{"id":"court_ctb_4023_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":4023,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT In re:","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\nIn re:\n\nHO WAN KWOK, *et al.*,\n\nDebtors.\n\nLUC A. DESPINS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,\n\nPlaintiff,\n\nv.\n\nWILDES & WEINBERG, P.C.,\n\nDefendant.\n\n# Chapter 11 Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) (Jointly Administered)\n\nRe: ECF No. 3559\n\nAdv. P. No. 24-05187 (JAM)\n\nRe: ECF No. 14\n\n## **APPEARANCES**\n\nDouglass Barron Paul Hastings LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166 Patrick R. Linsey Neubert, Pepe & Montieth 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, CT 06510\n\nand\n\nNicholas A. Bassett (argued) Paul Hastings LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C. 20036\n\n> *Counsel for Movant Mr. Luc A. Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee for the Estate of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok, Plaintiff*\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz (argued) Kellianne Baranowsky Michelle Amanda Antao Green & Sklarz LLC One Audubon Street, Third Floor New Haven, CT 06511\n\n#### *Counsel for Respondent G Club Operations LLC, Party in Interest*\n\nHolley L. Claiborn (argued) Office of The United States Trustee The Giaimo Federal Building 150 Canal Street, Room 302 New Haven, CT 06510\n\n*Counsel for Respondent Mr. William K. Harrington, United States Trustee for Region 2*\n\n# **MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO COMPROMISE**\n\n#### **I. INTRODUCTION**\n\nBefore the Court is the motion to compromise (the \"Motion to Compromise\") filed by Mr. Luc A. Despins, in his capacity as Chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") for the bankruptcy estate of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Individual Debtor\"), in these jointly administered Chapter 11 cases and in this adversary proceeding where the Trustee is the plaintiff. (ECF No. 3559; Adv. ECF No. 14.)<sup>1</sup> The Trustee seeks authority under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019 to enter into a settlement agreement with defendant Wildes & Weinberg, P.C. (\"W&W\") to resolve the adversary proceeding. The Trustee further requests authority to file the terms of the settlement agreement under seal for a period of 180 days after the entry of an order granting the Motion to Compromise. G Club Operations, LLC (\"G Club\") objects to sealing of the settlement agreement. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion to Compromise is **GRANTED**.\n\n<sup>1</sup> References to the docket in the main case, *In re Kwok*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), will be styled \"ECF No. \\_\\_.\" References to the docket in the adversary proceeding, *Despins v. Wildes & Weinberg, P.C. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05187, will be styled \"Adv. ECF No. \\_\\_.\"\n\n## **II. BACKGROUND**\n\nThe Individual Debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition in this Court on February 15, 2022. (ECF No. 1.) For the reasons set forth therein, on June 15, 2022, the Court entered a memorandum of decision and order appointing a Chapter 11 trustee to administer the Individual Debtor's bankruptcy estate. (ECF No. 465.) *In re Kwok*, 640 B.R. 514 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022). On July 8, 2022, Mr. Despins was appointed as the Trustee. (ECF No. 523.) After the appointment of the Trustee, orders entered authorizing joint administration of the Individual Debtor's Chapter 11 case with two affiliated corporate Chapter 11 cases. (ECF Nos. 970, 1141.)\n\nOn February 12, 2024, the Trustee filed a complaint with a single claim (the \"Avoidance Claim\") against W&W seeking avoidance and recovery of unauthorized post-petition transfers pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 549 and 550. (Adv. ECF No. 1.) On May 2, 2024, the Court entered the Order Directing Parties to Mediation, Appointing the Honorable James J. Tancredi as Mediator, and Amended Order Approving Procedures Applicable to Avoidance Claim Adversary Proceedings (as amended, the \"Avoidance Action Procedures Order\"). (ECF No. 3163; *see* ECF No. 3465.) Pursuant to the Avoidance Action Procedures Order, the Trustee and W&W engaged in mediation to resolve the Avoidance Claim. On August 13, 2024, Judge Tancredi submitted the Mediator's Report and Recommendation (the \"Mediator's Report\"). (Adv. ECF No. 13.) In the Mediator's Report, Judge Tancredi concluded:\n\nIn examining the claims and potential defenses and other facts and circumstances relating to the subject transfers, along with the highly complex and contested nature of this bankruptcy case, I believe that the economics and terms of the settlement agreement are fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the Chapter 11 estate as measured by the standards of *In re Iridium Operating LLC*, 478 F.3d 452, 462 (2d Cir. 2007).\n\n(*Id.*)\n\nOn September 19, 2024, the Trustee filed the Motion to Compromise (ECF No. 3559; Adv. ECF No. 14) and a motion to limit notice and service of the Motion to Compromise (the \"Motion to Limit Notice\", ECF No. 3565). The Trustee filed the settlement agreement between the estate and W&W under seal. (ECF No. 3561 (sealed).) On October 3, 2024, G Club filed an objection to the Motion to Compromise and the Motion to Limit Notice. (ECF No. 3633.) On October 7, 2024, the Office of the United States Trustee (the \"U.S. Trustee\") filed an objection to the Motion to Compromise. (ECF No. 3641.) On October 8, 2024, a hearing was held on the Motion to Limit Notice. During the hearing, G Club and the U.S. Trustee made clear that they did not object to limiting notice and service, but did object to the sealing of the settlement agreement. On October 15, 2024, the Court granted the Motion to Limit Notice (ECF No. 3685) and a Notice of Hearing was issued scheduling a hearing on the Motion to Compromise (ECF No. 3688).\n\nThe scheduled hearing was continued while the parties attempted to reach a resolution. On December 5, 2024, the Trustee filed a reply in support of the Motion to Compromise and a revised proposed order granting it. (ECF Nos. 3864, 3865.) The revised proposed order resolved the U.S. Trustee's objection which would: (i) allow the Trustee to file the settlement agreement under seal for a period of 180 days after the entry of an order granting the Motion to Compromise; and (ii) require the Trustee to file the settlement agreement publicly after the expiration of the 180-day period.