交易关系存有疑问。因此，我将在此结束。\n\n围绕Auto-Train案中的反向刺破公司面纱及Manichaean案中的追溯性实质合并的裁决，以及Duckworth案中为创设额外受让人撤销而追溯适用另一个自我原则的裁决，贯穿着一条主线。即：这些极为特殊且极少使用的衡平法救济，不得用于损害第三方；对于与相互独立、不同实体进行交易，存在合理预期。并且，当然不得以违反（听不清）政策的方式采用此类救济，例如削弱继续与困境公司甚至其关联方交易的激励，或以剥夺这些第三方依《破产法典》本可享有权利的方式采用此类救济：根据第363条寻求安慰令；根据第550条享有后续受让人抗辩。\n\n由于没有指称共同被告为内部人。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 77 of 125\n\n没有指称他们不仅仅是向非债务人转让人出售货物和服务的贸易债权人。\n\n受托人不应能够追溯性地利用另一个自我的认定，以创设额外的转让责任。\n\n基于该理由，我们认为该动议也应被驳回。\n\n所以，我超时了大约一分钟，感谢您的宽容。谢谢。\n\n法庭：非常感谢。\n\nSklarz律师？\n\nSKLARZ先生：早上好，法官阁下。Jeffrey Sklarz（杰弗里·斯克拉兹）。\n\n法庭：早上好。\n\nSKLARZ先生：受托人所寻求的这一非常救济当然并不常见；实质上，这相当于请求修订2022年的破产申请书，以纳入从未依据《破产法典》申请破产的新债务人。\n\n这并非典型的追溯性救济。在先前的听证中，法官阁下曾提到，嗯，您今天就一项违约诉讼作出判决书，但其涉及的是2017年的违约。这更类似于您今天作出一项命令，但认定所有人因违反该命令而构成藐视法庭，因为他们本应在2017年就知晓该命令。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 78 of 125\n\n受托人试图让时光倒流。在我当事人案件的书面陈述中，我们将此称为“时间旅行理论”，即实际上修订所有破产申请书，以纳入所有非债务人转让人，如同当时已提交数十份申请书一样。\n\n仅Kwok先生（郭文贵）及其后不久的Genever Company（Genever公司）申请了破产。没有任何一名非债务人转让人拥有破产申请书、破产财产清单或财务状况说明书。未举行第341条会议，也未提供《破产法典》给予债权人或利害关系方的任何其他保障。\n\n正如律师所说、正如最高法院所说、正如无数法院所说、正如法官阁下所说，我们应从《破产法典》开始。有两条规管申请书的《破产法典》条款：301和303。301是自愿申请；您提交一份申请书。这些实体没有申请书。\n\n如果如受托人所主张，其一直是这些实体的受托人，那么申请书在哪里？财产清单在哪里？对各实体资产的识别在哪里？如果受托人一直是这些所谓债务人的受托人，他就没有完成《破产法典》规定的任何要求。\n\n另一种选择是依据303提出非自愿案件。在此，存在一套极为细密的制度。首先，\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 79 of 125\n\n提交一份非自愿申请书，主张某债务人应进入破产程序；其后有一套程序。事实上，正如律师指出，依据303及相关法规，在间隔期间如何对待债权人是特别受关注的问题。受托人根本不能改写申请书，称所有人都知道他们一直处于破产程序中。这恰恰与Auto-Train所允许的内容相反。将这些请求重新描述为实质合并以外的任何内容，只是一种伪饰。例如，如果所有债务人、如果所有非债务人转让人在2022年实际上均为债务人，为什么受托人需要提交数百份申请，要求进行《规则》第2004条审查？他本应直接从其所控制的实体取得文件。\n\n如果他已经控制了这些实体，他根本不需要做任何这些事情。他不需要提起综合另一个自我案件。\n\n《破产法典》中没有任何条款提供受托人所寻求的救济。如前所述，受托人不具备诉讼资格。共同被告已经提出了这一点。除指出以下内容外，我不再重复：这一点已被反复说明，而且我认为在Picard v JPMorgan案（Picard诉JPMorgan案），464 B.R. 84, 92中表述得非常好。既定法律明确，该法律禁止受托人，为了对债务人提出普通法请求之目的，引用，\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 80 of 125\n\n实际上取代Kwok先生实际债权人的地位。\n\n原因在于，如果Kwok——Kwok不能因自己是另一个自我而起诉自己。这没有意义。这不是破产财产的资产。根据541，对于这类请求不存在诉讼资格。唯一可能的依据是544，而正如律师所说，那行不通。此外，法官阁下，鉴于受托人寻求重新排列非债务人转让人的资产和资本结构，政策考量极为令人担忧。Manichaean案中已对此作出很好的表述，Delaware Court of Chancery（特拉华州衡平法院）确实对这一救济深感困扰。\n\n作为初步说明，本案的奇特之处，以及使其与我参与过或在书面材料中见过的任何其他另一个自我、被指称另一个自我案件完全不同之处，在于不法行为人Kwok先生的行为增加了其破产财产。也就是说，他从这些另一个自我实体中窃取财产。\n\n受托人提交的起诉状称，他利用这些另一个自我实体、这些非债务人转让人来使自己获利。他购买法拉利汽车。他购买房屋。他拿走资金，并将其用于个人用途。这增加了破产财产。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 81 of 125\n\n在Mankassian（音译）或Manichaean案中——抱歉，我总是读错这个案件名称——\n\n法庭：我也不完全确定其准确读音。\n\nGOLDSTEIN先生（Goldstein）：——以及Gracey案和任何其他反向刺破公司面纱案件中，情况恰恰相反。破产财产被减少。\n\n在Mankassian案中，该债务人实体——即少数股东压迫权利所涉实体——买方策划使资金绕过该目标收购载体，以便其无需向原告付款。\n\n在本案中，如果从非债务人实体的债权人处追回资金，而这些债权人在很大程度上属于正常业务过程中的受让人，或者我的当事人属于正常业务过程中的受让人，或者属于律师事务所，那么这将使从未从该等服务中获得任何利益的人受益。\n\n这将进一步增加Kwok破产财产，而此前据称Kwok先生已从这些非债务人转让人处窃取资金。因此，这是多重受偿。损害与救济之间没有关联；这是一种颠倒。它将进一步减少一个已经被Kwok先生减少的财产。他的破产财产因实施欺诈而状况更好。他不能——受托人也不能——以这种方式重复受偿。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 82 of 125\n\n再次回到《破产法典》的具体规定，关于549请求，该条款明确涉及破产财产的转让。它并未——而要有破产财产，就必须有破产程序。因此，回到我的初步论点：没有申请书，就没有破产财产，也没有破产程序。你不能让世界倒转，然后说，嘿，我们实际上确实提交了所有这些申请书。他们从未提交过申请书。\n\n最后，法官阁下，受托人不是司法部。受托人并没有无限委任权，可以做任何其认为属于其版本正义的事情。\n\n其在《破产法典》下的唯一职责，是管理第11章下的破产财产，并为该破产财产的债权人利益进行追偿。