\n\nOn December 10, 2024, a hearing was held on the Motion to Compromise. During the hearing, the U.S. Trustee stated it remained opposed to a permanent sealing of settlement agreements, but believed sealing settlement agreements for a period of 180 days would balance the realities of these jointly administered Chapter 11 cases and the public's right to access\n\njudicial documents. (Hr'g Tr. at \\*22:4–14, ECF No. 3906; Adv. ECF No. 29.) The U.S. Trustee further stated the resolution it reached with the Trustee would be incorporated into future motions to compromise filed in the Chapter 11 cases and related adversary proceedings. (*Id.* at \\*22:15–25.) Although the U.S. Trustee's objection had been resolved, G Club continued to press its objection.\n\nAt the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the Motion to Compromise under advisement. This matter is ripe for decision.\n\n#### **III. JURISDICTION**\n\nThe United States District Court for the District of Connecticut has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). This Court has authority to hear and determine this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) and the Order of Reference of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut dated September 21, 1984. The instant proceedings are statutorily core proceedings. 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(A), (E), (O). The Court concludes its exercise of jurisdiction is not precluded by Constitutional concerns. *Cf. Stern v. Marshall*, 564 U.S. 462, 487–99 (2011).\n\nVenue in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.\n\n#### **IV. DISCUSSION**\n\nBefore turning to the merits of the Motion to Compromise, the Court addresses the Trustee's request to seal the terms of the settlement agreement and G Club's objection to that request. No parties have objected to the merits of the Motion to Compromise.\n\n#### **A. Trustee's Request to Seal Settlement Agreement**\n\n## **1. Legal Standard**\n\n\"In this country, courts have recognized a strong presumption of public access to court records. This preference for public access is rooted in the public's first amendment right to know about the administration of justice. It helps safeguard 'the integrity, quality, and respect in our judicial system' and permits the public to 'keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies'.\" *Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Orion Pictures Corp. (In re Orion Pictures Corp.)*, 21 F.3d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing *Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns Inc.*, 435 U.S. 589, 597–98 (1978) and *In re Analytical Sys.*, 83 B.R. 833, 835 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1987)) (internal citations omitted); *see* 11 U.S.C. § 107(a); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 5001(b). Nevertheless, \"the right is not absolute\". *Orion Pictures*, 21 F.3d at 27 (citing *Nixon*, 435 U.S. at 597); *see* 11 U.S.C. §§ 107(b), (c); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9018.\n\nThe Bankruptcy Code contains statutory provisions structuring a court's analysis as to whether court records may be sealed. 11 U.S.C. § 107; Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9018. Relevant to the Motion to Compromise, section 107(b)(1) provides: \"on request of a party in interest, the bankruptcy court shall . . . protect an entity with respect to a trade secret or confidential research, development, or commercial information\". 11 U.S.C. § 107(b)(1).\n\nThe Trustee requests to seal the settlement agreement on behalf of the estate. The estate is an \"entity\", which may request protection of its confidential commercial information. 11 U.S.C. § 101(15) (\"The term 'entity' includes person, estate, trust, governmental unit, and United States trustee.\"). The Trustee argues the settlement agreement is confidential commercial information. Because the Trustee – a party in interest – is requesting the settlement agreement be sealed, the Court *must* seal it if it contains confidential commercial information. 11 U.S.C. §\n\n107(b)(1) (courts shall protect the confidential commercial information of any entity upon motion); *Orion Pictures*, 21 F.3d at 27. Confidential commercial information is \"information which would cause 'an unfair advantage to competitors by providing them information as to the commercial operations of the debtor.'\" *Orion Pictures*, 21 F.3d at 27.\n\nTherefore, the issues before the Court are whether the settlement agreement is commercial information and if so, whether it is confidential commercial information.\n\n#### **2. Standing**\n\nThe Trustee first argues G Club has no standing to object to the Motion to Compromise because it has no pecuniary interest in the Individual Debtor's estate, has not filed a Proof of Claim in the Individual Debtor's case, and will not, as things presently stand, receive a distribution. G Club asserts it does not matter whether it has standing to object to the merits of the Motion to Compromise – any party can object to the sealing of the settlement agreement.\n\nThe Court agrees with G Club. Regardless of whether G Club has standing to object to the merits of the Motion to Compromise, which issue the Court does not reach, G Club has standing to oppose the sealing of the terms of the settlement agreement. As recognized by the United States Supreme Court, there is \"a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents.\" *Nixon*, 435 U.S. at 597–99 (discussing cases where third parties to ligation moved to inspect and copy public records and documents). G Club shares in this general right. *See In re Alterra Healthcare Corp.*, 353 B.R. 66, 70 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006).\n\n#### **3. The arguments for and against sealing the settlement agreement**\n\nThe Trustee argues authority exists to seal the settlement agreement because its terms are confidential commercial information that would benefit defendants, including G Glub, and harm\n\nthe estate. The Trustee asserts the estate will be funded almost exclusively through litigation – and much of that litigation is nearly identical to the present adversary proceeding. The Trustee believes many other avoidance proceedings will be settled during the 180-day period before the settlement agreement would be publicly filed and that these future settlements would be more favorable to the estate if the instant settlement agreement is temporarily sealed.\n\nAdditionally, the Trustee argues no parties in interest – and particularly, no creditors – have objected to the merits of the Motion to Compromise or opposed sealing the settlement agreement. Moreover, the Trustee asserts the Motion to Compromise and settlement agreement has been reviewed in unredacted form by the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the \"Committee\") and the U.S. Trustee and neither the Committee nor the U.S. Trustee has objected to the Motion to Compromise. Finally, the Trustee argues the Court, which has also been provided an unredacted copy of the settlement agreement, has enough information to determine the merits of the Motion to Compromise.\n\nG Club objects and asserts the settlement agreement cannot be sealed under existing law because it does not qualify as confidential commercial information. G Club cites many bankruptcy cases where courts declined to seal – or decided to unseal – settlement agreements: *In re Ditech Holding Corp.*, Case No. 19-10412 (JLG), 2019 WL 3294684, at \\*9–10 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2019); *Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Selected Debtors (In re Selected Cases)*, Misc. No. 17-204-GLT, 2019 WL 642850, at \\*2 (Bankr. W.D. Penn. Feb. 14, 2019); *In re Thomas*, 583 B.R. 385, 391–95 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2018); *In re Gibbs*, Case No. 11-03070, 2017 WL 6506324, at \\*1–2 (Bankr. D. Haw. Dec. 19, 2017); *Togut v. Deutsche Bank AG (In re Anthracite Cap. Inc.)*, 492 B.R. 162, 177–79 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013); *In re Oldco M Corp.*, 466 B.R. 234, 237–39 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012); *In re Quigley Co., Inc.*, 437 B.R. 102, 151–54 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010); *Geltzer v. Andersen Worldwide, S.C.*, No. 05 Civ. 3339 (GEL), 2007 WL 273526, at \\*3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2007); *Alterra Healthcare*, 353 B.R. at 75–77; and *In re Hemple*, 295 B.R. 200, 201–03 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2003).\n\nOn reply, the Trustee seeks to distinguish these cases from the present case and also cites to several orders, albeit without given rationales, where courts approved the sealing of a settlement agreement. (*See* Reply at Ex. 1, ECF No. 3864.) Finally, the Trustee cites *In re Farmland Industries*, *Inc.*, 290 B.R. 364 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2003), and *In re Global Crossing Ltd.*, 295 B.R. 720, 722–23 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003), in support of sealing the settlement agreement.\n\n#### **4. Analysis**\n\nSection 1106 requires the Trustee to investigate the financial affairs and conditions of the Individual Debtor with respect to determining, as soon as practicable, whether creditors and the estate are best served by filing a Chapter 11 plan, converting the case to another chapter, or dismissing the case. 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(3), (5). To this end, it is undisputed that the Trustee is the representative of the estate and has capacity to sue and be sued on behalf of the estate, including by bringing the Avoidance Claim and similar litigation. 11 U.S.C. §§ 323, 544, 547, 548, 549. In fulfilling his statutory duties, the Trustee: (i) is accountable for all property received by the estate; (ii) shall, if a purpose would be served, examine proofs of claims and object to the allowance of any claim against the estate that is improper; and (iii) shall furnish information concerning the estate and its administration as requested by a party in interest. 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(2), (5), (7), *made applicable by* 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1).\n\nThis case is not a case where the Trustee has been able to administer the Individual Debtor's assets and business operations with information provided by and cooperation from the Individual Debtor. The Individual Debtor claimed only \\$3,850.00 in assets on his bankruptcy schedules, but claimed his lifestyle was funded by his family and associates while he provided his services to many media enterprises without compensation. (ECF Nos. 78, 107.) Since the Trustee's appointment, the Individual Debtor, his family members, his associates, and associated entities have not cooperated with the Trustee's investigation, turned over assets of the estate as required by the Bankruptcy Code, or complied with their obligations as parties before the Court. 11 U.S.C. § 521. (*See, e.g.*, ECF Nos. 913, 1046, 1303, 1345, 1362, 1397, 1453, 1521, 1537, 1546, 1709, 1805, 1892, 1896, 2009, 2035, 2036, 2080, 2093, 2342, 2396; *Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Kwok (In re Kwok)*, No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 22-05032 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 13, 2023), ECF No. 133; *Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Nov. 4, 2024), ECF Nos. 239, 263, 290, 318.) Indeed, the Court has repeatedly cited the Individual Debtor and others for contempt of court for failure to comply with orders compelling compliance with the Bankruptcy Code and discovery obligations. (ECF Nos. 1372, 1537, 1709, 1892, 1896, 2009, 2035, 2093.) None of this contempt has been purged.\n\nUnder the circumstances of this case, the Trustee has been forced to ceaselessly litigate, and arguably re-litigate, turnover of estate assets and avoidance of transfers. As it presently stands, any distribution on the \\$18,896,778,040.832 asserted in proofs of claim filed against the Individual Debtor's estate will largely be funded by the Trustee's ongoing litigation. Hence, the commercial operation of the Individual Debtor's bankruptcy estate is the investigation of the\n\n<sup>2</sup> The Individual Debtor instructed his followers to file frivolous proofs of claim in his Chapter 11 case. (*See* ECF Nos. 1399, 1440.) Nevertheless, none of the claims asserted is presently disallowed in part or in its entirety.\n\nIndividual Debtor's assets and business affairs, and the litigation of Chapter 5 claims and related claims under state, federal, and foreign law for the benefit of the estate.\n\nIn carrying out his duties in the case, including pursuing and settling the Avoidance Claim through the terms of the settlement agreement, the Trustee is in possession of commercial information. The remaining issue is whether the settlement agreement is *confidential*  commercial information. Filing the terms of the settlement agreement publicly would allow hundreds of similarly situated defendants to use those terms as leverage in negotiations with the Trustee. G Club does not contest the Trustee's assertion that this is exactly why it wants the settlement agreement unsealed. *See Glob. Crossing*, 295 B.R. at 722–23 (discussing how a movant opposed a sealing motion, which the Court granted, because it wished to disrupt a deal between debtors-in-possession and a potential buyer of their assets). Because of the large number of similar avoidance claims, the Court is persuaded public disclosure of the settlement agreement at this time would have a significant impact on the recovery to all unsecured creditors.