\n\nKwok先生被指称不当行为的受害人，将通过赔偿和司法部获得处理。并且已有资金被扣押，将通过民事没收程序处理。\n\n需要明确的是，从未有任何受托人试图提出本案所提出类型的请求。此类请求——当然更从未以如此大规模提出。允许在不顾及债权人及利益相关者权利的情况下，追溯性地重组非债务人转让人的资本结构，将是前所未有且不被允许的。正如律师指出，必须有关于不存在损害的具体指称。这并未包含在其中。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 3985 Filed 01/21/25 Entered 01/21/25 13:49:43 Page 83 of 125\n\n有——这不可能载于诉状中。没有\n\n受托人提出这些主张的依据。\n\n受托人试图颠倒和歪曲法律，\n\n这是不应被允许的。\n\n基于上述理由，\n\n应准许我当事人提出的驳回动议。\n\n谢谢。\n\n法庭：\n\n谢谢。\n\nKINDSETH 先生：\n\n早上好，法官阁下。\n\nStephen Kindseth（斯蒂芬·金德塞思），Zeisler & Zeisler（泽斯勒与泽斯勒律师事务所），代表 Zeisler & Zeisler。\n\n关于这四个问题，法官阁下，我没有任何补充。\n\n我们支持并赞同共同被告的律师以及 Sklarz 律师提出的论点。\n\n法庭：\n\n好的。\n\nKINDSETH 先生：\n\n但非常感谢您给予我陈述意见的机会——\n\n法庭：\n\n谢谢。\n\nKINDSETH 先生：\n\n——如果我有任何补充的话。\n\n法庭：\n\n谢谢。我很感谢。\n\n好的。Bassett 律师，您的答复？\n\nBASSETT 先生：\n\n法官阁下，我可以上前吗？\n\n法庭：\n\n可以，请。\n\nBASSETT 先生：\n\n早上好，法官阁下。\n\n再次说明，书记载明，Nick Bassett（尼克·巴塞特），来自 Paul Hastings（普衡律师事务所），担任 Chapter 11 Trustee（第11章受托人）的律师。\n\n法官阁下，我显然会尽量在获准的时间内陈述我的论点。需要答复的要点很多。我也显然很乐意回答法庭可能提出的任何问题。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 3985 提交于 01/21/25 录入于 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 84 页，共 125 页\n\n法官阁下，在今日律师的陈述中，以及您在书面文件中所见，您多次听到关于本案及受托人提起的对抗程序中所涉衡平因素的讨论。这并不特别令人意外，因为当然，破产法院是衡平法院。但是，在这一点上，我认为非常重要的是退一步，审视本案中的衡平因素实际上如何权衡。\n\n被告方尽力将自己描绘为受害者，并向法庭说明他们认为受托人所寻求的救济将如何对其造成不利影响。但是，法官阁下，被告方请求本法庭得出的结果，将恰恰是与衡平结果相反的结果。\n\n现在，为便于厘清，本破产案件及其数千份案卷记录——法庭和各方对此都非常熟悉——均源于 Kwok 先生长期实施的欺诈计划：在将其实际拥有的全部资产隐藏于由其控制的壳公司网络之后，申请破产并声称自己拥有零资产。法官阁下，Kwok 先生实施的该项欺诈规模确实极其庞大；事实上，我认为毫不夸张地说，从未有过像本案这样的破产案件，至少没有达到如此规模的案件，在该案中，一名实际上是亿万富翁的个人债务人，过着人们所能想象的最奢华生活，随后申请破产，却声称自己实质上并无任何财产，因为他以一种将其全部财富藏入其控制下壳公司的方式安排其生活和事务。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 3985 提交于 01/21/25 录入于 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 85 页，共 125 页\n\n实际上，被告方请求本法庭通过驳回受托人的撤销请求权而采取的做法，是通过认定 Kwok 的壳公司实际上确为独立公司，从而使其向被告方转移资产不构成 Kwok 资产的转移，来使 Kwok 长期实施的欺诈计划合法化。\n\n换言之，按照被告方的逻辑，任何像 Kwok 一样经营其事务的个人，即使该人是亿万富翁，也可以申请破产并声称没有资产。此后，该破产案件中的受托人将永远无法向任何人主张撤销请求权，因为根据他们的说法，破产申请前或之后发生的转移并非债务人作出的转移，而是其独立壳公司作出的转移。\n\n法官阁下，就本案而言，他们试图以 Kwok 先生没有资产为由，彻底剥夺受托人甚至追究撤销请求权的能力，这一结果实属荒谬，并且从根本上违背《破产法》。Peterson 律师刚才提到，他们所寻求的结果并非试图剥夺受托人的救济，但这恰恰正是他们试图做的事。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 3985 提交于 01/21/25 录入于 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 86 页，共 125 页\n\n受托人正在追究的诉因，与 Kwok 先生实际经营的情况一致。他将其全部资产置于壳公司中，随后由这些壳公司处理其事务。它们向各方进行转移，也实施其他行为。与这一现实相一致，受托人追究其请求权并行使其在《破产法》项下权利的唯一方式，就是追究这些资产的转移，因为从经济实质上看，它们是 Kwok 先生资产的转移。\n\n现在，法官阁下，我将向法庭逐一说明律师就我们今日在此讨论的四个问题提出的各种论点，并解释为何被告方在每一项上都是错误的。\n\n现在，围绕 Manichaean（摩尼教）案进行了许多讨论，被告方援引该案及其他判例主张，受托人的替身主张必须失败，进而其欺诈性转移和第 549 条主张也必须失败，因为被告方据称是“无关联的第三方”，对 Kwok 先生的欺诈行为既未参与也不知情。法官阁下，这一论点存在若干问题。第一，我不会讨论既判案件法，因为我知道这是法庭不想听取的论点；但无论是否适用既判案件法，作为先例问题，本法庭已经作出裁定，认定 Lamp Capital（兰普资本）、Golden Spring（金泉）、Greenwich Land（格林尼治地产）以及 HGHK entities（HGHK 实体）是债务人的替身。我们主张这些裁定是正确的，不应受到扰动。第二，被告方错误描述了根据 Delaware law（特拉华州法），对第三方造成的所谓损害如何纳入替身分析。现在，被告方似乎根据其对 Manichaean 案和其他案件的解读主张，如果会有任何一个“无辜”之人可能因该结果而受损，根据特拉华州法便不能作出替身认定。但这根本不是法律。如果审视判例所言，法律关注的是整体情形中的衡平因素，而不是单一当事人是否会受损；尤其是，该原则旨在防止欺诈，正如本案所发生的欺诈。现在，谈到 Manichaean 案，被告方当然抓住了衡平法院所说的一段话，即该法院仅在不存在对第三方的实际、持续性损害时，才会考虑反向刺破公司面纱。但他们选择性引用该案，因为他们忽略了衡平法院的其他关键表述；该等表述为法院在作出裁定、说明根据特拉华州法可适用反向刺破公司面纱时真正的含义提供了更多背景。