\n\nThe Court concludes the 180-day sealing period agreed to by the Trustee and the U.S. Trustee strikes a reasonable balance between avoiding the harm the Trustee alleges and providing public access to judicial records. On the one hand, the Court credits the Trustee's representation that he believes within 180 days from the entry of an order granting the Motion to Compromise he will have settled numerous additional avoidance claims without suffering the harm the Motion to Compromise seeks to prevent. At that point, the estate's interest in the confidentiality of the settlement agreement will diminish. On the other hand, the time-limited nature of the sealing will provide public access in due course.\n\nThe cases cited by G Club do not compel a different result because they involved different entities, with different commercial operations, and different litigation postures. For\n\nexample, in *Andersen Worldwide*, a Chapter 7 trustee settled professional malpractice claims against Andersen Worldwide, S.C. and its affiliate (collectively, \"Andersen\") and moved the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to approve the compromise. 2007 WL 273526, at \\*1. The court denied the motion to compromise because it did not include the settlement amount. *Id.* at \\*5. The Chapter 7 trustee offered to present the settlement amount for *in camera* review because Andersen did not wish to disclose the settlement amount to parties in other, unrelated litigation against it. *Id.* at \\*2. The court concluded the settlement amount was not confidential commercial information, *id.* at \\*3–4, and protection of Andersen \"is a wan excuse for impinging on the public's right of access to judicial documents. There is no discernable public interest, or interest of the bankruptcy estates, in preserving Andersen's 'leverage' as against other parties that have sued it\", *id.* at \\*4.\n\nThe *Andersen Worldwide* court expressed doubt that litigation could be the commercial operations of an entity, stating\n\nBut the terms of the instant settlement have to do only with the instant litigation, and have nothing to do with the competitive business operations of the debtor or of Andersen, in any normal sense of the words. If the Trustee's definition were accepted, then not only would any paper filed by Andersen in the course of litigation likely constitute secret \"commercial information,\" but secrecy under this exception would also extend to any of countless cases involving a business entity actively defending civil suits for damages.\n\n2007 WL 273526, at \\*3. Nevertheless, the court also considered the specific facts and circumstances surrounding the litigation at issue. *Id.* at \\*4 (discussing the lack of any argument as to how the settlement information could be used by other litigants and Andersen's lack of similar concerns in other similar litigation). Upon consideration of the specific facts and circumstances surrounding the Avoidance Claim, the Court is not persuaded that *Andersen Worldwide* governs the result in this case. The Trustee is seeking to protect the estate, which estate's business includes litigation because of the particular circumstances of these jointly\n\nadministered Chapter 11 cases and related adversary proceedings, and the Avoidance Claim is similar to hundreds of claims the Trustee has brought.\n\n*Andersen Worldwide* is the progenitor of a line of cases. This line of cases includes *Quigley*, *Oldco*, *Anthracite Capital, Gibbs*, *Thomas*, *Selected Cases*, and *Ditech*, *i.e.*, all the cases cited by G Club with the exception of *Alterra Healthcare* and *Hemple*. As in *Andersen Worldwide*, the decisions in *Quigley*, *Oldco*, *Anthracite Capital*, *Gibbs*, *Thomas*, *Selected Cases*, and *Ditech* all involved a bankruptcy trustee seeking to seal the terms of settlement agreements because a counterparty requested sealing to preserve leverage in outside litigation. *Ditech*, 2019 WL 3294684, at \\*9–10; *Selected Cases*, 2019 WL 642850, at \\*2; *Thomas*, 583 B.R. at 391–95; *Gibbs*, 2017 WL 6506324, at \\*1–2; *Anthracite Cap.*, 492 B.R. at 177–79; *Oldco*, 466 B.R. at 237–39; *Quigley*, 437 B.R. at 151–54. The courts in these cases, each relying on *Anderson Worldwide*, determined on facts dissimilar to those before the Court that the terms of the settlement agreements at issue were not confidential commercial information.\n\n*Hemple*, much like *Andersen Worldwide* and its progeny, also involved a motion to seal for the benefit of a third party, rather than a debtor or bankruptcy estate. 295 B.R. at 202. The court denied the motion because it did not articulate a basis for sealing under section 107(b). *Id.*  at 202–03. Here, however, the Trustee argues the settlement agreement is confidential commercial information that should be sealed for the benefit of the estate.\n\n*Alterra Healthcare* also presents similar facts to *Andersen Worldwide*. In that case, a reorganized debtor, which had settled certain personal injury claims, had been granted authority to file the terms of the settlement agreements under seal. 353 B.R. at 69. Subsequently, a newspaper moved to unseal the settlement agreements. *Id.* The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware concluded, in pertinent part, that the terms of the settlement\n\nagreement were not confidential commercial information because they did not relate to the reorganized debtor's commercial operations – running long-term care facilities – and disclosure of the terms would not unfairly advantage the reorganized debtor's competitors to the detriment of the reorganized debtor or the estate. *Id.* at 76–77. Regarding harm to the estate, the court concluded similarly situated claimants would recover from a segregated fund and insurance proceeds rather than from the same monies the reorganized debtor's other unsecured creditors would receive any recovery. *Id.* at 76. Hence, any increased settlement leverage would not impact the estate as a whole but would instead potentially harm insurers. *Id.* Here, unlike in *Alterra Healthcare*, litigation is core to the estate's commercial existence and its impact on all the estate's unsecured creditors is certain, not speculative.\n\nThe Court finds *Farmland Industries*, cited by the Trustee, more persuasive on the facts and circumstances before it. In *Farmland Industries*, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Missouri held that the terms of a debtor-in-possession financing agreement were confidential commercial information. 290 B.R. at 368–69. The financing agreement at issue required the debtor-in-possession, as a concession to the financier for continued financing, to complete a section 363 sale of certain assets by certain dates. *Id.* at 366. The debtor-inpossession argued these terms constituted confidential commercial information and must be redacted. *Id.* The court concluded the redacted terms of the financing agreement represented commercial information because \"[t]he operation of a business—particularly one as far-reaching as the \\$11 billion businesses of the Debtors—clearly involves the buying and selling of various aspects of the business on a regular (albeit perhaps infrequent) basis. The sale of certain assets and the retention of other assets is obviously a part of a conglomerate's business operations.\" *Id.*  at 368. The court concluded the information was confidential commercial information because\n\n\"[i]f a potential buyer has knowledge of a deadline, in effect, by which the Debtors must sell a certain asset, that knowledge gives the potential buyer great leverage over the Debtors and places the Debtors at a distinct disadvantage in the sales bargaining and negotiating process.\" *Id.* at 369.\n\nAs in *Farmland Industries*, the terms of the settlement agreement relate directly to the estate's commercial operations. Moreover, just as the results of the section 363 sale would greatly impact the estate in *Farmland*, the resolution of the avoidance actions in this case will greatly impact the estate. Finally, disclosure of the terms of the settlement agreement would give defendants additional leverage to the detriment of the estate, like in *Farmland Industries* where the court held disclosure of the terms of the financing agreement would give potential buyers additional leverage to the detriment of the estate.\n\nOn the specific facts and circumstances of these jointly administered Chapter 11 cases and related adversary proceedings, the Court concludes the facts in *Andersen Worldwide*, its progeny, *Hemple*, and *Alterra Healthcare* are distinguishable from the case at bar. *Farmland Industries* is more persuasive because the facts in that case are more closely aligned with those presently before the Court. The terms of the settlement agreement are confidential commercial information that must be sealed upon the Trustee's request. 11 U.S.C. § 107(b); *Orion Pictures*, 21 F.3d at 27. Accordingly, G Club's objection is overruled.\n\n#### **B. The Motion to Compromise**\n\nThe Trustee argues the settlement agreement is a positive outcome for the estate and its creditors, is fair and reasonable to the estate and its creditors, and should be approved. The Mediator's Report recommends approval of the settlement agreement. No party has objected on the merits of the Motion to Compromise. While the terms of the settlement agreement have been\n\nfiled under seal, the U.S. Trustee and the Committee have both been provided with unredacted copies of the settlement agreement. G Club objects to the sealing of the settlement agreement, but does not seek access to the settlement terms in order to object to the merits of the Motion to Compromise.\n\nBased on the pre-Code decision of the Supreme Court in *Protective Committee for Independent Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson*, 390 U.S. 414 (1968), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has set forth the following \"interrelated factors\" to determine whether a settlement is \"fair and equitable\":\n\n(1) the balance between the litigation's possibility of success and the settlement's future benefits; (2) the likelihood of complex and protracted litigation, \"with its attendant expense, inconvenience, and delay,\" including the difficulty in collecting on the judgment; (3) \"the paramount interests of the creditors,\" including each affected class's relative benefits \"and the degree to which creditors either do not object to or affirmatively support the proposed settlement\"; (4) whether other parties in interest support the settlement; (5) the \"competency and experience of counsel\" supporting, and \"[t]he experience and knowledge of the bankruptcy court judge\" reviewing, the settlement; (6) \"the nature and breadth of releases to be obtained by officers and directors\"; and (7) \"the extent to which the settlement is the product of arm's length bargaining.\"\n\n*Motorola, Inc. v. Off. Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium Operating LLC)*, 478 F.3d\n\n452, 462 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing *In re Worldcom, Inc.*, 347 B.R. 123, 137 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006)).\n\nThe Second Circuit has also stated \"the task of the bankruptcy judge was not to determine\n\nwhether the settlement was the best that could have been obtained, something that neither he nor\n\nwe can ever know, but whether it 'fall[s] below the lowest point in the range of reasonableness'\".\n\n*Cosoff v. Rodman (In re W.T. Grant Co.)*, 699 F.2d 599, 613 (2d Cir. 1983) (alterations in\n\noriginal).\n\nThe Court has reviewed the terms of the settlement agreement. The Court finds that (i) the settlement amount reflects the amount sought, the litigation's possibility of success, and the likely costs and expenses of litigation; (ii) while creditors have not generally reviewed the terms of the settlement agreement, neither have they objected to the Motion to Compromise requesting such review; (iii) moreover, the Committee, a fiduciary for the unsecured creditors, has reviewed the unredacted terms of the settlement agreement and has not objected; (iv) the releases are narrow and solely related to the claims brought in the adversary proceeding; and (v) the settlement agreement is the product of arm's length negotiations. The Court concludes the settlement agreement does not fall below the lowest point in the range of reasonableness and is fair and equitable to the estate and its creditors. *See Iridium*, 478 F.3d at 462; *W.T. Grant*, 699 F.2d at 613. Therefore, the Court grants the Motion to Compromise and approves the settlement agreement.\n\n#### **V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER**\n\nFor the reasons stated above, it is hereby **ORDERED:**\n\n1. Pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019, the Motion to Compromise is **GRANTED** as set forth herein.\n\n2. G Club's objection to the Motion to Compromise is **OVERRULED**. The U.S. Trustee's objection is deemed **WITHDRAWN** due to the resolution reached between the Trustee and the U.S. Trustee.\n\n3. Pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019, the settlement agreement is **APPROVED**.\n\n4. As contemplated by the Avoidance Action Procedures Order, the redacted portions of the Motion to Compromise and the settlement agreement were filed under seal and, except as provided by this Order, shall, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 107(b)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 9018, remain under seal.