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 3985 提交于 01/21/25 录入于 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 88 页，共 125 页\n\n具体而言，衡平法院表示：\n\n“反向刺破公司面纱可能被用作伤害无辜当事人并扰乱独立交易各方预期的钝器，这些风险确实存在；但在我看来，这并不足以证明应当完全否定反向刺破公司面纱。相反，对这些风险的承认创造了一个管理这些风险的机会，并以符合衡平利益的方式这样做。”\n\n法院还表示，若不适用反向刺破公司面纱：\n\n“公司的欺诈性成员可能将资产公然隐藏，以逃避支付判决书，这将是一个不可接受的结果。”\n\n再次，我认为这正是我们在本案中面对 Kwok 先生时所处理的情况。\n\n最后，法院表示：\n\n“从根本上说，反向刺破公司面纱与传统刺破公司面纱一样，均植根于衡平；法院必须考量所有相关因素，以实现衡平结果。”\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 3985 提交于 01/21/25 录入于 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 89 页，共 125 页\n\n总而言之，Manichaean 案表明，根据特拉华州法，可以且应当适用反向刺破公司面纱，以防止像 Kwok 先生这样的人利用其壳公司实施欺诈计划，并为各方实现整体衡平的结果。这正是我们试图通过本案中的撤销请求权实现的目标。\n\n现在，法官阁下——通过本案中的替身主张——当然，其他司法辖区也有支持同一结果的判例，它们将替身分析界定为一种平衡测试，该测试专门旨在防止欺诈计划即使可能对其他债权人或某些当事人造成损害，仍被维持和认可。\n\n我们在书面文件中援引的 In re Mass（马斯案）具有指导意义。该案载于 178 B.R. 626，是 Middle District of Pennsylvania（宾夕法尼亚中区）的一宗案件。\n\n在该案中，债务人的股东根据宾夕法尼亚州法的反向刺破公司面纱理论，申请交付存入其全资公司银行账户中的资金，主张该公司是股东的替身，因此他们有权交付该账户中的款项。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 3985 提交于 01/21/25 录入于 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 90 页，共 125 页\n\n法院驳回了与该替身公司有业务往来的债权人的异议，并准许了该动议；该债权人主张该结果将对其造成损害。法院在作出该裁定时指出，在该情形下，反向刺破公司面纱并不会损害第三方，反而将：\n\n“有利于破产财产的所有债权人，而对该救济提出异议的商业债权人被告，不应仅仅因为其恰好与一家虚假公司订立合同，就享有优待。”\n\n换言之，在像本案这样的情形中，存在一些当事人——我将谈到这些被告是否确实受到损害——受托人认为他们并未受到损害；但即使他们受到损害，受托人寻求的救济也只是使他们与债务人的所有其他债权人处于同等地位，不给予他们优待，也不允许他们，法官阁下，通过要求法院维持 Kwok 长期实施的计划而从中获益，并使他们从 Kwok 壳公司收到的款项不受《破产法》撤销条款的约束。\n\n这进一步促进了破产制度所依据的基本原则，即债务人的所有资产均应被归集。\n\n并将其分配以按比例向其债权人进行分配。法官阁下，我们在书面意见中援引的其他案件也讨论了旨在实现整体衡平结果的反向刺破公司面纱，我在此不再重复。其中之一是 In re Schuster（舒斯特案）。另一个是 Petters Co.（佩特斯公司案）。但我现在想转而——法官：您能否——我并非——请您为记录拼写一下这些名称，可以吗。彼得森先生：当然。Schuster 拼写为 S-c-h-u-s-t-e-r。Petters Co. 拼写为 P-e-t-t-e-r-s。法官：好的。彼得森先生：现在，法官阁下，我想讨论被告多次提出的另一点，即在他们看来，如果 Delaware（特拉华州）法律确实阻止在无辜当事人可能因该结果而受到损害的情形下进行反向刺破公司面纱，那么他们主张，这就以某种方式将该问题转化为一项起诉要件，即受托人必须在其起诉状中积极主张，他所寻求结果不可能使任何一方受到损害。同样，这并非法律规定；但即使它是法律规定，也当然不是一项起诉要件。而且，我认为具有讽刺意味的是，被告完全依赖 Manichaean（曼尼教案）来支持该论点。\n\n如果您查看 Manichaean 案中发生的情况，法官阁下，该判决第 718 页载明，法院明确裁定这并非一项起诉要件，因为在该案中，法院分析替身实体因素并最终认定适宜进行反向刺破公司面纱时，注意到一方当事人已提交文件并就损害提出论点。法院在该阶段驳回了该论点，称：\n\n“为明确起见，与被主张为替身实体的第三方债权人有关的事实主张并未载于起诉状中。\n\n至少目前，我的分析限于诉状的四角范围之内。”\n\n因此，Manichaean 案在该问题上恰恰支持相反的命题，法官阁下。\n\n但是，最后，即使存在一项起诉要件，即使可能因反向刺破公司面纱而受到损害的当事人的无辜性，即使这一切在 Delaware 法律下均具相关性——而事实并非如此——允许受托人在破产案件中对这些被告提出撤销请求，并不意味着他们会因替身实体裁定而受到所谓的“损害”。\n\n正如本院完全知悉、被告及其律师也完全知悉的那样，所谓“无辜”当事人始终会在不知情的情况下受到破产的影响，尤其是通过偏颇清偿及撤销诉讼。对处于该等地位的当事人而言，这或许令人遗憾，但不幸的是，这就是破产的运作方式，因为这再次属于确保为债务人的债权人按比例分配资产并平等对待所有该等债权人的基本程序的一部分。这可通过《破产法典》中的一些简单例子看出，法官阁下。例如，法律明确规定，对于一项 Section 548 欺诈性转让请求，法院在确定该转让是否具有欺诈性时，仅审查债务人／转让人的意图；受让人是否具有欺诈意图并不重要。受让人可能是无辜的。这不会影响受托人或占有中的债务人提出的 548 请求的成立。同样适用于 Section 549 请求，法官阁下。《破产法典》对于收到 549 请求的受让人是否必须知道其从破产中的债务人处收到未经授权的转让，没有任何规定。不存在知情要件。不存在受让人不得为无辜者的要求；唯一重要的是，该转让发生于申请破产后且未经授权。因此，在本案中，法官阁下，我们主张被告根本没有受到损害，至少在破产运作方式的语境下并非如此。他们只是\n\n受到与任何其他当事人相同的《破产法典》撤销条款的约束。若他们有意对受托人的请求提出抗辩，例如依据 Section 548(c) 提出的价值抗辩或其他抗辩，他们可以提出这些抗辩，但这并不意味着受托人的请求存在瑕疵。\n\n法官阁下，关于这一问题的最后一点是，我要指出，他们所主张的任何损害，至少是他们所主张的潜在经济损害，完全为时过早，因为如果被告最终需要就受托人的欺诈性转让或申请破产后转让请求向受托人支付判决款，他们有权根据《破产法典》Section 502(a) 提出债权申报。\n\n现在，我同意律师的意见；我们并不是说——我今天站在这里并不是说所有债权人，包括这些撤销诉讼被告，只要他们提出债权申报，就将在本案中获得其债权的全额清偿；债权人的受偿水平显然仍有待确定。