\n\n5. The Trustee shall have until 180 days after the entry of this Order, except, if that date falls on a weekend or holiday, the Trustee shall have until the next business day thereafter, (the\n\n\"Six Month Anniversary Date\"), to file a notice (the \"Settlement Notice\") on the docket of the jointly administered Chapter 11 cases and this adversary proceeding, which Settlement Notice shall (i) refer to the docket numbers and dates of the original Motion to Compromise and this Order, (ii) attach an unredacted copy of the settlement agreement, and (iii) contain the following information regarding the settlement agreement: (a) the settling parties; (b) the settlement amount; (c) the date the settlement funds were received by the Trustee; and (d) the docket number(s) of the monthly operating report(s) showing the receipt of the funds by the Trustee, which monthly operating reports, if filed before the Six Month Anniversary Date, may redact the identity of the payor. Upon the filing of the Settlement Notice, the Clerk of Court is directed to unseal the unredacted Motion to Compromise and settlement agreement in the jointly administered Chapter 11 cases and in the adversary proceeding.\n\n6. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(3), the U.S. Trustee has a statutory right of full access to any information and/or documents filed on the docket or submitted to the Court in this case. The U.S. Trustee shall comply with the obligations of 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(3)(B).\n\n7. The Trustee is authorized, pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019, to execute, deliver, implement, and fully perform any and all obligations, instruments, documents, and papers and to take any and all actions reasonably necessary or appropriate to consummate the settlement reflected in the settlement agreement and to perform any and all obligations contemplated therein immediately upon entry of this Order.\n\n8. This Order shall, pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 6004(h), be effective and enforceable immediately upon entry.\n\n9. This Court shall retain jurisdiction to hear and determine all matters arising from or related to this Order and to the settlement agreement.\n\nDated at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 3rd day of February, 2025.","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院\n\n关于：\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，\n\n债务人。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS（卢克·A·德斯平斯），以其作为 HO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）破产财产第 11 章受托人的身份，\n\n原告，\n\n诉\n\nWILDES & WEINBERG, P.C.（怀尔兹与温伯格律师事务所），\n\n被告。\n第 11 章案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)（合并管理）\n\n事由：ECF No. 3559\n\n对抗诉讼程序编号 24-05187 (JAM)\n\n事由：ECF No. 14\n出庭人员\n\nDouglass Barron（道格拉斯·巴伦） Paul Hastings LLP（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所） 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166 Patrick R. Linsey（帕特里克·R·林赛） Neubert, Pepe & Montieth（诺伊贝特、佩佩与蒙蒂思律师事务所） 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, CT 06510\n\n及\n\nNicholas A. Bassett（尼古拉斯·A·巴塞特）（出庭陈述） Paul Hastings LLP（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所） 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C. 20036\n\n动议方 Luc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯）先生之代理律师，作为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）先生破产财产的第 11 章受托人，原告\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz（杰弗里·M·斯克拉兹）（出庭陈述） Kellianne Baranowsky（凯莉安·巴拉诺夫斯基） Michelle Amanda Antao（米歇尔·阿曼达·安陶） Green & Sklarz LLC（格林与斯克拉兹有限责任公司） One Audubon Street, Third Floor New Haven, CT 06511\n利害关系方 G Club Operations LLC（G Club 运营有限责任公司）之代理律师\n\nHolley L. Claiborn（霍莉·L·克莱伯恩）（出庭陈述） Office of The United States Trustee（美国受托人办公室） The Giaimo Federal Building 150 Canal Street, Room 302 New Haven, CT 06510\n\n第 2 区美国受托人 William K. Harrington（威廉·K·哈林顿）先生之代理律师\n准许和解动议的决定备忘录及命令\n一、引言\n\n本院审理的是 Luc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯）先生以其在这些合并管理的第 11 章案件中作为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）先生（以下简称“个人债务人”）破产财产第 11 章受托人（以下简称“受托人”）的身份，以及在该受托人为原告的本对抗诉讼程序中提出的和解动议（以下简称“和解动议”）。（ECF No. 3559；Adv. ECF No. 14。）1 受托人根据 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019 寻求授权，与被告 Wildes & Weinberg, P.C.（以下简称“W&W”）订立和解协议，以解决该对抗诉讼程序。受托人还请求授权，在准许和解动议的命令作出后 180 天期间内，将和解协议条款密封提交。G Club Operations, LLC（以下简称“G Club”）反对密封该和解协议。基于下述理由，和解动议获准。\n\n1 对主案 In re Kwok，Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) 中案卷的引用，将标示为“ECF No. __。”对对抗诉讼程序 Despins v. Wildes & Weinberg, P.C. (In re Kwok)，Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05187 中案卷的引用，将标示为“Adv. ECF No. __。”\n\n二、背景\n\n个人债务人于 February 15, 2022 向本院提交了自愿第 11 章申请。（ECF No. 1。）基于其中所述理由，本院于 June 15, 2022 作出指定第 11 章受托人管理个人债务人破产财产的决定备忘录及命令。（ECF No. 465。）In re Kwok, 640 B.R. 514 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022)。于 July 8, 2022，Despins 先生被指定为受托人。（ECF No. 523。）在指定受托人后，法院作出命令，授权将个人债务人的第 11 章案件与两个关联公司第 11 章案件合并管理。（ECF Nos. 970, 1141。）\n\n于 February 12, 2024，受托人对 W&W 提交了包含一项请求权的起诉状（以下简称“撤销请求权”），根据 11 U.S.C. §§ 549 and 550 寻求撤销并追收未经授权的申请后转让。（Adv. ECF No. 1。）于 May 2, 2024，本院作出《指示各方进行调解、指定尊敬的 James J. Tancredi（詹姆斯·J·坦克雷迪）法官为调解人以及经修订的批准适用于撤销请求权对抗诉讼程序之程序的命令》（经修订后，以下简称“撤销诉讼程序命令”）。（ECF No. 3163；见 ECF No. 3465。）根据撤销诉讼程序命令，受托人与 W&W 进行了调解，以解决撤销请求权。于 August 13, 2024，Tancredi 法官提交了《调解人报告及建议》（以下简称“调解人报告”）。（Adv. ECF No. 13。）Tancredi 法官在调解人报告中得出结论：\n\n在审查有关涉案转让的请求权、可能的抗辩以及其他事实和情形，并考虑到本破产案件高度复杂且存在争议的性质后，我认为，依照 In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452, 462 (2d Cir. 2007) 的标准衡量，该和解协议的经济安排及条款是公平、合理并符合第 11 章财产最佳利益的。\n\n（同上。）\n\n于 September 19, 2024，受托人提交了和解动议（ECF No. 3559；Adv. ECF No. 14）以及一项限制就和解动议进行通知和送达的动议（以下简称“限制通知动议”，ECF No. 3565）。受托人将破产财产与 W&W 之间的和解协议密封提交。（ECF No. 3561（密封）。）于 October 3, 2024，G Club 对和解动议及限制通知动议提出异议。（ECF No. 3633。）于 October 7, 2024，美国受托人办公室（以下简称“美国受托人”）对和解动议提出异议。（ECF No. 3641。）于 October 8, 2024，就限制通知动议举行了听证。在听证期间，G Club 与美国受托人明确表示，其并不反对限制通知和送达，但反对密封和解协议。于 October 15, 2024，本院准许限制通知动议（ECF No. 3685），并发布听证通知，安排就和解动议举行听证（ECF No. 3688）。\n\n在各方尝试达成解决方案期间，原定听证延期。于 December 5, 2024，受托人提交了支持和解动议的答复以及一份经修订的拟准许命令。（ECF Nos. 3864, 3865。）经修订的拟命令解决了美国受托人的异议，该异议将：（i）允许受托人在准许和解动议的命令作出后 180 天期间内将和解协议密封提交；及（ii）要求受托人在 180 天期限届满后公开提交和解协议。\n\n于 December 10, 2024，就和解动议举行了听证。在听证期间，美国受托人表示其仍反对永久密封和解协议，但认为在 180 天期间内密封和解协议将平衡这些合并管理的第 11 章案件的现实情况与公众查阅司法文件的权利。（Hr'g Tr. at *22:4–14, ECF No. 3906；Adv. ECF No. 29。）美国受托人还表示，其与受托人达成的解决方案将纳入今后在第 11 章案件及相关对抗诉讼程序中提出的和解动议。（同上，第 *22:15–25 页。）尽管美国受托人的异议已经解决，G Club 仍坚持其异议。\n\n听证结束时，本院将和解动议留待审议。本事项现已具备作出裁决的条件。\n\n三、管辖权\n\n美国康涅狄格州联邦地区法院根据 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) 对本事项享有管辖权。本院根据 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) 以及美国康涅狄格州联邦地区法院于 September 21, 1984 作出的移送命令，有权审理并裁决本事项。本程序属于法定核心程序。28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(A), (E), (O)。本院认定，行使管辖权不受宪法方面关切的排除。参见 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 487–99 (2011)。\n\n根据 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409，本地区的审判地适当。\n\n四、论述\n\n在审查和解动议的实体理由之前，本院先审理受托人要求密封和解协议条款的请求及 G Club 对该请求提出的异议。任何一方均未对和解动议的实体理由提出异议。\n\nA. 受托人要求密封和解协议\n1. 法律标准\n\n“在本国，法院承认公众查阅法院记录具有强烈推定。这种对公众查阅的偏好根植于公众根据第一修正案享有知悉司法管理情况的权利。其有助于维护‘我们司法制度的完整性、质量和尊严’，并允许公众‘密切关注公共机构的运作’。”Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Orion Pictures Corp. (In re Orion Pictures Corp.), 21 F.3d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1994)（援引 Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597–98 (1978) 及 In re Analytical Sys., 83 B.R. 833, 835 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1987)）（省略内部引文）；见 11 U.S.C. § 107(a)；Fed. R. Bankr. P. 5001(b)。然而，“该权利并非绝对”。Orion Pictures, 21 F.3d at 27（援引 Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597）；见 11 U.S.C. §§ 107(b), (c)；Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9018。\n\n《破产法》载有规定法院如何分析是否可以密封法院记录的法定条款。11 U.S.C. § 107；Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9018。与和解动议相关的是，第 107(b)(1) 条规定：“应利害关系方请求，破产法院应……就商业秘密或机密研究、开发或商业信息保护一实体”。11 U.S.C. § 107(b)(1)。\n\n受托人代表破产财产请求密封和解协议。破产财产属于“实体”，可以请求保护其机密商业信息。11 U.S.C. § 101(15)（“‘实体’一词包括个人、破产财产、信托、政府单位和美国受托人。”）。受托人主张，和解协议属于机密商业信息。由于利害关系方受托人请求密封和解协议，如该协议包含机密商业信息，本院必须将其密封。11 U.S.C. § 107(b)(1)（法院应依动议保护任何实体的机密商业信息）；Orion Pictures, 21 F.3d at 27。机密商业信息是指“会因向竞争者提供债务人商业经营信息而使其获得‘不公平优势’的信息。”Orion Pictures, 21 F.3d at 27。\n\n因此，本院面临的问题是，和解协议是否属于商业信息；若属于，该信息是否为机密商业信息。\n\n2. 资格\n\n受托人首先主张，G Club 无资格对和解动议提出异议，因为其在个人债务人的破产财产中不具有金钱利益，未在个人债务人案件中提交债权证明，并且按照目前情况不会获得分配。G Club 主张，其是否有资格反对和解动议的实体理由并不重要——任何一方均可反对密封和解协议。\n\n本院同意 G Club 的观点。无论 G Club 是否有资格对和解动议的实体理由提出异议——本院不审理该问题——G Club 均有资格反对密封和解协议条款。正如美国联邦最高法院所承认，存在“查阅和复制公共记录和文件，包括司法记录和文件的一般权利。”Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597–99（讨论诉讼第三方申请查阅和复制公共记录和文件的案件）。G Club 享有该一般权利。见 In re Alterra Healthcare Corp., 353 B.R. 66, 70 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006)。\n\n3. 支持及反对密封和解协议的论点\n\n受托人主张，存在授权密封和解协议的依据，因为其条款属于机密商业信息，将使包括 G Club 在内的被告受益，并损害\n\n破产财产。受托人主张，破产财产将几乎完全通过诉讼获得资金——而其中大部分诉讼与本对立程序几乎相同。受托人认为，在和解协议将被公开提交前的180日期间，许多其他撤销程序将达成和解；如果本和解协议被暂时密封，这些未来和解将对破产财产更为有利。\n\n此外，受托人主张，没有任何利害关系方——尤其是没有任何债权人——对和解动议的实体内容提出异议，或反对密封该和解协议。此外，受托人主张，无担保债权人官方委员会（Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors，以下简称“委员会”）和美国受托人（U.S. Trustee）均已审阅未删节版的和解动议及和解协议，且委员会和美国受托人均未对和解动议提出异议。最后，受托人主张，法院亦已获提供一份未删节版的和解协议，拥有足够信息以确定和解动议的实体理由。\n\nG Club（G俱乐部）提出异议，并主张根据现行法律，该和解协议不得被密封，因为其不构成保密商业信息。G Club援引了许多破产案件，在这些案件中，法院拒绝密封——或决定解除密封——和解协议：In re Ditech Holding Corp., Case No. 19-10412 (JLG), 2019 WL 3294684, at \\*9–10 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2019); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Selected Debtors (In re Selected Cases), Misc. No. 17-204-GLT, 2019 WL 642850, at \\*2 (Bankr. W.D. Penn. Feb. 14, 2019); In re Thomas, 583 B.R. 385, 391–95 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2018); In re Gibbs, Case No. 11-03070, 2017 WL 6506324, at \\*1–2 (Bankr. D. Haw. Dec. 19, 2017); Togut v. Deutsche Bank AG (In re Anthracite Cap. Inc.), 492 B.R. 162, 177–79 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013); In re Oldco M Corp., 466 B.R. 234, 237–39 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012); In re Quigley Co., Inc., 437 B.R. 102, 151–54 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010); Geltzer v. Andersen Worldwide, S.C., No. 05 Civ. 3339 (GEL), 2007 WL 273526, at \\*3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2007); Alterra Healthcare, 353 B.R. at 75–77; and In re Hemple, 295 B.R. 200, 201–03 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2003)。\n\n在答复中，受托人试图区分这些案件与本案，并援引若干裁定，尽管未说明理由，在这些裁定中法院批准密封和解协议。（见 Reply at Ex. 1, ECF No. 3864。）最后，受托人援引 In re Farmland Industries, Inc., 290 B.R. 364 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2003) 和 In re Global Crossing Ltd., 295 B.R. 720, 722–23 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003)，以支持密封该和解协议。\n\n4. 分析\n\n第1106条要求受托人调查个人债务人的财务事务和状况，以便在切实可行的最早时间确定，提交第11章计划、将案件转换至另一章，或驳回案件，何者最符合债权人和破产财产的利益。11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(3), (5)。为此，毫无争议的是，受托人为破产财产的代表，并有能力代表破产财产提起诉讼和应诉，包括提出撤销权请求及类似诉讼。11 U.S.C. §§ 323, 544, 547, 548, 549。在履行其法定义务时，受托人：(i) 对破产财产收到的所有财产负责；(ii) 如有必要，应审查债权申报，并反对认可任何对破产财产提出的不当债权；以及 (iii) 应按利害关系方的要求，提供有关破产财产及其管理的信息。11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(2), (5), (7), made applicable by 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)。\n\n本案并非受托人能够凭借个人债务人提供的信息及其合作，管理个人债务人的资产和经营业务的案件。个人债务人在其破产清单中仅申报 \\$3,850.00 的资产，但主张其生活方式由其家人和关联人士资助，而其向许多媒体企业提供服务却未获报酬。（ECF Nos. 78, 107。）自受托人获任命以来，个人债务人、其家庭成员、其关联人士及关联实体均未配合受托人的调查，未按《破产法》要求交付破产财产资产，亦未履行其作为本院当事人的义务。11 U.S.C. § 521。（见，例如，ECF Nos. 913, 1046, 1303, 1345, 1362, 1397, 1453, 1521, 1537, 1546, 1709, 1805, 1892, 1896, 2009, 2035, 2036, 2080, 2093, 2342, 2396; Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Kwok (In re Kwok), No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 22-05032 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 13, 2023), ECF No. 133; Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Nov. 4, 2024), ECF Nos. 239, 263, 290, 318。）事实上，法院已多次因个人债务人及其他人未遵守要求其履行《破产法》及证据开示义务的命令，而认定其藐视法庭。（ECF Nos. 1372, 1537, 1709, 1892, 1896, 2009, 2035, 2093。）这些藐视法庭行为均未得到消除。\n\n在本案情形下，受托人被迫持续不断地进行诉讼，并且可以说是就破产财产资产的交付和转让撤销反复进行诉讼。就目前而言，对个人债务人破产财产所提交债权申报中主张的 \\$18,896,778,040.832 的任何分配，将主要由受托人正在进行的诉讼提供资金。因此，个人债务人破产财产的商业运营是对下列事项的调查：\n\n2 个人债务人指示其追随者在其第11章案件中提交无理的债权申报。（见 ECF Nos. 1399, 1440。）尽管如此，目前所主张的任何债权均未被部分或全部不予认可。\n\n个人债务人的资产和经营事务，以及为破产财产利益而就第5章请求权和根据州法、联邦法及外国法提出的相关请求权进行诉讼。\n\n在履行其于本案中的职责时，包括依照和解协议条款追诉并和解撤销权请求，受托人持有商业信息。剩余问题在于，该和解协议是否属于保密商业信息。公开提交和解协议条款，将使数百名处境相似的被告能够在与受托人谈判时利用这些条款作为筹码。G Club并不争议受托人的主张，即这正是其希望解除和解协议密封的原因。见 Glob. Crossing, 295 B.R. at 722–23（讨论一名动议人反对一项密封动议，而法院批准该动议的原因，是其希望破坏占有中的债务人与其资产潜在买方之间的一项交易）。由于存在大量类似的撤销权请求，法院确信，此时公开披露和解协议将对所有无担保债权人的受偿产生重大影响。\n\n法院认定，受托人与美国受托人商定的180日密封期间，在避免受托人所主张的损害与向公众提供司法记录查阅权之间实现了合理平衡。一方面，法院采信受托人的陈述，即其认为在准予和解动议的命令作出后180日内，他将在不遭受和解动议所寻求避免的损害的情况下，就大量额外撤销权请求达成和解。届时，破产财产对和解协议保密性的利益将减弱。另一方面，密封的期限限制性将适时提供公众查阅权。\n\nG Club援引的案件并不要求得出不同结论，因为这些案件涉及不同实体、不同商业运营及不同诉讼态势。例如，在 Andersen Worldwide 一案中，第7章受托人与 Andersen Worldwide, S.C. 及其关联方（统称“安德森”）就针对安德森的专业过失请求达成和解，并向纽约南区联邦地区法院（United States District Court for the Southern District of New York）提出动议，要求批准该和解。2007 WL 273526, at \\*1。法院驳回了该和解动议，因为其未包括和解金额。Id. at \\*5。第7章受托人提出可供非公开审查该和解金额，因为安德森不希望向其他与其无关的诉讼中的当事人披露该和解金额。Id. at \\*2。法院认定该和解金额并非保密商业信息，id. at \\*3–4，且保护安德森“是干预公众查阅司法文书权利的一个软弱理由。对维护安德森相对于其他起诉其的当事人的‘筹码’，并不存在可辨识的公共利益或破产财产利益”，id. at \\*4。\n\nAndersen Worldwide 法院表示怀疑诉讼能否构成一个实体的商业运营，并指出：\n\n但是，本和解的条款仅与本诉讼有关，与债务人或安德森的竞争性商业运营毫无关系，无论按这些词语的任何通常含义皆是如此。