我的观点是，他们的损害论点至少是：(A) 为时过早；以及 (B) 这与 Manichaean 案所衍生的原则一致，即可能以某种方式受替身实体裁定影响的无辜当事人，在法院作出该裁定时，应当有某种方式能够依照衡平原则管理其风险。《破产法典》对此作出了规定。它\n\n通过他们可根据《破产法典》提出的抗辩作出该等规定。它还通过 Section 502(a) 债权申报作出该等规定，法官阁下。\n\n法官阁下，接下来我想讨论——我知道我剩余的时间不多了——但我想确保讨论其他论点。现在，被告花了大量时间讨论替身实体的后果，以及这是否会导致替身实体的资产成为债务人的财产。\n\n再次，本院已经裁定了这一问题。我们认为，本院先前的裁定具有先例效力，您知道，这与既判案件法原则无关，我们今天并未讨论该原则。无论如何，法官阁下，该论点在实体上因两个理由而不能成立。第一，正如我们在书面文件中所讨论的，替身实体裁定是否导致资产成为破产财团财产的问题，从根本上说是联邦破产法问题，而非州法问题。\n\n第二，即使州法适用，并且存在被告主张的所谓替代责任理论与同一性理论之间的区别，我们已明确说明 Delaware 采纳同一性理论。\n\n现在，关于联邦法与州法的区别，法官阁下，我们在书面意见中援引了相关案件。这些载于——抱歉——我们异议书第 25 至 27 段。众多法院已阐明这一一般概念，即，尽管——且这完全符合 Butner（巴特纳案）中最高法院的裁决——破产中的财产权利性质和范围首先由州实体法确定，但一旦作出该确定，联邦破产法，即《破产法典》Section 541，便决定该权益在何种范围内成为破产财团财产。再次，我请本院参阅我们异议书第 25 至 27 段汇集的案件，它们支持该一般命题。法官阁下，我认为重要的是要认识到，您知道，联邦法控制破产财团财产问题这一概念完全合理，因为界定何者构成破产财团财产对于破产程序绝对具有根本性。我请本院注意 Roberts 大法官在 Wellness（韦尔尼斯案）中的反对意见中所作的评论，该意见载于我们异议书脚注 17，其中他说：“界定破产财团财产是每一宗破产案件的所谓必要起点，而且是所谓对重构债务人与债权人关系不可避免的核心。”因此，在他看来，\n\n破产法院对审理替身实体请求具有核心管辖权。\n\n现在，法院在分析替身实体请求时，认真对待了破产财团财产问题对于破产程序具有根本性这一原则。法院认定，尽管辩护律师可能作何主张，在破产中，替身实体请求会将财产纳入破产财团，即使同一请求在破产程序之外更常被债权人用于使一个实体对另一实体的债务承担责任。\n\n因此，这里有两个步骤。根据州法，是否存在可成立的反向刺破公司面纱或替身实体理论？第二步，在破产中，如果是，其效果为何？这很合理，法官阁下，因为本案中的破产请求是依据《破产法典》Section 541 提出的。\n\n现在，法官阁下，一项具有指导意义的判决是我们在书面文件中援引的 Yerushalmi（耶鲁沙尔米案）。我拼写一下。即 Y-e-r-u-s-h-a-l-m-i，载于 487 B.R. 98。\n\n在该案中，法官阁下，第 7 章受托人请求作出确认判决，确认某项信托实际是债务人的替身实体，并请求交付其资产。破产法院首先确定该实体根据州法是否构成替身实体；该案适用的是 New York（纽约州）法律。然而，法院随后认定，该\n\n替身实体裁定的效果是破产法问题。这一点之所以重要、之所以在该案中出现，是因为该案被告通过主张州法时效已适用而对受托人的替身实体请求提出质疑。法院驳回了该论点，因为其认定该诉因是依据《破产法典》Section 541 和 542 提起的。在作出裁定的过程中，法院解释道：“本案事实，即破产受托人依据替身实体理论寻求追回破产财团资产，与非破产情形下由个别债权人为其利益提起、旨在使替身实体对另一方义务承担责任的替身实体案件有所区别。”\n\n法官阁下，这正是本案的情形。这并非郭文贵先生的一名债权人在破产程序之外提出的非破产法上的另一个自我诉因；而是受托人试图运用另一个自我原则，以符合经济现实并符合债务人处理其事务的方式，作出裁定，认定其保留在其空壳公司中的资产，事实上系其个人资产，因此属于破产财产的资产。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 3985 提交 01/21/25 录入 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 99 页，共 125 页\n\n法官阁下，另一宗我现在不作详细讨论、但同样指出破产程序中的另一个自我效力不同于破产程序之外的案件，是我们在书面陈述中引用的 Star Mountain（星山）案。除这些案件外，法官阁下，我们还引用了若干其他判决；这些载于我们异议的第30至34段，讨论了破产程序中的另一个自我理论，以及该等理论会增加破产财产，并导致另一个自我的资产成为破产财产。我要列出这些案件。我不会详细讨论它们，但关键在于，法官阁下，在这些案件中，法院所关注的并非所谓同一性理论与替代责任理论之间的区分；相反，它们是在破产法下，而非依据被告方希望法院依州法承认的所谓细微区分，就另一个自我判决的效力作出认定。这些案件包括我们在书面材料中引用的 In re Blatstein（布拉特斯坦案）；10th Ave. Record Distributors（第十大道唱片发行商）案；In re Pearlman（珀尔曼案）；In re Concepcion（康塞普西翁案）；In re Deckelbaum（德克尔鲍姆案）；In re Palmieri（帕尔米耶里案）；以及 In re Adler（阿德勒案），法官阁下。所有这些案件均指出，认定存在另一个自我的结果是，该等资产成为破产财产。\n\n法官阁下，即使同一性理论与替代责任理论之间确有这种区分，并且该区分在破产程序中具有相关性，我们主张，法律非常明确：在 Delaware（特拉华州），同一性理论占主导地位。法官阁下，我请法院注意 Spring Real Estate（春天房地产）判决。围绕该案已有许多讨论。\n\n被告方主张，该案中法院关于根据特拉华州法作出的另一个自我裁定之效力的表述属于附带意见。但是，法官阁下，无论是否属于附带意见，这都是衡平法院就其对另一个自我理论结果的看法所作的表述，不仅涉及特拉华州法，也涉及与破产案件的关系。而被告方没有引用任何相反的法律。\n\n法院在该案中称，引用如下：\n\n“在母公司存在单纯另一个自我的情况下，只要法院可以进行反向刺破公司面纱，法院即可为使受托人有资格撤销被指称的欺诈性资产转让之目的，将子公司的资产视为母公司的资产。”\n\n法官阁下，这正中要害。尽管被告方主张，该法院为支持该命题引用了 Nevada（内华达州）法，但法官阁下，该法院适用的是特拉华州法；即使其引用了一宗内华达州案件，也是因为其认为内华达州法与特拉华州法一致，和/或因为其同意受托人的观点，即另一个自我请求在破产程序中的效力不同于在破产程序之外的效力。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 3985 提交 01/21/25 录入 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 101 页，共 125 页\n\n我还要指出，法官阁下，被告方如此倚重的 Manichaean（摩尼教）判决，赞同地引用了 Spring Real Estate 案，以支持完全相同的命题。