若接受受托人的定义，则安德森在诉讼过程中提交的任何文件不仅都可能构成秘密“商业信息”，而且该例外下的保密性还将延伸至无数案件，其中商业实体正积极抗辩民事损害赔偿诉讼。\n\n2007 WL 273526, at \\*3。尽管如此，该法院亦考虑了围绕相关诉讼的具体事实和情形。Id. at \\*4（讨论不存在任何关于其他诉讼当事人如何能够使用和解信息的论点，以及安德森在其他类似诉讼中不存在类似担忧）。经考虑围绕撤销权请求的具体事实和情形，法院并不确信 Andersen Worldwide 支配本案结果。受托人寻求保护破产财产；由于这些共同管理的第11章案件及相关对立程序的特殊情形，该破产财产的业务包括诉讼，而撤销权请求与受托人已提出的数百项请求相似。\n\nAndersen Worldwide 是一系列案件的先例。这一系列案件包括 Quigley、Oldco、Anthracite Capital、Gibbs、Thomas、Selected Cases 和 Ditech，即 G Club 所援引的除 Alterra Healthcare 和 Hemple 外的所有案件。如同 Andersen Worldwide，在 Quigley、Oldco、Anthracite Capital、Gibbs、Thomas、Selected Cases 和 Ditech 中作出的裁决，均涉及一名破产受托人寻求密封和解协议条款，因为交易相对方要求密封，以保留其在外部诉讼中的筹码。Ditech, 2019 WL 3294684, at \\*9–10; Selected Cases, 2019 WL 642850, at \\*2; Thomas, 583 B.R. at 391–95; Gibbs, 2017 WL 6506324, at \\*1–2; Anthracite Cap., 492 B.R. at 177–79; Oldco, 466 B.R. at 237–39; Quigley, 437 B.R. at 151–54。这些案件中的法院均依赖 Anderson Worldwide，并基于与本院审理案件不同的事实，认定相关和解协议条款并非保密商业信息。\n\nHemple 与 Andersen Worldwide 及其后续案件颇为相似，亦涉及为第三方而非债务人或破产财产之利益提出的密封动议。295 B.R. at 202。该法院驳回该动议，因为其未阐明依据第107(b)条进行密封的理由。Id. at 202–03。然而，在此，受托人主张该和解协议属于保密商业信息，应为破产财产的利益予以密封。\n\nAlterra Healthcare（阿尔特拉医疗保健公司）案所涉事实亦与 Andersen Worldwide（安达信全球）案相似。在该案中，已重整债务人就若干人身伤害索赔达成和解，并获准将和解协议条款密封提交。353 B.R. at 69。随后，一家报纸提出动议，请求解封和解协议。Id. 美国特拉华联邦破产法院（United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware）认为，在相关部分，和解协议条款并非保密商业信息，因为其与已重整债务人的商业经营——运营长期护理设施——无关，且披露该等条款不会使已重整债务人的竞争对手获得不公平优势，从而损害已重整债务人或破产财产。Id. at 76–77。关于对破产财产的损害，法院认定，处境相似的索赔人将从隔离基金和保险赔偿金中获得赔偿，而非从已重整债务人的其他无担保债权人将获得任何分配的同一资金中获得赔偿。Id. at 76。因此，任何增加的和解谈判筹码都不会影响整个破产财产，而是可能损害保险人。Id. 本案与 Alterra Healthcare 不同，诉讼是破产财产商业存在的核心，其对破产财产所有无担保债权人的影响是确定的，而非推测性的。\n\n本院认为，受托人援引的 Farmland Industries（法姆兰德工业公司）案在本院面前的事实和情形下更具说服力。在 Farmland Industries 案中，美国密苏里西区联邦破产法院（United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Missouri）裁定，占有债务人融资协议的条款属于保密商业信息。290 B.R. at 368–69。涉案融资协议要求占有债务人作为向融资方就持续融资作出的让步，在特定日期前完成对特定资产的第363条出售。Id. at 366。占有债务人主张，该等条款构成保密商业信息，必须予以删节。Id. 法院认定，融资协议中被删节的条款属于商业信息，因为“企业的经营——尤其是像债务人价值 $11 billion 的业务如此广泛的企业——显然涉及定期（尽管或许并不频繁）买卖企业的各个组成部分。出售某些资产并保留其他资产，显然是企业集团业务经营的一部分。”Id. at 368。法院认定，该信息属于保密商业信息，因为\n\n“[i]f a potential buyer has knowledge of a deadline, in effect, by which the Debtors must sell a certain asset, that knowledge gives the potential buyer great leverage over the Debtors and places the Debtors at a distinct disadvantage in the sales bargaining and negotiating process.” Id. at 369.\n\n如同 Farmland Industries 案，和解协议条款直接涉及破产财产的商业经营。此外，正如第363条出售的结果将极大影响 Farmland 案中的破产财产，本案撤销权诉讼的解决也将极大影响破产财产。最后，披露和解协议条款将给予被告额外的谈判筹码，从而损害破产财产，正如 Farmland Industries 案中法院认定披露融资协议条款将给予潜在买方额外的谈判筹码，从而损害破产财产。\n\n基于这些联合管理的第11章案件及相关对抗程序的具体事实和情形，本院认定 Andersen Worldwide 案、其后续判例、Hemple 案及 Alterra Healthcare 案中的事实均可与本案区分。Farmland Industries 案更具说服力，因为该案事实与目前呈于本院面前的事实更为相符。和解协议条款属于应依受托人请求予以密封的保密商业信息。11 U.S.C. § 107(b); Orion Pictures, 21 F.3d at 27。因此，驳回 G Club（G俱乐部）的异议。\n\nB. 和解动议\n\n受托人主张，和解协议对破产财产及其债权人产生积极结果，对破产财产及其债权人公平合理，且应予批准。调解员报告建议批准和解协议。没有任何一方当事人就和解动议的实体内容提出异议。尽管和解协议条款已密封提交，\n\n美国受托人（U.S. Trustee）和委员会（Committee）均已获得和解协议未删节副本。G Club 对和解协议的密封提出异议，但并未为对和解动议的实体内容提出异议而寻求查阅和解条款。\n\n基于最高法院在 Protective Committee for Independent Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414 (1968) 一案中作出的《破产法典》颁布前判决，美国第二巡回上诉法院（United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit）提出以下“相互关联的因素”，以确定和解是否“公平且衡平”：\n\n(1) 诉讼成功的可能性与和解未来利益之间的平衡；(2) 复杂而旷日持久的诉讼的可能性，“及其伴随的费用、不便和延误”，包括执行判决时的困难；(3) “债权人的至高利益”，包括每个受影响类别的相对利益“以及债权人不反对或积极支持拟议和解的程度”；(4) 其他利害关系人是否支持和解；(5) 支持和解的“律师的能力和经验”，以及审查和解的“破产法院法官的经验和知识”；(6) “高管和董事将获得的免责范围和广度”；以及 (7) “和解在多大程度上是独立交易谈判的产物。”\n\nMotorola, Inc. v. Off. Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium Operating LLC), 478 F.3d 452, 462 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing In re Worldcom, Inc., 347 B.R. 123, 137 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006)).\n\n第二巡回法院还指出，“破产法官的任务并非确定该和解是否为本可能达成的最佳和解——这是他和我们都永远无法知晓的——而是确定其是否‘低于合理性范围内的最低点’”。\n\nCosoff v. Rodman (In re W.T. Grant Co.), 699 F.2d 599, 613 (2d Cir. 1983) (alterations in original).\n\n本院已审查和解协议条款。本院认定：(i) 和解金额反映了所请求的金额、诉讼成功的可能性以及诉讼可能产生的成本和费用；(ii) 虽然债权人通常尚未审查和解协议条款，但他们也未对请求进行此类审查的和解动议提出异议；(iii) 此外，作为无担保债权人受托人的委员会已审查和解协议的未删节条款，且未提出异议；(iv) 免责范围狭窄，且仅与对抗程序中提出的索赔有关；以及 (v) 和解协议是独立交易谈判的产物。本院认定，和解协议并未低于合理性范围内的最低点，且对破产财产及其债权人公平且衡平。See Iridium, 478 F.3d at 462; W.T. Grant, 699 F.2d at 613。因此，本院准许和解动议并批准和解协议。\n\nV. 结论与命令\n\n基于上述理由，特此命令：\n\n1. 根据 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019，依本命令所述，准许和解动议。\n\n2. 驳回 G Club 对和解动议提出的异议。鉴于受托人与美国受托人之间达成的解决方案，美国受托人的异议视为已撤回。\n\n3. 根据 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019，批准和解协议。\n\n4. 如《撤销权诉讼程序命令》（Avoidance Action Procedures Order）所设想，和解动议及和解协议的删节部分已密封提交，除本命令另有规定外，应根据 11 U.S.C. § 107(b)(1) 和 Fed. R. Bankr. R. 9018 继续保持密封。\n\n5. 受托人应于本命令录入后180日内提交一份通知；但如该日期适逢周末或节假日，受托人应于其后的下一个营业日提交（“六个月周年日期”）。该通知（“和解通知”）应提交于联合管理的第11章案件及本对抗程序的案卷中，并应：(i) 载明原始和解动议及本命令的案卷编号和日期；(ii) 附上和解协议的未删节副本；以及 (iii) 包含有关和解协议的下列信息：(a) 和解当事方；(b) 和解金额；(c) 受托人收到和解资金的日期；以及 (d) 显示受托人收到该资金的月度经营报告的案卷编号；如该等月度经营报告在六个月周年日期之前提交，则可删节付款人的身份。和解通知提交后，书记官应解封联合管理的第11章案件及对抗程序中未删节的和解动议和和解协议。\n\n6. 根据 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(3)，美国受托人对本案案卷中提交或向本院呈交的任何信息和/或文件享有完全查阅的法定权利。美国受托人应遵守 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(3)(B) 规定的义务。\n\n7. 根据 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019，受托人获授权于本命令录入后立即签署、交付、实施并完全履行任何及一切义务、文书、文件和书面材料，并采取为完成和解协议所载和解及履行其中所设想的任何及一切义务而合理必要或适当的任何及一切行动。\n\n8. 根据 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 6004(h)，本命令自录入之时起立即生效并可执行。\n\n9. 本院保留管辖权，以审理和裁定因本命令及和解协议产生或与之相关的一切事项。\n\n本命令于2025年2月3日作于康涅狄格州布里奇波特。","key_entities":["Je","Kwok","Despins","Ho Wan Kwok","Paul Hastings","HCHK"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":1,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":13,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":14,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":29,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":133,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":465,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":523,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3163,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3465,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3559,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3561,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3565,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3633,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3641,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3685,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3688,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3864,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3906,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":5473,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 18:55:58"}