我想说，法官阁下，至少我认为 Manichaean 判决明确表明，就替代责任理论与同一性理论之间存在任何区分而言，Manichaean 实际上表明，要么这种区分根本不存在，要么在特拉华州，其效力兼具二者。再者，这可从辩护律师在 Manichaean 案第710页引用的措辞看出，其中法院在两个相连的句子中，以两种方式表述了该问题。其首先称，引用如下：\n\n“从最基本的层面来看，反向刺破公司面纱涉及由商业组织承担其所有人的债务责任。”\n\n而紧接着一句，其在母公司—子公司语境中称：\n\n“如果子公司只是母公司的另一个自我，在子公司只是母公司的另一个自我的情况下，法院将把子公司的资产视为母公司的资产。”\n\n因此，Manichaean 本身已明确表明，法官阁下，被告方要求法院承认的这种僵硬区分，并非特拉华州法院在其判决中实际承认的区分。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 3985 提交 01/21/25 录入 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 102 页，共 125 页\n\n法官阁下，我知道时间不多了，但我最后希望确保回应的论点是这一追溯效力论点。法官阁下，我希望消除任何认为受托人实际上正在请求法院给予 nunc pro tunc 救济的看法。受托人并非如此。\n\n我认为，法院在9月听证会上的评论完全正确：看待此事的方式是，例如，若要求法院裁定一份合同是否在五年前被违反，而法院裁定其被违反，那么事实就是如此。法院并未给予 nunc pro tunc 救济；其仅仅裁决摆在其面前的问题。\n\n我还请法院注意我们所引用的 In re Adler 案，即该判决第58页，法官阁下；其中法院指出——那是处理 New York（纽约州）法的法院——但我认为，就讨论另一个自我请求如何运作而言，该案具有指导意义。法院所说的是，另一个自我认定在其生效时即确立另一个自我与控制方之间的相对权利，引用如下：\n\n“在满足另一个自我的事实要件的那一时刻。”\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 3985 提交 01/21/25 录入 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 103 页，共 125 页\n\n因此，这正是法院已经认定的，也是我们请求法院今天在这些对抗程序中再次重申的，即这些实体，即这些转让方实体，自始至终一直是郭文贵先生的另一个自我。并非它们在破产后才成为其另一个自我。也并非它们在任何其他时间点才成为其另一个自我。它们一直是其另一个自我，因此，它们的资产一直是郭文贵先生的资产。\n\n这就是我们基于所提出的事实请求法院裁决的问题。这根本不是 nunc pro tunc 救济。\n\n关于追溯性救济的问题，法官阁下，被告方指出，他们认为没有任何被引用的案件曾运用另一个自我理论，允许依据 Section 549 提出的破产申请提交后欺诈性转让请求继续进行。法官阁下，至少有几个这样的例子。我已经引用的 In re Schuster（舒斯特案）就是一个例子，其中法院允许——法院称，在作出另一个自我认定后，Section 549 请求可以继续进行。我们引用的 In re Deckelbaum 案是另一宗案件。我们在书面材料中引用了来自 Bankruptcy Court, Northern District of Georgia（乔治亚州北区破产法院）的 In re Harman（哈曼案）。那也是发生了该种情形的另一宗案件。此外，正如律师所承认，American International Refinery（美国国际炼油厂）案所表明的情形也是又一个例子，正如——那么——抱歉。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 3985 提交 01/21/25 录入 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 104 页，共 125 页\n\n法官阁下，以上是 Section 549 案件的例子，除此之外，我们还引用了一些案件，其中诸如 Spring Real Estate 案、In re Palmieri 案及其他案件的法院认为，另一个自我认定当然允许基于该等另一个自在作出另一个自我认定之前所作资产转让，追诉欺诈性转让请求。再说一次，这些案件没有讨论 nunc pro tunc 救济，因为根本没有必要。\n\n法官阁下，在我结束前还要补充两点。第一，我希望确保回应被告方如此倚重的 Duckworth（达克沃思）案件。这些案件可因若干理由加以区分。首先，Duckworth 是一宗源自 Illinois（伊利诺伊州）、适用 Indiana（印第安纳州）法的 Chapter 7 案件。该案涉及一名 Chapter 11 债务人，其在破产前不久将某些资产转入其空壳公司的银行账户，随后在破产后不久，该等空壳公司又向第三方进行了转让，而该等第三方最终成为撤销之诉中的被告方。\n\n法院最终如被告方所述驳回了受托人的请求，但该判决及其理由在此不适用，至少有四个原因。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 3985 提交 01/21/25 录入 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 105 页，共 125 页\n\n首先，该案中的法院一开始就拒绝适用另一个自我原则。其指出，适用的州法，如我所说，是印第安纳州法，并且法院预测 Indiana Supreme Court（印第安纳州最高法院）甚至不会适用该原则。显然，本案并非如此。特拉华州承认受托人的另一个自我请求。\n\n第二，法官阁下，该法院拒绝适用另一个自我原则以允许该案的 Section 549 请求继续进行，部分原因是，被认定受到另一个自我关系损害的唯一当事人是担保债权人，而他们甚至未从受托人对该等请求的追诉中获益。因此，即使受托人成功追诉该等请求，破产财产的利益相关方也不会获得实际利益；同样地，本案并非如此。若受托人的撤销请求成功，债务人的所有债权人都将受益。\n\n第三，法官阁下，这一点至关重要，而且辩护律师对此花费了很多时间，该法院认为，在该案中非常明确的是，受托人将另一个自我原则作为诉讼策略，试图规避被告方原本作为 Bankruptcy Code（破产法典）Section 550 下后手受让人所享有的抗辩。但是，这高度依赖于该案的事实，法官阁下。正如我所说，在该案中，债务人在申请破产前不久，将其账户中的资金取出，转入其空壳公司的银行账户；而在破产后，该等空壳公司又将资金进一步转让给某些成为被告方的第三方。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 3985 提交 01/21/25 录入 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 106 页，共 125 页\n\n在该等情形下，法院指出，鉴于该事实记录和事实现实，法院认为受托人本应基于债务人在破产申请提交前向空壳公司作出的转让提出 Section 548 请求，然后，即使寻求救济，也应通过后手受让人请求向被告方寻求救济，之后被告方即可提出其 Section 550 抗辩。\n\n但是，法官大人，这与本案实际发生的情况完全不相符。这并非本案事实。案卷中完全没有任何记录支持受托人在本案中正以该种方式运用其人格混同和撤销权请求。这并非这样一种情形：Kwok（郭文贵）先生在破产前将一大笔资金存放在银行账户中，并将其分给其空壳公司，随后我们决定，与其起诉这些空壳公司及作为后续受让人的这些被告，不如试图将其合并处理并提出 Section 549 请求。事实完全不是如此，因为这并非 Kwok\n\n案号 22-50073 文书 3985 提交 01/21/25 录入 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 107 页，共 125 页\n\n经营其事务的方式；Kwok 将其全部资产置于这些空壳公司名下，然后按照其意愿使用这些资产以实现其个人目的。\n\n因此，法官大人，我们提出请求的方式正是符合这一现实，而且这确实是——以 Duckworth 案中法院所建议的方式提出这些请求是没有意义的，因为本案并非如此。受让人、资产持有人是 Kwok 的空壳公司；它们是他的资产，因此我们将这些请求作为破产财产资产的转让人提出。\n\nDuckworth 案可予区分的最后一个理由，法官大人，是因为——这与我刚才提出的最后一点有些相似——法院强调，受托人试图以选择性的方式运用人格混同理论。如果您查看 2013 年的裁决，即该案的第二项裁决，在裁决书第 6 页，法院强调，受托人并非为所有目的寻求人格混同认定。他具体且仅为提出那些撤销权请求而寻求该认定；法官大人，本案同样不是如此。\n\n受托人已对这些实体提出人格混同请求，以确认它们现在及一贯以来均符合现实情况，即作为 Kwok 先生的另我，被用于持有并向其债权人隐藏其资产。法官大人，与 Duckworth 案不同，其后果是，这些实体的所有其他债权人均将有机会主张请求权。我们过去曾提出这一点。\n\n人格混同裁决的所有后果均源于法院的命令，而非仅仅——这不仅仅是受托人的诉讼策略或工具。\n\n最后一点——\n\n法 院：为公平起见，我要请你作结了，好吗？\n\n巴塞特律师：是，法官大人。\n\n我要提出的最后一点仅涉及受托人所寻求的请求与实质合并之间的关系。法官大人，受托人所寻求的救济实际上可能，而且我同意，确实寻求与实质合并类似的结果，但这两项法律原则并不相同，并且可以且确实并存。\n\n关于这一点，我请法院参阅 Star Mountain 案。该案中已有一项确认裁定，该裁定明确排除了实质合并。确认后，受托人，即诉讼受托人，寻求提出人格混同请求，随即产生了这样的问题：鉴于确认裁定，受托人能否提出那些请求？\n\n法院认为，受托人可以提出这些请求，因为尽管人格混同寻求的结果类似于实质合并，但它实际上是一项不同的法律原则；尤其是，实质合并并非仅以证明债务人曾利用其他实体实施欺诈为前提。它以债权人的合理预期和无望分离的混同为基础。\n\n案号 22-50073 文书 3985 提交 01/21/25 录入 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 109 页，共 125 页\n\n而且，由于适用于实质合并的标准，在许多情况下，法院退一步考虑实质合并的结果是否应当追溯适用于破产申请日，或者以追溯方式（nunc pro tunc）适用，是有意义的。\n\n但法官大人，本案中我们并不寻求实质合并；我们寻求的是，如我此前所述，由本院作出裁定，仅仅确认 Kwok 先生经营其事务的经济现实。他一向将其资产置于空壳公司名下，其目的正是使其全部财富处于其债权人可及范围之外。\n\n我们认为，若法院作出被告请求法院作出的救济，实际上将认可这一欺诈性虚构，并将对破产财产和债务人的债权人造成重大不利影响，法官大人。\n\n说完这些，除非法院有问题，否则我没有其他陈述。\n\n法 院：我没有任何问题，谢谢。\n\n案号 22-50073 文书 3985 提交 01/21/25 录入 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 110 页，共 125 页\n\n我要做的是短暂休庭，并允许联合被告和受托人：第一，你们可以答复；第二，巴塞特律师，巴塞特律师，你可以答复他们的答复。我将允许你们各作一次最后的简短陈述。\n\n我可能不会给你们每方超过 10 分钟，你们必须决定由谁来进行陈述，好吗？我现在将休庭，并于 12:35 返回，届时我将给予联合被告 10 分钟、受托人 10 分钟，然后我们将结束听证。\n\n有人有任何问题吗？\n\n（无人作口头回应）\n\n法 院：好的。谢谢。\n\n那么，法庭休庭至 12:35。\n\n法警助理：全体起立。\n\n法庭休庭至 12:35。\n\n（于下午 12:25 休庭。）\n\n（于下午 12:37 恢复审理。）\n\n法警助理：全体起立。\n\n休庭后法庭继续开庭。\n\n法 院：请坐。谢谢。\n\n嗯，我不知道是否所有人都已经到了，不过没关系，我希望他们会回来。也许他们决定离开了？\n\n（笑声）\n\n法 院：不，我只是开玩笑；我知道他们刚才在外面交谈，但也许有人可以去叫他们。哦，他们来了。他们来了。\n\n（停顿）\n\n戈尔茨坦律师：抱歉，法官大人。这是当一锅汤里有太多厨师时会发生的事情。\n\n（笑声）\n\n法 院：没问题。\n\n戈尔茨坦律师：感谢您的宽容。\n\n法 院：我只是想确认你们没有离开。\n\n（笑声）\n\n戈尔茨坦律师：还错过这个？不会。\n\n法 院：不会。那么，彼得森律师和戈尔茨坦律师，你们二位中哪一位将作总结陈述？\n\n戈尔茨坦律师：我想我又一次抽到了短签，所以……\n\n法 院：那就请开始吧；请继续。\n\n戈尔茨坦律师：好的。好。法官大人，有几点，仅作针对性说明。我甚至认为我不会用完我的 10 分钟——这话说得太早了，但我想我会是这样。\n\n案号 22-50073 文书 3985 提交 01/21/25 录入 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 111 页，共 125 页\n\n案号 22-50073 文书 3985 提交 01/21/25 录入 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 112 页，共 125 页\n\n我们就 549 案件提出的观点是——我没有听到巴塞特律师是否这样说，但他可能说过，而我可能遗漏了——我们说过，我们正在审理的并非一宗非内部人 549 案件，对吗？因此，Harman 案、Schuster 案均涉及债务人及其配偶。我认为 Deckelbaum 案——我认为那也是他们援引的案件之一——实际上涉及的是一家在破产申请后设立实体的律师事务所，而该律师事务所与此有某种关联。American International 案，我最初已经谈到过，我认为也是他们援引的一项判例，其中从未处理过 549 问题。该案中的转让问题是破产申请前转让，所以我们就说到这里。\n\n您知道，在 Duckworth 案中，他们试图区分 Duckworth 案。其中一个理由是，哦，只有——唯一会受益的一方将是有担保债权人。但是，您知道，阅读——如果您阅读 Duckworth 裁决，Duckworth 法院说——我进来时把页码弄丢了，但我原来有——法院在讨论该问题后，即可能受益的一方将是有担保债权人这一事实，接着说——这在第 4 页——受托人行为更严重的问题在于，对人格混同理论的过度宽泛适用。因此，我认为您不能仅仅忽略该分析。\n\n为区分 Duckworth 案而提出的另一个问题是——我认为，如果我没有听错巴塞特律师的话——就是说，嗯，您知道，这只是——债务人将资金存入 Power Trading，然后 Power Trading，您知道，向该贸易债权人作出这些付款。\n\n案号 22-50073 文书 3985 提交 01/21/25 录入 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 113 页，共 125 页\n\n该安排比这稍微复杂一些，对吗？资金流入这两家有限责任公司，他利用这些公司欺诈其债权人、隐匿其资金，甚至利用它们接收谷物销售所得款项。债务人从该账户中提取资金，而且根据我对法院裁决的理解——法官大人您也可以阅读——随后他将资金存入 Power Trading。因此，他试图以与本案所主张的非常相似的方式将资金保留在这些有限责任公司中。\n\n让我看看我原本还要就 Duckworth 案说些什么。\n\n（停顿）\n\n戈尔茨坦律师：是的，我认为这已经涵盖了所有要点。\n\n有人提到了 In re Mass 案，M-a-s-s，我只是想非常简要地说明一下关于基于反向刺破公司面纱而必须返还资金并无损害的说法。您看，那是一宗交还案件；该案中，一名判决债权人——该判决债权人对该实体享有判决债权，并且对债务人享有保证债务。\n\n案号 22-50073 文书 3985 提交 01/21/25 录入 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 114 页，共 125 页\n\n在破产申请后，该判决债权人扣押了一个称为“DIP 账户”、即债务人占有期间账户中的资金。因此，该案甚至不涉及任何撤销权请求。不存在第 550 条问题的叠加；那是一项根据第 542 条提出的交还请求，所以此处属于不同类型的请求。\n\n此外，您面对的是一名必然知悉破产程序却仍扣押一个账户名称为“债务人占有期间账户”的账户的债权人。因此，我认为该案在事实方面可予区分。\n\n您知道，我认为——最后只有两点。有一种论点认为，如果允许——如果法官大人决定适用我们在 Manichaean 案中讨论的对第三方债权人的保护、Auto-Train 案中的保护、Duckworth 案和 Lawler 案中的保护，那么您在某种程度上，我们在某种程度上，实质上就像是在让 Kwok 先生逍遥法外，或者认可他的欺诈行为。\n\n再次说明，并非如此。还有其他救济途径。他们本可以提出非自愿破产申请。他们本可以作为后续受让人提出请求，但这也是一种权衡的体现，对吗？归根结底，这是权衡的体现，即力图通过撤销权及类似权力追回资产，以使债权人受益。\n\n案号 22-50073 文书 3985 提交 01/21/25 录入 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 115 页，共 125 页\n\n但这也不能损害第三方的合理预期，即他们与之交易的实体彼此独立。而且这也涉及 Auto-Train 案中的同一项关切，即，当我们开始打乱既有安排时，尤其是在 549 请求权方面——对于 547 和 548，无辜债权人可以谈论风险，因为你们有抗辩事由。你们有正常营业过程抗辩，或者对于 547，有后续新增价值；对于 548，有 548(c) 抗辩。549 则完全不同，对吧。你们拥有的抗辩要少得多。\n\n但这就是平衡，对吧。这是对那些损害的权衡。最后，作为结论，我认为，颇具说明意义的是最后阶段，Bassett 律师说，看，归根结底，这与实质合并的结果大致相同，对吧。这正是我们正在做的；我们正在合并资产、合并负债。\n\n所以，再次，我将以我在陈述中提到的一点结束，即，如何适用两项衡平法原则，对吧，实质合并和另一个自我，但却以如此不同的方式适用它们，而事实模式却是相同的。这与 Auto-Train 案中所涉的关切相同，即法院是否因会损害 Midland Ross 而对其作出追溯既往的适用。以如此不同的方式适用这两项衡平法原则，实在毫无道理。除非我的同事们——好吧。他们说我讲完了，所以非常感谢。”\n\n法庭：好的。谢谢。\n\nBassett 律师？\n\nBASSETT 先生：再次说明记录在案，Nick Bassett（尼克·巴塞特），第 11 章受托人的代理律师。\n\n法官阁下，仅作几点结论性说明。首先，回应 Goldstein 律师就我在陈述中提及的第 549 条案件所发表的意见，他刚才的观点是，他们认为这些案件均未涉及非内部人。因此，所有这些案件都涉及针对内部人的 549 请求权。\n\n我请法院审阅这些案件，并在其中任何地方查找是否区分了内部人与非内部人。这根本不是那些法院作出裁决的依据。那些法院作出裁决的依据仅仅是，它们确认存在一个另一个自我的认定。该另一个自我认定的结果是，另一个自我的资产始终属于破产财产。发生的资产转让均发生在申请日之后，仅此而已。\n\n我请法院查阅第 549 条，并找出第 549 条中针对内部人的请求权与针对非内部人的请求权之间的任何区别。这种区别并不存在。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 3985 提交 01/21/25 录入 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 117 页，共 125 页\n\n相反，我要指出，被告方没有援引任何一宗像本案这样的案件；或许存在其他案件，其中债务人拥有另一个自我，法院以各种不同方式处理了这些情况。本案——我在陈述开始时强调过这一点，现在还要再次强调——我认为，与第 11 章破产历史上的任何其他案件都不同，至少在这种规模上如此。我们谈论的是一名亿万富翁申请破产，声称自己拥有零资产，因为他拥有的每一项资产、他用以维持奢华生活的每一项资产、他用以处理事务的每一项资产，都被藏在一家空壳公司中。若要求法院作出该裁定，其后果将在这种情形下是：这很棘手。受托人无法追究任何一项撤销请求权，因为在破产前及申请日后发生的每一项资产转让，都不是债务人对其资产的转让；而是 Kwok 先生（郭文贵）创建的这家虚构空壳公司所作的转让。这将是一个极其不公正的结果，与经济和实际现实不符，也与法律不符。法官阁下，我将回应 Goldstein 律师在结尾提出的平衡问题。我认为我在陈述中已努力说明得非常清楚：如果你看 Manichaean 案以及法院所说的内容，这是一项对所有因素的平衡。我们并不对此提出异议。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 3985 提交 01/21/25 录入 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 118 页，共 125 页\n\n我们所反对的是这样一种观念，即法律要求在法院能够作出另一个自我裁定之前，不得存在对任何一方造成损害的任何可能性。这根本不是判例法所说的内容。\n\n我还需要再次强调，当前根本不应提出整项论点，因为这不是一个诉状问题。如果他们想在之后出庭并称，你知道吗，我们是无辜的。我们毫不知情；顺便说一句，我并不承认所有这些被告事实上都是无辜的。我不知道他们从 Kwok 先生处收到的这些转让，但如果他们想提出该论点，他们可以在之后出庭，并将该论点作为积极抗辩提出。正如他们称法院应当遵循的 Manichaean 案所述，这不是一个诉状问题。\n\n此外，法官阁下，就这一整项平衡理念而言，我认为，没有比依赖《破产法典》更好的方式来平衡受托人所寻求裁定的损害与利益。我认为，这正是为何如此多案件都指出，另一个自我请求权在破产程序中的运作方式不同。\n\n在破产程序中，《破产法典》内置了固有保护。这些当事人可以提出其拥有的抗辩事由。他们并未被完全剥夺抗辩事由。他们可能希望自己是作为后续受让人而被起诉，尽管此处事实并非如此，但他们本可拥有后续受让人的抗辩事由。不过，他们在《破产法典》下拥有其他抗辩事由。\n\n他们也可以如我所说，对破产财产主张债权；这正是重点。这就是其运作方式。受郭先生欺诈影响、在其长年欺诈计划的余波中受到损害的人，均可根据《破产法典》获得救济。《破产法典》首先要求我们收集资产并按比例分配，这就是我们为何追究这些撤销之诉；随后，最终必须向破产财产返还款项的当事人，可以根据《破产法典》第 502(h) 条提出债权以获得救济。这就是平衡。《法典》对此作出了内置规定。\n\n因此，法官阁下，我们认为我们所援引的判例法完全支持我们请求法院作出的救济；我们还认为，应当作出该救济，同时应当理解，这是在一个极为独特的案件背景下进行的，与历史上任何其他案件均不同，其中债务人除了将其资产藏匿于空壳公司外，什么也没有做。这与任何其他案件都不同，结果应当与郭先生多年来的实际运作方式相一致。\n\n案件 22-50073\n文件 3985\n提交 01/21/25\n录入 01/21/25 13:49:43\n\n郭先生多年来的实际运作方式相一致。\n\n谢谢您，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：谢谢。\n\n好的。我显然已听取了各方意见。今天在一宗或两宗案件中提出了一些我尚未审阅的问题，包括今天提交的 Gracey 案，这没有问题，我会审阅该案。我当然也会结合今天提出的口头辩论，再次审阅所有提交的材料。\n\n希望是，我显然会尽早而非稍后作出裁定。这需要一些时间。我必须审查所有这些问题。但将作出裁决。\n\n关于本次听证的记录，如我在开始时所说，法院将做的是确保听证记录——我现在看向法庭书记员——载有所有共同被告的名单；但我们将注明今天代表共同被告出庭辩论的是谁，然后是代表特定被告出庭辩论的是谁，再然后是代表受托人出庭辩论的是谁；随后最有可能列出其余加入该书状的共同被告名单，好的。\n\n而且，因为如果我们不以这种方式处理，记录员将无法理解，我们显然希望记录员能够理解，然后我们将据此继续进行。有人有问题吗？\n\nSKLARZ 先生：法官阁下，仅就我那些存在所谓“非共同”问题的委托人的程序安排而言——\n\n法庭：对。\n\nSKLARZ 先生：——在状态会议期间，法官阁下，我表示我们将安排稍后进行辩论。\n\n法庭：对。\n\nSKLARZ 先生：您是否预计——再次，我很抱歉让您当场回答——您是否希望该项辩论在您作出裁决之前进行？\n\n法庭：我认为不会如此。\n\nSKLARZ 先生：可以理解。\n\n法庭：我认为，那些辩论将在我就联合书状中的问题作出裁决之后进行。\n\nSKLARZ 先生：谢谢您，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：我不能肯定地这样说，但我相信会如此。我不认为你是在让我当场回答；你是在问我一个问题。我的回答是，我相信将首先裁决这些问题，然后对于其他并非共同被告、但有待决驳回动议的被告，那些事项都必须以某种方式安排日程，我相信该等日程安排不会发生，或者对于那些事项将要发生的任何事情，不会在作出本裁决之前发生。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 3985 提交 01/21/25 录入 01/21/25 13:49:43 第 121 页，共 125 页\n\n例如，在你们的案件中是否可能发出一项命令称，将于某一日期就驳回动议举行听证——我们就随便选一个日期——March 31st。这可能发生，但我大概会在安排该日期时认为，我将首先就所有这些问题作出裁决。\n\n这有道理吗？\n\nSKLARZ 先生：有。\n\n法庭：好的。谢谢。\n\nGOLDSTEIN 先生：法官阁下，我是 Eric Goldstein（埃里克·戈尔茨坦）。\n\n我从共同被告组收到一个仅涉及程序安排的问题。我们正在就刚刚进行的事项以及我们今天所做的工作作出裁决。\n\n该裁决会在主案中作出，还是会在对抗程序中作出？\n\n法庭：嗯，就像我们过去所做的——不是过去——我们就联合书状所做的是，在主案中发出一项命令，在主案中提交一份书状，但随后在每一相应对抗程序中均作出一项提交。\n\n谁会作出该项提交？我不知道。我\n\n2 我的意思是，就目前坐在这里而言，无论是受托人是否要这样做，还是书记官办公室是否要这样做，或者无论我们将如何进行——我不知道。但在每一宗对抗程序中都会有——必须有某种记录，好吗，因为这对于使每一宗对抗程序的记录完整是必要的。\n\n8 那么，这是否会将您关联回主案？\n\n9 我不知道。就目前坐在这里而言，我不知道，但我们会弄清楚。\n\n11 戈德斯坦先生：可以。\n\n12 谢谢您，法官阁下。\n\n13 法庭：好的。谢谢。\n\n14 还有其他人有任何问题吗？\n\n15 好的。我确实感谢各方提交的详尽书面材料以及口头辩论。显然，每个人都在这些问题上花费了大量时间，并为我就这些问题作出裁定提供了许多需要思考和审阅的内容，因此我确实对此表示感谢；我也感谢尽管各方显然在这些问题上并不一致，但你们一直以合作方式开展工作。我确实感谢这一点——从法庭的角度看，这使工作稍微容易一些。\n\n24 因此，这是今日日程上的最后一项事项，现休庭。\n\n案号 22-50073 文书 3985 提交日期 01/21/25\n125 录入日期 01/21/25 13:49:43 第124页，共125页\n\n1 谢谢各位。\n\n2 法警：全体起立。\n\n3 现休庭。\n\n4 （程序于下午12:55结束。）\n\n案号 22-50073\n文书 3985\n提交日期 01/21/25\n录入日期 01/21/25 13:49:43\n\n1 证明\n\n2 本人证明，据本人所知及能力范围，前述内容是上述案件程序电子录音的正确誊本。\n\n7 /s/ William J. Garling（威廉·J·加林）\nJanuary 17, 2025\n\n8 William J. Garling（威廉·J·加林）, CET-543\n\n9 认证法庭誊录员\n\n10 代表 Reliable","key_entities":["Kwok","Despins","Ho Wan Kwok","Je","Paul Hastings","Guo","CIPA","Luc Despins","forfeiture"],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":32161,"status":"published","published_at":"2025-01-21 00:00:00","created_at":"2025-01-21","updated_at":"2026-08-23 22:31:16"}